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AN ANALYSIS OF THE ORGANISATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS OVER THE LIFE CYCLE OF THE SYDNEY ORGANISING COMMITTEE FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES

BY MAXIMOS MALFAS

A doctoral thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the Award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

June 2003

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An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG)

ABSTRACT

During the last two decades, the increasing scale of the Summer Olympic Games in terms of sports and participants has established it as an enormous event to plan and to manage. However, although organisational aspects of the contemporary Summer Olympics have emerged as a steadily growing area of interest by the Olympic Movement, it has attracted limited academic interest. The Organising Committees for the Olympic Games (OCOGs), in particular, which constitute the central planning and organisational bodies of the contemporary Olympics, have received little research attention in relation to their role in preparing and staging the event. In an attempt to provide insights into the organisational phenomenon of OCOGs and, to a broader extent, fill gaps in our understanding of the range of Olympic organisation, this research project provides an analysis of the Sydney 2000 Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG).

Specifically, by using a modified version of Mintzberg’s configuration approach as its conceptual framework, this thesis aims to identify and analyse the nature and range of organisational configurations evident within the life cycle of SOCOG. Specific objectives of the thesis include the following:

- To identify and evaluate the structural and contextual features of SOCOG throughout its life cycle, using a modified version of Mintzberg’s configuration analysis;
- To investigate the role and operation of SOCOG in the organisation of the 2000 Olympic Games;
- To explore the applicability of the life cycle periodisation for the study of SOCOG; and
- To review and evaluate the utility of the modified Mintzberg’s approach with regard to the examination of SOCOG.
Primary data was collected from a series of semi-structured interviews with SOCOG’s senior executives. Content analysis of SOCOG’s organisational documents and press coverage from Australian and international newspapers also provided additional sources of data, as did informal discussion with Australian and Greek Olympic editors and academics. The analysis of data revealed that the organisational formation of SOCOG changed significantly throughout its life cycle. As a result, a chronological periodisation of SOCOG’s operational life was applied. In doing so, it was found that SOCOG went through four main chronological stages, namely ‘Start-up Period’, ‘Build-up Period’, ‘Games-time Period’ and Close-down Period’, and exhibited four respective organisational formations. With regard to the applicability of Mintzberg’s modified approach, it was argued that it was a useful analytical device even if not accurate for describing the organisational formation adopted by SOCOG during the period of its operational decline. Finally, it was found that the role of SOCOG with regard to the organisation of the Sydney Olympics gradually weakened particularly in favour of the New South Wales government, which exerted considerable control over the organisation’s leadership and operations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express his appreciation to the institutions and individuals whose support was essential throughout the research undertaken.

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Special thanks to Mahfoud, Mansour and Richard who were more than my fellows, since our extensive discussions on academic topics considerably lifted my understanding of the current trends in sport politics and sociology.

I am very grateful to the managers of the Organising Committee for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games who were kind enough to openly make themselves available and grant me an interview, providing valuable information for the research project.

Special thanks are extended to my parents who have supported me over these years and helped me to pursue the best for myself. Their financial support along with their love and increasing encouragement have allowed me to see this important stage of my life through.

Finally, I would like to thank my fiancée Marianna Moraiti, who, despite often being miles away, was extremely supportive of this venture. Her love and understanding along with her psychological support made me strong and focussed on my work. Marianna also proofread the whole thesis and I am more than grateful to her for this.
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<td>ACOG</td>
<td>Organising Committee for the Atlanta Olympic Games</td>
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<td>AOC</td>
<td>Australian Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATHOC</td>
<td>Organising Committee for the Athens Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCOG</td>
<td>Games Co-ordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCC</td>
<td>Host City Contract</td>
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<tr>
<td>IF</td>
<td>International Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>Main Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
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<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>Olympic Charter</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Olympic Co-ordination Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCOG</td>
<td>Organising Committee for the Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORTA</td>
<td>Olympic Roads and Transport Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCC</td>
<td>Olympic Security Command Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOBO</td>
<td>Sydney Olympic Broadcasting Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOC</td>
<td>Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STORE</td>
<td>Sydney 2000 Technical and Operational Readiness Exercising</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOK</td>
<td>Transfer of Olympic Knowledge</td>
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, the increasing scale of the Summer Olympic Games in terms of sports and participants has established it as an enormous event to plan and to manage. However, although the organisational aspect of the contemporary Summer Olympics has emerged as a steadily growing area of interest by the Olympic Movement, it has attracted limited academic interest. The Organising Committees of the Olympic Games (OCOGs), in particular, which constitute the central planning and organisational bodies of the contemporary Olympics, have received little research attention in relation to their role in the planning and staging of the event. In an attempt to provide insights into the organisational phenomenon of OCOGs and, to a broader extend, fill gaps in our understanding of the range of Olympic organisation, this research project provides an analysis of the Sydney 2000 Organising Committee for Olympic Games (SOCOG). In particular, under a case-based methodological perspective, this study attempts to identify SOCOG's organisational nature by conducting an analysis of its organisational characteristics throughout its seven-year operational life.

This chapter sets out the perspective from which SOCOG has been examined, and shows how this study could contribute to knowledge and understanding in the area of Olympic organisation. Moreover, it provides an overview of the nature of OCOGs, and their role within the current organisation of the Summer Olympic Games. Finally, it provides an outline of the structure of this thesis.

1.1 THE STUDY OF SOCOG

This thesis aims to perform an organisational analysis of aspects of SOCOG. Specifically, it looks at a number of SOCOG's organisational elements over time in order to identify the organisational type or types that SOCOG exhibited during its life cycle. An organisational analysis which aims to classify an organisation naturally uses the premises of the organisation theory literature. Within this body of literature, the 'contingency theory' and the 'configuration approach' are the most prominent perspectives for classifying organisations. Although 'contingency theory' was first introduced by the Aston Group (Pugh et al, 1969a, 1969b, 1968) in the 1960s, its premises have been the basis for much recent organisational research, as much in the
mainstream organisation theory literature (e.g. Donaldson, 1987, 1996) as in the literature of sport organisations (e.g. Greenwood and Hinings, 1993; Kikulis et al, 1992, 1995). However, studies derived from 'contingency theory' have tended to use a limited set of structural elements of an organisation, such as centralisation of decision-making and specialisation of jobs, and the measurement of their relationship with a limited set of abstracted situational concepts, such as the size of the organisation and the type of technology used. The 'configuration approach', on the other hand, claims a holistic approach to the analysis of organisations, in the sense that particular situations or elements of organisation are explained in relation to the organisation as a whole and not in isolation. In effect, the 'configuration approach' gathers the premises of many other approaches into a multidimensional perspective, from which it ultimately aims to derive different organisational types, often referred to as 'configurations'. An organisational configuration constitutes a multidimensional collection of organisational characteristics that research has shown that commonly occur together (Meyer et al, 1993).

This thesis uses the premises of the 'configuration approach' as it takes the standpoint that a fuller understanding of an organisation's reality comes from an examination of the organisation as a whole. Particularly, this study is based on a modified version of Mintzberg's (1979, 1981) configuration approach. Mintzberg's approach holds a prominent position in organisation theory literature, as it constitutes a methodical combination of structural organisational elements and dimensions of the context in which an organisation operates. Mintzberg has identified five different configurations, which are treated as ideal types in the sense that he presents a series of arguments that result in specific predictions about organisational effectiveness as a function of the degree of similarity between an actual organisation and one or more of the identified configurations. In that sense, Mintzberg provides us not only with a classification of organisations but also with a theory for classifying organisations. However, although Mintzberg's approach offers a strong standpoint for organisational research and analysis, there has been limited empirical evidence to support its appropriateness for the study of sport organisations (e.g. Theodoraki, 1996). In view of this deficiency, by looking at SOCOG this study also aims to evaluate a modified version of Mintzberg's approach in regard to its suitability for the study of sport organisations.
Mintzberg’s approach is presented as a universal model, in the sense that it is applicable for the study of any organisation from any sector. It is widely accepted, however, that organisational studies should be cautious with generalisations of such scope, since often organisations of different sectors carry unique organisational characteristics (e.g. Child and Smith, 1987). Consequently, the initial step prior to the use of Mintzberg’s approach was to consider the uniqueness of SOCOG as a sport organisation. There are three characteristics which give SOCOG its organisational distinctiveness: first, SOCOG’s operations and resources depended substantially on co-operations with other private, public and voluntary organisations (Theodoraki, 2001); second, SOCOG, as any OCOG, operated in a non-competitive industry, in the sense that it was the only organisation that was awarded the right to organise the 2000 Sydney Games; and third, SOCOG experienced birth, dramatic growth in terms of numbers of staff and death in approximately seven years. The first and second characteristics of SOCOG suggest certain organisational particularities which should be taken into account when considering the application of Mintzberg’s approach to the study of SOCOG, namely, the presence of a strong resource-dependence status in SOCOG’s operations and the lack of a competitive environment, with its implications for the strategic position of the organisation. In view of such particularities, Mintzberg’s approach has been modified to accommodate the distinctive organisational characteristics of SOCOG.

The third unique feature of SOCOG suggests an additional consideration for the study of SOCOG. Specifically, the development of SOCOG’s life cycle indicates that the status of some of the organisation’s elements are most likely to change throughout its life cycle, since it is evident within the organisation theory literature that the overall size of an organisation affects the type of structure adopted (e.g. Pugh et Hickson, 1976, Kimberly, 1976, Meyer and Tsui, 1993). It has been found, for example, that large organisations favour bureaucratic and formal structures in contrast to small organisations, which find flexible and informal structures more applicable. In effect, SOCOG’s structural characteristics were anticipated to change as the organisation progressed towards the time of the Games as well as after the Games. As a result, it was felt that in order to provide a thorough examination of SOCOG’s organisational elements, it would be appropriate to consider SOCOG in multiple phases of its life cycle rather than as a whole. Effectively,
the possibility of achieving a periodisation of SOCOG into distinctive life stages was also considered.

To summarise the above, the aim of this thesis is to identify and analyse the nature and range of organisational configurations evident within the life cycle of SOCOG. As such, the research has the following objectives:

- To identify and evaluate the structural and contextual features of SOCOG throughout its life cycle, using a modified version of Mintzberg's configuration analysis;
- To investigate the role and operation of SOCOG in the organisation of the 2000 Olympic Games;
- To explore the applicability of the life cycle periodisation for the study of SOCOG; and
- To review and evaluate the utility of the modified Mintzberg's approach with regard to the examination of SOCOG.

1.2 THE NEW FACE OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES

In recent years the Summer Olympic Games have become one of the most significant sporting events. Since the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics the steadily increasing income from television and corporate sponsorship has given the event a prominent commercial profile. Parallel to this commercial success, there has been a substantial increase in the size of the Summer Olympic Games. Since 1984, every Games has been bigger than the previous one, both in terms of numbers of competitions, participating nations and athletes (IOC, 2001). However, the contemporary Olympic Games are not only a series of sport competitions. They comprise a global media event, which in itself is a major and immensely complex management responsibility. Moreover, the Games attract enormous numbers of visitors in addition to the 15,000 or so athletes and officials, consequently posing substantial problems relating to areas such as security, accommodation and transportation. These responsibilities are peripheral to the sport competitions yet crucial for the smooth transaction of the Games. As a result, the staging of the contemporary
Summer Olympics has become an enormous project, which usually requires considerable investment in both sporting facilities and supporting infrastructure such as in transportation, telecommunications, accommodation, and so on.

Not surprisingly therefore, the Olympic Games have also grown in significance for host governments. For example, the event can promote economic activity as a result of the jobs created by the vast numbers of tourists visiting the city before, during and after the event. The construction of sports facilities can also play a role in governmental programmes of urban renewal by, for example, introducing new sporting and recreational facilities into previously under-provided areas. On a broader scale, preparations for the event can provide governments with a means of justifying new investment in transport infrastructure and in projects to enhance the city's landscape and physical appearance.

Such a costly, high profile and diverse activity as hosting the Summer Olympic Games involves various interests including those of governments with their concern for political, social and economic benefits and the commercial with their concern to maximise profit. Given the vast economic and human resources required, the range of powerful interests involved and the intensity of media coverage, the management of such an event is certainly demanding. At the 1996 Atlanta Games, for example, the local Organising Committee had relationships with more than 1,000 organisations (ACOG, 1998). Consequently, Olympic organisers are involved in managing a highly complex network, which includes a diverse range of interests.

1.3 THE ORGANISATION OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES

The overall responsibility for the management of the Games rests with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), which owns the title to the Olympic Games (IOC, 1999b, Rule 11). The IOC entrusts the right for hosting the Games seven years prior to the event to the National Olympic Committee (NOC) of the host country of the Host City as well as to the Host City itself. The NOC, in turn, forms an Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG), which, from the time it is constituted, is directly responsible to the IOC (IOC, 1999b: rule 39, §1). The OCOG becomes part of the Host City Contract (HCC), which involves the host city, and the NOC of the host country (IOC, 1999b: rule
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG

CHAPTER I

An OCOG, however, does not co-operate only with the IOC but it also works closely with various bodies such as the International Federations (IFs), the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), departments and agencies within its own government, and many commercial organisations within the private sector. The IFs provide the technical support related to the competitions. They are responsible for determining the location of each venue, the physical layout of the field of play, as well as reviewing the format of the competitions, the utilisation of facilities and so on. The NOCs hold exclusive power over the presentation of their respective countries at the Olympic Games (IOC, 1999b: rule 31 § 3). In co-operation with the IOC and the IFs, they are responsible for determining the number of qualifying athletes they will bring to the Games, and generally, they represent the interests of their national squad of athletes. An OCOG also co-operates with the host government, which is usually responsible for building the Games-related infrastructure, and for providing essential services for the event, such as security and transportation. Finally, an OCOG co-operates with private organisations such as sponsors and the media which financially support the Games and frequently contribute to the staging of the event with staff and services.

1.4 THE ORGANISATIONAL MODEL OF THE SYDNEY 2000 OLYMPIC GAMES

As with every modern Olympic Games, the Sydney 2000 Olympics were run by the local Organising Committee (SOCOG), which operated under the umbrella of the Olympic Movement, namely, the IOC, the IFs and the NOCs. However, a central entity involved
in the preparations for the Sydney Games was the government of the New South Wales (NSW). It has been claimed that the multiple failures in areas such as security and transportation which occurred at the privately-run 1996 Atlanta Olympics prompted the IOC to encourage more governmental involvement in the running of the event (Associated Press, 1998). As a result, SOCOG's responsibility was limited to the organisation of the core event, namely the sport competitions, since the NSW government undertook responsibility for the delivery of functions peripheral to the core event. For example, the NSW government established the Sydney Olympic Broadcast Organisation (SOBO) to produce the sound and image signal of the Games, the Olympic Roads and Transport Authority (ORTA) to undertake all the transport-related matters, and the Olympic Security Command Centre (OSCC) to be responsible for the security of the whole event. Additionally, the NSW government established the Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA), which was responsible for the construction and management of all Games-related infrastructure, and also for co-ordinating the entire involvement of the NSW government in the event. An additional element of the organisation of the Sydney Olympics was the local Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), which was heavily involved in the planning and organisation of the sport competitions, particularly in later stages of the Olympic preparations when it undertook full responsibility for all the sport-related issues of the event. The fact, however, that the NSW government undertook some of the most vital responsibilities for the staging of the event should not devalue the task of SOCOG. SOCOG was operating in the centre of a complex organisational network, which involved various organisations with diverse responsibilities (Figure 1.1). Its role was to put together these responsibilities in such a fashion that would result in a successful outcome, that is, the smooth transaction of the Games.

This study is designed therefore to contribute to a better understanding of the organisation of the contemporary Olympic Games. In particular, the examination of SOCOG can reveal concealed organisational aspects and key actors of the organisation of the Games. In addition, the concept of considering an OCOG in different chronological stages can be of great benefit to Olympic scholars and practitioners, since it could allow large amounts of information about an OCOG to be broken down into manageable categories that would then be easier to comprehend, elaborate and store. Finally, the
employment of the modified version of Mintzberg's configuration approach can provide research evidence with regard to its applicability for the study of OCOGs and sport organisations with broadly similar event organising responsibilities, thus contributing to the field of organisation theory.

**Figure 1.1: The Organisational Model of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games**

(Source: SOCOG, 1999)

1.5 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The thesis comprises six further chapters which are structured as follows: Chapter II looks at the nature of Olympic Games within the spectrum of mega-sporting events. This chapter is composed of two main sections, the first of which explores the impacts of mega-sporting events on the cities and regions that stage them, in an attempt to uncover the range of interests involved in decisions made to host such events. The second section examines the Olympic Games within the wide context of the Olympic Movement with especial emphasis on identifying the implications for the organisational structure of the event. Particular focus is placed upon the role of the IOC in setting the framework for the
contemporary organisation of the Games, and on the critics that its practices have attracted.

Chapter III comprises a review of the organisation theory literature. It provides a critical evaluation of the various schools of thought and the particular approaches that have been used for the study of organisations. Attention is focused on the perspectives that have been used to categorise organisations, and specifically on Mintzberg's approach, which is justified, though in a modified form, as the conceptual framework for the study of SOCOG. The nature of the modifications to Mintzberg's model is outlined and the justification of the modifications is presented. Chapter IV extends the discussion on organisational analysis by exploring the organisational change literature. Specifically, this chapter looks at the organisational life cycle literature in order to provide a conceptual base for identifying methods and practices for dividing SOCOG's life into logical and defensible stages.

Chapter V presents the methodology which underpinned the empirical part of the thesis. Firstly, it provides the philosophical base upon which the study was designed in order to offer justification for the choice of the particular research design. Then, it exemplifies in detail the implementation phase of the research, with particular focus on the processes of data collection and analysis.

Chapter VI presents the empirical results of the study. The organisational characteristics of SOCOG that are under investigation are structured with regard to SOCOG's contextual factors and structural characteristics. Finally, chapter VII starts with a consideration of the patterns of change of SOCOG's organisational elements in the course of the organisation's seven-year life cycle. Thereafter, it discusses the organisational configurations exhibited by SOCOG, and provides the pattern of its organisational development. Moreover, it juxtaposes SOCOG's formations to Mintzberg's ideal organisational types and comments on the suitability of Mintzberg's modified model for the study of OCOGs. Chapter VII also presents the conclusions of this research project and stresses its contribution to the field of Olympic organisation and broadly to organisation research and analysis.
CHAPTER II

MEGA SPORTING EVENTS AND
THE OLYMPIC GAMES
In recent years, the Olympic Games have developed into one of the most significant mega international sporting events. The increasing number of cities bidding to host the Olympics and the increasing funds invested in Olympic bids indicate that local leaders perceive the securing of such an event as an opportunity to improve economic and social aspects of a city or region through the accumulated investment triggered by staging the Games. As a result, in the course of the last two decades there has been an increasing academic interest and research literature focused on the impact of the Olympics on the socio-economic and political life of the host city, region and country. From this perspective, the Olympic Games have been examined not only in relation to other mega-sporting events, such as the Football World Cup and World Championships, but also in relation to commercial and cultural events, such as Expos and festivals, since it has been claimed that regardless of their character, events such as the aforementioned generate similar dynamics for the host cities or regions. Here, however, it is suggested that an analysis of the character of the contemporary Olympic Games should not treat them as merely a typical mega-event, since the Olympics possess a number of distinctive characteristics. These special characteristics are primarily derived from the fact that the Games are presented and promoted as the prime expression of the philosophy of Olympism, and are also organised within a strict institutional framework set by the International Olympic Committee (IOC).

In view of the above, this chapter aims to reveal the status of the Olympics both as a mega-event as well as a property of the Olympic Movement. It contains two main sections. The first section explores the significance of the contemporary Olympic Games within the spectrum of mega-sporting events by critically evaluating their impacts on the host cities, regions and countries. In doing so, it aims to uncover the range and diversity of interests as well as the high stakes involved in the hosting of such events, thus illustrating the complexity of tasks that Olympic organisers face. The second section explores the Olympic Games as an expression of Olympism and part of the Olympic Movement. It aims to specify the institutional particularities of the Olympic Games, and effectively expose its unique organisational characteristics and their implications for Olympic organisers.
2.1. DEFINING MEGA SPORTING EVENTS

Before examining the Olympic Games as a mega-sporting event, it was considered appropriate that such events ought firstly to be defined. The initial step in defining sporting mega-events was to consider them within the field of other non-sporting events since most of the relevant research and analysis incorporates events of various types (e.g. commercial, cultural etc.). Therefore, the key issue to be addressed is the identification of the criteria by which mega-events in general ought to be defined. In other words, the central question is ‘How are mega-events distinct from other events?’

A mega-event can be viewed in two main respects: firstly, with regard to its internal characteristics, that is primarily its duration and its scale (i.e. number of participants and spectators, number of individual sessions, and levels of organisational complexity), and secondly, in respect of its external characteristics, which mainly take account of its media and tourism attractiveness, and its impact on the host city.

The internal characteristics of an event alone have attracted limited attention since researchers are primarily concerned with the external implications of an event, and also in some cases it has been found that some internal and external elements of an event are not necessarily interrelated. Ingerson (1998), for example, has found that in Australia in 1998, events with limited duration and media attractiveness made a bigger economic contribution than other longer-lasting events with bigger television audiences. Therefore, mega-events are usually perceived as having an impact on local tourism and economy (Hall, 1992a; Getz, 1998; Roche, 2000). Expenditures on facility and infrastructure preparation, as well as revenue from visitor spending, tickets and media exposure, form the baseline of the bulk of mega-event analysis. However, in looking even further, it has also become evident that mega-events can be analysed as tools of government policy or expressions of political ideologies (e.g. Hill, 1992). Furthermore, mega-events can be assessed in terms of their role in the process of capital accumulation through corporate sponsorships and media audiences (e.g. Whitson and Macintosh, 1996). Mega-events have also received attention in relation to the urban processes involved, such as the erection of landmark structures and the renewal of urban space with particular examples being the extensive waterfront development in Barcelona for the 1992 Olympics (De
Moragas and Bottela, 1995), and the refurbishment of the Homebush area in Sydney for the 2000 Olympics (Toohey and Veal, 2000).

Sensibly, therefore, authors' attempts to determine the criteria for defining a mega-event reflect the areas of their interests, which, as was mentioned above, mainly focus on their external characteristics and impact. Extensive attention has been paid to the argument that the extent of media coverage and particularly television coverage, and the associated attraction of sponsorship determine whether an event may be described as a mega-event or not (Morphet, 1996). More specifically, Roche (2000) has claimed that the degree of media interest in an event (i.e. local, national, global) will effectively define the type of event. In effect, Roche (2000) has suggested that the significance of an event depends upon the kind of media coverage it can attract and the degree to which it can become a national or international 'media event' (p. 7).

Although the levels of media attractiveness have been the centre of much mega-event analysis (e.g. De Moragas, 1996; Dayan and Katz, 1992; Jackson and McPhail, 1989), particular cases suggest that this criterion alone cannot determine the status of a mega-event. The 1991 World Student Games in Sheffield, for example, had poor media coverage and poor associated sponsorship, thus creating a major debt for the organisers (Roche, 1994). However, this event had a significant economic impact on the city of Sheffield and was also the starting point of an ongoing regeneration of the city, which has gradually created a high-profile sporting image within the U.K. (Davies, 1998). Similarly, in Australia in 1998, the Spring Racing Carnival made a bigger economic contribution ($174m) than other more prestigious events such as the Formula One Grand Prix ($96m) or the Australian Tennis Open ($70m), while having the lowest estimated television audience (300m, 500m and 600m respectively) (Ingerson, 1998).

Although the media-related aspect of events is rarely overlooked when authors attempt to classify an event, the focus is undoubtedly placed upon the consequences of an event on the host city, region or even country. Roche (1994, 1999), for example, has suggested that the criteria for determining a mega-event should be sought in the impacts, primarily economic ones, the event has on the cities that stage them. In more detail, Sola (1998) suggests that mega-events usually have an extraordinary impact on the host area in terms
of one or more of the following: "tourist volumes; visitor expenditures; publicity leading to a heightened awareness and a more positive image; related infrastructural and organisational developments which substantially increase the destination's capacity and attractiveness" (Sola, 1998, p. 242). It is claimed, therefore, that the degree and significance of the impact of an event on the host city or region mainly determine whether the event should be termed as a 'mega' one. In effect, here we adopt the notion that mega-events are those sporting, commercial or cultural occurrences whose impacts are significant for the cities, regions or countries that stage them.

Besides, it is accepted within the relevant literature that cities' motives behind the decision to stage a mega-event are its potential positive consequences, and predominantly its contribution to economic development and urban regeneration (e.g. Emery, 1998; Essex and Chalkley 1998; Shibli and Gratton, 1998; Kitchen, 1996; Stevens, 1996; Roche, 2000). Dunn and McGuirk (1999) claim that the hosting of mega-events has become a global imperative of competition between nations, regions and even individual cities, which try to attract international investment. More specifically, they claim that 'place-competition' and 'place-marketing' are the effects of global competition and capital mobility in the contemporary borderless world. In that sense, the internationalisation of capital can enhance the mega-event as a form of 'place marketing' for inward investment (Kearns and Philo, 1993).

Indeed, cities and regions are nowadays becoming increasingly concerned with promoting local economic development within their own boundaries, which involves different forms of restructuring of the city, region or even country, such as physical restructuring that enhances the repackaging of the location's identity. According to Graham (1992) the contribution of what he calls 'hallmark events', such as the Olympics, to strategies for urban regeneration is strongly associated with 'post-Fordism' and with the related transitions from industrial to post-industrial society and from modernity to post-modernity. Similarly, Harvey (1989) refers to mega-events as one of the main products of post-modern society and a key means by which cities express their personality, enhance their status and advertise their position on the global stage. The bottom line, therefore, is that both globalisation and the economic restructuring of cities have been powerful factors in enhancing the attractiveness of mega-events as stimulants.
to urban economic development (Roche, 2000, Hughes, 1993, Mules, 1993). It has been claimed, for example, that the economic decline of old manufacturing cities such as Manchester in a post-Fordist environment led to the conceptualisation of its 1996 Olympic Bid as a tool of urban regeneration in what was billed as the ‘Regeneration Games’ (Cochrane et al, 1996, p. 1322).

Mega-sporting events include specialist world-level international sport competitions (e.g. the World Cup competitions in soccer, athletics, rugby etc. and Grand Prix events for horseracing and motor racing etc.) and also the ‘world regional-level’ versions of these events. These are mainly connected to the multi-sport Olympics, such as the Asian Games, the Pan-American Games and the Commonwealth Games, and to a lesser degree to the world-level specialist events such as the European zone competition for the soccer World Cup (Roche, 2000, p.3). Such mega-sporting events provide great opportunities for regions and cities to develop internationally competitive investment environments. Through the processes of place competition and the restructuring they promote, regions and cities can benefit in the long term. In order to stage the Olympics, for example, considerable investment is required in both sporting facilities and supporting infrastructure (e.g. tourist accommodation, transportation, telecommunications etc.). In the same context, mega-sporting events the size of the Olympics or the football World Cup can promote economic activity as a result of the jobs created by the vast numbers of tourists visiting the city before, during and after the event. The construction of sports facilities can also play a role in programmes of urban renewal by, for example, introducing new sporting and recreational facilities into previously under-provided areas. On a broader scale, preparations for the event can also provide a means of justifying new investment in transport infrastructure and in projects to enhance the city’s landscape and physical appearance. Even unsuccessful bids for the Olympic Games can bring benefits. One example being, through the urban projects and regeneration initiated in order to strengthen the city’s Olympic bid (Lawson, 1996).

In effect, cities’ motives for wishing to stage mega-sporting events are largely derived from the stimulus to promote local economic development and urban regeneration (Kitchen, 1996). The realisation that mega-sporting events can be utilised in such a manner was firstly comprehended with the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games (Nash and
Johnstone, 1998). These Olympics had a limited contribution to the local urban development; however, their substantial commercial success, which resulted from increased television income and corporate sponsorship, and the subsequent surplus of US$ 215 million produced by the organisers, showed that the staging of sporting events the size of the Olympics can become a profitable business for host cities and regions (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). The most significant mega-sporting event in terms of economic and urban development was the 1992 Barcelona Olympics. These Olympics had a substantial impact on the local economy, and their preparations triggered public investment of US$ 6.2 billion (1995 prices) for redeveloping the city of Barcelona as well as the province of Catalonia (Preuss, 2000a).

Therefore, the hosting of mega-sporting events with the diverse benefits that it can promote, naturally involves various interests ranging from governmental initiatives for urban development to profit-oriented initiatives of the private sector. As a result, organisers frequently have to deal with diverse and often conflicting interests, which means that they have to perform a highly complex task. Therefore, in order to perfect our definition of a mega-sporting event, we will add to the status of its external elements, that is the degree of its impacts, its internal determinants which do not include its scale or duration as much as its organisational complexity and the involvement of diverse entities such as Governments, private corporations and public groups, which more accurately characterise its internal nature.

2.1.1 THE IMPACTS OF MEGA SPORTING EVENTS

As the discussion above suggests, the impacts of mega-sporting events on the host city or region can be immense and manifold, and a great part of the relevant literature supports the idea that such events can primarily produce positive outcomes. Whether mega-sporting events do indeed produce such net effects, however, has been under debate by several authors. In the following sections, the impacts of mega-sporting events will be discussed in succession with considerable focus on the relevant contradictory arguments.
Socio-Economic Impacts

It is often argued that the most important reason behind the decision of a city, region or country to host a mega-sporting event is the potential positive impact of the event on the local economy, which in turn can improve the social status of the host community. According to Crompton (1995), the economic impact of an event can be defined as the 'net economic change in the host community that results from spending attributed to the event' (p. 14). In that sense, we need to comprehend that the direct income of a mega-sporting event, that is from sources such as ticket sales, television rights and sponsorship deals, does not necessarily contribute to the economic development of the host community, since such income usually covers the costs for organising the event itself (Preuss, 1999). The economic contribution of mega-sporting events is primarily thought of in terms of the possibilities they provide of increasing the awareness of the city or region as a tourism destination and the knowledge concerning the potential for investment and commercial activity in the region. Therefore, they can attract more investment and visitors, and consequently create new jobs and contribute to the economic growth of the city or region (Essex and Chalkley, 1998).

On this basis, the bulk of the literature concerned with evaluating the socio-economic benefits associated with a particular sporting event draws attention to the effects of the event-related job creation on the unemployment rates of the host region (e.g. Miguelez and Carrasquer, 1995), the effects of the visiting spectators and the media-related advertisement on the tourism industry of the host city or region (e.g. Pyo et al, 1988; Kang and Perdue, 1994; Hughes, 1993) as well as the effects of the event on the social standards of the host community (e.g. Lenskyj, 2000; Eitzen, 1996). The latter primarily stresses the event-related impacts on the economic status of the citizens, and the role of the event with regard to the issues of poverty and social exclusion.

With regard to the issue of job creation, undoubtedly a mega-sporting event can generate large number of jobs not only those directly associated with the organisation of the event itself but also those in the tourism and retail industry due to the increased volumes of spectators-tourists, and in the construction industry especially when the staging of the event requires major infrastructural development, such as in the case of the Olympic
Games. For example, in Atlanta, the host city of 1996 Olympic Games, an investment of $2 billion was made in Olympic-related projects between the 1990 Olympic announcement and spring 1996. As a result, over 580,000 new jobs were created in the region between 1991 and 1997. A research commissioned by the Atlanta Convention and Visitors Bureau (ACVB) estimated that the cumulative economic impact of the Olympic Games between 1991 and 1997 was $5.1 billion (Stevens and Bevan, 1999). Barcelona, the host city of 1992 Olympic Games, had a similar experience, when, from October 1986 to July 1992, the general rate of unemployment fell from 18.4% to 9.6% (Brunet, 1995).

Although it should be accepted that the staging of a mega-sporting event evidently generates new jobs, attention should be placed on the quality and duration of these jobs. As Schimmel (1995) points out, sporting events create service-related jobs which are often part-time or low-paying. In his analysis of the Cape Town 2004 Olympic bid, Hiller (2000) reaches a similar conclusion and suggests that the vast majority of the anticipated jobs would have been low-paying and short-lived. Moreover, Miguelez and Carrasquer (1995) reported that the Barcelona Olympics generated only a limited number of new jobs since most of the Olympic-related jobs were temporary.

Related to the issue of job creation and to the broad economic development of the host city, region or even country is the boost to the tourism industry due to the staging of a mega-sporting event. For example, it has been reported that the tourism boom during the 1996 Football European Championships helped push Britain's trade balance into its first surplus since the beginning of 1995. In total, over 280,000 visiting spectators and media came to the UK to attend Euro'96 matches, spending approximately £120 million in the eight host cities and surrounding regions during the three weeks of the championship (Dobson et al, 1997). Similarly, during the 1998 Football World Cup in France, between 10m and 15m people visited the country because of the event, spending an estimated half a billion pounds on hotels, travel and food (Chaudhary, 1999).

Morphet (1996) has argued that the role of the media is vital in terms of creating awareness of the host city or region. He has claimed that once the media has been in these event cities, they are never the same because 'like former celebrities, these cities
expect a certain respect and recognition long after their moments of glory have been faded from the memory' (p. 312). Research showed, for example, that the televised production of England's cricket tour to the West Indies increased package tourism to those islands by as much as 60 per cent (De Knop and Standeven, 1999). Moreover, Ritchie and Smith's (1991) five-year study of the image of Calgary before and after the 1988 Winter Olympic Games, revealed that the Games had a dramatic impact on the levels of awareness and knowledge of the city of Calgary in Europe and the United States when compared to other Canadian cities. Similarly, in 1996, during the 17 days of the Centennial Olympic Games, it has been reported that two million people visited Atlanta and 3.5 billion people saw the city on world-wide television coverage in 214 countries and territories, and as a result, the tourist industry of the region increased dramatically (Stevens and Bevan, 1999).

Research, however, indicates that extensive media coverage of a mega-sporting event can not guarantee a different tourist image for the host city or region. For example, a study conducted in Goeteborg, Sweden, two months before and after the staging of the 1995 Athletics World Championships, looking at the effects of the event on foreign tourists' perceptions of the destination image, revealed that very few of the foreign tourists travelling to Goeteborg connected the games with the city, although the event was the biggest ever sporting event to have taken place in the city and the largest in the world that year (Larsson Mossberg, 1997). It was claimed that although the media coverage was intensive, it was focused on the sport activities, and as a result, very little information was transmitted about Goeteborg (Larsson Mossberg, 1997). Moreover, contrary to the vast majority of tourism impact studies of mega-sporting events, that undertaken by Pyo et al (1988) reviewed the tourism impact of the Olympic Games from 1964 until 1984 and found that their overall impact was negative. These results were later supported by Kang and Perdue (1996) who have criticised tourism impact studies of events, such as the Olympics, for overestimated policy approaches and 'short-terminism'. By employing a long-term view on the Seoul Olympics they found that the event did not have a long-term impact on local tourism.

The discussion above supports the argument that mega-sporting events have a positive economic impact on the host cities, regions or countries, but also suggests that the
economic contribution of such events might lie in a single impulse of increased demand during the period of the event, and consequently it might lose its effect in a short period of time. It is sensible, therefore, for one to consider whether the argument, which claims that mega-sporting events can be of enormous benefit to the host community, is valid. It has been claimed, for example, that the economic growth generated from such events may actually make the life of low-income residents more difficult. Hall and Hodges (1998), for example, emphasise the effects of a mega-sporting event on the house market and land values. They have claimed that the building of event-related infrastructure can involve housing relocation because of the compulsory purchase of land for clearance and building, and it can also lead to a rise in rents and house prices. Consequently, this can cause problems for people living on low incomes in these areas.

The 1996 Atlanta Games serves as an illuminating case of the negative social impacts of a mega-sporting event. A task force that investigated the social impact of the Games reported that 15,000 residents were evicted from public housing projects which were demolished to make way for Olympic accommodation. Moreover, between 1990 and 1995 9,500 units of affordable housing were lost, and $350 million in public funds was diverted from low-income housing, social services, and other support services for homeless and poor people to Olympic preparation during the same period (Beaty, 1999). In addition, homeless shelters were converted into backpacker accommodation during the Games, since human services organisations were offered financial incentives to convert their services for two weeks to accommodate tourists rather than low-income people (Leskyj, 2000). Similarly, in Sydney, in 1998, when the Olympic-related infrastructure was at its peak, house prices rose 7% above inflation, compared to the usual 2% (Horin, 1998). Moreover, in Sydney’s Olympic corridor, an area which was primarily occupied by low-income tenants and where unemployment was as high as 38%, rents increased up to 23% in the period 1997-1998 (Horin, 1999).

Consequently, mega-sporting events, such as the Olympics, could serve to exacerbate social problems and deepen existing divides among residents (Rutheiser, 1996). In Atlanta, for example, there were numerous reports of broken promises by the Olympic organisers regarding the poverty issue, in a region where 30% of the population lived below the poverty line (Beaty, 1999). ‘Street sweeps’ were made shortly after Atlanta
won the bid when attempts were made to criminalise poverty at the state level via several bills, such as that which made it unlawful to remove any item from a public trash container! (Lenskyj, 2000, p. 139). The Task Force for the Homeless reported that the cost to the taxpayer for using the city jail as a shelter for the homeless people arrested under these measures was $57 per day (Beaty, 1999).

The latter example raises the concern that when state and federal governments contribute to the staging of a mega-sporting event, they inevitably make use of public money. Although one could claim that tax money can be used for projects upon which an elected government decides, when an event creates public debts citizens are unfairly taxed to pay off these debts (Lenskyj, 2000). Nagano, for example, the host city of 1998 Winter Olympic Games, faced severe financial consequences for hosting such a big event and taxpayers suffered debts of up to 20,000 pounds per household to balance the city's books (Emery, 1998). Other examples include the city debts created from hosting the 1976 Olympics in Montreal and the 1991 World Student Games in Sheffield (Kitchen, 1996).

To conclude, when the socio-economic impact of a mega-sporting event is assessed one should take into account a number of vital considerations. Firstly, it is of decisive importance whether the host city manages to use the one-time economic impulse of such an event to change its structure in a way that will provide a self-sustaining process through, for example, permanent tourism, industrial settlements, regular follow-up events or even new economic relations with other regions or countries (Preuss, 2000b). Secondly, it needs to be comprehended that the extent of the benefit for the overall economy depends on the economic situation of the city when event-related investments are realised. A phase of increased investment activity and increased consumption expenditure in line with an economic upswing or boom may weaken the positive economic benefits. On the contrary, if event expenditures are made during an economic recession these will be considerably strengthen. The Olympic Games of Munich 1972, Barcelona 1992 and Atlanta 1996, for example, were fortunate that their investments fell in an economically weak phase, while those of Seoul 1988 probably led to crowding-out effects (Preuss, 2000a). This is supported by Hughes' (1993) study undertaken to provide background information for Manchester's ultimately unsuccessful bid for the
1996 Olympics, which concluded that such an event can have positive impacts on the cities which have an undeveloped sport infrastructure and which have high unemployment, and less so in cities with a developed infrastructure and low unemployment. Finally, as Preuss (1998) points out, cost-benefit analyses or economic impact studies are frequently ordered by the organising authorities of an event, and consequently, the results which the client favours can be produced, since there are some uncertain quantities and qualities, mostly of a social nature, which are easy to manipulate (Preuss, 1998). Therefore, one should bear in mind that a cost-benefit analysis of a mega-sporting event could be influenced in a way to bring out the desired results.

**Socio-cultural Impacts**

If we look at a mega-sporting event solely as a sport festivity, we can certainly argue that such an event can provide socio-cultural benefits for the host region. For example, sporting events the size of the Olympics can increase the local interest and participation in sporting activities (Ritchie, 1984), and also, as Essex and Chalkley (1996) have claimed, they can strengthen regional traditions and values, and increase local pride and community spirit.

Increased sports participation can make a significant contribution to the quality of life of both the individual and community. Hooper (1998) has argued that increased sport participation provides a sense of well-being through fun and enjoyment leading to self-fulfilment and achievement, and encourages social interaction and cohesion for those who may feel socially excluded. For example, Barcelona saw a notable increase in the participation of new social sectors of the population in active sports in the years following the hosting of the Olympic Games. There has been an increase of 46,000 new users in the city's sports centres after the 1992 Games, with the percentage of women participating in sporting activities increasing from 35% in 1989 to 45% in 1995. Moreover, in 1994, more than 300,000 people took part in sporting events which involved the city's inhabitants on the streets of Barcelona such as athletic competitions, popular marathon, the bicycle festival, the roller-skating festival and so on (Truno, 1995). It has been claimed that Catalans' drift into mass-community sporting activities was due
to an increased community spirit triggered by the 1992 Olympics. Truno (1995), for example, found evidence of increased civic pride during the Olympics and remarked that "the citizens have turned the city's streets into the world's largest stadium" (p. 55). This was also boosted by media coverage, which was presenting Catalans as a one of the most celebrative people in Europe (De Guevara et al, 1995). Similarly, a survey of the residents of the State of Georgia (USA), undertaken by the Governor's Department, confirmed that the 1996 Olympics generated civic pride, with 93% stating that the Games were positive for the community spirit of the city (Stevens and Bevan, 1999). A similar phenomenon was evident during the 1996 European Football Championship in England, where the country adopted the nostalgic theme 'football's coming home', and created a sense of national purpose, national unity and national pride (Morphet, 1996). The hosting of mega-sporting events, therefore, can provide localities with an opportunity to generate world recognition and reinforce their local pride and community spirit.

Mega-sporting events can also contribute to transforming the image of the host city. The city of Sheffield, for example, which was traditionally a manufacturing city, after the industrial recession of the 1980's and subsequent job losses, adopted sport, leisure and tourism as part of the re-imaging strategy of the city. Under that approach, the hosting of mega-sporting events was seen as an integral part of that strategy (Roche, 1994). The successful bid for the 1991 World Student Games and the subsequent investment of £139 million in sporting infrastructure in addition to a further £600 million in associated leisure and cultural facilities by the early 1990's has given the city a new focus. In 1995 Sheffield was designated by the Sports Council as the UK's first 'National City of Sport' in recognition of its ongoing contribution and commitment to sport, and in December 1997 it was named as the city chosen to host the headquarters of the UK Institute of Sport (Davies, 1998), a decision which was however subsequently reversed.

Physical Impacts

Mega-sporting events can also create opportunities for the construction of new sporting facilities as well as the improvement of the physical environment of the host city. The staging of multi-sporting events such as the Olympics or the Commonwealth Games
often involve the building of new sporting facilities or the restructuring of existing ones in order for the organisers to be able to satisfy the requirements of staging multiple sports in a short period of time. Moreover, the great numbers of participants and officials as well as tourists associated with the event usually require the construction of new roads and the development of the public transport network to ensure their efficient transportation to the sporting venues during the event. In addition, infrastructural development that is not directly related to the event often takes place, such as leisure facilities, commercial centres and open spaces, which aim to improve the physical appearance of the host city or region. Consequently, it has become increasingly common for mega-sporting events to be used as a trigger for large-scale urban improvement (Kitchen, 1996).

Perhaps the best example of a mega-sporting event being used in this way was the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, where major investments were made for new transport systems and for the rejuvenation of a run-down coastal area which now has a new marina, leisure facilities and attractive sandy beaches (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). It has been argued that the Olympic Village (Parc de Mar) was an excuse for opening the city up to the sea, thus realising a long-standing aspiration of the citizens, and the Vall d’Hebron, a huge sporting facilities area, provided an opportunity for organising and urbanising a chaotic urban space (Truno, 1995). Thus, the host authorities may see mega-sporting events as an opportunity to fund and bring forward long-term projects, which would otherwise remain in the pending file for many years. Portugal, for example, won the right to host the 2004 European Football Championships ahead of favourite Spain even though it had poorer stadiums and transport facilities. Giving the tournament to Portugal was seen as a way of helping both the country’s football and overall sporting development (Stevens and Bevan, 1999).

The 2000 Sydney Games continued the theme of major urban change. The organisers spent A$ 1.7 billion on the construction of sporting facilities, in addition to A$ 1.15 billion on supportive infrastructure (NSW, 2001). The latter included spending A$ 137 million in rehabilitating polluted sites in the area of Homebush Bay, which became the sporting centre during the Games. Similarly, in Athens, the host Olympic city of 2004, besides the creation and renewal of several sporting facilities, a £1.4 billion new airport
opened in 2001 able to handle 16 million passengers and 220,000 tons of cargo a year. Moreover, the £820 million expansion of the City's underground was completed in early 2001 with the new lines, carrying a total of 150 million passengers a year, thus creating 3,000 full-time jobs. Moreover, it is estimated that US$ 1 billion will be spent between 2000 and 2004 on projects that are not essentially Games-related but have been triggered by the staging of the event (Tzelis, 2001).

Mega-sporting events can also provide opportunities to the host sporting authorities to undertake joint projects in order to serve multiple purposes. In Atlanta, for example, the Olympic Stadium has been converted to the home of the City's Baseball Team. Funding for the $120m stadium came from the 1996 Olympic organising committee (ACOG), while the additional $35m required for the conversion was raised by the Atlanta Braves, Turner Broadcasting and Time Warner (Cramer, 1997). Similarly, in Manchester, the host city of the 2002 Commonwealth Games, the Sportcity, a 45,000 seat stadium, is a joint project of the organisers and the Manchester City Football Club, which after the Games will be the home of the local football team (Manchester 2002, 1999).

Although the staging of a mega-sporting event can contribute to the urban improvement of the host city or region, attention should be placed on the processes involved for accomplishing major construction projects. As Lenskyj (2000) points out, the set deadline for the construction of venues and the completion of infrastructure supports are often used by local politicians as the excuse for major constructions to bypass the usual stages in urban development applications, including social and environmental assessment, public hearings, and so on. In Athens, for example, the host city of the 2004 Olympics, the decision about the construction of the rowing centre for the Games at the Marathonas Lake was criticised for lacking adequate environmental analysis. It has been claimed that the project will undermine the natural resources of the waterland and cause collateral damage in the area (Mberi, 2001). The staging of a mega-sporting event may pose additional environmental problems, especially when temporary structures are built for the needs of the event. At Atlanta Games, for instance, four sports were hosted in temporary facilities which had to be demolished after the Games because of their limited usefulness to the local community (Lenskyj, 2000). In this case, the practices of disposing of such material, which cannot be recycled, fail to qualify as ecologically
sustainable development. Finally, when infrastructure projects speed up, other public works can be delayed or displaced. Moreover, when a large proportion of state funds are channelled into one metropolitan area, this often results in fewer infrastructure projects in suburban areas and in other regions (Rutheiser, 1996). The choice for such projects is usually a political one, since the cost of the often extensive event-related infrastructure is primarily covered by local governments (Preuss, 2000a). This, in turn, stresses the role of governments and the subsequent politics involved in hosting a mega-sporting event, which is presented below.

Political Impacts

The staging of a mega-sporting event of the significance of the Olympic Games or the Football World Cup usually has as its central constituent local, regional or even central governments. The main reason for that is that the administration of such events produces difficulties in covering the cost for the supportive infrastructure of the event or even for operating costs from tickets sales, sponsorship, television rights and so on, and therefore, governments' economic contribution is often required (Preuss, 2000a). For instance, the cost of the sporting and supportive infrastructure of the 2000 Sydney Olympics was mostly covered by the government of the New South Wales (NSW) which, in addition, provided several economic bailouts to the organisers to cover their operating costs (NSW, 2001).

Inevitably, therefore, the decision to bid for hosting a mega-sporting event is backed by governments, which frequently initiate such decisions, especially when the event provides the potential to pay them back in the form of economic, physical or other benefits. Public governance is mostly involved in such decisions at a local or regional level, since, with the exception of football events, mega-sporting events are awarded to cities rather than countries. Moreover, as Harvey (1989) points out, local governments have become comparatively autonomous from central governments, and as a result, they have adopted less bureaucratic and more competitive practices. Under this transformation, the competition to host and manage mega-sporting events has been an integral part of urban politics. Cochrane et al (1996) illustrate some of the key features of
this new urban politics through the example of Manchester’s Olympic bids of the 1980s and 1990s, in which local government-based decision-making and bureaucratic politics were essentially replaced by a dynamic business leadership.

Hall (1987) suggests that the decisions affecting the hosting of a mega-event grow out of a political process which not only involves the interests of political authorities, but also those of private, profit-oriented organisations. The New South Wales government in Australia, for instance, which was heavily involved in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympics, has adopted more entrepreneurial-driven forms of governance, since a broad range of non-government, often private, organisations were incorporated into the NSW government’s decision-making and policy formulation process (Dunn and McGuirk, 1999). Therefore, under the new urban politics imperatives, a decision to bid for mega-events, such as the Olympics, is not solely made by local or regional governments but often involves business corporations (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). In that sense, mega-sporting events are often credited with mobilising corporate elites and local politicians in profitable alliances that not only can boost local construction and retail and tourist industries but can also generate substantial infrastructure funding from higher levels of government. The practices of such alliances, which are termed by Lenskyj (2000) as ‘Politics of Place’ (p. 96), usually involve campaigns to persuade the citizens of the host city that the event will transform their hometown into a ‘world-class’ city, thus justifying the use of tax money. However, Eitzen (1996), through his analysis of Toronto’s bid for the 2008 Olympics, has claimed that taxpayers disproportionately bear the burden when they give consent for the use of tax money for the staging of mega-sporting events. For example, he has provided sufficient evidence that the policy of the bid committee regarding the sporting infrastructure was primarily focused on the needs of professional sport.

The organising committees of mega-sporting events frequently include elected representatives who serve as their members or even presidents, such as in the case of New South Wales MP Michael Knight, who was also the President of the Sydney 2000 organising committee. Such politicians often experience conflicting pressures to represent taxpayers’ interests, on the one hand, and profit-oriented interests on the other. The dual role of Michael Knight, for example, was promoted by the NSW government as
a major factor in keeping the project on target and on budget; however, it was claimed that the Olympics were compromised when Knight, as cabinet Minister, was not able to criticise the government’s handling of issues, such as the contamination of Sydney’s water supply due to Olympic works, and its serious implications for Olympic tourism (Lenskyj, 2000). In Sydney’s case, the ‘Olympics as catalyst’ rhetoric attracted a lot of criticism, since politicians and businessmen who had promised dramatic improvements in the lead up to the Olympic bid failed to take adequate action when urban social problems were equally urgent (Lenskyj, 2000, p. 96).

Finally, an additional political application of staging a mega-sporting event is what Ritchie (1984) refers to as a micro-political factor. This applies to the desire of individuals to utilise the visibility offered by the involvement with an event with a view to enhancing their careers in both political and non-political arenas (p. 10). Indeed, politicians who are involved in the organisation of prestigious sporting events, such as the Olympics, have the opportunity to improve their political image by associating themselves with the event, as well as to develop their public relations through contacts with sporting authorities and commercial organisations involved in the event. The case of the President of the Sydney 2000 Organising Committee, for instance, who retired from politics after the Games and is now working for the International Olympic Committee, might be seen as such an example.

Our discussion about the impacts of mega-sporting events suggests that such events can produce both positive and negative impacts for the host cities, regions or countries. It has been demonstrated that nearly all the positive applications of such events have also a negative side, which is often expressed in academic debates. However, what can be seen as indisputable is that mega-sporting events can benefit the managerial practices and capacities of the organising authorities. The sporting authorities involved in the organisation of a mega-sporting event can benefit by obtaining experience essential for organising future sport events. It has been reported, for example, that for the Barcelona sports world the organisation of the 1992 Olympic Games was a tremendous opportunity for improving its methods of management and its organisational capacity, for linking up better with the international sports network, and therefore for being better prepared to serve the city’s daily sports requirements. Sport clubs, sporting federations, and sports
management companies have also benefited from the accumulated know-how, having improved their workforces with the addition of workers involved with the organising committee of the Games (Truno, 1995). The organisers of mega-sporting events the size of the Olympics co-operate with International Federations, corporate sponsors, broadcasting corporations, governmental authorities, and the like. Individuals, therefore, can acquire sport-specific managerial experience, which can then be returned as a benefit to the sport administration of the host country, and can also provide these countries with a considerable advantage when they wish to stage future sporting events. Moreover, the organisation of complex events, such as the Olympic Games, which often requires business-like management, can improve the practices of the public administration. In Greece, for example, the Olympic preparations for the 2004 Games, which required the creation of many temporary companies, triggered the restructuring of the legal framework concerning the creation of Public Corporations and Limited Companies. In particular, the time span for establishing such organisations was dropped to one week from the two months that previously existed (Christodoulakis, 2001).

2.2 OLYMPISM, OLYMPIC MOVEMENT AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES

In many ways the Olympic Games might be seen as simply the clearest example of a mega-event in terms of scale, complexity and the various impacts mentioned in the previous section. The Olympic Games, however, possess additional levels of complexity deriving from its nature as the most prominent outcome of the ideology of Olympism. Its ideological background together with its unique organisation structure, and its cultural and political role on the global stage constitute some of the characteristics that distinguish them from other mega-sporting events.

2.2.1 OLYMPISM AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES

The institution of the modern Olympic Games was revived in 1896 by Baron Pierre de Coubertin. Coubertin was a visionary educator who claimed that high-minded international sport could foster individual and collective goodwill and even contribute to
world peace. He believed that this kind of event was not supposed to be simply a sport event but the focal point of a broadly based social movement which, through the activity of sport and culture, would enhance human development (Lucas, 1992). The modern Games, therefore, were revived as an expression of an ideology, a philosophy, that Coubertin called Olympism. It has been claimed that Olympism grew from Coubertin's initial goal of revitalising the youth of France through a global ideology that could embrace sport for all males, and eventually the inclusion of women athletes (Mechicof, 2000).

Coubertin believed that honest sport, enriched with style, ritual and symbolism could act for millions of people as a distinct set of beliefs, a kind of secular religion (Lucas, 1992). Today, the intended function of the plethora of Olympic ritual practices and ceremonies during the Games, from the reception of the 'sacred' flame to the taking of the Olympic oath, the victory ceremonies and the hand-over ceremony to the representatives of the next Olympic City, is to convey the message of what is, essentially, a form of pagan religion (Hargreaves, 2000). In that sense, it has been claimed that the Olympic Games can become the symbolic expression of a common 'global culture' which aims to bridge the gap between people of diverse backgrounds and interests (Hargreaves, 2000, p. 42), hence, then can serve humanity (Mechicof, 2000).

The Olympic Charter describes Olympism as a "philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind", which, by blending sport with culture and education, seeks to create a way of life based on the joy found in effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles (IOC, 1999b: Fundamental Principles §2). Consequently, the goal of Olympism is to "place everywhere sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to encouraging the establishment of a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity" (IOC, 1999b: Fundamental Principles §3). There is no doubt contemporary societies place a high premium on the ideals of Olympism. However, the institution of the Olympic Games, which is the most prominent expression of Olympism, has, as will be shown later, attracted considerable criticism especially during the last couple of decades. The focus of the criticism has been the Olympic Movement, that is, the international sport alliance which has derived from Olympism,
and particularly the International Olympic Committee (IOC), which has ultimate control over it.

2.2.2 OLYMPIC MOVEMENT AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES

The Olympic Movement includes the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the International Federations (IF), the National Olympic Committees (NOC), and all the associations, clubs and individuals belonging to them (IOC, 1999b: Rule 3 1). The IOC is the central power of the Olympic movement. It is a self-perpetuating body consisting of a maximum of 115 members drawn from a relatively wide variety of countries. Members are appointed by the IOC itself, and more specifically by its President and Executive Board (IOC, 1999b: Bye-Law to Rule 20, § 2.5). The IOC also holds the power to select the city to stage the Olympics. The responsibility for the organisation of the Olympic Games is entrusted by the IOC to the NOC of the country of the host city as well as to the host city itself. The NOC forms an Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG), which, in turn, co-operates with various entities, such as the IOC, the IFs, governments, the private sector and so on, in order to ensure the best possible facilities and environment for the athletes and visitors as well as the smooth transaction of the Games. Therefore, the organisation of the Olympic Games is a complex system which has as its central constituent the OCOGs. An OCOG co-ordinates the competences of the NOCs, which represent their athletes, the IFs, which set the technical requirements for the Olympic sports, and also the different levels of government which, as was mentioned earlier, contribute to the Games mainly with the provision of the supporting infrastructure.

However, the overall supervision of this organisational scheme is undertaken by the IOC, since legally the Olympic Games are its exclusive property (IOC, 1999b: Rule 11), as well as the OCOGs, which enter the Olympic Movement as temporary organisations. An OCOG becomes part of the Host City Contract (HCC), which involves the host city and the NOC of the host country (IOC, 1999b: Rule 39 § 4), and it must conduct its activities according to the HCC and the Olympic Charter. The IOC, therefore, has legal power over an OCOG, which, in its extreme, can be expressed as withdrawal of the organisation.
of the Games from the city, and consequently from the OCOG (IOC, 1999b: Rule 39 §
4). IOC's major exertion of power, though, is based on its economic control over the
Games. It has been claimed that this control was tightened considerably after the local
OCOG for the 1984 Los Angeles Games successfully demonstrated how the Games could
be organised to maximise income from television rights, sponsorship and merchandising,
and make a financial surplus over costs (Lenskyj, 2000). The IOC now determines in
detail the nature of the event with regard to its financing and contributes as much as 60%
to an OCOG's budget (Preuss, 2000a). It has exclusive control of the negotiations of the
television rights and the international sponsorship programmes for the Games, and keeps
part of the relevant funds for internal administration and for its constituents. In detail, the
IOC, the NOCs and IFs receive approximately 40% of the media and commercial
negotiations. The money coming into the Olympic Movement often reaches exceptional
amounts, especially if we consider that the television rights contracts alone for each
Games typically exceed $1 billion (Preuss, 2000a, p. 108).

2.2.3 IOC, OLYMPIC GAMES AND CRITICISM

An organisation as powerful as the IOC inevitably has its critics. As Toohey and Veal
(2000) point out, the IOC's success in recent years in securing substantial funding,
together with its power to determine the location of the Games, which can bring millions
of dollars to successful host cities, has led to scrutiny and criticism of its operations. Two
major focuses of criticism concern its statutory nature and its internal administration.
With regard to the former, the IOC is often viewed as a non-democratic and non-
representative international body which appears anachronistic in the modern world
(Krotee, 1988). This primarily refers to the election process of its members, since it is
the IOC that appoints the individuals who will represent their countries in the
organisation instead of the countries themselves. As a result, critics question the criteria
used to select members, with its over-emphasis on Europe and such idiosyncrasies as
longstanding members from the mini states of Liechtenstein and Monaco and three
members from Switzerland (Toohey and Veal, 2000).
The leadership of the IOC, following sustained criticism of its structure, and triggered by the bribery allegations of some IOC members involved in the evaluation of the Salt Lake 2002 Winter Olympics candidature, introduced reforms in 1999 which focused on the composition and membership of the organisation. The IOC composition, for example, now includes 15 IF presidents and 15 NOC presidents; however, the 70 members elected on an individual basis still guarantee the majority power in the sessions (IOC, 1999a). The members’ term of office is now eight years which is, however, renewable every eight years. The President is elected for an eight-year term, with the possibility of re-election for a second term of four years (IOC, 1999b: Rule 24, § 1). Although these reforms were intended to distribute the power within the IOC more evenly, it has been claimed that the decision-making power has in fact been concentrated in the IOC’s executive board, which has now even more power in membership decisions and in the selection of the host cities (MacAlloon, 2000). Therefore, it could be claimed that in a democratic world such practices can be viewed as more oligarchic rather than democratic.

Simson and Jennings (1992) have been severely critical of the IOC’s internal administration. They have argued that modern Olympic sport is a secretive, elite domain where decisions are taken behind closed doors, and where money is spent on creating a fabulous lifestyle for a tiny circle of officials rather than providing facilities for athletes. Moreover, with regard to IOC’s activities they have claimed that all Olympic gatherings are a constant and glittering round of first-class travel, five-star hotels, champagne receptions, extravagant banquets, mountains of gifts and lavish entertainment (Simson and Jennings, 1992). The criticism of such practices was broadly revealed in 1999, when some IOC members were found to have accepted bribes in the form of exceptional treatment and expensive gifts from the 2002 Winter Olympics organisers (Lenskyj, 2000).

