Global sport and local modernity: the case of ‘professionalisation’ of football in Algeria

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Global Sport and Local Modernity: The Case of 'Professionalisation' of Football in Algeria

This thesis provides a framework through which to analyse the development of Algerian sport, and more precisely the shift towards professionalisation. The framework is based on an analysis of globalisation approaches and local (Algerian) historical, ideological and cultural specificity. This aims at rereading and re-conceptualising sport (global culture) and professionalism, from local (Algerian) perspectives on authenticity and modernity which inter-relate global experiences and local diversity / autonomy. The method employed for the analysis of policy makers' views is discourse analysis based on data drawn from detailed qualitative interviews with actors, chosen from the Algerian political and academic communities and those directly involved from the policy and management sphere with the implementation of the 'professionalised' system.

The empirical work, which applies a non-conventional (constructivist, post-modern instead of positivist, modernist) way of both addressing and analysing the research questions, demonstrates that while discourses of resistance / local adaptation to globalising tendencies are strongly evident in relation to wider economic, political, and cultural forces, in relation to sport, these interviewees, adopt strategies of accommodation to the western phenomena associated with the professionalisation of sport. Specifically the discourse analysis shows that while key aspects of globalisation; namely, individualism, secularism, and materialism were presented as a serious threat to Algerian sovereignty, in contrast, professionalisation of sport was interpreted from a technical and managerial point of view. Discourse on ideology, the ‘exceptionalism’ of the Algerian case and context, and on identity were absent or neglected in interviewees’ responses in relation to sport, because of the so-called ‘universality’ of sport culture. This universality was defined in two principal ways; sport as an open arena for all cultures, but where western culture is dominant; and sport as a non-ideological and a-political arena, not controlled by any exclusive worldview.

The contribution of the research is to raise questions that had not been addressed before, such questions have to do with Algerian identity and particularism (spécificité) that link:

a) on the one hand, modernity, postmodernity and globalisation theories, approaches and debates to Algerian history, society, polity and geography;

b) and on the other hand, (to link) the discussion on globalisation and localisation, within Algerian space, to sport in general and football in particular, looking at a specific ideology or mode of management and practice in sport, which is ‘professionalism’.

Key words: Algeria, globalisation, localisation, discourse analysis, local modernity, postmodernity, nation-state, cultural specificity, professional football, NUD*IST.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.

[96.1] Read in the name of your Lord Who created.
[96.2] He created man from a clot.
[96.3] Read and your Lord is Most Honorable,
[96.4] Who taught (to write) with the pen
[96.5] Taught man what he knew not.

I would like to thank Professor Ian Henry for his time, expert advice, support and direction he has provided throughout the course of the study. Working under his supervision has been an enriching experience.

I would like also to express my appreciation to all staff and fellow research students in the Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy at Loughborough University for their support. In particular, I deeply grateful to Professor Barrie Houlihan my research director, Dr Phil Dine my internal examiner, Dr Eleni Theodoraki and Mrs Suzanne Whyman, Secretary to Professor Henry and Professor Houlihan.

I would like also to thank the interviewees who gave me their time and helped me to gather my empirical data.

Lastly, I owe a great deal to my family. To my mother and father who have given me so much help in so many ways. To the Algerian government for its financial support. Thanks above all to all my friends from all over the world and my colleagues, Dikea, Max, Richard, Mick, particularly Mansour Al-Tauqi, for their encouragement.
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GLOSSARY

ALN (Armée de Libération Nationale) National Liberation Army

ASP (Associations Sportives de Performance) Performance Sport Associations

ASC (Associations Sportives Communaules) Communal Sports Associations

CAF/AFC (Confédération Africaine de Football) African Football Confederation.

CDA Critical Discourse Analysis

DA Discourse Analysis

ENA (Étoile Nord Africaine) North African Star

FAF/AFF (Fédération Algérienne de Football) Algerian Football Federation.

FLN (Front de Libération National) National Liberation Front

FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) Islamic Salvation Front

GCC Gulf Council of Co-operation

MSP (Société pour la Paix) Society for Peace Movement

MTLD (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques) Movement for the Triumph of democratic Liberties

NFL National Football League

OAU Organisation of African Unity

OS (Organisation Secrète) Secret Organisation

PPA (Partie du Peuple Algérien)

PCA (Partie Communiste Algérien) Algerian Communist Party

RCD (Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie) Rally for Peace and Democracy

UDMA (Union Démocratique du Manifest Algérien)
“Accepter d’être elle-même, pour l’Algérie, ce serait aussi prendre conscience des tâches à accomplir, des tâches qui toutes se résument à assurer le difficile passage entre passé et l’avenir, entre les traditions et l’ère moderne, entre fermeture sur soi, même valorisée, et l’ouverture à l’extérieur, entre la référence régionale et le sens national. Ce serait créer suffisamment d’attachement à la patrie pour que ce soit supportable la nécessaire diversité entre les langues, les opinions, les parties, le comportement d’adaptation à un style de vie différent”.

Grandguillaume, G., Avec l’Algérie, ESPRIT, January 12 1995

“Si le sport n’est pas intégré dans la vie nationale, c’est-à-dire dans la construction nationale, si l’on construit des sportifs nationaux et non des hommes conscients alors rapidement on assistera au pourrissement du sport par le professionnalisme, le commercialisme. Le sport ne doit pas être un jeu, une distraction que s’offre la bourgeoisie des villes”

Frantz Fanon (1961) Les damnés de la terre, Francois Maspero, Paris, p.146
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rationale for the Research

As part of the Algerian struggle for independence, football ‘l'héritage de l'occupant’ and described by Fates (1994:29) as ‘ce corps étrange’, was used as a mean for the affirmation of Algerian society and also to resist colonial cultural hegemony, in its own terms. Hence, a description of the national space by Hussein (1997:167) could be applied to define the role of ‘indigenous’ sports associations (and later the FLN team)\(^1\) during the colonial era. Sports clubs were in a way a space for identification, a symbolic place for gathering, and a manifestation of certain signs of community and religious acknowledgement or ‘reconnaissance’. It is a space also for political messages, created by a collective voice, addressed to outsiders, and intended to be heard by the colonial power. This specific niche (the sports club) was necessary for the social sustenance and expression of the Muslim ‘indigenous’ population. This process of absorption and then transformation of football by nationalists is interpreted by Hannerz (1991), as being a form of “creolization” or what Bourdieu refers to as the de-assimilation of a global culture. After the independence the reactionist tendency toward global and western culture was less obvious in sport domain. In the early years of the post independence era, driven by populist and socialist values, sport was seen as an important element in, which could serve the political formation and mobilisation of masses for nation state building and the development of society. This period had known a spreading of physical education and the practice of sport at school, university and in the work place. It was an era of amateurism and political gigantism, characterised by the development of new massive sports facilities and the participation of Algeria in major regional games (Arab, African and Mediterranean) and other major international sporting events (Olympic Games and international championships). Sport was thus recognised by the state as being an effective

\(^1\) By 1958, the FLN understood the role that sport and particularly football (the most popular game in the world) could play in the internationalisation of the Algerian cause and decided to create a national revolutionary team. They gave orders to all Algerian professional players, playing in different teams in the French league (e.g. Mekhloufi, Zitouni), to join the Algerian national team of “fighters” (see Fates, 1994:33).
way to represent the Algerian model of development. Today as a reaction to the growing media exposure and cultural flows transmitted by satellite TV channels and the impact that global football industry is having on local football culture (on and off the pitch), as consequence also of the economic crisis, resulting in the steady drop of oil prices in the international market, failure of development projects, and heavy foreign debts, sport, particularly football [as with other sectors of the society], is moving toward a market oriented economy and professionalism, as part of general government strategy to reduce public expenditure and the creation of new sources of revenue.

If we take as axiomatic the claim by Harvey and Houle "linking sport to globalisation leads to an analysis of sport as part of an emergent global culture, as contributing to the definition of new identities and to the development of a world economy" (1994: 346), thus, it is of the greatest importance to refer in this thesis the Algerian experience in the professionalisation of sport to global flows, incorporating aspects of global culture, global communication systems, new world economy, and an international nation state system. This is designed to help us to comprehend the position of Algeria, as a developing nation state within the global context, and to understand the ways in which local agents or groups, particularly those who are directly involved in the Algerian government project for professional sport, read and react to this changing global context. Furthermore, we need to assess whether the role of those key agents is that of passive conduit, active participant, and resistor to/mediator of the importation of a Western model for professional sport.

From the above, the research questions to be addressed consist of the following:

**A) What constitutes the globalisation process?**

- Should the globalisation concept be modified by reference to other terms such as Westernisation, Americanisation, New World order or Universalisation?
- Can we consider globalisation as a neutral phenomenon, a new tool for economic and political control, or cultural imperialism or a vehicle of liberalisation for certain groups?
• What tools have people or nations in non-western countries to understand, embrace and/or resist this process?

**B) What is the nature of the Algerian proposal for professional football?**

• Is the Algerian government plan for professional sport, a project that has been imported due to the increasing global interconnectedness? If the culture, as suggested by Hutcheon (1989), is made by us and not given to us, what role can the Algerian professional football play in the global context?

• Does Algeria have a strong cultural identity and economic system to "protect itself" from the universalistic challenges of the New World system (culture, economy and political dependency) imposed by the western countries?

**1.2 Theoretical orientation**

To answer the preceding questions, it will be necessary in the first element to conceptualise globalisation and other related terms, namely Americanisation, new world order and "universalisation". The second element emphasises the relations or the common dimensions existing between globalisation theory and other concepts and theoretical approaches, such as modernity, cultural imperialism and hegemony. The third element will include a review of the commentators who have been critical of globalisation theory, particularly regarding its uni-directional/western type of thinking and perception of the modern world system (economically, politically and culturally). These include postmodernists and those who are seeking in their interpretation of the world order (science, history, geography and culture) to produce new definitions (or conceptualisations), which are more sensitive to other voices, races, and cultures, previously neglected in discourse on globalisation. Finally, examples from the sociology of sport and globalisation will be given to link the macro level theory to sport phenomena, to develop explanations of the global-local nexus in the world of sport (see figure 1.1).

---

2 Universalisation of values and globalisation of structures
1.3 Methodological consideration

This thesis adopts a constructivist approach, which stresses the need to look at ‘reality’ or phenomena, such as the professionalisation of sport in Algeria, as a social construct, framed by competing/interacting discourses. The ‘professionalisation’ of sport in Algeria is thus seen as shaped by the Algerian local (and internal) cultural, political and historical contexts, in relation to (external) global changes/or challenges. Discourse analysis, therefore, was used to analyse interviewees’ conceptualisation, on the one hand with reference to globalisation processes, and on the other hand, by reference to the formulation and implementation of the government’s project for professional sport (see figure 1.2)
1.4 Aims of the research

The primary aim of the research and the research questions noted above derived from the literature review and the philosophical position of the researcher. By analysing the professionalisation of football (as a social phenomenon and not as a specific case), and sport in general, the primary aim is to understand Algeria’s (as nation and state) relation to western modernity and globalisation process. The review of the literature linked to the research paradigm alludes to several important research objectives. These include:

- to reconsider the stages of Algeria’s nation state building (in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods) and the impact that those stages have had on the nature of the interpretation and absorption of sport (as value and modes of practice and management), culturally, historically, ideologically and politically.
- to evaluate ‘the local’ form of responses (adaptation/negotiation/differentiation) to the diffusion of the western modernity project and the impact that this has had on the Algerian position in relation to globalisation processes and the government policy for the professionalisation of football (at least in terms of changes in the state’s political ideology and interviewees’ conceptions).
to link the literature on western and local modernity, occidental and non-occidental postmodernity (including discourse analysis), and that of the history and sociology of the Islamic world, Arab nations and Algeria, to the study of sport sociology and sport policy.

1.5 Method of empirical investigation

1.5.1 Research strategy

This thesis is concerned with in-depth investigation of a set of particular political decisions, which constitute the government project for professional sport therefore, qualitative research strategies, and in particular a case study approach were deemed appropriate.

In order to address some of the research questions empirical research was undertaken in the Algerian context. The choice of Algeria in general as a subject of study and the Algerian government project for professional sport in particular, was both for intrinsic and instrumental purposes. Combining both types in investigating the Algerian case aimed at the following:

1. To improve the researcher’s understanding of the phenomenon which may be gained by employing pluralistic approaches or world views which include theories of globalisation (universalistic conceptualisations), postmodernist thinking, local modernity and post colonial literature (particularistic conceptualisations). It may help also in the acquisition of what Göle (1997) terms “an intellectual sensibility”. In other words, deconstruction and reinterpretation of some concepts, values and ideologies, which are ‘specific’ to Algerian history and identity.

2. To illustrate how the concerns of researchers and theorists in the domain of globalisation, sports and local identity are manifest in the Algerian case.

A core element of this research is open-ended interviews with sets of actors broadly from the political/intellectual sphere (exemplars/ representation of Algerian intelligentsia) who are supposedly familiar with general approaches on globalisation and local identity, but probably not in relation to professional sport. The second sets of open-ended interviews (micro-level) were conducted with personalities from the football community who are
directly concerned with the professionalisation of football in Algeria. Other research approaches, namely observation, and the analysis of documents such as press articles and official reports (actions plans and national sports debates at ministerial and football federation levels) were used to clarify meanings, and to check the ‘repeatability’ of an observation or interpretation, in order to identify different ways the phenomenon is seen. In other words to increase what is termed in discourse analysis, the level of warrantability (soundness and trustworthiness) of the analysis results (Wood and Kroger, 2000)

1.5.2 Data analysis

In respect of the constructivist research tradition and post-modern thinking, discourse analysis (DA) (facilitated by the use of software for qualitative data Analysis NUD*IST for the micro level interviews) was used in this study to analyse the interview transcripts. This could be regarded as part of the general (research) deconstructivist process of sport and local modernity, which attempts to reformulate or redefine globalisation and professional sport according to local (interviewees’) views or accounts; or alternatively, to discover whether their perceptions have any impact on their positions concerning professional sport (practice and values).

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The structure of the remaining seven chapters of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 is a review of literature on globalisation, sport and social theory. It aims at conceptualising globalisation and other related terms. The second element emphasises the relations or the common dimensions existing between globalisation theories and other concepts and theoretical approaches like modernity, nation-states, cultural imperialism and hegemony. The third element will include a review of the commentators who have been critical of globalisation theory, particularly regarding its uni-directional/dominating western perception and explanation of the modern world system (economically, politically and culturally). These include postmodernists and those who are seeking in their interpretation of world order (science, history, geography and culture) to produce new definitions (conceptualisation), which are more sensitive to other voices, races, and cultures, previously neglected in globalist discourses. Finally, examples from the sociology of sport
and globalisation will be given to link the macro level theory to sport phenomena, to consider the global-local nexus in the world of sport.

In chapter 3, consideration of the discourse on national identity highlights the importance of football in Algeria as a cultural and political vehicle; a) during the colonial period as a means of resisting western (colonial) hegemony; b) in the post-colonial era as an instrument mobilised by the FLN-state, externally, for national representation of the Algerian model of socialism and development; and internally, as an important element in political legitimisation. This type of phenomenon described by Giulianotti and Finn (2000: 258) as “the pretext through which the ‘imagined community’ of fellow nationals may be reached and unified via the match’s mediation on television, radio or print”. The chapter discusses also the relationship between football and the transition of Algerian society towards a market economy and a multi-party polity that may be regarded as the most significant precursor to the promotion of the professionalisation of football in Algeria.

Chapter 4 discusses the nature and variety of professional sports systems in western and non-western countries, and the main chronological developments that have occurred, since 1998, in the application of the Algerian government’s plan for professional football.

Chapter 5 presents a rationale for the methodological and epistemological decisions taken in relation to the research. It seeks to connect the researcher’s philosophical and political positioning to the methodological strategy adopted for the research. It involves a review of the applied theoretical paradigm and of the qualitative method, which uses case study strategy and discourse analysis to analyse interview transcripts. The chapter also displays how patterns in the data transcripts were grouped in themes and how these were used to structure the subsequent analysis.

Chapters 6 and 7 develop the core of the empirical analysis of the thesis. This analysis is divided into discussion of macro and micro levels, emphasising the specific content of the respondents’ utterances, in other words their argumentation strategies and to a lesser extent the linguistic forms of realisation they employ, while talking about issues such as globalisation, national sovereignty, and local reactions to western values. Furthermore, it examines issues related to professional sport in general, and football in particular.
Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, provides an overview of the research and attempts to address the research's political and philosophical position. It reflects on the contribution of pluralistic cultural identifications and independent thinking to the global and local nexus, and an understanding of the Algerian contemporary context, and in particular, the Algerian project of the professionalisation of sport.
CHAPTER TWO

GLOBALISATION AND SPORT, BETWEEN TRADITION, MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNITY

2.1 Introduction to globalisation

Technological development and the rise of the power of the mass media throughout the world have contributed to claims about the emergence of "world culture". It is argued that the contemporary world is becoming according to Hannerz (1990) a 'single network' of social relationships where people, culture and societies previously more or less isolated from one another, are now interconnected. In this more advanced and complex form of internationalisation, national borders are of less significance due to the growing flow of goods, information, images and people between different localities. According to Maguire (1999:13) every aspect of social reality, our activities, conditions of living, belief systems, knowledge base and responses, is affected by interconnections with other group, both "near" and "far away". Kaily and Marflett (1998:5) state that more and more people are drawn into the global system and so are affected by what happens elsewhere, producing what Giddens (1990:520) calls time-space distanciation. In other words, the intensification of world wide social relations is shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. Subsequently, the world has become a 'compressed' or a 'single space' as conceived by Robertson (1992:18), as a result of the increased intensity of global interconnectedness. Central to this regard, as reported by Giddens (1990:63-77), has been the emergence of a world economy, an international nation-state system, a global diffusion of technology and division of labour as well as military alliance and treaties.

In addition to globalisation, terms like Americanisation, mondialisation, westernisation, and new world order have been used to express the transformation and
transition which are occurring in the global, political and economic domains. This new world order can be seen, as reported by Edoho (1997), as the replacement of US-Soviet bipolarism with US unipolarism (at least militarily). This has led to the proclaiming of a new global re-division of labour and redistribution of power, one which means prosperity in certain parts of the globe and poverty in other. Universalisation according to Bauman (1998:59) means making “the world different or better from what it had been, and making similar the life conditions under which people live their lives with perhaps even equal chances for everyone, everywhere”. This is clearly not always the reality, when we know that more than 800 million people in this earth are suffering from the absence of food, education and health services. Regarding this point, Holton (1998:171) states that “universalism offers the promise, but not the reality, of a better harmonious future”.

For Giddens (1990:175) globalisation in part represents

...a diffusion of western institutions across the world...a process of uneven development that fragments as it co-ordinates, introduces new forms of world interdependence in which, once again, there are no “others”.

Because this process, mentioned above, is a product ‘in the west for the west’ it perhaps says more about westernisation than globalisation. Put in other terms, global processes function to impose western cultural imperialism on the non-western world (Holton, 1998). Some sociologists and economists are more radical in their definition of globalisation. They view it as the Americanisation of the world or the mondialisation of the USA (Gerbier, L’Humanité 28.01.00). In relation to this Donnelly (1998) states that

Americanisation tends to be viewed as a one way process in which American cultural form, products, and meaning are imposed on other cultures at the expense of the domestic culture ...particularly in the field of film, television, and popular music.
From the above discussion, the distinction between globalisation and globalism, as suggested by Hoogvelt (2001), is all-important.

Whereas globalisation is an objective, real historical process, real historical process which marks, in a sentence, the ascendancy of real-time, trans-border economic activity over clock-time economic activity (whether domestic or trans-border), globalism is the reification of this process of globalisation as some meta-historical force that develops outside of human agency, conditioning and limiting the scope of action of individuals and collectivities alike, be they nation-state or local group. Globalism as an ideology adds a belief in the inescapability of the transnationalisation of economic and financial flows to the existing credos of neo-liberalism, namely the belief in the efficiency of free competitive markets and the belief that this efficiency will maximise benefit for the greatest number of people in the long run (Hoogvelt, 2001:155).

Thus, it should be noted that in the case of our thesis, our criticism of globalisation as a concept and process is directed toward globalism as ideology, particularly its unitary, imposed and universalist neo-liberal form.

2.2 Modernisation versus modernity

Guttmann (1991:189) suggests that the concept of modernisation gives a better explanation of the globalisation process. It is preferable because it also implies something about the nature of the global transformation or trans-societal development as indicated by Maguire (1999:15). Robertson (1992:53) states that globalisation is intimately related to modernity and modernisation. Following the same line Giddens (1990) suggests that:

changes in means of communication and production have altered understandings of territorial space and chronological time...Such compression of the social environment makes modernity “inherently globalising”.

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On the one hand, King (1995) argues that "modern" and especially "modernism" "modernity" and "modernist", are terms and concepts particularly used in the humanities to refer to particular movement and tendencies in the arts, principally in Europe and the USA and with little reference to the world system as a whole. Doherty et al et.al. (1992:6) present modernisation as the economic, social, (including political) and technological innovations and development associated with western society over the past 400 years, that coincided with rise of capitalism. Moreover, modernity is used to refer to the transformed nature of life under capitalism in relation to the process of nineteenth and twentieth century urbanisation, which gave rise to the major cities and metropolitan centres of Europe and North America. According to Maguire (1999:15) the modernisation thesis is closely linked to functionalism. It is concerned with how traditional societies reach modernity, through the development of political institutions that support participatory decision making, the growth and development of secular and rationalist ideologies. It is concerned also with division of labour, the use of management strategies and finally technological innovations and commercial activities. Following the same idea, Gruneau (1988:11) writes that the main features of modernisation are:

a) Industrialisation, which is seen as a key strategy in the modernisation of western societies, which incorporates the emergence of new forms of technology in production that lead to increased complexity and specialisation in the division of labour. Industrialisation is also seen to promote the beginnings of greater centralisation of economic and administrative functions in towns as well as the demographic composition of pre-industrial societies. As a result of industrialisation, new individualist philosophies have emerged, based on the free market and individual freedoms. The latter includes rights to own property, freedom of speech and freedom of representation.

b) Capitalism which is seen as the major transformative force shaping the modern world,

c) The extension of the rational scepticism which resulted from the use of science and experimentation to understand analyse and control nature. Also the acceptance of the idea that knowledge is a representation of reality.
d) Secularism, which designates a tendency towards necessary and universal (scientific) objectivity and critical reason.

Furthermore, Giddens associates modernity with a time period and with initial geographical locations, “modernity refers to modes of social life organisation, which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century” (1990: 1). The same author incorporates in his definition concerning conditions of modernity (which is a concept often used critically in respect of the modernisation thesis) other moral dimensions to modernity that are neglected by the above authors. The following moral dimensions are: first, an increasing of surveillance and social supervision, which may be direct (prisons, schools and work places) or indirect (based on the control of information); second, military power or control of the means of violence and, finally, the industrialisation of war, which has radically changed the character of warfare (1990:59). Giddens conceives capitalism, particularly the capitalist production and nation-state system, as one of the most important institutional elements of modernity promoting the acceleration and expansion of modern institutions (1990:62). The nation-state system has been explained by the same author as the concentration of administrative power, which has allowed even quite small states to mobilise social and economic resources beyond those available to pre-modern systems.

In a manner similar to his treatment of modernity, globalisation was given by Giddens (1990) four dimensions. The nation-state system can be seen as one of the most important elements. The internationalisation of modern values has led to the emergence of modern and sovereign nation-states, defined by Giddens (1990:66) as separate entities, having more or less complete administrative control within their borders, which is recognised by other states. The second dimension is capitalism. Giddens (1990:72) maintains that the main centres of power in the world economy are capitalist states. These are the principal “actors” within the global political order, which work with Trans National Corporations (TNC) as “the dominant agents” within the world economy. This last point will be explained more fully in the next section, which concerns negative aspects of the globalisation process.
The third dimension is related to the commodification of labour power. It includes the separation of workers from controlling the means of production, and is based, according to Wright (1999:17), on low paid, flexible labour relations and new international marketing strategies. This situation has contributed to the acceleration of the centralisation and concentration of capital, resulting in extreme wealth and income disparities world-wide. The last dimension is concerned with world military order resulting from the industrialisation of war. It incorporates the flow of weaponry and techniques of military organisation and the alliance between states e.g. NATO

2.2.1 Modernity and ‘the West’

Is modernity exclusively a Western project? According to King (1995:111) the term “modernity” has become unproblematically associated with “the west”. It represents the countries and regions that are already well situated as noted by Edoho, in a reconfigured global economy, countries which have control over or access to, technology, markets and capital (1997:5). The ‘other’ or the ‘traditional rest’ are not part of the modern, owing to their inability to generate or access technology. This inability diminishes their status in the new world order. Eisenstadt (1966, quoted in Kiely and Marfleet, 1998:28), in a manner similar to Giddens (1990) defines modernity and development as “the process of change toward those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America”.

Therefore, development or modernity is to be achieved primarily through economic growth, but most importantly by the adoption of western values that represent the “norm” which needs to be followed. Those values, as mentioned earlier, include capitalism, industrialisation, rationalisation and secularism.

Following the criticism of Keily and Marfleet (1998:7) concerning modernity and the uneven relationship between developed and developing countries, development cannot only be a case of the rest becoming like the west. We can no longer take the historical experience of the west as a model for the historical experience of all peoples.
Chapter 2 Globalisation and Sport, between Modernity and Postmodernity

(Preston, 2000). Western theories of modernity, development and the civilising process could be conceived as theories that have been used by imperialist forces as an argument for their policy of colonisation. This policy was based on the idea that in order for the 'rest' to emulate 'the west', it has to be colonised, politically, economically and culturally (i.e. to be 'taught' the political, cultural and economic lessons of 'modernity').

It could be argued from the discussion above that the globalisation process is concerned with diffusion of the values of modernity from some part of the world ('the west') to the other ('the rest').

2.3 Globalisation, hegemony and cultural imperialism

Hamelink (1983:3) quoted in Houlihan (1994a) states that globalisation results in hegemonization, or cultural synchronisation. Following the same line of argument Houlihan (1994:360) claims that,

...more recently there has been a greater concern to analyse systematically the impact of global culture in particular to establish whether there is evidence to sustain claims of global cultural hegemonisation ...whether globalisation is a more participative process where negotiation and accommodation are possible.

Thus, to better understand the relationship of globalisation to cultural homogenisation we need first to understand the significance of hegemony as theory and process.

2.3.1 'Hegemony' theory

Gruneau (1988) defines hegemony as:
The whole range of processes through which dominant social groups extend their "influence" or "authority" to institutionalised modes of practice and belief. The objective of this is to win consent for the system and structure of social relations which sustain the dominant policy.

In other words, hegemony theories explain how dominant groups within society or, in the case of the globalisation process, between societies, are able to maintain their advantaged position over subordinate groups. A key feature of such a hegemonic system is that the dominant groups possess and/or control a greater share of the resources and subordinate groups (as Morgan, 1994:321 identifies) neither possess nor have access to such social life shaping resources. The superiority of dominant groups in such case becomes part of the natural (accepted) order, sometimes represented as 'God' given destiny. "We [the West] because we have the power (industrial, technological, military, moral) and they [other nations, or cultures] don't, because of which they are not dominant; they are inferior [subjects in imperial colonial discourse], we are superior" (Said, 1994:127). Therefore the colonial conquest or what early ethnographers and colonial novelists refer to as civilisational mission is a legitimate and a logical result of dominance. For this reason, between dominant and subordinate groups, it is more appropriate to refer to a power relationship or manipulation than to refer to negotiation. Dominant groups, classes or nations [the west], are exercising power to get what they want and make sure that their particular interests are being served, even if the other [subordinate groups or the rest] show some sort of resistance. Morgan (1997: 192) goes as far as to say that:

... There is no possibility that dominant groups act against their own self-interests and bargain from a position of weakness rather than strength.

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1 For more discussion on orientalism approach, and discourse analysis of British and French colonial novels see Edward Said's (1994) and Sardar (1999).
In the same vein, Chitour points out that the tendency today, under American hegemony or Pax America (major controller of information industry and technology), is to push other nations and cultures (as part of natural order) to adopt a common language, norms of telecommunications, security and quality. Put in other terms, a common set of (American) values. (Chems Eddine Chitour, Quotidien D'Oran, 28.12.2001, translated from French). On the other hand, in relation to the globalisation and hegemony debates Hall, from a Gramscian perspective, points out that the global is the self-presentation of the dominant particular. It is a way in which the dominant particular localises and naturalises itself and associates with a variety of other minorities, and is characterised by the same author as being “the universalising aspect, the universalising project, or the universalising hope to be universal” (1991:68).

Although, it needs to be noted that hegemony theory, as explained above, has been criticised as being a unidirectional ideology that marginalises the others, nevertheless Morgan (1997:192) claims that,

...If dominant groups held all the cards, controlled all the relevant resources, then there would be no reason for them to negotiate with other groups ...So from that fact that both groups are negotiating with one another...we can argue that no one has total control over the other.

If 'total' domination does not exist out there, despite simplistic, journalistic claims, the question to be asked is: whether subordinate groups reverse hegemonic forces?

According to Gruneau (1988:26), arguing from a neo-Marxist perspective, in unequal and capitalist societies, subordinate groups always negotiate from a disadvantaged position. Consequently, as Morgan (1994: 192) argues, it is a mistake to treat such parties as major players in that hegemony. They can do little more than oppose an existing hegemony and maintain what Hall (1991, quoted in Houlihan 1994a: 360), terms a superficial heterogeneity or resistance. Ultimately, it can be argued that globalisation or hegemony is synonymous with or, according to Houlihan (1994b), a conceptual extension of a longer established notion of cultural imperialism.
2.3.2 The 'cultural imperialism' perspective

Terms like cultural dependency or electronic colonialism (Hesmondhalgh, 1998:164) have been used to define the new form of international domination and uni-directional (top-down) cultural flows. Those flows are, it is argued, coming exclusively from 'the rich', 'the centre' or 'the west' where industrial and financial capitals are concentrated (Abou-El-Haj, 1991:140), to the periphery or less developed countries where they are not. Hesmondhalgh (1998:164) suggests that this new form of imperialism is different from direct political and economic domination by colonial powers. It is based on a more indirect form of power mainly cultural, which aims to affect the cultural strengths of less developed countries. One noticeable example of cultural imperialism is the huge success of fast food franchises such as McDonald's, what Ritzer (1993) and Featherstone (1995) refer to as 'McDonaldisation', the process by which principles of the fast food restaurant [along with other “American” products namely the Marlboro man, Coca-Cola, Hollywood, rock and rap music, NBA and American football, even Halloween], are coming to dominate more and more sectors of the rest of the world (Featherstone, 1995:8). Featherstone argues that the burger is not only consumed physically as material substance, but it is consumed culturally as an image and an icon of a particular “American” way of life. The Lion King, Jurassic Park and Titanic, for Chitour (2001) are not only movies, but real machines used in commercialising (American) food, music, clothes and toys\(^2\).

This new form of international domination can also be found in modern sport. Guttmann (1993a: 133) claims that:

> Despite a conscious effort to make IOC truly international, all but one of its six presidents has been a European, and the sixth was American....The Olympic programme remains essentially western. African and Asian athletes

\(^2\) According to Chitour America is spending around 200 million dollars for publicity. Selling American products is selling America, its popular culture, and its supposed prosperity.
compete on Western terms, in sports that either originated in or have taken their modern form in the West.

The same sort of strong feeling was expressed by Brohm in his approach to the ‘new imperialism’ of modern sport, or what he considers as “la barbarie sportive” or the authoritarian sportification of the world.

Today football taken by this irresistible wave \[\text{[liberalism]}\] tends also not only to colonise all countries, one by one, but also to supplant traditional corporeal practices, popular sports and ancestral games. Therefore we need to consider [football] as a political and ideological superstructure of advanced capitalism, at the same level as multinationals, stock markets, banks, trusts, cartels, media networks, competitive life style...the political economy of football, far from being <<un jeu d'êquipe>> or a <<convivial fête>> is all the way a capitalist political economy. It participates integrally in the dynamic of imperialist-capitalism, particularly with its ideological dynamic of merciless competitive incitation. (Brohm, 1998:68)

Nonetheless, the views expressed above represent one side (albeit of a fundamental line) in the discussion about globalisation and cultural imperialism. Houlihan (1994b: 178) suggests that the concept of globalisation is too complex to be reduced to an unidirectional process. Elsewhere Guttmann (1994b: 179) points out that: “Cultural interaction is something more complex than the domination by the totally powerful of the entirely powerless”.

The major critics of cultural imperialism have been concerned, firstly with the concept itself. Hall (1990:18, quoted in Houlihan, 1994b: 180) prefers speaking about cultural manipulation rather than imperialism. He states that: “Globalisation does not equate with the destruction and replacement of local cultures, rather, it is manipulation of local culture”.
Secondly, cultural imperialism accounts have been accused of paying insufficient attention to audience reception (Hesmondhalgh, 1998:166), in other words, audiences' abilities to negotiate the meaning of images or texts and make them to some extent their own. This kind of response to globalisation was named by Shelling (1998:142) 'deterritorialisation' which refers to: "the ways in which cultural forms and identities have migrated as a result of globalisation from their original place and reconstituted themselves in new contexts as diasporic forms".

Examples of local response/resistance to globalisation or "creolisation" and "corrupt metaphor" (Hannerz: 1991), can be found in music e.g. West African music represented by Youssou N'Dour or that of Algerian music represented by Mami and Khaled, Mussafateh alikhan (Pakistan) and Zouk music from Kasave. All those well-known kinds of world music were adapted to the new technological development, but their domestic or original rhythm has not been totally transformed. Abu-Lughod (1991:133) goes a step further in her argument concerning what she called "the orientalization of western music", what she also considers as de-localisation (a bottom-up approach toward globalisation). She goes on to state that,

I see more movement from the periphery to the centre than most people do. Listen to popular music in the States these days and you'll pick up third word influences; walk down the streets of New York and you'll see third world culture imported and affecting Americans.

For Edward Said (1998:261), because culture is the history of cultural borrowing from both directions, core and periphery, it is more suitable to refer to culture as a

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1 For Edouard Glissant the term criolisation is different from that of 'métissage'. Métissage is a racial, artistic, and an esthetic mixture. In contrast to métissage which is in a way mechanic and predictable, créolisation is a mixture of cultures that produces the unpredictable. Nobody could predict the result of créolisation (see Figaro, Saturday 27-Sunday 28, July 2002).

4 He uses in his approach to the west and cultural imperialism a more 'secular' (pluralist) analysis of human history, including that of imperialism that takes into consideration both the colonial and the colonized.
human and universal heritage, which is not under the monopoly and domination of any nation or civilisation.

...cultures are not impermeable; just as western science borrowed from Arabs, had borrowed from India and Greece. Culture is never just a matter of ownership, of borrowing and lending with absolute debtors and creditors, but rather of appropriation, common experiences, and interdependences of all kinds among different cultures. This is a universal norm.

Holton prefers using the term 'hybridisation' while talking about global and local culture, which he regards as one way of describing the 'indigenisation' of western style in non-western settings and the fusion of non-western influences into western cultures. Holton's approach emphasises cross-cultural borrowings and inter-cultural fusion and blending to create hybridised or mixed cultural forms

All this somehow occurs in a world where Coca-Colonisation or global capitalism is an ever-present, but not all determining force, and where nationalism, ethnicity, or some other kind of quasi-tribal affiliation is not the exclusive source of cultural identity. (Holton, 1998:179).

2.4 Globalisation, nation-state and postmodernity

2.4.1 Nation-state debate

There has been considerable debate between sociologists, economists and political commentators concerning the role and definition of nation-state in the New World system. Given the history of the nation-state, Wallerstein (1991) claims that the so-called nation-states are a relatively recent creation. He states that

A world consisting of these nation-states came into existence even partially only in the sixteenth century. Such a world was theorised and became a matter
of widespread consciousness even later, only in the nineteenth century. It became inescapably universal phenomenon later still, in fact only after 1945. (Wallerstein 1991:92)

However, it is necessary to distinguish between the concepts that compose the term nation-state. Bauman (1998:60) like Giddens (1990:73) defines the state from the Weberian approach as an agency claiming the legitimate right to violence and boasting sufficient resources. The latter include administrative and hierarchical organisation. The role of the state is to set up and enforce the rules and norms binding the running of affairs within certain “recognised” territory [i.e. recognised by other states and by supra-national organisations such as the United Nations]. The other conditions of the state are concerned first with possessing proper laws, taxes, school system, currency, and civil service, as well as police and armed forces, and secondly, with a strategic geopolitical involvement with other states and most importantly an economic and cultural foundation. According to Gruneau (1982:6), the principal role of the state consists of the embodiment in the collective values and interests of the people of any given society. Yet still, the conception of collective values and interests changes in relation to the ideology on which the concept of the state has been built.

As reported by Gruneau and from the perspective of western Marxists and from the east European socialist states, the role of the state in liberal democracy is limited to the embodiment of the values and interests of the ruling class. From the perspective of liberal democrats, socialist states are seen as simply protecting the interests of bureaucratic elites. Because the globalisation process is more concerned with liberal capitalist values, it could be argued that the role of the state within globalisation (due to the impact of financial markets) embodies only some values and interests; the interests of international organisations, known as supra-state and trans-national companies. Those groups are in a position to impose their interests upon the others (Gruneau, 1982:8). This point is discussed further below.

The second part of the composed term nation-state that needs to be defined is ‘nation’. Nations are formed by groups of people united by a common sense of belonging to the
same culture, history, language, race and religion. A state or nation is a nation-state, if the bond of nationalism, cited earlier, coincides with boundaries of the state. Some groups according to James Paul (1996), claiming to be nations have states like the French, Dutch, Iranian or German states, others may want statehood but do not have it e.g. Chechnya, Kurdistan, Kashmir, Tibet. Some nations are larger geographically than one state, for example the “Arab nation” incorporates more than a dozen states. The other important dimension that characterises nation-state and differentiates it from other forms of “imagined communities” throughout the history is sovereignty. The sovereignty of any nation-state depends on its ability to defend effectively the territory or borders against any kind of challenges, both from inside and outside. It depends also on its ability to protect the state’s cultural ‘distinctiveness’ through a powerful and distinctive identity.

This raises the question of whether sovereignty in the global system could be considered to be a ‘myth’?

Giddens (1998) suggests that “the end of the bipolar era, together with the impact of globalisation have radically altered the nature of sovereignty”. The nation-state faces serious challenges as a result of globalisation processes and the increase in the interconnectedness between governments, people and cultures as a consequence of the dramatically changed political, economic and social environment. On the one hand, “well established nation-states”, such as Canada, Belgium, Spain, Italy are facing what was referred to as separatist claims (Delbrück, 1994). For example, Catalonia in Spain, Wales and Scotland in Britain, and Quebec in Canada have revived or recognised officially their languages, set up their own parliaments or political assembly and claimed a unique political, cultural and economic status. Secondly, the other kind of pressure presenting a challenge to the above well-established nations is the world process of migration. Millions of people are on the move because of ethnic, religious and political conflicts (Delbrück, 1994:16), as well as for economic or cultural resources which has led according to Maguire (1993:311), to the formation of ethnic enclaves within the total national culture of any one nation-state. This movement has produced what Delbrück calls a “denationalisation process”, which
has made the meaning of borders literally and geographically less significant. Featherstone (1995) points out that:

More people are living between cultures, or on the borderlines, and European and other nation-states, which formerly sought to construct such exclusive sense of national identity, more recently have had to deal with the fact that they are multicultural societies as the "rest" have returned to the west in the post 1945 era. (Featherstone, 1995:10).

On the other hand, states are under external pressure, coming from "above" particularly from larger entities and supra-states like the EU, IMF or NAFTA as well as from trans-national companies⁵ (James Paul, 1996). This situation has led the former to cede some of their sovereignty, authority and power to the latter. Giddens (1998:140) points out that:

At the turn of the present century, for example, there were some twenty international governmental organisations and 180 transnational non-governmental organisation; today there are over 300 of the former and nearly 5000 of the latter.

The kind of economic pressure referred to in the last paragraph, is not only felt in the countries of the semi-periphery or periphery. It affects also the core or centre.

First world governments find themselves very restricted both in their power over their own economies (tariffs are often counter productive, encouraging multinationals to move still more jobs abroad) and in their ability to regulate the world market (boycotts and embargoes have only limited success). (Buell, 1994:117)

⁵ Described by Chitour (2001) as “post-national”, also as “anti-nationals”.
According to such accounts, the role of nation-states has become then a simple agent for mega companies, firms that produce and sell goods and services in more than one country. Such firms, also called transnationals, locate themselves in more than one country in order to achieve larger profits (lower costs, cheap labour, lower tax payments). Transnational companies are considered to be the new masters of the world, determining the economic policies of national governments and international financial markets.

Fifty percent of the largest economies in the world today are corporations rather than countries. For example, according to James Paul (1996), in 1995, General Motors had corporate sales greater than the economies of one hundred and sixty one countries. Ralston (1999) adds that five firms control fifty percent of the global market in different kinds of industries, namely, electronics, aerospace, automobile, airlines and steel.

Dean (1998) goes one step further in his argument by claiming that

Globalisation within the neo-liberal agenda is pointing to a new ultra minimalist role for the nation-state: as simply guarantor of debt repayment, of contact enforcement and of social control within agreed territorial boundaries.

According to Chitour (2002) under the rule of the ‘new masters’ of the world (multinationals), administrators, bank managers, movie directors, show-biz celebrities, athletes and politicians, constitute a new race of men and women whose religious, ethnic or cultural belongings become marginal; where their identity is above all professional.

Giddens (1990) has criticised the views of the above authors. He suggests that they underestimate the degree of sovereign autonomy of the nation-state. Armstrong (1998) claims that while the globalisation concept has undoubtedly identified processes and phenomena that clearly exist, it frequently exaggerates their effects, and
the severity of its impact is highly questionable. Armstrong prefers speaking about international society rather than globalisation processes when referring to the increase of global flows and interactions between nation-states. Within the international society the state is considered as an important social actor, where between states we speak more about negotiation and socialization rather than power and control. He suggests that many of the policies of deregulation, privatisation and opening up of markets were not a result of the globalisation process as argued by global theorists but a result of inter-subjective exchanges about the meaning of statehood in the modern era.

The state should be seen in its international context as a social as well as self seeking entity, with its membership of international society helping to confirm and preserve its identity as a state, while also shaping and changing it. (Armstrong, 1998: 463)

Elsewhere, Spybey (1996) recognises the power of the giant multi-national companies, but at the same time argues that this power has failed to challenge that of the nation-state. Thus total control by TNCs could be applied only in economically weak, corrupt and less developed countries, while in developed or more established nation-states the trans-national corporations according to Spybey “need the nation-state to provide a network of political systems against which they can play their matrices of mass production” (Spybey, 1996: 64). Consequently, the core or the centre is not concerned by the debate, which was reported earlier, concerning loss of nation-state power and authority in the face of the global economy.

2.4.2 Nation-state and ‘world culture’

The second issue that we should discuss in relation to nation-state and globalisation debates is the impact of the world/global system on the cultural boundaries of nation-states. To an extent never experienced before, with the speed of information, the world has become submerged by a “singular” culture. The development of technology (e.g. the internet) has increased global interconnectedness and made geography,
places and borders relatively unimportant (Dean, 1998). The English language could be seen as one example of this singular culture.

The English language is now undisputed as the one and the only international language...The English language has impacted on every other language in the world, and completely dominates the vocabulary of commerce and technology in particular. (Dean, 1998:7)

Wallerstein (1991) has given two explanations concerning the diffusion of what he terms world culture. First, with the aid of science and technology, distinct and distinctive groups over time are becoming close, creating one political, economic and cultural world. The second explanation is that the development of those distinct and distinctive groups or societies is taking parallel rout. This leads to the creation of a single human society, "we end up with a single human society and therefore necessarily with a world culture". (Wallerstein, 1991:93)

Hannerz (1991) speaks also about two possible scenarios of what he calls cultural flows or global homogenisation. The first scenario is saturation; it is operating according to Hannerz (1991:122) continuously. It makes the peripheral culture step by step assimilate more and more of the imported meanings and forms, becoming indistinguishable from the centre. The second version of the global diffusion of culture is concerned with a tendency to maturation. The periphery in this situation takes its time transforming or adapting metropolitan culture to its own specification. Hannerz (1991) explains this process as the cultural corruption scenario where the metropolitan or the centre's cultural forms imported in the first phase will no longer be recognised.

Local cultural entrepreneurs have gradually mastered the alien culture forms which reach them through the trans-national commodity flow and in other ways, taking them apart, tempering and tinkering with them in such a way that the resulting new forms are more responsive to, and at
the same time in part outgrowth of, local everyday life.  
(Hannerz, 1991: 124)

The views reported above, concerning the linear tendency towards one world culture and global homogenisation, have been heavily criticised for their disregard of the sovereign autonomy of the nation-state and cultural boundaries or distinctiveness. Wallerstein (1991) starts his criticism by asking for a redefinition of boundaries within the world system, which were arbitrarily designed. This can be applied also to the concept of world culture, the meaning of which is not universally shared. He continues his criticism by stating that

In a sense, the history of world culture has been the very opposite of a trend towards cultural homogenisation, it has rather been a trend toward cultural differentiation, cultural elaboration, or cultural complexity.  
(Wallerstein, 1991: 94)

The theory of global and world culture thus needs, according to Abu-Laghod (1991: 135), to develop much more tolerance and acceptance of the world views and way of life of the other. The ‘other’ or the ‘margins’ who in Hall’s term have been the initiators of the most profound cultural revolution, “which has come about as a consequence of the margins coming into representation – in art, painting, in film, in music, in literature...and in social life generally” (1991: 34). Understanding globalisation in postmodern and pluralist terms, in opposition to modernity and neoliberalism, may open the door for more recognition of the ‘margins’.

2.4.3 Postmodernity and postmodernism

Before starting the debate about postmodernity, social science and national identity discourses, it might be necessary first of all to distinguish between the concepts of postmodernity and postmodernism. Postmodernity is said to describe a pervasive, cultural condition making a new epoch in human affairs (Doherty et al, 1992: 11). It is another phase in the development of modernism that has emerged like modernity in
western societies, initially in the domain of art and architecture, and which continues today. Postmodernism is argued to be more problematic, it could be interpreted as a cultural logic of the consumer stage of capitalism. It comprises,

...new kinds of trans-national business, new international division of labour, new kinds of international banking and stock exchanges, new type of media interrelations and forms of transportation, computerisation and automation, the flight of production to the ‘third World’, the crisis of organised labour, gentrification on a global level, obsolescence of the nation-state...(Jameson, 1991 in Leitch, 1996).

It is another style of theorising, for particular modes of understanding based upon post-modern assumptions, translated into social science discourse. It rejects modernism and both the feasibility and the desirability of the modernist project, challenging the search for truth, denying progress and brings modernism to an end (Doherty et al, 1992:11). It is according to Leitch (1996) a philosophy that recognises the meaning of “difference”, a theory in the view of Hutcheon (1989) opposed to humanism’s oppressive unity; homogeneity, totalization, universalism and centricity. It focuses on the revision of concepts like progress, liberty, equality, justice, reason and rationality and the most important, the reinterpretation of knowledge itself (Doherty et al, 1992:16). Its emphasis is also, as argued by Featherstone (1995: 80), placed upon a more complex combination of difference, local diversities and otherness, the voices that were ignored or suppressed in the unified models of globalisation and world-system processes. Postmodernism is a theory where third world or peripheral countries are at least more potentially equally represented than in modernisation accounts.

Put in other terms, the main objective of post-modernism is restructuring the world system and enhancing the awareness of national cultural identity and self-determination. It is concerned also, with the acknowledging of the end of the cultural monopoly of the west, that the west is one “other” among others [Ricoeur, (1965:278 Buell, 1994:325)]. Postmodernism, Featherstone (1995:88) reminds as, is to be
regarded as 'the end of history'\(^6\), or the end of the western awareness of history as a unitary process. This suggests that there is no unitary (western) privileged history, but only different histories. The non-occidental or non-western countries have used postmodernism as a means of claiming, even before the 1960s, an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist revolution. This leads to the argument that peripheral cultures have in some way "already been post-modern". This was possible according to Buell (1994:327) as result of the globalisation process that impacts simultaneously on the core and periphery.

Again, this approach to post-modernism has been contested by King (1991:149) suggesting that current conceptualisations such as those offered by theories of globalisation, the world system theory perspective, post-modernism, post-colonialism, post-imperialism are all coming from "the west". Elsewhere, Buell (1994:337), following Jameson (1984), suggests that first world postmodernism is different from that of satellite post-modernism. The former reflects the fact that everything has finally been modernised; it reaches what Giddens (1998) calls the stage of saturation. The latter thrives on incomplete modernisation, which is coming, as previously reported by King, from the 'west'.

Other criticisms of postmodernism came from Doherty et al (1992) who claim that the ambivalence or uncertainty of postmodernism arises from the difficulties involved in conceptualising "post-modern social science". Postmodernism was accused by the same authors, of simply opening minds to paradoxes without resolution. One of those paradoxes is concerned with fragmentation. Postmodernist sociologists argued that postmodernism appeals to fragmented and contradictory subjectivity, which allows in the case of economics, for example, multi-methods or plural types of approaches at the level of theory, when compared with "the unitary choice of technique" presented by modernist economics (Doherty et al, 1992:200). The same authors maintain that fragmentation is a feature of modernism. Within the social sciences positivism has led to increasing specialisation and division between the various disciplines and the

\(^6\) Not as advocated by Fukuyama (1992), who preaches 'western liberal supremacy'.

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emerging of different sciences. The second paradox is related to the historical periodisation. Concerning this point, the questions that need to be asked are the following: could postmodernism be considered as an other stage of modernism? In other terms, is it an era that comes after modernism (following the fulfilment of modernity conditions) or is it an independent period, completely different from that of modernism (a break with modernism)? Postmodernist sociologists in a way have failed to give a clear and persuasive answer to the above questions. According to Doherty et al (1992), there is not an exclusively post-modern social science. There are many varieties of modernism and versions of postmodernism. Postmodernism might be conceived of as being both part of/ and after modernism (1992:204). Regarding this point Nishitani Osamu in his thesis on a postcolonial approach toward the concept of the ‘End of History’ argues that “an anti-modern attitude is, a fortiori, an attitude already modern in a sense that is a reaction toward modernity...” (1997: 37, translated from French).

Last but not least, linked to the grand narrative paradox, Doherty et al suggest that postmodernism is an anti-intellectual project that denies the possibility of truth. They regard it as contradictory, superficial and entertaining, toying with light, colours or words (1992:209). Elsewhere Morgan (1998, in Rail, G. 1998: 302) accuses postmodernism of being anarchist, radical and individualist, leading to “self enclosed” cultural narratives, which cannot prevent heroic resistance against aggressor nations from turning into horrific violence against non-aggressors.

However, despite the paradoxes and ambiguities surrounding postmodernism, and given that postmodernism represents a cultural condition of “western societies” (Doherty et al, 1992:5), it is still one of the few western cultural movements which is based upon ‘difference’ and pluralism. It is critically local, denying the uniformity and universalism of the modernist project, against the historical geography as set by western hegemony. Akbar prefers talking about postmodernism,

“not as an intellectual concept, and academic discussion remote from actual life in literary salons, but as an historic phase of human history offering
possibilities not available before to such large numbers; a phase that holds the possibility of bringing diverse people and cultures closer together than ever before” (1992:28).

The main question that needs to be asked in relation to our study is how global postmodernism, which takes into account the histories and local diversities of the periphery, could challenge the global modernism of the west? Hall (1991:33) proposed two scenarios for global post-modernism that the periphery can adopt to challenge that of global modernism. The first is increasingly defensive, retracting back to nationalism and national cultural identity in a highly defensive way by trying to build barriers against cultural flows coming from the centre. It aims at maintaining differences from the other at all costs, with the risk of transforming the meaning of resistance to that of ‘sectarianism’, ‘racism’ and ‘fundamentalism’. Difference, in this scenario is made the basis of the identity of the community, the ‘others’ become its constant frame of reference, exemplified by the many Canadians who ask how they differ from the Americans and how best they can preserve these differences. Quebec nationalists ask the same question about themselves and the rest of Canada (Parekh, 1994:503). The second scenario that periphery can adapt is that of trying to live with global modernism, and at the same time, organising resistance and incorporating difference. The difference is important, but it is ontologically secondary and derivative (Parekh, 1994:503). The risk with this strategy may be concerned with losing the meaning of resistance, or in the words of Wallerstein (1991:101) depriving cultural resistance of its raison d’être, resistance.

It can be concluded that the increase of global interconnectedness and of world market power has led to the decline in faith in the economic and political arenas as the principal sources of social progress (King, 1991). In this situation, ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ could be used as a means to help satellite countries to challenge the one-sided cultural monopoly of the core. Moreover, the extent to which the states organise and maintain cultural resistance depends on significant material conditions, and this is only made possible through their incorporation of technology, organisational forms, and modes of expression coming from the west.
Hannerz (1991:121) claims that,

The performance of the state in managing cultural flows depends in some significant part on material conditions. The soft state is often an impoverished state which may ill afford to maintain a powerful cultural apparatus.

From the above discussions of postmodernism a number of questions may be raised in respect of the research focus of this thesis.

1. What role could the Algerian state play in the new world system resulting from the globalisation process? Is it a role of negotiation and assimilation of global flows with the risk of depriving cultural distinctiveness or identity of its real meaning? Or is it that of cultural confrontation and resistance, with the risk of failing due to the lack of material conditions needed for performance in managing resistance toward cultural flows from the core?

2. Has Algeria managed to impose or build a restrictive and particularistic project of modernity and has it been able to protect itself against universalistic challenges?

3. Does the Algerian state possess the conditions namely technology, organisational forms, and modes of expression, to allow the maintaining of a powerful cultural apparatus?

4. Can the professionalisation project of the Algerian government in relation to sport be seen as an indication of the claim that the Algerian state is adopting more the first role which is that of assimilation than the second, which is concerned with 'resistance'?

5. Are there any other forms or methods of resistance, different from those cited above, that peripheral states could adopt to resist either the one sided global process leading to homogenisation, or the "hyper-localism" which rejects 'western' or globalised influences?
In the last section of our debate on globalisation we will look at different alternatives to both western authoritarian, universalist and centrist conceptions of modernity, and western pluralist but ambivalent and uncertain modes of theorising particular forms of understanding, and the response of some non-western scholars to that ambivalence.

2.4.4 The concept of 'local modernity'

Today, there are a number of intellectuals, artists and sociologists who share the same desire of searching for new cultural references from the ‘ignored’ past, in order to build what is named by Göle, (1997:41) a “critical transformation” of the non-occidental countries, and giving a new vision and essence to the pre-established concepts of ‘western’ enlightenment project of modernity, which can help to gain an 'intellectual freedom' from the dominant “pensée” of the occident. Göle (1997) defines this mode of thinking as a ‘local modernity’ approach. Compared to western modernity based on an “assimilation” and occidental tradition of social analysis, privileged by the indigenous ‘western’ intellectuals, the local modernity approach seeks a more exclusive (localist, non-western) and pluralist reflection of modernity. It involves a movement from a universalist conceptualisation to that of a particularistic conceptualisation, using a new type of “intellectual sensibility”, which focuses upon the rereading of modernity according to the historical practice of the non-occidental countries. This return toward local modernity could be viewed as an attempt of deconnection both theoretically and intellectually from the occident, what Lyotard (1984) defines as a process of de-universalisation of western meta-narratives, and which also requires their de-normalization and de-cosmopolitization.

However, it is worth noting that using what is named a ‘localist’ approach may present some risks. The first one is ideological; it is all important to distinguish here between an accepted (humanist) ‘localism’ that calls for critical transformation and ‘provincialism’ that in the name of combating global hegemony seeks to present local

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7 The struggle for modernity was essentially a fight against foreign, colonial or imperial domination, and not against an internal enemy (Ghalioun, 2000), which for western societies was religious despotism.
culture as a superior product, basing its hypothesis on the incommensurability of cultural specificity (Amin, 1988). A hyper localist and ethnocentric approach that aims at championing the local against the global, place against space, the indigenous against the universal (Smith, 1992:64, cited in Doherty et al 1992), could result in the emergence of all sorts or racist, xenophobic ideologies and violence. The other problem that we could face while studying local modernity concerns our definition of 'local'. According to Featherstone locality presents an oversimplified unified image of itself to outsiders, “this does not mean that inside the locality social differentiation has been eliminated, and relationships are necessarily more egalitarian, simple and homogeneous” (1995:10). Internally we may be able to detect all sorts of internal differences that can incorporate all types of rivalries, independences, power struggles and conflicts. In Hall’s perspective “the notion that identity has to do with people that look the same, feel the same, call themselves the same, is nonsense (1991: 49). Because “identity” does not necessarily imply ontologically given and eternally determined stability, or uniqueness, or irreducible character, or privileged status as something total and complete in and of itself (Said, 1994: 382), therefore research on Algerian society in general, and research on the government project for professional sport, in particular, needs to take into consideration all those types of differences that could emerge as a result of differences of interests, values and power relations.

The other point that we should consider is in line with Featherstone’s approach:

It is not the isolation of the nation which is the crucial factor in developing an image of itself as a unique and integrated national culture. Rather, it is the need to mobilise a particular representation of national identity, as a part of the series of unavoidable contacts, interdependencies and power struggles which nation-states become locked into with their significant others (1995:112)

Thus, in our rethinking of modernity that takes into account the histories, the social practices and subjectivity of the occident and the non-occident, we have also to acknowledge the relationships terms, such as dominance and independence (or at
least that of interconnectedness), between west/non-west, occident/non-occident. Building from this, the study of a non-occidental society like Algeria, which aspires to attain certain aspects of ‘modernity’, could not be analysed separately from the occidental history of modernity. The most crucial reason of this interdependency, put forward by Göle, Said and others, is history:

the imposed or “voluntarist” modernisation of colonisation had and still plays an important role in the “de-traditionalisation” or depersonalisation of the so-called traditional societies. (Göle, 1997: 42)

...we cannot discuss the non-western world as distinct from developments in the west. The ravages of colonial wars, the protracted conflicts between insurgent nationalism and anomalous imperialist control, the disputations new fundamentalist and nativist movements nourished by despair and anger, the extension of the world system over the developing world—theses circumstances are directly connected to actualities in the west. (Said, 1994: 394)

2.4.5 ‘Non-western’ postmodernism

Debate on non-western postmodernism according to Sardar\(^8\) (1998) is linked to two concepts: local authenticity and local autonomy. Both emphasise “indigenous” development, encouraging the means, language, beliefs and crafts of people - the very factors that give, from Sardar’s perspective, meaning, identity and richness to people’s lives. Non-western postmodernism aims at generating new forms of local production processes and products to satisfy local needs. The latter includes the transformation of traditions into cultures of resistance (toward western postmodernism). It does not mean isolating a culture from the outside world or shunning the benefits of modern society, but the ability and the power to make one’s own choices based on one’s cultural tradition (Sardar, 1998: 282). There are two dimensions of local autonomy:

\(^8\) Sardar was described by Akbar 1992 in his book on postmodernism and Islam as being part of the radical wing of Asian Muslim (English speakers) writers and scholars, whose works reflect the general Muslim sense of anger when referring to (imposed and colonial) westernisation and modernity.
Chapter 2  Globalisation and Sport, between Modernity and Postmodernism

1. An external dimension: which requires non-western societies to seek their economic and political development with an accent on local traditional cultures.

