CND: the challenge of the post-war era

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CND - The challenge of the post cold-war era.

by

Mark L. Harrison

A Doctoral thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of

Doctor of Philosophy

of the Loughborough University of Technology

February 1994

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Abstract

The intention of this work has been threefold. Firstly it examines in some detail the history of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) from its inception during the late 1950's to the beginning of the 1990's, as the Peace Movement begins to respond to the changes wrought by the ending of the cold war at the end of the 1980's. It examines in detail the relationship between the movement and their supporters and opponents. In particular, detailed attention is paid to the relationships that have existed between CND and the British Labour Party, as well as the wider Political Opportunity Structure - other major political parties, associated pressure groups, the Trade Union movement and the established churches.

Secondly, it examines the utility of the various Social Movement theories that are in existence, and applies these directly to CND in both an historical and contemporary context. Extensive examination of these theories will reveal that in the case of the majority (Resource Mobilisation, Relative Deprivation, New Social Movement theory), these are of limited utility in the case of CND in particular and British Social Movements in general.

Finally, with the use of original survey data and statistical analysis, the thesis will evaluate these perspectives, and will conclude with a discussion of new approaches to the study of the wider Social Movement phenomenon. In particular, the final chapter will discuss the concept of 'Habitual Membership' as a possible explanation for continuing CND membership and activity in the post cold-war period of the early 1990's.
Acknowledgements.

In the first instance thanks must be given to Loughborough University for the financial wherewithal, without which this project would not have been possible. Thanks are also due to Tony Burkett for his initial encouragement. My supervisor, Paul Byrne should be thanked for almost always having an open door and providing much needed help, encouragement and liquid refreshment. I am also grateful for the help, advice and friendship of Dave Allen, Joni Lovenduski and other members of staff in the European Studies Department at Loughborough. A big debt of gratitude is also due to the forbearance of the staff of the Computer Centre at Loughborough for their resilience in the face of the continual pestering by a computer illiterate. Thanks are also due to my friends Gary and Dean for helping me to unravel the mysteries of SPSS.

The staff and officers of CND, at both national and local level, have my gratitude for all the help they gave me - in particular, Marjorie Thompson, Bob Cole, Sheila Oakes and Bruce Kent, as do the staff of the Modern Record Centre at Warwick University Library.

To the Postgrads in A102 - many thanks for three years of good company.

Finally, I have to thank my wife, Janette; without her continuing belief in me, this project would not have seen the light of day. I will be eternally grateful

Mark Harrison
Loughborough University.
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED THROUGHOUT.

AA       Anti Apartheid Movement
CARD     Campaign Against Racism and Discrimination
CCND     Christian CND
CDS      Campaign for Democratic Socialism
CLP      Constituency Labour Party
CSWG     Committee to Stop War in the Gulf
DAC      Direct Action Committee
FoE      Friends of the Earth
ICBM     Inter Continental Ballistic Missile
INDEC    Independent Nuclear Disarmament Election Committee
INF      Intermediate Nuclear Forces
IRNF     Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
MAD      Mutually Assured Destruction
MCANW    Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons
MIRV     Multiple Independently targeted Re-entry Vehicle
MRCA     Multi Role Combat Aircraft
NCANWT   National Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Testing
NEC      National Executive Committee
NNPT     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NVDA     Non-Violent Direct Action
NVR      Non-Violent Resistance
PLP      Parliamentary Labour Party
POS      Political Opportunity Structure
PPOS     Parliamentary POS
PTBT     Partial Test Ban Treaty
RD       Relative Deprivation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Resource Mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANA</td>
<td>Scientists Against Nuclear Annihilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>Social Movement (s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMI</td>
<td>Social Movement Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social Movement Organisation</td>
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<td>SMS</td>
<td>Social Movement Sector</td>
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<td>TACT</td>
<td>Tories Against Cruise and Trident</td>
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION

The last two or three decades has seen tremendous change in the way that British politics has been conducted. During the sixties many commentators, usually those of a reformist nature embraced the idea of the 'end of ideology'. While this enthusiasm may have been somewhat precipitous in the light of recent developments - particularly with the birth of 'Thatcherism' - it cannot be disputed that the sixties saw the development of a new style of ideological politics. It seemed that for a considerable number of the electorate it was no longer acceptable to restrict their political activity to voting in a general election every four or five years. The 1960's were witness to the growth of a vast number of single issue movements. These embraced almost every aspect of political activity. In the environmental field alone between 1957 and the beginning of the seventies, the number of groups registered with the Civic Trust leapt from 200 to over a 1000 (1). This type of growth was mirrored throughout society at large and as the interest group sector grew it became necessary to redefine the terms used to describe this phenomenon. It was no longer possible on all occasions to speak of 'groups'. What was developing were 'movements'. Unlike the majority of the rest of the Western democratic world, this is a relatively recent occurrence - or to perhaps qualify this somewhat - the recognition of SM's as a phenomenon in British politics is recent. Only during the latter half of the post war years has it increasingly become apparent to British social scientists that the continuing use of such labels as 'interest' or 'pressure' group was becoming inadequate to describe a quantitatively different form of behaviour involved in the membership of such groups. It has become clear that behaviour and action involving mass mobilisation, or the threat of mobilisation, as their prime source of social sanction and hence of power (2) is a 'new' lineament requiring new perspectives.

This relatively recent flowering of such movements concerned with environmentalism, women's rights, consumerism, peace and other pressing issues of advanced economies has affected the political order of most western democracies. This development has spawned an extensive series of historical and descriptive essays on such movements. These have often made quite dramatic claims regarding the societal or political importance of these movements. To their supporters, these new social and political forces are viewed as being in the vanguard of the promised new society.

What though is it that separates these 'new social and political forces' from the traditional forum of interest or pressure group activity? Firstly, and perhaps crucially, the members
must have... *group consciousness*... *some sense of belonging and of solidarity* (3). Following on from this, there must exist agreement on the problem itself and a willingness to educate society to the alternatives as the movement see them. This in turn will lead to the construction of an ideology - even if it is sometimes expressed at the most simplistic level. As Byrne goes on to say though, much the same could be said of political parties and he therefore identifies four other factors that can be used to aid the definition of what constitutes a Social Movement (SM).

i) A SM will use 'non institutionalised' means in the pursuit of their ultimate goal (of course CND in particular do not rule out the use of 'institutionalised' channels, but in common with other movements, this is not at the expense of ruling out other potentially effective means).

ii) SM’s tend to eschew the more formal attributes of organisation (formal membership etc.) in favour of a more amorphous, organic structure. There is therefore a far greater reliance on the 'natural' enthusiasm of it's supporters than is found in a more formal organisation (within CND, as will be shown, there does exist a formal structure that would appear to militate against this factor. However, while CND can be said to have this formality, throughout the peace movement generally - again this will be illustrated later - there does exist a mistrust and suspicion of formal, hierarchical organisation).

iii) Following logically from the two preceding characteristics, SM’s tend to remain isolated from any potential access to the formal policy making process that may be enjoyed by traditional political organisations, be they interest groups or political parties.

iv) Finally, SM’s are further separated from the traditional pressure group arena in that they are concerned in creating a new consciousness within society.

To their critics, SM’s represent, at worst, a fundamental threat to the existing social and political order; at best they view them as peripheral and irrelevant outsiders.

Many theories have been suggested in an attempt to explain the phenomenon. One of the most common centres on the decline in traditional political allegiances, alliances and cultures. Certainly, throughout the sixties, seventies and eighties there has been a marked decline in partisanship reflected in the weakening association between occupational class and voting (class dealignment) and between voting for a party and support for its major issue commitments (partisan dealignment). There is too throughout this period evidence of increased third party voting and increasing voter volatility. The three decades have also seen a marked fall in the membership of all the major parties. The Conservative Party during the fifties could boast a membership of around two million. This has now fallen to something in the region of (a disputed) half a million. The Labour Party too has seen an even more dramatic fall from its heydays of the fifties with around one million individual
members to less than quarter of a million today. To put this into perspective, over this period the growth in interest group membership was burgeoning - Greenpeace alone has over 500,000 individual members (4).

With the birth of Thatcherism during the late seventies and early eighties, there appeared a new concerted attack on the position and influence of 'traditional' interest groups. Thatcher saw the corporatist nature that had developed in Britain with the growth in influence of sectional groups (particularly the Trade Union movement) as being somehow responsible for the ills that afflicted the Nation. The erosion of the 'powers' of such groups was a high priority of the new administration. This of course culminated in the virtual emasculation of Trade Union power enshrined in statute. One by product of this was a marked shift to much more loosely structured, even ad hoc participation and partisanship. Throughout this period, somewhat paradoxically, the new Social Movements (Environment, Women, Peace et al.) found themselves the grateful recipients of a large increase in membership. With 'traditional' channels of expression and influence rapidly closing many needed a new outlet for participation. Thus the Social Movement sector expanded at an unprecedented rate.

Turning to the question as to why CND and not some other SM in Britain - such as the women's movement, religious groups, environmental groups etc. - has been selected as the focus of this work. Firstly, an immediate attraction of the movement is that in terms of impact on the public psyche, there have been few, if any movements that, arguably, have had the popular impact of CND.

Secondly, the majority of those other SM's that have been mentioned do not have the relatively sophisticated organisation that CND enjoy. For the majority of movements theirs is an association based largely on informal networks and often without the centralised tendencies of CND. Certainly the women's movement, environmental groups and even religious groups have forms of organisation that are of a far looser nature than that of CND. Put simply, CND presents the researcher with a subject that is virtually self defining within a single organisation making the researchers task a far easier one than dealing with a plethora of groups that make up a larger conglomeration known generically as a SM. If one were to consider the difficulties, for example in mounting a study of the ecology movement - none of the groups that go to make up the wider movement (Greenpeace, FoE, WWF et al) are recognised as the core sector of that movement in quite the way that CND is within the wider peace movement. Even in the case of those movements that could be seen to largely fill this criteria, problems of 'finding' the core organisation remain (religious SM's being the most notable instance of this - divided over far more than they are united on - despite the existence of very definite centres of organisation within the established
churches, sects etc.) Only terrorist organisations can be said to have an organisational structure that approaches, even surpasses that of the Peace Movement/CND. However the difficulties involved in all but the most superficial study of such movements are far too obvious to need spelling out in detail. The second criteria of a readily identifiable membership, mass or otherwise, is equally difficult to identify.

CND, again unlike the majority of other movements has a mass membership that is readily identifiable and representative of the wider peace movement. No other movement, other than has already been mentioned, has such membership. One only has to consider the plethora of labels attached to the various sub divisions of the women's movement - feminist, radical feminist, lesbian feminist, pro choice feminist, pro life feminist etc. - for this to be self evident. Much the same is true of the ecology movement but this is further complicated by the fact that although the ecology movement as a whole is indeed a mass movement if one considers the membership levels of those groups which make up this SM, taking any one groups membership as representative of the whole is fraught with difficulties. For example, it is quite possible to be a member of WWF and yet still engage in field sports while the same would be almost unthinkable to a member of Greenpeace or FoE. Which of these organisations would then be used as the basis for research into the ecology movement? The obvious answer is of course all of them. This however raises a set of profound difficulties particularly if you are attempting to examine the membership of that movement. Many participants in the ecology movement, (unlike to a very great degree participants in the Peace Movement) have membership of more than the single group operating within that area. In the survey conducted for this research for example it was found that CND members who were also members of ecology groups were members of more than one such group (over 60 per cent who were members of ecology groups were members of more than one. Indeed, 20 per cent belonged to two or more.) The problems for the researcher here are again self evident. Simply put, unlike other SM's, to be a member of CND is to be a member of the peace movement.

The hypothesis that is at the heart of these deliberations is twofold. Firstly that, for the reasons that will follow, existing approaches are largely unsatisfying in explaining the British experience of Social Movements. To a large extent the British researcher has had to rely on the theoretical perspectives constructed and employed by his/her American and Continental European colleagues (with the notable exceptions of Parkin (5) and Marsh (6)) in their assessment of the SM phenomena due in part to the 'head start' they have enjoyed in the field.

The hypothesis that is at the heart of these deliberations is the contention that many of these positions will be of limited utility for two reasons; i) limited due an inherent imprecision -
most notable amongst these being the work of Gamson and ii) an imprecision that is almost
inbuilt due to the very specific nature of the British political system, and hence, culture.
What the hypothesis will contend is that such frameworks fail to a great extent to take
account of the fact that,

National traditions of social protest have firmly conditioned the 'nationalisation' of the new
movements of the past two decades, not because of any 'iron law' of co-optation but
because of the movement's need for consensus, allies and legitimation leads them to u se
the existing reservoirs of sentiment and expectation as raw materials (7).

As Eyerman and Jamison (8) rightly point out, the experience of SM's in different cultures
has been markedly different therefore colouring the perspective, unavoidably, of the
outside observer. They make the point that in the US case there are a number of vital and
marked differentials between them and their British and European counterparts;

1. SM's in the US have been both extra parliamentary and largely non-ideological. What
ideology has existed can usually be traced to theistic and populist core.

2. There exist within the American Social Movement Industry (SMI) a highly defined
streak of pragmatic and regionally based activity not found, by and large, in its European
counterparts.

3. SM's in the US tend to be found in readily defined single issue areas. Very rarely will
common cause be made between two groups campaigning in ostensibly crosscutting policy
areas. For example, the American Peace Movement will rarely, if ever become involved,
as CND have in the past with broader issues of arms sales, nuclear power/reprocessing.
This is left to those movements to whom that is issue specific. Another example can be
provided with reference to the lack of involvement by black women in the women's
movement or with women's involvement in the civil rights movement.

4. American SM's tend to be 'two movements in one'; that is, there is a definite and
recognisable difference between the movement at a grass roots level which has developed
its own strategies of opposition based around the aforementioned single issues and the
'other movement' which is made up of the professional lobbyists in Washington who are
...cut off from the grass roots but representing the interests of the public inside the halls of
government...(9)

Within Continental Europe there also emerges a somewhat different picture in relation to the
development of SM activity. Once again, Eyerman and Jamison have highlighted particularly
well the undercurrents of political culture that have contributed to this perspective. As they point out much of the development in Continental Europe has to a large extent been shaped by the forces, desires, fears and aspirations that were a legacy of WW2. In France, for example, nationalism and militarism remain extremely strong after occupation. So much so that a credible peace movement in particular has found it difficult to engage the national psyche at all but the most superficial of levels. The strength of the Left has dissipated what little oppositional factors existed and those that do exist are also pulled and factionalised to a far greater extent than the British case due to the divisions that exist between mainstream socialism and communism.

In other European states such as Germany and Holland, the societal divisions that exist to create the necessary milieu in which SM's are born have not been based on the readily identifiable political culture divisions that exist in, say France;

*Here, more than elsewhere, the challenge was generational, as guilty parents saw their children go to the streets in search of a new post-material future*(10).

As they go on to point out, much of the activity in Germany, and I would argue, Holland also has a marked anti-American feel which, at least to some extent is not found in the expressive actions of British SM's (paradoxically, in the case of CND there is an argument to be made for a degree of anti-Americanism - in the 1985 survey of members, 63 per cent of activists blamed America for the acceleration of the arms race).

In Italy meanwhile, political culture is sharply conditioned by a number of factors. Some of these are peculiar to the Italian experience while others can be found in a number of Mediterranean states. Throughout the Mediterranean there has long been a history of what Eyerman and Jamison have termed 'charismatic and expressive politics'. As well as this factor, of especial importance is the position of the established church - Catholic in Italy and Spain, Orthodox in Greece - as willing and highly visible players on the political stage. Therefore, to a far greater degree than in the rest of Europe this has introduced a symbolism to SM protest missing in other cultures. As in Germany, the political and historical legacy of fascism and political terrorism (Red Brigade, Baader-Meinehoff) have also contributed to the prevailing political culture in a manner that, despite the highly visible activities of the IRA or UDF, cannot be found in the British political culture.

The second but interconnected strand of the hypothesis will argue that even where these existing approaches prove relevant or useful, they do not provide a satisfactory account of motivation. While they all seek to explain why people join or are active within a given SM, they fail generally to attempt to explain why those same people remain as members,
particularly when the movement itself is moribund or redundant. In short, the second strand of the hypothesis will argue that insufficient attention has been paid to what could be termed the *temporal cohort effect* of SM membership, and the apparently increasing short term nature of that membership.

In the broadest possible terms, the focus of most of this work has been the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). In looking at this particular section of the wider peace movement, I have employed a variety of approaches including a postal survey of local CND groups, analysis of the organisational, tactical and ideological basis of the movement both past and present. The response of other political actors to the movement - in particular the Labour party - has also been a major consideration. Of increasing importance in this study has been the necessity to fit all of the above into a methodological framework. This forms a large part of what is to follow; i.e., a consideration of the utility of the various approaches to the study of Social Movements (SM’s) and their direct applicability to CND and the wider British Peace Movement.

In consideration of this, it quite quickly became clear that to focus exclusively on the contemporary CND would be to ignore vital factors that could only be considered by reference to the movement's long history. In approaching a movement such as CND there is always the danger of accepting many of the preconceptions (of both supporters and opponents alike) that are part of the baggage of such an organisation. Therefore, the examination of the contemporary movement must be set in that historical context. In compiling this work, several methodological approaches have therefore been used.

In Chapter 2, I have undertaken to provide a detailed historical analysis of the early growth of the movement during the late 1950's and early 1960's. This section is intended to 'tell the story' of these formative years of the movement. This has been accomplished primarily through the use of secondary material (in particular, Christopher Driver's account of the movements earliest years (11) and Taylor's (12) and Taylor and Pritchard's (13) work proved of particular value. Much of the material on the Labour Party and CND was drawn from the two excellent biographies of 'Nye' Bevan by Michael Foot (14) and Jennie Lee (15) and the equally valuable McDermott (16) biography of Hugh Gaitskell) I will also draw heavily on primary material provided through searches of archive material made available to me by CND themselves through their own office and the archive department of Warwick University library.

The second part of this chapter fulfils the same function with regard to the second period of CND's growth. Also included in this chapter is a consideration of the relationship
between CND and the wider Political Opportunity Structure (POS). Much of this analysis is given over to a consideration of the particular relationship that exists between CND and the British Labour party. As with the sections that deal primarily with CND, I have used a combination of primary and secondary material to compile this analysis.

The story of CND continues in Chapter 3, which details the first relative period of decline experienced in CND's history (approximately 1964 - 79). Again, a consideration and examination of their relationships with members of the POS forms the major part of this chapter, with again the Labour party being the focus of this examination. The effects of crises external to the movement (in particular the Vietnam War) are considered in some detail in this section. The majority of this material was garnered using primary sources (internal CND documents, minutes of National officer's meetings, reports from Labour party conferences, Newspaper archive material etc.) It was also necessary within this chapter to detail the far ranging defence initiatives and reviews of this period. To this end, Chalmers 'Paying for Defence' and Freedman's 'Britain and Nuclear Weapons' proved invaluable in explaining the intricacies of the debate.

Chapter 4 examines the movement enjoying a period of stability (1980 - 1989/90). Once again, this chapter is devoted to an exploration of CND's relationship with the POS. In this section though greater consideration is given to not just its relationship with the Labour Party, but also an examination and explanation of wider relationships with government, public opinion and a brief analysis of the unique strategic and international environment that applied at this time - concentrating particularly on the period of stability during the 1980's. Once again, the material has been compiled through a mixture of approaches including primary and secondary sources.

In Chapter 5, the intention is the application and testing of the utility of the various methodological approaches that attempt to offer explanations for the rise of SM's. Consideration is given to most of the major approaches such as the 'classical' doctrines of Relative deprivation (RD) and Resource Mobilisation (RM). The relative merits of 'instrumental' vs. 'expressive' involvement, the value of the 'conscience constituents' position as expressed by Verba and Nie are analysed. This discussion draws largely on the work of Parkin in order to highlight the inherent difficulty involved in the application of these absolute positions both generally and in a specifically British milieu. Finally, there is a discussion and analysis of the approach to SM's provided by the new SM theorists such as Tourraine and Melluci.
The second part of this chapter is used for the purpose of again testing the utility of the methodological approaches attempting to offer explanations regarding the effectiveness of SM's at the height of their mobilisational powers. Of particular relevance in this section is the examination of the very definition of a POS and its relevance to the British experience. Following this there is a further assessment regarding the measurement of the impact of SM's on the POS. Gamson's work in particular is considered at some length. Analysis of the effects of mass mobilisation is also undertaken and the concept of 'Imperialist Pacifism' is introduced and discussed. Finally, an analysis of the criteria used in the assessment of success and failure is necessary. Again Gamson's work is central to this, and drawing particularly on the work of Marsh, I will show the limited utility of such approaches in the consideration of CND, and indeed, the wider SMI extant in Britain.

In Chapter 6, the contemporary position of the movement is examined in some detail. In particular the effect of the Gulf War, the fall of the 'Iron Curtain', the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a possible 'New World Order' on CND is discussed. The question that is posed in this chapter is can, should and indeed did CND expand their focus from a unilateralist movement to that of a broader anti-war movement. Once again the movement's relationship with the Labour Party is analysed in some detail. The majority of the material in this chapter has been derived from primary sources - particularly interviews and correspondence with leading CND figures, past and present. Extensive use is also made of other primary sources such as contemporary news reports and Labour Party documents.

Chapter 7 is based upon a sample survey of local CND groups. Using these results in comparison to results obtained in earlier studies (Parkin, Taylor, Byrne etc.) a detailed picture of the declining contemporary movement is constructed. This highlights the changes that the movement has experienced during its long history. What this chapter will also demonstrate is the changing nature of the movement as it seeks to come to terms with wider changes within its campaigning area. It demonstrates that the contemporary CND is in many important aspects is qualitatively and quantitatively different to the CND of the fifties, sixties and seventies.

In the final chapter many of the questions raised in Chapter 7 are discussed. In short, the intent in this final chapter is to conduct a critical appraisal of theoretical thought in the light of these new findings and on 'new politics' in general. In particular, the question that is asked is of what use are the existing theoretical positions regarding a movement whose moment seems to have passed. In particular, how - if at all - can they explain the
continuing membership of CND at this time. The concept of 'habitual membership' as a new and valid approach is raised and discussed before more general conclusions conclude this final chapter.
FOOTNOTES.


4. While it might be overstating its significance, the growth in single issue movements has not escaped the politicians notice. Chris Patten a former Chairman of the Conservative Party recently made the amusing aside that the RSPB with over 700,000 members is now a serious threat to the Conservative Party. Taken from a transcript of the BBC2 documentary 'The Incredible Shrinking Politicians'. 25.10.93.

5. Parkin, F., 'Middle Class Radicalism'. (Manchester University Press., 1968. )


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid. , p. 37.

10. Ibid. , p. 38.

11. Driver, C., 'The Disarmers'. (Hodder and Stoughton., 1964.)


14. Foot, M., 'Aneurin Bevan'. (Davis Poynter., 1973.)

15. Lee, J., 'My Life with Nye'. (Cape., 1980.)

CHAPTER 2.

THE FIRST WAVE - FROM APATHY TO MASS MOVEMENT AND BACK AGAIN.

Even its most vociferous opponents would have to agree that the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has proved itself to be the most resilient, and arguably, effective group of its kind in the British political arena. True, as we shall see later, it has had its moments of disaster, tragedy and even comedic episodes, but its durability and ability to survive has surprised both its critics and most ardent supporters. How and why though did such an organisation become a touchstone for radical social movements that were to follow them and adopt many of their attributes both at an active and organisational level? To some extent it was CND that set the standard for popular protest, if not in the level of results achieved, certainly in the methods employed therein and the potential for the successful prosecution of a campaign. This is not to belittle the contribution of other movements, such as the Women's Movement, but in terms of high profile campaigning it was CND that appeared to be at the forefront in the wider public perception.

The 'why' is unquestionably far easier to answer than the 'how' and so we will begin with a short overview of the political and strategic circumstances salient to the period in question and in the birth of CND. 1957 was to prove the decisive year in the nascent movement's history as, until this time, the protests against nuclear weapons had been largely the preserve of obscure anti nuclear and pacifist groups - generally very small in size - and culminating in demonstrations during 1951 and 1952. These groups were again active during 1955 when the 1955 Defence White paper announced that Britain intended to develop her own H-bomb. The majority of public opinion though was, if not in favour of nuclear weapons, certainly ill informed on the issues. Furthermore, as far as the public at large were concerned they had reason to be grateful for the weapons development. They saw the Americans use of such a weapon against Japan only a few short years before as having conclusively foreshortened a war in which millions had died and millions more may have died had the weapon not been used. To this background of an almost apathetic electorate (perhaps engendered by the cloak of secrecy in which the issue was shrouded), the events of 1957 were to prove something of an awakening as the emergent relationship between the US A and the USSR began to take on the familiar shape that was to dominate International relations and strategic affairs for
the next thirty years. If further evidence were needed that the old world order was rapidly changing, it was provided as Soviet tanks rolled into Hungary to crush the uprising there while the West looked on in apparent impotence. All of the above events served to prompt

...a resurgence of interest on the left in a radical reappraisal of Britain's role in the World, the nature of Communist society and the impact of nuclear weaponry on International relations. (1)

The birth of a movement.

The space or vacuum into which CND would move as a protest movement was thus filled; but if a space had been filled or, probably a better metaphor, the remaining pieces in this dangerous jigsaw had been fitted, it cannot be argued that CND sprang into existence overnight either. For the movement to be born there had to have been the embryo developing alongside the offspring of nuclear weaponry and its developing strategic significance. As I mentioned earlier, the roots of the movement can certainly be found in the earliest anti-nuclear and pacifist movements of the early 1950's. As early as 1948 small anti-war movements such as the Peace Pledge Union (PPU) had formed a commission,

to study and discuss the possibility of direct action to seek withdrawal of American bases, stoppage of the manufacture of atomic weapons in Britain, withdrawal of Britain from NATO and disbandment of the British armed forces. (2).

The Commission also, with the development of the American H-bomb, instigated 'Operation Gandhi', which was to preempt the Committee of 100's tactics by almost ten years. There followed several small scale demonstrations including a sit-down demonstration outside the War Office in January of 1952 and a small demonstration outside the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston in Berkshire (the latter being organised by Hugh Brock who was instrumental in later forming the Committee of 100 - of whom more later). Such demonstrations lead to the formation of the Direct Action Committee (DAC), the direct forebear of the Committee of 100. Founded on Gandhian principles of Satyagraha, an "ethic-principle the essence of which is a social technique of action" (3) based firmly in the ethos of non-violence (4). From 1954 to 1957 the group undertook a series of moves designed to create...an Internationalist, neutralist and democratic movement
to oppose the Cold War and its ideology (5). Probably the most important role played by the DAC/NVR during this period in the history of CND was the establishment of Aldermaston as a focus of protest, marches and demonstrations that were set to follow. As Taylor notes, and for reasons I outlined earlier, though the movement was growing slowly it made little or no impact on the psyche of the electorate. However, by 1957 as the first British bomb was exploded and the public began to realise the realities of the situation the campaign gathered increasing momentum, and for the first time in nuclear politics the possibilities of a mass movement emerging became apparent as the first Aldermaston march took place with those taking part estimated at between 5 and 10000. It is worth making the point here, that this mass demonstration was very much the DAC's project even though the newly formed CND had provided help in the organisation - much against their better judgement, for reasons that will be outlined later.

The roots of CND themselves, while certainly entertaining loose connections with those involved in the direct action campaign, were to be found far more closely intertwined with the cerebral, undemonstrative (in the sense that they were largely against the type of direct action tactics described above) community of the intelligentsia of the left. Formed at the same juncture as the DAC, the National Committee for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT) was founded in the Golders Green and Suburb Womens Co-operative Guild with the stated intention of persuading the government to stop the testing of nuclear weapons and to work for the world-wide elimination of the nuclear threat. (Gertrude Fishwick, NCANWT's most tireless worker, a retired civil servant, has been credited by some as being the individual who began ...the chain reaction that ended in CND (6).)

The nature of the movement during the latter part of that year can be judged by its list of sponsors who included such respected establishment figures as Benjamin Britten, the Bishop of Chichester, E.M. Forster, Lord Boyd-Orr, Sir Compton Mackenzie, Henry Moore, Dr. Donald Soper, Michael Tippet, and Sir Miles Malleson (with the increasingly influential Bertrand Russell joining them a little later), and also by the movement's insistence that it was not and should never be a mass movement. As the above list of dignitaries suggests, they wished to rely rather on its influence exercised through the circles in which its sponsors moved. Behind this notion was the belief that the issue on which they campaigned was a moral and not a political matter and could and should be resolved without recourse to overt political arenas. As shall be seen, this was a viewpoint that shaped much
of which was to follow, as was NCANWT's insistence that they were decidedly not a pacifist group and in their forthright opposition to both communism and the British Communist Party.

That NCANWT proved to be the foundation on which CND was to be built is undoubted, not least because when NCANWT finally merged with CND they provided CND with their assets and contacts as well as their headquarters on a rent free basis. However the acknowledged catalyst in CND's eventual emergence was J.B. Priestley's seminal article 'Britain and the Nuclear Bombs' in the 'New Statesman' on 2nd November 1957, which was written largely in response to Bevan's amazing and public rejection of unilateralism. The article caused a tremendous response amongst the periodical's readership and the then editor, Kingsley Martin, responded by calling a meeting at his flat to discuss the issues raised. The resulting attendance read like a 'Who's Who' of the democratic left intelligentsia and included Priestley, his wife Jaquetta Hawkes, Bertrand Russell, George Kennan, P.M.S. Blackett and a somewhat strange bedfellow in the shape of Denis Healey, a confirmed and vociferous advocate of multilateralism. All of those who attended, with the obvious exception of Healey, agreed that a new organisation was needed to conduct "an all out disarmament campaign" (7). On the following day a telephone call was made to NCANWT and CND was, in effect, born.

From elitist to mass movement.

The founding meeting of CND took place at the home of Canon John Collins on January 16th 1958 and an executive committee was elected. This was made up of Collins, Richie Calder, James Cameron, Howard Davies, Michael Foot, Arthur Goss, Sheila Jones, Kingsley Martin, Priestley, Professor Rotblatt, Lord Simon and Peggy Duff - the committee later elected Bertrand Russell as President, and after some delay, Lord Simon as Treasurer, while at its second meeting Canon Collins was elected Chairman (18).

The first manifestation of the potential of the new organisation was demonstrated on the 17th February 1958 when at CND's inaugural meeting at Central Hall the crowds spilled into other rooms and out into the street (19). The main and most important result of this meeting was the revision of policy, which up to this point had been somewhat ambiguous on the question of unilateralism. In its first draft of the policy statement the words were included that there should be a British initiative
...to stop the armaments race, if needs be by unilateral action ... It also stated amongst other things that she make no further tests or proceed with the setting up of new missile bases, but importantly, that this should only be done, ...pending negotiations . However, after the Central Hall meeting, CND had rejected the concept of conditional unilateralism and nailed its colours firmly to the mast of unconditional unilateralism, thus the statement would now say that Britain must;

a) renounce unconditionally the use or production of nuclear weapons and refuse to allow others to use them in her defence;

b) use her utmost endeavour to bring about negotiations at all levels for agreement to end the armaments race and to lead to a general armaments convention and;

c) invite the cooperation of other nations, particularly non-nuclear powers, in the renunciation of nuclear weapons.

Following the meeting it became apparent that the leadership's desire to remain an 'elitist' grouping able to pursue their aims through the exercise of contacts within the political elite was not to be the reality of the situation. This realisation found its first test in CND's reaction to the DAC who, as we have seen, were committed to the furtherance of unilateralism by the means of non-violent direct action (NVDA), and who were planning a march from London to Aldermaston that year at Easter. The executive of CND were split with the majority, including Priestley and Collins, opposed to the idea. They were then therefore somewhat taken aback when between 5 to 10,000 people actually took part. CND, after seeing the impact, subsequently took over the organisation of following marches which in the early years regularly saw up to 100,000 taking part at various stages. Despite their apparent success it did little to alleviate the ever present rift between CND's leadership and their supporters and their differing feelings regarding the efficacy of NVDA. Throughout 1958 the profile of CND was raised considerably by the continuing use of NVDA, and the arguments that raged within the movement were now primarily of a political, rather than a moral nature, evidenced by the growth of groups both within and outside the movement who supported the campaign. These ranged from the establishment of a Youth CND (YCND), the Women's group and the Labour Advisory Committee designed to foster links between the campaign, the PLP and the trade unions. Although still largely moral in opposition this latter linkage showed the increasing belief that for the campaign to achieve its aims it must begin to address the political realities of the situation. Indeed Collins some years later admitted as much when he said
It was a moral campaign...the Conservative Party would be unlikely to change policy...we hoped that the Labour Party would be stirred. ...to realise that they must base defence and foreign policy ...on Britain without the bomb...I always felt that the campaign should concentrate itself on changing the Labour Party opinion and all the floating voters who would vote to make the Labour Party effective as a political power (10)

Further credence was given to this view by Michael Foot, who of course would come to lead the Labour Party - albeit briefly - who had stated on more than one occasion that ...only through the election of a Labour government and the political pressure we may exert afterwards can we succeed (11). )

CND, DAC and the Committee of 100.

The problem remained though as to the tactics required to advance this and the larger goal, i.e., NVDA vs. 'insider' politics. The DAC continued to plough very much its own furrow of activity employing such tactics as the 1959 'Voters Veto' campaign in which they urged CND supporters to actively campaign against anti-unilateralist Labour candidates. Such campaigns of course greatly concerned the leadership of CND and they made assiduous efforts to maintain the distinctions between themselves and what they saw as the excesses of DAC strategy, in order to minimise the possibility of a public antipathy arising against their cause and the campaign itself. By the time of the Aldermaston march of 1960 the mood though had begun to change and there appeared a growing militancy within large parts of the movement as a whole. Bertrand Russell, a long time advocate of NVDA, resigned as President at this time in order to form the Committee of 100 designed to organise specifically NVDA on a national basis. The split between Russell and CND was acrimonious - particularly between Russell and Collins - and very public with Russell accusing Collins of double standards, i.e. that he (Collins) had told both Russell and the movement at large that

...the policy of the campaign (is) as laid down by conference....while committing us to democratic means of persuasion and argument. ...also gives full freedom to individuals who wish to (to) support direct action....(12)

...while at the same time, he (Collins) was stating to the press,
...that the campaigns policy should be urged only by legal and democratic persuasion and that any plans for civil disobedience were directly contrary to it...(13)

and that since Collins had never withdrawn this, he (Russell) found it ...impossible to work with the national chairman of the campaign (14).

Throughout the years 1960 - 61, the Committee of 100 engaged itself in a number of protests, marches, sit-downs and sit-ins, culminating in September 1961, after fears of war were stoked by the building of the Berlin wall and the virtual siege of that city and the resumption of superpower nuclear testing, with a rally in Trafalgar Square where 1314 protesters were arrested and at Holy Loch where a further 351 were similarly detained. As Taylor and Pritchard have observed, the media coverage was enormous and the Committee's star appeared to be in the ascendancy over that of CND. However the ensuing activity could not match this spectacular start and there followed a series of disastrous demonstrations with nothing like the numerical support initially enjoyed. The authorities behaved in an increasingly belligerent manner towards the protesters, even invoking the Official Secrets Act at one stage to arrest some of the Committee's leading members. CND could no longer turn a blind eye to the Committee and were openly critical of their tactics and their organisational abilities (not unwarranted if one considers that the sites of the demonstrations were, by and large, inaccessible and that many were organised to take place at the height of a particularly wet and cold winter - hardly likely on either count to attract anything other than the most determined demonstrators). Despite the best efforts of CND, they soon came to be viewed in the same light as the Committee by the media, and while support for them continued at around the same level - if the large numbers attending the Aldermaston marches were any indication - they were not gaining any new support. This was particularly true in the case of the PLP who with an election looming large could not afford to associate themselves with an apparently increasingly militant movement of which CND, rightly or wrongly, was seen as the leading constituent part.

Events after this time began to move apace; firstly, in 1963 Russell resigned as President of the Committee of 100; secondly, and almost certainly coincidentally, the activities of the Committee became even more militant. All seemed to alienate both the public and mainstream CND from them, and to CND seemed a futile diversion away from the movements unilateralist stance. The media, which up until this point while not sympathetic to the unilateralist cause but who had nonetheless
maintained a relatively neutral stance, appeared more and more hostile. The Times for example commenting upon the violent scenes at the end of the 1963 Aldermaston march reflected somewhat sadly;

...when demonstrations give way to rowdyism and mob violence...the dangers are poisonous enough to stifle any seeds of good...a movement which provides protective coloration for subversion...cannot expect immunity from criticism...(15).

While this criticism may have appeared a little harsh as regards CND per se, and despite a spirited defence of the organisation by the likes of Kingsley Martin the 'beardies and wierdies' (16) had done considerable damage as their actions were the actions that created the headlines by which the anti - nuclear movement as a whole (and CND) in particular were judged by the public at large, those in power whom they hoped to influence, and more importantly perhaps - as shall be returned to in the next section - those aspiring to power, i.e., the Labour Party.

**The early decline.**

It was however not only internal difficulties which exacerbated CND's decline in both numbers and influence during the early and mid nineteen - sixties. Outside factors played a major role too, and in particular two events; i) the Cuban missile crisis (the Soviet Union had positioned nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba targeted directly at the heart of the United States. Kennedy, the US President responded by telling the Soviets that unless the missiles were withdrawn any Soviet ship approaching Cuba would be considered hostile and sunk. This highly dangerous game pushed the World to the very edge of superpower conflict before the USSR pulled back from the brink, but for several days the World did indeed appear to teeter on the edge of the abyss) and; ii) the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. The effect of the former on the perceptions of the public regarding nuclear war were profound indeed. Byrne argues that its resolution showed that restraint could and would be used, and that the argument that nuclear weapons prevented war rather than made war more likely was, at least to many, shown to be a correct assumption. However, another perspective on why the crisis had such an effect on CND's support is Christopher Driver's. It is a perspective that cannot be easily dismissed (although it is sometimes overlooked in preference for the former). Driver makes the point that during the week of the crisis protest did not die, indeed as he says, it regained...*the freshness and spontaneity*...(17)
lost as the campaign had grown. What was different was that rather than their being a great cross section of middle class society taking part, the protesters were largely, and somewhat ironically in view of CND's original ethos of elitism, the middle class intelligentsia. The majority of the public had relegated the crisis to the back of their minds or, as Lord Russell astutely remarked, the majority at the moment of apparent truth realised they were absolutely powerless and preferred, if they were to die, to do so at home rather than as part of an anonymous crowd futilely railing against what appeared to be the inevitable outcome (even two of the Committee of 100's leading members who believed so fiercely in the efficacy of protest and direct action disappeared during the critical week and they, Pat Arrowsmith and Wendy Butlin, were later found to have decamped to Western Ireland in an attempt to escape the coming apocalypse). With the Partial Test Ban Treaty following this crisis - proof it appeared to many that multilateral agreement was possible despite the pessimism of CND - the movement lost an impetus they could never regain until almost two decades later. As we shall see later, the late sixties and seventies brought with it new concerns and dangers, such as the war in Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia etc. that pulled the protesters of the concerned middle classes and intelligentsia, who were CND's natural constituents, if not away from the movement certainly in increasingly numerous directions. In any history, no matter how necessarily brief like this one, it can be all too easy to slip into the language of hyperbole or damnation, and yet, it is difficult not to agree that CND, at least during the early part of this period were, ...arguably the greatest protest movement in Britain since the Chartists (18). Over the first few years of their existence they mobilised thousands of people into rallying in large numbers to protest on the streets of Britain in a way that no other single issue group has done before or since. One though must not let this blind us to their failures - true they mobilised thousands of concerned people, but they did not achieve their stated aim of Britain's unilateral abandonment of nuclear weaponry - an aim that could only be achieved, by CND's own reckoning, by not only capturing the hearts and minds of the people but also their democratic representatives and in particular the Labour Party. It is to this apparent failure we will now turn our attention.

**Bevan and the British bomb.**

It was the events of 1957 that to a great extent proved the catalyst for CND's emergence as an anti-nuclear movement. In this year the first British hydrogen bomb was successfully exploded and the Duncan Sandy's Defence White Paper
also announced that British military planning would henceforth rely more heavily on nuclear rather than conventional armaments and further \( \text{that there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country...}(19) \) against nuclear attack. The fact that Britain, rather than just possessing the weapon, had in 1956 also developed the delivery systems necessary, added a new piquancy to what had been up to this point, a somewhat ethereal and theoretical debate. The final and perhaps most important contribution to the development of CND was provided by the loss to the 'right' of one of their (the unilateralist's) most vociferous and charismatic champions, Aneurin (Nye) Bevan. As Taylor has said, \( \text{...following the Labour Party's defeat in 1951 there had been deep and bitter divisions between Left and Right, with Bevan the undisputed leader of the Left (20)} \)

As he goes on to say, these disagreements were largely ideological, but from 1951 to 1957, Bevan had campaigned clamorously for disarmament on a unilateral basis characterised by his statement that...\( \text{if Britain had the moral stature she would say; 'we can make the H. bomb, but we are not going to make it, we believe that what the human race needs is leadership in the opposite direction, and we are going to give it' (21).} \)

On the eve of the 1957 Party Conference Bevan gave no indication of his own bombshell that he was to drop amongst the Left less than a week later when, along with Sidney Silverman and Barbara Castle, he co-sponsored a motion calling for the ending, unilaterally, of Britain's nuclear weapons programme. By the following week an amazing volte face by Bevan had ensued; Bevan argued that to accept a unilateralist resolution proposed by Ian Mikardo and Barbara Castle was an...\( \text{emotional spasm "that would dismay the Commonwealth and"...}(\text{reduce}) \text{Britain to complete negation in the chambers of the World (22)} \)

With regards to why Bevan did this we can only surmise as he himself never gave his reasons but theories abound as to why, and it is perhaps worth while to consider some of these in more detail, if only to illustrate the dilemma in which a unilateralist who has the potential, or indeed real political power can find him/herself.
Michael Foot in his biography of Bevan himself asks the same question and goes on to examine some of the more sensible theories propounded. The first of these concerns the talks with Kruschev during which the Soviet leader had purportedly informed Bevan that he wished Britain to keep the bomb and that unilateral disarmament by Britain would leave her without an international role or effective voice. This was in fact the story that had been run by the Daily Express - *Mr. Bevan has been telling his friends that Mr. K. said to him, 'Do not create a vacuum in Europe by giving up the bomb'* (23).