An additional area of major criticism of the IOC concerns the role of the organisation in setting the current commercial image of the Olympic Games. It has been claimed, for example, that, in seeking financial independence by means of the sale of television rights and the pursuit of sponsorship, the IOC is selling out the Olympic ideals to media and commercial interests (Toohey and Veal, 2000). The role of the IOC’s Presidents has been seen as enormously influential in setting the tone and direction of the IOC during
their terms of office. In recent years, particularly under the presidency of Juan Antonio Samaranch, the Olympic Games have been transformed into a highly significant sporting event, and Samaranch is frequently characterised as the reformer of the Olympic Movement. Lucas (1992), for example, has argued that Samaranch's ability to blend the traditional Olympic views with new directions has helped the movement to survive in a period of rapid changes in the world of sports, and that he has merged the very best traditional Olympic values with his vision of a new more embracing and more humane Olympics.

Lucas' (1992) views, however, can be seen as dubious, since the modern scenario of Olympic organisation is mostly dealing with television contracts, multimillion dollar commercial negotiations and doping accusations, and is often involved in serious international political crises (Guttman, 1992). It has been claimed, for example, that through the intervention of television and the ever-increasing commercialisation of the Games since the 1980s, they have become a very lucrative branch of the worldwide entertainment industry (Hargreaves, 2000). It can sensibly be said, therefore, that Olympism is not treated as a global ideology but rather as a global brand. The over-commercialisation of the Games has been clearly in evidence during the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. As Aspden (1996) has reported, Atlanta was unable to make people forget the dollar signs and concentrate on the sport, since the city's centre was transformed into a maze of flashy vending stalls. In a similar vein, Toohey and Veal (2000) believe that the primary aim of the organisers of the contemporary Olympics is not sport for its own sake but rather sport for capitalist profit. Similarly, Simson and Jennings (1992) have claimed that the IOC simultaneously proclaims the independence of the Olympic Movement while giving blessing to almost any commodity that pays a 'kick-back' to the IOC. The invitation, for example, of professional players for the first time to take part in the 1988 Seoul Games and the addition of professional basketball players to the 25th Olympiad in Barcelona was seen as a strategy to involve more commercial interests in the Games (Isao, 1992). Under the current status of the Olympic Games, therefore, it is often said that the Olympic ideals are 'for sale' in an Olympic global bazaar (Simson and Jennings, 1992).
An additional criticism of the IOC is levelled at its role with regard to the political implications of the Olympic Games. A basic contradiction of the Olympic Movement, for example, is that it claims to be international but relinquishes moral authority to national governments. While, in principle and according to the rhetoric of the IOC, athletes who participate in the Games represent just themselves, in practice they represent individual nation-states, and therefore politics, political analysis and political debate are often close to any consideration of the Games (Toohey and Veal, 2000). Because the Olympics have pre-eminence as an international sporting event, one which is watched in the four corners of the world, they have become the perfect medium through which to demonstrate political power and promote political causes. Added to this incentive are the organisational structure and rituals of the games themselves. It has been argued, for instance, that when during Olympic medal ceremonies the national anthem is played and the flag of the victor's country is raised, and when, at the Opening Ceremony, athletes march into the stadium nation by nation, then these practices are overtly creating nationalistic tensions, rivalries and pride (Toohey and Veal, 2000).

States and nations have tried to exert political pressure in pursuit of their interests through the Games. Since the 1950s it has become more systematic, particularly against the background of the cold war between the US and former USSR and the 'new world order'. Besides the well-known boycotts of the Moscow 1980 and Los Angeles 1984 Olympics, other notable instances include the dispute of the 'two Chinas' and the 'two Germanys' when the People's Republic of China, Chinese nationalist Taiwan, the Federal Republic of Germany and the former DDR used the Olympic movement to resolve the question of international recognition of their regimes. Moreover, the Arab–Israel conflict was manifested at the 1972 Munich Games with Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israeli athletes, and the anti-apartheid lobby had South Africa excluded from the Games for a long time (Hargreaves, 2000).

Consequently, it is often argued that IOC's sovereignty is largely an illusion, as its autonomy and immunity to political pressure have been overrated. The IOC has presented a questionable 'independence' by collaborating with political power, while only rarely resisting it (Hoberman, 1986). The worst crime in Olympic history, for example, the massacre of students demonstrating against the Mexican dictatorship during
the 1968 Olympic Games, was carried out by the Mexican Government to guarantee what was then called 'Olympic peace'. Moreover, the 1988 Olympic Games took place in Seoul, South Korea, which was under military dictatorship. It has been claimed that the regime in Seoul used the 1988 Games to promote both their economic and, by securing the participation of the Chinese, their foreign policy (Hoberman, 1986). Sensibly, therefore, Hoberman (1986) terms the core doctrine of the Olympic Movement as 'amoral universalism', in the sense that it strives for global participation at all costs, even sacrificing rudimentary moral standards. Hoberman carries on to claim that when confronted with political conditions beyond its control, the IOC elite reacts instinctively as the conservator of the Olympic status quo, rather than as a vanguard of change (Hoberman, 1986).

A final criticism of the IOC is that, despite the responsibility it has assumed for the control of doping in Olympic sports, it has not been sufficiently 'tough on drugs'. It is claimed that, for fear of offending major member nations or particular sporting federations, it has been slow to use its moral authority to demand penalties on offenders, and has put insufficient resources into testing (Toohey and Veal, 2000). Houlihan (1999) has suggested that the various interests involved in the anti-doping policy of the IOC are reflected in its limited list of banned substances and practices. More specifically, he has argued that the IOC has shown considerable compromise to different parties concerned with doping, such as doctors, sports administrators, scientists, lawyers and so on, who have different priorities on this matter. For doctors, for example, the priority should be the athlete's health, while for sport administrators the ergogenic potential as well as the image of the sport. This naive IOC anti-doping policy reflects what Houlihan (1999) calls "the current mix of science, morality and administrative pragmatism" (p. 96).

The strength of criticism of the IOC and the Olympic Games is clearly evident and we agree with Hoberman (1986), who has claimed that most of such criticism is a reaction against contemporary culture. That is, the presence of advanced technology in sports, the problems associated with a mass culture of sports, the commercialisation of sports, the distortions of human life introduced by specialised training and so on (Hoberman, 1986). The criticism of the IOC, therefore, can be seen as a critique of contemporary sport in general, as a uniquely modern social phenomenon. We also accept that Olympism is a
worldwide sports movement with its own structure and culture, whose activities have important political, economic and cultural ramifications (Hargreaves, 2000). Therefore, perhaps, as Mechico (2000) has stated, Olympism is yet another example of 'social Darwinism'. In that sense, those individuals and social institutions that adapt to changing environments have a much better chance of surviving than those who insist on maintaining the status quo and resist change (Mechico, 2000).

2.2.4. THE OLYMPIC GAMES TODAY AND THE STUDY OF SOCOG

In its current status the Olympic Games come in two forms: Summer and Winter Olympics. Each runs every four years, and since 1994 the Winter Games alternate with the Summer Games in a two-year cycle. In the last couple of decades, both forms of Olympic Games have experienced exceptional growth. This is evident not only from the steadily increasing number of sports in the Olympic programme, but also of the numbers of participating nations and athletes (see Appendix I). As a result, the Olympics have been transformed into a massive sporting event, which, besides the large numbers of spectators they attract, in the case of the Summer Games, are viewed by a global audience of 3.5 billion (De Moragas, 1996).

However, if one considers the negative implications associated with the Olympics mentioned earlier, it is sensible to wonder how the magnitude and significance of the event has been enhanced rather than diminished through the years. Probably, as MacAloon (1995) believes, the Olympics have a positive, reconcilable effect on its international audience. He has stated, for instance, that "the Olympic Games create a sort of hyperstructure in which categories and stereotypes are condensed, exaggerated, and dramatised, rescued from the 'taken for granted' and made the objects of explicit and lively awareness for a brief period every four years" (p. 182). It is true that most sports spectators are more interested in the athletes and their performances than in Olympism and its ramifications as a social movement. Moreover, as Guttmann (1992) has claimed, the history of the Olympic Movement remains concealed from its enormous audience; which does not just overcome its history but it has also demonstrated a prodigious ability to forget it (Guttmann, 1992). For example, a study conducted by the
IOC in 10 countries around the world after the Salt Lake bribery scandal, concerning people's changes of perceptions about the image of the Olympic Movement and the Games, revealed that the Olympics are still considered peaceful, multi-cultural, and global and not exploitative or political (Sponsorship Research International/IOC, 1999). Lenskyj (2000) believes that the IOC, along with local Olympic Organisers and public relations experts, have largely succeeded in maintaining the illusion that, while international tensions may manifest themselves in boycotts or malpractices, the sport world is unequivocally supportive of the Olympic venture.

Therefore, despite the widespread criticisms around the institution of the Olympic Games, which mainly challenge the connection between the ideas of Olympism and the contemporary nature of the event, the Games continuously grow in magnitude and significance. In effect, the contemporary Olympics sustain the status of a mega-event, which has multiple impacts on the host area, both positive and negative, and consequently involves diverse interests. As was shown earlier, economic benefits are the prime motive for all the interests involved in the hosting of the Games, whether it is the local Government, which seeks urban development of the region through infrastructure made for the staging of the event, or the corporation that becomes a sponsor of the event to attract publicity.

The discussion in this chapter, therefore, stresses a main issue, which has important implications for the study of SOCOG. That is, SOCOG should be realised as an organisation which, by undertaking the task of organising an event with multiple ramifications, effectively served external interests. Specifically, an examination of SOCOG should take into account the role of the Olympic Movement and especially the IOC which, in order to secure the best possible presentation of the event, directly affects the organisation of the Olympic Games, and consequently the OCOG. The practices and reputation of the IOC during SOCOG's term of office, affected certain aspects of the organisation, including its organisational structure, its relations with other organisations, and predominately its financing. For instance, the IOC's encouragement for more public involvement in the organisation of the Sydney Games resulted in the appointment of a NSW Cabinet Minister to the leadership of SOCOG. Furthermore, the bribery scandal in the evaluation of 2002 Winter Olympics candidature triggered bad publicity for the
practices of the Olympic Movement, and as a result, potential sponsors for the Sydney Olympics were discouraged from associating themselves with the Games, thus creating gaps in SOCOG’s budgetary provisions (Associated Press, 1999).

In the case of the Sydney Olympics attention should also be placed on the role of public governance and particularly the New South Wales (NSW) government. As was shown in the previous chapter, the NSW government established state agencies to undertake some important responsibilities of the Games’ preparations, and also possessed ultimate authority over SOCOG’s leadership. The NSW government aimed to draw maximal benefits from the Games, as much with regard to local physical development as with regard to local economic growth. Consequently, the organisational aspect of the Games, a responsibility undertaken by SOCOG, was under the strict supervision of the NSW government. In effect, SOCOG was not only operating in co-ordination with state agencies but, as will be shown in later chapters, the NSW government imposed leadership changes on the organisation and gradual shift of some of its responsibilities to governmental agencies.

Therefore, although SOCOG may appear as an independent organisational entity, in reality it operated in the centre of a complex organisational model, and inevitably had to deal with the needs of the various constituent groups. The preparations for the Sydney Olympics lasted seven years and during this period SOCOG needed to elucidate its relations with the various entities of the Olympic Movement, such as the IOC, the NOCs and the IFs, and simultaneously to deal with other groups whose interests are attracted by the event, such as public authorities, commercial organisations, spectators and various public groups. In effect, SOCOG faced the difficulty of bringing together often-conflicting interests, which stemmed from the dual nature of the Olympic Games, that is, as product of the Olympic Movement but also as a mega-sporting event. Therefore, by unfolding SOCOG’s peculiar organisational character, which by nature acted as target of pressures coming from all the entities involved in the preparation and staging of the Sydney Games, the reader could ultimately acquire a deep understanding of the organisational nature of the contemporary Olympic Games.
CHAPTER III

ORGANISATION THEORY AND
MINTZBERG'S CONFIGURATION
APPROACH
The aim of this chapter is to provide a critical review of the organisation theory literature. In doing so, it ultimately aims to stress the premises of contemporary organisational research, and provide a justification for the selection of Mintzberg’s (1979) configuration approach as the conceptual framework for this study. According to Pugh (1997), organisation theory is “the body of thinking and writing which addresses itself to the problem of how to organise” (p. xii). This body of literature has emerged in the form of various schools of thought, which have provided certain conceptual lenses for analysing organisations, thus attempting to identify the best way to manage organisations. As McKinley et al (1999) maintain, a school of organisational thought is “an integrated theoretical framework that provides a distinct viewpoint on organisations and that is associated with an active stream of empirical research” (p. 635). As such, the schools of organisational thought provide the basic intellectual structure within which ongoing theoretical and empirical work takes place. Thus, by understanding and critically evaluating the development of this intellectual structure, this chapter will ultimately provide insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the available frameworks for the study of organisations, and particularly for the study of SOCOG.

3.1. THE ORGANISATION THEORY LITERATURE

The study of organisations is not a recent phenomenon. In the early years of the 20th century, the rise of industrial corporations coupled with an increased impact of social science thinking on our society led to a continual stream of organisational writing (Pugh, 1990; Clegg and Hardy, 1999). The study of organisations draws largely from disciplines such as sociology, psychology, biology and economics. Therefore, the development of schools of thought within organisation theory is subject to the wider development processes of those disciplines (Reed, 1999), and consequently, the field is often seen to be composed of multiple and largely incommensurable theoretical frameworks (McKinley et al, 1999). However, as Shenhav and Weitz (2000) have claimed, the dominant intellectual thread and the main force behind the development of organisation theory has been the elimination of organisational uncertainty, in the sense that the various
approaches to organisation studies share the underlying assumption that "organisations exist in a world teeming with uncertainty which poses a real and actual threat to the business enterprise" (Shenhav and Weitz, 2000, p. 376).

Given that organisation theory is a multiple, overgrown yet still developing field (Kilduff and Kelemen, 2001), it was felt that a review of the relevant literature should be organised in as comprehensive and distinct set of categories as possible. Carper and Snizek (1980), for example, have categorised the organisation theory literature as either primarily theoretical, that is deriving from 'typologies', or empirical, that is deriving from 'taxonomies', in its methodologies, analyses and conclusions. Moreover, Astley and Van de Ven (1983) have identified and classified a number of schools, including 'classical theory', 'population ecology' and 'contingency theory', in terms of their degree of environmental determinism and the level of analysis to which they refer. Other writers stress the appropriateness of certain metaphors in organisation theory to reflect the ways that the various perspectives perceive organisations. MacKechnie and Donnelly-Cox (1996), for example, have identified 'rare skill' and 'anthropological' metaphors in the organisation theory approaches, while Morgan (1997), going even further, provides a series of metaphors, such as 'machine', 'organism', 'brain' and so on, to reflect how the various organisation theory authors have conceptualised organisations. While Carper and Snizek's (1980) and Astley and Van de Ven's (1983) approaches are certainly dated, a metaphor perspective could be helpful for this review. However, although Grant and Oswick (1996) suggest that metaphor is an inevitable feature of our lives, and hence our study of organisations, the ability of a metaphor perspective to increase our knowledge and understanding of organisational phenomena has been criticised (e.g. Tsoukas, 1993). Also, a wider metaphor categorisation, such as this suggested by MacKechnie and Donnelly-Cox (1996), would tend to position many schools of thought under a single label, thus failing to identify minor differences among them, while a detailed metaphor categorisation, such as that suggested by Morgan (1997), would tend to overcrowd some categories, while leaving some others relatively empty, thus risking an overemphasis on some schools of thought at the expense of others.
Here, we will follow Reed’s (1999) theorising, who has categorised schools of organisational thought in relation to the central problematic around which they were developed, coupled with the socio-historical context in which they were articulated. While a discussion of the latter is beyond the scope of this chapter, it was felt that by using these two criteria, our review of the organisation theory literature could benefit in two main ways. Firstly, by using major issues of organisational concern as points of reference, commonalities among schools of thought can be marked, simultaneously enabling the identification of the shifts of concern between subsequent groups of schools of thought. Secondly, by referring to the socio-historical context in which schools of thought were developed, a chronological order is sustained, thus facilitating our understanding of the development of organisational theorising throughout the years.

Drawing largely from Reed’s (1999) theorising, the following sections provide a critical review of the organisation theory literature, grouped under four categories. These are presented under the labels ‘focus on order: from nightwatchman state to industrial state’, ‘focus on integration: from entrepreneurial capitalism to welfare capitalism’, ‘focus on market liberty: from managerial capitalism to neo-liberal capitalism’, and ‘focus on power and justice: from modernity to post-modernity’.

3.1.1 FOCUS ON ORDER: FROM NIGHTWATCHMAN STATE TO INDUSTRIAL STATE

In the course of the formative decades of the twentieth century, the economic, social and political changes that capitalist-led modernisation brought in its wake created a world that was fundamentally different from the relatively small-scale and simple forms of production and administration which dominated earlier phases of capitalist development. Effectively, western societies transformed into developing industrial societies, as the role of the industrial-based economy became dominant. As a result, the early twentieth century witnessed the growing dominance of large-scale organisational units in economic, social and political life, as the complexity and intensity of collective activity moved beyond the administrative capacity of more personal and direct forms of co-
ordination (Reed, 1999). The rise of the industrial state essentially symbolised a new
mode of governance in which rational, scientific organisation transformed human nature.

The needs of a rapidly developing industrial society generated a stream of literature that
was concerned with corporate management (Clegg and Hardy, 1999). This body of
literature, which is often referred to as 'classical organisation theory', was primarily
influenced by the work of Max Weber and his analysis of bureaucracy ("The Theory of
Social and Economic Organisation", 1924). As a social theorist, Weber observed the
relationship between the mechanisation of industry and the rise of bureaucratic forms of
organisations, being especially interested in the social consequences of bureaucracy
(Weber, 1947). His work has been popular for the identification of ideal types of
societies and organisations as 'patrimonial', 'feudal' or 'bureaucratic'. Weber (1947) has
claimed that effective societies, hence organisations, should be characterised by rational
and legal forms of domination and make use of bureaucratic administrative apparatuses
(Weber, 1947). In his work, one can find the first comprehensive definition of
bureaucracy as "a form of organisation that emphasises precision, speed, clarity,
regularity, reliability, and efficiency achieved through the creation of a fixed division of
tasks, hierarchical supervision, and detailed rules and regulations" (Weber, 1947, p. 8).

The concept of bureaucracy dominated organisation studies mainly through the
contribution of the works of Frederick Taylor (1947) and Henry Fayol (1949). These
management theorists provided the basis for the 'scientific management' and 'classical
management theory' respectively. They were both advocates of bureaucratic forms of
organisations and they identified detailed principles and functions through which a
formal organisation could be achieved (Morgan, 1997). Taylor's (1947) concern with
scientific management focused on the systematic design and management of individual
jobs, through, for example, task specialisation and functional supervision, incentive wage
systems and so on, thus recommending the permanent monopolisation of organisational
knowledge through the rationalisation of work performance and job design (Reed, 1999).
Fayol's (1949) principles of organisation, although focused on the design of the
organisation as a whole with a perceptive awareness of the need for contextual adaptation
and compromise, were driven by the need to construct an architecture of co-ordination
and control to contain the inevitable disruption and conflict caused by 'informal'
behaviour (Pfeffer, 1997). As such, the concepts of ‘division of work’ and ‘unity of command’ remain the central focus.

This stream of literature advocated the orderly nature of organisations captured in the idea that management should be a process that involves detailed planning, command, co-ordination and control. As Slack (1993) has suggested, the organisation was conceptualised as “a series of interrelated parts, each of which performs a narrow set of activities in a rigid, repetitive, and impersonal manner in order to achieve a particular end” (p. 190). Under the rubric of classical organisational thinking, the organisation is seen as a rationally constructed artifice, where human beings become raw material transformed by modern organisational technologies into well-ordered and highly productive members. Reed (1999) has maintained that this approach prescribed a blueprint for an authority structure where individuals and groups were required to follow certain laws, and it also provided a universal characterisation of the organisational reality irrespective of time, place and situation. As such, classical organisation theory was founded on the underlying belief that organisation provides a principle of structural design and a practice of operational control, which can be rationally determined and formalised in advance of actual performance (Reed, 1999, p. 30). Effectively, organisational analysis was based on the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ (Perrow, 1986), which reduces the often interpretive work done by organisational actors to a purely cognitive process, dominated by standardised rules and operating programmes. Thus, a cognitive research agenda was established rendering the organisation knowable (Perrow, 1986).

The ideas derived from the classical school have been heavily criticised for their lack of concern for individual needs and ideologies (e.g. Morgan, 1997; Frisby, 1995; Reed, 1999; Pfeffer, 1997), that is, the human aspect in organisations. Although the classical theorists recognised that it is important to achieve harmony between the human and technical aspects in organisations, their main focus was to make humans fit the requirements of what they often refer to as ‘mechanical’ organisation (Morgan, 1997). This bureaucratic approach had the potential to routinise and mechanise almost every aspect of human life, eroding the human spirit and capacity for spontaneous action (Reed, 1999). Such ideas, however, which aimed to promote a rational and routinised way of
managing an organisation with a particular focus on efficiency, proved incredibly successful for managing organisations in the early post-war period (Pugh, 1997). Also, the premises of the classical school of thought lifted the theory and practice of organisational management from an intuitive craft into a codified and analysable body of knowledge that "traded on the immensely powerful cultural capital and symbolism of 'science'" (Reed, 1999, p. 30). Moreover, the theorising of the classical school has been useful in setting future organisational research, since organisational elements underlined by the classical school, such as the specialisation of work tasks and the concentration of decision making, have been the focus of many subsequent studies (e.g. Durkheim, 1964, Pugh et al, 1968, 1976). Elements of the classical approach have proved successful even in the management of contemporary organisations, such as that of McDonalds restaurants (Daft, 1997) and public schools (Meier et al, 2000). As Du Gay (2000) maintained very recently, the benefit of a bureaucratic organisational form is that it removes an organisation's dependency on the personal moral propensities of its staff. He goes on to argue that thanks to bureaucracy it is assured that everything from the delivery of the mail to legal decisions, will be carried out impersonally, without regard for personal characteristics, such as religious and political beliefs of economic status, since bureaucratic office holders will display an antipathy towards those relations that open up the possibility of corruption through, for example, the improper exercise of personal patronage, indulging incompetence or betraying confidences (Du Gay, 2000, pp. 56-57).

However, the failure of formal organisational design theorising to address the problem of social integration and its ignorance of the impact of the external environment on organisations in a continuously unstable and uncertain world, has formed the basis for alternative organisational theorising and research. Particularly the 'human relations school', the 'systems theory' and the 'contingency theory' have placed considerable attention on these missing elements of the classical organisation theory. These schools of thought are presented below under the label of 'integration' to denote their common concern for integrating the missing concepts of the classical school of organisational thought in their theorising.
3.1.2 FOCUS ON INTEGRATION: FROM ENTREPRENEURIAL CAPITALISM TO WELFARE CAPITALISM

HUMAN RELATIONS SCHOOL

The failure of the rationalistic model, as suggested by the classical school, to deal with the dynamism and instability of organisations and its inability to address the problem of social integration (Williamson, 1990), gave rise to a new stream of organisational theorising commonly known as the ‘human relations school’. The whole thrust of the human relations perspective is “a view of social isolation and conflict as a symptom of social pathology and disease” (Reed, 1999, p. 31). It attempted to improve on classical theory by focusing on uncertainties generated by the work group and workers’ social needs (Shenhav and Weitz 2000). Under this perspective, the organisation is seen as a social system, which ought to facilitate the integration of individuals into the wider society in order for the organisation to adapt to changing socio-technical conditions (Reed, 1999). As Thompson and McHugh (1990) have informed us, this conception of organisations as the intermediate social units which integrate individuals into modern industrial civilisation under the auspices of a kind and socially skilled management, became institutionalised in such a way that it began to replace the predominant position held by exponents of the classical school.

Therefore, the main focus of the theorists that followed the human relations school of thought has been the human element in organisations. Elton Mayo (1949), the founding father of the human relations movement, employed a social approach to organisational theory with a primary concern with employees. His research at the Hawthorne Plant of the Western Electric Company in Chicago in the 1920s and the 1930s, also known as ‘Hawthorne Studies’, became famous for stressing the importance of social needs and of group norms in the work place (Morgan, 1997). Mayo (1949) drew particular attention to employees’ motivations for work, and that turned the focus of organisation theorists to the needs of the workforce.

Inspired by the Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of human needs, which presented the human beings as a kind of psychological organism struggling to satisfy its needs in a quest for
full growth and development (Morgan, 1997), organisational psychologists (e.g. Herzberg, 1966; McGregor, 1960) entered the arena of organisational theory providing alternative forms of organisational management. The idea of giving employees more autonomy and more responsibilities combined with a democratic, employees-focused style of leadership emerged as an alternative way to manage organisations compared to the authoritarian and dehumanising style of the classical school approach. It was agreed that a focus on the needs of employees will result in more motivated and committed workforce, in other words a feeling of job satisfaction that in turn will lead to increased productivity, improved work quality, and reduced employee absenteeism and staff turnover (Herzberg, 1966).

Although the human relations school gave another dimension to the study of organisations, away from the rigid and authoritarian ideas of the classical school, it is not without limitations. First, it fails to recognise or at best marginalises the existence of an external environment to organisations (Williamson, 1990), and second, it ignores the political aspect of the organisation that is monitored by different interests, conflicts and relations of power (Morgan, 1997). It was rather seen as management-oriented, and its focus on the employees' needs as a way to increase employees' involvement and commitment to the organisation without paying them any more money (Pugh, 1997). The objectives of this managerial approach, therefore, remain to be productivity and efficiency, the main objectives of the classic school, yet with a more humanistic profile.

SYSTEMS THEORY

The acknowledgement of organisations as social systems by the human relation school can be seen as the starting point of systems theory. Systems theory, also known as 'open systems theory', draws on the idea that an organisation is a systemic entity of a wider socio-technical system, that is, its organisational environment. Systems theory maintains that all organisations, regardless of the sector, are situated in an environment which comprises other organisations, such as suppliers, customers, competitors, and even powerful individuals (Williamson, 1990). As a result, the acceptance of an organisational environment turned the interest of organisational theorists to the relationship between
organisations and their environments. The work of Parson (1956) and Katz and Kahn (1966), are the most representative. Both theorists have regarded organisations as 'organisms' (Morgan, 1997), in the sense that organisations are open to their environment in order to survive, and consequently they need to show an awareness of the needs of this environment.

Parson's (1956) views represent an early but limited form of open systems theory, in that it attempts to tie the organisation to the environment through the activities that the former performs for the latter (Carper and Snizek, 1980). He proposed four different types of organisations according to the primary goals that each serves for the society (i.e. oriented to economic goals, oriented to political goals, integrative, and pattern-maintenance) (Parson, 1956). Despite the obvious limitation of Parson's approach, namely the argument that organisations exist to serve the larger society and do not have goals of their own, his work developed the notion that organisations should be studied as part of their sociological 'ecosystem'. Following Parsons' (1956) functional typology Katz and Kahn (1966) saw the organisation as a set of interacting subsystems, that is, 'managerial', 'strategic', 'technological', 'human-cultural', and 'structural'. According to the type of interaction of these subsystems with the environment, they identified four 'genotypical classes' of organisations, namely 'productive/economic', 'maintenance', 'adaptive' and 'political/managerial' (Katz and Kahn, 1966).

The open systems approach is not without weaknesses. By focusing on organisational needs as a determinant of its relationship with its environment, it ignores the significant role of the people within the organisation, since it essentially claims that an organisation will be functionally effective if it achieves explicit goals, which are formally defined through rational decision-making. However, different power holding groups in organisations often perceive the organisational environment in various ways and it is their choice how to act toward it. One manager, for example, could see a rapid technological evolution in the industry as giving opportunities for long-term investment and potential growth of market share, while another manager could perceive this environmental change as the best timing for the organisation to diversify its operations to other markets or industries. However, the open systems theory contributed in the field of organisational studies by moving away from bureaucratic means of thinking, which prevailed in
organisation theory until then, toward a way that meets the requirements of the environment. According to Morgan (1997), these insights were marshalled under the perspective known as 'contingency theory', which was to dominate the theoretical development and empirical research within the field between the 1950s and 1970s.

CONTINGENCY THEORY

As Checkland (1994) has suggested, systems theory provided considerable conceptual inspiration for the subsequent development of contingency theory, often referred to as 'socio-technical systems theory' (Reed, 1999), or 'structural contingency theory' (Donaldson, 1999). Contingency theory constitutes a structural-functionalist interpretation of the systems approach, as it provides an 'internalist' focus on organisational design elements combined with an 'externalist' concern with environmental uncertainty. The key research issue which emerges from this synthesis of structural and environmental concerns is to establish those combinations of internal designs and external conditions which will facilitate long-term organisational stability and growth (Donaldson, 1999). Therefore, under the theorising of contingency theory, organisations are considered open systems, which need to achieve a balance between their internal needs and the environmental circumstances. The advocates of contingency theory, although using different determinants of organisational design and environment, commonly agree that there is no one-way of managing organisations, but rather that the appropriate organisational form would depend on the kind of task or environment with which an organisation is dealing, and thus, management should be concerned with alignments and 'good fits' (Miles and Snow, 1984; Thompson, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Pugh and Hickson, 1976; Woodward, 1965).

Burns and Stalker (1961) were the first researchers to empirically examine the relationships between the organisation and its environment. By giving extensive illustrations from qualitative case studies, they developed the patterns of adaptation to technological and commercial changes exhibited by 20 firms in the UK. They devised a scale of organisational responses whose polar extremes were defined as 'organic' (e.g. a small mill) and 'mechanistic' (e.g. an electronics firm) organisational structures (Burns
and Stalker, 1961). Their work highlighted the limitations of formal bureaucratic organisational forms, which, they have claimed, are only appropriate to stable environmental conditions. They went on to argue that changing environmental conditions require organic systems of management, that is, flexible authority, task allocation and communication, as opposed to the rigid procedures of bureaucracy (Burns, 1963). Burns and Stalker's approach received support from other researchers who focused on the technological changes of the organisational environment (e.g. Woodward, 1965, Perrow, 1967, Thompson, 1967). Woodward, for example, (1965) after studying British industries, provided a typology in which work organisations were classified according to the kind of production technology they used, that is, 'unit/batch process', 'large batch/mass production' and 'continuous process'. Woodward (1965) and his advocates considered that the nature of technological variables could present important implications for the design of effective organisational structures. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) continued the exploration of the relationship between an organisation's structure and the environment that it faces. They examined high and low performance organisations in different industries and they analysed the degree of structural differentiation necessary for a firm to function effectively in a particular technological environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).

Contingency theory has been utilised as an empirical tool to establish relationships between 'contextual variables', such as organisational size, age, technology and environment and structural features of organisations, such as levels of decentralisation of decision-making, job specialisation and formalisation of tasks. Based on such variables Pugh, Hickson, Hinings and Turner (1969a, 1969b, 1968), commonly known as the Aston Group, produced one of the most influential studies, which also developed the first taxonomy of organisational structures. Their analysis was based on a study of 52 organisations of 250 or more employees, in the Birmingham area. Highly influenced by the Weberian literature on organisations, they constructed 64 component variables, which reflected the bureaucratic characteristics of organisations, in order to operationalise five primary variables of structure, namely 'specialisation of functions', 'standardisation of procedures', 'formalisation of documentation', 'centralisation of authority', and 'configuration of positions' (Pugh et al, 1969b). These variables reflected a large part of
the concepts used in the literature of organisational structure at that time, and provided the basis for much future research in organisational structure (e.g. Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Alexander and Randolph, 1985; Donaldson, 1987; Palmer et al, 1987). Moreover, based on three dimensions of organisational design, that is, ‘structuring of activities’, ‘concentration of authority’ and ‘line control of workflow’, they developed clusters of organisations, thus establishing a seven-fold taxonomy of organisational structures. Their purpose was to produce homogenous groups of organisations that will represent alternative forms of the ‘Weberian’ bureaucracy. These were identified as ‘full bureaucracy’, ‘nascent full bureaucracy’, ‘workflow bureaucracy’, ‘nascent workflow bureaucracy’, ‘pre-workflow bureaucracy’, ‘personnel bureaucracy’, and ‘implicitly structured organisations’ (Pugh et al, 1969b). The overall conclusion of their research was that “a single bureaucratic type of organisations is no longer useful, since bureaucracy takes different forms in different settings” (Pugh et al, 1969b, p. 115).

Despite obvious methodological limitations of their study, that is, a small population of organisations was defined geographically, no voluntary organisations were included, and only relatively large firms were considered relevant to the research (Carper and Snizek, 1980), the work of the Aston Group provided the first empirical framework for examining organisations based on structural design parameters and contextual variables.

Contingency theory, however, has been criticised for its determinism in that contingency causes structure. Under the rubric of contingency theory, the organisation bows to the imperative of adopting a new structure that fits its new level of the contingency factors in order to avoid loss of performance from misfit (Donaldson, 1999). Some authors reject such situational determinism asserting instead that organisational managers have a free choice (Whittington, 1989) and some speak of free will (e.g. Bourgeois, 1984). Child (1972) argues more elaborately that the contingencies have some influence but that there is a substantial degree of choice, which he terms ‘strategic choice’. Child (1972) explained the connection of environment and structure to effectiveness as the result of decisions taken by ‘dominant coalitions’ in organisations, that is, “the strategic decisions of those who have the power of structural initiation” (Child, 1972 p. 16). He went on to claim that an analysis of decision-making could offer a more useful way to understand relationships among organisational parameters than the contingency theorists, who
focused on the establishment of structural forms ignoring the essential political process "whereby power-holders within organisations decide upon courses of strategic action" (Child, 1972, p. 1).

Child's (1972) theorising gave rise to a body of literature, often referred to as 'strategic contingency theory'. This literature is concerned with the missing value of contingency theory, that is organisational strategy, and examined its relationship with organisational structure. Much of this work was influenced by the work of Chandler (1962). Chandler (1962), saw strategy not only as goals and objectives, but also as the means by which they are to be achieved. His work focused on the strategy-structure relationship. He looked at strategic changes that had occurred in American corporations over a period of 50 years, and how these changes affected organisational structure. His main conclusion was that a new organisational strategy, such as diversification, required a new structure if the company was to operate efficiently. This meant that strategy could influence structure in organisations, and replications of his work (e.g. Channon, 1973) confirmed his general findings. Moreover, Mintzberg's (1973) theoretical work identified three modes of strategy formulation, namely 'planning', 'entrepreneurial' and 'adaptive'. He has claimed that organisational conditions such as size, leadership, and the degree of competition and stability within the environment favour one mode of strategy formulation over another. Following the same line of argument, Miles and Snow's (1978) work on the relationship between strategy and structure derived a strategic taxonomy of organisations. Specifically, they identified 'defenders', 'prospectors', 'analysers', and 'reactors' organisations. Like Mintzberg (1973), they have claimed that certain organisational conditions, such as the level of competition, favoured one strategic type over another.

Much of the literature on the strategy-structure relationship has followed Chandler's (1962) view that structure follows strategy. A number of writers, however, have suggested that structure, under certain conditions, can determine strategy (e.g. Scott, 1973), or that they both evolve simultaneously (e.g. Fredreckson, 1986). With a more elaborate argument, Mintzberg (1990) has claimed that the relationship is a co-ordinated one. He has stated that "the structure follows strategy as the left foot follows the right in walking. In effect, strategy and structure both support the organisation. None takes
precedence: each always precedes the other and follows it” (Mintzberg, 1990 p. 183). Strategic contingency theory provided alternative thinking for contingency theorists; however, its over-reliance on strategy as determinant of structure has rendered it deterministic as well (Williamson, 1990). In an attempt to overcome the limitations of contingency theory, but largely drawing from its theorising and findings, a small body of literature emerged under the appellation of ‘configuration approach’.

CONFIGURATION APPROACH

Most of the approaches that have been reviewed within the perspective of contingency theory have attempted to classify organisations. Burns and Stalker (1961), for example, identified ‘organic’ and ‘mechanistic’ forms of organisation, Woodward (1965) classified organisations as ‘small batch’, ‘large batch’ or ‘continuous process’ according to the type of technology utilised, and the Aston Group (Pugh et al, 1968, 1969a, 1969b) constructed seven different types of organisational bureaucracies with regard to a series of structural and contextual organisational variables. As Carper and Sniezek (1980), have claimed, the field of organisational theory has a research tradition rife with conceptual attempts at classifying organisations, and Meyer et al (1993) inform us that this has been at the root of organisation theory since Weber's (1947) notions of ‘charisma’, ‘traditionalism’ and ‘bureaucracy’. The contribution of such attempts is that by classifying organisations into homogeneous groups one can be helped to identify commonalties as well as differences across organisations. Besides, solid findings about a narrow population are more beneficial to the field than marginal findings generalised to the broader population (McKelvey, 1978).

The term ‘organisational configuration’ is used to denote any multidimensional constellation of distinct organisational characteristics that commonly occur together (Meyer et al, 1993). As such, organisational configurations are clusters of organisations that share a common profile along important characteristics such as strategy, structure technologies, processes, and so on. Miller (1987) has claimed that there are four imperatives behind the generation of organisational configurations, namely environment, structure, leadership and strategy. Although some writers have used dimensions from
more that one of the aforementioned imperatives to derive configurations, such as Mintzberg (1979) who used structure and environment, it is mostly common that a single dominant imperative will underlie and organise a configuration (e.g. Miles and Snow, 1984, Duberly and Burns, 1993; Gastrogiovani and Justis, 1998). Much of the work on organisational configurations has been focused on identifying structural commonalities among organisations. It has been argued that the structure of an organisation influences, among others, the flow of information and the human interactions within the organisation (Meyer et al, 1993). Moreover, Miller (1987) argues that structure is channelling collaboration, specifying modes of co-ordination, allocating power and responsibility, and prescribing levels of formality and complexity. In simpler terms, Mintzberg (1979) sees organisational structure as "the sum total of the ways in which [an organisation] divides its labour into distinct tasks and then achieves co-ordination among them" (p. 2).

The configuration approach could be seen as an evolution of the contingency theory but not as alike. According to Meyer et al (1993), contingency theory has been preoccupied with abstracting a limited set of structural concepts, such as, centralisation, specialisation, standardisation and so on, and measuring their relationships with a limited set of abstracted situational concepts such as size and technology. The configuration approach, on the other hand, claims a holistic synthesis of organisations, which means that certain situations or elements of organisations are explained as parts of the organisation as a whole and not in isolation. Moreover, non-linearity is acknowledged, and therefore variables that are found to be causally related to one configuration may be unrelated or even inversely related to another. In effect, that means that there is more that one way for organisational success, a notion that is referred to as 'equifinality' to imply that multiple organisational forms can be equally effective (Meyer et al, 1993).

The organisation theory literature indicates a debate between the classifications of organisations that are originated in the concepts and intuitions of theorists, commonly known as 'typologies', and those that have been derived as empirical evidence and have relied to advanced statistical analyses or multivariate techniques, that is 'taxonomies'. Although writers such as Carper and Snizek (1980) have made a clear separation between empirically-based and theoretically-based classifications of organisations, we will be in line with McKelvey (1978) and Meyer et al (1993) who view typologies and taxonomies
as equally valuable. Their central argument is that although taxonomies are empirically examined, they are theoretically grounded, and typologies are using multiple attributes that are empirically grounded. Among the limited work done on organisational configurations, Mintzberg’s (1973) configuration approach constitutes one of the most significant and influential. Although a typology by nature, it has been very influential in the field of organisation theory because as Meyer et al (1993) have stated “it goes beyond a two-fold distinction yet remains the essential elegance and simplicity that is the hallmark of typologies” (p. 1182). However, Mintzberg (1979) has been criticised for failing to incorporate the issues of culture and strategy in his otherwise comprehensive approach (Doty et al, 1993).

With determinism as the main problem of organisational theory and research alternative views of organisations emerged in the 1980’s. Before we consider these perspectives, however, we need to review of market-based theories of organisation.

3.1.3 FOCUS ON MARKET LIBERTY: FROM MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM TO NEO-LIBERAL CAPITALISM

The realisation of a liberal global economic market in the 1970s and 1980s initiated a focus on the impact of this new order in organisations. The basis of theorising is that through globalisation nations and organisations engage in an expanding economic struggle which will be won by those organisations and economies that will manage to adapt themselves to market demands (Du Gay, 1994). Under this concept, new theories of organisations emerged drawing primarily from the disciplines of economics, social sciences, and even biology. These approaches, which are often referred to as ‘market-based theories’, treat an organisation as constituting a unitary social and moral order in which individual and group interests and values are simply derived from highly influential market interests and values that are irrelevant to conflict and power struggles (Perrow, 1986). As Reed (1999) has argued, this concept of organisations is entirely in keeping with a wider ideological and political context dominated by neo-liberal theories of organisational and societal governance, which raise impersonal market forces to the
analytical status of ontological universals, determining the chances of individual and collective survival (p. 34).

From the field of economics this theorising has taken the form of two main perspectives, namely ‘transaction cost analysis’ and ‘agency theory’. Transaction cost theory concerns itself with the adaptive adjustments which organisations need to make in the face of pressures with the aim of maximising efficiency in their internal and external transactions (Williamson, 1990). Its basic assertion is that markets and hierarchies are alternative instruments for completing a set of transactions. In particular, it suggests that market forms of governance rely on prices, competitions and contacts to keep all parties to an exchange informed of their rights and responsibilities. Hierarchical forms of governance, on the other hand, bring parties to an exchange under the direct control of a third party, typically called the ‘boss’ (Williamson, 1993). Effectively, the focus of the transaction cost theory is on the microeconomic impacts of such exchanges on organisations, since it supports the idea that organisations are increasingly sensitive to the institutional constraints within which economic transactions are conducted (Williamson, 1990). However, it understates the cost of organising and neglects the role of social relationships in economic transactions (Barney and Hesterly, 1999). Moreover, while acknowledging that the parties involved in such transactions may have conflicting interests, it does not attempt to understand the causes of such conflicts.

Conversely, by attempting to understand the causes of disagreement or conflict among parties in such transactions, ‘agency theory’ has focused on the analysis of agency relationships including such issues as the role of the board of directors and top management, with an emphasis on the risk attitudes of ‘principals’ and ‘agents’. According to Arrow (1985), agency relationships occur whenever one partner in a transaction, the ‘principal’, delegates authority to another, the ‘agent’, and the welfare of the principal is affected by the choices of the agent (Arrow, 1985). A typical example is the relationship between outside investors in an organisation and its managers. In this case, the investors delegate management authority to managers who may or may not have equity ownership in the organisation. The delegation of decision-making authority from principal to agent is seen as problematic in that the interests of principal and agent will typically diverge, and the principal will not perfectly and costlessly monitor the actions of
the agent (Arrow, 1985). Therefore, agency theory suggests that the economic transactions between the market and the organisation involve agency problems which lead to costs, and by identifying the sources of such problems suggests the best ways to reduce the subsequent costs (Barney and Hesterly, 1999). Therefore, the economic theories of organisations attain the goal of profit maximisation through the elimination of transaction and agency cost, and assume that organisations that do not put concern on such costs will have little chance of survival.

Although economic market-based theories of organisations have brought the aspects of the new conditions of the economic market into the field, they have not attracted much attention from organisational theorists and researchers probably because such theories often involve rational economic research agendas in a primarily sociologically dominated field. The market-based theories that have attracted more attention are ‘population ecology theory’ and ‘resource dependence theory’, which are briefly presented below.

POPULATION ECOLOGY THEORY

Heavily influenced by the biological literature, the population ecology approach originated with the work of Hannan and Freeman (1977). The basic notion of this approach is that organisations are like living things, which survive if they are able to exploit their environments for resources (Ulrich, 1987). As Baum (1999) has suggested, the research agenda of the population ecology research begins with three observations: a) diversity is a property of aggregates of organisations, b) organisations often have difficulty devising and executing changes fast enough to meet the demands of uncertain, changing environments, and c) the community of organisations is rarely stable, since organisations arise and disappear continually (p. 71). Therefore, unlike other environmental approaches to organisations, the population ecology approach does not look at individual organisations but at populations of organisations which exist in the same industry, geographical market, and so on. The basic idea is that the fittest organisations within specific populations will survive while the others will not. The number of organisations within a sector is considered predetermined, and thus under environmental pressures some organisations perish. By employing theories of
competition and fitness-set and by supporting the notion that certain organisational classes experience very strong inertial pressures, Hannan and Freeman (1977) have argued that the organisational environment is the critical factor in determining which organisations are fit and which are not, selecting the stronger and eliminating the weaker. The central lines of inquiry of ecological research have been the effect of organisational aging and size on failure (e.g. Freeman et al, 1983), the effect of the dynamics and density of organisational populations on failure (e.g. Carroll et al, 1993; Hannan and Freeman, 1989) and the effect of institutional pressures on failure (e.g. Barnett and Carroll, 1993).

RESOURCES DEPENDENCE THEORY

The central notion of the resource-dependence approach is that organisations do not exist in isolation but they depend on their environments for resources. The starting point of this approach can be identified in Emerson's (1962) 'power-dependence theory' of social relations, which argues that there is a mutual power dependence or interdependence in any relationship. Emerson (1962) believed that a symmetric dependence between two actors implies a balanced power relationship, and where the relationship is asymmetric, the actor that is less dependent will have considerable power over the other (Emerson, 1962).

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Pfeffer (1982) extended Emerson's (1962) theory to the examination of the organisation-environment relationship. They have claimed that resource-dependence is proportional to the extent to which the resource is important to the organisation's functioning, the relative magnitude of the resource exchange, and the extent to which it is not available from alternative sources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). They identified managerial attitudes which are used to reduce environmental uncertainty and caused by the organisation's resource dependence, namely 'symbolic', 'responsive' and 'discretionary'. Further, they stressed designing techniques of organisations according to the ways they depend on their environment, such as 'scanning systems', 'loosening dependencies' and so on (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The idea here is that in order to control the uncertainties created by resource supplies, dependent organisations
attempt to ‘enact’ their environment in order to reduce this uncertainty. In practice, that would involve attempts to empower individuals to act on the organisation’s behalf and to regulate the use, access and allocation of organisationally generated resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have claimed that “survival comes when the organisation adjusts to and copes with its environment, not only when it makes efficient adjustments” (p. 19). This perspective, therefore, has also paid attention to decision-makers’ concerns for maintaining organisational autonomy and power over other organisations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Unlike population ecology, it places considerable emphasis on the managerial action in the relationship between organisations and their environment and has stressed the potential for better understanding of this relationship.

While there are significant theoretical differences between the aforementioned market-based approaches, particularly in the degree of environmental determinism in which they engage, both subscribe to a set of assumptions that unify internal administrative forms and external market conditions by means of an evolutionary logic, which subordinates collective and individual action to efficiency and survival imperatives largely beyond human influence (Reed, 1999, p. 33). As Thompson and McHugh (1990) suggest, these approaches ignore the concepts of power, conflict and domination which are absent from frameworks of analytical vision and empirical concern, since they remain silent on the power structures and struggles in and through which organisations respond to environmental pressures. Such critics have generated a new focus of organisational theorists away from macro-level, deterministic perspectives and towards micro-level approaches in order to comprehend the hidden aspects of organisational reality.

3.1.4 FOCUS ON POWER AND JUSTICE: FROM MODERNITY TO POST-MODERNITY

Organisation theory in its early development focused on the structure and design of organisations, while later approaches, such as the contingency theory, recognised the role of the environment in shaping organisational structures and processes. Organisational
theorists, however, have paid little attention to individual needs, organisational ideologies and broader sociological issues, such as power and justice. In view of this deficiency, in the last fifteen years or so, the traditional approaches to organisation theory have been heavily criticised. Steffy and Grimes (1986) and Argyris et al (1985), for example, have criticised the traditional approaches for giving inadequate definitions of organisational concepts, focusing on controlling individual behaviour, assuming gender neutrality, and paying inadequate attention to the consequences of managerial action. Besides, as Frisby (1995) has pointed out, there was also a need for alternative perspectives in organisation theory in order to overcome problems that have arisen due to an over-reliance on traditional approaches.

Moreover, new forms of organisation emerged, which were sufficiently different from the bureaucratic features of modern organisation to suggest the appellation of the 'postmodern' organisation. As Galbraith et al (1993) maintain, the post-modern organisation is primarily decentralised, internal communication is achieved through modern information technology, and hierarchies are premised less on jobs and job requirements and more on competencies. In addition, on the outside, the boundaries that formerly constrained organisations are breaking down, as individual entities merge in chains, clusters, networks, and strategic alliances questioning the relevance of an internal organisational focus (Cooper and Burrell, 1988). The newly found fluidity in the external appearance of organisations rests on the assumption that the inter-organisational relations into which an organisation enters may be a more important source of capacity and capability than internal features, such as size and technology (Alvesson and Deetz, 1999). As a result, the conception of a contingent relation between organisational aspects, such as size, and its structural characteristics is challenged if, for instance, an organisation is multi-headed or networked.

The changing organisational forms coupled with the general need for novel organisational theorising have brought the concerns of Marxist thinking to organisational studies that focus on conflict, power and resistance. That was seen as the early stage of a change in social and political thought, which was taking place under the rubric of 'postmodernism' (Clegg, 1990). At the core of this theoretical project was 'class struggle' as the essential turning point on which social and economic development
occurred. As such, individuals were visible only in so far as they were carriers of identities that their class position either ascribed or denied (Alvesson and Deetz, 1999, p. 186). Essentially, post-modern thought has certain implications for organisational research since it challenges the position of the researcher and the status of the subject. As Clegg and Hardy (1999) have claimed, under the rubric of post-modernism, the research subject is acknowledged not as a stable constellation of essential characteristics, but as a socially constituted category of analysis. Consequently, the status of the researcher is challenged as well; "No longer all-knowing, all-seeing, objective, the researcher is forced to re-examine his or her relation to the research process and the knowledge it produces" (Clegg and Hardy, 1999, p.2).

Under post-modern theorising, a new stream of organisation studies emerged, which, although it stresses different organisational elements, has often come under the label of 'critical organisation theory'. As Reed (1999) suggests, these approaches in their different ways attempt to reformulate the concept of organisation as a socially constructed and sustained order necessarily grounded in the localised stocks of knowledge, practical routines and technical devices mobilised by social actors in their everyday interaction and discourse (Reed, 1999, p. 36). Clegg (1994) has maintained that such approaches aim to reinforce a view of organisations as "the condensation of local cultures of values, power, rules, discretion and paradox" (p. 172). Therefore, the focus is shifted again back to the local aspects of organisational life in order to critically redefine the mission of organisation theory away from ethical universals and conceptual abstractions towards cultural relativities and interpretive schema that are inherently resistant to historical and theoretical generalisation (Alvesson and Deetz, 1999). However, the turn towards the 'local' in organisation analysis has been marked with theoretical attempts to redirect the study of organisations back towards institutional forms such as the 'new institutionalism' (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, Scott and Meyer, 1994). The 'new institutionalism', although focused on organisational structures and practices by looking outside the organisation, it is often attached to post-modernism, since, away from rational approaches, it acknowledges the existence of a power struggle in the organisational environment. As such, before embarking on a discussion of critical
organisation theory, we will identify and review the main premises of 'new institutionalism'.

NEW INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

New institutional theory constitutes a revisiting of the classic institutional theory that was conceptualised by the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977). As Scott (1994) has suggested, Meyer and Rowan (1977) have offered a radical departure from conventional ways of thinking about formal structure and about the nature of organisational decision-making through which structure was produced. They have claimed that formal structures have symbolic as well as action-generating properties, that is that the adoption of a formal structure can occur regardless of the existence of specific problems of coordination and control of members' activities that an organisation may face (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 340). As Tolbert and Zucker (1999) have suggested, this novel premise directed attention to external influences, which are not linked with actual production processes, such as the passage of legislation and the development of strong social norms within an organisational network (Tolbert and Zucker, 1999, p. 172).

DiMaggio and Powell (1991) have extended institutional theory to argue for a new organisational theory that entails a "rejection of rational-actor models, an interest in institutions as independent variables, a turn towards cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest in properties of supra-individual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of individuals' attributes and motives" (p. 8). They emphasise factors which penetrate organisational practices and processes, such as the state, social class, professions and sector procedures, in order to reveal the strategic role played by power actors in the formation and reformation of rule systems that guide political and economic action (p. 28). Organisational reality is seen as neither internally directed, nor externally determined; rather special emphasis is placed on the socially constructed nature of organisational realities, and on the creation of shared knowledge and belief systems (Shenhav and Weitz, 2000). Therefore, the new institutional theory has as its central concern the cultural and political processes through which organisational actors and their interests are institutionally constructed and mobilised in
favour of certain organising logics rather than others. A major contribution of the new institutional theory is the introduction of the concept of 'institutional isomorphism', that has been conceptualised as the constraining process that forces an organisation to resemble other organisations that face the same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). The three mechanisms through which institutional isomorphism occurred are identified as 'coercive', which stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy, 'mimetic' resulting from standard response to uncertainty, and 'normative', which is associated with professionalisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 67).

Although the 'new institutional theory' perspective has suggested a comprehensive framework for looking at the organisational structure-environment relationship, it has not yet been clearly operationalised, and this is its major limitation. As Tolbert and Zucker (1999) have claimed, there is very little consensus on the definition of key concepts, measures or methods within this theoretical tradition, as it has developed no central set of standard variables, nor is it associated with a standard research methodology.

CRITICAL ORGANISATION THEORY

Critical theory is often given a broad meaning to include all works taken from a critical stance on contemporary society with an orientation towards investigating "exploitation, repression, unfairness, asymmetric power relations, distorted communication, and false consciousness" (Alvesson and Deetz 1999, p. 186). As such, through critical thinking, researchers are encouraged to go beyond the assumptions, ideologies and norms that remain uncritical of social bias, including the world of organisations. It has been suggested that much of critical organisation theory derives from Marxist roots, which in organisational studies takes the form of a critique which argues that organisational structures are not rational systems for performing work but rather power systems designed to maximise control and profits (Scott, 1992, p. 115). As Alvesson and Deetz (1999) have suggested, the central issue for critical organisational theorists is that contemporary society, as a result of science, industrialisation and information
technologies, has developed positive capacities but also dangerous forms of domination, which are reflected in contemporary organisations (p. 188).

As a result, critical theory in the field of organisation studies serves as an ideological critique with a central concern with the themes of domination and exploitation by owners and managers in the workplace. A considerable amount of such critical work has addressed management and organisation theory as expressions as well as producers of ideologies, which legitimise and strengthen specific societal and organisational relations and objectives (e.g. Alvesson and Willmott, 1996; Ogbor, 2000). Critical organisation studies, therefore, focus on the perspective of those who work for the organisation in contrast to those who own or control them, and extends our understanding of organisations by considering the social, political and cultural contexts in which organisations and individuals are situated. As such, the central objective of critical organisation theory is "to create societies and workplaces which are free from domination, where members have an equal opportunity to contribute to the production of systems, which meet human needs and lead to progressive development of all" (Alvesson and Deetz, 1999, p. 192). In other words it aims to determine how dominant ideologies create systems of power and privilege within organisations, and try to transform existing social inequalities and injustices (Macintosh and Whitson, 1990).

Critical organisational research has shown that the norms within which the organisation is legitimised mirror those of the dominant group in the larger society (e.g. Grubbs, 2000; Kersten, 2000; Ogbor, 2000; Nkomo, 1992). It has opposed the perceived hegemony and domination of the powerless, emphasising as bases of difference and oppression of employees' class (e.g. Davies and Thomson, 1994), gender (e.g. Acker, 1990; Martin, 1995; Mumby and Putnam, 1992), and more recently sexuality (e.g. Humphrey, 1999; Parker, 2002). Ogbor (2000) suggests that the overall contribution of such studies is the examination and exposition of situations of domination and repression within organisations and the central point in their analysis of organisational practices is the promotion of emancipation and freedom from managerial and administrative means of employee domination and repression.
As was mentioned above, critical organisational theorists often have a clear research agenda, which is focused on the interests of specific identified groups in organisations, such as women or people of colour, but usually address general issues of norms, values, forms of consciousness and communicative distortions within corporations. The latter often stresses the concept of what is referred to as ‘corporate culture’, which as Shein (1985) has suggested, is “the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs which are shared by members of an organisation, which operate unconsciously, and define in basic taken-for-granted fashion an organisation’s view of itself and its environment” (Schein 1985, p. 6).

The issue of corporate culture was initially conceptualised from a non-critical perspective. It was seen as just another instrument for the control of the non-rational aspects of employees. Peters and Waterman (1982), for example, saw corporate culture as a set of common values and beliefs, which can serve as a regulatory mechanism, when, for instance, an organisation faces transaction costs or communication problems. It has been argued that managers can build a culture by articulating a set of values and then reinforcing them with formal policies, informal norms, language, stories and rituals (Peters and Waterman, 1982). Recently, however, it has been suggested that it is more appropriate to examine organisational culture through a critical perspective. Ogbor (2000), for example, has claimed that, if uncritically examined, corporate culture remains an ideology which is socially constructed to reflect and legitimise the power relations of managerial elites within an organisation. A critical perspective on corporate culture, therefore, can help to expose situations of domination, disempowerment, and undemocratic practices in organisations (Ogbor, 2000, p. 591).

From a critical perspective, Schein (1990) has identified three layers in organisational culture, namely ‘artifacts’, such as physical layout of facilities and dress code of employees, ‘organisational values’, which can be found in organisational statements of goals and objectives, and ‘unconscious’, the taken-for-granted beliefs, traditions and habits of organisational members that underlie decision-making and managerial action (Schein, 1990). Schein (1990) has also referred to organisational sub-cultures to describe informal groups within an organisation that share same beliefs, experiences, views or problems. Moreover, Siehl and Martin (1989) went deeper in examining organisational
culture by distinguishing ‘espoused values’, such as social responsibility, financial concerns and so on, and ‘values in use’, such as social inequality, resistance to change, and the like. Recent critical research on corporate culture has argued that through the active participation of individuals in organisations, the identity of the individual is reconstructed to fit into the norms and values prescribed by the culture of the organisation (e.g. Carr, 2000). Also, it has been shown that the norms by which the organisation is legitimised mirror those of the dominant group of the larger society (e.g. Grubbs, 2000; Kersten, 2000). As such, corporate culture is seen as a social ‘artifact’, which reflects the social relations and power order of the wider society.

The concept of corporate culture has attracted much attention in contemporary organisational studies, and its inclusion in theoretical frameworks is often seen as absolutely essential (Ogbor, 2000). However, although Willmott (2000) has recently demonstrated that culture can be theorised in the same way as structure, possessing irreducible powers and properties that predispose organisational actors towards specific courses of action, its intricacies and the consequent difficulty of examining it, using life histories, analysis of archival materials and so on, is probably its basic limitation. Clegg and Hardy (1999), for example, have noticed that although organisational culture constitutes a ‘hot’ topic in organisational studies, much of the research interest has been rather prescriptive. Moreover, in an organisational world in which a high proportion of the workforce works part-time or as independent contractors with limited attachment to firms, the issues of culture and cultural control may be seen as almost irrelevant (Handy, 1995).

In general, critical organisation theory provides insights into the ways in which power and authority becomes institutionalised in organisational practices (Ogbor, 2000). Moreover, it enables us to examine assumptions embedded in taken-for-granted managerial practices, and question the role of organisations and their accountability to the community (Rusaw, 2000). Also, it helps to reject existing modes of social imperialism and cultural domination, and as a result, researchers are encouraged to go beyond the assumptions, ideologies and norms that remain uncritical to social bias (Alvesson and Deetz, 1999). However, if one assumes that the political, social and cultural contexts within organisations reflect the wider societal status quo, then suggestions for changes in
the micro level would be ignored, unless changes in the macro level are achieved. Indeed, as Alvesson (1991) has claimed, when the product of critically minded theorists diverges from that offered by the status quo, especially when the knowledge offered does not function to legitimise the societal bases of power and domination, such knowledge is seen as heretical.