2. An internal dimension: which requires the nation-states to provide space and freedom for ethnic minorities within their boundaries, to realise their full cultural potential, to make their own choices and articulate their own cultural alternatives. It is different from that of the European notion of nation-state which, according to Sardar, promotes unique and dominating cultural homogeneity and a European definition of citizenship. In where the state presents itself as the owner of universal reason, particularly in the French case (and to a lesser extent in German and British terms), denying particularism (which is considered as illegitimate) even in the name of cultural diversity. For foreigners or ethnic minorities, access to the political arena could be possible only through assimilation (to laicité). Césari (1997) interpreted this as confusion between state and nation, which disqualified also, every specific identity in the cultural behaviour and life in the society. Sardar writes:

   What the white men did bring was the idea of the modern nation-state – a key component of democracy. The notion of the state with its impersonal institutions and emphasis on geographical boundaries was alien to African thought, it has led to a total dislocation and disruption of African societies. The imposition of the nation-state in Africa effected profound change by destroying the indigenous social fabric of villages and communities, chieftaincies and kinship. It replaced these organic structures with alienating state institutions such as bureaucracy, law courts, political parties, and of course the military. (Sardar, 1998:66, in italic added)

In non-western societies genuine heterogeneity of culture within communities and systems of governance, is an integral part of society. Therefore, the return to local identity should aim at the (re)discovery (deconstruction and reconstruction) of the

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9 In the post-independence era the vacuum left by the displaced political structures (provoked by colonial society) was filled by military and authoritarian regimes in most colonised countries, particularly in Africa.
means of stable plurality within communities and not through the (imposed) secularisation and acculturation of the society. It is not an argument for a conservative traditionalism but, instead, a means of sustaining ‘the values and axioms of a civilisation’ against the morality, relativism and, ultimately, the nihilism of post-modern western culture (see McGuigan’s 1999, reflection on Sardar’s thesis). It means also equal participation of all cultures in wealth and social opportunity, the encouragement of cross-cultural communication and the elimination of extremist positions and actions, what McGuigan refers to “as multiple dialogues between non-western cultures and with western culture” (1999:92).

Establishing cultural authenticity requires a change in the usage of meaningful content of the term “modernity”. Redefining it according to non-western terms and cultural frameworks, using traditional concepts and ideas as analytical tools, incorporating the knowledge of the past into the thought process and products of today presents similarities with the local modernity concept suggested by Göle (1998). This is a modernity interpreted not as a historical product of the sole occidental civilisation, but based on another mental attitude or manner of considering the past and present (Babes, 1997).

[We need...] a cultural definition of modernity that allows us to avoid the double trap of diachronic definition and that of a debate which opposes tradition to modernity in terms of breakdown. On the one side tradition is synonymous with religion, and on the other side, modernity is exempted or totally disconnected from religion. (Babes, 1997, translated from the French)

The other element should be the production of alternative imagery, modes of perceptions and information (local cinema, alternative TV production, news channels and literature). The Arab news channel El Jazeera (based in Qatar) could be seen as an example of what Sardar refers to as a non-western cultural resistance (to the hegemony, for example, of CNN):
Cultural autonomy cannot be gained without human and financial commitment; it requires a volte face from the passive acceptance of the notion that ‘things change’, to actively changing things (Sardar, 1998: 287)

Sardar concludes his definition of non-western postmodernism by claiming that beyond the pursuit of cultural authenticity and autonomy, non-western societies need to come to terms with the dark side of non-western culture (self-discovery and self-criticism):

The denial of individualism in non-western communities should not be used as an excuse for the violation of [universal and not western liberal] human rights. Common values should not be used as licence for the ruthless suppression of dissenting voices...the corruption and abuse of power that have a certain history in non-western societies need also to be directly addressed (Sardar, 1998:287).

2.4.6 Postmodernism and Islam

According to Akbar, it is difficult to relate Islamic postmodernism to western postmodernism in any coherent or direct manner, or even to establish a causal relationship between the two. Postmodernism in the Islamic world would mean reversion to traditional Muslim values and rejection of (imposed and western) modernisation. In other words, we need a shift to ethnic or Islamic identity as against an imported western one; above all, an awareness of the power and pervasive nature of the western media which are perceived as hostile. He takes the “progressivist” ideology and political history of Arab and Islamic nations as departure points for his criticism of applied (or imposed) modernism in Arab and Islamic countries. The defeat of the Arabs in 1967 at the hands of Israel and of Pakistan in 1971 at the hands of India, reflect, according to Akbar, the bankruptcy of what is referred to by
traditional and radical Muslim scholars\(^\text{10}\) as secular or modern rulers. The failure of materialist models whether Marxist or capitalist (both western modernist and secular ideologies) to provide social and political solutions is clear: "Marxism has usually meant grey brutal dictatorship, while capitalism is mostly characterised by alienation, greed and anarchy" (Akbar, 1992:36).

Postmodernism according to Akbar’s perspective would be interpreted as being the answer to the failure of the western project (negotiated or imposed owing to colonial history) of modernity. The latter is perceived as being synonymous with dictatorship, military coups, and a low standard of education, poverty and economic decline, rather than progress, enlightenment or emancipation. The other characteristics of modernism according to Muslim reformists are the multi-national companies and their visible efforts in supporting what was seen as a corrupt local élite, the large-scale migration from rural to urban areas and consequent social disruption of traditional life. Furthermore, there are the failure to build effective institutions of the modern state and an awareness that architectural designs (e.g. shopping malls) imported from the west do not always meet local requirements.

However, it is worth mentioning that postmodernism from the Muslim scholars’ point of view (at least that of Akbar) is not a separate phase from modernity. It emphasises its European origin and contexts, pointing out that many of the features of modernism are continued, although in altered form, in postmodernism (Akbar, 1992:32). In the same perspective, Cesari (1997:73) points out that the re-islamisation, or what Akbar refers to as Islamic postmodernism, has to be interpreted not as total rejection of occidental values, but instead as a mean of giving an Islamic content to the significance of self, and that of the society. This re-appropriation intervenes at the level of individuals and, politics, as well as social.

\(^{10}\) Akbar (1992) is dividing Muslim scholars according to their response to western modernity into three categories: traditionalists, radicals and modernists (pp.157-167)
To sum up, it could be argued that both Sardar and Akbar attempt to redefine postmodemism according to non-occidental or non-western histories and traditions. For Sardar adopting strategies for cultural authenticity and cultural autonomy are the *sine qua non* for surviving postmodemism. For Akbar it is the return to Islamic values. Both authors claim their attachment to some features of western modernity (nation-state, technology, etc.), but reject western authoritarianism, and appropriation of knowledge, progress or human rights. This is even in the name of postmodemism, which has been presented by western postmodernists, according to Sardar (who is perhaps more critical than Akbar), as a new (western) theory of liberation that promotes pluralism, but which in fact is another western project with its real aim to transform other cultures into historical, identity-less masses and perpetual consumers of its (own) products; “by isolating and further marginalising other cultures by irony and ridicule” (Sardar, 1998: 291). The final point that needs to be mentioned which Sardar and Akbar emphasise in their works is the power of the media and image in the post-modern era. Because of “its capacity to subvert reality, to simplify issues dangerously and influence events” (Akbar, 1992: 224) the media (the central feature of dominant global civilisation) is being transformed into a potential source of disruption to traditional life. Non-western cultures need to understand and acknowledge their threats (and benefits) in order to face/resist their challenging messages and images. Sardar points out that a serious effort has to be made to replace the global (meaningless, violent and perverted) free market and profit making TV and cinema programmes by *indigenous* cultural products and the making of local television programmes.

The view of Akbar and Sardar on non-western/ western modernism, and western/non-western postmodemism is compatible with the study’s philosophical and theoretical position because it respects notions of multicultural pluralism and universal equality between the west and non-west, the occident and non-occident. It does not reject western paradigms, progress and technological advance. It recognises also the openness and humanism of the western postmodemism debate; however, it rejects the (imposed) supremacy of western modernism or the cynicism and relativism of western postmodemism.
In relation to the study of the Algerian project of professional sport, the questions that needs to be asked are the following:

How can notions of cultural autonomy, local authenticity or return to traditional values (non-western postmodernism) be defined in relation to sport in general, and professional sport in particular? What is the feasibility of the project in the sport domain? In other words can a redefinition (deconstruction and reconstruction) of professional sport according to non-occidental practices (history and values) be achieved? If yes which form might it take?

2.5 The globalisation and sport debate

To understand globalisation of the cultural market and to limit what Warnier refers to as the optical illusion (the adjustments of macro-sociological and micro-ethnographic observations or research levels) in researching sporting phenomena both global and local approaches need to be considered in equal manner. This applies to the west, which is supposed to be the sender or origin of global cultural products. Even western countries, affirming the existence of standardisation of cultural products and homogenisation of consumption constitutes a logical error (Warnier, 1999:98). Consumption (intercepting and then interpreting the products of cultural industries) becomes itself a space for the production of cultural specificity such that today the real problem that contemporary societies are confronted with is the problem of dispersion of cultural references, more than homogenisation. Therefore, the global-local nexus, which results in establishing new and complex relations between global and local spaces, is of significance to a number of endeavours, including sport (McDonald et al. 2001)

We can start this section by asking the following question: Can we speak about globalisation in the sports world? Regarding this issue Maguire (1993:309) has argued that the emergence and diffusion of sport is clearly interwoven with the globalisation
process; the global migration of both professional and college sports personnel; the flow from country to country of sports goods, equipment and landscapes. Hall claims that popularising international sport festivals with standardised rules and events is similar to the way in which organisations such as the United Nations and UNESCO have encouraged homogenised definitions of citizenship, human rights and principles of basic human dignity (in Cantelon and Murray, 1993: 278). On the other hand, Wright (1999) claims that globalisation of sport is linked to the triumph of capitalism and acceleration in global production processes. These have resulted in the emergence of a new international division of labour based on low-paid, flexible, labour relations, and new international marketing strategies to produce sport and leisure-related apparel. Other examples of this globalisation are, a) the increasing domination of the world by the tele-communication industry promoting global culture (including sport) to a world-wide audience of consumers (Sklair, 1991:62); b) the ownership of sports franchises broadcasting to billions of viewers images of a number of established global or major multi-sport events such as the Olympic Games or soccer World Cup (Houlihan, 1994). The above points are all indicative of what Wright (1999) describes as globalising tendencies in sport, to which we could add the following:

1. promoting national leagues and specific teams, like the Chicago Bulls or Manchester United to markets overseas;
2. development of international sports management firms, the proliferation of foreign athletes in professional teams, and the professionalisation of former amateur sports, like athletics or Rugby Union.

From the above discussion, the emerging theoretical questions that we might ask are the following. How is the diffusion of this global culture viewed or interpreted by different nations and cultures? Can we talk about a homogeneous and universal response to sports (values and institutions)? Who were, or actually are, the main actors in the diffusion of sport? Historically are there any forms of contemporary challenge or resistance to this diffusion? Do all nations have the means to negotiate the meaning of sport (global culture)? Finally, could the diffusion of sport be considered as a new form of cultural imperialism and ideological manipulation?
Chapter 2 Globalisation and Sport, between Modernity and Postmodernism

According to Maguire (1993:311) globalisation of sport is best understood as a balance between diminishing contrasts (homogenisation) and increasing varieties (heterogenisation). Homogenisation occurs through the diffusion of western products and the cult of consumerism via the media-sport production, which ensures that the marketing of the same sports forms, products and images does occur. While the contrast between cultures has diminished a degree of pluralisation and diversity has developed, which makes globalisation patterned by several competing processes including Europeanisation, Orientalisation, Africanisation, and Hispanisation, among which the Americanisation tendency is the most powerful (e.g. the growth of American football in Britain). In Donnelly’s (1998) terms, the Americanisation thesis (which does not go unchallenged), particularly from a marketing point of view, is deemed more suitable to interpret the source of changes in global sports rather than globalisation. Even though the two most significant “American” sports, American football and baseball are not widely played (McDonald et al. 2001). An example of the Americanisation of sports is the transformation of the game to a corporate product, a “show-biz” spectacular, with high-scoring, or record-setting superstar athletes; the ability to attract sponsors by providing desired audiences; and having the characteristics necessary for good television coverage (Donnelly, 1998: 246). To these could be added the Americanisation of Australian cricket and the Americanisation of British soccer (with the shift to profit-taking clubs, all seated stadia, and a super league), the Americanisation of Canadian football, or even the construction of Disneyland outside Paris, which in Donnelly’s terms are all examples of the shift towards a “monoculture”. On the other hand Kidd prefers talking about the notion of “American capitalist hegemony” rather than simply Americanisation, which in his view provides a more accurate explanation of the Canadian case (1991: 180). The examples of the National Hockey League, which moved into the larger and richer markets of the US, or Canadian Football which feeds into the NFL, or Toronto basketball moving into the NBA. All provide evidence of what Kidd perceives as the result of the dynamics of the American media-sports industry (1991:179)

In the debate on globalisation, sport and international politics, Houlihan (1994) distinguishes four categories to test the significance of sport for the relationship
between nations in terms of cultural imperialism or some other form of what Houlihan terms 'participative' globalisation. The first group consists of those states which are generally poor with low levels of industrialisation, described also as having few strong local sporting traditions, and which were once colonies for European power and remain economically dependent on western states (e.g. most of the Caribbean states, most of South America, and Africa). It is within this group of countries where the driving force of globalisation is exploitation, and ideological manipulation of communities and people as market consumers and workers, that evidence in support of cultural imperialism, should be found (1994:187). Within this group of countries sporting traditions are imported by a dominant economic power and it is difficult for the 'dependent' state to redefine the sporting experience in such a way as to seriously challenge the cultural hegemony of the former (1994:190). The second group called culturally strong ex-colonies, is described as being those states and communities which were, or still are, in a colonial position but which differ from the first group because they possess a recognisable local sporting tradition (the Irish Republic, Scotland in Britain, Basque regions in France and Spain). Within this group evidence of both cultural imperialism and high levels of conflict, at the interface between the external and local culture, can be found. In comparison to the first group of countries it is possible for culturally strong ex-colonies to develop a local culture within the cultural hegemony of an imperial power and work towards objectives alien to the interest of that power (1994:192). The third group includes those richer ex-colonies, which have a large number of settlers from the ex-imperial power (Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada) where the imperial immigrants are numerically and/or economically dominant. Sport is used to maintain a strong political and cultural identity with the homeland and to demonstrate cultural superiority over local population. This makes those countries more supportive of the 'participative' model of globalisation but also they work to develop a sporting culture, which they are able to define as their own. The final group contains countries which are industrial (having the same characteristics as the previous group in terms of wealth, relatively independent media and sporting success), but are non-western and without a strong local (competitive) sporting tradition. Those countries are expected to be in a 'participative' relationship with globalisation using sport as a vehicle for nation
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building or as for example is the case in Japan for the reconciliation between tradition and modernity (baseball and Wa philosophy, see Horne, 1996).

Nonetheless, the above approaches, which explain the diffusion and globalisation of sport, "superseding traditional games and adopting national identities" (Wright, 1999) undermine the degree of freedom for decision-making that nation-states, particularly on the periphery, have in joining the global world of sport. These states are reduced according to some theories to a set of superficial and non-challenging responses. According to Cantelon and Murray (1993) a former colonial power, which still maintains a certain cultural weight within the context of a global culture, does not experience globalisation in the same fashion as former colonies: "...the experiences of sport at the level of the stadium, pool, gym or rink do vary from place to place and person to person" (1993:285). Therefore, according to the same authors, "to suggest a global sports culture as a one-way street towards greater homogenisation with no possibility of uniqueness or distinctiveness, would be a mistake" (1993:287).

Can we speak about local responses to globalization in modern sport?

Guttmann (1994: 132) states that:

Despite its British origins, soccer has been adopted around the world. The rules of the game are international but the associated rituals are often the product of native culture. The folklore of Brazilian soccer is unlike that of the German game: watching Santos of Sao Paolo is not the same as a visit to the terraces of Shalke 04.

There is in the history of modern sport, as in the music or film industry, considerable evidence of local response to Western hegemony. This phenomenon demonstrates the ability of peripheral countries or "satellites", as Guttmann (1994: 175) terms them, to resist and even surpass the centre or "metropolis". The most memorable examples of the above are the defeat of the American Baseball team in 1896 by the Yokohama Athletic Club, or the British Rugby team by New Zealand’s “All Blacks” during the
rugby tour of 1905-06. The globalisation of judo or table tennis or chess, are other examples named by Guttmann (1994: 115) as reverse (bottom-up) diffusion, described also by Roberston (1992:54) as the particularisation of the universal and the universalisation of the particular. As Wagner says:

...We make too much of cultural dependency in sport when in fact it is the people themselves who generally determine what they do and do not want, and it is people who modify and adapt cultural imports, the sport, to fit their own needs and values (Wagner, 1990:402).

Wagner prefers speaking about the internationalisation of world sport where Americanisation, the European (modern) approach and traditional sports exist an equal terms. Examples of this synthesis can be found in martial arts that involve traditions of great respect, sportsmanship and the development of which is being encouraged by the American media and sports organisations. Here, rather than Americanisation of the Martial arts, there is an internationalisation of sport, what Wagner refers to as a joining of like interests, with a sport culture flowing in all directions (1990: 400). Wagner proceeds by stating that

The long-term trend has to be, I think, towards greater homogenisation [internationalisation], and I don't think there is anything bad or imperialist about this; rather, these sports trends ultimately must reflect the will of people. Over time, one can hope that this global sports culture will develop in ways that are in harmony with likes, interests, desires, and values of diverse peoples all over the world. (1990:402)

To conclude this debate, it is worth noting that, the relationship between global and local in the domain of sport, is not always the clash between modernity and tradition or western, and non-western cultures. This relationship encompasses examples of coexistence too. As the organisation of global events could serve global (media, marketing) interests, it could also serve (not always for the best of citizens'
interests)\(^{11}\) the renewal of the local economy, assisting in the re-imagination, positioning of "self" and gaining civic pride through success (McDonald \textit{et. al.} 2001). It may be used (peacefully) as tool in the internationalisation of local folklore, games, festivals and increasing the global viewers' awareness about local specificity; namely languages, history, life style, and worldviews.

\(^{11}\) Increasing of taxes, imposed urbanisation, transgressing environmental order...
3.1 Introduction to the study of ‘global’ and ‘local’

Warnier (1999) claims that studies on globalisation and culture are biased by questions of methods, divided between observing the circulation of cultural flows at global level or studying the way that those flows are perceived or responded to, at local level. In both cases the study results and generated observations are defined by those two approaches. Economists and specialists in media and industries, or quantitative (modernist) sociologists privilege the first approach to explain global profit laws and financial logic of the new economic order. For Warnier, a globalist approach to world culture does not take into consideration or explain how global products are received at local level. The follower of this route or method does not have access to intermediate instances such as family, local community, political and religious leaders, churches, mosques and schools, which have the ability to extract and re-contextualise products of global cultural industry (produits des cultures-industries).

The adepts of a globalist approach do not have time or leisure, to live one month in a Canadian village or Indian dance school in Madras. Those authors reproduce the mistakes of modernist theorists, who preach one linear model of civilisation.... It is not only a theoretical error, but it is an error of method (Warnier, 1999:97, translated from French).

In contrast, an ethnologist who lives for two years in an African village would have taken a local approach to study global cultural flows, positioning himself/herself from local (recipient) perspective, rather than the sender of global culture. The latter could
not be generalised to other localities, for methodological and practical reasons related to what Warnier describes as the adjustments of macro-sociological and micro-ethnological observations or research levels. This creates a sense of continuous "optical illusion", which in Warnier’s terms, needs to be revealed and denounced.

Therefore, to understand globalisation of cultural market and to limit the optical illusion, both approaches—global and local—need to be considered in equal manner. This applies to both the west and the occident, which is supposed to be the sender of global cultural products. Even within the west (the centre) affirming the existence of standardisation of cultural products and homogenisation of consumption constitutes a logical error (Warnier, 1999:98). Changing of media technologies has led to the regionalisation of media environment previously monopolised by big companies like CNN, NBC, or ABC, in favour of more fragmented local regional TV stations. Consumption (intercepting then negotiating the products of cultural flows) becomes a space of cultural production, in such a way that today the real problem that confronts contemporary societies are the problems of dispersion of cultural references rather than homogenisation. In the same respect Hall suggests that

what we usually call the global, far from being something which, in systematic fashion, rolls over everything, creating similarity, in fact works through particularity, negotiates particular spaces, particular ethnicities, works through mobilising particular identities and so on (1991:62).

According to Warnier, in relation to claims concerning identity (revendications identitaires) analysts are divided between two scenarios; passive coexistence or cultural conflicts (choc des cultures or conflits politiques?). Within those two scenarios we can find four main methodological approaches; those who privilege global or local perspectives and others who follow political and identity factors as interpretative principles (see table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Scenarios for local and global studies: clash of cultures or political conflicts? (Warnier, 1999:103).

For Warnier, Huntington (1996) privileges culture and identity to interpret factors of conflicts at global level. The objective of his work was to produce the most probable configuration of the world in the post cold-war era, which he divides, according to cultural and identity, into seven or eight major civilisations. For Huntington, from Warnier’s point of view, identity reactions are responses to the threat of global cultural flows, imposed by one dominant civilisation on other civilisations. The analysis proposed by Jean Francois Bayart (1996) in his work on *L’illusion identitaire* is in total contrast with Huntington’s approach. It favours politics as the explanatory principle, in other words, it focuses upon power relations and actions networks which in the author’s point of view are crucial (and significant more than identity factors) in understanding co-operation and conflicts within society, owing to their ability to mobilise cultural identification, according to group interests and social categories. This approach was described by Warnier as the analysis of local political trajectories, which integrate ethnological perspectives in analysis and neglects the global type of perspective adopted by Huntington. The other type of analysis suggested by Warnier is that exemplified by the work of journalist Ignacio Romonet (1997), which privileges a globalist approach focusing on world geo-politics and its impact on the cultural domain. Romonet expresses his fear regarding the development of “*la pensée unique*”, that of one linear model of thinking based on the values of economic liberalism (notably the appropriation of means of production and cultural transmission by private industries). The latter, he argues, will be the new obscurantist ideology that will suffocate every attempt at free or independent reflection. For
Warnier the generalist or globalist studies of Huntington and Romonet (using macro-level positions) do not take into consideration the diversity of local situation and the vitality of intermediaries, at micro level.

The study of the Algerian project of professional sport uses both global and local explanations, perceptions, reflections and definitions of globalisation processes (including sport and particularly professional sport). It aims at revealing examples of heterogeneity within global and local levels on notions like modernity, nation-state, cultural imperialism, and hegemony, as well as postmodernism. This, according to non-occidental and non-western traditions, histories, values and identity. It seeks also to develop a rereading and re-conceptualising of sport (global culture) and professionalism, from a local (Algerian), cultural, political and historical perspective (combining both local ‘authenticity’ and local ‘modernity’), trying at the same time to link it to global experiences and diversities (local ‘autonomy’). In other words, this thesis represents a study of Algeria as part of global networks and interconnectedness. For example it links Arab-Berber and Islamic identity, Euro-Mediterranean (historical and geo-strategic) elements and Algeria’s African geographical position. It also address Algeria as an active member of international sport community (Olympic committee and international sports federations).

In the same vein, Quandt (1998) points out that the Algerian case as a research object is sufficiently rich and complex that it cannot be reduced to a single grand explanatory scheme. Thus, the discussion on nationalism and the national state formation in general, and Algerian nationalism in particular, could only be meaningful if the historical background of the Algerian nation is taken into account. The discussion of the discourse on national identity has three principal aims, firstly, it attempts to discuss the role of nationalism and nation formation in the process of emancipation of non-western societies or “Third World” countries. It considers also the questions concerning the reconstruction of national identity which may be based on the political and cultural regeneration, moral and political origin, the reconstruction of historical continuity, or on religious issues. This would include the
theoretical literature of Tibi (1981), on models of nationalism in ‘Third World’ countries that incorporate:

a) Nationalism as an anti-colonial “modernisation ideology”,
b) Marxist analysis on the problem of the subject and colonised people,
c) Nationalism as a result of the process of acculturation,
d) Nation formation in the colonies in the context of de-colonisation achieved by armed struggle (Frantz Fanon, 1952).

Secondly, the discourse on national identity aims also to give an outline of the history of Arab nationalism, under the Ottoman Empire, and afterwards under French and British colonialism. Transformation of Arab identity from a cultural to a political nationalism, into macro-nationalism (for a unified Arab national state) in the post-colonial era. Sport will be part of the national identity debate due to its importance in the development of nationalism, as a mean of resisting western hegemony and also because of its political and social importance for governments both in the developed and developing countries (Africa, Arab countries, and particularly in Algeria). Ultimately, a historically based analysis of the role of sport (particularly football) in Algeria in the colonial and postcolonial period, which includes a discourse on political and national identity, are deemed essential to an understanding of the latest government project for professional sport.

3.2 Four scenarios for nation formation in the “Third World”

A) The Marxist discussion of the national question is dominated by the theme of aspirations for emancipation, which become a dominant feature of international relations. Relations, according to Marx and Engels, between nation-states are as much based upon subjection and domination as those of classes within a single society. Within the same framework Lenin called for the right to self-determination of all people. He asserted that the right of colonised people to self-determination is a basic principle of socialist foreign policy. This could be explained as the political separation from alien national bodies and the formation of an independent national-
state. In the same vein, Marx claimed that socialists in the oppressor nations have a duty to call for the right of the oppressed peoples to their national existence (international acknowledgement). Lenin, following the ideas of Marx and Engels stated that:

A socialist of any of the oppressing nations...who does not recognise and does not struggle for the right of oppressed nations to self-determination...is in reality not socialist but a chauvinist. (Lenin reported, in Tibi, 1981:18).

B) A modernist or progressive approach considers that the nationalist movement would be largely inspired by Western-educated intellectuals, who are supposed to be the leader of social change in the 'Third World' (Tibi, 1981:34). Nationalism based on a modernisation approach insists not on de-colonisation alone, but also on modernisation in the sense of industrialisation. The western educated colonial intellectuals express their nationalism in their aspirations to modernise the pre-colonial social structure of their own countries. They oppose both European colonisation and the traditional elements in their own societies. This is reflected in Kemalism\(^1\), an approach to nationalism, based on the assumption that:

modernisation is desirable and necessary, that indigenous culture is incompatible with modernisation and must be abandoned or abolished, and that society must be fully westernised in order to successfully modernise... Modernisation and Westernisation reinforce each other and have to go together (Huntington, 1998:73).

\(^1\) Atatürk (, originally Mustafa Kemal) 1881 -- 1938 Turkish army officer, politician, and president (1923--38), born in Salonika, Greece. He raised a nationalist rebellion in Anatolia in protest against the post-war division of Turkey, and in 1921 established a provisional government in Ankara. In 1922 the Ottoman Sultanate was formally abolished, and in 1923 Turkey was declared a secular republic, with Kemal as president. He became a virtual dictator, and launched a social and political revolution introducing Western fashions, the emancipation of women, educational reform, the replacement of Arabic script with the Latin alphabet, and the discouragement of traditional Islamic loyalties in favour of a strictly Turkish nationalism. In 1935 he assumed the surname Atatürk ("Father of the Turks"). (Biography.com).
For different reasons, further discussed in this chapter, we can argue that attaching modernity to westernisation or explaining development/underdevelopment, progress/decline in Muslim societies only in reference to the one linear (eurocentric) norm of modernity, is both a methodological and an epistemological mistake. The Kemalism project of modernisation is not applicable in Muslim societies (even in Turkey), because, first the struggle for modernity (in terms of progress or development) in Muslim societies was directed toward an external enemy, colonial power, rather than an internal enemy (Christian fundamentalism). The second reason worth mentioning is that the call for reformism, modernisation and resistance against ‘Jahilia’ ignorance, social injustice, and the tyranny of traditions, which are perceived as a deviation from the real spirit of religion, namely progress and continuous renovation, was first made by Muslim clerics, in the name of Islam. Therefore, as argued by Cesari, the Kamalist option of modernity which consists in imposing, in authoritarian manner, an occidentalisation synonymous with modernity is not legitimate in any country in the Muslim world (1997:95)

C) The acculturation theory of nationalism emphasises western influence and cultural diffusion in the formation of nationalism (liberal nationalism) in the “Third World”. In a similar manner to the modernisation approach, acculturation theory stresses the fact that those western educated colonial intellectuals, described as “marginal intellectuals”, absorb the western (nuclear) ideas of the nation, which make them the legitimate carriers of nationalism. Behrendt distinguishes two models of acculturation, the first type, “passive-imitative acculturation”, represent passive adaptation to cultural elements. “Active-syncretic acculturation” consists of selection and active application of suitable extraneous cultural elements. The second process differs from the first in the sense that a conscious synthesis is taking place (Behendt, 1965 cited in Tibi, 1981:23).
Tibi views the process of absorption of western models of nationalism by the non-western marginal intellectuals as a one sided approach that makes the investigation of social phenomena in the “Third World”, based on acculturation, irrelevant to political realities. Furthermore, this type of nationalism that is bourgeois liberal nationalism, cannot realise its aim in a society, which still has a pre-colonial structure, and lacks a historical and political infrastructure.

D) Nationalism based on direct confrontation and armed struggle. The leader of this intellectual movement is Frantz Fanon, who suggests that nation formation could be achieved not in an evolutionary manner but by force, powered by the development of a national consciousness, which focuses upon political actions. According to Fanon, the de-colonisation process takes different phases. First, emancipation phase, consists of promoting national unity as the central idea in the anti-colonial struggle. In the second phase, national consciousness develops gradually in the course of armed action to achieve the integration and cohesion of the various social groups. Nationalists, according to Fanon’s approach, seek to compensate the de-traditionalisation and de-personalisation of the colonised societies as a result of imposed European culture, by returning to the pre-colonial culture. Fanon argues that nationalism created from an anti-colonial struggle risks failure, for the following reasons:

1- The absence of political stability, due to the effect of social ‘destructuration’ and disruption of traditional realities caused by the colonial administration.
2- The absence of social and economic integration and cohesion.

Frantz Fanon was born in 1925, to middle class family in the French colony of Martinique. He left Martinique in 1943 to join the free French in World War II, and he remained in France after the war to study medicine and psychiatry on scholarship in Lyon. In 1953, Fanon became head of the Psychiatry Department at the Blida-Joinville hospital in Algeria. The Algerian war consolidated Fanon’s alienation from the French imperial viewpoint and in 1956 he formally resigned his post with the French government to work for the Algerian cause. Following his resignation, Fanon fled to Tunisia and began working openly with the Algerian independence movement. He was also Ambassador of the Provisional Algerian Government in Ghana, working to establish a southern supply route for the Algerian Army. Fanon died at the National Institute of Health in the Bethesda, Maryland, where he had sought treatment for his cancer, on December 6, 1961. At his request, his body was returned to Algeria and buried with honours by the Algerian National Army of liberation. His main works are Black skin, white mask (1952), A dying colonisation (1959), The Wretched of the Earth (1961)
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3- the use of nationalist ideals by the ruling (under-developed) bourgeoisie, not as a mean of mobilisation of social classes for development, but rather to divert attention from unachieved aspirations and uncompleted tasks. The latter thus transform aspirations toward emancipation into chauvinism and finally into fundamentalism (religious and tribal rivalries).

Another variant of (anti-colonial) nationalism is the pan-ideology, which is found in a number of “Third World” national movements especially in Africa (Pan-Africanism) and the middle east (Pan-Arabism) (Tibi, 1981:44). The ‘Pan’ ideology was described as being a macro nationalism, which is the projection of micro-nationalism, onto the larger geographical area. It is based on common interests (religion, culture and race) as the basis for aspiration for political entity in more than one state. Macro-nationalism will be discussed fully in the next section, which considers Arab nationalism and al–Husri’s approach to Pan-Arab nationalism.

The type of nationalism referred to in the different approaches cited earlier is conceived as being an “ideological nationalism”, where nation formation must be understood in terms of the creation of group cohesion, an authority which mobilises all forces to overcome underdevelopment. The objective of this is to obtain rational legitimacy, which leads to an internal and external political legitimacy. The second level of national formation is nation-state building, which requires the formation of an institutional framework and sovereign authority within which the organisation of development policies take place. The question that Tibi (1981:36) asked is whether the national state formation in the “Third World” can provide a suitable framework of organisation for socially and economically backward countries?. He continues by stating that the success or failure of nation formation in these states (Third World countries) depends primarily on the political structures within which the process takes place. Deutsch (1963 cited in Tibi, 1981:37) goes a step further by claiming that the success of nation formation depends on two conditions, the rate of assimilation and the rate of mobilisation. It depends as well on the identity of “the nation builder” or the leader of social change, who also holds political power. Behrendt and Mühlmann, (reported in Tibi, 1981:36) reject the idea of the nation-state in the “Third World”,

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because of the historical ‘quality’ and sometimes the absence of local historical infrastructure. Some other anthropologists go even further by denying even the existence of nationalism in the ‘under-developed’ countries, particularly in Africa where Africans are seen as ethnics, and Westerners as nationalists (Vidags, 2000). Tibi’s response was that both Behrendt (1965) and Mühlmann, (1961) take state formation in European history as the only model. They consider this model as universally applicable, which prevents them from understanding other historical forms of state formation.

3.3 The formation of Arab nationalism

Arab nationalism has taken different forms throughout history. But first, under the Ottoman rule, Islam and Shari’a (the Islamic legislation) and Islamic universalism, were the most important elements of the political system. This gave legitimacy to military rule and expansion of the Ottoman Empire, and ensured at the same time the loyalty of Arab subjects on religious ground (Tibi, 1981:52). This was the situation until Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt in 1789, and afterward under the rule of Mohamed Ali in 1805. According to Tibi, historians and social scientists specialising on Middle East history are in agreement in considering 1798 as the year in which the history of the modern Middle East, and modern Egypt, begins. The expedition brought to Egypt, and later to the whole Arab peninsula, the values of the French revolution based on solidarity, freedom, equality and citizenship. This led to the emergence of national movements, supported by western educated Arab intellectuals (inspired by modern European culture), expressing the desire for Arab nationalism. The establishment of the first western academic institute in the Arab world in modern times (the Institute of Egypt) and the introduction of modern ‘secular’ topics of study reinforced the cultural diffusion. The reaction of the Egyptians toward these evolutions was divided between fascination and resistance. The ‘Eulama’ or Islamic scholars represented the latter, the conservative wing, organised a religious revolt

3 Mohamed Ali (1769-1849) is Turkish of Albanian origin. Governor and later Viceroy of Egypt (1805-49), he is considered as the founder of the Egyptian royal family, which endured until the 1953 revolution.
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against what they thought to be a deviation from true Islam. This forced Napoleon, who was considered by the same wing as the "infidel", to abandon his expedition in 1801. However, the French influence, despite the resistance of the religious movements, had succeeded in establishing itself further, and Mohammed Ali, the new leader of Egypt, continued to work at what Napoleon had begun. He introduced Egypt to the so-called European ‘progress’, through the building of a modern state organisation, with a rational economic system and a modern army trained and equipped along modern lines. This was possible with the support of the French (which was gradually terminated because of British rule), to block the British invasion and Ottoman rule in the region.

During Mohamed Ali's rule of Egypt, groups of students were sent to France for higher education to study new ‘secular’ subjects and the work of major European thinkers, such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau and others. Among the first Arab nationalist thinkers of that time was Al-Tahtaoui. His conception of nationalism ‘Watan’ was different from predominant western notions. In comparison to western nationalism, which preaches individualism (or laïcité) and secularism, Al-Tahtaoui insists on the formation of political authority within the tradition of Islamic values that take the prophet Mohamed (PBUH) and his companion as a model. He also emphasises the importance of ‘sharia’ Islamic legislation, which was described as being similar to the rationalist and natural law of modern Europe. With al-Tahtaoui, the new era (known as Nahda or renaissance) in Islamic and Arab world history, began. The leaders (like El-Afghani and Abdou) of this movement aimed to study Islam as an ideology and project for society, by enriching it with those discoveries of rational European science (at least those which are not contradictory with Islamic values). During this period Islam became an anti-colonialist ideology, which called for political actions against imperial (British and French) Europe, in addition to the adaptation of progressive elements of European civilisation that might strengthen

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4 In the literature there is a significant distinction drawn between laïcité and secularism. Secularism designates a tendency towards necessary and universal objectivity. Laïcité on the other hand is a representation, and consequently a subjective fact, which has a link with the consciousness and the position of the subject (individual or social group) in the system. Both notions impose a categorical separation between the spiritual and the temporal (see Ghalioun, 2000).

5 Peace Be Upon Him.
Islamic universalism and maintain Islam as an important part of national education. Huntington (1996) defines the ‘Nahda’ as a reformism movement, which was the dominant response to the west on the part of Muslim élites for fifty years from 1870s to the 1920s (until the rise of Kemalism and ‘Islamist’ movements). It combines modernisation with preservation of the central values, practices and institutions of the society’s indigenous culture. In other words, reformism attempts a new reconciliation of Islam with modernity, and the best of western rational thought (Huntington, 1996:74).

In addition to the reformist movement, which sees Islam as the foundation of nationality for Muslims, superior to any other form of association or any national commitment, another movement, or Arab nationalist mode of thinking, was part of the modern Arab history of nationalism. It developed as a consequence of western acculturation or depersonalisation of Arab societies, in the form of a cultural bourgeois movement, or literary renaissance that sought at the beginning (under Ottoman rule) an independent Arab cultural nation without a state, promoting both religious toleration and separation of religion from politics. Furthermore, the adoption of a liberal model of freedom and bourgeois democracy based on western lines, partly Francophile and partly Anglophile. However, after the First World War and due to colonisation by French and British troops (the early supporters of Arab separatist movements in the Ottoman Empire) Arab nationalism took a different form. There was a shift from the cultural bourgeois form, to that of a political (populist and separatist) movement and subsequently with the influence of Al-Husri, a form of Pan-Arab nationalism.

3.3.1 Al-Husri approach to Arab nationalism

Tibi (1981) was influenced in his writing by Al-Husri, who is considered as the leading pan-Arab nationalist writer. His ideas of Arab national liberalism were based on the following schools of thought:

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*Sati al-Husri (1882-1968)* was born into Syrian family in Yemen, studied education in Paris, Switzerland and Belgium. After his return from Paris he taught for a time at a number of Ottoman Institutions. He was appointed afterwards as a director of Education in Syria, and became thanks to his
Chapter 3 Discourse on Sport and National Identity

1) The German concept of nation that perceives the nation in terms of a cultural nation and the national language as the barometer by which the culture of people and the level of development may be measured (Herder, 1964 reported in Tibi: 103). From al-Husri's perspective and the German interpretation of nationalism, "as long as the nation takes care of its language, it will stay alive and have its own personality. If a nation is able to keep its language alive under foreign rule, it remains alive and does not lose its existence as a nation" (Tibi, 1981: 120). The Arabic language could be seen as a powerful example of Arab unity, for two exceptional reasons; first, Arabic is the language of Islamic revelation, it is the language of the Koran; second, Arabic language is exceptional also, because it is a language that allows people (Arabs from different religions) to communicate at a very high cultural level (Chevallier, 1991:35). Additionally, while language is the soul of the nation, its history, which is defined as the common memory of the people, could be seen as its consciousness. For this reason, al-Husri stresses in his work, the importance of teaching the glorious historical past as a mean of spreading belief in the nation, which leads to cultural unity. Based on these conditions, language and history, al-Husri claims that the Arab people, who now live in a number of independent states, actually belong to a single all-Arab nation, which could form a macro Pan-Arab state united by a single language and common memory. This view was shared also by Arab leaders such as Nasser who claimed that "if it is the history of any Umma [nation] which produces its consciousness, and if it is the language of any Umma that produces its mode of thinking [pensée], then, Arab people have the same consciousness and the same thinking, which means that eventually Arabs represent the same Umma" (speech

relation with King Faysal of Iraq, a Minister of Education in 1920. Because of his position, and because of his influence on the educational system in general, he was able to make national education the focus of the educational and cultural policy of Iraq, which was under British mandate, but with a certain degree of autonomy in internal affairs. He took also different positions in Egypt, where he worked in the cultural department of the Arab League; he was also the chair of Arab Nationalism Institute, which he founded. Al-husri died in 1968 in Iraq at the age of 76. He is considered to be the father of the modern Arab nationalism literature. (Biography.com)

7 Egyptian president 1952-1970 and one of the most important personalities and leaders of Arab nationalism, non-alienated and anti-imperialism movements.

8 The linguistic and populist notion of nationalism expressed by Al-Husri and Nasser undermines others', languages' (e.g. Berberism) or dialects' rights of existence and emancipation, because there are conceived, in comparison to academic Arabic (the language of nationalists parties), as low cultures.
made by Nasser in July 9, 1960, reported by Abou Chdid Nasr, 1981, translated from French). In the main time Al-Husri criticises those Arabs (local patriots) who have developed a form of nationalism restricted or confined to only one region, limited by borders that have been drawn by colonialism. He is also against Pan-Islanism (cosmopolitan and internationalist) forms of nationalism that consider Islam alone constitutes Arab culture.

2) Al-Husri’s theory of nationalism included also the social and historical philosophy of Ibn Khaldoun9 particularly the issue regarding the concept of ‘assabiya’ interpreted by modern sociologists and orientalists as ‘group feeling’, ‘solidarity’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘nationality’. Group feeling is in its strongest state in the early phase of civilisation (the nomadic stage), as the process of civilisation continues, its strength decreases. As a consequence, group feeling or solidarity disintegrates, resulting in the disintegration of civilisation, and the place of the group is taken by other groups (civilisations, dynasties), whose group feeling is younger and therefore stronger. This was described as the cyclical theory of civilising process that consists of two main stages:

- The growth stage characterised by urbanisation, specialisation and ideology (religious values), demographic development.
- The stage or regression or decline characterised by the decline of group feeling, internal conflicts, and external invasion.

It could be argued from the above that al-Husri’s approach to Arab nationalism, does not correspond with the “passive-imitative acculturation” model to nationalism,

9 Ibn Khaldoun (1332-1406), Islamic historian and sociologist, one of whose famous works was a prolegomena, introduction or “Muqqadima” which includes chapters on the scientific conditions of historical analysis, states, governments and institutions. Also other chapters on science and culture, human society in general, psycho-pedagogy and didactics, as well as on economy, work and profit. He is also well known for his theory on the life cycle of civilisation, where he outlines that there is a strong connection between social change, and the climate and the level of economic activity. Societies according to Ibn Khaldoun were held together by social cohesiveness, with religion as a strengthening factor. Arnold Toynbee described the work of Ibn Khaldoun as “undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created by any mind in any time or place” (Toynbee, 1951:322).
based on universalist and unidirectional western diffusion. It may be explained rather as an active-syncretic acculturation, which reflects a synthesis between German nationalism and Ibn Khaldoun's philosophy and history of civilisation.

After the Second World War a new stage in the historical development of Arab nationalism began. It was based on a nationalism that presents its opposition to the west entirely in terms of Western imperialism. Its main aim, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s was to combine Pan-Arabism or Pan-Arab national considerations with those of sub-national identities, ensuring the separate independence of the Arab states, while at the same time, keeping the door open for gradual measures of cooperation, integration and unification (Ibrahim, 1996). The establishment of the League of Arab states in 1945 was a formalisation of this compromise. The Arab League was composed mainly of Arab states situated in the Middle East, which were under the protectorate of the British Empire and gained their independence earlier than the Arab states in North Africa, which were under French colonial rule. Difference in the colonial history between Arab states situated in the Middle East and North Africa will be examined later in this chapter.

North African, known also as the Maghreb states, in addition to claiming that they ideologically and culturally belong to Arabic nationalism, were also influenced, in a different manner and intensity (for historical and geographical reasons) by African revolutionary nationalism. Nationalism which calls for an anti-colonial, armed revolution, and cultural nationalism, and which was according to Buell "in position to take sharply etched anti-colonial positions and spark reactions and imitations throughout the world" (1994:86). However, it should be noted that although claiming their adhesion to All-Arab nationalism, the Maghreb states did not achieve the unity or uniformity which it was hoped to be achieved after the independence. This was the case also under the umbrella of a Maghreb Union or 'Maghreb des peuples', which according to Stora (1999), has rather taken the form of a 'Maghreb des regions' (based on regional solidarity). In the same vein, Tibi writes that,
...In the Maghreb states, Pan-Arab nationalism was even more alien to the local nationalism than in Egypt. There was a Moroccan, an Algerian, and Tunisian nationalism, each with its own history even though each country had been subjected to French colonial rule. (Tibi, 1981:177)

3.3.2 Arab nationalism in the post-independence era

The new challenges that arose in an international system polarised by the ideological and geopolitical conflict of the cold war (1945-1990) had changed the orientation of Arab nationalism. Based initially on anti-imperialism and anti-colonialist ideology, Arab nationalism had known another orientation based on socialism and the Soviet model of development. A group of Tunisian socialists reported in Tibi claimed that

Arab unity is the only alternative to building socialism in order to create a real independence from imperialism and a common market for our resources and our products as a precondition for our industrialisation... (Tibi, 1981:180).

Huntington states that Arab élites, and other political leaders in Third World countries, in Africa, and Latin America, imported socialist and Marxist ideologies and combined them with nationalism in opposition to Western capitalism and Western imperialism (1998:100). The Arab nationalists leaders in the post-independence period concentrated their efforts on state building, consolidating independence, achieving socio-economic development, and ensuring reasonable measures of equity, as well as quests for a greater share in power, wealth and prestige, in their newly independent countries (Ibrahim, 1996). They introduced also new measures such as land reform, nationalisation of foreign and upper class assets, and an open and free system of health and education.

National discourse in the post-independence era, combined with 'progressivist' claims, manifested the first 'break' with religious language. Dignity and progress were not called upon in terms of eternal truth but in terms of historical 'legitimacy'; "is not God who speaks forever, but is nation which inspires...the symbols of this
coming period are not those of sacred words, but those of greatness and glory of the past...” (Hussein, 1997:169, original text in French)

It could be argued that Arab nationalism in this period was neither ‘reformist’ nor ‘Kamalist’, neither Islamist nor western modernist. The reasons for this are the following:

- Arab nationalists adopted some concepts from Islam such as the concept of "Umma", instead of ‘nation’ to express the universal unity of Muslim community within the Arab countries, even though not all Arabs are Muslims. According to Chevallier (1991:31), the term nation according to the French definition means a state with limited territory, different from that of ‘Umma’, which exceeds the state territory.

- Some Arabic states, which are known as more advanced ‘secular’ Muslim societies, socialist and progressists such as Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, in addition to adapting their constitutions from the British and French legislations, they also used the Koran, to some extent, as a source of legislation. They included in their legislation certain textual guidance from the Koran known as “spiritual guidance” that guides by definition the behaviour of Muslims in determinate political and social situations (Chevallier, 1991:199).

- Arab (populist) nationalism in the post-independence period was criticised as being a barrier to a progressive and democratic transformation of the Arab countries privileging the freedom of nation over that of individuals. The reason for this according to Dawisha (2000) is that both ‘nationalists’ and ‘Islamists’, who have been hostile to the West, are hostile to democracy and western institutions such as elections and majority rule, because they are seen as a heritage of western imperialism and western culture.

This hostility toward democracy and western values however did not last. It lost its strength (with varying intensity) for different reasons illustrated below. According to Huntington (1998), the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and the rest of
Europe in the beginning of the 1990s, its severe modification in China, and the failure of socialist economies to achieve sustained development in Latin America, Eastern Europe and in Africa, has created an ideological vacuum. For this reason, western governments, groups and international institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, attempted to fill this vacuum (particularly for the developing countries) with doctrines of "neo-orthodox" economics and "democratic politics". Dominique Chevallier (1991) argues that today and particularly in North Africa, it is more common to think about political pluralism and about democracy than ever before, especially after the constitution of the Maghreb Union in 1989. To face the new economic challenges in the region, the Arab states in the Maghreb, which want to be part of the European community, at least economically, are obliged to adopt the European model of democracy, according to the European criteria, which means a 'liberal' and 'pluralist' politics. Today, probably because of the geographical position and similar colonial history, 'controlled' democracy, pluralism, elections and freedom of speech (which exist in the university but not necessarily in the press, Chevallier 1991), has become part of the political debate in major North African countries, particularly in Morocco, Algeria and to a lesser extent in Tunisia. Multipartism has even become a fact in those three countries starting in the 1990s, where different political parties (nationalist, social-democrat, liberal and conservative), representing different ideologies and suggesting different projects for society, are becoming part of the political space. This is not the case for example in the Gulf countries (where the monarchies still control the political environment) founded on the old and tribal traditions (Chevallier, 1991:173); nor in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and to a lesser extent in Jordan, where respectively, Baathism, populism, and Kinship still the norm. The exception in that region may be Lebanon, due its multi religious characteristics, where populism with parliamentary presentation is the condition for social cohesion.

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10 Family law in Algeria is taken from Islamic legislation.
11 Maghreb in Arabic means west.
12 Before the collapse of Saddam's regime.
Chapter 3

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The collapse of communism and the absence of compelling new secular ideology, has also played a role in the appearance of a religious nationalism, which has taken the place of a secular nationalism (Huntington, 1998:101). As a consequence, new Islamic political movements\(^\text{13}\) (linked to the triumph of the Iranian Revolution) have emerged in the more advanced and seemingly more secular Muslim societies, such as Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia. According to Huntington (1998), the aim of those movements\(^\text{14}\) is to resist the dominance of other nations “the West”, and often to resist the local ruling class which has embraced the values and life style of those dominant nations. That revival is not aiming at total rejection of modernity, it is the rejection, according to Huntington, of the West and particularly “the secular, relativistic, degenerate culture associated with the West. It could be interpreted as a declaration of cultural independence from the west” (Huntington, 1998:101).

Huntington view was not shared by Cesari (1997) who suggests that a total rejection of modernity is not possible. Such goal is illusory because colonial domination had modified mentalities and social relations, in a manner that today only a ‘reform’ (and not total change) might be possible. Such reform would incorporate philosophical interrogations, which problematise both relations between the present and the past (le mode d’être historique) and the construction of self-Islamisation, or a return to an Islamic basis for identity as an autonomous subject (1997:96)

3.3.3 Arab nationalism and globalisation

The new world system, globalisation, multinational diversification and division of labour, as well as the generalisation of the western model of the nation-state, have together created contradictory imperatives for Third World countries, particularly for Arab nations, resulting in disillusionment with a previous era of nationalism that did not realise its “populist hopes” (Buell, 1994:116). Such dramatic internationalisation has followed-on further ‘de-territorialisation’ and heterogenisation of local culture, as consequences of Arab nationalism. The new geo-political and economic situation has

\(^{13}\) Islam is a refuge for societies’ identities and ethno-cultural groups, which were scratched out of their structures and traditional values by material modernity; it is also a reference for all social forces which are unable to express themselves politically elsewhere, outside their spaces protected by religious immunity; finally, it is a tool for those who want to take power ...(Arkoun in Goussault, 1990).
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had an impact on the fragmentation and localisation of Arab nationalism politically, ideologically and economically. The division of Arab nations between Maghreb and Gulf unions and Middle East co-operation, the 'Islamisation' of Sudan 'Africanisation' of Libya, the crisis between West Sahara and Morocco, the political division of the Arab League during the Gulf War, and at various points in the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, those are all evidence of the heterogenisation of Pan-Arab nationalism. Tahar Ben Jelloun (1997: 159) states that today Arab ideology or 'la pensée Arabe' is confronted by universalist challenges (global politics, economy and culture, in addition to the so-called Pan-islamism) and internal conflicts, which were underestimated or ignored in the past when populist unitary values held sway. These internal problems have been used as a veil by political regimes in the Arab world to resist the principles and conditions of democracy\textsuperscript{15}, imposed by the new world system. Arab nations, today hesitate between the options of political entity (the western model of the nation-state), cultural identity shared with the rest of Arab nations that constitute the Arab world, or identity with a larger entity, the Islamic community (Hussein, 1997:168). This sense of division and fragmentation was also expressed in Edward Said's book on culture and imperialism (1994) which includes, in addition to his critique of the imperial construction of Arab identity in Western literature, a discussion about the fragmentation that Arab nationalism is going through. In Said's terms, today Arab state nationalism(s)\textsuperscript{16} "fracture into clan or sectarian ones... Rulers are clans, families, cliques, and closed circles of ageing oligarchies, almost methodologically immune..."(1994:361)

Sport (the subject of our study), which is based on the nation-state system, and described by Vidacs (2000:110) as being the vehicle par excellence for national sentiments, has also been an arena of ultra-nationalist, popular chauvinism and political conflicts between Arab states. This, according to Fates (1994), makes the feeling of solidarity and unity between Arab people in the Pan-Arab nation, as seen by al-Husri, and even within the Maghreb Union, hard to achieve.

\textsuperscript{14} Some of those movements are legal, organised in a form of political parties and non governmental associations, other are not legal, or not recognised by the state.

\textsuperscript{15} Every call for political or cultural pluralism was depicted as danger to the (natural) national unity.
For example, Iraq was refused permission to participate in the VIIe Pan Arab Games that took place in Syria in September 29, 1992 by decision of the Syrian Organisation Committee, following the threat by Gulf states, members of the Gulf Council of Cooperation \(^{17}\), to withdraw from the Games. In 1997, six years after the Gulf war, the Arab Games were held in Lebanon. It was an occasion for this country, as expressed by its Prime Minister Rafic Harriri in his opening speech, to re-establish its credibility within the Arab League after long years of civil war and destruction. The other aim was to reinforce the Arab unity against the Israeli occupying army, accused in the same speech of transforming Lebanon into a graveyard but which as a result of the Games has become “a place for unity, peace and Arab solidarity under president Elias Hrawi’s mandate”\(^{18}\). The president of the Pan Arab Games Association prince Faisal Bin Fahd Bin Abdel Aziz claims that

This is a tournament of solidarity between the Lebanese people who have established credibility in their country and given rise to this great sporting event (...) Bombs can destroy a city but can never shake the faith of believers

However, the events that occurred before and during the Games, which manifested symbols of Arab unity and solidarity with Lebanon, did not incorporate the Iraqi people. The Iraqi team was banned from participation in the Pan-Arab Games, since according to General Secretary of the Arab League the “least harmful (decision) had to be chosen”. Reflecting on the reasons for this decision, the Lebanese Foreign Minister states that “Lebanon was left in a difficult position, inviting Iraq and losing the participation of countries whose (economic)\(^{19}\) relations with Lebanon are of paramount importance, or excluding Iraq to safeguard relative inter-Arab accord, because full accord was not possible”. The Head of the Iraqi delegation commented

\(^{16}\) Based on different interpretations of nationalism, including the one party security state (e.g. Syria and Iraq) or regional, local nationalism (e.g. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco) (see Said, 1994:304)
\(^{17}\) Gulf states, which are members of the GCC (Gulf Council of Co-operation), are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and UAE.
\(^{19}\) Kuwait and Saudi Arabia invested heavily in the process of rebuilding Lebanon after the civil war, including the reconstruction of major sports facilities used during the Pan-Arab games.
that this decision was against the Arab nationalist ideology preached by Lebanese politicians and Arab League personalities, of which Iraq was once deemed to represent the intellectual centre.

Another example of internal conflicts is football matches between Algeria and Egypt, known as ‘enemy brothers’, which have generated violence and a number of diplomatic incidents in the last fifteen years. This has also been the case in other sports competitions between Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya, supposedly members of the Maghreb union.

In other words, as a consequence of the new world system, sub national identities, and political and economic interests, have taken the place of ‘single all Arab nation’ considerations of unity and co-operation, which nevertheless still exist but only in some limited economic and cultural sectors (including sport), although without any real political will to extend or deepen such an approach.

3.4 The history of Algeria’s nationalism and nation-state

Before undertaking an analysis of Algerian nationalism and the role of sport in building Algerian national identity, we need first to comprehend (and to deconstruct) the particularity of French colonialism and its impact on Algerian society, during the colonial and postcolonial period. An analysis of the Algerian nation needs also to take into account the geographical localisation of the country (North Africa, Arab nation, Mediterranean Sea and the Islamic World).

A- The type of colonialism:

According to Manceron (1996), Algeria and South Africa are the only colonies in Africa and Asia that experienced a significant immigration movement from Europe\(^{20}\). The migrant population coming to extend the colonial presence and rule in both regions had established their own interests, own society and culture (and own

\(^{20}\) The other contemporary example (of a large-scale of colonial settlement) is the Palestinian’s occupied territory.
language in South Africa). In the case of South Africa, which was under British rule, settlers were mainly from the Netherlands and Great Britain. For Algeria they were from southern Europe such as southern Spain, Corsica, Malta and the south of Italy as well as France. Furthermore, in the case of Algeria, in comparison to South Africa, the conquest project was for about a century the official doctrine of the three French republican states (Manceron, 2002). The notion that Algeria is France and France is Algeria was the only accepted form of truth for French successive governments\textsuperscript{21}, elected parliaments, and those in charge of establishing educational (history and geography) programmes.