Foot for his part discounts this theory. The conversation took place with Kruschev before the NEC meeting when Bevan had strongly supported unilateral action. While this may be true, Bevan's imagery of Britain 'naked' in the discussions on nuclear weapons does bear a marked similarity to Kruschev's reported remarks that Britain would, if she pursued the unilateralist path, find herself without an effective voice in International relations. The second of the theories concerns a meeting that took place the night before Bevan's speech between himself and Sam Watson, the union leader. According to this theory Watson, apparently with Gaitskell's accord,...*had taken him (Bevan) to a high mountain and shown him...the offices and influence...which would be his, if only he would defend the Executives position on the bomb* (24).

No one disputes that the this meeting occurred, but according to Jennie Lee, all that Sam Watson had done was to appeal to Bevan not to split the party when there was a real opportunity of winning the next election. As Jennie Lee remarks, and it is difficult not to agree, the promise of high office would not have been enough reason for a change of heart - *could they really believe that he was a small time career politician prepared to sacrifice his principles in order to become second in command to the right wing leader of the party* (25). Perhaps as Foot says, it was Watson's call on Bevan not to split the party and not the promise of high office that finally swayed Bevan (26). Whatever the reason, and Foot who was a close friend and associate...*never asked him why; it would have been an insult.* (27)

Bevan never retreated on one word he had spoken that day for which he earned the enmity of the left, with previously close associates and friends never speaking to him again. Repercussions for Labour and the disarmament movement were profound. The feelings it engendered were summed up by one (right wing) Labour
MP who at the end of Bevan’s speech... \textit{had to get up and go away...I felt as if I had been present at a murder} - the murder of the enthusiasm that has built the Labour movement (28).

If the victim of this murder was Bevan it was his ghost that would continually return to haunt the relationship between Labour and CND throughout the next thirty years and beyond.

On the day that the Labour conference broke up, another significant brick was placed in the growing foundations of CND; the Soviets launched Sputnik 1. This meant that Moscow now had the ability to strike deep into the heart of the USA with its own nuclear arsenal. No longer was the US nuclear strategy, based as it was on the assured destruction of the USSR should they attack Europe through the unanswered use of nuclear weapons, a viable option - the world had now entered the era of the MAD doctrine, making total nuclear annihilation if not a probability, certainly possible.

\textbf{CND and their 'Natural Allies' - Labour, Trade Unions and the Church}

It may appear somewhat paradoxical that I describe the Labour Party as a natural ally of CND when one considers that it was a Labour government which took the decision, under Attlee, to produce Britain’s first atomic bomb (although it was Churchill who began the process by instigating research and production of the hydrogen bomb). However, it does not appear as strange a decision when one considers, a) the leading figures within CND during the period were of the left of British politics - Kingsley Martin, J.B. Priestley, A.J.P. Taylor (even though Priestley argued he wasn't interested in "capturing the Labour Party"(29).) - and as was determined earlier, there was the realisation that it was only through the Labour Party that CND could hope to realistically enjoy real political success in the advancement of their cause, and b) the Labour Party was the only major party with the real hope of gaining power that had a history and tradition of ethical protest on the twin issues of foreign and defence policy upon which CND's protest were based. Further, as Taylor notes, there was the ongoing argument within the Labour movement itself between the left wing 'fundamentalists' and right wing 'revisionists' (led by Gaitskell) which by the beginning of the 'sixties would
become sharply polarised by the debate within the Party as a whole, on the subject of unilateralism.

The effect on CND that the 'defection' of Bevan to the multilateralist approach had has already been outlined, but it is necessary at this juncture to explain exactly why this was such a blow to the cause of CND. Bevan, despite being a member of the Attlee government that had taken the decision to manufacture the atomic bomb, had long been an opponent of continuing development, and as has been shown, had on several occasions called for Britain to disarm itself in nuclear terms unilaterally. Such was Bevan's antipathy to increased defence spending of any kind that in 1951 he, Wilson and Freeman had resigned from the government over the introduction of welfare charges to help fund increased expenditure on defence. His influence within the Party cannot be overstated, and by 1952, out of seven CLP seats on the NEC, six were controlled by 'Bevanites'. His conversion was then, as one can imagine viewed with no little amazement and consternation by his supporters and opponents alike. While Bevan's decision was a blow to CND and its supporters within the Party, it was not an immediately fatal blow. True, they had lost their most able, vociferous and charismatic parliamentary voice but they did not lose much, if any support within the party as a whole and the majority of those MP's who supported unilateralism did not desert the cause with him. Difficulties though did remain in the relationship. Principal of these by 1958 were the growing activities of the DAC who tended to view parliamentary activity as worthless and believed the only way change could be realised was in a reversal of the policy of quiet diplomacy and negotiation favoured by CND's founders, i.e., that change could and should be forced on the government of the day by the actions of those at the bottom of the existing hierarchical structure. They argued that the essentially undemocratic way that the people of Britain had a nuclear deterrent foisted upon them negated any constraints there may have been upon them to behave within the accepted bounds of a free and fair democratic society. This culminated in 1958 and 1959 with the 'Voters Veto' campaign.

This campaign was not a new idea but in January 1959 in a by-election in SW Norfolk, the DAC circulated a pamphlet entitled, 'Political Implications of a Voters Veto' urging voters to withhold their vote from any candidate who was not a declared unilateralist. The effect of the campaign was at best minimal. However its potential effect on the relationship between CND and the Labour Party was disastrous. Had the campaign been successful and had CND supported it, CND would almost certainly have been proscribed by the Labour Party (as was already being urged by some, like George Brown, on Gaitskell) and would have alienated
the Labour left who saw a real chance of a Labour victory in the coming election. The reasons for the failure of the campaign were obvious; i) the unwillingness of the voters to withhold their vote over a single issue, and propitiously for the future relationship with Labour, ii) the refusal of the CND leadership to be associated with the campaign in any way. After this distraction the relationship between CND and the Labour movement of the left grew apace and by the time the 'Voters Veto' fiasco was over the relationship, which had been formalised at the 1958 Labour conference in the shape of the Labour Advisory Committee, again resumed some of its previous warmth. At that same conference, unilateralism was the subject of intense and at times bitter debate, revolving as it did around the unilateralist resolution proposed by the Fire Brigades Union. Speaker after speaker endorsed the resolution, but importantly most were CLP representatives who in terms of voting power carried little weight. Noticeably absent in terms of support for the resolution was the real power of the electoral college, the Labour leadership and the major trade unions. The union block vote was crucial to the success or failure of a resolution and...without gaining support within the trade unions, CND would not 'capture' the Labour Party...(30). Examining the figures involved in the ensuing vote one can see that, ...the unions support for unilateral disarmament was exceptionally low... - a mere 200,000 to 300,000 according to the motion...(31).

**Labour and unilateralism.**

Following the 1958 conference though the situation vis a vis unilateralism and the trade union movement appeared to be changing in CND's favour with the General and Municipal Workers Union (GMWU) adopting unilateralism at their conference by 150 votes to 126 (although this was later reversed at a recalled conference to discuss the Labour policy document 'The Next Step'). However, the first cracks were beginning to appear in the impasse, and one after the other the major unions - TGWU, AEU, USDAW and the NUR - as well as a host of smaller unions began to throw their not inconsiderable weight behind the unilateralist strategy. This left only the GMWU and NUM as the only two of the major unions supporting the official TUC/NEC policy document.

In an attempt to head off growing union and left wing support for unilateralism, the TUC/NEC had prepared the document 'The Next Step ', in which Gaitskell proposed forming a 'non - nuclear club' and which appeared to meet the unilateralists halfway by arguing that...the fact we are opposed to the policy of
unilaterally renouncing nuclear weapons does not mean that the next Labour government is committed to going on producing those weapons...(32)

The proposal for a 'non-nuclear club' met with the reception one might expect for, as Taylor says, it was little more than opportunistic, political window dressing that was never likely to attract serious consideration from the other nations who would be likely members of such a 'club' - China had dismissed the idea out of hand calling it, according to one union leader, ...a lot of tripe...(33), while at a slightly more cerebral level, Professor P. M. S. Blackett, the highly regarded military historian and scientist, while seeing some merit in the idea was forced to concede that as a practical proposition it was virtually worthless, and ...the risk that Britain might be atom bombed by France or Sweden won't disturb my sleep. (34).

Clearly the Labour leadership were concerned at the advance of unilateralism within the Party, particularly at the grass roots level of the CLP's, with increased union support for the concept and the apparent growing public support evidenced by the success of the Aldermaston march. In 1959 (following election defeats in 1951 and 1955) in the interests of electoral success, the disparate groups temporarily buried their differences over this question. Yet, following a third consecutive electoral defeat in 1959 the wounds were re-opened and the tide of unilateralist fervour once again threatened to sweep away the Labour right at the 1960 Labour conference.

Parkin has argued that this was not simply an argument over defence policy in relation to nuclear weapons but simply part of a larger battle being fought between the 'revisionist' and 'fundamentalist' wings of the party, with Gaitskell's continued leadership of the party at the heart of the matter - in short it was a convenient stick with which the left could beat the right and Gaitskell in particular. The theory is all the more attractive when one considers that after the 'big six' unions had adopted the unilateralist policy, the Communist Party very quickly dropped their opposition to unilateralism in order to jump onto the bandwagon that was gaining momentum in an effort to force Gaitskell to resign. Whether this was the reason for the left to hitch themselves to the unilateralist cause is debatable, particularly when one notes that even after the defection of their 'leader', Bevan, most remained loyal to the concept of unilateralism even after it appeared to be dead in the water as far as possible success was concerned. Nevertheless, with the cancellation of the 'Blue Streak' project rendering Britain's independent deterrent virtually worthless and with it Gaitskell's principal argument of adherence to an independent nuclear...
Streak' project rendering Britain's independent deterrent virtually worthless and with it Gaitskell's principal argument of adherence to an independent nuclear deterrent, coupled with the NUM finally joining the unilateralist surge, the position of the NEC and Gaitskell looked increasingly untenable. Gaitskell was finally forced into the open as a nuclear 'hawk' - the Emperor’s new suit ('The Next Step') had been decisively stripped away. The 1960 conference was now concerned with a far wider question than British unilateralism. Now unilateralism without an independent British deterrent meant withdrawal from NATO with the possibility of American isolationism or increased West German hegemony in Europe being the result. This was Gaitskell's major card and he went on to assert that the debate was not about defence but about his continued leadership of the party and the position of conference with regards to the PLP, that the PLP could not and would not be dictated to by conference, and certainly not by an outside pressure group that was unrepresentative of the electorate as a whole. The argument was encapsulated by Christopher Mayhew, a former Navy Minister, who said

...what really mattered was that conference should not be allowed to dictate to the PLP...(and) that constitutionally it would be monstrous to have MP's dictated to by an outside body; and...because the PLP reflected public opinion far more accurately than the conference (35).

On this last point Gaitskell and his allies certainly played a very astute hand by removing the debate from the simplistic and emotive homily of 'Ban the Bomb' and placing it firmly in the complex and theoretical area of a debate on neutrality involved with leaving NATO. By doing this, Gaitskell believed, working class sympathy for unilateralism and CND would evaporate and CND would once again be come (remain?) an essentially middle class campaign enjoying little support from Labour voters who were, in terms of defence and foreign policy issues, generally conservative and even hawkish, evidenced by almost solid working class support for the Suez policy some few years earlier.

To return for a moment to the assertion that the real motivation behind the growth of unilateralism within the Labour movement was part of some left inspired Machiavellian intrigue designed to remove Gaitskell. This would in my view be over simplistic and to do a large disservice to many involved at the time who at no time intended the removal of Gaitskell per se and his replacement with a figure from the left of the party. Indeed after the defection of Bevan, there was in reality no - one on the left with the necessary experience or charisma to mount such a
challenge, and even before this point there had been no attempt to remove Gaitskell directly which there could well have been. When the 1960 conference ended Gaitskell's 'fight and fight again' rhetoric took on a more concrete mantel as it attempted to reverse the conference vote in favour of unilateralism. Gaitskell based his campaign on the belief (correctly) that much of CND and therefore support for unilateralism was middle class in origin and that it did not enjoy the support of Labour's traditional voters in the working class in any meaningful terms of political loyalty in the way that the Party itself did. Therefore the strategy focused heavily on the political results involved in unilateralism which would, so Gaitskell portrayed it, involve the party in wholesale abandonment of revisionism and the introduction of the hard left's fundamentalist politics. The right's response to the challenge it faced from the left came in the form of the Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS) which had three main aims,

*to influence the trade unions to reverse their support for unilateralism; to increase the volume of media pressure in support of Gaitskell and against...the implied political extremism of those supporting the unilateralist position; and to encourage the 'silent majority'...to involve themselves and defeat the left* (36).

They were to contribute in a major way to the success of the campaign although it would be too simplistic to imagine that they alone achieved these stated aims or that, as Parkin rightly says, the major factor was the re-establishment of party unity in the face of *the complete disruption of the Labour Party...(37) that would otherwise have resulted. Rather it would appear that there was a combination of factors that were responsible; certainly, the CDS and the need for unity played their part, but the major factor I would argue was

*...because the issue itself had become diffused...the trade union's espousal of unilateralism had been based on the fundamental moral appeal that the H-bomb was morally wrong...After 1960 this was no longer feasible - the abandonment of our nuclear weapons...had altered the context of the debate...the unilateralists...were undoubtedly in favour of withdrawal from NATO...but to advocate this policy as the natural corollary to unilateralism was to ensure defeat* (38)

During the next few years CND continued to maintain the same tactics and strategy towards 'capturing' the Labour Party, but and despite the continuing anger of the left of the party. Labour had moved on and away from unilateralism and the
question was not to be raised seriously within the party for another decade or more. In 1961 at the Blackpool conference only the TGWU remained as outright supporters of unilateralist policy with the remainder of the major unions backing either the Crossman - Padley plan (which recommended the gradual move away from dependence on nuclear arms and the eventual closure of US bases in Britain and a 'no first use' policy as USDAW did or, like the AEU, NUR and NUM accepting the official NEC/TUC policy of a total rejection of unilateralism and continuing membership of NATO). Whether the events that followed were the cause or effect of this result is debatable, but what is certain is that after 1961 the divergence between CND and the Labour Party increased dramatically. The increasing militancy of the movement and in particular the activities of the Committee of 100, served to illustrate to the party that a large section of the disarmament movement had little faith or interest in the democratic access to the legislative process that they represented. Furthermore, the formation of the Independent Nuclear Disarmament Election Committee (INDEC) in 1962 as a separate political 'party' putting forward CND candidates for election in an attempt to force Labour candidates to become unilateralist or lose votes appeared to confirm this belief. This was, it must be said a rather naive and gauche approach doomed to failure - it seemed that the movement had not learnt the lessons of the 'voters veto' campaign that the British electorate is, if nothing else, unlikely to decide how to vote on the strength of a single issue and is in its political outlook essentially conservative - and it is certain that the campaign made little or no difference and was certainly ultimately harmful to the movements relationship, such as it now was, with the Labour Party. In response to the campaign INDEC was proscribed in 1962 and for a while it again looked as if CND might suffer the same fate (Bertrand Russell also faced this danger for a time due to his continued backing of the Committee of 100) but escaped due to the fact that ...if Labour Party members were forced to choose between the party and CND, the heart would be torn out of too many constituency organisations. (39)

Indeed the attitudes of the CLP's were perhaps even more unilateralist than ever even at this low point, than they had been during the height of their power in 1960/61 (40).

After Gaitskell.

After Gaitskell’s early death in 1963 the campaign within the party lost much of its direction and fervour. The hated figure of Gaitskell had gone and the left was deprived of an easy target of the right. With the accession of Wilson to the
to have elected and still remain an electorally viable alternative to Conservatism. CND itself at this time appeared more divided and distant from its membership (and therefore the Labour Party) than it had ever been in the past due to the increased and increasing militancy within its ranks. As we saw earlier, the effects on the public opinion of Cuba, Berlin, Hungary and the cancellation of 'Blue Streak' had all served either to distance or dilute public opinion and within the POS. By 1964 many of the leading figures within CND had gone. So too had the overt support of many leading Labour figures of the left. Nuclear issues, whilst not forgotten, became just one more ingredient in the increasing potpourri of issues with which the middle class radical was now concerned - such as the increasing disquiet over Western policy in Vietnam. A constant failure, as we shall see, has been CND's inability to win the hearts and minds of the working classes and thus the Labour Party whose brief flirtation with unilateralism appeared to be over and the love - hate relationship they enjoyed was not to be rekindled for some ten years or more. All of the foregoing suggests failure by CND. While it may be true that they did not achieve even one of their aims and consistently failed to convince any - not only Labour - major political party of the just nature of their cause, one must not underestimate their other achievements. They were the first protest movement following the years of austerity imposed by war that seriously challenged the belief that had grown up during the war years that 'government knows best'. They challenged the quiet acquiescence of the British people in the face of, what they believed was an unjust and undemocratic decision to first develop and then deploy nuclear weapons. CND created an atmosphere in which protest became, if not the norm, certainly acceptable - no longer could a British government take decisions affecting the lives of millions and expect them to give way. CND, despite their failure to attract the working class was the first real mass movement, able to mobilise hundreds of thousands in support. We cannot though escape the fact that ultimately CND did 'fail' - they consistently failed to consolidate gains they did achieve and allowed themselves to be torn apart by internal squabbling and dissent. They consistently failed to adjust to new realities in the situation and often appeared to be standing still as the argument moved on to pass them, almost being destroyed in the process. As we shall see, it was to be almost ten years before CND re - appeared as a genuine force in British politics, and as in the 1960's, the success they enjoyed was considerable, but then as now, they faced a period of 'hibernation' from which no - one was sure they were going to awake.
The Church and the bomb.

But I say to you that hear, Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those that abuse you. To him who strikes you on the cheek, offer the other also. . . . . (Luke 6. 27 - 29).

Of all the institutions that comprise the establishment it would appear that the Christian church may be the only one that it may be reasonable to suppose would be a natural ally of the disarmament movement. Surely it could not be clearer that Christianity is an implacable enemy of war and all its evils as the most potentially destructive force of the basic precept of Christianity. Certainly during the first three hundred years of Christianity the mood of the church was unambiguous on the matter as Christians both abstained, and more importantly, were allowed without undue persecution to exercise that right. However, in about the fourth century AD, this view came to be altered as democracy spread slowly from Greece, due to the argument that if Christians were to share in the decision making process and benefit from living under a democratic regime they must also be prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice through war that allowed them to practice such beliefs in such states and cities.

In the following years there developed the concept of the 'just' war to justify Christian participation in conflict (mooted originally by St. Augustine and redefined by, amongst others, Aquinas and Vitoria). For a war to be seen as just by Christians it should conform to six principles;

1) The authority which wages war must be legitimate

2) The cause must be just in proportion to the events which will occur in its conduct.

3) A just and lasting peace should be its ultimate intent.

4) It should only ever be a last resort.

5) Success should be reasonably expected.
6) The conduct of the war should be morally legitimate so that non-combatants would not be killed, and the war should not end when the evils that remain are greater than those which caused the conflict. (41)

Of course, these rules of engagement were soon to be overtaken by an era of weapons of mass destruction which made the last objective particularly difficult to achieve. With the advent of war on a scale that Saint Augustine could never have imagined came a reassessment of the Christian attitude to war in general, and during the late 1920's a massive debate throughout the church began. This culminated in 1930 with the Lambeth Conference Declaration which stated that "war as a method of settling international disputes is incompatible with the teaching and example of our Lord Jesus Christ". Ten years later though the divisions in the church again became apparent when a resolution at the 1940 Convocation of Canterbury requested a ruling on the just war standards as they applied to the war against Hitler. The church authorities, in a move that was to be a forerunner of future uncertainty over the question of nuclear weapons, 'decided' that the resolution and a decision on it should not be taken until after the war was over.

Following the end of the Second World War and the dropping of the atom bomb on Japan, the church once again turned its attention to the question of war in general and nuclear weapons in particular. The first serious consideration of the question came with the 1946 Commission edited by Dr. J.H. Oldham, which despite the issues that were discussed and studied only took about six days to compile (and even then at three separate weekend meetings). One of the participants was Dr. George Bell, Bishop of Chichester - later to become a founder patron of NCANWT - but even his participation failed to awaken the Commission to the unique nature of the question under discussion, and the Commission agreed that, the argument that on balance the use of the atomic bomb saved hundreds of thousands of lives...undoubtedly has weight (42)

Although they later added the caveat that this line could also be used as an excuse for all kinds of excesses and barbarities), they signally refused to condemn, unlike their American counterparts, the use of the weapon as they argued they did not have all of the relevant facts before them. They also gave voice to many of the beliefs that have characterised the debate in the church since this point; a) that the bomb should only be used as a deterrent in the face of a threat and further, b) that it was not the church's role to dictate to government on matters that were/are a matter of
national security. In 1948 this and other views were confirmed almost as official
document in a report by the Church of England Commission; it was not until Britain
exploded her first nuclear warheads in 1952 and the decision to begin production
taken two years later that the Christian church in Britain again took a serious look at
the issues involved. Despite a ruling from the World Council of Churches calling
for a promise from all nations not to produce or use nuclear weapons, the British
Council of Churches, reflecting either their innate conservatism or their confusion
and ignorance, decided not to act as they viewed opposition to the bomb as a matter
of conscience for the individual. Some members of the established churches in
Britain were certainly exercising that very right. Mention has already been made of
the Bishop of Chichester's (43) involvement with NCANWT, but also involved
were a number of prominent churchmen. These included Dr. Donald Soper,
Reverend George Macleod and of course Canon Collins. These though were the
minority and the majority appeared to agree with the Bishop of Derby who argued
that the bomb was no different to a hand grenade, if a bit larger or the Bishop of
Southwell who was happy that the question raised no new issues. The Bishop of
Willesden, expressing an opinion which is now often heard, declared, \textit{it might be}
\textit{better to perish than submit to the parody of civilisation...presented from the other}
\textit{side of the Iron Curtain} (44). i.e. an early relation to the now hackneyed phrase
'better dead than red'. Indeed as Driver discovered, by 1958 only twelve per cent
of Bishops and suffragens were declared unilateralists with the remainder, one
presumes, either undecided or committed to the concept of deterrence and/or
multilateralism.

The 1959 British Council of Churches report \textquote{Christians and Atomic War}', did little
to clarify the position of the church, indeed against a background of increased
testing and the growth of popular concern and protest, it achieved little more than a
further clouding of already murky waters. It maintained that the nation state had the
inalienable right to use military force to defend the freedoms we enjoy but further
noted that the West's reliance on nuclear weapons was to be deplored and that every
effort be made to prevent first use becoming necessary. What it did not do, and this
is vital in this context, was to advocate any form of unilateral action to help achieve
this end. By the time of the next consideration of the issues in 1963, the debate had
moved on considerably - the Berlin Wall had been erected, the Cuban crisis was
recent history and the Partial Test Ban Treaty was in place - and the conclusions
and recommendations made in the report did reflect this new reality more radically
than at any other juncture. The most important resolutions denounced the strategy
of first use once again and in another resolution the weapons were denounced as...\textit{an offence to God and a denial of His purpose for man} (45). Once again
though, the report fell far short of the unilateralist's expectations. Indeed it saluted the achievement of the Partial Test Ban Treaty as being due to our possessing nuclear weapons which...confers political influence...(46).

It becomes clear then that, far from an ally for the anti-nuclear movement, the church had to a large degree come not only to 'live with the bomb', but to paraphrase the sub-title of the film 'Dr. Strangelove', came almost to 'love the bomb', seeing it as the ultimate safeguard against the dark forces which threatened the very existence of western civilisation and Christianity. The rebels against the official church line were very much in the minority. However, one in particular proved to be a moving force in what was to become an integral, even vital component of CND particularly in the years of decline following the early 'sixties, and that was Canon John Collins. He it was who brought Christians into the movement, initially through Christian Action, a body made up of pacifists and non-pacifists opposed to the growing proliferation of nuclear arms. This culminated in a meeting at the Royal Albert Hall in May 1959, organised jointly with the Friends Peace Committee, under the title 'Modern War: A Challenge to Christians'. Many, while encouraged by the meeting, found it lacking in clear purpose and direction, and as a direct result Christian CND (CCND) was formed in an attempt to clarify the situation.

During the early part of its life CCND confined itself largely to small scale events such as vigils and tended to fight shy of the larger public events organised by the national movement or even smaller local CND groups. The result of this being to create the impression, inside and outside CCND that they were somehow removed from the larger campaign and movement. From the middle of the decade they became far more active within the movement as a whole (although they still refused to take part in or condone NVDA) The activities they did conceive became more frequent and more co-ordinated with the mainstream movement. The reasons for such a strategy were largely two fold; i) they wished to retain their respectability so as not to further alienate opinion within the mainstream churches (And hopefully to gain increased recognition) and ii) they wished to avoid the same pitfalls that CND had succumbed to in terms of a division within their own ranks. That they were successful in the latter intention is not in doubt for during CND's hibernation period of the mid 'sixties to the late 'seventies, it was to a great extent a small but dedicated hard-core of CCND activists that through their actions ensured that when a revival of fortunes occurred, CND was still there to provide the focus and rallying point for unilateralist demands.
With regard to the established church, CCND appeared to gain little or no ground - indeed by the time of the BCC report 'The Search for Security' in 1973, the status quo of the arms race and its logic was still purveyed as the accepted doctrine with nuclear weapons viewed not as an evil per se, but rather a device which makes war, in the words of the report, ...less romantic...(47) than in previous eras. Running like a thread through all of the aforementioned reports, and a thread which also was a tripwire to any meaningful discussion was that of a belief that unilateralism and pacifism were two sides of the same equation thus rendering anything other than blind acquiescence to the logic of deterrence and nuclear proliferation untenable and further, clearly denying that with the advent of mass destruction came a need to restate the obviously outdated rules of the 'just war'. CCND were left by the churches to plough a lone furrow throughout this period, and a 'natural ally' as they might have first appeared became for CND yet another buttress for what CND viewed as the patent illogicality of nuclear weaponry. (48)


4. See above for fuller exposition.

5. in *ibid.* p. 120.


7. in Taylor. R., *op cit.* p. 20

8. Arthur Goss in *ibid.* p. 23

9. in *ibid.* p. 47.


13. *ibid*.

14. *ibid*.


16. *in spite of the impression created by the press a large proportion of CND supporters are responsible and serious...the part played in it by members of the Committee of 100...is very small indeed...the beardies and wierdies who win so much publicity do not in fact exercise any considerable influence*. Martin, K., in *New Statesman* 4.10.63. p. 437.

18. Surveying the list of names involved at this early stage one can see the elitist inclinations of the nascent organisation. This is not as cynical as it may appear, as their stated intention at this early stage was not to be mass movement - *...we didn't want membership - either people supported us or they didn't...this is the campaign we are running*...Taylor. R. and Pritchard, C., *op cit.* p. 15.

19. The organisation's growth into the beginnings of a mass movement did little to bridge the social divide that existed between the movements founders and it's potential membership. This was evidenced in a letter from Canon Collins' wife to Jaquetta Hawkes regarding Collins attendance at an event organised by London CND; *...the thought of spending a social evening organised by our long haired, bearded friends...fills me with such despondency and gloom...John says that as he is Chairman...he ought to put in an appearance.* In Taylor. R. and Pritchard. C., *ibid.* p. 5.


21. *ibid.* p. 103

22. *ibid.*


26. Bevan's dislike of Gaitskell is well documented and the idea that he would somehow change his position to serve Gaitskell per se is somewhat ludicrous - on one occasion he had even accused Gaitskell of demagogy . See McDermott. G., *'Leader Lost'* (Leslie Frewin. 1972.) pp. 92 - 93.


28. *op cit.*


32. *'Disarmament and Nuclear War; The Next Step.'* 24.6.59. Labour Party.

33. in Driver. C., *op cit.* p. 92.


37. Parkin. F., *'Middle Class Radicalism'* (Manchester University Press. 1964.) p. 127.


40. see Driver. C., *op cit.* pp. 87.88.

41. see Ruston. R., *'Nuclear Deterrence - Right or Wrong'*: (Cape.,1981.) for a more complete and in-depth discussion.

42. *The Era of Atomic Power* p. 50.

43. Dr. Bell, the bishop of Chichester, who had served as the Archbishop of Canterbury’s chaplain during the First World War had long been concerned that militarism was being allowed to rise unchecked due to the ‘nationalisation’ of Christianity and believed that it should once again become internationalised; only then would the Church be able to address the question of war in a realistic manner.

44. in Driver. C., *op cit.* p. 198.
44. in Driver. C., *op cit.* p. 198.


46. *ibid.* p. 22.


CHAPTER 3.

1964 - 79. IN WITH A BANG AND OUT WITH ALMOST NOTHING.

The 1960's were to prove a curious time for CND. At the beginning of the decade success, while not assured, seemed always around the next corner. Public opinion appeared increasingly sympathetic to the unilateralist message. In 1960, the Labour Party adopted unilateralism. In 1963 the Partial Test Ban treaty (PTBT) had been signed. So, the question that needs to be addressed is, what happened during the latter half of a decade and the early part of the next in which CND,...came in with a bang and went out with almost nothing? (1)

Before answering this question it is first necessary to illustrate that CND's decline was real. The most obvious area in which the decline was apparent was in the sphere of finance, membership and general support. An examination of these shows all too clearly the problems that the movement were having to face with increasing regularity. Beginning with the financial predicament that CND faced, the audited accounts for 1964 show a relatively healthy surplus of over £5000 (2). While this may have appeared encouraging, the movement had to start to come to terms with the fact that they could no longer rely on a regular income of this nature due to the rapidly evolving political climate. This proved particularly to be the case following the Cuban missile crisis and the signing of the PTBT had drastically cut the support of the wider public on whom CND relied so heavily for income. While the committed supporter provided a relatively stable 'core' income it was the sale of CND paraphernalia etc. to this more amorphous sector that ultimately determined CND's financial health and viability. This concern with the economics of a SM began to take on almost the same importance as the movement's central tenets. The movement's National executive increasingly found their time more and more dominated by these financial considerations at the expense of a wider agenda. In the summer of 1964, the 'Million Shilling Fund' was launched in response to the fact that by May, overall debt had increased by nearly £1000. The intentions of the appeal were twofold:

i) Each region be given a target... which would result in a regular income of £1000 a month.
ii) In addition each region be given a target to be achieved by October 15th which would bring in £2500. (3)

These objectives were to be achieved by the regions gaining 1000 sponsors - groups, individuals companies etc. - who would contribute through donations to the movement. The scheme was a failure with few groups collecting the target figure within the time allowed and, by May of the following year contributions from the regions had reached a static high of around £300 per month. By the time of the next audit, the surplus of the movement had been reduced to around £2700 (4) and, by 1966 they were operating with a deficit of almost £2000 (5). The financial plight of CND was all too obvious and was underlined by a plea in October 1966 for £5000 to be raised by Christmas to enable the movement to pursue its goals and stated aims. In that months 'Sanity', a full page article detailed what CND could achieve but wouldn't unless the £5000 was found and, these included

... more and better demonstrations. At the moment we haven't enough money to advertise them properly, to recruit for them effectively. ... .There is to be a big international demonstration on Vietnam on December 10th. We ought to be able to spend £500 on this. We haven't got it (6)

- an appeal almost for their very survival. The appeal was an undoubted success and, by February of the following year a total of £4918 (7) had been realised. By July CND were once again in a surplus situation (£1188) albeit still operating on the very edge of insolvency. From this point onwards the dangers of CND disappearing due to financial constraints were relieved. Changes in membership fees and the way they were paid almost ensured the movements financial survival into the next decade at least - though it remained precarious. This was though totally reliant on CND retaining and even expanding its support to ensure this income. There were increasingly worrying signs that general support was in fact falling evidenced by the 1966 conference decision to seek to increase membership by 1968 by 3000 members generating an income of an additional £3500. In the event, once again by 1968 CND were in debt to the tune of about £2000. So it continued; one year a small surplus followed by another of deficit with the movement only surviving, as past Chairman (sic) Olive Gibbs acknowledged, due to loyalty, luck and an understanding Bank Manager (8).
Public opinion.

As to the question of public support, and perhaps this may appear self evident from the foregoing, this was certainly falling. True, the hard-core remained but, the mass support so apparent during the movements early years continued to diminish. Zoe Fairbairns, one time editor of 'Sanity' summed up the situation this way:

When strangers asked me who I worked for, I always felt I had to spell it out: 'CND...yes it is still going'. There were times when the only people on pickets seemed to be the (four) office staff - does that make us paid agitators, we wondered... (9).

For a decade which began with such optimism it seems the enthusiasm of the movement had ebbed with an increasing haemorrhage of support an obvious corollary. The reasons for this will be discussed later, for the moment an illustration of this phenomenon is necessary. In the early '60's as we have seen, hundreds of thousands had taken to the streets in the cause of unilateralism. On the Aldermaston marches Trafalgar Square was guaranteed to be packed to overflowing whilst the march itself would stretch for miles into the distance. Never before had Britain witnessed a public outpouring of protest on this scale. How then could such a movement in so short a space of time find itself applauding the fact that by 1975 its main Easter event - a 'Teach In' at Bath University - attracted 160 people. This after filling the biggest halls and squares the country could provide only ten years or so previously. The decline in support though had begun at a much earlier juncture and, as early as 1965 the Easter march could only attract about 5000 people. For the media the event was no longer 'news'. Even CND admitted, albeit in a positive manner, that the effect of such demonstrations was now limited:

It is true that the march is no longer so fashionable... If we can generalise about these marchers, they were less noisy, more serious than in previous years...(and) with the advent of the Beatles and the Rolling Stones...casual dress and long hair has established its own conformity (10).

While the Stones may have been an unfortunate example to use there is little doubt that for the majority of the establishment whom CND were trying to influence it was an apt one. The Stones viewed as they were then as non-conformist rebels. If
the views of one Tory Councillor through whose Borough the march passed, are thought to be typical, then CND were seen in the same light; Members of the movement are a lot of nitwits who sit down on the pavement to get their backsides wet (11). 

Paradoxically, in the light of CND's financial plight, Easter demonstrations following 1965 were at least numerically very successful with the 1966 event attracting crowds estimated at between 7000 and 15000 people. However, as will be shown the circumstances, aims and organisation were radically different to any that had gone before. Far more typical a turnout for a CND demonstration was that against the so called 'Nuclear Alliance' at the Czech Embassy which attracted some 280 supporters in 1970. Attention must now be given as to the reasons why in such a short space of time, CND found itself on the very margins of the political protest arena.

A major element was of course a hangover from the early years discussed earlier - the issue had lost its immediacy as the Cuban crisis had shown to many people that nuclear war was apparently not going to occur, and even the threat or deterrent value of nuclear weapons had ostensibly been proved correct. An alternate view was that the game of bluff and brinkmanship played out by Kennedy and Kruschev had proved to many that whatsoever they might do to prevent nuclear war, ultimately they were powerless to prevent the eventual outcome. Many more had taken comfort from the signing of the PTBT as, after CND had repeatedly told them that multilateralism was unworkable as a concept due to the possession of nuclear weapons locking their owners into an ever increasing spiral of increased deployment, here was proof on the face of it that World leaders could and would conclude such supposedly impossible agreements. In Frank Allaun's eyes indeed, ...it was the success of this treaty...which did more than anything else to undermine CND. Some members... sat back thinking the job had been done... (12)

Clearly, all of the above were factors in CND's early decline reflected in CND's decision after the 1964 election to organise, a series of forums in Central London in halls holding not more than 200... (13) - a far cry from the days when the Central hall could be used and be assured to be packed to overflowing. However, there were other factors that should not be overlooked in the decline of CND as a
truly mass movement. No longer could the simple and emotive phrase 'Ban the Bomb' hope to encompass all the arguments involved with the issue or elicit the same response it once had. Faced now with the slogan, supporters and public alike were entitled to ask, 'which bomb?'. The bomb had undergone a metamorphosis into something far more.

The vocabulary of the debate began to alter drastically as such weapons systems as ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile), MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicle), SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile) etc. became the issues of the day. For all but the hardened Unilateralists, the issues were too complicated as the idea of bombs dropped from aircraft was displaced by the technology and vocabulary of science fiction and the 21st Century. A more immediate problem for CND was how to respond to the situation in Vietnam. From the outset they were concerned at the way the conflict was progressing and, of particular concern during the early part of the period was the increasing degree of American involvement and the obvious implications of the USA being a nuclear power, i.e. they were concerned that should the Americans become directly involved, as of course they eventually did, they would be tempted to use their nuclear capability (as they were so tempted during the Korean war) to 'resolve' the conflict. To reflect this concern it was decided to organise that year's (1965) march around the issue of Vietnam - importantly it was not anti-American per se but anti-war in general - as Olive Gibbs remarked when asked why she would be taking part,

*For the same reasons that made me march at Easter 1958 and every Easter since then; to demonstrate my horror of nuclear weapons and my total opposition to any policies based on them* (14).

**CND, Vietnam and radicalism.**

Not everyone associated with CND shared such clear sentiments though and a rift began to develop throughout the movement over CND's position of neutralism in that rather than attaching blame to any one protagonist, CND viewed all parties to be at fault in resorting to the option of conflict to resolve the problem. At a later anti-war rally later that same year (16.10.65) leading speakers from CND attacked American policy directly and declared that CND should actively support the Vietnamese Liberation Front (NLF) against the USA. The movement began to split decisively into two opposing camps with many long term rank and file members
expressing anger and sadness at the turn of events. Typical of such feelings were those of Nonie Larbey, then secretary of the Hertfordshire area CND;

At the Trafalgar Square meeting on October 16th I was disturbed to hear Mervyn Rice (Chairman of Youth CND) imply that CND should support the NLF of Vietnam...CND's basic hypothesis is surely that all war in the nuclear age is indefensible...and we cannot therefore see how...we can lend our name in support of a country which employs violence to further even the most noble of ends (15)

Increasingly obvious too was the growing influence of groups within CND, now they had become part of the anti-war movement, who were not made up of the 'middle class radicals' identified by Parkin. Yes, the majority were middle class, but these were not the moderate left wing middle classes on which CND were founded. YCND in particular provided a base for the increasingly radical student and Marxist groups that hitherto had always had a presence at demonstrations and rally's but had remained almost loftily removed from the mainstream and happy to operate on the periphery of the movement. Anarchists, who had also long attached themselves limpet like to the demonstrations, but had also remained aloof from the mainstream, became the focal point of unrest at public rallies. During the Easter march of 1966 they had almost succeeded in turning what had been a peaceful event into violent confrontation with the police, with 28 eventually being arrested outside the US Embassy in Grosvenor Square. More telling though were the comments made by one of the anarchists at the rally who said, ...the CND had become ineffectual. The rally was becoming a ritual and those who took part in it were fast becoming a laughing stock (16).

Whether such comments stung CND into action is unclear but, what is in no doubt is the effect such statements and actions had on the mainstream CND supporter on whose continued involvement it could be argued the movements chances of survival and success depended, as well as on the direction the movement was apparently moving. One supporter wrote of the 1966 rally;

... we heard no well known public figures speaking for CND. ... we did not attend to hear folk songs, or the views of any splinter groups - be they anarchist, socialist, communist, vegetarian, Christian or atheist. It was always previously understood that whatever you were, on that day and march our object was to demonstrate against nuclear war (17).
By 1967 it would appear that the above view was almost a minority opinion within the movement as CND appeared to have been appropriated by the radical left. At the annual conference in 1966, the 250 delegates, against the advice of the National Council, decided that major policy changes in the Easter demonstration should take place with the main theme being the condemnation of the British government's support of American action in Vietnam. At the National Council meeting which followed, it was also decided that for the first time the demonstration should be jointly organised with other 'radical' groups, such as the United Nations Association (UNA), the Campaign for Anti-Racism and Discrimination (CARD), the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AA) and Oxfam. The demonstration was to be one... in which Vietnam would be seen as part of the wider perspective of the Cold War and the conflict between the affluent white and poor coloured nations (18).

Gone almost totally was any reference to 'Ban the Bomb', instead it was replaced by an anti-imperialist message in which any reference to nuclear weapons was obfuscated and carried through in a broad reference to the 'Cold War'. Theoretically as it is the conference that holds ultimate responsibility for policy, this decision and vote became official policy, even though serious misgivings were voiced by members of the National Council, such as Peter Worsley, who argued that by accepting a broadly based march they had effectively closed the campaign - a decision he believed they would regret. However, due to CND's organisational structure, the decisions carried at conference may not be final policy. The National Executive Committee spends much of its time sorting out the actual practicalities of policy decisions and campaign issues not able to be discussed either at conference or National Council and is, more often than not, the real arena in which the final and refined policy is made and distilled. On this occasion the committee identified several difficulties in agreeing a joint approach with the aforementioned organisations. It was finally agreed that,...CND should run the Easter demonstration and should invite other organisations to co-operate (19).