3.2 CHOICE OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: MINTZBERG'S CONFIGURATION APPROACH

This review of organisation theory has stressed the main perspectives of the field, each of which has contributed in its own way to the evolution of organisational analysis. The various schools of thought have marked with their presence the terrain of organisation theory by providing novel theorising yet sustaining continuity, in the sense that they were investing their work in previous literature. Within this constellation of perspectives two central debates can be identified. First, there has been a general theoretical debate concerning the concepts of 'structure' and 'agency' as they are employed for the explanation of organisational features. Those who emphasise 'structure' highlight the importance of the objectified external relations and patterns that determine or constrain social interaction within specific organised systems; while those who emphasise 'agency' stress an understanding of the social and organisational order, and focus on the social practices through which human beings create and reproduce organised systems (Reed, 1999). Therefore, schools of thought, such as 'systems theory' and 'contingency theory' as well as the market-based theories, are in favour of the structural conception of organisation, while post-modern schools of thought support the agency conception of organisation. Secondly, there has been an epistemological debate between 'positivism' and 'constructivism' with regard to the nature of knowledge that organisation studies produce. The former treats an organisation as an entity existing in its own right, which can be explained in terms of general principles that govern its operations, while the latter conceptualises an organisation as a socially constructed and dependent entity which can only be understood in terms of highly restricted and localised methodologies that are open to revision and change (Donaldson, 1996). As such, the rational, integrationist and
market-based schools of thought are in favour of a positivist epistemology, whilst the post-modern perspectives have been developed on the basis of a constructivist epistemology.

Given the above, the choice of a theoretical and epistemological stance and the subsequent decision on a specific conceptual framework for the examination of organisations is not an easy task. Clegg and Hardy (1999) claim that organisational researchers decide what empirical sense they wish to make of organisations by deciding how they wish to represent them in their work. Representation involves a choice concerning what aspects of the organisation a researcher wishes to represent, and how he or she represents it. Consequently, a representation of an organisation is achieved in particular terms addressing certain ways of seeing, and therefore acknowledging certain organisational attributes. However, at the same time such a representation entails certain ways of not seeing, thus failing to acknowledge other possible organisational attributes.

As such, the employment of a particular perspective for the study of SOCOG would inevitably entail the risk of not addressing certain aspects of the organisation. However, given that the aim of this study is to identify the range and nature of organisational formations in SOCOG's life cycle, a prime concern of this project is to address structural characteristics of SOCOG. Therefore, the employment of a critical stance is abandoned, since, although it could stress issues such as the internal politics or the corporate culture in SOCOG, it would fail to reveal its structural nature. Moreover, a market-based perspective would focus on the external conditions of SOCOG, thus underemphasising its internal setting. As such, it was felt that an integrationist perspective would be appropriate to capture the structural characteristics of SOCOG, since, away from classical approaches, such a stance would focus on the internal nature of the organisation, yet simultaneously acknowledging the dependence of its internal condition on external factors. Among the integrationist perspectives 'contingency theory' appears as the most profound approach for the examination of organisational structures (Donaldson, 1999). Most of the work on organisational structures has advocated the premises of contingency theory as much in mainstream organisation studies (e.g. Donaldson, 1987; Miller and Droge, 1986; Pugh et al, 1968, 1969) as in studies of sport organisations (e.g. Frisby, 1986; Kikulis et al, 1989; Slack and Hinings, 1987; Thibault et al, 1991; Theodoraki,
However, as was mentioned earlier, contingency theory has been criticised for employing limited structural concepts and measuring their relationship with a limited set of abstracted situational concepts. A better conceptual tool for the capturing of organisational structures and formations is provided by configuration theory, which is often seen as an extension of contingency theory (Donaldson, 1999; Slack, 1997). It has been claimed that configuration theory's capacity to combine broad patterns from contingency theory's fragmented concepts, grounding them in rich, multivariate descriptions can help consolidate the gains of contingency theory (Meyer et al, 1993, p. 1176). Therefore, a configuration perspective was seen as the most appropriate for examining the organisational formation of SOCOG. In particular, the conceptual framework of this study is largely drawn from Mintzberg's (1979) approach, which constitutes the most prominent configurational perspective (Meyer et al, 1993). Mintzberg's (1979) approach was seen as a comprehensive, multidimensional structural model, which does not capture structural characteristics in relation to isolated external factors, but rather in relation to each other and the organisation as a whole. However, Mintzberg's (1979) model is defective mainly because of its claim of its appropriateness for the study of any organisation, of any sector. As a result, this study has considered the particularities of SOCOG as well as of the industry in which operates, and has adjusted Mintzberg's configuration model to fit the study of SOCOG. In the following sections Mintzberg's (1979) configuration approach will be presented in detail as well as its modified version, which has been used for the examination of SOCOG.

3.2.1 MINTZBERG'S CONFIGURATION APPROACH

With his book 'The Structuring of Organisations' (1979), Mintzberg has provided us with a structural typology of organisations. Starting from his assumption that effective organisations achieve coherence among their component parts, and that they do not change one element without considering the consequences for all of the others (1979, p. 7), he has argued that organisations fall into natural clusters, what he called 'configurations'. Specifically, he has claimed that organisational elements such as spans of control, forms of centralisation, planning systems and so on, should not be chosen at
random, rather they should be selected according to internally consistent grouping, which
in turn should be consistent with the situation of the organisation, the conditions of the
industry in which it operates, and its production technology (Mintzberg, 1981). As a
result, Mintzberg (1979, 1981) has identified five main organisational configurations,
each of which constitutes a combination of certain elements of structure and situation,
namely the ‘simple structure’, the ‘machine bureaucracy’, the ‘professional bureaucracy’,
the ‘divisionalised form’, and the ‘adhocracy’ (see Appendix IV). Mintzberg has treated
his configurations as ideal types, in the sense that he presents a series of arguments that
result in specific predictions about organisational effectiveness as a function of the degree
of similarity between an actual organisation and one or more of the identified
configurations. In that sense, we agree with Meyer et al (1993), who claimed that
Mintzberg presents not only a typology but a theory as well.

In order to synthesise his configurations, Mintzberg (1979, 1981) identifies five basic
parts of the organisation, six basic co-ordinating mechanisms, nine essential parameters
of design and four situational factors. The selection of the basic part of the organisation,
which represents its basic functioning part, using the most appropriate ‘co-ordination
mechanism’ to co-ordinate organisational activities, together with the appropriate ‘design
parameters’, which specify the organisational structure, are put against characteristics of
the internal and external organisational environment, (i.e. the ‘situational factors’), and
eventually produce an effective organisational form, that is a ‘configuration’.

**Five Basic Parts of the Organisation**

Mintzberg (1979) identifies five parts of the organisation: a) the ‘strategic apex’, that is,
the top management. Here are found those people charged with the overall responsibility
for the organisation such as the Chief Executive Officer and any other top-level
managers; b) The ‘operating core’, which encompasses those organisation members who
perform the basic work related directly to the production of products or services; c) The
‘middle line’, which comprises the middle-line managers and acts as the connector
between the strategic apex and the operating core; d) The ‘technostructure’, which
consists of the control analysts, such as accountants, and those who focus their attention
directly on the design and functioning of structure; e) The 'support staff', which comprises all the organisational units that provide support to the organisation but which are not part of the operating core, such as the payroll staff. Finally, Mintzberg (1983) sees the organisation as being surrounded by what he calls 'ideology' (Figure 3.1). Although it is not explicitly stated, Mintzberg attempts to incorporate in the term 'ideology' the cultural characteristics of an organisation, what is commonly known as 'corporate culture'. As was mentioned earlier, corporate culture has attracted much attention in contemporary organisational studies (e.g. Schein, 1990; Siehl and Martin, 1989; Ogbor, 2000), nevertheless Mintzberg fails to emphasise on this issue, and this has been one of the main criticisms on his approach (e.g. Doty et al, 1993).

**Figure 3.1: The Basic Parts of an Organisation**

![Diagram of an Organisation](image)

(Source: Mintzberg, 1979, p. 20)

**Six Basic Co-ordinating Mechanisms**

Mintzberg (1979) defines the structure of an organisation as "the sum total of the ways in which [the organisation] divides its labour into distinct tasks and then achieves co-ordination among them" (p. 2). These co-ordinating mechanisms are considered as the most essential elements of the organisational structure, "the glue that holds organisation
together" (p. 3). These are identified as ‘mutual adjustment’, where co-ordination is achieved by informal communication; ‘direct supervision’, when one individual directs the work of others through instructions and orders, ‘standardisation of work processes’, when contents of the work are specified, ‘standardisation of outputs’, when the results of the work are specified, ‘standardisation of skills’, when the kind of training or knowledge required to perform the work is specified, and ‘standardisation of norms’, when people in the organisation share the same set of beliefs in order to perform the work (Mintzberg, 1979, 1981).

Nine Essential Parameters of Structural Design

According to Mintzberg (1979) organisational structure encompasses formal and semiformal means that organisations use to divide and co-ordinate their work in order to establish stable patterns of behaviour. These are the following design parameters: a) ‘job specialisation’, the horizontal and vertical in the hierarchy specialisation of tasks; b) ‘behaviour formalisation’, achieved through job descriptions, rules, regulations and so on; c) ‘training’, which refers to the process by which job-related skills and knowledge are taught, such as formal training programmes); d) ‘indoctrination’, the process by which the organisation socialises its members to achieve standardisation of beliefs; e) ‘unit grouping’, the selection of the criteria by which the organisations is separated into different unit groups, usually grouped by market or function; f) ‘unit size’, which is similar to what is called ‘span of control’ and specifies the number of positions into a single unit; g) ‘planning and control systems’, such as action planning and performance control systems which are used to standardise outputs; h) ‘liaison devices’, mechanisms used to achieve mutual adjustment between as well as within units, such as committees and task forces, and i) ‘decentralisation’, which determines the diffusion of decision-making power within the organisation.

Situational Factors

As a ‘structurist’ (Pugh, 1997, p. 11), Mintzberg (1979) claims that effective organisations require effective structuring. He has argued that effective structuring
requires a consistency among the design parameters and situational factors. In other words, the situational factors we are presenting here are contingency factors that influence the choice of the design parameters. Mintzberg (1979), therefore, provides us with a series of hypotheses based on the nature of the situational factors that organisations are dealing with.

**Age and Size.** According to Mintzberg, the age and size of the organisation will mostly affect its formalisation of behaviour. Moreover, the larger the organisation, the more specialised its tasks, the more differentiated its units and the more developed its administrative component. Mintzberg (1979) puts particular attention on organisational age and size and claims that these situational factors determine structural transitions attested as the organisation grows. More specifically, he has argued that organisations have initially a ‘craft structure’, which after passing the stages of ‘entrepreneurial’, ‘bureaucratic’, and ‘divisionalised’ structures it will end up with a ‘matrix structure’. The above seem arbitrary but Mintzberg (1979, 1981) explains that such structural transitions are not continuous or linear, rather that they are only hints of the relationship between organisational growth and structural development.

**Technical System.** Mintzberg supports that the production technology utilised by organisations affects its structural formation. In particular a regulating technical system would formalise the operating work, and in effect would bureaucratise the structure of the operating core. However, when the technical system utilised by the organisation achieves automation of work processes the structure within the operating core transforms to an organic one (Mintzberg, 1981, p. 116). Moreover, a complex technical system, such as advanced computing technology, would require a large and professional support staff, which would essentially require selective decentralisation of decision making within the operating core, usually achieved with the use of liaison devices (i.e. committees, expert groups etc.).

**Environment.** In line with contingency theorists, Mintzberg supports that the environment of an organisation affects its formation. He identifies four dimensions of organisational environment. That is, ‘stability’, which can range from stable to dynamic, ‘complexity’, which can range from simple to complex, ‘market diversity’, which can
range from integrated to diversified, and 'hostility' which can range from munificent to hostile. Based on these dimensions he maintains that the more dynamic the organisational environment, the more organic the organisational structure and the more complex, the more decentralised the structure. Moreover, he argues that hostility in the organisational environment centralises its structure, while environmental disparities encourage selective decentralisation of decision making in order to differentiate work constellations (Mintzberg, 1979, 1981).

Power. Mintzberg (1979) identifies 'external control', 'power needs' of organisational members, and 'fashion' as the major organisational power factors. He has argued that the greater the external control of the organisation the more centralised and formalised its structure. With regard to power needs of organisational members, he has claimed that they tend to create excessively centralised structures. Finally, he supports that 'fashion' favours the structure of the day and of the culture. However, he points out that when a new structure comes along it is not appropriate for all organisations.

3.2.2 MINTZBERG'S STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATIONS

As was mentioned earlier, a major contribution of Mintzberg's approach to the field of organisation theory is the identification of five main configurations, that is organisational types that are shaped according to the structural and situational elements that organisations exhibit. A brief presentation of these configurations is presented below.

The Simple Structure

The name tells a lot about this configuration. The organisational structure is simple comprising not more than one large unit which consists of one or a few top managers and a group of operators who do the basic work. It has little or no 'technostructure', few 'support staff', a loose division of labour, and a small managerial hierarchy. In effect, little of its behaviour is standardised or formalised, and minimal use is made of planning, training, or 'liaison devices'. According to Mintzberg (1979) co-ordination is achieved at the 'strategic apex' by direct supervision and consequently, power of decision making is
centralised in the hands of the CEO who usually is the owner of the organisation. Such organisations must be flexible because they operate in dynamic environments but in order for the chief executive to retain control simple environments are required as well. Centralised control favours rapid and flexible innovation; however, when complex forms of innovation are required the ‘simple structure’ falters because of its centralised management (Mintzberg, 1979). Mintzberg (1979) believes that almost all organisations begin their lives as ‘simple structures’, granting their founders the latitude to establish them and retain this structure in their formative years. ‘Simple structures’ will normally fail to bureaucratise after their formative years, since bureaucratic forms of structure require power control to move away from the entrepreneur to the ‘technostructure’ or the ‘operating core’, and a CEO is expected to resist to such changes. Mintzberg (1979) claims that when an organisation experiences extreme pressure or hostility in its environment, and therefore needs to act urgently and effectively, it reverts to ‘simple structure’, no matter what its usual structure. That is, systems and procedures are suspended and the power returns to the CEO to give him or her the control to face the situation directly.

The Machine Bureaucracy

This configuration falls close to what the Aston Group (Pugh et al., 1969) has described as ‘workflow bureaucracy’. Its emphasis is on ‘standardisation of work processes’ for co-ordination, and as a result it requires many analysts, that is strong involvement of the ‘technostructure’, to design and maintain its systems of standardisation. As a result the expert staff possesses a certain degree of informal power, which results in a certain amount of horizontal decentralisation of decision making. ‘Machine bureaucracy’, however, tends to be vertically centralised because formal power is usually concentrated at the top (Mintzberg, 1979). Since machine bureaucracies seek functional stability, achieved through ‘standardisation of work processes’, they also seek simple and stable environments. The work of complex environments cannot be rationalised into simple operating tasks, and that of dynamic environments cannot be predicted. Mintzberg (1979) suggests that a large ‘support staff’ secures this stability; the organisation supplies
its own support services wherever possible so it can closely control them. Having a large 'support staff', a large 'operating core', a large 'technostructure' and a large 'middle line' as well, one would expect a very large organisation. Indeed Mintzberg's 'machine bureaucracies' are large so that they can achieve repetition and standardisation. The 'technical systems' utilised are expected to fulfil a regulating function, since they routinise work and consequently enable that work to be standardised. According to Mintzberg (1979), this passion for standardisation and tight control systems is usually encouraged in externally controlled organisations, such as those controlled by governments (Mintzberg, 1979).

The Professional Bureaucracy

The basic co-ordinating mechanism employed by this configuration is the 'standardisation of skills'. Such organisations rely for their operating tasks on trained professionals whose skills are usually standardised out of the organisation, such as in a university or a training camp (Mintzberg, 1979). The highly skilled specialists, who constitute the 'operating core' of the organisation, have considerable control over their own work. There is, therefore, little, if any, 'technostructure' in such organisations since the professionals have the adequate knowledge and ability to perform their jobs without the support of specialist staff. In effect, professional staff possesses considerable power and autonomy, which consequently decentralises the organisational structure. Moreover, the 'support staff' is large in order to back up the professionals, dealing with simple and routine jobs. Mintzberg (1979) claims that 'professional bureaucracy' is most effective in stable yet complex environments. Complexity requires the decision-making power to be decentralised to the 'operating core', while environmental stability enables those individuals to work with a good deal of autonomy. While organisational age and size are not of particular interest in professional bureaucracies, the technology utilised is of importance only for what it is neither regulating, nor sophisticated, nor automated. Essentially, Mintzberg claims that the aspect of 'technical system' should not restrict the freedom of the specialists in performing their complex tasks in Professional Bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1979, 1981).
The Divisionalised Form

This structure can be described as market-based, with the 'strategic apex' being a central headquarters overseeing a set of parallel divisions, each charged to serve its own markets. According to Mintzberg, the divisionalised structure is not a complete structure but rather a partial one, in the sense that structure is imposed by the headquarters to the divisions. Therefore, each division has its own structure and possesses considerable autonomy to operate its own business. However, the headquarters usually employ performance control systems in order to ensure 'standardisation of outputs', what is often the basic coordinating mechanism for such organisational structures (Mintzberg, 1979). Consequently, a small 'technostructure' as well as a small 'support staff' is required. Such central control to the divisions, which is used to standardise their outputs, encourages bureaucratisation within the divisions. Moreover, standardisation is achieved through the control of the divisional manager who would centralise the power on the apex of the division. Consequently, one would expect the divisions to have a 'machine bureaucratic' structure. Alternatively, one could see the headquarters as acting as the external controller with the divisions structured as 'machine bureaucracies'. According to Miller and Friesen (1984), the 'divisionalised form' has emerged as a means for 'machine bureaucratic' organisations to adapt themselves to new conditions and spread their risks by overlaying another level of administration that could add and subtract divisions.

The Adhocracy

Mintzberg (1979) has claimed that when sophisticated innovation is the case, another configuration is required, that is, the 'adhocracy'. This organisational type requires experts who are formed into smoothly functioning project teams achieving co-ordination through 'mutual adjustment'. In that case, extensive horizontal job specialisation is required which is achieved through formal training. Many 'liaison devices' are also essential in order to ensure co-ordination between these teams. Decision-making power is selectively decentralised to the teams which are usually located in different parts of the organisation. Matrix structures are often required, in the sense that the 'support staff' and
the 'technostructure' would be absorbed into the different project groups. Mintzberg (1979) identifies two types of adhocracies, namely the 'operating adhocracy', where the innovation takes the form of direct services to external clients, such as consulting firms that form multidisciplinary teams to deal with others organisations' issues, and the 'administrative adhocracy', where the project work serves the organisation itself, such as with chemical firms and space agencies. In any 'adhocracy' type the decision making power is evidenced within the project teams from where it is emerged. Mintzberg claims that flexible, organic structures with a great deal of decentralisation of decision-making are appropriate for organisations seeking sophisticated innovation. 'Adhocracy', therefore, is an organisational formation that favours environments that are both dynamic and complex. Usually 'adhocracies' are young organisations because, as Mintzberg (1979) claims, time encourages an organisation to bureaucratise. 'Technical systems' in 'adhocracies' are expected to be sophisticated as well as automated. Specialists of the 'technostructure' hold the power of decisions concerning the sophistication of the technology utilised, while the automation is achieved by standardisation, which is designed and built right into the machines, and is controlled by the specialists in the 'operating core'. Finally, according to Mintzberg (1979, 1981) 'adhocracies' seem to be fashionable as organisational types since they combine some sense of democracy with the absence of bureaucracy. Effectiveness, however, is usually achieved through inefficiency, since project teams are formed with highly paid specialists and separate secretarial support. Consequently, such organisational forms can only be found in extremely innovative industries, such as in the industries of electronics and genetics (Mintzberg, 1979).

3.2.3 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF SOCOG

As was shown above, Mintzberg's configuration approach provides a description of two sets of organisational dimensions: the parameters of structural design and the situational factors. The former refers to the internal organisational attributes that synthesise the structure of an organisation, while the latter refers to the main external factors that represent the context in which an organisation operates. In addition, Mintzberg stresses the basic manner with which work is co-ordinated within an organisation (i.e. basic co-
ordinating mechanism) as well as the part of the organisation with the most significant contribution to an organisation's operations (i.e. basic part of the organisation). According to Mintzberg (1979) the combination of these organisational attributes synthesises the structural profile of an organisation, namely a structural configuration. However, Mintzberg (1979) treats his configurations as ideal types, in the sense that any effective organisation of any sector should fall in one of the identified organisational types. Earlier we have stressed that different sectors carry different organisational design requirements (Child and Smith, 1987), and therefore when a particular organisation is examined, the notion of 'sector specificity' should be taken into account. Consequently, the application of this conceptual framework for the examination of an organisation like SOCOG requires a consideration of the unique organisational interactions and the context in which the organisation has been developed (Child, 1988). For this reason, Mintzberg's approach has been modified for the examination of SOCOG. This meant that some of the elements of Mintzberg's approach were excluded from the conceptual framework, as they were seen to exhibit little relevance to the organisational peculiarity of SOCOG, while new SOCOG-specific variables were added (see Table 3.1). An additional consideration with regard to the conceptual framework was that Mintzberg (1979, 1981) often provides a weak explanation of the manner in which each variable should be measured. Consequently, the operationalisation of SOCOG's characteristics under investigation was based partly on Mintzberg's theorising and mostly on studies that have employed similar organisational attributes. The framework that was used for the examination of SOCOG and the operationalisation of its variables is discussed below:

**Situational Factors**

Mintzberg identifies four main factors that form the context in which an organisation operates, namely 'size', 'technical system', 'environment' and 'power'. With regard to 'size', Kimberly (1976) has suggested that four important aspects should be considered: the physical capacity of the organisation; the personnel available to the organisation; the volume of organisational input or, occasionally, the volume of its output; and the discretionary resources available to the organisation. Kimberly (1976) has claimed that although these four aspects are distinct, they are often inter-correlated. Organisational
studies often use a single measurement of organisational size, that is, the number of staff available to an organisation. Pugh et al (1968, 1969) and Robbins (1990), for example, have measured size in terms of numbers of staff as they claimed that this is a fairly accurate measure across organisations, and is highly related to other measures of size. Similarly, Child (1973) has empirically supported 'numbers of employees' as the strongest indicator of organisational size. Consequently, in line with major organisational studies the organisational size of SOCOG will be measured with regard to the numbers of staff available to the organisation.

The situational factor of 'technical system' was excluded from the theoretical framework of this study. In Mintzberg's (1979) terms, the organisational attribute of 'technical system' refers to the levels of influence that the technology used by an organisation has on operational tasks (i.e. regulation of technical system), and to the levels of difficulty of this technology for staff, (i.e. sophistication of technical system) (Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 250-251). Although it has been empirically proven that the technology utilised affects the organisational structure (e.g. Woodward, 1965; Thomson, 1967; Perrow, 1967), much of that research has been focused on manufacturing and machine-production firms, where production technology is the central operating issue. Moreover, the impact of technology on structure has generated considerable debate. The Aston Group, for example, found only weak relationship between technology and various measures of organisational structure (Hickson et al, 1969a). Similarly, Child and Mansfield (1972) replicated the Aston Group's work to examine the technology-size-structure relationship and rejected the technological imperative, by concluding that "size has a much closer relationship to the aspects of structure measured than does technology" (p. 383). Also, in recent organisational research it has been claimed that traditional studies that examine relationships among technology and structure fail to tell a true story and are not particularly helpful in managing processes in the post-industrial age (Roberts and Grabowski, 1996, p. 415). Roberts and Grabowski (1996) have suggested that different sectors carry different relationships between technology and structure, and that in some sectors technology does not directly affect structure. They went on to claim that in 'system design' studies, such as this study, which examine an organisation as a whole and in relation to its environment, consideration should be placed on the levels of correlation.
between technology and structure. Therefore, for the case of SOCOG, which is predominantly a ‘service provider’ organisation, technology has been seen as not directly affecting its corporate structure. The structure of some areas in SOCOG may be affected by the technology used such as Broadcasting or Accreditation but it has been considered that single SOCOG’s organisational units such as the aforementioned cannot significantly affect the structure of SOCOG as a whole.

The dimension of ‘environment’ can be confusing since the term itself can be defined in a variety of ways. Most commonly, a distinction is drawn between the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ environment of an organisation. The key element of the internal environment is the corporate culture, that is, values, beliefs, understandings and norms shared by the members of the organisation (Schein, 1992), which is beyond the scope of this study. On the other hand, the external environment includes all elements existing outside the boundary of the organisation that have the potential to affect the organisation (Daft, 1997). The general external environment includes international, political, socio-cultural, technological and economic factors and affects the organisation indirectly (Daft, 1997). The focus of this study is on the part of the external environment that directly affects an organisation; that is its ‘task environment’. This can include owners, customers, suppliers, associates, competitors and so on (Morden, 1996). In the case of SOCOG, it could be considered that the owner is the IOC and the NSW government; customers are the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), which represent the athletes of their countries, the spectators, and the IFs which represent the Summer Olympics’ sports. Suppliers are the IOC, the taxpayers and NSW government, as well as the sponsors and the television rights holders who are also customers at the same time. Other entities of SOCOG’s task environment could be the citizens of the Sydney and Australia as well as special public groups, such as environmental and indigenous groups. The term ‘environment’, therefore, is used here as synonymous with ‘task environment’. For the needs of this study, SOCOG’s environment has been separated in four different categories: the ‘Olympic Movement’, the ‘Commercial Sector’, the ‘Public Governance’, and the ‘Public Groups’. The Olympic Movement includes the IOC, the International Federations (IF), the National Olympic Committees (NOC), and the athletes. The Commercial Sector includes the sponsors, the media and partner organisations. The
Public Governance consists of all levels of Public Governance involved in the organisation of the Games such as the host city, the state government, and the Federal Australian government. Finally, the Public Groups category is comprised of the citizens of the host City and visitors as well as established public groups, which could affect the organisation of the event.

The conditions of an organisation’s environment are seen by Mintzberg to be affected by the factors of ‘complexity’, ‘stability’, ‘market’s diversity’ and ‘hostility’. This study, however, utilises only the first two factors. ‘Complexity’ refers to the extent to which the environment is ‘simple’ or ‘complex’ and is measured by the number and heterogeneity of external elements influencing SOCOG’s operations, while ‘stability’ refers to the extent to which an organisation’s environment is ‘stable’ or ‘dynamic’ and is measured by the levels of prediction of the needs of external elements influencing SOCOG (e.g. Duncan, 1972; Dess and Beard, 1984). The factor of ‘market diversity’ was excluded, since it was seen to be incorporated in the factor of ‘complexity’, which stresses the heterogeneity (i.e. diversity) of the environmental entities. The ‘hostility’ factor was also excluded from the conceptual framework, since SOCOG operated in a ‘competition-free’ industry, in the sense that it virtually held a monopoly with regard to the organisation of the Sydney Olympics. However, external organisations which were involved in the Games’ preparations, such as the IOC or the NSW government, could create a degree of hostility towards SOCOG. Though, the interests of the organisations of SOCOG’s environment are more likely to create a rather hospitable condition for the organisation, since they mostly operated in co-operation with SOCOG, and to a degree their success depended on the performance of SOCOG. For example, the Olympic Movement seeks the smooth transaction of the event and the best possible presentation of the Olympic sports, the public governance seeks among others financial efficiency of the organisation, and the commercial sector wishes their best possible presentation during the event. As such, SOCOG is unlikely to face hostility from external entities but rather support for a common purpose.

According to Mintzberg (1979), the situational factor of ‘power’ mainly refers to the extent of external control of an organisation by other powerful organisations or individuals. Such a concept, however, is difficult to measure, since the ways through
which an organisation can be externally controlled can be various. For example, an organisation which is dependent on external financial resources could be controlled by its financial suppliers through strict budgetary control mechanisms, while a public organisation could be controlled by the state through the enforcement of a undesirable legal framework. This study measures the ‘power’ dimension by determining the degree of representation of external actors on the decision-making bodies of SOCOG, a measurement which is grounded on the Aston Group’s operationalisation of the situational factor of ‘ownership and control’ (Pugh et al, 1968, 1969a). In doing so, it is aimed not only to measure the number of external individuals involved in the decision-making processes in SOCOG, but also to identify external factors and agencies that influenced the decision-making of the organisation.

In previous chapters it was shown that one of the main characteristics of SOCOG was that a great deal of its operation was, by its very nature, dependent on externally held resources. Consequently, it was felt that issues of SOCOG’s resource dependence should be incorporated into the theoretical framework of the study. The bulk of research on organisational resource dependence is grounded in Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) theorising which has stressed the internal and external strategies that organisations develop in order to minimise the uncertainty arising from dependence on the environment for resources. In effect, the work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) is mainly a strategic management theory focused on organisations’ strategies towards environments which hold essential for their operations resources. Much of recent empirical work on organisational resource dependence is based on Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) theorising, and naturally falls into the field of strategic management (e.g. Schmid, 2001; Hillman et al., 2000; Froelich, 1999), which is beyond the scope of this study. However, the starting point, as much in Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) work as in the bulk of the recent research on organisational resource dependence, is the assessment of the levels of importance of external resources for the organisations under investigation. Consequently, in order to enrich the situational factors of the theoretical framework, the attribute of ‘resource dependence’ was added to indicate the levels of importance of externally held resources for SOCOG. By employing the attribute of ‘resource dependence’ it is not intended to add another factor to Mintzberg’s approach but rather to give greater emphasis to the
context within which SOCOG operated. In other words, it was felt that by identifying the importance of external resources to SOCOG's operations throughout its life cycle, a fuller understanding of SOCOG's organisational condition could be achieved. Following Johnson and Scholes' (1997) classification of organisational resources, SOCOG's resources were categorised as: a) Financial Resources, including financial assurance, b) Human Resources, including IFs' experts, volunteers and contractors' staff, c) Physical Resources, such as sport venues and equipment, and d) Intangibles, which according to Hall (1992b) include the brand name and the corporate status of the organisation. The attributes of the latter were seen to be incorporated into the term of 'legitimacy resources' (Hall, 1992b), in the sense that SOCOG received its Olympic essence and its legal status by external agencies, namely the IOC and the NSW government respectively.

Parameters of Structural Design

Mintzberg's configuration approach describes an organisation's structural design with reference to nine factors, namely 'job specialisation', 'behaviour formalisation', 'decentralisation', 'training', 'indoctrination', 'unit grouping', 'unit size', 'planning and control systems', and 'liaison devices'.

Mintzberg's 'job specialisation' refers to the specialisation of tasks within an organisation. The term 'specialisation' often falls under the notion of 'complexity', which refers to horizontal and vertical differentiation in an organisation (Hall, 1991). This has been measured with regard to the number of major sub-divisions in an organisation and the number of sections per unit (e.g. Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Price, 1972). Similarly, Hall et al (1967) and Pugh et al (1968) have focused on the number of major divisions or departments in an organisation to measure organisational specialisation. This study has followed the theorising above, and operationalised 'specialisation' as the number of major divisions and programmes in SOCOG. The number of divisions and departments in organisations is also referred to as 'departmentation', and it has been claimed that it is one of the most critical aspects of organisational structure (Hollenbeck, 2000).
'Behaviour formalisation' refers to the standardisation of work processes by the imposition of operating instructions, job descriptions, rules, regulations and the like (Mintzberg, 1989, pp. 103-104). This organisational attribute is usually termed 'standardisation' to describe the extent to which rules, procedures, instructions and communication are written (e.g. organisational charts, employee handbooks etc.) (Pugh et al, 1969a). Hage and Aiken (1970) have measured 'standardisation' with reference to both written and unwritten rules that govern an organisation. This is in line with Hall (1982), who has suggested the use of perceptual measures for 'formalisation', which also allows the identification of informal procedures in an organisation; something that cannot be obtained if only official records are used. Most of the work in sport organisations, however, has measured 'formalisation' with reference to the existence of written documentation (e.g. Frisby, Slack and Hinings 1987; Thibault et al, 1991, Kikulis et al, 1995; Theodoraki, 1996). This study endorses Hall's (1982) notion that an organisation can be standardised (i.e. formalised) not only through written, official instructions, but also through non-written, informal procedures. As such, 'formalisation' has been operationalised as the levels of adherence of SOCOG's staff to both formal and informal instructions.

'Decentralisation' refers to the diffusion of decision-making within an organisation (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 105). Mintzberg suggests that "when all power for decision making rests at a single point in the organisation we shall call the structure centralised; to the extent that the [decision-making] power is dispersed among many individuals we shall call the structure decentralised" (1979, p. 181). This concept has been used by the vast majority of studies in organisational structure, and it usually comes under the label 'centralisation' to refer to the extent that the decision-making power is concentrated (Hollenbeck, 2000). The Aston group has measured 'centralisation' with regard to the locus of authority to make decisions affecting the organisation. This point in the hierarchy was determined by asking "who was the last person whose assent must be obtained before legitimate action is taken—even if others have subsequently confirmed the decision" (Pugh et al, 1968, p. 76). This approach to centralisation has been used in several studies of sport organisations (e.g. Kikulis et al, 1989, 1995; Slack and Hinings, 1987; Thibault et al, 1991; Morrow and Chelladurai, 1992; Frisby, 1986; Theodoraki,
1996). Consequently, in line with the bulk of the relevant literature, this study has operationalised ‘centralisation’ as the level in the hierarchy of SOCOG where final decisions were made.

‘Training’ and ‘indoctrination’ refer to the formal programmes that are used to establish and standardise the skills and attitudes respectively of staff in an organisation (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 104). Mintzberg sees ‘training’ and ‘indoctrination’ as alternatives to the concept of ‘formalisation’ in the sense that both contribute to the standardisation of the performance of an organisation’s staff, hence to the overall organisational standardisation. Indeed, the ‘training’ attribute is often incorporated in the ‘formalisation’ or ‘standardisation’ design factor both in the organisation theory literature and the literature on sport organisations (e.g. Pugh et al, 1968, 1969a, 1969b; Kikulis et al, 1995), while ‘indoctrination’ is omitted. As such, these design parameters could be seen as part of the ‘formalisation’ factor and get excluded from the conceptual framework. However, in order to be as close as possible to Mintzberg’s model, this study has included the ‘training’ variable, which has been operationalised as the levels of training required for the staff available to SOCOG.

‘Unit grouping’ refers to the choice of bases by which positions are grouped together into units in organisations (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 104). Mintzberg (1979, 1981) suggests two main bases through which positions are grouped in organisations: the function performed and the market served. The latter is partly related to what is often referred to as ‘spatial dispersion’ to denote the degree of geographical dispersion of organisational units (e.g. Hall et al, 1967; Hall, 1991). However, Mintzberg has extended this concept to include the various criteria utilised by organisations to divide their units. These can include work processes, products or services, customers and area (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 104). Following Mintzberg’s conception, in this study the ‘unit grouping’ dimension has been operationalised as the type of criteria used to break down organisational units.

Related to the ‘unit grouping’ is the structural dimension of ‘unit size’, which refers to the number of positions or sub-units, contained in a single unit. Mintzberg uses this term as equivalent to ‘span of control’ or ‘span of authority’, which refer to the extent that a particular job is supervised (e.g. Pugh et al, 1968, 1969a). This factor, however, is
usually included in organisational studies as a dimension of 'centralisation', since the degree of supervision is seen as a factor which is closely related to the decision-making structure in organisations (Hall, 1991). Similarly, Hollenbeck (2000) has claimed that the 'span of control' dimension fails to reveal the authority structure in organisations, and that it more accurately achieved through the examination of 'centralisation'. Therefore, the 'unit size' factor was seen as a weak dimension of organisational structure and it was excluded from the conceptual framework.

The design factor of 'planning and control systems' refers to the action planning and performance control mechanisms that are utilised by organisations to standardise their outputs (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 105). Although Mintzberg treats this factor as a distinct variable, he fails to exemplify its difference with the 'formalisation' factor. As it was shown earlier, 'formalisation' is used to describe the levels of adherence of an organisation's staff to formal and informal mechanisms that are used to standardise its operations, and naturally includes planning and control mechanisms. Whether they are formal or informal, the existence of procedures which aim to direct and control the performance of an organisation's staff fall under the 'formalisation' attribute. As such, the 'planning and control systems' variable was excluded from the conceptual framework as it was seen to be incorporated into the 'formalisation' design variable.

Mintzberg (1979) also identifies 'liaison devices' as a design parameter that refers to the mechanisms used by organisations to co-ordinate work among organisational units. According to Mintzberg (1979) such mechanisms usually take the form of standing committees, which bring together individuals from different organisational units on a regular basis to decide on specific issues, or task forces, which are formed for a certain period of time to perform a specific task. Mintzberg sees the existence of such devices as an essential factor for identifying the manner that complex and multi-divisional organisations achieve co-ordination of operations among their various organisational areas. Therefore, the 'liaison devices' variable has been operationalised as the number of standing committees and task forces in SOCOG.

Organisation theory literature claims close association between strategy formation and structure, and Mintzberg's approach has been criticised for lacking such strategic features.
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG

CHAPTER III

(Doty et al, 1993). Strategic contingency theorists such as Channon (1973) and Miles and Snow (1978) examined the strategy-structure relationship based on the levels or degree of competition an organisation faces. They went on to claim that the rivalry of the industry in which an organisation operates affects the nature of its strategic formation, and that its structure is formulated accordingly. In the organisation of the Olympic Games, however, competition exists only when cities bid to host the event and therefore, when an OCOG is established it operates under a ‘monopolistic’ state of competition. That is, an organisation operates alone in an industry, in our case the industry of the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, and hence there is no competition from within the industry (Sloman and Sutcliffe, 1998). At a business level, therefore, which refers to how an organisation competes within its industry for customers (Daft, 1997), an OCOG does not formulate strategies because there is no competition that will force the organisation to diversify, for instance, or radically relocate its pricing policy. Strategy formulation for OCOGs, therefore, is bounded at a functional level which concerns with independent strategies for each operational area (Daft, 1997) such as marketing, finance, planning, and so on. OCOGs’ operational-level strategies, however, are constrained by external organisations such as the IOC which makes the marketing arrangements on behalf of OCOGs, the IFs which set the rules for the competitions or the government which establishes the financial boundaries of an OCOG. The major strategic issue for the organisation of the Olympics, therefore, is whether an OCOG has enough scope to exert operational-level strategies. This strategic feature of OCOGs has been operationalised as ‘strategic capacity’ and it refers to the degree that SOCOG can formulate operational-level strategies.

The conceptual framework adapted from Mintzberg’s (1979) approach and the operationalisation of the variables is presented in table 3.1 along with the key study or studies that have operationalised the respective variables in the same manner. Effectively an organisational model is produced which will be used for the examination of SOCOG. In particular, Mintzberg’s (1979) modified approach will be applied throughout the life cycle of SOCOG rather than in a specific point in its organisational life. The main assumption behind the choice of this process is that SOCOG’s organisational characteristics will tend to change as the organisation progressed through its operational
life primarily due its dramatic growth. This in turn raises the necessity for stressing some basic issues with regard to organisational change. These issues and their relevance to the study of SOCOG are presented in the following chapter.

**Table 3.1: The Conceptual Framework for the Study of SOCOG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextual Characteristics</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
<td>The Number of Staff available to SOCOG (Kimberly, 1976, Hall, 1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>The number and heterogeneity of external elements influencing SOCOG (Complexity); The levels of prediction of the needs of external elements influencing SOCOG (Stability) (Duncan, 1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resource-Dependence</strong></td>
<td>The levels of importance of resources possessed by external actors to SOCOG (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
<td>The degree of representation of external actors on the decision-making bodies of SOCOG (Pugh et al, 1968, 1969a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural Design Parameters</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialisation</strong></td>
<td>The number of operational areas (major divisions, departments and programmes) in SOCOG (Hall et al, 1967; Kikulis et al, 1989; Hollenbeck, 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formalisation</strong></td>
<td>The levels of adherence of SOCOG’s staff to both formal and informal instructions, and procedures (Hall, 1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centralisation</strong></td>
<td>The level in the hierarchy of SOCOG where final decisions are made (Pugh et al, 1969; Kikulis et al, 1989; Theodoraki, 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
<td>The levels of training required for the staff available to SOCOG (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit Grouping</strong></td>
<td>The type of criteria used to break down organisational units (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liaison Devices</strong></td>
<td>The number of standing committees, commissions and task forces in SOCOG (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BASIC PART OF THE ORGANISATION</strong></td>
<td>The part of the organisation which makes the most significant contribution to SOCOG’s operations (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BASIC CO-ORDINATING MECHANISM</strong></td>
<td>The fundamental ways in which SOCOG achieves co-ordination among its divisions and programmes (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRATEGIC CAPACITY</strong></td>
<td>The degree that SOCOG can formulate strategies at operational-level.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER IV

ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE AND THE STUDY OF SOCOCG
The aim of this study is to undertake an analysis of the organisational configurations evident in the life cycle of the Sydney 2000 Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG). Effectively, by using the conceptual framework presented in the previous chapter, this study aims to examine the nature of a set of SOCOG’s contextual and structural elements, in order to provide a holistic analysis of its organisational formation throughout its life cycle. SOCOG, however, like any Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG), exhibited a changing character, since it experienced dramatic growth in its size, and subsequent death within approximately seven years. The organisation theory literature suggests that changes in an organisation’s size affect the status of its structural elements (e.g. Pugh and Hickson, 1976, Kimberly, 1976, Mintzberg, 1979; Meyer and Tsui, 1993). Consequently, it would be mistaken to apply a structural examination of SOCOG without considering the time aspect, as it is unlikely for the organisation to exhibit the same kind of characteristics throughout its life cycle. Therefore, it was felt that in order to examine the organisational formation of SOCOG it would be appropriate to consider whether it was possible and analytically useful to separate its life cycle into distinctive chronological stages and apply Mintzberg’s (1979) modified approach on each of these separately. This offers the prospect of identifying the range of organisational formations in SOCOG, thus providing an evolving, time-specific picture of the organisation.

The idea of examining SOCOG at distinctive phases of its operational life rather than at a random point in time, and the consequent requirement to chronologically separate its life cycle, necessitates the consideration of aspects of the organisational change literature. In particular, in order to achieve an appropriate ‘periodisation’ of SOCOG’s life cycle, there is firstly a need for a thorough understanding of the sources of change in organisations and the associated patterns of change identified by the literature. This chapter, therefore, aims to provide an understanding of how organisational change is conceptualised in the relevant literature, and effectively to provide guidance for the selection of a theoretical framework which would be suitable for identifying change in SOCOG. It consists of three parts, the first of which concerns the nature of organisational changes and the forces behind such changes. The second part reviews different perspectives for classifying change in organisations. Finally, the third part draws on the particularities of SOCOG,
and provides support for the selection of a ‘life cycle’ perspective for understanding its changing character.

4.1 THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

Contemporary organisations are in a constant state of change as new people enter organisations, new production technologies are introduced, new products and services are launched, new divisions are often created, decision-making processes are altered, links with other organisations are developed, plans are redirected and even organisational objectives are diversified. Change, therefore, is a phenomenon which is attached to virtually every organisation and its study has generated a great deal of analysis. Organisation theorists have attempted to describe organisational change in various ways which often reflect their particular perspective on organisations and the specific organisational aspects that they investigate. As such, four main types of organisational change are often identified, namely ‘processual’, ‘structural’, ‘cultural’ and ‘political’ (Cao et al, 1999).

A ‘processual’ view sees organisational change in terms of alterations in the ways that organisations operate both internally and externally, whether it concerns the manner that related tasks are grouped within an organisation to produce a certain outcome or the interaction of an organisation with customers, suppliers and other organisations (e.g. Hammer, 1996). A ‘structural’ view sees change in terms of organisational functions such that the basis for grouping activities, the individual roles and responsibilities, the decision-making processes, the mechanisms for co-ordination and control and so on (e.g. Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). A ‘cultural’ view stresses changes in values, beliefs, understanding, and norms shared by the members of the organisation (e.g. Milliken and Martins, 1996). Finally, a ‘political’ view puts emphasis on changes in the power distribution and the manner that this power is exercised by groups or individuals in organisations (e.g. Pfeffrey, 1993).

Each of these four types constitutes a different perspective on organisational change as it refers to a particular dimension of an organisation. However, despite this diversity, these different perspectives are often seen as interrelated and interdependent (Lancourt, 1994).
DeLisi (1990), for example, has claimed that shifts in the wider societal culture influence individuals who influence organisational culture, which in turn affects organisational structure. Moreover, Burnes (1996) suggests that changes in the power distribution in an organisation (i.e. 'political change') affect the authority structure and the decision-making processes, and often the overall organisational culture. In the same line of argument, Nadler (1988) has claimed that a significant and lasting change in organisational behaviour needs structural change, task change, change in the social environment, as well as changes in the individuals themselves. As such, organisational change is seen as a dynamic process, where change in any one organisational dimension often results in compensatory change in others.

What are, though, the forces behind the generation of change in organisations? The organisational change literature often emphasises the role of the external environment as a trigger for organisational change. The external environment includes all elements existing outside the boundary of the organisation that have the potential to affect the organisation (Senior, 1997). These often fall under the PEST acronym (Bourgeois, 1980), which is used to refer to the political, economic, socio-cultural and technological factors that have a potential to affect an organisation. Changes, for example, in taxation, in lifestyle or in currency exchange rates are expected to affect markets and industries and, at least indirectly, the organisations that operate within them. Organisations are directly affected by their customers and suppliers as well as by associate and competitor organisations (Daft, 1997). Therefore, the environmental factors that can generate change in organisations include customers, suppliers, governmental and regulatory bodies, trade unions, competitors, labour supply, and technological advances (Senior, 1997, p. 13).

The view that sees organisational change initiated in the external organisational environment draws largely from mainstream organisation theory perspectives, such as 'population ecology', 'resource dependence', 'contingency theory' and 'institutional theory' (see a discussion of these perspectives in chapter III). Although these perspectives differ, primarily in the degree to which they see environment affecting organisations, they all subscribe to the notion that when environmental change occurs, organisations need to change in order to adapt to the new conditions. An 'organisation-
adjusting-to-the environment' view of organisational change, however, is often seen as
deterministic as it overemphasises external causes of change over internal dynamics for
change. Burnes (1996), for example, has argued that organisations often find that the
dominant internal view of how they should operate is out of step with what is required to
align or realign them with the environment. Consequently, organisations may face a
number of choices ranging from whether to attempt to change their structures, cultures or
styles of management to accommodate the environment, or whether to attempt to
manipulate the environment and other constraints so as to align them more closely with
the dominant view within the organisation. It is, therefore, the choice of key
organisational members which determines the attitude of an organisation towards an
environmental change, and consequently the nature and range of organisational change.
Internally, change is often initiated by 'change agents', that is, people whose job it is to
ensure that an organisation makes the necessary changes to maintain or increase its
effectiveness (Child, 1972). Change agents can introduce changes in strategy, operations
and management or adopt a new leadership style. A new chief executive officer, for
example, a revision of the administrative structure, the redesign of a group of jobs, the
introduction of a new strategy, staff redundancies and so on, are changes that are
normally internally triggered (Senior, 1997, p. 18).

Therefore, although organisational change can be the result of either external or internal
factors, internal and external forces for change are often seen interrelated. This is in line
with Child's (1972) theorising, which has identified decision-making as the link between
environment, organisation and effectiveness. Child (1972) has explained the connection
of environment and structure to effectiveness as the result of decisions taken by
'dominant coalitions' in organisations, that is, "the strategic decisions of those who have
the power of structural initiation" (Child, 1972, p. 16). Therefore, the mechanisms of
organisational decision-making exert great influence on the manner in which
organisations change. Mintzberg and Waters (1990), and Kimberly and Rottman (1987),
for example, have claimed that decision-making structures are strongly linked to the
strategic direction of an organisation, and therefore, when organisational change occurs,
decision-making structures are the central point. In a similar vein, Huber and Glick
(1995) maintain that organisations change in a manner which reflects how organisational
key actors perceive environmental changes. In particular, they claim that key organisational members can influence change in four important ways: a) through their belief systems—their values, ideologies, and mental models of cause-effect relationships; b) as inhibitors of change; c) as interpreters of the environment—they may perceive an environmental stimuli as problem or opportunity; and d) as manipulators of the environment—they may advertise, lobby or educate to make environments more hospitable to the organisation (Huber and Glick, p. 7).

Consequently, when looking at changes in organisations both the conditions of the organisational environment as well as the choices of the key organisational members should be considered. Moreover, it is essential for the researcher to comprehend that evidence of organisational change cannot be objectively examined as it depends on how organisational actors perceive change. For example, from a researcher's perspective a new post or a new job description may be seen as change, whilst from the perspective of managers this may seem insignificant. However, the same phenomena can often be perceived as evidence of either change or stability depending upon the perspective that is taken, and on how the boundaries of the system within which the change is taking place are defined (Cao et al, 2000). For example, a change in the diffusion of decision-making of an organisation may occur to enhance stability. However, such an action constitutes a significant structural change, which, regardless of the perception of organisational members, needs to be analysed, especially when organisational structure is examined. Overall, therefore, a comprehensive approach to organisational change would have to be based on a thorough understanding of all aspects of the organisation, namely “its organisational objectives, its structure, its social interactions, its individual members and its environment” (Druhl et al 2001, p. 385).

4.2 CATEGORIES OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

Given that organisational change is a complex phenomenon (Senior, 1997), many authors have attempted to categorise changes in organisations in order to shed more light on how change should be understood. In doing so, authors tend to emphasise particular organisational aspects. Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1996), for example, categorised
change as being either 'strategic' or 'non-strategic', while others, stress the organisational level in which change occurred, such as Burnes (1996), for example, who has identified change at 'individual', 'group', 'inter-group' or 'organisation' levels. Moreover, the scale of organisational change is often the point of reference, where organisational change is categorised as 'incremental' and 'radical' (Goodstein and Warner, 1997), 'evolutionary' and 'revolutionary' (Tushman et al., 1988), or as 'incremental' and 'quantum' (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). However, most authors have drawn upon the notion that the environment triggers internal changes (e.g. Felkins et al., 1993; Burnes, 1996; Ansoff and McDonell, 1990; Wilson, 1992), and have categorised organisational change as being mainly 'planned' or 'emergent'.

Burnes (1996) suggests that most of the literature on the planned approach to change has derived from the practice of 'organisation development', which has been described as "[the] systemic application of behavioural science knowledge to the planned development and reinforcement of organisational strategies, structures and processes for improving an organisation's effectiveness" (Cummings and Huse, 1989, p. 1). The concept of planned change relies heavily on the assumption that the environment is known, and consequently, there is one way that change ought to be achieved, that is, deliberately and carefully thought through and then implemented (Wilson, 1992). This notion is in contrast to a great number of writers who claim that organisational change is more of a continuous and open-ended process than a set of discrete events (e.g. Stacey, 1996; Cummings and Huse, 1989). On a similar note, planned change has been criticised for its emphasis on incremental and isolated change and its inability to incorporate radical and transformational change (Dunphy and Stace, 1993; Miller and Friesen, 1984). Planned change also assumes that common agreement can be reached and that all parties involved in a particular change project have a willingness and interest in doing so (Burnes, 1996).

The drawbacks of the planned approach to change have given rise to the 'emergent' approach. Emergent change has been given a number of different labels, such as 'continuous improvement' and 'organisational learning' and stresses that change is an open-ended and continuous process of adaptation to changing conditions and circumstances. It also sees the process of change as a process of learning and not just a method of changing organisational structures and practices (Overmeer, 1997; Burnes,
Writers such as Pedler et al (1991), Wilson (1992) and Clarke (1994) have advocated emergent change by challenging the appropriateness of planned change in a business environment that is increasingly dynamic and uncertain. As such, emergent change stresses the unpredictable nature of change. Burnes (1996) maintains that the main premise of the emergent approach is that organisational change is considered a continuous process of experience and adaptation aimed at matching an organisation's capabilities to the needs of a dynamic environment and it is achieved through a multitude of small-scale incremental changes (Burnes, 1996, p. 189). The emergent approach to change, however, assumes that all organisations operate in dynamic and unpredictable environments and this is its major weakness. Although most organisations operate in environments with some degree of unpredictability, not all organisations face the same degree of environmental turbulence. As a result, some organisations may find planned approaches to change both appropriate and effective in their particular circumstances. It is, therefore, a matter of how the organisation wishes to operate and the character of its environment.

The planned-emergent distinction of organisational change provides an understanding of the nature of change that organisations may experience; however it fails to address the aspect of time. Organisations often undergo continuous change, and therefore theories of change ought to explain continuity within specific timescales (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Orlikowski, 1996). As such, a search for general patterns of change requires considerable focus on the temporal context, as generalisations are hard to sustain over time (Pettigrew et al, 2001). The concepts of continuity and temporality are the focus of a body of literature which aims to describe the stages through which organisations go as they grow and develop over time, commonly known as ‘organisational life cycle models’ (e.g. Greiner, 1972; Kimberly and Miles, 1980; Quinn, 1980; Quinn and Cameron, 1983). Much of the literature of organisational life cycles draws on Greiner's (1972) theorising. Greiner (1972) has argued that as organisations grow in size their activities go through the following phases each of which is associated with a different growth period in an organisation's life: ‘entrepreneurial stage’, where the founders define organisational culture, mission and goals; ‘collective stage’, where departments and functions begin to be defined; ‘formalisation stage’, where systems of communication and control become
more formal; and 'elaboration stage' which occurs when the organisation has reached a plateau in its growth curve and it is time for strategic change.

The orderly nature of organisation evolution has been also highlighted in the work of Kimberly and Miles (1980), Quinn (1980) and Quinn and Cameron (1983). The main premise of this literature is that changes that occur in organisations follow a predictable pattern, which can be characterised by developmental stages. Kimberly and Miles (1980) identified different organisational life stages with reference to organisational development. However, although they claimed that organisations experience 'creation', 'transformation' and 'decline', they stressed that the length of time that organisations spend in each stage may vary considerably, and every organisation will not necessarily go through every stage. In line with Kimberly and Miles (1980), Quinn (1980) and Quinn and Cameron (1983) have claimed that organisations follow sequential stages of development that occur as a hierarchical progression that is not easily reversed and involves 'birth', 'growth', 'maturity', and 'diversification' or 'decline'. Although this literature provides important clues concerning the manner that organisations develop, it emphasises a single developmental sequence that is expected to pertain to most organisations irrespective of the industry or market in which they operate.

Opposing the argument above, Miller and Friesen (1984) have argued that organisational stages of development will vary as a function of leadership, strategy and industry. Some organisations, therefore, may spend more time in the 'birth' or 'growth' phase while some may remain small and simple forever. Miller and Friesen (1984) have maintained that an initial key event or decision causes an imbalance that either requires or facilitates a series of subsequent environmental, organisational or strategy-making changes. They also claimed that there is "a package of changes that occur between the onset of the imbalance or stress and the time when the equilibrium or tranquil interval is reached"; what they have termed as organisational 'transition' (Miller and Friesen, 1984, p.129). Thus, critical incidents or decisions that may cause an organisational transition may involve "the replacement of a top Executive, the introduction of a new product/market strategy, an adoption of a significantly different production technology, a major change in distribution, promotion or pricing strategies, modifications of organisational structure and the distribution of authority, change in the environment caused by competitors".
strategies, acquisitions, mergers or the addition of new departments and the like” (Miller and Friesen, 1984, p. 131). In the same line of argument, Tushman’s et al (1988) described ‘frame-breaking change’ in an organisation’s life cycle as a major change in strategy, structure, people or processes. They have argued that causes of ‘frame-breaking’ can include sharp changes in legal, political or technological conditions which shift the basis of competition, and internal dynamics such as a new management style, change in size with implications for new management design and so on (Tushman et al, 1988, pp. 712-713).

Kimberly and Quinn (1984) inform us that there are three main types of organisational transitions. These are: a) ‘restructuring’, which refers to major changes in structure such as shift from a functional to a product or matrix form of organisation and it involves changes in reporting relationships, distribution of authority and roles of key individuals; b) ‘repositioning’, which refers to major changes in strategy and may involve adding new product lines, eliminating old ones, or may even involve getting completely out of one or more business altogether or getting into new ones; and c) ‘revitalising’, which refers to major changes in how an organisation defines its operations and it may involve change from a less-to-a-more centralised decision-making structure, from a less-to-a-more-participatory managerial structure, or from a more-to-a-less-formal style of operations (Kimberly and Quinn, 1984, p. 5). Such a classification, however, stresses change in individual organisational aspects which, as was mentioned earlier, are often interrelated. As such, organisational change should be considered holistically rather than as a collection of disparate elements (Kimberly and Rottman, 1987; Hinings and Greenwood, 1988). While individual organisational elements may change over time, it is the patterning of change in these elements that is important (Miller and Friesen, 1984). Therefore, organisations should be considered as composed of tightly interdependent and mutually supportive elements such that the importance of each element can be best understood by making reference to the whole organisation (Miller and Friesen, 1984, p. 1).
4.3 ORGANISATIONAL LIFE CYCLES AND THE STUDY OF SOCOG

The life cycle theorising and the concept of organisational transition can be helpful for understanding the changing patterns in SOCOG. It is known that SOCOG was formed as a small organisation, which gradually grew in size, and after an operational climax of 17 days promptly died. It is, therefore, certain that SOCOG went through developmental stages, which however could not be precisely predicted in terms of the time of either their occurrence or their magnitude and significance. Moreover, the organisational environment of SOCOG could be viewed as both known and dynamic in the sense that the nature of involvement of environmental elements such as the IOC, governments and sponsors is given yet not absolutely predictable. In the course of the seven-year period of SOCOG’s life, changes in the sport competition schedule, for example, the appointment of new administration or changes in the financing of certain areas of the event could not be predicted, yet could trigger organisational changes.

Therefore, Miller and Friesen’s (1984) claim that critical events or decisions in an organisation’s life trigger organisational transitions, can be helpful for identifying organisational transitions and subsequent life stages in SOCOG. This assumes that the life cycle of SOCOG experienced long periods of stability, which were interrupted, by short periods of radical change. This notion has also been supported by Laughlin (1991), who has claimed that organisational change is not incremental but rather involves stability marked by periods of rapid change. Such transitions however, may not be solely triggered by SOCOG’s environment but may also have internal triggers. Besides the fact that the external triggers for change are likely to be filtered by the perceptions of members of the organisation, SOCOG might need to make internal changes, independent from its environment, to facilitate its operations within a tight timescale. For example, SOCOG had planned to reposition part of its operations into the sporting venues at a certain period of its life cycle. This change was largely internally rather than externally driven, since SOCOG had to move its operations to the sporting venues in order to achieve better control of the event during its execution. Consequently, in SOCOG’s life cycle, we would expect periods of relative tranquillity to be punctuated with ‘frame-breaking’ caused by critical external incidents or internal decisions.
This notion was central to the work of Greenwood and Hinings (1988) and Kikulis et al (1992, 1995) on the Canadian National Sport Organisations, which was based on the evolution-revolution model of change. According to Tushman et al (1986) evolutionary change applies when an organisation makes incremental adjustments in strategy, structure and/or processes while revolutionary change occurs in response to major environmental or strategic changes that require a "simultaneous and sharp shift in strategy, power, structure and controls" (Tushman et al, 1986, p. 31). In line with this, Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 1996), and Kikulis et al (1992, 1995) have found that change is not a linear process and that organisations do not clearly move from one phase to the next. They went on to suggest that the concepts of 'archetypes' and 'tracks' are central to understand the process of organisational change.