B- The Brutality of the colonial power:

The Algerian people suffered under colonial domination more than any other people in Africa or the Arab world. According to Manceron (1996), nowhere was the colonial 'conquest' so violent, brutal and radical in its destruction of the pre-existent social structure than in Algeria. Nowhere, had the repression of the colonial power toward the native population caused so many deaths (more than one million)\textsuperscript{22} and so much suffering and trauma than in Algeria. The only other example of destructive colonialism in Africa is South Africa, however, by comparison to Algeria, the colonial métropole (Britain, Netherlands) had the wisdom, according to Manceron, to disassociate (désolidariser) itself from the European settler minority, leaving the conflict to be resolved between the European settler minority and the autochthonomous [indigenous] majority, and not between the latter and the metropolis [as was the case for Algeria] (Manceron, 2002: 1330).

In the same vein Khan suggests that

\textsuperscript{21} Francois Mitterrand’s speech made in the 1950s, then Minister of interior affairs, expressed this colonial ideology.
\textsuperscript{22} 10 times more than in Morocco, a society that had an equivalent population.
French colonialism worked not only to expropriate the Algerian tribes and destroy the rural economy, but also to wipe out handicraft and guild-type organisation, pillage the cities, suffocate the few extant intellectual élites, steal or burn archival documents and entire libraries, wage ceaseless war on Arabic language and Islam, and try to drive them into permanent inferiority by setting up a Native School system designed mainly to enhance a servile education necessary for the advancement of colonialism and a degree of acculturation apt to ensure the maintenance of foreign domination (1991:286)

Manceron continues by stating that the damage caused by the war was not only quantitative, but also much more profound. It affected the raison d'être of the Algerian nation, its national identity and values. Bourdieu goes as far as to claim that the colonial situation and war had subjected the Algerian society to a real déculturation...a catastrophic experience of social surgery, the war made a clean sweep of a civilisation that we could not talk about q’au passé [only as lost history] (1974:123, translated from French).

The colonial domination had broken the link and social contract between society and the state. The latter had been (and still is) perceived by the large Algerian population, throughout history, as being the server or protector of the minority’s interests. Dominant interests prevailed- the ‘beylik’ interests during the Ottoman period, the French interests during the colonial era, and the FLN-state interests in the post-independence era.

The state was seen as a predatory force that imposed a taxes, crushed revolts and wasted the country’s resources to subsidise luxurious lifestyle for the high and mighty and to feed an army whose main job was not to defend the country from foreign attack but to maintain internal order (Khan, 1991:286)
C- Localisation of the Algerian nation

The Islamisation and the Arabisation of Algeria and the Ottoman presence in the region, have had a huge impact on the cultural values of the Algerian population. Algerians were (and still are) fascinated by the East, considered at some points in time as the most prestigious centres of culture and the source of intellectual models. This fascination has continued to become a source of reference for the Algerian nationalist movement, particularly for the so-called reformist or Islamic renovation movement, during colonisation, and by the national party (FLN), in the post-colonial period.

Because of the geographical position of the country (in the southern Mediterranean), the Algerian people were also fascinated by the west, which represents the 'Christian world' or the 'anti thesis' of the Arab-Islamic world, but at the same time regarded as the centre of enlightenment, secular science and rational administration. However, the colonial conquest of the region had broken this contact and transformed the Algerian vision into one of European (colonial) modernity, thus moving from a desirable model to an imposed one (without any negotiation or adaptation to the particularity of Algerian society). In contrast to Algeria, in Turkey, Egypt or even Tunisia and Morocco, the European modernity were 'freely' negotiated and accepted. (Meynier, 1996:43).

This duality of conception of Algerians concerning their identity and origins, situated between traditional values and modernity, as well as Islamo-Arabo-Berber and Mediterranean cultures, has resulted in a nationalist sensitivity that is a mixture of the culture of the Orient and the 'imposed' European model of the nation-state and modernity.

23 Through forced acculturation, and (destructive) administrative interventionism (see Bourdieu 1974).
3.4.1 Algerian national identity

The colonial policy in legitimising colonialism had passed through the de-legitimisation of the pre-colonial Algerian nation. This de-legitimisation was based on the colonial myth that people living in the Maghreb were “anarchic” and had been unable throughout history to organise themselves (Meynier, 1996: 37). They had always needed to be ‘organised’ by external powers; Romans, Arabs, Ottoman and French. Of course, according to French historians and ethnographers, Arabs and the Ottoman could not be compared to Romans and their French descendants in colonial mythology. According to Ruhe (1998: 179), the colonial power, from its arrival in Algeria, started abolishing and destroying every culture and political reference that represented the ‘other’ and its culture, in order to establish what Ruhe describes as “France over the Mediterranean Sea”. Regarding this point Cesari (1997: 82) claims that the imposition by colonialism of capitalism, military power and social (including information) control, have heavily affected not only social and political organisation, but also Algerian mentality.

In line with Manceron (1996: 16), the questions that need to be asked when undertaking a historical analysis of the Algerian nation-state, are the following:

- What is the place of nation and state in the “Algerian space” or history?
- Can we refer to the Algerian State (multiple states) before colonisation? In which period? In which territory?
- Could the modern concept of “state” be applied to define the dynasties that had existed in Algeria before colonisation?

Manceron (1996: 19) criticises the colonial myth and its version of history before colonisation. He states that the history of what is described as the “Algerian space” had experienced successive Berbers, Arabs, and Islamic states, which had had an administrative control over different parts of the Algerian territory. Before the Romans there was the Great Numedia (which corresponds to what is now known as the Maghreb) under the leadership of Massinissa and Jugurtha. After the Islamisation
and Arabisation of the region, the "Algerian space" had known a number of dynasties such as the Rostomides and the Ziyanides in the west, the Hammadites in the East, the Almohade 'Empire' covering the south of Spain and a large part of the Maghreb. As well, 'La Régence d'Alger', founded during the Ottoman presence in the region (1555-1830), which corresponded, according to Benjamin Stora, to the modern criteria of a sovereign state with a powerful navy that controlled and imposed its hegemony on Mediterranean Sea. To counter the colonial invasion, Amir Abdelkader had founded a powerful Algerian state (1832-1847) with the aim of unifying the various components of Algerian society to resist the French invaders. Similar to Mouhamed Abdou in Egypt, Emir Abdelkader attempted to create a state with an appropriate politico-military organisational structure. He succeeded in establishing an independent administration (in charge of tax and judiciary systems) and a regular national Army under orders to serve the state. An army described by Tocqueville and reported in Bennoune (1991: 57) "as the prime condition of power of the Prince (Abdelkader) state that controlled the western part of Algeria and defeated the French army on a number of occasions".

3.4.2 Algerian nationalist movements

Benjamin Stora (1998) described the culture of Algerian nationalism as being complex and mixed. It incorporates, firstly, socialist values of emancipation and self-determination. Secondly, it took from communism its approach regarding political party structure, founded on central democracy (the Etoile Nord Africain, ENA 1926 Partie du People Algérien PPA 1937, Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques MTLD 1946, and National Liberation Front FLN 1954). Thirdly, it took from the Baathist movements (in Syria and Iraq) the values of all-Arab nation and Pan-Arab nationalism, and finally from religious movements in the Islamic circle, values of differentiation, reformism and cultural separation.

The reformist movement, represented by the Eulama (Muslim scholars), was the first movement to occupy the Algerian national historical space. Their essence was to combat what is known as the de-Islamisation of Algerian society (Harbi, 1996:67) and its depersonalisation introduced by the colonial power to break the existing link
between Algerians and their religion, Islam, described by Harbi\textsuperscript{24} as one of the most important dimensions of Algerian identity. Ibn Badis, the leader of the movement himself claims that Algerian individual nationalism is Islam, the fundamental element of differentiation (between Muslims and non-Muslims). Therefore, the objective of the movement was the continuing Islamisation (in addition to the Arabisation) of the society, which in their perception had not yet been achieved. The clerics project for society was different from that of other Algerian élites, which the movement described as being occidentalised and westernised, both in their behaviour and world view based on individualism and not on religious community. Harbi continues by stating that the reformist movement succeeded in establishing itself within the Algerian national and political space because it brought a new set of cultural and communication tools to diffuse their political and cultural views. They succeeded also in compromising, for tactical reasons, between modernisation (without westernisation) and cultural separation. In other word, they combined between two types of nationalism, \textit{tactical nationalism} (taking particular positions for particular political situations) and \textit{historical nationalism} (for long term strategy)\textsuperscript{25}. Because of this they were accused by some historians (prior to that, by nationalists) of being assimilationist, due to the fact that they accepted for example French nationality (without naturalisation), which they distinguished from ethnic nationality (Islam).

Other fundamental dimensions of the reformist movement were belief in the following:

- \textit{Linguistic nationalism}, which links Islam to the Arabic language (the language of revelation and the holy Koran); and
- \textit{Juridical nationalism} that opposed the introduction or mixture between modern (secular) French law and Islamic law.

\textsuperscript{24} For more discussion about the impact of colonial history in Algeria read Harbi (2002) article: Le poids de l'histoire et la violence vint à l'Algérie http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2002/07/HARBI/16734..

\textsuperscript{25} The position of Eulama was marked by a number of tactical compromise under the framework of "l'état de nécessité" necessity case, not exempt though from their long term objective, fundamentalism (Harbi, 1996:71).
Ibn Badis\textsuperscript{26} claimed that

(...) this Algerian Muslim nation is not France; it is not possible that it be France; it does not want to become France; and even if it wished, it could not be France (\textit{al-Shihab}, April 1936, as translated by John Ruedy 1994, p. 76)

The second most important movement in the Algerian space during the colonisation was the \textit{"Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien"} (UDMA), founded in 1946. Its leader Farhat Abbas, according to Benjamin Stora, was deeply influenced by French republican values and regarded by the colonialists as the model for integration. Ex-general secretary of the North African Muslim Students Association, elected as a general council, municipal council and \textit{délégué financier}, married to a French woman, Farhat Abbas was described by Montagnon (1998:224) as a man of French culture who sees his future and that of his people only under French rule\textsuperscript{27} and whose aim was to reconcile and link questions of republican values, with Islam and \textquote{Laïcité}, which made him (according to radical nationalists) a pure \textit{assimilationist}.

In opposition to the Farhat Abbas movement, which was depicted as \textit{francophile}, bourgeois and elitist, there was the populist movement \textit{Etoile Nord Africaine (ENA)-Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA)- Mouvement de la Triomphe pour la Liberté Démocratique (MTLD)}, the movement that sought to represent the inspiration of the majority of Algerian people. Its leader was Messali Hadj, who was described by historians as the father of the Algerian independent front that took its values from international independent or separatist ideologies, Arab nationalism and Islam. According to Bennoune (1991), the only party that understood the nature of French colonialism and the structural characteristics of traditional Algerian society was the popular national movement. This was possible because the founders (Algerian migrant workers) of the movement had a profound knowledge of French society\textsuperscript{28},

\textsuperscript{26} Imam Ben Badis died in April 16, 1940. This day is celebrated as an Algerian holiday, called \textit{yaoum el-ilim} (day of knowledge).

\textsuperscript{27} His view about Algerian nation had changed after the 1945 massacre, to become an influential member of the Notional Front (FLN), and president of the first Algerian provisional government.

\textsuperscript{28} It has been argued that Algerian flag was designed by Messali in France.
especially of its workers' movements and the ideas and programmes of the major political courants (wings) on the left, right and centre.

(...) Having been in contact with these modern parties and movements, they had learned their methods, their organisational and operational styles in particular, and had even gone so far as to assimilate their ways of planning and executing their activities as well as their conception of relations between society and state, people and nation. (Bennoune, 1991:49)

Messali Hadj was the first Algerian nationalist who preached total independence and anti-colonial resistance. He stated in one of his political speeches in August 1937 that:

The Algerian People have their own language, religion, glorious past, thinkers, and Islamic traditions. We are still today, despite colonisation, very attached to our past, the source of our political inspiration...Independence is a natural fact and part of every Muslim heart (Stora, 1998:26, original text in French)

The political programme of ENA-PPA- MTLD included the following:

- Total independence for Algeria
- Total retreat of the occupation army
- The constitution of a national Army, national revolutionary movement, and a national (representative) assembly.
- Introduction of the Arabic language in the national curriculum
- Recuperation of properties lands, mines and forest confiscated by the colonial power and settlers.

Those political demands were seen by the French colonial power as unacceptable, and as a result of this the populist national movement was banned and its leaders, among them Messali Hadj, were arrested or forced to leave the country.
Between the supporters of the colonial society and the supporters of Algerian nationalism, represented by Messali Hadj, Ferhat Abbas and Ben Badis, another small movement (minority) existed, the Algerian Communist Party (PCA). The political vision (or dream) of the Algerian communist movement was to create a multi-cultural and a multi-ethnic nation, open to all communities. This communist dream had failed because, according to Stora (1998: 25), it was not in touch with the realities of the Algerian identity based on Islamic values and the Algerian society, which was at that time under total oppression by the colonial power.

From the populist movement a new nationalist and revolutionary front, the nationalist underground organisation, the secret organisation (OS), appeared in the Algerian political space. According to Khan:

it was a small group of breakaway PPA militants who decided to spark the liberation war by seizing the initiative and appealing directly to people. They were driven by a powerful conviction that it was imperative to stop the nationalist movement from playing political footsy (co-operating, negotiating) with the colonial power, and their initiative immediately injected two of the dominant principles of national legitimacy into the Algerian equation: the people and the Army. (1991:289)

Those in charge of this movement contested the leadership of Messali Hadj and called for group direction of the armed revolution, under a national and single party (the FLN) and a National Liberation Army (NLA) as the only way to achieve total independence. The former was perceived as the sole representative of the Algerian will, while the latter represented the military instrument of the Algerian revolution. The aim of the movement was to establish a modern revolutionary organisation of a national scale, capable of mobilising all the creative energies of the Algerian people in general, and those of the nationalist militants in particular (whatever their political and ideological beliefs), for the liberation of the country (Bennoune, 1991:49).

29 Although, we have to acknowledge the active participation of members of the French communist party in the struggle of Algerian people for self-determination.
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The transformation of the Algerian political resistance toward colonial power, first, from assimilation (UDMA) and reformism (Muslim scholars), toward nationalism (ENA-PPA-MTLD), and afterwards to anti-colonialism and armed revolution (FLN), was a result of some internal and external events. Most notably, the massacre of 45,000 Algerians by the colonial army forces who were taking part in peaceful demonstration for independence on 8th May 1945 and the defeat of the French Army, the third most powerful army at that time, in Vietnam. The launching of the National Liberation War on 1 November 1954 was, as described by Bennoune (1991:59)

the upshot of a series of contradictions created by the colonial situation. The country had been brought to a political impasse on account of the status conferred on the colony by the French National Assembly in 1947, and above all by the uncompromising opposition of the settlers to every reform designed to improve the condition of Algerians.

The main objectives of the Algerian revolution were, internally, the restoration of the Algerian State as a sovereign, democratic and socialist state within the framework of Islamic principles; and externally, to internationalise the problem and to achieve North African unity within its national Arab-Islamic frameworks.

3.4.3 Sport and Algerian nationalism

Sport in parallel to other cultural manifestations [art, literature30 and theatre], inspired by the Algerian struggle for independence, had become a privileged site for individual liberation and an instrument for subversion (Dine, 1996). The politicisation of sport transformed the stadium into a symbolic, and sometimes into a real, arena of multi-civilisation conflict (occidental, Judeo-Christian versus Berber-Arab-Muslim).

The diffusion of modern sport, described by Lanfranchi (1994:71) as “l'héritage de l'occupant ”, started just after colonisation and the arrival of the first groups of

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30 For more discussion about language, literature and postcolonial discourse in Algeria see (Brossard, 1993; Niang, 1996; Salhi, 1999).
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(European) immigrants. The creation of the first ‘school of swimming’ goes back to 1844 in Algiers and the first sports clubs founded were le Sport Nautique d’Alger in 1867 and the Regional Association of the Algerian Gymnastics Society in 1891 (Archive d’outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence, reported in Fates, 1994:25). Physical education, (see figure 3.1) particularly gymnastics, first appeared in the colonial school as a form of military education, to become part of the national curriculum for education, by a decree from the Ministry of Public Instruction in 1882.

However, it should be mentioned that physical activities were part of Algerian culture centuries before colonisation. Fates goes a step further by stating that Algerians were not ‘inculte’ or ‘physically illiterate’, Algeria had its own cultural life and traditional physical activities founded on a conception of the world and society, and part of the collective (un) consciousness (1994:20). Those physical activities intended for entertainment and enjoyment contained spiritual exercises attached to religious beliefs, described by orientalists as a combination of magic-religious rituals. This is not completely true if we take the view of Muslim ‘pedagogists’ and philosophers, inspired by the prophet’s life and model of education, such as Abu Hamid al Ghazali31, who insists on the educational and health benefits of physical activities. Al–Ghazali promotes for example “innocent games which children should practice after school, to avoid killing the spirit” [reported in Fates (1994:26), original text in French].

31 Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) Islamic philosopher, theologian, and jurist, born in Tus, Iran (near modern Meshed). He was appointed professor of philosophy at Nizamiyah College, Baghdad (1091–5), where he exercised great academic and political influence, but later suffered a spiritual crisis which caused him to abandon his position for the ascetic life of a mendicant sufi (mystic), spending his time in meditation and spiritual exercises. After a brief return to teaching he retired to Tus to found a monastic community. He was a prolific author, best known for the monumental The Revival of the Religious Sciences, The Aims of Philosophers, The Incoherence of the Philosophers (biography.com) of the Religious Sciences, The Aims of Philosophers, The Incoherence of the Philosophers (biography.com).
Figure 3.1 *Histoire du Collège du Grand Alger, et du petit lycée de Ben-Aknoun 1883-1889* (Physical Education classes in colonial high school)

[Link](http://www.lycee-el-mokrani.edu.dz/15.05.01)
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As an example of those physical activities that were practised before colonisation (and some of them still survive in different forms), we can cite the following (see figures 3.2 and 3.3):

- **Fantasia**, a combination of horse riding and shooting, still popular in the western and sub-Saharan regions of Algeria
- Hunting in the mountains and the Sahara
- Singing and dancing (*Tekouka*) in the south.
- At *Telemcen* (in the West), in the region of *Djedjli* and in oriental *Kabylie* (the north) games of balance were practised to celebrate the spring season
- Summer carnivals in the Kabylie region
- At *Aures*, ball games (*Koura*) for girls were popular. (Fates, 1994:21)

3.4.4 The foundation of the Algerian national movement of sport 1920-1954

As the most evident of colonial sport we can cite football, which according to Alfred Wahl (reported in Dine 1996:178) developed in a spectacular manner after the First World War, both in France and *outre-mer*. For example, in June 1934, Paris had 13,448 registered players, whereas the number of registered players in Algeria had reached 13,494\(^{32}\) (see Lanfranchi and Taylor, 2001). When it was first introduced, teams were organised in Algeria in terms of ultra-nationalists and European groups (Spanish, Italian, Maltese and Jewish), reflecting the Mediterranean representation and cultural richness of Algerian society under the rule of the French Republic. The local population was not part of this social representation by the colonial power of Algerian society and a true hostility was expressed by European settlers regarding the participation or access of the local ‘indigenous’ population to sport. Participation in sport was strictly reserved for Europeans citizens (Fates, 1994:29), Algerian ‘indigenous’ people were not considered as citizens but ‘subjects’ and therefore they did not have the same rights as ‘European’ (settlers and state officials). According to the civil law, built on the values of French Revolution, citizens’ rights of freedom of

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\(^{32}\) The difference is that Paris had 110 equipped stadia while Algeria had only twenty (Lanfranchi and Taylor, 2001).
Figure 3.2 Pre-Historical wall drawings in Tassili Mountains (Algerian desert)

Dancing  
Hunting  
Chariot

Playing chequers  
Dance of the ‘indigenous’ (south Algeria)

Figure 3.3 Popular games and Physical activities before French colonialism
thought, of speech and media, or the rights of assembly and to found associations, did not exist for non-citizens. Because the majority of non-citizens were in the "indigenous" category, they were not allowed to create their own associations or to have access to organised sport activities. This goes with the same line with Bourdieu's analysis of the colonial society in his work on the sociology of Algeria, who suggests that:

The colonial society reminds us of a system of castes. It is composed in fact of two distinct and juxtaposed communities...the European society, the minority majority [la minorité majoritaire] in social, economic and political plans, tries, based on racist ideology, to transform privileges to a right...to authorise each society to be what it is, the dominant, dominant, the dominée, dominée. (1974: 116, translated from French)

Meanwhile, as a result of a rapid increase in the level of competitions and profit, some clubs, which until then, had been composed mainly of European players, were forced to recruit talented 'indigenous' players without taking account of their ethnic origins. Some of these players were very successful and played as professionals in French teams and were even selected to play international matches with the French national team. These include players like Mekhloufi (St Etienne, 1958) who was selected four times to play with French national team, and Brahimi (Toulouse, 1957) selected once. We can cite others like Bouchouk who played for Toulouse, 1957, Ali Bennouna (Sete, 1934), Ben Bouali (l'OGC Nice, 1954), Ben Ali (Bordeaux, 1941), Firoud and Bentifour (l'OGC Nice, 1954), Bouchache (le Havre, 1959), Salem (Sedan, 1961) [reported in Fates (1994:34), from Actualite de l'immigration, April 26th, May 2nd 1989].

33 The division between two societies was part of scientific process of colonisation. According to Toqueville, "there have to be two very distinct form of legislation in Africa, because there are two very very separated societies. Absolutely nothing could prevent Europeans being treated separately. The rules that were made for them should be applied only for them" (Alexis de Tocqueville, "Travail sur l'Algérie. in oeuvres complètes, Paris, Gallimard, « Bibliothèque de la Plaidade ″, 1991, in http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/06/Le_cour_Grandmaison_15321 translated from French).

34 According to Lanfranchi and Taylor (2001) between 1945 and 1962, seventy-six Muslim Algerians, thirty four Moroccans and seven Tunisians played in French professional football.
Integration or inclusion of 'indigenous' individuals into football was not only for players but also for administrators. As a policy and effort from the colonial authority for 'reconciliation' the presidency of Union Sportive Franco-Musulmane Setifienne (USS) was awarded to Farhat Abbas, (the leader of UDMA, Union Democratique du Manifest Algérien and supporter in his early political activism of assimilation). Regarding this point, Lanfranchi and Wahl (1996: 123) suggest, according to the evidence of some "pieds noirs," that In the case of Algeria, football formed a privileged space where the two communities mixed... Were not Albert Camus, the goal keeper for the young Racing Universitaire d'Alger and Ahmed Ben Bella, who had played professionally for Olympique Marseille, the most eloquent proof of the autonomy of sport?

However, despite the colonial policy of integration the majority of Algerian 'indigenous-Muslims' wanted to found their own Muslim sports associations, sometimes without the consent of the colonial authorities. Mouloudia Club d'Alger (MCA) was the first Muslim club to be created in 1921. It included six sports sections: football, basketball, volleyball, athletics, swimming and boxing, followed by others in Constantine (in the east) and Oran (in the west). Muslim clubs became the place for the formation of national movement leaders and a place for a wider political mobilisation (see figure 3.4 ). As for reformists, sport (in addition to theatre, and the scouts movements) was viewed as an arena that could be used for the moral protection (re-Islamisation) of youngsters, a way to keep them away from immoral deviations (alcoholism, prostitution, gambling and immoral spectacles) provoked by

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35 European settlers, called pier noir for the colour of their shoes.
36 This form of integration that existed in Algerian football starting from the 1930s is well expressed by Ben Bella, one the political leaders of Algerian revolution and first president of independent Algeria: "At Meghnia, during my childhood, I did not notice the difference between Frenchmen and Algerians, as much as I was to do later at Tlemecen. There was only a handful of European, most of them colons [settlers]. For instance, the Jews, Frenchmen and Algerians of Meghnia together composed the football team, and this teams spirit did much to strengthen our friendship" (in Merler, R: 1965, reported by Dine: 2002).
37 Popular also within European elites (particularly from the Algerian communist party), who favoured self-determination for Algerian society.
Figure 3.5 An ancient photo (early 1930s) of *Mouloudia* Football Club, the first Algerian ('indigenous') football club (http://membres.lycos.fr/mcalger/)
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colonial acculturation. In this case, football ‘l’hérétage de l’occupant’ and described by Fates (1994:29) as “ce corps étrange”, was used as a mean for the affirmation of Algerian society and also to resist colonial cultural hegemony, in its own terms. This process of absorption and then transformation of football by nationalist is interpreted by Hannerz (1991), as being a form of ‘créolisation’ or what Bourdieu refers to as de-assimilation of a global culture (see globalisation chapter).

Some of the names of ‘indigenous’ clubs started with the words ‘Club Musulman or Union Sportive Musulmane’. Islam was a fundamental element and symbol of differentiation (between Muslim and non-Muslim clubs). Moreover, a considerable number of Muslim football clubs, to express their nationalist ideology and identity, adopted as their team colours, the colours of the ‘non-recognised’ Algerian national flag, which were green, white and red. The other example of this form of resistance is Guelma (a team in the Constantine region), which to protest against the massacre of 45,000 Algerians on 8 May 1945 played (and it still does today) in black strip (Fates, 1994:32). As described by Darby (2002:27), football clubs in colonised Algeria acted as centres of anti-colonial sentiment and the promotion of a nationalist tradition. Hence, a description of the national space by Hussein (1997:167) could be applied to define the role of Muslim sports associations during the colonial era. Sports clubs were in a way a space for identification, a symbolic place for gathering and a manifestation of certain signs of community and religious acknowledgement or ‘reconnaissance’. Sport was also a space also for political messages, created by a collective voice, addressed to outsiders, and intended to be heard by the colonial power. This specific niche (the sports club) was necessary for the social sustenance and expression of the Muslim ‘indigenous’ population.

As a reaction to this and in order to reduce the influence of the so called ‘fanatics’, ‘nationalists’ and ‘trouble makers’ among the clubs, the colonial authority ordered the incorporation of three Europeans in the list of players for Muslim clubs, which

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38 “Ignorant youngsters, who were under the threat from bars, cafes and the streets. Those who succeed in finding a job, considered themselves as simple animated tools, outside their work. They showed no interest in anything, or anyone, or in any cause or public interests” El Shihab, Mars, 1933, reported by Fates (1994:107, translated from French).
wished to play against Europeans. This new rule did not stop confrontations on and off the pitch, between supporters of Muslim clubs (proponents of national independence) and supporters of European clubs (promoters of colonial society). Football matches had become an occasion for political expression, rejecting the colonial oppression and promoting nationalists demonstrations, all over the country to the extent that Philip Dine suggests that nationalist movements, mainly the PPA (*Partie du Peuple Algérien*) (and later on, the FLN), had transformed football from a colonial tool of integration and reconciliation, to a tool for political agitation (Dine, 1996:181). A letter sent by *le Préfet de Constantine*, dated 22 December 1937, addressed to the General Governor of Algiers, reflects this concern:

...For almost four months, indigenous nationalist propaganda, represented by the PPA [Algerian Popular Party] has been evident (...) This set of ideas and doctrines delivered to a frustrated and ignorant population have resulted in a high level of excitement and provoked a particular “need for expansion” among the young population, which could explain recent incidents... and regrettable demonstrations that may result in compromising order and public security...

During the match played on Sunday 20\(^{th}\) of February 1938 between JSD (*Jeunesse Sportive Djidjlienne*) and Union sportive de Biskra, one minute of silence for the memory of “6 indigenous people killed in the 6\(^{th}\) of February in Biskra” was ordered by players from JSD (...) On stadium terraces political agitation was directed by M.Khalef the local leader of PPA (*Rapport de la PRG, Archives d'outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence*, reported by Fates, 1994:29, original text in French, translated by the author).

### 3.4.5 Football and the Algerian Revolution 1954-1962

According to Lanfranchi, from 1954, football had an important place in FLN strategy (consciously or not) for armed struggle. For example, the final details of Armed revolution were planned by representative of FLN in Switzerland during the latter stages of the 1954 World Cup (Lanfranchi and Taylor, 2001). On 26 May 1957, Ali
Chekal, former president of the Algerian Assembly and a firm supporter of colonial society and the indissoluble link between France and Algeria, was killed by Ben Sadok, during the French Cup final between Toulouse and Anger (Lanfranchi, 1994: 71).

Fates points out that after the maturation of the national movement when the FLN took over its role as the sole leader of the armed revolution for independence, sport had to be integrated as a part of a dynamic break with colonial society. As a consequence, the FLN ordered ‘Muslim Clubs’ in 1956 to stop all sports activities and joining the ALN troops to fight against the colonial power. Those measures however excluded Algerian professional players, playing in France, but by 1958, the FLN understood the role that sport and particularly football (the most popular game in the world) could play in the internationalisation of the Algerian cause and decided to create a national revolutionary team. They gave orders to all Algerian professional players, playing in different teams in the French league, to join the Algerian national team of “fighters” (Fates, 1994: 33). Ten players among them Mekhloufi and Zitouni who were internationals and certain to be selected for the World Cup in Sweden, responded positively. Political leaders of the FLN welcomed the engagement and political positioning of Algerian players, which was seen as a patriotic decision that put “the independence of the homeland before any other interests” (Le Monde 22 April 1958, reported in Lanfranchi, 1994: 71). Members of the FLN team, described as political militants and ambassadors of Algerian revolution, under the leadership of Mekhloufi (named by Boudjedra 1981, as “le footbaleur de la révolution”, in a novel dedicated to the FLN team), played and won 14 successive matches, in a

39 Among the best strikers of Toulouse were Algerians Ahmed Brahimi and Said Brahimi. Rachid Boudjedra in his novel Le Vainqueur de coupe (1981) neatly encapsulates the feelings of Ben Sadok who was revolted to see two Algerians playing football, while their fellow people were being killed, but at the same time being happy to see them performing well, so that they could show French spectators that Algerians were capable of anything (even killing)....(see Boudjedra, R:1981).

40 In April 1958, Mekhloufi abandoned the French national team preparing for the World Cup Finals in Sweden and instantly became an Algerian national symbol. A few months earlier he had been part of a French team, which won the world military football competition in Buenos Aires on the French National Day, 14 July 1957(Lanfranchi & Wahl,1996:119)
number of countries regarded as future allies of the Algerian republic (Lanfranchi, 1994:71) namely the Soviet Union, China, North Vietnam, and Arab countries.  

Scoring an average of four goals a game and winning many of their games, the FLN team embodies the inescapable momentum toward victory of the liberation movement itself. (Lanfranchi and Wahl, 1996:122)

The response of the international football authorities, represented by FIFA, was to ban all Algerian players who agreed to join the FLN team. This decision was extended to all national teams, which played against the FLN team. For example, in 1958, the Moroccan Federation of Football was simply excluded from FIFA, following a demand from the French Federation (Lanfranchi, 1994:71).

Dine points out that, in giving the order for indigenous clubs to withdraw from the colonial leagues (and stop their sporting activities in 1956) and requiring the return of professional players, playing in French clubs in order to join the FLN team, the FLN transformed football into a tool of nationalist agitation. This was further compounded by the bombing of a stadium in Algeria and execution of persons (e.g. Ali Chekal) who were supporters of l’Algérie Française, during a football match in French territory (Dine, 1996:181). Nonetheless, it should be noted that the French authorities also used the stadium during the revolution (previously seen as a place for reconciliation and multi-ethnic integration), as a tool of oppression in an effort to destroy Algerians (logistical) support for the revolution. Some examples of this oppression were the massacre of innocent members of the population in 1955 in Skikda, or the transformation of Stade De Coubertin in Paris into a camp for Algerian workers arrested after 17 October 1961 protest. According to Fates, the

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41 The FLN Team won 43 of its 57 matches scoring 244 goals (Chehat, 1987, reported in Lanfranchi & Wahl, 1996).
42 Following the decisive and the large-scale attacks mounted on 20 August 1955 by the ALN in Zone II, North of Constantine, the colonial police and army reacted with massive repression, massacring thousands of Algerian civilians. (Bennoune, 1991:71).
43 “The mass imprisonment of Algerian [over 11,000] demonstrators was also uncannily reminiscent of the Rafle du vel d’hiv, the July 1942 roundup of over 13,000 Jewish men, women and children arrested by French police for deportation” (see Anne Donadey, 2001:48).
FLN succeeded through its national football team, in ensuring an honourable participation in international life by accomplishing high quality sporting performance and thus becoming a model for other revolutionary movements fighting for their independence around the world (e.g. the Palestinian national football team). In this way the phenomenon of sport became an effective diplomatic instrument for the promotion of the Algerian cause by the international society (Fates, 1994:33).

3.5 Post-independence and the FLN-state

Nation-state building in the post-independence era, as a result of colonial history, operated, according to Stora (1998:33), by authoritarian centralisation and dissimulation of differences. The FLN-state as with any other populist state in the Third World in general and Arab nation in particular, had presented itself as a liberating, centralising, and unifying force. Moreover, a guarantor of popular sovereignty, and national integrity, as well as the defender of the country's frontiers (designated by the colonial power). Above all, according to Bennoune, the new state presented itself as socialist in orientation (against neo-colonialism), populist, development oriented, modernist (modernity without modernisation or democratisation). It was also a key agent of technological, economic, social and cultural transformation (1991:83). Ali El-Kenz, goes a step further by claiming that the State, drawing its legitimacy from the springs of the national liberation movement became the prime mover of the society. A highly centralised establishment, depriving all other institutions of essential power. This was explained by Santucci (1993) as the relation between the unity of state power (l'unité du pouvoir d'état) and that of nation's unity (l'unité de la nation).

The achieved unity of state power consecrated to express the nation's unity, was used to justify the totalitarian power of a ruling system [d'un appareil dirigeant], as well as to subscribe its action within a unified and stable
framework in relation to religious, civil and military aspects (translated from French by the author).

On the ideological level, it was the responsibility of the FLN, the single party, to ensure the hegemony of the state over society, in resisting imperialism and neocolonialism. One of its assignments was the co-ordination and orientation of activities of the ‘masses’ now defined as ‘the social force of revolution’, which include workers, peasants, the army, youth and the executive strata, organised under a populist value system (El-Kenz, 1991:12). Thus, the role of civil society was reduced to an instrument of the regime, without any autonomy margin in serving its cause and that of society in general (Hadjeres, 1996:132). It was democracy, but a democracy under a politically despotic regime (El-Kenz, 1991:16).

(...) There were the individual citizens entitled to claim different rights, but these rights, were exclusively social, the right to work, education, health, housing etc. On the other hand there was the state, with the panoply of monopolistic powers it had reserved for itself, starting with the power of command, but embracing also a monopoly over organisation expression, etc. Thus a sort of tacit social contract was established between citizens, who seemed to have abdicated their political right to the state, which would compensate by guaranteeing them their social rights (security in exchange of freedom). (El-Kenz, 1991:17)

Politically, according to Bensmaia (1997:150), everything happened in a such way that in Algeria “we wanted to build a system without incompatibility, contradiction or opposition”. In other words, the foundation of the Algerian regime was based on the negation of political conflict, what Bensmaia describes as a “unanimity mode of thinking” or “pensée unique”. Pluralism was considered as synonymous with division (Cesari, 1998:43) and criticising the FLN State was regarded in a way as criticism of the historical legitimacy of the national revolutionary movement. In other words, the state party was, until 1988, a tool and place for the fabrication of unanimity, which did not, according to Cesari, correspond to monotheism, since the organisation of
state was founded on one regime but divided between three systems of power (party, administration and Army). El-Kenz gives another explanation of this ‘trinity’ known also as ‘Troika’ of power structure, which in his view had three dimensions; oil income (the first source of Algeria’s export income), a strong, centralising state, and a single party.

(…) Together [party, administration and the army], they constituted a system of power that conceived itself as a continuation of the liberation movement, identifying itself with ‘the revolution’, was the self-appointed guide of the people defined as a revolutionary force, and related to the society as if it were a military headquarters commanding an army on the battlefield in a new species of war called, for the moment, development. (between bracket added, 1991:14)

Islam on the other hand, as a source of other social values, was largely instrumentalised by élite groups within the party circle, in the service of the state. For example “Article 43 of the 1963 law did not recognise national community in terms of a social diversity of groups but as an homogeneous community, defined by Islam” (reported by Cesari, 1998:43, original text in French). For this purpose, the early nationalist formula of the reformist movement of Muslim scholars that “Algeria is my homeland, Arabic is my language, and Islam is my religion” was combined with socialist values, and used according to Cesari (1998:43) to found what is described as ‘Islamic-socialism’, in other words Islam in service of socialism. Hadjeres describe this ideological dualism by stating that:

The Algerian regime, was founded legally, “constitutionnellement”, on popular sovereignty, “Algerian republic democratic and popular”, “From the people for the people”. At the same time Islam is the state religion, and the chief of state declared his oath on the Koran even regarding the affirmation of his loyalty toward socialism (Hadjeres, 1996:119, original text in French).
As for "socialism", in comparison to other Maghrebin states, the example of Tunisia which opted for a reformism based on two sequences, first socialist and then liberal, or Morocco which adopted a non-contested, but tolerated liberalism by the presence of an important public sector, Algeria picked a militant and revolutionary type of socialism largely inspired by the soviet model, emerging within an ideological atmosphere of third-worldism (Santucci, 1993). El-Kenz speaks about this 'specific form' of socialism in Algeria as opposed to the 'scientific' socialism of the eastern countries. For example, people did talk of social struggle but they took care not to see it in terms of class struggle.

(...) It was not so much intended to describe an existing social structure in precise scientific terms. What it was meant to do was to help to organise the public perception of social reality in a simple, bi-polar schema entirely accessible to everyday common sense attitudes, with the virtue of combining in one potent brew facts as well as values, ethical and economic considerations, politics and history, revolution and reaction, good, evil, black and white...(El-Kenz, 1991:12).

3.5.1 Boumedienism and the 'Algerian model' for development

Hussein points out that "every nation needs a presence that symbolises, physically, nationalist feeling, and a voice that permits every citizen to find itself in communion with others. It is the figure of the father Nehru, Sokarno, Nasser, Bourgiba..." (1997:168, original text in French, translated by the author). For the Algerian case, it was Boumedienne, a personality who fulfilled the role of the nation's father, as described by Hussein. On the one hand, this reproduces the basic structural principles of the community, where members could recognise themselves through the eyes of others and through the personality of the father or the chief; on the other, it reproduced an ideological mobilisation and openness toward notions of modernity and universalism, (as identified by the father) that could be applied, in this first stage, to serve the state. The father "image" would allow everyone to start identifying himself or herself as an element of the national reality, to which he or she belongs, to
become thus affected by the past and future, the success and failure of the nation. Hussein (1997: 169) defines this process of emancipation and personal affirmation as being the birth of the “postcolonial individual”. As long as the father (Boumedienne) continues proclaiming a need for national unity, this unity will be accepted as being vital, to face any external challenge (neo-colonialism) or even internal (national development and nation-state building).

The government (under the leadership of Boumedienne, from 1966) came into power following a military coup on 19 of June 1965 and took major steps toward taking control of Algeria’s economy, by nationalising the minerals, banking, insurance and manufacturing sectors. This process culminated in 1971 with the nationalisation of the oil and gas sectors (owned before this by American and French companies) (Stone, 1997:55). The nationalisation programme of the government was viewed as being the last stage of de-colonisation (Bastion, 1996:82), aimed at establishing a full exercise of sovereignty over the country’s natural resources. It aimed also at ending the presence of the last colonial interest in the region and controlling the appropriation and redistribution of the country’s oil income, which was then the main source of wealth and foreign exchange (El-Kenz, 1991:13).

For Bastion, the year 1971, had marked the end of privileged Franco-Algerian interstate co-operation and the start of a new era characterised by the ‘banalisation’ of the relationship between France and Algeria.

Algeria has its own legislation [in addition, to its total control of the country’s natural resources], and therefore the entire instrument of its independence (Bastion, 1997: 82, original text in French).

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44 Four days after the friendly match between the Algerian national football team and Brazil in the Oran stadium named today “19 of June 1965”, which is the day when Boumedienne took power from Ben Bella (present during the match), in a military coup, known also as the day of “revolutionary reform”.
The nationalisation policy of Boumedienne's government (managed by a powerful stratum of technocrats\textsuperscript{45}) was followed by other economic, social and cultural reforms. Those reforms were part of one government development project; known in the west as "The Algerian model of development" that incorporated the following:

- **"Industrialising industries"** aimed at building up the material bases for development, especially of its industrial core, and launching of the metallurgical industry and a machine service sector. The industrialisation programme was under the responsibility of "national corporations", organised by the state in a form of socialist and "Fordist-like" styles of management (El-Kenz, 1991), which gave the workers participatory rights in decision making, in addition to other social rights (e.g. Consumer co-operatives, transport system, holiday and summer camps). The national corporations launched ambitious programmes for the construction of factories, and industrial complexes for liquid gas production, fertilisers, industrial vehicles, motors and electronics engineering (El-Kenz, 1991: 15).

- **The "Agrarian revolution"** aimed to abolish the old settler plantation system and replace it with a new system of co-operative units. Those units worked in cooperation with banks and other state service co-operatives, which provided them with funds, equipment, advice and aid in marketing their products. According to El-Kenz (1991; 15), the two sectors were expected to work together to modernise agriculture, at the same time to ensure social advancement and justice, particularly for the peasant class who suffered most from colonial repression and remained after independence on the sidelines while the rest of society marched forward.

- **Education** the Algerian model of development was extended to education. After 1971, the country had seen a multiplying of schools and higher education

\textsuperscript{45} Most of them trained in Europe, especially in France, and according to El-Kenz believed implicitly in the social ideals of Saint Simon (1991:13).
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institutes and universities, giving free access for the "masses" to education, the training system and to knowledge of modern technology that could serve in the national development process. As a consequence, initially massive demand for foreign teachers and advisors (particularly from other Arab countries and France), during the 1960s, was gradually reduced to provide work for the rapidly growing number of Algerian graduates (Stone, 1997: 55).

- **Welfare State** a system for 'free medicine' and social security was established, to cover the population's expenses (in some cases up to 100%), for diagnosis, prescription and drug purchases. In the same vein, in order to maintain worker's purchasing power "the system of consumer price subsidies for staple commodities was also reformed" (El-Kenz, 1991:15).

Millions of young people could now enter the multitude of schools and training centres opened throughout the society. In clinics and hospitals, people could get free treatment and medicine, and household budgets benefited from consumer price subsidies for essential commodities. This was the Algerian experience of the welfare state. It was a mixture of political anachronisms typified by authoritarian power structures and confiscating all freedom from the citizens, on the one hand, and on other hand, 'a programme of economic and social modernisation' typified, by contrast, by huge industrial achievements, an educational system focused on science and technology, etc. (El-Kenz, 1991:22).

Regarding foreign policy, independent Algeria has played a major role in international affairs, in multiple arenas (Stone, 1998:238), providing active support for countries struggling for their liberation, participation in the non aligned movement, and in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Arab League. Moreover, the promotion within the UN of the concept of a "new world economic order" and a new set of relations (based on equality) between north and south.
3.5.2 Nation-state building, socialism and sport 1962-1988

In 1962, at the end of the bloody struggle for independence, the victorious FLN-led resistance established an independent Algerian socialist state. Westernisation, socialist ideologies, secularism and the colonial phase, have all influenced the modernisation of newly independent countries, particularly those in Arab countries like Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, where the appropriation of the colonial model of sport was accepted with little criticism or adaptation (Fates, 1994:37). The appropriation of the dominant model of sport was seen as a necessity, taking into account the multiple uses of sport as an element for political, social and cultural recognition. The adoption of this universal language (sport) was accumulated by the adhesion46 of newly independent countries, during the 1960s, to the homogeneous laws, which regulate the functioning system of international sports movements and international federations. The latter was regarded as being an effective arena for future international treaties and conventions between north and south, east and west (Fates, 1994:37). As Wagg comments

(...) Soccer has always been considered to be one of the most important modernising forces of the continent [Africa]. The degree of competence an African state has achieved is measured on the soccer pitch...The World Cup Tournament, the ability to compete at the highest level, has become the ultimate measure of progress. (1995:37)

By the mid-1960s membership of CAF (Confédération Africaine de Football) had increased to more than 30 and the majority of those members had also joined FIFA (Darby, 2002:181). In Algeria sport like any other sector of the society, namely education, industry, agriculture, was seen by the FLN as a real instrument that may be used; a) externally, as a tool for national representation (of the Algerian model of socialism and development); b) internally, as an important element for political legitimisation. The FLN-state, as part of its policy for nation-state building and

46 This adhesion did not happen without conflicts and certain radicalism (for political and ideological reasons), which led sometimes to situation of crisis (GANEFO games, black September 1972, denunciation of apartheid).
development, had given to sport a privileged position, to serve the political formation and mobilisation of the masses, in order also to maintain a social balance and stability for the political system. To continue with the process of total rupture\textsuperscript{47} with the colonial past, after a short period of transition, the FLN-state through its legislative system had set up a new “Algerian” model for pedagogy and socialisation, known as the “sport-education community”. It aimed at establishing, through the practice of sport, a moral and civic education (for both sexes) and preparation of the younger generation for productive work, discipline and full integration into the socialist, democratic, and popular values of the nation. With the participation of schools, sports clubs, local communities, student and worker trade unions, the objectives were concerned with the foundation of a new method of insertion within the political system, which may serve in the formation of political attitudes based on patriotism, citizenship and \textit{civism}, building what Fates described as a “social positivism” (1994:64). For this reason, a considerable financial investment thanks to oil and gas income, was made by the state in the development of mass sport and the organisation of physical education, in training of new PE teachers and specialised sport technicians. This investment was also directed to maintaining sports facilities, (inherited from the colonial era), and the development of new massive Olympic infrastructures (e.g. 5 July stadium, in Algiers) symbolising what is known as ‘political gigantism’ (\textit{El Watan}, November, 31, 2000). The aim was to host major events at national and international level such as the African, Arab, and Mediterranean games, which according to Giulianotti and Finn (2000) serve to legitimise a specific state model of political administration (internally and externally). Other facilities were also built throughout the country (particularly in big cities), in an effort to combat centralism and ‘regionalism’. A series of articles in \textit{El-Moudjahid}, which appeared between 23 August and 10 September, 1975\textsuperscript{48} reinforces Giulianotti and Finn’s argument on state legitimisation and sport, particularly those describing the national football team’s victory in the final against France (\textit{l’ennemie d’hier}).

\textsuperscript{47} Total rupture was not achieved, if we consider the number of teachers and sport technicians formed in France in the 1970s, according to western, secular and modern models of teaching and pedagogy.

\textsuperscript{48} Before, during and after the 1975 Mediterranean games, in Algiers. The first major international event organised in Algeria after only 13 years of independence.
The revolutionary regime in Algeria has always accorded major importance to young generations in this country. The proof is the building of sports facilities in wilayates (departments). This effort is symbolised by the Olympic Complex of 19th June [the day of the military coup, called also the day of the revolution’s correction], where the Mediterranean Games of Algiers will take place...Those projects were achieved for a precise objective, building an infrastructure d'envergure aiming at facilitating the promotion of sports practice for all young Algerians (Djamal Saifi, *El Moudjahid*, 23.08.1975, original text in French)

(...). To add a white stone to the event, the revolutionary regime has provided all the necessary means, to accomplish this exaltante mission. During the reception organised at the People’s Palace, the president Houari Boumedién after congratulating Algerian athletes, was involved in discussion for considerable time with athletes whose performance had not escaped the attention of the president of the council of ministries, which are youth to participate more in the promotion of sport” (*El Moudjahid*, 10.09.1975, original text in French)

(...). all invited delegations, the majority of whom came to Algeria for the first time, declared their admiration for the achievement of our country. Emerging from people, the revolutionary regime, works for the people [from the people for the people, an ancient socialist slogan]. It is within this vision that the Algerian Sport University, and Olympic City of 19 June were constructed. (*El Moudjahid*, 10.09.1975, original text in French)

(...). Algerian football merited (its victory). This football allowed 70,000 persons to sing Kassaman [national anthem] (*El Moudjahid* 8 September 1975, original text in French).
Those reforms were reinforced by new legislation\textsuperscript{49} for physical education and sport aimed at all sectors of the society, and representing the essential base for national sports activities, in total harmony with the general politics and ideology of the state (Ministry of Sport and Youth, \textit{Assises National sur le sport}, 1993). One of the most important sectors concerned with those reforms was school, where participation in sport reached 89\%, according to ministerial estimates. The promulgation of the new code for physical education and sport, defined a physical educational system fully integrated within the national system of education, intended to facilitate the normalisation of sports activities and to combat the social discrimination, inherited from the colonial era. More importantly, it aimed at the development of a real policy for sport, through the co-ordination, organisation and funding of different types of sporting practice at different levels. Additionally, the system was intended to fulfil the following obligations:

- The general spread of Physical Education and sport at school, university or the workplace as well as in the community and within the National Popular Army.
- The encouragement of specialisation in the training of future sport coaches and technicians.
- The elaboration of a new system in detecting young talent.
- The mobilisation of necessary resources in developing the sport and physical education system.

\textit{(Les Actes, Assises National sur le sport, 21/22 of December 1993).}

\textsuperscript{49} The national sport movement was still organised under the colonial law of sport dated from 1901, extended by a decree 66-354 on July 10, 1963, until the appearance of new ordonance on sport and physical education, Number 76-81 in 22\textsuperscript{nd} of September 1976.
In the same vein football had experienced in 1977 radical reforms which changed the established structures inherited from the French Football Federation, previously organised under the 1901 (colonial) law related to sports associations and activities. All sport associations at different levels were subject to regulation by local authorities and national corporations. The reforms divided sports associations into two categories; a) élite clubs, known also as Associations Sportives de Performance (ASP), whose principal mission was to develop performance and enhance the level of football and other sports in Algeria; b) Associations Sportives Communales (ASC), municipal sports associations playing at regional level. The reforms also had an impact on the historical and regional names of some prestigious clubs, which were forced to embrace the name of national corporations responsible for the organisation of their financial and human resources. Mouloudia Club d’Oran (MCO) and Mouloudia Club d’Alger (MCA) were both sponsored by SONATRACH (National Oil Company) and became respectively Mouloudia P (petrol) Oran, and Mouloudia P (petrol) Alger. The same thing for l’ESS (Entente de Setif) which was sponsored by National company of plastic industry, and which became EP (plastic) Setif, or JSK (Jeuness Kabylie) which under SONELEC (Electronic industry) became Jeunesse E (electronic) Tizi Ouzou (the principal city of the Grand Kabylie region). The ASCs (Municipality Sports Associations) in the other side were given the name of a "baladia" or commune. For Saifi (1983) with the implementation of these reforms the state had decided to establish order in the sport movement which had previously been characterised by contradiction and mismanagement. It aimed also to abolish regionalism and chauvinism by attaching the name of the clubs to the values and the organisational culture of the company that sponsored them rather than to the old regional (pre-colonial) solidarity. Additionally, the reforms played a role in enhancing the social and professional situation of coaches and players\textsuperscript{50} and thus allowing them to focus in better on their sports careers and to increase the intensity of training and competition\textsuperscript{51}. From a management point of view, the reforms were aimed at better evaluation and control of financial expenditure. Administrative

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{50} For instance in the case of injury the athlete gets the same remuneration as other workers in the company.  
\textsuperscript{51} The athletes had previously required an authorisation from the company's directors in order to participate in competitions at national or international level, or simply for training.}
Directors whose role was managing and reporting annual financial reports, were not elected but appointed and selected by decision from the company. The results of these reforms were felt within two years of their implementation at national and communal levels. At international level, after winning the first gold medal in football in the 1975 Mediterranean Games in Algiers and after an historic final against France\textsuperscript{52}, the Algerian national team was victorious in the African Games of 1978 and were semi-finalist in the Mediterranean Games organised in Split in 1979. Algeria reached the quarter final stages at the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980 and the semi-final of the 1982 African Cup in Nigeria. These victories were capped by the 'memorable' success of the team in the 1982 World Cup, particularly against West Germany (Saifi, 1983:67), which is still considered as to be one of the best moments in the history of Algerian sport.

In respect of the ideals of international socialism, expressed in operational terms as

"Strengthening friendship and co-operation, promoting understanding and supporting the struggle for peace and democracy and eliminating western influence" (Hazan, 1987:251), Algeria and other African and Arab (socialist) countries\textsuperscript{53} developed a strong sporting relationship with the USSR and other socialist regimes from the Eastern block (which shared the same ideals). These relations took the form of receiving Soviet specialists, experts, coaches, doctors and sport administrators, sending students and athletes to physical education institutes and joint training programmes, providing financial aid and sports equipment, and finally exchanging sport delegations (Hazan, 1987:255). According to different Soviet sources, discussing Soviet-Algerian sports relations, in 1982 the number of Soviet experts in Algeria had reached seventy, which is estimated to be the largest in Africa, many of them former top athletes such as A. Sergeyev (Wrestling) and Eduard Makarov (Football). This heavy investment may be explained by the geo-strategic importance of Algeria (an Arab, Muslim, African, and Mediterranean country) for the USSR's own international political strategy.

\textsuperscript{52} The first gold medal in a major championship in football came after only 13 years of independence.\textsuperscript{53} Estimated at 30 for the period between 1960's and 1970s Hazan (1987:258).
These close sports relations had an impact on the general sport policy orientations (for historical, ideological, and political reasons) of the FLN-state. Rachid Mekhloufi, symbol of patriotism and ambassador of the Algerian revolution, 10 years after independence, then coach of the Algerian national football team, was criticised by state officials for his professionalism and his method of coaching, which was seen as being too (French) European (Lanfranchi and Wahl, 1996:125). Finally unable to convince state officials of the rightness of his approach he was dismissed and replaced by a Romanian coach\(^5\) regarded as having more realistic and socialist methods of coaching. Lanfranchi and Wahl explained this decision as part of the FLN-state post-independence policy to negotiate the universalism of football, which had to be reflective of the state ideology (socialism).

It could be argued from the above that Fates's thesis regarding the adoption of the western European model of sport as a universal language, which in his view happened without any form of negotiation or resistance, was not totally applicable in all cases. A (planned or unplanned) local resistance or response, to the well-established 'international' sports organisations, existed (and still) in many occasions, with different intensities and for different ideological or political reasons. Some times this was in the name of socialism and anti-imperialism, and other times for Pan-African (anti-apartheid) coalitions and Pan-Arab solidarity. For instance, the decision of FIFA to nominate M. Jean Crafford, representative of South Africa as the Vice president of the African zone, in October 1967, in a congress organised in Mexico, provoked a major compaign of protest by African countries. Algeria reacted to this decision by publishing a strong statement in the Algerian Press Service, reproduced in different African newspapers. The content of commentary was the following:

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\(^5\) The Algerian team trained by Romanian, suffered defeat after defeat, without making use of the service of Dahleb, or Karim Maroc, who like Mekhloufi had opted for professionalism (Lanfranchi, 1994).
In taking this decision, officials in FIFA, have shown not only proof of a total disregard for all the independent African states, but have also ignored the political sensibilities that have transformed the world. How can we explain the imposition of a vice president of FIFA who is representative of a country estranged from the rest of the African continent by virtue of its politics based on apartheid. The time has come for African states and newly independent countries in the world, to unite their efforts, to adopt a joint policy for a strong presence in FIFA, and to evaluate all subjective elements of this organisation' elements that do not take into account political realities. (Reported in Chehat 551993 :61, translated from French).

The ideologies cited had affected also the view of non-western countries about (the imposed or exported) international norms and rational mode, theories and strategies of the way football should be played. This 'rebellion' against western hegemony and control over the game which had no real effect was expressed in the Moudjahid articles, dated in September 9, 1975 and entitled le Baroud d'honneur de l'EN de football

The sudden emergence of this country [France] at the summit of European football was an occasion for a number of [French] 'pseudo-technicians' to make fortunes, in the mean time diffusing in third-world countries theories that did not have anything in common with the soul, culture and physical constitution of those countries.

3.6 Market economy, pluralism and the end of populism

As a consequence of the national economic crisis, the reduction of oil revenue, and the failure of Algerian development programme (characterised by over-centralism and external economic dependence), the period of the 1980s was marked by a profound revolution in Algerian society, described by Hidouci (1995) as "decades of

55 For more information about the Algerian history of modern sport see Grine (1993).
deterioration”. To face the economic crisis the government first started encouraging management autonomy for national corporations (the heritage of political gigantism of the socialist era). Those corporations were divided into autonomous regional entities\(^{56}\) and became responsible for their own profitability and for finding their own supplies, sales and financing (Stone, 1998:97). Furthermore, after twenty years of socialism and public ownership, the governmental project was directed toward encouraging “controlled” liberalisation, privatisation and increasing foreign investment. This has involved the transition from a system of economic and social regulation, administered by the state, to a new system determined by market forces (El-Kenz, 1991:26). El-Kenz adds that

The market was to be the ruling social arena, its mechanism, the social motive force, its prices the ultimate umpire (...) it was time to shatter populism both as an ideology and as an organisational option to clear the way for a new resource allocation system in the society based on new principles (...) Businessmen were now encouraged to do business, capitalist to place investments (...) on social scene ‘fortune, wealth, and profit notions, that the old scale popular values had made almost sinful, now came strutting out to occupy centre stage in Algerian social and psychic life (1991:27).

The market economy was seen as a fundamental objective for the future of Algeria. It was one of the few political orientations, as expressed by Ellyas (1996:111) that met a favourable echo within Algerian society. The reason for this, according to Ellyas, was the conception of Algerians about liberalism and capitalism, assimilated automatically (because of twenty years of populism and socialism) to democracy and freedom. It brought the hope for a new era of self-professed ambitions and the end of

\(^{56}\) legislation was enacted in 1988 giving enterprises autonomy (see Dillman, 1997:160).
privileged and restricted access to private initiatives, and free creativity. The start of liberalism also brought an end to the egalitarianism (considered before as the inevitable route toward modernity) and other forms of cultural dogmatism and political conformity previously imposed by the hegemony of the FLN-state. (Chikhi, 1991)

However, the hopes for more freedom, and a new society were soon destroyed by the economic realities, in the form of; world recession, low foreign reserves, treasury and public enterprise deficit, which according to El–Kenz (1991:33), had twisted the internal logic of the market economy, and distorted its operational rules. The effects of these phenomena became more unpredictable and uncontrollable, politically, socially and culturally. Now that the state was making no more promises, every group had to come up with its own visions of the future (El-Kenz, 1991:30). It was the end of state political organisation based on the principal of national liberation with a single party, responsible for guiding and leading society. Now the old forms of group solidarity, old networks and coalitions (berberism, regionalism, and clientelism), long suppressed by the nationalist movement were emerging again in unforeseen forms (ibid:31).