This should be viewed as an attempt by the still largely conservative committee to placate the increasingly disenchanted yet important middle class membership. They were increasingly dismayed at the direction the movement appeared to be taking. At the same time the committee hoped to keep the increasingly influential radicals within the movement happy. There was also the hope that the issue of nuclear weapons might once again reassume its previous centrality to the campaign as
opposed to the spreading theme of general anti-Americanism that appeared to be gaining ground. This strategy, if that is what it could be termed, appears to have failed on all fronts. The demonstration itself was the smallest for many years with an attendance estimated at around 3000 and, if they hoped to attract a majority of unilateralists, as opposed to the multi faceted radical left, they were again to be sorely disappointed. The BBC in a Home Service radio documentary on the rise and fall of CND sent a reporter to cover the demonstration and he later commented that the typical slogans on view included, 'Hands off Vietnam', 'Polaris, out, out, out', 'Get your Anarchist Badges', 'Yanks Out', 'Against Racialism', 'Votes at Eighteen', - The original, purer slogan, 'Ban the Bomb', appeared to have been mislaid (20).

The belief that CND remained neutral over Vietnam as well as a host of other issues appeared to have gone. This can be illustrated by the lack of CND paraphernalia on the march, replaced for the majority by small flags of the NLF. It was not only Vietnam; anti-racism, housing, employment, sexual discrimination - all, argued the burgeoning radical left, contributed to the state of mind and false consciousness that allowed wars to be fought by capitalist 'democracies' and allowed therefore the development of weapons of mass destruction while the population acquiesced or were increasingly apathetic. Throughout this period in its history the movement continued with its delicate balancing act of retaining the central message of unilateralism while at the same time attempting to incorporate other issues, perhaps with the most honest motives of linkage but surely also in the hope of retaining, or perhaps more properly at this stage, regaining the mass support to which it had become accustomed. Such tactics though ensured that CND became lost amidst a welter of other protest groups who attached themselves to a variety of eclectic causes. These included amongst others Vietnam, Rhodesia, South Africa, Northern Ireland and opposition to Britain's proposed entry to the European Common Market. To many outsiders the movement may have once attracted, they appeared a vehicle of the extreme left; a haven for the followers of Guavara, Castro and Trotsky with which the era, not just in Britain but throughout Europe, was redolent. The events of March 1968 and the so called 'Battle of Grosvenor Square' when over 200 were arrested during a violent anti-war demonstration did little to help this impression. The sight of demonstrators carrying or wearing the CND symbol while screaming imprecations or throwing bottles at the police or darts at police horses dismayed many both inside and outside the movement. The days of peaceful, popular and politically effective demonstrations appeared a distant memory. CND, to their credit attempted to distance themselves from such extremes and, the following week, fearing another violent confrontation, attempted to
organise a separate demonstration to the main event (21) planned later for that same day. This CND organised demonstration was described as ...a model of orderly good humour and disciplined behaviour (22).

However, as the later demonstration in the afternoon was ending, violence, although not on the scale of the previous week, erupted yet again. There were scuffles at the Cenotaph as demonstrators laid a wreath under the inscription 'To Our Glorious Dead' in the colours of the Vietcong, while there were breakaway marches that came into confrontation with the police and counter demonstrations and a total of 43 people were arrested. The organisers of the later march, the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign Ad Hoc Committee had been present at the earlier CND march as individual members and one of their leading figures, Tariq Ali, later remarked, somewhat prophetically,

this is the end of the old style CND demonstrations. People now realise that these things are irrelevant ; that is why six times as many people came last Sunday. In future they will come to ours (23).

The 1970's.

By 1969 the very future of CND was coming to be called into question. At the annual conference moves were made to change the name of the organisation to the Campaign for Survival (although whether this referred to survival of the movement or mankind is debatable). Delegates were told by the acting treasurer, Sheila Oakes, of debts of over £4000. The realisation that the days of the big Easter march were numbered was also apparent. The decision was made therefore that the tradition be changed in favour of a static rally with some form of relevant entertainment as the centrepiece. One delegate even went so far as to suggest that the organisation be wound up as, the movement had been set up to work through mass demonstration and, . . . they are now pitifully small. Nobody takes any notice. The population as a whole just does not care (24).

The suggestion was of course taken no further while the move to change the name of CND was also defeated but, only after being remitted to the National Council. Despite these decisions, the signs of a movement in serious, if not terminal decline were there for all who cared to see (25). The movements fortunes though were soon to be revived not by any action on their part but, as is so often the case, by the
actions and decisions taken by the politicians and military men of Whitehall, Washington and Moscow.

The Neutron bomb, or 'Enhanced Radiation Weapon' as the Pentagon preferred it to be called, is a weapon that relies on one component; prompt and increased radiation while playing down the other horrific effects of nuclear explosion such as blast, heat and delayed fall out, all of which would still be present. The weapon had originally been intended for use as a battlefield anti-tank bomb or artillery shell designed to halt armour and 'disable' their crews. The debate became somewhat confused after it was suggested they could be used against other targets such as cities and increase, to use 'Pentagonese' vocabulary, 'collateral' damage (human deaths), while at the same time leaving 'real estate' (buildings etc.) relatively unscathed - as some critics see it, the ultimate capitalist weapon. This though was never the use to which the Pentagon saw them being put. Supporters saw its capability as a 'tank buster' would make it easier to use in a battlefield situation thus enhancing deterrence. Opponents argued that it was this very reason, its potential for ease of use, that would make escalation to full nuclear exchange more likely. In the period 1977 through 1979, the debate within NATO raged as to the weapons most effective deployment. The US President, Jimmy Carter, was at first prepared to deploy if the Europeans asked for deployment. Then in 1978, Carter decided unilaterally not to begin production at all, yet alone deploy the new weapon. The Germans in particular were dismayed at this decision and the German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher flew to Washington in an attempt to persuade Carter to change his mind. The result of this meeting was a somewhat bizarre decision that the weapon be included in the forth coming talks with the Soviets even though the weapon was neither being produced or deployed.

All of the above for CND was little more than an exercise in semantics as, for the first time there appeared to be an implicit component within the debate that showed that the doctrines of Counterforce and MAD, under which no side would risk starting a war due to the other sides ability to destroy them, was an historical irrelevance. Here instead was a new strategy and weapon which made the idea of actually fighting a limited nuclear war acceptable. Not only was this of concern in itself but, it also appeared that this nuclear exchange would take place on the battlefields of Europe. Thus, while 'limited' for the USA, countries such as West and East Germany, Poland, Hungary et al whose borders formed the front line would in all likelihood be devastated. Throughout Europe the slumbering peace movement awoke to this new threat and found that once again people were turning to them in significant numbers to protest at this new turn of events. In Holland one
million signatures against deployment were collected while in Britain, CND collected a quarter of a million signatures. This was a level of support that could never have been envisaged had not the Neutron Bomb re-awakened the public to the new realities of the possession of nuclear weapons. As Cathy Ashton, one time vice chair of CND has said, . . . Carter's decision to deploy this weapon unwittingly created the seed from which the peace movement was to blossom (26).

Though this 'blossoming', or perhaps re-blossoming may be more apt, was a slow process, CND's national membership had by 1979 doubled and more to stand at around 4287 after a low in 1971 of around 2000 with, between 1977 and 1979, over 1700 new members joining and affiliated groups such as trade unions jumping from a low of 68 in 1972 to almost 300 in 1979. More growth of a somewhat more spectacular nature was experienced again in 1979 with the Government's decision to site Cruise missiles in Britain in 1983. Cruise is a pilotless aircraft with continual propulsion, that is to say it is a hybrid bomb/missile and a direct progeny of the Nazi V2 programme. Cruise missiles had two distinct features that were advantageous to the military planners; i) they were extremely accurate over long distances - something a ballistic missile lacks and, ii) they provided a loophole in the SALT treaty which made mention of ballistic missiles only thus allowing this frightening piece of new military hardware to be deployed (Kissinger believed too that the deployment would give the NATO allies greater leverage in the next round of the SALT talks). Following hard on the heels of the Neutron Bomb debate, this was almost bound to create a furore especially when it became clear that overall control of the weapon would remain in the hands of the Americans, even though they were to based on British soil at (nominally) British RAF bases. The outcry against this escalation in the arms race was, it is fair to say, totally unexpected by the British and American governments. Meanwhile the public, whose concern had been aroused by the Neutron Bomb episode was deeply divided over the Cruise decision. CND too were (pleasantly) surprised by the public's reaction and by 1980 membership had again doubled from just over 4000 to over 9000 and the number of local CND groups had leapt from 150 to 300. CND had taken the first steps in their new reincarnation as a truly mass protest movement and, perhaps as importantly the issue of nuclear disarmament was once again fixed firmly as the centre piece of their protest.
Labour in power and opposition - Pushing on an open or closed door?

What though of CND's 'ally', the Labour Party? While opposed to Cruise and the Neutron Bomb, unilateralism was by this stage apparently a lost cause. In the 1978 conference debate Labour placed themselves firmly in the multilateralist camp when, in reference to Cruise and the Neutron Bomb they stated, *...immediate initiation of international negotiations to bring about agreements and measures that will totally ban this dreadful weapon* (27) was their stated policy. Had Labour by this time become a lost cause for CND or was unilateralism still significantly alive within the party? It is this question that must now be addressed.

As stated earlier, Gaitskell's early death in 1963 had deprived many on the left of an obvious target and, with Wilson's succession to the leadership the left were somewhat placated due to his centre-left credentials (28). Under the circumstances Wilson was perhaps the most 'radical' candidate with a real chance of winning power for the party that the left could hope for (29). Much of the fervour within the party for unilateralism was dissipated by Wilson's election. CND had high hopes for the Labour government elected in 1964 and these hopes appeared realistic when the new government cancelled one of the five new Polaris submarines. It was a small step for CND but nonetheless after years of false hopes, one in the right direction. This was though to be the only success they enjoyed and even that later transpired to be not a moral decision but economic and military. Denis Healey, the Labour Defence Minister had decided that military spending be held at a level of £2000m. in 1964 and rising to £2400m. by 1969/70 (at 1964 prices), believing that this would reduce the amount of GDP spent on defence from 7 to 6 per cent, thereby increasing the amount available for other economic causes and, part of this 'Defence Review' (although it came before the actual review paper proper), was the cancellation of the fifth Polaris submarine.

Perhaps in hindsight, CND should have realised that even with a Labour government in power committed to reducing the arms expenditure, the equation of 'cutting' need not necessarily mean removal of weapons. It could equally mean their replacement with cheaper alternatives or, reduced roles for those already in service rather than their wholesale destruction. Certainly the portents for a close relationship were becoming unfavourable. This should perhaps have been realised when CND's attempts to foster a relationship with the party immediately before the
1964 election had been sharply rebuffed by Wilson - CND's National Executive had written to Wilson asking him to receive a CND deputation to discuss the nuclear issue, as they had with the other major party leaders. Wilson alone replied to this request with an unequivocal "No" (30). He gave no reasons of any kind and it was a rebuff that should perhaps have indicated to CND that his mind was firmly set on a course in which CND and unilateralism played little or no part whatsoever. CND did not appear to be listening, or perhaps they themselves were ‘turning a deaf ear ‘ to Wilson's apparent intransigence in the hope that once elected a Labour Government freed from the constraints of electoral necessity might become more amenable to CND's blandishments and advances. On November 10th 1964 a Majority Report of the Executive Committee of CND on the future role of the movement still persevered with the impression that Labour would listen and that . . . CND must provide. . . support. . . to ensure they (Labour) are not deflected from their purpose. . . (31), of disarmament in general and British nuclear disarmament in particular. If CND were giving the impression of not hearing or ignoring the signals emanating from the Labour Party then the Labour Party were making no such pretence of listening to CND anymore. As early as December 1964, Wilson stated, . . . we cannot afford to relinquish our World role - our role which for shorthand purposes, is sometimes called our 'East of Suez' role (32) .

If further evidence were needed by CND that Labour had finally deserted them and their cause it was provided by Labour's response to the Chinese exploding their first nuclear weapon. Labour immediately stated that should India, in the face of this new threat in Asia, wish it they could have the protection of the British deterrent and in Wilson's assertion that,. . . our frontiers are on the Himalayas and in the standard of living of the people of India (33) . Far from the language of disarmament this was the language of neo -colonialism and a government that still viewed Britain as a significant World power.

Some hope for CND did remain with Labour committed to reducing defence spending - surely here there was room for cuts in spending and a halt in deployment of new weapons systems. These though were hopes that were to be dashed for, despite the scrapping of the fifth Polaris, nothing that already existed was discarded. Instead, the cancellation of future projects, such as the P1154, HS681 and TSR2 aircraft were the areas on which the axe fell most readily. To imagine that CND were without support within the party at this time would be to give a false impression. Throughout this time Labour MP's were still regular participants at
CND events, particularly at Easter (Frank Allaun, Stan Orme, Konni Zilliacus etc.) and, within the PLP as a whole, there remained a genuine commitment to defence spending cuts - real cuts as opposed to the cancellation of projects not yet deployed - and particularly a desire for such cuts to fall on Britain’s perceived role ‘East of Suez’. While this support might not have included outright support for nuclear cuts, it was still a source of encouragement for CND. Growing too at this time was an increasing disquiet with the Government’s apparent close relationship with the Americans over the developing Vietnamese situation. At the conference that year, this concern was reflected in a motion calling on the government to recognise

...the heavy burden on the national income involved by the maintenance of outmoded military bases abroad and urges the government....to take all these factors into consideration, so that the nation will be relieved of the increased burden of defence expenditure (33) .

The government though had no intention of relinquishing Britain's world role but, due to opposition within the party to the 'East of Suez' role, this was the area in which the most drastic cuts were eventually made with the cancellation, amongst other things, of a new generation of aircraft carriers, (the CVA01), designed to enhance that role. Even so the government still argued that its responsibilities in the East could still be carried out from bases in Britain using the new F-111 aircraft recently ordered from the USA.

By the time of the 1966 election, even with a large influx of new Labour MP's, CND's influence within the party was at best minimal. There was no-one in a position of power within the party that could remotely be regarded as a unilateralist and, despite a commitment to again cut defence spending Labour still retained the belief not only in Britain's NATO role, but also as an independent and real world military power. It is true to say that throughout the period of this Labour government unilateralism was never an issue seriously raised and certainly never considered, causing the relationship, such as it now was, between the party and CND to deteriorate to a point where - apart from the heroic efforts of a few MP's to keep the issue live - there was in fact no meaningful relationship whatsoever. Certainly there was still a significant number of Labour MP's who continually harassed the government on the issue of defence cuts (such as the occasion in 1967 when some 63 MP's rebelled against the whip in abstaining on the 1967 Defence White Paper vote or, in 1969, when 30 backbenchers abstained over Healey's defence statement), but as seen, Wilson and Healey's prime concern was Britain's
role as a world power - a world power 'on the cheap' certainly but, an important military player on the world stage nonetheless. Indicative of the apparent torpor that had settled on the party regarding the nuclear arms issue was the fact that between 1965 and 1971 only one of eight resolutions concerned with defence presented to conference made explicit mention of Britain's nuclear capability (1968 - a motion calling on the government, as part of a rethink of defence policy to...stop making both nuclear weapons and their delivery systems (34). Even this was defeated on a card vote by over a million votes and did not in any way, had it been successful, call for unilateral disarmament or the ability to prevent Britain purchasing weapons and/or delivery systems from other states. )

Yet further strains were placed on the CND/Labour relationship by Labour's continued support for the USA as it became yet more involved in Vietnam. CND came to view Wilson as 'Johnsons Boy' (35) appearing as he did totally uncritical of US foreign policy, not only in Vietnam but in the Far East generally. Wilson justified his support of Johnson and US foreign policy in these terms ;

...we strongly believe in the stabilising force of the Western Alliance and (This was the basis for his support) we must be careful to do nothing to weaken the cohesion of the Alliance and its ability to deter the changing threat of aggression (36). 

CND saw statements such as this as an indication that in the Labour leadership there was a Cold War mentality every bit as dangerous as any Tory government that had ever been in power. There is little need to expand on these matters other than to say that CND had reached an impasse in their relations with the one party that could or would even try to reduce or even eliminate the British or any other nuclear deterrent. However, by 1972, and after the election defeat in June 1970, unilateralism returned to the Labour Party agenda in a major way and the path appeared to have been cleared for a thawing in the Cold War that had developed between movement and party.

At both the 1972 and 1973 party conference, the party once again swung decisively behind the unilateralist cause. In 1972 a motion declaring and demanding that the next Labour government remove all nuclear bases in Britain was presented while the 1973 conference declared itself ...opposed to any British defence policy based on the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons...(and) demands the closing down
of all nuclear bases...and demands this pledge be included in the next election manifesto (37) .

What did finally appear was a somewhat diluted version but nevertheless a major step forward from the previous Labour policy in that they pledged to, a) seek the removal from Britain of the American Polaris base, b) renounce any intent of moving towards a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons, i.e., the replacement of the rapidly ageing Polaris and, c) a commitment to reduce defence spending to the same level of a proportion of GDP as our European allies. After Labour's re-election in 1974, faced with declining industrial output and accelerating inflation, as well as growing pressure from within the party, it seemed that these pledges may become a reality. On the first of the pledges (American bases) nothing happened at all, the pledge was allowed to fade into obscurity while the third pledge became a political and economic maze of semantics coupled with what can only be seen as creative accounting. Without wishing to be come bogged down in the mire of economic language and calculi, what resulted from the ensuing review was,

... the appearance that it (the government) was fulfilling its manifesto pledge . . . by assuming an implausible increase in the economic growth . . . it claimed that the defence burden would be reduced from 5.5% to 4.5% of GNP thus bringing it ten years later 'more into line' with major European allies (38) .

The second and probably most important manifesto pledge as far as CND were concerned was laid to rest after another round of political and military juggling. The government continually insisted that there would be no new generation of weapons but also insisted on the maintenance of the effectiveness of the existing deterrent. This insistence was the device by which a continuing development was defended. Such developments included the building of a new plant at Chapelcross to manufacture Tritium for warheads (since 1958 this had been imported from America), the decision to replace the ageing Vulcan bomber with the Tornado MRCA, a continuing interest in the development of the Cruise missile and, after a nine year interval, the resumption of weapons testing. CND was of course dismayed, arguing that while the letter of the manifesto had been observed the spirit in which the pledge had been made was assuredly broken.
Of more concern was the way in which the debate - a misnomer if ever there was one - on the 'maintenance' of the effectiveness of the existing deterrent took shape. The decision to modernise Polaris had been made by the previous Tory administration but was carried forward by the Wilson government. Like the decision to produce the Atom Bomb in 1947, 'Project Chevaline' (39) as it was known was authorised by a small clique of Ministers and Wilson and the decision hidden from Parliament and the public by charging the cost of research and development to what was euphemistically termed the 'Maintenance Budget'. Once again, it is clear that CND had no role to play and, once again relations between the two were reduced to contacts with largely ineffectual and little known figures within the party - there was no equivalent of Bevan to fight the unilateralist cause in the highest offices of Whitehall. What rebellion there was on the defence issue was confined to abstentions in votes by Labour backbenchers on defence reviews in which Britain's possession of a nuclear capability was rarely if ever mentioned let alone questioned.

Unlike CND during this period, Labour was united on a variety of issues. While CND were desperately fighting for their very survival, the lack of an effective anti-nuclear lobby allowed multilateralism to become the accepted wisdom within the Labour Party, so much so that the unilateralist posture adopted by the party in 1973 could almost be viewed as an aberration or a luxury the party leadership could allow the radicals while they were in opposition. Pragmatism though returned at the time of an election and, when faced with the realities (as Labour if not CND saw them) of the governance of Britain. When Bertrand Russell had publicly destroyed his Labour Party membership card in 1965 he declared of the then Labour Party government, *Hitler at least never professed humanity, but these men who now pollute the chairs of office professed before the election the most noble and lofty ideals of human brotherhood* (39) - in 1965 people were still listening to CND and such gestures mattered. By the 1970's CND was almost a nonentity; an organisation that appeared to be in its death throes; those who had not left in disillusionment or disgust had barely heard of them or had forgotten them. People were no longer listening to CND's message - certainly Labour had ceased to listen many years before.
FOOTNOTES.


2. CND Audited Income and Expenditure Accounts. 30.6.64

3. CND National Executive Minutes. 25.7.64

4. CND Audited Income and Expenditure Accounts. 30.6.65

5. ibid. 30.6.66

6. Sanity. 10.66

7. Sanity. 2.67

8. Sanity. 5

9. in Minnion. J. et al., op cit., p. 68.

10. Sanity. 5.65

11. ibid.


13. CND National Executive Minutes. 26.9.64.

14. Sanity. 2.65

15. Letter to Sanity. 10.65

16. The Times. 12.4.66

17. Letter to Sanity. 5.66

18. CND National Council Minutes. 5.12.65
19. CND National Executive Minutes. 7&8.1.67


21. For an excellent in depth study of this march, see Halloran. J. D. et al., *Demonstrations and Communication; A Case Study*. (Penguin. 1970.) particularly Ch. 1 & 2. pp. 17 - 51.

22. *The Times*. 25.3.68

23. *ibid.*


25. The 'static' rally in 1970 did in fact prove to be something of a success with over 8000 people attending - although, how many were CND supporters and how many were residents of Bethnal Green out for the day at a carnival in Victoria Park, we cannot be sure. This though was to be the high point of the movement's activities for a number of years with the 1970 conference again discussing whether the organisation should be disbanded. The remainder of the larger part of the '70s were spent reeling from one financial crisis to another. By 1976, the Easter event was a march through East Anglia to RAF Lakenheath in which only about 300 took part.


28. Tony Benn's reaction to the election of Wilson was typical of the left's attitude; "It is a great shot in the arm and opens up all sorts of possibilities for the Party...He is an excellent chairman...and has some radical instincts where Hugh (Gaitskell) had none", in Benn. T. *Out of the Wilderness. Diaries 1963 - 67*. (Hutchinson. 1987.) p. 5.

29. In a memo to his own party, Richard E. Neustadt, a member of the West German SPD, wrote on July 6th 1964; "A Labour victory should leave the left unorganised and leaderless (Wilson was its leader) ". Commenting on Wilson's
style of leadership he further noted, "...he...means to take all key decisions into his own hands...sitting at the centre of a brains trust with himself as first brains truster... 'I shall be chairman of the board, not President, he says, but Managing Director too, and very active at it'". in *New Left Review*. 'Memo on the British Labour Party and the MLF.'. 1968. Vol. 51. pp. 11 - 21.

30. *CND Majority Report of the Executive Committee*. 10.11.64

31. *CND National Executive Minutes*. 30.6.64

32. *House of Commons Debates*. 12.6.64. col. 423.4


34. Craig. F. W. S., op cit p. 140.1

35. *ibid*. p. 142


38. Craig. F.W.S., *op cit*. p.143


40. 'Project Chevaline' revolved around the debate regarding the upgrading of Britain's deterrent. Faced with having to counter the penetration of the Soviet 'GALOSH' ABM system that surrounded Moscow, the original Polaris had, in strategic terms become redundant. There were two options for its 'replacement'; 1. The purchase of the 'Poseidon' SLBM - a new missile with a 'MIRV'd' front end carrying between ten to fourteen warheads or,
2. Fit a new warhead to the existing Polaris system.
It was this option that eventually proved most attractive and, in 1973 the 'Super Antelope' warhead, the speciality of which was the penetration of ABM's went into development under the codename 'Chevaline'. As one commentator has noted in reference to the decision, *The virtues of Chevaline did not lie in strategic rationale...the aim was to keep a nuclear capacity in being.*
(See Freedman, L., *Britain and Nuclear Weapons*. (Papermac. 1980.) p.53.)

41. *Sanity*. 2.65.
CHAPTER 4.

CND-THE SECOND WAVE - INFLUENCE OR IMPACT?

Duncan Rees (1), writing in 1987, said that

*CND has now twice...grown spectacularly in size and influence. I would suggest that in both cases this has had much to do with external...factors and little to do with meticulous planning for expansion by CND itself* (2).

This appraisal of CND during the period now being considered (1980 - 1989/90) is to some extent correct in that, as will be shown, it was indeed externalities which ultimately determined the organisation's growth during the early part of the decade in particular. Where Rees' thesis must be questioned is over the matter of 'influence' - does he mean by 'influence' political, i.e. within the political system as exemplified by the political parties; public opinion or influence over the executive and/or the majority party in the House of Commons? - this is something he does not make clear, and is a question that is vital in any examination of CND during the 1980's.

CND's growth, or perhaps regeneration is a more apt term, during this phase is self evident. Membership had doubled during 1980 to stand at around 9,000 - , and in the following years it increased even more dramatically until, by March 1984, the total national membership stood at around 94,000 with a renewal rate of over 70 per cent and the number of new applications for membership per week running at an average of around 400 (and this was the average at a time when there were no advertising campaigns and minimal publicity). By the time of CND's annual demonstration in October 1980, public support for the movement had grown to such an extent that between 50/80,000 people took part in that march through Central London. For Bruce Kent that day

...stands out above all the others...I was almost crying as I saw the size of the demonstration...Yet less than a year earlier a few hundred people had come to the same United Nations disarmament event (3).

Although impressive in size, CND where no longer to be found at the vanguard of this new protest as they once had been. Due to the difficulties experienced they were still just one group amongst many to which support for the cause had
dispersed. These groups included the World Disarmament Campaign, various religious, pacifist and humanitarian groups, the far left, such as the BCP and the SWP, and perhaps most importantly the increasingly influential environmental lobby such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. While all of the above were important, by far the biggest contribution to the march in terms of numbers were the individuals who were members of no one group. Like the early Aldermaston marchers many of these new participants in popular protest were young people who in many cases had never been involved in politics before (4). The protest also marked a return to the movement of those members who had left after the heady days of the early sixties when anything seemed possible (with amongst the most welcome being E.P. Thompson). CND was once again moving towards being viewed as the natural rallying point for this new, and not so new support, and were soon back in the vanguard of the disarmament campaign. Once again the symbol of the broken cross, for so many years a forgotten totem, became de rigeur for the committed and the radical as well as for many whom its only association was an historical artefact more commonly associated with scenes from the Woodstock era and the pop culture of the late sixties and early seventies. Once again CND's message was being delivered at a time when people were prepared to listen. This included many who had been, if not opponents of the message, certainly stoically indifferent throughout the preceding decades.

The rebirth of the movement.

We will return later to examine the matter of public support for CND in a wider discussion of their effectiveness during the decade, but for now, an examination of why support for the movement increased so dramatically during the early part of the decade is required. The General Election of May 1979 had returned the Conservative Party to power with a commitment to improve Britain's defences which included the continuation of the deployment of Cruise and the replacement of the ageing Polaris system with the new Trident C4 missile. While deployment of the new generation of missiles is important in that it forced the public into consideration of nuclear weapons for perhaps the first time since the early sixties, their deployment, or at least the decision to deploy, was also made at a particularly fortunate (for CND anyway) historical juncture when US - Soviet relations were at a very low ebb. The Soviet Union had only recently invaded Afghanistan causing a virtual freeze in any relations between the superpowers other than those that were conducted in the style of 'megaphone' diplomacy. While war between the superpowers over the issue of Afghanistan was never a realistic possibility, it did serve to illustrate that the almost comforting stand off or status quo of the 'old'
Cold War was over, and that the superpowers could and would risk the possibility of conflict despite the popular assumption that the very possession of weapons of mass destruction prevented such action - one could almost argue that where Vietnam threw this doctrine into question, Afghanistan appeared to be the conclusive argument and final nail in the coffin of the nuclear weapons as deterrent stratagem so long portrayed as orthodoxy by all the major players on the nuclear stage. It became increasingly clear that the MAD doctrine was outdated and talk of a 'winnable' nuclear exchange - with Europe as the battlefield - was fast becoming in military/political circles, an accepted currency whereby the

...evolving military strategy for NATO (had) placed Europe in a position where its destiny in any conflict with the Soviet Union (was) to become a doomed, ghost haunted battlefield (5).

Such a scenario was of course nothing new; Kissinger, as early as 1959 had stated;

_The defence of Europe cannot be conducted solely from North America...however firm allied unity may be, a nation cannot be counted on to commit suicide in defence of a foreign territory_ (6)

and, by 1976 the former Secretary of State for Defence, James Schlesinger, left no doubts as to US/NATO defence policy when he said,

...should deterrence fail, our theater nuclear capabilities provide a source of limited and controlled options other than the early use of US and allied forces...we do not rule out the use of nuclear weapons...if that should prove necessary to contain and repel a major conventional (My italics) attack by the Warsaw pact (7).

It thus appeared that the idea of deterrence was all but dead as a) it saw nuclear exchanges as winnable, and b) these, even if they meant a first strike by NATO against Soviet troops in Europe, would if needs be, be initiated by Warsaw Pact aggression - something the doctrines of deterrence and MAD had supposedly made unthinkable and yet it was something that in the minds of military strategists was not only 'thinkable' but also possible or even probable. During the period of status quo relationships between the superpowers such strategic thinking went largely unnoticed by all but academics, military strategists and historians, politicians and committed peace campaigners. To the majority of the public it was just another twist in the game of nerves and the convoluted game of nuclear etymology played out by the superpowers and one which the majority, looking at it in that context,
could very well ignore, as was much of the argument over the so called 'missile gap' (so assiduously pursued by the Americans) created by the deployment of the new Soviet SS 20 ICBM. The real sea change in public opinion and sensibilities occurred with the announcement of the twin or dual track policy, i.e., the introduction of Cruise and Pershing 2 IRNF's in 1979, closely followed in Britain by the publication of the Government booklet 'Protect and Survive' in the Spring of 1980 - a booklet which asked people to ponder the unthinkable - that should Britain be subject to nuclear attack, could your family survive and then proceeded to explain what simple measures could be taken to maximise the chance of survival (these measures included such helpful hints as taping up your windows to prevent being showered with glass and further useful advice as to how to survive if caught outside when the attack occurred - lie down.). In February of that same year the BBC in the 'Panorama' programme had broadcast the civil defence film made by the government in the run up to nuclear war. The British people were for the first time being made aware that which they had for so long was told could never happen was indeed being planned for, and the question that was increasingly being asked was, if, as you have told us for so many years, nuclear weapons prevent nuclear war, then why do we need to prepare to survive a nuclear war?

Opposition to Cruise began to swell from the end of 1979 and the early 1980's onwards, shown relatively consistently in opinion polls of the time;

**TABLE 4:1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Should</th>
<th>Should Not</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sept.1983</strong></td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MORI.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oct.1981 MORI</strong></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oct. 1982.</strong></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOC.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jan. 1983</strong></td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>.MORI.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jan. 28th-Feb.</strong></td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1983. SOC.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Support amongst the general public for deployment, if the polls were to be believed, was markedly low and this trend was also reflected throughout Europe as support for the movement increased so dramatically during the early part of the decade. CND recruitment was also aided by increasing revelations throughout the early eighties regarding nuclear weapons and civil defence planning. For example, the publication of the details surrounding the civil defence exercise 'Square Leg' in the 'New Statesman' showed that no-one and nowhere, according to official estimates, would be safe in a nuclear exchange (shades here of the Sandys' Defence review). Evidence also emerged of plans for an elite to survive in a string of 'secret' bunkers while plans had also been made to remove the nation's artistic and other treasures to vast bunkers created in old slate quarries in the Welsh mountains; all of this coming to light at a time when the rest of the population were being told that the best way of surviving a nuclear attack was simply to remain indoors. Details also began to emerge of a series of computer faults in the American early warning systems which had, if the reports were to be believed, for a while made the possibility of an American counter strike against a non-existent Soviet strike a possibility. Coupled with the increasingly vitriolic nature of relations between the superpowers and Soviet sabre rattling over the increasingly dangerous Polish/Solidarity question, and Ronald Reagan's volumatic, belligerent and bellicose attitude to anything Communist - including the Soviet Union's Caribbean and Central American 'client states' (Grenada, Nicaragua etc., and of course Cuba) this era was to prove a fertile ground for recruitment to the peace movement generally and to CND in particular. As has already been illustrated, membership rocketed, and even after deployment of Cruise in 1983, by 1985 CND were still receiving between 50 and 60 new applications a day for membership and the national membership had grown to over 110,000 with approximately another 250,000 members of local CND groups. By any criteria they were once again becoming a truly mass movement comparing favourably, in terms of the size of membership, with most political parties, and perhaps even more favourably in terms of activity levels of that membership. A survey carried out in 1985 of CND's national membership found that from its total membership there were,

...some 5,000 (Perhaps even 10,000) people who are active in this way (canvassing and lobbying) - an achievement which can only be matched...by the major political parties (10),

and this takes no account of the many more who indulged in more passive activity such as simply wearing a CND badge or putting 'No Cruise - No Trident' slogans on the rear windows of their cars - in the same survey 88% of respondents (sympathisers, participants and activists) engaged in this minimal activity. Returning to Rees' initial assertion regarding influence, then it must be said that the debate as a whole had a substantial and increasing influence on public opinion, but the important distinction to be made here is that it was not CND that was orchestrating the debate in toto but that they, in common with all the other participants were following in the wake of developments that were external to them and over which they exercised little or no control (only in the orchestration of the debate regarding Civil defence could it be argued that CND had made the running - as will be shown later in the discussion of the impact of the 'Square Leg' exercise). Certainly, while a consistent majority of the public were against modernisation, there remained majority support amongst them for the idea of nuclear deterrence as a bulwark of NATO strategic policy: While they may also have abhorred the idea of first use, Cruise and (perhaps) Trident (to many Trident appeared to be so far in the future it was not of immediate concern), what the majority were not in favour of was CND's unilateralist and anti-NATO position, as illustrated by the following opinion polls from 1983, when Cruise was deployed (11);

**TABLE 4:2**
The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs - Louis Harris Poll Sept.10th - Nov.4th 1983.

| The use of nuclear weapons is not acceptable under any circumstances not even if we are attacked with nuclear weapons | 24% |
| Nuclear weapons should be used if we are attacked with nuclear weapons | 61% |
In the current debate...which of the following best expresses your personal view ...?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Give up all nuclear weapons regardless of whether the Soviet Union does</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduce just enough weapons to create a balance between East and West until an acceptable agreement can be concluded.</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly CND were carrying forward support on the issue of Cruise (although the reply to the last question would appear to suggest that by the time of deployment many had succumbed to the idea that there existed a missile 'gap' that only Cruise could fill) but were still failing to convince the majority of the public and electorate on the merits of unilateralism (Peter Byrd in an article marking CND's 30th anniversary in 1988 also concludes that another serious failure by CND at this time was their failure to exploit the 'Gaullist' factor in refusing - not unsurprisingly perhaps considering the absolutist nature of the campaign - to utilise, ...the middle position on Cruise, namely that there should be a clear 'double key' system giving the British government a veto on the deployment of Cruise (12)), and the increasingly important message that Britain should withdraw from the NATO alliance. In a letter to Bruce Kent in 1986, Jaquetta Hawkes summed up the feelings of many when she wrote,

...I now feel that the continued strength of NATO is immensely important...I would now be prepared to risk a freeze, and certainly the end of Trident, but cannot in conscience go further than that (13).

If the membership of CND by unconvinced unilateralists, as appears to be the case, was a new phenomenon, there were many more similarities between the campaign of the eighties and that of the sixties than at first glance there appears to be. The first important similarity was in the socio-economic position of its membership. As
observed in the first chapter, CND relied upon a core group of middle class membership as activists, and by the time of Byrne's survey in 1985, this position had once again been assumed, with 63 per cent drawn from the middle classes (particularly the educational professions - 25 per cent) compared with only 23 per cent from a working class background showing as had occurred in the sixties... *CND's supporters are concentrated in occupations... which are generally held to involve considerable responsibility and commensurate social status* (14).

As regards political loyalties, once again it is the left that appeared in the preponderant majority with, if we include the Green/Ecology Party as a party of the left, over 78 per cent supporting such parties (15) - and such support it appears was not only limited to voting intentions but in the case of a significant minority, 39 per cent, extended to actively campaigning for the candidate of that preferred party (16). The time to explore such findings will come later, but the above examples serve to illustrate the similarities that were extant between the first and second 'waves' of CND and the campaigns seeming inability to attract and retain the committed support of a significant working class constituency in Britain. While Byrne's analysis maintains that unlike the first wave, there were few serious disagreements regarding the tactics of the new campaign as there had been between CND and the Committee of 100 over the question of NVDA versus more orthodox campaigning, i.e., education, professional lobbying etc. in which CND were closely involved, that is not to say that all was completely and unanimously harmonious. For the 1980's though the major area of dispute was not that of a perceived generation gap (although whether this had truly been the case in 1960 is debatable when one considers that the founder of the Committee of 100 was almost 90) but of a gender gap and the argument that despite the best efforts of the national leadership rumbled on throughout the early part of the decade revolving around the male free domain of Greenham Common where Cruise missiles were due and eventually were deployed. Many members were a little confused and angry that the focus of the campaign against Cruise had been allowed to be taken over by the women of the 'Peace Camps' at a time when what was needed was the motivation of the movement as a whole, male and female, behind the issue at Greenham Common. While the action was not officially part of CND's strategy it did give its unequivocal support to the action at least in terms of moral support. However, like the Direct Action campaigns of the 1960's, CND's association with the 'Peace Camps' at Greenham and Molesworth cost them dear in terms of public support. While much of this loss of support can be laid at the door of a particularly nasty press and media campaign to discredit the women - even at one point alleging that the Soviets had 'moles'
within the camps, as well as the usual allegations of rampant lesbianism and drug taking - suffice to say that, rightly or wrongly, CND's association with the camps did indeed affect the public view of the peace movement in general and CND in particular in much the same way as the Committee of 100's activities had some years earlier. It is also worth noting at this point too the commitment of the movement to other forms of Direct Action. Unlike the earlier movement there was little or no disagreement over the need for Direct Action, and throughout this second wave CND's perceived collective public persona was often that of massive public protest or small scale pickets of individual bases to the cutting of wire and trespass at MOD establishments and/or RAF/USAF bases. At the annual conference in 1982 any doubts as to the movement's commitment to NVDA were dispelled totally by a resolution which without reservation backed any such actions but stressed that

*Conference believes that NVDA is merely one, but important (my italics) tactic in our campaigning work, and that it must go alongside other tactics which involve everyone in our movement* (17).

While without doubt laudable, the public image of CND remained that of an organisation often in confrontation with the authorities and usually ending in mass arrests following some form of civil disobedience. Therefore, despite the commitment by all factions to the concept of education, lobbying etc., there still existed in the majority of the electorate an antipathy to, if not the message, certainly to the messenger and their style of delivery - a view which is borne out to a large degree by the polls that follow. When one views the results of such polls, one must seriously question James Hinton's assertion that those in CND who questioned the use of such tactics and particularly the continued backing for the Peace Camps *...were slow to understand that Greenham reached parts of the public psyche that no other campaigning could reach* (18) - in a certain respect, he may be right but certainly not in the positive way he imagined.
### TABLE 4:3

MORI/Daily Star.

*Regardless of your views on nuclear weapons, do you approve or disapprove of the tactics of anti nuclear protesters.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 8 - 9. 1983.</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n = 1038)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4:4

*Do you have a favourable or unfavourable opinion of the women anti nuclear protesters at Greenham Common.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favourable</th>
<th>Unfavourable</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 8 - 9. 1983.</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n = 1038)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOP/Daily Mirror**

### TABLE 4:5

*Have the women at Greenham Common made you more likely or less likely to think Britain should give up its nuclear weapons.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More likely</th>
<th>Less likely</th>
<th>No difference</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1983.</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n = 1060)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These latter two polls would appear to starkly contradict Hinton's positive approach to the Greenham campaign; certainly one cannot dispute that the campaign had an
effect, but for whatever reasons, that effect was according to the pollsters at best negligible or at worst, negative in the extreme.