Archetypes are related to Mintzberg's (1979) notion of structural configurations, extended to include the underlying values and beliefs that hold these configurations in place. Archetypes, therefore, can be identified by isolating the distinctive ideas, values and meanings pervasively reflected in, and reproduced by, clusters of structures and systems (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988, p. 18). By identifying sector-specific design archetypes, therefore, one can identify how far any particular organisation is moving from one archetype to another, that is, 'revolutionary change' or within an archetype, that is 'evolutionary change'. The extent to which organisations remain over time within the assumptions of a given archetype or move between archetypes can be assessed by identifying the various 'tracks' that organisations follow. According to Kikulis et al (1995), when an organisation experiences change but continues to evolve within the same archetype, it follows an 'inertial track'. Organisations may also experience changes in their structures and systems in the direction of an archetype to which they aspire but have not yet reached. Such organisations follow a 'convergent track'. When organisations experience revolutionary changes moving from one archetype to another, then they follow a 'reorientation track'. Some organisations may make revolutionary changes but having assessed these changes decide to revert to their initial organisational design, following a 'reversal track'. Finally, when a change is externally imposed on an organisation, it is more likely that structure and systems will change but values and
beliefs will not. In that case organisations follow an ‘unresolved track’ (Kikulis et al. 1995).

The literature on the Canadian National Sport Organisations provides us with two main arguments which can inform this study. Firstly, it stresses the significance of considering the concept of sector-specificity when examining a particular set of organisations, and secondly, it underlines that organisational design must be understood in terms of a holistic approach in the sense that many organisational elements need be taken into account. Greenwood and Hinings (1988), for example, have argued that organisations display patterns of interdependent elements, and that it is the manner in which these elements interact that demonstrates the viable design configurations for a set of organisations. Therefore, by identifying different structural designs in SOCOG’s life with reference to a holistic, sector-specific set of variables, we would be able to comment on the pattern as well as on the extent of the changes from one structural design to another. It is, however, also important for the purposes of this study to identify the reasons behind a potential shift from one structural design to another. Mintzberg (1991) identifies seven forces that drive the organisation to adopt particular structures acknowledging that such forces are results of both the influence of organisational members on the environment and the tolerance of the environment for alternative organisational forms. These are: ‘direction’, which is related to an organisation’s strategic vision, ‘efficiency’, which encourages standardisation and formalisation, ‘proficiency’ which emerges when an organisation has to carry out tasks with high levels of knowledge and skills, ‘concentration’, which encourages particular units or divisions to concentrate their efforts on serving particular markets or areas, and ‘innovation’ which encourages adaptation and learning. Mintzberg (1991) also identifies ‘co-operation’ which refers to the establishment of ideology or organisational culture that has the capacity to “knit a disparate set of people into a harmonious, co-operative entity” (Mintzberg, 1991, p. 55), and ‘competition’ which refers to the pulling apart of politics in the sense of politics as the non-legitimate organisational behaviour. Mintzberg (1991) claims that each of these forces drives the organisation to its corresponding form. Therefore, ‘direction’ will favour simple organisational structures (i.e. ‘simple structure’), ‘efficiency’ will favour mechanistic structures (i.e. ‘machine bureaucracy’),
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'proficiency' will favour professional bureaucratic structures (i.e. 'professional bureaucracy'), 'concentration' will favour divisionalised designs (i.e. 'divisionalised form'), and 'innovation' will favour ad hoc organisational forms (i.e. adhocracy). Finally, 'co-operation' will favour an ideology-driven organisational form, while 'competition' will favour a politics-driven organisational form (Mintzberg, 1979, 1991).

To conclude, here we argue that aspects of the organisational change literature can provide significant theoretical foundations for this study. In particular, change in SOCOG is understood as a phenomenon which can be initiated from both external and internal forces, and concerns with alterations in its processes, structure, culture or power relations. Such changes are considered interrelated in the sense that a change in a particular attribute of SOCOG affects the organisation as a whole. Moreover, by advocating a life cycle approach to change, SOCOG is seen to exhibit an evolving operational life, which is characterised by long periods of stability that are interrupted by short periods of transformation. Effectively, SOCOG's organisational elements are expected to experience long periods of stability, which are interrupted by externally or internally triggered episodes of change, forcing the organisation to exhibit multiple formations. This theorising can benefit the study of SOCOG in two main respects. Firstly, it can assist the identification of different life stages in SOCOG's life cycle. By identifying key incidents or decisions within SOCOG's life cycle one would be able to locate organisational transitions, and subsequently separate its life cycle into distinctive organisational stages. Secondly, by capturing SOCOG's structural formation in various phases of its life cycle, this study can derive with different structural configurations and assess the degree of structural alteration from one phase to the next. It is important, however, to acknowledge that critical events or decisions cannot be objectively observed, since their significance as triggers for change would be dependent on the perceptions of SOCOG members. This in turn holds important implications for the methodological approach that will be followed to identify SOCOG's life-stages, and this will be the concern of the following chapter.
CHAPTER V

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The aim of this study is to identify and analyse the nature and range of organisational formations that the Organising Committee for the Sydney Olympic Games (SOCOG) exhibited throughout its life cycle. The main objectives of the study are as follows:

- To identify and evaluate the structural and contextual features of SOCOG throughout its life cycle, using a modified version of Mintzberg's configuration analysis;
- To investigate the role and operation of SOCOG in the organisation of the 2000 Olympic Games;
- To explore the applicability of the life cycle periodisation for the study of SOCOG; and
- To review and evaluate the utility of the modified Mintzberg's approach with regard to the examination of SOCOG.

In order to attain these objectives, one case study was designed to examine the 7-year operational life of SOCOG, which operated in the period 1993-2000. This chapter aims to provide an understanding of the methodological stance of the study and describe the process of data collection and analysis. The chapter is structured in three main parts. The first part provides the philosophical grounds upon which this study was designed. The second part offers the justification of this research design, and the third part presents in detail the implementation phase of the research, including its implications for data analysis.

5.1. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

First of all, there is a need to outline the general methodological issues that informed the formulation of the research design of this study given that the underlying philosophy of the research problem affects the choice of the research methods. The social sciences research literature identifies two basic research philosophies which challenge each other as they contribute their own particular insights into the terrain of acceptable knowledge, namely 'positivism' and 'constructivism'. The schools of thought contained within the positivist approach are closely associated with philosophical realism while the
constructivist or ‘interpretive’ position is closely associated with philosophical idealism (Eisner, 1990, p. 88). These approaches to social research are also referred to as philosophical paradigms (e.g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979, Bryman, 1989, Sparks, 1992, Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, Guba and Lincoln, 1998), in the sense that they can provide particular sets of lenses for seeing the social world. Consequently, differences in paradigm assumptions cannot be set aside as mere philosophical differences, since, explicitly or implicitly, these positions have important consequences for the practical conduct of a research project, as well as for the interpretation of its findings. According to Guba and Lincoln (1998) a paradigm may be viewed as “a set of beliefs that deals with ‘ultimates’ or ‘first principles’. It represents a ‘world view’ that defines, for its holder, the nature of the ‘world’ ” (p. 200). It has been argued, therefore, that research paradigms define for researchers what it is they are about and what falls within and outside the limits of legitimate inquiry (Guba and Lincoln, 1998). In effect, the researcher, having determined the underlying philosophy of the research, is restricted to the use of those data collection methods which are associated with the respective paradigm.

The basic beliefs that define research paradigms can be summarised by the examination of certain assumptions regarding questions of ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’. Ontological assumptions revolve around questions regarding the nature of existence, that is the social world. Interconnected with ontological issues are a set of assumptions of an epistemological kind that refer to questions of knowing, and particularly the relationship between the knower and what can be known (Guba and Lincoln, 1998, p. 201). The answers to these questions can be classified in a number of ways. As was mentioned earlier, the most common classification distinguishes between ‘positivist’ and ‘constructivist’ (or interpretive) positions or traditions. Researchers in the positivist tradition focus upon identifying the causes of social behaviour, with an emphasis on explanation. In contrast, the adherents of the constructivist tradition focus upon the meaning of behaviour, emphasising understanding, rather than explanation (Donaldson, 1996). The basic problem with this classification is that it tends to incorporate post-positivist positions such as ‘critical realism’ within the positivist tradition, and alternative constructivist positions such as ‘critical theory’ and ‘feminism’ within the constructivist
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tradition. Here, ‘positivism’ and ‘constructivism’ are treated as the opposite ends of a continuum within which the social sciences research literature has placed alternative philosophical positions such as ‘post-positivism’ and ‘critical constructivism’. The latter is termed here as ‘critical theory et al’ to incorporate all the theories and approaches which fall within a critical stance (see Table 5.1). Consequently, a ‘realist’ (or ‘naive realist’) ontological position indicates that the reality to be investigated is external to the researcher and comprehensible, while a ‘critical realist’ position assumes that reality is external but can only be imperfectly comprehended because of basically flawed human intellectual mechanisms and the fundamentally intractable nature of phenomena. A ‘historical realist’ ontological position assumes a comprehensible reality consisting of historically situated structures that are as limiting and as conflicting as if they were real (Guba and Lincoln, 1998, p. 208). In contrast to realism, a ‘relativist’ ontological position indicates that reality is a product of individual consciousness and cognition, which is “apprehended in the form of multiple intangible mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature” (Guba and Lincoln, 1998, p. 206).

Table 5.1: Basic Beliefs of Research Paradigms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POSITIVISM</th>
<th>POST-POSITIVISM</th>
<th>CRITICAL THEORY et al</th>
<th>CONSTRUCTIVISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td>Naïve realism—'real' reality but comprehensible</td>
<td>Critical realism—'real' reality but only imperfectly and probabilistically comprehensible</td>
<td>Historical realism—virtual reality shaped by social, political, ethnic, cultural, economic, and gender values; crystallised over time</td>
<td>Relativism—local specific constructed realities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td>Dualist/Subjectivist; findings true</td>
<td>Modified Dualist/Subjectivist; findings probably true</td>
<td>Transactional/Subjectivist; value-mediated findings</td>
<td>Transactional/Subjectivist; created findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong></td>
<td>Experimental/Manipulative; chiefly quantitative methods</td>
<td>Modified Experimental/Manipulative; may include qualitative methods</td>
<td>Dialogic/Dialectical</td>
<td>Hermeneutical/Dialectical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Guba and Lincoln (1998, p. 203)
In terms of epistemological assumptions, an 'objectivist' view regards knowledge as something which can be acquired, and therefore, the investigator is able to determine a problem or phenomenon without influencing it or being influenced by it, while a 'modified objectivist' view rejects pure objectivity of knowledge apprehension and is mainly concerned with judging findings in respect to pre-existing knowledge. A 'transactional' and 'subjectivist' epistemological position, in turn, considers knowledge as something which has to be personally experienced, hence findings are value mediated (critical theory) or literally created (constructivism) (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). It has been argued that the ontological and epistemological positions that a researcher adopts in a study direct the choice of strategy for data collection (Guba, 1990). Therefore, an 'experimental' approach to data collection will set the research upon a systematic protocol and technique which favours quantitative techniques such as surveys, questionnaires, personality tests and so on. On the other hand, a 'hermeneutical' (or 'ideographic') approach to data collection suggests that there is a need to gain first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation and therefore qualitative techniques, such as observation and interviewing, should be utilized (Sparks, 1992, p. 14).

However, the argument that researchers are obliged to employ the research methods indicated by the underlying philosophy of the research has been challenged. Bryman (1989) for example, has claimed that social science research could encompass aspects of many philosophical positions. He has stated that a method will be good or bad only in relation to the problem under investigation, and that the arguments about the epistemological distinctiveness of quantitative and qualitative research is not, and should not, be taken to be a barrier to such integration (p. 254). The nature of the problem under investigation, therefore, plays an important role in the selection of the type of research methods. Yin (1994) for example, has argued that besides philosophical arguments, there are other factors that influence the research design of a study. These are the research objectives, the background to the research, and practical constraints imposed upon the researcher by external factors. Further, Blaikie (1993) claims that besides the nature of a particular research problem, the choice of the methodological strategy can also be made in terms of how the ontological and epistemological approaches relate to the worldview of the researcher or in terms of both discipline and academic institution that naturally
influence a researcher’s exposure to and experience of particular approaches and strategies (Blaikie, 1993, p. 202).

After considering the above, this study adopts the main premises of the ‘post-positivist’ philosophical position, or what has also been termed ‘critical realism’ (e.g. Donaldson, 1996, Guba, 1990, Marsh and Smith, 2001). Critical realism acknowledges that the world is, to an extent, socially constructed. Consequently, the study adopts the notion that the way institutions or processes are socially constructed affects outcomes, but the extent and resonance of that social construction is constrained by deeper social relations. That is, some crucial structural effects cannot be directly observed, and such evidence does not speak for itself, it has to be interpreted (Marsh and Smith, 2001, p. 530). Effectively, the study holds that many organisational characteristics in SOCOG, such as the ‘organisational size’ or the levels of ‘specialisation’, can be directly observed and examined, for example through analysis of organisational documents. However, organisational aspects, such as ‘power’, which refers to the levels of external control, or ‘centralisation’, which refers to the diffusion of decision-making in SOCOG, cannot be directly observed so confidently, and therefore they need to be qualitatively interpreted. Also, it is believed that quantitative techniques would impede the full understanding of the context in which SOCOG operates, and particularly the manner in which this context is perceived by organisational members. There is a need to take account of the interpretations that are offered by managers regarding the nature of their organisation and therefore, interview-based qualitative methods were seen as the most appropriate for this study. In doing so, the researcher would be able to capitalise on chance remarks or unreported events that could indicate a new line of investigation, a flexibility that can only be achieved via qualitative techniques. The nature of links between an OCOG and the International Olympic Committee or the International Federations, for example, are difficult to identify since they are described in a secretive manner in Games-related documents. It is sensed, therefore, that SOCOG’s managers would be able to provide additional information about such relationships, which could reveal new organisational aspects for investigation. As a result, this study rejects the positivist contingency research into organisational structure, which holds that organisations are to be explained by scientific laws, in which the shape taken by organisations is determined by material
factors such as their age and size, and these laws hold generally across organisations of all types and national cultures (e.g. Pugh et al, 1969a, 1969b; Donaldson, 1996). It is rather considered that modern organisations, such as SOCOG, are also shaped by complex processes produced by organisational members, and therefore organisational reality is seen as being, partially at least, socially constructed. Moreover, sector-specificity is acknowledged, and as a result, tentative hypotheses can be proposed with regard to other OCOGs.

The background to the research suggests that the study should be of an exploratory, as well as an explanatory, nature. The lack of research on the organisational nature of OCOGs indicates the need to firstly portray the nature of SOCOG’s structural and contextual characteristics throughout its life cycle. However, there is secondly the need to fully understand how the context of SOCOG is perceived to affect its structural characteristics. For example, in line with the premises of organisation theory SOCOG’s changing size, age and environment are anticipated to affect certain organisational aspects such as the diffusion of decision-making. This study, therefore, needs to explain how the change in the size of SOCOG, for example, is perceived by managers and consequently how managers translate this change into managerial action. Consequently, there is a need for the use of qualitative research methods, and interviewing has been selected as the most appropriate source of primary data. An additional source of data derives from analysis of documents, which serves a dual role. Firstly, information contained in documents can inform the organisational elements under investigation which can only be quantitatively examined, such as SOCOG’s ‘size’, measured in numbers of staff, or SOCOG’s levels of ‘specialisation’, measured in numbers of operational areas. Secondly, the simultaneous analysis of documents and interviews supports the triangulation of data, which, as will be shown later, enhances the validity of the study.

5.2. RESEARCH DESIGN

As was mentioned earlier, this study constitutes a case study of SOCOG. The primary data of the study is based on qualitative research interviews with SOCOG’s senior managers. By using a modified model of Mintzberg’s (1979) configuration approach as
the conceptual framework (see Table 5.2), the research interviews aimed to identify the nature of SOCOG’s organisational characteristics in order to enable the synthesis of the organisation’s formation. In particular, with strong support from document analysis, the interviews sought to reveal the perceptions of SOCOG’s managers with regard to the structural and contextual elements of the organisation throughout its seven-year life cycle. Before embarking on a detailed description of the case study design, however, a consideration of the issues of ‘validity’ and ‘reliability’ in qualitative research is firstly presented, along with the manner that these issues were tackled in this study.

**Table 5.2: The Conceptual Framework for the Study of SOCOG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCOG’s DIMENSIONS</th>
<th>OPERATIONALISATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>The Number of Staff available to SOCOG (Kimberly, 1976, Hall, 1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>The number and heterogeneity of external elements influencing SOCOG (Complexity); The levels of prediction of the needs of external elements influencing SOCOG (Stability) (Duncan, 1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource-Dependence</td>
<td>The levels of importance of resources possessed by external actors to SOCOG (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>The degree of representation of external actors on the decision-making bodies of SOCOG (Pugh et al, 1968, 1969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>The number of operational areas (major divisions, departments and programmes) in SOCOG (Hall et al, 1967; Kikulis et al, 1989; Hollenbeck, 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formalisation</td>
<td>The levels of adherence of SOCOG’s staff to both formal and informal instructions, and procedures (Hall, 1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralisation</td>
<td>The level in the hierarchy of SOCOG where final decisions are made (Pugh et al, 1969; Kikulis et al, 1989; Theodoras, 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>The levels of training required for SOCOG’s staff (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Grouping</td>
<td>The type of criteria used to break down organisational units (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison Devices</td>
<td>The number of standing committees, commissions and task forces in SOCOG (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Part</td>
<td>The part of the organisation which makes the most significant contribution to SOCOG’s operations (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Co-ordination Mechanism</td>
<td>The fundamental ways in which SOCOG achieves co-ordination among its divisions and programmes (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Capacity</td>
<td>The degree that SOCOG can formulate strategies at operational-level.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.1 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE STUDY

The questions of validity and reliability are principal in any research study, since they essentially challenge the quality of the research findings. Effectively, the issues of validity and reliability constitute the criteria for assessing the procedure and results of a research study. Here, a brief discussion of these notions is presented, particularly with regard to qualitative social inquiry. In doing so, it is intended to provide a basic understanding of the concepts of validity and reliability and essentially demonstrate the manner in which they were applied as criteria for assessing the quality of the research design of this study.

In qualitative research validity often receives more attention than reliability (Mason, 2002), and it refers to “the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers” (Hammersley, 1990, p. 57). In other words, validity challenges the essence of a research study, as it questions whether the researcher examines or measures what he or she wants to examine or measure. According to Kirk and Miller, (1986) three errors may occur in relation to the concept of validity: to see a relation, a principle, and the like, where they are not correct (type 1 error); to reject them where they are indeed correct (type 2 error); and finally ask the wrong question (type 3 error) (Kirk and Miller, 1986, pp. 29-30). The question of validity in qualitative research, therefore, turns into the question of how far the researcher’s constructions are grounded in the constructions of those whom he or she studied as well as how far this grounding is transparent for others (Flick, 1998, p. 225). As a result, validity challenges not only the production of data but also the presentation of the results of a study. In effect, the validity of a study holds implications for two main issues, often referred to as ‘internal’ and ‘external’ validity (e.g. Silverman, 2000; Flick, 1998; Bryman, 1989). The former, ‘internal validity’, refers to the central notion of validity and ensures that the researcher measures the topics under investigation and not something else; in other words the study is valid on its own. However, internal validity presupposes that the topics under investigation are appropriately operationalised. In effect, if the operational definitions are inadequate, the meaning of the ensuing internally valid findings will be unclear and misleading (Bryman, 1989). The latter, ‘external validity’, is concerned with the extent to which the findings of research can be generalised beyond the specific limits of the
setting in which the study is undertaken (Silverman, 2000). As Stablein (1999) maintains, external validity is concerned with the degree to which the results of a study may be both be justified as representative of the situation in which they were generated and have claims to generality (Stablein, 1999). However, according to Bryman (1989), this depends on a number of factors, including the aims of the study, the methodological techniques utilised and the size of the research sample.

Accordingly, the aim of this study suggests that the issue of external validity is of minor importance. As was mentioned earlier, this study aims to examine a particular organisation, i.e. SOCOG, within a particular context, i.e. the organisation of the 2000 Sydney Olympics, and assess the utility of a particular conceptual framework, i.e. Mintzberg's modified approach. Therefore, questions of external validity are insignificant, insofar as generalisations of the findings from SOCOG's case for other OCOGs or sport organisations are beyond the scope of this study. Consequently, this study is primarily concerned with answering the questions of internal validity, which essentially challenge the conceptual and ontological clarity of the study and the success with which the author has translated these into a meaningful and relevant epistemology and methodology (Mason, 2002, p. 188). In other words, the study should provide a clear operationalisation of the phenomena under investigation (SOCOG's organisational characteristics in this study), as well as demonstrate that the research strategy employed is appropriately designed on these elements, that is ensuring the validity of data generation methods. With regard to the former, this study has provided a clear operationalisation of SOCOG's elements under investigation, which is based both on Mintzberg's (1979) theorising and on previous organisational studies that have examined these elements (see section 3.2.3 in chapter III and Table 5.2 in this chapter). With regard to the research strategy employed it was shown earlier that this study adopted a critical realist stance and utilised qualitative research methods. In particular, semi-structured interviews with SOCOG's senior staff and analysis of organisational documents were seen as the most appropriate methods to provide a valid account of SOCOG's organisational nature throughout its life cycle. It was explained that interview-based qualitative methods would allow the researcher to capitalise on SOCOG's managers' perceptions of the nature of the organisational elements under investigation,
and with support from organisational documents would be able to provide a legitimate explanation of the organisation’s reality.

In qualitative research literature the concept of validity is often misinterpreted or even omitted, and as a result, many qualitative studies fail to stress validity issues and often do not mention validity at all (Silverman, 2000). It is true that often the term itself seems confusing, especially when various aspects of validity are examined by researchers who attempt to test a study’s validity. Researchers, for example, refer to ‘face validity’ when they attempt to examine the correspondence between a measure and the concept in question (Eden and Huxham, 1999). Moreover, ‘criterion validity’ is often tested, when the researcher aims to connect a measure with a relevant criterion (Bryman, 1989). ‘Construct validity’ is also tested, which involves the drawing of hypotheses about the likely connection between the concept of interest and another concept (Stablein, 1999). For the establishment of aspects of validity, various methods are suggested, which range from the usage of the assessment of panels of judges and experts to the employment of theoretical deduction techniques. However, the bulk of literature in qualitative research in general, and in organisational research, in particular, supports the view that the answers to questions of validity are primarily tackled through the use of ‘triangulation’ (e.g. Silverman, 1993, 2000, Flick, 1998, Shaw, 1999, Bryman, 1989). In short, triangulation refers to the combination of different methods, study groups and different theoretical perspectives in dealing with a phenomenon. Denzin (1989) refers to four types of triangulation: ‘data triangulation’, which refers to the use of different data sources; ‘investigator triangulation’, which refers to the use of different observers or interviewers; ‘theory triangulation’, which refers to the employment of different theoretical points of view; and ‘methodological triangulation’, which refers to the use of different research methods (Denzin, 1989, pp. 237-241).

As will be shown in the following sections in detail, triangulation was utilised to enhance the validity of this study. In particular, ‘data triangulation’ was achieved through the generation of data both from semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Both sources of data were analysed simultaneously, thus enabling the researcher to evaluate the validity as much of the interviewees’ responses as of the information reported in the documents. In this time-constrained study ‘investigator triangulation’ was impossible to
achieve. However, the interview data was further evaluated by senior academics at Loughborough University who acted as external judges and effectively provided a critical eye for the subsequent data analysis. Moreover, the interviewees were involved in the further research process by confirming their responses and providing clarifications on the interview data. Effectively, the interviewees agreed with the contents of their statements, and therefore the validity of the data was further enhanced through what is commonly known as ‘communicative validation’ (Flick, 2002, p. 223). ‘Theory triangulation’ was not applicable for this study, since one of the study’s objectives was essentially to test the utility of a particular theoretical framework, namely Mintzberg’s (1979) modified approach. However, given that the theoretical framework utilised comprises elements of different organisation theory perspectives, this study virtually achieved theory triangulation. Finally, ‘methodological triangulation’ was not achieved although, as will be shown later, a number of SOCOG’s elements under investigation were quantitatively examined. Effectively, this study adopted a qualitative research design as it was argued that a solid explanation of SOCOG’s organisational nature could be more confidently achieved through qualitative analysis of its characteristics. It was explained earlier that this study abandons the positivist perspective which pertains to much of previous organisational research, and therefore the use of qualitative research methods was seen as the most appropriate to acquire SOCOG’s organisational reality.

Reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions (Silverman, 1993). Measures of reliability are more comfortably associated with quantitative research where standardised research instruments are used. In that sense reliability is often measured by observing the consistency with which the same methods of data collection produce the same results. The logic is that, if a researcher measures the same phenomenon more than once with the same instrument, then he or she should get the same measurement. Reliability is therefore being conceptualised in terms of how reliable, accurate and precise the research tools or instruments are (Mason, 2002, p. 187). All of this is premised on the assumption that methods of data generation can be conceptualised as tools, and thus can be standardised. In qualitative researching, however, the non-standardisation of many methods for generating data renders the
researcher unable to perform simple reliability tests because the data that is generated
will not take the form of a clearly standardised set of measurements (Flick, 2002).
According to Mason (2002), an obsession with reliability in qualitative research could
inappropriately overshadow more important questions of validity, resulting in a
nonsensical situation where a researcher may be not at all clear about what he or she is
measuring, i.e. validity, but can nevertheless claim to be measuring it with a great deal of
precision, i.e. reliability.

Despite these criticisms of conventional measures of reliability, it is essential for the
qualitative researchers to deal with overall questions of accuracy in their methods and
research practices. As with validity, reliability is often taken to comprise two elements:
'external' and 'internal' reliability (Bryman, 1989). The former refers to the degree to
which a measure is consistent over time, while the latter refers to the degree of internal
consistency of a measure with implications in the context of multiple-item quantitative
measures, when the question is whether the constituent indicators cohere to form a single
dimension (Bryman, 1989, p. 56). In qualitative research, the focus is primarily on
external reliability and it mainly pertains to the process of sorting and analysing the data.
According to Kirk and Miller (1986) reliability receives its importance as a criterion for
assessing qualitative research only against the background of a specific theory of the
issue under study and about the use of methods (p. 50). Effectively, the quality of
recording and documenting data becomes the central basis for assessing the reliability of
a qualitative research and that of successive interpretations. In other words, the
researcher needs to establish the logic behind the approaches used for the data collection
and analysis so that if it were the same data to be analysed, it would provide the same
findings. For the qualitative researcher, therefore, the main concern with regard to the
issue of reliability is the establishment of appropriate thematic categories when collecting
and analysing data (Silverman, 2000). In effect, a clear thematic plan ensures that the
data can be categorised appropriately by multiple researchers, or by the same researcher
in different periods of time.

In this study the issue of reliability was of major importance for two main reasons.
Firstly, the reliance on research interviews required the conventionalisation of the
interview notes in order to increase the comparability of the perspectives which have led
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to the corresponding data (Flick, 2002, p. 220). For that reason, all interviews were tape-recorded and fully transcribed, thus allowing the separation of concepts of the interviewees from those of the interviewer, which in turn made reinterpretation and assessment by different analysts possible. Secondly, due to the large amount of data generated both from the research interviews and document analysis a clear thematic plan was required. For that reason, an initial thematic template was devised, which corresponded to SOCOG's elements under investigation. However, given the flexibility of responses allowed by semi-structured interviews, the template was constantly modified according to new topics of interest aroused by the interviewees. As a result, a final template was devised, consisting of fourteen thematic categories (see appendix V), and data was sorted accordingly. Moreover, the process of sorting and analysing both the interview and documentary data was closely supervised and consulted by experienced researchers at Loughborough University, thus ensuring that the interviewees' statements and documentary information were appropriately categorised. Finally, in order to enhance the reliability of the study and broadly facilitate the process of data analysis individual rating scales were developed for each of SOCOG's dimensions under investigation. This process ensured a degree of standardisation of measurements for SOCOG's structural and contextual elements and largely reduced the subjectivity of the data interpretations by the researcher.

5.2.2 CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

A case study implies the study of a single case, SOCOG in this study. Case study is not a methodological choice, but rather a choice of object to be studied (Stake, 1998). Yin (1994) has defined case based methodology as "an empirical enquiry that investigates phenomena within their real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (p. 13). In our case, a case study methodology would allow us not only to identify the nature of SOCOG's structural and contextual elements but also to discover and investigate issues that may appear insignificant to other organisations but which are of significance for the study of OCOGs, and SOCOG in particular. Indeed, this is achieved through
multiple sources of evidence, namely semi-structured interviewing and document analysis. The study of SOCOG, therefore, is employed in an exploratory as well as explanatory manner since it aimed to achieve insights into the previously uncharted area of OCOGs as sport organisations, but also to explain how contextual factors and structural elements are perceived by key actors in a particular OCOG. Moreover, the study of SOCOG held a meta-evaluative application (Yin, 1994), in the sense that the researcher was able to go back to the theoretical framework employed, that is Mintzberg's modified approach, and critically evaluate it with regard to its application in the case of SOCOG.

Case studies have attracted criticisms, primarily with regard to their validity. As was mentioned earlier, validity is concerned with ensuring that the researcher measures what it is intended to measure, and as a result establishes the domain in which the findings of a study can be generalised (Shaw, 1999). Bryman (1989) has argued that accusations about the limited generalisability of case studies may be based on an erroneous application of statistical notions, which treat the case as a sample of one. Moreover, Yin (1994) claimed that such concerns arise from confusion as to the type of generalisations to be made from case study research. He has argued, for example, that the aim of a case study is not to infer the findings from a sample to a population but to engender patterns and linkages of theoretical importance (Yin, 1994).

To overcome such concerns Yin (1994) suggests that a theory should be tested in comparable contexts to see whether it fits in with other cases. Yin (1994) calls this approach a 'replication logic' and argues that it is a more appropriate framework within which to judge the generalisability of case study evidence than in terms of sampling notions. Bryman (1989) argues that case study research that examines more than one site often comprises its own replication logic. In this time-constrained research project, the selection of a single case study, that of SOCOG, was essentially a natural process since at the time of the empirical data collection (November 2000-May 2001) SOCOG was the OCOG which had just delivered the Games but was still in operation. That allowed the researcher to have access to key organisational members as well as to a wide range of the organisation's documents, while having a clear view of the organisation's life cycle time boundaries. It would be extremely difficult to attempt to investigate OCOGs for earlier
Games, as key informants would have disposed and moved on to other positions, and organisational documents would be difficult to request and acquire. Moreover, the next operational OCOG, that is the Organising Committee of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games (ATHOC), had not completed its task at the time of the research, and therefore a holistic view of the organisation's life cycle could not be obtained. A solid replication strategy could have involved the examination of ATHOC after the completion of the 2004 Games. However, as was mentioned earlier, the generalisation of the findings from SOCOG’s examination for other OCOGs is beyond the scope of this study, although it is broadly aimed to establish a foundation for comparative research based on future OCOGs. Effectively, the study aims to draw conclusions with regard to the organisational nature of SOCOG, and ultimately to consider the theoretical implications of Mintzberg’s (1979) modified approach for the study of OCOGs. Consequently, although this study provides the basis for future replication only some limited and tentative theoretical generalisations might be made.

5.2.3 CASE STUDY DESIGN

According to Yin (1994) there are two basic concerns when considering a case study design. First is the choice of single or multiple case design. Although single case design has informed much research in social sciences (Bryman, 1989), there is a major weakness associated with this type of case study design; that is, its poor validity. According to Stake (1998), single case design is only appropriate when testing well-formulated theories or when multiple cases do not exist. In our case it was the latter that led to a single case design, since, as was mentioned earlier, multiple cases, that is many OCOGs in operation, did not exist at the time of investigation. Analysis of documents of previous OCOGs, however, has informed the empirical design of the study. In particular, by analysing official reports and publications of former OCOGs, the researcher acquired a solid understanding of the key organisational issues of these organisations, which in turn formed the basis for embarking on the examination of SOCOG. Connected with the notion of ‘replication logic’ mentioned earlier, it is often argued that a case must be selected in such a way as to ensure ‘literal’ or ‘theoretical’ replication (Yin, 1994). This
is in line with what Stake (1998) terms as 'intrinsic' and 'instrumental' case studies. In effect, an 'intrinsic' case study design draws the researcher toward an understanding of what is important about the case within its own world, not so much the world of researchers and theories. In contrast, an 'instrumental' case study design draws the researcher toward illustrating how the concerns of researchers and theorists, that is the underlying theory, are manifested in the particular case (Stake, 1998, p. 99). In this study, the selection of the case serves both intrinsic and instrumental interests. As was mentioned earlier, it aims to use the case of SOCOG to explore the particular characteristics of an OCOG, but also to inform the theory for the study of such organisations through the evaluation of the modified Mintzberg’s (1979) approach, thus serving theoretical interests as well.

A second concern when considering case study design is whether the case studies should be 'holistic' or 'embedded', which implies the number of units of analysis to be used in each case study (Yin, 1994). Holistic case studies rely on a single source of evidence and are usually used when a study aims to generate a general picture of the case under investigation or when it is difficult to identify different units within a case (Yin, 1994). Obviously such a design undermines the emphasis on the triangulation of data, which is a key feature of case based studies since there is a single source of primary evidence (Bryman, 1989). Conversely, embedded case design favours the collection of evidence from various units within a case. Yin (1994) claims that researchers using this type of design occasionally fail to extrapolate from the units of analysis to provide an overall picture. This design, however, enhances the capacity for triangulation and thus the validity within cases, since evidence is obtained from different sources. In this study evidence was obtained both through interviews and document analysis (two units). These data collection techniques were used on SOCOG (one case), and consequently, this case study research adopted a single case, embedded design.

5.2.4 METHODS AND CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

As was said earlier, this study makes use of qualitative research methods. Bryman (1989) has suggested that there are three main sources of data associated with qualitative
research: ‘observation’, ‘unstructured interviewing’ or ‘semi-structured interviewing’ and the examination of documents, which is commonly known as ‘document analysis’. Although observation could contribute to this study, interviewing and document analysis have been selected as the most appropriate methods for the case based study. The purpose of this case study is to examine SOCOG for a period of approximately seven years and therefore it would be extremely difficult to observe SOCOG operations for such a long period of time.

This study, therefore, makes use of interviews as the tool for empirical data collection. Out of the two types of qualitative interviewing, the semi-structured has been selected as the most appropriate for this study. As was mentioned in previous chapters, the topics of enquiry for this study have been guided, but not prescribed, by configuration theory and particularly by a modified version of Mintzberg’s (1979) approach. Therefore a topic structure in the interviews was seen as appropriate, since unstructured interviews would risk taking the respondents to the main topics of investigation. When using semi-structured interviews the researcher makes use of a schedule but recognises that departures will occur if interesting themes emerge from what the respondents say (Bryman, 1989). This type of interviewing, therefore, allowed the researcher to address the main lines of inquiry, derived from Mintzberg’s modified approach, while giving considerable latitude to the interviewees to bring up other issues of importance in relation to SOCOG. However, in line with Brewerton and Millward’s (2001) arguments, the researcher was not tempted to spend too long on peripheral subjects, as there was the danger of losing the control of the interview, thus reducing the reliability of the technique.

When using interviewing to examine organisational phenomena, however, caution should be exercised in interpreting the responses of the interviewees. Bryman (1989) suggests that organisational reality is actively devised by the people in the organisation and therefore one would expect the responses of the interviewees to be filtered by their experiences and knowledge of the organisation, their past experiences of organisations and so on. Similarly, King (1994) has argued that when you ask people to explain a phenomenon (organisational nature in this study), it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve objectivity of response. In this study, however, the triangulation
of data through the use of document analysis reduced the subjectivity of the responses since the researcher interpreted the interview-based data with the support of relevant documentary information.

The collection and examination of documents, which is also referred to as 'archival analysis', is seen by Bryman (1989) as an integral element of qualitative research. He has argued that such materials are non-reactive, that is, they are not the product of investigations in which individuals are aware of being studied, and therefore can fulfil several functions for the qualitative researcher. For example, they can provide information on issues that cannot be readily addressed through other methods, and also check the validity of information deriving from other methods such as interviewing. In this study, the analysis of SOCOG’s documents directly informed four main attributes of the theoretical framework, namely, ‘size’, ‘specialisation’, ‘training’ and ‘liaison devices’. As will be shown later, the aforementioned attributes have a quantitative nature, that is they are operationalised in quantitative terms, and therefore they could be more accurately addressed from SOCOG’s official reports rather than from the interviewees. Moreover, the analysis of official reports of SOCOG, previous OCOGs and the IOC, as well as press cuttings of Australian and British newspapers and magazines, provided a background for the formation of the questions of the interviews, and also checked the validity of the interviewees’ responses. The most valuable contribution of the analysis of documentary information to this study, however, was that such analysis enabled the researcher to check the gap between reported policy and actual practice within SOCOG. For example, interviewees often reported the diffusion of decision-making power within SOCOG in a different manner than it is reported in the organisation’s official documents. Moreover, since the purpose of this study is to examine SOCOG over a period of seven years, documents provided historical information in the conduct of the interviews. This was essential for the process of interviewing, since it both refreshed the memory of interviewees on particular subjects and prompted them to embark on in-depth discussions of issues that are not well documented.
5.3 DATA COLLECTION

A major consideration of this study was the selection of individuals to participate within the case. Brewerton and Millward (2001) claim that the selection of individuals drawn from a target population should reflect the population's characteristics in all significant aspects. Thus, there was a need to ensure that the sample selected from SOCOG would be able to provide a faithful representation of the organisational elements under investigation. The individuals that qualified for this research were the senior executives of SOCOG who were responsible for organising and delivering the Sydney Games. The main reason for this selection was that only senior staff could provide solid information for a number of the topics under investigation. For example, the nature of SOCOG's organisational environment, which refers to the organisation's relationships with external actors such as the IOC or the NSW government, could only be clarified by people who had a holistic understanding of the role and operations of SOCOG. Moreover, the senior staff of SOCOG were often directly involved in particular dimensions and processes under investigation such as in distributing authority within the organisation (i.e. 'centralisation') or in formulating the strategic direction of the organisation (i.e. 'strategic capacity'). That type of sample selection is termed as 'purposive sampling' since individuals were selected from a population according to the underlying interest of particular groups (Brewerton and Millward, 2001, p. 114). Apart from SOCOG's senior staff, a short interview was conducted with Mathew Moore, the leading Olympic editor of Sydney Morning Herald. It was felt that the views of a journalist, who had constantly reported SOCOG's operations from a critical perspective, would be helpful, particularly with regard to issues that the interviewees would feel reluctant to reveal or comment in detail, but also in sensitising the researcher to key issues, actions and events in the life cycle of SOCOG.

For organisational studies a major problem is to obtain access to the organisation under investigation (King, 1994). Bryman (1989) suggests that it is often difficult for researchers to get access to organisations for in-depth studies. With the above problem in mind, Crompton and Jones (1988) have suggested that if the researcher has a contact within the organisation under investigation he or she should secure entry through this route and if not, entry should be sought at the top of the organisation since access often
has to be approved at this level in any case. In the case of SOCOG the access problem was evident early in the design of the research since this organisation was located in Sydney, Australia. The researcher sought contact with senior staff of the organisation by e-mail communication in April 2000, and in May 2000 the researcher met the Chief Executive Officer of the organisation, Mr Sandy Hollway, in Olympia, Greece. Through this contact the researcher secured a number of interviews with senior officials of SOCOG, including the CEO, in Athens, where they would travel after the end of the Sydney Games to debrief the organisers of Athens 2004 Olympics. As planned, in November 2000 seven face-to-face interviews were conducted with SOCOG’s senior staff and an additional interview with Sydney Morning Herald’s Olympic editor (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3: The Sample for Semi-Structured Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sandy Hollway</td>
<td>SOCOG’s CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Richmond</td>
<td>SOCOG’s Director General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Elphinston</td>
<td>SOCOG’s Head of Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Leece</td>
<td>SOCOG’s Head of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Eyers</td>
<td>SOCOG’s Deputy CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Sloman</td>
<td>SOCOG’s Chief Operation Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda Hindson</td>
<td>SOCOG’s Sports Division Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kristine Toohey</td>
<td>SOCOG’s Head of Records and Documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathew Moore</td>
<td>Olympic Editor (Sydney Morning Herald)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOCOG, however, was not dissolved until the end of 2000, and therefore additional information was needed for the period after the Games and until its closure. For that reason, additional e-mail contacts were made with the interviewees in the period December 2000-March 2001. Moreover, another face-to-face interview was conducted in May 2001, in Manchester, England with SOCOG’s Head of Records and Documentation.
Christine Toohey, who was one of the last individuals to leave the organisation. Interviewees were contacted yet another time (various dates within 2001) in order to clarify some of their responses but also to provide additional information in particular issues under investigation. Effectively, when gaps in the data aroused in the course of sorting and analysing both the interviewees’ transcripts and documentary material, the interviewees were of substantial support. During that process and in order to acquire specific information on SOCOG’s staff training, an additional e-mail communication was conducted with James Riodan, Olympic Training Director of SOCOG’s official training agency, TAFE NSW (Technical And Further Education). Overall, therefore, the data collection of this study was an ongoing process which essentially was extended throughout the year 2001.

All interviews were conducted based on an interview guide (appendix II), which listed nine main topics that were under investigation. These topics, upon which the interview questions were based, were mainly derived from Mintzberg’s modified approach but also through informal discussions with various academics with Olympic interests as well as through e-mail communication with employees of SOCOG and ATHOC. Kidder (1981) has argued that semi-structured interviews elicit the personal and social context of beliefs and feelings of the interviewees. He went on to claim that such interviews achieve their purpose to the extent that the subject’s responses are “spontaneous rather than forced, are highly specific and concrete rather than diffuse and general, and are self-revealing and personal rather than superficial” (p. 187). With the above in mind and in order to enhance the validity of the data in terms of obtaining honest questions, interview data was pursued by underlining to the interviewees the academic nature of the study and the promise that the data would only be used for these purposes. Moreover, during the interviews the researcher tried to explain and clarify questions which were misunderstood, while avoiding wording them in such a way that might have led the interviewee to particular answers (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). The interview questions were asked to all interviewees in the same manner and, when it was sensed that the interviewee had more things to say about a topic, follow-up questions with additional probing and exploration were used, so as to obtain the maximum response from each question. Moreover, at the beginning of each interview a brief overview of the scope and
objectives of the study was given in order to familiarise the interviewee with the topics under study.

The interview guide was continuously revised through consultation with experienced researchers at Loughborough University in order to ensure that the focus of the interview questions was appropriate. This was seen as essential in order to ensure the validity of the interview questions. After permission was given by the interviewees, all interviews were tape-recorded and then transcribed. This increased the reliability of the process since data was then explicated in such a manner that made it possible to check what a statement on a subject was and where the researcher's interpretations began. As was mentioned earlier, the transcription of interviews has been seen as an important aspect of ensuring the reliability of the interview process, a practice which is also termed as 'procedural reliability' (Flick, 1998, p. 223). In addition, the interview transcripts were sent back to the interviewees by e-mail in order to validate their responses. This process, which has been termed as 'communicative validation' (Flick, 2002) or 'respondents validation' (Mason (2002), is seen as the main mechanism for ensuring the validity of the interview data.

5.4 ANALYSIS OF DATA

In this study, a major consideration was the analysis of data since the reliance on interview transcripts and documentary material generated a huge amount of information. Brewerton and Millward (2001) have argued that there are no clear and universally accepted techniques for the analysis of evidence from case studies. They maintain, however, that the ultimate goal of the case-study researcher is to treat the evidence fairly, to produce compelling analytical conclusions and to rule out alternative interpretations. Yin (1994) has suggested two strategies for analysing case study evidence. The first relies on the theoretical propositions of the research and the second suggests the development of a case description. The first strategy was seen as the most appropriate for this study, since the propositions of Mintzberg's (1979) modified approach assisted the formation of the research questions and consequently shaped the plan of data collection from the interviews.
The analysis of the interview data was conducted simultaneously with the analysis of related documents and press cuttings to ensure triangulation of data, although a preliminary examination of some documents was also conducted (Table 5.4). Both sets of data were sorted according to a thematic template consisting of fourteen categories relevant to the research questions (appendix V). Each category carried a code under which all the pertinent information, meanings and quotes were placed. In the course of this coding, inadequacies in the initial template were revealed and as a result the number and nature of codes were periodically revised. This method of text data analysis has been termed as 'template analysis' (Crabtree and Miller, 1992). According to King (1994), its main difference from 'content analysis' is that the template can be revised, perhaps many times, through exposure to the textual data, and also the pattern of themes emerging is interpreted qualitatively rather than statistically (p. 24).

Table 5.4: Major Documents Analysed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOCOG's Annual Official Report, 1996</td>
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<td>SOCOG's Annual Official Report, 1997</td>
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<td>SOCOG's Annual Official Report, 1998</td>
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<td>SOCOG's Annual Official Report, 1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCA's Official Report, 1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCOG-ATHOC Debriefing Proceedings, 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney 2000 Host City Contract</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

An additional consideration in the course of analysing the data was the genuineness of the information derived from documents and press cuttings. The major limitation of such documents is that they are rarely neutral entities because they are written for a specific purpose and audience. Calvert (1991) suggested that the researcher should assess the suitability of documents for the study by trying to identify the relation of the authors to the event as well as the actual meaning of the documented information. When documentary information was brought into the template, attention was paid to the
position and relevant knowledge of the author as well as to the intended readership of the document so as to assess the quality of the information. The triangulation of the data, however, ensured that interview and document data would challenge each other on conflicting interpretations for a specific topic.

5.4.1. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

In the course of analysing the data a major concern was the rating of SOCOG's dimensions under investigation, a process which was essential for providing a reliable account for each of SOCOG's characteristics, and broadly for enhancing the reliability of the study. Effectively, in order to identify possible changes to the nature of SOCOG's dimensions during the organisation's life cycle, there was a need to establish the boundaries of change for the elements under investigation. This process was a difficult task given that previous organisational studies examining structural and contextual elements were of minor assistance, as, in contrast with the present study, the majority of such studies take account of large samples of organisations and utilise quantitative research methods. Effectively, in order to determine the boundaries of organisational dimensions, measures of variation are primarily used, such as standard deviations (e.g. Kikulis et al, 1995), mean standard scores (e.g. Pugh et al, 1968), z-scores (e.g. Theodoraki, 1996) and the like. Moreover, this study essentially aims to assess the utility of Mintzberg's theorising for the study of SOCOG, and therefore there was a need to provide accounts that would correspond to Mintzberg's descriptions of organisational elements. In other words, the rating patterns for SOCOG's dimensions under investigation had to be established in such a manner that would produce accounts that would effectively fall into Mintzberg's explanations of the organisational elements in question.

Consequently, given that the purpose of the data analysis was to identify the nature of the organisational elements of a single organisation over its life cycle, that is SOCOG, while maintaining a comparability of the accounts provided for each of the elements with the respective accounts provided by Mintzberg (1979), the rating patterns of SOCOG's dimensions and the subsequent determination of threshold points were directed by two
main considerations. Firstly, the description attached to each of SOCOG's dimensions under investigation had to be SOCOG-specific, in the sense that it had to make sense within the specific boundaries exhibited during SOCOG's life cycle. For example, with regard to SOCOG's levels of 'specialisation', i.e. the number of operational areas in the organisation, the rating pattern devised was based on the upper and lower numbers of operational areas established by SOCOG throughout its life cycle. Secondly, the rating patterns had to be formulated in a manner that would ensure that the number of different accounts provided for a specific dimension under investigation would be consistent with the number of accounts provided by Mintzberg (1979) for the respective dimension. For example, in order to describe SOCOG's levels of 'specialisation' three accounts were established, namely 'low specialisation', 'some specialisation' and 'much specialisation', which are in line with Mintzberg's description of the 'specialisation' dimension. Therefore, given that the determination of thresholds had to be both SOCOG-specific and Mintzberg-specific, the process was often assisted by external data assessors, a practice which has also been adopted by Doty et al (1993), who have empirically tested Mintzberg's approach. Effectively, when the boundaries of a dimension were difficult to set, experienced researchers from Loughborough University were involved in the process by reassessing the data. This helped to maintain a consistency of descriptions of the dimensions under investigation across the life cycle of SOCOG, and essentially enhanced the reliability of the study.

Rating patterns were devised for the majority of SOCOG's dimensions under investigation, yet not for all of them. In particular, the dimensions of 'basic part' (i.e. the part of the organisation which makes the most significant contribution to SOCOG's operations) (Mintzberg, 1979), 'basic co-ordinating mechanism' (i.e. the fundamental ways in which SOCOG achieves co-ordination among its divisions and programmes) (Mintzberg, 1979), and 'unit grouping' (i.e. the type of criteria used in SOCOG to break down organisational units) (Mintzberg, 1979) were excluded from this process, as the data analysis of these dimensions was entirely based on the specifications provided by Mintzberg's (1979, 1981) approach. The 'basic part' of SOCOG was primarily identified through analysis of the interview data, and was assessed in view of SOCOG's managers' perceptions of the people who produced the bulk of work in the organisation.
Consequently, when the bulk of work in SOCOG was produced by its senior staff, the basic part would be its 'strategic apex'; when the bulk of work was produced by the staff located in the middle level of SOCOG's hierarchy, such as the leaders of the departments and programme areas, the basic part would be its 'middle line'; when the bulk of work was produced by staff located in the lower level of SOCOG's hierarchy, the basic part would be its 'operational core'; when the bulk of work was produced by specialist staff, such as analysts and accountants, the basic part would be its 'technostructure'; and finally when the bulk of work was produced by the staff that provided complementary support to SOCOG's operations, such as secretarial and payroll staff, the basic part would be its 'support staff'. Similarly, the data analysis concerning the 'basic co-ordination mechanism' in SOCOG was based on the interviewees' perceptions of the manner that work was co-ordinated in the organisation. As such, 'mutual adjustment' would be SOCOG's basic co-ordination mechanism when co-ordination was achieved by informal communication, 'direct supervision' when a limited number of individuals directed the work of others through instructions and orders, 'standardisation of work processes', when contents of the work were specified, 'standardisation of outputs', when the results of the work were specified, 'standardisation of skills', when the kind of training or knowledge required to perform the work was specified, and 'standardisation of norms', when people in the organisation shared the same set of beliefs in order to perform the work. With regard to the element of 'unit grouping', the analysis of data was based both on interview data and documentary information, and aimed to identify whether the grouping of SOCOG's operations was based on functional responsibilities or geographical place, a distinction which is grounded on the theorising of major organisational analysis and research literature (e.g. Hall et al, 1967; Hall, 1991; Pugh et al, 1968, 1969) and is also adopted by Mintzberg (1979, 1981). Therefore, when operations were primarily grouped in terms of the responsibilities of SOCOG's divisions, departments and programmes, its unit grouping would be 'functional-based', while in the case that SOCOG's operations were grouped according to the responsibilities of the venues of the Games, its unit grouping would be 'place-based'.

With regard to two dimensions under investigation, namely SOCOG's 'formalisation' (i.e. the levels of adherence of SOCOG's staff to both formal and informal instructions
and procedures) (Hall, 1982), and SOCOG's 'training', (i.e. the levels of training required for SOCOG's staff) (Mintzberg, 1979), both sources of data proved insufficient on their own as a basis for defining thresholds. With regard to 'formalisation', interviewees' replies were not wholly consistent in specifying the degree of adherence of SOCOG's staff to formal procedures throughout the life cycle of the organisation, while in relation to the 'training' dimension, the volume of SOCOG's staff training could not be precisely calibrated from either the interviewees or from the information contained in the organisation's official documents. In order to clarify the data concerning these two dimensions and consequently enhance its validity, additional contacts were made with the interviewees as well as with James Riodan, Olympic Training Director of SOCOG's official training agency TAFE NSW, via e-mail communication. Those surveyed were asked to rate SOCOG's formalisation in different periods of its life cycle that were developed according to the interview data. A simple rating scale was used (i.e. 1 = few formal procedures, 2 = some formal procedures, 3 = many formal procedures) (Appendix III), which was based on Mintzberg's (1979) rating criteria of the 'formalisation' dimension. All interviewees replied, thus providing a further set of assessments of SOCOG's level of formalisation in different periods of its life cycle. The replies were not statistically analysed but rather used to enhance the validity of the interviewees' responses. Consequently, when there were 'few' formal procedures in SOCOG the organisation would experience 'little formalisation', when there were 'some' formal procedures in SOCOG, the organisation would experience 'some formalisation', and when 'many' formal procedures was the case, SOCOG would experience 'much formalisation'. Similarly, TAFE NSW's Olympic Training Director was asked to rate the level of job training of SOCOG's staff in the periods of the organisation's life cycle identified earlier, using a three-level scale (i.e. 1 = little staff training, 2 = some staff training, 3 = much staff training) (Appendix III), which was also based on Mintzberg's (1979) rating criteria of the 'training' dimension. His replies were based on TAFE NSW's numerical data, which could not be provided to the researcher at the time of the data collection. Effectively, according to the volume of training that SOCOG's staff went through, SOCOG's levels of training were characterised as 'little', 'some' or 'much'.
With regard to SOCOG’s organisational ‘size’ (i.e. the number of staff available to SOCOG) (Kimberly, 1976; Hall, 1972), a three-level rating scale was devised to determine whether the organisation was ‘small’, ‘medium’ or ‘large’. This separation is consistent with Mintzberg’s description of organisational size and also pertains much of previous organisational research (e.g. Pugh et al, 1968, 1969a; Kimberly, 1976; Roberts et al 1989). The rating boundaries for SOCOG’s size followed a widely accepted definition of organisational size, which has been adopted by the majority of recent organisational research (e.g. Ghobadian and Gallear, 1997; Germain and Spears, 1999), and suggests that a ‘small’ organisation employs up to 50 staff, a ‘medium’ organisation employs up to 300 staff, and a ‘large’ organisation employs more than 300 staff (World Bank Group, 2002).

The dimension of ‘organisational environment’ was synthesised by the analysis of two measures, namely ‘complexity’ (i.e. the number and heterogeneity of external elements influencing SOCOG), and ‘stability’ (i.e. the levels of prediction of the needs of external elements influencing SOCOG) (Duncan, 1972). With regard to SOCOG’s environmental ‘complexity’ a four-level rating scale was devised, which was based on Mintzberg’s (1979) descriptions of the ‘complexity’ dimension, and aimed to identify whether SOCOG’s environment was ‘simple’, ‘relatively simple’, ‘relatively complex’ or ‘complex’. Firstly, using both interview data and documentary information, thirteen external organisations that influenced SOCOG throughout its life cycle were identified and grouped into four broadly homogeneous categories, namely ‘Olympic Movement’, ‘public governance’, ‘commercial sector’, and ‘public groups’. Then, SOCOG’s ‘complexity’ was rated according to the impression that was built up by the interviewees and in co-operation with external assessors as follows: ‘simple’, when the number of the organisations influencing SOCOG was small (i.e. three or less) and homogeneous (i.e. from one or two of the categories); ‘relatively simple’, when the number of the organisations influencing SOCOG was relatively small (i.e. four to six) and relatively homogeneous (i.e. from two or three of the categories); ‘relatively complex’, when the number of the organisations influencing SOCOG was relatively large (i.e. seven to nine) and relatively heterogeneous (i.e. from three of four of the categories); and ‘complex’ when the number of the organisations influencing SOCOG was large (i.e. ten or more).
and heterogeneous (i.e. from all the categories). With regard to SOCOG’s environmental ‘stability’ an additional four-level rating scale was devised which aimed to identify whether SOCOG’s environment was perceived by its senior staff as ‘stable’, ‘relatively stable’, ‘relatively dynamic’, or ‘dynamic’. SOCOG’s environmental ‘stability’ was rated as: ‘stable’, when the needs of SOCOG’s environment were substantially defined by SOCOG’s staff; ‘relatively stable’, when the needs of SOCOG’s environment were relatively defined by SOCOG’s staff; ‘relatively dynamic’, when the needs of SOCOG’s environment were relatively unknown to SOCOG’s staff; and ‘dynamic’, when the needs of SOCOG’s environment were substantially unknown to SOCOG’s staff.

The dimension of ‘power’ was rated by determining the degree of representation of external actors on the main decision-making bodies of SOCOG (Pugh et al, 1968, 1969a). As was mentioned in previous chapters, SOCOG was by its very nature an externally controlled organisation as much by the IOC as by the state government of the New South Wales. Consequently, the analysis of the ‘power’ dimension did not aim to identify whether SOCOG was externally controlled or not, but rather to determine to the extent to which the decision-making bodies of the organisation were controlled by external organisations or individuals. Therefore, a three-level rating pattern was devised, namely ‘low external control’, ‘moderate external control’ and ‘high external control’, which is also in line with Mintzberg’s description of the ‘power’ dimension. Having identified the main decision-making bodies of SOCOG, the ‘power’ dimension was initially considered with regard to the analysis of a quantitative factor, that is the number of individuals from external organisations in the main decision-making bodies of the organisation. Effectively, when the number of externally controlled individuals in the decision-making bodies of SOCOG was proportionally smaller than that of SOCOG’s executives, SOCOG was considered ‘least externally controlled’, while in case the number of externally controlled individuals in the decision-making bodies of SOCOG was proportionally bigger than that of SOCOG’s executives, SOCOG was considered ‘highly externally controlled’. Finally, when SOCOG’s administration and external organisations were equally represented in the main decision-making bodies of SOCOG, the organisation was considered ‘moderately externally controlled’. However, given the multiple exchange of decision-making authority between SOCOG and external organisations, the ‘power’
dimension was also considered by qualitatively analysing the extent to which the officially reported decision-making bodies of SOCOG actually took the major decisions for the organisation. In other words, SOCOG's 'power' was also measured through the analysis of a qualitative factor, that is the degree to which the established decision-making bodies of SOCOG were directed by external organisations or individuals. This analysis was based on the interviewees' perceptions of the power distribution in SOCOG, and essentially aimed to identify whether the organisation had the adequate power to put forward their own decisions. For example, when the main decision-making body in SOCOG was a committee that primarily comprised SOCOG's executives, that is the organisation was 'least externally controlled', attention was placed on the influence of external organisations or individuals on the members of the committee and on their subsequent decisions.

The dimension of 'resource dependence' was measured by determining the levels of importance of resources possessed by external organisations to SOCOG (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Given that SOCOG was formed as a resource-dependent organisation, the types of resources which were essential for the organisation's operations were firstly identified through analysis of both interview and documentary data, and grouped into four categories, namely 'financial resources', 'human resources', 'physical resources' (i.e. sport venues, equipment and the like), and 'intangibles' (i.e. the brand name and the corporate status of the organisation), following Johnson and Scholes' (1997) classification of organisational resources. Then, the rating of the 'resource-dependence' dimension was based on the interview data and was measured on a three-level rating scale, in order to determine whether SOCOG operated under 'low resource dependence' 'medium resource dependence' or 'high resource-dependence'. Effectively, when the utilisation of externally held resources was perceived by interviewees as not essential for SOCOG's operations, that is the organisation could utilise alternative internal resources, its resource-dependence was considered 'low'. In the event that the utilisation of externally held resources was moderately essential for SOCOG's operations, that is the organisation could utilise a moderate amount of alternative internal resources, its resource-dependence was considered 'moderate'. Finally, when the utilisation of externally held resources was absolutely essential for SOCOG's operations, that is the
organisation could not utilise alternative internal resources, its resource dependence was considered 'high'.