According to Chikhi, interaction between the political and religious spheres (Islam in the service of socialism) as well as between the social and cultural domain was insufficient to offer society a fresh alternative. “Neither could it bridge the yawning gap between ideology and daily reality [characterised by unemployment, inflation, housing problems and demographic explosion]. And it was far from constituting a response to the dream of new society” (1991:217). To fill in the gap between state ideology, market economy and daily realities, new protest movements developed seeking the reconstruction of the society’s lost identity and integrity, seen as being under threat, as a consequence of “uncontrolled liberalism”. Those movements which also existed within the single party system, have opted, according to Hussein, (1997:173), for two modes of resistance. One option is to claim the return to pre-national values of religion and community solidarity (Islamisation). The second is to appeal for radical modernity and democracy, based on laïcité and individual
autonomy or citizenship rights (democratisation). Both movements criticise the socialist version of populism on the one hand, and the new liberalism on the other, which provides no social vision potent enough to lift society out of its crisis (Chikhi, 1991:219). The social protest expressed by both groups was later transformed to cultural and political forms of resistance. As a result

in place of strikes, there were now riots, instead of old street demonstrations, there were now revolts by young people in high schools, sports stadia and the street...By delegating power which had previously been exercised by the state to the market, the party and the state had also abandoned the claim to legitimacy based on the principle of the party state and the nation-state (El-Kenz, 1991:32).

Within the student movement, among intellectuals and the liberal professions, questions about problems of liberty and lack of democratic spaces were openly raised. This process of individual affirmation and autonomy, as expressed by Hussein (1997:171), was accelerated as a result of; a) the penetration of the values and norms of the world economy into the national economy, and b) the loss of state capacity for ideological mobilisation. consequently, society has become divided mainly into two predominant social groups: first, a group calling for an assimilation of the new economic environment, culturally and ideologically; and second, a group rejecting the new environment, as being a source of social exclusion and looking instead for other existential references (essentially through Islam).

Another group of conservative (economists) within the state sphere has opted for technological assimilation but also stresses the necessity of dealing with the west through hard bargaining. For them

The only way to become a great nation is to take the technology the West has to offer and assimilate it...In drawing from the West, Algeria must use its leverage constantly to drive a harder bargains. It must take advantage of
opportune moments to play countries and business off against each other (Dillman, 1997:174).

3.6.1 Socio-economic crises and football 1988-1992

Fates has argued that there was a correlation between economic crisis resulting from consecutive drop of oil prices, the decline in the value of the American dollar (reaching respectively $10 and 7FM\textsuperscript{57}) and the increased interest in sporting spectacles. According to Fates, interest in sport, particularly football, had increased to the extent that it became one of the privileged domain of the presidency \textsuperscript{58}. For instance, the Ministry of Sport and Youth declared that the Algerian team victory against West Germany, in the 1982 football World Cup in Spain, had achieved more service to the nation than the work of any other Algerian ambassadors in their positions around the world. This victory achieved also, within Algerian society, a sense of mobilisation and nationalist feeling, never gained before by the FLN-state. In 1986, the preparation of the football national team, for the World Cup in Mexico, was seen as being an effective ideological tool to be used by the state for finding new ways of preoccupying the population distracting them from political and economic realities (Fates, 1994). In the same vein, Giulianotti and Finn (2000) point out that “football provides the pretext through which the “imagined community” of fellow nationals, may be reached and unified, via the match’s mediation on television, radio or print”.

Because the spectacle provided by the national team became politically important, internally and externally, the participation of professionals\textsuperscript{59} (seen during the socialist

\textsuperscript{57} Almost all Algeria’s export receipts were paid in US dollars. The devaluation of this currency reduced the value of Algerian imports by three time between 1985 and 1991 (see Bradford Dillman, 1997).

\textsuperscript{58} The president condemned the failure of the Algerian football team in the African Cup in Egypt 1991, giving strict orders for the Ministry of Sport to intervene directly in changing the president of football federation (Fates, 1994).

\textsuperscript{59} Majority of them were dual citizens e.g. Abdallah Liegon (Medjadi) playing at Monaco, Dahleb the Captain of Paris St Germain, Karim Maroc From Lyon FC, Ouadjani Cherif, Mansouri, Korichi and others. For more literature on the history of football and immigration (See Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001.)
era as being against state ideological precepts) became an imperative, reclaimed by all citizens. Some of those players, because of their high popularity, were favoured in a variety of ways (free tickets, financial compensation, etc).

Algerian people are in need of some emotions that have to be procured at a price. There is no event that could provide this emotion in equal manner that provided by sport events (...) In Algeria, the streets are empty on three types of occasion; at the moment of breaking the fast during Ramadan, during the broadcasting of the national team’s football matches, and during the final episodes of certain popular TV series (Fates, 1994: 51, original text in French, translated by the author.)

However, popular mobilisation achieved by international competitions, does not apply to national domestic games. The end of the 1980s had seen the start of a state-population mobilisation and of repression cycle. State owned media, particularly newspaper and other security reports had shown that violence, at different stadia in Algeria, for the season 1987-1988 alone had (officially) caused the death of 3 people with, 365 injured, 127 cars damaged or completely destroyed, and 516 persons arrested. For the 1988-1989 season, the same sources indicated 478 injuries, 127 cars damaged, 451 persons arrested. Football stadia, after twenty years of independence, were transformed again into an arena for political agitation and social protest.

Chikhi states that

The sport stadia were next to register the heat of social discontent. At every football match, there were riots and youth demonstrations. The youth came from varying backgrounds, but they came together at regular intervals to poke symbolic fun at the high and mighty, sending up highfalutin official pretensions to morality in irreverent doggerel. In time such demonstrations were duly stigmatised as a threat to social harmony and unity. (1991:220)
Football matches have become the only occasion for thousands of young people to gather and shout openly against the regime and the bourgeois (called also *nouveaux riches*) and to present their social (and regional, cultural and political) demands. By asking for houses, immigration to Europe or Australia and legalisation of drugs, (sometimes in the presence of high state officials and the president himself), young people have used stadia to express their rejection of social inequalities, state authoritarianism and FLN hegemony. By doing so, the younger generations (consciously or not) had become, according to Fates, the actors for the acceleration of history and for democratic transformation.

### 3.7 Transition toward 'democracy'

The failure of the Algerian economic reforms and transition toward market economy\(^\text{60}\) was due mostly to its mode of regulation, seen by Safir (1995:139) as centralised in an economy with problematic performance, strongly linked to the price of oil in the world market.

Safir goes as far as to claim:

> Changing the regulation modes in a sense of a larger market intervention was reduced to a simple operation of technical nature, denying the role of social actors-social groups, trade unions, and diverse other associations from civil society (1997:139, translated by the author)

According to Zoubir (1994), the real cause of failure consisted in the process itself (liberalism without democracy) characterised by lack of agreement (within the party) on the urgency of introducing pluralism, in order to end the single party monopoly and establish democratic legitimacy. Accordingly, the transition toward market economy instead of being the source of democratisation of the Algerian society,\(^\text{60}\)

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\(^{60}\) on more discussions about the multiple causes of economic crisis in Algeria see Doukali, L. (1998).
became the cause of rivalries and conflict, creating a situation of multidimensional crisis and triple deficits: economic, social and cultural (Safir, 1995:116).

The cracks within the ruling bloc and within society provoked a real crisis, which ended with the tragic riots of October 1988 that marked the end of the FLN's hegemony over Algerian political life. It precipitated what Zoubir (1994) described as an amazing development, which involved notably the introduction of multi-party system and the inauguration of a process of genuine democratisation. As a result a plethora of political groupings came into existence, which were later legalised according to articles 12 and 14 of the new constitutions (February 1989). This included provision for fundamental liberties to be respected, specifically guaranteeing freedom of expression, association and assembly, as well as the right of strike (Tahi, 1992:339). In contrast to the more ideological constitution of 1976, there were no references to either socialism or the FLN (single party). The revised constitution, according to Tahi, ended nearly three decades of the FLN monopolisation of Algeria’s political life.

It was the beginning of a new era: of multi-partism, new parties with different ideological and political lines were created, proposing different projects for the society, including economic, social and cultural programmes. Legislation opened the door for the introduction of a degree of freedom of speech: “independent or at least privately owned-newspapers proliferated and as new parties were legalised, vigorous political-or anyway ideological-debate was allowed.” (Roberts, 1999).

Algerian society was the only society in the Arab world that had the occasion to express freely, where the will for political alternative was openly suggested during the 1990-1991 elections, and Algerian press is one of the few critical toward the regime within the region (Schmid, 1998)

However, it needs to be emphasised that the democratisation of Algerian society after an impressive beginning (1988-1991) experienced, during the late 1990s, what Hadjeres (1996:124) defines as “a resistible and contradictory evolution”. The causes
of the crisis were due first to the political history of post-independent Algeria under populist and socialist ideologies. For Manceron, the establishment of democracy in a state directed by one party for a period of thirty years, is a difficult process, especially if we consider other variables that the process is confronted with, such as identity crisis, state de-legitimisation and demographic explosion (1996:17). According to Safir (1995), democracy which is considered as the second dimension of transition (in addition to market economy) was initiated by the regime (the political elite) with the aim of accelerating economic and political reforms. It aimed also to enlarge the basis of support for government policies by bringing the political movements into an alliance with the authorities. In other words, it aimed to transform the FLN (after thirty years of political and ideological monopolisation) into an organisation that would be capable of acting as the driving force of “renovation” in Algeria (Tahi, 1992). Furthermore, the variables mentioned by Manceron, in addition to the underestimation of the necessary role of the state in directing the process of transition (Safir, 1995), provoked an unanticipated result. It placed the process beyond the control of its initiators, who according to Safir were not in touch with the profound evolution of the Algerian society.

In the mean time, a new force represented by the ‘Islamist’ movement, adopting political Islam as a tool for social mobilisation and refuge against social marginalisation, have imposed itself within the political sphere. It has developed, as suggested by Lamchichi (1993), as a consequence of social unbalance and the effect of the profound cultural crisis of Arab societies (Pan-arabism61) in general and Algerian society in particular. This multiple crisis was caused, as argued before, by the early regime strategy of controlling modernisation, as well as by the state élite’s inability to promote true political, moral and cultural reforms. Lamchichi continues by stating that the Islamist thematic finds through its re-evaluation of cultural and religious foundations and its quest for lost “authenticity” support for its political discourse. In addition to the return to religious practice, the movement seeks a reactivation of old solidarity and communitarian ideologies, presenting them as a possible solution against modern individualism perceived as “a dangerous oxygen
coming from the Occident, *en perte d'identité*” (Rabia Bekkar, 1992). One of the main parties representing this view was FIS (*Front Islamic du Salut*). In comparison to other Islamic political movements in Algeria (Movement for Peace and Nahda) or in other Islamic countries (e.g., Pakistan, Egypt or Turkey) which call for a universalist Pan-Islamism, the FIS opted for a local model of ‘Islamism’ known as ‘Algerianist’ that combines both Islamisation with national history and values. It is based according Kepel (1994) on défrancisation process, exhibiting an Islamic identity clean (pure) or exclusive from any intellectual or linguistic links with French (laique) culture and calling for a redefinition of mass religious practices affected by superstitions (heritage of maraboutism) and other heterodox practices mixed with French influences.

According to Cesari (1997:80), the existence of the FIS was the product of a certain political culture (represented before by FLN-state) marked with permanent reference to unity or a negation of conflict within society and the political sphere. Although, the reference toward unity was not this time in the name of socialism (as conceived by FLN-state) but in the name of both the Algerian revolution and Islamic identity. Furthermore, the FIS has similar perception of nation-state to that of FLN but with different interpretations of democracy or legislation. In terms of the FIS discourse, the former (an occidental concept and system) is replaced by *Shoura* (dialogue, discussions and interpretations), and the latter (secular legislation) by an Islamic state and legislation, *Sharia*. Quandt (1998:97) in talking about similarities existing between FIS and FLN argues that Islam, as a political phenomenon in Algeria, did not develop initially in opposition to nationalism but rather as part of it. Many of the FIS leaders for example were active at one time in the National Liberation Front; this had led some to see little real difference between old FLN and today’s FIS.

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61 The Pan-Arabist philosophy was accused by a number of Islamist movements as being secular.
62 a process which Kepel interprets as the breakdown of cultural *metissage* of post-colonial Algeria (see Kepel: 1994).
3.7.1 Football and political crisis (from 1992)

From the late 1990s Algerian football has been affected by the same influences as those, which Mignon (1994)\(^63\) describes in the French football league at the beginning of 1990s. It is not a form of Americanisation (diffusion of American culture in Canada, or England) but another aspect of globalisation specific to Mediterranean football culture, which is called “Italianization”. The nature of this new wave coming from southern Europe did not relate to the style of football played on the pitch, but rather was more about supporter style (slogans, songs and symbols), and supporter behaviour, particularly in Algiers (a Mediterranean city). This may be due to the growing interest of the Algerian media in European football, expressed by the increasing time reserved for live broadcasts, reporting, and news coverage from the major European Leagues (the Italian league in particular, one of the most powerful league in Europe). It coincided with the launch of Champions’ League in its new lucrative form, with more clubs, more competition and therefore more broadcasting hours. Another factor was the growing popularity within Algerian households of satellite television channels like TF1, France2 and Canal plus, which in addition to offering longer hours for the broadcast of sporting events (including live matches, documentaries, analysis), were (and still are) seen as a means to break down the geographic isolation that Algeria was experiencing because of new restrictions imposed by the European Union regarding the visa delivery system. Satellite channels were perceived also as another alternative for Algerian families to express their freedom of choice to watch other programmes instead of the Algerian ‘state-controlled’ channel, which had become in their eyes, another tool used by the regime for political and media manipulation\(^64\).

Nevertheless, the Italianisation of supporter behaviour in Algeria did not reach the stage of what Giulianotti and Finn (2000) refer to as a “dislocation of national

\(^63\) See also Mignon (1999). Fans and Heroes in French Football. Football and the World Cup.

identity" when talking about the impact of the football industry on new football consumers in Asia and North America. It consists in the Algerian case of both local connections with national and clubs stars, as well as “post-national” identification with European football stars, made “familiar” by the global football media and trans-national merchandising companies (see Giulianotti and Finn, 2000). Mouloudia Football Club (MCA), the oldest football club in Algeria, known for its historical role in the formation of the nationalist movement and resistance against colonial hegemony, was given the name by its supporters of ‘Juventus’. Algiers Union Football Club (USMA), the other popular and rival club, was given the name of AC Milan, and its stadium Bologhine, the name of ‘little San Siro’. The effect of this ‘Italianization’, was extended to the name of popular players and coaches for example Ifticene the coach of USMA, was given the name of ‘Capelo’ the famous coach of AC Milan. On the other side, the defender of Mouloudia, Lazizi, also an international player, was called ‘Baresi’, after the famous defender of the Italian national team. The other impact of this new culture was the development of clubs’ supporters associations, transformed by their active members (mainly the unemployed) into small enterprises, involved in organising trips to attend away games, the sale of different club souvenirs (in the same manner as occur in Roma, and Naples). Merchandise includes badges, stickers, photos, and posters. Also in evidence is the sale of all sorts of flags and replica kits of major European professional teams (e.g. Naples, Rome, Liverpool, Milan, and Barcelona) worn by supporters at every sporting event (see figure 3.5). In this manner, the claim that “Football support is no longer an “end” in itself, but a medium for the consumer to buy safely and successfully into global popular culture (Giulianotti and Finn, 2000:266), is as true of Algerian support as it is of supporters in western Europe.

Off the pitch, because of the steady devaluation of the Algerian currency, privatisation and decentralisation of national co-operatives (the major sponsors of big sports clubs in Algeria), accompanied by the rise of unemployment, an unprecedented development has occurred in the Algerian football. This development could be described as the beginning of the unofficial movement toward professionalisation. It was unrecognised by the state but accepted within football clubs and it concerned the
Figure 3.6 Crowd attending a football match in Algiers, illustrating supporter behaviour and type of clothing (Algeria New Press 2002)
rapid growth of both transfer fees and salaries that represented the only source of revenue for some players and coaches whose positions as employees\(^65\) in national cooperatives was no longer guaranteed. At the same time there was a clear will by political parties to take over sport, particularly football (the most popular sport) for political and ideological purposes (what Giulianotti and Finn consider as the appropriation of football for service in counter-cultural resistance to regime). Stadia became arenas for political mobilisation and demonstrations of force for electoral campaign meetings. Inter-urban football tournaments organised during national or religious occasions in different cities were used to display symbols in favour of political, ideological and cultural claims\(^66\) of different parties (FIS\(^67\) in Algiers, and RCD in Kabylie region).

Sport in general, and football in particular, was transformed to a political and ideological subjects of debate, most of the time a tool for ideological positioning and a way to distinguish a movement or political party from another (e.g. modernist versus traditionalists). This debate incorporates certain crucial aspects such as Islamic identity, women’s participation, and sporting entertainment. If we take the example of sport within the discourse of Islamism. Fates (1994) claims that ‘Islamists’ were not totally disinterested in sport. Although it is considered secondary, in comparison to their initial project – the Islamisation of Algerian society – sport was not absent from their preoccupation. This is due to the importance of sport, or what Fates refers to as “desire of sport”, particularly football, in Algerian society. Being an integral part of Algerian culture, attracting many fans, sport was perceived also as a serious competitor to the ‘Islamist’ project, deviating youngsters from ‘Islamists’ political and religious preaching. This view, according to Fates, was also shared by (what ‘Islamists’ consider) the regime or state’s ‘official’ Islam. In a letter addressed to the Algerian Football Federation asking for the rescheduling of football matches the High

\(^65\) Some of the national corporations in addition of being the official sponsors of the sports clubs, offered salaries and positions as employees for some top players and coaches.

\(^66\) For example the pursuit of the recognition of Amazighia (the Berber language) as an official language by the government.

\(^67\) FIS, Islamic Front for Salvation (‘islamist party”) and RCD, Rally for Culture and Democracy (laïque party).
Islamic Council (official representative of the regime in terms of religious issues) suggests that

Islam encourages the practice of sport. However, considering the beginning of holy month of Ramadan [month of fasting] and in respect of the weekly prayer on Fridays, it would be suitable to reschedule the sports competitions [normally played on Friday] to Thursday afternoon, so that sports players and fans will be able to take advantage of the joy of sports. (Message of the president of High Islamic Council (HIC), and member of FLN Central Committee, in a conference about national sports movement, April 15, 1985, reported by Fates, 1994, p. 111, translated from French).

Both representatives of state’s (official) Islam and ‘Islamist’ (political) movements criticised the non-Islamic dress of the gold medallists Hassiba Boulmarka in Tokyo 1991 athletic World Championship, described by one of the imams of Algiers as being “scandalous dress” (Fates, 1994:110). However, for feminists’ movements (women’s associations in general) Hassiba Boulmarka’s victory was considered as a victory against integrism or neo-fundamentalism, and “Islamists obscurantism” (see Morgan, 1998:346-363) and as a symbol of resistance against the Family Law adopted by the National Assembly in 1984, which according to women’s associations had legalised the inferior status of Algerian women. For women’s (Muslim feminist) associations Hassiba did not need prior permission from her father or husband to participate and succeed, as should be the case for the rest of Algerian women who represent more than half of the population and who like Hassiba are able to represent their country with dignity.

With regard to the above discussion, although much has been written about sports within the discourse of ‘Islamism’, most of it (including that by Fates), lacks serious

\[\text{References:} \]

68 See also Fates 1983, Fates 1990 for discussion of women participation in sport and sport and Islam or ‘Islamism’.

69 Morgan in his article, Hassiba Boumalka and Islamic Green, criticises Lyotard’s moral relativism and described as being a post-modern discourse that threats the ‘victims’ (Hassiba Boulmarka) and the ‘oppressor’ (‘fundamentalists’) in equal manner, without moral judgements.

70 Adopted from Islamic legislation sharia.
Chapter 3  Discourse on Sport and National Identity

philosophical debate in relation to the values of Islam and modern sports. The majority of this literature refers to the Islamists’ point of view (e.g. whether reformist or ‘fundamentalist’) as representing one group or discourse (particularly regarding women’s participation in sport), in comparison to the modern (western) liberal view. Further analysis of Islam and sport is needed, of a more sophisticated nature which would seek to avoid misinterpretation and misunderstanding by eschewing simplistic accounts of Islam and looking to establish historical facts and philosophical (re) interpretations (deconstruction and reconstruction) of the Islamic point of view about some notions related to the practice of sport, such as the body, Islamic dress, physical activity, entertainment or leisure, sport in Ramadan, similarities and differences between Islamic and Olympic values and their significance (universalism, peace, sportmanship, anti-doping etc.).

3.7.2 Political violence and football

Political violence, which flared up after 1991, affected all sectors, including sport, and particularly football, being perhaps partly responsible (together with mismanagement) for the failure of the national team to qualify for the successive World Cups in 1994 and 1998, the latter organised in France (where the largest community of Algerian immigrants are living). An atmosphere of insecurity resulted in the decline in the level of activity of the football leagues, and instability in the organisation of competitions principally at a regional level, where weekly displacement for competition became dangerous for staff, players and supporters. Some well-known personalities within the media, and administrative spheres, as well as ordinary football fans, became direct victims of this political violence. Examples of prominent football personalities who fell victim to such violence include, Mr Haraigue, the president of the Algerian Football Federation, the President of Bourdj Mnail Football Club (East of Algeria), the well known football fan of the ex-CRBeloald (Belouazded Football Club), known as ‘Yamaha’. The list of victims included also ten young supporters of USMA Algiers, who were killed while

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71 As part of the deconstructive study of sport in Muslim countries we need to separate between Islam (religious principals) and Islam the way it is practiced by Muslims (religiosity), see Tibi (2001).
72 'popular area in Algiers, the birth place of the winner of Nobel price in literature, Albert Camus.'
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celebrating the success of their team in the 1997-Cup Final. This happened in Bouzéreah, in one of Algiers’ most popular streets, adjacent to 5 July Olympic Stadium.

However, because all social sectors, with different personalities in a range of positions with diverse ideological orientations, and all classes have been the direct victims of this violence, we cannot assume anything regarding the political or ideological objectives behind the assassination of personalities within the football sphere. The reason (which has nothing to do with the cultural western origin of the game) may simply be the popularity of the game and the media exposure that it gets in comparison to other sports. It should be mentioned though that despite all the violence, the Algerian Football Federation did not stop running the football league, and supporters did not abandon stadia. The same could be said for the media (newspaper and television), which continued covering the games. In these circumstances football had become (whether consciously or not) for some a symbol of resistance against political and ideological radicalism, and for others a source of distraction from the hard realities that the country has been going through. More research needs to be done about the role that football played in this particular period (especially in the period between 1991-1997).

3.8 Conclusion

To conclude this chapter we can argue that sport was mobilised throughout the modern history of Algeria for different purposes (see table 3.2). It was used during the colonial period both as means of exclusion (rather than integration or inclusion) by the colonial power and as an arena for political expression and individual liberalisation for the Algerian nationalist movement. During the revolution, the FLN football team became a symbol of resistance and struggle for independence and therefore sport (the heritage of colonial power) was viewed as an effective tool for international recognition of the Algerian struggle for independence. In the early years of the post-independence era, driven by populist and socialists values, sport was seen as an important element, which could serve the political formation and mobilisation of masses for nation-state building and the development of society. This period
experienced a spreading of physical education and the practice of sport at school, university and in the work place. It was an era of amateurism and political gigantism, characterised by the development of new massive sports' facilities and the participation of Algeria in major regional games (Arab, African and Mediterranean) and other major international sporting events (Olympic Games, and international championships). Sport was thus recognised by the state as being an effective way to represent the Algerian model of development.

Table 3.2 Sport, state ideology and national identity in Algeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
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| 1926-1957    | Colonialism and Algerian Nationalist Movements                                    | - Sport organised in terms of ultranationalist and European groups (representing cultural richness).  
                                      |                                    | - A colonial tool for integration.                                               |
|              |                                    | - A privileged site used by nationalist movements for individual liberation and an instrument of subversion or political expression and rejection of colonial oppression. |
| 1954-1962    | Algerian revolution                                                               | - Integrated as a part of dynamic break with colonial society.                  |
|              |                                    | - Sport (football, the heritage of the colonial power) used for the internationalisation of the Algerian cause. |
|              |                                    | - Externally, tool for national representation                                   |
|              |                                    | - Internally, an important element for political legitimisation and integration into socialist and popular values of the nation (social positivism) |
|              |                                    | - Strengthening friendship and co-operation with other socialist countries.      |
|              |                                    | - Amateurism era                                                                 |
|              |                                    | - An arena for political agitation and social protest or rejection of social inequalities. |
|              |                                    | - End of amateurism.                                                            |
| From 1992    | Market economy                                                                    | - Commercial sport?                                                            |
Today as a reaction to the growing media exposure and cultural flows transmitted by satellite TV channels and the impact that global football industry is having on local football culture (on and off the pitch), as consequence also from the economic crisis, resulting of the steady drop of oil prices in the international market, failure of development projects, and heavy foreign debts, sport, particularly football [as with other sectors of the society], is moving toward a market oriented economy, as part of general government strategy to reduce public expenditure and the creation of new sources of revenues.
CHAPTER FOUR
PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY

4.1 Introduction

According to Featherstone’s, approach to local identity and Göle’s to local modernity, the analysis of discourse in the study of the non-occidental countries cannot be effected if it does not take into consideration relations of dependency with the occident. Thus, considering the dependency element while studying non-occidental history may be seen as more relevant for the Algerian case. A country where more than a hundred years of colonialism have had an impact in the depersonalisation and dislocation of its national culture, the effect of which is still felt in Algerian society (e.g. in cultural and ideological conflicts between Arabopone and Francophone), as well as in France within the Algerian immigrant community. The incidents which took place during the friendly match between Algeria and France in September 2002, and which provoked both in the Algerian and French media, and in political spheres, is yet another proof of the tensions that still remain on both sides, as consequences of colonial history. It should be mentioned in the same perspective that the shared history between Algeria and France resulted also in creating strong links in the domain of football. Algeria, which was a reservoir of ‘indigenous’ professional football players during colonial era (e.g Makhloufi), and in the post-independence era of players like Madjer and Assad, still remains a lucrative market for French football clubs. The same could be said for the Algerian national team, which the majority of its professional players (most of whom are born and live in France) are playing in the French league. Thus, the study of the French experience in the professionalisation of sport in general and the modernisation of football in particular, may help in understanding the absences and presences in the modernisation of Algerian football.
The other reason for choosing the French case, is the uniqueness of its system and for the so-called French ‘exceptionalism’ (Bourdieu, 1999: 20), which still allows the active role of the state via political regulation and which, according to Mignon (2000), could have some impact upon the future development of football in Europe, as well (for cultural and historical reasons) in the Maghreb region. Even though the focus is the French case for the reasons discussed above, the chapter includes also a discussion on the English or market driven model of professional sport, in addition to the American model of restricted liberalism. This may be regarded as part of our discussion on global and local nexus and multiple applications of modernity. The latter is better explained in terms of western heterogeneity shaped by local traditions and global trends, rather than of homogeneity.

Other examples of “specific” models of professionalisation of sport in non-western countries (for instance Japan), need also to be taken into account. This can help in understanding the effort of some nations, in the Far East, (non-western culture)\(^1\) in combining between global product; professional sport based on western liberal values (organisation and management rationality) with local culture, traditions and belief systems. Furthermore, their ability and strategy of absorbing the professional sport model and adapt it to their cultural and societal specificity (to transform it in a way to their own), what Göle refers to as local modernity (which in this context implies a non-occidental form of modernity).

**4.2 The French case**

Mignon (2000) claims that international success of the French national team has not prevented the continuous exodus of players from the French League to other European leagues\(^2\) like England, Spain, and Italy, which offer in comparison with French clubs better financial rewards. Players’ wages reflect these inequalities: during 1997-1998 Youri Djorkaeff earned 12m francs with Inter Milan while fellow international Robert Pires earned just 1.5m francs with Metz (Eastham, 1999:66). This

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\(^1\) For more discussions about the professionalisation of football in non-western cultures (Glombijn, 1998 on Indonesian football; Ben-Porat, 1998 on the commodification of football in Israel).

\(^2\) There are actually 180 French players playing abroad.
was due, according to Mignon, to the modest development of the French football economy, in comparison to Italy and England, which have seen in recent years a real economic boom because of the increase in the value of TV rights and in private investments. The other reason is the cultural difference between the football culture in France (based on Jacobin and republican values) and more 'rational' (business oriented) and financial mechanisms of football elsewhere (Mignon, 2000:234). According to Eastham, "of Western European countries, France has the strongest state interventions in sport. The republican state justifies its high level of involvement in terms of the need to ensure that the general interest of sports prevails over the multitude of private interests that traverse it" (2000:58). Mignon raises also the point of spectator attendance in relation to stadia capacity, which reaches respectively 88 percent and 85 percent for Marseille and PSG (the biggest clubs in the French League), but only 48 percent for Strasbourg, another club in the Premiership. This reflect the inequality between French clubs in attracting supporters, which is limited to a few clubs.

The other causes of the relative lack of money within French football reported by Mignon are:

- modest investment by big investors in professional clubs, which are seen as too risky a form of investment;
- limited consideration of merchandising;
- failure to adapt the treatment of young players to the Bosman law;
- lack of professionalism in club management;
- lack of big cities that are able to build big football audiences (exceptions being Marseilles and PSG);
- legal prohibition on gaining financial returns from football and general sport activities (activities of general interest);

The other major handicap is what Eastham calls the high labour overhead or "social cost", considered as the single major factor for France's inability to compete with rivals elsewhere in Europe.

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3 The ticket price in England is three times higher than in France.
The whole of the French national health and social security system plus the retirement pension system is financed not from the central state budget but from contributions paid by employers and workers as percentage of salary (…). Studies comparing the tax and national insurance overheads for players and clubs in the five major European leagues reveal that France is at considerable handicap. The figures show that a net monthly salary of about 50,000 francs costs a French club over three times as much due to social costs. A similar salary is much less of a financial burden for clubs in Italy, Spain, Germany and England. (Mignon, 2000:65)

4.2.1 The national system of football in France

According to the laws of the French Republic, the state is responsible for the improvement of the general well being of citizens and their integration (with no gender or ethnic distinctions) into society. Therefore, the promotion of sport⁴, in addition to health, education and solidarity, is the domain of the state represented by the Ministry of Youth and Sport at national level and the municipalities at local level. The latter in addition to owning the majority of sporting facilities (with the exception of Auxerre FC), provide subsidies to professional and regional (amateur) clubs through the sports’ governing bodies and other public institutions such as National Fund for Sport (FNDS). The latter obtains some of its money from two major public organisations; the Loto sportif (National Football Pools) and the National Lottery. There is also la Direction National de Controle De Gestion (DNCG) established in 1991 after a series of financial football scandals during the 1970s and 1980s. Its main mission is to analyse the accounts of all professional clubs to make sure that they are financially balanced and to control expenditure to prevent any illegal payment, accounting frauds or tax evasions. As part of its responsibility of financial supervision it has the right also to prohibit any new spending, which could cause a further unbalance. Eastham (2000:74) points out that it is not unusual for DNCG to place a club under temporary suspension and ban all transfer activity if it is not satisfied with the state of the club’s finance.

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⁴ The official launch of professional football in France was in 1932, see Faure, JM and Suaud. C (1994)
For Mignon, and according to the "new wave of football managers", the financial dependence of professional clubs and state intervention in sport, channelled by the French Football Federation (FFF) in charge of the organisation and the regulation of French football and the French National League (LNF) in charge of professional activities, in addition to other sport's governing bodies, have all played a negative role (at least from business point of view) in the business management of French Football clubs. For the new generation of football managers the cited national structures "hinders initiatives from being taken by the clubs, and thus stops them from reaching the top" (2000:242). In the same vein Mignon states that

\[\text{The importance of the state may be an obstacle to autonomy, not as a restraint on the free market, but as a restraint on change in the relationship between the state and its citizens, and on the development of broader participatory democracy (Mignon, 2000: 247, original text in French)}\]

Nonetheless, it needs to be mentioned that the intervention of the state in professional football affairs has also many positive aspects that could be taken into account by Algerian decision-makers in charge of developing professionalism. For instance, in preserving equality between clubs or at least reducing the gap between rich and poor clubs and in restricting risks of corruption, mismanagement and misuse of public funds.

4.2.2 Professional status in French Football

The idea of sport as a public service, under the 1901 law\(^6\), which produces citizens of the republic, has transformed football to a space for the democratic expression of local, political and ideological (socialist or Catholic) sensitivities instead of money-making. This situation was transformed during the 1960s, after the decline of traditional industries, which had financed the first generation of semi professional clubs and as a consequence a new generations of players emerged for whom football is becoming a way to escape job insecurity and financial hardship that characterised

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5 Known today as the LPF (League of Professional Football).

6 1\(^{st}\) of July law relative to association's contract (Journal officiel du 2 Juillet 1901).
French society, in the period prior to the 1968 social (and intellectual) revolution. When clubs turned professional, founder members realised that the 1901 law still provided all the necessary legal protection while allowing them, in Eastham's terms, to trade on behalf of the club and pay employees. For instance, in respect to public service and the 1901 law (on public organisations) "the funding for the redevelopment of the ten World Cup venues came from mixture of public and private sources, but the football clubs themselves (who are essentially tenants) did not have to pay a single franc" (Eastham, 1999:61).

From the 1980s new entrepreneurs arrived determined to invest in football and go further in the economic rationalisation of this sector. To face these new economic realities, the state decided in 1984 to change its regulations relative to the organisation and promotion of sport and physical activities. A new law known as "loi Avice", 16 July 1984, followed by other amendments (1989,1992,1999,2000), appeared in order to consolidate the judicial system that organises and controls sports in France. The reform takes into consideration, according to Bouchet (2002), all operated evolutions in the society (e.g. technological and managerial innovations, consuming behaviour and demographic development), in order to adapt sports practice to the country's political, social and economic realities. It included the adoption of new laws that concern accidents in stadia, the financial drift of professional clubs, and the fight against doping and violence. The aim was the insertion of economic logic into different sports markets (sponsoring, major events or spectacles, working legislation) and the introduction of a managerial logic into sports organisations.

The other major reforms brought by this new law concern professional football and TV rights. It transformed the clubs into companies with specific commercial status. They were designated, according to their annual turnover (which must be over 2.5 million francs), to an SAOS (Société anonyme a objet sportive) or SEM (Société d'économie mixte). To become an SAOS though the club must retain at least 33 percent of the capital, so that other investors can come in, for instance PSG or Marseille where financial partners like Adidas, Panasonic or Canal Plus own 49 per cent. To become an SEM, the local authority owns 50 per cent of the capital with the

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7 A modification to the law in 1987 allowed them to legally remain under "association 1901" on the condition that the club was not in the red for two consecutive years (Eastham, 1999:60).
association retaining 33 per cent. The 33 per cent ownership of the club capital is sufficient, according to Mignon, for the association to play the role of blocking minority in relation to other investors and could prohibit them from receiving any dividends. Regarding this point Eastham stresses that

Despite these changes to the financial statute of football clubs, the structure of the game in France still reflects a view of sporting activity as part of the public mission of the state and of local authorities. This may be traced back to Coubertin’s Olympic ideal, seeing sport as a philosophical and ethical approach to life. (1999:60)

Another important influence for change came from the liberalisation of TV broadcast regulations and the end of state monopoly, which resulted in the creation of several independent channels. Competition between those independent channels in broadcasting football matches and attracting large audiences⁸, has produced a lot of money for clubs to be spent on recruiting domestic players who until 1968 were tied to their clubs until the age of 35⁹. The money was also used to recruit new foreign players, particularly from Eastern Europe and Africa for the more spectacular staging of matches. This new situation encouraged some media interests like Canal Plus to invest in PSG in the same manner as BSkyB in Manchester United, in order to control the broadcast of the game and thus controlling the costs of TV right and the pay per view market. The investment by media companies in football did not reach the same scale as in England. This was, according to Mignon, the result of the low level of attraction of viewers, except in some instances for the national team or when French clubs are representing France in different European competitions.

4.2.3 The role of the National League of Football

The league has been delegated powers by the FFF in order to ensure the homogeneity and equality of all levels of professional football, in distributing TV income, application of rules and dealing with clubs (rich or poor). Its main mission is to guarantee the public service and application of state directives. Given its position as

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⁸ number of broadcasting hours has grown from 10 hours in 1974 to 500 in 2000 (Mignon, 2000:244).
the guardian of Republican values (of equality, and the public interest), the LNF tries also to associate public interests with football, as part of the state policy of treating sport as similar to other cultural matters and not as subject to market forces (Mignon, 2000: 246). For this reason the state created (starting from 1950) a category of civil servants known as “Directeurs techniques”, working at the level of youth coaching centres\(^9\). Their role is to improve sporting technical skills and more importantly to enhance social justice and social mobility, as well as promoting a more economical, rational and efficient brand for club management. Talking about the importance of DTN contributions for French football, Gerard Houllier (Liverpool FC, 1999) states that

The DTN has always had coaching as its principal objective. Ever concerned to improve its activities, in the early 1990s the DTN even introduced a far-reaching pre scheme of Youth Development (‘pre-formation’ or ‘pre training’) for every young player, who can learn advanced skills in seven football centres across France. (Houllier, 1999: vii)

The role of the LNF was challenged recently by big professional clubs represented by the UCPF (Union des Clubs Professionals de Football). They called for less tax on clubs and wages, and more importantly, to be acknowledged as the owners of football rights, which would allow them to take all the economic benefits resulting from their involvement in the organisation of the game. The clubs have criticised the monopoly on the management of TV right management by the LNF and its distribution over different French professional clubs, which according to the UCPF, does not take into consideration differences between small (poor) and big (rich) clubs, in attracting viewers. For this reason they have called for individual negotiations of TV rights with the channel of their choice, for the broadcasting of their own matches. These demands have been met with certain hostility by the Ministry of Youth and Sport, which sees

\(^9\) They could leave the club before this age only if the club’s owner agreed to a transfer (Mignon, 2000:237). This situation changed after 1968 after the 1968 social revolution. For the first time players were to be allowed the mobility or autonomy accorded to the workers.

\(^{10}\) The creation of youth centres became after 1974 compulsory for all clubs which want to reach the status of professional clubs.
this move, by rich clubs, as counter the French model of republican compromise and equality between French professional clubs.

The question that should be asked is, for how long the LNF will be able to resist to the pressure of rich clubs that have started to organise themselves in association with other European clubs and media owners, in a form of business lobby? Or as Bourdieu (1999: 20) put it, the issue is "whether French exceptionalism—that is to say the very special relationship between sport and the state which makes sport a public service, public health service or civic education service—is merely an out-of-date idiosyncrasy doomed to be swept away by the force of money?"

For Mignon the future of football in France remains unclear. Political factors such as a change of ministerial position or of the political majority in the parliament or the opening of the country to the influences of a free international market (as is the case for the British model of professional football), could play a role in the change of the republican model of professional football in France. Whether a standard (business oriented) model will be developed remains to be seen.11

To sum up, it could be stated that even though French professional model of football is not as successful to some extent as those adopted in other European nations such as England or Italy, however, for the reasons reported above, we can argue that the French model has shown its ability to produce young talents with technical skills. Furthermore, it has produced a football system that is intended to be a compromise between social and business needs. It has sought to combine republican traditions and modernity in sport management (including football), to establish at the same time a balance between general public service and equality amongst clubs, which arguably is not present in other European nations.

11 The new Minister of Youth and Sport (de la droite majoritaire) Mr Jean-Francois Lamour, has proposed new reforms. The most important points addressed in the report, are concerned with the business activities of professional clubs. The ownership of the TV rights will go from the FFF to the clubs (with the condition that the sales of the rights remain centralised). The same was suggested for the logo or l'image de marque which will be the property of the club and not the association. (see Didier Romain, Le parisien 01.10.02).
4.3 The American professional sport system

The purpose of this section is to review the 'uniqueness' of the American approach in adapting professional soccer (European game) to its domestic sport culture. However, because soccer despite its steady development in the US after the 1994 World Cup is not established yet as a popular sport, and because other sports in the US have very different systems, professional systems applied in other major leagues are included in this section, as part of the literature on the American professional sport system. This will provide the author with an idea about the major differences that exist at level of systems and values, between the American and other European professional leagues, which will reinforce our argument about the heterogenisation (the diversification, the pluralism) of sport structures, particularly at the professional level, within the so-called core countries.

Vallet (1998) suggests that:

Soccer is the only factor of mundialisation that escapes American tutelage. If the world of image is dominated by Hollywood and that of money by Wall Street, the planet of football is less North- American” (In Hoehn & Szymanski: 205, translated from French).

In comparison to Europe, where professionalism in soccer was already introduced (e.g. 1885 in England), it was not until the 1920s that the United States had a strong league. But in Clement and Pedersen’s (2001: 152) terms the American Soccer was only a regional (Northeast) League. Thirty years later, the United States had two national soccer leagues after the formation of the United States Soccer Association and the National Soccer League. These two leagues merged in 1968 and became known as the North American Soccer League (NASL) (2001:153). However, despite the increase in the game's popularity amongst young participants (particularly within the Hispanic community) during the 1970s, the NASL struggled to maintain its status and went bankrupt. This was due mainly to the absence of a major television contract, and heavy expenditure on worldwide stars coming from other countries (e.g. Pele), as
part of league policy to enhance the popularity of the game in order to attract more spectators, TV stations and sponsors. The other major problem was the lack of minor leagues or a college development system that could feed the league with young talents and allow its continuity. This was the case until the 1990s. However, the publicity surrounding the World Cup increased enthusiasm for soccer and resulted in the formation in 1996 of Major League Soccer (MLS) (2001: 153). For the first time in the history of soccer in the United States there was a clear will of those in charge of the league not only to adopt European soccer but to transform it to an American product, ready to be exported back to its birth place, Europe, in its new American and 'MacDonalised' format. The following expresses clearly this will:

Yet, emerging out of this nation's reluctance to embrace alien value characterized by the demise of the professional North American Soccer League (NASL in 1985), The major Indoor Soccer League (later the MSL) appeared to satisfy the unique cultural needs of the nation's sports consumer through a bastardized version of the sport...With the plans to expand into Europe (...) MISL consultant for international expansion, confidently stated "This is McDonald's of soccer...The English will take to it like American fast food”12 (1994:96)

The relative success of the World Cup had played an important role in attracting sponsors and TV interests to the newly established league. With teams consisting of American players (from different ethnic backgrounds) in addition to a limited number of international stars, the MSL, according to Clement and Pedersen, is structured as a single entity, which means that all teams are owned by the league (2001:153). Hoehn & Szymanski refer to this structure as a syndicated league, where "ownership is pooled and players can be allocated centrally to different teams to maintain competitive balance" (1999:213). The MLS uses this structure “to eliminate the financial unbalance or disparities between large and small market [big and small clubs], control player costs, offer commercial affiliates an integrated sponsorship and increasing program and allow for decisions to be made that are in the best interest of the entire League rather than just one team” (Clement and Pedersen, 2001:153). This

also allows, in Hoehn & Szymanski's terms, the maintenance of a certain solidarity between teams, competing together in the same format from year to year, in comparison to European leagues where this factor is undermined by the fact that composition of each league division changes from year to year and that the set of competitors change in different competition (1999: 214). However, it should be emphasised that the American league in its actual format undermines the sense of competitiveness and equal opportunities for other clubs to access high level competition and market share.

4.3.1 The American professional sports model of 'restricted liberalism'

From Hoehn and Szymanski's perspective, there are two main differences between American and European professional sports system (see table 4.1). First, the US leagues are generally “hermitic”, in other words, new teams are seldom admitted to the league and there is no annual promotion and relegation between junior and senior leagues. Expansion franchises are admitted on agreement between already existing league members and the entry fee is divided between them (1999: 213). It is worth noting that US leagues are closed, which means that member teams do not compete simultaneously in different competitions. For instance, the most powerful football league in the USA (NFL) consists of two conferences, National Football Conference (NFC) and the American Football Conference (AFC). Each of those conferences gathers respectively 15 and 16 franchises. We can cite also the National Basket Ball Association (NBA) which consists of 29 teams comprising Western and Eastern conferences (Clement and Pedersen, 2001: 149). Similar to the NFL, home territory for a club is the city that holds the franchise and a 75-mile (120Km) radius from the city, with the exception for basketball and football where Los Angeles and New York/New Jersey each comprise two franchises. The problem that result from this system is that with a limited number of franchises, unlike European cities (which sometimes boast more than one big club e.g. Manchester, Milan, Madrid), many cities in the US lack a major team (Hoehn & Szymanski, 1999:214).
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Table 4.1 Differences in structure of US and European sports leagues (Hoehn & Szymanski, 1999:215)

Secondly, the other major difference is that of player salaries and the distribution of club revenues. To preserve what Hoehn and Szymanski define as a competitive balance between the clubs and to restrict output in order to keep the price high (for broadcasting rights), the major leagues, which Gratton and Taylor (2000: 197) refer to as cartels, intervene in the labour market and redistribution of revenue. For the player market “in an effort to ensure a level playing field, or equity in competition that
translates into exciting, closely contested matches, [Major leagues] players salaries have been negotiated under player salary cap” (Clement and Pedersen, 2001: 148). Based on multiple accounting and bargaining systems the salary cap (the maximum an organization is allowed to spend each year on players salaries) differs from one league to another. The average player salary for the 1999 season in the NFL was $1 million, and $2.8 million for the NBA (ibid:149). The other intervention that US leagues authorities have tried to maintain has been the “rookie draft”. When players finish college or high school and enter professional sports the best rookie players is automatically awarded to the team that finished last in the previous season’s competition, the second pick the second last team, and so on. This system, according Hoehn and Szymanski, allows poorly performing teams, which acquire the best young talent, to improve their standing in the following year (1999:214). The length of the contract that links the player to its team, compared to a more typical three-years contract in Europe (1999: 214), is different in the US from one sport to another. It depends also on the status or market classification of the player. Contracts for young inexperienced player (rookies or players with less than three years experience) in the NFL, for instance, are less flexible than for experienced professionals (including veterans or free agents). Regarding this point Clement and Pedersen claim that

The football veterans are either regular (under contract) or free agent. Free agents are either restricted or unrestricted. Restricted free agents are players with three completed seasons and an expired contract. Unrestricted free agents are players with four or more completed seasons and an expired contract. (2001: 148)

On the other hand, contracts for NBA players are not so restricted and can be for any period of time up to six years. Contracts between veteran free agents and their prior teams may be up to seven years, while a rookie contract may last for three years with one additional year (2001: 149).

The main medium for redistribution of profits in US leagues is the sharing of national broadcast revenue 13, which is considered as the most important source of income. For

13 Averaging 32% of income in baseball, 34% in baseball and 63% in American football (Sheehan, 1996: in Hoehn & Szymanski, 1999: 214).
instance, in early 1998, American broadcasters (CBS, ABC, and ESPN) agreed to pay $18 billion for the rights to the National Football League for 8 years (Gratton & Taylor, 2000: 197). This money as in other leagues is divided among clubs equally, in contrast to European soccer leagues where its redistribution among clubs, according to Hoehn & Szymanski, is based on a performance-related element and a fixed share.

For example, the Premiership League contract shares half of the contract value equally among the teams, 25% on the basis of league performance and 25% on the number of games televised (1999:214).

The same could be argued for gate receipts, for instance in the NFL and baseball league where respectively 40% and 20% of net receipts go to the visiting team (1999:215).

The other characteristics of the American professional model are the following (see Gratton and Taylor, 2000: 1999):

- Both clubs and leagues clearly have profit maximising as the priority.
- The conflict between behaviour required to ensure profit-maximising by the league as a whole and maximisation of profit for the most successful clubs in the league requires that the league act as a 'cartel' to impose restrictions on output (the number of clubs, number of games, price competition, salaries paid to players, and the operation of the labour market). In addition, the leagues have traditionally employed revenue-sharing arrangements so that the economic gap between the richest and the poorest clubs is narrowed.
- These restrictions on competition in both product and labour markets aim at maintaining the competitive balance (or uncertainty of outcome) that is a necessary condition for the successful operation of professional team sports leagues.
- The sale of broadcasting rights has become an increasingly important source of revenue to professional team sports leagues and clubs.
The other issue that should be noted, is the relation between local governments and club owners. In order to attract more spectators and consumers to the city and stadium arenas so that local businesses will benefit more from their spending, cities are competing to attract the restricted number of franchises existing in the market. One of the tools is to provide subsidies to profit maximising sports industries, by using public money to build new facilities and to lease them afterward to clubs’ owners for either no rental fee or minimal sums. According to Gratton and Taylor (2000:199), quoting from Crompton (1999), “in 1997 there were 113 major league professional franchises [from different leagues]. Between 1989 and 1997, 31 had a new stadium or arena built; and in 1997, an additional 39 teams were actively seeking new facilities, finalising a deal to build one, or waiting to move into one”. As a result of what Gratton and Taylor describe as rather unusual situation for profit maximising business to receive such huge subsidy from local government, American professional teams are moving to cities which provide them with the best offer in term of facilities.

4.3.2 Future trends in the MSL

The fundamental question that we may ask is whether the MSL will be able to sustain itself as growing market and compete with other (more popular and lucrative) sports leagues. The last decision of the Major Soccer League (MSL) authority to fold two of its 12 franchises, the Miami Fusion and Tampa Bay Mutiny, gives an idea of the financial problems that the MSL is confronted by. This decision was made due to the lack of investment in both teams, which despite their modern stadiums and a strong Hispanic fan base, failed to attract investors’ money needed for their day to day management. Regarding this point, Barry Wilner claims that the seven-year old league saw little future for those two teams (Sport Business International, March 2002: 6). Other teams such as the Dallas Burn and San Jose Earthquakes, which are short of investors, may face the same decision. The other challenger for the MSL, which makes the league actually hard to market, is not baseball or basketball but the WUSA, the Women Soccer league. The popularity of the latter, according to Wilner

14 The typical arena cost for hockey and basketball is around $150 million while for football and baseball stadia the typical cost increases to approximately $ 250 million (Crompton, 1998, in Gratton & Taylor, 2000:199)
15 Seven teams are owned by two men, Phillip Anschutz (16th- richest person in the US) and Lamar Hunt, a long time supporter and investor in American soccer (see Sport Business International, March 2002)
(2002: 6), is higher than the MSL, because of its identifiable stars namely Mia Hamm, Brandi Chastain, Kristine Lilly which have no parallel in the case of the MSL. This has resulted in ESPN2 the TV station, which broadcasts the MSL games, signing a new contract with the WUSA for 26 telecasts in the 2002 season, four of them in prime time on Thursday nights (the contract runs through to 2006).

In relation to men’s success, thus it remains to be seen whether this is the beginning of the end of the MSL or whether the 2002 World Cup finals in which the US team created the surprise to qualify to the quarter final, will breath new life into the domestic league, through greater public awareness, TV coverage and investment.

4.4 The British professional system

After discussing French centralised government based (dirigiste) model of professionalism and that of American restricted liberalism, the aim of the following is to discuss another professional sport model that of the British ‘market driven’ system.

The English Football League was the first professional football League in the world, which came into existence in 1888, with 12 competing clubs (Conn, 1999: 42). Its objective prior to the 1990s was to maximise profit through the pursuit of playing success which could lead to larger attendance and hence greater revenue (Taylor and Gratton, 2000). This was defined by economists as utility maximisation. However, according to Taylor and Gratton, the professional system failed to achieve both profit and utility maximisation. The steady decline of fans’ attendance from 41.3 million in the 1948-49 to that of just over 16 million in 1985-1986 season, proved to be an indicator of this failure. Mismanagement (balancing between clubs’ budget and expenditure), lack of investment, low performance and hooliganism, which resulted in the banning of all English football clubs from European competitions, had caused a real crisis. In Hamil’s terms, until the 1980s football clubs were mainly loss making. They were supposedly social; as opposed to commercial; institutions. This is still the case in the lower divisions but not in the Premiership in its new format.
Clubs were privately owned, usually by locally based, wealthy and indulgent benefactors motivated by a desire for prestige in the local community, some sense of noblesse oblige, or just pursuing a hobby. (1999: 23)

The Hillsborough disaster in 1989 where 96 Liverpool supporters were killed at the FA Cup semi-final against Nottingham Forest was a culmination of the so-called “custodian” type of management. The latter, according to Conn, represented the public rationale for a self-serving group of businessmen, varying greatly in competence and concern for the game and its supporters (1999:44). Hamil goes on in his argument to state that football was (and still is) used by club directors as a way to increase their public profile, making contracts, transforming football clubs into poorly run companies in “which complacent owner-directors regarded supporters as a rabble and failed to provide for their safety, let alone comfort” (1999: 44).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Hillsborough disaster despite the emotional crises that it provoked, particularly for the families of the victims, was a major turning point for British football. Following the disaster, Lord Justice Taylor was appointed to conduct an official inquiry. The report produced from the inquiry identified the particular cause, which according to Conn, could be summarised as follows:

the League and the FA had both failed to regulate member clubs effectively in terms of fulfilling their safety duties; the ethos of public service in the boardroom [the interest of supporter customers] was being widely betrayed (1999:47).

In the application of the Taylor recommendations grants were awarded for conversion of spectators’ stand. One of the most important tasks was also to transform all Premiership football grounds into all-seater stadia, with better comfort and accessibility for spectators. Furthermore, in order to meet the costs of the Taylor recommendations, the Conservative government charged the Football Trust with assisting professional football clubs financially. Quoting from The Football Trust (1997) Hamil reports that the Trust distributed, between 1990 and 1997, £150 million
to clubs\textsuperscript{16} in the FA premier League, the Football League and the Scottish Football League (1999: 26).

The modernisation of football grounds in addition to the increasing importance of revenue from broadcasting rights has helped football to regain its popularity and for clubs to rethink their business and the type of management to be adopted in order to achieve profit maximisation. A negative point is that this happened at the expense of fan rights. The steady increase of ticket price and its consequences for fans' (individuals and family) rights are to be dealt with in the subsequent section.

4.4.1 The new commercialism

The increase of broadcasting rights, which coincided with the launch of the country's first satellite television companies was the major trigger to the twenty biggest football clubs in the country breaking away in 15 August 1992 from the Football League to form the FA Carling Premier League\textsuperscript{17}. The former was criticised for its collectivist fashion of managing football and method of distributing revenue amongst its members (Hudson, 2000). The establishment of Premier League has given satellite channels an opportunity for investment in football, which in Hudson's term was conceived as the "killer" product with which to pursue consumers to invest in both satellite equipment and subscription channels. Securing exclusive rights for the live broadcast of Premier League matches helped to increase the number of BskyB subscriptions from under 2 million in 1993 to over 6 million in 1999, transforming its profitability from 1992 losses of £47 million into profit of £374 million in 1997\textsuperscript{18} (Lee, 1999: 93). In other words, it was this major escalation of the 'war' between TV companies (particularly between BskyB and ITV) in purchasing broadcasting rights that provided English clubs in the Premiership with a huge influx of money to be spent in paying rapid wage inflation and buying top players. Only 14 per cent of this television revenue went in 1998-99 to other football-related bodies, mainly the Football League, the Professional Footballer's Association and the Football Trust.

\textsuperscript{16} Manchester United received £3.4 million public money, Chelsea £4 million, and Sheffield Wednesday £3.6 million (Conn, 1999:48).

\textsuperscript{17} An agreement was reached between the protagonist in which it was conclude that the FA run the disciplinary and refereeing system of the Premier league, in exchange of the Premier League independence in managing their turn over (see Conn, 2001: 287).
According Gratton and Taylor, in 1998-99, various youth development schemes together received a total of £200,000 and the English schools FA £25,000 out of total television revenue to the Premier League of £168 million. The rest, the biggest part, which represent half of the share is divided among the teams, 25% on the basis of league performance and 25% on the basis of the number of game televised (Hoehn and Szymnaski, 1999). For the gate receipts, which represent another major source of revenue for football clubs, for the Premier League, the home team retains all income.

Moreover, the changing of professional football objectives from utility maximisation, or what Conn defines as public service ethos and culture in running of the club (1999: 45), to that of profit maximisation, has pushed rich clubs to look to the financial markets to supply investment capital. The first football club to float was Tottenham Hotspur, which did so in 1983, followed in 1992 by Manchester United, Preston, and Millwall, which became publicly quoted companies with the associated responsibility to share holders to operate on sensible commercial grounds (Gratton and Taylor, 2000: 203). Today there are 23 clubs listed on either the London Stock Exchange or the AIM (twenty in England and three in Scotland) (Hoehn and Szymnaski, 1999). The results for 1996-97 report published by Deloitte and Touch, quoted in Gratton and Taylor (2000: 208) indicated the increase profitability of the Premiership clubs and the growing gap between the Premiership and the Football League:

Turnover grew significantly for the Premiership League (34%), Division One (26%) and Division Two (32%), although turnover fell 1% in Division Three. The Premier League now accounts for 68.7% of football revenue...The top five finishers in the Premier League (Manchester United, Newcastle United, Arsenal, Liverpool, and Aston Villa) had a combined turnover greater than that of all the 72 Football League clubs...

In the same vein, Lee (1999:85) argues that Manchester United’s 1996-1997 revenue of £87.9 million meant that it alone had received no less than 13 per cent of the Premier League’s revenue. However, a recent study shows that Manchester United, supposedly one of the biggest and richest club in Europe, had lost 70% of its share

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18 The Premier League is the most famous football league. It is broadcast to 152 countries on a regular basis (The Observer Sport Monthly, January 2002)
value in the last two years (l’Express 7-13 March, 2002). The same applies to other professional football clubs which chose flotation in order to maximise their profit, but which in reality, from Conn’s perspective, was a way for them to avoid being subject to regulation, allowing major shareholders and chairmen to make vast personal fortunes out of their football club shares (1999: 51).

Because of the ‘unrestricted’ liberalism and absence of internal regulations, which govern the relation between clubs and its supporters, English football has become a free market business (Conn, 2001: 209). For instance Conn argues that contrary to the spirit of Taylor Report, clubs were allowed to raise their ticket prices which they have done dramatically, growing by over 300 per cent since 1989. This has threatened more and more to “lock out the “traditional” working class fans who once formed the bedrock of the game and, crucially, for whom football formed their staple leisure activity” (Hudson: 2000). The other implications of the clubs’ commercial policy (looking for new revenues) and strategy in ‘exploiting’ fans’ brand loyalty and emotional bond which link them to their clubs, is the steady price rises for replica kit and other merchandising products, making them the most expensive in the European market.