Despite this impact upon public opinion, CND continued to remain committed to protest, and in particular, large scale demonstrations. The rationale behind this continued strategy appeared to be two fold; a) it allowed 'passive' supporters to become and feel involved in the campaign without asking them to be placed at risk of arrest as the more active members were as, in such large scale demonstrations they could register their protest yet remain a largely faceless entity in an almost amorphous mass, and b) mass demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands and bringing Central London to a virtual standstill ensured massive media coverage that could not be guaranteed at smaller, if more effective activities or through the other more 'acceptable' means CND were now using - professional lobbying etc. There were of course certain drawbacks to this approach. One that has already been mentioned was the majority public attitude to such protest in that they appeared to regard such activity with either antipathy or apathy which makes one question why CND persisted with such activity for any other reason than to prove that they could still mobilise many thousands in support of unilateralism or, to give the 'passive' member chance to feel they were making some contribution no matter how small. CND themselves continued to assert that such demonstrations did make a difference in that they showed that they were not a minority group stating an extreme position and that such a group could not be ignored - indeed, as will be shown later in discussing the INF treaty, CND claimed that it was partly due to their actions during this period that the treaty ever happened at all -, but the fact remains that the impact on the psyche of the majority was minimal. Perhaps a factor in this minimalist effect was due somewhat to the second problem that large scale demonstrations engender via media coverage. Certainly a march through the centre of London closing busy shopping and commerce areas to traffic will interest the media and guarantee extensive coverage, but the problem that all groups faced was the lack of control over how the demonstrations were reported. Certainly CND wished to exercise no sort of editorial control, but all too often the message the march was attempting to convey became lost in general description of the march, i.e., who the organisers were, how many took part (always a matter of dispute with official numbers often many thousands below that of the march organisers), how many arrests took place and for what offences, who spoke at the rally, but and this was the problem for CND, very rarely what they said other than small 'sound bites' which rarely gave the viewer/listener/reader anything more than a general impression of what the wider message was. Media fatigue was also an increasing factor; this was a decade of protest with rarely a week going by without a mass
demonstration of some kind, be it CND, Anti-Apartheid or the unemployed. Demonstrations rapidly became commonplace and the media interest faded accordingly until a point where mass demonstrations were all but ignored by the media unless they involved violence and/or mass arrests. Thirdly, and this was again a problem for all similar groups, was the question of the venue of protests. To hold a march in London was to guarantee media coverage and large numbers but they failed to highlight the real message. In 1984 the decision was made to hold that year's protest in Barrow where the Trident submarines were to be built. The activists argued that this was the ideal venue as they were carrying the protest to the heart of the matter in much the same way the protesters had highlighted twenty years earlier the significance of Aldermaston to the nuclear arms industry. In the event the demonstration was something of a failure, at least in terms of numbers and media coverage with only around 25,000 attending (compared with the hundreds of thousands that had marched through London only twelve months before), while in 1985 a similar demonstration at Molesworth (where Cruise had been deployed) attracted a similar figure. There appeared to be a clear correlation between venue and size of demonstration, and it may also have been true that many of the 'passive' supporters who had turned out in their thousands on previous occasions in London found the idea of being in a situation at a military base which might result in such activity as wire cutting, trespass and arrest less attractive than a simple march and rally in London where there was no wire to cut. Another factor that should not be overlooked was that by the time of the Barrow protest in 1984, Cruise had already arrived in Britain and so for many individuals within the movement their personal reason to protest had been removed either as this was the major factor in their participation or through disappointment that despite their protests deployment had gone ahead with barely a pause; as one long time CND supporter put it,

...I went to Barrow, Molesworth - you name it, I've been. I went more through habit than anything...I'd reached a point after Cruise came of thinking, what's the bloody point, I've not made a blind bit of difference (20).

CND and the Political Opportunity Structure.
The Conservative Party and Government.

As far as government is concerned the impact of CND is even more difficult to evaluate, because government has been so resolutely opposed to CND objectives (21).
While evaluation is certainly problematic it is safe to say that CND did without doubt force the government into, at the very least acknowledging the potential of the peace movement as an instrument of public opinion machinery. They were able to help motivate a significant number of the electorate into supporting their (CND's) favoured policies, and their arguments, particularly with regard to Cruise if not unilateralism per se, were winning for them many new converts. This was certainly evident amongst the young electorate - indeed if the polls were to be believed the majority of the electorate if not unilateralist were certainly anti-Cruise and pro-freeze at the beginning of the decade at least. The Conservative government's response to this was two fold. Firstly, the flow and quality of information that CND were producing had to be matched. While the government's response was a long way short of total freedom of information, in terms of sheer quantity and quality it was a watershed in the defence debate. It surpassed any previous official contribution to the defence debate that had occurred previously. As one commentator has said:

*From a perspective of democratic decision making and public accountability, in a policy area traditionally closed and bereft of sustained analysis of alternatives, this is no mean achievement* (22).

Care should be exercised before one accepts such blandishments at face value as information to one man is disinformation and propaganda to another. Bruce Kent in reply to a similar assertions, has called the whole process "a twisted debate" (22), characterised not by a flow of information but rather

*...a propaganda war in which those who hold power in this country have done everything within that power to marginalise, trivialise and defame those who hold different views to their own* (24).

Again, as with the previous statement, very great care should be taken before accepting it at face value, and it may be as well to remember that it takes two protagonists to make 'war' - propaganda or otherwise - and yet he (Kent) would be the first to deny that CND engaged in anything other than the dissemination of the truth as they see it; a view that opponents could with equal justification use to accuse them of propagandising should that perceived truth not be the truth as they see it. Even if we accept that what was occurring was a propaganda 'war' and no
more, this is still no mean achievement for a pressure group to force a government into entering into such a contest - were they totally ineffectual, as the government often claimed, there would be little need to have become engaged in debate, even if as Kent claims that debate was 'twisted'.

One may argue about the first stage of government reaction to CND activity, but with regard to the next stage in its evolution, there is little doubt that what the government became engaged in was all out propaganda. This began in earnest in February 1982 with a full briefing session for over 90 members of Conservative Central Office Speaking Panel, advising them how to counter the unilateralist argument and present the government's policies vis-a-vis defence in general and nuclear defence in particular. How seriously the government were taking the peace movement by this time can be judged by the seniority of the Ministers involved in that briefing - they included Douglas Hurd, then Minister of State at the Foreign Office and Peter Blaker, then Minister of State for the Armed Forces. While the pretext of the meeting was a briefing, it became clear that the meeting was intended as the starting point for a concerted campaign meant not only to counter CND's arguments, but also to publicly ridicule and embarrass them through a campaign of smears and innuendo. Typical of such tactics was the signing of an Early Day motion by over a hundred Tory MPs in 1982 which alleged amongst other things that CND had received £6m. from the USSR in 1981, and further allegations that amongst the women at Greenham Common there were a number of Soviet spies. While such allegations were patently, even comically false, they did serve to distract attention away from the real issues that CND felt should have been debated and in many instances when given access to the media much time was having to be spent in the refutation of such attacks. After a further Tory victory in the 1983 General Election (of which more later), the offensive against CND by the government was stepped up. For while the immediacy of the issue of Cruise was beginning to recede, CND, albeit more slowly, were still growing in numbers and opposition to Cruise, despite falling somewhat, appeared to be holding steady. A series of 'own goals' by the Americans - the invasion of Grenada, Reagan's 'evil empire' rhetoric - was causing a few visible ripples to appear in the increasingly close (at least from Thatcher's viewpoint) trans-Atlantic relationship. Talk emanating from Washington about the so called 'Star Wars'(SDI) project also helped engender a general anti-Americanism which provided added impetus and succour to CND at a time when they may otherwise have been expected to fade somewhat from the limelight. By this time, Michael Heseltine had been appointed Minister of Defence replacing the ineffectual (in terms of the impact on CND) John Nott, and while some observers may overstate the overall importance of CND by saying his appointment was made
with the intent being solely to "neutralise CND" (25), it was certainly one of his briefs, if not the overriding one. This was soon made clear when he set up within the MOD a small group of civil servants known as DS19 whose function was solely to aid the minister in the campaign against unilateralism (DS19 was officially disbanded after the 1983 election). However, it may prove in hindsight to have been an unexpected positive factor in CND's continued, if diminished, popularity as Heseltine on numerous occasions rather than 'neutralising' CND added to their list of sympathisers in a series of mismanaged, clumsy and well publicised incidents. Perhaps the best known of these was, in 1983 in the so called 'Raid on Molesworth' -

_The sight of a civilian minister dressing up in an army flak jacket to lead the army in a military raid on a group of 'hippies' at the RAF base and erect a £1m. meshed fence shocked many people. It seemed to be an abuse of State power, a fatal seduction by images of soldier heroics_ (26).

While in no way endorsing the somewhat hyperbolic nature of the above statement, coupled with Heseltine's statements that protesters entering the base could be shot, it is certain that, to borrow Hinton's phrase, the action reached parts of the public psyche. There was an outcry against both actions and statement and applications to join CND doubled to over 100 a day by the end of that week - once again reinforcing Rees' thesis that 'meticulous planning' had little to do with CND's expansion.

_The 'Dirty Tricks' campaign_ ?

Another example of the clumsy way in which the government handled the question was provided some time later in 1985 concerning allegations CND had been making that they and their members were subject to phone tapping, break ins at CND premises where only documents were disturbed, delay in delivery of their mail and envelopes torn open to such an extent that the Post Office was forced to re-wrap them. 'Cruisewatch', which had been set up by CND in the Greenham and Molesworth areas to monitor the movements of Cruise convoys reported over 70 incidents of strange occurrences with telephone equipment including it going dead, strange clicks on the line or other unexplained interruptions, usually at the time of
convoy movements (27). CND, with the support of the Labour Party asked repeatedly that their allegations be investigated but to little avail as the government continued to insist they had little interest in the activities of CND.

In 1985 though, CND's allegations began to appear all the more credible when an ex MI5 employee, Cathy Massiter, stated that between 1981 and 1985 she had been responsible for official surveillance of known left wing activists within CND and that she came under increasing pressure during this time to broaden the surveillance to include all activists, be their activism political, moral or religious in its source. Anyone with connections to Communists was to be included in the investigation no matter how tenuous that connection. Surveillance was carried out, according to Massiter, in two major ways; i) through the tapping of telephones - primarily that of John Cox who was at that time a Vice President of CND using the justification that he was a member of the BCP, and ii) by planting a spy in CND's office. The man that was used, again according to Massiter's account had, as far as CND were concerned, impeccable left wing references. Massiter claimed that the man, Harry Newton, had in fact been an MI5 agent since being recruited in the mid fifties. The repercussions for the government of these allegations were potentially enormous as it appeared that the official guidelines for the conduct of telephone tapping had been disregarded. An inquiry by Lord Bridge (who was chairman of the Security Commission) into the allegations concluded that it did indeed appear that the guidelines had not been followed.

Despite complaints from the opposition parties that the inquiry was shackled by the inability to look at the use to which the information had been put, the Home Secretary, Leon Brittan (28), informed them that he was satisfied that the information had not been used for any other purpose than laid down in the security service directives. In other words, all the information gathered had been for use in the interests and protection of 'National Security'. Due to the nature of the area that was under discussion, CND were continually faced with an all pervading silence regarding the allegations - despite charges that the information gathered had been for party political purposes rather than in the interest of National Security - as the government could refuse to answer such specifics as they, so they argued, could be prejudicial to the aforementioned National Security interest. Happily for CND the High Court, to whom they took the case in an attempt to lift the blanket of silence, agreed that it was not acceptable for government to avoid giving uncomfortable answers to serious questions simply by hiding behind the blanket response of National Security. Rather more unhappily for CND the Court decided that the remainder of Massiter's allegations regarding the illegality of the phone tapping
were unfounded and inadequate. By this time though CND were not the movement they had been just two years earlier; Cruise had arrived and the salience of the issue was beginning to fade, but the actions of the government over the Massiter allegations reinforced the view that CND were still regarded as a major influence on opinion that could not afford to be wholly neglected.

From this point on, the attacks against CND by the government subsided. The reasons for this are clear in that two rationales were now at work; firstly Cruise was here, apparently to stay, and despite CND's continued ability to turn out thousands for demonstrations, the numbers were slowly declining and support for their position in the polls was also falling. The 1983 elections had seen also a firm and unequivocal rejection of the concept of unilateralism by the majority of the British electorate. The birth of a ferocious nationalism engendered by the victory in the Falklands war was an important factor- Britain, to many of its people had proved itself once again as a military force to be reckoned with. This was coupled with an obvious disappointment and subsequent demoralisation within CND that not only had they failed to prevent the arrival of Cruise but also failed to sway opinion against the conflict in the Falklands. Secondly, the government may also have decided that to continue with such tactics against CND was counterproductive. It kept CND in the spotlight at a time when their political star was once again fading in the light of the rapidly improving relations between the USA and the USSR. The Soviet willingness to discuss the so called 'Zero Option' (under which they would give up all their SS4's, SS5's and SS20's in return for the removal or cancelled deployment of Cruise and Pershing) after the years of Brezhnev's consistent refusal to consider the proposals appeared to offer a real possibility of breakthrough in the logjam of disarmament. Particularly so when (after pressure from Britain and West Germany) intermediate weapons were to be included in any negotiations - the 'Double Zero' option. The movement's attempts to claim some of the credit for the resultant INF agreement - *I do not think it is unreasonable for us to claim a proper and generous share of the credit* (29) - by seeing their opposition to the twin track policy as the catalyst for the 'Zero Option', fell on stony ground. This was due in part to the fact that negotiations when they occurred were conducted by the Americans, and the European governments could only look on somewhat impotently as the solutions were hammered out - *This had little to do with pressure from the peace movements for a zero option when all governments......had successfully deployed the new weapons* (30), and after CND had consistently condemned the zero solution as a subterfuge to rationalise rearmament.
To many observers CND's position appeared somewhat disingenuous when viewed against the official line that the agreement had been reached from a position of negotiation from strength, whereas CND's preferred position of unilateralism would have meant Soviet missiles would still be intact. CND found the argument difficult to counter without further loss of credibility and support. It can reasonably be concluded from much of the foregoing that the 'influence' CND enjoyed with government was minimal, particularly following the 1983 election, and their success in forcing the government into debate, even if 'twisted', in no way compensated for real influence - hence the distinction made between 'influence' and 'impact' at the beginning of this chapter. Realistically CND was forever responding to externalities, and at no time other than on occasions during the run up to the deployment of Cruise did they have a realistic chance of dictating the terms of debate against a government whose face was firmly set against their core objectives and principles. (It is perhaps unreasonable to assume that they were ever in a position to do anything else given the absolute 'outsider' status of the movement.) Both sides committed mistakes in the confrontation - CND's perhaps understandable refusal to countenance any watering down of its principles prevented them certainly from carrying forward much of the support they initially gained over the issue of Cruise; particularly true with regard to the middle ground argument over the 'dual key' question and despite the popularity of such an option with the British people.

If CND's influence on government was minimal, what of the other political parties (A more detailed examination of relations with the Labour Party will follow later in this chapter).

**The Liberals and the Liberal/SDP Alliance.**

Within the Liberal Party there has always existed a tradition of anti-war protest which first found its voice in opposition to aspects of the Boer War, and despite Lloyd George's premiership, a vociferous opposition existed within the party to the First World War, one of the most vociferous being Bertrand Russell. The Liberal Party had long opposed Britain being a nuclear power in her own right, but following the Second World War as the political contest increasingly polarised into its present two party contest, the Liberal Party's point of view was increasingly relegated to that of an interesting, valid but somewhat pointless side show, at least in electoral terms. CND meanwhile, while not completely turning their back on the
Liberal Party, turned in apparent political realism towards the Labour Party as their best hope of delivery of their goals. Throughout this period though it was the Liberals, and in particular the Young Liberals that maintained something of a radicalist position as a counterpoint to the orthodoxy of the two major parties. They consistently opposed the Vietnam war, and in 1970, were the only one of the major parties to actively campaign against nuclear energy. By the time of CND's revival in the early eighties at the Party's annual conference over a third of the delegates were prepared to vote in favour of a motion calling for unilateral nuclear disarmament. A year later another motion calling on Britain to...take the initiative in calling for a European nuclear-free zone and opposing the siting of Cruise missiles in Britain (31), was accepted by 752 to 485 votes. In 1982 the Party Council agreed to support NVDA against Cruise and further, to support the freezing of the manufacture and deployment of new generation weapons. For CND the omens appeared encouraging; here was a major political party prepared, if not to support unilateralism, to oppose Cruise; a difference underscored by the Liberal leader, David Steel when he said,

if the Geneva talks (32) succeed we will have no cause to place Cruise missiles in this country and at the same time we get rid of the SS20's...Now that to me is a much bigger game than simply deciding unilaterally that we want to have no cruise missiles here...the prize we are after is a much bigger one (33).

Nevertheless it was encouraging as there was surely a sign that the door to the party was slightly ajar for CND and an area in which their more fundamental ideas might eventually find favour. This was not to be the case as in 1981 at the Liberal General Assembly, the decision had of course been made in favour of an alliance with the newly formed Social Democratic Party (SDP). This was a double edged sword for CND as the formation of the SDP had considerably weakened the position of the Atlanticist/multilateralist wing of the Labour Party depriving them of some of their most determined and eloquent advocates. Both David Owen and Bill Rodgers, while members of the Labour Party, had written influential pamphlets in favour of Cruise. Owen's had been written for the Campaign for Labour Victory, many of whose members had eventually joined the SDP, while Rodgers' was published by the Labour Committee for Transatlantic Understanding who were an organisation encompassing right wing trade unionists and funded directly by NATO. Their role within the newly formed alliance was in direct relation to this as their arrival signalled the weakening of the power base of the unilateralists within the Liberal hierarchy. The alliance presented immediate problems for CND as Owen soon made
it clear he was totally opposed to the Assembly decision, and Steel, in the interest of
the new found alliance's potential electoral appeal soon fell into step. CND
continued to campaign within the Alliance drawing hope from the fact that many
individual members of the Alliance continued to express support for CND and their
unilateralist position - each party having their own CND groups. Within the
Parliamentary party(s) there were some (David Alton, Bill Pitt, Richard
Wainwright, Simon Hughes) who actively continued to campaign for and support
the anti-Cruise stance. However, the parliamentary party's ultimate position
remained one of increasing hostility towards CND exemplified in their decision to
appoint Lord Mayhew, a bitter opponent of unilateralism and a long time sparring
partner of CND, as their official defence spokesman.

By the time of the 1987 general election, and despite a vociferous campaign by the
remaining unilateralists within the Alliance, the new party appeared firmly wedded
to the concept of 'No Trident' but 'No Unilateralism'. By now it was Owen that
was dictating Alliance defence policy which appeared to be i) cancellation of Trident
but, ii) the retention of Polaris and US bases - although the latter of these was an
area of some debate. This however was of little comfort for CND's future relations
with the Alliance as Owen's view of international relations and Britain's position
seemed to be based increasingly on a stronger European element of security,
becoming gradually less reliant on US support. This would, in the short term at
least, require Britain's retention of some nuclear capability of her own to
counterbalance that of the French so as to prevent their hegemony over any new
European security structure, but this plan in no way envisaged either Britain in the
short term or Europe in the longer term relinquishing possession of some nuclear
capability. There was little here for CND to applaud and so it remained even after
the acrimonious split between the Alliance partners after the 1987 election. While
the Liberals had presented CND with the possibility of influence during 1980/81,
by the end of the decade and INF, the destruction of the walls dividing Europe and
the improving relationship between West and East that chance had gone. Like the
Conservatives, the Alliance and their progeny could point to their own arguments -
like that of David Steel - and with some justification say that they were right to
oppose the surge of unilateralism. CND, or at least their ideas and beliefs can be
said to have been influential on Alliance policy but that influence was purely
transitory and selective in its impact, i.e., the adoption of the no Cruise, no Trident
element coupled with the rejection of the unilateralist and anti-NATO stance that
ultimately, if CND's influence is to be judged, has to be viewed as disappointing as
these are the root of their doctrine of opposition - all else are little but component
parts of that whole. While they may have been, from CND's viewpoint, steps in the
right direction, they were very tentative, exploratory steps rationalised still in the overall language of deterrence and negotiation from a position of strength.

**The Ecology/Green party, SNP and Plaid Cymru.**

If the Conservative and Alliance parties proved something of a disappointment for CND, the same could not be said of the minor parties which proved a fertile area in which CND could propagate their unilateralist message. At the beginning of the decade the Green Party (or Ecology Party as it was then known) were a relatively small grouping, but by the time of the mid eighties their size had hardly increased but their influence had grown enormously on the major parties as they competed to secure the expanding environmental vote. From their inception their position on nuclear weapons was absolute and their manifesto for the 1983 election was equally unambiguous on the matter; not for them the 'yes.... but' equivocation of the Alliance;

*Let's start with basics. No Cruise, No Trident, No Polaris. No nuclear weapons of any description. No chemical or biological weapons. No American bases. No involvement with NATO (34).*

Here was a political party that agreed without argument with everything CND stood for, and in some cases went even further blaming the economic system for a society that felt it needed to produce such weapons and create an arms race which

*...exploits not just people but the entire planet and fosters excessive competition, consumption and aggression (and which) can never be the basis for a peaceful world (35).*

(The relationship with the Greens was not totally harmonious. The Greens absolute opposition to nuclear power meant that their embrace could never be total. To have unequivocally accepted the Green position would have led to difficulties in CND's relationship with several of the big Trade Unions on whom they relied for a good deal of support)

Like the Greens, CND's philosophy was also welcomed by the two major nationalist parties, the SNP and Plaid Cymru. Both parties have long espoused a system of de-centralised government and stressed the vitality of small scale
development and environmentalism which is in direct counterpoint to the idea of nuclear weapons or civil nuclear installations. This attitude is founded in the history of both nation's radicalist tradition of politics and results in a 'leftist' leaning to many of their policies. It would appear only natural that this philosophy apply to defence issues, particularly as defence in general and nuclear defence in particular appears to the nationalists to reflect an imperial position in the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in the face of widespread opposition in both nations and with no consultation with the nations involved to defend what the nationalists view as the outdated concept of 'Great Britain' and her interests. The SNP in particular has a long record of opposition to nuclear weapons going back to the 1960's and Scotland in general has long provided CND with some of its most vocal, strongest and loyal support even at times when support throughout the country as a whole has fallen away. One major reason for this support is that Scotland is on of the most heavily militarised areas in Western Europe with many nuclear installations, RAF and Naval bases, and one of the most extensive command and communication networks in the NATO area (even after the success of the INF talks, Scotland remained heavily militarised as the new Trident submarines were to be based at Faslane and the plans for a new early warning station at Glengarry would remain in train). Within the SNP, support for disarmament and CND has been virtually constant; only in the mid seventies did this support appear to waver when the SNP supported the idea of a non-nuclear NATO - the so called 'Norwegian Option' - but by 1981, they had once again reverted to outright opposition to any alliance based on nuclear weapons as it appeared NATO would continue to be. One should not underestimate the potential of the SNP. On strategic nuclear thinking as, should they ever be successful in attaining some sort of independence from London where their opposition to nuclear weapons remained as an integral part of that independence, then this would seriously call into question the concept of Britain/England remaining a nuclear power as the majority of principal bases are still in Scotland. To replace Faslane alone with an equivalent facility in England capable of servicing and storing Trident would take years - perhaps a major reason why successive governments have refused to deal with nationalist demands in any meaningful way for many years?

Plaid Cymru's opposition to nuclear weapons is founded too in its history of radicalism, and while not as heavily militarised as Scotl, and Wales bears more than its fair share of the military burden as well as being the site of a number of important civil nuclear installations and nuclear power stations. Their attitude to the defence question can be summarised in two considerations; the defence of Wales and its culture through self government, and defence and peace achieved through by
the attainment of an international peace keeping force and the overthrow of the concept of state militarism. Plaid actively encouraged its members to join CND, and like the SNP, campaigned vigorously for nuclear free zones throughout their respective countries. So, while it is clear that CND benefited from the beliefs of the minor parties, it is still difficult to sustain Rees' belief that CND proved an 'influence'. For all the above mentioned, unilateralism was a present policy whether motivated by nationalist or ecological sentiment. There was little need for CND to attempt to influence them; indeed as already alluded to earlier, and as will be shown in more detail later, in the case of the Green party and the ecology movement it was their influence that appeared to be growing within CND. As allies they were of course welcomed by CND, but...a popular movement whose objectives require governmental action has to win the support of a major party (36), and realistically without a overhaul of the electoral system none of CND's allies could hope to achieve even a share in real government. As the Conservative Party could never be seen as an authentic option for influence (37) it was the Labour Party that remained the only real option through which CND could pursue this goal during the period in question, and it is to that relationship attention must now turn.

The Labour Party - A break in the 'log jam' or electoral 'cold feet'?

At the 1980 Labour Party conference following the 1979 election, the Labour Party appeared to wed itself firmly to the unilateralist cause with resolutions passed opposing Cruise, Trident, US bases and any policy based upon the threat of nuclear weaponry. By the time of the 1983 election (and following the 1981 and 1982 conference decisions), the two thirds support of conference had been achieved to enable the decisions to become official party policy contained in the 1983 election manifesto, 'The New Hope for Britain'. If the manifesto overall was a cause for celebration for CND there still remained some ambiguities and doubts over the real willingness of a future Labour government to actually carry through its pledges if elected to office. It must be remembered that at this time within the party there was an ongoing 'battle' between left and right for control of the party. While in no way doubting the sincerity of the left in their allegiance to unilateralism, CND had also to be aware of the historical precedents of such a policy shift. After all, was it not a previous Labour administration - after a remarkably similar struggle between left and right for control of the Party - that had made similar election pledges, only to plead once in office that the time was not right. While the manifesto indeed pledged to remove all American bases, abandon the dual track decision by cancelling Trident
and refuse to allow Cruise to be stationed in Britain, as well as simultaneously developing and implementing a credible non-nuclear defence, policy its wording on the issue of Polaris remained vague -

*We will propose that Britain's Polaris force be included in the nuclear disarmament negotiations in which Britain must take part.* (38)

This pledge in no way spelt out what would happen if the Soviet Union rejected British proposals, i.e., would Britain retain Polaris (at least). Vital too was the fact that Britain's continued membership of NATO was never in question. To many observers, CND included, this appeared to be something of a compromise designed to please both wings of the party at a time when divisions between left and right were once again becoming all too apparent.

Before this point, it had appeared that the left were in almost unopposed ascendancy within the Party as a Labour leader with impeccable left wing credentials, Michael Foot, was now at the helm, and the position of the Atlanticists within the party had been considerably weakened by the defection of many of them to the ranks of the SDP in 1981. They still retained something of an important foothold within the Parliamentary party though with the election of Denis Healey as Deputy leader. (Somewhat surprisingly too, until he left to help form the SDP, William Rodgers was also retained by Foot as Defence spokesman despite the fact that during the election campaign for the leadership, Rodgers had said that he could not serve under Foot and that he (Foot) would have to dismiss him (38). Foot never did replace Rodgers until his defection to the SDP. However by the time of the 1982 conference, Healey remained as the only Atlanticist within the upper reaches of the party, a position that, as an election drew ever nearer became more and more difficult for him to sustain and which during the campaign for the 1983 election ended in both Healey and the ex-Labour Prime Minister, James Callaghan, both speaking out against Labour manifesto pledges - Healey said he did not believe Labour would renounce Polaris without reciprocal agreements from the USSR, while Callaghan unequivocally derided the concept of unilateralism. Perhaps in another election this dispute may have been papered over, but defence was becoming an increasingly important component of a bitter and acrimonious campaign (during the 1979 election 2% of the electorate considered defence an important election issue compared with 38% during the 1983 election (39)). The attempts made by Foot to clarify Labour's position were, to be kind, not in the least helpful and only served to underline the apparent confusion that had grown up
within the party. They also appeared to confirm to CND that Labour's commitment to unilateralism was less than total, and that they were once again faced with the possible scenario of having a Labour Party committed to unilateralism while in opposition but a Labour government that could not or would not deliver on its manifesto pledges.

CND were also highly critical of the way Labour had allowed the government to dictate the defence debate with Labour consistently, they felt, ignoring the issues of Cruise and Trident and getting drawn into the debate over Polaris and defence issues in too general a manner. They pointed out that at no time in the press conferences called by the party during the campaign, did they have one on the subject of defence. Perhaps this may have been a deliberate attempt on the part of the party to avoid the difficult questions that their policy had opened up, but to CND the party left the electorate with an obscured choice (40).

Like the election of Foot to the leadership of the party, the election of Neil Kinnock in the Autumn of 1983 brought a long time supporter of CND and unilateralism to the helm of the party. However, on this occasion, the left was, if still powerful within the party, beginning to splinter. Kinnock was certainly a left winger, but unlike Foot, he did not enjoy the support of the majority of the left as the Tribune group had by this time broken with the hard left and become the Campaign group. With Tribune gradually being pushed further to the right, Kinnock's bulk of support was to be found increasingly in the centre left and right of the party. The first defence review undertaken with Kinnock as leader, 'Defence and Security for Britain' did provide some clarification of the Labour position on defence, but as importantly, it also attempted to prevent continued internecine warfare in at least one policy area. Much of the document seemed to be a restatement of accepted policy - removal of Cruise, cancellation of Trident and the removal of all nuclear bases etc. - but what was new, in as much as it was stated as preferred policy where before there had been ambiguity, was Labour's commitment to NATO. This commitment was tempered by the intention that through continued membership of NATO, a Labour government would press for a policy of no first use and the greater use of NATO's machinery as a force for political rather than military initiative and an increased reliance within NATO on the use of conventional rather than nuclear forces. There appeared to be something here for everyone and at the 1984 conference there was a four to one majority in favour of acceptance. CND were delighted with the recommitment by the party to the idea of unilateralism, although they were not happy with the continued commitment to NATO. They were also very unhappy with the lack of a campaign by the party before an election campaign
got underway to publicise and explain their policy. Indicative of the Labour attitude to defence as they saw it, was the continued membership of three Labour MP's of the Commons Defence Select Committee who were resolutely opposed to unilateralism with no attempt made by the party leadership to remove them, and the ineffectual nature of the Labour Defence spokesman, Denzil Davies who on several occasions missed important defence debates in the House.

Concern over this matter was also manifested in the 1985 conference decision to call for an increased emphasis to be given to defence proposals. Kinnock's response to this was to mount a campaign based not on the disarmament aspects of defence policy, but one which stressed how Labour would be the party that would strengthen Britain's conventional defences by using savings made in the cancellation of Trident. CND saw this as being something of a retreat from the basic argument, as the new approach, rather than playing up the benefits to peace that could be achieved through disarmament, chose to address the result in positive military terms. The imagery that was used was too close to that evoked by the Wilson government at the time of the 'East of Suez' debate. There still remained divisions and ambiguity regarding Labour policy that continued to haunt the Party. In early 1986 for example, Kinnock and Healey, after a visit to the Soviet Union, disagreed on how a future Labour administration should dispose of Polaris. Kinnock argued that it would go unilaterally. Healey meanwhile believed it would be the subject of negotiation with Soviet SS20's providing the negotiating counterbalance. Many details of defence policy were ambiguous - when they spoke of removing American bases, did they mean actual closure or them becoming non nuclear but still operational? While they were committed to get rid of Polaris and cancel Trident, what was to happen to Britain's submarine fleet? Too many questions of this kind remained far too close to an election. With the comments of Casper Weinberger in October 1986 alleging that despite Labour's commitment to NATO, their policies vis-a-vis nuclear weapons would create severe, perhaps fatal strains in the Alliance, and despite Labour accusations of outside interference in the political process, the Tories were able to pour scorn on Labour defence policy. Labour's response to such attacks was again surprisingly low key and confused. Martin O'Neill, then junior defence spokesman, responding to allegations that Labour would close all American nuclear bases, said that in fact only two would be closed (Greenham and Holy Loch) while the rest would be made non nuclear. This appeared to be in apparent contradiction to the 'official' policy of closure of all nuclear bases as had been stated on several occasions by Labour's defence spokesman, Denzil Davies (41). It was becoming obvious that tensions were once again building within the party over the nuclear issue. At the 1986 conference this
shift became apparent when a composite motion calling for, ...the next Labour Government to remove all United States bases...from British soil (42), and another calling for ...withdrawal from NATO as a step towards a European nuclear free zone (43), were both heavily defeated. At the same time, another motion calling for the next Labour Government to, support the collective defence organisation developed through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (44) was endorsed by a margin of almost five to one. Not only did this seem to be a shift in policy, it was also indicative of the dilemmas involved. To many, unilateralism and NATO membership were incompatible - and yet to have committed Labour to leaving NATO would have been tantamount to electoral suicide. As it was, the apparent contradictory message of unilateralism and continued NATO membership was equally damaging. By the time of the 1987 election, policy - to CND - had become even more watered down. The manifesto, 'Britain will win', still stated that Polaris would go and Trident be cancelled. However, it was less than equivocal on the subject of Cruise. This, according to the manifesto, would be removed only if the INF discussions did not reach agreement on their removal. Critics were quick to point out that this was unilateralism by the back door as what was in effect being said was that if the weapons were not bargained away they would be thrown away. As had been the case in 1983, Labour's response to this was half hearted and confusing to the electorate. Once again, it appeared to many that Labour candidates and officials were ill briefed on the issue and unprepared to discuss them (at least in terms that were comprehensible to the layman). Leading figures within the party did not help matters due to their seeming inability to 'keep their feet out of their mouths'. Even the leader of the party was prone to this on occasions, most notably in an attempt to predict British reaction to a Soviet invasion;

...he talked of making Soviet occupation 'untenable', implying that a conventional army could not resist an invasion by a Soviet army that had nuclear weapons. The public could not understand why he wanted a unilateralist policy. Was it because he was a CND supporter or merely because conference had accepted the policy and Kinnock had to go along with the decision? (45)

( Even that most astute of politicians, Denis Healey, had fallen prey to this tendency when at one point he had declared that Moscow was praying for a Labour victory.) Such statements only served to provide succour to Labour's opponents with the Conservatives able to portray Labour as a party that would leave Britain defenceless. This certainly struck a chord with the electorate who had clearly come to believe that Labour were a party without a clear and coherent defence policy.
This was the message that appeared to be delivered by the polls. In a Gallup survey conducted a few days before the election, only 17 per cent of respondents believed that Labour would give Britain an effective defence policy (the Conservatives in contrast scored 57 per cent). Even more telling with regard to nuclear weapons specifically was the finding that 70 per cent of respondents believed that Britain should not get rid of their nuclear weapons while other countries (unspecified in the question) kept theirs (46).

Even CND found the message coming from the Labour camp confusing - were they still unilateralist or not was the question being asked. Ron Todd, the leader of the TGWU and a long time CND supporter was in no doubt that the reason behind confusion was due almost totally to the lack of informed debate and leadership from the party. He also believed that this unwillingness to engage the electorate in real debate on the issue was a vital factor in Labour's subsequent defeat;

In the run up to the election...we should have taken defence by the scruff of the neck...people said, 'well, it's not a vote winner, it's a dirty subject', and so on. I said, 'you're assuming that the Conservatives are not going to mention it. If we don't grasp the nettle they will' (47).

Labour's defence review.

Following the defeat in the 1987 election and after exhortations from the unions, Labour embarked on a thoroughgoing policy review. Labour announced that all reasonable policy options were to be considered as part of the process, including the unilateralist option (48). The omens from CND's perspective of an open discussion did not appear favourable when soon after the announcement of the review, Gerald Kaufman and Allan Rogers (both of whom were opponents of unilateralism) were appointed Shadow Foreign Secretary and Junior Defence spokesman respectively. The alarm bells soon began ringing for CND with a series of well reported remarks and interviews by senior Labour figures. The most well reported of these was that of the Labour leader himself where he stated that his own and the Party's enthusiasm for unilateralism of earlier years was, ... very appropriate at the time because absolutely nothing was happening (49). In contrast, he now believed that as circumstances had changed, nuclear weapons should now be viewed as bargaining pieces and their removal should not be on the
basis of...*something for nothing*...now that it can be *something for something* (50), due to the INF talks promise of a *...break in the log jam* (51).

CND were of course horrified by this (52). Not only was Kinnock declaring that unilateralism was now no longer of use, but that the long shared goal of the cancellation of Trident appeared to be in the process of reassessment. Despite protestations that CND had misunderstood Kinnock's position and despite his later retraction of the 'something for something' statement, suspicion that the party were once again preparing to discard CND and unilateralism persisted. Leaks regarding the review itself appeared to lend further credence to CND's concerns. At a Fabian Society conference in January of 1989 - said not to reflect official party thinking - the keynote analysis stated, *...flexibility in the timing and phasing of the withdrawal of Britain's strategic nuclear forces would be inevitable* (53), and further, that

*the defence of Britain will be best achieved through a strategy of common security; reducing and eventually (my italics) eliminating the role of nuclear weapons* (54).

As has been said, while this was said not to be the official line, the authors of the ensuing Fabian pamphlet were both former senior advisors to Labour's Foreign Affairs and Defence teams. Martin O'Neill - the party's defence spokesman - was the director and principal speaker at the conference.

Whether or not this can be viewed as mere coincidence is not important to the overall context of the argument. It must be said though that the completed review proper bore an uncanny resemblance to the Fabian document. Gone was any pretence of unilateralism. What was now proposed was a return to the ideas and concepts of a multilateral approach and the expansion of Britain's conventional defences. Nowhere in the resultant policy document did there appear to be any guarantee of a non-nuclear Britain. In its place was the pledge to work towards a nuclear free world by the year 2000. The document was laden with phrases such as '*...seek to...*', *...press for...*', *'...be pursued...'*', etc. Implicit in such phraseology was the implication that Britain would remain a military nuclear power. Labour, when elected would '*...seek to achieve...*' the elimination of all nuclear weapons through four kinds of action;

*Acting within NATO;*

1. *Strongly oppose the modernisation of short range and tactical nuclear weapons within the alliance.*
2. Oppose the deployment of short range and tactical nuclear weapons.
3. Seek to secure a widening of the NATO negotiating mandate at the disarmament talks in Vienna to include aircraft and short range and tactical nuclear weapons.
4. Work for the abandonment of flexible response as a NATO policy.
5. Press for our NATO partners to adopt a policy of no first use.
6. Take active steps to make the 'third zero' a NATO objective.

(It is worth noting at this point that the language is again hopeful rather than certain. There is no mention made of what the response would be should they fail in the achievement of any or all of these goals. Certainly critics have pointed out that the threat of leaving NATO was not a consideration. Indeed, the review stated quite pointedly that,

As long as NATO continues in existence the Labour Party, pledged and committed to membership of the Alliance, will ensure the continuance of this (Britain's) contribution (55). )

Acting with the USA and USSR,

1. Secure participation in the disarmament talks.
2. Place all of Britain's nuclear capability into such negotiations with the intention of eliminating it in concert with action taken by the superpowers.

(importantly, this elimination was now being spoken of in terms of 'asymmetrical' cuts, i.e., unequal reductions in which the side with most gives up the most.)

Acting in the UN.

1. Strongly support an early verifiable agreement on a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (TBT).
2. Insist at all times on a strict interpretation of the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
3. Work for full implementation and strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT).

Acting on their own.

1. Adopt a policy of no first use of British capability until Britain is entirely rid of that capability.
2. End testing of British nuclear devices.
3. Cancel existing plans to increase the number of warheads on missiles possessed by Britain.
4. Not proceed with a nuclear stand off missile for Tornado.
5. Cancel the fourth Trident submarine.

Gone totally was any promise to cancel Trident in full if reciprocal measures by the USSR were not forthcoming. This was explained as being due to economic considerations in that,

...the first Trident will be commissioned in 1992. Some 60 per cent of work on the second submarine, and 40 per cent on the third will have been carried out. There would be no financial savings available from halting construction...indeed because of the deliberately built in penalty clauses, more public money would be wasted through stopping their construction...(56).

Once again it appeared as though CND had failed in their fight to capture the Labour Party. Labour, badly mauled in two consecutive elections after badly misjudging the public mood over defence, could not and would not be so caught out again. The claim by Kinnock that the logjam of disarmament had been broken was difficult to dispute. CND of course would have preferred to have seen it swept away by a unilateralist Labour government. This was not to be. Charges by CND that Kinnock was a traitor were also hard to deny (some Labour figures had doubted his commitment to unilateralism before the review process had occurred -

*I believe that the change in Neil did not come as late as people suggest...I remember listening to his speech in 1983 at the anti Cruise rally...in which he said, '...and Polaris should be put on the table where it belongs' - he didn't say 'get rid of Polaris...' * (57)

- and the impression that he was prepared to sacrifice principle to the 'greater good' of electoral success was also felt strongly within CND. Unilateralists that remained within the party saw the policy review presented in the light that, *...Labour must abandon unilateralism because otherwise it will lose the election*  (58). They viewed such arguments with ill concealed

...disgust. *Absolute disgust...You talk to various people in the Labour Party who support the scrapping of nuclear weapons. They will say they don't believe in nuclear weapons..., but out there the British people do, so we've got to go along with it. It's an utterly cynical approach* (59).
Cynical it may well have been, but it was a reflection of the new mood of realism that appeared to be sweeping the party. The continuing rout of the left throughout the party epitomised this relationship at a wider level. The centre right (Hattersley, Kaufman, O'Neill et al.) were the faction in the ascendancy and the ones who now had their leader's ear. CND, associated as they were with the 'old left' of the party found their views increasingly marginalised - determined as the leadership were not to suffer the humiliations of 1983 and 1987 ever again. CND's closest allies were no longer to be found per se, within the ranks of the Labour Party.
FOOTNOTES

1. At the time he wrote this piece, Duncan Rees was secretary of the World Disarmament Campaign (UK) - in the past he had been YCND EC (1972-74) CND Council and EC (1972 - 74); CND Organising Secretary (1975 - 80); CND Vice Chair. (1981); CND Conference. National Organiser.


3. Kent, B., Letter to members and supporters from CND Annual Conference. 11.11.90.

4. Many banners on this march bore witness to the 'new generation' of activists that had appeared - 'Pimlico Schoolkids Against the Bomb' (The Times. 27.10.80.) was typical of many.


13. Jaquetta Hawkes to Bruce Kent - CND Archives. 2.7.86. Kent, B. Personal Correspondence.


20. Author's interviews with Peterborough CND members.


24. *ibid.* p. 78.


27. See Schwarz, W. *Clunk Click Every Trip*. *Guardian*. 22.2.85.


32. The Geneva Talks were a result of Reagan's Zero Option ideas and eventually resulted in the IMF agreements of 1987.88.