With reference to the 'specialisation' dimension, that is the number of operational areas (major divisions, departments and programmes) in SOCOG (Hall et al, 1967; Kikulis et al, 1989; Hollenbeck, 2000), a three-level rating scale was devised to determine whether there was 'little', 'some' or 'much' specialisation in the organisation, thus ensuring consistency with the accounts of 'specialisation' provided by Mintzberg. The establishment of thresholds and the subsequent assessment of this dimension was a two-step process. Firstly, using data from SOCOG's official documents the total number of operational areas established by the organisation throughout its life cycle was identified, that is 95, and it was divided into three equal portions (i.e. 32 operational areas) to correspond to the three levels of 'specialisation'. Consequently, a quantitative indicator of SOCOG's 'specialisation' was established. In particular, when SOCOG operated with 31 or less operational areas its level of 'specialisation' was considered 'little'; when SOCOG operated with 32 to 63 operational areas, its level of specialisation was considered 'some'; and when SOCOG operated with 64 or more operational areas its level of 'specialisation' was considered 'much'. Having the rating pattern above as a basis, the second step involved analysis of the interview data which was related to 'specialisation'. Specifically, SOCOG's level of 'specialisation' was further assessed in view of the interviewees' perceptions of the quantity of operational areas in the organisation. For example, if SOCOG were found to operate with 20 operational areas at a given period of its life cycle, that is there was 'little' specialisation in the organisation according to the quantitative indicator, it would be also assessed whether the impression that was build up by the interviewees suggested that indeed the organisation experienced low levels of specialisation during that period.

The evaluation of the dimension of 'liaison devices' (i.e. the number of standing committees, commissions and task forces in SOCOG) (Mintzberg, 1979) followed a logic similar to the evaluation of 'specialisation'. In particular, based on Mintzberg's description of 'liaison devices' a three-level rating scale was developed to identify whether there were 'few', 'some' or 'many' standing committees, commissions and task forces in SOCOG. Initially, a quantitative indicator was developed by identifying the
maximum number of committees, commissions and task forces with which SOCOG operated, that is 14, and by dividing it into three equal portions. As such, SOCOG's 'liaison devices' were firstly considered as follows: 'few', when they were five or less, 'some' when they were between six and ten, and 'many' when they were eleven or more. In view of the indicator above further analysis of the interview data was subsequently conducted in order to evaluate the interviewees' perceptions of the quantity of 'liaison devices' under which the organisation operated. Effectively, on the assumption that some of the committees or commissions established by SOCOG would have lost their significance or become inactive during the organisation's life cycle, further assessment of the dimension was required to identify whether the number of 'liaison devices' suggested by the quantitative indicator corresponded to SOCOG's organisational reality. For example, if SOCOG was found to operate with seven 'liaison devices' in a certain period of its life cycle, that is the organisation operated with 'some liaison devices' according to quantitative indicator, attention would be placed on the interviewees' perceptions of the role and significance of each of the reported 'liaison devices' in that particular period.

The dimension of 'centralisation' was measured by determining the level in the hierarchy of SOCOG where the bulk of final decisions were made (Pugh et al., 1969; Kikulis et al., 1989; Theodoraki, 1996). Following Mintzberg's (1979) approach, a four-level rating pattern was devised, namely 'centralisation', 'limited decentralisation', 'decentralisation' and 'selective decentralisation'. Effectively, when the authority for final decisions was rested at the top of SOCOG's hierarchy, that is the Board of Directors or the senior management, SOCOG was considered 'centralised'. In case the decision-making authority was mainly vested in the middle line management, SOCOG was considered 'limited decentralised'. SOCOG was considered 'decentralised' when final decisions were primarily made by the staff at the lower levels of SOCOG's hierarchy, that is its 'operational core'. Finally, SOCOG was considered 'selectively decentralised', when the authority for final decisions was selectively delegated to its 'operational core' at the lower levels of the organisation's hierarchy.

Finally, the dimension of 'strategic capacity' was considered by determining the degree to which SOCOG could formulate its own strategies at operational level. In particular, the analysis of this dimension aimed to identify whether SOCOG had the adequate
authority to draw its own strategic direction with regard to its operational activities, such as its marketing and financial strategy, and consequently to discover the extent to which SOCOG's operational strategies were constrained by external organisations or individuals. A three-level rating pattern was devised, namely 'low strategic capacity', 'medium strategic capacity' and 'high strategic capacity'. By assessing the interviewees' perceptions of the extent that the organisations' strategies were externally constrained, the 'strategic capacity' dimension was evaluated as follows: when SOCOG was found to have limited space to operate its own strategies, the organisation's 'strategic capacity' was considered 'low'. In case that SOCOG were found to have extensive space to operate its own strategies, its 'strategic capacity' was considered 'high'. Finally, when SOCOG was found to have considerable space to operate its own strategies, yet to a degree it was constrained by external factors, the organisation's strategic capacity was considered 'medium'. For example, if the impression that was built up by the interviewees suggested that the majority of SOCOG's operational strategies were considerably hindered or reformed by external organisations, such as the IOC or the NSW government or by powerful individuals, such as the president of an organisation or a politician, the organisation's 'strategic capacity' would be considered 'low'.

To conclude, the process of analysing the data was guided by two main considerations. Firstly, the issues of validity and reliability of the data were of central importance during the data analysis. With regard to the former, by sorting the data according to a research template, the analysis of the interviews' transcripts and the documentary material occurred simultaneously, and was assisted by the interviewees' feedback, in order to achieve triangulation of data, and consequently enhance the validity of the data. With regard to the latter, SOCOG's dimensions under investigation were analysed on the basis of individual rating patterns, and often with the contribution of external assessors, which essentially enhanced the reliability of the data. Secondly, to a great extent the analysis of data was guided by Mintzberg's (1979) configuration approach to organisational analysis. In particular, the evaluation of SOCOG's dimensions was largely based on the rating criteria used in Mintzberg's approach, in order to allow comparison between the descriptions of SOCOG's organisational characteristics and those provided by Mintzberg for the elements of the organisational types he identifies. It was felt that this practice
would enable the researcher to comment on the usefulness of the conceptual framework utilised for the study of SOCOG, and consequently fulfil one of the main objectives of this study.
CHAPTER VI

PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
In previous chapters it was shown that the conceptual framework for this study is a configuration model, which consists of fourteen main elements. These elements have formed a research template (Appendix V) upon which SOCOG's organisational reality is examined. The information that informs the research template is primarily derived from the semi-structured research interviews but is also supported by secondary documentary sources. This chapter, therefore, extracts information both from primary and secondary data and aims to present a synthesis of evidence for SOCOG's organisational life with regard to the topics of the research template.

The chapter contains two main parts. The first part constitutes an analytical chronology of SOCOG's operational life, which also serves as an introduction to the organisational analysis of the organisation, and highlights key events in SOCOG's seven-year life cycle. The second part draws evidence mainly from the research interviews and presents the organisational condition of SOCOG with reference to its contextual characteristics and structural design parameters. This bipartite framework for the presentation of results is designed not only to illuminate the organisational structure and processes of SOCOG from a variety of differing perspectives but also to provide a rich and comprehensive basis for the analysis of results, which follows in chapter VII.

6.1 AN ANALYTICAL CHRONICLE OF SOCOG

This section aims to provide an analytical chronology of the operations of SOCOG. Firstly, SOCOG's institutional setting and main organisational responsibilities are presented. Secondly, significant internal events that characterised the operational life of SOCOG are highlighted as well as external events that affected the organisation's operations. Further, and for a fuller understanding of SOCOG's organisational progress, a chronology is presented. The section ends with a summary of the key events of SOCOG's seven-year life cycle.

The organisational structure of the Sydney Olympics was based upon a cooperative arrangement between the Australian public sector, particularly the state of the New South Wales (NSW), which underwrote the Games, the local and international business
community and the Australian and international Olympic and sporting movements. SOCOG was one of the three key organisations that delivered the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, together with the Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA) and the Olympic Roads and Transport Authority (ORTA), which were NSW government's agencies. All three organisations were interdependent, and over time their interaction and integration progressed to the point where the Games' organisation was undertaken under a single body, i.e. 'Sydney 2000', which effectively merged the operations of the three aforementioned organisations.

SOCOG was established in 12 November 1993 as a statutory corporation under the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games Act 1993 by the NSW Parliament, and became part of the Host City Contract (HCC), which involved the IOC, the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) and the City of Sydney (NSW, 1993, Section 10). Under its charter, SOCOG's responsibilities in relation to the Games were:

- To implement the sports programme, including preparing and operating all venues and facilities for the Games;
- To organise the cultural programme;
- To establish a marketing programme in consultation with the IOC and the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC); and
- To arrange and make available host broadcaster and television and radio facilities and other information services (SOCOG, 2001a).

In effect, SOCOG responsibilities included the areas of sport competition, the Olympic Village, ticketing, sponsor servicing, ceremonies, licensed products, press operations, protocol, the torch relay, arts festivals and the entire Olympic broadcasting arrangements (SOCOG, 1996). Therefore, SOCOG's operations involved a wide range of responsibilities which were central to the successful organisation of the event.

Organisationally, SOCOG was established in the form of a private corporation under a Board of Directors which was, however, appointed by the Governor of the NSW. This meant that SOCOG was essentially established as a blend of a private enterprise and a public authority, since the responsibility for the appointment of the leadership of the
organisation lay in the hands of the NSW government. A major implication of such an institutional setting for SOCOG was that the structure and, to a degree, the operations of the organisation were affected by the political conditions of the time, particularly those within the State of NSW. For example, SOCOG was formed under a Conservative Party State government which appointed Gary Pemberton as President of SOCOG's Board. In July 1994, Mr Pemberton was granted the position of Executive President of SOCOG, holding also responsibilities of a CEO. At the NSW State elections of March 1995, the Conservative government was succeeded by a new Labour Party government which in turn replaced Mr Pemberton with John Illife, and appointed Mal Hemmerling as CEO of the organisation. The new State government established a new Cabinet post of Minister for the Olympics, a position which was awarded to MP Michael Knight. In September 1996, in a controversial move, Michael Knight replaced John Illife to take also the Presidency of SOCOG, a position that Michael Knight would hold until the end of the event (SOCOG, 1997).

During its formative years, therefore, SOCOG experienced several changes of its leadership primarily as a result of the political alteration in the State of NSW. Such changes combined with the inexperience of SOCOG as an Olympic agency, resulted in a slow development of the organisation in terms of establishing its functional areas (SOCOG, 1997). In effect, the formative years of SOCOG constituted the initiation of the organisation into the Olympic project. Like most OCOGs, SOCOG embarked on the Olympic Project with limited detailed information about the preparation and running of the Olympic Games, and consequently during that period, SOCOG was trying to comprehend its position within the organisation model of the Sydney Olympics. In the course of its formative years, therefore, SOCOG was rather a small organisation that was primarily concerned with understanding its role with regard to the organisation of the event and establishing its key strategic relationship with the state government (Elphinston, 2000a).

A milestone for SOCOG's operations was the execution of the 1996 Atlanta Games. A group of SOCOG's staff observed the running of the event and was also debriefed on the organisational aspects of the Games through formal and informal meetings with key staff of the Atlanta organising committee (ACOG). In addition, SOCOG purchased Games-
related information from ACOG in the form of written documents which covered aspects of the preparation and execution of the event (SOCOG, 2001a). As a result, the end of the Atlanta Games signified a new era for SOCOG in terms of organisational knowledge, since the organisation had then acquired first-hand information and experience of the organisation of the Olympic Games. Moreover, the end of the Atlanta Olympics turned the focus of the Olympic movement and the world's sport media to the Sydney Games. An important consequence was that SOCOG intensified its contact with the entities of the Olympic movement, such as the IOC and the IFs as well as with the Olympic sponsors and media corporations, which together constitute the main elements for the operation of every Games (Hollway, 2000).

In March 1997 SOCOG's CEO, Mal Hemmerling, was replaced by Sandy Hollway. That was the last change at SOCOG's leadership that SOCOG would see until the end of the Games. SOCOG's leadership structure, mainly with regard to the dual role of MP, Michael Knight was constantly subject to severe criticism, not only from the NSW political opposition but also from the Conservative Federal Australian government, both of which opposed the idea of a politician leading an Olympic agency. The reality, however, was that Michael Knight took over the bulk of SOCOG's decision-making power, which meant that the NSW government furthered its control over SOCOG (Moore, 2000a). Consequently, as the Olympics were coming closer, the Conservative Party-controlled Australian Federal government resented the role of the Labour-controlled NSW government which was gradually taking all the kudos associated with the Games. It is true, however, that although the Sydney Olympics became embroiled in political struggle from time to time, in general this was kept to a minimum. This was not always easy if we bear in mind that from the date that Sydney launched its bid in 1991, the NSW government had been under different political party control to that in office in the Federal Australian government.

From 1997 onwards SOCOG grew rapidly as new functional areas were established in order to deal with the increasing number of interest groups involved in the Games. SOCOG's next organisational target was the running of the Test Events, a series of sport competitions, which were scheduled for September 1999 and designed to test SOCOG's procedures and practices under real event conditions (SOCOG, 1999). SOCOG's
managerial ability, however, to deal with the complexity of the Olympic preparations was subject to criticism from the NSW government, mainly in relation to its ability to deal with budgetary planning. SOCOG’s budget needed to be bailed out twice by the NSW government, which was then keen to take more responsibilities from SOCOG (Moore, 2000b). In early 1999, SOCOG’s reputation was even more tarnished when its ticketing policy literally collapsed. The organisers failed to deal successfully with 137,000 prepaid applications for Olympic tickets, and as a result, the Australian public as well as the NSW government lost confidence in SOCOG’s administrative ability. Ten months before the event, SOCOG’s performance was presented through the media as inadequate for organising the event, a fact that created a negative climate around the organisation of the Sydney Olympics as a whole (Hollway, 2000). This resulted in the NSW government getting even more involved in the preparations of the Games, mainly by replacing key SOCOG staff with NSW civil servants, who took responsibility for some of the most important areas of the organisation, but also by imposing stricter budgetary controls on SOCOG. In particular, in February 2000, SOCOG’s venue operational programs and budgets were outsourced to the OCA, including venue acquisition, Games presentation, environment, spectator services, catering, cleaning and waste management and venue overlay (SOCOG, 2001b). Furthermore, SOCOG outsourced the administration of all the sport-related issues of the Games to the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), and consequently the organisation’s power was even more diminished. However, SOCOG’s role was still essential since its central responsibility was to co-ordinate the activities of all the constituents of the Games, ensuring the smooth transaction of the event.

In late May 2000 the Main Operations Centre (MOC) became operational. The MOC was the central mechanism of co-ordination and control for all the Games’ operations, and its launch signified that SOCOG and all the other constituents of the Sydney Olympics reached the very last stage of preparations for the Games. As was mentioned earlier, SOCOG’s main responsibility was to run the event, and therefore after May 2000 its main concern was to organise and co-ordinate the activities and responsibilities of the various agencies involved in order to ensure consistency and effectiveness of operations during the Games, which took the form of intensive simulation exercises in what was called ‘Sydney 2000 Technical and Operational Readiness Exercising’ (STORE)
(Sloman, 2000b). Therefore, four months before the event, the testing of the Games' operations became the main task for SOCOG. Another area of major concern for SOCOG was the recruitment and training of the Games' workforce. Within the four months preceding the Games, SOCOG's paid staff numbers were doubled and approximately 41,000 volunteers were recruited and trained (Sloman, 2000d).

In terms of organisational structure, SOCOG changed significantly after May 2000. In June 2000 the Board of Directors was virtually replaced by the Games Co-ordination Group (GCOG) (Buckle, 2000). The GCOG was established in December 1999, bringing together top executives of the key agencies responsible for the Games. It was headed by NSW Minister for the Olympics, Michael Knight and AOC President John Coates (SOCOG, 2001a). GCOG was formed as a co-ordination body, yet from June 2000 it held considerable decision-making power since it would decide on matters that could not be resolved at a senior management level (Eyers, 2000). During the event, the responsibilities of the Board of Directors were officially vested in the GCOG, and particularly in Michael Knight and John Coates who formed a 'Games-time Commission' to make decisions at short notice (SOCOG, 2000b). Moreover, a few months before the Games, OCA, which was formed to act as the co-ordination body between SOCOG and the NSW government, and was also responsible for delivering the entire new Games-related infrastructure, and ORTA, which was responsible for co-ordinating all ground transport services for the event, merged their operations with SOCOG under a common co-ordinating entity, commonly known as 'Sydney 2000'. 'Sydney 2000' was headed by OCA's Director General David Richmond, who also became Director General of SOCOG in August 2000 (SOCOG, 2000a). A few weeks before the Games, therefore, SOCOG was assimilated into a new organisational scheme, which essentially gave the NSW government further control over the Games' delivery.

The actual period of Olympic Games competition took place from September 15, 2000 to October 1, 2000. The sport competitions were executed by 40 venue teams which were located at the sporting and non-sporting venues, under the supervision of the GCOG and in co-ordination with the MOC which was acting as the main co-ordination body of the Games. Right after the Games, a group of SOCOG's staff moved to the organising committee of the 2000 Paralympic Games (Sloman, 2000c), and the organisation was
preparing for its dissolution, which was officially achieved at the end of the year 2000. After the Games, SOCOG's main task was to make the appropriate actions, in order for the organisation to finalise its operations. That involved a series of legal arrangements, particularly with regard to SOCOG's obligations to the Host City Contract and to the state of NSW, which was the underwriter of the organisation (Eyers, 2001). Moreover, SOCOG undertook the responsibility to record and transfer the organisational knowledge acquired during the Sydney Olympics to future Olympic Organising Committees. Effectively, SOCOG became an integral part of the Transfer of Olympic Knowledge (TOK) programme, a joint initiative of SOCOG, IOC and the Athens 2004 Organising Committee (ATHOC), which aimed to gather key documents and data from the Sydney Olympics, which could then be used by ATHOC but also by future OCOGs. This process involved the filing of a series of Olympic organisational manuals, a task which was undertaken by record specialists in SOCOG, as well as numerous debriefings from key SOCOG's staff to their counterparts in other OCOGs (Toohey, 2001).

The period after the Games was marked by the resignation of the President of SOCOG, Michael Knight. That occurred a week after the Games, in October 2000, and as a response to this the responsibility for SOCOG was transferred to the NSW Treasurer, Michael Eagan (SOCOG, 2001a). One month after the Games, legislation was passed by the NSW Parliament to allow OCA to take full responsibility of the wind-up process and to effectively succeed SOCOG after the end of 2000 (Sydney 2000 Games Administration Act 2000). SOCOG eventually dissolved in December 31, 2000. Specifically, from January 1, 2001 the Director-General of OCA, David Richmond, took over the responsibilities of the Board and CEO of SOCOG. Moreover, a special Wind-Up Steering Committee was established which met fortnightly to review and receive reports on the financial and legal affairs of SOCOG. Financial management of all Olympic agencies from this date was brought under the overall supervision of OCA's Executive Director (SOCOG, 2001a).

To summarise, SOCOG was by its very nature a peculiar organisation both institutionally and operationally. With regard to the former, SOCOG was formed not only as a temporary Olympic agency but also as a statutory authority of the NSW government. This meant that the organisation was subject to regulation by the permanent bodies of the
Olympic Movement, such as the IOC and the IFs, as well as by the NSW government's authorities, such as OCA, which were involved in the preparations for the Sydney Olympics. With regard to the latter, and often interrelated to its institutional position, SOCOG went through several organisational changes. In particular, the election of a new Labour Party State government triggered consequent changes on the leadership of the organisation. Significant changes also occurred with regard to the nature and intensity of NSW government's involvement in the Games with the creation of OCA, which incorporated the entire NSW responsibilities for the Games, and with the appointment of NSW Minister for the Olympics, Michael Knight, as President of SOCOG in September 1996.

SOCOG faced financial difficulties and the loss of confidence of the NSW government, particularly after the failure of its ticketing programme in February 1999. From that point onwards SOCOG underwent further changes as it started losing vital operational responsibilities as well as significant elements of its authority for the management of the event as a whole. In particular, the establishment of the GCOG in December 1999, which excluded SOCOG's CEO from its leadership, and the outsourcing of the bulk of venue operations and budgets to OCA, in February 2000, undermined SOCOG's authority and essentially weakened its role in the Games. After May 2000 SOCOG experienced further organisational changes. Specifically, the bulk of its staff moved to the venues in the form of Venue Teams under the supervision and control of a single body, the MOC. Further, in June 2000, the merger of OCA and SOCOG under the leadership of OCA's Director General, David Richmond, and his subsequent appointment as Director General of SOCOG further reduced SOCOG's sphere of responsibility for the running of the event. SOCOG continued to change after the Games. President Michael Knight resigned and OCA took full responsibility of managing the dissolution of SOCOG, which effectively dissolved in December 2000. Overall, therefore, SOCOG's life cycle was marked by a series of events and decisions which often triggered organisational changes. Table 6.1 provides a chronology of SOCOG through an extensive summary of the key events which marked its seven-year life cycle.
Table 6.1: The Chronology of SOCOG's Life Cycle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1993</td>
<td>- SOCOG is established by a NSW Parliament Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- A 14-member Board of Directors is formed under the Presidency of Gary Pemberton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1994</td>
<td>- Gary Pemberton is appointed as CEO of SOCOG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>- A new Labour Party government is elected in the NSW state and MP Michael Knight is appointed as Minister for the Olympics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The Olympic Co-ordination Authority Act 1995 merges the NSW government's responsibilities in the Games into one statutory authority, the Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1995</td>
<td>- Gary Pemberton is replaced by Mal Hemmerling as CEO of SOCOG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1996</td>
<td>- Gary Pemberton is replaced by John Illife as President of SOCOG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1996</td>
<td>- SOCOG delegations observe the running of the 1996 Atlanta Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1996</td>
<td>- SOCOG President John Illife is replaced by the NSW Minister for the Olympics Michael Knight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1997</td>
<td>- The Olympic Roads and Transportation Authority (ORTA) is established with the role of co-ordinating the Olympic transport services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1997</td>
<td>- SOCOG CEO Mal Hemmerling is replaced by Sandy Hollway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1999</td>
<td>- SOCOG’s Ticketing Programme fails to satisfy pre-paid applications. SOCOG faces financial difficulties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1999</td>
<td>- SOCOG runs a series of Test Events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1999</td>
<td>- The Games Coordination Group (GCOG) is established, bringing together the top executives of the key agencies responsible for staging the Sydney 2000 Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2000</td>
<td>- Following SOCOG’s continuing financial difficulties, SOCOG outsources to OCA a package of venue operational programs and budgets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2000</td>
<td>- The Venue Teams move to the venues. The Main Operations Centre becomes the central co-ordination body of the Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The STORE programme is launched to test readiness and co-ordination of activities of the agencies involved in the Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2000</td>
<td>- SOCOG's Board of Directors responsibilities are moved to the GCOG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- SOCOG, OCA and ORTA are merged under the 'Sydney 2000' headed by OCA Director General David Richmond.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2 THE ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCOG

This section presents the organisational characteristics of SOCOG based on the conceptual framework developed for the study. As was mentioned in previous chapters, the theoretical framework which was utilised to examine SOCOG, constitutes a modified version of Mintzberg's (1979) configuration approach (Table 6.2). In particular, SOCOG's organisational condition is analysed with respect to its contextual characteristics and its structural design parameters. The former includes its size, the conditions of its organisational environment (complexity and stability), the level of its dependence on externally held resources (resource dependence), and its level of control by external entities (power). The latter comprises the level of formalisation, specialisation, centralisation and staff training in the organisation as well as the criteria used for its unit grouping, and the number of its liaison devices. This synthesis of SOCOG's organisational condition incorporates the presentation of three additional elements, namely, the basic mechanisms utilised for co-ordination in SOCOG (basic co-ordination mechanism), the parts of the organisation with the most significant contribution to its operations (basic part of the organisation), and its capacity for strategic formation (strategic capacity). The time aspect is central to this presentation, since SOCOG's organisational characteristics are not captured at a specific point in time but rather in the course of its seven-year life cycle. As such, particular attention is placed upon the fluctuations that the organisational elements under investigation exhibited across SOCOG's organisational time.
Table 6.2: SOCOG’s Organisational Elements under Investigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTEXTUAL CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>STRUCTURAL DESIGN PARAMETERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Specialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Complexity</td>
<td>Formalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Stability</td>
<td>Centralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Dependence</td>
<td>Unit Grouping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Liaison Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Co-ordination Mechanism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Part of the Organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2.1 SOCOG’s ORGANISATIONAL SIZE

SOCOG was established as a small organisation, whose size increased gradually up until the time of the Games and decreased rapidly right after the end of the event. In terms of paid staff, SOCOG started its operations with 16 members of the Sydney 2000 Bid Committee, who joined SOCOG on its formation, and by the time of the Games, its staff figures reached 3341 employees. As figure 6.1 depicts, SOCOG’s growth rates were not linear throughout its seven-year life cycle, since in its formative years the organisation developed very slowly. In particular, within the first three years of its operations, SOCOG grew from 16 to 113 members of staff (Sydney 2000-ATHOC, 2000). However, four years before the Games, and particularly after the Atlanta 1996 Games, SOCOG’s growth rate started to soar, as the organisation was almost doubling its staff every year (Table 6.3). Three years before the Games SOCOG employed 374 staff, 742 staff two
years before the Games while one year before the Games SOCOG’s staff increased to 1252.

**Figure 6.1: Evolution of SOCOG’s Paid Staff Numbers**

SOCOG’s organisational growth increased substantially after the Main Operations Centre (MOC) became operational, in May 2000. The establishment of the MOC was an indication that SOCOG was moving closer to a structure suited to the running of the Games. Venues became the focal point for the organisation of SOCOG which was now functioning under a single co-ordinating body, the MOC. As such, the Venue Teams had to be fully recruited in order to experience real time conditions and test their operations. Consequently, within five months SOCOG almost doubled its size employing approximately 1500 more staff and reaching a total number of 3341 staff at the time of the event. The vast majority of the staff employed during that period was hired 2-3 months before the Games and was primarily allocated to existing Venue Teams (Sloman, 2000d).

**Table 6.3: SOCOG’s Staff Evolution after the 1996 Atlanta Games**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>1252</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>3341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sydney 2000-ATHOC, 2000)
Out of the 3,341 SOCOG’s staff in post in September 2000, 24 held executive positions such as CEO, Deputy CEO, Business Group Managers and General Managers, only four of whom were women. Overall, 60% of SOCOG’s total paid staff were men, while 12.2% were people from racial, ethnic and ethno-religious groups, 1.6% were Aboriginals and 2.1% people with a disability (Sydney 2000-ATHOC, 2000). It is worth mentioning that in addition to SOCOG’s paid staff, almost 41,000 volunteers worked for the Sydney Olympics as well as more than 100,000 people who were associated with the event through their employment with companies to which the organisers had outsourced Games services, such as catering, cleaning and so on (Table 6.4).

Table 6.4: Sydney 2000 Games-time Workforce Statistics as in September 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paid</th>
<th>Volunteers</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,341</td>
<td>40,913</td>
<td>103,190</td>
<td>147,444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sloman, 2000d)

6.2.2 SOCOG’s ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

As was mentioned earlier, SOCOG was formed as the central organisational body of the Sydney Olympics. Therefore, it naturally became an interlinked part of a multiple group of entities whose input into the preparation and running of the event was essential. That included Olympic agencies, private corporations as well as Australian public agencies and organisations. Further, due to the strong appeal that the contemporary Games have to the host community, SOCOG also interacted with independent groups and organisations which represented public interests related to the event. As a result, SOCOG was operating within a heterogeneous organisational environment, which, for the purposes of this study, has been divided into four main categories, namely the Olympic Movement, the Commercial Sector, the Public Governance, and the Public Groups categories. The Olympic Movement includes the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the International Federations (IF), the National Olympic Committees (NOC), and the athletes. The Commercial Sector includes the sponsors, media corporations and partner organisations of the Sydney Olympics. The Public Governance consists of all levels of
public governance involved in the organisation of the Games, namely the City of Sydney, the NSW state government, and the Federal Australian government. Finally, the Public Groups category comprises the Australian general public as well as established public groups such as indigenous groups and Green organisations (Figure 6.2).

**Figure 6.2: SOCOG’s Organisational Environment**

The entities of the Olympic Movement and the Commercial Sector affected SOCOG in a manner similar to previous OCOGs. The support of the Olympic Movement was essential as with every contemporary Games. For example, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) made most of the marketing arrangements on behalf of SOCOG providing the organisation with approximately 60% of its budget (Preuss, 2000). Further, through its Co-ordination Commission, the IOC monitored the progress of the Olympic preparation and advised SOCOG on organisational matters. The International Federations (IFs) provided the technical support for the sport competitions, such as venue specifications and requirements for their respective events, and the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) represented the athletes’ interests in the Games, as the Olympic Charter suggests (IOC, 1999, rule 31 § 3). A significant role in the Sydney Games was played by the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), especially in latter stages of the
event's preparations, as it was awarded the responsibility for the bulk of the sport-related issues of the event.

As with the Olympic Movement, the Commercial Sector constitutes an integral part of every contemporary Olympics, since it is the main financial supplier for the event mainly through media royalties and sponsorship fees. The IOC has established a long-term sponsorship programme with international corporations, commonly known as 'The Olympic Partners' (TOP), and also negotiates the media arrangements on behalf of each OCOG. In the case of Sydney 2000 Games, the IOC provided SOCOG with US$ 536 million from sponsors and US$ 1.3 billion from media royalties, which as was mentioned earlier covered 60% of SOCOG's budget. In addition to the above, private organisations contributed to the organisation of the event as a whole by providing a wide range of goods and services for the Games (SOCOG, 1997).

The role of the Public Governance for the Sydney Olympics was also very important. After the failure of the privately funded Olympics in Atlanta, the IOC encouraged more public sector involvement in Sydney Olympics (Associated Press, 1998), and as a result, the role of all levels of governance (i.e. City of Sydney, NSW government, and Federal Australian government), was crucial for SOCOG's operations. As was mentioned earlier, the most important role was held by the NSW government which underwrote SOCOG, and was also responsible for the construction of the entire Games-related infrastructure, spending approximately US$ 2.9 billion (1995 prices) (Preuss, 2000). The NSW government also provided a range of support services particularly in the areas of transport and security. The Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA) was the link between the NSW government and SOCOG. OCA was responsible for the design and construction of the Olympic venues and for co-ordinating the entire NSW government's involvement in the event (SOCOG, 1999).

Finally, the importance of Public Groups in the organisation of the Sydney Olympics was primarily manifested through the involvement of the citizens of Sydney, Aboriginal groups and the Australian Green movement. Although their involvement was predominately consultative, their role was essential for the planning and organisation of the Games, since their voice was represented by the media which were often critical to
SOCOG's operations creating a negative profile for SOCOG, and the organisation of the Games as a whole (Hollway, 2000). Aboriginal groups, for example, attempted to use the global platform of the event to raise awareness of their history and they were constantly claiming greater involvement in the organisation of the Games (McDougall, 1998). Green Peace Australia, however, was the most influential Public Group, particularly in the early stages of the preparation of the Games mainly through its involvement in the design of the Olympic infrastructure, such as the Olympic Village and the majority of the sporting venues (Brogan, 1996). Further, Green Peace Australia assisted OCA to set the environmental guidelines for the development of the Olympic venues and for the establishment of an environmental policy for the Games as a whole. The Aboriginal groups and Green Peace Australia were significant elements of SOCOG’s environment, since they were both highly profiled in the Australian media, and they were often concerned with issues with considerable potential to embarrass the practices of SOCOG, the IOC and the NSW government.

**SOCOG's Environmental Complexity**

As was mentioned above, SOCOG was operating within an organisational environment comprised of diverse entities. However, not all these entities were influential throughout SOCOG's life cycle. In the course of its formative years, for example, SOCOG established strong relationships primarily with the Public Governance and to a lesser extent with the Olympic Movement and the Commercial Sector. At SOCOG’s formation, the NSW Government’s Olympic responsibilities, in terms of coordination of services and construction of facilities, were undertaken by four government ministers and five separate government agencies. The Government’s Olympic entities included: the Office of Olympic Co-ordination, in the Premier's Department; the Olympic Construction Authority, housed in the Public Works Department; the Homebush Bay Development Corporation, which was responsible for providing most Olympic venues; part of the Department of Sport and Recreation, which had responsibility for delivering certain other new Olympic facilities such as the rowing course and Velodrome; and part of the Department of Planning, which was responsible for securing venues for equestrian and
mountain bike events (SOCOG, 2001a). In 1995, the election of a new State government in NSW and the appointment of a Minister for the Olympics saw the merger of the five departments previously undertaking Olympic work into one statutory authority known as the Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA). From 1995 onwards, therefore, SOCG’s links with the NSW government achieved through its relationships with OCA.

OCA acted as the permanent venue provider to SOCG and therefore, SOCG had to specify to OCA its venue needs. The venue requirements and specifications would be set by the IFs, and SOCG together with OCA would agree upon the final designs. OCA’s Managing Director, David Richmond explains:

The OCA built the permanent venues [...] to meet SOCG’s requirements. The way we did that was that in the early stages, we worked with SOCG to get agreement on the initial designs, and at the same time with the IFs on the sports to get the agreement on the final design (Richmond, 2000).

SOCOG, therefore, established close links with the IFs early in its operations. Commenting on the nature of involvement with the IFs, Bob Elphinston stated:

So, if it is a new venue they [IFs] have been involved in the design: how many spectators seats will be, how big the field of play should be, and other requirements like the air conditioning and things like that (Elphinston, 2000a).

SOCOG’s relationships with the Olympic Movement also took the form of formal interaction with the IOC, through executive meetings with the IOC Coordination Commission, which monitored the Olympic preparations, and regular reporting to the IOC Executive Board (SOCOG, 2001a). The IOC co-ordination commission officially met with SOCG’s officials every six months and more regularly as the time progressed towards the Games. Unofficially, however, SOCG’s communication with the IOC was very frequent, sometimes even on a daily basis. SOCG’s Head of Sports, for example, said:

In a formal sense the IOC Co-ordination Commission was coming to Sydney every six months but with an ongoing basis in between. I talked with the IOC Sports Department almost every day (Elphinston, 2000a).
In early stages, SOCOG also paid considerable attention to its marketing programme in order to raise private money. Jim Sloman explained "due to the fact that SOCOG started from scratch, its initial focus was very much on marketing, in order to raise money" (Sloman, 2000a). SOCOG's links with sponsors and media corporations were created through the IOC, which negotiated and set the international Olympic sponsors and media arrangements for the Games on behalf of SOCOG. Within the first two years of SOCOG's operation, the initial arrangements with the first group of Olympic partners and licensees were made, although most of the major-level sponsorships were confirmed shortly after the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games (SOCOG, 2001b). In 1995, however, SOCOG received the first television rights money from the North America television rights holder, NBC (SOCOG, 1996).

In summary, at the start of its operations, SOCOG's was influenced by a limited number of external organisations. As SOCOG's CEO, Sandy Hollway, said:

In the beginning we [SOCOG] did not have many relations with all the constituent groups apart from the NSW government with concern to the delivery of the permanent venues, the IFs with concern to the sporting venues, and the IOC that was co-ordinating our agreements with the sponsors and the media (Hollway, 2000).

However, this changed after the 1996 Atlanta Games as the attention of the Olympic Movement turned to the forthcoming Sydney Olympics. The various constituent groups of the Olympics (i.e. sponsors, media, IFs, etc) began to get more involved with the preparations for the Games in order to promote their interests and get some of the diverse benefits that the Olympic Games can provide. As such, from 1996 onwards, SOCOG developed strong relationships with virtually all the elements of its organisational environment, but also experienced certain pressures which had a considerable impact on its operations, particularly on its decision making structure and its organisational criteria for grouping its operational areas. The involvement of the Public Governance in the Games, for example, considerably increased after the Atlanta Games and particularly after the appointment of the NSW Minister for the Olympics, Michael Knight, to the presidency of SOCOG (Moore, 2000a). In effect, the NSW government's OCA took more responsibilities for the Olympic preparations, establishing strong links with SOCOG. OCA, which was initially responsible for building the permanent venues, was
also granted the responsibility for the delivery of the venues overlay in December 1996. Venues overlay refers to the provision of all the temporary facilities for the venues such as temporary seats, temporary structures as well as all services needed to support the venues (SOCOG, 1997). This resulted in shifting the functions and personnel of the SOCOG Facilities Division to OCA. Moreover, OCA, in addition to its responsibility for monitoring SOCOG’s budgets, co-ordinated NSW government’s services to the Games, such as transport, security and health care (SOCOG, 1997). The range of relations between OCA and SOCOG during that period were described by OCA’s General Director as follows:

In the overlay process, we jointly scoped the overlay, SOCOG and OCA people, and then it was handed over to the OCA to deliver the overlay. That was one linkage. The other linkage is where we facilitated all of the provisional [e.g. transport, security, health etc.] from the government services. Our job was to make sure that for example, the security services, the transport services and so on were being provided to SOCOG and at budgets that were within the governmental budget. [...] The other thing that we did was that we monitored on behalf of the government the budgets. So, we had a lot of linkages (Richmond, 2000).

A further linkage between SOCOG and the State government was established in early 1997, when the NSW government formed the Olympic Roads and Transport Authority (ORTA) to co-ordinate planning and delivery of integrated roads and transport services for the Games, in accordance with specifications determined by OCA, but primarily by SOCOG. SOCOG provided ORTA with specifications with regard to the delivery of the transport services for the Olympic Family members, including athletes, officials, accredited media, workforce and paid, volunteer and contract staff. As a result, SOCOG created several links with ORTA, mainly through areas whose operations were affected by transportation issues. These included the areas of IOC Relations and Protocol, Press Operations, Venue and Competition Management, Accommodation, Ticketing, Sports Competition Programme, Security, and Accreditation (SOCOG, 2001a).

After the Atlanta Games the Olympic Movement’s involvement was mainly manifested through the increasing involvement of the IFs. The IFs assisted SOCOG to complete the full Olympic competition schedule as well as the schedule for the Test Events, and they
constantly consulted SOCOG on various sport-specific issues such as the provision of facilities for the sporting and training venues, for the field-of-play and the like (Elphinston, 2000b). Commenting on the role of the IFs during that period, SOCOG's senior Executive Bob Leece said:

The most dominant and influential group is the IFs. The only chance they get to exercise their power is the Olympic Games because they have done these Games after Games and year after year in regional and world championships. They get the power and the money from the IOC for the Olympic Games period and they try to get more and more out of this. IFs were very influential from the early stages but particularly after the Atlanta Games (Leece, 2000a).

As was mentioned earlier, the IFs also played a significant role during the Test Events period, which took place one year before the Games and involved 14 events (Sloman, 2000c). David Richmond, for example, said: "[...\] when we did the test events, they [IFs] were a critical part of that and we took feedback then about things that worked or did not work. So, there was a constant sense of involvement" (Richmond, 2000). The IFs, therefore, constituted an additional external force influencing SOCOG's operations.

Private organisations also had an increasingly significant impact on SOCOG as the time of the event drew closer. More than 60 per cent of sponsorship revenue money was committed or was at the table by June 1997, and one year before the Games, SOCOG had signed contracts or had Memorandums of Understanding in place for 80% of the sponsorship deals and 96% of the television rights (SOCOG, 1999). SOCOG's agreements with sponsors and television rights holders were formally finalised within the six months preceding the event (Eyers and Read, 2000). The Olympic sponsors appeared to be the most influential actors within the Commercial Sector. SOCOG's Director General, for instance, said: "I think that from about 12 months before the Games it becomes difficult because, for example, the sponsors started exercising their rights. They started getting closer to the Games" (Richmond, 2000).

After the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, the sponsors of the Sydney Games substantially increased their usage of SOCOG's intellectual property, such as the Olympic logo, in marketing their products. Particularly, two years before the event the sponsors took full
advantage of the sponsorship ‘value chain’, which set out the benefits of sponsorship at different levels of investment. Rights included access to Olympic emblems, designations, symbols such as the official pictograms of the 2000 Olympic Games, imagery such as the ‘Look of the Games’ and other Sydney 2000 properties. Approved designations varied from generic ones, such as ‘Official Worldwide Sponsor for the 2000 Olympic Games’ and ‘Team Millennium Olympic Partner’, to more specific ones such as ‘Official Banking Partner of the 2000 Olympic Games’ and ‘Official Supplier of Tennis Balls to the Australian Olympic Team’ (SOCOG, 2001b). Further, a number of Olympic marketing properties were developed by SOCOG to offer sponsors incremental marketing opportunities and create a secondary revenue stream. They were known as ‘complimentary properties’ or ‘core assets’. These included: the ‘Olympic Journey Tour’, the ‘Olympic Arts Festivals’, the ‘National Olympic Education Program’, the ‘Volunteers Program’, the ‘Test Events’, the ‘International Youth Camp’ and the ‘Olympic Torch Relay’. Each core asset had its own Olympic emblem, and sponsors could use the emblem to market themselves in association with that asset (SOCOG, 2001b).

The Australian Public Groups also became significant constituent elements of the Sydney Olympics as the Games neared. The Aboriginal community was keen to get involved in the Games in order to promote themselves through the media exposure that the Olympics provide (Elphinston, 2000a). In December 1998, for example, the Aboriginal authorities exerted considerable pressure on SOCOG, and particularly on its President, to support an indigenous candidate to fill a vacancy that emerged in SOCOG’s Board. This did not fulfilled, and SOCOG was under severe criticism from the press for excluding Aboriginals from SOCOG’s main decision-making body (Clarey, 2000). The Australian Green movement was also influential not as much in SOCOG as in OCA, which was responsible for constructing the Olympic venues. Commenting on the role of the Green Australian movement Bob Leece said: “OCA was set up to develop new standards in environmental initiatives through the development of the facilities and the Greens contributed a lot. It was an important criterion for the selection of contractors and consultants” (Leece, 2000a). The Green Movement also put pressure on OCA concerning its environmental policy. Green Peace Australia, for example, sued OCA in
1999 for going against environmental regulations with regard to the issues of ozone destroying and gas air conditioning in the Super Dome venue. The case was eventually settled out of court after months of legal manoeuvring by OCA and the NSW government (Green Peace, 2000).

Although it was not represented by a formal organisation the most influential public group for SOCOG was the Australian public, which one year before the event started associating itself with the Games, primarily as potential ticket holders. Commenting on the role of the Australian public, David Richmond said:

What happened 12 months out was that you have engaged for the first time the public in a very strong way because they are actually putting in for tickets. So, they suddenly get a sense of ownership so that becomes the largest constituency [...] (Richmond, 2000).

The Australian public put considerable pressure on SOCOG's operations, especially when SOCOG failed to deal effectively with thousands of pre-paid ticket applications. According to Mathew Moore, Olympic editor of a leading Australian newspaper, Australian public's pressure on SOCOG came mainly through the media and the NSW government. The ticketing problems directly affected the public and also stimulated interest within the media. The media saw this episode as a chance to scrutinise SOCOG's operations and they were severely critical of its practices (Moore, 2000a). In the words of SOCOG's CEO, the public's reaction "was fuelled by a very intense and critical media" (Hollway, 2000).

Therefore, as the time of the event was coming closer, and particularly after the end of the 1996 Atlanta Games, SOCOG experienced considerable complexity in its organisational environment, as both the number and the diversity of external organisations influencing the organisation gradually increased. As the nature of demands and exchange relationships became more complex, the entities that comprised SOCOG's organisational environment were effectively the essential constituents for the delivery of the Games. Consequently, their links with SOCOG were becoming closer and stronger as time progressed, since both sides aspired to achieve co-ordination of activities that would lead to the smooth transaction of the event. As such, SOCOG's organisational
environment became even more complex a few months before the Games as the various constituents of the groups integrated their operations under a single organisational model. Particularly, after the establishment of the Main Operations Centre (MOC), SOCOG's role was to co-ordinate the operations and tasks of OCA, IFs, sponsors and so on, and test their effectiveness as a whole so as "to run the show", in the words of SOCOG's Head of Sports (Elphinston, 2000a).

Thus, a few months before the Games, SOCOG's links with the Public Governance became very strong, particularly through the increasing involvement of OCA in the organisation of the event. In particular, OCA played a major co-ordination role in ensuring the efficient operation of the Games' sites as well as in providing essential venue operations and services, such as environment operations, spectator services, catering, cleaning and waste management (OCA, 2000). In addition, OCA's Development Managers, who were responsible for delivering the venues overlay, became Venue Operators (Sloman, 2000b). Their main responsibility was to provide the necessary facilities for each venue and assist the Venue Manager with the venues operations. Commenting on OCA's involvement in the Games during the Games-time period Bob Leece said:

Coming to the Games-time, my staff [OCA] became from development managers to help develop the facilities and do the overlay, the subordinates to the Venue Manager in SOCOG, the sub-managers in SOCOG. They provided the site facilities and the back up on the resources. The government could provide us an honour of the facilities to help them put on their events, as you would do as if you were hiring a theatre on a show (Leece, 2000a).

OCA's involvement in the venues operations was seen as essential, since OCA was responsible for the operations of the Common Domain, the areas surrounding the venues, and therefore its presence in the venues was considered necessary for ensuring effective communication between the inside and outside of the venues. David Richmond, for example, said:

In Sydney there was total integration. There was a sense in which the organisation worked for the customer for the moment. [...] The only way to achieve that was with integration. Integrate the communications so we do not just get messages about what
you do when you get to the venue. You get messages in the same format of communication right through. Integrate the movement of people; integrate the transport and so on. [...] There had to be much more integration, otherwise you would not have got the successful Games that we got. We looked at things in a very holistic way (Richmond, 2000).

Apart from the strong links that SOCOG had established with the NSW Government, primarily through the role of OCA and ORTA, a few months before the event the organisation established closer relationships with local government authorities as well as with the Federal Australian Government. These links were based on early-established relationships in the form of Memorandums of Understanding, joint committees and forums between SOCOG and the Federal and local government tiers. The Sydney of City, for example, which was a major local government authority, was co-operating with SOCOG’s Cultural Commission for the organisation of Olympic-related cultural activities in Sydney such as parades, festivals, exhibitions and so on (Leece, 2000b). Further, SOCOG created close links with other local authorities with regard to the provision of training sites, and a series of other issues ranging from joint ventures on city improvements to co-ordination for local business opportunities for the Games-time period (SOCOG, 2001c).

The Australian Federal Government was also communicating with SOCOG through the Sydney 2000 Games Coordination Task Force, which was located in the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet. With the provision of a fund of A$ 30,79 million to SOCOG, the Federal government allowed SOCOG to purchase services, facilities and the like from federal agencies or other organisations such as the Department of Immigration, the Department of Health, as well as the Australian Custom Services, the Capital City Airports and so on (Sydney 2000-ATHOC, 2000). Further, a number of commitments were obtained from the Federal government to SOCOG including the facilitation of entry to Australia by members of the Olympic Family, the extension of Medicare benefits to members of the Olympic Family, the admission of goods for use at the Games using simplified customs procedures and without the payment of sales tax or customs duty, and exemption from income tax for non-residents working at the Games (SOCOG, 2001c).
The role of the Olympic Movement was naturally very significant a few months before the event, mainly because it represented the needs of the athletes who, quite sensibly, became the central part of the Games. The IFs were very influential during that period because they directed the entire organisation for their sports and they also had the responsibility for selecting and appointing the technical officials for the competitions (AOC, 2000). The Australian National Federations also played a vital role at that time because they provided technical support and guidance to SOCOG, and assisted the organisation to recruit and train national technical officials and volunteers for the sport competitions (Elphinston, 2000b). Moreover, the NOCs became a key part of the Games during that period since they were responsible for all matters concerning their athletes. They appointed Attaches who acted as intermediaries between SOCOG and the NOCs in order to assist in solving travel, accommodation and other problems as well as Chefs de Mission who liaised with the IOC, the IFs and SOCOG to deal with issues concerning their athletes and officials (Elphinston, 2000b).

The Commercial Sector's involvement in the Games a few months before the event as well as during the event was mainly represented by the role of the sponsors and the media. The association of the sponsors with the Games became very intense during that period since they got great benefit during the six months preceding the Olympics. SOCOG's Director General said:

They [sponsors] get enormous benefit for the last 6 months. Therefore, their interests are much more focused on their image, their advertising and their association with the Games. Plus, they are looking very much at what kind of presence they will have around the Games, and how people will know that they are part of it (Richmond, 2000).

According to SOCOG's Head of Sports, Bob Elphinston, the main benefit for Olympic sponsors is publicity and therefore, during that period, when the public interest for the Games is intense, sponsors start exercising their rights in order to increase awareness of their association with the event (Elphinston, 1999b). For that reason, SOCOG established a Sponsors Operations Centre to coordinate sponsors' activities, which became operational four weeks prior to the Games (Eyers and Read, 2000). The most influential commercial group during the actual Games-time period, however, was the
mass media. SOCOG’s CEO explains: “President Samaranch always reminded us that the mass media would be the ones to determine whether we would be successful or not. Their view of the Games would be very important so we understood the need to look after them” (Hollway, 2000). Of the mass media, television was seen as the most significant medium for SOCOG, and particularly the North America television-rights holder, NBC. Bob Leece, for example, said: “The second most influential group [after the IFs] of course happens to be the television, and for Sydney and ATHOC is NBC. It is the biggest and most infantile sponsor; you have to look after them” (Leece, 2000a). SOCOG had to provide the television-rights holders with the best possible facilities because, as Mr Leece stated, their experience of the Games would be reflected on the coverage of the event.

As the time of the event was approaching, the importance of the Public Groups for SOCOG was primarily manifested through their role as Olympic ticket-holders whether they were Australian citizens or visitors. Nowadays, the Olympics constitute probably the most prestigious sport spectacle, and therefore SOCOG had to ensure a great experience for the spectators. This involved provision of high quality services within the venues as well as ensuring their smooth movement in the common areas among the venues (Barraclough and Gallagher, 2000).

As the above discussion suggests, in the few months before the Games as well as during the event, SOCOG was operating within a very complex organisational environment. It was not only the great number and heterogeneity of external elements influencing SOCOG, but also the intensity of their involvement and the diversity of their needs, especially during the sixteen days of the sport competitions. However, SOCOG’s organisational environment radically changed right after the end of the Sydney 2000 Games. SOCOG retained links only with the NSW government since the other constituents of the Olympics (i.e. IOC, IFs, sponsors, the public and so on) did not have any involvement after the Games were over. The NSW government’s involvement after the event was again the responsibility of OCA. In particular, one month after the Games, legislation was passed by the NSW government to allow OCA to lead the process of winding up the Games (Sydney 2000 Games Administration Act 2000), and as a result SOCOG’s operations were strongly influenced by OCA, which had the ultimate control.
over the post-event operations (Eyres, 2001). SOCOG’s CEO saw this as a natural organisational evolution; he said:

That is very sensible in effect that the government will be around for a long time and therefore, it should lead the process of tidying up the Games: the financial reporting, the ultimate financial resolution, the selling of the remains of the Games, the assets disposal and all of that (Hollway, 2000).

This, however, was seen as an extension of what had started nine months before the games, when OCA started taking over tasks that were under SOCOG’s control such as catering, cleaning, communications and so on (Toohey, 2001). SOCOG’s staff had to report to people from OCA, and this created a culture of ‘us’ and ‘them’ inside the organisation. Kristine Toohey explains:

[After the Games] there was certainly a culture of an “us” and “them”. If you came from OCA you would be the “us”. I came from SOCOG and SOCOG was the “us”. I think that people in both, it did not matter which agency you were from, thought that this was the one important agency (Toohey, 2001).

OCA therefore was the sole element in SOCOG’s environment which was influencing the organisation after the Games. SOCOG’s relationships with other environmental groups such as the sponsors, the media and the Australian public naturally ended when the Games were over. We would expect, however, the elements of the Olympic Movement and the IOC in particular to provide SOCOG with some post-Games guidance to assist the smooth dissolution of the organisation. This was not the case in Sydney. Kristine Toohey, for example, said about the role of the IOC after the Sydney Games:

After the Games was over the IOC basically thanked us for the success of the Games and then vanished. I believe that the IOC does not care about what is happening with an OCOG after the Games; at least this is what we experienced in Sydney. There was not guidance for the wind-up process (Toohey, 2001).

After the Games, therefore, SOCOG had relationships only with the Public Governance, and particularly with the NSW’s OCA. As such, the organisation was operating within a simplified organisational environment, which solely comprised OCA.
Overall, therefore, although SOCOG was, by its very nature, operating within a multiple organisational environment, the number of the entities in its environment influencing the organisation was not constant throughout its life cycle (Figure 6.3).

**Figure 6.3: Changes in SOCOG’s Environmental Complexity**

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<td><strong>NOCs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Local Public Authorities (City of Sydney)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>AOC</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Media</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Contractors</strong></td>
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As was shown earlier, up until the Atlanta Olympics, SOCOG had created close links only with the IOC, which was co-ordinating the international media and sponsorship arrangements and through its Co-ordination Commission was monitoring the Olympic preparations, the IFs which set the requirements for the sporting venues, and the NSW government with regard to the construction of the Olympic venues and the provision of a series of support services for the Games. After the 1996 Atlanta Games, the complexity of SOCOG’s environment increased significantly. In particular, media and sponsor companies turned their attention to the Sydney Olympics creating closer links with...
SOCOG, and the Federal Australian government started negotiating its involvement in the event with regard to the provision of Games-time services. Further, the Green Movement furthered its co-operation with SOCOG with respect to environmental issues, and Aboriginal groups, in the light of the Games’ global appeal, claimed considerable involvement in the event. The general public also became a significant element of SOCOG’s environment primarily as potential ticket holders.

In the course of the four months leading up to the Games, and particularly after the establishment of the MOC, which co-ordinated the operation of all the constituents of the event, SOCOG experienced the greatest complexity in its environment. More entities started co-operating with SOCOG, and the involvement of those previously influencing the organisation was intensified. Additional elements in SOCOG’s environment included the NOCs, which were representing the officials and the participants of the sporting competitions, local public authorities, which primarily contributed to celebrating events surrounding the Games as well as contractor companies with regard to the provision of services in kind. Finally, after the end of the event the majority of the elements in SOCOG’s environment naturally stopped influencing the organisation. In view of SOCOG’s dissolution, it was only the NSW government still co-operating with the organisation through its OCA, which was awarded the full responsibility for the organisation’s wind-up process.

**SOCOG’s Environmental Stability**

As was shown above, SOCOG was operating within a diverse organisational environment which consisted of public authorities, commercial organisations, public groups and sporting organisations. As a new and temporary Olympic authority, SOCOG experienced difficulties in dealing with its environment, since it mostly comprised people who had not organised Olympic Games in the past, and particularly in the beginning, had only limited information about the particularities of the task they were undertaking. As a result, the quality of prediction about the needs of the entities in SOCOG’s organisational environment was limited in the early stages of its operations. There was not much information available to SOCOG, from the IOC, for example, about the potential scope of
involvement of external organisations, and there was also limited knowledge about their needs. Jim Sloman, for example, said:

It is very hard to predict their [external organisations] needs especially in the beginning. It was very hard for us because there was not very much information. When you went in, you do not get handed a book on ‘this is how you do it’. There is no manual for that. [...] All we basically had was the Host City Contract (Sloman, 2000a).

SOCOG, therefore, began the preparations of the Olympics having as its initial guidance the Host City Contract (HCC), which only specified the legal status of SOCOG and its legal relationships with the IOC, the NSW government and the City of Sydney (HCC, 1992). There were no specific guidelines from the IOC or the IFs concerning the organisation of the Games. The IOC Co-ordination Commission for the 2000 Olympics, which was set up to monitor the progress of the Olympic operations and to provide guidance to the organisers, visited Sydney only twice a year. In the beginning, the commission’s main concern was to get agreement with the organisers on the organisation model that would deliver the Games, by encouraging intense involvement of the NSW government (Moore, 2000a).

The needs of the various entities external to SOCOG became fairly precisely defined only after SOCOG’s staff visited Atlanta in 1996 and had a first-hand experience of the organisation of the Olympics and the particularities of the Olympic project (Elphinston, 2000a). SOCOG’s staff observed the Atlanta Games, but also purchased paper-based files of the Atlanta Organising Committee (ACOG) and incorporated them into a library in SOCOG to supplement the tacit knowledge of its staff (Toohey, 2000). This material became the basis for much of Sydney’s early operational planning (Toohey and Halbwirth, 2001). As a result, SOCOG’s knowledge about the needs of the various actors of its organisational environment was improved in later stages and particularly after the 1996 Atlanta Games. SOCOG’s Head of Sports, for example, stated: “I think that the needs of the different clients were fairly well identified especially after Atlanta” (Elphinston, 2000a).
SOCOG, however, probably overestimated its knowledge of some external players who in turn put pressure on the organisation’s managerial practices. The IOC bribery scandal in 1998, for instance, in which some IOC members had been involved in corrupt practices in the evaluation of Salt Lake bid for the 2002 Winter Olympics, triggered bad publicity for the IOC and a loss of public confidence. In effect, potential sponsors for the Sydney Olympics were discouraged from associating themselves with the Games, such as the case of Texaco-Caltex, an American Oil Company, which pulled out of a US$ 6.3 million sponsorship deal (Associated Press, 1999). This came at the time when SOCOG was trying to raise almost A$ 1 billion to cover a projected revenue shortfall (Washington, 1999). Commenting on this SOCOG’s CEO said:

Certainly when we needed the revenue to be pulled in, throughout 1999 and especially the first half of 1999, it was a very bad climate in which to be going out to a company and say ‘here, come and support the Games’ because the IOC was facing such a difficulty (Hollway, 2000).

During the initial months of 1999, SOCOG’s Sponsorship Division was affected by the controversy surrounding the IOC. Some sponsors claimed compensation or, at a minimum, IOC-driven marketing activity to address perceived damage to the Olympic brand and consequently their own investment. Therefore, attracting Olympic sponsors was a great problem for SOCOG, which in an attempt to regain sponsors confidence about the Olympics took out paid advertisements in Australian newspapers to promote IOC’s reforms, which were launched in the first quarter of 1999 (Associated Press, 1999). SOCOG’s response to the IOC scandal was seen also as an attempt to regain the public’s confidence, since an Australian IOC member, Phil Coles, was caught up in the whole bribery affair (Washington, 1999).

A similar, but local, problem affecting the public’s perception of the Games arose in relation to the arrangements for the allocation of tickets for the event. From 1998 onwards, the general public became an essential part of the event since SOCOG launched its ticketing sales campaign. Ticketing sales was SOCOG’s major financial linkage with the general public. Later in 1999, however, SOCOG’s ticketing programme nearly collapsed. SOCOG managed the whole process in secrecy and significant public discontent arose concerning the number of tickets being made available to the general
public, and with the way in which information was communicated to the public. Even greater controversy arose as it was realised that a limited number of tickets had been offered for some events. Speculation grew that the best tickets had been held back for sale to 'the rich' at premium prices (Moore, 2000b). The immediate result of the breakdown in SOCOG's ticket sales program were an administrative shake-up adopted by SOCOG's Board in November 1999 which suggested the replacement of a number of personnel and no further ticket sales to the public until May 2000 (SOCOG, 2001b). 

Commenting on SOCOG's ticketing problems David Richmond said:

So, you had a new constituency of people who had made their applications. Some of them had been unsuccessful and they were unhappy generally at that point. So, they were quite difficult to deal with because they were represented at the media. Every one of them represented a viewer, a reader. So, in the local context they became very powerful. SOCOG was not really geared to deal with it. So, that pressure from that group for the last 12 months became very strong (Richmond, 2000).

When the ticketing crisis developed, it triggered severe criticism by the Australian press to SOCOG's ticketing practices, primarily because the ticketing mismanagement created a A$ 76 million shortfall in SOCOG's budget (Moore, 2000b). SOCOG's CEO said:

We did have a period of great, great, great stress and difficulty which was in the last quarter of 1999, and this is when the issues of ticketing, as you know had become very controversial and there was widespread criticism of us. [...] And this whole set of issues became extremely controversial and became the source of almost daily, prominent criticism of the SOCOG in the media both printed media and on radio and television. So, that was a very tough time that we had to battle through and pass. [...] By the end of 1999 this was clearly our biggest, single problem (Hollway, 2000).