4.4.2 Future trends

The fundamental question that we may ask here is whether future trends of the English professional system will be toward more restricted liberalism (Americanisation) or toward more centralised government regulations (the example of French dirigiste model). The other alternative might be continuing with a market driven logic, which implies further fragmentation of the British football and which could lead to the creation of a European ‘Super League’ incorporating a combination of American ‘cartel’ type of management with a European market driven perspective.

Gratton and Taylor in comparing the British professional to that of the American suggest that

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19 At Chelsea, for example, the average ticket price has risen from 7.50 in 1990 to over 30 today (Hudson, 2000)
the Premiership League has, at least in some ways, started to exhibit the characteristics of the American professional teams sports Leagues with increasing revenues from sponsorship, merchandising, and sale of broadcasting rights leading to higher profits (2000: 208).

However, it is worth noting that Americanisation of the English professional systems on the field and in terms of management, is felt more in other sports, particularly those originating from the USA namely basketball, Ice Hockey, American football, than in football. This might be difficult to achieve in football for the following factors cited by Gratton and Taylor (2000: 209):

- The lack of restrictions in the English football of output in terms of the number of clubs and number of games. The NFL in the USA has 30 clubs for a population of 260 million. England and Wales have 92 Premier and Football Leagues clubs with a further 40 clubs in Scotland for a total population of 56 million.
- The movement of franchises from one city to another is inconceivable in Great Britain due to the strong historical and emotional link between the club’s identity and the community.
- Absence in the British case of restrictions on such as competition revenue sharing and salary caps, regarded as essential in the American model.

Gratton and Taylor conclude their comparison by pointing out that the closest we might see to an American model of professional team sports is the new European Champion’s League, with a larger number of more equal clubs, more revenue sharing, and greater exposure through free-to-air channels (2000:210). The other example might be the European ‘super League’ that ‘super clubs’ in Europe might establish independently from the UEFA, which according to directors of the rich European clubs is becoming a commercial imperative. The move toward free market is in Conn’s term “the inevitable, provable, logical consequence of allowing anything to be run according to who can make the most money out of it” (2001: 294).

Nonetheless, while English football is witnessing an apparent economic boom, particularly for clubs which are at the top of the Premiership League, namely
Manchester United, Newcastle, Liverpool and Arsenal, more voices are raised in protest against the unrestricted liberalism, which the cited clubs are adopting. More people within politics, academic institutions, media and fans’ associations are calling for more regulation and government intervention to protect fans’ rights and football’s ‘soul’ from commercialism. Regarding this point, Hamil suggests that the new commercialism in English football is creating a handful of super clubs who by dint of their financial power, can more or less guarantee that they will be able to finish in the top ten of the Premier League each year. This has produced a huge inequality between Premiership clubs and other clubs in lower divisions such that many semi-professional clubs today are in financial trouble, suffering, according to Conn

(...) for having to compete with Premier League hype and games being televised in mid-week very much more often. At the grass-roots of the game, the municipal playing fields where Premier clubs find their talent and on which the vast majority of the football population play the game, local authority cuts have led to facilitates deteriorating into a state of squalor and disrepair” (1997: 52).

An example of this deteriorating state that local facilities are facing can be found in Conn’s comparative analysis of the difference between Manchester United plc and Chorlton Park, situated two miles away from Old Trafford

If Old Trafford is the Theatre of Dreams, then Chorlton Park is the Community Hall of Despair. It boasts every conceivable impediment to a decent game of football for the amateur teams who are cursed with it as their home ground (2001: 276).

In his predictions for the future Conn goes on in his arguments by stating that

Football will gradually become much less a participation sport, much more a form of mere television entertainment (...) At the top, football will create more multi-millionaire shareholders, directors, players and agents (...) fewer and fewer people will experience the joy of playing the game, according to their preferred or natural level (...) The future of football is therefore much
like that of every other industry governed solely by the free market, lacking the redistributive hand of regulation. Like the retail food industry, which now, across the country, has four superstores where everybody does their shopping, from which the poor and the careless are generally excluded. The banks; once there was one in every town, now there are four major ones with some minor players. Cinemas a few multiplexes. Clothes a handful of chain stores (2001:294)

To sum up, we can argue that the lack of strict regulations, which could reduce the gap between Premiership and other football leagues in lower divisions, in addition to the problem of social exclusion resulting from the steady increase of ticket price and other merchandising products, have all transformed football, from what was a working class game, to a sport for the rich. As a consequence, more members of the parliament and others from government have expressed their concern and called for the establishment of a new approach to football. One of them was Tony Blair, who in 1995 (as leader of the Opposition at that time) expressed such anxieties

I worry that a game in which one individual is deemed to be worth 7 million and whose club must raise the money with ever more lucrative and exclusive television deals, merchandising and expensive seats, is a game which may lose touch with its roots. I worry too that fans are taken for granted...that the dividing line between marketing and exploitation may have been crossed amid the plethora of ever changing strips (Quoted in Hamil, Michie & Oughton, 1999: 22).

Following Labour’s victory in 1997 the Football Task Force was established. Its aim was to tackle the problem of the rising ticket costs, merchandising policies, which from Brown’s (1999) perspective appeared to exploit fans’ loyalty and emotional bond with the brand. Additionally the problems of lack of representation for fans at all levels in the game and other issues related to rapidly growing imbalances in the financial strength between the Premiership and the three divisions of the football League (1997: 57). The major focus of the Task Force was specifically on the need for improved administration, furthermore, establishing legislation in relation to football violence, finance, ground safety, rights of fans and football for all. The other
example of the government's hostility toward non-regulated liberalism in football concerned BskyB's bid for the ownership of Manchester United. Following the example of the ownership of Paris Saint Germain by the leading French media company, Canal plus, and Berlusconi media company ownership of AC Milan in Italy, BskyB offered £623.4 million for the control of the world's most profitable football club. Reacting to that Tony Bank, the Minister for Sport, argued that "football clubs could not be treated like product in a market place as allegiances to them are based on cultural affinities" (Financial Times, 26 October 1998, quoted in Lee, 1999: 95). As a result of the Monopolies and Mergers commissions' (MMC) examination of the BskyB bid and in response to the protest of Manchester Fans and the Professional Footballers' Association, the government established a new competition regime. The aim of the new rules is to protect the integrity of English sport from business monopolies (Lee, 1999: 96). The other major decision taken by the government was the blocking of the BskyB bid.

In concluding, we should take into consideration another type of influence on the professional football system in Britain. It emanates from France and concerns football development programmes and the launch of football academies. The system was initiated in France under the direction of Gerard Houllier, subsequently the manager of Liverpool. It consists of the recruitment of the best young talents from small clubs from different regions to join the national academy (see Time, January 28, 2002). The program according to football specialists was behind the success of the French national football team in both the World and European Cups, both at senior and junior levels. It is this same programme, which has produced the forty French professional footballers currently playing in the Premiership. Some English clubs like Arsenal, Liverpool and Fulham (under the management of French coaches) have already adopted aspects of the French model. In addition to bringing French technicians to reinforce their coaching team, they have also signed partnership contracts with other French clubs for the transfer of young French talents to the Premiership (e.g. Arsenal's partnership with St Etienne).

4.5 Soccer in Japan

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Incorporating Japan in our discussion on professional sport could be seen as legitimate for our research on global and local trends and debates on western/non-western culture or modernity/tradition dualism. Japan’s specific route to modernity, is described in terms of localisation of sport and some success in ‘reverse diffusion’ (Guttmann, 1994) of sporting forms and cultures (i.e the spread of martial arts from Japan to the West), could lead to the recognition of the diversity of modernities (Horne, 1998: 172). “Imposed or externally induced” modernity (Therborn, 1995), including forms of sports and leisure, in addition to the de-westenised, de-centred conception of the global, has enabled Japan, from Horne’s perspective, to position itself as part of the Asian “other” (from the point of view of the modernising West) and yet simultaneously distinct from (superior to) its neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region (Horne, 1998: 171).

The establishment of professional football League in Japan was announced in 1990. This aimed to breath life into football in Japan, which is still, for cultural and historical reasons not a major sport in comparison to Sumo or baseball (see Horne, 2000:218). The launch of professional soccer coincided with the international success of Japan in different international competitions for both women and men. For instance, in 1995 Japan won the Dynasty Cup in Hong Kong, the women’s team reached the quarter finals of the second FIFA Women’s World Football championship, held in Sweden and at the World University Games held in Fukuoka (Horne, 2000:219).

According to Watts (1998), the distinctiveness of the new J. league is that it involved an attempt to market soccer in the same way as a new improved consumer product, in Japanese “Shinhatsu Bai” (new improved product). It seeks to create a new identification system and consumption culture based on linking, through football, the Japanese to their hometown (furusato) or at least to their place of consumption, as opposed to their company and place of occupation (production), which exists in baseball for example (Reported in Horne, 2000:219).

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20 Soccer has become a favourite sport in Japan during the past two decades with the number of participants rising from 270,000 in 1979 to 810,000 in 1999 (according to Japanese Football Associations) in Chiba et. all. (2001).
What are the main cultural differences between baseball and soccer in its new format in Japan? The development of a new style of baseball known as “samurai baseball”, called also yakyu (baseball in Japanese), was based on the spirit of bushido, or the strict training regime (called also death training) which promotes endurance gutu (Whiting Roberts, 1977, reported in Horne, 2000:214). This may be interpreted as an attempt of creolization or domestication of baseball (an American sport) and its transformation to some extent to a local product linked to local values and (warrior) Japanese beliefs (about the Japanisation of baseball see Chiba et all. 2001). However, the Japanisation of football aimed at introducing a new (western) type of thinking, which consists of changing the consumption behaviour of the population and its identification or “wa” (group solidarity) from the company toward the region and place of consumption. This could be viewed, in contrast to baseball, as an attempt toward the modernisation of Japanese society through the assimilation of certain aspects of western consumerism through professional football.

4.5.1 From experimentation toward ‘normalisation’

The development of professional football in Japan, for organisational (rational) and cultural causes, went through different modifications and phases. At the beginning, new criteria of affiliation were added for joining the J. league, for example, the possession of at least a 15000 capacity stadium that could also be turned into a community-based centre. Regarding the league competition system, in the first season of the J. league all clubs played each other four times on a home and away bases, owing to the small numbers of affiliated clubs (at that stage ten). The league was divided into two stages; “suntory” which ran from mid March to mid July and; “Nicos” from mid August to mid November. Horne (2000:220) adds that in contrast to major European leagues, a period of 30 minutes of extra time was played if scores were level at the end of the official time 90 minutes. If the game was still tied the result was determined by penalty kick shoot out, as happens for example in the World Cup Finals. With this form all league matches were played as finals. According to Watts (1998), the system adopted enabled the element of “Showdown” found in baseball and Sumo, to be incorporated in football. Teams received three points for a win of any kind and starting from 1995 season, teams losing after a penalty shout out were awarded one point.
The increase in the number of teams and competitions obliged the decision-makers in charge of the J. league to drop the old system of two stages in favour of a single format, with two home and way games. Starting from 1999, two divisions in J. leagues have been created composed respectively of 16 and 10 teams with promotion and relegation between them, in addition to the old semi-professional league the JFL was composed of company teams. Another change was to drop the shout out as a way deciding tied matches in the J. league. From 1999, three points were awarded for a win in the official time and two point for a win in extra time through the scoring of a “golden goal”, with one point for a draw after 120. In this manner the J. league for nearly nine years went from the stage of ‘experimentation’ to a stage of ‘normalisation’.

As a result the J. league has experienced a steady development in the last ten years. It has gained a national and an international reputation attracting world class players and coaches from Europe and Latin America (e.g. Arsene Wenger, subsequently coach of Arsenal, or Dunga, the famous Brazilian midfielder). Japanese football has also produced local world class players such as Nakata (who is perceived as a national hero). Yet, soccer has not attained the popularity of baseball and Sumo, which according to Horne, possess in comparison to soccer, a “hardcore” of fans and sponsors which does not yet exist in football. This may change after the World Cup Final. A further factor will be the impact of TV broadcasts, particularly from the Japan SKY Broadcasting Company (JSKYB), a joint venture between Murdoch’s News Corporation and the Soft Bank Corporation (Horne, 2000:225), which from its establishment in 1995, has been competing with other domestic cable and satellite TV companies in broadcasting local and international games.

4.5.2 The beginning of ‘commercialisation’

Three key changes are affecting the future of Professional soccer in Japan, creating new business and investments opportunities. These changes, according to McDonald et al (2001), are the acceptance of agents in representing the interests of professional athletes, the launch of new broadcasting satellite BS-4, and the organisation of a
global sport event, the 2002 World cup. These developments has provided Japanese professional Leagues, as well as Japanese and foreign companies including sports marketing agencies, with opportunities to develop their marketing strategies (2001:40). The above cited changes are the result of the transformation of Japanese culture, which in McDonald et al’s point of view, is creating an environment supportive of the continued emergence and professionalisation of sports on and off field, and most importantly, to the acceptance of western strategies of management. Part of this cultural mutation, is the gradual change in Japanese corporate culture from traditional human resource management based on Confucianism and the concept of wa, which consists of harmony, unity and co-operation, to a (individualist) performance based evaluation and reward system (McDonald et al, 2001:41). The latter in addition of the weakening influence of Confucianism amongst younger generations, including professional players, has enabled the development of the trend of agents signing professional athletes to contracts either for transfer or endorsements, as well as giving financial advice in return for commission. For example, Sunny Side Up a small marketing agency has negotiated a number of endorsement deals for Nakata, the most popular soccer player in Japan (playing in Serie A). These include; Canon ($500,000), Asahi Beverage ($1 m), Subaru ($1 m), and Direct TV ($500,000) (Sankei Sport News, 2000 in McDonald et all, 2001: 55). The same marketing agency, with 47% share, works in partnership with eplayers, an Internet company offering Nakata merchandise, tours of Roma and “even an auction to meet and spend time with Nakata” (McDonald et al, 2001:55).

The increase interaction between global and local is due also to the emergence of global media, including the Internet21 and satellite broadcasting (e.g. the launch of the new broadcasting satellite, BS-40. The other forces are “the growth of the fame phenomenon in Japanese society and the creation of celebrities through mass media, and the internationalisation of Japanese TV” (McDonald et al, 2001:40). BS-4, in addition of providing the necessary channel capacity for the purchase of broadcasting, it will enable Japanese viewers (consumers) to closely follow their heroes, baseball and soccer players playing abroad. The channel, could also be used for local interests

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21 In 1997, the number of host computers in Japan that were connected to internet numbered 730,000, with 4.5% of the global market this was second only to the United States (Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication, 1999, in McDonald et all, 2001:45).
such as the internationalisation of local sports culture e.g. Sumo. Furthermore, as a result also of global and local interaction or what McDonald et al refer to as global-local nexus, is the hosting of global event, the 2002 World cup soccer, by Japan. The latter has offered new opportunities to attract global attention and the potential to accelerate the popularity of J-league (McDonald et al, 2001:44).

To conclude this section, we can argue that the existence of multiple professional sports (football) systems in both western and non-western countries, and within western countries themselves (USA, England and France) supposedly representing the centre (as one entity) in the global system, reinforces Warnier's (1999); Göle's (1997); Featherston's (1995); Hannerz (1991) and others views on global culture and modernity that world culture, and particularly sport, is witnessing a dispersion of cultural references, rather than homogenisation and standardisation. The professionalisation of sports in the west (USA-Europe) and non-western countries (Japan) is shaped by local, social, and historical as well as cultural structures and interpretations of modernity. The latter even though its values rationalisation, secularism, democracy, and nation-state are accepted as being a condition for progress (at least in industrial countries), it is applied differently from one country to another. This applies to professional sport, e.g market driven in Britain, restricted liberalism in the USA, and state dirigiste in France. The consumption, interception and then interpretation of 'universal' values of professionalism (individualism, liberalism, consumerism, and commercialism) also represent a space for the production of cultural specificity. Japan provides an example where tradition and belief systems are part of professional sport structure, despite the challenge of Americanisation (e.g baseball). Nonetheless it should be noted that the local application of professional sports in different cultural spaces, particularly in football, does not happen in total isolation from other world experiences. Cultural interlay between what are perceived as core and periphery countries can also be found in the application of professionalism in sport. The popularity of English football, particularly the business success of clubs such as Manchester United, Liverpool and Arsenal have pushed clubs directors in France to call for de-centralisation of decision making and reform in the relation between central government and football clubs (the withdrawal of taxes and other financial restrictions). The same could be said for English football, which may consider the French policy for the development of elite sport and French government
intervention in the regulation of professional sports, as possible models to be adapted in the Premiership. The transformation of the aims of professionalisation from utility maximisation to profit maximisation in English football, is another example of cultural interaction between Britain and the USA. The same could be argued for the commercialisation of sports and role of players’ agents in Japan.

4.6 Algerian system of ‘professional football’

Today, sport (as with other sectors of the society), particularly football, is moving toward a market oriented economy, as a reaction to the growing media exposure and cultural flows transmitted by satellite TV channels and the impact that the global football industry is having on local football culture (on and off the pitch). As a result, professionalism, which was rejected during the socialist era, is seen today as an effective strategy to modernise sport and thus for the country to position itself, after more than ten years of political and economic uncertainty, as a strong sporting nation.

After discussing different approaches in relation to globalisation and sport, from both globalist and local point of view, the function of the following is to position the Algerian case within the debate about local responses to global cultural diffusion, particularly in association with the professionalisation of football.

4.6.1 The ‘professionalisation’ of sport in Algeria

Professionalisation of sport in Algeria was definitely rejected as mode of sports organisation or management in the first years of post-independence. This was due, according to Chehat, to the lack of technicians and managers, who (with the exception of football, boxing and cycling) were limited in the level of competencies and quality. The second most important element was the absence of sports infrastructures. From Chehat’s perspective, although the capital [Algiers] and the city of Oran enjoyed relatively developed sports infrastructure, other regions suffered far more from the consequences of the colonial past.

Sport was never conceived for the good of masses. It was open only for the descendants of the colonial power. It is not a surprise to find that the biggest
stadium in Algeria was built in Oran, where the European population represented 75% [of the total population] (Chehat 1993:54, Translated from French).

Additionally for national sport administrators and decisions makers, professionalism was often synonymous with exploitation and tragedy (e.g. El Ouaïf\textsuperscript{23}, Bob Omar\textsuperscript{24}, who died in total anonymity and misery) rather than with success, (e.g. Mekhloufi, Cherif Hamia). According to \textit{El Moudjahid}, earning a living from sport in Algeria after the war was simply not possible, when millions of Algerians were suffering:

Those [sports managers] who wanted to develop professionalism, they are not aware of the consequences that this move could have on the sports’ domain. They are already projecting that the next season [1965-1966] they should gain a monopoly hold on valuable players by promising them some financial remuneration. On the other hand, there are players who want to transform football to a full time activity [a financial source] using threatening procedures vis-à-vis their clubs’ directors... [\textit{El Moudjahid}, September 1965, Reported by Chehat 1993, 53, translated from French].

To confront those demands, the Algiers Football League (AFL) created in 1965 a commission named “\textit{la commission d’amateurism}” which aimed to close the doors of what it had described as “corruptive infiltration” in the Algerian football, and other sports disciplines. In the same vein, Algerian Football Federation (AFF) refused to provide authorisation for those athletes who wanted to turn professional in Europe. These procedures did not however stop the Algerian Football Federation from selecting professional players who were already in Europe to participate in international competitions (this reflects their political and diplomatic importance for the regime.) The first president of the Algerian Football Federation declared in 1963 (one year before the launch of the Algerian Football League) that:

\textsuperscript{22} Situated in the West of Algeria, considered as the second biggest city in the country.
\textsuperscript{23} World famous long distance runner and the first Algerian to participate in the Olympic games in 1924 organised in Paris and to win a gold medal in 1928 in Amsterdam.
\textsuperscript{24} Famous professional boxer, who died in 16 of August 1932 after three months of agony (Chehat,1993:27)
This use [of professional players' experience], will contribute firstly to developing the level of national sport, secondly to the training of a new sports elite, and more importantly will give us the possibility to produce [in the future] educators and demonstrators. (reported in Chehat 1993:54, translated from French).

In the aftermath of the Algerian historic participation in the 1982 World Cup, more football agents were interested in the talents of Algerian mundialistes. One of those agents in search of a new market of footballers and who was prepared, according Chehat, to carry out an unprecedented razzia was the president of FC Mulhouse, M. Andre Goerig. Goerig succeeded after two days of negotiations in signing contracts with the most brilliant strikers in the history of Algerian football namely Assad and Madjer. The former for a Spanish and the latter for a French club. The news of an agreement between those two players and Andre Goerig was responded to by Algerian newspapers with severe criticism, which saw in those first professional contracts, a green light for the exodus of the best Algerian footballers. El-Moudjahed was the first to react by stating that “It did not need...more than two short meetings for selling an athlete whose training needed five years of investments. Three Mulhousiens managers signed the first official Algerian contract. They went back tanned and happy, not only for having signed Assad, but more importantly for being able to demonstrate to other European clubs, that we could negotiate better and quicker a player than a baril de petrole in Algeria... in a condition to be discrete and diplomatic” (reported by Chehat, 1993:162, translated from French). In order to limit any future attempts to sign similar contracts the Algerian Football Federation decided to forbid the transfer of any players under the age of 28.

Today the Algerian government, which has financed sport since independence in 1962, encourages, the movement of sport from amateur to professional status, as part of a policy to reduce the size of the public sector budget in order to address growing financial problems. This partial financial disengagement from football of the Algerian government was initiated in 1999 and it was intended that it would be completed

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25 It is another word used by colonial military force during the Algerian revolution for the verb to comb (ratisser), military expedition, raid, incursion, invasion, attack, aggression, conquest (see Brian, E. 2002).
within a period of three to five years (*Liberté*, January 27th 1999)\(^{26}\). The change in the status of football is designed to serve as a first experience of professional sport in Algeria and may be extended to other sports namely handball, volleyball and basketball. It will also open doors to other commercial opportunities and will bring obvious changes such as the arrival of sport agents, a professional players union, television revenue and the potential creation of thousands of new jobs related directly or indirectly to the practice of professional sport.

4.6.2 'Professional' club status

Professional sports clubs are described in Algerian law as those clubs having a durable sporting activity aiming at the achievement of sporting results against remuneration, negotiated by the concerned parties (art. 20-21). The constitution of professional sport clubs falls under the legislation relating to commercial companies and the conditions of affiliated leagues and federations. As a result, professional sports, after being designated during the socialist era by state actors as a product of neo-colonialism and capitalism, have today become an important element in the development of sport in contemporary Algeria and are part of the Algerian’s government policy for the transition towards a market economy. This was proposed in the national conference on sport held in 1993 (*Les Assises National du sport*) and the programme of action of the Ministry of Sport for the years 1994-1997 \(^{27}\), as the preponderant form of organisation and management\(^{28}\), as well as a new arena for capital investment and production.

This evolution, which it is envisaged will transform sport in an important sector in the national economy, will require careful management and organisation. As Dunning, *et. al* (1993) suggest such systems necessitates an increasing amount of financial and managerial support.

\(^{26}\) Algerian newspaper.

\(^{27}\) March 1994.

\(^{28}\) we should mention that professional sports clubs affiliated to sports federations as indicated by article 20 still depend financially on the state national budget for sport, despite their status as commercial companies.
Additionally, it needs a political system (and a policy system in general) and development strategies, which determine how existing resources are used and applied to sport. In other words, the country’s readiness to apply resources to the furtherance of high-performance sport will depend on different elements. Such resources may include finance, control over legislation, specialist knowledge, legitimacy, personnel and equipment (Houlihan, 1997:19).

The questions that we might ask in relation to the above historical overview and our debate on global and local nexus are the following:

1. What are the role and objectives of sport (football) now that Algeria is in a stage of transition toward market economy and democratisation?
2. Is the development of sport, particularly football, likely to follow the same development path as in western societies, or will a new Algerian model emerge?
3. Will there be cultural resistance from some groups in the community or in the polity to what might be seen as an imported western (or global) culture of professional sport?
4. Can the professionalisation of football be the force behind the commercialisation of sport in Algeria?

4.6.3 The current situation of 'professional football' in Algeria

The aim of the subsequent discussion is to give an overview about the main developments in the experience of professional football in Algeria. These include the rationale behind the adoption/adaptation of the Swiss model of professional football, the role of le Groupement professionnel GPF (the first structure in charge of professional football), and the crisis in the football federation and its consequence on the management of the professional league.

Professionalism was initiated, as previously argued, by the Ministry of Sport in order to promote sport and transform it to a lucrative sector directed by the law of market economy. For this reason a commission composed of representatives of fifteen ministries under the supervision of Mr Azzoug, Ministry of Sport and Youth (MSY)
delegate, was established in 1998, in order to discuss managerial and judicial aspects of the professional system, namely:

- transfer of sports clubs from non-profit associations to commercial companies;
- possibility of partnership of local authorities in the management of capital in professional clubs;
- extending period of transition from non-professional to professional to five years;
- redefining work legislation for players, coaches and managers;
- doping issues;
- negotiation of TV rights;
- sponsorship and investments conditions;
- taxation system of professional clubs and individual players.

It worth noting that most of the Commission recommendations are, at the time of writing, still part of an unofficial Ministry of Sport proposal not yet adopted by the National Assembly and the Senate Chamber.

For the first season of 'professionalism' in football the Swiss football system that is in amalgam between professionalism and amateurism, supported by a modest physical infrastructure and financial means in comparison to other European leagues, was seen as suitable for the Algerian case. Therefore a Swiss professional league composed of 14 clubs playing in two phases, play off and play down a system (also adopted in Tunisia) was regarded as suitable for Algeria. In similar vein the Administrative Council of Football composed of the Ministry of Sport and Youth, the presidents of the professional clubs, and two presidents from first and second divisions and held under the auspices of the Algerian Football Federation (AFF), decided to reorganise the football system. Subsequently, a new professional league was initiated composed of 12 clubs managed by another 'autonomous' structure le groupement professionnel (GPF). The role of the GPF\textsuperscript{29}, which is composed of six departments or commissions (general secretary, competitions, finance, judicial and training centres), was planning and management of competitions in the professional league (which was also called the

\textsuperscript{29} General secretary of the GPF was also the president of professional club CABatna, and national observatory for sport. It needs to be noted here that accumulation of positions is against the Ministry of sport regulations.
Additionally, the GPF was to negotiate on behalf of professional clubs presidents for TV broadcasting rights. It was decided, for the first two years of the transition period, to suspend the relegation system for the professional league and to maintain the number of professional clubs at 12 for the first season, to be extended to 14 for the following year.

As part of the Ministry's project for the professionalisation of the football administration, training programmes and short study visits were organised for clubs presidents and coaches. These took place with the partnership of FIFA and other European football federations and non-governmental associations e.g. Liverpool JohnMoors University Institute of Football, Michel Hidalgo's centre at Aix-en-Provence, the Grasshooper club of Zurich, and the National Council of Algerian Footballers in Europe (which is a member of FIF-Pro but which is still not recognised by the AFF). The aim of these visits was to develop the managerial knowledge and abilities of football clubs presidents and increasing their familiarisation with other professional administrative systems such as organisation, finance, sponsorship, merchandising...) adopted in 'developed' countries.

4.6.4 Professionalism or 'non-amateurism'?

The experience of professional football in Algeria is now in its third year, but still has yet to assume a clear final form. The last three years saw a number of events and conflicts in the Algerian football with potential consequences for the future of professional football system. One of these problems is that of the legitimacy and the legality of the GPF in managing the professional league. The ordinance 95-09 (see appendix) regarding the national sports system does not mention the GPF as a legal structure responsible for the management of the professional league, but instead refers to the National League (NLF) which incorporates both professional and amateur teams (art.12). The decision to establish the GPF was made by the AFF in collaboration with Ministry of Youth and Sport and its initial role was managing the professional sport under the tutelage of the AFF.
It is the Federation’s right to create new structures which enable decentralisation of decision making (Mr Kezzal, President of the AFF, Liberté 23.07.00)

However, what was supposed to be part of the general structure of the AFF had become an autonomous entity responsible for the day to day management and planning of the professional league. Its role involved resolving internal conflicts and it even had the right of cancel disciplinary sanctions made by the AFF disciplinary commission.

It is absurd, a commission that gives a verdict and another [department] belonging to the same structure [GPF] which cancels everything, isn’t this an eloquent example of ... irresponsibility (Liberté 18.01.2001)

The other criticisms that the GPF was subject to, are concerns with its ability to manage the competition system in the super division. This is described by some professional clubs’ managers and technicians as irresponsible and irrational. The intensity of games planned in the first professional season, with an average some times of three matches per week, had been the cause, according to some coaches, of the increase of violence in and off the pitch, in addition to the growth in players’ injuries. Mr Khalef for example, the coach of the national team which won against Germany in 1982 World Cup, argued that “nowhere in the world do professional footballers play every three days” (Liberté, 24.12.200). For instance, the season 2000/2001, 293 people were injured as a result of violence, including 36 players, 24 referees, 79 from security service and 159 supporters (Quotidien D’Oran, 04.10.01). The president of the GPF himself declared in a press conference held on the occasion of the draw for the 2000/2001 season that Algerian football was still in a stage of ‘non-amateurism’ rather than full-blown professionalism. The reasons of this are the centralisation of decision-making, absence of potential sponsors, and inequalities that exist between football clubs in the super-division. According to the president of the GPF, only three clubs would actually be able to fulfil the recommendations for the professional project concerning the management of football stadia (see appendix)
The first professional season 1999/2000 with no relegation system created a league without any real incentive to compete professional clubs. This allowed clubs in the 'super'-division to line up junior players, or even not to attend the game, "knowing that they do not have anything to win or to lose" *(Liberté, 22.06.2000)*. For this reason it was decided by the AFF General Assembly to modify the competition system, despite the protest of members of the GPF, which perceived those modifications as contrary to the professional project proposal. It was agreed at the end of the General Assembly's extraordinary meeting to change the number of clubs in the super-division from 14 to 16 with relegation for the last two clubs starting from the next season 2000/2001. The other important decision was to change the name of the super-division used to refer to the professional league to that of the former name, Division 1.

The other point that generated criticism of the government project was the financial situation of the so-called 'professional clubs'. For many observers and experts professionalism in Algeria is *un projet mort-né* *(El Watan 30.04.2000)* without any real chance of attaining its objectives. According to *El Watan*, most of the clubs despite their professional status still depended exclusively on Ministry of Sport and local authority' subsidies. Other sources of revenue such as TV rights*30*, sponsoring, merchandising, and gate receipt*31*, represents only a small percentage of the total income. For instance, *CABatna* (supposedly a professional club) had threatened to withdraw from the league due to the financial crisis that the club was facing in the first professional season. The financial crisis has also extended to the AFF. It is worth noting that 55% of the AFF budget (500 million AD, 5,802.9 EUR) for the season 2000/2001 went towards covering the transportation costs of the national team, leaving the AFF with 200 million DA (2,321.2 EUR) of debt and a 800 million AD (9,284.62 EUR) deficit.

The steady growth of players' wages, budgeting problems, failed to respect the professional project proposal, poor performance, absence of clear judicial procedures regarding transfer of players, or of a taxation system for professional players, added to

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*30* For the first season of the professional league the national TV station (the only existing terrestrial TV station in Algeria, at that time) had agreed to pay the GPF, 225 Million AD (2,52 M, EUR).

*31* Distribution of gate receipt is as follow: 20% AFF, 30% Stadium, 50% club.
which the internal lobbying and conflicts inside the AFF and GPF and lack of external financial investments\(^{32}\) all made the survival of the new professional system problematic. Many of the ‘professional’ clubs were sponsored by one company the Khalifa Group (with interests in airways, banks, medicines, TV, radio), which was also the official sponsor of Olympic Marseille and Bègles Rugby Club in France, and most of the Algerian sports federations\(^{33}\). The same company was also responsible for finance and management of Hussein Dey, a popular club from Algiers, which plays in the first Division. The management of Hussein Day Football Club by the Khalifa Group represents the first experience of big scale private financial investment in sport, which may be extended to other national and foreign companies.

In response to the crisis the Minister of Sport and Youth established in August 2001 a commission known as the National Commission for Reflection and the Reform of the National Football (NCRRNF). Its main role is re-establishing ‘discipline’ within the national football system and suggesting new programmes of development for grass roots. It was composed by specialists and technicians outside the football sphere (economists, legal experts, etc) as well as well-known personalities in football, including president of the AFF, coaches, the president of the Central Referees Commission and ex-international players. Some of the suggestions raised by the delegation were as follow:

- to reduce the size of the General Assembly of the AFF from 90 to 80.
- To re-establish the National League, according to the 95-09 ordnance, article 12, to be responsible for managing of both the first and the second divisions.
- To freeze the transfer of players starting from the season 2002/2003 in order to encourage la “formation au sein des clubs”.

\(^{32}\) The highest amount of money that sponsors could put on sport club is limited to 300 million AD (3,37 M, EUR).

\(^{33}\) Part of the sponsorship contract which link Khalifa Group with the AFF, Khalifa airways receives 50% of ticket prices for internal lines, while for national teams (and for all levels) transportation is totally covered by the company. Among those clubs sponsored by the group, 90 % of the financial needs of Hussein Day was covered by Khalifa. (Le Matin, 06/03/03). The collapse of Khalifa has left the Algerian football in big financial crisis, particularly for clubs like Hussein Day.
To declare players’ annual revenues as taxable service. The revenue extracted from the latter will be used to enhance existing infrastructures and organise new programmes for development of the practice of football, which is in decline. Finally, as a result of its failure in managing the professional league and its contested credibility and legality, the GPF was suspended by the newly elected Football Federation Bureau (FB) directed by Mr Raouraoua, the elected general secretary of the Algerian Football Federation. The FB decided also, in a meeting held in 20 November 2001, to re-launch the activities of the National Football League (NFL) in order to be the legal structure responsible for the administration of D1 and D2 competitions under the supervision of the AFF.

The following figure represents what might be considered as the emerging structure of the professional league, juxtaposed with the traditional state-football federation-clubs, organisation based on a horizontal or top-down process of decision making process (see figures 4.1 and 4.2). Structures such as clubs’ presidents, managers, and professional players associations (e.g. National Council of Algerian Footballers in Europe), will call for a larger share of resources and more democratisation or participation in the decision-making process. The other challenge to the traditional relation AFF-football clubs is likely to come from the liberalisation of media space (e.g. the launch of Khalifa TV and Beur TV), and the opportunities that this liberalisation could bring to professional football clubs in terms of TV revenues.

34 100,000 licences for a population of 30 million. 1 licenced player for every 300 inhabitants (interview with Kezzal president of the AFF, Libertie 03.03.2000).
Figure 4.1 A web of interaction representing Algerian professional football stakeholders. Adapted from Henry (2001)
Figure 4.2 National System for sport and physical culture

Organisation of sports and physical practice

- Elite Sport
- Sport and Physical Education
- Recreational activities
- Sports Competitions

Ministry of Youth and Sport

Structures and Departments

Structures
- National sports Federations
  - National Olympic Committee
- National Sport Associations
- Sport Ligues
- Professional Sports Clubs
- Amateur sports Clubs

Departments
- The National Observatory for Sport
- The Regional Observatory for Sport
- The Community Council for Sports
- The National Scientific Council for Sport and Physical Culture
- The National Commission for Elite Sports
- The National Committee for Intersectoral Coordination and Prevention of Violence
5.1 Research paradigm

The research approach adopted in this thesis seeks a more pluralist approach or conceptualisation of globalisation (including sport in general and professional sport in particular), according to historical practices of the non-occidental countries, which will differ from western, ‘universalist’, one-sided views of culture, history geography and modernity. Therefore the use of a constructivist research paradigm, which stresses the need to look at ‘reality’ as socially constructed or framed by competing/interacting discourses, is deemed appropriate.

The aim of this section is to outline the researcher's position on constructivism and postmodernist thinking and how post-structuralism could inform, and discourse analysis be used, in analysis of the interview transcripts. This links the issues raised in the literature review to these of the methodology chapter, which may help also to clarify the researcher’s domains of analysis which will inform analysis of the data drawn from open-ended interviews.

5.1.1 Constructivism and post-modern thinking

According to Fox and Miller (1995:75), the move toward constructivism was made possible by the insight that humans who seek to know social reality are themselves bearers of that reality. Observers of social reality cannot be external to it, nor can their observations be isolated from that being observed. In this case the conception of reality is in a sense negotiated, or socially constructed. For Guba and Lincoln (1994), the inquiry aims of this paradigm are oriented to the production of reconstructed understanding. It deals not simply with different interpretation of the same world, but literally different world versions or different ‘remakings’ of the world. In other terms, constructivist thinking can be seen as a replacement of what is labelled as the conventional (systematic) scientific, or positivist paradigm of inquiry characterised by the application of rigorous (universal) methodology to produce valid information.
Shwandt in comparing constructivism to other research paradigms claims that constructivists emphasise the pluralistic and plastic character of reality. Pluralistic in the sense that reality is expressible in a variety of symbol and language systems; plastic in the sense that reality is stretched and shaped to fit purposeful acts of intentional human agents (1994:125).

Post-modern social theory takes constructivism as an entry point to reject traditional western epistemology. Its criticism is aimed at deconstructing western metanarratives of truth and the ethnocentrism implicit in the European view of history as the unilinear progress of universal reason. The latter is perceived by postmodernists as being underwritten by a foundational epistemology and claims universally valid knowledge at the expense of local subjugated knowledge. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that non-western cultures have been aware of both diversities of reality as well as its social construction. According to Sardar (1998:41), from an Islamic point of view, reality is designated by a number of technical forms.

_Haqtqah_ reality per se; _haqqa abadiya_ is unitary reality; _haqqa al haqataq_ is the reality of realities; _haqqa muqayadah_ is determined reality (for example for science and rational inquiry); _haqqa al-insan_ is the reality of man (socially constructed reality); _haqqa al-shay_ is the reality of things; _haqqa wahida_ is single reality\(^1\).

Sardar continues by stating that each reality reveals its essence through a particular methodology. Determined reality, the reality of the world, is acquired through sustained use of reason and physical human faculties. The reality of man is the self he shapes through his cultural, social and communal identity. Put in other terms, in Islam there are many ways of knowing, based on human faculties of experiencing reality and examining the universe, which could be refused or negotiated. However, the criticism cannot exceed the link between human and _haqqa mutlaka_ which is absolute reality, or reality of God, this due to the limited human’s faculties of knowing comparing to that of the Almighty. This includes the existence of God, the

\(^1\) Different forms of reality reported by Sardar do not represent a hierarchy of realities from Islamic point of view, but multiple realities).
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revelation, Angels, the prophecy truth, the resurrection, the Day of Judgement and the promise of rewards and punishments in the hereafter, in addition to other domains which are beyond the human perception, and scientific reasoning. Muslims may employ some of the conceptual tools (critical reasoning) of François Lyotard or Jean Baudrillard for analysis, though in Akbar's view, there must be parting of company on certain crucial points (1994:6). The prophet Mohammed (PUH) said “He who knows himself (his soul) knows his Lord”. Self-discovery and self-knowing, which are the central notions of the post-modern age are also central notions in Islam. However “while Muslims appreciate the sprit of tolerance, optimism and the drive for self-knowledge in postmodernism, they also recognise the threat it poses them with its cynicism and irony” (Akbar and Donnan, 1994:86)

In contrast to Baudrillard, who notoriously is claimed to have stated that the Gulf War had not ‘taken place’, we could argue that the pain, suffering and the death of the ‘others’ was real and not socially constructed. The Gulf War was also very real in Sardar’s terms: “it was paid for in hard cash by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and it involved the transfer of ‘real’ wealth from the Middle East to the west” (1998:27). One cannot ignore also some historical realities, or be neutral when studying or analysing the Holocaust, Sabra and Chatilla, or Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 9-11. By denying and rejecting the existence of certain realities (Gulf War, death, pain), Baudrillard’s (moral) relativism, or illusioninism (even cynicism) becomes, according to Haraway (1991, reported in McGuigan, 1999: 84), “a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere”, which is logically not acceptable.

From the above, it could be argued that the researcher in social science needs to take into consideration some ‘determined realities’ and previous attempts to conceptualise social phenomena. Fox and Miller (1995:87) point out that

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2 Arkoun suggests that the debate on alternative Islamic model of scientific reasoning, needs to consider the difference between religious reasoning vs. critical reasoning. The former seeks searching for coherent explanations within the strict (not exclusive) borders of a larger religious truth that belongs to the system of belief and non-belief. Whereas the latter aims to develop a new approach or cognitive system based on new interpretation of reality with new hypothesis, totally autonomous from religious or traditional orders (see Arkoun, 1995)

3 Peace Upon Him (salla allhou Alay’h wa sallam)
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One cannot simply ignore agencies, institutions, bureaucracies, and constitutional regimes. One needs to be able to talk about "systematics" but one also needs a way of talking about them to avoid reifying them - making them into immutable things.

Like, Fox and Miller, Mc Guigan (1999:86) argues that

The Derridean procedure of the deconstructing of a word-concept, say 'identity', does not result in its utter rejection [as advocated by relativists] but, instead, puts the term under erasure, graphically depicted by a cross or a line though the word...The concept still has to be used - there is nothing to put in its place - yet there has to be a necessary reflexivity in its use, a recognition that it represents an analytical problem as well as fallible solution.

Although, postmodernists doubt that any method, theory, or discourse has a universal general claim as the 'right' or the privileged form of authoritative knowledge, it does not automatically reject conventional methods of knowing and telling as false or archaic. It opens those standard methods of inquiry and introduces new methods, which are also, then, subject to critique (Richardson, 1994:519). However, those who work within it, according to Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 497), favour criteria like those adopted by some post-structuralists in evaluating qualitative research.

5.1.2 Post-structuralism

For post-structuralists language is how social organisations and power are defined and contested and the place where our sense or selves, our subjectivity is constructed. The objective is no longer the revelation of truth, but assisting in the highlighting of issues inherent in the construction of meaning (Williams, 1999:251).

According to Richardson (1994:518), understanding competing discourses, as competing ways of giving meaning and of organising the world makes language a site of exploration, and struggle. Thus, post-stucturalism according to Richardson directs us (the researchers) to understand ourselves reflexively as persons writing from particular positions (outsider, as a non-western, analysing Algeria, a non-western
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society; insider as user of western theories) at a specific time (a world characterised by global interconnectedness and increasing world market power). In this respect, it frees post-structuralists from trying to write a single text in which everything is said to everyone. Manning and Cullum (1994:468) state that post-structuralism, in the same manner as post-modern thinking, turns attention to the margins and reverses the usual adherence to dominant (western) cultural values. According Manning and Cullum,

The literature of the Third World, of people of colour, of writers from non-European countries, is to be read and understood within the given (local) cultural context, rather than from the perspective of Western-European or Greco-Roman traditions.

To apply this to our previous epistemological discussion on the question of what and whose definition of the post-modern paradigm is ‘best’ suited for the study approach\(^4\), the type of the analysis to be adopted, is the one designated by Scheurisch (1997) as ‘self-critical pluralism’. According to Scheurisch, all perspectives imply political arrangements and invariably exclude some groups, some voices. Therefore employing “some sort” of social relativist or postmodernist perspective is necessary but certainly not in a romanticised manner (1997:40), for instance, ‘one unified blackness’ or ‘third world identity’ or locality (see Hall 1991; Featherstone 1995).

The other point that should be stressed, as part of our self-critical pluralism principle, and our global vision to civilisation’s history, concerns concepts of West/non-west, occident/non-occident. There has been in the literature on civilisation’s history an (ideological and epistemological) opposition between ‘orient’ and ‘occident’, between two civilisations and cultures whose roots go back to the same heritage—Greek civilisation—and to the same supreme references (Arkoun, 1995). This antagonism between occident and orient was generated and encouraged, in Arkoun’s term, by both side by a form of an ‘institutionalised ignorance’. For some, the west or western civilisation is that of the United States and western Europe, predominately white, which embraces non-western nations like Israel, Australia, and even non-western culture like Japan, but excludes (denies) thousands years of occidental and oriental

\(^4\) Particularly in relation to the researcher’s philosophical and ideological (balancing between insider-outsider, western- non-western point of views) positioning.
Islamic history, that had extensively contributed (and still) to the European’s enlightenment and modernity projects. For Akbar (1994), “the ‘West’, ‘global civilisation’, ‘the G7’ ‘the United States ‘ and ‘the United Kingdom’—we are using these terms loosely interchangeably”

It should be noted that our debate in the thesis of west and non-west in relation to globalisation process, modernity or post modernity is not that of stereotypical ‘we’ versus ‘others’, but that of west and non-west are all ‘others’ among ‘others’. In other terms it is neither orientalist nor occidentalist (Akbar, 1994), neither eurocentric nor arab or Islamo-centric.

5.2 Data analysis

Debate on postmodernism, constructivism and post-structuralism took us to talk about discourse analytic studies which “combine language analytic proceeding with analysis of process of knowledge and constructions without restricting themselves to the formal aspects of linguistic presentations and processes” (Flick, 1998:203). According to Silverman (1998:146), discourse analysis emphasises the way versions of the world, of society, events and inner psychological worlds are produced in discourse. It is usually used to analyse transcripts of talk from everyday institutional settings, a transcript of open-ended interviews or a document of some kind. According to the same author, part of discourse analysis may involve coding a set of material but this is an analytic preliminary used to make the quantity of materials more manageable rather than a procedure that performs the analysis itself (Silverman, 1998:158). Analytical concepts and categories related to contents, features, structures or might be used to help the researcher in finding what to look for during the analysis functions. (Wood and Kroger, 2000:99)

In respect of postmodern social research, and according to Derrida’s deconstructivist method, to avoid being thematised or categorised, the deconstructor attempts to lodge his/her own discourse in between and to construct his/her double text or sense of ‘betweenness’, opening destabilising and permanent doubleness (Leitch, 1996:34). The latter is applied in a manner that the interest of the analysis is not to report one account or another but trying to discover their connections, linkages, betweens and
joinings. Or what Derrida refers to as “Double Session”, the interval between several styles (Leitch, 1996:32), where neither style is truer than others. The discourse analysis (DA) used in this thesis to analyse the set of interviews aims, first, at discovering how the designation of ‘self’ (locality, Algerianity), and the ‘other’ (global forces, the West), by Algerians from different intellectual, ideological or political backgrounds, operate. Secondly, it involves revealing the position of interviewees about professional sport, which is considered in the literature as a global and western product. In other words, whether sport is regarded as a defining feature of the ‘other’. Therefore, for the purpose of this research DA could be regarded as part of the general (research) deconstructivist process of sport and local modernity, which attempts to reformulate or redefine globalisation and professional sport, according to local (interviewees’) views or accounts. It is a mirror, which aims to detect the homogeneity/heterogeneity, dichotomy (doubleness, betweeness, hybridity) and even ambiguity existing in the designation of interviewees of themselves (we, I, and our) and others (global forces, multinationals, the west, IMF, international sports organisations...). Additionally, to discover whether their perception of ‘we’ and ‘others’ has/or does not have any impact on their positions concerning professional sports (practice and values), or by contrast, it is viewed as a neutral field, relatively unaffected by local positioning toward the global order.

The domains used to analyse the interview transcripts are extracted from the literature review chapters and are as follows:

1. Globalisation (hegemony, cultural imperialism, world culture and nation state), particularly those related to (pluralist) postmodernist views of what is perceived as (multi-directional) local (or periphery) response to (core) ‘unidirectional’, ‘one sided’ cultural flows (i.e. Hannerz 1991; King 1991; Parekh 1994; Featherstone 1995; Hall 1991; Abu-laghod 1991; Göle 1997; Hesmondhalgh 1998) and;
2. The Algerian history of modernity, nationalism and sport, which divides the local response to globalisation (or western modernity) into:

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5 According to Hoogvelt (2001) and from post-colonial discourse hybridity is celebrated and privileged as kind of superior cultural intelligence through the advantage of “in-betweeness” “thid-way”, the straddling of two cultures and the consequent ability (for the subordinated “others”) to negotiate the difference (tradition and modernity).
• **Integration**: hard bargaining, trying to live with global modernism, and at the same time, organising resistance and incorporating difference,

• **Islamic Reformism**: a new reconciliation of Islam, modernity, and the best of Western rational thought. This includes the rejection of "the secular, relativistic, degenerate culture associated with (dominant nations) the West" (Huntington, 1998:101)

• **Assimilation**: adopting western modernity. Modernisation could not be possible without westernisation, and the application of laïcité (division between politics and religion) in all domains of the society.

It should be noted that those groups are derived from the researcher's individual understanding, based on a range of literatures (written by westerners and Algerians) about Algeria, which cannot be generalised within Algerian society, nor to other non-western societies.

5.2.1 Discourse analysis

The first phase of the analysis focuses on understanding different interviewers' representation of local group feeling (s) or national identity (ies). In other terms, what would be the respondent's description of local distinctiveness? Is it nationalism based on western modernisation and western perception of 'nation'? Or is it part of what Tahi describes as "active-syncretic acculturation" that consists of selection and active application of suitable (western) extraneous cultural elements, in addition to Arab nationalism that adopts both the European system of nation-state and separation of religion from politics? Or is it based on Islam as the foundation of nationality for Muslims, which is superior to any other forms of association or any national commitment? Most importantly, do all respondents define locality in the same manner?

The second stage of the analysis emphasises the interviewers' views on globalisation, do they perceive this as an imposed, hegemonic, western and unidirectional project or in contrast as universal movement in the elaboration of which countries from the

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*According to Maldidier (1971:73) every political discourse is based on contradictory propositions (translated by the author from French).*
periphery can participate? How can the relationship between the interviewees and globalisation be described? Is it a relationship based on resistance (total rejection of western and multinationals hegemony), or is it that of integration and negotiation? How do respondents view the role of Algeria in the new world order?

In the last stage of the analysis the orientation will be to re-conceptualise the interviewees’ perception of the professionalisation of sport in Algeria? How is the professionalisation of sport viewed or explained? Is it part of the globalisation process? What is the relationship of respondents to this project? Is it a relationship of resistance or total acceptance? Or is it perceived as being a neutral domain (part of universal culture) and therefore not under any ideological or political manipulation by global forces (such as international sports federations)?

Nonetheless, it should be noted that the above categories and analytic questions are not final. More categories, features and themes might emerge while doing the analysis, which need to be taken into consideration in the formulation of Algerian locality and respondents’ positions on globalisation and professional sport. For Wood and Kroger (2000) the task of discourse analysis is not to apply categories to participant’s talk, but rather to identify the ways in which participants (interviewers) themselves actively construct and employ categories. Discourse analyst may use his/her own categories as a guidance, however in Wood and Kroger’s terms discourse analyst takes nothing for granted and questions everything including the researcher own categories and assumptions.

One of the strategies used by discourse analysts to extract categories (which need further questioning) is first or initial reading. For Wood and Kroger the aim of initial reading is to identify (or confirm) the specific focus and appropriate sections of analysis. Like transcription, the initial reading involves theoretical, interpretative, or analytical activity; its point is to make the data manageable for formal analysis (2000:87).
5.2.2 Discourse analysis strategy

Analysis of talks and transcripts, using Discourse Analysis procedures (DA) is a new subject for the researcher. For this reason a familiarisation and an understanding of the strategy (in relation to research paradigm and research method) and of its uses in different domains (language, media, and cultural studies) was deemed essential.

Wood and Kroger (2000) provide a useful review of DA method, including a detailed description of all steps (and reflections) that the discourse analyst needs to follow (though not in rigid and systematic manner), while studying speech or any sort of documents. Importantly, this source incorporates some practical examples for each stage of the analysis (transcripts, first reading, categorising, interpreting, evaluating and writing up). It also considers this approach, in relation to notions of ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’ (terms used in conventional work).

The first stage of the analysis consists essentially of a detailed and repeated reading of the discourse against the background of the discourse analysis perspective (linked to theoretical and philosophical positioning of the general study). It incorporates as reported by Wood and Kroger the following steps:

- Identify how the argument is worked up e.g., definition of globalisation of Algerian distinctiveness (local identity, local modernity), perception of professional sports.
- Give emphasis to participants’ meanings.
- Consider what is not there (resistance toward westernisation and modernisation of Algerian society, resistance toward consumerism and individualism of professional sport).
- Play with the text. Ask how it would read if it was produced by different participants or phrased differently.
- Detect different segments (categories) of discourse and a different function of the same segments (sub-categories).
- Develop new terms, describe and analyse the ways in which participants treat categories.
In addition to the above stages Wood and Kroger talk about other procedures that discourse analysts could use to make the text (transcript) useful to read, and therefore easier to analyse. One of those procedures is *scaffolding*. It consists of writing the analysis in the same way as writing a report, sometimes following the same order of the final paper—writing the introduction, then the body, then the conclusion (2000:97). The idea is to end up with a set of claims, and the way they were derived and supported throughout the text. The next procedure is looking for similarities and differences of accounts and versions. It is concerned with whether a participant orients to two accounts (globalisation and sports) in a different or contradictory manner. Regarding this point Wood and Kroger point out that in the empiricist repertoires (the positivist approach), experimental data are given logical and chronological priority, the author's personal and social commitments are not mentioned. For positivists (and to a lesser extent for critical realists) actions and beliefs are a neutral medium through which empirical phenomena make themselves felt. From a contingent repertoire perspective, action and belief are depicted as dependent on speculative insight, prior commitment, personal characteristics, and social ties. Therefore, the connection between belief (ideology, worldview), and the phenomena under study is less-clear cut than in the empiricist repertoires. For the discourse of open-ended interviews in relation to Algerian local responses to globalisation phenomena (e.g. the professionalisation of sport) differences and similarities procedure will be used to look for consistency and inconsistency between different respondents (representing different projects for the society, or academic fields), as well as within the same text (same respondent) concerning the different issues discussed.

The function of the discourse will be oriented toward notions of local distinctiveness, identity and positioning, also on issues related to globalisation processes (modernisation, multi-national corporations, supra-states) and the Algerian project for professional sport. Additionally, it involves reporting new problems (new definitions), not reported or covered in the literature review (e.g., incomprehension in the existence of a link between the application of professional sport and religion, or views on sport as a neutral field). Concerning the issue of new problem, Wood and Kroger claim that the discourse analyst needs to be clear whether he/she is talking about what participants are doing or about his/her (the discourse analyst's) activities (2000:172)
The other procedure that Wood and Kroger explore in their work is grounded interpretation. It emphasizes the necessity of examining the text or talk in terms of some theoretically based framework. This does not mean, as suggested by the authors, beginning the analysis by applying particular (pre-determined) theoretical concepts in interpreting respondents' views, but rather that "the findings are framed in the context of relevant devices or concepts" (2000:115). Its aim is to assess whether the interpretations are likely to stand or if they should be revised (2000:113). However, according to Wood and Kroger, there are limits to the necessity for grounding:

> Analysts should not be so concerned with grounding in the initial stages that they become overly constrained or cautious and unduly constrict the creative activity involved in interpretation [notions of overanalysing and under analysing] (Wood and Kroger, 2000:116).

To conclude with the analysis procedures Wood and Kroger (2000:159) mention that there is no clear cut (systematic) path to follow in doing analysis, no single criterion for selecting an approach. The discourse analytical perspective, according to the same authors, is a constructivist, even a kaleidoscopic one. This is what makes DA flexible in comparison to other rigorous (positivist) approaches (e.g., content analysis). For Wood and Kroger (2000:159) flexibility has many advantages, but it can also be a source of insecurity (particularly regarding notions of reliability and validity, see next section).

5.2.3 Types of Discourse analysis

We can find in the literature many versions and types of discourse analysis. Each of those types has different origins, uses, significance, as well as links to a multitude of schools of thoughts and researches paradigm (structuralism versus post-structuralism, positivism versus critical theory). As an example of these schools we can cite French and British discourse analysis, the Frankfurt and Vienna models, and Dutch critical analysis (see. Van Dijk, 1985; Glyn, 1999; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Wodak, 2001 Wood, 2000). Wood and Kroger in their categorization of different types of DA select
three varieties of analyses, defined as the most useful. The first one is reported as being Social Psychology Discourse Analysis (SPDA). Some of the central concepts and notions of SPDA are interpretive repertoires, attitudes and attributions as discursive accomplishment, accountability practices of fact construction, the working of descriptions, the management of stake and interests, and emotion categories (2000: 21). It involves the application of discursive psychology and social psychology, which looks at language as action (attribution, remembering, perceptual, cognitive), in discourse analysis. The second type is Conversation analysis (CA) defined also as "talk in interaction", aims at analysing casual everyday conversation or talks in institutional settings, focusing on the way in which turns at talk are shaped for particular aspects of the context or occasion of use (2000:200). Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) where the focus is on understanding of discourse in relation to social problems or social structural variables such as race, gender, class, and power. Sometimes, according to post-structuralist terms (Foucauldian approach), it goes beyond a concern with the structure of language to consider a wide variety of features of language use (2000:21), with an emphasis on the problems of treating texts as representational. One important notion concerns with construction of subject and object in discourse. According to Wodak et al (1989: 8) the aim of CDA is to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control and dominance, as well as discriminatory inclusion and exclusion (group, gender, class) in language use, "taking into account that discourse is structured by dominance, that every discourse is historically produced and interpreted (situated in time and space) and that dominance structures are legitimated by ideologies of powerful groups" (Wodak and Meyer 2001:3). Put in other terms, CDA, according to Wodak et al, is committed to an emancipatory, socially critical approach, and allies itself with those who suffer political and social injustice (1989: 8).

For the purpose of our research, which focuses on the conception of respondents regarding the global and local in relation to professional sport, the type of discourse analysis used to analyse interview transcripts is CDA. It seeks (re) construction of the perception and attitudes of representative of different political and ideological groups (assimilation, reformism and integration) that exist within national space (excluding others groups which are not part of the interview sample), about group feeling and solidarity, “self”. As well as toward ‘others’, (sometimes members of the same
national space but from different political orientations) members of out-group (outside the solidarity group, using Ibn Khaldoun notion of ‘assabia’). Nonetheless, the analysis does not go far as looking at the source of meaning or mental conception of knowledge and underlying reality (Henry, 2002) (the ‘why’ of language used) as in Focauldian tradition, but looking more at how this conception was produced in the discourse and in specific context (the ‘how’ of language used to answer interview questions).