33. Steel, D., in Sanity. (interview with Chris Horme) 12.82.


37. Mention should be made though of the existence of an organisation known as TACT (Tories Against Cruise and Trident). This group was set up by a Sue Cossette in 1982. She believed that CND was...too left wing...it will take some time before people understand that CND is not controlled by Tony Benn and Arthur Scargill...CND should belong to everyone in Britain regardless of party. , in Sanity. 12.82. It soon became apparent that TACT was by no means unilateralist and described the...full CND position as an extremist one. It may be that TACT does us (CND) more harm than good...it lacks genuine roots amongst Conservative constituency activists...(and) is almost guaranteed to divert attention from the issues to the cut and thrust of smear and injured innocence, placing us on the defensive from the outset. Hinton, J. ‘How to deal TACTfully with Tories (and how not to)’. Discussion Paper for CND EC. 30.4.83.


39. The Times. 27.10 80.


41. Ruddock, J., in Sanity. 7.83.

42. The Guardian. 29.9.86.


44. ibid. p. 161.
45. ibid.


47. ibid. p. 61.

48. quoted in Sanity. 10.89.

49. CND were consulted but, according to Bruce Kent, the outcome of these consultations were dubious;

...they...asked for memoranda, which we submitted very carefully...I think we had something like 40 minutes...We'd hardly sat down before Kaufmann stood up and said, he was very sorry but he had an urgent engagement...and he left. We were left with Martin O'Neill - a pleasant enough bloke - Stuart Holland...and George Robertson...There was no discussion about the issue at all...they started from the presumption of continued militarism...(the result being) an ambiguous, convoluted statement...People could tell they were fidgeting and dodging.

Taken from an interview, by the author, with Bruce Kent. 28.5.91.

50. BBC Transcript. This Week, Next Week. 5.6.88. p. 9.

51. ibid. p. 10.

52. ibid. p. 9.

53. Kinnock had trailed this position as early as 1986 when on a speaking engagement at the Kennedy School of Political Studies in Cambridge he had said that of the 135 US bases in Britain, only three would in fact be closed - Greenham, Molesworth and Holy Loch - while the F111 bases at Upper Heyford and Lakenheath, would remain open but converted to non-nuclear use and, unlike New Zealand, US ships carrying nuclear arms would not be barred from using British ports. See Leapman, M., ‘Kinnock’. (Unwin Hyman. 1987.) pp. 163-164.

55. *ibid*.


57. *ibid*.


59. Authors interview with Jeremy Corbyn MP. 12.2.91.

60. Livingstone, K., in *Guardian*. 15.5.89.

61. Corbyn, J., *op cit*. 
CHAPTER 5.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND THE 'RISE' OF CND.

INTRODUCTION.

The question that must now be addressed regards the application of SM theory to movement's such as CND. In particular, if and how these theories can be applied to the periods in a movements history where they are experiencing growth, as is the case with the periods that have been outlined in some detail in chapters 2 and 4. For the purposes of this section, the periods have been further split. The first section will deal with the time of growth (1957/8 - 1962/3 and 1979/80 - 1981/2). The second discussion will deal with the periods 1962/3- 1963/4 and 1981/82 - 1988/9 when growth can be said to have reached its peak and will concentrate on those theories that relate particularly to the Political Opportunity Structure. It is important to bear in mind at this point that what is required is not only an interpretative tool of research, but also a satisfying predictive methodology. This, as will be seen, is an area that has remained largely ignored by social movement research, concerned as it is to explain the growth and effect of SM's. 'Growth' in this discussion will be taken to mean the expansion of membership and general support (The question of the growth of influence and access to the Political Opportunity Structure, as stated will be considered later). The matter of theory regarding the decline of SM activity/membership/support will be considered after the later relevant sections.

It is simply not enough, as some are inclined to do, to divide approaches to this question into the two 'classical' doctrines of Relative Deprivation (RD) and Resource Mobilisation (RM). While both are important they are but, in the former case, a distillation of the 'Weber-Michels' Marxist approach and, in the latter case, a staging post on the road to the 'new social movement' theorists such as Touraine and Melucci. Of far more use in this analysis is the classification used by Eyerman and Jamison in describing RD.

The particularists, focusing as they do on individual motivation and socialisation, are concerned with an 'actor' level, where social movements are seen as collections of individuals and where interest is focused on individual actions and reactions. The resource mobilisation school focuses on a group level of organisations and collectivities, where social mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion form the central focus of analysis and where individuals are treated as types, depersonalised units in
decision making models. The new social movement theorists are concerned with a macro structural level of society, where movements are seen as historical actors articulating long term trends and deep-seated social forces. (1).

**Particularism.**

This approach's roots can be traced to the broadly Marxian theorem of the 'Weber-Michels' school. It begins from the premise of a conflict paradigm suggesting that SM development can be traced to individual stress and alienation from societal values, usually due to the economic imisseration of the individual. Taking the two periods in question, can this theory be said to be of any use in explaining the growth of CND?

The answer to this question must be an unequivocal no. The formation of CND was initially moved by a group of people who were far from suffering the economic imisseration that the theorem posits. These were people firmly entrenched in the highest reaches of society and therefore far removed from feelings of alienation and powerlessness that the Marxist approach demands. The question though remains as to the relevance of such an approach when applied to the wider and growing movement. In an attempt to answer this reference must be made to the attempt made in 1959 to determine the background of participants in that year's Aldermaston march (2). Nine out of ten of under twenty-five's participating said they supported the campaign for moral reasons - the percentage was even higher in the over twenty-five age group. A further 34 per cent were moved by a religious faith and no more than 4 per cent were from a working class background (teachers were by far the biggest occupational group). Even more telling was the fact that only around 6 per cent supported the voters veto campaign. This would hardly appear to give succour to the Marxist view of a potentially revolutionary vanguard being found amongst the burgeoning social movement industry (SMI).

Perhaps the theory then cannot be used to any great effect with regards to the first historical phase under discussion, but perhaps it may prove of more use in explaining the second rise of the movement during the early eighties. During this period, as has been mentioned, economic imisseration and alienation were a real feature of this period. In particular unemployment was rising rapidly. If one was to follow the Marxist approach to its obvious conclusion then one might have expected to see a marked increase in, a) the working class/unemployed involvement and/or, b) an increased radicalisation amongst the movements membership and support. This was certainly not the case though. Byrne, in his 1985 survey of CND members (3) found
that in line with other previous surveys (Parkin (4), Taylor and Pritchard (5)) membership remained largely middle class (63 per cent) while only 22 per cent of respondents could be said to be broadly working class. Of course, radicalisation is not the preserve of the working class but here too there was little sign of an upsurge in a revolutionary consciousness with only 1 per cent of respondents citing 'Communist' as a voting preference while - although critical - 61 per cent believed that the government could be trusted sometimes. Dissatisfaction with the political system per se proved to be a minor reason for joining the movement and, like the earlier survey, moral reasons proved to be by far the single biggest motivation. Indeed, as a whole the respondents in the 1985 survey showed themselves to be far from alienated from 'conventional' politics;

**TABLE 5:1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% who:</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Sympathisers</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Read about politics</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss politics</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convince others to vote</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend political meetings</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact politicians</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for candidates</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Byrne, P. *The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament*. Croom Helm 1988, p. 74.)

The 'Weber - Michels' model was taken as the basis for the next important stage in the 'particularist' or RD approach. This moved the theorem away from the almost abstract favoured by Weber and Michels into the realms of hypotheses directly related to dependant and independent variables. The pioneer in this new approach was Edward Gurr whose theory revolved solely around the motivational aspects of individuals within SM's thus;
...the relative deprivation model posits social conditions as preconditions to violence.... Though such variables as socialisation, tradition and legitimacy of the system will influence.... The critical factors exist in the minds of the individuals. (6)

The major difficulty with this work is that it maintains that the necessary alienation can occur at any time, i.e., the economic state can be buoyant, crisis ridden or merely acceptable and yet still give rise to the conditions that result in alienation on the part of the individual. In the context of the Peace Movement this theoretical position tells us little about the effect of such occurrences as the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the Cuban missile crisis, the decision to deploy Cruise, the Invasion of Afghanistan etc. or any other international crisis that occurred during the periods in question. It merely asks us to accept that it was such occurrences that caused the growth in support. This though severely limits the use of the theory as a predictive tool as RD can only be assessed as a factor once it has occurred. Even accepting this though leaves more questions than it answers. Discovery of the link to social change becomes almost an impossibility particularly once the participant becomes immersed in whatever culture and motivation is employed by the SM, i.e., does the SM act due to the prevailing mores of participants/members or, does the member act due to the prevailing mores of the wider movement? This problem, while in no way unique to the Peace Movement in general and CND in particular, is certainly applicable for as Byrne notes, if applied to CND:

...this would require an interpretation...which saw individuals as feeling they had a legitimate right to live in a society free from weapons of mass destruction and this right was being withheld from them...but it does not allow for the possibility that such feelings will arise as a consequence of participation....rather than being a cause of it. (7)

Certainly, as has been argued with reference to CND's 'second wave', there were many participants at this time who became involved with the movement purely as a means of voicing their dissatisfaction with a particular policy decision (the decision to deploy Cruise or Trident or both). This did not mean that they agreed with CND's wider aspiration of total nuclear disarmament. Certainly, many of these people did leave after deployment had occurred or the decision was made to remove them but, it seems reasonable to suppose that some remained within the movement as newly convinced unilateralists and indeed that this decision was made due to a change of consciousness that occurred due to their participation within the movement.
In conclusion then, it must be said that RD is based on the obvious hypotheses that individuals will rebel due to discontent, this being due to the fact that they are not receiving that to which they believe they are entitled. RD is therefore guilty of reducing the obvious to a scientific level. It is a theorem that attempts to prove the obvious applied after the event. It is the attempt to turn explanation in hindsight into a predictive theory. Ultimately RD fails in this respect due to the failure to identify a link between RD and activity directed towards the existing political/social system. Nowhere does the theory attempt to provide a meaningful correlation with the fluctuations of the economy in which the SM operates. In form, the theory is impressive with its application of the logical and deductive mechanics (a plethora of charts, graphs, statistics etc.), but in content this approach - driven by the search to explain the obvious - is flawed. Some of these characteristics are shared by the other approaches that will be considered, and an overall assessment of the use and validity of all will follow in the conclusion to this section.

**Resource Mobilisation.**

Turning now to the 'competing' school of thought. It was during the 1970's that RD first came to be seriously challenged. Most notable of these challenges was made by McCarthy and Zald. The basis of this challenge was that the formation of SM's could not always be found in the alienation or consciousness of the individual participant. The focus of study was moved away from the supposedly aggrieved individual to the wider perspective of the SM in which the individual finds themselves. Importantly they define a SM as;

... *a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of that society.* (5).

What can be taken away from this definition in the positive sense is that it promotes the importance of sentiment over behaviourism and moves the area of study away from the individual onto the wider Social Movement Organisation (SMO) as it exists within the still wider Social Movement Industry (SMI), being those other SMO that are campaigning on broadly similar or interconnected issues and also includes *the collectivities or organisations that cater to the social movement...* (9)

Of course the previous definition poses several immediate problems in general and with regards to CND particularly. The first of these suggests, according to McCarthy and Zald, that - and this is in direct counterpoint to RD - the expansion of the Social
Movement Sect or (SMS) will only occur at a time when individual participants 'resources' are at their highest. (In speaking of resources, McArthy and Zald tend to limit the definition to mean the amount of disposable income and time available both to the individual within society. This in itself is perhaps too narrow a definition and could be broadened to include such factors as the amount of political freedom, the availability and access to political information and the ability to disseminate information within society.) i.e., discontent increases at a time when things are getting better. This approach on the face of it seems helpful. At the time of CND's growth during the late 'fifties and early 'sixties things were 'getting better'. This was the time when according to Macmillan, we'd 'never had it so good'. On a prima facie level then this appears useful in attempting to explain the rise of CND. However, the theory is infinitely less useful when applied to the later period of growth experienced by CND. At this time, as already mentioned, Britain was in the midst of recession. Inflation was high and still climbing and unemployment was rising inexorably to its highest levels since the Depression. There were few levels of society or parts of the country (save the South East) that remained unaffected. This then would seem to render the strategy somewhat less than useful. Even reversing the underlying supposition in an effort to clarify the dilemma, i.e., a growing SM, SMI and SMS does not equate with growing discontent, is less than helpful. What we are left with then is a scenario in which SM's have little or nothing to do with increased social tensions and crises. As has been said;

This problem cannot be solved by adding more hypotheses about the development...e.g., the greater the discontent in a social order the greater the development of SMS (etc.). Since the expansion of the SMS would be the prime indicator of the increase in discontent, the hypothesis would be tautological...The authors have reified the concept, rendering it meaningless....(10).

Further, this definition of what constitutes a SM relies heavily on the movement being motivated by a consciousness founded upon feelings of alienation felt by participants towards an existing, usually hierarchical, political, economic and class based system. While this may have a relevance in the study of such movements as the Equal Rights, Women’s or Student Movements it is not relevant per se to either CND or the wider peace movement. At no time in the period under discussion has CND challenged or attempted to challenge either the social structure or reward distribution of British society. While the majority of individual members subscribe to these views, they have rarely found a voice within the movement as a whole. In order to illustrate this one need only refer to the previously quoted survey results questioning participant's motivation which found that, for the majority, their activity was motivated by moral
forces. There was not found to be, at least in the context of their involvement with the peace movement, any attempt to view participation as a challenge to the existing societal environment in which - and this must be stressed - they operated as members of CND. Their participation was seen as merely and, in the case of the majority, solely concerned with their opposition to nuclear weapons. (It can be argued that when such sentiments have been expressed forcibly as part of the campaign by groups such as DAC or the Committee of 100, through such campaigns as the 'Voters Veto' or the demonstrations against Queen Frederika of Greece, the wider campaign, as was shown in earlier chapters, has suffered. )

At the heart of RM theory is the supposition, based on Olson's 'free rider' concept (11). This concept revolves around the belief that there is no certainty that a group of individuals with a shared grievance will come together to articulate their dissatisfaction /demands. Olson argues that it is simply not rational for the individual to act as they will receive the collective goods irrespective of their inaction - i.e., it is largely self interest that is the ultimate motivating force. Clearly in the case of CND this is just not the case. If one follows Olson's logic to its end then the participation of individuals within the peace movement and CND must be seen as 'irrational'. This does require some kind of explanation. It is simply not enough to dismiss it as 'irrational' behaviour.

Certainly during the two periods in question, there appeared on numerous occasions a remarkable willingness for participants to disregard totally their self interest - particularly true in terms of personal welfare and even safety. Even more starkly contradicting Olson's premise is the fact that throughout the time of the movements greatest growth a significantly large section of the movement were prepared to place at risk both liberty and life (consider the actions of those arrested for cutting wire and entering US bases illegally or, the threat made to shoot trespassers at Greenham and Molesworth - certainly self interest was not a factor. );

Prima facie, there is something paradoxical about a theory which suggests the improbability of events which (were) regular, even if not everyday, features of political life. (12)

McCarthy and Zald attempted to resolve this paradox in identifying a group of 'Conscience Constituents'. These were people motivated not by an immediate, personal or life threatening crisis but by an altruistic, philanthropic motive. These were to be found largely amongst the well educated, middle income, middle classes (13). While this might almost certainly be the case - and if one were to look at the
results of membership surveys of the period it would appear self-evident - it does little to address the question of 'rationality'.

Hirschman (14) has argued that the rationale for the behaviour of 'conscience constituents' can be found in the behaviour itself, i.e. that the very act of participation is the only reward participants desire. In the case of CND, it is perhaps true that for many participants the outcome of action is a secondary consideration. Many will participate in the full knowledge that success will not necessarily follow. The participation is motivated by a desire to be seen expressing those feelings that have lead to involvement. Certainly in relation to CND and the periods in question (particularly the earlier period) this can be seen to be a particularly relevant assumption. Parkin in his study of CND during the 'sixties made the distinction, like Hirschman, between what he called 'instrumental' and 'expressive' politics. He differentiated between the two thus; Instrumental activity may be thought of as that which is directly geared to the attainment of concrete and specific goals, generally of a material kind. Emphasis is placed on the ends to be achieved rather than on the means employed in attaining them. Expressive activity, by contrast, is that which is less concerned with specific achievements than with the benefits and satisfactions which the activity itself affords. The reward are as much in the action itself as in the ends it is directed to (15).

Parkin confirmed the existence, of a belief that morality was of a higher significance than expediency, i.e, the realisation that beliefs may never become translated into policy. Indicative of this was the response to the following question (16);

Protests And Demonstrations which fail to achieve their aims are a waste of effort?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement Level</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree Strongly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree/Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>86%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don't Know/No response</td>
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Through his work in this period, Parkin attempted to resolve the methodological questions posed by the 'Olsonian' approach to collective action. The first of these is to question the cogency of the particular 'means' and 'ends' division which is implied by the idea that activity requires an evaluation of 'cost' and 'benefit', which allows low/zero benefit activity to escape examination;
....while (these) models claim to explain collective action, they actually make its occurrence a mystery. Why should an individual actor ever allow him/herself to become embroiled in collective actions when this can never increase his/her overall well-being... (It does not) account for cases of collective action, especially where outcomes are unclear, organisations weak etc. (17).

In the particular case of CND, Parkin identified participation in CND as being not solely based on opposition to nuclear weapons but as a representation of a whole political ideology that was at deviance with the prevailing societal attitudes expressed through the usual political/social channels. Thus individuals as part of CND are given the opportunity to give vent to these 'deviant' beliefs, therefore, ..group solidarity becomes a meaningful incentive when operating in a hostile environment. (18) - a 'benefit' gained at minimal 'cost', if one were to apply the Olson model.

The question still remains though, and particularly in the case of CND's largely middle class background, as to why such relatively large numbers of individuals with a good income and from professions with a large degree of security should express such 'deviant' values. Here it is necessary to move away somewhat from the restrictive confines of the arguments regarding 'benefit', 'cost' etc. into the even more rarefied atmosphere of the analysis of SM's as the bearers of political conscience and as conscious actors on the political stage. Verba and Nie have argued that the reason behind the middle class nature of 'conscience constituents' is that,

...the higher status individual has a greater stake in politics, he has greater skills, more resources, greater awareness of political matters, he is exposed to more communication about politics, he interacts with others who participate... (19).

Certainly, in the case of CND members during the 'sixties and 'eighties this outlook would appear to present some explanation. Parkin's findings would appear to substantiate this approach. Taking just one section of CND's membership (those aged between 18 and 25) it can be seen that there was indeed a great awareness of political issues to the extent that the majority were actively involved in other political organisations and that interaction/socialisation with and through others was also high. On the level of family interaction alone, 62 per cent of respondents parents was either a supporter or approved of CND (20). This view also receives support in later studies like Byrne's which found a correspondingly high participation level in politics throughout the age groups (21). Returning to an earlier point though, this does tend to ignore the underlying consciousness of participants that develops through contact with and within the SM in which they find themselves. It could be argued that such
interaction only serves to deepen their understanding of the wider political and social arena in which they now operate. This may be responsible for 'new' beliefs and behaviour which is in line with their 'new' view of that arena - it must be stressed that this may be the case. It cannot be definitively proven but, for the reasons outlined neither can the other. Another difficulty inherent in this approach is its inability to explain a), why far more (if not all) of the educated middle classes took part and, b), why those that did were drawn largely from the 'creative and welfare sector' of that class.

Inglehart (22), to some extent at least compounds this methodological dilemma with the introduction of the concept of 'post materialism'. This states that the post war generation has developed a revised value system to that which existed before. He argues that due to the lack of real need now experienced by the majority of the people in western society, their self interest has now been redirected into what could be called 'Other-interest' (this paraphrases Melucci's use of the construction of the 'Other' which will be returned to later ), i.e., interest is now projected onto a wider arena and becomes concerned with altruistic causes. Once again a prima facie case can be constructed using this model - there is little need again to illustrate the middle class nature of the campaign - as a partial explanation for the two periods of growth experienced by CND (as well as a host of other SM's and even political parties). However, one still returns to the original question of determinism, i.e., if participants are 'post materialist' in motivation has this motivation been instilled by membership/socialisation or was it prior motivation/socialisation that was responsible for allegiance. Also, once again with particular regard to CND this approach again tends to disregard or ignore historical factors (Cuban missile crisis, invasion of Afghanistan etc. ) in the generation and regeneration of SM's. As with many other theories that revolve around RM, the models of SM's tend to be marked by stasis that fails to differentiate between periods of activity and quiescence.

What then of the new social movement (NSM) theorists such as Habermas, Touraine and Melucci. If the existing sociological models are of only limited value in attempted assessment, how useful is the alternative?

It must be said that in the context of this discussion tracing the generation and regeneration of CND, this approach has little to offer in that it largely fails to address the central question of motivation and mobilisation which, despite their faults, both RD and RM attempt. To some extent in this approach SM's 'are'. There is little or no attempt to ascertain 'how'. We are just, although this is an over simplification, asked to accept that they do indeed exist. Little or no help is provided, other than the
acceptance of some kind of 'post materialism', to explain exactly how such movements are born.

As suggested, to a large extent the roots of these theorists can be traced to the aforementioned 'post-materialist' arguments of Hirschman in that they (SM) are, ..potential bearers of new social interests...(and have a ) potential civilisational role...(23).

What is expressly 'new' with regards to this approach is that unlike either RD or RM which concentrate on motivational and mobilisational questions, Touraine et al are concerned with a macro structural level of society, in which SM's are viewed as actors giving voice to long term trends. Central to this theory are two major characteristics of approach; i) New movements are primarily social and are located within civil society. That is, their concern is motivated and driven by the adoption of and transmittance of alternative/deviant lifestyles, ergo - unlike RD and RM - they are not concerned with the political per se. To this end they have little interest in direct challenge of the state but rather to prevent the 'inner colonialisation' (24) of civil society by the increasingly technological state. ii) New Movements are viewed as agents of shifting values and champions of alternative lifestyles. This is to be achieved through a focusing on identity and symbols rather than the purely political. This is because, as Melucci has argued, SM's can evolve into 'class movements' because the modern capitalist system, ..no longer concerns the sole production of economic resources but also the production of social relationships, symbols, identities and individual needs (25).

At the centre of the approach is the belief that only through the maintenance of retaining..space which separates a movement from a decision making apparatus...(26). will the movement be ultimately successful. Herein though lies a difficulty. In speaking of 'success' in this context how is this to be defined if they are, by definition, removed from the political. By what criteria is 'success' to be judged?

It would be all too tempting at this point to agree with Touraine that the peace movement, ergo CND, is not a SM at all under this definition, based as it is on an oppositional footing to the state. However this only shows the theory to be as contradictory as it really is. Using the pure definition we would be left with a situation where very few supposedly SM's could be considered as 'new' SM's as at some, or even every stage of the development of alternative life styles they will either directly or indirectly come into close contact or confrontation with the state. For example, for the Womens movement abortion on demand is generally seen as a
central plank of their ideology. However, to achieve this requires legislative action on the part of the state which in turn requires the very contact that the 'pure' theory above discounts. Thus, the definition of what or who is a 'new social movement' is ultimately arbitrary.

So, the argument as to whether CND is a 'new social movement' becomes somewhat meaningless in this context. Certainly, in respect to the two periods of CND's growth, it is all too clear that they are removed from the definition. Far from removing themselves from the political, CND have assiduously pursued even greater contact with that sphere. One only has to consider the constant attempts to 'capture' the Labour Party and the growing sophistication of their use of the Parliamentary lobbying system to realise this.

The emphasis on the autonomy of the individual within society and as participants within SM's inherent in this theory is even harder to maintain when considering CND. Certainly as a member of, to use the previous example, the Womens movement it is, to a large extent possible to live out an alternative and even autonomous life style. However, as a member of CND one can certainly declare your house, your street or, as in the case of nuclear free zones, the town in which you live 'nuclear free'. But, unlike the case of the Womens movement, this is largely symbolic. The individual CND member cannot prevent the transportation of Cruise missiles or the actual use of these weapons simply by their adoption of this 'alternative life style'.

In conclusion then, it must be said that in the context of this discussion, the NSM theory is of very limited utility. Firstly, it does little to explain the growth and membership of SM's - they just 'are'. The whole concept must also be questioned, not just in relation to CND - who, following Touraine's reasoning are not a NSM - but generally as,

*...new movements are concerned with issues many of which can be thematized in terms of civil rights and citizenship, and thus make political demands whether for resources or legislative and legal changes* (27)

**Conclusion.**

In attempting to identify the utility of existing approaches to the question of CND, several shortcomings have appeared. Some of these are true of all while others are unique to that particular approach. All are guilty of ignoring the often spontaneous aspects of the movements behaviour. This has happened due to the desire to make
such occurrences fit into the existing social structures thus ignoring the inner
dynamics of the movement itself. This in turn has led to an over emphasis on the
formal structures of the movement which in turn has led to the movements leaders
being given powers and influence they just do not possess. This can best be
illustrated by reference to what happened during CND's formative years.

At the time of their founding, as has been shown, CND's leadership were to be found
amongst the left intelligentsia. It was therefore quite natural that due to the political
access they enjoyed they wished to see CND develop as an elite group. The fact that
this control was lost to the wider movement and that even some of this 'elite' were
radicalised along the way (Russell most particularly), illustrates all too clearly the
danger of ignoring the constant ebb and flow of dynamics that are to be found - not
just within CND - but within most SM's. It is this that all approaches make little
attempt to explain, other than at a superficial level.

Following logically from this is the fact that existing models have a tendency to
portray CND in a somewhat static light. At the heart of all of these criticisms is the
failure by all of the major theories to examine the inherent consciousness of CND
members as they become immersed in that particular culture that is CND. In the case
of RD and RM this is due largely to the emphasis being on the study of activity that is
quantifiable. In the case of CND this has been almost solely focused on the
phenomena of collective action. It has therefore failed to answer the questions raised
regarding the type of activity that generates yet more activity. i.e., it attempts to
answer why people originally took part in CND activity, but to some extent not why
that activity not only continues but often intensifies.

In its favour, RM does have the advantage of viewing collective action as rational
rather than a mere irrational aberration. It is closely associated, unlike the NSM
approach, with a realistic appraisal of the relationship between the SM and the
political arena in which it operates, i.e., there is a realistic assumption that SM's will
and must become involved in negotiation and confrontation in the wider political
arena.

To summarise then, neither of the two main approaches that have been discussed are
or can be definitive explanations of the rise of CND during the 'sixties and 'eighties.
RD offers some suggestions that cannot be ignored on the motivation of the
individual participant of CND during this time. However it does not help greatly in
the understanding of continued and increased activity (and even less about why this
activity may indeed cease).
RM has attractions that counterbalance this defect through its concentration on the wider movement rather than the individual - although this in itself could be a defect as it tends to ignore the potential effect of the individual in relation to the wider movement.

While the above appears, indeed is unsatisfactory, there appears little alternative to this apparent dilemma. It is not the purpose of this work to construct a definitive theorem with which to explain the rise of CND. Rather, the aim is to illustrate the difficulties that are involved in arriving at the definitive reason for SM growth. The conclusion must remain that within the confines of the strict approaches outlined, the growth of CND at these times remains something of an enigma on which the various approaches can only hope to throw something of a selective and, ultimately unsatisfying light on. The criticism of stasis remains but, it is one that perhaps must be acknowledged and that this 'still' snapshot, even allowing for missing or ill fitting pieces is the best that can be hoped for. Any talk of amalgamation by necessity means the discarding of perhaps vital pieces that would certainly lead to, ...a loss of the particular contributions that each has provided to the understanding of social movements. (28). The implication of this being, that although the theoretical perspective would be strengthened, empirical research would suffer.
CND AS MASS MOVEMENT AND THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE.

INTRODUCTION.

In this section, an examination of the validity of descriptions of the POS is undertaken - bearing in mind the peculiarly British traits associated with the political arena in which the movement operates. A prerequisite for this is a definition of what is meant by this concept.

This is followed by an assessment and evaluation of approaches which are concerned with measuring the impact of SM's on the POS, and their relevance and utility to the two periods under discussion. In particular the work of Gamson (29) is analysed in some detail. Encompassed in this consideration is an analysis of the efficacy of mass mobilisation, and the level of integration into the party system. In the same context, and on a purely British level of analysis the concept of 'Imperialist Pacifism' as well as the more heterogeneous concepts involved in the assessment of success and failure are introduced and discussed.

Once again, as was the case with the section that dealt with the various approaches that attempt to explain the rise and growth of SM's, the intention of this section is not to seek to provide the definitive schemata. Rather, the intent is to illustrate once again the dilemmas, and indeed dangers that are involved in attempting to construct a valid and definitive model.

CND and the Political Opportunity Structure (POS).

In referring to a 'Political Opportunity Structure' we are referring specifically in this instance to those factors common to a society such as the electoral and party systems as well as the prevailing attitudes of that society from which the political context is constructed and in which SM's will operate.

For the majority of what is to follow the focus is on the more formal structures of the POS defined above, i.e., parties and government. The wider definition, including the
shapers of cultural attitudes such as the media and the importance of public opinion and perception are discussed later in this section.

By definition, the POS in which a movement is forced to operate will determine to a very large extent how that movement undertakes its mission. The case of CND and the British POS amply illustrates this fact as the POS (in its widest possible definition) that exists in Britain is virtually unique throughout the majority of the democratic western nations. To begin with, politics in Britain is firmly rooted at a national level and based to a very large extent in the capital, London (as is the media - again a powerful and largely centralised media is a feature that is almost unique to Britain). Throughout the majority of the rest of western Europe where a comparable peace movement exists, regional government is far more clearly defined and the local media exerts considerable influence.

In terms of the institutional arrangements, CND is able to draw upon a population steeped in the long history of political participation and mass suffrage within a strongly defined party system based largely on (two) mass parties. This is a population too that has grown used, over centuries, to...extra parliamentary agitation and moral crusades (becoming) accepted modes of political activity (30).

This would seem to contradict somewhat the prevailing view amongst political culture theorists that subscribes to the belief that if they desire to show, ...a stable democracy based upon public allegiance, he reaches for the example of British politics as if prompted by a conditioned reflex (31).

Marsh goes on to show that this is far from being the case and that the British experience responds far more closely to the earlier statement. In a study carried out by researchers from Yale that looked at the frequency of unorthodox political activity over a twenty year period, Britain recorded 132 major political demonstrations that were viewed as significant at a national level. In a ranked order of other states (136), Britain was placed tenth - far higher than many other countries that popular perception and prejudice might place well ahead, even in such a crude frequency rating (Italy-109th, Pakistan 108th for example).

Marsh's own work on what he terms the 'protest potential' of the British is even more conclusive, particularly the attitudes expressed regarding unorthodox political behaviour. In the sphere of 'extra parliamentary agitation', and particularly the use of lawful demonstrations, the majority of respondents (55 per cent) expressed approval of the use of such tactics. Even more revealing was the response of participants when
asked; 'Are there ever times when it is justified to break the law to protest about something you feel may be very unjust or harmful?', 56 per cent believed that there were occasions when such behaviour was justified. As important as the result itself was the fact that the response was based on behaviour specific rather than issue specific factors; i.e., unorthodox political behaviour is viewed within the overall context of acceptable political behaviour and is not judged on the outside observer's view of the legitimacy or otherwise of the ideology that is being expressed.

This is vitally important for while the cause may be viewed as deviant from societal norms by the majority, the majority do not generally view the public espousal of that cause as necessarily deviant behaviour.

Is there then a model that can be applied to the POS in Britain that will aid the assessment of CND's tactics and the success of those tactics during the two periods under consideration? The short answer to this question must be no. The model that proves most useful though is that constructed by Kitschelt in his study of four anti nuclear movements in different countries (32). In this he identifies two basic models of (formal) POS. The first of these he describes as 'open' to many and various influences including parties, pressure groups, individuals etc. and yet 'weak' in implementation. The second he calls 'closed'; that is they are open only to those organisations allowed by a strong central government and 'strong' in implementation. Depending on which type of government exists, the SM will adopt tactics and organisational structures that will best impact on that particular POS. If the first of these two models apply they will become 'assimilative', i.e., participatory and, if the second, 'Confrontational'. This is clearly problematical in the broad British context in that the political system in Britain does not fit comfortably into either category. In the context of CND, this deficiency is compounded by the fact that the policy area that they are attempting to influence has traditionally been associated with the 'closed' model. This can be illustrated by the examples from both periods where the decisions made to update and improve Britain's nuclear capacity (Polaris, Cruise, Trident etc.) were taken largely without reference to the wider POS, i.e., the decisions were made by a few behind closed doors and implemented without wide consultation. In this context one might have expected CND to react in the 'confrontational' manner described by Kitschelt. Indeed they did (Aldermaston marches, the huge marches of 'eighties, the Greenham and Molesworth camps etc.) but, they also employed the more 'sophisticated' tactics more usually associated with an 'open' system (lobbying, petitioning and even - the height of conformity and assimilation - the decision to stand for election under the banner of INDEC in 1962.) However, while Kitschelt's
model is therefore limited in its utility, it does, as Byrne notes, *remind us of the necessity to examine the tactics of SM's within the context of the political opportunities open to them* (33).

Another difficulty that occurs with this approach is that Kitschelt speaks in this classification of the POS as an almost seamless creation that is marked by access only through a single or relatively few entry points, all of which are strictly controlled by a single or various gatekeeper(s). While this may be true of totalitarian or authoritarian systems that operate either a totally closed system (Nazi Germany) or spurious corporatist system (Franco's Spain or Pinochet's Chile), that appears open but is in fact rigidly controlled, in Britain this is plainly not the case. (Perhaps the best analogy can be drawn with a border crossing; using Kitschelt's model, then all borders of a POS are either totally open - such as the English-Scots border thus allowing completely free movement between the two states - or totally closed - perhaps the best example being the border that existed between West and East Germany. In reality the majority of state border's are only nominally controlled in such a way and the most determined can usually find a way across such official barricades - perhaps in this instance the example of the US-Mexican border is the closest.) The British political system's border's are riven with many such gaps through which a SM can gain some access (even if as in the latter examples case they are later expelled). In the case of CND, much of their access has been gained through their attempts to 'capture' the Labour Party. In this venture they have had, as has been shown, somewhat mixed fortunes but, the existence of this potential entry point does seem to further fragment Kitschelt's neat view of an amorphous political system that fits comfortably into one of two groups.

The same theory seems to work on the understanding that influence is almost a top-down process, i.e., that it is the influence exerted through the highest reaches of the political system that is to be used as the benchmark for potential access/influence. During the height of CND's membership during the 'eighties, much of the contact was made through the framework of party organisation and electoral politics. During this time the Labour Party had several representatives on CND's executive council while CND had a network of sympathisers in the constituency organisations. At the level of Local Government CND were heavily 'represented', illustrated by the success particularly of the 'Nuclear Free Zone' campaign, with several large local authorities adopting this policy. The parliamentary and elections committee of CND provided elected MP's of all parties with material on disarmament and sent representatives to local meetings to raise questions regarding nuclear and defence policy. Clearly, while CND's access to the very highest offices of the political system was limited and that
entry remained 'closed', the system could be described as much more 'open' the lower down the system one looked.

In terms of the broader political party POS, penetration of the 'elite' - other than the government party - was relatively extensive. This was a two edged sword for the Peace Movement in that they were able to exert an influence on the Defence Policy of a major political party, but it also became almost impossible for them to maintain the previously independent position they had before. This is something that the Labour Party could not accept in return for it's support.

This is certainly true, although the latter point regarding costs is probably overstated in that CND did not have to maintain a critical stance as the Labour Party had virtually accepted piecemeal the CND position on defence. There was little need for criticism. The question that now deserves some consideration are the organisational factors that influenced this apparently successful period in CND's history. Indeed, did organisational strength play any part or, could such developments be viewed as an coincidental accident of history.

**Organisational theory.**

To a very large extent, the development of organisational theory is a natural offspring of RM theory. As shown, the RM theory has developed from the premise that SM's attempt to gain the achievement of goals through the application of resources. Therefore the question that evolves naturally from this position is which form of organisation is the most effective in the actual application of resources?

The origins of the debate itself can be found in the writings of Weber and Michel in which an increasing focus was placed on the organisation and leadership of a SM as determinants of their effectiveness. Their position, which revolved around the bureaucratisation thesis, was largely pessimistic in tone. Put simply, they believed that it was a natural progression from dynamic movement to one that was weighed down by a *petit bourgeois* leadership whose main goal was to hold on to power rather than see the fulfilment of the Movement's aims.

Far from viewing this process of bureaucratisation as a negative, Gamson argues that it is both largely unavoidable and necessary if a movement is to be successful - or at least increase its chances of 'success' Certainly there can be little doubt that CND,
not just in the two periods being examined, can rightly be adjudged to fall into the category of a bureaucratic organisation using Gamson's framework;

1. the group possesses a written document, a constitution or charter that states both the purposes of the organisation and its provisions for operation...

2. The group maintains a formal list of members, thus distinguishing members from mere supporters and sympathisers (perhaps here CND do diverge slightly in that it is possible to be a member of a local group without belonging to the national organisation. However, at the national level membership lists are kept - more will be said about this later in this section)

3. The group possesses three or more levels or internal divisions. (34)

Gamson goes on to say that it is the increasing bureaucratisation of a movement that also increases their 'combat readiness' through the routinisation of necessary tasks and the ability to overcome internal conflict. As will be demonstrated, CND has to a large extent managed to avoid damaging internal conflict through a variety of tactics so, it would appear that Gamson's thesis may be of some use in this respect. However, like the majority of approaches, the causal link - in this case between increased bureaucratisation and conflict resolution - is almost impossible to establish.

Taking the first time period under scrutiny, internal conflict was an ever present problem. The Committee of 100 was a constant thorn in the side of the wider movement and a thorn that was never successfully removed. Indeed its tactics grew to such an extent that they almost became part of mainstream CND (direct action etc.). At this point there would be little difficulty in placing CND in the categories assigned by Gamson. In this he found, using his scales of 'success' that groups with factionalism scored low on 'acceptance' and 'new advantages' within the POS - 35 and 22 per cent respectively. Certainly, during the 'sixties, save the Labour Party, acceptance and advantage by the wider POS were in somewhat short supply. How much of this can be laid though at the door of visible factionalism is debatable and can be illustrated by comparison with the second motivational height of CND during the 'eighties. In this period factionalism (while of course present) was at a far lower level than in previous times. Many of the tactics of those like the Committee of 100 had become accepted as an integral part of the movement while arguments that existed over ideology and movement direction were resolved within the movement. Those that were not were usually subsumed under the sheer volume of numbers that were united on far more than they were divided. The clamour of the extremists was
lost amidst the far greater noise of the mass movement. As one past vice chair of CND said;

...in periods like that you'll get these elements whose sole role is to build their own party (SWP)...on the demonstrations there were elements of these people...we had to spend part of our time - the officers of CND - defending some of the antics that went on but ...what we did in the 'eighties...we built such a big movement they were swamped (35).

Following Gamson's thesis one might have expected an increased degree of 'acceptance' and 'new advantages'. However, there is little to suggest that this happened and, despite claims to the contrary by CND, the level of 'success' enjoyed by the movement was minimal and cannot be seen to have quantifiably increased.

The other factor identified by Gamson as being concomitant to a movement's success is the degree of 'centralisation' of power (36) within a movement;

A challenging group is coded as having a centralised power structure if there is essentially a single centre of power within the organisation...the single centre of power is frequently associated with personal leadership...In some cases, the group is essentially a personal vehicle for such a leader and could hardly be said to exist independently of its core figure (37).

Whether or not this has an effect on a SM's chances of 'success' is somewhat irrelevant in the case of CND as in very few ways, according to the above definition, do they correspond. Certainly within the movement there is a centralised organisational structure. However, there is also a degree of autonomy enjoyed by local CND groups that sometimes results in action taken that does not have the official or unofficial sanction of the leadership. An example of such action can be found in the support of local groups during the 'sixties for the actions of the Committee of 100, such as 'Voters Veto' and other campaigns of civil disobedience. With regard to the factor of personal leadership, there is little evidence to suggest that the 'leaders' of CND during these two time spans were anything more than just that. While the leaders may have been almost instantly recognisable (John Collins, Bruce Kent, Joan Ruddock etc.) that is not perhaps surprising due to the extensive media coverage garnered by the movement during these times. Certainly, during the 'eighties with the unprecedented growth of the electronic media and the level of public debate regarding the issue of Cruise, it would have been somewhat surprising had not the movement's leaders become widely known. Despite both Ruddock and
Kent's later excursions into the realms of party politics, there can be little doubt that this was a 'natural' progression rather than part of some grand scheme to use CND as a 'vehicle' for this move. As to whether a movement can survive without its 'core' figure; this argument would seem to suggest that only through the adoption of a charismatic leader can a movement survive. This is all too plainly an incorrect assumption on the part of CND. If one considers the past leadership of the movement, while all could be said to be eloquent, intelligent and forthright, none could be described as having the necessary charisma sufficient to carry the movement through difficult times (with the exception, arguably of Bruce Kent). Suggested too in this thesis is the idea of leader as some sort of fountainhead of ideology, i.e., remove the head and the movement is directionless. Once again this is clearly untrue of CND. Above all, CND is a democratic movement. Policy is made at conference theoretically by the mass membership. While the leadership structure allows for an input from the wider membership to the formation of policy it does not allow for wholesale change or abandonment. Indeed, looking at the structure of CND with its plethora of committees, groups and sections one is left with the impression on occasions of movement crying out for the type of leadership that Gamson appears to describe.