OCA's Director General attributed SOCOG's inability to deal successfully with the public to the structural formation of contemporary OCOGs; he said:

One of the problems with OCOGs is that they are not actually set up to deal with those customers. They are set up to deal with the IFs, the sponsors, the NOCs but not very well until right at the end to deal with the retail customer, if you like. So, that was a huge pressure (Richmond, 2000).
Therefore, although, as the time progressed, SOCOG significantly developed and enhanced its knowledge of the needs of its organisational environment, the quality and accuracy of its prediction of those needs remained at a relatively low level. The actual days of the competitions, however, required SOCOG to have solid knowledge about the needs of the entities involved in order to satisfy their needs effectively but also immediately. A smooth transaction of the Olympics requires an OCOG to be very well prepared and sometimes to be proactive, especially with regard to issues concerning the athletes’ needs such as appropriate training services, accurate transportation to venues and so on. For that reason, SOCOG went through an ongoing exercise during the four months leading to the Games, which aimed to create Games-time conditions and test the readiness of the organisation. Commenting on that, David Richmond said:

We did a lot of work on what we call ‘operational readiness’: are you really, really ready? We tested everybody, we quizzed everybody and we went through all our plans. You are 4-5 months out; are you really ready? How are you going to do specific things on specific days? That kind of analysis, I believe, was fundamental to the success of the Games because we discovered so many things that were not right and we had to fix them (Richmond, 2000).

SOCOG’s Operational Readiness exercises actually started a year before the event, when SOCOG carried out the Test Events, which gave to SOCOG an initial understanding of a real event-time situation. A few months before the Games, SOCOG’s Operational Readiness took the form of intensive contingency planning and simulated exercise programmes. Contingency planning was implemented by the Venue Managers on a fortnight basis, and was aimed at the Venue Teams planning for the unforeseen based on an extensive list of contingency planning subjects, such as spectators services, security, catering, accreditation as well as utility failures, health incidents, personnel contingencies and so on. The contingency plans were subject to a regular three-weekly formal review from the competent agencies with the final review to take place in July 2000. The simulated exercise programme started in late May 2000 and involved venue-based simulated exercises and a major multi-agency simulation. The venue-based exercises involved real time simulations for each Venue Team on a standardised set of scenarios and aimed to provide a venue-by-venue review of operations. After the completion of the
venue-based simulations a multi-agency simulation took place two months before the Games. That was a 60-hour exercise on a number of 'surprise' scenarios which aimed to invoke the Games-time structure and operations (Sloman, 2000b).

A few months prior to the event, therefore, SOCOG adopted a proactive approach in dealing with the diverse needs of its organisational environment. The Head of Sports of the giant American network NBC, Dick Ebersol, for example, praised SOCOG for its readiness at his arrival in Sydney, one month before the Games. In particular he stated: “I am extremely satisfied with Sydney organisers. In terms of television, we could do the Games right now” (Australian Associated Press, 2000b). In effect, SOCOG had rendered its environment more predictable, especially if we consider the generally acknowledged success of the execution of the Sydney Olympics.

After the execution of the Games, OCA was the only external agency influencing SOCOG's operations. However, OCA's practices in relation to the Games, and to SOCOG in particular, were fairly well known by SOCOG since the two organisations were in a close relationship throughout the preparations for the event and specifically during the nine months preceding the Games. Kristine Toohey, for example, said:

In terms of relationships I think that nothing changed. If you like people before the Games you like people after the Games. If you did not like them before the Games you did not like them after the Games. I do not think that the Games made a change on that. We in SOCOG knew OCA's staff quite well and we knew what to expect from them. As I said it was something that we have been experiencing since the beginning of 2000 (Toohey, 2001).

Therefore, after the event and until its resolution, SOCOG was operating within a relatively known organisational environment, since organisational members were highly aware of the nature of OCA's involvement, not only at an organisational level but also at an organisational actors level.

The discussion above shows that SOCOG's knowledge of its environment changed significantly in the course of its life cycle. As a new Olympic agency, in its formative years the knowledge available to SOCOG with regard to the needs of the entities of its environment was limited. However, this knowledge substantially improved after
SOCOG's staff observation of the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, as much due to the first-hand experience acquired as due to the detailed formal information purchased regarding the role of external agencies in the Atlanta Games and their interaction with the local organising committee. With the exception of some isolated incidents in its environment, such as the IOC bribery scandal and the failure of communication with the general public through the tickets sales programme, after 1996 SOCOG's knowledge of the entities in its environment gradually increased. Particularly after May 2000, when the STORE programme started, in order to test the co-ordination of activities of all the agencies involved in the delivery of the event, SOCOG tested its interaction with the other constituents of the Games, and consequently its environment was rendered considerably stable. SOCOG's environment was considerably known after the Games, since the organisation maintained links only with OCA, an organisation the needs of which were fairly well known, as the two organisations were in close co-operation throughout the years of the Olympic preparations.

6.2.3 SOCOG's RESOURCE DEPENDENCE
Throughout the years of the Olympic preparations, SOCOG created links with various external organisations, which often constrained its operations. However, SOCOG would not be able to effectively perform its tasks without the existence of such organisations, since they possessed essential resources for the successful delivery of the Games. In particular, SOCOG was in need of financial resources from the IOC, the NSW government and the Olympic sponsors, human resources from Australian Trade Unions and the general public in the form of staff and volunteers, expert knowledge from the IFs as well as physical resources provided by the NSW government in the form of Olympic-related infrastructure (Figure 6.4).

Moreover, corporate legitimacy, although intangible in nature, was an essential externally held resource for SOCOG. Corporate legitimacy is used here to refer to the legal arrangements made as much by the IOC as by the NSW government in order to provide SOCOG with the appropriate legal status and authority for operating as an Olympic organising committee. Such arrangements do not only include the Host City Contract,
which specified the broader legal framework of SOCOG, but also a series of legal agreements primarily between SOCOG and the NSW government which was responsible for establishing the legal framework of the organisation. Overall, therefore, resources held by external actors were important to SOCOG throughout its life cycle.

Figure 6.4: SOCOG’s Dependence on Externally Held Resources

In early stages of its operation, SOCOG’s main concern was to establish its legal framework which would set the nature of collaboration of the organisation with other Olympic agencies and consequently determine the areas of its direct responsibility (Hollway, 2000). In effect, during the first years of its operations, SOCOG was concerned with negotiating the arrangements with NSW governmental agencies, and later with OCA primarily in relation to the delivery of the Games-related public works and services (SOCOG, 1997). Moreover, considerable focus was on raising money because in the words of SOCOG’s CEO, “it [SOCOG] had to estimate its revenues and adjust its budgets” (Sloman, 2000a). Early in its organisational life, SOCOG received its share from the international Olympic sponsorship (i.e. TOP IV Programme), which was co-
ordinated and negotiated by the IOC. Moreover, in 1996, SOCOG gained further financial security from the NSW government, whose underwriting commitment was formalised in an Endorsement Contract struck between the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), the Lord Mayor of Sydney and the Premier of NSW (SOCOG, 2001b). This contract established an A$140 contingency fund from the NSW government to support future financial shortfalls in SOCOG’s budgets (Moore, 2000b).

In later stages, externally held financial resources were again of major importance for SOCOG’s operations, particularly after the ticketing problems in 1999, when SOCOG’s budget showed an overall deficit of A$ 193 million (Moore, 2000b). Having already received most of its revenues from the commercial sector, SOCOG had to rely on NSW government’s funding to balance its books, and particularly on the A$ 140 million contingency fund. As such, the NSW government was absolutely essential for SOCOG’s financial viability as it was underwriting the organisation. SOCOG’s CEO, for example, said: “In terms of the financial security, obviously it is highly desirable to have right from the beginning a government as the underwriter if you were running a deficit at the end, and we had that with the NSW government” (Hollway, 2000).

As the organisation was moving towards the time of the event it became necessary for SOCOG to outsource certain services due to lack of capacity and resources. The most important supplier of services was the NSW government’s OCA, which was coordinating NSW government’s services to the Games, and ORTA. OCA was coordinating, among others, security services, and ORTA transportation services for the Games with SOCOG paying A$ 120 million and A$ 35,8 million respectively for these services (SOCOG, 1999). Moreover, in 1998, SOCOG signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Australian Federal Government paying A$ 32 million for the provision of services from Federal Government agencies, including the Department of Health, the Department of Foreign affairs, the Department of Defence, the Australian Custom Service and the Department of Immigration (SOCOG, 1999).

SOCOG continued to be heavily dependent on resources held by external organisations, even a few months before the event. Financial resources were again needed, since in June 2000 the NSW Government had to boost SOCOG’s contingency fund with an
additional A$ 70 million to help meet projected shortfall from ticket sales and sponsorship revenues (SOCOG, 2001b). However, the most important resources needed by SOCOG in the course of the six months leading to the Games were human resources. If we consider that more than 97% of the Games workforce was contractors' staff and volunteers (Sloman, 2000d), we can understand the enormous numbers of human resources that SOCOG required during that period. For example, SOCOG faced significant uncertainty in May 2000, when the organisation's long-established relationships with the Australian Trade Unions deteriorated, threatening to paralyse public transportation during the Games, due to disagreements on the Unions' claim for special payment for Olympic workers. This issue, however, was solved in time by the NSW government in consultation with SOCOG (Associated Press, 2000). Volunteer attrition during the Games was also an issue of concern for SOCOG but the organisation managed to keep the attrition rate low at approximately 5% (Sloman, 2000d). Games’ Chief Operations Officer's statement shows the importance of the volunteers during the Games. He said: “Biggest issues during the Games became resource-based issues. You know 'I do not have enough volunteers today, they have not turned up' or 'something changed and I need transport at a different time, and so on'” (Sloman, 2000a).

When the Games were over, SOCOG’s main task was to arrange the last operational details in order for the organisation to dissolve smoothly. As was mentioned earlier, this involved the selling of the remaining assets of the Games, the financial resolution of the organisation, and the like. Consequently, SOCOG's operations after the Games did not require additional external resources. However, SOCOG was in need of state support on legal matters since the unique institutional nature of the organisation required particular legal arrangements for its dissolution. This task was undertaken by OCA (OCA, 2000). Moreover, to some extent, SOCOG was in need of human resources for two reasons. Firstly, SOCOG relied on the volunteerism of some members of staff who continued to work for the organisation in order to finish their tasks even though their contracts were over (Toohey, 2001). Secondly, the nature of some tasks undertaken during that period required the knowledge of expert staff. In particular, one of the most complex tasks for SOCOG was the gathering and storage of the organisation’s records. This required the expertise of record-specialists since organisational records, such as reports, plans and
correspondence, were kept in different departments in the organisation's Headquarters but also in the Games' venues. As a result, SOCOG employed 10 archivists to deal with a task that involved the gathering and filing of 40,000 reports and 50,000 other records (Toohey and Halbwirth, 2001).

Overall, therefore, SOCOG's dependence on externally held resources was at a high level throughout the life cycle of the organisation. It was shown above that SOCOG was essentially a powerless organisation in terms of resources, as the vast majority of the resources required to perform its task was provided by external organisations. Besides, SOCOG's institutional status, which required SOCOG to operate in co-ordination both with the Olympic Movement and the NSW government, coupled with the uniqueness of its task, rendered the organisation dependent on external resources. For example, technical staff for the sporting competitions could only be obtained by the IFs, as with financial resources the majority of which could only be provided by the IOC through its Olympic sponsorship and media arrangements. After the event SOCOG's operated relatively autonomously, since its main task, i.e. to make the final arrangements for its dissolution, did not require many external resources. However, as the organisation was preparing for its closure, it required legal support from the NSW government in order for the post-event responsibilities to be arranged, particularly those which concerned SOCOG's relationships with OCA, as well as some human resources to deal with the storage of the organisation's records. As such, SOCOG's dependence on external resources was also essential after the end of the event; yet due to the relatively small amount of resources required, its resource dependence was rather moderate.

6.2.4 EXTERNAL POWER IN SOCOG

The discussion above shows that the organisations that operated in SOCOG's organisational environment contributed significantly to SOCOG's operations throughout the life cycle of the organisation, mainly as providers of various resources. However, the links that were established between SOCOG and external organisations were not only resource-based but also took the form of representation in SOCOG's policy and decision-making bodies. Particularly in early stages, this was the case of the NSW government, of
which SOCOG constituted a statutory authority, and was naturally involved in the set-up of the organisation. In the beginning, the sole policy-making and decision-making body in SOCOG was its Board of Directors (SOCOG, 1996). At the time, SOCOG's main concern was to understand its position within the Olympic project and its relationships with the various entities involved in the organisation of the Games. Sandy Hollway explains:

In the beginning [...] our main concern was to establish the frameworks and policies for the organisation by taking into consideration the long-term relationships of SOCOG with the various constituents of the Games; this was actually responsibility of the Board (Hollway, 2000)

The NSW government had the prime role in setting SOCOG's Board of Directors, since its members were initially appointed by the NSW Governor, and after 1995 on the recommendation of the NSW Minister for the Olympics (SOCOG, 1996). The Board consisted of 14 members, three of whom represented the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), six represented the different levels of governments (City of Sydney, NSW, and Federal Australian) and four came from the Australia's corporate sector, appointed, however, on the recommendation of the NSW Minister for the Olympics. The sole representation of SOCOG in the Board was its CEO (SOCOG, 1996). Therefore, SOCOG was effectively formed as an externally controlled organisation, as much by Olympic agencies as by the NSW government which had the authority for appointing the members of the Board. The majority of the interviewees argued that in early stages of its operations SOCOG was highly externally controlled predominantly by the NSW Government. For example, SOCOG's Head of Sports, Bob Elphinston said: "In the beginning, I believe that the NSW government exerted considerable power over SOCOG mainly by appointing the members in the Board" (Elphinston, 2000a).

The main policy-making and decision-making body in SOCOG remained its Board of Directors, even in later stages. In 1998, the number of its members increased to 15, 11 of whom were representing the different levels of governments, three were representing the Olympic Movement, and one position held by SOCOG's CEO (SOCOG, 1999). The NSW government alone was represented at SOCOG's Board with seven members with the President of the Board being the NSW Minister for the Olympics. That denotes even
further control by the NSW government over SOCOG, although it was not seen as a drawback. Bob Leece, for example, stated: "Well, the NSW government underwrites SOCOG. Who has the money should be the person that should have the control" (Leece, 2000a).

NSW government's control over SOCOG became even more evident after SOCOG's ticketing problems in 1999. The President of SOCOG brought into the organisation a group of NSW public servants to deal with the ticketing issue. This action was seen as the result of an increasing loss of confidence by the NSW government over SOCOG's management processes (Moore, 2000b). SOCOG's staff, in turn, felt at the time that the organisation was gradually moving under the control of the NSW government and particularly of its Minister for the Olympics. SOCOG's Deputy CEO, Michael Eyers who was brought in SOCOG in November 1999 to deal with the ticketing issue, said:

Well, increasingly SOCOG has become subject to the direction and control of the NSW government. That has been a gradual process which really started in November 1999 when I joined, and my appointment was one of the first steps in the take-over process. [...] They [SOCOG's staff] felt that the Minister was interfering in the way that SOCOG was doing its job. They felt that this was not a good thing. My attitude was that SOCOG had not done its job very well and it was lucky that this interference only went as far as it did. I would have been very happy to take it further (Eyers, 2000).

SOCOG's CEO agreed that the development of the relationship between SOCOG and the NSW government was a gradual process that went through four stages. He said:

[...] Stage one was co-operation, stage two was collaboration, stage three was integration and stage four was joint operations during the Games. In the beginning we discussed common issues and we tried to understand each other's plans. I am talking 3-4 years out of the Games. The collaboration stage was where, for example, we had outsourced to the government some important functions like organising the transport for the Olympic Family, and we really became quite operationally close. Then it was the integration which I think only really started with the development of tight, common structures in about January 2000, 9 months out from the Games. Creation also of common committees to jointly drive the project and then of course at Games-time everybody was just into a joint operation (Hollway, 2000).
In addition to SOCOG's Board, the Sports Commission constituted a vital decision-making body in the organisation. The Sports Commission was established in 1996 as a permanent commission of SOCOG's Board and was granted the sole responsibility to deal with all sport-related matters. The Sports Commission was chaired by Australian Olympic Committee's (AOC) President, John Coates, and involved one more AOC official, two IOC members in Australia, an ex-SOCOG Board member, one SOCOG Board member and one SOCOG's Senior Executive (SOCOG, 2000a). The Sports Commission was an autonomous body, since its functions could not be altered or abolished by SOCOG's Board of Directors, unless the decision to do so was supported by both the President of SOCOG and the President of AOC (SOCOG, 2000a). Therefore, after 1996, AOC, and particularly its President, emerged as a powerful entity within SOCOG's environment. SOCOG's Chief Operating Officer, Jim Sloman, said:

The Australian Olympic Committee [AOC] had a very strong involvement at the end of the day. In the beginning, SOCOG was structured in that the Board was all-powerful but within there was a Sports Commission that became the Board in terms of sports, led by John Coates, senior vice President of SOCOG and also President of AOC (Sloman, 2000a).

One can understand from the above that as the time progressed, SOCOG was increasingly becoming more externally controlled primarily by the NSW government and to a lesser extent by the AOC. That was not only manifested through the strong representation of the aforementioned entities on SOCOG's main policy making bodies, but also through the direct appointment of people nominated by the NSW government to SOCOG.

As the time of the Games was coming closer, the power of the Board was declining and it held its last pre-Games meeting in late August 2000. John Valder, for example, Australian Prime Minister's appointee to SOCOG's Board, said in June 2000 that often he found out about key decisions taken for the Games by reading about them in newspapers (Buckle, 2000). In reality, a new decision-making body, the Games Coordination Group (GCOG) took over from SOCOG's Board around June 2000 holding regular but unpublished meetings (Buckle, 2000), although officially it took control of the Games in August 2000 (Sydney 2000-ATHOC, 2000). The GCOG was established in late 1999, initially as a co-ordination mechanism, comprising the key actors of the
various agencies involved in the delivery of the event. It was headed by the Board’s President Michael Knight and AOC President John Coates and included 11 other senior executives from SOCOG, OCA, ORTA, the Olympic Security Command Centre (OSCC) and the Sydney Olympic Broadcasting Organisation (SOBO) (Figure 6.5).

Of the 13 members of the GCOG only two were SOCOG’s Executives while the rest were OCA’s senior staff or NSW Government’s appointees. This new organisation model aimed at bringing all the key agencies from SOCOG and the NSW Government involved the Games under a common structure. This new structure, however, meant that SOCOG’s role was undermined in favour of the NSW Government and OCA in particular. This became even more evident two weeks before the Games when SOCOG and OCA merged into a new organisation, the ‘Sydney 2000’, whose Director General was the Director General of OCA, David Richmond and not SOCOG’s CEO. The creation of ‘Sydney 2000’ under OCA’s leadership was mostly seen as SOCOG’s takeover by the NSW government rather than a merger. Michael Eyers, for example, said:

The establishment of GCOG [Games Co-ordination Group], which was the group that ran the Games from August 2000 onwards, meant that a lot of decisions that impacted across all of ‘Sydney 2000’ agencies were taken by the key players in that group. The
key players were Knight, Coates and Richmond. That meant that Richmond was further in control of SOCOG than he had been before. Then, shortly before the Games, Richmond was appointed as Director General of 'Sydney 2000' in order to give him specific direct authority to some people in SOCOG. [...] So, there has been a steady process of take over. I do not think you can call it a merger; I would rather say it was a take-over (Eyers, 2000).

SOCOG's CEO, however, claimed that 'Sydney 2000' was a necessary merger between OCA and SOCOG which had to operate in close collaboration with each other. He stated:

I have never seen it ['Sydney 2000'] in terms of conflicts of power, but one comment I would make is that you will see some Australian press reports that say that OCA or the government took over. The right description is that it was a merger if you want a business parallel [...] because of two reasons. One was that even in the areas where we were operating together, we were operating as a merger not as take-over and the second reason is that the vast majority of the things SOCOG did it led itself (Hollway, 2000).

SOCOG's Head of Sports gave his own explanation for 'Sydney 2000'. He stated:

They [NSW Government] wanted to ensure the success of the Games and they had absolute confidence in the Minister for the Olympics who ultimately was responsible to the parliament. He in turn had absolute confidence in David Richmond who was Director General of OCA and he felt it was important to have one single leader at the time (Elphinston, 2000a).

Games' Chief Operating Officer, Jim Sloman, gave a more elaborate explanation for the creation of 'Sydney 2000'. He said:

The 'Sydney 2000' was a merger but also a struggle for power. To be frank, the public sector did not like SOCOG and it took over a number of things they thought they should have been doing [...]. So, a lot of governmental departments were jealous of the role SOCOG had. [...] Yes it was a matter of jealousy and that made it difficult. [...] You had the OCA who would be delivering all the venues and they were playing a very key role. Clearly as the Games came closer the venues were delivered. So 'what do we do next'? Suddenly, you had SOCOG whose power is rising, its staff is rising, its profile is rising, it is running test events. So, suddenly OCA said: 'we have done all the
work; we delivered the venues so give us something to do’. So, there was a great
tendency to criticise and a desire to take over, if you like (Sloman, 2000a).

Despite whether ‘Sydney 2000’ was a merger or a take-over, although later it will be
argued that it was primarily the latter, it is clear that from two months before the event
onwards, SOCOG was further under the control of the NSW Government, remaining
therefore, a highly externally controlled organisation.

NSW government’s control over SOCOG extended after the Games. Legislation (Sydney
2000 Games Administration Act 2000) rendered OCA the successor of SOCOG after the
Games and particularly after December 31, 2000, when OCA would take over the
exclusive responsibility of the wind-up process and SOCOG effectively would dissolve
(NSW, 2000). OCA officially succeeded SOCOG in December 31, 2000 as was planned
but OCA’s control over SOCOG was a gradual process which was developed
substantially right after the Games. Michael Eyers, for example, explains:

There has been a steady process of take-over. [...] And the take-over process continues
after the Games. If you were now [November 2000] in the organisation you could see
that OCA has the control. There are some [SOCOG’s] teams left which have to report
to OCA. OCA people have to sign off on virtually all SOCOG’s operations (Eyers,
2000).

OCA’s control over SOCOG after the Games implied further control of the NSW
government over the organisation. SOCOG’s Board of Directors, which was the most
powerful decision-making body in the organisation, virtually lost its power after the
Games since it held only two meetings in order to review the Games’ operations
(November 16, 2000), and to dissolve (December 14, 2000) (Eyers, 2001). After the
Games, the decision-making power was rested on OCA’s senior staff, which was leading
the wind-up process (Toohey, 2001).

Consequently, with respect to the degree of representation of external actors in its main
decision-making bodies, SOCOG was subject to a high degree of external control
throughout its life cycle, primarily by the NSW government. The NSW government was
responsible for appointing the members of SOCOG’s Board of Directors, which in the
early stages of SOCOG’s operations was the main decision-making body in the
organisation. Moreover, the President of SOCOG’s Board was the NSW Minister for the Olympics. After 1996, SOCOG’s Board delegated the decision-making power for sporting issues to the Sports Commission, which was mainly controlled by AOC’s officials, and later, in 1999, the GCOG gradually took over the decision-making authority of the Board. The GCOG was mainly controlled by OCA and AOC’s officials. As a result, the main policy-making and decision-making bodies in SOCOG were effectively controlled by external authorities throughout the organisation’s operational life.

6.2.5 SOCOG’s STRATEGIC CAPACITY

The discussion above has shown that SOCOG was operating within a highly influential organisational environment, which held fundamental resources for its operations. Besides, SOCOG constituted a unique organisational authority, since it was established by the NSW government to fulfil the obligations of the Host City Contract, and its prime responsibility was to deliver the Olympic Games, a sporting institution owned by the IOC. Consequently, with regard to the capacity to formulate its own strategic direction, SOCOG was by its very nature constrained by its organisational environment. SOCOG’s CEO, however, believed that contemporary OCOGs have considerable space for strategic formulation. He said:

I think that an OCOG does actually have a leadership role and there are turning points on the track, which it can lead to different directions. I think that it is an important role for an OCOG to help establish what the vision of the Games is, as well as to make the right choices along the way of how to get there. So, I do not see it as just a mechanical, technical exercise of organising the Games because point one, I think there are different kinds of Games you can organise with different character and legacy and image, and secondly there are different ways you can get there (Hollway, 2000).

SOCOG, however, was operating under certain legal obligations. It was not only committed to the Host City Contract but also to a series of contracts, primarily with the IOC, with regard to issues ranging from the sponsorship arrangements with Australian companies to the usage of Olympic symbols (SOCOG, 1997; SOCOG, 1998). SOCOG’s Deputy Chief Executive Officer, for example, said:
Certainly it is true that OCOGs are fairly substantially constrained by what the IOC delivers to them, not only the Host City Contract but more importantly the specific arrangements with sponsors, the sets of rules that the IFs are entitled to adhere to, the requirements for establishing financial boundaries and a whole series of things from accreditation to various sorts of merchandising (Eyres, 2000).

Moreover, SOCOG, as any OCOG, did not have power over the focal issue of the Games, that is the sports programme, with concern to the number of Olympic sports or the number of participating athletes. SOCOG, therefore, from its formation had to adjust its operations within the boundaries established by the permanent Olympic agencies such as the IOC and the IFs. In the case of the Sydney Olympics an additional source of strategic constraint for SOCOG was the role of the NSW government. Having the sole responsibility for delivering, and in later stages for operating, the entire permanent Games-related venues as well as determining the authority of SOCOG for key organisational areas of the Games, the government of NSW practically created a platform upon which SOCOG had to operate. However, this was not necessarily a drawback, since SOCOG could not manage effectively the Olympic venture on its own, given the proliferation of the Games' complexity. Jim Sloman, for example, said:

You can say that an OCOG should follow specific guidelines to deal with specific things but at the end of the day it receives benefits from that: money from the IOC, technical expertise from the IFs and venues from the government in order to facilitate its operations. If you consider the magnitude and complexity of the project and the various interests involved, I think that SOCOG had to collaborate with external organisations whatever the 'strategic' cost. SOCOG's aim was to deliver the best Games ever and that was achieved with the contribution of several other organisations (Sloman, 2000a).

SOCOG, therefore, was operating within a strategy-determined framework whose boundaries were mainly set by the IOC, the IFs and the NSW government. The involvement of these organisations in the organisational model of the Sydney Olympics was seen by SOCOG's executives as essential for the delivery of the event; however, it
denotes that SOCOG's ability to formulate its own strategies was limited throughout its life cycle.

6.2.6 DIVISION OF OPERATIONS IN SOCOG

When the complexity of tasks that SOCOG had to perform is considered, the task of separating the organisation into different operational areas is naturally a complex task. In effect, the division of SOCOG's operations into an appropriate number of specialised areas for the delivery of the event was a gradual process, which underwent several changes. These changes were not only related to emerging organisational needs which often required the creation of additional operational areas, but also to the fact that SOCOG had ultimately "to run the Games from the venues" (Hollway, 2000), which implies the shift of its operations to the Games' venues in order to deliver the event. Consequently, it was of equal importance to SOCOG as much to decide on the number of operational areas in the organisation as to choose the time to move its operations to the venues.

Figure 6.6: SOCOG's Main Operational Areas: 1993-1996

In early stages and particularly within the first three years of its operations, SOCOG had not established the frameworks for all of its operational areas, and therefore it had created
only eight operational divisions (Sports, Marketing, Finance, Human Resources and Administration, Corporate Affairs, Technology, Facilities and Games Services), and two programme areas (Cultural and Ceremonies), each of which was headed by a Director reporting to the President (SOCOG, 1996) (Figure 6.6). SOCOG was claimed to be in anticipation of more detailed information to come into the organisation mainly from members of its staff, who observed the Atlanta Games and acquired valuable knowledge about an OCOG’s operations. For example, SOCOG’s Head of Sports stated: “[SOCOG’s] experience in Atlanta was very useful for dealing with our structure” (Elphinston, 2000a). Therefore, in the beginning SOCOG, in the words of its Chief Operating officer, “established a limited number of operational areas” (Sloman, 2000a), although conceptual operational plans were in place for most of SOCOG’s functional areas (Sloman, 2000c).

After the 1996 Atlanta Games, and the establishment of a solid leadership under the Presidency of the NSW Minister for the Olympics, SOCOG developed rapidly establishing the frameworks for all its operational areas. As a result, the number of its divisions and programmes increased dramatically. In particular, in the period 1996-1997, SOCOG was operating under 5 Business Groups reporting directly to the CEO, comprising 16 divisions and 5 programmes (SOCOG, 1997). Further, in the period 1997-1999 SOCOG increased even more its operational areas to 74 programmes operating under 21 divisions and 6 business groups (SOCOG, 1999). As was mentioned earlier, in the period after the Atlanta Games SOCOG experienced increasing complexity in its organisational environment, and therefore it had to rationalise its knowledge and expertise by breaking it down into different divisions and programmes. The establishment of such a great number of operational areas in such a short period of time, however, was seen as problematic. SOCOG’s Senior Executive, Bob Leece, said:

[After Atlanta] SOCOG established a lot of different programs in different areas [...] but there was lack of communication between those areas, lack of accountability within the areas. [...] SOCOG, in the management and development of its program areas with the managers were not given any discipline or control of how to appoint and select management programs. These program areas were a lot at the expense of their wishes
and a lot of people felt a lot of power by employing a lot more people. [...] They employed a lot of people far too early (Leece, 2000a).

Figure 6.7: SOCOG’s Main Operational Areas: Games-time

Despite the criticism of SOCOG’s selection of its functional areas, it is a fact that SOCOG established very early its Games-time functionality, as it reached the actual Games-time period with a minor increase in the number of programmes, that is, 95 programmes under 20 divisions (SOCOG, 2001d) (Figure 6.7). During the six months leading to the Games, however, the operations and responsibilities of the various divisions and programmes gradually integrated into each of the 40 Olympic venues. That meant that representatives of SOCOG’s divisions and programmes moved to the venues and reported to their respective leaders, which were located in the organisation’s Headquarters (Sloman, 2000b). In effect, SOCOG’s divisions and programmes that represented functional areas of the organisation became part of an integrated
organisational model, which as was mentioned earlier, brought together all the constituent agencies of the Sydney Games. As a result, in the course of the actual Games-time period, the functional responsibilities of the divisions and programmes became venue-specific.

After the Games, SOCOG's dissolution gradually started. One month after the Games (October 30, 2000) the vast majority of programmes had been dissolved with the remaining programmes incorporated into their respective divisions. From that point onwards, SOCOG's divisions were gradually dissolved, and by December 15, 2000, the organisation was operating with four major divisions: Finance, Legal, Technology and Procurement (Eyers, 2001). The dissolution of each division was signified by the departure of the respective General Manager since in most of the cases people left the organisation together with their General Managers. Kristine Toohey explains: "[In] quite a few cases they asked people from the divisions to go with the General Managers [...] so in many cases whether a functional area was still operating depended on whether the General Manager was in house (Toohey, 2001).

The dissolution of SOCOG's divisions and programmes was based on a detailed plan, which aimed to terminate the unnecessary functional areas of the organisation within certain periods of time after the end of the event (Eyers, 2001). Throughout the short post-event period of SOCOG's operations the main divisions of the organisation were Finance, Legal, Procurement and Workforce (Toohey, 2001). Moreover, roles that were the responsibility of divisions that had been dissolved were being covered by contractors or by former employees working as—sometimes part-time contractors (Eyers, 2001).

Therefore, the operational structure of SOCOG changed throughout the life cycle of the organisation since new operational areas were created as the time of the Games was coming closer. In the course of the seven years of its operations, the establishment of the various operational areas was related to the criteria that were used to break down the organisational units (i.e. 'unit grouping’). In particular, SOCOG started its operations as being a functional-structured organisation. That is, its organisational units were broken down according to basic organisational functions. Jim Sloman explains: "we started off with SOCOG as being very much a corporate structure. You would be in finance; you
would be in marketing, in sports, in technology and so on. It was all functional-based’ (Sloman, 2000a). In later stages, however, SOCOG’s structure underwent significant changes as the Venue Teams were established, and naturally the organisation was gradually moving from a functional to a venue-based structure. In effect, from 1997 onwards, SOCOG went through a transition period where there were two structures working in parallel, a functional-based and a venue-based, which ended on May 2000 when SOCOG eventually adopted a solid venue-based structure (Figure 6.8).

Figure 6.8: The Evolution of SOCOG’s Structure

As is depicted in figure 6.8, in 1997 SOCOG established the concept of its operations, which refers to time-specific strategic plans with respect to the gradual transfer of its operations to the venues (Sloman, 2000b). In early 1998 SOCOG developed a detailed generic plan for one venue, thus creating a model which was used as a template and then rolled out across all venues. SOCOG’s Chief Operating Officer described the evolution of SOCOG’s structure as follows:

We basically had to shift this [functional structure] to a venue-based model and we did that by taking one venue as the generic venue, the Aquatic Centre, and doing an operating plan for that. When we were happy with that we then migrated that into a
whole of other venues. So, we went from sort of one group doing the generic plan; we then went to 4 groups which had a caste of venues to look after; we then went to 9; we then went to 14 and a year out of the Games we appointed 40 venue managers who then did their own, but they took the model that has been developed (Sloman, 2000a).

In the course of the year 1999, the organisational focus was on integrating the Venue Teams within the existing functional-based structure. The Venue Teams were operating still at SOCOG's Headquarters but they had their own individual structure under the direction of the Venue Managers. The Venue Managers were appointed one year before the Games in order to test the command and control mechanisms of the Venue Teams during the test events. During the test events, for example, Games-time reporting and simulated meetings took place in order for the Venue Teams to get familiar with a multi-event atmosphere (Sloman, 2000b). SOCOG, therefore, was gradually adopting a matrix structure in the sense that the functional areas within the Venue Teams were reporting to the venue manager but also to the respective functional area at SOCOG's Headquarters (Figure 6.9). Commenting on that Jim Sloman said:

In reality you have to force the pace and it becomes a matrix organisation. [...] So by the time we were running Test Events you have the people work for the venue manager. They did not work for a functional area. Yes, they had a secondary report which was a secondary report to the functional area (Sloman, 2000a).

Figure 6.9: SOCOG's Structure: Dual Reporting

(Source: Sloman, 2000b)
In effect, from early 1999 until the middle of 2000, SOCOG was operating under two structures: a functional and a venue-based structure. As such, during that period, the criteria used to group the organisation's operations were based both on functional responsibilities and geographical place. This period of structural transition for SOCOG practically ended in late May 2000, when the Main Operations Centre (MOC) became operational (Sloman, 2000b). That meant that the leaders of the functional areas became part of the MOC through which they were co-ordinating their respective competencies in the venues. From that time onwards, therefore, SOCOG was operating under a venue-based structure, within which SOCOG's functional responsibilities were integrated in the form of functional representatives in each of the venues, who in turn were reporting to their respective leaders in the MOC. Under this structural model, SOCOG would embark on the delivery of the sport competitions at the actual Games-time period.

After the Games, the venue teams naturally dissolved and most of the staff left the organisation. The remaining staff returned to their initial posts in the Headquarters to temporarily re-form the functional areas, in order to review their operations and eventually dissolve. As a result, after the Games SOCOG returned to its initial functional-based structure. Kristine Toohey, for example, said: "[after the Games] you still had your functional areas, whoever you reported to you still reported to, and when they had left you had somebody else; there was still a structure" (Toohey, 2001).

The division of SOCOG's operations, therefore, changed significantly in the course of the seven years of its life, since, as the time passed, the increasing number of SOCOG's responsibilities required the establishment of various operational areas, initially in the organisation's Headquarters and in later stages in the sporting venues as well. In the initial three years of its operations, SOCOG operated with a functional-based structure establishing only a few of its operational areas. After 1996 and until the creation of the MOC in May 2000, the organisation experienced considerable growth establishing most of its operational areas while operating under both a functional and venue structure. After May 2000 and until the end of the Games, SOCOG underwent further growth reaching a total of 95 programmes under 20 divisions and 5 business groups. During that
period, SOCOG was almost exclusively operating from the venues, apart from a small group of senior staff, which was located in the MOC to co-ordinate the venue operations. Finally, after the Games SOCOG returned to a functional structure, and its operational areas gradually dissolved, apart from four divisions, which dissolved concurrently with the closure of the organisation in December 2000.

6.2.7 INTERNAL CO-ORDINATION IN SOCOG

As was shown above, SOCOG established various operational areas throughout its life cycle, which naturally increased the complexity of its operations. Although these operational areas were representing diverse competencies, in the form of different divisions, departments, programs and, at Games-time, Venue Teams, it was essential for the organisation to achieve co-ordination among these areas in order to reduce internal complexity and produce a solid outcome, that is the successful execution of the Games. Thus, SOCOG had to develop internal mechanisms of co-ordination, which would enable the organisation to work as a cohesive entity. Such mechanisms included practices that standardised the organisation’s processes and outputs, as well as the creation of internal relationships in the form of committees and commissions, which aimed to co-ordinate information and ideas from different organisational areas for particular tasks.

In the beginning, the main way that SOCOG was achieving co-ordination among its operational areas was through official monthly Board meetings, but also through informal meetings between the leaders of the functional areas and the Board. Commenting on the manner in which tasks were co-ordinated in early stages, Bob Elphinston said: “We [Heads of Divisions] would sit down and place our views and experiences and through thorough discussion we would come up with a decision” (Elphinston, 2000a). Consequently, besides the Board meetings, internal co-ordination in SOCOG was also achieved through informal interactions of its senior executives. Besides, in early stages, SOCOG had not established many committees which could facilitate internal co-ordination. In particular, within the first three years of its operations, only two standing committees were established, namely Audit Committee and Remuneration and Retention Committee, as well as a Stadium sub-committee, which provided advice in the selection
As time progressed, SOCOG established formal mechanisms for co-ordinating work among its divisions and programmes in the form of various standing committees, commissions and sub-committees. In particular, between 1996 and early 2000 SOCOG established 12 more committees and commissions reaching a total of 14 (SOCOG, 2001d). Along with these committees and commissions, SOCOG formed various sub-committees, which acted as task forces, in the sense that they undertook a specific task and when their job was done they dissolved. Moreover, under the matrix structure (i.e. functional/venue) SOCOG established formal plans and procedures, which pertained across all operational areas to ensure consistency of processes. Bob Elphinston, for example, said: “we had developed formal operational plans across all programmes to achieve consistency of operations and to co-ordinate our work” (Elphinston, 2000a).

After May 2000, when SOCOG was operating under the Main Operation Centre (MOC), its functional areas were incorporated into the Venue Teams and co-ordination among those areas was achieved within each venue under the control of a powerful Venue Manager. In particular, each Venue Team held daily informal turnover sessions, which involved its key managers and then an official report of each session was forwarded to the MOC (Sloman, 2000b). Co-ordination within each venue, therefore, was primarily achieved through informal communication, while the MOC was responsible for consistency of operations across all venues, through direct communication with the Venue Managers. Although Venue Managers had formal responsibilities to the MOC, most of such communication was in the form of informal telephone communication (Sloman, 2000a). As such, co-ordination between the venues and the MOC was also achieved through informal interaction. Moreover, after the establishment of the MOC, the various standing committees and commissions, which were previously essential co-ordinating tools, lost their significance. Bob Elphinston, for example, said: “We had many committees and commissions along the way that were making recommendations and decisions and then as we were getting closer to the Games-time they became less necessary” (Elphinston, 2000a). In effect, the committees, commissions and task forces in SOCOG were not active after May 2000 (Sloman, 2000a). These groupings aimed to
bring together people from different constituencies involved in specific tasks, having a co-ordinating but mainly advisory role. In the course of the three months leading to the Games as well as during the event, this responsibility was taken over by the Games Co-ordination Group (GCOG), which comprised people from all the constituent groups of the Games. As was mentioned earlier, the Executives of the GCOG had distinct responsibilities acting all together as a standing committee holding daily meetings. SOCOG’s Chief Operating Officer explains the role of the GCOG during the actual Games-time Period:

Basically what happened is that the GCOG was a group of people who had specific tasks to do: how to run the event was my role; Hollway’s role was really to look after the Olympic Family and the diplomacy into the business. Eyers’ role was to look after the sponsors and the stakeholders and their issues. Richmond’s role was really to look after the city and the urban domain. Bob Leece’s role was to look after the transport and so on. We were all set in this Games Co-ordination Group. We met every morning. I ran my meeting at 6:30 at the MOC, then at 7:30 we had the GCOG meeting and at 9:30 we had the IOC Co-ordination Commission (Sloman, 2000a).

After the Games, each operational area worked relatively autonomously as they mainly reviewed their operations and prepared to dissolve. Although co-ordination among the operational areas was not required, the top of the organisation had set specific deadlines by which divisions had to be terminated (Eyers, 2001). Therefore, there were no specific mechanisms for internal co-ordination but rather time-specific plans for tasks that had to be accomplished. In terms of committees and commissions, only the Finance Committee and the Audit Committee re-grouped and met regularly during that period in order to provide consultation for the financial resolution of the organisation. The Sports Commission and the Contingency Committee met also once after the Games but only for reviewing their operations and then dissolved (Eyers, 2001).

SOCOG's internal co-ordination and communication, therefore, was an essential organisational process, which involved different mechanisms during the life cycle of the organisation. A wide variety of tasks had to be performed often in detail, which in turn required SOCOG’s staff to adhere to detailed formal instructions and procedures. In early stages, however, formal mechanisms for work co-ordination were limited
(Richmond, 2001; Sloman, 2001). Each division and programme would have its own plans, policies and procedures manuals and the like, but since only some of them were operational at that stage, the bulk of formal paperwork produced in the organisation was restricted to strategic plans and primarily to a general Master Plan. That would list all SOCOG's tasks, and project individually the time of their completion (SOCOG, 1996).

In later stages, the diversity and complexity of SOCOG's tasks resulted in the establishment of many formal mechanisms in the form of formal plans, policies and procedures manuals and detailed job descriptions. In 1998, for example, SOCOG developed various human resources-related plans such as a Code of Conduct, Occupational Health and Safety plans, Disability plans, an Ethnic Affairs Statement and Agreement as well as well-established processes for planning, managing and reviewing staff's performance against key result areas and agreed objectives (SOCOG, 1999). Moreover, as SOCOG was reaching the Games-time period, detailed job descriptions for its staff were established as well as minute-by-minute daily-run schedules (Sloman, 2000c). That increasing formality of SOCOG's operations became a subject of criticism primarily because that was seen as lingering its decision-making processes. Bob Leece, for example, said:

Up to this year [2000] SOCOG was extraordinarily bureaucratic producing loads of paper work which did not mean anything because SOCOG had a lot of young enthusiastic people, highly motivated, highly energetic young people but they were desperate for leadership, which did not exist because SOCOG did not have a solid framework in which to operate. [...] The decision-making processes were long (Leece, 2000a).

David Richmond shared Mr Leece's views and illustrated the reasons behind SOCOG's bureaucratisation. He said:

I think the source of bureaucratisation was the fact that you had an organisation, which was very much based on functional responsibilities and technical skills. And the way which the organisation worked was that every technical skill had to sign off on every decision, and there was very little management on the programmes (Richmond, 2000).
After the establishment of the Games-time structure, in May 2000, the plans, policies and procedures of all functional areas were integrated in the Venue Teams. Moreover, formal protocols were formed in order to ensure that messages across all venues were consistent (Sloman, 2000b). As a result, SOCOG’s staff followed detailed formal instructions, which in turn affected its decision-making processes. SOCOG’s Deputy CEO, Michael Eyers, illustrated that with an example as follows:

"In SOCOG we had this issue where sports wanted to take extra seats in the SuperDome and the ticketing said: 'this is a problem because we want to be able to take a high price for those tickets'. We must resolve that. [...] SOCOG would produce loads of paperwork, make inefficient meetings, and the problem would be still unresolved. So [...] there were some sorts of problems tending to go on for too long unresolved (Eyers, 2000)."

SOCOG’s operational systems, however, were subject to an external audit, in July 2000, which was conducted by external independent auditors on behalf of OCA and the NSW Government (SOCOG, 2001a). In relation to the external audit process, OCA’s Director General said: “We had a thing called STORE exercising [Sydney 2000 Technical and Operational Readiness Exercise] early July 2000 where we tested their [SOCOG] management systems very well. We tested their weaknesses and so they were not so bureaucratic. Anyway, they had to be fast, flexible” (Richmond, 2000).

Under the Games-time structure, therefore, SOCOG’s operations were conducted in a less formalised manner (Hollway, 2001; Elphinston, 2001; Sloman, 2001; Richmond, 2001), since the increased operational complexity of the Games-time conditions required the organisation to act in a flexible and time-efficient manner. After the Games, formal plans, policies and procedures manuals and the like, which previously aimed to standardise work processes were not in use, since most of the work was co-ordinated in an informal manner. People in SOCOG were not given any formal guidelines to accomplish their tasks, apart from a time span within which a functional area had to be dissolved and consequently its tasks to be accomplished. Commenting on this Kristine Toohey said:

“Well, there was a succession plan, which specified when certain people would go, and who would be the person from OCA to report to if you were still employed by
SOCOG. But apart from that I think that we were working at our own pace. Our team for example was autonomous in terms of setting our own plans because the job that had to be done was relying on our expertise. I think that this was the same with other teams in SOCOG. I do not think that any area in SOCOG was following any plans (Toohey, 2001).

After the Games, therefore, SOCOG operated in a flexible manner, without formal plans and instructions, apart from a general plan, which specified the lines of authority in a period that the organisation was transformed in order to dissolve.

Overall, therefore, SOCOG utilised diverse methods for the achievement of internal coordination in the course of its life cycle. In the early stages of its operations, and particularly until 1996, when limited organisational growth had occurred, internal coordination was mainly achieved through informal interactions among the operational areas at an executive level. Formal plans and instructions were limited during that period and only a few committees and commission had been established. In the period between 1996 and 2000, when SOCOG experienced considerable growth in terms of numbers of operational areas, the internal co-ordination took the form of formal mechanisms, which primarily aimed to regulate the various organisational functions. This was achieved with the creation of several committees and commissions, which brought together the various competencies in order to perform particular tasks, as well as with the establishment of formal means in the form of detailed plans and instructions, procedures manuals and the like. After May 2000 SOCOG’s operations were dispersed across the venues under the supervision of the MOC, and consequently co-ordination could not be achieved with tight, formal mechanisms. The Venue Managers primarily communicated with the MOC through informal interaction and meetings, although some formal instructions and reporting existed, and the co-ordinating roles of most of the committees and commissions were incorporated into a sole body, the GCOG. After the Games, SOCOG gradually became a small organisation with a limited number of operational areas. Internal co-ordination was often not required since the organisation was divided into small groups, which were mostly working autonomously. However, a general formal plan existed, which specified desired outcomes of operations within a specific timetable.
6.2.8 DECISION-MAKING IN SOCOG

As was shown above, SOCOG's employees were often working within a complex internal organisational environment where, from time to time, they had to operate within formal guidelines, but also flexibly at their own discretion. The manner in which SOCOG's staff was operating was closely related to the decision-making structure in the organisation, since the level in the organisational hierarchy where decisions were finalised, naturally determined the staff's authority boundaries.

In the early stages of SOCOG's operations, the decisions made in the organisation were mostly of a strategic nature and were naturally finalised at the very top of the organisation, that is, the Board of Directors. Jim Sloman, for example, said: "In the beginning, SOCOG was structured in that the Board was all powerful" (Sloman, 2000a). The Board of Directors would approve the establishment of each operating area and the appointment of senior staff to lead those areas. The Board also established the initial legal frameworks, such as those which would protect the rights of potential sponsors and partners. The 'Sydney 2000 Games Protection Act 1996', for example, provided protection for Sydney Olympics words and symbols (SOCOG, 1996). There would also be decisions initiated by the Head of a division or a programme but they would be finalised at the Board. Commenting on this, Jim Sloman stated: "Usually they [Heads of Divisions] would get to the Board and say, for example, 'we need to structure this way because of that reason' and the Board would decide for that" (Sloman, 2000a).

After the establishment of the Sports Commission in 1996, SOCOG's Board of Directors retained the majority of the decision-making power, yet the Sports Commission received ultimate decision-making authority for sport-related issues. Specifically, the Sports Commission was responsible for making all the decisions concerning the sport competitions including the Test Events. These included decisions concerning the IFs and NOCs' relations, the Games scheduling, the sport equipment, the freight, such as canoes, rowing shells, yachts and horses, the IOC sport relations as well as all the human resources issues with respect to the sport competitions, such as volunteers, marketing, facilities operations, villages, medical, transport, accreditation, accommodation and so on (SOCOG, 2000a). The wide range of responsibilities of the Sports Commission marked a
clear shift of a great deal of decision-making authority from the Board to the Sports Commission. SOCOG's Head of Sports, for example, said:

In the case of sport, which was very important, there was a commission of the Board, the SOCOG's Sports Commission and it was given the total authority. It was an autonomous body that had to work within the budget approved by the SOCOG Board. It had total authority in all decisions concerning sport: the athletes, the village and so on. That was in the hands of John Coates, the President of the Australian Olympic Committee (Elphinston, 2000a).

Although the Sports Commission had the total authority to decide on sport-related matters, it was, however, financially constrained by the Board, since it was operating within specific budget allocations that were approved by the Board (SOCOG, 2000a). Moreover, in later stages, Board's President, Michael Knight, became even more involved in SOCOG's operational decisions, which was seen as an action to ensure that SOCOG was placed more tightly under the control of the NSW government (Moore, 2000c). Commenting on the decision-making structure of SOCOG, Bob Elphinston said: "After Atlanta, the decision-making power rested in the Board and particularly in Michael Knight" (Elphinston, 2000a). As a result, major decisions were finalised at the top of the organisation whether that would be the Board of Directors or the Sports Commission. Some major decisions were even finalised outside the organisation, in the NSW government's Cabinet sub-committee, which was formed to decide on Michael Knight's recommendations (Richmond, 2000). The organisation, however, was in the process of establishing the Venue Teams, which would eventually run the Games from the sporting venues. The establishment of the Venue Teams in 1999 marked a shift of considerable decision-making power to the lower organisational levels, since the majority of the competition-related issues were gradually delegated to the Venue Manager (Sloman, 2000b).

SOCOG's decision-making structure changed substantially after May 2000, when the organisation adopted a Games-time structure. The vast majority of the Games' decision expected to be made inside the venues by the Venue Managers. Operational decisions which could not be made by the Venue Managers were transferred to the Main Operating Centre (MOC), which was located in SOCOG's Headquarters and run by SOCOG's
Chief Operating Officer. However, strategic decisions, which could affect the Games as a whole, such as security issues, were transferred to the leaders of the GCOG, Michael Knight and John Coates. SOCOG’s Head of Sports explains:

At Games-time, the total authority was left in the hands of Michael Knight and John Coates. So, the President of the Board and the President of the Sports Commission had the authority to make decisions at Games-time. On the day-by-day basis, we had the Chief Operating Officer for SOCOG [Jim Sloman] who had been the deputy CEO and he managed the MOC, which took all the decisions about what should occur. But if the decisions were much broader, at a higher level, then it would go to Michael Knight and John Coates. Venue managers were expected to resolve all issues at the venue with their teams. So, the ideal position was that there were no issues coming to the MOC. The reality I suppose was that 90% of the decisions were made at the venue and 10% came in the MOC. Of those 10% probably very small percentage less than 10% of 10% went to Michael Knight and John Coates (Elphinston, 2000a).

The role of the Venue Managers, therefore, became very significant, during the period that SOCOG was operating under a venue-based structure. SOCOG’s Chief Operating Officer, Jim Sloman, said:

So, we said the Venue Manager basically is 'king' and decisions were made within the venue, if they can, within a certain set of parameters and that only if it is going to have a Games-wide effect or political effect or security, or it is obviously a Games-wide issue that will be escalated, it should reported to us (MOC). We kept the structure very flat [...] So yes, these people [Venue Managers] were delegated responsibilities and it was a key feature of the model (Sloman, 2000a).

Therefore, in the course of the three months leading to the Games as well as during the event, there was a clear shift of SOCOG’s decision-making power to the sporting venues, which essentially constituted the organisation’s ‘operating core’, since the vast majority of decisions was finalised in the venues by the Venue Managers.

After the Games, SOCOG gave considerable decision-making autonomy to the staff at the bottom of the organisation, which, as was mentioned earlier, was structured in various teams of experts who were operating within existing departments, programmes or divisions. These teams could autonomously decide on operational issues, which were
primarily related with the dissolution of their respective departments, programmes or divisions. However, the strategic direction of the organisation was vested in OCA’s executives, who were supervising SOCOG’s operations during that period. Commenting on this, Kristine Toohey said:

[After the Games] David Richmond [OCA’s Director General] was very powerful. Sandy Hollway [SOCOG’s CEO] was accounted toward the volunteers so he was moved to another governmental department. Surely it was Michael Knight a very powerful individual and also Michael Eyers [OCA’s appointee as SOCOG’s Deputy CEO] was very powerful. So between those three people certainly (Toohey, 2001).

David Richmond was leading SOCOG after the departure of SOCOG’s CEO and together with Michael Eyers were the main decision-makers in the organisation. It seems from the above, however, that Michael Knight, former President of SOCOG and former NSW’s Minister for the Olympics, was also an important decision-maker after the Games, although he resigned from his posts right after the end of the event. Kristine Toohey illustrated Michael Knight’s involvement in SOCOG after the Games. She stated:

Michael Knight still has to sign off on the Post Games Report [PGR]. There is a difference you have to understand [...] even if he did not work for the organisation [...] does not mean that he did not have influence. Knight had considerable impact on individuals working for SOCOG because essentially OCA was the successor organisation and most of the people who had an Olympic-related responsibility were OCA’s staff, not SOCOG’s staff. As I told you Richmond and Eyers were very powerful (Toohey, 2001).

Michael Knight therefore, could affect decisions in SOCOG primarily by influencing its main decision-makers, that is David Richmond and Michael Eyers, who were Knight’s closest subordinates during his terms of office (Moore, 2000a). The power for important decisions in SOCOG during that period, therefore, primarily rested in the hands of OCA’s senior staff.

Consequently, the decision-making structure in SOCOG underwent considerable changes during its life cycle. In early stages, and particularly until 1996, the Board of Directors was the main decision-making body in the organisation. However, after 1996 substantial decision-making power moved to the Sports Commission, which although it constituted a
commission of the Board, it had ultimate authority for decisions on the majority of sporting issues. As such, the bulk of decision-making power was vested at the upper levels of SOCOG's structure. The decision-making structure in SOCOG changed significantly after May 2000, when the organisation moved to a venue-based structure. In particular, the bulk of decision-making authority was transferred to the venues, which from that point onwards constituted the operating body in the organisation. The Venue Managers were powerful individuals who had the authority to make most of the decisions. Consequently, from May 2000 until the end of the Games, SOCOG's decision-making power was rested in the lower levels of the organisation's structure. Finally, after the Games the decision-making authority remained at the lower levels of the organisation, since SOCOG retained a small number of operating teams, which worked relatively autonomously. However, considerable decision-making power moved back to the top of the organisation, and particularly to OCA's staff, who led SOCOG's operations until its dissolution.

6.2.9 STAFF CONTRIBUTION TO SOCOG

As was mentioned earlier, SOCOG experienced significant increase in the numbers of its staff throughout its life cycle. SOCOG's staff allocated in different divisions or departments as well as in different levels of authority within the organisation. However, with regard to the authority they were given to contribute to the organisation's operations, SOCOG's employees were allocated to different organisational parts, namely the 'strategic apex', the 'middle line', the 'operating core', the 'technostructure', and the 'support staff' (Figure 6.10) (Mintzberg, 1979). These parts contributed to the overall operations of the organisation, however, some parts had more significant contribution than other parts in certain stages of SOCOG's operational life.

In early stages, for example, SOCOG was a relatively small organisation, where most of its operations were undertaken by senior executives or Board members. As was shown earlier, particularly until 1996, SOCOG's operations were mainly related to strategic issues, primarily with regard to the establishment of the functional areas of the organisation. As SOCOG's Chief Operating Officer stated, "in the beginning the bulk of
work was produced by the Board and by a limited number of executives who consulted the Board on various issues" (Sloman, 2000a). Consequently, in the beginning, the part of SOCOG with the most significant contribution to its operations was the top of the organisation, which comprised senior staff, namely its 'strategic apex'.

Figure 6.10: The Basic Parts of an Organisation

As SOCOG was growing bigger, however, and its task was getting more diverse, the various functional areas undertook more organisational responsibilities, having more significant contribution to its operations. Expertise was essential, and as a result, the organisation's expert staff, that is SOCOG's 'technostructure', had a significant contribution to SOCOG's operations. For example, SOCOG's CEO said: "when I came in SOCOG [March 1997] my main task was to get the planners work. [...] We had to produce plans for all the areas. [...] We had to plan our structure and budgets until the Games". Moreover, SOCOG employed expert staff of the Atlanta's organising committee and also employed consulting firms to deal with diverse issues ranging from planning to technology (Moore, 2000b). After 1999, however, the recently established Venue Teams acted as its 'operating core', which essentially delivered SOCOG's tasks, in the sense that those teams were getting prepared to deliver the sport competitions. As
SOCOG progressed towards the time of the event, therefore, its Operating Core gradually contributed more significantly to SOCOG’s operations.

Figure 6.11: Typical Venue Structure: The Aquatic Centre

After May 2000, when SOCOG was operating under a mainly venue-based structure, the bulk of SOCOG’s operations were run by 40 Venue Teams each of which comprised representatives of SOCOG’s functional areas as well as representatives of all the constituents groups involved in the running of the event (Figure 6.11). As was mentioned earlier, the Venue Teams were able to make most of the decisions concerning the running of the Games, and delivered this massive event to the many constituents, primarily athletes, officials, broadcast and press (Sloman, 2000b).

As a result, in the course of the three months leading to the Games as well as during the event, the Venue Teams had the most significant contribution to SOCOG’s operations as well as to the event as a whole. After the Games, SOCOG’s main task was to make the appropriate arrangements in order for the organisation to dissolve smoothly. That was a
task, which was undertaken primarily by ad hoc teams, which were working within their respective functional areas (Toohey, 2001; Eyers, 2001). However, the contribution of some expert staff was also needed during that period, particularly with regard to the filing of the organisation's records. This was an essential process for SOCOG, since one of its responsibilities to the Host City Contract was to compile a comprehensive Post-Games Report (IOC, 1992, Section 46). Moreover, SOCOG undertook the responsibility to transfer its managerial expertise to future OCOG's through the Transfer of Olympic Knowledge (TOK) programme. This involved the gathering of the key documents and data from the Sydney Olympics into manageable manuals, which could be used by future Olympic organisers, and therefore a substantial input of record specialists was required (Toohey and Halbwirth, 2001). Consequently, after the Games and until its dissolution, the bulk of work in SOCOG was produced by members of the lower organisational levels (i.e. 'operating core') with considerable contribution from expert staff (i.e. 'technostructure').

Overall, therefore, the organisational parts of SOCOG with the most significant contribution to the organisation's operations varied with the period of its life cycle. In particular, in early stages the majority of work was undertaken by senior staff, while, as the organisation was growing bigger the 'operating core' gradually had the major contribution in the organisation. In the period between 1996 and early 2000, when SOCOG experienced enormous growth, the contribution of expert staff of its 'technostructure' was also considerably significant for the organisation's operations. After May 2000 and until the end of the Games, the Venue Teams, which represented SOCOG's 'operating core', played the prime role in the organisation's operations. Similarly, after the event, the staff of SOCOG's 'operating core' was the key player in producing the work in the organisation, however, it was considerably helped by a small number of experts of the 'technostructure'.

It is clear from the above that SOCOG's members of staff from different levels of the organisational hierarchy significantly contributed to the organisation's operations as a whole. The tasks that had to be performed considerably varied, as the organisation was eventually operated with a wide range of operational responsibilities. However, the majority of jobs in SOCOG were related to the delivery of the sport competitions of the
biggest multi sporting event, and therefore, staff training should have been an essential parameter for the organisation’s operations, as the vast majority of SOCOG’s staff performed jobs that they had never done in the past.