The kind of discursive construction or “analytical intervention” (Wodak et al, 1999:8) we envision, serves to detect different (plural or singular, heterogeneous/homogeneous) respondents’ production (rejection or defence) of local uniqueness or distinctiveness in adapting global cultural, economic and political forms, including the professionalisation of sport. The study of Wodak et al (1999) on the discursive construction of national identity is used as a guide (not a model) to construct meaning (not imposed interpretation) of local singularity in comparison to global order and local resistance (if it exists) toward global challenges. This includes the following justifications:

1. Justification of positive uniqueness and resistance
   - Strategy of differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ described Wodak et al. (1999:37) as strategy of singularisation and differences that incorporate arguments on national positive uniqueness (including ‘we are superior to them’), in addition to national independence and autonomy.
   - Arguments on external threat (global forces) and warning (shared worries) against the loss of national autonomy or independence.
   - The will to unify/ cooperate/ feels and shows solidarity to resist external threat.
   - Resistance/rejection of an action the consequences of which for the country’s future fate are depicted as negative (e.g. western modernity, liberalism, secularism...)

2. Negative uniqueness or neutrality
   - Extra-national dependence/ external forces/ force of facts (e.g. IMF, World Bank, FIFA).
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- Rejecting neutrality and negative singularisation/ or isolation (e.g. hyper localism, regionalism)

5.2.4 Evaluation and reporting

The other issues that discourse analysts need to take into consideration while doing the analysis are issues of validity and reliability. According to Wood and Kroger's point of view, because DA looks for constructed realities it has shifting and multiple meanings. Therefore, the analyst's account or interpretation of that discourse is thus only one version of its meaning—which cannot be said to be true or false (2000:167). There is thus no basis for selecting one account over another on the grounds that one is truer, or more valid version of the world (of reality out there) or a better account of 'how things really are'. The same could be said for the concept of reliability, which in conventional work can be assessed independently of the context. This is not the case for the social world, in which meaning is inseparable from context, which makes it much more difficult to assess whether or not there is a repeatability and thus 'reliability' on the level of concepts.

To avoid a mismatching between the analysis and philosophical roots of the study, Wood and Kroger prefer using other concepts to talk about consistency and inconsistency of meaning and interpretation in discourse analysis. They prefer talking about warrantability. For them the notion of warrantability in DA transcends reliability and reformulates validity. It replaces the term validity with criterion of soundness, which is concerned with showing that the analysis is well grounded, able to withstand criticism or objection; based on evidence that can be supported (acceptable and convincing). It refers to reliability in term of trustworthiness, in other words, worthy of trust and confidence, derived from accountable accounts. This reflects not only useful way of understanding the discourse at hand, but also a possible basis for understanding other discourses. Each of those two levels of warrantability (soundness and trustworthiness) includes some criteria that the discourse analyst needs to check while doing the analysis:
A) Criteria of trustworthiness

- Orderliness and documentation

Orderliness refers to the clarity of the way in which the research in all its aspect was conducted, recorded, and reported. Documentation involves clear description of all facets of the research, including how the data were collected and how the researcher went about doing the analysis. This would help to increase transferability (not generalisation) of the analysis in a sense that the reader of discourse analysis need to be able to fully understand the steps taken in analysis and perform their own evaluation of the analysis conclusion (Potter & Wetherell, 1992).

- Audit

This criteria is used to increase ‘confirmability’ of the interpretation, through the establishment of a written audit (audit trail) which could permit an external auditor (research supervisor, internal examiner and research director) to confirm that the interpretation has been made in ways consistent with the available data.

B) Criteria of soundness

- Orderliness

From Wood and Kroger perspective both analysis (procedure or stages) and reporting of the analysis, should be orderly.

- Demonstration

This deals with presenting the steps involved in the analysis of excerpts (sub claims, paragraph, or technical description of the pattern) rather than simply telling the reader about the argument and pointing to an excerpt as an illustration. It means also showing how the interpretation of the sub claims as well as the overall claims (categories, analysis of patterns) are grounded in the text.

- Orientation

The aim of orientation for Wood and Kroger (2000:171) is to show that a participant’s orientation is consistent with analyst’s interpretation. The recognition that a participant orientation to a particular feature (category or sub-category) in a particular way has a particular meaning or is relevant for respondents. If participants treat two utterances (professional sport, administration of football) as similar, different, or contradictory, the analyst is also justified in treating them in these ways. Or if a participant treats her or his previous utterance as creating a problem (the
imposition of professional sport on periphered countries), by offering a subsequent utterance (exploitation, imposition) directed toward the problem, the analyst can treat the previous utterance (professionalisation of sport) as one creating that problem.

- Claim checking: patterns

The goal is to produce a set of claims, patterns (how a particular structure gets built up from its component moves) accounts for all of the data while acknowledging the possibility of making an argument for more than one set of claims. According to Wood and Kroger one can strengthen one's claims by showing how they are supported across sequences of discourse (2000:172).

Wood and Kroger, in addition to criteria of trustworthiness and soundness reported above, identify other parameters that the discourse analyst needs to take into account to increase 'reliability' and 'validity' of the analysis. Those parameters focus more on nature of analysis (analyst's orientations) rather than discourse content (respondent's orientations). One of those parameters is coherence. It refers to the set of analytic claims that are made about the text, which aims to show to the reader how the discourse is put together, in well developed (coherent) argument. Wood and Kroger include under coherence the requirements that a set of claims should also be characterised by a clear and adequate explanatory scope (2000:174). This could be done through inter-textual analysis, which can serve to strengthen the coherence of claims by locating them within a larger social context and making their scope explicit, or by comparing the set of claims to the goals of the research. The other parameter is plausibility. For Wood and Kroger, good interpretation should bring clarity, and direct attention to what is usually unnoticed. It involves also the comparison of a claim (e.g. local identity, specificity, and globalisation) to other work or other knowledge, for a 'warrant'. That is, although a set of claims should help us to see in new ways, it should also seem reasonable in terms of what readers as social beings already know about social life (2000:174). In terms also of what readers as analysts know about the sort of claims that have been made in the literature (linkages to discourse available in the culture and to texts available in the literature).
The last parameter is fruitfulness, which in contrast to plausibility, the direction is from the present work to other work, that is, considering the implication (transferability) of the present work for other works, rather than considering the present work from the perspective of previous work. For Tracy (1995, reported by Wood and Kroger, 2000:175) fruitfulness criteria should be:

intellectually, implicative for the scholarly community. It should suggest productive ways to reframe old issues, create links between previously unrelated issues and raise new questions that are interesting and merit attention (Tracy, 1995:210).
5.3 Qualitative research method

Qualitative research studies of ethnic groups, subcultures, sectarian or political movements, in their natural setting have attempted to make sense of and interpret phenomena, which have been investigated (e.g. new supporter cultures and identity (Mignon, 1994). This type of research involves a variety of empirical strategies for collecting data, such as case study, participant observation, narrative method and ethnography. Furthermore, it uses a wide range of techniques including observations, interviews (from open-ended to highly structured), documents and communication tools (television, tape recorder and videotapes).

This thesis is concerned with in depth investigation of a set of particular political decision (government project for professionalisation of sport), therefore, a qualitative research paradigm which uses strategies of gathering data such as case study, observation and document analysis, was deemed appropriate.

5.3.1 Case study

Case study research as an empirical inquiry uses multiple sources of evidence to investigate a contemporary phenomenon, within a real life context. Zonabend (1992) quoted in Tellis (1997) point out that a case study is done by giving emphasis to completeness in observation, reconstruction and analysis of the case under study. It uses as many sources as possible, to investigate systematically an individual, organisation, or event. It can be suggested that case study strategy deal with gathering maximum information about a typical, small-scale research entity like a religious group, a group of politicians, and an organisations, in a natural setting such as a company, club, church, or leisure centre. It focuses on individual instances rather than a wide spectrum approach, quite the opposite of any mass study. The rationale behind concentrating effort on one case rather than many is that there may be insight to be gained from looking at an individual case that may have wider implications and applications.
The case study strategy offers more chance than other empirical strategies, of going into sufficient detail, to explain complexities of given situations. It can provide the investigator with a variety of sources and multiple methods for gathering data. For example, observation of events within the case study setting could be combined with collection of documents from official meetings and informal interviews with people involved.

5.3.2 Types of case study

Stake (1994 quoted in Denzin and Lincoln, 1994:237) identifies three types of case study:

A. **Intrinsic case study**: which is used in order to get a better understanding of a particular case. The study is not undertaken because the case represents or illustrates a particular trait or problem, but because, in all its particularity and ordinariness, this case itself is of interest.

B. **Instrumental case study**: a particular case is examined to provide insight to an issue or refinement of theory. The case is of secondary interest, it plays a supportive role, facilitating investigator's understanding of other interests.

C. **Collective case study**: Researcher may study a group of cases jointly in order to understand better the phenomenon under investigation. They are chosen because it is believed that understanding then will lead to better theorising.

The choice of Algeria\(^1\) in general as subject of study, and the Algerian government project for professional sport in particular, was both for intrinsic and instrumental purposes. Combining both types in investigating the Algerian case aimed at the following:

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\(^1\) To know more about Algeria see appendix 2.
a) To improve the researchers' understanding about the phenomenon, which may be gained by employing pluralistic approaches or world views which include theories of globalisation and modernity (universalistic conceptualisations), postmodernist thinking, local modernity and post colonial literature (particularistic conceptualisations). It may help also in the acquisition of what Göle (1997) terms “an intellectual sensibility”. In other words, deconstruction and reinterpretation of some concepts, values and ideologies, which are specific to the Algerian history and identity.

b) To illustrate how the concerns of researchers and theorists in the domain of globalisation, sports and local identity are manifest in the Algerian case.

Although, it should be noted, in relation to the above discussion, that the development of sport in Algeria, and more particularly the professionalisation of sport in Algeria, is studied not as a distinctive and specific (Arab, North African, and Third World) case, but rather as a social phenomenon under the rubric of local and global nexus. It is not based on conventional case study parameters linked to probability/non probability sampling or validity and reliability (see research paradigm chapter).

Overt access was gained by seeking permission from the highest relevant authority namely the Algerian Ministry of Sport and Youth, the Algerian football federation, and other members of civil society. A copy of the research proposal, which contains information about the basic research goals and plan, was presented to the appropriate parties.

5.3.3 Other research tools

Analysis of documents namely press articles and official reports\(^2\) were used to enhance the understanding of the information gained from interviews. This served to identify the value system/power, as well as the goals and organisational strategy of Algerian national sport (football) system. The triangulation\(^3\) of strategies, coding and categorising of the findings, resulting from the different strategies and research tools for gathering data, was used to clarify meanings and to check the repeatability of an

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\(^3\) Perception of the process may be different. Not triangulation strictly.
observation or interpretation, in order to identify different ways the phenomenon is being seen.

**Interviews**

Following Stake (1994) ideas and theoretical orientations regarding case study strategy, which concerns “assuring variety but not necessarily representativeness, without strong argument for typicality”, the study of the Algerian’s government project for professional sport did not strive for generalisation nor for representativeness in sampling.

The first group of open-ended questions includes issues covered in the macro-level of the research such as globalisation, modernity, hegemony and cultural imperialism (see figure 5.1). It was undertaken with respondents from civil society, including members of the intelligentsia, namely researchers in sociology, political science and sport science, who are supposedly familiar with general approaches on globalisation and local identity, but probably not in relation to professional sport. The same questions were asked also to representative of three political parties; Movement for Peace (MSP), Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and National Liberation Front (FLN). The three selected parties, according to the literature review, might seek to promote three ideologies or projects for society that could be divided into; a) assimilation, adopting western modernity and laïcité (or division between state and religion); b) integration; incorporating difference; c) and Islamic reformism, reconciliation of Islam and modernity. The rationale behind the division between those parties was based on the researcher’s rereading accounts of Algerian nationalist history, which synthesise the Tibi and Al-Husri model of Arab nationalism and other contemporary historians’ and sociologists’ accounts of Algeria’s identity. However, attention should be drawn to the fact that those categories might be difficult to verify since there are no definite ideological or political separations between them. For instance, it might be possible for the supporters of Islamic community and integration to share the same values on nationalism. This could be applied also to the defenders of assimilation and integration whose views on issues such us modernity and secularism may be similar. This may be true as well in relation to professional sport that all
groups might regard as an important element in the transition of Algeria towards a market economy.

It should be noted however that, for certain reasons reported below, representatives from the Islamic Front (FIS), which calls for an Algerian model of Islamic state based on nationalist values\(^4\) was not included among the interviewees. The reasons for omission of the FIS are linked to methodological problems; first, access to the research field. The party officially (by a judicial decision) does not exist in political sphere; it does not have a bureau or representative in the country, and its political activities were banned. The other reason, is the ideological and political fragmentation that has existed within the movement regarding the notions of modernity, identity and nation-state, divided between reformism (Pan-Islamic universalism) and nationalism (based on nationalist values already included in the sample). The name of the movement was also attached to another wing (radicals) that calls for armed struggle as a way to establish an Islamic order by resisting what radicals refer to as the ‘secularism’ and ‘tyranny’ of the state.

\(^4\) In contrast to reformist movement which promote universal, and Pan-Islamic discourse.
5.3.4 Macro level interview issues

Eisenhardt (1999: 141) points out that without a research focus, it is easy to become overwhelmed by the volume of data. For the purpose of this study, the constructs or key words that the first stage of interview questions (those asked to members of civil society) will try to cover are related to the following points:

a) what constitutes the globalisation processes;
b) the power of response to globalisation challenges;
c) the Algerian position in the New World Order;
d) western domination of world football (values and institutions);
e) Commercial values of professional sport;
f) Algerian cultural heritage and globalisation challenges (professional sport).

Those constructs were organised into two categories of questions, one is related to globalisation issues, and the other one includes questions linked to sport issues. This facilitated the acquisition of certain flexibility in asking questions and choosing the categories, which may need more focus than other, depending on the interviewee’s familiarity with the concepts.
Interview questions

A. Globalisation issues:

Algeria is developing politically, economically and culturally in a globalised context. By globalisation I mean that the world is experiencing increasingly rapid and extensive flows of finance, technology, ideas/values, people, media etc.

- Do countries from the world’s economic core and trans-national corporations use this process of globalisation to extend their economic, political and cultural influences (or control)? How?
- Is national sovereignty to be regarded under threat, due to the increased external pressure coming from above (multi-nationals, supra-states) that transform nation-state into relatively powerless agent?
- Do you see globalisation as simply another form of US dominance, or do you think that new forms of global and local politics, economic and cultures are emerging?
- What tools do people or nations in non-western countries have to embrace, adapt and/or resist globalisation?
- It is said that the neo-liberal (market economy) model of society is spreading throughout the globe. In resistance to this some groups advocate total rejection and the adoption of locally specific cultural and political forms. Is there any other model of development that Algerian society could adopt which is a compromise between total acceptance of neo-liberalism, and total rejection of the west?
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B. Sport issues

The Algerian government plan for professional sport has been developed over recent years.

- What have been the major influences
  a) in promoting the drive to have a professional league;
  b) in shaping the kind of system adopted?

- Is the Algerian model of professional sport unique i.e. a wholly locally developed system?

- Is it a system "borrowed from" or adapted from the model of professional sport in other countries?

- Why do you think the state developed the professional sport system at this point in time?

- What do you (or your party) think about modernist and western values in professional sport (consumerism, free movement of players, roles of agents etc)

- Can the values associated with professional sport in the west be applied to Algerian society? Do you think that professional sport in Algeria is an assimilation of the western model of professional sport (values and organisation)?

- Are we able to build a local model of professional sport compatible with the Algerian context and its values?

- Will the development of sport result in the meeting of commercial needs rather than social needs (sport participation, health)?

- Do you consider it is important to preserve
  a) local art
  b) local cultural forms
  c) local sport forms
  d) if so why? and how?
5.3.5 Collecting data

Before undertaking the formal interviews with the persons contacted in Algeria, it was necessary first to undertake a pilot study. The aim of this was to check the understanding, comprehension and reactions of the respondents toward the different questions asked, particularly in relation to sociology theories and concepts such as modernity, globalisation, secularism, neo-liberalism, or multi-nationals. For this purpose, and after rechecking the content and order of questions with the researcher’s supervisor, two (tape-recorded) interviews were undertaken with two British professors from European study group (both familiar with post-colonial and francophone studies). The other pilot interview was done with an Algerian lecturer (in a British university) in the field of political studies. The pilot study helped the researcher to re-organise some questions and delete others that seemed less coherent and add other points, which were not covered. The second step was to (re) contact different representative from academic and political spheres in order to confirm their consent and arrange meetings. A tape recorder (with enhanced digital sound) was used, after the permission of the interviewees, had been obtained to record the discussion. This had facilitated the accuracy in reporting the interviews’ content and in writing the full interview transcript. Note that only one respondent refused to allow use of the recording equipment, and for this case field notes were made during and after the interview, as the only way to report the respondent’s view on various questions asked.

5.3.6 Micro-level interview issues

For the next stage (micro-level) of the study the focus was on linking the Algerian project for professional football to other existing and already established models of professional sports, namely the French centralised model, UK’s market driven model, and the American professional system of restricted liberalism. Other examples of “specific” models of professional of sport in non-western countries, for instance, Japan, China, Indonesia and Korea were also taken into account. This helped understanding of the effort of some nations, in the Far East, (non-western culture) in combining the global product, professional sport, based on western liberal values
(organisation and management rationality), with local culture, traditions and belief systems.

For the above purpose semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of football community, starting from what could be viewed as the top level in the pyramid of the decision making process, namely:

- the Ministry of Sport and Youth, which represent the principal sporting authority in Algeria and was one of the initiator of the professionalisation project.
- the Algerian Football Federation (AFF), which represents the highest football authority in the country, and the sole representative of Algerian football community at international level;
- the National Football League (NFL) nominated by the AFF to administer the first and second divisions;
- the general secretary and administrators of an Algerian professional football club, USMA one of the biggest clubs in Algeria, the 2001-2002 champion;
- Khalifa Group⁵, the most rapidly growing private group in Africa and Arab world, and one of the major sponsors of Algerian football clubs, and sports federations, the official sponsor of Olympic Marseilles, Formula 3 car racing, and one the major investors in Begle-Girond, French rugby team whose administration is headed by the famous French actor Gerard Depardieu.

**Interview structures**

The interview questions are drawn from the literature on professional sport models in western and non-western countries. They cover four parameters, which might be considered as the main factors behind the shaping of professional sport systems namely politics (the nature of the state), the economic situation, and in addition, cultural and social structures.

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⁵ Khalifa group's business services include: Khalifa airways; Khalifa itiniris airways; Khalifa Bank, Khalifa catering; Khalifa printing and processing; Khalifa car hire; Khalifa Jet set; Khalifa TV; Khalifa TV news.
**Political dimension**

- Who participated in the elaboration of the government’s project for professional sport?
- Who is responsible for the application of the project? Is there a ministerial commission supervising the project?
- Why was the professional project initiated in 1999 (and not before). (It had already been discussed in the National Assembly for Sports in 1993 and in the Ministry action Programme for the years 1994-97.)
- Do you think that there is a consensus within the football community about the necessity to move toward professionalism as a condition for the development of the national sports system? Is there a necessity for change?
- Will professional football remain part of the public mission of the state? (e.g. to ensure the public service)

**Economic aspects**

- Is the shift toward professionalism part of the movement of the national economy toward a market economy?
- Do you think that the economic crisis that Algeria is going through could be seen as a major obstacle to the implementation of professionalism?
- Are private companies ready to invest in what might be considered as a risky business (with violence in stadia, an undefined judicial system, undefined commercial benefits)?
- Many of the so-called professional clubs are under threat of cessation of their activities because of the lack of funding (the highest amount of sponsorship money allowed by law is 3 million AD [32,106.14 Euro])
- What will be the likely economic impact of the introduction of professional sport
Cultural and social dimensions

- What were the reasons (rationale) behind choosing to follow the Swiss model of professional football?
- What other models of professional football could be applied in Algeria?
- Can the professional values of commercialism, individualism, free movement of players, role of agents, be applied in Algerian society? Is there specific legislation that ensures equality between clubs, the rights of fans, or which restrict the risks of corruption, and the misuse of public funds?
- What do you think about other Arab and African experiences in relation to professionalism in sport?
- Do you think that an Algerian model of professional sport that takes into consideration the social and cultural specificity of the country will emerge?

Specific questions for representatives of Football Federation

- What was the role of the groupement professionnel GPF? Are there similarities between the GPF and the Premier or National Leagues in England and France, which are responsible for day to day management of professional football business (negotiating broadcasting rights, dividing revenues among professional football clubs)? Were tasks and responsibilities of the GPF decided between clubs managers themselves, or suggested by the MYS?
- What is the rationale behind the decision to adopt a system without relegation for the first two years of the professional experience? Were there economic or technical reasons?
- What are the main tasks and responsibilities of the LNF? Are the members of the executive board elected or selected?
- How do you assess professional football experience so far (economic, sporting and social evaluation)? Is there a need to reconsider the government’s project for professional sport?
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- **Specific questions for representative of Khalifa Group**

  - What is the strategy of Khalifa Group in relation to sponsoring and investment in football both in Algeria and France?
  - What are the main differences between the Algerian and French football system?
  - What are the points in the French system that could be/or could not be applied in the Algerian case in relation to investment rules, commercial status of the clubs, government regulations?

- **Specific questions to representative of professional clubs**

  - Did clubs' delegates participate in the elaboration of the government project’s for professional sport?
  - What are the major weaknesses/strengths of the project?
  - What form of commercial status could professional clubs adopt? Which one is the most applicable now?
  - What are the main sources of revenue of the club? (External funding, sponsorship, merchandising)
  - What were the reasons (rationale) behind choosing to follow the Swiss model of professional football?
  - What other models of professional football could be applied in Algeria?
  - What do you think about other Arab and African experiences in professionalism?
  - Do you think that an Algerian model of professional sport that takes into consideration the social and cultural specificity of the country will emerge?
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It should be noted that not all interviewees accepted to be recorded. Field notes were used in this case to report the main points covered by the respondents, during and after the interview, by noting the main observations.

5.3.7 Coding and analysis

After finishing the interview transcripts the next stage was to enter the document into qualitative analysis software, Non-numerical Data Indexing Searching and Theorising (NUDIST). To make this quite large body of transcript more manageable we then performed a series of coding and categorising exercises. This involved searching through the material for a number of themes or nodes. Some of those nodes arose from our concerns on issues relevant to the study focus (e.g. global and local nexus, local identity and modernity), while others emerged from our reading of the respondents' answers. The transcripts were then organised into twenty one tree nodes, which were regarded as most relevant to the study focus. In addition, there were four free nodes which were difficult to link or organise within specific categories. It was difficult to have a clear-cut decision about the distribution of codes in the file. As my understanding of a particular theme developed I found it useful to uncode some of the materials which I saw as incoherent or more usefully represented as a sub category.

The use of NUDIST here was helpful in facilitating the process of going backwards and forwards between codes and original text or from one tree node to another, which allowed us to grasp the general idea of the interviewees' answers on different topics. The analysis of the second set of interviews via NUDIST coding followed the development of skills in the area at late stage in my development. Time was not available however to allow the interviews from the first (macro) stage to be recorded employing NUDIST.

\footnote{Number of taped recorded interviews for macro level are six and one non-recorded. For micro level tape recorded interviews are three, and three non-recorded.}
CHAPTER SIX

Discourse on Globalisation, Modernity and Professional Football

6.1 Introduction to macro-level analysis

The macro-level analysis focuses first on globalisation and professional sport in a narrower sense, organised under the rubrics of 'national identity', 'specificity', 'localisation' and 'neutrality'. This include other concepts connected to what could be seen as the envisaged local response to globalisation challenges, namely 'integration' (compromise, or adaptation) ‘assimilation’ (adoption or total acceptance) and ‘resistance’ (rejecting or refusing western hegemony). The analysis emphasises also the specific content of the respondents' utterances, their argumentation strategies and to a lesser extent the linguistic forms of realisation they employ while talking on issues such as globalisation, national sovereignty and local reactions to western values. This was compared to their argumentation on questions associated with professional sports as a value system, a set of practices and as a mode of management. To get a clearer picture of the interviewees' response, some categories which are the product of the researcher's understanding of the literature, were used to divide the interview transcripts into distinctive quotations, or excerpts. Other categories were also produced from our first reading of interview transcripts. The list and positions of respondents are as follow:

- Respondent from nationalist or conservative party, National Liberation Front (FLN), in charge of Youth and Sport Commission in the Senate
- Respondent from Islamic reformism, Movement for Peace, President of the Party’s High Political Commission.
- Respondent from democratic liberal wing, Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), representative of the party’s parliamentary group, in charge of Youth and Sport Commission in the party, the president of the party group in the Algerian Parliament.
- University lecturer in sociology, Algiers university
6.2 Globalisation in the interviewees’ discourse

6.2.1 Definition

Respondents interpreted globalisation in different ways, although all of them (despite their ideological and political orientations or academic positions) agreed on the existence of both negative and positive forms of globalisation. They approved also that Third World countries (referred to as ‘non-developed’, ‘developing’, ‘the South’, and ‘other nations’) are not active participants in this process. For instance, the National Liberation Front representative links the process to a specific period, modern time or the 21st century. He defines it as both a complex and non-spontaneous process, directed by ‘global forces’. Complex in a manner that it affects both developing (e.g. Algeria) and developed countries, and in particular, effects different classes within capitalists countries. The difference between those two poles is that the former are considered as the initiators of globalisation processes, while the latter such as Algeria have not participated in its conceptualisation, and reacts to it without well-defined strategy. Developing countries here were given the role of simple (passive) receiver of the process, living its consequences without a planned strategy (or even an awareness), “a [globalisation]process that Algeria lives its consequences and reacts to it with no well studied ideas or strategy” (respondent from conservative party, National Liberation Front)

As part of the complexity of globalisation, the National Liberation Front representative acknowledges the existence of double aspects of the same process. In addition to negative consequences; both, social and ‘moral deviations’, globalisation incorporates also positive elements such as general access to knowledge, the spread of western humanist values (e.g. freedom of speech, human rights). The level of positiveness of those values within any society is conditioned by the degree of its assimilation. Put in other terms, less resistance to what is conceived as western could
help in accelerating the establishment of certain (accepted) values in what could be defined as recipient societies.

if the establishment of democracy took five centuries in developed countries it is possible for developing countries to build their society with a democratic basis in twenty years (respondent from conservative party/National Liberation Front)

For the representative of Islamic resurgence/or reformism, Movement for Peace, globalisation is an old phenomenon, which goes back to the history of civilisations. The same processes appears today with new forms of social, economic and political practice characterized by high levels of information technology and directed by those who control the means of power. It is another concept for the new world order, which existed before in the guise of Islamic dominance, colonialism or in the bipolar system of the cold war. “Globalisation won’t be different from the new world order in its old form…” (respondent from Islamic reformism/ Movement for Peace)

However, in comparison to Islamic dominance, which in the respondent’s terms is based in the respect of other nations cultures and faiths, the new form of globalisation represents a real threat. Its real (destructive) aim is to control the world economy, global natural resources and the manipulation of human being’s customs, values, relationships and sovereignty.

It coincides this time with economic power and the destruction of human beings, of customs, values, relationships and sovereignty (respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace)

The new globalisation that the respondent from Islamic reformism/ Movement for Peace refers to is managed by two main forces, firstly, American military and cultural hegemony (Americanisation), secondly, ‘Zionist’ control of finance (banking) and media (information). Hence, the party that he represents is not against the idea of international co-operation beyond borders or scientific evolution, seen as positive aspects of globalisation and compatible with Islamic values. The party is against the uneven development that exists actually, as a result of globalisation, between nations
in relation to access to technology and world resources. He rejects this form of globalisation because it is an anti-democratic project, which seeks to re-establish feudalism or the relation between dominant 'master' and dominated 'slave'. The other reason for opposing globalisation, as indicated by the references to Americans and Zionists, is connected with Islamic ideology and the party's project for society. It is interpreted as being against (our) Islamic principles of human rights and freedom which the party strives to apply in the Algerian society. One can suggest here that the respondent criticism in relation to globalisation (Americanisation) concerns the form of application and not its (western) paradigm or values namely democracy, freedom of speech, human rights, which the party is attached to, simply because those values are not contradictory to Algerian society's Islamic principals or the Party's project for society (establishing an Islamic state).

Globalisation is in contradiction with democratic practices, it abolishes simple human rights and brings back slavery, middle age cultures in new attractive (media) forms (respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace)

It [globalisation] brings back the age of feudalism (...) globalisation erases [neglects] concept of democracy. From an Islamic perspective we strive for the development of human rights and freedom. Globalisation comes to take those human rights, of sovereignty and ownership. Financially and economically, globalisation becomes a tool of oppression that prevents freedom of expression or choice (respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace)

Globalisation, in the manner depicted above, represents a new form of oppression under the control of 'Zionist dominance' (in particular through world-wide banks) and prevents people from experiencing freedom of expression and choices. Globalisation conceives others ('third world countries', 'Islamic nations') as human but of a lower order. Thus, for religious Islamic reasons, it can not be accepted. Finally, because globalisation as it applies today is based on inequality and uni-polarism, support for it is in decline and other poles (such as Islamic movements) will emerge to change its principles.
money should not be the monopoly of a minority of persons, as in the case of world-wide banks. Three or four banks are controlling the financial transactions in the world (respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace)

The sense of incompatibility that exists between the globalisation project and other cultures (e.g. Islamic religion) was also addressed by other interviewees from the academic sphere, particularly by the Political Scientist, who argues that globalisation is exclusively western, linked to a specific, one-sided ideology, and defined as liberal economy and culturally western. Its causes lie in intensification of contacts between states, under the umbrella of international organisations (e.g. NATO)

The main objective of globalisation goes beyond the reduction of distances between countries, politically, culturally and militarily. In the Political Scientist terms, it is about the diffusion of unidirectional principle of liberal hegemony.

Globalisation is not a case of space reduction between populations, it is about the attempt to expand and diffuse unidirectional principles, as reported by Fukuyama on ideological conflict and liberal hegemony. (the Political Scientist)

In relation to the Islamic model and globalisation values, the Political Scientist argues that globalisation imposes certain definitions and values on other non-western cultures without taking into account their specificity. For instance, according to Islamic views on human rights, “the principal values are equality and justice, followed by freedom”. The same could be said regarding citizens’ rights, or on issues such as heritage, or marriage. Thus, imposing a western conception of culture and economy through globalisation generates problems of incompatibility between the west and non-western societies. Hence, the terms west and non-west (or west versus non-west), according to the Political Scientist’s discourse, represent two distinctive blocks, at least in their conception of world culture and economy.

For the sociologist, globalisation is an ancient phenomenon, which existed throughout the history of civilizations and which appears today with a new form characterized by
Chapter 6 Discourse on Globalisation, Modernity and Professional Football

technological revolution. It is also source of tension between local and global, south and west, although both poles are part of the process and work in its development. The same view was shared by the Anthropologist, who suggests that globalisation, as a process, is an old phenomenon, which goes back to the history of civilizations, but which is today under the control (although not total dominance) of the USA, or unipolar hegemony. Moreover, according to the Sociologist, globalisation coincides actually with the generalization of knowledge and education in the world (though to lesser extent in the south) and it consists of two forms; unification through technology and the market economy; diversification, through conflicts\(^1\) between cultures and populations

Globalisation consists of two movements or faces: first unification (unity) or unipolarism. Technology and market economies have experienced a real boom after the decline of communism in the world, which played in the past the role of slowing down this historical movement and paid a high price for this position. The other face is the emergence of population and cultures as a result of conflicts, which becomes an engine for development. This is my view about globalisation. It is a contradictory, conflictual (local and global) and an ancient phenomenon (history of civilisation) with new forms (technology, communication)...This conflictual movement is the engine of nations' emancipation. (the Sociologist)

When asked about the subject of sport and globalisation, the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy points out that globalisation, which was limited to the political and to economics (with a separation between sports and these domains), was now present in sport in an invasive manner. Starting from its codification, sport in its modern form has challenged all other traditional modes of cultural practice, to become today a universal form practised all over the world, despite differences in culture and developmental and ideological orientations. A significant element of globalisation in sport is the establishment of international sports organizations and legislation that aims at linking populations and facilitating communication through codified and normalized spaces. This happened, according to the Director of the Algerian Olympic

\(^1\) Conflicts here are seen as an engine of development, constructive rather than destructive.
Academy, while the world was witnessing the end of bipolarism and conflicts between two ideologies, which resulted in the failure of socialism as a system and ideology. As a consequence, the sports world today is characterised by the dominance (control) of developed countries over international institutions and technological innovations, creating a gap, which is hard for developing countries to diminish or challenge. In this situation there is only one alternative left for Third World countries, which is to accept or abide by the global sporting order.

Nations are not living in isolation, there is a logic that imposes itself at international level and every country (depending on its convictions) has to integrate this new dynamic (mondial). (The Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy)

To sum up, one could suggest that the multiple definitions and characteristics reported by respondents about globalisation as process and ideology, present the concept as the bearer of a double, sometimes conflictual, meaning. One is negative and destructive, where globalisation is seen as a means of control and imposition of unidirectional western cultural, liberal, secular ideology or will over 'others'; non-western, non-rich or less economically developed nations. The other image is positive and productive, which defines globalisation as purveyor of technological innovations, progress and democracy, compatible with Algerian society and with Islamic values.

6.2.2 globalisation and hegemony

Respondents in their designation of globalisation, or new world order, mention the existence of certain controls, dominance of one culture, ideology, power, geographical position, over other nations and cultures. This relationship of dominant – dominated was considered throughout the discussion on globalisation questions, as an external menacing threat on local identity and sovereignty. This domination, even though it is not total, according to the majority of respondents, is hard for ‘subordinate’ nations (for economic, political or geo-strategic reasons) to defy or resist. The representative of the National Liberation Front expresses his worries regarding the level of hegemony exercised by rich countries on other nations through the imposition, without limit or reserve, of a universal type of consumerist behaviours, described as
the new religion of the west. This is a hegemony that it is hard for non-rich countries to identify or confront, because it is submerged today (though less so then in the past) by ambiguity and confusions, “what is considered positive may have negative consequences in the future...” (respondent from the conservative party/National Liberation Front)

The hegemony exercised by global forces is much more clear and obvious from economic standpoint. This can be observed, for instance, in the relationship between the IMF (referred to in the literature as supra-states economic activity), supposedly the initiators and regulators of development programs and Third World countries, which benefit from those programs.

Countries linked to different treaties with IMF would not be able to plan their own programme of development without referring to those (imposed) treaties (respondent from the conservative party/National Liberation Front)

For the delegate of Movement for Peace, imposing a hegemony, a new ideology of consumerism with restricted choices, under the label of liberal commercialism and the guise of commercial adverts, becomes in this new era of globalisation the condition by which to rule and control the world. This may be regarded as another proof of the strong link that exist between globalisation and liberal hegemony.

It is not a coincidence but planned by those who want to control the world (respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace)

As an illustration of this hegemony the representative of Movement for Peace uses the example of the world finance and banking system. Today, three or four banks (he describes as Zionist), are monopolizing financial transactions, which he conceives as against ‘universal’ human rights and Islamic principles. In this case a distinctive Islamic banking system, viewed as more respectful to human conditions, is the alternative (reflecting a universality of Islamic principles).

Other terms such as “diffusion of unidirectional principles...imposing certain western definition of culture” (the Political Scientist), were used to elucidate the links existing
between globalisation and western hegemony, and the threat that the latter is having on national sovereignty. The Political Scientist continued by stating that national sovereignty, more than ever, is facing many challenges, one of which is western unipolarism under the leadership of the US, which has restricted other nations (particularly Third-World countries) freedom to exercise control over their internal and external affairs, thus giving itself the right of interference in internal affairs of any nation in the name of protecting human rights. The other form of threat on national sovereignty, is the media, which under the title of freedom of speech and of communication rights diffuses images of what is happening around the world, without any territorial restrictions.

Sometimes applying western hegemony goes beyond imposing a single life style or mode of thinking to that of imposing local political orientations, in return for more benefits from the global order and foreign investments. The respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace refers to the 'dirty' political intentions of the west, supported by Zionist money, which impose on non-developed countries some conditions which are in contradiction with their 'sovereignty' and identity. Such conditions include, dictating restrictions on educational programmes\(^\text{2}\), establishing diplomatic relations with Israel (which is not recognised as a state), or stopping the construction of water dams. The respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace goes even further by describing those conditions coming from above as menace to the nation's sovereignty as well as a threat to the future of young generations.

The type of western hegemony criticised in the response of the respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace or the representative from conservative party/National Liberation Front could be found also in sport, which according to the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy, is dominated by international sports organizations described as 'lobbies', with their own specific aspiration—for money making—and who impose their hegemony on non-developed countries with less economic power.

\(^\text{2}\) Imposing 'laïque' educational programmes.
The interviewees’ approach to western dominance and hegemony not only included the unidirectional, opposed (rejectionist) voices mentioned above. For instance, the Sociologist considers claims about the power of western hegemony exercised on other nations and cultures, to be exaggerated, not existing in reality. In the same vein, the Anthropologist suggests that hegemony of thought (de la pensée), which is supposed to be one of the conditions of the globalisation process, is not achievable in reality. The representative of democratic (liberal wing), Rally for Culture and Democracy, claims that western hegemony is a fact that we cannot escape. Hence, he argues that there is no other alternative or choice for non-developed countries, which for economic and political reasons, have only to ‘abide’ by the new order, directed by western forces.

From the above discussion, we can argue that respondents acknowledge the existence of a certain (but not total) western hegemony ‘out there’, which for some is a threat and for others is merely a fact of life.

6.2.3 Criticism of westernisation

Respondents reacted differently toward the relation between globalisation and western values (westernisation). Some of those reactions focus on the positive aspects that globalisation; namely, democratisation, technological developments and scientific revolution, might bring for developing countries such as Algeria. Others (sometimes the same respondents), in relation to other western values, focus on the negative consequences, the unidirectional cultural flow or the effects that certain western values such as secularism or commercialism may provoke on Arabic, Islamic and non-western countries. One of the western values discussed by the respondents was secularism, or what is known within Algerian political and cultural spheres, laïcité, the division between politics and religion (the practice of Islam), in the case of Algeria, as part of individual and private domain, and not as a holistic project for society. According to the National Liberation Front representative, the western notion of secularism, which consists of the division between religion and politics (laïcité), despite being more evident in some respects, due to globalisation, is also currently subject to internal and external opposition.
There is an internal opposition in the sense that the opposition toward secular trends exists also in the west, described as capitalist countries, or the birth place of secularism. Paradoxically, it is in the occident where new religious, sectarian groups have emerged, whose existence is strangely tolerated in the secular west, transforming religion from spiritual belief to a 'new refuge'. It is a refuge from the threat of materialist societies, described by this respondent, as a 'jungle' in a state of confusion and disorder owing to the injustice of capitalism. On the same point, the respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace states that whereas secularism is a condition for progress in the west or the Christian world, as a result of the pervious heavy historical control of the church, in the Middle East (which is multi-religious society) and the Maghreb Union (a Muslim society), the focus of unity is respectively, Arabism and Islam, while the causes of fragmentation and division, is tribalism. Thus, the condition for progress and unity in the Islamic countries is to follow Islamic principles, which are stronger than any tribal solidarity, whilst applying secularism or laïcité may open doors to social deviations (e.g. pornography, revealing and exposing the human body). In other words, Islamic rule does not need secularism to achieve progress, because Islam in contrast with the Christian church order accepts and encourages knowledge. This is expressed by the respondent as the 'advantage' of Islam over Christianity in terms of openness to knowledge. The same could be argued in relation to other fundamentals of western modernity such as individualism. The sense of community solidarity (e.g. notions of Twiza, or community work and Tadjmaat, community leaders), which in contrast to western capitalist cultures is a reality that still persist (for historical and cultural reasons) in Arabic, Islamic and non-western traditions.

The Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy points out that westernisation, particularly western individualism, materialism and the ubiquitous competition for records in the west, (which has become the trend in other nations too) is synonymous with doping and corruption.

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3 Tadjmaat or timishraf is the village/or the tribal council or assembly. An ancient form of social organisation that is still active in some parts of Algeria, particularly in the Kabylie region. (see Pierre Bourdieu 1974, Sociologie de l’Algérie).
Take the example of cycling\(^4\) where everyday we hear about (...) unacceptable practices that happen in the name of materialism (The Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy).

The Sociologist questions whether in reality there is a unique, homogeneous model of secularism or modernity: "Is cultural content, religion or secularism defined or practiced in the same manner in France, USA or Germany?". Specificity in practising or applying secularism and modernity exists also among industrial countries. Moreover, technological advancement and success in the market economy, is not the sole product of a single (western) culture (e.g. of Japan, and Korean success). The globalisation process is happening in such a way that today both western and non-western countries are facing, simultaneously, trends of unification and diversification. The former, through the creation of supra-states bodies such as the EU, WTO, the latter, through the emergence of new nations (e.g. the former republics of Yugoslavia) or regional separatists movements (e.g. Basque in Spain and Corsica in France). Thus, claiming that globalisation is synonymous with westernisation does not reflect the multiplicity and the pluralism that the process engenders.

6.2.4 Algeria in the new world order

Algeria as a nation, a state and identity, was represented in interviewees' discourse in different terminology; non-western nation, a developing country, with Arabo-Islamo-Berber identity, belonging also to the Maghreb, African Union and a larger Mediterranean culture. Nonetheless, as a result of the new world order (and of new forms of globalisation) Algeria is facing many challenges. Some of them come from 'above' (external) such as; world banks, the IMF, rich nations or the west in general, others are internal challenges such as social and economic problems, identity questions and violence, resulting from the regime's (FLN-state) past political orientations.

\(^4\) Referring to Tour de France and the successive scandals of doping that have tarnished the image of this legendary race.
According to National Liberation Front, Algeria did not participate in the acceleration or conceptualisation of globalisation processes (playing a role of an outsider), nor did the share in the economic boom and development that rich nations are benefiting from. It is in a position of a receiver of cultural, political and economic values and systems, without a thoughtful strategy. Such a strategy should include, according to the respondent from conservative party/National Liberation Front, a modern (developed, rational), educative and strong media system that is able to resist, what he refers to as 'non-habitual' or alien lifestyles, foreign to Algerian society. For the respondent from conservative party/National Liberation Front, although Algeria possesses a financial ability, which in reality is the product of international economic conditions rather than a planned and national economic system, it still has many internal problems to deal with. This includes problems of unemployment, a housing crisis, and lack of education and health care, which work as barriers against its development. In the same vein, the respondent from the Rally for Culture and Democracy claims that the country is not participating in the process because it is a nation that depends exclusively on oil revenue, and is served by poor negotiators, who are the major factor responsible for current internal problems. In comparison to Tunisia, which was seen as a model of a progressive and secular regime in the region, and which does not possess the financial and human resources that Algeria has, Algerian leaders are unaware of the macro and micro socio-economic situation. They are also responsible for the mis-management, bankruptcy, and mis-use of financial resources, as well contributing to the identity crisis which Algeria is currently facing, particularly in relation to the issue of Berberism. For the Rally for Culture and Democracy the solution to the crisis must involve first the recognition of Algeria’s specificity and distinctive identity (known as Amazighia, or berberism).

The entire problem is situated in this issue [identity]. There is in Algeria a hybrid regime. A regime that refuses to recognise its identity and its origin. A large part of the population is rejected and not recognised, that the constitution did not take into consideration. I am giving a political view regarding the recent events in Kabylie region. The problem emerged after the 1980 riots in this region and the creation of the Berber movement. For a country to achieve stability socially and economically we need first to respect the person (citizen), respect his/her values and cultural identity. The cultural question
needs to be resolved urgently.... It needs to be resolved as soon as possible in order to be able to resolve other problems. (Respondent from Rally for Culture and Democracy)

We may suggest here that regarding the issue of identity the use of the “I” pronoun when discussing the Amazighité problem (caused by the ‘other’, the regime) and the Kabylie region, may be seen as an indicative and an affirmation of the link between the respondent, the party and the Berberist cause. The use of the pronoun ‘we’, on the other hand, emphasises that it is a national and not a regional (Kabylie region) problem.

According to the respondent, from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace point of view, Algeria is living a real identity crisis, which is an obstacle to development. The following answers reflect this position

Are we Arab, Amazigh, Islamists, Democrats, Algerian, Euro-Mediterranean or African? (Respondent from Islamic reformism/ Movement for Peace).

More hazardously, the country is facing terrorism and violence that has affected the principal (strongest) value of Algeria’s nationalism and union, Islam, causing its deviation and deformity from its real message, and resulting also in a regionalisation of the country. The crisis has given the opportunity for the enemy of Algerian forces, namely Zionists [Israeli companies with American names], to invest locally despite security problems and media campaigns, organised by European channels, which show the country as “a volcano” ready to explode at any time. The crisis has also had a negative effect on the democratisation process (modernisation) (...) as a result, democracy, which aimed originally at the gathering of national potential. Getting into [integration into] globalisation [or at least some of its aspect] in a respectful

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5 Referring to the call of political parties and other movements in civil society for the recognition of Amazigh as a national language and part of Algerian cultural and media spaces.
way, was affected by the crisis and thus causes its [democracy’s] decline (The
(Respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace).

In the same line, the Political Scientist argues that Algeria was a victim of mistaken
political and ideological orientations made by the political elite representing the
regime, from the beginning of the period of independence. Those orientations failed
because of their neglect of the specific natures of Algeria’s position and
circumstances.

The problems of Algerian society are different from those of British society, as
are the development mechanisms, or consciousness and traditions. (the
Political Scientist)

6.2.5 Local response to globalisation

Respondents’ reaction toward globalisation, may be divided into three main groups;
total assimilation and rejection of traditionalism, underdevelopment and violence;
integration, adaptation of certain ‘accepted’ aspects of westernisation, defined also as
compromise between Algerian distinctiveness (spécificité) and globalisation trends;
resistance, resisting values which are not compatible with Algerian circumstances. It
should be noted though that all interviewees rejected a total resistance, which might
be explained as a policy of protectionism and isolationism toward the west. Such an
approach was seen as a source of radicalism and violence. This could be interpreted,
as the interviewees’ will to differentiate and distance themselves from armed groups
which had chosen the use of violence as a tool of resistance against social and
political order. Moreover, we should report as well that each of the interviewee did
not have (may be for political or ideological reasons) a distinctive single—unitary
response and reaction to all issues regarding globalisation. In other words, the same
supporters of resistance toward western materialism and secularism, who regarded the
west as a source of social deviation, are also elsewhere in the interviews, the
supporters of the total assimilation of western human rights and democratic values.
These create a situation of ambiguity, common in political discourse, and which is
hard to explain in a holistic way.
a) Resistance

The respondent from National Liberation Front argues that resistance against cultural diffusion needs a cultural policy. It should include modern (developed) educative programme that could be used to combat negative aspects of globalisation.

It is hard for any country to affirm the existence of a cultural policy to resist (this diffusion). There may exist a sort of resistance but it is very limited one. (National Liberation Front)

Assimilation of western values such as democracy, human rights, knowledge, even if it is recognised by respondents as beneficial for achieving certain aspects of progress and development (democratisation), probably more in Algeria than in other Arab countries which are regarded as protectionist or highly resistant toward the west, it may also, according to the same respondents, have negative outcomes that can stimulate value problems and social deviations (e.g. prostitution, drugs, and family breakdown). The same sort of double standard was used to define the concept of resistance. For example, according to the respondent from National Liberation Front, resistance toward western media and globalisation, is a natural response to globalisation challenges, which aims at finding temporary solutions. However, the same process (resistance) if it was not based on (modern) scientific basis and strategic planing or rationality, can have a destructive effect (e.g. radicalism and terrorism). One of the conditions of effective resistance reported by the respondent from National Liberation was to re-establish a partnership based on shared geography and identity “Algeria could not fight alone against those problems, outside the Maghreb Union, and Arab space”.

The respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace expressed the same view, but with different intensity “...we refuse the oppressive forms of globalisation” went on to state that regional co-ordination and partnership (namely, Arabo-Islamic, Maghreb, Gulf and African Unions) could protect and preserve a ‘minimum’ of sovereignty and civilization, from the western materialists bloc (USA and Europe). In

Islamic union was not mentioned.
the same vein the Anthropologist suggested that resisting globalisation hegemony and uniformity or a unidirectional way of thinking needed to pass through a unified strategy and group solidarity.

According to the respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace, "Algeria is not able to resist globalisation flows (alone), because its infrastructure (tools, opportunities) were not built on the respect of person but on oil". Furthermore, the resistance toward globalisation should be peaceful, rejecting the resorting to violence that some groups have chosen in the name of Islam in order to destabilise the society, such that the Party (perceived by western media as 'moderate Islamist') is one of its victims.

Resistance, according to the sociologist, has to be directed against western hegemony and western 'reductionist' views or the undervaluing of 'others' (non-westerners). This does not mean refusing all that emanates from the west (rejecting the principal of total resistance), but relates to protecting local particularism, even in the application of western values such as individualism and democracy. Values such as individualism or democracy, which involve ideas of solidarity and human rights, need to emerge or to be applied, according to 'our' (Algerian) civilisational values. Those demands should emerge in different forms, shape and structure than in western democracies "...the most important is the form, which gives to societies their identity and spécificité" (Sociologist). The process of adaptation, rather than transformation of western norms to local circumstances, is described by the same respondent as 'positive resistance'. Adaptation should incorporate both local history and past national experiences (including western experiences in integrating tradition and modernity). Positive resistance could also mean transforming (créolisation) of global products to local use, with examples of satellites and cables TV7 which contribute today in strengthening the link of the Algerian immigrant community with its native culture, and the opening of Algerian society to other Arab and Islamic countries (to reinforcing Algerian identity). From the perspective of the Political Scientist, resistance towards global order means refusing western universalism of statehood and

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7 Described in Algeria, particularly within 'Islamist' discourse, as paradiabolique (evil) instead of parabolic, referring to the negative effects that some programmes of certain French channels could have on the viewers' moral values, particularly on young generations.
governance, "we cannot design a standard model of governance or statehood that could be applied to all countries"

If resistance is feasible and applicable in other domains, it is hard to achieve in sport. For the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy, every attempt to modify the (standardised) game of handball by other nations and cultures namely Korea, Algeria, Egypt, by introducing a new dynamic to the game or calling for re-adjustment of power relations, was confronted by strong opposition from sports institutions. This was explained as being a way for those institutions (described also as lobbies) to protect their interests and supremacy, both in and off the field. In other words a 'temporary resistance', limited to some game strategies, is possible but it is hard to maintain in order to challenge the dominant (or imposed) form of practice and structure.

b) Assimilation

The respondent from the National Liberation Front describes high technological assimilation as a way to reach positive development and interaction with the West.

General access today to knowledge for a young population in Third World countries, particularly in Algeria where the degree of technological assimilation is high, could result in a positive development and interactions. (respondent from National Liberation Front)

According to the Rally for Culture and Democracy, assimilation consists of adopting the real values of globalisation, needed to achieve progress. The position of 'in between' western development or progress and traditionalism, which he sees as synonymous also with underdevelopment and violence, is completely rejected "...we cannot stay in a situation of "a just milieu" [in between], when something is black we must say that it is black". Tunisia, a neighbour country known as one of the most secular and liberal Islamic countries, which is one tenth of Algeria's size and poor in

8 Referring to the example of the Algerian defence strategy, which privileges 3-3 advanced type defence rather than the traditional 6-0 defence line, to compensate the lack of height in the Algerian team comparing to other world class teams.
natural resources, is presented by the representative from the Rally for Culture and Democracy as a model of historical progress, owing to its policy of assimilation of western values. As a result “it is becoming a competitive country for Algeria”.

For the representative from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace ‘accepted’ assimilation means close contact with knowledge, technology and management science. Whilst the Political Scientist define assimilation as a negative adaptation (adoption) of different western ideologies namely socialism, liberalism and the market economy, which had failed in all Islamic countries and resulted in internal problems that have affected even the existence of the state.

c) Integration

According to the respondent from National Liberation Front, ‘compromising’ in the adaptation of certain values of globalisation becomes an obligation, even if the final result of the compromise may be unclear or unpredictable.

We are obliged to compromise. This compromise will include 50/50 or 30/70 we cannot know, because it is hard to predict the result of globalisation influences on younger generations (respondent from National Liberation Front)

For the Political Scientist, integration means positive adaptation that concerns variation to external environment (global challenges) without affecting internal principle or identity, maintaining a ‘passive’—minimum resistance⁹—of the principles and values of national institutions. Finally, according to the Sociologist,

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⁹The term ‘minimum’ institutional principles as strategy of integration was not clearly defined.
integration means “combining” between tradition and modernity which involves gathering social forces, specific abilities and culture for development.

6.3 Professional sport in interviewees’ discourse

6.3.1 Definition

Professional sport is defined exclusively in terms of western economic and managerial criteria in addition to other aspects linked to nation-state building namely national positioning, prestige and solidarity. The latter is particularly important now that Algeria is living a momentous political and identity crisis. The representative from National Liberation Front defined professional sport as an important element of the market economy and globalisation process, which in Algeria may attract huge sums of money and investment, and could play an important role in building nation’s reputation. Additionally, the application of professional sport if well managed could promote other sectors such as tourism. The other benefit of professional sport comes from football schools under the management of big clubs, which from the point of view of the respondent from the Rally for Culture and Democracy, could play a considerable role in diminishing stress, delinquency, and the creation of new symbols or role models to be followed by the younger generations. According to the respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace, professionalism is the path (a necessity) that needs to be followed in all sectors (jobs or arts), including sports. The same view is shared by the Anthropologist who states that professional sport is not distinctive from other economic and commercial sectors, and thus it should be treated, and managed in the same manner.

The Sociologist goes a step further by claiming that the most important aspects of professional sport concern the market economy, specialisation, individualism, capitalism and technological development (in other words western conditions of modernisation). It is linked also to other spiritual needs, for instance respect of environment and religion. The latter point reported by the respondent is contradictory or incompatible with western modernity- a secular model, which does not take the religious order as an integral part for development or rational thinking. The same could be argued for modern sport, which follows the condition of modernity, and
where religious domain is not an integral part of its mode of practice and organisation. Sociologist continues by stating that professional sport could be used as a tool for resolving identity problems by rejecting identity conflicts within the sports arena.

The principal engine is the economy and individualism that may take the form of group interest in developing sport practices...There is also technological development and capitalism. Other aspects related to specialisation, spiritual needs, respect for the environment and religion. The latter could be used to resolve identity problems (the Sociologist)

The Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy gives another explanation of professional sport based on psychological and managerial interpretations. Professional sport is first an attitude, it requires a mentality/frame of mind (which is absent in the Algerian case), together with an economic plan and security, more importantly, financial investments, and quality service. Those aspects exist in developed countries but not in the Third World countries, which for the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy are not ready to adopt such complex and developed systems.

Algeria does not have experience, for this reason it called for other experiences and external models. Exchange programmes were organised with Italians, and Swiss, to try to define professionalism with judicial and organisational configurations. It was important to recycle the activity within an economic context. We wanted very quickly to reproduce those external models, without adapting them to Algerian situation and people’s mentalities. Professionalism first of all is an attitude, which needs to be developed and introduced in the society. We thought that new laws, texts, and structures are going to resolve the problem, which is completely wrong.

6.3.2 Professional sport values

Sport in general and professional sport in particular, is conceived as a neutral field despite its obvious ‘western’ origins (at least in codified terms) free from any ideological control or cultural monopoly. The respondents’ interpretations of professionalism focused only on western forms (perceived as the most successful
model) of practice and values, namely materialism, individualism, consumerism, glory, and free movement of players. Theses were seen as compatible with Algerian society and not contradictory to Islamic values. Thus, it should be noted that discussions on consumerism, individualism and the search for glory from an Islamic perspective, in other terms Islam in relation to professionalism values, were absent in the interviewees' answers. The connection between those two subjects was not understood or did not exist in the mind of respondents prior to the interview, which explains their surprise when they were asked to give their view about it. For most respondents, sport represents a universal culture that symbolises human values and experiences and therefore it has to be accepted as such. Its ideological compatibility with Algerian society had not been considered, is viewed as unproblematic, and therefore absent in respondents' discourses. The most important question for respondents was how to manage sport and transform into a beneficial sector. The following selected quotations of the respondent from Islamic reformism, Movement for Peace answers indicate this tendency.

...The professionalisation of sport should not be linked to ideological criteria but to criteria of ability and stability, because it concerns with human experiences that could be developed.

Professional sport is based on humanist values, changed but not directed by any ideology. Our party views sport as a beneficial sector if it is well planned.

Professionalisation of sport from both the Sociologist's and the Anthropologist's perspectives is not contradictory to Islamic values. For the Sociologist everything is a product that could be sold or bought according to the law of demand and supply. Applying those market laws in western countries has not affected their humanism. Western liberal societies are even more humanist than other non-liberal societies. The Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy suggests that professional sport values are compatible with Algerian society and part of the society's transition and openness towards a market economy, a goal which was accepted without reservation.
Professional values are compatible with Algeria society, because it is a society open to the market economy. Why should sport be an exception? (...) logic of interest, free movement of players, or recruitment/or decrease of staff. Those are mechanisms resulting from this logic. Sport could not be excluded from the general frame of the society. (the Director of The Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy)

...Buying and selling players is in fact concerned with buying and selling talents and skills. This is acceptable in Islamic values. (the Anthropologist)

Furthermore, professional sport which is part of the market economy is, according to respondent from the National Liberation Front, the shortest way to achieve glory and the best results. It allows free movement of players without restrictions and brings new experiences and emancipation. It may also work as a source of exploitation transforming, in the view of respondent from Rally for Culture and Democracy, players to a sort of 'product' that could be sold and transferred (although this he accepted as a natural norm).

The only reservations or criticism came from the Political Scientist who in comparison to other respondents, gave a political and ideological dimension to his definition of professional sport. He explained politically, sport in general as a component of society low in political salience, which is affected and manipulated by politics, but which does not have any real effect on politics. Yet, ideologically it is undoubtedly liberal, and thus compatible with western liberal societies, but not in other nations where the form of practice was imposed by international sports organisations.