The above is of course simplifying Gamson's position, but his core thesis is clear - that the more bureaucratic and centralised a movement is the greater its chances of success. In complete contrast to Gamson's generally optimistic evaluation of bureaucratisation however, Gerlach and Hine (38) are of the opinion that the very opposite is true and that movements that are decentralised and informal are far better placed to achieve success. They identify three traits within such organisations that they have labelled 'SPR'. Each of these will be examined and assessed for utility in the case of CND, but before doing so, it would be well to point out here that the Gamson and Gerlach and Hine strategy's represent two extremes of a complex argument and as such should be viewed as illustrating the dilemmas involved. Other middle ways have been formulated - e.g., Zald and Ash (39), Dwyer (40). Both of these theoretical positions begin from the assumption that the majority of SM's will not fall comfortably into either category. Most will rather be constructed in organisational forms that enables them to assume a variety of tactics and strategies dependant upon circumstances. As Dwyer particularly showed in his study of the US anti nuclear movement, the loose structure at the local level compared with the more bureaucratic and centralised national organisation allowed for mobilisation and spontaneity at a local level, while the more formal structure was able to provide more specialised resources as the need arose. However, for the purpose of this discussion it is the two extremes that best illustrate the variety of approach.
The first feature of 'SPR' is 'segmentary', i.e., where a movement is composed of many and various groups. In the case of CND this is of immediate relevance as CND is composed of many such local groups. The second feature identified is 'polyccephalous'. That is, it is decentralised with no central command or single authoritative leadership. Again, there is an element of this within CND with much activity at a local level conceived and executed without overt reference to the national movement. However, as has been shown earlier, there is within CND a recognisable leadership structure and without the support of this leadership, the scope for action of local groups is limited. Thirdly, identified by Gerlach and Hine is the concept of 'reticulation'. That is when much activity derives from the nature of the movement as a network of organisations that interact largely through informal links and shared consciousness. Once again, this can be seen to have echoes in much of CND's campaign, particularly through the early part of the deployment of Cruise. This can be illustrated with reference to the interaction between the two local groups that formed the centrepiece of the survey that will be discussed later. It was to a large extent due to the initial local reaction and action undertaken by the local CND groups closest to them that the bases at Greenharn and Molesworth first came to the attention of the wider public. The first demonstrations were organised by these groups at a local level and it was at a later date that CND at a local level began to use the Bases as a rallying point for National demonstrations. Even here, much of the organisation and tactics were either left in the hands of the local groups or, tactics were those also first used by the local groups, e.g., wire cutting, passive resistance to the entry of construction vehicles, the linking of hands around the base etc. However, it must also be said that once the demonstrations reached a certain size, the local groups had to relinquish much of the control they enjoyed initially as it was only through the offices of the national movement that protest on a national scale could be organised. They still remained though the prime gatherers of intelligence 'on the ground'; i.e., it was only they who could provide the necessary local information and impetus that was required to sustain the campaign (although, to a large extent this role became largely redundant once permanent 'peace camps' were established at the bases in question).

So, as has been said, while the two approaches concerning the organisational strengths of SM's are at the opposite spectrums of approach, neither is wholly satisfying as a basis for their raison d'être, i.e., the eventual assessment of the success of a movement. Gerlach and Hine's model appears at first to be useful in that, it appears directly relevant to CND. It is important to note though that this model is very closely tied to the 'new' social movement theorists in that it relies heavily on individual personal change achieved through participation within the given SM.
There is little or no evidence that such change occurs at any significant level within CND. Thus, in this respect at least its overall utility is somewhat flawed. What remains therefore from this theoretical position is the contention that a certain amount of decentralised organisation has definite advantages over the more formally organised and bureaucratic organisations with which they share the political stage. Perhaps then the model that comes closest to fulfilling expectations is that of Zald and Ash and Dwyer, i.e., the relatively loosely organised periphery (local CND groups) combined, as the need arises with the organisational, financial and mobilising qualities of the more formal central organisation. Once again though, common to all the broad and specific arguments regarding RD, RM and new social movement theory, the majority of these approaches can be said to be guilty of ignoring the potential effect of the wider environment in which the individual moves when not participating as well as the values, mores and consciousness that the individual brings with them to the movement rather than those which the movement instils in the individual. The question that all of the above eventually seeks to answer though is that of success and what they all tend to leave unanswered is how that is to be measured.

The meaning and measure of success.

At the most basic of levels it would plainly be foolish to argue that CND has been unsuccessful. During the two heights of mobilisation CND has been by far the numerically largest protest movement that Britain has ever seen. So, if it were enough to use this as a guide, then CND has undoubtedly been successful. Even this very simple benchmark though only serves to illustrate the very great difficulty that exists in this attempted assessment as the very nature of a mass movement carries with it certain costs that may lead to limited success. This is certainly true of the public's perception of the tactics employed by the movement. While it may be true that the British public has a capacity to take on board the idea of protest, there are limits to this acceptance. As Marsh showed the acceptance of protest is high but, only remains so within a relatively limited area. Whilst it may be true that almost 70 per cent of his respondents expressed some form of positive attitude to lawful demonstrations, when the actions described became more militant (occupations, blocking traffic, damaging property etc.) so support fell away. Indeed, in the instance of damage to property, only 2 per cent approved of such tactics. The correlation
between militancy, violence and approval is clear when one considers the following table;

**TABLE 5:2**

*Attitudes towards unorthodox political behaviour (%)*.  

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strong Approval</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approval</strong></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disapproval</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong Disapproval</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Adapted from Marsh, A., *Protest and Political Consciousness*. (Sage. 1977. ))*

So, while the growth of an organisation into a truly mass movement is welcomed by that movement, it does bring with it problems of a kind that do not exist per se when that movement is either small or growing. The problem is keeping the large membership involved in the campaign while at the same time avoiding tactics that alienate the uncommitted. In the case of CND, this meant they had to find a means of educating the public regarding their position on nuclear weapons while at the same time ensuring those ideas were not associated with types of action of which the public does not approve.

In the case of the tactics employed by CND in opposition to Cruise, they were able to use the mass demonstration as a means to keep large numbers involved without alienating non dissidents on a huge level as many approved of the tactic in response to deployment. Where the difficulty was visible was in the tactics employed by a smaller hard core of members/supporters. (Certainly though in some terms it can be argued that tactics like those employed at Greenham were successful in the area of gaining media attention). In this respect at least it is difficult not agree with the assessment that,
...movements will have such effects as strengthening their opponents, stabilising the order they are challenging or teaching lessons for those who are involved. This is so whether or not these members perceive themselves as 'effective' (41).

So, at this level at least it can be said to be relatively easy to identify effect. Although whether it can be said to be 'successful' is more problematic and at the level of 'success' within the stricter confines of the formal POS it is even more problematic.

Once again it is Gamson that has probably come closest to providing us with a useful classificatory system of success/failure (42). In what he describes as the 'Outcome of Resolved Challenges' he posits four possibilities as the outcome of SM activity;

1. full response (absolute success)
2. Co-optation (an acceptance that carries no benefits for the SM)
3. Pre-emption (carries benefit but no acceptance)
4. collapse (absolute failure).

While this framework provides a basic structure, it does raise as many questions as it seeks to answer. The first of these is, to return to the critique of Kitschelt's POS is the tendency to view this as some sort of seamless entity where results can be seen in the absolute terms that Gamson uses. However, the British POS is, as has been said not that simplistic. Certainly, in the case of CND and the two periods under consideration this has proved to be the case. Although in absolute terms it does appear that CND have failed to alter the course of British defence policy at a national level, they have succeeded in, to use Gamson's term, 'full response' on several occasions from one major component of the formal POS; i.e., they have succeeded in committing the Labour Party to a unilateralist course on several occasions (1963, 1980-83). Of course, doubt must remain though as to how loyal such support would have remained had Labour won power. No matter how transitory this support has proved it does illustrate the problem of a) attempting to construct a definitive model of the POS and, b) assessing the degree of success/failure within that POS. Were it possible to overcome the first of these methodological dilemmas, one would still be faced with a series of difficult problems - this despite Gamson's own acceptance that his model requires 'additional complexity' - that are not, if indeed they ever can be, easily surmounted.

Some of these problems that exist can be said to be true of all SM's while others are unique to the case of CND and the British POS. Probably the most important of the former is the 'problem of causal attribution'(42) or, to put it more simply, how does
one definitively establish the causal link between SM action and POS reaction. As Dieter Rucht (43) has pointed out, causal factors and their results are rarely linked but are achieved - if indeed they ever are - through a complex web of variables that are not always directly connected to the issue pursued by the SM. This can best be illustrated in reference to CND with the introduction of the idea of 'Imperialist Pacifism' (44). This directly illustrates two important features; i) the nature of the dilemma of causal attribution and, ii) the unique nature of the environment in which CND operates.

'Imperialist Pacifism' is the tendency for dissidents (CND members and supporters) and counterdissidents (Government, political parties, the media etc.) to adopt an attitude that decisions made by Britain - in this case in the realms of defence policy - will carry extensive political and moral weight. This concept revolves around the idea that there is a refusal on the part of all participants to view Britain in the real light of a relatively minor power in the world context. The result of non-acceptance of this position is manifested in the refusal to believe that whether Britain has nuclear weapons or not means little in the overall context of the (then) superpower stand-off. Such an attitudinal anomaly makes the identification of causal attribution in the British context that much more problematic. However, this has not prevented some from adopting such a positivistic stance. Baehr for example has little difficulty in accepting the CND line that it was the impact made by the demonstrations of the early eighties that were in a large part responsible for the 1987 INF treaty. He argues, with an apparent lack of hard empirical evidence (even using Gamson's flawed paradigm) that the role played by the movement in educating the mass of public opinion to the dangers of further deployment was critical in what was to follow and he further states;

...the peace movement provided politicians with an incentive to make or support the deal...Western politicians...came to desire the prestige that accrued from disarmament...(45)

Certainly this thesis is appealing at face value until one examines the central assumptions behind it. Certainly CND was responsible for the stimulation of debate on the matter that was without precedent. However, where the thesis fails badly is in the definitive nature of the declaration that it was this factor that to a large extent was responsible for the treaties that were to follow. Indeed, using the evidence deployed before vis a vis public opinion, it is perhaps easier to make the case that the activities of CND during this time made the achievement even more difficult - certainly this was a view of many poll respondents (46). At a very crude deductive level, it must also be asked that if it was so important that 'politicians desired the prestige that
accrued from disarmament' (as presumably this would be an electoral asset), then why did the politicians that constantly espoused disarmament - the Labour Party - lose two successive elections at this time. Baehr is perhaps guilty here of overstating the depth of public support for a deal. As well as this, one will always return to the central dilemma in this argument. That is, while the official line remains one that the INF treaty (and others like the PTBT in 1963) were made on the basis of strategic/economic criteria and not on any potential electoral benefit, then the attempt to find causality is severely damaged. While common sense may tell us that there is a link, this is not satisfying. Such deductive reasoning tends to leave the researcher out on a limb and subject to criticism that they have fallen prey to the 'Owl of Minerva Syndrome', i.e.,

*(that) where the reinterpretation of social reality is formulated ... bearing something of an 'official' stamp, that is endorsed by recognised leaders and intellectuals of the movement....some) may be tempted to read this back into their own recollections. ...hence they may....(subscribe) to the 'official' version of social reality...while by-passing or downplaying the complex currents and cross-currents...that were actually present though in retrospect were inadmissible (47).*

Such currents and cross currents that pertained during the second peak of CND activity would have to include, as Baehr does acknowledge,

*...the parlous state of the Russian economy...an embattled (US) President desperate for....a peace accord....the dynamism of Mr. Schultz (US Secretary of state)....* (48).

However, perhaps quite rightly, he goes on to say that none of this was sufficient on its own and it was the peace movement that provided the final impetus. He is though guilty of, if not ignoring other factors, certainly down playing them with the thinnest possible justification in order to reach a totally unverifiable conclusion; i.e., in neither case is it possible to follow the link of causal attribution to a satisfactory conclusion.

Another difficulty identified by Rucht, and one that is particularly apposite in the case of CND, is that of 'time reference and effect stability'. That is to say, that certain movements, such as CND, may be involved in campaigns that last - by necessity - for decades and it is therefore necessary to differentiate between the goals of a movement and their successes over these different time periods. As he says a short term gain may turn out to be a hollow victory in the long run. In the case of CND this can best be illustrated by reference to the apparent successes of the signing of both the aforementioned PTBT in 1963 and the INF treaty in 1987 that in the long term -
accepting for the moment that they were indeed the 'successes of the Peace Movement - they coincided with a fall in membership numbers. Secondly and perhaps more importantly,

...surveying a lengthy time span also allows us to relativise effects according to their historical relevance. What can be perceived as a great victory from the immediate perspective may be a minor result as compared to the more subtle and gradual impacts that become visible only in the long run (49).

Once again, using the examples of the two treaties serves to illustrate this factor as well as showing that the gradual impact need not be positive for the movement in this longer term. Similarly, the problem of unintended or perverse effects needs to be considered; i.e., those outcomes that they have not foreseen as a consequence of their activity. Very clear examples of this can be seen throughout CND's history, in particular CND's efforts to capture the Labour Party. On numerous occasions this has caused CND to openly express their support for many of the party's wider aspirations. The very fact that this support has occurred has been used by the antagonists of party and movement alike to discriminate against them to considerable electoral effect - particularly during the 1983 election. The result of this has been an unwillingness on the part of the Labour leadership to be seen to be associated with the movement, culminating in the resignation of Neil Kinnock as a member of CND. Hence the channels into the POS and therefore the possibility of success through those same channels have been severely foreshortened.

**Conclusion.**

With regards to the first consideration of this section, the various models of the POS that have been constructed, it must be said that all are of only limited utility. Kitschel't's is perhaps the most useful in that it is a reminder that the formal structure of the POS must be considered. However, the model itself is, as has been noted, somewhat flawed as, particularly in the British case, the POS has characteristics of both constructs. It further assumes that there is an amorphous quality to the POS that in reality is simply not the case. As has been amply demonstrated, in the case of CND and their relationship with the POS, while the higher reaches of the POS have remained largely closed, various entry points at a lower level have remained open. This being the case, it is only by a consideration of the utility of the model that this becomes apparent. In this limited way then its utility is demonstrated.
With regard to the organisational context, there again appears to be only limited use for the various approaches. Once again no one in particular can be said to be definitive. In the case of Gamson's and its applications in the context of CND, there are immediate and initial problems in the assignation of CND to Gamson's classifications (bureaucratic, non-bureaucratic etc.) in that they fail to fit neatly into any one category. CND have and continue to fall between two stools in organisational terms. At the other extreme, Gerlach and Hine's model tends to overcome this difficulty by its very vagueness of classification. However, while this theory may go some way to being useful with regards to the autonomy enjoyed by local CND groups, there are still unresolved difficulties such as...the tendency of the media to treat them as a collectivity, and visit the perceived sins of one upon all... (50) as well as others mentioned, such as the tendency to view membership of a given SM as the prime formative influence on a participants consciousness, rather that consideration given to the reverse hypothesis.

Turning to the question of the actual measurement of success or failure, this is perhaps the most problem ridden area under consideration. Whilst it is perfectly possible and feasible for the researcher to construct a model of the SM and POS that is going to be examined, it is extremely difficult - perhaps impossible - to construct a similar model by which effect can be assessed and judged. The arguments have already been too well rehearsed elsewhere to require reiteration here. Suffice to say it is an area that will continue to be marked by a less than objective or rigorous approach. Perhaps such bald statements as, 'it was largely due to the activities of the Peace Movement that the PTBT/INF treaty was signed', will continue as valid currency.

It is perhaps sufficient to illustrate this predicament by reference to the most basic measure of SM 'success' where even the success of the mobilisation of hundreds of thousands must be questioned. Yes, thousands did join the movement but, many more thousands did not. Success therefore remains an elusive concept.

Many of the above discussed theories are able to tell us something with regard to the motivation of the individual members of a SM - even if these are somewhat flawed. They are also able to provide a cogent argument and definition of the type of membership that might be involved in terms of their instrumental and/or expressive nature. Once again though, even these theories are prone to inherent problems. What all of the aforementioned positions fail to account for though is what might be termed the capacity of those movements to continue, for whatever reason, to provide that
membership with a *continuing* outlet of expression over the lifetime of that individual's allegiance to radical protest and political activity.

As will be argued in later chapters, CND have proven themselves more than able to attract the 'expressive' membership in the past. Certainly if one considers the results of surveys conducted during the eighties, the expressive nature of CND membership is self evident. However, as will be seen in the examination of the nineties cohort, this is a situation that will be shown to be changing. It will be argued that the movement is no longer the 'natural' home of the 'expressive dissident'. In short, the evidence will show that a qualitative and quantitative change has occurred *throughout* the SMI and that it is therefore no longer possible - even allowing for the flawed nature of the discussed approaches - to concentrate on the purely structural location of SM support. What now appears to be needed in the light of evidence suggesting a far more transitory membership is an account of the apparent shifting loyalties of the movements membership - which in the case of CND, as will be seen, involves a greater movement towards environmental concerns often at the expense of and not always in tandem with CND membership.
FOOTNOTES.


4. See Parkin, F., ‘Middle Class Radicalism.’ (Manchester University Press. 1968.)


13. See Byrne, P. and Parkin, F., both op cit.

15. Parkin, F., *op cit.* p. 34.

16. *ibid.* p. 36.


33. Byrne, P., op cit. p. 16.


35. Authors interview with Bob Cole. CND Vice-Chair.


37. ibid.


40. Dwyer, L. 'Structure and strategy in the Anti Nuclear Movement', in Freeman, J., 'Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies'. (Longman. 1983.)


42. ibid.

43. ibid.


46. 46 compared to 24 per cent believed the activities of CND - particularly at Greenham - made agreement and peace more difficult to achieve. Figures extrapolated from various opinion polls between early 1983 to late 1984.
47. Foss, D.A. and Larkin, R., *op cit.* p. 77. Based on the Nietzschien philosophy that the 'owl of Minerva takes wing once the shades of dusk have already fallen'.


49. Rucht, D., *op cit.*

INTO THE NINETIES.

Introduction

The intent in the following introductory section is not to give a detailed account of the beginnings of the crisis which eventually led to war. Rather the intention is to give a rough timetable in which it will be possible to fit in the responses of both CND and the Labour Party in later sections. In the section that follows, both the reaction and impact of CND are looked at and assessed both in the context of the conflict itself and, in the wider context of the future direction of the movement once hostilities had ended. In particular, the question of whether CND can, should, or indeed has developed from an anti-nuclear movement into a broader anti-war movement will be considered. This becomes apposite as they reacted to the ending of the Cold War and the emergence of the, so called, ‘New World Order’. The implications of such a role change will also require some kind of examination of the impact of such a change on the wider membership as the broadening of their aims has implications for those - the majority - of their members who are not pacifist in absolute terms (‘nuclear pacifists’ may be a better label for the majority). There will also be an examination of the Labour Party's and Trade Unions response and role vis-a-vis their relations with the Peace Movement.

The Gulf Conflict; the background.

The new decade could not have begun more dramatically. On August 2nd 1990 Iraqi forces invaded and overwhelmed their neighbour Kuwait in the space of a few hours. World reaction was swift. Less than twenty four hours later the United States, Britain and France had frozen all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and NATO urged all its member states to halt all trade with Iraq. Iraq's biggest arms supplier, the USSR, immediately halted all arms sales and shipments. The United States also ordered seven more warships - including the aircraft carrier USS Independence - into the Gulf area. At this stage though, despite appeals from Kuwait, President Bush was at some pains to point out that no direct military intervention by the US was being contemplated.

By August 3rd though, four thousand American troops were on their way to neighbouring Saudi Arabia, ostensibly as a deterrent designed to make the Iraqis
think again should they be considering moving in a westerly direction ('Operation Desert Shield').

Domestically, at least at this early juncture, the British response was supportive of UN sanctions but while they had been 'consulted' about the deployment of American forces, there were no plans to despatch British forces to the Gulf region. The stated aims of the British Government at this stage were twofold; i) the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and, ii) the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government (1). During this debate on the 6th and 7th of September the vote was not taken on the substantive issue of what many saw as the increasing inevitability of conflict (by this time British forces were deployed in the region) but rather was on 'adjournment of the House' (2). By the time of the next debate - December 11th (3) - events had moved on apace. Domestically, Britain had a new Prime Minister, John Major while internationally the UN had passed resolution 678 which allowed the use of force to eject Iraq from Kuwait. (The UN Security Council in a display of unity not seen since the Korean war had passed this resolution by twelve to two - only Cuba and Yemen had voted against while China had abstained. The resolution, passed on 29th November, gave Iraq until January 15th to pull out of Kuwait. The time lag was to allow for 'one final opportunity' (4) for a peaceful solution otherwise the resolution allowed other member states to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area. (5)

By the time resolution 678 had been agreed the military build up in the Gulf had reached unprecedented proportions. The multinational force assembled in the region now numbered some 400,000 (over half this total being American) with another 150,000 en route. )

The debate on December 11th was remarkable for the strange alliances that were forged between previously implacable political enemies. None more so than the equanimity displayed by those old rivals of Commons debates, Edward Heath and Denis Healey. Both spoke eloquently against what they saw as the precipitous rush to war with Heath warning MP's,

...not to get into a position of rigidity, but realise that finding a peaceful solution, although not easy, is possible and the price of not finding one is immensely high and could be unsustainable. (6)
Healey meanwhile spoke of a situation whereby,

*President Bush by his words and deeds is making it more difficult to use the necessary means that will restore peace and stability to the Middle East, and is threatening to commit us all to a course of action that will destroy the possibility of peace and stability for at least a generation...We must give them (sanctions) at least twelve months to work.* (7).

These were strange allies to what had been essentially CND’s position since the start of the crisis but welcome if only for the authoritative manner of their position and the general respect they enjoyed with the wider electorate. On the day of the UN deadline, January 15th, another, and as it transpired, final debate on the crisis occurred. By this time Britain had 35,000 service personnel in the Gulf and less than two days later they were at war as the allied forces launched a surprise attack on Iraqi targets. Operation ‘Desert Storm’ had begun.

**CND goes to war.**

At the beginning of the Gulf crisis CND, in common with the majority of the British people, were caught unawares. Events had progressed in a direction that few could have imagined. That years Annual report was remarkably upbeat - *it has been a year of achievement and hope*...(8) in response to the vast changes occurring in Europe. There was no air of complacency though. Despite the very welcome change in East-West relations CND still saw a role for themselves in ending nuclear proliferation and the international arms trade and to promote the UN as a forum for the resolution of conflict. The Gulf crisis merely served as a timely reminder of the necessity of an organised peace campaign. Bruce Kent summed up the position thus;

*The Gulf crisis has brought together all the issues - deterrence, arms sales, the UN and human rights - in one boiling saucepan. When these kind of problems are solved world-wide, perhaps CND’s work will be over.* (9)

Here was a clear statement from one of CND’s most respected figures that a redefinition of the movement’s role and consciousness was required. No longer would it be enough to campaign against single missile systems. What was now needed, according to the movement’s best known leader at least, was the development of CND into a general anti-war movement. This view was most
certainly reflected in the views of the newly elected Chair, Marjorie Thompson (10),

...it is now apparent that the issues of nuclear proliferation, the UN's emergence as a forum for solving disputes and the need to free Europe from its one remaining bloc requires CND's clear unequivocal lead as well as our vision...(11)

(Whether or not this was a view supported by the rank and file member/supporter will be analysed later). In some ways then the Gulf crisis could not have occurred at a better time as it,

...uniquely tied together the two campaigns...planned. We don't want to see the peace dividend squandered and the fact Saddam Hussein was near to developing a nuclear capability allows us to hilight the nuclear proliferation problem. (12)

Another way in which CND also hoped to profit was in a growth of membership. As the threat of war grew so too would the numbers of people involved in the peace movement. (Thompson had already acknowledged that the fall in CND's membership was of concern, dropping steadily from a high of around 100,000 in 1984 to 65,000 in 1990 - although they were a long way off the worst days of the 70's when membership had fallen in 1971 to a little over 2,000 (13). In actual fact, this increase in membership at a national level did not occur in real terms. Indeed, by the end of hostilities the figure had fallen by 2,000 to 63,000 and peaked during the early part of the war at 67,000 (14). )

All of CND's attention though now became directed to opposing the drift to war. During the early stages of the crisis and their support for the UN position and the continuation of sanctions, CND appeared to have found a real sense of purpose after the morale sapping and somewhat directionless days of the late eighties.

As part of the Committee to Stop the War in the Gulf (CSWG) which comprised along with CND, the Green Party, the Campaign for Non Alignment and other left wing groups, mass demonstrations against war and in favour of continued sanctions were organised. On the 24th November 1990, 20,000 people (CND's estimate) were involved in demonstrations in London while hundreds more took part in actions at a local level. As the deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal grew nearer so the attendances grew. On January 12th 1991 according to CND estimates around 100,000 people took part in a rally in London (Police estimates put the figure closer to 42,000). That there was a real danger not only of war - at this
stage it seemed almost certain - but of nuclear weapons being used in any conflict is not in doubt as it was estimated that;

...about 1,000 US tactical nuclear weapons (were) in the Middle East...about 50 of the 400...Cruise missiles on US warships are nuclear armed...at least 100 (nuclear weapons) will be deployed on the large amphibious assault ships...The final US nuclear stockpile in the region is at the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey, where 200 nuclear bombs...are stored and could be delivered by F16 or F111 strike aircraft. (15)

and yet the actions taken by CND and their allies appeared to have little or no effect on the mass of public consciousness. Evidence from the polls suggests that the level of public support for the allies actions remained relatively constant - indeed, as shown once hostilities began attitudes if anything hardened;

**TABLE 6:1**

*If the UN deadline expires on January 15th and Iraq has not left Kuwait, do you think Britain, America and the other allies in the Gulf should;*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan. 1991 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Try to free Kuwait by force.</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UN blockade of Iraq be given more time in which to work</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6:2

Do you think America, Britain and the other allies were right or wrong to launch an assault on Iraq once the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal had passed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Gallup Political and Economic Index. Report 366. p.10)

Given CND's position regarding the question of sanctions, i.e., that they be given more time in which to take effect, one may have expected that with 43 per cent of respondents in favour of continuation of sanctions CND should have been able to draw on this not inconsiderable base. If though we are to talk in terms of success and failure by CND and their allies their inability to mobilise this support must be addressed. And, not only did they apparently fail to mobilise, they must also be said to have failed not only in actual mobilisation but also in disseminating the overall message that force should not be regarded as a viable option - the majority of respondents (49 - 69 per cent) being in favour of sanctions over a limited period (which by implication suggested that force be used after this time - although this is contradicted by the latter poll.)
TABLE 6:3

How much time should the blockade be given before force is used? (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 1 month</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 months</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 months</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 12 months</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longer than a year</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force should never be used</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 6:4

Although you personally favour going on with the blockade, if Britain, America and the other allies did decide to free Kuwait by force, would you support that, or would you be opposed to it? (All those saying blockade) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favour</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the war progressed and CND's predictions of the return of hundreds of body bags proved incorrect so even the limited support they had enjoyed began to dwindle. By the middle of January the average attendance at rallies in London had fallen to around 5,000. Why had this happened; why did CND fail to cash in on the obvious antipathy to war in the Gulf exhibited by a not inconsiderable number of the British people?
Using Rucht's methodological analysis (16) it is possible to identify several possible reasons for this apparent failure. The first of these factors is what Rucht has called the problem of interrelated effects, i.e., Social Movements tend to pursue several goals at the same time. So, while CND in this instance was opposing war in the Gulf they were still pursuing the wider goal of nuclear disarmament. More importantly they were still also seen by the majority of dissidents and counter dissidents in the same light. So, as Rucht goes on to say, *Movement investments and resulting effects in one dimension are likely to have effects in other dimensions, and vice versa.* (17.)

The effects in one dimension with regards to CND are clearly those they gathered in their long history as primarily an anti nuclear movement. This position, to many, appeared discredited as relations between East and West changed beyond all recognition. Many clearly felt that CND's position was at best marginal and, at worst, irrelevant. Was CND now viewed as an interesting relic of the past whose message - whatever it might be - was no longer pertinent. They had been 'wrong' about nuclear weapons, perhaps they were also wrong about the consequences of war in the Gulf?

In the short term, it may be correct to view CND's actions during the Gulf crisis/war as a failure. Certainly their predictions of hundreds of body bags arriving back in this country and the United States as the land war dragged on for many months proved (thankfully ) incorrect. Predictions that Israel if attacked might respond with Nuclear weapons also proved false. All of this undoubtedly contributed to CND's failure to win popular support. However, in the long term, if success is to be judged in this way, other predictions did come uncomfortably close to the truth - in December 1990 they predicted the destruction of up to 500 oil installations with fires burning for many months and a devastated environment. Sadly this did prove to be the case and, while CND would have been glad to have been proved wrong, this 'success' may yet prove valuable to them in the long term particularly as their issue base broadens to include ecological implications of war. Of far more possible relevance during this period and any evaluation of the effect of CND's opposition to the war is the question of unintended and perverse effects.

As Rucht affirms, *It is commonplace that social actors...produce unforeseen consequences that they usually perceive as negative* (18). Of course, these results may not always be absolute negatives. They may not produce the result that was intended but can produce other gains even though the original goal remains
unattained. In CND's case in their opposition to the Gulf War, their alliances with not only the far left but - more importantly perhaps - their alliance with ecological groups such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth may prove a 'successful' unintended effect at a later date. Certainly, up until this point there is much evidence to suggest that CND had been held very much at arms length by the ecological groupings due to CND generally being perceived as a radical movement of the left (In fairness, it should also be pointed out that due to the influence of Trade Unions within CND and their concern over some of the implications in terms of employment of many 'Green' policies, CND had been less than assiduous in their courting of the wider Green movement). The use of the phrase, 'may prove' successful however, is vital in consideration of this particular period in the history of the movement. This is particularly true with regards to these future relations with the 'Green' movement as there is still the tendency for many of them to view CND as political radicals. As one senior CND figure puts it, ...there is this image that they can't touch CND; they're those 'nasty political people.' (19)

As was mentioned earlier, CND were but one, if important, component of the Committee to Stop War in the Gulf (CSWG) along with other groupings of the left and far left. It is this involvement that some have suggested was critical in the failure of CND to mobilise and retain support in favour of sanctions: ...it never managed to get its arguments for sanctions heard above the din of Trotskyist calls for Iraqi victory against the imperialists...(20)

It seems that CND, surprisingly, were caught unawares of this. Surprisingly because it seemed in some ways to be a repeat of the similar phenomenon that occurred during the Vietnam war - unsurprising perhaps though when one considers (as will be seen later) that very few members or leaders with memories of this earlier period remained within the movement. At a meeting of the CSWG designed to adopt a 15 point policy statement on January 12th (21) the time was spent debating the status of the Trotskyist's in the CSWG which prevented the policy statement being adopted. The meeting had begun with representatives of the far left taking many of the seats that had been reserved for formally affiliated members. These they refused to give up and the meeting had to be adjourned to another room. Marjorie Thompson, representing CND at the meeting, even hinted that CND would pull out of the CSWG. Such internal wrangling was doing little for CND's credibility as a focus for the anti war movement. Such incidents also served to illustrate both the naiveté of CND's new Chair and the divisions that were
just below the surface within CND (Officers, members and supporters alike.) Marjorie Thompson has since admitted that;

...the participation of the SWP and others in the CSWG was, to say the least spicy - I've never seen anything like it. In the last six months I have learned so much about different factions on the British left...I got into trouble at one stage for saying that I wished they'd all disappear...The other lesson would be to have our own organisation on board, which it was not rather than have them fight every inch of the way. In the space of twelve hours, I was called a Stalinist by Tony Benn for ejecting Socialist Organiser from the room; then I was called a Trotskyist from inside my own organisation...there are some people in this organisation spending more time trying to outmanoeuvre us and organise against us and they can look at their consciences when they wake up in the morning...(22).

It was not only the new chair that was disenchanted with the antics of the far left. The ordinary supporter, particularly those with memories of that earlier period, was concerned that due to their association CND were once again coming to be viewed as an integral part of the far left;

...my distrust is of people who are predominantly anti-American...I still have memories of going down Whitehall surrounded by great crowds of people all yelling, 'Ho, Ho, Ho Che Minh', and me saying 'hang on a minute, that's not what I'm here for' and yet we still seem to be making - no not making - appearing to be making common cause with the American flag burning, 'Victory to Iraq' Trotskyist brigade...It is something that puts people off...the public don't understand you can't stop them coming. All they see is a person carrying a CND banner standing next to someone with a 'Victory to Iraq. Death to the Imperialists' banner. It's very sad. (23).

Certainly much of this could genuinely be regarded as a perverse and unintended effect. Whether though it is wise to see the failure of the central message as being solely due to this aspect of the public perception of CND is doubtful. Many of the images of the anti-war factions were powerful and did affect the way in which some non dissidents viewed CND. However, it is too easy to imagine that this alone was responsible for the failure. Other than in its future relations with the wider SMI, it is difficult to see this association remaining once the Gulf war becomes part of history. Certainly, if one uses the similar instances that occurred during the Vietnam war, no long term damage was caused to CND's reputation; i.e., at a time
of crisis and controversy this image was largely forgotten as people flocked to CND in huge numbers. However, what was unique on this occasion was that it was British troops that faced possible death as the 'tools of the forces of Imperialism' and not a somewhat distant nations troops. Perhaps then this may be something that will indeed return to haunt CND at sometime in the future.

**After the war.**

In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War CND was left facing a situation where many of its major projects had, to all intents, to be revitalised. Almost all of the movement's energy had been devoted in the previous weeks and months to opposition to the war. In this they had been largely unsuccessful. Membership had remained static at best and, despite claims by CND to the contrary, they had come out of this experience with their public image somewhat tarnished.

Perhaps the first manifestation of this was the appeal launched in September for £120,000; *To put it bluntly without this money the result will be that CND in its present form will cease to exist.* (24).

Certainly, the cost of maintaining opposition to the war had meant that expenditure outstripped income but, the problem was further complicated by a dramatic fall in the sales of CND merchandise which by August were 70 per cent below target. Additionally, and perhaps of more concern to the movement was the fact that membership subscriptions and fees from affiliated organisations showed a small but nonetheless dramatic fall during the early part of 1991. The end of year accounts show a fall of over £24,000 in this area alone (1989/90 - £337,170. 1990/91 - £313,158. (25)) By the end of the financial year, the movement faced an overall deficit of £166,653 compared with a profit of £13,492 for the previous year (26). The situation was so desperate that unless the money was found by the end of September, wages would not be able to be paid. As it happened the financial bind into which CND found themselves thrust was eventually (temporarily ?) resolved when in September an anonymous donation of £100,000 was received.

What though were the reasons for this? Certainly the Gulf crisis had played a part in these financial difficulties. Campaigning activities had swallowed a large proportion of expenditure ( £212,439 in 1990/91 compared with £116,944 the previous year) but, the largest expense by far - with nearly a two fold increase on the previous year - had been spent on membership and fund-raising activity. Implicit in this was the suggestion that the major concern for CND at this time was
the maintenance and/or expansion of a slowly falling membership. Other factors were also seen by CND as being responsible with, recessionary factors (27), not being the least of these. While this may indeed be the case, and it is a difficult argument to refute, care should be exercised before accepting this at face value. During previous recessionary times, particularly during the early to mid 'eighties, this had not been a significant factor. Indeed as noted previously, during the height of CND's regeneration at a time of severe recession, both membership and income had not only been maintained but considerably improved. It can therefore be argued that while 'recessionary factors' may have played some part they were not as important as CND would themselves suggest. Consideration must also be given to other possible factors that may have deprived CND of members and finance. One of these factors has been considered earlier, i.e., the association of CND in the CSWG with factions of the far left leading to the alienation of some supporters - perhaps short term disaffection but, important at a time when the movement required the greatest mobilisation possible. Yet another already mentioned that may have had an effect was CND's apparent inability to correctly predict the effect of the war itself, i.e., the appearance of a yawning credibility gap with regard to the movement's much vaunted role as a supplier of accurate predictions of military conflict and their outcomes. In short, for many years, CND had said that it was their information and not that of government that could be trusted - part of the 'twisted debate' argument - and yet at the time when this authoritativeness was needed it was lacking. CND were not sorry that their worst case scenario had been proved incorrect, indeed they were delighted that the massive flow of body bags, the use of nuclear and/or chemical weapons etc. had not occurred but, their credibility had suffered.

Yet another possible factor in the loss of support for CND and the CSWG was the almost pacifist nature of the campaign. While many of the public did indeed support the call for UN sanctions to be given more time, this was not at the expense of ruling out the use of force at some juncture. It is quite possible that for many CND members this echoed their own feelings. As the 1985 survey had shown, while pacifists formed a significant part of CND, almost half of the membership were not pacifists (as will be seen, the latest survey almost exactly mirrors this position). CND though at no time considered the use of force a legitimate action. Even after hostilities had begun, they maintained outright opposition to the war with one of their better known supporters even expressing the hope that through the actions of the peace movement, British force's morale would be undermined;
I certainly hope my behaviour is as bad for soldiers' morale as possible - that's what I want more than anything...In principle, anyone at the moment who is seducing British soldiers from their duty...has my full support (28).

Such sentiments coupled with total opposition to war at any price may have tested the loyalty to the movement of many. Indeed it is perhaps indicative that once hostilities began subsequent anti-war demonstrations continually diminished in terms of size. Yet another factor, but one that does little to answer why membership and income fell, may have been - as was the case with the Cuban Missile crisis - that the outbreak of hostilities illustrated to all but the most committed the possible futility and inadequacy of their protest. For others it may even have been the final fling in a movement that they saw as being increasingly irrelevant in the emerging 'New World Order' of increasing Superpower cordiality, détente and real disarmament and a reflection of CND's apparent ideological incoherence. It was perhaps the case that for many CND members decisions regarding priorities were being undertaken. For many, other causes were, in the light of post Cold-War developments, assuming a greater primacy than nuclear disarmament. Certainly, if one compares CND's membership figures quoted earlier with those of just one other movement, Greenpeace, one is able to see that, at the time that CND's membership was failing, Greenpeace UK's membership was increasing rapidly. In 1991, 46,000 people joined Greenpeace while in the first five months of 1992 more people have joined than in the whole of the previous year (29). Clearly, while recession may have affected income, there are deeper underlying reasons to explain why CND has not benefited from such an increase. It would of course be a mistake to assume that all of Greenpeace's new members were by definition CND supporters but one must assume that a number are, particularly when one considers that Byrne's 1983 study found that 51 per cent of respondents were also members of altruistic movements outside of CND (30). In short, what this seeks to illustrate was that the factors responsible for CND's decline - and this word is used relatively - could not and should not be looked for in external events alone. To do so would be to ignore the fact that other groups operating in a similar milieu were not experiencing the same difficulties as CND. Equally, the factors outlined above are by no means intended to be definitive as regards CND's fall from pre-eminence in the SMI. The intention is merely to represent the pitfalls involved in any attempt to assess the success or failure of any Social Movement within a given time reference.
Whatever change in consciousness was occurring within the movement, one fact that was clearly evident was that with regard to access to the Parliamentary POS (PPOS), CND's options had been considerably marginalised since the end of the previous decade. As seen, the PLP - not all by any means, but the majority certainly - were moving further and further away from CND's position. Events at the start of the new decade widened this gulf even further, leaving CND in something of a political no-man's land. How CND should and will respond to this will be looked at later. For now, a brief examination of the Labour Party, its response to the Gulf Crisis and the continuing debate over defence is required.

**Widening the Gulf with Labour.**

The crisis had a predictably divisive effect on Labour and...inspired considerable silliness...Gerald Kaufman...effectively arguing that we should delay military action long enough to ensure that it is practically infeasible...Mr Kinnock... rejected the peace at any price blandishments...with the angry affirmation that the Labour Party 'is not a pacifist party'. But, of course, part of the problem is that a good section of the party is instinctively pacifist. (31)

During the Gulf crisis Labour was caught firmly between these two opposing factions. On the one hand the leadership was keen to draw upon the hard lessons that had been learnt during the early 'eighties and the Falklands. Then Michael Foot had supported Mrs Thatcher almost all the way once conflict had begun but, the impression that remained longest in the minds of the electorate was the hesitancy and vacillation that preceded this position. It seemed that while the electorate would respect a principled position, it would equally electorally chastise those who appeared to prevaricate. Consequently, Kinnock's position throughout the conflict was generally resolute. It was that the UN sanctions be given time to achieve their aims but, should this fail and hostilities begin, then full support would be given to British and allied forces.