Nevertheless, in the early stages of SOCOG’s life cycle, there was limited training for its staff (Riordan, 2001). The organisation was formed by highly respected professionals with sound skills and experience, both from the business and the sporting industry, who initially came in the organisation to provide strategic advice and direction (SOCOG, 1996). These individuals, however, needed to acquire the Olympic-specific knowledge in order to identify the key characteristics of the Olympic project. This was not achieved through job-specific patterns of training but rather through observation of major sport events and attendance of Olympic-related meetings and conferences. David Richmond, for example, said:

We built that knowledge up from the bid process, even I was not involved in that; reading the documentation and then the evolution of meetings with IOC over the years, attendance of the Atlanta and Nagano Olympic Games, observations at other major events, going to conferences of some of the major consistencies like the Association of Summer Olympic Games and so on (Richmond, 2000).

It was not before 1997 that staff training became an essential consideration for SOCOG. In particular, in 1997, with the perspective of the vast amount of staff that SOCOG would employ in the following years, the training of SOCOG’s paid staff as well as of volunteers was outsourced to TAFE NSW (Technical And Further Education), a major Australian training agency (SOCOG, 1998). TAFE NSW’s contribution to SOCOG’s staff training was limited in the beginning, as SOCOG’s paid staff was primarily undertaking on-the-job training, and therefore, TAFE NSW’s role was to train a pool of candidates who would staff SOCOG during the Games (Riordan, 2001). For that reason TAFE co-ordinated together with SOCOG various Olympic-related training sessions in 20 Australian Universities covering a wide variety of expertise such as IT, media, competitions management and so on (SOCOG 2000b). Therefore, although a great deal of training took place, most of it occurred outside the organisation.
The bulk of training for SOCOG’s staff but also for volunteers and the rest of the Games workforce took place during the three months leading to the Games (Riodan, 2001). In particular, between June 2000 and October 2000, 36 training sessions took place all around Australia which aimed to train approximately 47,000 volunteers and 60,000 paid and contract-partner staff (SOCOG, 2000). That was an enormous task, which was responsibility of TAFE. All trainees underwent a three-level training programme comprising orientation training, venue training and job specific training. Bob Elphinston explains:

All staff and volunteers trained first of all in the generic requirements of the Olympic Games: what was the Olympic Movement about, the Olympic Games’ importance and so on. Then they had venue-specific training: what they would require to do at the venue; and then there was job-specific training (Elphinston, 2000a).

After the Games, there was naturally no training for SOCOG’s staff (Riordan, 2001). As was mentioned earlier, after the Games SOCOG comprised people who had worked for the Games as well as experts, whether they were previously working for SOCOG or they had been brought in the organisation to accomplish specific tasks. As a result, SOCOG did not need to train its staff since most of them were working for SOCOG long before the Games, and the new staff that came in the organisation during that period were highly-skilled and experienced professionals (Toohey, 2001).

Consequently, the amount of training undertaken by SOCOG’s staff changed significantly through the years of the organisation’s life. In early stages, limited staff training was undertaken primarily in the form of observation of other sporting events and attendance of Olympic conferences. In later stages and particularly after 1997 the process of planning and delivering SOCOG’s staff training was formalised as it was outsourced to TAFE NSW, which however, delivered the bulk of training in the period between June 2000 and October 2000. Finally, after the Games, staff training in SOCOG was not needed as the majority of the remaining staff either was trained in the past or was expert staff that employed after the Games to facilitate the wind up process (Toohey, 2001).
This chapter attempted a holistic description of SOCOG's organisational nature, following the premises of a modified version of Mintzberg's (1979) configuration analysis. This process involved the identification and evaluation of a series of structural and contextual characteristics of SOCOG throughout its life cycle, in an attempt to provide a sufficient account of the organisation across the seven years of its operation. In doing so, it was shown that SOCOG was an evolving organisation, since the majority of its organisational dimensions under investigation changed significantly in the course of its life cycle. Consequently, it was felt that the development of a single synthesis of SOCOG's characteristics, that is one organisational formation, would be inadequate for providing the scope of its organisational status. It is rather suggested that a comprehensive understanding of SOCOG as an organisational entity requires multiple synthesises of its organisational dimensions by capturing their nature at different points of its operational life, and consequently deriving multiple organisational formations. Therefore, there is a need to identify distinctive periods in SOCOG's life cycle, capture the nature of its characteristics in each of the periods, and eventually synthesise the respective organisational formations. The process of periodisation of SOCOG's life cycle along with a time-specific analysis of its organisational characteristics is presented in the following chapter.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this thesis has been to identify and analyse the nature and range of organisational configurations evident within the life cycle of SOCOG. Particularly, the research has the following objectives:

- To identify and evaluate the structural and contextual features of SOCOG throughout its life cycle, using a modified version of Mintzberg's configuration analysis;
- To investigate the role and operation of SOCOG in the organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games;
- To explore the applicability of the life cycle periodisation for the study of SOCOG; and
- To review and evaluate the utility of the modified Mintzberg's approach with regard to the examination of SOCOG.

The purpose of the present chapter concentrates on the fulfilment of the last three objectives, as there has already been a long discussion of the first objective in the last part of the previous chapter, and also to provide the final remarks of the thesis as a whole. Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is fourfold: firstly, it aims to elaborate on the role that SOCOG played in the preparations and organisation of the Sydney Games; secondly, it aims to discuss the usefulness of a chronological separation of SOCOG's life cycle into distinctive organisational stages; thirdly, it aims to discuss the organisational status of SOCOG with regard to the premises of Mintzberg's configuration approach to organisational analysis, and assess the utility of Mintzberg's approach for the study of SOCOG. Finally, this chapter aims to draw the major conclusions of this study, and provide recommendations for further research in the field of the Olympic Games organisation. As a result, this chapter is structured in four main sections. The first section comments on the organisational position of SOCOG in the Sydney Olympics through an analysis of its status and organisational responsibilities throughout its operational life. The second section argues the need for a chronological division of SOCOG's life cycle, identifies the key incidents in SOCOG's life cycle and ultimately provides a time-specific pattern for the orderly
structuring of its organisational elements. Subsequently, the third section discusses the organisational formations identified in SOCOG, particularly in relation to Mintzberg’s (1973) organisational configurations (appendix IV), while commenting on the usefulness of Mintzberg’s modified approach as the conceptual framework for the study of SOCOG. Finally, the fourth section of this chapter constitutes the concluding part of the thesis. It presents the main conclusions of the study, states its main implications for academics and practitioners, and suggests areas and methodologies for further research.

7.1 THE ROLE OF SOCOG IN THE ORGANISATION OF THE SYDNEY OLYMPICS

In accordance with the Olympic Charter (rules 39, 40), SOCOG was established by the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) and became an integral part of the Host City Contract of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Like every contemporary OCOG, SOCOG was formed as the central constituent of the organisational model of the contemporary Olympics with specific organisational responsibilities. According to its charter SOCOG was responsible for the following:

- To implement the sports programme, including preparing and operating all venues and facilities for the Games;
- To organise the cultural programme;
- To establish a marketing programme in consultation with the IOC and the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC); and
- To arrange and make available host broadcaster and television and radio facilities and other information services (SOCOG, 2001a).

Effectively, SOCOG was formed as a private organisation which would hold the sole responsibility for the core part of the Olympic project, while the building of the Olympic infrastructure and other peripheral responsibilities, such as the security and the transportation of the Games, were undertaken by public organisations of the state.
government of the New South Wales (NSW). Therefore, SOCOG had to co-operate not only with the NSW government on a number of supporting services to the event but also with the constituent organisations of the Olympic Movement, namely, the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the International Federations (IFs) and the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) with regard to a variety of event related issues ranging from the arrangement of the marketing deals to the planning and delivery of the sporting competitions.

Therefore, although SOCOG held the appellation of the organiser of the Sydney Olympics it was in fact, in view of its organisational position, the co-ordinator of the event. In effect, SOCOG was a temporary organisation with limited resources, whose main responsibility was to bring together the resources of other organisations and co-ordinate their operations for a particular period of time, and subsequently to dissolve.

As was shown in the previous chapter, in order to deliver the event SOCOG was in need of a number of externally held resources. As with every OCOG the main financial supplier to SOCOG was the IOC, which provided SOCOG with approximately 60% of its budget through its international sponsorship deals. In the case of the Sydney Olympics, however, the contribution of the host government, that of NSW, was also substantial. Apart from the building of the entire new Olympic infrastructure, the NSW government underwrote SOCOG, and also assumed the responsibility to provide a wide range of facilities and services which were essential for the effective delivery of the event. Moreover, the NSW government was responsible for determining the operational framework of SOCOG, including its legal status, and for appointing the leadership of the organisation.

Therefore, although SOCOG was established as a private organisation, it essentially constituted a statutory authority of the NSW government, and effectively from its formation its power over the organisation of the Games was significantly restricted. From the early stages of SOCOG's operation it was evident that the NSW government intended to control SOCOG, particularly by ensuring that any individuals appointed to leadership positions in SOCOG were sympathetic to the state government. After the 1995 state elections, for example, when the Labour Party succeeded the Conservative
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Party in the government of NSW, SOCOG gradually underwent significant changes as much with regard to its leadership as with regard to its links with the NSW public governance. The new government replaced the President and CEO of SOCOG, and a Ministry for the Olympics was established to co-ordinate the involvement of all the government’s authorities in the Games’ organisation. Moreover, in 1996 the Minister for the Olympics, Michael Knight, was appointed President of SOCOG’s Board of Directors, which essentially meant that the organisation was not only directly linked to the NSW government, but was also under its direct supervision.

Under the presidency of Michael Knight, SOCOG operated with a peculiar leadership structure, in the sense that the organisation was virtually controlled by the NSW government. SOCOG’s budgets and operations came under severe criticism from its President, a situation that was often reinforced by the Australian media. SOCOG was frequently presented in the media as unable to operate efficiently and effectively and generally as an organisation which would not be able to deliver successful Games. The belief that SOCOG was ineffective for performing its task was strengthened in 1999, when SOCOG mismanaged the Games’ ticketing programme creating a significant loss of money and public confidence in the organisation. This negative profile of SOCOG, coupled with the given desire of the NSW government for further control over the Games’ organisation, resulted in the appointment of a number of NSW’s public servants to key positions in the organisation as well as the transfer of a number of SOCOG’s responsibilities, including the venues operations, to the NSW’s Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA), which was the main organisational link between SOCOG and the NSW government. Moreover, the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) took full responsibility for all the sport-related issues of the Games, an area that was the central responsibility of SOCOG. In effect, from the year 1999 onwards, SOCOG’s role with regard to the organisation of the Games was gradually weakened as the NSW government and the AOC took over some of the organisation’s main responsibilities.

The strong involvement of the NSW government and AOC in the Games’ organisation became more evident during the last six months of the Olympic
preparations, when the organisational power of SOCOG was diminished. In particular, a new co-ordination body, the Games Co-ordination Group (GCOG), which was headed by the NSW's Minister for the Olympics and AOC's President, replaced SOCOG's Board of Directors, and SOCOG was integrated into a new organisational entity, 'Sydney 2000', which incorporated all the organisational constituents of the Games under the leadership of the OCA's Director General. Practically, during the Games-time period SOCOG lost the majority of its original responsibilities and significant organisational authority. It was no longer the central organisational and co-ordination body of the Games, but rather a powerless organisation with only a limited contribution to the delivery of the event.

Overall, therefore, the significance of SOCOG's role in the organisation of the Sydney Games gradually diminished during the organisation's life cycle. SOCOG was never a powerful organisation, yet in the early stages of the Games' preparations it held a significant co-ordination position. Its initiative in dealing with prestigious international organisations, such as the IOC and the IFs as well as media networks and multinational corporations, gave the organisation a high profile, which could easily be envied by the other constituents of the event's organisation. The research findings suggest that as the time of the Games neared, the NSW government, and to a lesser extent the AOC, were tempted to get involved in the organisation of the Games as actively as possible, in order to enjoy the privilege of the Olympic Games' kudos, in our view. Besides, the aforementioned entities constituted the prime political and sporting bodies respectively around the Sydney Games, and had a noticeable aspiration to present the Games as their own product. The NSW government, in particular, invested considerable funds to build and support a prestigious 'show', which would be run by a relatively independent and apolitical organisation. Undoubtedly the NSW government aspired to receive the international recognition in case of a possible success of the event, which in turn would raise its local administrative profile. Conversely, there was a high level of risk of international embarrassment involved for the status of the NSW government, if organisational problems arose. Moreover, the extensive media attention on the preparations of an Olympic Games undoubtedly provides a useful opportunity for politically ambitious
politicians, and in the case of the Sydney Olympics this was presumably an additional incentive for stronger political involvement in the event's organisation. However, it needs to be acknowledged that SOCOG mismanaged particular areas of the Games' organisation, and essentially justified the intense involvement of the NSW government in the name of the Games' success.

The case of SOCOG and its role within the organisation of the Sydney Olympics reveals the intensity of power relations in the Olympic management and perhaps the need for alternative organisational models in the contemporary Olympics. With regard to the former, the peculiar structure of the organisation of the Olympic Games allows the involvement of diverse interests, which in turn generates a complex network of power relations. The fact that the IOC owns the Games, yet it delegates the responsibility for their organisation to an OCOG, which is often dependent on governments and commercial organisations, inevitably creates a weak organisational model usually enabling more powerful and strategically located interests to prevail. In effect, although the IOC's institutional framework concerning the organisation of the Games seems solid, it is effectively adjustable to the conditions of the place and time in the name of the Games' success. For example, the Sydney Olympics occurred after the privately funded Olympic Games in Atlanta, which was in many respects an organisational failure. As a result, in the subsequent Olympics in Sydney the IOC encouraged the deep involvement of the public sector in order to guarantee the success of particular areas of the Games, such as security and transportation, both of which substantially failed in Atlanta. Besides, the increasing magnitude and organisational complexity of the Olympic Games is naturally beyond the scope of an OCOG, and therefore the IOC seeks the involvement of credible agencies, usually the host governments, which have the capacity to provide the necessary facilities and services for the event and guarantee its financial viability. Therefore, the role of OCOGs in the organisation of the Games might be weakened in the future, and perhaps we might see the role of the host governments or the National Olympic Committees of the host countries to be strengthened.
7.2 MAPPING SOCOG OVER TIME

The examination of SOCOG's organisational characteristics in the previous chapter has shown that the organisation did not maintain a constant organisational status throughout its life cycle. Both SOCOG's contextual characteristics and structural design parameters underwent significant changes as the organisation progressed towards the time of the event as well as after the end of the event. As a result, an orderly presentation of SOCOG's organisational characteristics requires the examination of the nature of these characteristics in particular periods of SOCOG's operational life. In other words, it was felt that in order to provide a comprehensive picture of SOCOG's organisational reality, it would be appropriate to consider the nature of its characteristics at distinctive chronological stages rather than as a whole.

The identification of different stages in SOCOG's life cycle, however, can be problematic. The seven years of its operational life could be separated in terms of chronological age, but, as was shown in previous chapters, calendar time and organisational time are not necessarily identical. On the contrary, it has been claimed that organisations often have rhythms and cycles that are quite independent of their chronological age (Kimberly, 1980; Orlikowski, 1996). It is felt, therefore, that it would be more appropriate to separate SOCOG's life cycle with regard to key elements that characterise its operations rather than to calendar time. In effect, by taking on board Miller and Friesen's (1984) approach to organisational change, one could expect that critical events or decisions in SOCOG's life cycle, whether they were internally or externally generated, would have triggered organisational transitions. As such, by identifying organisational transitions in SOCOG's life cycle, one would be able to locate transitional points in terms of organisational time, and consequently mark SOCOG's shift from one particular organisational status to another.

The examination of SOCOG's contextual and structural characteristics can provide useful insights into the process of identifying critical events and decisions, which could qualify as transitional points in the organisation's life cycle. Effectively, certain events or decisions in SOCOG's life cycle can be classified as 'critical' ones, in the
sense that they provoked considerable changes in the organisation as a whole. As was shown in the previous chapter, SOCOG's life cycle was marked by a series of events and decisions which had the potential to trigger organisational transitions (see chapter VI, Table 6.1). However, according to the perceptions of SOCOG's managers and the analysis of the relevant document data only a limited number of such events and decisions had a transitional effect on the organisation's operations. These include the following:

- The observation of the Atlanta Games by SOCOG's staff, in August 1996.
- The appointment of NSW Minister for the Olympics, Michael Knight, to the position of President of SOCOG, in September 1996.
- The shift of SOCOG's operations to the Games' venues under the coordination of the Main Operations Centre (MOC), in May 2000.
- The end of the Games, in October 2000.

The following sections will ultimately justify the significance of the aforementioned events as transitional points in SOCOG's seven-year life cycle. Specifically, it will be shown that the two initial events, which occurred almost simultaneously, signified the transition of SOCOG's operations from a formative stage, which is termed here 'Start-up Period', to a stage of significant growth and development, namely the 'Build-up Period'. Further, it will be illustrated that the establishment of the MOC in May 2000 marked the shift of SOCOG to another organisational phase, that is the 'Games-time Period', which ended in October 2000, when the event was finished. The later event will finally indicate SOCOG's shift to the last stage of its operations, the 'Close Down Period', which naturally ended in December 2000 when the organisation officially dissolved.

SOCOG's START-UP PERIOD

As was mentioned earlier, SOCOG was established on November 12, 1993 as a statutory corporation under the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games Act 1993 by the NSW Parliament, and became part of the Host City Contract
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(HCC) (NSW, 1993, Section 10). The 'Start-up Period' of SOCOG's life cycle refers to approximately the first three years of its operations, that is, until September 1996. This separation is justified by two main reasons. The first, a feature likely to be common to all OCOGs, was knowledge about the Olympic project, while the second was a feature unique to SOCOG and concerned the impact of the change in the government of NSW which affected the leadership of the organisation.

Regarding the first reason, it was shown in the previous chapter that SOCOG undertook the organisation of the Olympic Games with limited knowledge about the nature and scope of its operations and with little relevant experience and expertise. As the Head of Sports in SOCOG said: "Obviously, very early in the time of an OCOG you are vulnerable because you know the least about the Olympic Games [...] An OCOG is the only 'rookie' in the business. All the rest have been there in every Games" (Elphinston, 2000a). Unlike other organisations, which are present in every Games, such as the IOC, the IFs, the NOCs as well as the long-time corporate sponsors and media corporations, in the case of SOCOG it was only after the Atlanta Games that the organisation acquired detailed information about the actual organisation of the Games. SOCOG's representatives from all programme areas travelled to Atlanta to observe the running of the event and get briefed on key areas of the organisation of the Games (SOCOG, 1997). SOCOG's staff observed key organisational areas of the event and had debriefing sessions with their counterparts in the Atlanta Organising Committee (ACOG). In addition, SOCOG purchased related organisational documents and manuals from ACOG, such as strategic and operational plans, statistical data, job descriptions and the like, which were utilised as the blueprint for SOCOG's operational development (Toohey, 2001). Commenting on SOCOG's staff experience in Atlanta, the Chief Operating Officer of SOCOG said: "We learned a lot in Atlanta. Atlanta was virtually the starting point for SOCOG" (Sloman, 2000a). Further, the accumulated knowledge acquired from the case of the Atlanta Olympics helped SOCOG to elucidate the nature of involvement of the permanent organisations involved in the preparations and delivery of the Olympic Games, such as the IOC, the IFs, and the NOCs. Effectively, the needs and role of the aforementioned entities, in the words of SOCOG's Head of Sports, "were fairly well
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identified especially after Atlanta" (Elphinston, 2000a). Consequently, SOCOG's experience in Atlanta was a critical event in the organisation's life cycle in that it essentially signified the end of a formative phase which was characterised with limited knowledge among SOCOG's members of staff with regard as much to the internal functioning of an OCOG as to its relationships with the permanent agencies of the Olympic Games' organisation.

The latter reason, political change, was associated with the significant lack of continuity of leadership during that period. The appointment of SOCOG's leadership was the responsibility of the NSW Governor and between 1993 and 1996 SOCOG's leadership changed several times, primarily as a response to the political alteration of the NSW government. Particularly, SOCOG's initial leadership was appointed by a Conservative Party ruled NSW government. However, after the 1995 state elections a new Labour government took over, which subsequently changed both the President and the Chief Executive Officer of the organisation. SOCOG's final leadership positions were established in September 1996, when, after the NSW government's decision to be directly involved in the Games' preparations, the Minister for the Olympics, Michael Knight (MP), was appointed as the President of SOCOG. Although the initial leadership changes that occurred during that period were naturally potential transitional events in SOCOG's life cycle, they were rather perceived by SOCOG's managers as incidents solely related to the political instability of the time in the state of the NSW. For example, SOCOG's senior executive Bob Leece, referring to the political situation under which SOCOG was operating during its first three years, stated:

People [in SOGOC] did not know where they were going due to political uncertainty. It was not until 1995 when a new government elected in Sydney and Michael Knight appointed as the Minister for the Olympics and particularly when Mr Knight appointed the President of SOCOG in September 1996 (Leece, 2000a).

Therefore, the appointment of Michael Knight in the Presidency of SOCOG was yet another critical event in the organisation's life cycle as far as SOCOG's leadership stability is concerned. Effectively, despite the criticism on this decision, the
appointment of a Minister in the leadership of SOCOG was shown as an event which clarified and stabilised the relationships between SOCOG and the local government and, in addition to the experience acquired by the Atlanta Olympics, provided the organisation with a clear vision of the nature and scope of the Games' organisation. The uncertainty and hesitance for growth of the formative years were replaced by organisational stability and confidence among organisational members in relation as much to the role and operations of SOCOG as to the manner and intensity of involvement of external organisational entities. In the words of SOCOG's Head of Sports, organisational members "shared a common understanding [...] under a solid leadership" (Elphinston, 2000a).

Effectively, the two aforesaid events signified a new start for SOCOG, which thereafter intensified its contacts and relationships with the other organisations involved in the Games' preparations and grew rapidly in terms of both numbers of staff and operational areas. Specifically, within the following year SOCOG tripled its numbers of staff and established the vast majority of its operational areas in the form of divisions, departments and programme areas. The organisation essentially embarked on a period of major organisational development, namely its 'Build-up Period'.

SOCOG's BUILD-UP PERIOD

After September 1996 SOCOG experienced a long period of stability as much internally as in its organisational environment. This period practically ended in February 1999, when it was revealed that SOCOG mismanaged its ticketing programme, which nearly failed. This was coupled with a series of financial problems that SOCOG faced during that period, and as a result the organisation's managerial ability was heavily criticised by the media. In response to a general disbelief in SOCOG's capacity to deal with the increasing demands of the Games' organisation, the NSW government took over a considerable amount of SOCOG's responsibilities, mainly in relation to the venues' operations. Although SOCOG's managers saw this event as the start of a gradual process which aimed to shift the bulk
of SOCOG’s operations under the NSW government’s control, it was accepted that following this event the organisation experienced minor organisational changes. SOCOG’s CEO, for example, stated: “I think that nothing changed in SOCOG. We were fortunate to have a government that was willing to do things for us. [...] we were working closely with the NSW government throughout [the Olympic preparations]” (Hollway, 2000). Effectively, NSW government’s deeper involvement in the event’s organisation was not perceived as a significant event but rather as an action which supported SOCOG’s operations. In a similar line of argument SOCOG’s Chief Operating Officer said: “they [NSW government] had built the venues and knew better how to do the job there. [...] I think that after that we [in SOCOG] were more focused on our job” (Sloman, 2000a). Therefore, although the direct involvement of the NSW government could be a transitional event in SOCOG’s life cycle, in reality it did not introduce significant changes, since it did not hinder the organisation’s growth, neither did it challenge the central role of SOCOG in the Games’ organisation. SOCOG continued to grow as it employed more employees to staff the Venue Teams, which were still located at the headquarters of the organisation. The Venue Teams ran the Test Events in September 1999, when the organisation for the first time tested their operations under real event conditions.

Although SOCOG mainly operated with a functional-based structure, that is its operational units were created around functional responsibilities, such as marketing, finance, human resources and so on, its purpose, in the words of its CEO, was “to run the Games from the venues” (Hollway, 2000). As such, until the first half of the year 2000 SOCOG operated under a functional structure, which was however gradually transformed to a venue-based structure. Practically, the establishment of the Venue Teams meant that a considerable amount of SOCOG’s operations became venue-specific. Since 1996 SOCOG’s long-term objective was to plan and organise the shift of its operations to the venues, which effectively occurred in May 2000. SOCOG’s CEO explains:

We were planning that [shift from functional structure to venue structure] since 1996 [...] The Venue Managers were appointed in September 1999, one year
before the Games. [...] People moved into the venues at different times at somewhere between 6 months and 3 months out of the Games (Hollway, 2000).

This process officially ended in May 2000 when the Main Operations Centre (MOC) became operational (SOCOG, 2001b). The MOC was the central mechanism of co-ordination for all Games operations, and its launch signalled that SOCOG would primarily operate from the venues. By May 2000 SOCOG had moved entirely to the Games’ venues apart from a small team of senior executives, which remained in the headquarters to co-ordinate the venue operations. Under this structure a substantial amount of decision-making power was transferred to the leaders of the venues, the Venue Managers, who thereafter held the central role in SOCOG’s operations. The shift of SOCOG’s operations into the venues was seen as a significant event in the organisation’s life cycle. Essentially, SOCOG moved into a new operational phase which was characterised by constant testing of its operations, particularly in relation to the operations of the other constituent organisations of the Games’ delivery. SOCOG’s Director General, for example, said: “This was a new stage for everybody involved in the event. [...] We had to test our operations as a single body and make adjustments where it was required”. As such, the initiation of the MOC marked a new stage for all the organisations involved in the event, since from then on they had to operate in co-ordination with other agencies rather than in isolation. Correspondingly, in May 2000 SOCOG’s ‘Build-up Period’ practically finished as the organisation moved to a new stage, namely its ‘Games-time Period’.

**SOCOG’s GAMES-TIME PERIOD**

As was explained above, SOCOG adopted the structure with which it would run the event after May 2000; when the MOC became operational. From that time onwards, the organisation would primarily operate from the venues, thus establishing a venue-based operational structure. SOCOG established such a structure relatively early in order to test its effectiveness by performing a series of operational readiness exercises in the form of intensive simulations in what was called Sydney Training Operational Readiness Exercises (STORE) (Sloman, 2000b). Its main priority was to organise and
combine the activities and responsibilities of various agencies in order to ensure consistency of operations during the Games, and therefore testing the Games' operations became the main task for SOCOG.

During that period the NSW intensified its control over the Games' organisation, which in turn resulted in substantial changes in the organisational model of the event. In particular, in June 2000 the responsibilities of SOCOG's Board were transferred to the GCOG, which comprised the leaders of all the governmental agencies involved in the Games. Furthermore, SOCOG along with the other governmental agencies merged their operations under a new organisational scheme known as 'Sydney 2000' which was headed by OCA Director General. These changes were seen as a natural process of merging the operations of the organisations that had diverse responsibilities regarding the delivery of the Games. In the words of SOCOG's Deputy CEO "there were many dispersed responsibilities [...] It was essential to have a common structure" (Eyers, 2000). Indeed, a single structure would ensure the smooth transaction of the Games. However, in doing so the overall authority of the Games' delivery was virtually taken over by NSW government's OCA. Effectively, this could be seen as a critical event in SOCOG's life cycle, since the organisation lost its central role in the Games' organisation. However, SOCOG's managers stressed the fact that the organisation's central role changed little, as it main task was still to deliver the sport competitions. SOCOG's Head of Sports explains: "there were many [event-related] issues that were beyond our responsibility. SOCOG had still total authority over the competitions. [...] This was the central task of the Sydney Olympics" (Elphinston, 2000a). Further, NSW government's control over SOCOG was a gradual process which practically started in 1996, when Michael Knight took over the Presidency of SOCOG, and intensified after 1999, when OCA took control of a large number of SOCOG's responsibilities. Consequently, the establishment of 'Sydney 2000' was rather the formalisation of a situation that had started long ago. SOCOG's Head of Records and Documentation explains: "I think that [after the creation of 'Sydney 2000'] nothing changed. We in SOCOG knew OCA's staff quite well and we knew what to expect from them. It was something that we have been experiencing since the beginning of 1999 (Toohey, 2001)."
Therefore, the events that occurred during that period were perceived as essential organisational modifications which mostly affected the overall delivery of the event rather than the operations of SOCOG. In fact, despite these changes in its environment, SOCOG did not change significantly until the end of the event. The organisation retained its structure and operations during the time of the Games' execution, which essentially constituted the continuation of a period that started in May 2000. Consequently, SOCOG's 'Games-time Period' does not include only the 16 days of the competitions but also the whole period during which SOCOG was operating under a venue-based structure, namely, between June 2000 and October 2000. In October 2000 the Games ended and subsequently SOCOG's venue teams started to dissolve, with people either leaving the organisation or returning to their initial positions in the headquarters. As a result, after October 2000, SOCOG resumed a functional-based structure as the various functional areas were grouped again in the organisation's headquarters (SOCOG, 2001a). In effect, the end of the Games was a transitional event in SOCOG's life cycle, since directly thereafter the organisation's wind-up process began. Having delivered the Games, SOCOG's main task was to finalise its operations. The organisation practically moved into its final operational stage, namely the 'Close-down Period'.

SOCOG's CLOSE-DOWN PERIOD

This stage covers the period after the completion of the sport competitions until the wind-up of SOCOG. The end of the Games naturally signified the transition of SOCOG into its last operational stage, since having accomplished its task, it gradually started to dissolve. As was mentioned above, SOCOG's operations resumed in its headquarters and its numbers of employees decreased dramatically. The contracts of the staff were gradually terminated as each of its functional areas was finalising its operations and removing its staff. Only a core of people was kept, who had the task of winding up the organisation including the finalising of the organisation's accounts, dealing with legal matters, disposing of the equipment and so on (Elphinston, 2000a). The IOC required SOCOG to dissolve before March 31 2002 (NSW, 1993, Section
but SOCOG effectively dissolved on December 31, 2000 (SOCOG, 2001a). SOCOG’s wind-up period lasted a few months, since following legislation (Sydney 2000 Games Administration Act 2000) the NSW government, and OCA in particular, assumed full responsibility of the Games’ wind-up process. Therefore, SOCOG’s final operational stage was relatively short, since SOCOG did not deal with the matters that were related with the Sydney Olympics as a whole. Effectively, when matters that were solely related to SOCOG’s operations were settled, the organisation dissolved.

A summarised break-down of SOCOG’s life cycle into specific stages is presented in table 7.1.

**Table 7.1: SOCOG’s Life Stages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCOG’s LIFE CYCLE</th>
<th>CHRONOLOGY</th>
<th>TRANSITIONAL EVENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>START-UP PERIOD</td>
<td>November 1993-</td>
<td>Observation of the Atlanta Games (August 1996) &amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September 1996</td>
<td>Appointment of Michael Knight in the presidency of SOCOG (September 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUILD-UP PERIOD</td>
<td>October 1996-</td>
<td>Establishment of the Main Operations Centre (MOC) (May 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAMES-TIME PERIOD</td>
<td>June 2000-</td>
<td>The end of the Games (October 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLOSE-UP PERIOD</td>
<td>October 2000-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**7.2.1 SOCOG’s CHARACTERISTICS OVER TIME**

The discussion above asserted the need for examining the organisational status of SOCOG in different stages of its life cycle. It was suggested that in the course of the seven years of SOCOG’s operational life, the organisation went through four organisational periods, namely ‘Start-up Period’, ‘Build-up Period’, ‘Games-time Period’ and ‘Close-down Period’. Therefore, by considering the nature of SOCOG’s
organisational characteristics in each chronological period we will be able to map changes in its organisational status over time. In effect, the information derived from the analysis of SOCOG’s organisational dimensions can be reconsidered in the context of the different periods identified, thus providing a series of organisational snapshots, one for each of SOCOG’s four periods. In order to achieve this, the status of each of SOCOG’s elements under examination is briefly discussed below in relation to each of the four periods identified.

**SOCOG’s Size**

SOCOG’s size increased continuously until the end of the Games, when it decreased dramatically thereafter. In particular, over the ‘Start-up Period’ SOCOG’s size was *medium* (i.e. less than 300 staff) since the organisation employed only 113 staff at the end of that period. In the course of its ‘Build-up Period’ SOCOG experienced rapid growth reaching a total of 1800 staff. Its size increased further during its ‘Games-time Period’ when SOCOG employed a total of 3341 staff. As a result, SOCOG’s size was *large* (i.e. more than 300 staff) during both its ‘Build-up Period’ and ‘Games-time Period’. Finally, after the Games SOCOG’s size decreased dramatically and before the final staff release (15 December, 2000) the organisation employed only 50 staff. SOCOG’s size during its ‘Close-down Period’, therefore, was *small* (i.e. 50 staff or less).

**SOCOG’s Environment**

SOCOG started its operations with a limited number of entities in its organisational environment, however with very limited knowledge about their needs. Effectively, during the ‘Start-up Period’ the needs of SOCOG’s environment were substantially unknown by its staff (i.e. dynamic conditions) although the organisation had established close relationships only with the IOC and the NSW government (i.e. simple conditions). As such, in the course of the ‘Start-up Period’ SOCOG’s organisational environment was *simple, yet dynamic*. During its ‘Build-up Period’ the number and heterogeneity of the entities operating in SOCOG’s organisational
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Environment escalated, but by then possessing greater understanding of the organisation of the Olympics, its knowledge about the needs of the environmental entities improved significantly. Specifically, SOCOG established links with all the constituent organisations of the Games, as well as with the Public Groups which were associated with the event primarily as potential ticket holders (i.e. complex conditions). Furthermore, besides SOCOG's enhanced knowledge of its environment some incidents occurred, such as the IOC bribery scandal and the failure of the communication with the public due to the ticketing problems, which caused temporary turbulence in the organisational environment of SOCOG (i.e. relatively stable conditions). Consequently, SOCOG's organisational environment during that period can best be described as relatively stable and complex. In the 'Games-time Period', SOCOG naturally experienced great complexity in its environment as the organisation was in close co-operation and co-ordination with all the constituents of the Games (i.e. complex conditions). SOCOG's knowledge of its environment further improved, however given the unpredictability of the environmental needs under the real event situation of that period, SOCOG's environmental conditions were rather relatively stable. As such, during the 'Games-time Period', SOCOG's organisational environment was complex but relatively stable. Finally, after the Games the number and heterogeneity of external entities influencing SOCOG was limited, since the organisation was operating in co-ordination solely with the NSW government's OCA (i.e. simple conditions). Moreover, the early-established links between SOCOG and OCA meant that the organisation's knowledge of its environment during that period was at a high level (i.e. stable conditions). Consequently, SOCOG's organisational environment during its 'Close-down Period' was simple and stable.

SOCOG's Resource-dependence

As a temporary Olympic agency, SOCOG was by nature dependent on resources held by external organisations. These included financial resources from the IOC, sponsor companies and the NSW government, physical resources from the NSW government in the form of sporting facilities and Games-related infrastructure, human resources,
such as technical staff from the IFs and volunteers, and last but not least ‘intangible’ resources, such as the institutional framework which enabled SOCOG to operate as an Olympic agency. Due to its institutional setting, the latter was the responsibility of the IOC but also of the NSW government. As a result, its levels of resource dependence were high throughout the years of the Olympic preparations, not only due to the vast numbers of resources required but also due to the fact that the majority of such resources could only be obtained from external sources. However, after the event the organisation required a limited amount of externally held resources, particularly in the form of expert staff to deal with the sorting of SOCOG’s organisational records, and a legal framework which would arrange the post-event responsibilities and essentially allow the organisation to dissolve. Thus, after the Games SOCOG’s dependence on external resources can best be described as moderate.

**SOCOG’s Power**

Whilst being an Olympic agency, SOCOG was established as a statutory authority of the NSW government. As a consequence, the organisation served various external interests, and it was shown that the degree of representation of external actors on its policy-making and decision-making bodies was constantly high. It was shown, for example, that during the ‘Start up Period’ and ‘Build-up Period’, SOCOG’s Board of Directors and later the Sport Commission, which were the main policy and decision making bodies in the organisation, predominantly comprised external actors (i.e. high external control). Similarly, in the ‘Games-time Period’ the GCOG was the main policy and decision making body in SOCOG, and it was formed by individuals that served the interests of various external organisations (i.e. high external control). Finally, in the ‘Close down Period’ there was not any established policy and decision making bodies in SOCOG, since the organisation’s main task was to make the appropriate arrangements to dissolve. However, given that SOCOG’s operations during that period were under the supervision of OCA’s staff, who were responsible for the wind up of the whole event, SOCOG practically remained highly externally
controlled. Therefore, SOCOG was a highly externally controlled organisation throughout its life cycle.

SOCOG's Strategic Capacity

The discussion of the previous chapter has shown that SOCOG's operations at the strategic level were considerably constrained by external organisations. In particular, it was suggested by SOCOG's managers that the organisation's operational strategies were considerably constrained by the permanent agencies of the Olympic Games' organisation, such as the IOC and the IFs, a phenomenon which is likely to be common to any OCOG. However, it was stressed that due to the distinctiveness of the organisational model of the Sydney Olympics, where the involvement of the local government was substantial, SOCOG's strategic capacity was also limited by the NSW government. As a result, SOCOG had limited space to determine and pursue its own strategies, and therefore its strategic capacity was rated low throughout its life cycle.

SOCOG's Specialisation

In the course of its 'Start-up Period', SOCOG established only a small number of operational divisions and programmes (i.e. eight divisions and two programme areas), and therefore there was little specialisation in the organisation. During its 'Build-up Period', however, SOCOG created the vast majority of its operational areas in the form of divisions and programmes (i.e. 21 divisions and 74 programme areas), and therefore the organisation experienced much specialisation. After May 2000 SOCOG retained the large number of divisions and programme areas established in the previous period, and consequently, during the 'Games-time Period' there was still much specialisation in the organisation. Finally, after the Games the bulk of SOCOG's operational areas gradually dissolved and the organisation operated with a limited number of divisions and programmes (i.e. four divisions). Thus, SOCOG's specialisation during the 'Close-down Period' was again little.
SOCOG's Unit Grouping

Within 'Start-up Period' the grouping of SOCOG's organisational units was based on the various organisational functions, thus SOCOG operated with a functional-based structure. In the course of its 'Build-up Period', SOCOG retained its functional structure but also established the Venue Teams, which were representing the operational responsibilities in respective geographical locations. Therefore, during that period, SOCOG operated with two parallel structures, a functional-based structure and a place-based structure. Over the 'Games-time Period', it was shown that SOCOG was primarily grouped in regard to the venues' operations, and as a result it mainly operated with a place-based structure. After the Games, the Venue Teams dissolved and SOCOG re-formed a limited number of its operational areas in the organisation's headquarters. Therefore, in 'Close-down Period' the organisation resumed a functional-based structure.

SOCOG's Liaison Devices

The analysis of SOCOG's life cycle revealed that in the 'Start-up Period', SOCOG established few liaison devices, in the form of two committees and one task force. In the 'Build-up Period', the organisation operated with the maximum number of committees, commissions and task forces, reaching a total of fourteen. As such, there were many liaison devices in SOCOG during that period. In 'Games-time Period', however, the work of the previously established liaison devices was practically incorporated in the GCOG, which was the sole liaison device under operation during that period. Consequently, in Games-time period SOCOG operated with few liaison devices. After the Games, only two committees re-formed, namely the Finance Committee and the Audit Committee, and therefore in 'Close-down Period' SOCOG operated yet again with few liaison devices.
SOCOG’s Formalisation

SOCOG’s managers revealed that in the course of its ‘Start-up Period’ SOCOG’s staff was operating with a limited number of operational instructions, and therefore there was little formalisation in the organisation. During the ‘Build-up Period’, however, the great number of operational areas and the increased complexity of the tasks that had to be performed required SOCOG’s staff to adhere to many formal and informal procedures. Thus, in the course of that period there was much formalisation in the organisation. In ‘Games-time Period’, formal plans and instructions were in place but it was suggested that SOCOG’s staff adherence to them was neither little nor much, since flexibility of operations was often required. Therefore, during the ‘Games-time Period’ there was some formalisation in SOCOG. Finally, during the ‘Close-down Period’, SOCOG’s staff was working relatively autonomously, and adherence to operational instructions was not required. Consequently, there was again little formalisation in SOCOG.

SOCOG’s Centralisation

During the ‘Start-up Period’, there was centralisation of decision-making in SOCOG, since most of the decisions were finalised at Board level, that is, the organisation’s Strategic Apex. In the course of its ‘Build-up Period’ the decision-making power still rested within its Strategic Apex, namely its Board of Directors as well as the Sport Commission, which assumed ultimate decision-making power over the sporting issues. However, there was a gradual shift of authority to the Venue Teams, which were established at the end of that period. Consequently, there was limited decentralisation of decision-making in SOCOG. Through ‘Games-time Period’ considerable amount of the decision-making power was transferred to the Venue Teams, which constituted its Operational Core, and therefore during that period there was decentralisation of decision-making in the organisation. In the course of its ‘Close-down Period’ the decision-making power remained at the lower levels of the organisation, since the bulk of decisions were finalised by ad hoc teams of specialists which were working autonomously. However, the authority for major decisions,
mainly pertaining to financial and legal matters, rested with the NSW government's OCA, which had ultimate control over the organisation's wind-up process. As a result, during that period there was selective decentralisation of decision-making in SOCOG.

SOCOG's Training

During SOCOG's 'Start-up Period' there was little staff training in the organisation, which primarily took the form of observation of major sport events and attendance of Olympic-related meetings and conferences. Over the 'Build-up Period' there was a need for staff training, a task which was undertaken by an external training agency. However, before May 2000 no more than a moderate volume of staff training occurred, and therefore there was only some staff training in SOCOG. In the course of the three months leading to the Games a considerable amount of staff training was required, and as a result the vast majority of training took place during that period. Therefore, in the course of the 'Games-time Period' there was much training in SOCOG. Finally, in the 'Close-down Period' SOCOG's staff mainly consisted of experienced managers and specialists, and thus only a limited amount of training was required. Consequently, there was little staff training in SOCOG during that period.

SOCOG's Basic Organisational Part

During the 'Start-up Period', SOCOG's main concern was to establish a solid leadership structure and decide on its structural formation with regard to its main operational responsibilities. This work was primarily produced by the strategic leadership of the organisation, and consequently the part of SOCOG with the most significant contribution to its operations was its Strategic Apex. In 'Build-up Period', SOCOG was at the process of intensive planning of the event, a task that was primarily undertaken by specialised staff. However, the creation of the Venue Teams meant that considerable work was produced by the staff of the lower levels of the organisation. Consequently, SOCOG's basic organisational parts during that period
were its *Technostructure* and its *Operating Core*. In the 'Games-time Period', the bulk of work in SOCOG was produced in the venues by the Venue Teams, which constituted the *Operating Core* of the organisation. Finally, during the 'Close-up Period' the majority of work in SOCOG was produced by teams, which represented the various operational areas, but also by expert staff, which were assisting the dissolution process, or undertaking other specialised tasks. As such, in the course of that period the *Operating Core* and the *Technostructure* were again the most significant organisational parts in SOCOG.

**SOCOG's Basic Co-ordinating Mechanism**

In the course of the 'Start-up Period', the work co-ordination in SOCOG was primarily achieved through informal interactions of its members. SOCOG, therefore, was co-ordinating work with *mutual adjustment*. In the 'Build-up Period', however, the great number of operational areas and related responsibilities required SOCOG's staff to follow specific guidelines in the form of plans and operational instructions. Work was highly standardised and consequently co-ordination was achieved through *standardisation of work processes*. In 'Games-time Period', fast and flexible decision-making processes were required, and as a result work in SOCOG was co-ordinated mainly through informal means, namely *mutual adjustment*. During the 'Close-up Period', SOCOG's main concern was effectively to finalise the operations of its functional areas within a strict timetable, and therefore, certain outcomes had to be produced at specific dates. Consequently, the dominant process of co-ordination can be best described as being achieved through the *standardisation of outputs*.

The discussion above has shown that the majority of SOCOG's organisational dimensions exhibited different profiles in each of the four periods identified. Consequently, by allocating the status of SOCOG's organisational dimensions in each of the periods of its life cycle, it is suggested that the organisation experienced four distinct organisational configurations (Table 7.2). The following section provides an analysis of each of SOCOG's configurations, and juxtaposes them to Mintzberg's (1979) ideal organisational types.
### Table 7.2: SOCOG’s Organisational Characteristics over its Life Cycle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>START-UP PERIOD</th>
<th>BUILD-UP PERIOD</th>
<th>GAMES-TIME PERIOD</th>
<th>CLOSE-DOWN PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Simple/ Dynamic</td>
<td>Complex/ Relatively Stable</td>
<td>Complex/ Relatively Stable</td>
<td>Simple/ Stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource-Dependence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>High External Control</td>
<td>High External Control</td>
<td>High External Control</td>
<td>High External Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Capacity</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>Little Specialisation</td>
<td>Much Specialisation</td>
<td>Much Specialisation</td>
<td>Little Specialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Grouping</td>
<td>Functional-Based</td>
<td>Functional and Place-Based</td>
<td>Place-Based</td>
<td>Functional-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Few Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Many Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Few Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Few Liaison Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formalisation</td>
<td>Little Formalisation</td>
<td>Much Formalisation</td>
<td>Some Formalisation</td>
<td>Little Formalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralisation</td>
<td>Centralisation</td>
<td>Limited Decentralisation</td>
<td>Decentralisation</td>
<td>Selective Decentralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Little Training</td>
<td>Some Training</td>
<td>Much Training</td>
<td>Little Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Part</td>
<td>Strategic Apex</td>
<td>Technostructure/ Operating Core</td>
<td>Operating Core</td>
<td>Technostructure/ Operating Core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Co-ordination Mechanism</td>
<td>Mutual Adjustment</td>
<td>Standardisation of Work Processes</td>
<td>Mutual Adjustment</td>
<td>Standardisation of Outputs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.3 SOCOG’s ORGANISATIONAL FORMATIONS AND MINTZBERG’S CONFIGURATION APPROACH

Throughout this study, and particularly in the previous section, it was shown that SOCOG, as an organisational entity, constitutes a peculiar phenomenon. This is not only justified by its temporary status, since it was formed to undertake the task of delivering the 2000 Olympic Games and subsequently dissolved, but also by the fact
that the organisation changed significantly throughout its operational life. Effectively, it was shown that, although SOCOG was practically always in some sort of formation, the organisation went through four distinctive organisational stages, namely ‘Start-up Period’, ‘Build-up Period’, ‘Games-time Period’ and ‘Close-down Period’. As a result, with respect to the life stages identified and the organisational characteristics under investigation, in the course of its seven-year life cycle, SOCOG practically took four main organisational formations (Table 7.2). This section aims to assess the degree of correspondence between SOCOG’s configurations and Mintzberg’s (1979) organisational types, and subsequently to comment on the usefulness of Mintzberg’s theorising for the study of SOCOG.

### 7.3.1 SOCOG’S START-UP FORMATION

The formation that SOCOG adopted during its ‘Start-up Period’ indicates the position of a young organisation, which embarks on a relatively unknown project. SOCOG’s prime responsibility was to organise and deliver the Sydney Olympics, while operating as a cohesive part of a larger organisational network, which mainly involved the NSW government and Olympic authorities. Therefore, it was not only the organisation’s task that was unfamiliar to SOCOG’s members, but also the manner of involvement of the other constituents of the Games’ organisation, and their relationships with SOCOG. The latter was of particular importance to SOCOG’s operations, since the organisation was, by its very nature, dependent on resources held by external organisations. During this period, however, SOCOG had strong relationships mainly with the NSW government, and to a lesser extent with the IOC, since the other constituents of the Games, such as the IFs and the Olympic sponsors, devoted their attention and resources to the approaching 1996 Atlanta Olympics. Consequently, SOCOG was operating within a simple, but considerably unknown, organisational environment. Moreover, although SOCOG was formed under the Host City Contract as the main organisational body of the Sydney Olympics, in reality it was subject to NSW government’s authority, which was encouraged by the IOC to be strongly involved in the Games’ organisation. The NSW government was not only
responsible for building the entire Games' infrastructure, but also for protecting SOCOG's financial viability by underwriting its operations. The latter meant that essentially the NSW government had ultimate power over SOCOG's operations, and during that period this was mainly expressed by the NSW government's appointment of SOCOG's Board of Directors, which was the main policy and decision-making body of the organisation. Consequently, the peculiar institutional status of SOCOG, which was virtually formed both as a private corporation and a public authority of the NSW government, rendered the organisation highly externally controlled, very early in its operations.

The organisational situation of SOCOG during that period is reflected in its structural characteristics. SOCOG experienced limited development, establishing only a few operational areas, which were based on its main functional responsibilities. SOCOG's limited organisational activity did not require many commissions and committees, neither the existence of formal plans and instructions for work coordination. Internal co-ordination was rather achieved through informal interaction at Board level, since the bulk of the organisation's operations were related to strategic issues. The decision-making power was also concentrated in the Board of Directors, namely the 'Strategic Apex' of the organisation, which was effectively the organisational part of SOCOG with the most significant contribution to its operations. Finally, staff training was limited, and it mainly took the form of attendance at Olympic conferences and observation of the organisation of international sporting events.

When the formation adopted by SOCOG during its 'Start-up Period' is juxtaposed to Mintzberg's (1979) structural configurations, a clear correspondence with the configuration of 'Simple Structure' can be noticed. As it is illustrated in table 7.3, SOCOG's characteristics during that period are almost in congruence with the elements that form Mintzberg's 'Simple Structure'. 'Simple Structure' refers to a formation often observed in new and small organisations, which operate within dynamic environments and consequently require flexible structuring (Mintzberg, 1973; 1981). During that period SOCOG was a new organisation, yet it was rather
seen as medium-sized. However, given the vast amounts of staff employed in later stages, and considering the admittedly subjective definition of ‘medium’ organisations, SOCOG was rather relatively small. Consequently, with respect to Mintzberg’s general description of ‘Simple Structure’ SOCOG’s situation during that period essentially corresponds with this particular organisational configuration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.3: SOCOG at ‘Start-up Period’ and Mintzberg’s ‘Simple Structure’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCOG</strong>’s <strong>START-UP PERIOD</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit Grouping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Organisational Part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Co-ordinating Mechanism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: Shading depicts similarities between Mintzberg’s Simple Structure and SOCOG’s Start-up formation)

Mintzberg (1991) has claimed that the force that drives organisations to adopt simple structures is ‘direction’, which refers to the need for the organisation to build its strategic vision (p. 55). This applies to the situation of SOCOG during its ‘Start-up Period’, when, as was mentioned earlier, the organisation was in the process of realising its role and responsibilities for the organisation of the Sydney Olympics. Mintzberg (1979) also argues that in simple organisational structures the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) holds ultimate power and personally controls the organisation’s operations through direct supervision. This, however, differs from
SOCOG's status during that period, since the organisation was highly externally controlled and work co-ordination was achieved through mutual interaction among its members.

The aforementioned characteristics, which fall in the elements of ‘Power’ and ‘Basic Co-ordination Mechanism’ respectively, are the main differences that can be identified between Mintzberg’s ‘Simple Structure’ and SOCOG’s ‘Start-up Period’. These differences can easily be justified, since in the ideal ‘Simple Structure’ the CEO is usually the owner who establishes the strategic direction of the organisation, while in the case of SOCOG, the ownership was with the Board of Directors, which was mainly controlled by the NSW government, and partly with the IOC which owns the institution of Olympic Games. Moreover, as the element of ‘Strategic Formation’ suggests, the ability of SOCOG to determine its own strategic direction was highly constrained, not only by the NSW government, but also by the IOC. That set, for example, the platform for SOCOG’s behaviour towards the commercial sector, the IFs, which in turn set the organisational standards of the sporting competitions, and to an extent the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), which had the second strongest representation on SOCOG’s Board. Therefore, with the absence of a consolidated ownership, SOCOG’s work during that period was mutually co-ordinated by a group of key individuals at Board level. This minor deviation between SOCOG’s early formation and Mintzberg’s typical ‘Simple Structure’ could mainly be justified by the peculiar institutional status of the former. Effectively, the differences between the two formations could not be considered significant, since they did not introduce substantial complexity. Thus, it can be claimed that in the course of the ‘Start-up Period’, SOCOG’s formation substantially coincides with Mintzberg’s ideal ‘Simple Structure’.

7.3.2 SOCOG’S BUILD-UP FORMATION

In the course of the ‘Build-up Period’ SOCOG’s formation changed significantly. The organisation imported Games-specific expertise, as much from the experience acquired by its staff who had observed the Atlanta Olympics, as from former Atlanta
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Gaines' staff who were appointed to the organisation. This accumulated knowledge, combined with a solid leadership under the Presidency of Michael Knight, also the NSW government's Minister for the Olympics, signified a new organisational era for SOCOG. The organisation experienced significant growth during this period in terms of numbers of staff, and established the vast majority of its operational areas in the form of divisions, departments, programmes and later Venue Teams. Moreover, SOCOG intensified its relations with various external organisations, such as the IFs and sponsoring corporations, since, with the 1996 Atlanta Games completed, the entire Olympic Games industry naturally turned its attention to the forthcoming Sydney Games. Despite this increased complexity in its environment, SOCOG's knowledge of its environment improved considerably, as the organisation gradually familiarised itself both with the needs and the nature of involvement of the constituents of the Sydney Games' organisation. However, the dependence of SOCOG on externally held resources remained at high levels particularly in terms of Games' services, a great amount of which was outsourced to NSW government agencies, such as the Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA) and the Olympic Rails and Transportation Authority (ORTA), as well as to Federal Australian government's authorities. In addition, SOCOG remained highly externally controlled during that period, since its main decision-making bodies, namely the Board of Directors and the Sport Commission which undertook the full responsibility for all the sport-related issues, were controlled by the NSW government and the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) respectively.

In terms of structural characteristics, SOCOG developed two parallel structures, one functionally based and one venue-based, as the organisation was gradually shifting its operations to the Venue Teams. The vast majority of the Venue Teams were still located in the headquarters, yet their operations were entirely related to the respective venues. In addition, due to the wide range of operational areas, SOCOG established formal mechanisms to co-ordinate work among these areas, in the form of formal plans and instructions as well as committees and commissions. As a result, during that period the organisation's work processes were highly standardised. Moreover, in a period of intensive planning the bulk of SOCOG's work was essentially carried out
by the expert staff of its ‘Technostructure’, although a considerable amount of work was gradually being undertaken by the emergent Venue Teams which constituted the organisation’s ‘Operating Core’. Also, the Venue Teams increasingly received decision-making authority, particularly on venue-specific issues, although major decisions were still finalised at the upper levels of the organisation. Finally, some staff training took place during that period, particularly with regard to the people that would staff the Venue Teams.

**Table 7.4: SOCOG at ‘Build-up Period’ and Mintzberg’s ‘Machine Bureaucracy’ and ‘Professional Bureaucracy’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOCOG’s BUILD-UP PERIOD</th>
<th>MINTZBERG’S MACHINE BUREAUCRACY</th>
<th>MINTZBERG’S PROFESSIONAL BUREAUCRACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>Relatively Old</td>
<td>Typically Old</td>
<td>Varies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Varies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>Complex/Relatively Stable</td>
<td>Simple/Stable</td>
<td>Complex/stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
<td>High External Control</td>
<td>Technocratic and External Control</td>
<td>Professional Operator Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialisation</strong></td>
<td>Much Specialisation</td>
<td>Much Specialisation</td>
<td>Much Specialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit Grouping</strong></td>
<td>Functional and Place-Based</td>
<td>Usually Functional</td>
<td>Functional and Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liaison Devices</strong></td>
<td>Many Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Few Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Some Liaison Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formalisation</strong></td>
<td>Much Formalisation</td>
<td>Much Formalisation</td>
<td>Little Formalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centralisation</strong></td>
<td>Limited Decentralisation</td>
<td>Limited Decentralisation</td>
<td>Decentralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
<td>Little Training</td>
<td>Little Training</td>
<td>Much Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Organisational Part</strong></td>
<td>Technostructure/ Operating Core</td>
<td>Technostructure</td>
<td>Operating Core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Co-ordinating Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>Standardisation of Work Processes</td>
<td>Standardisation of Work</td>
<td>Standardisation of Skills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: Shading depicts similarities between Mintzberg’s Machine Bureaucracy and Professional Bureaucracy, and SOCOG’s Build-up formation)
The formation adopted by SOCOG during its ‘Build-up Period’ does not entirely correspond with any of Mintzberg’s (1979, 1981) configurations. However, as table 7.4 depicts, SOCOG’s formation during that period constitutes a hybrid of Mintzberg’s ‘Machine Bureaucracy’ and ‘Professional Bureaucracy’. In effect, in the ‘Build-up Period’ SOCOG held the main elements of ‘Machine Bureaucracy’, since the focus was on functional stability through standardisation of work processes and formalisation of operations, with the contribution of many analysts of its ‘Technostructure’. Therefore, in line with Mintzberg’s theorising, SOCOG was highly specialised on the basis of functional responsibilities, with a small degree of decentralised decision-making, and also required low levels of staff training (Mintzberg, 1981, p. 108). However, as was mentioned earlier, during that period there was an emerging Venue-based structure in SOCOG, operating parallel with its main functional-based structure, which was progressively undertaking a great deal of the organisation’s operations. In effect, this new structure would ultimately constitute the main operational body of SOCOG, and consequently, apart from the strong presence of the ‘Technostructure’, there was also a significant contribution of the ‘Operational Core’ to the organisation’s operations.

According to Mintzberg (1979, 1981), a machine bureaucratic structuring suits externally controlled organisations, such as the case of SOCOG. However, it is suggested that such structuring is more effective in simple and stable environments. The main rationale behind this argument is that environmental complexity requires decision-making power to be decentralised to the ‘Operating Core’, while environmental stability enables individuals to work with a good deal of autonomy. Mintzberg (1979, 1981) suggests that these characteristics pertain to organisations that rely for their operating tasks on professional staff, whose skills are usually standardised outside the organisation, such as in universities or training camps and who possess considerable power and autonomy, which in turn decentralises the organisational structure (Mintzberg, 1981, p. 109). This description, which refers to Mintzberg’s ‘Professional Bureaucracy’, has little to contribute to the account of SOCOG’s ‘Build-up’ formation as a whole, yet it should not be ignored. The ‘Build-up Period’ was effectively a transition stage in SOCOG’s life cycle, since the
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organisation was both building up its functional areas and gradually shifting the bulk of operations to the Venue Teams. As was mentioned earlier, that meant that the Venue Teams were steadily becoming more autonomous and, consequently, to a degree, they decentralised SOCOG’s structure. Moreover, at that stage, the people that staffed the Venue Teams came from different operational areas of SOCOG’s functional structure. Consequently, if the Venue Teams were considered as independent entities within SOCOG, it could be claimed that the skills of their members were practically externally standardised.

With respect to Mintzberg’s configurations, therefore, it could be argued that during that period SOCOG was mainly formed as a machine bureaucratic organisation, yet with a sense of ‘professionalism’, primarily due to the existence of the Venue Teams. Besides, Mintzberg (1991) argues that the forces that drive organisations to adopt machine bureaucratic and professional bureaucratic structures are ‘efficiency’ and ‘proficiency’ respectively. The former refers to the need of organisations to standardise and formalise their operations, while the latter is related to the need of organisations to carry out tasks which require high levels of knowledge and skills (Mintzberg, 1991, p. 55). Both of these forces were present in the case of SOCOG during its ‘Build-up Period’, since ‘efficiency’ applies to the organisation’s need to standardise its operations in order to develop its functional structure, while ‘proficiency’ is associated with the work of the Venue Teams, which were performing a specialised task, that is, the organisation of the venue-specific operations. Consequently, by following Mintzberg’s theorising, it could be argued that during the ‘Build-up Period’ SOCOG adopted a bureaucratic amalgam formation.