6.3.3 The hegemony of professional sport

Professional (western) sport as a value system is accepted by respondents as a natural norm. It imposes itself as part of another hegemony, provoked by the generalisation of the market economy and neo-liberalism. Hence, 'other' nations have no alternative
but to accept the dominance of international sports organisation and the professionalisation project, even if it is synonymous with exploitation (e.g. in player markets). This hegemony was criticised and rejected only on two occasions. It was rejected firstly as a form of universalism that denies the existence of any ideological manipulation in the domain of sport; and secondly, because of its unidirectional mode of practice, resulting from top-down imposition of western liberalism on other nations and cultures. In spite of this, professional sport, in general, is seen as an integrated system within globalisation processes and a natural (accepted) ‘model’ for management, to achieve progress and development in sport. Additionally, its application in a developing country may contribute to the attainment of other aspects of modernity, particularly those related to increasing economic profit and nation-state building. Thus, the acceptance of the society’s orientation toward the market economy implies acceptance in every domain, including sport where the professionalisation project, is conceived as vital to Algerian football, simply because it is the most effective tool for success.

Professionalism is not a choice... Professional sport has imposed itself for one reason: the search of glory and the shortest route to achieve the best results. (...) Therefore, it is not possible to be open in the domain of culture and the economy and not in sport. Professionalism is part of a global change and ....countries, which refused to adopt this form “superficially”, in reality are obliged to apply it. (Respondent from the National Liberation Front).

For the Sociologist the professionalisation of sport is simply a movement that cannot be opposed, “can we stop the moves toward professionalism movement? Socialist countries could not succeed in stopping this movement in the past”. The same view was shared by the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy who claims that “it [professionalisation of sport] is a sort of wave that draws everything along”

However, from the Political Scientist’s point of view, the adoption of a professional model was a result of the hegemony and dominance of international sports organisations, which are behind the standardisation of sporting practice and the system of management and competition.
There are also some international pressures that impose on national systems adoption of external models. The FIFA regulations could be viewed as mechanisms that regulate sport activities, including sanctions that can be applied on countries which refuse to respect those regulations. Sometimes it results in a total interdiction of participation in international competitions. (Political Scientist)

In the same vein the Anthropologist suggests that professionalism has been imposed as a tool of integration in the new world order, under the influence of external forces (which were not defined by the respondent).

The Representative from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace, rejected the existence of such hegemony at least in sport, described it as an aspect of a universal culture that could shaped but not dominated by any specific ideology. "Professional sport is based on humanist values, which has known some changes, but is not directed by any ideology". (Movement for Peace)

6.3.4 Algeria in relation to professional sport

All respondents agreed that the multitude of problems that Algeria is going through could be seen as an obstacle to the application of ‘real’ professional sport (as it is applied in other developed countries). Those problems are concerned with political instability (terrorism, insecurity), lack of communication within the sports sphere (managers, coaches and players), and lack of financial resources. However, the most important obstacle to the development of professional sport is the administrative inability of those who are in charge of sport at both national and club levels, and who may be described as volunteers, in other word they are not selected for their managerial and communication abilities. Thus, even the possibility of applying such a complex and developed model in Algeria was questioned at various points by some respondents, who previously had shown a real enthusiasm regarding other questions such as the compatibility of professional values with Algerian society and the benefit that such a project could bring to the Algerian economy.
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The other point raised is the importance of professionalisation of sport at national level. It is conceived as a national affair, (though not under the sole responsibility of the government), hence it needs a real debate, in the same manner as any other sector (economy, politics, and culture). This debate should include all parties (thus reaffirming democracy), managers, coaches, players and sponsors. The latter will help to build an Algerian professional attitude and practice (which is currently absent), able to adopt western models of managing professional sport. It will contribute also in building a mutual understanding of the real benefits of professional sports, namely international prestige, resolving internal political problems, and cultural and social crisis. We could argue also, from the respondents’ position, that problem of professional sport in Algeria is not related to ideological incompatibility (the west versus local ideologies) but it is linked to the society’s readiness/or lack of readiness to apply western (developed and successful) criteria of management.

The introduction of professional sport is seen as the only way for Algeria to re-appropriate its lost prestige at international and continental levels, and to regain its position as an influential country in the world of sport, particularly in football. “Every Algerian is living hard reality of continuous defeat of the Algerian national team”. (representative from the National Liberation Front). According to the respondent from the Rally for Culture and Democracy, professionalism in Algeria, as a mode of management, is absent (on and off the pitch), owing to the lack of communication between different structures in charge of football. “Coaches who do not know how to work because the Algerian Football Federation (AFF) is saying something and the Groupement professionnel is saying something else”. This lack of communication has provoked a misconception of professional sport as a concept and practice, which the Party tries to resolve through the organisation of conferences.

The other problem addressed by the same respondent is the lack of financial resources:

10 Groupement professionnel was the responsible body for managing professional league under the supervision of the Algerian Football Federation (see chapter on professional sport between modernity and tradition)
Another problem is the lack of state subsidy. Can we talk about state subsidy in professional sport? This should be the responsibility of clubs' presidents. Today some clubs, which cannot afford to travel, are threatening to stop competing before the end of the season, because they do not have enough money. This is not professional sport. (Representative from the Party for Culture and Democracy)

Respondent from the Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace talks about another issue, which concerns the negative effect that government instability and political manipulation have had on football, particularly at international level.

Every time that a minister of sport and youth is changed a new president of the federation is nominated. Every time that the coach of national team is dismissed a new formation is called. There is instability in the mind of the national sport manager.

Algeria lacks efficient (professional) sport administrations, planned strategy in building professional schools, and links between sports clubs and companies. Therefore the application of professional sport could elevate the level of sport practice and performance for both genders, in order that other Zidane(s), will emerge in the future.

We need a new vision and strategy able to assimilate potential like Morcelis, Madjers, Hassibas. These are models in expressing Algerian abilities in competing.

For the Political Scientist and the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy, the most successful model of professional football is Manchester United and Real Madrid, particularly in terms of their business oriented strategies, managerial abilities,

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11 RCD, the Rally for Culture and Democracy was the only party that organises a debate on the professionalisation of sport in Algeria, inviting sporting personalities (coaches and managers), and party members to discuss this issue.
12 Accepting Hassiba as a role model.
13 Affirming the Algerianess of Zidane.
and the large popular support. The French experience is absent in respondents' discourse, despite the cultural and historical links between Algeria and France.

Manchester United and Real Madrid, are real business enterprises, with huge investment everywhere. (the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy)

Another point that is worth considering is that the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy, in comparison to other interviewees, talks from an 'insider' position, as part of the system and one of the initiators of the policy, by using the pronoun “we”, “we wanted...we said to ourselves...we thought that”. Therefore talking about the failure of professionalisation of sport so far could be interpreted as a self-criticism and not part of an outsider (political opposition) point of view, as projected by other interviewees. According to the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy, the application of “imported” professional sport passed through different phases. The first of this is experimentation where professional sport was conceived as a way to achieve social security for athletes, previously neglected in the era of amateurism, thus moving to the status of ‘non-amateurism’, rather than outright professionalism.

Re-establishment of social conditions will allow players to live under social norms (paying taxes, adhesion to social security) to avoid past experiences where sometimes the player would find himself without resources. It was necessary to normalise the situation. (The Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy)

The second stage was looking for a ‘suitable’ model for Algeria from both judicial and organisational aspects. “Exchange programme were organised with Italians, Swiss”. The adoption of those external models failed because they were not adapted to the Algerian (economic and legislative) context. For this reason the application of the professionalisation project is problematic, down to the absence of economic planning and internal and external investments.

14 French model was not investigated.
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(...)

We are thinking about professionalism without taking into account human means and abilities...we need real management and experience in directing enterprises [business oriented] that could bring a plus [e.g Manchester United, Real Madrid].

6.3.5 Type of responses to professional sport

a) Assimilation

The position of the country, politically and economically, which is affected by the external environment shaped by globalisation processes, leaves for decision makers one choice, which is to accept the professional 'model', presented as one uniform and homogeneous system, as it is conceived and applied in the west. The assimilation of the established professional 'model' would contribute to the acquisition of transparency in managerial practice in addition to economic benefits.

We are not asked to produce a new model or type of professional sport. There are other human experiences that we need to assimilate
(Representative from the National Liberation Front)

In the same vein the representative from the Party for Culture and Democracy states that professional sports models imported from the west passed through different phases that need to be respected “...we need to respect those phases in Algeria...we need to apply this model 100%” (Party for Culture and Democracy). The assimilation is easier in Algeria in comparison to other countries, it is argued, due to its leading status within Third World countries and its openness toward occidental and non-occidental cultures “...this created a model that could assimilate all sorts of forms of development” (Respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace). In the same vein the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy argues that the assimilation of market economy values within Algerian society, needs to be adopted in all sectors including sport, because it is the sole condition for success.
Chapter 6 Discourse on Globalisation, Modernity and Professional Football

Why should sport be an exception? (…) If we want to subscribe to the framework of international competition we are obliged to adopt exactly the same dimensions (The Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy)

b) Integration (particularism, localisation)

The idea of localisation, adaptation of the (western, liberal) professional sport model to the society’s local needs, is seen as inapplicable in the Algerian case. This view was shared particularly by those who were in favour of total acceptance of the western sporting ‘model’. Algerian specificity is hard to achieve at least in sport, for both cultural and economic reasons. The former was explained by reference to the ‘universality’ of sport and the latter relates to the uneven position of developing countries in the new world order.

Talking about the adaptation of the professional sport model to the Algerian situation is unacceptable (…) In the domain of sport it would be a monumental mistake to consider Algerian specificity. (Respondent from the Party for Culture and Democracy)

Localisation of professional sport is problematic and hard to achieve in Algeria. (the Sociologist)

The only possible spécificité, from the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy’s perspective, is at level of culture and emotions and not that of practice or management.

I do not believe in specificity, there are some specificities that exist at level of emotions linked to Nordic or Latin American cultures, but in practice these are common things (the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy)

c) Resistance

Resistance, in the sense of refusing, rejecting, challenging or transforming the existing professional model, is absent in the interviewees’ discourse. The only envisaged
resistance was the acquisition of equal opportunities and corresponding power that would allow small countries through the assimilation of the universal (western) model to compete and win in international competitions. "We cannot create a model similar to Germany but we can compete and win against Germany" (Movement for Peace)

Small countries that succeed in marking their presence create a mobilisation at national level and consolidation of identity (The Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy)

According to the Political Scientist, resistance toward the imposed system and international regulations was not possible due to the hegemony exercised by international sports organisations on sports practice. This does not mean though that in the future we are not going to see the emergence of any opposition, by some countries, particularly in Third World countries where the modern sports values were imposed."...the practice of those regulations in Africa could cause some reservations and bring about a conflictual situation “(Political Scientist)

6.4 Conclusion

In accordance with respondents' discourse, globalisation is divided into four forms, positive and negative globalisation, old and new globalisation. From an historical point of view globalisation, as a process, is an old phenomenon, which was manifest before in different civilisations and appears today in a new form of practice, featured by information technology and a sophisticated banking system. Respondents distinguish also between two types of world order. On the one hand, positive globalisation is characterised by generalisation of knowledge and the spread of democracy and technology. This is accepted by respondents due to its impact on development and its compatibility with Algerian society. On the other hand negative globalisation is conceived as an imposed project, non-democratic and uneven, handed down from 'above', the west, rich countries, and manipulated by supra-state influences, the World Bank and Zionist forces. This manifestation of globalisation is rejected or criticised with varying degrees of intensity because of its strong link with secularism, individualism and materialism, synonymous also with social or moral
shortcomings. Furthermore, this negative globalisation is seen as incompatible with Islamic principles.

**Globalisation in the interviewees’ discourse**

On the issue of local reaction or response toward different global forces, we can divide interviewees’ discourse into the following groups (see figure 6.1):

![Figure 6.1 - Globalisation in the interviewees' discourse](image-url)
1. Group in favour of positive globalisation and resistant toward negative globalisation

This group is comprised of the representative from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace, and the Political Scientist. Both respondents acknowledge the benefit of positive globalisation in the progress of the Algerian society and call for a rejection of both; a) negative globalisation, which represents a threat to the nation’s sovereignty and is synonymous also with social deviations, immorality, and inequality between nations, b) radical resistance toward the west adopted by local groups, equivalent to violence and isolationism. Within this group, effective resistance passes through local and regional co-operation, which consists of both supporters of Arab\(^\text{15}\) identity and Islamic solidarity and also through positive adaptation to the external environment without affecting internal principles of Algerian identity, and maintaining what the Political Scientist refers to as the “minimum of institutional principles and values”

2. Group in favour of positive globalisation and calling for a compromise or integration of global and local approaches

This group incorporates the majority of respondents namely the representative of the National Liberation Front, the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy, the Sociologist, and the Anthropologist. These respondents all agree about the importance of positive globalisation for non-western, underdeveloped nations, in the acquisition of democracy, access to knowledge and human rights. It is also regarded as the condition for development and progress. They also agree about the notion of compromise and adaptation required while dealing with global challenges seen as a threat to Algerian identity and sovereignty and as synonymous also with social failings, family breakdown, corruption, materialism, sectarianism and individualism. However, not all members of this group agree about the way to compromise or react toward the negative aspects of globalisation processes. The discourse regarding this point was ambiguous or inconsistent. On one hand, the notion of compromise was

\(^{15}\text{Amazighité (recognised by Algerian legislation as part of the Algerian historical and linguistic space) was not cited by the respondents while referring to effective resistance.}\)
expressed as an ‘adapted’ integration that needs to adjust to the transformation of the ‘unpredictable’ parameters of globalisation. This is apparent in the following excerpt:

We are obliged to compromise. This compromise will include 50/50 or 30/70 we cannot know, because it is hard to predict the result of globalisation influences on young generations [more than other]
(Respondent from the National Liberation Front)

On the other hand, the same concept was presented as a ‘positive’ resistance, which aims at transforming western products according to local realities and the adaptation of past occidental experiences in integrating tradition and modernity. In the words of sociologist, what has happened in Algerian society are conflicts in the struggle to find solutions for a crisis and new conditions for development, “new forms that combine between tradition and modernity and how can we gather social forces, which include specific abilities, culture and civilisation, for development?” (the Sociologist). In both cases, resistance toward western hegemony and economic order can exist only in a virtual sense. It exists for the interviewees in theory but in practice is impossible to apply, due to the uneven position that globalisation has created between rich and non-rich countries, and the internal challenges that the latter is facing.

It is hard for any country to affirm the existence of a cultural policy to resist [this diffusion]. There may exist a sort of resistance but it is very limited one. (Representative of the National Liberation Front)

3. Group in favour of globalisation without reserve

This approach was reflected only by the Democratic (laique) wing, the respondent from the Rally for Culture and Democracy, who argued that the problem is not situated in values associated with globalisation, but at the local level, that is at the level of the government’s representatives who are in charge of negotiating with international bodies. The positiveness of the process depends on the high level of adoption of globalisation conditions and the internal condition of the country, as well as the regime’s policy toward culture and identity. The discourse of the respondent recognises both, first, the legitimacy of globalisation’s contribution to progress and
the enlightenment project, and secondly, regionalisation trends, particularly in relation to *Berberism*. Because globalisation is not problematic, but is in fact the *sine qua non* for development and democracy, terms such as resistance, rejection, opposition toward western values are absent in this respondent’s answers. This discourse thus contains more terms such as assimilation, adoption or total acceptance.

**Professional sport in the interviewees’ discourse**

In contrast to globalisation issues, professionalism was interpreted from a technical and managerial point of view. Discussion of ideology, at least in relation to professionalism and Algerian societal values, was absent or neglected in respondents’ discourse, because of the so-called universality of sport culture. This universality was defined in two principal ways; sport as an open arena for all cultures, where western culture is the most dominant; sport as a non-ideological and apolitical arena, not controlled by any exclusive worldview.

Because professional sport is accepted as a *natural order* in managing and organising the sport sector, then criticism expressed when reacting to globalisation questions, was absent from discussion in professionalism. Despite being assimilated to a determinate geography and value-set, (i.e. those of the west), professional sport was presented by a majority of respondents as compatible with both Algerian society and Islamic principles. The other point that needs to be reported is that all respondents shared the same view about the importance of the success of professional sport for the nation’s prestige. After ten years of violence and instability that affected all sectors, including sports (e.g. repeated and, according to respondents, ‘humiliating’ defeats of Algerian national football team, at regional and African level), professionalisation of sport is conceived as the solution for Algerian football to regain its lost prestige.

On questions related to professional sport, interviewees’ responses could be divided into three main groups:
1. *A group accepting professionalism, as it is established elsewhere, without reserve:*

This includes the majority of respondents namely the representatives of the National Liberation Front, the Rally for Culture and Democracy, the Sociologist, the Anthropologist. For them professional sport represents the highest model of organisation in sport, the importation and success of which in Algeria needs a financially and psychologically secure environment, which is absent at the moment. The adoption of this model could open doors to Algeria for further development on and off the pitch (e.g. tourism), and will help in the socialisation of young generations.

*There is no such Algerian spécificité, players are human beings, they need to be free, to be well managed and respected too (respect plays an important role). In Algeria players are not respected...we need to apply this model 100%... there will be no such Algerian specificity at least in sport, because sport is a universal culture. In the domain of sport it will be a monumental mistake to consider Algerian specificity. (Respondent from the Party for Culture and Democracy)*

Sport has moved from restrictive practices for leisure and recreation, to something big and general, with huge sums of money, a sport reputation that could have an impact on the nation’s reputation, in its position and recognition. In tourism the organisation of international events or a good performance in one of those competitions, is enough to attract big investment. *Sport which has before been isolated, has today become linked with political, economic, and cultural orders.* (Respondent from the National Liberation Front)

*Professionalism is synonymous with financial revenue. Transforming sport to a financial resource (...) Professionalism is a criterion that can be used to evaluate the political, economic and social system and development of any country (...) Professionalism is based on competition, which leads to technical development and which needs special equipment and infrastructures (the Anthropologist)*
2. The group accepting professionalism and acknowledging the hegemony of the existing model.

Professional sport is viewed in this perspective an imposed project by international sporting federations. It is based on western values, which its application in non-western societies although it is difficult to challenge in real terms, may result in future tensions between national and international federations. This view was expressed by the Political scientist. "... The practice of those [imposed] regulations in Africa could cause some resentment and conflictual situations".

3. The group accepting professionalism, and for whom resistance means equal opportunities.

This group incorporates the representative of Movement for Peace/ Islamic reformism and the Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy, who refused to talk about Algerian uniqueness in the adoption of western professional sports 'model'. For the former because it is a universal culture, and for the latter because simply it does not exist in practice (though he accepted that it may exist in fans' behaviours and cultures).

I do not believe in spécificité, there are some particularities that exist at the level of emotions linked to Nordic or Latin American cultures, but in practice, there are commonalities.
(The Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy)

For both respondents, resistance should aim to gain equal opportunities, which would allow small nations like Algeria the position of winning against developed nations, such as Germany (a reference to the famous 2-1 win of Algeria against Germany in 1982 World Cup).
We cannot create a model similar to Germany, but we can compete and win against Germany. (Respondent from Islamic reformism/Movement for Peace)

we want this to be confrontation between equals. Openness to those universal dimensions in sport means openness to the world. Sport is an important phenomenon in the third millennium. I do not think that its establishment will be reduced to fulfill recreational needs. Sport is an important element in political plans...small countries that succeed in marking their presence create a mobilisation at national level and consolidation of identity (The Director of the Algerian Olympic Academy).

In conclusion, the fundamental question the above groups and categories of response invite is why do interviewees accept professional sport, which is acknowledged as a western product with its values and mode of practice, virtually without reserve? In parallel with this, in the name of Algerian identity and Islamic principals, the same respondents (with different levels of intensity), expressed their worries and criticism with reference to globalisation. The values of which, according to the interviewees themselves, have the same ideological and geographical origin as professional sport, i.e. the west. Some aspects of (negative) globalisation; namely, individualism, secularism, and materialism were even presented as a serious threat for Algerian sovereignty and which, according to their discourse, is threatened by the hegemony of American and world banks “(controlled by Zionist forces)”. The only respondents who showed consistency in their view about globalisation on the one hand and professional sport on the other were the representative from the Rally for Culture and Democracy and the Political Scientist. The former accepted both concepts and systems, which he regards as essential conditions for development and progress and thus important elements for modernity. The latter expressed similar worries when talking about both the results of imposing global values and those of professional sports on other non-western cultures, which in his analysis may be the cause of future conflicts or clash between cultures.

In line with what has been written above, one can suggest that the discourse of criticism directed toward aspects of western ideology (namely, liberalism, individualism, secularism) or political and economic (banking) hegemony, under the
title of Algerian nationalism, and Islamic identity (particularly from a reformist point of view), exists alongside discourse of acceptance, assimilation and notion of the passive outsider. These tendencies were in relation to both globalisation processes and the professionalisation project for football. The question of compatibility or incompatibility of professional football (liberal/neo-liberal) values with Algerian society values and identities remains unasked, or not perceived as essential or a priority in the respondents’ discourse. One of the reasons that make the sports domain conceived, consciously or not, as a neutral field (an affair low in political salience, non-ideological and a value free system) in the minds of interviewees has to do with the national prestige that the adoption of professional sport could bring. From our understanding of respondents’ positions, this objective may be seen as more important than any other concerns associated with local distinctiveness. If this the case, the question we may ask is to what extent is this objective of national prestige a function of the previous ten years of political instability and violence which affected the image of Algeria?

Figure 6.2 provides a summary of different respondents’ discourses from this sample of political and intellectual strata in relation to professional sport, particularly football, as a mode of practice and management. In the Chapter which follows we will thus be in a position to make comparison with the value positions of respondents operating in the sports field.
Figure 6.2 Professional sport in respondents discourse

- Professional sport definitions
  - Management: Finance, planning, organisation; market economy, investment, quality development
  - Social factors: diminishing stress, role models; increasing solidarity
  - Nationalism: prestige, resolving identity problems
  - Cognitive level: a culture, an attitude

- Values
  - Western origin
  - Universal: Human experience
  - Ultra-liberal: materialism, individualism, search for glory and best results
  - Insuperior political affaire

- Hegemony
  - Accepted: Part of globalisation process, hegemony of liberalism; norm of management
  - Denounced: Exploitation, imposed form

- Local response
  - Assimilation: Importing, adopting total-acceptance
  - Specificity: rejected not-applicable
  - Resistance: explicitly rejected means equal opportunities

- Algeria
  - Negative: political instability, lack of communication, finance, infrastructure, planning, legislation, culture of professionalism
  - Uneven position: comparing to developed countries
  - Positive: openness toward change

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7.1 Introduction to micro-level analysis

The micro-level empirical study reported in this chapter teases out the views of Algeria policy from primary actors, in the football world in Algeria, in charge of implementing professionalism (club managers and major sponsors), about what they think is an appropriate and achievable model\(^1\) of professional football, for the Algerian case. It addresses the following central questions: is Algeria moving toward local version of the French administrative system, already adopted in other sectors, or will an Algerian model based on Algerian traditions and the particular circumstances of the Algerian system develop? Could alternatives to this outcome develop, such as the emergence of a new professional sports system based on new hybrid forms?

For the above purpose semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of football community starting from what could be viewed as the top level in the pyramid of the decision making process, namely:

- the Ministry of Sport and Youth, which represent the principal sporting authority in Algeria and was one of the initiator of the professionalisation project.
- the Algerian Football Federation (AFF), which represents the highest football authority in the country, and the sole representative of Algerian football community at international level;
- the National Football League (NFL) nominated by the AFF to administer the first and second divisions;
- the general secretary and administrators of an Algerian professional football club, USMA one of the biggest clubs in Algeria, the 2001-2002 champion;

\(^1\)The term model in this context is not used to refer to idealistic (universalist) structure (i.e. mathematical function) but it represents specific system or mode of organisation.
· Khalifa Group, the most rapidly growing private group in Africa and the Arab world, and one of the major sponsors of Algerian football clubs, and sports federations, the official sponsor of Olympic Marseilles, and one of the major investors in Bégle-Girond, French rugby team, whose administration is headed by the famous French actor Gerard Depardieu.

The method employed for the analysis of policy makers' views is discourse analysis (DA henceforth) based on data drawn from ten detailed qualitative interviews, with those directly involved with the implementation of the professionalised football system. It seeks to detect whether notions such as 'singularity', 'difference' and 'particularism', that incorporate positive views of Algerian national 'uniqueness', are present, together with notions of national independence, autonomy and authenticity (whether accepted or rejected), in respondents' discourse on professionalism in sport in general, and in their discourse on the Algerian government's project for professional sport in particular. The aim of DA here is to direct attention to the way a particular version or argument (e.g. professional football, sport business, government project for the professionalisation of sport) are designed in the respondents' language use while talking about 'we' (in group) and 'others' (out group). The use of 'we' may represent a specific institution or interest group, directly involved or not in the application of the professionalisation plan. It could designate also 'we' as Algerian in comparison to 'others', other nations or professional leagues. It seeks also to report respondents' conceptualisation (ambiguities, connections, and linkages) of the policy itself, and the stages it went through. In other words, the general respondents' position in relation to the formulated project and its implementation; who was responsible for formulating the project; which departments, or commissions have had the task of supervising the implementation of the project; what is the rationale behind, for instance, the selection and adaptation at some stage of the Swiss model. In addition to other issues which are absent in the literature.

The dissimilarity with the macro-level analysis consists in the use of NUDIST coding (see methodology chapter) to analysis the second set of interviews, in order to extract what we assume are the most significant categories or interviewees' perceptions (or

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2The group has recently collapsed due to financial and judicial problems.
discourses). Figure (7.1) sum up different discourses’ fragments that emerge from the analysis.

Figure 7.1 Discourse categories

### 7.2 Relevant themes/argumentation strategies addressed by respondents

#### 7.2.1 Professionalism

*The Algerian project for professional sport*

There was a disagreement between respondents about who had been the real initiator of the project. Some respondents (interviewees, National Football League, Director of National Teams, president of USMA Football Club) presented Derouaz (ex Minister of Sport and Youth) as the direct initiator of the project, or at least as being behind the idea of establishing a professional football league. Other, the USMA club president went even further by linking the failure of the project to the fact that Mr Derouaz had left office.
...Derouaz was the person responsible for the establishment (AVENEMENT) professionalism... (National Technical Director)

...The Minister designated a commission composed by representatives of the AFF [Algerian Football Federation]... elite sports clubs... representative of the central administration. (Ministry of Sport and Youth)

The Khalifa group representative (who is a well-known sports journalist) had strongly disapproved of the role of the government in the establishment of the project. For him it was the Groupement professionnel GPF, Professional Football Commission (established by a decision of the Ministry of Youth and Sport), which was the real initiator of the project and which according to the same respondent was an illegal institution. (for more information about the GPF see chapter four).

The use here of terms such as 'I think..., to my knowledge..., if my memory is good...' (see below quotations) reflects the position of the respondents' role as non-participants (outsiders) in decision making, or their lack of knowledge about the real decision makers. The representative of the Ministry of Youth and Sport, because of his position as representative of the government (authority), and the Director of National Teams, were (at least in relation to the initiators of the project) the only respondents talking from an insider point of view.

...The Minister designated a commission composed of a representative of the Algerian Football Federation... elite sports clubs... a representative of the central administration, both at level of sport administration, of legislation and the cabinet... add to that representatives of other sectors namely the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Internal Affairs and local authorities... (Ministry of Youth Sport)

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3 He was appointed by the Ministry Youth and Sport in order to set up a project on training academies for professional clubs.
No, no, it is not...we have to make some corrections here. Firstly, the project was not put down by the government...this is fundamental. The project was put down by what we call the GPF which had no legal basis (Khalifa Group).

As far as I know, it was a decision...of Mr Derouaz who was the Minister of Sports and Youth with members of his cabinet, and I think as well what we called the GPF... it was this team that worked on the project. (Director of National Teams).

The participation of the Algerian Football Federation?
I don't know, I can't confirm this (National Football league)

It was a working group set up by Mr Boubaha and Azzoug (from the Ministry of Youth and Sport) in charge of reflecting on [the development of] the professional football (Algerian Football Federation)

I think as far as I know it was a commission established by the ex-Ministry of Youth and Sport. It was an internal commission with the participation probably of two or three clubs administrators...I did not take part though (president of USMA Football Club)

It needs to be noted that, according to respondents, it is not appropriate to talk about 'professionalism' at the moment as a project but as a 'dossier' (a file or a proposal) that has been almost forgotten, or temporarily frozen for a variety of reasons, and which needs to be completely redefined. The Ministry of Youth and Sport talks about un projet mort-né......still at the proposed stage of a project. "It is a dossier sleeping somewhere, which we bring back occasionally". For the president of the USMA Football Club "...unfortunately, I said unfortunately, the ex-Minister has gone, and the project has experienced delays, actually has been forgotten". We have to acknowledge here the existence of internal and external inconsistency in the interviewees' discourse while talking about the project. For example, on the one hand the representative of the Ministry of Youth and Sport explicitly confirms that before the initiation of the project, there was though a long process of thinking and reflection. On the other hand, according to the representative of the Algerian Football
Federation, it was not debated but established as quickly as possible (in a rush). The other internal inconsistency concerns the representative of the Ministry of Youth and Sport. He affirms at the beginning of his answer that the project was well thought through and studied. The same respondent later criticises the same project which in his view neglects all the essential parameters needed for the successful implementation of any policy (e.g. the lack of formal judicial, financial, and legal means through which to promote the application of such a developed and complex project). The other incoherence is the use of terms ‘working group’ and ‘commission’ to indicate the group which was in charge of the initiation or formulation of the project. The use, by some respondents, of the term ‘working group’ gives an image of informality, irregularity of meeting and of a lesser importance for the project, while the concept of ‘commission’ by contrast reinforces the notion of the formality, rationality and continuity of the process.

**Definition of professionalism**

Professionalism was defined by respondents by reference to legal, financial, and managerial perspectives. Respondents talked about funding, financial resources, financial autonomy, sponsorship, and investment, which were regarded as being the only conditions to be met for the clubs to turn professional. They focused also on transparency in managing sports clubs which may be achieved with the existence of managerial abilities, knowledge, efficiency, and high performance both on and off the pitch, qualities which were seen as absent at the moment in Algeria.

The success of professionalism is linked to the country's economy and new types of management...clubs do not have the maturity...(Algerian Football Federation)

Professional football has to live from its own means...we need to put clubs in a situation where they will be obliged to look by themselves for different source of revenues...Clubs that are able to find sponsors could turn professional ...the other conditions are: supporters, effective infrastructures, competent managers and administrators, judicial status...the infrastructure does not exist at the moment (Director of National Teams)
...professional management in the domain of football...Professionalism, indeed in France...it is not the footballer who is professional, it is rather the club, the structure which is professional...all professional clubs are under commercial law... this is a judicial model which does not exist today in Algeria (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

Another point raised by the respondents, is the importance of legal or judicial systems including taxation, salaries and indemnity regulations, and commercial laws for the achievement of better managerial conduct. Because the professional player is an employee, and professional football is a (regular) job, then it must be treated like any other job, and thus be regulated by the existing legislation relating to work.

...it is people who are in charge of the club who decide themselves in favour of the passage toward professionalism, because exercising a football profession is a job, the same as any other job. We are footballers just as we might be an electrician, or a doctor or financial expert, and the laws that regulate the world of work exist. From the moment that you professionalise a club, the footballer is an employee of the club, therefore he is under work legislation which already exists and he does not need another law...It is this spirit that did not preside over the elaboration of the project...it is the club which decided at a certain moment to become professional...(National Football League)

The other elements that emerge from our reading of the respondents' definitions are as follow:

- professionalism is not only a profession or mode of management but a culture, or ethos (e.g. respondents' National Football League, Ministry of Youth and Sport).
- professional sport needs, in addition to financial resources an, appropriate infrastructure, training centres, accommodation, and stadia that can attract large supporters (e.g. National Football League, president of USMA football club)
'Other' models

The respondents refer to other established models of professional football in contrast (mirror-like) to the Algerian case. Other systems represent success, creativity, efficiency and rationality, while Algerian football system correspond to irrationality, corruption and irregularity. Some respondents even refused to compare Algeria and other countries in terms of budgets, TV revenue, facilities, and sport business. The same sort of debate about uneven development was evident while comparing the level of football in Algeria with other Arab countries (e.g. Tunisia, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia...). The other reasons for deficiency are lack of readiness to apply such managerial models in Algeria, owing to the absence also of professional culture and organisational stability, as well as the absence of a flexible legal commercial system that could offer the club the chance to apply the appropriate commercial status adopted in other sectors, which correspond to its existing means.

You cannot compare the incomparable. It is two completely different economies [Algerian and France]. (we find) two different modes of functioning in professional French football and Algerian football. (Khalifa Group)

I can talk a little bit about Tunisia. The Tunisian started putting down professionalism which involves only 4 well known clubs maximum; Esperance de Tunis, Etoile Sahel, Club Africain, Sfax...Those are clubs...I had the chance to visit Tunisia...Esperance de Tunis has all the means to become professional...a professional club that does not own a training centre, does not have a stadium for training, does not have its own infrastructure for competitions, accommodation, providing means, training camp...l'E.S Tunis has all those facilities...(Ministry of Youth and Sport)

Moreover, the French had established an extraordinary thing, which is the commercial company with a sporting object. It is the only commercial company in the world where it is forbidden for the stakeholders to share the
profit...You see how people think putting in place a notion of a company or an SAOS"\(^4\)...(Ministry of Youth and Sport)

we have nothing...to compare with English clubs like Manchester, which is in the stock market, or take a club like Barcelona, which is one of the richest clubs in the world, it has its own bank, 100,000 membership holders...It's another world (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

...therefore they have the criteria for professionalism, we have only to measure the efforts of those Arab countries...in twenty years of the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian history, look at their performance in the Asian games...three or four times practically they have been present in the World Cup [finals]...they have made a fantastic effort...in any case there is a professional culture which exists in their countries...and this from the beginning...our problem is that we have been dependent on the state since independence. (National Football League)

However, the discourse of respondents while talking about other models was not always that of fascination from an uneven position. Other expressions of 'banalisation' (normalisation or de-specification) or similarities were also used while discussing other systems, particularly in Arab and African countries, which for respondents are experiencing the same sort of slow development or 'non-amateur' [rather than professional] process, where only three or four clubs could afford to turn to professional. For this reason, the Swiss experience is seen as an appropriate model (at least in the eyes of some respondents) because of its combining of, professionalism and amateurism. This was the main reason for decision-makers in Algeria opting for such a model.

Switzerland has a system which is both professional and amateur...it is a system like any other system...(National League of Football)

\(^4\) Societe anonyme a objet sportive, for more details see chapter on Professional sport models, French system of professional sport.
I believe that our neighbours have the same judicial status as we do...they are neither professional players, nor amateur...It is ambiguous...we have a non-amateur football...what is the meaning of non-amateur?...usually non-amateur means non-professional, there shouldn't be any other explanation...it is a word game. I think that the Tunisians started by first of all structuring their big clubs, by offering them the necessary means, which have helped the emergence of an elite system. We can cite Tunisia where the biggest clubs are three or four in number, [the same as] in Morocco, in Egypt...(president of USMA football club)

The number of professional clubs in the Arab and African countries is very limited...they created a network that allow the transfer of African talents to Europe (Algerian Football Federation)

**Debated/imposed model**

There was an incoherence in respondents' discourse about whether or not a debate/consultation had taken place prior to the establishment of the project. While the representative of the Ministry of Youth and Sport and USMA Football Club talked about consensus and agreement, the president of the Algerian Football Federation speaks about "Masquarade", pseudo-debate and an 'imposed' project:

(...)*Masquarade* only 2 or 3 clubs that have the ability to apply the Ministry of Youth and Sport conditions (*Mouloudia* Algiers Club, USMA Football Club, *Youth Kabylie* Sport Club)

(...) imposed by the state...there was a pseudo-dialogue or consultation between the Ministry of Youth and Sport and clubs' presidents.(Algerian Football Federation)

This view was shared by the Director of national teams and the president of the National Football League, who both agreed that the project in the decision to turn professional was by decree rather than initiated by the will of clubs' administration. For the Director of national teams a consensus was not needed: "there was not a
consensus inside the football community...the Ministry of Youth and Sport did not need a consensus”. It was seen by him as the only way for the Ministry of Youth and Sport to force the clubs, at least in the long term, to look for their own sources of revenue. For the President of the League, the lack of debate was due to the absence of information regarding the content and the consequences that the application of the project's conditions, set by the Ministry of Youth and Sport, would have on the clubs' day to day management (only three clubs could fulfil those conditions)

...we have to be clear, for myself I start from the principle that professionalism must not be decreed. From the moment that the administration decides to 'professionalise' football, it cannot work...It is clear, it is a problem, as I said, of principle. (National Football league)

The general manager of USMA because of his position as being one of the participants in the debate that followed the initiation of the project, was one of the few respondents who gave more details about the facets discussed. He acknowledged the fact that almost all the representatives of the clubs agreed [though not without showing some reservation on issues such as the infrastructure, finance, period of transition] about the project in general. He insisted also that there was a lack of information or awareness within the football community regarding the content of the project.

...It is a very premature project, thus we discussed it in a rush at the level of the MYS, with the presence of clubs' presidents...nevertheless some of them had given their views, others were not able to pronounce...they were not aware or did not study the dossier, but I think there was nonetheless a large participation from the D1 clubs' presidents...(president of USMA football club)

This respondent insisted on his role as one of the most influential and active club presidents. The repeated use of pronoun ‘I’ is an indication of this role;

...personally I remember at that time I addressed this problem, by saying to them that it is the state’s role to take charge really and totally of this facet, at
least for a period of 5-7 years...at the beginning we talked about 3 years... I intervened in order to try to extend it...I asked for 7 years, we agreed at last about 5 years..5 years is just median, because we cannot realise infrastructures for example a stadium with 15000-20000 seats, even with the collaboration with local authorities (president of USMA football club)

Professional sport values

Respondents had chosen a business-oriented view while discussing professionalism, which for the majority of them was a logical consequence of Algerian society's openness toward a market economy. Hence, for some respondents the market economy, privatisation and the law of demand and supply should be the sole regulator of professional football, even in relation to the movement of players (who are referred to by some respondent as 'products'), or ticket price. Respondents insisted that it is the club's responsibility to determine the ticket price, not on the basis of social criteria (e.g. access, equality, social benefits...), but of economic demands (organisation of spectacle, art show etc), as it is applied in other European clubs (e.g. Barcelona, Manchester United...). As part of this process, the role of the Ministry of Sport would be limited to resolving ethical issues such as doping. This may be explained as respondents’ demand for the redefinition of hierarchical responsibilities, as part of an inclusive process for change in the Algerian football system.

...We cannot talk about balance or equity between clubs...it is the market economy that regularises professional football and not the MYS (its role is linked mainly to ethical issues e.g. doping)...Supporters unemployed or not have to pay for the ticket price and it is for the clubs themselves to decide about the price [this is not the significant source of revenue for the clubs]...the supporters of Real Madrid need to pay the price to watch Zine Dine Zidane.

(Director of National Teams)

The other point that emerges from our reading of the interviewees' answers is their passivity while considering issues such as the inequality between clubs that the application of the conditions for professional sport could provoke. It is accepted as being a norm or part of an economic logic. For that reason only clubs that are able to
find enough resources would have the right to turn to professional. What is worth noting here is that respondents did not question the consequences or the effects of such conditions on other, less affluent clubs.

The most important elements in professional sport business, according to the Khalifa Group spokesperson, are media coverage, the number of spectators and Internet visitors. Those are the points that raise the sponsors' interest in whether to invest in a club rather than 'journalistic' speculations. Bearing in mind that he is himself a journalist, his criticism might be perceived as a criticism of sport journalism in Algeria, particularly when it comes to football, which for the Director of the Khalifa sport section is not as professional (respecting ethical journalistic values) as it should be. Thus, the press is not considered by him as a reliable source of information. When asked about the impact Olympic Marseille's successive financial scandals might have on the image of Khalifa Group, the Khalifa representative claimed that

...this is your version of things, when you say that from an ethical point of view [Olympic Marseille] is not the most effective club. What makes the group become interested in the club? This is the question that you need to ask. What makes the group become interested in the team...is the club getting enough media coverage or not?, ...only numbers talk, while at a statistical level, Marseille has 26 games broadcast on Canal Plus, a club which receives the most playing exposure on TV...Marseille is one of the most visited internet sites after Manchester United. Furthermore Marseille is also the closest city to Algeria, where there is a big concentration of immigrants...From this point, despite scandals it is the club that has the biggest number of supporters in France. If you wanted to do a statistical analysis take simply France Football Magazine, the club that receives Marseille has always the highest level in terms of attendance. When Marseille plays at home tickets are sold out. Now if you talk about the scandals that Marseille is going through, you take all France Football magazine and on TV, Marseille bounced back constantly...and when

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5 Director of Sport section at Khalifa Group is a well known sport journalist for Algerian Radio, currently working at Khalifa TV, the first Algerian private channel.

6 Referring to my question on ethical problems that Olympic Marseille has been facing.
we talk about Marseille's scandals we don't talk about Khalifa. Khalifa is only their kit sponsor. (Khalifa Group)

The only respondents who acknowledge the existence of another aspect, a negative, dangerous and even 'perverted' side of professionalism, were the representative of the Ministry of Youth and Sport and the president of the National Football League. The former talked about the “infernal spiral” of professional business, referring to the economic crisis that some big clubs are going through due to the steady rise of players’ salaries. The latter criticises the misuse of the state's budget (money belonging to the Algerian people) by some clubs in paying high prices for the transfer of players. This was described as anti-professional and uneconomic.

It is an infernal spiral too, this the danger of (professional) activity, the perverting effects of professional activity...You are not learning something new if I tell you that Real Madrid is heavily in debt. If it was not for the intervention of the King himself who got involved to erase the debt (we won't hear today about Real)...It is still however (even today) in debt. When we see players like Zidane who cost 50 billion, I am asking myself where are we going?...this spiral is linked to professionalism... (Ministry of Youth and Sport).

... The money that the state gives is the money of Algerian people, it is unacceptable to give money to a club to be used to buy a player. On the other hand this money needs to be maintained and reoriented towards funding of projects...(National Football League)

7.2.2 Algerian identity

The use of terms such as "we are at point zero"...(Ministry of Youth and Sport) "we are behind"..."we have nothing super" (National Football League) tells us about the degree of negative feelings or views of respondents about Algerian football or Algerian society in general, in comparison to other advanced societies or even neighbouring countries (Tunisia and Morocco). The explicitly negative image or observations projected by respondents could be explained as part of a self criticism,
since most of the interviewees hold key roles in the decision making process. Their discourse includes also criticism of "other", "le milieu", (underworld, affairist) "club managers", viewed as the real cause of the crisis, who according to respondents lack both knowledge, and managerial abilities. More importantly they are resisting change, or the application of any new plan that could bring transparency to Algerian football. The discourse of 'we' and 'others' here could be explained as a will by respondents, particularly those at top level of decision making (Ministry of Youth and Sport, Algerian Football Federation, National Football League), to disconnect themselves from the cause of the crisis, which was in "reality" provoked by 'others'.

...clubs do not have the maturity...there are many people who belong to the 'milieu' who do not want the application of professionalism synonymous with transparency in the management of football clubs (paying taxes, the amount of players transfer...) which is absent at the moment. (Algerian Football Federation)

The other problem raised, is the socio-economic crisis that Algerian society is going through, which according to the representative of the Ministry of Youth and Sport makes the application of any rational or scientific plan difficult. For instance, selling any product or service in Algeria today is not based on criteria of quality, but rather on necessity. The same could be argued regarding sponsorship. The most important issue for the representative of Khalifa is not performance but the ability to satisfy the needs of different inter-regions, namely east, west and south (not one region without another).

...as we are based in big cities, as you know very well in Algeria, if you are helping the West, you are obliged to help the East (of Algeria), therefore we try to be present all over the nation. (Khalifa Group)

...I am not going to teach you something new if I told you that in Algeria today you do not need to have a marketing strategy to sell a bottle of oil...it is just an example...you can sell an Adidas ball...because it is a necessity...and not because it is good quality...it is just an image that could be applied to describe the activity...we are at point zero...(Ministry of Youth and Sport)
In this situation thinking about Algerian distinctiveness or exceptionalism is not an issue. Algeria has only one option, which is to copy other advanced models without reserve (despite the difference in value systems). The only positive aspect that Algerian society could provide at the moment is its adaptability, the capacity to import and than adopt any system in a short time. Algerian openness to the market economy here becomes an advantage.

I am sorry to tell you that ... I am going to be frank with you, in Algeria we can envisage everything...(Ministry of Youth and Sport)

... I think there is a fundamental aspect, we have only to copy what others have done before us, 30 years ago trying to gain time (...). Of course we are not going to start from scratch, we have only to adopt what other countries had already achieved. If they took 20 or 30 years to achieve their actual level, we can save at least 20 years...In other words 10 years trying to attain their level. (National Football League)

In any way this difference [between values] exists and will exist because those people [the occident] are in advance...thus for us we cannot wait, we have to begin ...is not going to be that easy, but we have to start...the most important step is to undertake something...to enter [this domain] without asking questions, we can or we cannot [professionalise]!! (USMA Football Club)

7.2.3 Development or 'modernity'?

Modernisation for respondents meant a suitable organisational system that take into consideration the criteria of performance, efficiency, effective management of both the club administration and infrastructures (stadiums, accommodation, training academy etc). Its success is linked to the availability of financial sources (e.g. sponsors, investors...), and more importantly a clear judicial system able to control players and managers revenues and tax rates. Interviewees suggested that the application of judicial procedures may help in the achievement of a better re-orientation and use of state revenues. The professionalisation of sport (football) is seen here as a vector for
development and qualitative evaluation of the football sector. If well managed, on a scientific basis, it will contribute to finding new means of finance and organisation and preparation of clubs for future disengagement from the state, which according to the respondent is inconceivable at the moment (during the transition period). The representative of the Ministry of Youth and Sport goes even further by stating that the professionalisation of sport is not only the concern of the Ministry of Youth and Sport or the Algerian Football Federation, but it is a project for society as whole (due to the role that it could play in the modernisation of Algerian society).

7.2.4 The role of the state

For respondents, the state (or local authority), that represents the principal actor and initiator of the (imposed) professional project, has to assume responsibility in financing elite clubs. It cannot discharge itself of its mission for two main reasons; a) the state’s involvement in the finance of sports clubs, particularly football, is a historical reality, which started with the independence of Algeria and the state still remains the main source of finance. This has caused, according to the National Football League president, an absence of professional cultures within football clubs in Algeria. This is not the case in other countries, where the state has invested heavily in sport. As a result most of the clubs today cannot fulfil the conditions set by the government in relation to professionalism, and without state subsidy they cannot survive. In other words, there is a situation of total dependency;

their countries...and this from the beginning...our problem is that we have existed while depending on the state starting from the beginning of independence. The sports associations are still expecting money from the state, thus there is not a professional culture...(National Football League)

b) The importance of sports competitions and media coverage for internal and international political affairs.

...Stade de France we cannot say that this means nothing. When the national anthem reverberates for 30 seconds and is broadcast by many TV channels in the world, we cannot say that it means nothing. It is for this reason that the
state is conscious of this phenomenon, and has never discharged itself of the responsibility. (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

The president of the National Football League claims that the role of the state has to be limited to the building of new facilities and controlling the clubs' budget. The other crucial task should be financing new development projects that could contribute in the modernisation of football (new facilities, technology, training programmes, and youth development programmes). As part of the openness of football toward the market economy it is the state's responsibility to protect investors' rights, and to set up adequate judicial and commercial systems.

...In other words state engagement needs to be reoriented towards the organisational domain, youth development, improving of training conditions...however the state cannot give money that will be used to buy players, it is anti-economic and anti-professional. (National League of Football)

The state is under the obligation to protect investors. Whether it is fans who invest, or it is a mixed, supporters-club, company, the state has to establish texts that allow the protection of investors, in the same manner as in other sectors...I think we have first to organise. If we don't put down a platform we cannot emancipate.(National League of Football)

On the other hand, the general manager of USMA Football Club argues that the disengagement of the state from football affairs is inevitable in the future. However, for the time being (a period of 5 to 7 years) it has to guarantee a sustainable financial support that is needed for the clubs' passage toward professionalism, by giving priority to elite clubs (e.g. in the use of facilities).

[It is] practically impossible for the club to honour [the conditions of professionalism] ...personally I remember at that time I addressed this problem, by saying to them that it is the state’s role to take charge really and totally of this facet, at least for a period of 5 to 7 years...(president of USMA football club)
According to the respondent from Khalifa, the actual responsibility of sponsors is to fill the vacuum that disengagement of the state from financing sports may provoke. In other words to take over the state's role and to contribute to the development of the sport movement.

...Khalifa participates throughout different actions in the development of the national sport movement. It compensates by its intervention for the state's disengagement from club management...when I talk about the disengagement of the state...you know that in sport eventually during the reform periods (...) intervention of the state was done in different ways, and today clubs have more and more difficulty surviving...(Khalifa Group)

7.2.5 Football business in Algeria

The business of sport in Algeria cannot be evaluated in terms of revenue, for many reasons, according to respondents. One of the reasons is the government's restriction in relation to sponsorship, which is limited to 3 million Algerian Dinars (34,767 EUR), and described by respondents as a masquerade, a joke, very modest,

"three million AD as the maximum amount, is a joke. What is 3 millions?...if we take the annual budget of a club in the first division it reaches 50 million AD (579,450 EUR). Today the amount of a contract for one player is 3 million AD, it is a joke" (Khalifa Group)

From the economic point of view the company either public or private has the ability to finance sports activities through sponsorship, but again the actual regulation allows [a club] to spend (invest) only a limited amount, 3 million AD. It is a moderate (very limited) platform or budget...it means nothing. (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

The other reasons can be summarised as follow:
Lack of investors' interest toward sport: investors do not need sporting events to improve their *image de marque*, brand image and commercial activities. This makes Khalifa Group, as implicitly suggested by its representative, an exception in the Algerian space. It shows the level of awareness that the group has regarding the social and national interests of sponsoring sport clubs at national level. One of the benefits, particularly for the clubs, is to overcome the financial crisis that state disengagement from sport may cause.

I am not able to tell what makes other private groups refuse to invest, or not to want to invest in sport. In terms of revenues you have advertising (publicity), again there isn't revenue in terms of money, but we have to say that the hesitation of other groups I cannot say...perhaps they have another strategy. For them sport is uninteresting. (Khalifa Group)

Absence of judicial and commercial legislation: that could control more efficiently the transfer of players, the use of sponsors' money, protecting investors' rights and clarifying clubs' commercial status. There is:

Ambiguity regarding the amount paid for the transfer of players...Absence of transparency in the management of the clubs (annual revenues and spending) (Technical Director of USMA's school of football)

Financial inequality between clubs: There are today only three or four clubs able to fulfil the conditions of professionalisation plan, set by the Ministry of Youth and Sport in partnership with the GPF, professional football commission and Algerian Football Federation. One of the main reasons for this is the imbalance that exists between the clubs in terms of revenue and expenditure, which is caused by the economic and political crisis that the country is going through (unemployment, insecurity...)

The political situation [insecurity] and a high rate of unemployment have affected the annual revenues of the club from gate receipts ...annual subscription that costs between 1500-5000AD (57.95 EUR) (secretary of USMA football club)
talents...there aren't any...even stadia revenues are very limited, with only 100AD (1.80 EUR) for the entry...the biggest revenue for big matches is 1.5 million old Dinars (17,571 EUR), if we deduce other expenses, the Algerian Football Federation, National Football League, security ...we have nothing...to compare with English clubs like Manchester, which is in the stock market, or take a club like Barcelona, which is one of the richest clubs in the world, it has its own bank, 100000 membership holders...It's another world (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

Most of the clubs are totally dependent, today (more than ever), on state subsidy and local authority financial support. The other sources of revenues (sponsoring, ticketing, advertising or broadcasting rights) represent only a small percentage of the clubs annual budget\(^7\). For instance, it is the National Football League the body responsible for negotiating broadcasting rights with the only terrestrial channel, and distributing it equally (not based on performance) amongst clubs in the first and second divisions. Regarding this issue the president of USMA claims that the clubs had not received what was owed to them for the last five years.

Criteria of distribution? At the moment there are none. In our opinion that money belongs to the club and needs to be returned to the clubs...the large majority of it. (National Football League)

The ordonnance 95-05 is still ambiguous...it says that the Algerian Football Federation negotiates on behalf of the clubs for TV rights...now it is the National Football League...however, the contracts exist but none of the clubs have received a single centime for about 5 years\(^8\) ...thus it is a domain that needs to be explored and to be put in place. (president of USMA Football Club)

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\(^7\) Estimated by the technical director of USMA at 140million AD (160,453 EUR).

\(^8\) USMA share is estimated at 110 million AD (120,921 EUR) (Le Matin, le dossier du Jeudi, 21.08.02).
Because of the above-mentioned problems, respondents are calling for reconsideration of existing sources of revenue. A part of their suggestions is the decision regarding ticket price, which according to them, should be the sole responsibility of the club and for which supporters, unemployed or not, would have to pay.

It is for the clubs themselves which entail to decide about the price [the most significant source of revenue for the clubs]...the supporters of Real Madrid need to pay the price to watch Zine Dine Zidane (Director of National Teams).

The same could be said about TV rights. A reconsideration of the National Football League status and the establishment of a new process of negotiation and co-operation between National Football League and the club presidents' association, with new criteria of revenue distribution are seen as other means for the clubs to take into consideration, in order to increase their revenues.

...thus it is a domain that needs to be explored and put in place. Myself I think to reach this level we need first to organise ourselves [as clubs presidents] in an association ...which should serve as a positive force that could bring a concrete benefits football, this in collaboration with the National League of Football...In other words this association shouldn't have to interfere in the work of the National Football League ...but will constitute a proposition force ... exactly, trying to defend all this and put in place mechanisms that enable us to protect the club image. It is the Clubs and the National Football League's task to establish more efficient means without affecting both clubs and the National League of Football. (president of USMA football club)

The other option would be to open up new doors for investment and to search for new sources of revenue, e.g. merchandising, or club membership. When asked about this issue the USMA president states that

the legislation is still ambiguous...one thing is certain in respect of merchandising at the level of the USMA, we are starting to improve...we gave the image of the club to a company specialised in sports articles which provided us with sports kits...in exchange we do not pay for any rights for
publicity or products sold by this firm...actually we do not have the control over our image, it does not exist in Africa...nor for the image of our players...(president of USMA Football club)

7.2.6 Social aspects

The role of sport as a social force, that could be reoriented toward the insertion and socialisation of youngsters and facilitating their access to sport facilities and mass participation in sports activities was neglected by respondents. For the Director of national teams or the USMA Football Club president, in the use of sports facilities has to be given the priority to the professional clubs. Moreover, The principal regulator of sport practice becomes the market economy and not social interests. This must be applied also to the clubs themselves, in the sense that the old system of state assistance (socialism) or equality between clubs is not applicable in the Algeria of 2002.

...Supporters, unemployed or not, have to pay the ticket price and the clubs themselves should decide about the price (which is the most significant source of revenue for the clubs)...(Director of National Teams)

Local authorities have to continue to financially support professional clubs...the use of the municipal infrastructure has to be the priority of professional clubs (…) we cannot talk about balance or equity between clubs...it is the market economy that regularises professional football and not the Ministry of Youth and Sport (its role is linked mainly to ethical issues e.g. doping) (Director of National Teams)

Not all respondents were unanimous about denying developmental projects of 'socialist' Algeria. The representative of the Ministry of Youth and Sport acknowledges however, the contribution of the previous era, characterised by a socialist orientation, in the development of sport. The Ministry Youth and Sport comparing 'socialist' Algeria and that of market economy suggests that
...Furthermore Algeria in the social domain in the 70s and 80s is not the Algeria of 2002. There were large fields everywhere where youngster could devote [their time] to football games. There was a natural training in football, but today the noose is tightening more and more. However, I can certify that young teams do not even have a pitch for training...those are the perverted effects...there are more clubs than available infrastructure, more players in the senior team than young teams. (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

7.2.7 Sport and football in Algeria

Organisation

The discourse of respondents regarding issues of the organisation of football in Algeria, can be described in two main terms. The first may be labelled as a traditional or conservative voice, accepting the existing hierarchy of football organisation, which is constituted of four main actors; the state (Ministry of Youth and Sport, local authorities...), the Algerian Football Federation (AFF), National Football League (NFL), which is the new institution in charge of professional football and clubs (sports associations). The answers of the National Football League spokesperson reflect this tendency. He insists on respecting the Algerian Football Federation as the central institution, solely responsible for managing football affairs. This is with respect to FIFA recommendations. The National Football League is not an autonomous department but constitutes another institution to which the Algerian Football Federation has delegated the task of managing the first and second divisions (establishing calendar, negotiation TV rights...). Although, for the president of the National Football League, this should be the role of the state, particularly now that Algerian football is moving toward professionalism, to establish an appropriate legislation and necessary conditions.