CND insisted that this was not the position of the vast majority of Labour MP's and certainly by the time of the debate on the technical motion on the adjournment of the House on 15th January 1991, a significant minority of Labour MP's were openly expressing their hostility to the official party line. There were fears that up to 40 MP's might vote against the motion at the end of the debate. In an attempt to head off the potential rebels a left wing motion to the PLP calling on them to;
...recognise the very dangerous consequences of a Gulf war and considers that the UN authorised should not undertake military action before sanctions have been in operation long enough to have the maximum impact...(32).

was backed by the Shadow Cabinet. While it was not expected that the number of MP's voting against the Government would rise much above 40, there was increasing evidence that other MP's planned to abstain. But despite claims that a majority of Labour MP's were opposed to the war it seemed that most agreed with the party chairman, Tom Sawyer, ...that in talking about sanctions we do not give the impression of avoiding realities. (33). (Those who believed the majority were against war pointed to the breakdown of voting on previous occasions. On September 7th 128 of 223 Labour MP's voted with the Government (34). On December 11th 131 out of a possible 227 Labour MP's voted with the Government (35). In the first of these votes 36 voted against official policy, while in the second 41 had voted against the Government. Taken at face value it might appear that the majority did not support the leaderships views. But, further analysis shows that on both occasions there was only a one-line whip in operation and amongst those who did not take part were influential Shadow Cabinet members including Gordon Brown and Tony Blair. )

The realities of the situation for the party were plain to see. The public by the beginning of January were not only expecting war (this had risen from 25 per cent in November 1990 to 63 per cent by January 1991 (36)) but, by a margin of three to one believed that force should be used to retake Kuwait. Moreover, more than half further believed that action should take place immediately after the expiry of the UN deadline of January 15th. The critics of Kinnock's line within the party also seemed to exacting a toll on the support that Labour had been accruing for itself after the election of John Major as leader of the Conservative party. At the end of December, Labour had established a lead (45 over 41 per cent) in the polls with many commentators asserting that Major's 'honeymoon' period was over. However, as the new year began, the dominant political issue was each party's ability to handle the growing crisis. Labour's very apparent difficulties were reflected in the sudden wave of support for the Tories who, by the end of January had regained their lead in the polls (44 over 42 per cent (37). On the personal level, John Major was incredibly popular. His personal poll rating throughout the crisis was around the 60 per cent level while Kinnock's never rose higher than the mid 40 per cent (38). )Any hopes that the party would oppose the war once it had begun
were dispelled by Kinnock soon after hostilities had begun in earnest. In a

television broadcast on 18th January he gave unambiguous support to the use of
force and distanced himself completely from the peace movement by making no
reference at all to the continuation of sanctions; *The major cause of the failure of
peaceful efforts was Saddam Husseins complete refusal to give any indication that
he would accept the rule of International law...* (39).

If Kinnock hoped that the start of the war and his position would pull the teeth of
his critics within the PLP he was to be disappointed. By the time of the next
official debate on the 21st January, the opponents of the war were complaining that
they were being denied a voice in Parliament as political differences were
temporarily sidelined. They pointed to the fact that in this debate MPs were able to
unite on a motion calling on support for British forces, the minimisation of civilian
casualties and a renewed call for a Middle East peace settlement once hostilities
ended, but fell short of providing an opportunity to vote against the war. While the
peace movement may have welcomed the support of these MPs, it must also have
been a cause for concern that Labour front bench spokespeople were beginning to
fall by the wayside. This was enabling the removal of some of the most potentially
effective allies that the peace movement had within the PLP from positions where
their voices were to be heard at their loudest and most effective. After the debate on
the 21st January, Tony Banks, Labour's Social Security spokesman, resigned. In
doing so he became the fourth frontbencher to resign the others being John Battle,
John McFall and Maria Fyfe. Such resignations appeared to be strengthening
Kinnock's position amongst the PLP rather than weakening it. Even amongst the
constituencies, normally a fertile ground for the pacifist wing of the party, there
appeared to be little or no significant opposition to the leadership's position;

*Gone are the days when local parties bombarded party headquarters with
complaints about the posture of the leadership...By yesterday the international
department had received only a dozen resolutions on the issue. Most criticised the
Kinnock-Kaufman stance.* (40)

More worrying for Kinnock was the opposition within the Shadow Cabinet. This
was led by John Prescott, the Transport spokesman, a long time opponent of the
war who was now beginning to voice concern over the long term aims of the war,
i.e., that the real aim of the action was the removal of Saddam Hussein from
power. In an attempt to maximise dissent over the Gulf policy, Prescott had held a number of 'supper club' meetings (41). These had attracted several prominent Labour MP's and front bench spokespeople - Clare Short, Mark Fisher and, importantly (of whom more later) the ex-chair of CND, Joan Ruddock. Prescott was further supported in the shadow cabinet by Michael Meacher (Social Security), Ann Clwyd (Overseas Development) and Jo Richardson (Women's Issues). By implication, Prescott was accusing Kinnock of supporting these aims. Kinnock was of course furious and informed Prescott that he must not make statements that were outside his portfolio. He had breached shadow cabinet collective responsibility and misrepresented the front bench's Gulf policy. Kinnock's uncompromising approach appeared to be winning through and a few days after the contretemps with Prescott, he won overwhelming support for his position as the NEC by a vote of 22 to 3 voted in favour of the destruction of Iraq's military power by force if needs be. In doing so he successfully defeated a left wing call for an immediate cease-fire, and satisfied the remaining doubters by making plain that there should be a move away from a military approach once hostilities ended in an effort to bring peace and stability to the region.

Once again though, if Kinnock believed he had silenced the critics within his own party he was to be disappointed. Following the death of civilians in Baghdad during an allied bombing raid in February, Clare Short was dismissed from the front bench after refusing to agree not to make statements condemning the bombing and the apparent widening of the war aims. More seriously for CND, Joan Ruddock (who had earlier called on the leadership to review its stance) agreed to refrain from further comment and was allowed to remain in her position as front bench transport spokesperson. CND were of course dismayed by this. Of all the Labour rebels they felt could be relied upon, Joan Ruddock, due to her past very close association with CND, was perhaps the most important. There was a sense of betrayal felt by many within the movement that such a prominent figure should desert the movement at a time when it needed as many friends as possible. Some even viewed this as the final act in the relationship between CND and the PLP;

Yes. I think...(it was the final nail in the coffin). Personified by Joan Ruddock actually. Let's be honest. I know some of the details about the meeting she had with Kinnock after Clare Short had been in (42)... it was personified in the fact that Joan Ruddock should shut up about it. I think it was just utter cynicism... (43)

While the focus of this chapter has been largely negative in terms of CND's relationship with the Labour Party, there was a potentially positive dimension to
these developments. These once again though could be viewed in the light of aforementioned unintended or perverse effects. This will be discussed in greater detail in a later section but for now the words of a vice-chair will serve to illustrate the potentially beneficial nature of these developments;

...the problem is we have a history of a love-hate relationship with the Labour Party...in a way it's a good thing that the Labour Party can be seen to be more distant because then you might be able to talk to a wider audience. (44)

**Post Gulf war Labour policy.**

Following the end of hostilities, Labour could once again turn its attention to domestic issues in preparation for the forthcoming general election that had to held within the following year. Due to Kinnock's forthright and open support of allied actions in the Gulf it appeared unlikely that they would be faced with the same difficulties they had encountered after the Falklands war (where their stance on defence remained largely ambiguous. The very public and ruthless way that Kinnock had dealt with critics within his own party ensured that in this respect he would avoid the same fate as Foot in 1983, i.e. it was unlikely he would suffer directly from any kind of 'Gulf factor'. However, Labour still had to bridge a credibility gap that existed regarding defence in general. During the Gulf war the electorate's trust of Labour on defence had risen considerably, although they still were not seen as the most trusted party on defence issues. Once the war had ended though, the electorate once again assumed the previous position of putting their trust in defence with the Tories, at Labour's expense.

**TABLE 6:5**

*I am going to read out a list of problems facing the country. Could you tell me...which political party you personally think could handle the problem the best ? (%)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain's defence.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While they enjoyed a considerable advantage in other policy areas such as unemployment, pensions, transport, education and health, defence still appeared to be the Achilles heel for the party. By July of 1991 it appeared that the party were embarked on a major effort to rectify this electoral dilemma. It was an effort that was to finally lay to rest any remaining doubts regarding the relationship of the party with the peace movement.

Two events in particular were to provide the decree nisi in the separation. By far the most important in terms of impact on the wider electorate was the decision by the Kinnock's - both Neil and Glenys - not to renew their membership of CND. Both had been members since the early '60's and both had been highly visible and voluble members of the movement. Membership though, once Kinnock had become leader of the party, became a larger and larger electoral liability. The party was increasingly seen as untrustworthy on defence and it had a leader who consistently refused to renounce membership of CND. This was a target that the Tories could not fail to take advantage of, and in defence debate after defence debate they never failed to score points from Labour over Kinnock's membership. As the party moved further and further away from unadulterated unilateralism, so Kinnock's membership became less and less tenable. Not only was he targeted by his political opponents but, he increasingly found himself attacked by former allies from within the Labour and peace movements for his apparent contradictory allegiances:

*Neil Kinnock should get out of CND and get out now...his lust for power has become so great that he is prepared to ditch any principle...I would rather have a credible Conservative Prime Minister who believes in a nuclear deterrent than a bullshit Labour one like Neil Kinnock* (44).

It would be a truism to say that in the end Kinnock had little alternative but to leave the movement if the accusations of duplicity were not to become seen as correct. In electoral terms this would almost certainly have proved disastrous.

In substantive terms, far more important was the article written by Gerald Kaufman, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, for the *Guardian* in the same month. Kaufman insisted that the article was intended as a clarification of Labour's strategy for eliminating nuclear weapons. However, the peace movement and many senior figures within the party itself saw the article as signalling a major policy change. The debate centred around one short paragraph, which said that;
...it makes sense for Britain to play a constructive role right the way through the international nuclear disarmament negotiations. We believe that Britain ought to remain as a participant in these negotiations until they are successfully and finally concluded with an agreement by all thermo-nuclear powers to completely eliminate these weapons (45).

While there was criticism from within the party from those who believed that what Kaufman was actually saying was that Britain was prepared, under Labour, to retain its nuclear deterrent until everyone else got rid of theirs, the response from the left was remarkably muted. A major reason for this reaction was the ambiguity of Kaufman's words - he consistently refused to spell out the exact meaning of his words - which allowed a quite different scenario to the one envisaged above. For example, it is not beyond the realms of possibility for Britain to have remained a party to disarmament talks even after she had relinquished all her own nuclear capacity. A precedent of a kind was already there as Britain was still involved in talks aimed at eliminating chemical weapons even though she had unilaterally abandoned such weapons as long ago as 1957. Such a scenario allowed therefore for Britain to abandon its weapons while at the same time remaining in talks to encourage others to follow suit. Perhaps then, as has been suggested, Kaufman's words were intended as little more than a 'kite flying' exercise (46) designed to test the response of Labour support. While the response within the party was muted, it was sufficient to ensure that major policy changes were avoided at that time.

However, by the time of the Labour conference in October 1991, the other interpretations of Kaufman's words appeared somewhat charitable as it became clear that a Labour Government had no intention of abandoning Britain's deterrent unless others did so. By the time of the election in 1992 there was little of the ambiguity left and the Labour Manifesto stated baldly,

*We shall seek to involve the four former Soviet nuclear republics, together with France and China. Until elimination of those stocks is achieved, Labour will retain Britain's nuclear capability with the number of warheads no greater than the present total (47).*

This explicit commitment once again caused barely a ripple within the PLP or the broader party. With an election looming in which there appeared a realistic possibility of victory, it seemed as if once again party unity was of the paramount importance. There were signs that in many important policy areas - health, education, unemployment etc. - Labour were by far the most popular party.
Defence was almost a non-issue as far as the voters were concerned. The threat from the fast disintegrating Soviet bloc appeared minimal if not non-existent and, the issue of nuclear disarmament in general and unilateralism in particular was viewed by many as an irrelevance. This was particularly true in the light of the spectacular arms reduction proposals being mooted and agreed between President's Bush and Yeltsin. While it may have been true that a significant number of sitting Labour MP's and candidates were 'closet' CND supporters, few at this point were prepared to show their hands. While the Tories attempted at one stage to use this very reticence to attack the Labour Party - they cited the lack of any reference in the Labour Party campaign directory to the fact that over 100 candidates listed had been or were CND members (only Bruce Kent, standing as a Labour candidate in Oxford, remained listed) - it elicited little response amongst an electorate more concerned with the state of the economy, jobs, health and education. Labours hopes of an election victory were of course misplaced, although for the first time in over a decade they could and were seen as a real alternative to the Conservative Party.

**Conclusion.**

While one could utterly dismiss the issue of defence as a reason for this defeat one should also remember that this was an issue, along with the handling of the economy, with which voters least trusted Labour to cope with. That it was a major contributory factor in their eventual defeat - as was the case in 1983 and 1987 - is not tenable. Neil Kinnock as leader of the party had transformed the party from an unelectable position to one where they were viewed as a potential party of government. While the debate may be joined as to the methods he employed - the defeat and humiliation of the far-left, the total re-orientation of Labour policy on a plethora of issues (which critics see as a total abrogation of the politics of principle in favour of the politics of electoral necessity) - there can be little doubt as to the result. The new Labour leader John Smith, has inherited a party that is now being seen as a real alternative. Part of Kinnock's legacy is the marginalisation of CND within the party. Of course this has occurred before, but never at such an historic juncture where the temperature of hostility between the former nuclear adversaries is rapidly falling and the number of nuclear agreements moves at an almost bewildering pace. Of course, it may be that the spectre of nuclear confrontation will once again appear and those Labour MP's who remained largely quiet in recent times will once again make their voices heard. Unlike past eras though, their voices are very much at the periphery of the party. There is no Bevan, Foot or even the
younger Kinnock in a position of potential or real power within the party. There are some such as John Prescott and Clare Short who will no doubt remain to prick what remains of the party’s unilateral conscience, but they too will find it difficult to make themselves heard above the voices of the ‘new realists’ that now control the party machinery. There is little doubt that John Smith will be equally unforgiving to those who would, intentionally or otherwise, seek to deflect Labour from their prime aim of forming the British government.

In terms of CND’s access to the POS, this gives little comfort. For many years they enjoyed the support of a major section of a major political party. This was something that could never be taken for granted but, it is now of an even more tenuous nature and there are increasing signs that the CND leadership has now begun to give up any real hope of enjoying anything like the influence it once did.

On a broader scale, questions must also be asked regarding CND’s survival as a mass movement. Should the present situation vis-a-vis the superpowers continue it is difficult to imagine the movement being able to motivate huge numbers on a single issue. Certainly amongst CND’s leadership this is a realisation that is gaining credence;

*I can’t see in any short to medium term any kind of revival of that kind of mass movement...I also think there’s a whole change in style in the political culture regarding the way things are done in society...I think our job is therefore much more low-key* (48).

It must be said that while there may be reasons of ‘political culture’ (sic) for such a change one cannot ignore the internal reasons that have almost forced this change on the movement. Firstly, there were mistakes made by CND during the Gulf War, particularly in terms of alliances and their participation in the CSWG, that served to alienate those within and outside the movement. Secondly, the financial and membership difficulties - which may or may not have their roots in the first reason - have left CND organisationally changed, even weakened, and, perhaps, unable to function in the way to which they had become accustomed.

That a change in consciousness in the movement is occurring is almost beyond doubt. There is a move away from the shibboleth of unilateralism by the leadership. The Labour party is no longer seen as the ‘natural’ home of CND and questions are beginning to be asked as to future alliances and entry points to the emergent POS. It is the implications of these and other changes that now needs to
be examined in an attempt to assess whether such change is occurring in the wider movement and, the implications of such change and to address the central question, can CND survive as a SM into the next century.
FOOTNOTES.


2. ibid.


4. UN Resolution 678.

5. ibid.


7. ibid.


10. A more unlikely candidate as leader of CND it would be hard to imagine. She was born into a staunchly Republican family - her mother was Reagan's campaign director in California, her father is a member of the John Birch society, while her brother is employed by the US defence department. Her grandfather was a Republican candidate and she herself was a Republican Senator's assistant. At one time it was suggested that she may run for Congress. During the seventies, she studied at the LSE and afterwards worked at Holy Loch selling academic courses to American servicemen. It was during her time there that she became converted to the unilteralist's cause;

I was shocked at the NATO bases in Britain...I saw people who had been drinking handling Poseidon warheads...loading more than they would legally be allowed in the United States. And it was shocking to see the contemptuous way the natives were being treated by what seemed to be an occupying force. (Times. 13.6.90. p.26)

12. Thompson, M., in Guardian. 12.11.90.

13. CND National Membership figures.
   1970 - 2120 members.
   1971 - 2047
   1972 - 2389
   1973 - 2367
   1974 - 2350
   1975 - 2536
   1976 - 3220
   1977 - 4287
   1978 - 3220
   1979 - 4287
   1980 - 9000
   1981 - 20000
   1982 - 50000
   1983 - 75000
   1984 - 100000
   1985 - 92000
   1986 - 84000
   1987 - 75000
   1988 - 70000
   1989 - 66000
   1990 - 65000


14. Figures supplied to author by CND Press and PR Committee.

15. Rogers, P., 'Mushroom cloud over the Gulf', Observer. 6.1.91.


17. ibid.

18. ibid.
19. Authors interview with Janet Bloomfield (Vice chair of CND 1991/92).


21. The statement of demands finally agreed upon by the CSWG stressed the prime nature of the UN in the ultimate resolution of the conflict. This reflected CND's increasingly important campaign to make the UN the foremost body in the area of conflict resolution. Demands included that a UN force be deployed to replace the existing alliance forces in the area, that a UN administered relief fund be established to care for the victims of the conflict, the convening of a Middle East peace conference which would discuss all aspects of Arab - Arab and Arab - Israeli conflicts (Iraq, Kuwait, Palestine, Lebanon etc.). On the nuclear issue, demands included that an immediate ban on all exports of weapons related technology be introduced, the NNPT be strengthened and the IAEA given greater powers of inspection and, a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing should be approved. Other related demands called for NATO not to extend their area of activity and relaxation of the rules of censorship at the time of the war were to be challenged.

22. Authors interview with Marjorie Thompson.


24. CND letter to members. 14.1.91.


26. ibid.

27. CND letter., op cit.

28. Times., 2.2.91.


31. Johnson, R.W., 'Facing both ways!', New Statesman and Society., 18.1.91. p.10

33. *Guardian.*, 15.1.91.

34. *Parliamentary Reports (Hansard).* Sept. 7th., *op cit.*

35. *ibid.*, Dec. 11th.


37. *ibid.*


39. Transcript of broadcast. 18.1.91.


41. The existence of Prescott's 'supper club' came to light when the minutes of one of its meetings was found by a House of Commons photocopier.

42. Despite several attempts by the author, Joan Ruddock steadfastly refused to be either interviewed or answer written questions.

43. Authors interview with J. Bloomfield, *op cit.* (although she purported to have knowledge of the content of the meeting between Ruddock and Kinnock, she could not be drawn into providing this detail.)

44. Thompson, M., quoted in Jones, M. and Grice, A., 'How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb'. *Sunday Times.*, 14.7.91.


48. Authors interview with J. Bloomfield. *op cit.*
CHAPTER 7.

WHERE TO NOW. CND MEMBERS SURVEY 1991/92.

It has been established that the nature of the area in which CND operates is one that is subject to vast change at the time of writing. With the ending of the cold war has come enormous change that has caused the Peace Movement to assess and revise its core consciousness. Some have even called into question the very raison d'etre of the movement. Undoubtedly CND has changed. It does campaign on a variety of issues that to some have little relation to its original motivation and, while unilateralism remains at the centre, it can be argued that CND has, to some extent, evolved into a wider anti war movement.

That CND has evolved is beyond doubt. What is not so clear however, is whether the membership of CND has altered, reflecting as it were their changed and indeed straitened circumstances. The intent of this survey, conducted over a three month period during the winter of 1990/91, has been to examine if and how the 'makeup' of CND has in fact changed in line with the very different wider milieu in which the movement operates. In preceding examinations of this question - Parkin in the 'sixties (1), Taylor and Pritchard's follow up in the 'seventies (2) and Byrne's survey during the mid-eighties (3) - very definite characteristics have emerged in relation to the 'typical' CND member. These have included a relatively even balance between the genders, a preponderance of members aged between 25 and 40, a very strong bias towards those from what could be called a middle class background, a pronounced tendency of support for politics of the left - usually manifested in support or membership of the Labour Party - and a relatively high level of participation in other movements such as trade unions, political parties and churches. As Byrne points out though, one should not be left with the impression that CND is totally homogenous in these respects. It does draw support from all sections of society -even to a limited extent the working class (4) - the majority of political parties and across the age range to some degree. The fact remains though that for the majority of it's support CND has relied to a great extent on the well educated, politically active/aware middle class.
At least in terms of the age of CND’s members, things appear to be changing from the position in previous studies. The so called ‘protest generation’ (5) are growing noticeably older and are no longer to be found in the 25 - 40 age group. Of course this in itself is perhaps not surprising; no one is immune from the passage of time. What is of more interest is the fact that CND as a whole is an ageing movement. If this result is compared with Byrne’s 1985 study, there is an almost perfect correlation between the growth of the older membership - i.e. 41+ in the 1991 survey and the fall in numbers of the younger membership; i.e. the 16 to 40 cohort. In short, it would appear that CND is failing to ‘replace’ the ageing membership with younger participants. This is also borne out by the fact that those members who are now aged between 41 and 47 who would have fallen into the 25 - 40 age group in 1985 now constitute some 18 per cent of the sample survey overall. If the results of the 1985 and 1991 survey’s are directly compared the nature of the changing membership age is readily apparent.

### TABLE 7:1
**Demography**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 or under</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 -24</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 -40</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 59</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>n =</strong></td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Several causal factors are apparent immediately. The first of these, quite simply, is a perceived irrelevance of the movement in the increasing climate of super power co-operation and disarmament. Even amongst CND supporters almost half (44 per cent) of those questioned said that their own fear of nuclear war had decreased and that the level of public sympathy had also fallen dramatically (64 per cent). The former was particularly marked in the under 40 age group, where 61 per cent agreed that their own fear of war had decreased. It is also interesting to note that while only around 15 per cent believed that CND should not modify its unilateralist stance, around 45 per cent believed that CND's future direction should be determined by a wider basket of campaigns - particularly 'green' issues and not just unilateralism per se. This factor illustrates well the changing nature of attitudes within the CND membership. In particular, it does provide some evidence that the nineties survey cohort as opposed to the eighties cohort may be subject to what might be termed a 'temporal structural location'. In other words, it could be suggested that the nineties cohort, with some exceptions as will be seen, appear far more likely to view CND as a component part in a larger campaigning base. There would also appear to be strong evidence that they are far more likely to 'shift' allegiances from one movement to another as they perceive the expressive nature of membership to have shifted accordingly.

### TABLE 7:2 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>+/-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 or under.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 - 24.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 40.</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total +/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 69.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>+36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 +</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total +/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(+46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Such an apparent diversity of interest and activity is not new. CND has always
attracted a high percentage of activists and members of other movements and
organisations but, until now this has not caused any serious internal divisions
within the movement. What is new though, and supports the arguments with
regard to CND membership being seen as an end in itself - as previous surveys
have suggested - is that unlike previous survey evidence where, \textit{very few CND
members who did support other campaigns were prepared to prioritise them over
the cause of nuclear disarmament}...(6) in the 1990 survey, only 14 per cent were
prepared to identify this as their clear priority compared with 23 per cent who
believed that 'green' issues were of major significance to them personally. There is
little evidence to suggest that this will cause divisions per se within the movement
but it does serve to illustrate perhaps the sense of shifting priorities in the
movement. Further, it is also perhaps indicative of a wider change in attitudes and
loyalties within the constituency upon which CND traditionally draws and thus a
partial explanation for the apparently ageing nature of CND's support. The
male/female 'balance' too has though remained something of a constant in the six
years since the last study as the table illustrates;

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & \textbf{Gender} & \multicolumn{2}{c|}{\textbf{1985}} & \multicolumn{1}{c|}{\textbf{1990/91}} \\
\hline
 & \textbf{Male} & \textbf{Female} & \textbf{Male} & \textbf{Female} \\
\hline
-16 & 3 & 4 & 0 & 1 \\
17 - 24. & 21 & 19 & 5 & 5 \\
25 - 40. & 47 & 47 & 27 & 21 \\
41 - 59 & 15 & 19 & 42 & 45 \\
60+ & 14 & 11 & 19 & 25 \\
No Resp & & & 7 & 3 \\
\hline
Total & 100 & 100 & 100 & 100 \\
n = & 310 & 306 & 74 & 121 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table 7.3.}
\end{table}

So, while the parity between genders remains virtually constant regardless of age, it
does once again serve to illustrate the ever upward movement in the average age of
CND's members to be true even across the gender divide. Those younger members
of CND, and this must be of some concern for the movement's future, increasingly
appear to view membership of CND as something of a stepping stone, or a first
entry point to the world of expressive politics. Unlike the older members that have
remained within CND, their loyalty to the movement - while strong - will not
prevent them leaving the movement in the longer term in order to find a more 'relevant' outlet for their expressive opposition.

**Educational and Occupational Data.**

In all of the previous studies of CND's membership, the majority of members have been found to come from a broadly well educated and middle class background. This is also true of the present study.

**TABLE 7:4.**

**Class, Education and Gender (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class, Education and Gender</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree/Higher</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree/Prof. Qualification</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Qualification</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this respect at least, very little appears to have changed since surveys of both the 'sixties and eighties. Moreover, in terms of occupation within the broader class categories there appears to be little deviation from Parkin's finding (7) that the majority of occupations are clustered in the educational and caring professions. From the 99 per cent of respondents who replied to this question, 22 per cent were employed in education (26 per cent of all female respondents, 17 per cent of all male respondents compared with 28 and 20 per cent respectively in 1985) while 15 per cent were employed in a caring profession (17 per cent of all women and 12 per cent of all men compared, once again with 15 and 10 per cent respectively in the 1985 survey). The most striking correlation between the 1990/91 and the 1985 data is the almost perfect correspondence between 44 per cent of respondents in 1985 who fell into what Byrne called the 'non commercial' (8) sector and the 41 per cent who fell into that category in the 1990/91 survey (this compares with this group
making up around 13 per cent of the total workforce in Britain as a whole - approximately 3,28,000 people from a total workforce of 25,986,000 (9).

The one major divergence that appears in the 1990/91 data is the increase in unemployed. In 1985 these numbered a mere 4 per cent of the total; five years later this figure had risen to 21 per cent of the total making them the second biggest 'occupational' group after those employed in the non-commercial sector. This is perhaps due to the increasingly difficult recession with its high cost of unemployment and reflects the increasingly 'white collar' nature of unemployment during the early 1990's - demonstrated by the fact that the number of respondents in this category with a degree and/or professional qualifications was over 60 per cent. Whatever the reasons for this, because of the sheer size of this group they will be included as a separate sub group or 'class' in some of the analysis that is to follow.

What one takes away from the above is that, as has been said earlier, far from CND being a manifestation of alienation (10) it is quite the opposite - a haven of middle class 'respectability' where the majority are drawn from professions and backgrounds that have and continue to enjoy a modicum of respect and social standing. The important areas of difference though are the ageing nature of the membership which appears to be concomitant with an inability to attract younger members to 'replace' them.

In line with the earlier data, it is Labour that emerges with a clear electoral advantage. However, what is of interest is the growth in the support for the Green Party. If one compares the two sets of results, it appears that much of this support has been gained from the old Alliance parties, now the Liberal Democrats. Support though has also been gained from the Labour Party but at a far lower rate.

Political uncertainty is clearly not a problem within CND. A remarkably low number of respondents did not express a preference or indicate that they might abstain - even those who did usually gave as a reason their dissatisfaction with the political system rather than apathy per se. This was certainly the case, as perhaps might be expected when one regards the relatively high intent to abstain amongst the unemployed.
## Table 7:5.
### Voting Preferences (1985) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th>Working Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Won’t vote</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n =</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 7:6.
### Voting Preferences (1990/91) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th>Work. Class</th>
<th>Unempl oyed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LibDem</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Won’t vote</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n =</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the age category, the one clear difference that emerges between these latest results and the 1985 survey is the growth in support for the Green Party amongst those aged over 40 (38 compared to 17 percent in 1985). Once again though it would appear that the majority of this increase can be explained by the ageing nature of the membership; i.e., those who fell in the 25 - 40 age group in 1985 and now fall into the older category have 'carried forward' their voting allegiances into the over 40 age group. A similar occurrence would also explain the fall, from 48 per cent in 1985 to 24 per cent now in the 25 - 40 bracket. In the majority of other age groupings there is an insignificant change in party loyalty from 1985 (the only exception being the very low percentages shown in the youngest age group, which should not be treated as too significant as the number of respondents in this category was very low - only 10 in all. However, as has been stressed this low number is significant in illustrating the apparent failure of CND to attract younger adherents).

In terms of gender based loyalties, there appears once again to be very little variation, with voters spread relatively evenly between Labour, LibDem and Green Parties. The only point of significance to note here is the preponderance of male CND members voting Green (62 per cent male, 38 per cent female).

Class too appears to play a negligible role in determining party loyalty, with the middle class vote spread fairly evenly amongst the three party groupings, although again in absolute terms the share each party enjoys has fallen from the 1985 level. The party that appears to have borne the brunt of this fall appears to be the Liberal Democrats (50 per cent as compared with 73 per cent in 1985).

Turning now to Party membership, as distinct from Party identification, membership of the Labour Party is the dominant factor - as it has been in previous surveys. Perhaps surprisingly though given Labour's policy shift on nuclear disarmament, membership in percentage terms has increased to stand at 38 per cent (25 per cent in 1985). Membership of the Liberal Democratic party has also seen a small increase of 3 per cent to 5 per cent while Green Party membership has seen the most significant increase from 3 to 11 per cent. In all, over 55 per cent of CND members are also members of a political party and of those who were not members of a party almost 65 per cent indicated that they would vote Labour in any election (18 per cent would vote Green, 9 per cent Liberal Democrat with the remainder not voting). In line with the 1985 survey 70 (compared with 71) per cent were of a
middle class origin. Only 8 per cent gave their reasons for joining CND as due to their political beliefs while 67 per cent gave their reasons as being a mixture of political/moral/religious motivation.

**Membership of Other Political Groupings.**

**TABLE 7: Membership of Other Political Groupings.**

**Membership of Other Peace, Environmental and misc. Groups (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace Groups</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n =</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unsurprisingly, a significant number of respondents were involved in campaigning organisations other than CND. The majority of those who belonged to other peace groups were drawn from the public sector (68 per cent). Of all the other peace groups, the one that attracted by far the highest percentage of relevant respondents was MCANW (the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons) with 54 per cent who responded to this question. This reflected the considerable number of respondents who were employed in or associated with the medical profession. In the environmental sector there appears to be insignificant growth in membership - which would seem to militate against any argument that CND was to some extent losing support amongst its existing membership to the burgeoning membership of environmental groups (1985 - 22 per cent) By far the largest section within this category belong to Greenpeace - 66 per cent with a further 22 per cent members of FoE. However, and in line with the previously mentioned factor of the ageing nature of CND's membership and the shifting nature of movement allegiance and membership, when the membership of Environmental groups is broken down into the age categories the following results can be seen;
TABLE 7:8.
Membership of Environmental Groups by Age (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>% membership of environmental groups.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 and under.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 - 24.</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 40.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 59</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 +</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again, while in no way conclusive, this would appear to suggest that, for the younger membership, in terms of motivation their membership of CND is seen as part of the wider agenda of environmental politics and not the prime means of expressive activity it might once have been. With a shrinking younger membership, the implications for the movement's long term future in the face of these shifting involvement's seem grave.

Where quite a spectacular reduction in activity appears to have taken place however, is in the final category - Trade Union membership. This has, in line with the national trend, fallen dramatically from around 40 per cent in 1985 to around 29 per cent today. Perhaps a large explanation for this can be found in the increasingly high number of unemployed within CND (11). No such decline can be found in membership levels of moral campaigns with around 25 per cent of respondents remaining members of such organisations (Amnesty International being the largest group attracting around 27 per cent within this category) compared with 29 per cent in 1985.

Participation Within CND.

TABLE 7:9.
Participation Within CND.
Activity at a Local and National Level (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend Meetings</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stood for Office</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organised the above</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By far the most favoured activity of participants at both National and local levels are demonstrations, although the divergence between attendance at local and national level is high (12). Therefore, while attendance at local demonstrations is limited to only 12 per cent of the membership, 52 per cent are prepared to demonstrate at a national level. In all of the categories of participation, requiring more commitent in terms of time and resources than demonstrations and meetings, the percentages involved are low. This suggests that for the majority, their membership could be seen as purely expressive; there are less than 20 per cent who are prepared to pursue their activism beyond the purely demonstrative. Despite this, there are only 21 per cent of members who are completely passive, i.e. whose membership of the movement remains their only expression of protest. Some of this inactivity will of course be due to age, infirmity or lack of resources such as income and time. However, when one considers that the largest number of 'non-active', (40 per cent) members are concentrated in the 40-60 age group, this would appear to offer only a partial explanation. If one were to extrapolate these findings to the wider movement which currently enjoys a membership in the region of 60,000, the level of participation is impressive. It would certainly suggest that at the very least a national demonstration would still attract around 30,000.

What is also of interest is that in terms of those attending demonstrations, there has been an increase of 13 per cent since the time of the last survey in 1985. This gives credence to the argument that, for many respondents in the 1985 survey, their membership of CND was motivated by opposition to singular aspects of the nuclear question, most notably the deployment of Cruise and to a lesser extent Trident.

There are perhaps two factors at work here. The first of these is almost certainly that many who joined in the halcyon days of the movement when membership figures exploded have now left the movement. This would appear to be borne out if one considers the makeup of respondents when categorised by the period in which they joined:

**TABLE 7:10.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joined</th>
<th>CND (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Certainly the evidence would appear quite strong that this section of members who joined prior to 1980 now forms the smallest category, and gives little indication of the huge influx of members that occurred during the early part of the 'eighties. Indeed the 'backbone' of the movement remains those members who joined prior to this point. However, what the residual number of these middle members (those who joined between 1980 - 83) has left the movement with is a relatively hard-core number of members who could be classed as active. Only 5 per cent of respondents who fall into this group take no part whatsoever in CND activity. This compares favourably with those in the other categories whose rate of passivity is considerably higher - 23 per cent in the case of those who joined prior to 1980 and 26 per cent of those who joined after 1984. This then would seem to offer at least a partial explanation for the percentage increase in the overall numbers prepared to play an active role within the movement, i.e., while actual numbers may have shrunk, what the movement appears to be left with is a far more committed smaller membership where membership alone is an insufficient means of protest. Considerably more difficult to establish with any degree of certainty is whether this increased commitment has occurred due to socialisation within the movement, or whether this was a commitment that was brought with them on joining and that they were always likely to remain as active members.

As has been shown earlier, only 8 per cent of respondents said that their membership of CND was due to political beliefs, although 50 per cent of respondents replied that there interest in politics outside of CND had increased due to membership, while 39 per cent said that their political activity had increased due to membership of CND. This would suggest that the socialisation that took place as a member of CND was a critical factor in their wider political aspirations and activity. However, it would appear that this position is not nearly as clear cut as these figures would suggest.
TABLE 7:11.
Political Activity, Interest, Party membership and length of CND Membership (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>joined</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Party Mem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>Static</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pre 80</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80 - 83</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post 84</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above figures the picture becomes even less clear with regards to the membership that joined during the mid period. These figures would seem to suggest that it was not socialisation that was a factor for a significant minority. Certainly at both the levels of 'activity' and 'interest' the majority of respondents believe that their activity and interest has not been affected in any way. Taken on their own, this could suggest that there is a greater degree of apathy at this level. However, when one considers party membership - taking this for a moment as an indicator of activity and interest - this is far higher amongst this section of the membership than the others. This would seem to suggest that many of this section came into the movement with an already heightened political sensibility; hence the relatively low level of increase expressed, i.e., they already had a level of activity and interest that exceeded those who joined earlier or later (13).

Of course this is by no means conclusive and, if one were also to consider membership of other movements as a given indicator of political activity/interest, then the 'mid' group actually appear to take relatively little part in other pressure group/social movement activity (28 per cent are engaged in membership of other groups compared to 32 per cent in both the other membership categories). So, once again, a picture that seemed to be becoming clearer is once again muddied and the answer to the question as to whether CND membership is a consequence of existing political beliefs or vice versa must once again remain largely unanswered. However, and at the risk of labouring this point, what should be of concern to CND is that these new activists are once again, in the main, far from the expected
age range, i.e. 25 - 40, with the majority (54 per cent) falling into the 40 - 60 age bracket.

**Religious Belief.**

In line with earlier surveys there appears to be only moderate enthusiasm for the church amongst CND's membership, although the total number who responded as being active in their religious beliefs has risen to 30 per cent, compared with 23 per cent in 1985. In relation to the wider, largely secular society, this is relatively high. Of this number, 35 per cent were members of the Church of England, 15 per cent were Roman Catholic, 1 per cent were Methodist, 15 per cent were drawn from the United Reform Church and 32 per cent were Quakers (14).

Of interest though is the increase in membership of the Labour party by members of established churches. This figure has risen dramatically from 16 per cent in 1985 to stand at 39 per cent (29 per cent of Church of England members, 67 per cent of Catholics, 33 per cent united Reformed and 11 per cent of Quakers). In line with the majority of the rest of the movement, if it is possible to generalise, what appears to have occurred is that those who remain within the movement and who are also a member of an established church are a potentially more active membership than before - at least in terms of the percentage membership. Certainly in terms of participation rates this is confirmed by the fact that almost half (49 per cent) of those of those who responded as being active in an established church, had taken part in demonstrations, while 40 per cent attended meetings regularly.
TABLE 7:12.
Religious denomination, age, gender and length of membership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>C of E.</th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>U.Reform.</th>
<th>Quaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17-24.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-40.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-59.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n =</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n =</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined pre 80.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined 80-83.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined post 84.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n =</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pacifism.
As was to be expected, pacifism is relatively high amongst CND's membership. There was though no significant difference between this survey and the 1985 study, with just over half of all respondents declaring themselves pacifist (52 per cent). The 1991 results duplicated exactly the statistics of the earlier survey and once again showed a slight bias towards women in the overall number of pacifists. However, what has become apparent in this 1991 survey is the fact that more women than men espouse pacifism (66 per cent of all women respondents declared themselves to be pacifists compared to only 34 per cent of all male respondents). Explanations for this occurrence are difficult to construct. Going beyond the simplistic notions of women being generally and 'naturally' less aggressive than men and this in some way accounting for this pacifist tendency, there is little in terms of political activity/membership, as has been illustrated, that might provide an explanation for this phenomena. In most other categories that might contribute, there is little to
differentiate between the genders. One partial explanation may be found in the fact that the vast majority of practising Quakers (where pacifism is a central tenet) are women (74 per cent). This though is, as has been said is only partial when one considers that Quakers in total constitute only 9 per cent of all respondents and, only 32 per cent of respondents who were active church members. The political sphere does not provide an explanation for this phenomenon either. The differences between pacifism and non-pacifism of members of parties is negligible. Only in the case of the Green Party, as might have been expected, is there a majority who are pacifist. However, breaking this category down still further provides no evidence to suggest that this can be seen as a factor to explain female pacifism within CND. Of the 65 per cent of Green Party members who declared themselves pacifist, only just over half (53 per cent were women). Throughout the other major parties rates of pacifism between male and female are of a similar dimension and could not therefore be considered significant as an explanation.

With regards to age, there is again very little difference in the rates of pacifism. The percentages of those in all groups, with one exception, almost mirrors the overall picture. The one exception to this picture is the 16-25 age group. Here, 80 per cent of respondents were prepared to view themselves as pacifist. The major explanation for this can perhaps be found in the relationship between religion and pacifism. Within this group there is a relatively higher participation rate within the church than in the other groups and, more significantly, within this particular sub-group (age), 100 per cent of respondents were also pacifist. However, it would perhaps be somewhat unwise to draw any firm conclusions from this result due to the relatively small size of this respondent sub-group.

Overall, the relationship between religious belief and pacifism was insignificant and very much in line with previous surveys with only 33 per cent of those expressing a religious affiliation also pacifist.
### TABLE 7:13.

**Pacifism, gender, age, religious denomination and party membership (%).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pacifist</th>
<th>Non Pacifist or No reply.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Respondents.</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female.</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 17-24.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 25-40.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 41-59.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 60+.</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of England.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Reformed.</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaker.</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party Member.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LibDem Party Member.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party Member.</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n =</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The Issue of Defence.

The final category to be considered is the importance of the defence issue and nuclear weapons to the individual CND member. Defence is only one of the considerations that will come into play in affecting how an individual will cast his or her vote. With regard to CND members it could be expected that defence will play a crucial part in their overall political 'makeup'; i.e., that in terms of priorities, it would rank very highly on their political and electoral 'shopping list'. Or is it the case that the nuclear issue is just one, perhaps minor element of their overall political profile?

In an attempt to assess this, respondents were asked to rank in order what were the most important issues to them when it came time for them to cast their vote during an election. Of course, as some respondents pointed out, it is not possible in many instances to separate these various policy areas into such neat packages and there is a tendency for many - if not all - to overlap to some degree. The criticism was also made that the list was by no means exhaustive. This is again valid. However, it
was not the intent of this question to examine the consciousness of CND members across the whole policy spectrum. Rather, the intent was an attempt to concentrate the mind on the centrality of one policy area in particular, i.e. defence. In effect it was hoped to force them to prioritise their membership of CND in relation to other forces demanding of their time, effort and resources. The majority of respondents, it must be said, did manage to achieve this. The overall results were as follows:

**TABLE 7:14.**

Factors most likely to influence voting in order of importance (%).