7.3.3. SOCOG’S GAMES-TIME FORMATION

In the course of the ‘Games-time Period’, SOCOG experienced multiple organisational changes. The Venue Teams moved to the respective venues, and the organisation employed more people to staff them. SOCOG almost doubled its number of staff during that period reaching the peak of its size. The organisation’s main task was to run the event by co-ordinating the involvement of all the constituent
groups of the Games’ organisation and, naturally, it operated within a heavily populated and heterogeneous organisational environment. SOCOG was highly dependent on its environment for resources, in terms of financial resources, but primarily in terms of human resources. During that period, the organisation required a financial subsidy from the NSW government to cover an unexpected deficit, but also the contribution of several thousand people in order to deal with the organisational magnitude of the Sydney Olympics. The latter took the form of people who were working for contractor companies of the Games as well as volunteers. The needs of SOCOG’s environment, however, were fairly well known in that period, due to the long-established relationships that the organisation had developed with its environmental entities, particularly in the course of its ‘Build-up Period’.

Over the ‘Games-time Period’ SOCOG also experienced a significant institutional change. The organisation merged its operations with OCA and ORTA under a new organisational scheme, known as ‘Sydney 2000’, which aimed to bring together the various organisational competencies of the event. ‘Sydney 2000’ was headed by the General Director of NSW’s OCA, David Richmond, but it was controlled by the Games Co-ordination Group (GCOG), which virtually took over the responsibilities of SOCOG’s Board of Directors. The GCOG was headed by NSW government’s Minister for the Olympics, Michael Knight, and AOC’s President, John Coates. Consequently, during that period, SOCOG was still subject to external control, as much due to the appointment of a NSW government’s favourite at its leadership, as to the external control over GCOG, the organisation’s main decision-making body.

With respect to structural characteristics, SOCOG underwent fundamental changes in that period. In particular, the organisation was converted into a venue-based form, since its functional operations were entirely moved to the venues and the respective Venue Teams. Therefore, the Venue Teams had the most significant contribution to the organisation’s operations. They consisted of representatives of SOCOG’s functional areas, who undertook functional responsibilities inside the venues, and were headed by a powerful Venue Manager. Co-ordination among the venues and internal consistency of their operations were achieved through the Main Co-ordination
Centre (MOC), located at the headquarters of SOCOG, and which consisted of executives who previously headed the functional areas of the organisation. Consequently, there was a dual reporting policy, since the venue members had to report both to the Venue Manager and to their functional leaders in the MOC. This reporting, however, was of an informal nature, since the communication of all these actors took primarily the form of telephone interaction or informal meetings.

Concerning the decision-making, the Venue Managers held ultimate authority since only a limited number of decisions, particularly those that could affect the event as a whole, were finalised outside the venues. In effect, SOCOG had to run a real-time show, namely the sport competitions, and therefore, high flexibility of operations but also immediate decision-making was required. As a result, during that period there were limited formal instructions that guided the organisation, and also a considerable decentralisation of the decision-making authority. Moreover, the co-ordinating roles previously undertaken by various committees and commissions were incorporated into the GCOG, and therefore SOCOG operated with a single ‘Liaison Device’.

Finally, during that period SOCOG experienced the highest levels of staff training. As was mentioned earlier, the organisation required a large number of people to staff the Venue Teams only a few months before the event. New staff attended intensive training sessions, as much with regard to the organisation of the Games as a whole, as with regard to their specific responsibilities inside the venues.

During the ‘Games-time Period’, therefore, the organisational focus of SOCOG was on the venue operations. The Venue Teams were operating relatively autonomously and aimed to serve particular areas, mainly related to the needs of the sporting competitions. According to Mintzberg’s (1991) theorising, an organisation which encourages particular units or divisions to concentrate their efforts on serving particular markets or areas, venues in the case of SOCOG, are driven by the ‘concentration’ force, and would be expected to fall into the configuration of ‘Divisionalised Form’ (Mintzberg, 1991, p. 56). However, as depicted in table 7.5, SOCOG’s ‘Games-time’ formation has little in common with Mintzberg’s ‘Divisionalised Form’. Mintzberg (1979, 1981) suggests that ‘Divisionalised Forms’
usually operate in simple and stable environments, and they are controlled by middle line managers. Moreover, the Headquarters impose particular structures on the units, and by using strict performance control mechanisms, the Headquarters achieve standardisation of the units' outputs. In effect, Mintzberg (1979, 1981) treats the 'Divisionalised Form' as a structural evolution of a machine bureaucratic organisation, which, in order to adapt to new conditions, spreads its risks by overlaying another level of administration that could add and subtract divisions or units (Mintzberg, 1981, p. 110). Consequently, in line with Mintzberg's arguments, each division or unit is a separate 'Machine Bureaucracy', with highly formalised operations and limited decision-making authority.

In 'Games-time Period', however, SOCOG seems to hold more elements of Mintzberg's 'Professional Bureaucracy' rather than those of his 'Divisionalised Form' (Table 7.5). As was stated earlier, during that period SOCOG was operating in a complex and stable environment, and as a result it required decentralised decision-making and flexible operations, although some formalisation existed inside the venues. Like Mintzberg's 'Professional Bureaucracy' SOCOG's operations were concentrated on its 'Operational Core', and also required much staff training. Moreover, although work co-ordination was achieved through informal means, the 'Operational Core' of the organisation required highly-trained individuals, like in the case of 'Professional Bureaucracy', yet in the case of SOCOG this training took place inside rather than outside the organisation.

Consequently, with regard to Mintzberg's theorising, it could be argued that SOCOG's 'Games-time' formation constituted yet again a hybrid of two configurations. In effect, the organisation required being 'divisionalised' to serve the venue needs, while retaining a certain degree of 'professionalism' to deal with the complexity of its task. Clearly, SOCOG's formation during that period reflects the peculiarity of its task, since it was effectively formed as a professional 'Divisionalised Form'.
### Table 7.5: SOCOG at 'Games-time Period' and Mintzberg’s ‘Divisionalised Form’ and ‘Professional Bureaucracy’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOCOG’s GAMES-TIME PERIOD</th>
<th>MINTZBERG’S DIVISIONALISED FORM</th>
<th>MINTZBERG’S PROFESSIONAL BUREAUCRACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>Typically Old</td>
<td>Varies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Very Large</td>
<td>Varies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>Very Complex/Relatively Stable</td>
<td>Relatively Simple/Stable</td>
<td>Complex/stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
<td>High External Control</td>
<td>Middle Line Control</td>
<td>Professional Operator Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialisation</strong></td>
<td>Much Specialisation</td>
<td>Some Specialisation (between Divisions and Headquarters)</td>
<td>Much Specialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit Grouping</strong></td>
<td>Place-Based</td>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Functional and Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liaison Devices</strong></td>
<td>Few Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Few Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Some Liaison Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formalisation</strong></td>
<td>Some Formalisation</td>
<td>Much Formalisation (within Divisions)</td>
<td>Little Formalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centralisation</strong></td>
<td>Decentralisation</td>
<td>Limited Decentralisation</td>
<td>Decentralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
<td>Much Training</td>
<td>Some Training</td>
<td>Much Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Organisational Part</strong></td>
<td>Operating Core</td>
<td>Middle Line</td>
<td>Operating Core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Co-ordinating Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>Mutual Adjustment</td>
<td>Standardisation of Outputs</td>
<td>Standardisation of Skills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: Shading depicts similarities between Mintzberg’s Divisionalised Form and Professional Bureaucracy, and SOCOG’s Games-time formation)

### 7.2.4 SOCOG’S CLOSE-DOWN FORMATION

After the end of the Sydney Olympics, SOCOG’s formation changed yet again, this time in a rapid fashion. Within a period of two months following the peak of its operations, SOCOG managed to perform the appropriate actions for its dissolution. Essentially, SOCOG’s operations during the ‘Close-down Period’ were entirely aimed at the closure of the organisation. SOCOG’s size decreased dramatically,
immediately after the end of the Games, since the vast majority of the staff was laid off, while a small part of it, particularly that with venue-related responsibilities, moved to the organising committee of the subsequent 2000 Paralympic Games. Moreover, the entities that formed SOCOG's organisational environment moved their operations to other projects, with the exception of the NSW government, and particularly its OCA, which virtually led SOCOG's wind-up process. Essentially, although OCA and SOCOG were still operating as a merged organisation, legislation passed by the NSW government gave OCA ultimate authority over SOCOG's wind-up process. Moreover, with SOCOG's President, Michael Knight, resigning right after the end of the Games, the NSW government appointed its Treasurer, Michael Eagan, as the head of the organisation. SOCOG's Board of Directors resumed its position at the top of the organisation, yet it held limited power, since it convened only twice during that period only for the purpose of reviewing SOCOG's operations. Therefore, during that period SOCOG was still externally controlled, this time solely by the NSW government. Besides, the institutional position of SOCOG, required the intense involvement of the NSW government, which had to perform the appropriate legal and financial arrangements for the organisation's closure.

In the course of the 'Close-down Period', the Venue Teams had finalised their operations, and SOCOG was re-structured in the Headquarters in the base of functional responsibilities. However, most of the departments and programme areas that had been established in the 'Build-up Period' disbanded soon after the end of the Games, and as a result the organisation was operating with a limited number of divisions. Regarding the decision-making authority, the divisions were working relatively autonomously; however, on institutional grounds, decisions related to the closure of each division, essentially required the involvement of OCA, which undertook the task of sorting out SOCOG's legal arrangements on NSW government's behalf. Consequently, although major decisions were finalised at the top of the organisation, a considerable amount of decision-making authority was selectively decentralised to its operational base. Moreover, the NSW government had set a specific timetable for SOCOG's dissolution, and therefore the organisation's operations were virtually standardised according to certain outcomes, that is the
punctual closure of each division. However, during that period, SOCOG was also responsible for the filing of the Games' documents and records. This was a massive task which required the contribution of record specialists, who were brought into the organisation after the end of the Games. As a result, apart from the significant role of SOCOG's 'Operational Core', there was also a considerable operational contribution of a 'Technostructure', which was actually attached to the organisation during that period.

The discussion above suggests that after the end of the Games, SOCOG did not adopt a solid formation, since it rather temporarily re-organised its operations in the headquarters, in order to start to dismantle and eventually dissolve. Therefore, the organisational status that SOCOG adopted during that period was essentially driven by a predominant force, what could be called 'decline and death', since this particular status facilitated the organisation's operational decline and closure. As a result, when SOCOG's 'Close-down' formation is juxtaposed to Mintzberg's (1979, 1981) theorising, it is hard to identify strong commonalities with any of his configurations.

However, as shown in table 7.6, there is a certain degree of congruence between SOCOG's 'Close-down' formation and Mintzberg's 'Machine Bureaucracy'. This is explained by the fact that, like 'Machine Bureaucracy', SOCOG was an externally controlled organisation, operating in a simple and stable environment, and it essentially required some degree of Mintzberg's (1991) 'efficiency', yet not in order to enhance its productivity but rather to perform certain tasks within a tight timetable. However, unlike the 'Machine Bureaucracy', SOCOG was not required to 'formalise' its operations, since the focus was not on standardising its works, but rather on dealing with specialised tasks, which were spread across a limited number of operational areas. SOCOG's limited 'Specialisation', and 'Formalisation', combined with the small 'Size' of the organisation, constituted characteristics that are usually adopted by 'Simple Structures'. Indeed, SOCOG was a small and flexible organisation, however, not due to the volatile conditions of its environment, as in the case of the 'Simple Structure', but rather due to the decline of its operations, which, naturally affected both its size and its levels of 'Formalisation'. Besides, unlike
SOCOG, Mintzberg (1991) claims that ‘Simple Structures’ correspond to new organisations that are usually in the process of building their strategic direction.

**Table 7.6: SOCOG’s at ‘Close-Down Period’ and Mintzberg’s ‘Machine Bureaucracy’ and ‘Simple Structure’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOCOG’s CLOSE-DOWN PERIOD</th>
<th>MINTZBERG’S MACHINE BUREAUCRACY</th>
<th>MINTZBERG’S SIMPLE STRUCTURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>Typically Old</td>
<td>Typically Young</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>Simple/Stable</td>
<td>Simple/Stable</td>
<td>Simple/Dynamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
<td>High External Control</td>
<td>Technocratic and External Control</td>
<td>CEO Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialisation</strong></td>
<td>Little Specialisation</td>
<td>Much Specialisation</td>
<td>Little Specialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit Grouping</strong></td>
<td>Functional-Based</td>
<td>Usually Functional</td>
<td>Usually Functional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liaison Devices</strong></td>
<td>Few Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Few Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Few Liaison Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formalisation</strong></td>
<td>Little Formalisation</td>
<td>Much Formalisation</td>
<td>Little Formalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centralisation</strong></td>
<td>Selective Decentralisation</td>
<td>Limited Decentralisation</td>
<td>Centralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
<td>Very Little Training</td>
<td>Little Training</td>
<td>Little Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Organisational Part</strong></td>
<td>Technostructure/Operating Core</td>
<td>Technostructure</td>
<td>Strategic Apex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Co-ordinating Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>Standardisation of Outputs</td>
<td>Standardisation of Work</td>
<td>Direct Supervision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: Shading depicts similarities between Mintzberg’s Machine Bureaucracy and Simple Structure, and SOCOG’s Close-down formation)

Overall, therefore, in the course of the ‘Close-down Period’, SOCOG exhibited organisational characteristics that can be found both in Mintzberg’s ‘Machine Bureaucracy’ and ‘Simple Structure’. Nonetheless, it would be misleading to claim that SOCOG’s ‘Close-down’ formation was a blend of the aforementioned configurations, since it effectively satisfied none of the ‘forces’, which, according to Mintzberg (1991), drive organisations to adopt the respective formations. As a result, it is more appropriate to claim that SOCOG’s ‘Close-down’ formation does not correspond to any of Mintzberg’s configurations.
7.3.5 MINTZBERG’s CONFIGURATION APPROACH AND THE STUDY OF SOCOG

The discussion above has shown that none of the formations adopted by SOCOG match entirely with any of Mintzberg’s (1979) configurations, with the exception of its ‘Start-up’ formation, which almost coincides exactly with Mintzberg’s ‘Simple Structure’. Therefore, it can be argued that SOCOG’s formations show a weak association with Mintzberg’s ideal organisational types. According to Mintzberg’s (1979, 1981, 1991) theorising, this means that overall SOCOG did not achieve an ideal organisational formation apart from the early stage of its life cycle. Mintzberg (1979, 1981) claims that organisations need to achieve ‘fit’ between their ‘Situational Elements’ and ‘Structural Design Parameters’ in order to be effective, and SOCOG essentially failed to achieve it. Although the organisational effectiveness of SOCOG is beyond the scope of this study, it is difficult to overlook the lack of correspondence between SOCOG’s formations and Mintzberg’s ideal configurations. Essentially, with regard to the measurement of organisational effectiveness Mintzberg supports that it should be evaluated by reference to the relationship between the structure of the organisation and the external conditions of the context in which it operates. However, in recent organisational research there has been considerable debate about how accurately researchers can measure organisational effectiveness (Cameron, 1986; Chelladurai, 1987), which is predominantly seen as a complex multi-dimensional concept that must be evaluated in its entire context, especially if the organisation has multiple goals and constituents (Chelladurai and Haggerty, 1991), such as a typical OCOG.

Although different models of effectiveness have been posited, such as the ‘goals model’ (in which effectiveness is evaluated against the achievement of formal goals), the ‘systems model’ (in which effectiveness is evaluated by reference to its ability to attract inputs of human and financial resources, process throughputs, and achieve outputs), and the ‘structures and processes model’ (in which effectiveness is evaluated by reference to the relationship between the structure of the organisation and the way
in which work is organised), it has been noted that having distinct sets of effectiveness criteria for different aspects of an organisation is a flawed approach because, in reality, these individual aspects of the organisation work in an integrated fashion (Chelladurai, 1987; Chelladurai and Haggerty, 1991). Recent research in the sport organisational domain has adopted a more persuasive approach in which effectiveness is evaluated according to the perceptions of a number of internal and external constituents of organisations, commonly known as 'multiple constituency approach' (e.g. Papadimitriou, 1994; Chelladurai and Haggerty, 1991). Given that an OCOG is by its very nature the centre of multiple and diverse constituencies, the 'multiple constituency approach' is essentially the most appropriate for measuring its effectiveness. In the case of SOCOG, for example, organisational effectiveness could be assessed in view of the NSW government's perception of its financial performance, since it was underwriting the organisation, the IOC's or the IFs' perception of the organisational success of the Games' delivery, the level of the athletes' satisfaction, or even the sponsors' perception on the quality of services and facilities provided for exercising their sponsorship rights. In other words, there are different perceptions of how effective an organisation is, and therefore, the examination of SOCOG's effectiveness would require an in-depth analysis of the various views of effectiveness by all constituent parties. This in turn reveals a significant deficiency of Mintzberg's approach as it solely relies on the fit that an organisation achieves between its structure and its context to evaluate effectiveness, while it disregards the perspective of the organisation's stakeholders, that is any group or individual within or outside the organisation that has a stake in the organisation's performance (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).

Mintzberg's approach has been criticised as an inefficient tool for measuring organisational effectiveness (Doty et al, 1993), yet, in defence of his theorising it needs to be stressed that he acknowledges that often 'non-linearity' is observed in effective organisations, which practically means that, although he treats his configurations as 'ideal types', he virtually accepts that multiple organisational forms can be equally effective. This view is justified by Mintzberg's argument, which claims that often organisations experience more than one of the 'forces' that underlie
his configurations. In this sense, an organisation might be simultaneously ‘forced’ to be ‘formalised’ and ‘professionalised’, for example, and thus hybrids of more than one configuration might emerge (Mintzberg, 1981, p. 113). This view is supported in the configuration theory literature under the term of ‘equifinality’, to imply that there is more than one way to achieve organisational success (Meyer et al, 1993). Besides, Mintzberg himself has claimed that organisational effectiveness is a multi-dimensional issue that is difficult to examine (Mintzberg, 1991), and its assessment essentially varies according to the nature of the organisation under study and the industry in which it operates.

Although Mintzberg’s approach can be seen as a unilateral diagnostic tool for organisational effectiveness, it should be acknowledged that it holds significant strengths for the study of SOCOG. As was mentioned in previous chapters, Mintzberg’s approach constitutes both a theory and a typology, in that it can be used as an effective tool for organisational research as well as a basis for deriving organisational types. Essentially, the contribution of Mintzberg’s approach to the present study was two-fold, since it was used both as the theoretical framework for the study of SOCOG and as the base for deriving the organisational formations that SOCOG exhibited during its life cycle. Concerning the former, this study has significantly benefited through the use of Mintzberg’s (1979) approach, as it helped to produce a rich account of SOCOG’s organisational reality. The examination of SOCOG’s ‘Situational Factors’ provided a solid understanding of the setting in which the organisation operated, and the analysis of the elements of ‘Environment’ and ‘Power’, in particular, revealed the exogenous organisational dynamics of the organisation. Also, the examination of SOCOG’s ‘Structural Design Parameters’ provided a comprehensive description of the manner in which the organisation was internally operated. For example, the researcher was able to identify the criteria that were used by SOCOG to break down organisational tasks (i.e. Unit Grouping), the manner that decision-making authority was distributed in the organisation (i.e. Centralisation) as well as the levels of adherence of the organisational members to formal procedures (i.e. Formalisation). Finally, the analysis of SOCOG’s ‘Basic Organisational Parts’ uncovered the place within the organisation where the bulk of
work was concentrated, while the examination of the element of ‘Basic Co-ordinating Mechanism’ revealed the way that SOCOG attained co-ordination of its operations as a whole.

The main strength of the configuration theory, not to mention Mintzberg’s approach, is that it does not treat the organisational characteristics in isolation but in combination. Effectively, organisational characteristics are seen as a group of interrelated elements which synthesise a particular organisational type. Consequently, by examining each of SOCOG’s formations as a synthesis of a series of interrelated attributes, and by following Mintzberg’s reasoning, the researcher was able to identify the manner in which SOCOG’s characteristics were associated with each other, and particularly the degree to which the nature of its ‘Situational Elements’ affected its ‘Structural Design Parameters’. Effectively, Mintzberg’s approach allowed the behaviour of the organisation towards its external condition to be identified, as well as the manner that this behaviour was practically interpreted in terms of its internal structuring. Moreover, by juxtaposing SOCOG’s formations with Mintzberg’s configurations, and by considering the ‘forces’, which, according to Mintzberg (1979, 1991), put pressure on organisations to adopt particular forms, commonalities and differences were identified, which in turn provided sufficient reasoning for the dynamics that drove SOCOG to adopt particular formations.

However, it needs to be stressed that, in order for the study of SOCOG to be appropriate, Mintzberg’s approach was developed in two main respects. Firstly, the attributes that synthesise Mintzberg’s configurations were reviewed and adjusted to fit the characteristics of OCOGs. Essentially, by attempting to embrace all types of organisations of every sector in his configurations, Mintzberg includes in his approach a wide range of organisational features, some of which did not hold particular significance for the study of SOCOG. The technology utilised by the organisation (i.e. ‘Technical Systems’ in Mintzberg’s terms), for example, was excluded from the theoretical framework of the study as it was explained that the examination of such an aspect has little to contribute to the present analysis of SOCOG’s organisational formations. Furthermore, Mintzberg’s set of organisational dimensions failed to
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capture characteristics that were of particular significance for the study of SOCOG, such as the attribute of 'Resource Dependence' which was added to the theoretical framework of the study. Secondly, the modified Mintzberg's approach was practically considered in different periods in SOCOG's life cycle in order to deal with the changing nature of the organisation, since Mintzberg essentially fails to stress the time aspect for organisations that have a chronologically determined life cycle. In reality, with regard to the present study the above constitute the two main weaknesses of Mintzberg's approach, which however were readily identified, and triggered subsequent adjustments of the study's theoretical framework. Nevertheless, while the former adjustment provided constructive insights into the organisational particularities of SOCOG and avoided reliance on attributes that might be misleading for the organisation's account, the latter adjustment revealed a significant inadequacy of Mintzberg's approach. Specifically, while Mintzberg's theorising was relatively effective in giving reasoning for SOCOG's organisational adaptations in the three initial stages of its life cycle, it was particularly weak in doing so for SOCOG's 'Close Down Period'. In other words, Mintzberg's configurations are not accurate in capturing the condition of organisations that experience operational decline and eventually death. While it could be argued that there is little insight to be gained into organisational evolution from the analysis of organisations such as SOCOG, as they have a clearly defined finite life, it can also be strongly argued that the analysis of SOCOG demonstrated that an examination of this type of organisation is of significant interest. In particular, it was shown that during that period SOCOG required a particular formation in order to carry out its closing operations, which among others involved a loose structuring with selective delegation of the decision-making authority as well as the contribution of expert staff.

To conclude, it is claimed that although Mintzberg's approach suffers from particular weaknesses, it needs to be assessed in terms of the aims of this study. In doing so, Mintzberg's theorising successfully supported the accomplishment of two of the main objectives of this study, namely the identification and evaluation of the structural and contextual features of SOCOG throughout its life cycle, and the investigation of the role of SOCOG in the organisation of the 2000 Olympic Games. Thus, the overall
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contribution of Mintzberg's approach to the particular study was undoubtedly significant. Generally, however, it needs to be stressed that although Mintzberg's configuration approach constitutes a landmark in contemporary organisational analysis, it should be cautiously utilised. Particularly with regard to organisational effectiveness, Mintzberg's approach is ambiguous and its full employment by organisational analysts could lead to misleading results. Moreover, although Mintzberg includes a wide range of dimensions to describe an organisational synthesis, a careful consideration of possible particularities of the organisations under investigation should be performed. Specifically, the study of SOCOG showed that the conditions of the industries in which organisations operate as well as possible distinctive internal elements of individual organisations should be considered. Therefore, the applicability of Mintzberg's approach in organisational research and analysis should be assessed in relation to a number of factors. However, we believe that the unique qualities of Mintzberg's approach, namely its comprehensive collection of organisational dimensions and its holistic understanding of organisations can provide useful insights into virtually every organisational analysis.

7.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The present study sought to perform an organisational analysis of SOCOG using as its theoretical framework a modified version of Mintzberg's configuration approach. In doing so, it aimed to provide a holistic understanding of the organisational nature of SOCOG by also considering the applicability of a periodisation of its life cycle, as well as to examine its role in the organisation of the 2000 Sydney Olympics. Further, it aimed to assess the suitability of the theoretical framework employed for the particular study. Consequently, from an organisational analysis perspective this study held a two-fold character, since it not only aimed to contribute to the understanding of a particular organisation but also to provide useful theoretical insights into the utilisation of a particular conceptual framework.

With regard to the former, this study revealed that SOCOG constituted a distinctive organisational entity. It was found that besides its operational temporality SOCOG
underwent significant organisational changes throughout its seven-year life cycle. In particular, by taking on board Miller and Friesen’s (1984) approach on organisational transitions, it was discovered that the organisation went through four main chronological stages, namely ‘Start-up Period’, ‘Build-up Period’, ‘Games-time Period’ and Close-down Period’, and exhibited four respective organisational formations. In addition, it was found that the role of SOCOG with regard to the organisation of the Sydney Olympics gradually weakened particularly in favour of the NSW government, which exerted considerable control over the organisation’s leadership and operations.

With regard to the applicability of the theoretical framework employed, it was argued that the modified version of Mintzberg’s approach was a constructive research tool for the examination of SOCOG. By considering the temporary nature of SOCOG as well as the particularities of the Olympic Games’ organisation, Mintzberg’s (1979) original approach to organisational analysis was modified and subsequently considered in different periods of the organisation’s life cycle. In doing so, the researcher was able to capture both the internal characteristics of SOCOG and the conditions of the industry in which the organisation operated throughout its operational life. Also, by drawing on Mintzberg’s ideal organisational types the manner in which SOCOG’s internal and external characteristics were interrelated was considered, and reasoning was provided concerning the synthesis of the different organisational formations adopted by SOCOG. However, it was stressed that with regard to the study of SOCOG Mintzberg’s modified approach had one significant weakness. Specifically, it was not able to provide an adequate explanation of the organisational formation adopted by SOCOG during the period of its operational decline (i.e. ‘Close-down Period’). As a result, it was suggested that Mintzberg’s modified approach should be cautiously utilised for the study of organisations that experience predetermined decline and closure.

Although the present study constitutes a case study of SOCOG it has nevertheless provided empirical evidence that could lead to some tentative hypotheses with reference to future OCOGs as well as the organisation of future Olympic Games.
Specifically, through the examination of SOCOG it could be suggested that the OCOG holds a central formal role within the network of the interests involved, yet it lacks resources and administrative power for fulfilling the organisation and delivery of the event on its own. Apart from the powerful positions of the permanent organisational entities of the Olympic Games, namely the IOC, the IFs as well as the media and sponsor corporations within the network, it seems that the role of the host public governance will tend to be significant for future OCOGs. In the case of SOCOG the increasing size of the Olympic Games required the building of stadiums and support infrastructure which could not be delivered by the OCOG, and therefore it could be argued that the early and increasing involvement of host governments in the Olympic preparations is likely in future Games. An alternative hypothesis is that future OCOGs will adapt to the increased expectations and pressures placed upon them rather than losing responsibilities and power to other public or quasi-public agencies as was the case in Sydney. However, this scenario is less likely due to the continuity expectation, particularly following the problems of the privately-run Atlanta Olympics, that public authorities will adopt a much more prominent role in ensuring the successful delivery of the Games.

The examination of SOCOG also revealed that like all OCOGs, it was embarking on a relatively unknown project, since they possess limited expertise and detailed information concerning the organisation of the event. In the case of SOCOG this resulted in the slow development of the organisation in the early stages of its operations. SOCOG's staff attempted to build its knowledge base through the observation of the previous Olympics and other contemporary mega-sporting events as well as through the acquisition of documents and Games' data from previous OCOGs. Essentially, SOCOG's experience identified and highlighted a significant deficiency in OCOGs which can impede their smooth development, and consequently put at risk the successful delivery of the Games. In view of this problem the IOC, SOCOG and the Organising Committee of the 2004 Olympic Games (ATHOC) jointly initiated the Transfer of Olympic Knowledge (TOK) programme, designed to gather detailed organisational information and key data from the Sydney Olympics in the form of a series of organisational manuals, which could then be passed to ATHOC.
and to future OCOGs. Effectively, the TOK programme creates a potential blueprint for the organisation of the Olympics that could be enriched through the years with the experience of different OCOGs in order to constitute an effective tool for the Olympic organisers, particularly during the demanding initial stages of their operations.

Overall, this study can contribute to the understanding of the organisational particularities of a unique species of sport organisations, providing many benefits to the organisation analyst. In particular, it could be utilised as a theoretical base, which would allow comparisons between SOCOG and other OCOGs. In doing so, commonalities could be identified providing generalisations about the status of OCOGs, and also differences could be highlighted, which could support the uniqueness of a particular OCOG. However, a comparative study on OCOGs needs to consider that although the organisational practices of OCOGs tend to be standardised through the TOK programme, they would nevertheless be likely to depend, at least to a degree, on the particularities of the various political economies in which the event is organised. Consequently, if the case of SOCOG is compared with a future OCOG attention should be placed upon issues such as the political and legal system of the host country, the levels of public administration involved in the Games’ organisation, the organisational culture of the host country, and the like. Effectively, an OCOG operates within a network of cultures and ideologies which inevitably affect its corporate culture and its managerial practices. In particular, an OCOG operates as an Olympic agency yet with the status of a private corporation within the business and political culture of the host country. Unavoidably, therefore, it is affected not only by the ideological and managerial requirements of the Olympic Movement, and the IOC in particular, but also by the management practices of the country in which it operates. This can include its legal arrangements with suppliers, its co-operations with the public sector, the status of employment of its staff and the like.

In view of the above the organisational analyst could utilise the premises of this study in order to stress particular characteristics of an OCOG and employ alternative theoretical frameworks and methodologies for its examination. For example, the case
of SOCOG showed that the organisation operated in an influential institutional environment, which to a certain degree directed its development and imposed particular internal organisational changes. It would be, therefore, constructive to consider the cultural and political processes through which a particular OCOG's organisational actors and their interests are institutionally constructed and mobilised in favour of certain externally imposed organising logics. This could be achieved through the employment of 'institutional theory', and DiMaggio and Powell's (1991) concept of 'institutional isomorphism', in particular. In doing so, the researcher would be able to elaborate on the forces that drive an OCOG to adopt a specific formation, namely 'coercive', which stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy, 'mimetic' resulting from standard response to uncertainty, and 'normative', which is associated with professionalisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 67).

Finally, this study could also be of particular benefit to future Olympic organisers, but also to organisers of other mega-events, such as world sporting championships and EXPOs, which are also characterised by long periods of preparation and short periods of execution. The case of SOCOG provides for the Olympic Games' organisers a comprehensive view of the event's organisation and of the different interests involved, which can facilitate their understanding of the particularities of the project they undertake. It was shown, for example, that while an OCOG is constantly monitored and assisted by the Olympic Movement's agencies it is practically left alone after the Olympic Games is over. In managerial terms that implies that during its last operational stage an OCOG operates on its own experience and resources, without any guidance from the permanent agencies of the Olympic Games organisation, and thus it might find essential the contribution of the public sector, such as in the case of SOCOG's Close-down period. Moreover, the changing character of SOCOG and the identification of the forces that drove the organisation to adopt different formations during its life cycle can assist the planning process of an OCOG, stress actors, events and chronologies of major concern, and consequently facilitate the development of a contingency planning policy. The concept of periodisation could also be applicable to the organisation of other mega-events, since
it essentially stresses the developmental nature of a mega-event organising committee. In doing so, large amounts of information about the organisation of a particular event could be assessed in terms of key events and chronologies, and consequently broken down into manageable categories that would then be easier to comprehend, elaborate and store. In addition, the mega-event organiser could utilise the present study as a platform for assessing the external condition of a particular organising committee and for considering the dynamics of changes in its structure and processes.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

THE GROWTH OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES
(Source: IOC, 2001)

SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES

<table>
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WINTER OLYMPIC GAMES

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<td>77</td>
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APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW GUIDE

TOPICS

1. ENVIRONMENT:

**-Complexity** (The number and heterogeneity of external elements influencing SOCOG)

**PROMPT:** From SOCOG's official reports one can identify four basic actors in SOCOG's environment: The *Olympic Movement* (IOC, IFs, NOCs), the *Public Governance* (Governments, Public Authorities), the *Commercial sector* (Sponsors, Media, Contractors etc.), and various *Public groups* (Aboriginals, Greens etc.).

**QUESTIONS**

- Can you identify any other environmental actors that have influenced SOCOG? Which do you think was the most influential entity in the organisational environment of SOCOG? What was the role of the Australian Olympic Committee/the IOC Co-ordination Commission?

- What links were established between SOCOG and external actors? What kind of agreements was in place with governmental agencies (e.g. MoU) such as OCA and ORTA?

- What was the role of these entities after the end of the event? Was there any particular involvement of the IOC, the sponsors or any other organisation apart from OCA?

**-Stability** (The levels of prediction of the needs of external elements influencing SOCOG)

**PROMPT:** Consider the IOC's corruption scandal and its impact on sponsorship, and IAAF's change of track and field competition schedule which affected ticketing.
QUESTIONS

- Do you consider predictable the needs of the above actors? Can you identify any particular period throughout SOCOG’s life that the organisation probably did not have the appropriate knowledge or expertise to deal with its environmental needs? In which stage of the organisation of the Games did you have the most problems to deal with the needs of these actors?

- Was SOCOG getting more familiar with the needs of these actors as the organisation progressed towards the time of the Games and after the Games?

- How useful was the participation of SOCOG’s staff in Olympic-related conferences (e.g. GAIFS) for dealing with the needs of these actors?

2. RESOURCE DEPENDENCE (The levels of importance of resources possessed by external actors to SOCOG):

PROMPT: Consider the dependence of SOCOG on financial, human, physical and legitimate resources. Also, consider NSW government’s contingency fund for SOCOG.

QUESTIONS

- Which were the external to SOCOG actors that possessed resources essential for the operation of SOCOG (e.g. IOC, NSW Government, Commercial Sector)?

- In financial terms SOCOG was heavily depended on other organisations such as the IOC and the NSW government for resources. Do you think that SOCOG could obtain such resources elsewhere?

- Which specific resources were more important to SOCOG during the initial years of its operations? Did it change in latter stages of the organisation’s operations?
• Has this dependence to external resources influenced organisational actions, such as strategic planning, budgetary planning, management of human resources and so on? If yes how?

3. POWER (The degree of representation of external actors on policy making bodies of SOCOG):

PROMPT: Consider the role of OCA’s Director General David Richmond and other individuals which represented NSW government’s interests. Also, consider the power relations after the merger of OCA and SOCOG into ‘Sydney 2000’ in the last six months of the Olympic preparations.

QUESTIONS

• Which do you thing was the main policy-making body in SOCOG? Did that change as the organisation progressed towards the time the Games?

• Which do you think were the most powerful entities or individuals in SOCOG’s environment (e.g. IOC, NSW government, AOC, sponsors)?

• Whose voice was the most dominant in the Board of Directors?

• Were there any overlaps between SOCOG’s and OCA’s responsibilities? If yes, in such cases which organisation was the most dominant?

• Can you recall any incidents initiated by external actors that challenged the authority structure within SOCOG?

• Who was the most powerful individual in SOCOG after the end of the Games?
4. FORMALISATION (The levels of adherence of SOCOG's staff to both formal and informal instructions, and procedures):

QUESTIONS

- Do you think that overall SOCOG was a bureaucratic organisation? Do you believe that the day-to-day operations were primarily driven by strict rules and instructions?

- How was work co-ordinated in the initial years of SOCOG's operations? Were work processes standardised through the use of formal plans, written policies and rules, detailed job descriptions and so on?

- Has this changed after the shift of SOCOG's operations into the venues/after the end of the event?

5. CENTRALISATION (The level in the hierarchy of SOCOG where final decisions are made):

PROMPT: Consider the role of President Michael Knight, particularly during Games-time period. Also, consider the staff changes in SOCOG that were imposed by President Michael Knight after the ticketing problems and how did they affect the decision-making structure in the organisation.

QUESTIONS

- Concerning decisions of strategic nature, such as the creation of a new division or programme, who was responsible for that?

- When operational decisions were made, such as the appointment or termination of staff or the creation of a new program, who was the last person whose assent had to be obtained before legitimate action was taken? Was the manager of the respective division
responsible for such decisions? Were individuals from different SOCOG's levels involved in such decisions?

- As SOCOG was getting bigger, more committees, commissions and management forums were created. Do you think that this created a slower decision-making process?

- How were decisions made when SOCOG was operating from the venues? What was the role of venue managers in the decision-making process?

- How decision-making works now that the Games are over?

6. TRAINING (The levels of training required for the staff available to SOCOG):

   QUESTIONS

   - Was there any training for SOCOG's staff in the beginning? When did the bulk of SOCOG's staff training take place?

   - What form did SOCOG's training take (On-the-job Training, Training Sessions etc./general, task-specific)?

7. UNIT GROUPING (The type of criteria used to break down organisational units):

   QUESTIONS

   - What was the main criterion for the grouping of the various organisational units during the life cycle of SOCOG (functions, competitions, venues etc.)?

   - When did exactly the shift of SOCOG's operations to the venues take place?

   - How was SOCOG structured after the end of the Games?
8. BASIC CO-ORDINATION MECHANISM (The fundamental ways in which SOCOG achieved co-ordination among its divisions and programmes):

QUESTIONS

- In the beginning, when limited departments and divisions were established, how was work co-ordinated among its units?

- As SOCOG was getting bigger there were more committees and commissions and more management forums to co-ordinate work. Do you think that this was a bureaucratic way to co-ordinate work?

- When SOCOG adopted a venue-based structured, were there any differences in the way that work was co-ordinated?

- How is work co-ordinated now that the Games are over?

9. STRATEGY FORMATION (The degree that SOCOG can formulate strategies at operational-level):

QUESTIONS

- In terms of strategic formation, do you think that SOCOG had the appropriate space to form its own strategies or it was something that was predetermined by other agents such as the IOC, the government and so on?

- From your experience with SOCOG, how autonomous do you think is an OCOG in formulating its own strategies? Do you think that their strategic ability is constrained by external actors, such as the IOC, the Ifs, governments and so on?
A: QUESTIONING SOCOG’S FORMALISATION

Please note that this question seeks your perception about the issue under investigation in four different chronicle stages in SOCOG’s life-cycle. These are:

- **Start-up Period**: From November 1993 until Michael Knight’s appointment as President of SOCOG in September 1996;
- **Build-up Period**: From October 1996 until the establishment of the Main Operation Centre in May 2000;
- **Games-time Period**: From June 2000 until the end of the Olympics in October 2000;
- **Close-up Period**: From October 2000 until the resolution of SOCOG in December 2000.

**Question:**
To what extent, do you think, SOCOG’s operations were guided by formal means such as work plans, written policies and procedure manuals, detailed job descriptions and the like in each of its life-cycle periods?

(1=few formal procedures; 2=some formal procedures; 3=many formal procedures)

*Please tick (v) appropriately*

<table>
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</table>
B: QUESTIONING SOCOG'S TRAINING

Please reply to the question at the end of this message by considering the chronological periods in SOCOG's life cycle provided below:

- **Start-up Period:** From November 1993 until Michael Knight's appointment as President of SOCOG in September 1996;
- **Build-up Period:** From October 1996 until the establishment of the Main Operation Centre in May 2000;
- **Games-time Period:** From June 2000 until the end of the Olympics in October 2000; and
- **Close-up Period:** From October 2000 until the resolution of SOCOG in December 2000.

**Question:** Please consider TAFE NSW's records and rate the levels of training of SOCOG's staff at the chronological periods provided below. (1=little training; 2=some training; 3=much training)

*Please tick (v) appropriately*

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Games-time</th>
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## APPENDIX IV
### MINTZBERG'S ORGANISATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Means of Co-ordination</th>
<th>Simple Structure</th>
<th>Machine Bureaucracy</th>
<th>Professional Bureaucracy</th>
<th>Divisionalised Form</th>
<th>Adhocracity</th>
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<td>Standardisation of Work</td>
<td>Standardisation of Skills</td>
<td>Standardisation of Outputs</td>
<td>Mutual Adjustment</td>
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<td>Key Part of the Organisation</td>
<td>Strategic Apex</td>
<td>Technostructure</td>
<td>Operating Core</td>
<td>Middle Line</td>
<td>Support Staff (AA)/ Operating Core (OA)</td>
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<td>Specialization of Jobs</td>
<td>Little Specialisation</td>
<td>Much Specialisation</td>
<td>Much Specialisation</td>
<td>Some Specialisation (between divisions and HQ)</td>
<td>Much Specialisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formalisation of Behaviour-Bureaucratic/Organic</td>
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<td>Much Formalisation-Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Little Formalisation-Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Much Formalisation (within divisions)-Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Little Formalisation-Orgnic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit Grouping</td>
<td>Usually Functional</td>
<td>Usually Functional</td>
<td>Functional and Market</td>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Functional and Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit Size</td>
<td>Wide</td>
<td>Wide at bottom, narrow elsewhere</td>
<td>Wide at bottom, Narrow elsewhere</td>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Limited Action Planning (esp. in AO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Control Systems</td>
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<td>Action Planning</td>
<td>Little Planning and Control</td>
<td>Little Planning and Control</td>
<td>Limited Action Planning (esp. in AO)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Training and Indoctrination</td>
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<td>Little Training and Indoctrination</td>
<td>Much Training and Indoctrination</td>
<td>Some Training and Indoctrination</td>
<td>Much Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Few Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Few Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Some Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Few Liaison Devices</td>
<td>Many Liaison Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralisation</td>
<td>Centralisation</td>
<td>Limited Decentralisation</td>
<td>Decentralisation</td>
<td>Limited Decentralisation</td>
<td>Selective Decentralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age and Size</td>
<td>Typically Young and Small</td>
<td>Typically Old and Large</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Typically Old and Very Large</td>
<td>Typically Young (OA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical System</td>
<td>Simple, not Regulating</td>
<td>Regulating but not Automated, not very Complex</td>
<td>Not Regulating or Complex</td>
<td>Divisible, otherwise like Machine Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Very Complex, often Automated (AA), not Regulating or Complex (OA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Simple and Dynamic</td>
<td>Simple and Stable</td>
<td>Complex and Stable</td>
<td>Relatively Simple and Stable</td>
<td>Complex and Dynamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>CEO Control, not Fashionable</td>
<td>Technocratic and External Control, not fashionable</td>
<td>Professional Operator Control, Fashionable</td>
<td>Middle-line Control, Fashionable</td>
<td>Expert Control, very Fashionable</td>
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## APPENDIX V
### DATA ANALYSIS TEMPLATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMES</th>
<th>OPERATIONALISATION</th>
<th>DATA SOURCES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>The Number of Staff available to SOCOG (Kimberly, 1976, Hall, 1972)</td>
<td>Documentary Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Complexity</td>
<td>The number and heterogeneity of external elements influencing SOCOG (Duncan, 1972)</td>
<td>Documentary Data / Interview Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Stability</td>
<td>The levels of prediction of the needs of external elements influencing SOCOG (Duncan, 1972)</td>
<td>Interview Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource-Dependence</td>
<td>The levels of importance of resources possessed by external actors to SOCOG (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978)</td>
<td>Interview Data / Documentary Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>The degree of representation of external actors on the decision-making bodies of SOCOG (Pugh et al, 1968, 1969)</td>
<td>Documentary Data / Interview Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>The number of operational areas (major divisions, departments and programmes) in SOCOG (Hall et al, 1967; Kikulis et al, 1989; Hollenbeck, 2000)</td>
<td>Documentary Data / Interview Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formalisation</td>
<td>The levels of adherence of SOCOG's staff to both formal and informal instructions, and procedures (Hall, 1982)</td>
<td>Interview Data / E-mail Questionnaire</td>
</tr>
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<td>Centralisation</td>
<td>The level in the hierarchy of SOCOG where final decisions are made (Pugh et al, 1969; Kikulis et al, 1989; Theodoraki, 1996)</td>
<td>Interview Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>The levels of training required for SOCOG's staff (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
<td>Interview Data / E-mail Questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Grouping</td>
<td>The type of criteria used to break down organisational units (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
<td>Documentary Data / Interview Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison Devices</td>
<td>The number of standing committees, commissions and task forces in SOCOG (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
<td>Documentary Data / Interview Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Part</td>
<td>The part of the organisation which makes the most significant contribution to SOCOG's operations (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
<td>Interview Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Coordinating Mechanism</td>
<td>The fundamental ways in which SOCOG achieves co-ordination among its divisions and programmes (Mintzberg, 1979)</td>
<td>Interview Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Capacity</td>
<td>The degree that SOCOG can formulate strategies at operational-level.</td>
<td>Interview Data</td>
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APPENDIX VI

SAMPLE INTERVIEW

INTERVIEW WITH SANDY HOLLWAY (Chief Executive Officer of SOCOG)
26-11-00, Hotel Metropolitan, Athens, Greece

Researcher: I can see from Socog's official reports that the most important actors in its organisational environment were the Olympic Movement, the public governance, the commercial sector and the various public groups. Do you consider the needs of these actors predictable?

Hollway: I think right from the beginning we understood that there were a number of actors, interest groups who we had to take into account. Our main concern was to establish the frameworks and policies for the organisation by taking into consideration the long-term relationships of Socog with the various constituents of the Games; this was actually responsibility of the Board. We had always said of course that it should be the athletes Games and we would understand the need to look after the interests of the athletes and therefore the IFs. I think we had always developed a high respect for the role of the NOCs around the world and we knew we needed to satisfy them. President Samaranch always reminded us that the mass media would be the ones to determine whether we would be successful or not. Their view of the Games would be very important so we understood the need to look after them. And I think right from the beginning we understood the need to involve government in our model. This was not a big philosophical problem for us. We understood the importance of government and I think also the indigenous people and the Green groups and community organisations. I think, yes, from the very beginning we had a very good idea that we needed to cover off multiple players with multiple interests. Now, at least one of those players would say that we should have been moved more quickly and I am thinking of the aboriginal leadership. We set up an advisory committee of the aboriginal leadership to help us, but we were probably slower in doing that than we should have been. They believed they should have come one or two years earlier. But I think that we always understood the need to cover the interests of these groups.
Researcher: I understand that Socog had the appropriate knowledge and expertise to deal with their needs, right?

Hollway: It is a good question. I think the answer is yes. For example, in the case of the indigenous people we made sure that we hired somebody, who happened to be Garriela, an indigenous person, a former rugby player for Australia, well regarded with strong connections. I myself had a lot of experience in that area. In the case of the Green groups, yes we had a couple of people who had already strong connections and held good respect by those groups. So, yes; we did believe we needed people with expertise. Again I will give you another example. If you take the media and I am not talking about influencing media stories, but servicing the media at Games-time with all the operational support they need, we made a decision that our media division will be made up of people we hired who were working journalists. So, everybody, at any level of seniority that we hired was a professional journalist who knew what was required.

Researcher: Which was the most difficult period to deal with the needs of those interest groups?

Hollway: I honestly think with those actors that there was not a particular period of great stress or difficulty. In the beginning we did not have many relations with all the constituents groups apart from the NSW government with concern to the delivery of the permanent venues, the IFs with concern to the sporting venues, and the IOC which was co-ordinating our agreements with the sponsors and the media. We did have a period of great, great, great stress and difficulty which was in the last quarter of 1999 and this is when the issues of ticketing, as you know had become very controversial and there were widespread criticism of us.

Researcher: You mean from the NSW government.

Hollway: This was really from the community. It was the customer. The problems were that people were upset that there were not enough tickets in particular sports for Australian customers. They believed that we had managed a premium ticket programme. This is of course, selling tickets of premium prices but we have been secretive about it. There were issues about the processes of purchasing tickets and whether it was fair. And these whole set of issues became extremely controversial and became the source of almost daily, prominent criticism of the Socog in the media both printed media and on radio and television. So, that was a very tough time that we had to battle through and get
passed. But one could say that this was a reaction of the community fuelled by a very intense and critical media. It was not a problem with any particular player or group.

Researcher: Can you see the ticketing problem as an issue which challenged the power structure within Socog. I can recall Mr Knight's action to move some civil servants into the organisation to deal with the problem. Did you see that as a change in the decision-making power?

Hollway: First of all, the ticketing actually did not directly affect the budget. The single most important difficulty we had with the budget was in fact on sponsorship revenue. We in fact achieved a record in sponsorship revenue but we had been striving for even more and we reached too high. We could not get as much as we wanted and that left a problem to us in terms of having to cut back in expenditure in 1999 and 2000. But coming to the ticketing issue, by the end of 1999 this was clearly our biggest, single problem; and we substantially reinforced the ticketing area. We brought in new deputy executive officer in the form of Michael Eyers who focused a lot of his attention on ticketing. We put in place, then, a general manager in the form of A. March to do ticketing. We also introduced a consumer liaison and complaints mechanism, in about of November 1999.

Researcher: Don't you think that SOCOG experienced changes as the NSW government essentially took over some of its responsibilities?

Not really; I think that nothing changed in SOCOG. We were fortunate to have a government that was willing to do things for us. The ticketing was one area. We were working closely with the NSW government throughout. I did not see it as a major change in our practices.

Researcher: You mentioned that you had problems to reach the expected revenues from sponsorship. Do you think that the IOC corruption scandal affected sponsorship revenues?

Hollway: That's a good question. I think that that was a factor. Certainly when we needed the revenue to be pull in, throughout 1999 and especially the first half of 1999, it was a very bad climate in which to be going out to a company and say "here, come and support the Games"...because the IOC was facing such a difficulty. But honestly I do not think it was the biggest factor. I think the biggest factor was that our marketing department simply overestimated the amount of sponsorship that it could obtained.
Researcher: In financial terms Socog was heavily depended on other organisations such as the IOC and the NSW government. Do you think that Socog could obtain such resources elsewhere?

Hollway: Oh no. We had a budget of about A$ 2.4 billion and the revenue from that was from the broadcast rights, from sponsorship, from ticket sales and from merchandise sales and that is all private money. The contribution by the government was at the end; a contingency fund of A$ 140 million which is a small amount of money against A$ 2.4 billion and we would certainly not even use all of that. Moreover, Socog from its private income is in fact making longer contributions to the NSW government and to AOC. Socog's part of the Games would have been delivered almost entirely on the basis of private funding.

Researcher: The IOC, however, encouraged involvement of the NSW government. Was it only for delivering the Games-related infrastructure?

Hollway: No, I think it was also services and financial underwriting. In relation to services, for example, I think the IOC had reached the conclusion, in particular from observing Atlanta that if you wanted to get good transport, if you wanted to get good security arrangements, and so on, then government had to be involved because it is the most reliable supplier of such services. In terms of the financial security, obviously is highly desirable to have right from the beginning a government as the underwriter if you were running a deficit at the end and we had that with the NSW government. Now, the government of course quite properly insisted that we operate within our means, the private money I was talking about before. But when we got to the point where we needed a bit extra, at least the government was the underwriter and at least we could have an intelligent conversation with the underwriter. Where you can say “look, if you give us some funding we can deliver a fantastic Games. If we do not get funding we would have to cut away”, and this could be satisfactory but it would not be good, right? In Atlanta they did not really have the opportunity for such a discussion and so I think the importance of the link with government is in relation to services and some sort of financial insurance in the crutch.

Researcher: As Socog was getting bigger, more committees, commissions and management forums were created. Do you think that this created a slow process of
decision-making, in other words, do you think that the organisation became more bureaucratic?

Hollway: I think that Board level committees came and went. We had for example a committee to develop the look and image of the Games which I think played a very useful role in about 1998-early 1999 and having done its job, disbanded. We had a committee of the Board that was concerned with accommodation, and essentially when it had done its job, disbanded. At the other extreme we had committees which were permanent. Committees of the Board like the sport commission which looked after the sports and sport-related issues, like the committee for arts and festivals and I think these in fact were helpful bodies, not bureaucratic ones.

Researcher: The structure of Socog was initially functional-based and as it was getting closer to the Games it was becoming more venue-based. How did this integration happen? How difficult is to pass from an operational-based to a venue-based structure?

Hollway: It is not very difficult if it is well planned and is everybody in the organisation understands what is happening. We were planning that since 1996 because essentially your purpose is to run the Games from the venues. Now, I think we did plan well and everybody in the organisation did understand what was happening. Our plan in brief was as follows: that we would start with a functional structure, we would develop a venue-operating plan for a venue, and we used the Aquatic Centre as the model, as the example, as the pilot. Then we would put together teams, still in the headquarters, not in the venues, to plan each of the venues. So, your team for example, might be responsible for taking the generic plan, the Aquatic Centre model, and translate it into plans for the Velodrome, the Stadium, the Equestrian, and so on. And then as we went along, we developed more and more teams for each venue and finally we moved the people actually out in the venue and then we recruited more people to go to the venue. Every member of staff knew that they were migrating from their original roles through to either staying in the headquarters, as some did, but for most of them going to a Games-time role in the venues. And the impression that we gave to staff was that this was an exciting and interesting thing to be doing. It was not an uncertainty, it was not a threat, it was not an insecurity. It was an exciting progression to be made. Now, how fast you make that move is a very important question which we thought about in great detail and we talked a
lot to Atlanta and Barcelona about this. Because you want to be out to the venues well before the Games, you want your venue teams, but you do not want to put everybody in your venue teams before certain common policies have been established. I think we got the timing right.

Researcher: When exactly did you pass to the venue-based structure?
Hollway: The venue managers were appointed in September 1999, one year out of the Games. By that stage, however, venue plans have been developed for every venue and after that the venue teams were all put together. People moved into the venues at different times at somewhere between 6 months and 3 months out of the Games.

Researcher: Socog employed TAFE (training agency) to run training sessions for its staff. What those sessions involve? Did they involve information about the history of the Olympic Games, for example?
Hollway: Yes it did. Typically our training even for the average volunteer was in three parts. The first part was a general orientation about the Olympics. The second part was training on the specific functional job and the third part of the training was actually at the venue where they would be located to make sure they understood their role. In the first part we gave a lot of lectures, a lot of information material about the Games, the history of the Games, the values of the Games, why the Games were important to Australia and we tried to engender a really good spirit. In other words, we did not say to the volunteers: well you are going to rip tickets and you will be at the Equestrian Centre, so go and do that. We wanted them to have a sense of the bigger picture and the mission and the importance of it, and the Olympic tradition in which they were working. This was very important.

Researcher: There was some criticism on Socog's recruiting practices. For example, P. Collins (NSW opposition leader) claimed that 70% of the jobs in Socog between 1997 and 1998 were not advertised. Do you want to comment on this?
Hollway: My comment would be like this: first of all I come from a background in the public service, this civil service, where indeed every hob is advertised, processes are going through for selection and I understand this system very well. But with the Organising Committee, for jobs at least, it has to be different for two reasons. One is that you do not have the time for laborious recruitment processes, and certainly for some of the key technical jobs or very senior jobs it is very sensible for people to target particular
individuals and try to go and recruit them. So, the other comment I would make is that this issue was never a major political or administrative issue for us.

**Researcher:** You were member of the Human Resources Committee which was responsible for recruiting senior executives...

Hollway: That committee was only important I would say late 1996 and very early 1997 at a time when M. Knight had the responsibility of trying to locate the senior executive team. One that was done by about March of 1997. I think the committee actually did not meet again, or it met very infrequently. So, it was a committee which had a specific purpose: to help with high level recruitment and then really it ended, it finished.

**Researcher:** I can see from your official reports that there was a Venue Olympic Construction Division within Socog that acted as the link to OCA. It has been claimed here, however, that this division was not the actual link to OCA but rather informal communication between the two organisations. Would you agree with that?

Hollway: Yes, I do agree with that.

**Researcher:** Were there any conflicts between OCA and Socog?

Hollway: I think in the early days OCA was focusing on organising the construction of the Games and that involved no conflict with Socog at all. Then, when we needed somebody to actually help with the planning of the venues and how they would operate and also to put the Olympic overlay into the venues, it was natural to work very closely with OCA. OCA was performing the job, in the early days, of constructing the venues which was one of its key roles and as we moved on we used OCA to also put in the Olympic overlay and to help with the planning of the venues and none of that involved any conflicts. If there were issues, they were just normal issues of debate and discussion and so on. Sometimes there were issues about who paid for what. I mean, should sometimes be on the government’s budget as part of the construction or should it be on Socog’s side as part of the operation. But these were traditional issues; there was no major conflict there. Then OCA also had a role of co-ordinating governmental services which we also found very useful to have a governmental entity that was doing that. So, I think it was a relationship that actually came closer as we came towards the Games.

**Researcher:** At the end, however, the two organisations became one in the form of “Sydney 2000”. Did that create conflicts of power and authority within the new organisation?
Hollway: It went through four stages. Stage one was co-operation, stage two was collaboration, stage three was integration and stage four was joint operations during the Games. The first stage of co-operation was really...we discussed common issues and we tried to understand each other's plans. I am talking 3-4 years out of the Games. The collaboration stage was where, for example, we had outsourced to the government some important functions like organising the transport for the Olympic Family, and we really became quite operationally close. Then it was the integration which I think only really started with the development of tight, common structures in about January 2000, 9 months out from the Games. Creation also of common committees to jointly drive the project and then of course at Games-time everybody was just into a joint operation. I have never seen it in terms of conflicts of power but one comment I would make is that you will see some Australian press reports that say that OCA or the government took over. The right description is that it was a merger if you want a business parallel. You mentioned earlier the civil servants' involvement but it is a wrong picture because of two reasons. One was that even in the areas where we were operating together, we were operating as a merger not as take over but the second reason is that the vast majority of the things Socog did it led itself. Accreditation, volunteers' recruitment, uniforms, youth camps, technology, venue operations and so on. So, we had probably, I would say... substantial parts of our programmes were ones that just went on through the whole four year period in the same way, without in fact any governmental involvement at all.

Researcher: How are things after the Games. Who is mostly involved in the wounding up process? Are you personally involved in this?

Hollway: The only aspect that I am deeply involved in is the volunteer legacy. How we can take the tremendous success of the volunteer programme and translate that in other areas of Australian life. And that is the part of the follow up that I am doing, and of course I am involved in the transfer of know-how and some bits and pieces like that. The government passed legislation a couple of weeks ago (middle of November 2000) and the important point is that...it very sensibly says in effect that the government will be around for long time and therefore, it should lead the process of tight up the Games, the financial reporting, the ultimate financial resolution, the selling of the remains of the Games, the assets disposal and all of that. So, this would be lead by OCA and Socog and ORTA and the other specific Olympic agencies would just end.
Researcher: How many staff are there now in Socog?

Hollway: As we speak there are probably about 500 and by the 15th of December it will be down to not more than 100. When we leave our present offices and we move to smaller offices, these will do just the rap up. So, the staff hit a pick of perhaps 2400 and then drops away to no more than 100 within two months. So it is a very rapid decline.

Researcher: In terms of strategy, do you think that there is much space for an OCOG to develop its own strategies it is like a train running on a predetermined track?

Hollway: I think that an OCOG does actually have a leadership role and there are turning points on the track which it can lead to different directions. I think that it is an important role for an OCOG to help establish what the vision of the Games is, as well as to make the right choices along the way of how to get there. So, I do not see it as just a mechanical, technical exercise of organising the Games because point one, I think there are different kinds of Games you can organise with different character and legacy and image, and secondly there are different ways you can get there. So, I think it has to be a highly creative organisation as well as a technically solid one. For example, image, I think it would generally be said that the visual look of the Games in Sydney was good, and the sports presentation to the spectator was good and the attitude and friendliness of the staff and the volunteers was very good and notable. And all of these things matters that are intangible that are creative and that do not come from nothing. They come from deciding to do things in certain ways, whereas an issue as accreditation for 200,000 people. That is a very tough task but it is more a mechanical task like the train on the track.