...you know that football structures, talking about the state first, the principle actor, or the institutions that administer football namely the Algerian Football Federation and the National League of Football; or the associations, each of those four football actors have not got the conditions that determine
professionalism...For example, the state has to revise a certain number of laws...This is the responsibility of the state. (National Football League)

The National Football League is one member of the Algerian Football Federation among others...its essential role is to manage football practice... the Football Federation has two major responsibilities; to reflect on existing football legislation...and to put in place new legislation if needed...managing also everything concerned with national teams... the role of the National Football League on the other hand is to manage first and second divisions (28 clubs) as well as cup competitions. (National Football League)

The second, is a progressivist voice, which calls for a redefinition of tasks and responsibilities. This voice is represented by the Director of National Teams and president of USMA. The former calls for the adoption of the French system of administration, limiting the role of Ministry of Youth and Sport to the resolving of ethical issues (e.g. doping). A separation of the Algerian Football Federation and National Football League in terms of tasks and responsibilities, where clubs should be more present in the decision making process, particularly regarding the issue of TV rights, was proposed as an alternative. Regarding this point, the Director of National Teams called for a distribution of TV rights between clubs based on performance rather than equality. This view was shared by the president of USMA football club, who suggests that a reorganisation of (professional) clubs in an association⁹, which works in 'co-operation' with National Football League, may contribute to better negotiation of clubs' interests. While, terms such as 'co-operation' and 'partnership' were often used by the respondent to show his good will, he refused the status quo and proposed a different form of administration for Algerian football, where the role of the clubs would be more important, and that of the National Football League limited to the setting of the calendar for league competitions

The French model needs to be adopted...the Algerian Football Federation is responsible for national teams and training [players, coaches and managers]...the National Football League works with club presidents...in the

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⁹ Defined a positive force, a structure that could suggest new ideas.
organisation of matches and the distribution of TV revenues... Distribution of revenues has to be based on performance rather than equality... the role of the National Football League is to be the judge, resolving different conflicts within the league... We cannot talk about balance or equity between clubs... it is the market economy that regularises professional football and not the Ministry of Youth and Sport (whose role is linked mainly to ethical issues e.g. doping) (Director of National Teams)

Myself I think to reach this level we need first to organise ourselves [club presidents] in an association... which would serve as a positive force that could bring concrete benefits for football, this would be in collaboration with the National Football League... In other words this association shouldn't have to interfere in the work of the National Football League... but we will constitute a regulating motor... to put in place mechanisms that enable us to protect the club image. It is the clubs' and the National Football League's task to establish more efficient means without affecting both clubs and the National Football League... the National Football League's role is to establish a calendar, designating matches, and that is all.... There are other subjects that we need to discuss... I think that sooner, we are going to discuss TV rights and issues of clubs' image... sports products... all that concerns the clubs... personally I would like the clubs and the National Football League to meet in order to talk about all those problems. (president of USMA football club)

Actual conditions of Algerian football

The image presented by the respondents about the actual conditions of football in Algeria, is negative. This negativeness which is ‘out there’ is provoked by ‘others’, les affairists, opportunists, who call themselves club managers, but who for respondents lack any notion of management, knowledge, awareness, and information about efficient administration and governance. Their main focus is the senior team and not the grass roots, and their primary goal is oriented toward football to the detriment of other sports. This negativeness is also presented as a result of the past mismanagement and state policy and other factors, namely inappropriate legislation, lack of finance, concentration of clubs in a limited geographical area and lack of
facilities (training academies, stadia, transport etc...). These conditions make the achievement of both elite sports and mass sports objectives set by the state, impossible to realise, resulting in an incompatibility between the project for professional sport and the reality of Algerian football. This project, according to these respondents, was imposed and did not take into consideration the conditions required for professionalism to take roots and which are available in other countries, but absent in Algeria.

No, no...there are first and second divisions. We don't need to use terms such as 'super' [league] particularly in our country...we have nothing 'super'. The National League is in charge of managing the practice of football. (National Football League)

training academy...I'E.S Tunis has all those facilities...when we talk about Algerian clubs, our model club today is JSK\textsuperscript{10}, it does not have even a field for training...to give an example. It has been strongest club since the independence, winning the most titles at national and international levels. A club which does not have its own facilities, which is dependent on state subsidy and other patronage...which hardly help the club to meet its financial costs. This is happening to the detriment of other sections and disciplines that have practically disappeared today...for example swimming, Judo...which produced successful athletes for the national team. (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

first...a sports club which does not own a stadium or have a structure at its disposition. A sports club which does not have proper finance...a sports clubs which does not have a judicial framework or the means of transports...has instead the status of an association like any other community association...we cannot discuss professionalism...or other aspects too... (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

\textsuperscript{10} Youth of Kabylie Football Club, one of the best club in Algeria and Africa.
We can not talk about professionalism...lack of financial resources, infrastructure problems, inability of administrators in day to day management of the club, particularly in relation to training centres; concentration of the clubs means for the A [senior] team; absence of managers who take charge of the interests and rights of players...the majority of administrators have limited knowledge and training in management...Algerian football is managed by 'AFFAIRISTES'...Ambiguity regarding the amount paid for the transfer of players...Young players from the training centre are not insured in the same manner as players in the A team\textsuperscript{11} (Technical Director of UMSA school of football)

Legislation

In terms of legislation the interviewees' responses focus on three different elements, which they see as the most important conditions for the professionalisation of football, and which in their view the 95-09 article (see appendix 1) on elite sport did not address. The first element is football clubs status and its relation to the Association. Football clubs today, despite the application of professionalism, still have the status of non-profit associations, with no legal identity separate from the club as whole (in where football is only one sport section among others).

\begin{quote}
The football section is not a moral/judicial, independent entity that is able to be professional by itself within an amateur association, this is fundamental (National Football League)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Today, in Algeria we employ the expression "professional" bearing in mind that neither players nor the clubs have a professional status. According to the law they are still non-profit bodies. (Khalifa Group)
\end{quote}

The second element concerns remuneration and the tax system. There is currently no legislation that regulates this facet. For the representative of the Ministry of Youth and Sport:
...we cannot talk about professionalism without talking about a taxation system or athletes' salaries...athletes today are employees...even if they are gaining colossal sums of money they do not declare their taxes...There isn't any imposition...no internal revenue service...there is nothing...it is an empty field...(Ministry of Youth and Sport)

The last element is the business football, particularly in relation to merchandising, the protection of clubs' image and TV rights.

It is difficult because the legislation is ambiguous in our country...it is not very strict with the number of importers and number of products circulating everywhere in the country...we are not able to resolve the problem...and the legislation is still ambiguous...The ordinance 95-05 is still ambiguous...it says that the Algerian Football Federation negotiates on behalf of the clubs for TV rights...now it is the National Football League...however, the contract exists but none of the clubs have received a single centime [penny] for about 5 years...thus it is a domain that needs to explored and put in order (USMA Football Club)

7.2.8 Football, politics and nationalism

For some respondents there is a close link between sports, politics and nationalism. Sport, in addition to being an economic vector, is also a powerful tool for social cohesion that could serve in diminishing social conflicts between classes and regions.

Football is a vector of unity between social classes and regions that needs to be taken into consideration...The raising of the Algerian flag during an international competition is an example of this unity (Director of National Teams)

The representative of USMA football club, who is in charge of the training academy, goes even further by accusing some groupes d'influences (political and financial
lobbies) of using their power or position to intervene for political considerations in the results of football matches, and even on deciding the season's champion.

Political decisions coming from above that impose match results [problem of violence in the Kabylie region] and decide which club would be the champion. (Technical Director of USMA training centre)

The political use of elite sport in general is not specific to Algeria or to the Third World, it also exists in 'developed' countries like France or the USA, where elite athletes are considered and treated like ambassadors of the state.

Moreover, with the French who are more or less well placed in this domain "the intervention" of the state is more significant than in Algeria, because high level sport is a an important social, political and economic sector. I do not deny this aspect, even in developed countries...the elite athlete in the USA, is an athlete who represents the state, has more advantages...he/she is given support in multiple forms. (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

The same respondent goes on by stating that

...by attracting a large number of spectators to the 5 July stadium, or stade de France we cannot say that it means nothing. When the national anthem reverberates for 30 seconds and is broadcasted by TV channels across the world, we cannot say that it means nothing. It is for this reason that the state is conscious of this phenomenon, and has never discharge itself [of its role]. (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

7.2.9 The Algerian economy

The Algerian economic crisis is seen as a major obstacle in the professionalisation of football in Algeria. One can add that a lack of private investment in sport is owing to the absence of financial and judicial guarantees by the state and the reduction of the

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12 Referring to the year 2002 events in Kabylie region
budget allocated to sport by the state. The latter is described as insufficient and ‘unfair’, for a society where the majority of population is under twenty five.

(...) even if it was initiated by the government in 1998. I cannot hide from you that the economic and political realities of the country are not favourable...It does not help us to discuss the matter in a rigorous and objective manner. (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

(...)The Algerian economy is having difficulties in taking off so a private investor will not come. He has to have political and economic insurance...I think it is not the moment yet [to attract investment]...probably in the near future. (President of USMA Football Club)

7.2.10 Football and 'mondialisation'

Globalisation here is defined sometimes as an imposed project (of economic liberalism, capitalism, and the market economy) such that Algeria, which is in a difficult economic position, has no choice is but to follow. Professionalisation here is seen as a logical consequence, or product of globalisation

There is a need today to reflect on the Ministry of Youth and Sport project and redefine professionalism, adopting FIFA recommendations, and the world market economy...I do not believe in Algerian specificity [the possibility that is of a form of professionalism specific to Algeria]. (Algerian Football Federation)

Algeria, which has accepted aspects the global order (IMF and WTC), cannot escape the application of FIFA rules even if it wishes to maintain Algerian ‘particularism’. Such an approach is explicitly refused. Even though the world order was linked, in interviewees' responses, to terms such as immorality, inequality, and was presented as a threat to the nation-state, and in relation to football seen as synonymous with consumerism, accepting world order was nonetheless the only way for Algeria to achieve progress, in terms of professional sport.
There are also the effects of *mondialisation*, the famous Bosman rule in Europe, if it permits few countries to benefit from (the new system), we have to say that it has reduced the problem of nationalism to a nothingness. It affects [reduces] a lot, the training of young talents. You can see that in the French team, which is supposedly the world champion, and is constituted of players playing almost all from abroad. When you see a Nigerian playing with Poland, I ask myself questions. How long can this go on? To the detriment of whom? ... *Mondialisation* on the social and ethical level could bring also lot of positive things, but regarding moral values, it could have a major effect, particularly in terms of training. This is the problem. The phenomenon is there ...Those are the questions that we need to ask (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

For the representative of the National Football League, the assimilation of global values (including western values of professionalism) is the only means by which to move away from the 'archaic' system that the country is witnessing in different domains.

...the primary stage is to look for a model...but Algeria enters into *mondialisation*, and has just signed a partnership with the European Union...Algeria will soon join the WTO, ...*international rules which are going to be imposed on us*, while we are preparing ourselves to apply them gradually...we have to do it, or we are going to remain in an archaic system ...it is the same for industry (National Football League)

### 7.3 Discourse fragments

We can summarise interviewees’ discourse particularly in relation to utterances\(^\text{13}\) such as professionalism, the Algerian context, and globalisation/localisation in the following ways:

1. **Discourse of assimilation of global professional sport values**: for a majority of respondents there is no other alternative for Algerian football in order to achieve

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\(^{13}\) Some of utterances are repeated to illustrate different issues.
progress but to apply other models of professional football systems and values, that have been formed in developed countries. Thus, the Swiss model for its specificity in combining amateurism and professionalism, and the French model for its flexible commercial status for professional clubs and organisations, are conceived as suitable models for the Algerian case.

The French model needs to be adopted...the Algerian Football Federation is responsible for national teams and training [players, coaches and managers]...the National Football League works with club presidents...in the organisation of matches and the distribution of TV revenues...Distribution of revenues has to be based on performance rather than equality...the role of the National Football League is to be the judge, resolving different conflicts within the league...We cannot talk about balance or equity between clubs...it is the market economy that regularises professional football and not the Ministry of Youth and Sport (whose role is linked mainly to ethical issues e.g. doping) (Director of National Teams)

2. Discourse of negative self/self criticism (in-group); this is evident in comparing Algerian society to other societies, particularly in relation to the application of professional sports systems, characterised by inferior economic and social status, problematic administration and organisation level. One can also add, a lack of managerial ability, creativity, transparency and absence of qualitative evaluation. In other words, the logistics needed to apply such a professional football system of management and competition.

No, no...there are first and second divisions. We don't need to use terms such as 'super' [league] particularly in our country...we have nothing 'super'. The national League is in charge of managing the practice of football. (National Football Club)

3. Discourse of negative others (out-group): others here are represented as pseudo managers who are in charge of football clubs, le milieu, underworld, affairists, corrupted, who lack knowledge and are not aware of the modern/scientific, and professional type of management. The term 'others' also represent the state, which
according to the respondents, has not invested enough in sport (due to the political crisis that the country is going through) in terms of facilities or the creation of better environment (culture, spirit) for the application of a system of professional football. The state, according to interviewees, has imposed the new professional system upon clubs, without taking into account financial and legal realities, and is therefore, held responsible for the failure of the project, and is seen as having the responsibility to find new solutions (re-conceptualisation of the project).

...you know that football structures, talking about the state first, the principal actor, or the institutions that administer football namely the Algerian Football Federation and the National Football League; or the associations, each of those four football actors have not got the conditions that determine professionalism...For example, the state has to revise a certain number of laws...This is the responsibility of the state. (National Football League)

4. Discourse of positive others (out-group); others represent professional models or football management in developed and some third world countries, where scientific management systems, professional culture, creativity, adequate legislation, facilities, exist, are valued (and perhaps ‘idealised’) by some interviewees.

we have nothing...to compare with English clubs like Manchester, which is on the stock market, or take a club like Barcelona, which is one of the richest club in the world, it has its own bank, 100,000 membership holders...It's another world (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

5. Discourse of normalisation/de-specification (out-group); this is evident, particularly in relation to “professional” systems in Africa, which for some respondents are all going through the same level of slow development and the experience of non-amateurism rather than professionalism.

I believe that our neighbours have the same judicial status as we do...they are neither professional players, nor amateur...It is ambiguous...we have a non-amateur football...what is the meaning of non-amateur?...usually non-amateur means non-professional, there shouldn’t be any other explanation...it is a word
game. I think that the Tunisians started by first of all structuring their big clubs, by offering them the necessary means, which have helped the emergence of an elite system. We can cite Tunisia where the biggest clubs are three or four in number, [the same as] in Morocco, in Egypt... (USMA Football Club)

6. Discourse of outsiders (in group/out group), most interviewees chose to speak from an outsider point of view, as not part of decision-making, particularly in relation to the implementation of the professionalisation of football, unaware also of the real initiators of the project, thus they are not responsible for the failure of the project.

As far as I know, it was a decision... of Mr Derouaz who was the Minister of Sports and Youth with members of his cabinet, and I think as well what we called the GPF... was this team that worked on the project. (Director of National Teams)

The participation of the Algerian Football Federation? I don't know, I can't confirm this (National Football League)

7. Discourse of positive specificity/distinctiveness (in-group in relation to out-group); this discourse promotes the distinctiveness of the Algerian compared to other nations, or its relation with the new world order and particularly the globalisation of professional sports systems, characterised by its ability to absorb (copy) other models (already established and applied in other nations) in a short time.

... I think there is a fundamental aspect, we have only to copy what others have done before us, 30 years ago trying to gain time(...). Of course we are not going to start from scratch, we have only to adopt what other countries had already achieved. If they took 20 or 30 years to achieve their actual level, we can save at least 20 years... In other words 10 years trying to attain their level. (National Football League)

8. Discourse of liberalism; this accepts the market economy as the only norm that is needed to regulate the professional football business, where football players are
defined as ‘products’, and financial inequality between rich and non rich clubs is accepted. Values such as equality between clubs, equal distribution of revenue, social integration, social welfare, solidarity are not mentioned. Media (TV, Internet) that diffuse football matches (e.g. the Champions League) to millions of viewers, is considered a powerful tool that transforms football into a lucrative business attracting considerable (questionable) sums of sponsors’ money. Among them representative from Khalifa, for whose the media is the most powerful factor for a private group in deciding whether to invest or not in a professional club.

It is for the clubs themselves to decide about the price [the most significant source of revenue for the clubs]...the supporters of Real Madrid need to pay the price to watch Zine Dine Zidane .....Supporters, unemployed or not, have to pay for the ticket price and the clubs themselves should decide about the price (which is the most significant source of revenue for the clubs)...(Director of National Teams)

9. Discourse of good governance- this incorporates two sub-themes:

a) transparency and legality in the application of working legislation, judicial and commercial law-transparency in terms of control of clubs budgets, reorientation of state funding to the development of football and denunciation of corruption.

b) modernisation: this is characterised, according to respondents, by management efficiency, rationality, scientific procedures, better facilities for training.

...we can not talk about professionalism without talking about a taxation system or athletes’ salaries ...athlete today are employees...even if they are gaining colossal sums of money they do not declare their taxes...There isn't any imposition...no internal revenue service...there is nothing...it is an empty field...first...a sport club which does not own a stadium or has a structure in its disposition. A sport club which does not have proper finance...a sport club which does not have a judicial framework or the means of transport...has instead the status of an association like any other community associations ...we
cannot discuss professionalism...nor other aspects too... (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

... The money that the state gives is the money of the Algerian people, it is unacceptable to give money to a club to be used to buy a player. On other hand this money needs to be maintained and reoriented towards funding of projects...(National Football League)

10. Discourse of dependency: disengagement of the state from financing football is unthinkable, particularly now that most of clubs are going through economic crisis.

from the beginning...our problem is that we have existed while depending on the state starting from the beginning of independence. The sports associations are still expecting money from the state, thus there is not a professional culture...(National Football League)

11. Discourse of nationalism: respondents insist on the importance of sports particularly football for national unity, reducing conflicts between social classes/regions and international prestige. In relation to globalisation issues, mondialisation, in the form of global interconnectedness and migration, encouraged by the establishment of the Bosman law, is presented as a threat to nationalism, national borders and considerations (e.g. the phenomenon of a Nigerian playing for Poland?).

...by attracting a large number of spectators to the 5 July stadium, or Stade de France we cannot say that it means nothing. When the national anthem reverberates for 30 seconds and is broadcast by TV channels across the world, we cannot say that it means nothing. It is for this reason that the state is conscious of this phenomenon, and has never discharge itself [of its role]. (Ministry of Youth and Sport)

12. Discourse of change: change was expressed by respondents as changing legislation, changing tasks and responsibilities (e.g. negotiation of TV revenues, the state's role), redefining priorities (e.g. in relation to elite sport and sports for all),
changing structures (e.g. the set up of an association of football clubs presidents as a new force).

Myself I think to reach this level we need first to organise ourselves [club presidents] in an association ...which would serve as a positive force that could bring concrete benefits for football, this would be in collaboration with the National Football League...In other words this association should not have to interfere in the work of the National Football League...but will constitute a regulating motor... to put in place mechanisms that enable us to protect the club image. It is the clubs’ and the National Football League task to establish more efficient means without affecting both clubs and the National Football League ...the National Football League’s role is to establish a calendar, designating matches, and that is all.... There are other subjects that we need to discuss...I think that sooner, we are going to discuss TV rights and issues of clubs’ image...sports products

13. Discourse of nostalgia; nostalgia for the past socialist era, of sporting successes, and development projects-Algeria in the 1970s and the 1980s where the increase in the accessibility to sports facilities, and mass participation was the official policy of the party state is viewed, in comparison to the Algeria of 2002 of uncontrolled liberalism, social and economic crisis, in addition to political violence, corruption and marginalisation.

...Furthermore Algeria in the social domain in the 70s and 80s is not Algeria of 2002. There were large fields everywhere where youngster could devote [their time] to football games. There was a natural training in football, but today the noose is tightening more and more. However, I can assure you that young teams do not have even a pitch for training...those are the perverted effects...there are more clubs than available infrastructure, more players in the senior team than young teams. (Ministry of Youth and Sport)
7.4 Conclusion

To conclude, we can argue that issues such as those of tradition or of a belief in adopting of professional sport (historically a western product), are neglected or viewed as non-essential, even in the name of Algerian particularism and national identity. The local Algerian context was presented as a negative reflection of other nations’ success, particularly those in developed countries (such as France or Spain). This is evident at all levels, namely in the application of professional system, or at the level of creativity, modernisation, sense of organisation, and managerial culture. In Algeria, sport in general, and football for our case study, is still managed according to regionalist (intra-Algerian) considerations, a pragmatic and improvised approach (e.g. the decision to suspend relegation system for two years), based also on top-down (state) decisions and on a non-scientific (archaic, outdated, traditional) basis. For respondents, the crisis of the national football system is simply a reflection of the Algerian society’ multiple and compound crisis.

Professional sport is conceived as a ‘secular’ domain that needs to be regulated just like any other economic sector by market, with managerial and scientific (non-archaic, rational) standards, where the values of market economy (liberalism, profit maximisation) are among its most important facets. Thus, accepting the application of ‘professional’ football both as reflecting a set of values and as a mode of organisation, requires a redefinition of the state’s objectives in relation to national sport, by giving priority to elite sports, sometimes to the detriment of mass sport (e.g. in the use of facilities). In terms of the football business it means also a redefinition of the conditions for clubs to turn to professional, maximising other sources of revenue (merchandising, sponsoring, gate receipts) and a reconsideration of the National Football League criteria for the distribution of broadcasting rights. The latter should be based on performance and not on old socialist values of equality, state dirigisme, or that of Algerian ‘collective solidarity’. This implies a revision of the state’s role (e.g. limitation of state power, horizontal subsidiary, and de-centralisation), and a reconsideration of the clubs’ position in terms of decision-making so that they might represent a new ‘positive’ force, within the national football structure. Moreover, the success of professional sport depends on favourable economic, cultural and social
conditions; on good governance based on rational and scientific measures (an appropriate judicial system) and more importantly on a better (controlled) use or reorientation of existing funds for the development of football.

The position of Algeria, accepted by respondents' themselves as that of a peripheral country at least in the world of football, leaves for the Algerian football authorities no alternative, but to follow the path of professionalisation of sport, already adopted by other nations, including neighbouring, Arab, Islamic and African countries, without asking questions about the possessiveness/or negativeness that such a project may have on the future of football. This means, accepting a position of passive conduit or 'participant outsiders', accepting both the positive and negative (perverted) sides of mondialisation (e.g. a decrease in national considerations, and the growth of ultra-liberalism, etc). If we want to give a 'rational' explanation of respondents' discourse based on previous studies (which is however not the general aim of our study), it can be stated that the absorption of cultural flows, namely of professionalised football, expressed in the interviewees' answers, is in line with Hannerz's (1991) first scenario of cultural flows or global homogenisation, which is that of 'saturation'. In the saturation case, the peripheral culture gradually assimilates more and more of the imported meanings and forms, until it becomes indistinguishable from the centre. In contrast to a scenario of cultural corruption or a process de-assimilation, where the metropolitan or the centre's cultural forms imported in the first phase will no longer be recognised. Thus, for the Algerian case and from the respondents' perspective, the question that we need to ask in relation to the application of the professional system, is not whether or not the system is compatible with Algerian societal and cultural specificity, traditions and belief systems. The real questions are economic and managerial, not cultural; they are questions of whether the system is appropriate now that Algeria is going through economic crisis, and if it is applicable to a national football system characterised by a lack of human and financial resources and adequate environment). In this case a hybrid\(^4\) system that absorbs other 'positive' experiences in the domain (including aspect of the French system) and combines amateurism and professionalism (as in the Swiss system) is seen as an acceptable alternative or starting point for the Algerian case.

\(^4\)Hybrid not in the postcolonial sense of combining tradition and modernity.
A final point that should be made, however. Changes in the interview timing, for example holding interviews after the World Cup and not before, might have resulted in different analysis outcomes and discourse fragments. A discourse of equality between what is perceived in the globalisation literature as 'core', 'semi-periphery' and 'periphery', might have been evident following Korean, Japanese, Turkish and Senegalese successes. Discourse of cultural specificity in adapting cultural flows, which Maguire (1999) defines as part of global process of 'diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties', might have been reflected in the respondents' answers. All this remind us that generalising from the interview analysis results about Algerian space and time should be done with appropriate caution and by reference to context.
8.1 Introduction

The study's results and the observations generated are defined by both global and local approaches. It is divided respectively between studying the circulation of cultural meanings, ideologies at a global level (e.g. professional sports systems in western and non-western cultures) and analysing the way that these flows (specifically those associated with professional football) are perceived, the way they are responded to, and re-contextualised in Algeria's political, academic and sport spheres. This involves depicting pluralistic cultural identifications and independent reflections of the global and local nexus, with the rejection of a notion of a "pensée unique", and a unilateral mode of thinking about 'self' (Algerian) and 'others'.

8.2 The theoretical approach

Throughout the process of our critical reading and analysis of the theory of globalisation that encompasses discussions on modernity and nation state, or concepts such as Americanisation and hegemony, our concern has been to move out of the framework of western thought and its Eurocentric values, without falling into hyper-localism and provincialism. In this respect, the approach of the thesis is based on the concept of local modernity, which searches for new readings of (western) modernity, according to the historical practice of the non-occidental countries. It looks back to pre-colonial and colonial history, searching for new cultural references to understand the post-colonial Algerian nation-state and the development of a sporting movement, based on nationalist and populist values, and subsequently the contemporary attempt to develop a market-driven approach in sport and other aspects of civil society. The local modernity approach is aimed also at providing a new perspective on pre-established concepts, such as nation, modernity and sport, which can help to gain an "intellectual freedom" (not total independence) from the dominant "pensée" of the occident. This approach thus contributes to the de-universalisation of the western metanarrative (Lyotard, 1993). It is this thinking that informs the notion of
postmodernism, a postmodernism that recognises fragmentation, heterogeneity and particularism and which takes into consideration 'others'— the periphery — as active participants in a globalisation process. This approach is seen as a useful framework to explain change in Algerian society, ideologically and politically. The transformation of the state's political ideology based on nationalist, socialist and populist ideals to what could be defined as 'democratic' and market-driven, has had an impact on the state's sport policy, particularly in relation to the latest project on professional football.

We have to distinguish here between the 'sociology of postmodernism', synonymous with pluralism and self-determination, and 'post-modern sociology' which advocates hyper-reality and relativism. We can argue that for the purpose of our study, a non-western interpretation of post-modernity in line with Sardar's (1998) approach on local authenticity and autonomy and Akbar (1996) on postmodernism and Islam, in addition to other post-colonial authors (Hannerz 1991; King 1991; Parekh 1994; Featherstone 1995; Hall 1991; Abu-laghud 1993; Göle 1997; Hesmondhalgh 1998; Said 1994), has given an insight to our study's philosophical, theoretical and political positions. It respects the notions of multicultural pluralism and universal equality between west/non-west, occident/non-occident. It accepts also aspects of the western paradigm, that is, recognises some aspects of progress and technological advance, as well as the openness and humanism of western postmodernism. However, it rejects the imposed supremacy of western modernism and the cynicism (à la Baudrillard) of western postmodernism.

The other point worth considering while studying globalisation and the diffusion (re-interpretation) of sport — the heritage of French colonialism — in Algerian space and time, is the history of Algerian nationalism and nation-state building, within a specific geographical setting (within the Maghreb, Arab nation, Mediterranean and Islamic worlds). The duality of the Algerian conception concerning identity and origins, situated between Islamo-Arab and Berber cultures and Mediterranean links, has resulted in a hybrid sense of belonging that is a mixture of oriental culture and an "imposed" European model of nation-state and modernity. The hybridity here could be seen as a 'positive' characteristic of a post-colonial society, celebrated and privileged as a kind of superior cultural intelligence (Hoogvelt, 2001), through the
advantage of "in-betweeness". In other terms, it is the product of cross-cultural interchange and communication which provides a 'third space', a freedom from total submission to either an ethnocentric or an exclusive western set of cultural values (Bhabha, 1990).

Today, the new world system characterised by the global diffusion of western liberalism and the widespread of multinationals, have together created contradictory imperatives for all ex-colonised countries, such that today Arab nations (states and societies) are hesitating between; (a) the options of political entity (b) the western model of the nation-state, which takes pan-Arab (secular) identity as the basis of its unity; or c) that of a larger entity that incorporates the whole Islamic community, or what is known in Islamic discourse as the "Umma". In Algeria, as a result of the penetration of the values and norms of the world economy into the national economy and the loss of state capacity for ideological mobilisation, a process of individual affirmation and autonomy has emerged. Algerian society has become divided into different social, political and ideological groups: a laique wing calling for an assimilation of (western) values of enlightenment and progress; a reformist wing rejecting (western) liberalism, as a source of social exclusion, and looking instead for other existential references (essentially through Islam); and a third group of conservative (economists) within the state sphere, which has opted for technological assimilation but also stresses the necessity of dealing with the west through 'hard bargaining'. These could be viewed as multiple (though not mutually exclusive) Algerian responses towards globalisation characterised by 'assimilation', 'resistance', and 'integration'. It is within these three 'meso' categories that the author has sought to understand the local conceptualisation of interviewees in relation to the values and system associated with professional football, of which the application in Algeria may be viewed as the product of the global and local nexus. This nexus represents the direct and indirect reaction to growing media exposure and the cultural flows transmitted by satellite TV channels and the impact that the global football industry is having on local football culture (on and off the pitch). This is a consequence also of the economic crisis, which has resulted from the steady drop in oil prices on the international market, the failure of development projects and the weight of heavy foreign debts.
These have forced succeeding governments to revise their public expenditures plans, in different sectors, including sport, and to re-consider their socialist (economic and social) orientations within a general framework of structural adjustment, imposed by the IMF.

8.3 The methodological approach

Taking into account the points discussed above, the use of a constructivist research paradigm, which stresses a) the need to look at 'reality' as socially constructed or framed by competing/interacting discourses; and b) which deals literally with different world versions or different 'remakings' of the world, was deemed appropriate to the aims of this study. In respect of post-modern social research which searches for self (a form of critical pluralism; Scheurisch, 1997), discourse analysis was used in this thesis to analyse interviewees' responses, on the one hand, to globalisation issues, and on the other, to the formulation and implementation of the government's project for professional sport. The aim was, first, to discover how the designation of 'self' (locality, Algerianess), and 'others' (global forces, the West), by Algerians from different intellectual, ideological or political backgrounds, operates. Secondly, the study sought an understanding of the position of interviewees about professional sport, which is considered in the literature to be a global and dominantly western product. In other words, the study aimed to evaluate whether sport (specifically professional football) is regarded as a defining feature of the 'other'. Therefore, for the purpose of this research discourse analysis could be regarded as part of the general deconstructivist research strategy in relation to sport and local modernity, which attempts to reformulate or redefine globalisation and professional sport, according to local (interviewees') views or accounts. It is a mirror, which aims to detect the homogeneity/heterogeneity, dichotomy (doubleness, betweeness and hybridity) and even ambiguity existing in the designation of interviewees of themselves (we, I, us and our) and others (global forces, multinationals, the West, IMF, international sports organisations etc...). Additionally, the research sought to discover whether their perception of 'we' and 'others' has or does not have any impact on their positions concerning professional sports (practice and values), or by contrast, it is viewed as a neutral field, relatively unaffected by local positioning toward the global order.
Chapter 8 Conclusions

From our reading of discourse analysis literature, critical discourse analysis (CDA) was specifically seen to be consonant with our epistemological approach, which sought a (re) construction of the perception and attitudes of representatives of different political and ideological groups (broadly representing strategies of assimilation, reformism and integration) about their ‘group feeling’ and solidarity, and about ‘others’, (sometimes members of the same national context but from different political orientations) or members of out-group. The study of Wodak et al (1999) on the discursive construction of national identity and Wood and Kroger’s (2000) warrantability protocol were used as a guidance (rather than a ‘model’) to construct meanings (and not imposed interpretation) of local ‘singularity’, in contrast to the notion of ‘the global order’. Furthermore it should be noted that the discourse analysis used in this thesis does not go as far as looking at the source of meaning or mental conception of knowledge and ‘underlying reality’ (Henry, 2002) and the ‘why’ of language used, as in Foucauldian tradition\(^1\), but looking more at how this conception was produced in the discourse and in the specific context (the ‘how’ of language used to answer interview questions).

8.4 Results of the analysis

The general observations, which emerge from our analysis of interviewees’ discourse, suggest that the general view of respondents relative to Algerian cultural ‘exceptionalism’ (distinctiveness) is, with different levels of intensity, one of general scepticism, self-criticism and even denial. This is both in relation to the position of Algeria in the new world order, and in relation to the implementation of professional football. In relation to the elaboration and application of the professional football project, the discourse of criticism directed toward aspects of western ideology (namely, liberalism, individualism, secularism, or political and economic hegemony) under the form of Algerian nationalism and Islamic identity (particularly from a reformist point of view) exists alongside discourses of acceptance, assimilation and a notion of the ‘passive outsider’.

\(^1\) To use Foucault terms, all societies arrogate the power of the sign to themselves through a system of collective mapping, a system of exclusion, limitations and appropriation...that imposes strategies to assimilate all adversarial discourses (Erickson, 1998:9).
The question of compatibility or incompatibility of professional football (liberal/neo-liberal) values with Algerian society and identities remains unasked, or is not perceived as essential or a priority in the respondents’ discourse.

In the discourse of those from the political and academic spheres representing different world views, we found that the discourse of ‘we’-Algerian identity- or that of the reconstruction of the society’s lost identity and integrity, were present, or explicitly referred to, while discussing educational, financial and cultural questions. However it was completely rejected, put aside or simply absent in the sport domain, which is treated by most respondents as a-political, a non-ideological, universal and value-free system. In the same vein professional football is conceived as a ‘secular’ domain that needs to be regulated, as with any other economic sector, by market rules, managerial and scientific, modern, rational, standards, where the values of the market economy (competitiveness, market forces) represent key facets. Because professional sport was explained as being an integral product of the globalisation process, it is therefore a ‘natural’ model for management, in which progress as well as other aspects of modernity in sport, namely economic profit and nation-state building can be achieved.

One can argue that the transformation of football from amateurism to ‘non-amateurism’ to use the concept employed by some respondents, or from the state’s (étatique) legalist model to that of a professional system\(^2\), coincided with the transformation of Algerian society, or at least, of the state’s political and economic ideology, based on socialism, populism and the welfare state system, to one based on liberalism and market economy. The latter is conceived as the sine qua non condition for ‘progress’ which will facilitate the integration of Algeria into the new world order in political, economic, industrial and financial levels, after more than ten years of absence from the international arena, due to the internal political violence. More than

\(^2\) It went also through an intermediate stage, which is that of le model de l’entreprise (Bouchet and Kaach 2002, Chehat 1994), where the club is under the tutelage of the public company that it represents (see chapter 3 of the thesis).
this, because of the perceived failure of 20 years of populism and socialism, the market economy is today equated, at least at a psychological level, with democracy and freedom (Ellyas, 1996).

In terms of professional football, democracy and liberalism (according to respondents' discourse) mean opening the government project up to a national debate, where political parties, sponsors, clubs managers, and players should participate. It consists also of (1) a revision of state objectives in relation to national sport, by giving priority to elite sports, (2) a redefinition of the conditions for clubs to turn professional, and to maximise their sources of revenue (specifically merchandising, sponsoring, media income and gate receipts). Furthermore, it is argued that there should be a re-consideration of the National Football League criteria concerning the distribution of broadcasting rights, which according to respondents should be based on performance and not on old socialists values of equality, state dirigisme or that of Algerian collective 'solidarity'. This implies a revision of the state's role (i.e. limitation of state power, horizontal subsidiarity, and de-centralisation), and a reconsideration of the clubs' position in terms of decision-making (e.g. establishing club presidents association as new 'positive' force). ‘Resistance’ in a sense of rejecting, challenging or even transforming or re-adapting a professional football model to the Algerian context is not envisaged. The resistance expressed was is the promotion of equal opportunities to allow third world countries to win and compete at international level, which could contribute to the regaining of international prestige, and the resolution of internal political problems, and cultural and social crisis.

Building on both the findings of the analysis and research's theoretical approaches enables us to move further in our research claim. The study reveals that discussing globalisation processes, as unidirectional (i.e. flows from core to periphery), and as an exclusively western-eurocentic project, requires critical reappraisal. Globalisation, in a form of homogeneous world system, or indeed globalism, which is defined as the diffusion (imposition) of western values of progress and enlightenment, namely, liberalism, modernity, and the nation-state, which is explained also as the (one) universal path for development, which others (non-western, non-rich, and the periphery) should follow, has been faced by severe criticism by philosophers and sociologists, both in the west and other cultures. There are no such thing 'out there'
as a unique, a universal model of modernity and liberalism. Those values are understood and applied differently in occidental and non-occidental nations. Professional football, which is the main subject of our study, is an example of this heterogeneity, it is conceived differently in Europe and the USA, supposedly the birthplace of modern (Europe) and the origin of professional sports (US). Divided between a centralised, state-interventionist model (e.g. France), a market driven (e.g. England), and ‘controlled’ liberalism (e.g. USA), professional sport may be seen today as an evidence of the heterogeneity, pluralism, and fragmentation of the world system.

Sport, particularly football, has been the subject of transformation, redefinition and manipulation in the Algerian space. Starting from the early colonial years, sport was used by colonial administration and European settlers for racial segregation, subsequently to become a means for integration of the ‘indigenous’ population into colonial (Mediterranean, multiracial and multi-religious) society. It was creolised, (taking Hannerz’s term) by the nationalist movement to be converted into another arena of the Algerian population’s struggle against an imposed colonial order, and was a very effective tool for the internationalisation of the Algerian cause for independence (see chapter 3). In post-independent Algeria, sport (particularly football the most popular game) was used in the service of the FLN-state ideology; internally, for the mobilisation of social forces (youth, students, workers) around socialism; and externally, for the integration of independent Algeria into the world community. In the 1990s, sport like any other sector, has reflected the struggle for transformation of Algerian society, from state dirigisme and socialism to political pluralism and market economy, and on the field from amateurism to that of ‘professionalism’. Nonetheless, in practice most of the clubs are still heavily dependent on state and local authority subsidies and voluntarism in day to day management. It should be noted also that those changes have not occurred always as a result of political decisions coming from above. Particularly worthy of discussion is that the state project for professional sport was also a state reaction to the already existing (unofficial) professional football, in the form of money-making (high salaries), and the transfer of players negotiated, according to respondents’, by “pseudo-managers”.
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Previously prohibited because of its liberalist, and neo-imperialist intentions, professional sport, particularly in football, is recognised today as the ‘norm’. However, from the respondents’ perspective, professional sport exists only in developed countries, and not in Algeria, where an adequate judicial system, favourable economic, political and social conditions, and more importantly a culture of ‘professionalism’ (of rational policy, management and organisation) are not sufficiently present to be able to apply the term meaningfully.

8.5 Research implications

Finally, it could be stated that the aim of the research is neither to evaluate policy (the government project for professional sport), nor to generalise the empirical study results, suggesting an applicable model for professional football in Algeria (or in the Maghreb the Arab and Islamic world), which would take into consideration the uniqueness of that region of the world, as an alternative to western model(s). The contribution of the research was to raise questions that had not been addressed before, such questions have to do with Algerian identity and particularism (spécificité) that link:

a) on the one hand, modernity, postmodernity and globalisation theories, approaches and debates, to Algerian history, society, polity and geography;

b) and on the other hand (here where we think the uniqueness of our research approach is situated), to link the discussion on globalisation and localisation, within Algerian space, to sport in general and football in particular, looking at a specific ideology or mode of management and practice in sport, which is ‘professionalism’.

For this reason, we have chosen a non-conventional (constructivist instead of positivist, modernist) way of both addressing and analysing the research questions. The approach was based on deconstruction and reconstruction of certain presumed realities ‘out there’ that we tend (as Algerian, or western sociologists, historians, Francophone or Arabophone) to take for granted. The research problematised, for those concerned with the Algerian context, the existence ‘out there’ of a common, a uniform and a homogeneous understanding of Algerian (we versus others) ‘locality’,

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'identity', 'history', 'geography', 'ideology' and society. In relation to our case study, a shared conceptualisation of the meaning of 'professional football' within the academic, political and sports community, was similarly problematised. The use of discourse analysis (and to some extent, English\(^3\) as the language of our thesis) to interpret the language use (interviewees' interests, world views, argumentation strategies) helped us to gain a certain flexibility, critical subjectivity and self-reflexivity, or in Foucault's (1977) terms, to gain the thought of the multiple, thought that accepts divergence, what Erickson conceives as postcolonial discourse or the discursive tactics of post-colonial authors characterised, according to the perspectives of Deleuze and Guattari (1972), by an "opening up, polyvalence, divergence, disjunctiveness and differentiality" (Erickson, 1998:15) Consequently, we have achieved to some extent a balance in our research between our position as an 'insider' and 'outsider' or that of Algerian nationality on one side and researcher in the western academy on the other. Although, we acknowledge the existence of local response to globalisation (or globalism), westernisation (or occidentalism) and the new world order (or the New World Order), the objective was not to detect a local, Algerian model of professional sport (underlying reality). The general aim was to give a voice to 'others' to suggest their own meanings, definitions and evaluations, of professional football in Algeria, without privileging one reality over other (multiple realities). This may help to open up new debates, discussions, and to suggest new research topics on the field of sport policy and governance in Algeria, and at a practical level, reconsideration of the Algerian government's project for professional sport, taking into account the multiple views addressed in the thesis.

\(^3\) The use of English helped us to avoid in a way the complexity of applying discourse analysis to Arabic and French languages (interviewees' answers) knowing the ideological connotations that those languages have within the Algerian media, educational, political and cultural contexts (Arabophone versus Francophone).
References


http://www.abc.net.au/specials/saul/fulltext.htm


Preamble

This article shows the conditions which the sporting clubs must have in order to be able to develop regularly, in the national championships of Premier Division and the Division One teams constituted by players having a professional status.

The notion «professional» means here, a durable sporting activity aiming at the achievement of the sporting results against remuneration (article 20 of the order 90-09 relevant to the orientation, organization and development of the national system of sporting and physical culture), negotiated between the concerned parties.

The national structure of the professional football management, which is denominated, National Structure of Management, is considered as the specialised organ of the federation, competent for the professional practice (control of the working and the management of the competition).

1) Preliminary engagements

The club participating, should act with respect for the regulation of the country, especially in:

- The legislation of work, particularly facing the staff (players and setting) wage-earner.
- The regulation relevant to the hygiene and security in the installations under its responsibility.

The club must participate regularly to the whole of the competitions, avoiding all perturbation of a normal development, if it is not the case, it will have sanctions, like the ejection from the national sporting movement.

The club engages in fighting against all recourse to products or processes of doping, and in case of necessity, sanctioning with an exemplary manner all behaviour of this type.

It engages in sanctioning with an exemplary manner all behaviour contrary to the ethical and the sporting moral.

The club delegates to the national structure of professional football management power to negotiate for on account with the concerned partners, the rights of televisual retransmission of the matches in which it participates.
2) **Obligations to subscribe by the club:**

2.1) **In the statutory matter and the organizational one:**

The participating club must, in a duration of 3 years, constitute for the management of the section which is engaged in the competition reserved for the professionals, a commercial company in association with the local collectivities (APC, Wilaya, Gouvernorat,...), public companies and/or other private shareholders.

This company can take one among these following status: a commercial company with a sporting object, a mixed company with a sporting object, joint-stock company.

The enabling club must respect its engagements facing the other sporting disciplines it develops, except in case of due agreement notified by the administration relevant to sports, after decision of national structure of management.

Concerning the transactions which directly interests the players under contract (mutation, lendings, sponsoring etc...), the club has to respect the regulation of the national structure of management.

The contracts of all players must integrate a clause relevant to the obligation to answer to the convocations of the different national teams, and take care of them. They benefit from the right of indemnity according to competences of national structure of management.

The club must contract all the necessary assurances concerning the athletes and competitions it organises.

2.2) **In substructure matter**

The participating club must assure for the whole of the official competition, a stadium of an official domiciliation for the club.

- Besides the emergency equipments (firstary, ambulance,...), the stadium must have grand-stands which can receive at least 15000 seats.
- The sport area should be conformable to the effective rules, the pitch must be natural and in good condition. The club must own at leasts a comfortable ground. So, for a duration of 3 years, an artificial swaid is tolerated.
Appendix I Government Project for the Professionalisation of Football

- The sport area must be protected from the grand-stands. The access of the spectators into the ground and the changing-room, is forbidden. It is reserved only for the players and the officials.

- The stadium must have at least 03 separate changing-rooms (one for each kit and another one for the officials) in good conditions and equipped with necessary conveniences (shower-bath with hot and cold water...) and which respect the conditions of the effective regulation in security and hygiene matter.

- The stadium must also be equipped with a grand-stand for the written press, and a cabin for the (radio and television). These grand-stands must be served by several phone lines and fax in good conditions.

- A parking area must be controlled and protected.

- The stadium must be provided with a sufficient lighting system for allowing the presentatonight matches.

2.3) In the framing matter

The participating club must benefit, under the authority of a general manager, from a permanent and wage-earned framing, composed at least by the following points:

- A technical framing constituted by a technical manager, one or several specialized trainers, physical preparers.

This framing must respect the qualification criterions, as it is mentioned within the effective texts, especially, in the executive decree 91-187 dated june 01st, 1991.

Concerning the trainers and the physical preparers, they can, for a transitory period of 03 years, be recruited among the persons who had exercised a same function (trainers or physical preparers) during at vital 5 years in the lap of national 1 or 2 prior to 1999.

- The medical framing (doctors, physiotherapists) should fulfill the qualification criterions required for the practice of the function, as it is determined by the health ministry.

- The administrator framing must engage a direction’s responsible or a secretary general.

The administrative responsible can be recruited among the graduated management of sport who can work at the level of the football structures (federation, leagues, clubs,...).
2.4) In the matter of the logistic means:

- The club must possess a fixed administrative seat.
- It has to offer 2 stars Accommodation, to the visiting teams.

2.5) In financial matter

- The club has to display a provisional budget (receipts and expenses) for the exercise 1999/2000 in order to cover the running of the engaged team (H.T.R., wages and indemnity of the players and the technical and administrative framing equipments and material, other charges of administrative character...) in the professional championship, this previsional budget which must have guarantees with good execution is submitted to the preliminary approbation of the structure in charge of the competition.
- The club must necessarily have the function of an approved auditor.
- The accounts of the club must be regular and submitted to the control of the competent entreaties.

2.6) The internal regulation of the club

The club must enclose to its demand, a specific internal regulation, and submitte it for the approbation of the entreaties in charge of the management of professional football. The internal regulation must particulary establish the rules to which all patner contribute, (athletes, technical and administrative framing), and also obligations which derive from their contractual relation with the club (the behaviour on the ground and outside of it, discipline and sanctions...).

The internal regulation will introduce the contractual clauses which have to rule the relations between the club and the different members of the technical framing, and between the club and the athletes submitted to the professional system and / or semi-professional, and in training situation.

These contracts which will be submitted for the preliminary approbation of the structure in charge of the management of the competition, should be conformable to the type-contracts mentioned in the annexes.
2.7) **Formation:**

The club must develop during a period which does not exceed the two years from the beginning of the season 1999/2000, an activity of formation and apprenticeship in favour of young footballers previously selected, the age must be between 16 and 19 years.

- Either by using its own means
- Or within a public organism or a private one, specialized in the field and approved by the competent authorities.

The relation with the players in apprenticeship must be formalized by a contract establishing the modalities of taking care of the players (duration, the total of the admitted student's grant, premium of the match, in case of necessity, liberation conditions from the club ...), in the respect of the limits of the internal regulation.

This contract which should be conformable to the limits of the type-contract mentioned in the annexe, is submitted for the preliminary approbation of the structure in charge of the competition management.

The young athletes in apprenticeship, must benefit from the facilities relevant to the their study cycle or from a professional formation.

The engagement of a club in developing by its own means an activity of formation, allows the state to have direct and/or indirect subventions, whose the amount is proportionally calculated according to the number of the youths in formation, but, this number should not be less than to 6 nor more than 15.

2.8) **The players number:**

For being able to participate to the championship of superdivision 1 or division 1, the club must show at least a number of 22 players divided as follows:
Appendix I

Government Project for the Professionalisation of Football

- 08 contractual and professional players, and at most 03 foreign ones, 08 contractual players in semi-professional status, 06 players on probation for the club called to progress in superdivision 1.

- 06 confirmed contracts of professional players for the club called to progress in the division 1, with 02 foreign players, 10 contracts of players in semi-professional status, 06 players on probation.

So, and for a period of 03 years from the beginning of the season 1999/2000, it will be tolerated at least 06 professional players for the Premier Division and the Division One.

The club should have and maintain at vital a lower team in the championship of the league of the county.

In case of impossibility duly justified, the club will be obliged to name a team from its county, progressing at least in the championship of the county.
### About Algeria

Information provided by www.countryreports.org

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<tr>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Northern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Morocco and Tunisia</td>
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<td>Map references:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Area: total:</td>
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<tr>
<td>water: 0 sq km</td>
<td>land: 2,381,740 sq km</td>
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<td>Area - slightly less than 3.5 times the size of Texas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land total:</td>
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<td>border countries:</td>
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<td>Maritime claims:</td>
<td>territorial sea: 12 NM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Climate</td>
<td>arid to semi-arid; mild, wet winters with hot, dry summers along coast; drier with cold winters and hot summers on high plateau; sirocco is a hot, dust/sand-laden wind especially common in summer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrain</td>
<td>mostly high plateau and desert; some mountains; narrow, discontinuous coastal plain</td>
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<td>Elevation lowest point:</td>
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<td>highest point:</td>
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<td>permanent crops:</td>
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<td>other: 97% (1998 est.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irrigated land:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment party to:</td>
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Appendix 2

Information about Algeria

agreements: Wastes, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands

*signed, but not ratified:* Nuclear Test Ban

Geography -

second-largest country in Africa (after Sudan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population:</td>
<td>32,277,942 (July 2002 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age structure:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14 years: 33.5% (male 5,512,369; female 5,311,914)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-64 years: 62.4% (male 10,175,135; female 9,950,315)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years and over: 4.1% (male 610,643; female 717,566)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2002 est.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate:</td>
<td>1.68% (2002 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth rate:</td>
<td>22.34 births/1,000 population (2002 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death rate:</td>
<td>5.15 deaths/1,000 population (2002 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net migration rate:</td>
<td>-0.42 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2002 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex ratio:</td>
<td>at birth: 1.04 male(s)/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-64 years: 1.02 male(s)/female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years and over: 0.85 male(s)/female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total population: 1.02 male(s)/female (2002 est.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate:</td>
<td>39.15 deaths/1,000 live births (2002 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth:</td>
<td>female: 71.67 years (2002 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male: 68.87 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate:</td>
<td>2.63 children born/woman (2002 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate:</td>
<td>0.07% (1999 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS - number of people living with:</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS - deaths:</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nationality: noun: Algerian(s)

*adjective:* Algerian

Ethnic groups:

Arab-Berber 99%, European less than 1%

Religions:

Sunni Muslim (state religion) 99%, Christian and Jewish 1%

Languages:

Arabic (official), French, Berber dialects

Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write

*total population:* 61.6%

*male:* 73.9%
female: 49% (1995 est.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Country name: | conventional long form: People's Democratic Republic of Algeria  
conventional short form: Algeria  
local short form: Al Jaza'ir  
local long form: Al Jumhuriyah al Jaza'iriyyah ad Dimuqratiyyah ash Sha'biyyah |
| Government type: | republic |
| Capital: | Algiers |
| Administrative divisions: | 48 provinces (wilayas, singular - wilaya); Adrar, Ain Defla, Ain Temouchent, Alger, Annaba, Batna, Bechar, Bejaia, Biskra, Blida, Bordj Bou Arreridj, Bouira, Boumerdes, Chlef, Constantine, Djelfa, El Bayadh, El Oued, El Tarf, Ghardaïa, Guéla'ma, Illizi, Jijel, Khénchela, Laghouat, Mascara, Medea, Mila, Mostaganem, M'Sila, Naama, Oran, Ouargla, Oum el Bouaghi, Relizane, Saida, Setif, Sidi Bel Abbès, Skikda, Souk Ahras, Tamanghasset, Tebessa, Tiaret, Tindouf, Tipasa, Tissemsilt, Tizi Ouzou, Tlemcen |
| Independence: | 5 July 1962 (from France) |
| National holiday: | Revolution Day, 1 November (1954) |
| Legal system: | socialist, based on French and Islamic law; judicial review of legislative acts in ad hoc Constitutional Council composed of various public officials, including several Supreme Court justices; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction |
| Suffrage: | 18 years of age; universal |
| Executive chief of state: | President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (since 28 April 1999) |
| Executive head of government: | Prime Minister Ali Benflis (since 26 August 2000) |
| Executive cabinet: | Cabinet of Ministers appointed by the president |
| Executive elections: | president elected by popular vote for a five-year term; election last held 15 April 1999 (next to be held NA April 2004); prime minister appointed by the president |
| Executive election results: | Abdelaziz Bouteflika elected president; percent of vote - Abdelaziz Bouteflika over 70%; note - his six opposing candidates withdrew on the eve of the election citing electoral fraud |
| Legislative bicameral Parliament consists of the National People's Assembly or Al-Majlis Ech-Chaabi Al-Watani (389 seats - changed from 380 seats in the 2002 elections; members elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms) and the Council of Nations (144 seats; one-third of the members appointed by the president, two-thirds elected by indirect
vote; members serve six-year terms; the constitution requires half the council to be renewed every three years)

**elections:** National People's Assembly - last held 30 May 2002 (next to be held NA 2007); Council of Nations - last held 30 December 2000 (next to be held NA 2003)

**election results:** National People's Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA%; seats by party - FLN 199, RND 48, MRN 43, MSP 38, PT 21, FNA 8, Nahda 1, PRA 1, MEN 1, independents 29; Council of Nations - percent of vote by party - NA%; seats by party - RND 79, FLN 12, FFS 4, MSP 1 (remaining 48 seats appointed by the president, party breakdown NA)

**Judicial branch:** Supreme Court or Cour Supreme

**Political parties and leaders:**
- Algerian National Front or FNA [Moussa TOUATI];
- Democratic National Rally or RND [Ahmed OUYAHIA, chairman];
- Islamic Salvation Front or FIS (outlawed April 1992) [Ali BELHADJ and Dr. Abassi MADANI (imprisoned), Rabeh KEBIR (self-exile in Germany)];
- Movement of a Peaceful Society or MSP [Mahfoud NAHNAH, chairman];
- National Entente Movement or MEN [Ali BOUKHAZNA];
- National Liberation Front or FLN [Boualem BENGHAMOUDA, secretary general];
- National Reform Movement or MRN [Abdellah DJABALLAH];
- National Renewal Party or PRA [leader NA];
- Progressive Republican Party [Khadir DRISS];
- Rally for Culture and Democracy or RCD [Said SAADI, secretary general];
- Renaissance Movement or EnNahda Movement [Lahbib ADAMI];
- Social Liberal Party or PSL [Ahmed KHELIL];
- Socialist Forces Front or FFS [Hocine Ait AHMED, secretary general (self-exile in Switzerland)];
- Union for Democracy and Liberty [Mouley BOUKHALAFA];
- Workers Party or PT [Louisa HANOUN]

**note:** a law banning political parties based on religion was enacted in March 1997

**Flag description:** two equal vertical bands of green (hoist side) and white; a red, five-pointed star within a red crescent centered over the two-color boundary; the crescent, star, and color green are traditional symbols of Islam (the state religion)

### Economy - Algeria

**Economy overview:** The hydrocarbons sector is the backbone of the economy, accounting for roughly 60% of budget revenues, 30% of GDP, and over 95% of export earnings. Algeria has the fifth-largest reserves of natural gas in the world and is the second largest gas exporter; it ranks 14th in oil reserves. Algeria's financial and economic indicators improved during the mid-1990s, in part because of policy reforms supported by the IMF and debt rescheduling from the Paris Club. Algeria's finances in 2000 and 2001 benefited from
the temporary spike in oil prices and the government's tight fiscal policy, leading to a large increase in the trade surplus, record highs in foreign exchange reserves, and reduction in foreign debt. The government's continued efforts to diversify the economy by attracting foreign and domestic investment outside the energy sector has had little success in reducing high unemployment and improving living standards. In 2001, the government signed an Association Treaty with the European Union that will eventually lower tariffs and increase trade.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $177 billion (2001 est.)
GDP - real growth rate: 3.8% (2001 est.)
GDP - per capita: purchasing power parity - $5,600 (2001 est.)
GDP - composition by sector: agriculture: 17%
industry: 33%
services: 50% (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line:
Household lowest 10%: 4.4%
highest 10%: 25% (1995)
Income or consumption by percentage share:
Distribution of family income: 35.3 (1995)
Gini index:
Inflation rate (consumer prices): 3% (2001 est.)
Labor force: 9.4 million (2001 est.)
Labor force - by occupation: government 29%, agriculture 25%, construction and public works 15%, industry 11%, other 20% (1996 est.)
Unemployment rate: 34% (2001 est.)
Budget: revenues: $20.3 billion
expenditures: $18.8 billion, including capital expenditures of $5.8 billion (2001 est.)
Industries: petroleum, natural gas, light industries, mining, electrical, petrochemical, food processing
Industrial production growth rate: 6% (2001 est.)
Electricity - production:
fossil fuel: 99.58%
hydro: 0.42%
source: other: 0% (2000)
Electricity - exports: 210 million kWh (2000)
Electricity - imports: 150 million kWh (2000)
Agriculture - products: wheat, barley, oats, grapes, olives, citrus, fruits; sheep, cattle
Exports: $20 billion (f.o.b., 2001 est.)
Exports - commodities: petroleum, natural gas, and petroleum products 97%
Exports - partners: Italy 23%, Spain 13%, US 13%, France 11%, Brazil 7%, (2000)
Imports: $1 billion (f.o.b., 2001 est.)
Imports - commodities: capital goods, food and beverages, consumer goods
Imports - partners: France 29%, US 9%, Italy 8%, Germany 6%, Spain 5% (2000)
Debt - external: $24.7 billion (2001 est.)
Economic aid - recipient: $100 million (1999 est.)
Currency: Algerian dinar (DZD)
Currency code: DZD
Fiscal year: calendar year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephones - main lines in use:</td>
<td>2.3 million (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephones - mobile cellular:</td>
<td>33,500 (1999)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Telephone system: **general assessment**: telephone density in Algeria is very low, not exceeding five telephones per 100 persons; the number of fixed main lines increased in the last few years to a little more than 2,000,000, but only about two-thirds of these have subscribers; much of the infrastructure is outdated and inefficient **domestic**: good service in north but sparse in south; domestic satellite system with 12 earth stations (20 additional domestic earth stations are planned) **international**: 5 submarine cables; microwave radio relay to Italy, France, Spain, Morocco, and Tunisia; coaxial cable to Morocco and Tunisia; participant in Medarabtel; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean), 1 Intersputnik, and 1 Arabsat (1998)
Broadcast stations:
- Radios: 7.1 million (1997)
- Televsions: 3.1 million (1997)

Internet users:
- Internet Providers (ISPs): 180,000 (2001)

Transportation Algeria

Railways: total: 4,820 km
- standard gauge: 3,664 km 1.435-m gauge (301 km electrified; 215 km double-track)
- narrow gauge: 1,156 km 1.055-m gauge (1999 est.)

Highways: total: 104,000 km
- paved: 71,656 km (including 640 km of expressways)
- unpaved: 32,344 km (1996 est.)

Waterways: none

Pipelines: crude oil 6,612 km; petroleum products 298 km; natural gas 2,948 km

Ports and harbors: Algiers, Annaba, Arzew, Bejaia, Beni Saf, Delys, Djendjene, Ghazaouet, Jijel, Mostaganem, Oran, Skikda, Tenes