**Ranking (0 = No Response. 1 = most important. 7 = least important)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Issues</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic issues</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European issues</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social issues</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence/nuclear issues</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green issues</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It becomes clear from this that for the majority of CND members, the nuclear issue in broad political terms is not of prime importance. Indeed it would appear that it is of relatively minor importance when compared with social and green issues (although it is the second most important factor for a significant minority). This would appear to suggest that unilateralism - if we accept the thesis put forward and supported by earlier studies that CND members display loyalty to a range of 'radical' policy areas - is viewed by the majority as merely a component part of their whole political persona and by no means the determining characteristic.
Extrapolating this into the important subgroups, there is a remarkable degree of convergence displayed in this assessment by most of the major cohorts;

**TABLE 7:15.**

*Issue Importance by subgroups (%) - 'Top 3' Rankings.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social Issues</th>
<th>Green Issues</th>
<th>Defence Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 17 - 24.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 25 - 40.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 41 - 59.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 60+</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND Activist</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND Non Activist</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND Passive</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree/Higher</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree/Prof.Qualification</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Qualification</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifist</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Pacifist</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only two cohorts diverge from this general position to any degree. Both of these results are perhaps unsurprising - amongst Green Party members, 30 per cent identify defence as the most important factor in voting behaviour and choice (again, unsurprisingly, the majority - 55 per cent - put green issues at the head of their electoral choices). A significant minority of those professing allegiance to
Quakerism also make defence the prime issue (37 per cent of Quakers) in terms of issue importance. This again though was perhaps to be expected in the light of the Quakers anti-war and pacifist theology.

Conclusions.
In terms of the structural location of the majority of CND's membership, there appears to have been little shift from the position of previous studies. Generally the mass of support is still to be found amongst the well educated, middle income, middle classes. They are to be found, still, amongst those occupational groups that can be best called non-commercial. As Byrne has noted in commenting upon Parkin's thesis that this section of society have a predisposition towards radical politics that sees, .membership of social movements as a manifestation of fundamental values, which are at variance with the 'dominant' or 'old' value order...(15) this is still almost impossible to prove through the medium of surveys that can only ever be limited in the assessment of individual consciousness. What this survey, in common with the majority of others, does seem to show though is the inadequacy of arguments relating to alienation as espoused by the Relative Deprivation theorists. The results would also seem to substantiate further Parkin's findings that, for many participants, morality was of a higher significance than expediency. Certainly the response to the following would seem to substantiate this finding:

**TABLE 7:16.**
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CND has failed to win the support of the 'ordinary' people.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree Strongly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Disagree Strongly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/No Response.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the simplest level, even forgetting for a moment the effect, (perceived or otherwise) on the formal Political Opportunity Structure, this would appear to indicate that for the majority CND have 'failed' (16) in their attempt to win over public opinion. Were the membership and activity levels of respondents of the 'instrumental' (17) nature, it is likely that the membership would begin to question the very validity of the movement and their membership. This would seem to be far from the case. Certainly when asked if CND should modify its stance on its core tenet, i.e., unilateralism, the following was the relatively unequivocal response;
When asked if CND should make the ultimate response to its apparent failure, i.e., should they disband, the reply was even stronger:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 7:18.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree Strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Disagree Strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/No Response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Somewhat surprisingly, at least at the intuitive level, disagreement with the latter two statements actually increased the longer the respondents had been members of CND. Thus, amongst the respondents in the sub groups of length of membership, the reaction to the same questions was as follows,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 7:19.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. CND should modify its stance on unilateralism. 2. CND should disband.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Question 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joined after 1984.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree Strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Disagree Strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/No Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joined 1980 - 83.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree Strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Disagree Strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/No Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joined Before 1980.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Agree Strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Disagree Strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/No Response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All of the above argues therefore quite strongly in favour of CND as an expressive rather than instrumental movement.

As has been said previously, the most important finding revealed by this latest survey is the phenomenon of CND as an 'ageing' movement. That is to say the bulk of its support and membership is increasingly drawn from the age range 40 - 60, as opposed to 25 - 40 age group in previous studies. This does suggest that CND is and will face difficulties in reorientation. At the leadership level there is not only acceptance of the fact that CND will eventually have to broaden its campaigning base to include issues of environmentalism and more general anti-war campaigning, there is also active encouragement being given to this end. However, throughout the movement there is evidence that this reorientation is far from gaining acceptance. Respondent replies to the statement that CND should now become a multi issue movement suggest a deeply entrenched antipathy to the dilution of CND's central message by a significant number. With regards to the specific statement that 'the movement's future role should be determined by the increasing concern in 'Green' issues not unilateralism per se', 44 per cent of respondents agreed with this statement. However 32 per cent did not. When asked whether 'CND should become a multi issue movement', the results were even more pronounced with just 30 per cent agreeing and 50 per cent disagreeing. While in no way suggesting that this will cause schisms to appear throughout the movement, it does illustrate the difficulties faced by the leadership in terms of their desired reorientation of the regime. This becomes even more apparent when the respondents are again split into the various subgroups. Particularly apposite is the factor of the movements ageing nature where amongst the most populated group (40 -60), opposition to dilution or reorientation is at its strongest (60 per cent of this subgroup disagreed with the statement that CND should become a multi issue movement; only 15 per cent agreed). The implications for the movement are even more pronounced if one considers that the active element amongst the movement is dominated by this subgroup (43 per cent of the total) and that opposition to the widening of CND's interests is expressed by the majority of this active section (56 per cent compared with 32 per cent who agree). If one were again to add to this the factor of age, coupled with the high allegiance and membership levels of environmental groups amongst the younger membership and, the shifting nature of movement membership that is apparent, the long term future of CND must be in some doubt. If CND fails to 'change direction' due to the apparent intransigence of it's older supporters, then its ability to retain the younger members with their wider agenda - particularly environmentalism - will be damaged.
Despite this apparent search for a 'new' direction, what emerges from this survey is a movement that is still essentially durable. What does though remain unanswered to some extent is whether this durability can remain in the face of a changing world order and the new demands and scenarios forced upon it from both internal and external factors. Internally, the shrinking size and ageing nature of the movement will be the major concern of the movement. Certainly CND appears to have a remarkably stable hard-core of activism unrivalled by most other mass movements. However, this will present problems in its own right due to the apparent fundamentalist leanings of those activists. As Bruce Kent remarked,

...within CND itself there is a hard core of absolute fundamentalism which I see as a parallel with religion; exactly the same thing...I don't understand those people at all; nice people but, complete fundamentalists...they are the lifeblood but, that obsession (with unilateralism)...how much other lifeblood might there be if we actually opened it up to people who weren't hung up on that word...(18)

This is the major impression that is left by this survey and it is one that appears set to continue to bedevil the movement for some time to come.
FOOTNOTES.

1. Parkin, F., 'Middle Class Radicalism'. (Manchester University Press. 1968).


4. The failure on the part of the movement to ‘capture’ this important section of society is an ever present thorn in the movements side. Despite years of attempting to address the problem they have consistently failed in this endeavour.

5. This is the term most commonly used by analysts to refer to that generation of middle class youth that took part in the protest movements of the 'sixties that were viewed as the forerunners of the new social movements of the seventies, eighties and - to a lesser extent - the nineties.


8. Within this category, I have used Byrne’s definition. This cohort includes subgroups divided where necessary into four categories - education, caring, scientific and other professionals.


10. The traditional Relative Deprivation approach assumes that movements grow on the back of individual or group deprivation. While this may be perfectly valid as an explanation for such movements as the Civil Rights and Women’s groups, its validity of application to a movement such as CND is debatable due to the mainly altruistic nature of the campaign. Of far more relevance to the Peace Movement is the idea that CND is composed largely of ‘conscience constituents’ - those who do not stand to gain directly from the successful prosecution of a campaign. See McCarthy, B. and Zald, M., ‘Resource Mobilisation and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’. American Journal of Sociology ., Vol. 82, No. 6, 1977, pp. 1212 - 1241.
11. Another explanation of this could also be found in the fact that due to the large concentration of those found within the caring, scientific and other professions, there is a tendency for those respondents to reply negatively to this question due to their belonging to a professional association - BMA, RCN, Law Society etc. - rather than a Trade Union.

12. ‘Activity’ was defined as any behaviour other than mere membership of the movement. This was regarded as passivity. ‘Activity’ was further subdivided into ‘mid’ (attendance at meetings and demonstrations), and ‘high’ (attendance at meetings, demonstrations, organisation of these events and standing for office at a local or national level).

13. This was further borne out when the numbers who had belonged to a political party before they joined CND was assessed. Of those who joined in the ‘mid’ period, 62 per cent were already members of a political party. Of those who had joined before 1980 only 31 per cent were already members of a party and, those who joined after 1984, only 42 per cent were already political party members.

14. It should not be thought that the survey only included these denominations or no non-Christian religions. A section for replies from Hindus, Moslems, Buddhists and a box marked ‘others’ was also included. The fact that no-one replied in these categories perhaps illustrates another failure of CND. That is their inability to win the hearts and minds of the ethnic and/or religious minorities within British society.


16. ‘Failure’ is a value laden term and one that I have tried to avoid where possible. It can be argued with some justification that CND did succeed in stimulating a debate in an area of normally closed policy unlike any before. It is necessary though to balance this ‘optimistic’ view with the ‘pessimistic’. For example, what can appear to be success in the short term can turn out, in the long term, to be a phryric victory - what Rucht has called ‘perverse or unforeseen consequences’. (For a much more detailed examination of this whole question, see Rucht, D. ‘Studying the Effects of Social Movements.’ ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops University of Limerick. March 30 - April 4. 1992)

17. This argument takes as its starting point Parkin’s thesis whereby he defines ‘instrumental’ politics as directed solely to the attainment of concrete goals. On the
other hand, and it is this thesis that would appear of most validity to CND, he speaks of ‘expressive’ politics as being concerned with the sense of satisfaction that the activity itself affords the participant. See Parkin, F., *op cit.* Chapter 3.

18. Authors Interview with Bruce Kent, 28.5.91.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

WHITHER OR WITHER CND? - THE RATIONALITY OF PARTICIPATION IN THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD.

INTRODUCTION.

While much of the preceding discussion has centred on the various theoretical positions that concern a SM's motivation and seek to explain the effectiveness of their campaign, little has been said so far regarding the explanation of why membership of those movements decline, or perhaps more importantly, why people will remain within a SM after a point where that SM has become ineffective and/or moribund. It is to this that we turn in this final chapter. To do so, it is essential to remind ourselves of the recent history of CND in order to illustrate the relevance of this particular question.

As has been shown, during the Autumn of 1990, CND proved itself incapable of turning the mass of public opinion against the use of force against Iraq. Once hostilities began in earnest, the movement, as was largely the case with Vietnam, found itself sidelined as the hostility between itself and their 'allies' in the anti-war movement broke the surface.

Since 1990, CND's public profile has been further eroded by the type of publicity it can ill afford. Rather than their campaigns being the focus of attention, the loss of the Kinnocks as members and the movement's continuing financial difficulties have provided the bulk of what media coverage they have received, which it must be said has been almost non-existent.

As illustrated, during the eighties, CND grew rapidly as the plans for the siting of Cruise bases at Greenham Common and Molesworth became apparent. Within a year of this decision CND's membership had grown to more than 100,000. However, at the tail end of this decade signs of at least a slowdown in this revival were apparent as the tensions between the superpowers eased immeasurably. With the signing of the INF treaty in particular, it appeared to many that CND's work was largely at an end. Despite CND's assertions that little had in fact changed - Nato was planning ongoing modernisation of its non INF forces and pressing ahead with Trident - they seemed to
be swimming against the popular tide of opinion as never before. This appeared to view the threat of nuclear war as having been lifted from over the heads of the British people. From this point on, CND's membership began its slow yet dramatic decline.

With the overthrow of communism in the Soviet client states during 1989 and 1990 the central message of CND began to seem yet more obsolete even to many who had supported the movement during the halcyon days of the mid eighties. CND's response to this was an attempt to broaden its campaigning issues to include such things as the 'peace dividend', low flying aircraft, the future of Europe after communism, the arms trade and the Middle East. All this managed to achieve was the impression of a movement confused about its present and future priorities.

For a short while at least, the Gulf crisis and war provided a clear focus for the movement. This was temporary however, and the movement quickly became an irrelevance to the mass of public opinion. Their arguments that once the conflict began and casualties began arriving home in huge numbers was overtaken by events and CND's credibility, already damaged, suffered further as a consequence.

Other organisations, notably Greenpeace, have all but taken the place of CND in several important campaigning areas - the safety of Britain's Polaris fleet of submarines being a good example. In the case of Greenpeace, several of this organisation's employees were previously employed by CND. A wide variety of groups have moved into those areas where CND have previously campaigned almost alone (these include groups such as the British American Security Council (BASIC) who deal with nuclear weapons issues). CND's pre-eminence as researcher into such issues has been overtaken by a plethora of environmental groups. Staffing at all levels has been drastically reduced and, CND can no longer afford the luxury of much original research.

If the preceding account gives an impression of a movement that is dying on its feet, it is to be fair a somewhat false impression. Comparatively speaking, it is still a mass movement with approximately 50-60,000 national members who, as has been shown in the examination of the survey results, remain quite significantly active in their membership. It has not yet reached the low point it experienced during the seventies. It should be noted however, that it is a rapidly declining membership and one that looks set to continue declining. As has been shown in previous chapters, it is not gaining the younger membership it requires for long term vitality. It relies increasingly on an enthusiastic but nonetheless ageing membership.
With regards to the first question raised as to why CND is failing to retain members, there are perhaps a number of possibilities that can be suggested. At the simplest level, and in common with the reasons why they seem to find it increasingly difficult to attract or maintain a younger membership, there is evidence that, even amongst those who still are members of the movement that CND's position is becoming increasingly irrelevant. When survey respondents were asked whether 'CND is becoming a relic of the Cold War era' almost a quarter (23 per cent) agreed with this statement (of some significance also was the fact that a further 19 per cent expressed themselves neutral on this question). Also of interest was the fact that this 23 per cent was composed of members whose own fear of nuclear war had decreased since the ending of the Cold War. The other reason that suggests itself is that, rather than failure, former members may believe that it is due to CND that such changes have come about. Therefore, irrelevance, rather than being due to 'failure' is due to the movement's 'success'. Whichever may be the case - and the difficulties in proving either argument have been set out earlier - the result for CND is the same; a falling membership.

However interesting it may be to speculate on why people leave a movement, what is of more interest is why people will continue as members of CND, or any other movement for that matter at a time when their future prospects and fortunes appear to be at their lowest ebb - be it due to 'success' or 'failure'.

**The remaining membership.**

As has already been seen, much has been written regarding why people join SM's, what they do once they have become members, the effectiveness (or otherwise) of those actions, the relative merits of bureaucratic and non bureaucratic structures and so on. Where a gap would seem to exist in this field is in the validity and application of explanation regarding continuing membership of a SM once that movement has, for whatever reason, become moribund and/or irrelevant. Some would argue that this in itself is a contentious point. Certainly CND themselves argue that they are far removed from either of these two conditions. The argument that is being pursued here is one that sees this is indeed the situation that applies in reality to CND today. It is difficult to sustain an argument that still places CND at the forefront of the anti nuclear movement that exists today. A far more accurate hierarchy is one in which CND have become a minor player on this particular stage. While the leadership of the movement will take issue with this position, the membership themselves would appear to accept, or at the very least have begun to accept that their central argument is flawed and in need of adjustent to take account of the new realities.
As shown, almost a quarter of respondents believe that CND is a relic of an earlier era and, perhaps more telling is that almost half of the survey respondents (47 per cent) believe that CND will never again be the truly mass movement it was during the fifties/sixties and eighties. Some respondents make the point that it is difficult to make such a prediction with any degree of certainty, as there is no possible way of knowing what outside influences will pertain that could mark a return to resurgence and pre-eminence at some future date. Valid as such a view point might be, it is the present situation that is of interest; with the ending of the Cold War in particular, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which this might occur. If CND's rebirth is dependant on external crises, as seems to have been historically the case, then if contemporary history is to serve as a guide, the prospects for the movement appear bleak. Were this position still tenable, resurgence of the movement should have occurred (The Gulf War, civil war in what was Yugoslavia, tension between Russia and Ukraine over control of nuclear forces and the Black sea fleet, civil war in Georgia, war in Azerbaijan - the list goes on) It has not. Only briefly during the Gulf War was there a very brief growth period (although even this was very short lived and on a very much smaller scale). The reason for this is not difficult to find. For CND to exist as a mass movement with potential political influence, they would seem to require the previous superpower stand-off to be revived. If it were possible to express this position as a simple equation it would look something like this;

\[
\text{Nuclear Weapons} + \text{Crisis} + \text{Cold War} = \text{SM (CND) 'success'}. \\
\text{Nuclear Weapons} + \text{Crisis} - \text{Cold War} = \text{SM (CND) 'failure'}. \\
\]

**The utility of the existing approaches.**

As has been shown earlier, the classical doctrines of RD and RM are of limited utility when it comes to attempting to explain the initial motivation that is involved in membership of a SM. In the case of RD, and in the light of the survey results which show a significant increase in the percentage of the unemployed amongst CND members, there would appear to be a *prima facie* with regards to alienation being a factor in membership of CND. On a wider level, the survey also shows that in line with wider trends, Trade Union membership has fallen dramatically in recent years (a fall amongst CND members from 40 per cent in 1985 to 29 per cent in 1990/91. This compares with a fall of around 5 per cent nationally during roughly the same period and a fall of around 25 per cent between the years 1979 and 1987 (1)). All of these factors would seem to point to an increase in alienation on the part of many individual respondents. While this then might provide a partial explanation, it does nothing to answer the question, why continue as a member of CND specifically? It also would
seem to ignore the fact that the vast majority of CND members could not be said to be in a position of alienation situated as they are amongst the broad and still largely employed middle classes. Also, as has been said before, great care should also be exercised regarding the importance of union membership as an indicator due to the fact that for many members of CND their occupations will demand that they be members of professional associations such as the BMA, the RCN etc. rather than Trade Unions per se. i.e., they do not view themselves as members of Trade Unions.

RM theory is also of limited utility in seeking an explanation for continued membership of an ailing SM such as CND. To recap for a moment on the core thesis of RM, this states that as things improve for individuals, i.e., as they have more disposable income, increased leisure time, greater job security etc., then so too will their commitment to SM activity increase in broadly commensurate terms. This may go some way to explaining why members are leaving the movement in the present economic and political climate as the middle classes that make up CND's membership, employed as the majority are in the 'welfare and creative sectors', are faced with some of the greatest problems of any sector of the larger workforce - enforced wage restraint, removal of job security etc. At face value, a possible explanation for declining membership? Perhaps, although even this becomes contradictory when applied to the longer perspective of membership rates of CND since their inception. If one considers this in these wider terms, the correlation becomes unsustainable;

1950's - 1960's. Low unemployment, relatively wealthy = increase in membership (substantiates RM theory).
1970's. As above = decrease in membership. (contrary to RM theory).
1980's. Rising unemployment, public sector wage restraint, increase in relative poverty etc. = increase in membership (contrary to RM theory).
1990's. As above = decrease in membership (substantiates RM theory).

So, the argument has come almost full circle returning to the earlier discussion of the relative merits of those theories created by Olson, Gamson, Parkin et al regarding the rationality of participation, 'conscience constituents', altruism, 'cost', 'benefit' etc. Are these arguments of any utility in attempting to explain the phenomenon of continued CND membership?

The answer to this question is a qualified yes. Certainly there is still a discernible element of a 'feel good factor' involved in CND membership, gained through the satisfaction derived from group activity. However, in other important respects this is
now at best only a partial or peripheral explanation. In describing this satisfaction, Wilson has said that it involves,

_The fun and conviviality of coming together, the sense of group membership or exclusiveness, and such collective status or esteem as the group as a whole may enjoy...(2)._ 

The 'coming together' may still be a valid reason for continued membership but, is this reason enough? Surely this could be found at a more meaningful level through the membership of other organisations or movements, particularly in the present climate. In looking at CND today, exclusiveness, as has been amply illustrated is no longer a factor in the arena in which they operate. CND is now just one - some might argue a very minor - player on this particular stage; CND are no longer the sole or even major movement operating within this broad area and, their current confusion over future direction further demeans any claims they might have to exclusivity.

Wilson further states that, in terms of incentive, this is provided by the sense of satisfaction of having contributed to the attainment of a worthwhile cause. The difficulties inherent in deciding whether or not CND have contributed to the attainment of ongoing superpower disarmament have already been discussed. What this does serve to raise though are two further questions that need to be addressed, namely; 1) if CND have attained their goals why continue as a member of a movement that is by its own definition redundant and, 2), if these goals have not been attained while a truly mass movement, at a time when sympathy for the goals of the movement were at their highest, then why, at a time when the pursuance of those goals is greeted with hostility or apathy should an individual retain their membership of such a movement? If one is to speak in terms of rationality of participation and the attainment of goals as the major motivation, then it would appear to be more 'rational' to participate in another movement that has those attributes that CND has lost or is in the process of losing. Membership of an organisation such as Greenpeace which enjoys a large measure of public and (to some extent) political respect would appear the 'rational 'course to take. Of course, as was demonstrated with the results of the survey, many CND members are members of other philanthropic groups and yet many are not. Even those that are remain members of CND despite the increasingly crosscutting nature of the campaigns and the apparently increasing irrelevance of CND as an effective member of this Social Movement Sector (SMS).

Parkin has also identified another characteristic of SM membership that may aid the understanding of continued membership of CND. That is, membership of such
movements provides an antidote for those members of society whose values are largely at odds with those who enjoy political power and authority. As Byrne points out, this might provide an explanation of why CND expanded as it did during the eighties:

*The seventies had seen a Labour Government degenerate into immobilism, and the Trade Union movement castigated for the pursuit of 'selfish sectional interest'. For people holding left wing views and wishing to register their opposition to the return to power of right wing governments in the West, CND offered a relatively trouble free opportunity to make a statement of opposition* (3).

During the late eighties and early nineties, Labour were still immobile in an electoral sense, in that to many commentators they appeared condemned to an indefinite period in opposition; i.e., as an alternative to Thatcherism their challenge appeared cursory and ideologically outmoded. The Trade Unions pursuit of 'selfish interests' during the seventies had resulted in what appeared to be their effective neutralisation as a political force through the application of many and various Parliamentary Acts designed to drastically curb what many saw as their inordinate power. Perhaps then a case can be constructed where membership of CND during the nineties can still be viewed as a 'trouble free' opportunity to register and establish left wing credentials. Where the present situation differs though is in the symbolic nature of that protest. During the eighties, membership of CND was a high profile symbolism due to the frequency and size of the movements activities. During the 'eighties, CND were viewed predominantly, even by non-dissidents, as a 'respectable' and sincere movement. The situation in which CND find themselves now is both qualitatively and quantitatively different. In terms of visible symbolism, membership of CND no longer guarantees a high profile individually or collectively and, while the movements sincerity cannot be doubted, CND, are now viewed by the majority as a minor nuisance or total irrelevance.

As has been shown in an earlier chapter, support for the Labour Party amongst CND members is particularly strong. Perhaps this might present at least a partial answer to the question under consideration; that given the demonstrably multilateral nature of current Labour defence policy, while the majority agree with the broad thrust of overall Labour policy, they cannot support their defence policy and once again membership of CND for them appears at face value to be a symbolic or expressive act of protest on this particular policy area. This, on the evidence of the survey results, would appear highly unlikely. When respondents were asked if they believed the Labour Party to be lost cause for CND, 53 per cent of all respondents disagreed. Of the 62 per cent who were Labour supporters, 65 per cent disagreed and of the 38 per cent who were Party
members, disagreement rose to 71 per cent (of the remaining Labour supporters - 35 per cent - only 31 per cent believed the Labour party to be lost cause. The majority, 69 per cent remained unsure. There was a remarkably similar correlation amongst those respondents who were party members - of the 29 per cent remaining party members 33 per cent believed the party a lost cause while 67 per cent were unsure). This would seem to suggest quite definitively that for the majority of Labour supporters/members that remain within CND their membership is far from simply symbolic or expressive. It would appear to reflect a belief on the part of these individual respondents in the continuing and ongoing ability of CND to have an effect on an important part of the British POS, namely the Labour Party. In other words, their membership could be said to go beyond the expressive and become instrumental - at least in terms of their relationship with the Labour party. The reality is of course debatable but, it is not the intent here to explore this. Rather the intention is to pose the question why people belong to such a movement at such a time. Here then is one possible explanation. Once again though its very partiality makes it unsatisfying. There are still 45 per cent of respondents overall who do view the Party as a lost cause, with a significant number of Labour supporters and members amongst them. Membership or support of a particular party is in itself only one, (albeit important) factor. It cannot stand as a complete explanation in its own right. Again then, the question of expressionism as a motivator of membership is raised. If, as would seem to be the case, an argument of sorts can be constructed for symbolic or expressive membership by these respondents then the discussion has yet again come full circle. If it can be argued that movement membership even to a limited extent is symbolic, why choose to exercise that symbolism through a low profile SM such as CND ?

Byrne has said, with regards to CND membership during the eighties, that it represented opposition in an area of domestic politics that could not be provided directly through membership of other altruistic organisations such as Amnesty or other Third World campaigns. This might have been true at this time, but even that relevance must now be questioned. The issue is now almost certainly of little relevance in the present domestic climate as it has been largely overtaken by far more immediate and pressing concerns ranging from unemployment to environmental concerns. The previous difficulties involved with membership of environmental groups - in that they represent difficulties with regard to traditional socialist beliefs in the necessity of economic and industrial growth - while still present, are not as insurmountable as they once were. All of the major parties, including Labour, now accept that economic growth should go hand in glove with environmental considerations. Membership of the environmental movement, with the exception of certain radical groups, no longer entails an unacceptable alteration of lifestyle in the way that it once did. Certainly, it is quite
possible to be a member of a group such as FoE or Greenpeace without radically changing ones lifestyle. Moreover, as such organisations have grown in recent years, they would appear to have taken over much of the ground upon which CND operated. It is this movement that, if the argument is to be believed, is the one in which radical credentials are now established in much the same way as it was suggested CND performed this function in the past. They have assumed a relevance domestically, campaigning on a plethora of issues. Certainly, if one is looking for 'fun and conviviality', a sense of group membership and esteem, environmental groups have adopted this mantle with some ease. Greenpeace alone can now boast a membership in the UK alone of over 300,000 and, in terms of status and esteem their record is impressive (although, as with CND's claims of 'success' a deal of care is needed before we accept them at face value);

_Barely a week has gone by without Greenpeace pressing its arguments in the papers, on radio and television and on the streets...on issue after issue we have taken the initiative...The results are obvious. The environment is now a fixed item on the social agenda...The politicians and industrialists are having to listen and react...we have emerged as a respected radical voice, authoritative as well as provocative. We have after all been proved right on issue after issue. It is a long time since we could be dismissed as a bunch of fanciful troublemakers (4)._ 

As has been said, many CND members are also members of such groups and yet retain membership of CND despite the increasingly crosscutting nature of their respective campaigns. If membership of certain groups is a means of demonstrating radical credentials then, in terms of rationality, continued membership of CND becomes even more problematic as a statement of non-revolutionary radical politics.

**Conclusion.**

**Habitual membership ?**

One possible explanation that has thus far not been considered is that of membership of CND through habit. While this idea, in comparison with other more complex theorems, might appear simplistic, there does seem to be some superficial evidence to suggest that this might prove a worthwhile approach. At least this would seem to be the case for the vast majority who joined the movement either prior to or during the
halcyon days of the eighties (74 per cent of respondents joining the movement prior to 1984, compared to just 26 per cent who joined after this date), especially when combined with the response to certain questions contained within the survey.

CND's major campaign issue is the unilateral disarming of Britain; for the majority within the movement this is a largely non-negotiable principle with regards to their membership (71 per cent of all respondents disagreed with the proposition that CND should modify its stance on unilateralism). It is therefore somewhat surprising to discover that when asked if, 'the movement were to drop its commitment to unilateralism in favour of multilateralism, would you still remain a member of CND?', 66 per cent of all respondents answered in the affirmative. As this is the core principle of the movement, this raises the question, under what circumstances would membership be relinquished? If this result is broken down still further, of the 71 per cent of all respondents who were against the abandonment of 'pure' unilateralism, 72 per cent would remain as members, 12 per cent would leave the movement with the remainder being unsure of their response. 47 per cent of those respondents who joined before 1980 and 38 per cent of those who joined between 1980 and 1983 would still remain as members.

Further corroboration of this can be found in response to the question, 'under what circumstances would you consider taking no further part in CND activity?' A little under half of all respondents (46 per cent) stated there were no such circumstances; 21 per cent stated that they would take no further part once disarmament was achieved; 5 per cent if CND became violent in their opposition with the remainder either not replying or giving a variety of reasons ranging from lack of time, ill health, old age, or in the event of CND becoming too closely tied to any one political party (usually Labour).

There are many and various explanations that can be advanced for this loyalty. Taking pacifism as an example, one might expect that the pacifists within CND would be likely to give continued membership serious consideration. This, however, is not borne out by the responses below;
Table 8:1
Pacifists cohort; (52 per cent of respondents) Question 1. 'CND should modify its stance on unilateralism?' Question 2. If the movement were to drop its commitment to unilateralism in favour of multilateralism, would you still remain a member of CND?' (%). Question 3. 'Under what circumstances would you consider taking no further part in CND activity?' (%)

| % answering 'no' to question 1. | 82 |
| % answering 'yes' to question 2. | 68 |
| % answering 'none' to question 3. | 40 |

It would also seem sensible to speculate that amongst those respondents for whom defence/nuclear issues are the major factors in influencing how they vote (14 per cent) the continuing adherence to unilateralism would prove to be a major factor in their continuing membership. Once again, and even more convincingly than the pacifist cohort, this does not prove to be the case;

Table 8:2
Defence issue cohort; (14 per cent of respondents) Question 1. 'CND should modify its stance on unilateralism?' Question 2. If the movement were to drop its commitment to unilateralism in favour of multilateralism, would you still remain a member of CND?' (%). Question 3. 'Under what circumstances would you consider taking no further part in CND activity?' (%)

| % answering 'no' to question 1. | 68 |
| % answering 'yes' to question 2. | 64 |
| % answering 'none' to question 3. | 41 |

- These examples are in some way representative of 'extreme' membership, i.e., the cohorts represented could be seen to have a far more clearly defined modus operandi with regard to their attitude to defence/nuclear/peace issues than the majority of the more 'mainstream' membership. This does, because of their 'extreme' nature, make them even more compelling as factors in the argument regarding habitual membership. Certainly, if for the majority of these highly committed groups there appears to be a conflict between belief and continued membership, then for the less 'committed' it is
quite reasonable to assume this conflict will be magnified. This is not the case. If one considers the results of these same questions when applied to the simple subgroup of gender, there is a remarkable degree of convergence in terms of response;

**Table 8:3**

*Gender; Question 1. ' CND should modify its stance on unilateralism ?' Question 2. If the movement were to drop its commitment to unilateralism in favour of multilateralism, would you still remain a member of CND ?' (%). Question 3. ' Under what circumstances would you consider taking no further part in CND activity ?' (%)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% answering 'no' to question 1.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% answering 'yes' to question 2.</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% answering 'none' to question 3.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar findings can also be displayed across a variety of the 'simple' subgroups - occupation, education etc. What this achieves is simply to continue to pose the question as to why do a large number of respondents continue to remain as members in the light of their responses. It is clear that there are few immediately obvious factors contained within the various subgroups and cohorts that will provide a satisfying explanation. Certainly nothing as simple as gender or occupation are the determinants of this phenomenon. Even when these subgroups are broken down into smaller cohorts, the similarity of the findings leads to a similar conclusion. In short, a return to the idea of membership through habit seems inevitable.

Another factor, mentioned on previous occasions, is the increasing age of many CND members. Aside from the question of habituality, the ageing nature of the movement lends credence to the argument concerning the shifting nature of 'expressive politics' in the 'nineties'.

Table 8:4

Question 1. 'If the movement were to drop its commitment to unilateralism in favour of multilateralism, would you still remain a member of CND?' (%).

Question 2. 'Under what circumstances would you consider taking no further part in CND activity?' (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>% answering 'yes' to question 1.</th>
<th>% answering 'none' to question 2.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 - 24.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 40.</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 59.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This would seem to show that the contention expressed in the earlier chapters regarding the shifting nature of expressive membership in the nineties holds particularly true in the case of CND. Those who joined during the eighties, i.e., those largely to be found in the 41 - 59 age cohort, seem far less likely to be involved in a shift of their loyalties, even when the visibly expressive nature of their membership appears exhausted. What this demonstrates with some force is not only CND's inability to 'capture' a younger membership but also that amongst those who do belong to CND in the younger cohorts there is demonstrably less likelihood of them remaining within the movement in the longer term.

While this evidence is far from definitive, it does provide one possible explanation, in that for many the reasons for continued membership are little more than habit. Certainly lack of choice in the exercise of opposition to nuclear weapons should not present a difficulty, and in the present circumstances, the exercise of this opposition through CND, for any other reasons, appears irrational. If CND were to renounce a unilateralist approach and this would not lead to a substantial number resigning membership, then the speculative argument of habitual membership is as strong as any other. At best, it is certainly no weaker than most.

While much time and effort has been given over to explanations of why individuals become members of SM's, their behaviour as members and the efficacy of their
individual and collective actions, little or nothing has been said to explain the continued membership of ailing or 'redundant' SM's.

This does not make such approaches any the less valid - even if it leaves them somewhat flawed. While the deficiencies of these approaches have been detailed in earlier chapters, it is nonetheless important that their usefulness not be overlooked completely...It would be a serious oversight to discard them totally, even if no approach is satisfying in its entirety.

In the case of Relative Deprivation, its prime asset is that it does not overlook the individual. While it may ignore the possibility that feelings of deprivation can occur due to the individuals belonging to a movement (rather than deprivation motivating membership), the individual member - due to this very oversight - becomes a focus of interest in their own right.

Turning to the Resource Mobilisation 'school', which has provided the framework for much of what was to follow; the application of this model forces the researcher to consider the organisational and structural factors that are commonplace in all such organisations. It further removes SM's from a vacuum and places them in an arena in which they are forced to compete with other SM's for finite resources. In the case of this study of CND, the major resource in question has been the individual membership. RM has the advantage of perceiving collective action as something other than an irrational aberration. Like the New Social Movement theories, it provides a realistic picture of the relationship between a Social Movement and the wider Political Opportunity structure. In particular, it has no difficulty in assuming the existence of a relationship that involves bargaining, negotiation and confrontation. Of particular importance to this study has been the work of Hirschmann, Parkin, and Verba and Nie. and the debate regarding 'instrumental' and 'expressive' membership. This enables action to be defined in other than a very narrow 'means', 'ends', 'cost', 'benefit' relationship. It allows the researcher to move away, should it prove neccessary, from attempting to fit behaviour into a rigid and formularised pattern. Against this positive aspect, there is the valid charge that due to its focus being the structure of a movement, it can sometimes overlook the contributory effect of the individual to that 'group consciousness'.

This thesis has, however, attempted to hilight the limited utility of existing approaches and to suggest a 'new' perspective of 'Habitual Membership'. The very paucity of work in this area is illustrated by the fact that much of the preceding examination relied on the extrapolation of said theories into an area in which the originators themselves
never considered they should be applied. This, coupled with their already discussed limited utility with regards to the areas in which they were intended to be applied means that it is not surprising that they ultimately prove so unsatisfactory as explanatory theorems of the phenomena just considered. While the arguments that have been suggested regarding the 'Habitual Member', at least in terms of scientific, sociological or psychological rigour, are equally flawed, in the light of the flawed nature of the accepted approaches to this question this makes the approach no less valid. It is certainly an avenue worthy of further investigation (alongside the extension of the accepted approaches).

Whilst it has been argued in much of the preceding analysis that CND is a movement in decline, this should not blind us to the possibility that this may be reversible. Perhaps in time, given the right circumstances, there will once again be a rebirth of CND. What can be of no doubt, however, is that at present CND are in steep decline and their campaign holds an increasing irrelevance to the majority of public and political opinion. For political theorists, it is an opportunity to come to terms with the dynamics of a once powerful movement in decline. It is an opportunity that, as this brief examination makes clear, has so far not been grasped.
FOOTNOTES


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APPENDIX.

CND Local Members Survey

The survey contained in the appendix was delivered to all members of CND in the Peterborough and Cambridge areas. This was achieved by the survey's inclusion in the newsletter's published by both groups and delivered to all registered members of these local groups. Coverage of the sample population was 100 per cent. A total of 352 surveys were eventually distributed. 198 replies were received in return, representing a response rate of a little over 56 per cent. The sample error is +/- 3 per cent.
CND LOCAL MEMBERS SURVEY

1. Age
2. Sex
3. Marital Status
4. Age of children (if applicable)
5. Education and qualifications and date of completion of formal education

6. Occupation
7. Are you a member of National CND? Yes/No
8. How long have you been a member (state year joined).
9. Please indicate whether you are, or have been a member of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Past</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Labour Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Conservative Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Social Democrats/SDP/Liberal Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) Green Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>(f) Anarchist</td>
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<tr>
<td>(g) Other (please specify)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

10. Please indicate how you voted in: (a) The 1983 General Election
     (b) The 1987 General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1987</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Labour Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Conservative Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Social Democrats/SDP/Liberal</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) Green Party</td>
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<td>(e) Communist Party</td>
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<td>(f) Other (please specify)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(g) Did not vote</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
11. How would you vote if there was a General Election tomorrow?
   (a) Labour Party
   (b) Conservative Party
   (c) Liberal Democratic Party
   (d) Green Party
   (e) Communist Party
   (f) Other (please specify)
   (g) Did not vote

12. Please rank in order of importance the factors that would most influence your vote

(a) local issues
(b) economic issues
(c) European issues
(d) social issues
(e) unemployment issues
(f) defence issues
(g) green issues

13. At a local level what level of support do you feel CND has received from

(a) Labour Party
(b) Conservative Party
(c) Liberal Democrats
(d) Green Party
(e) Communist Party
(f) Other (Specify)

14. Recently, has this support in your opinion

(a) Labour Party
(b) Conservative Party
(c) Liberal Democrats
(d) Green Party
(e) Communist Party
(f) Other (Specify)
15. Are you a pacifist?

16. Are you a practising member of a religious denomination? If yes, please specify which.

17. Since becoming involved with CND, what type of activities have you taken part in?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nationally</th>
<th>locally</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Demonstrations, etc.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Attending meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Stood for office</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) Organising any of the above</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) None</td>
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<tr>
<td>(f) Others (specify)</td>
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</table>

18. If also a member of a political party (see question 9), what type of activities have you taken part in.

(a) Canvassing
(b) Attending meetings
(c) Stood for office
(d) Organising any of the above
(e) None
(f) Others (specify)

19. Are you currently a member of any other pressure group (eg. Greenpeace, FoE, Anti-Poll-Tax Union, etc.) (please specify)

20. Does your involvement with any of these groups involve you in any of the following activities:

(a) Demonstrations, etc.  
(b) Attending meetings  
(c) Stood for office  
(d) Organising any of the above  
(e) None  
(f) Others (specify)
21. Do you believe in the principle of non-violent direct action?

22. Have you ever been arrested while taking part in CND inspired activity?

23. If yes, was this on more than one occasion?

24. Is your membership of CND motivated by
   (a) Political beliefs
   (b) Moral/Religious beliefs
   (c) A combination of the above
   (d) Others (please specify)

25. Since your involvement with the Disarmament Movement, would you say your political interest has:
   (a) increased
   (b) decreased
   (c) disappeared
   (d) remained the same

26. Since your involvement with the Disarmament Movement, would you say your political activity has:
   (a) increased
   (b) decreased
   (c) disappeared
   (d) remained the same

27. Since the ending of the cold war has your fear of nuclear war:
   (a) increased
   (b) decreased
   (c) disappeared
   (d) remained the same

28. Since the ending of the cold war has public sympathy for the cause:
   (a) increased
   (b) decreased
   (c) disappeared
   (d) remained the same
29. At both national and local level, with whom should CND be most closely liaising politically?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local</th>
<th>National</th>
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</table>

(a) Labour Party
(b) Conservative Party
(c) Liberal Democrats
(d) Green Party
(e) Communist Party
(f) Nationalists
(g) Others (please specify)
(h) None

30. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements:
(tick relevant box)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>agree strongly</th>
<th>agree</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>disagree strongly</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) CND is becoming a relic of the Cold War era</td>
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<td>(b) CND should modify its stance on Unilateralism</td>
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<td>(c) The Labour Party is a lost cause for CND</td>
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<td>(d) CND has failed to win the support of the ordinary people</td>
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<td>(e) CND should disband</td>
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<td>(f) The National leadership is out of touch with local activists</td>
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<td>(g) The movement has become too political</td>
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<td>(h) The movement is not political enough</td>
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<td>(i) The majority of people see nuclear weapons as a necessary evil</td>
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<tr>
<td>(j) CND should become a multi issue movement in an effort to attract new support and members</td>
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<tr>
<td>(k) The movement’s future role should be determined by the increasing concern in ‘Green’ issues not unilateralism per se</td>
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<tr>
<td>(l) CND will never again be the truly mass movement it once was during the 1960s and the 1980s</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
31. Under what circumstances would you consider taking no further part in CND activity at:
   (a) National level
   (b) local level

32. If the movement were to drop its commitment to unilateralism in favour of multilateralism, would you still remain a supporter/member of CND.

33. Please add any further comments you feel you may wish to regarding the movement or, you may wish to expand on any of the points raised in earlier questions.

Thank you for completing this survey. You may rest assured that all replies will be treated in the strictest of confidence. Should any respondent wish to receive a copy of the preliminary findings, would they please write to me at the above address, when a copy will be sent at the earliest possible time.

Mark Harrison