Policy change, governance and partnership: Sheffield City Council’s leisure services, 1974 to 1999

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Policy Change, Governance and Partnership: Sheffield City Council's Leisure Services, 1974 to 1999

by

David Denyer

A Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Award of Doctor of Philosophy of the Loughborough University

May 2002

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ABSTRACT

Policy Change, Governance and Partnership: Sheffield City Council’s Leisure Services, 1974 to 1999

The aim of this thesis is to provide a theoretically informed but empirically grounded account of policy shifts, which have occurred over time in relation to local government leisure policy. A principal focus is on the development of partnerships and local governance, evaluated in part through an analysis of policy in a major British city, Sheffield, over the closing decades of the century.

Theory plays a central role in this thesis. It is used to inform the enquiry, to suggest the research questions and to help interpret the results. As such, the study provides a review of the Sheffield case through the prism of theories of politics, policy studies, management studies, sociology and leisure studies. The research builds on theoretical accounts of urban politics and in particular urban regime theory. The regime literature has been used to explain the ability of groups of actors in a city to develop a strategic vision and mobilise the collective action of others to support or resist particular projects or modes of governance (Stone 1989; Harding 1994; Stoker and Mossberger 1994; Strange 1993; Digaetano and Klemanski 1993).

This research subscribes to critical realism and to the view that some phenomena, such as the actions of individuals, cannot always be observed in an objective way. As such, this thesis does not attempt to generate and test hypotheses. Rather, qualitative methods (observation, interviews and document analysis) were used to gather reflexive agents interpretations of the structural context and how this affects their actions and behaviour. Interview transcripts, field notes and documents were analysed using inductive content analysis (facilitated by QSR NUD*IST software for qualitative data analysis).

The inductive content analysis revealed 387 raw data themes or ‘free nodes’ from which three general dimensions emerged. These dimensions are used to structure the explanation of the Sheffield case. At the macro level, an account of the influence of broad socio-economic and political forces is provided. At the meso level, an interpretation of interorganisational relationships and the operation of leisure partnerships is offered. At a micro level, the thesis reports the affect of inter-subject relations.

An overall explanation of policy change, governance and partnership in Sheffield City Council’s Leisure Services is offered that blends careful empirical analysis and theory construction and commentary.

Keywords: Leisure Policy, Governance, Partnership, Collaboration, Urban Political Economy, Urban Regime Theory, Inductive Content Analysis, NUD*IST
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I would also like to thank the past and present staff of Sheffield City Council and to the individuals from the numerous Sheffield organisations who gave me their time and helped me gather the empirical data.

Lastly, I owe a great deal to my friends and family. To my mother and father who have given me so much help in so many ways. To the Tranfields who have also provided some much needed assistance and support. Thanks above all go to Jenny who has been an inspiration.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCT  Compulsory Competitive Tendering
UDC  Urban Development Corporation
TEC  Training and Enterprise Council
EU   European Union
Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Structure of the Chapter

The Chapter is divided into a further seven parts. The section, which follows this introduction, provides a rationale for studying policy change, governance and partnerships. The third section considers the methodological approach adopted in the thesis. The fourth section locates the research within the different bodies of literature, which have helped to inform the research, in particular, theories of the state and contemporary theories of urban politics. The fifth section details the aims and objectives of the research, which were derived from an assessment of the literature. The sixth section provides a rationale for the methods of data collection and the methods of data analysis chosen in this study. The seventh section suggests ways in which the conclusions drawn from this thesis might be evaluated. The final section outlines the structure of the rest of the thesis.

1.2 Rationale for the Research

Local government in England in the last quarter of the twentieth century was subject to significant change reflecting in large part the changing social, economic, cultural and political structures of English society. Specifically, policy thinking about local government evolved from confidence in the corporate management and pluralist assumptions of the 1973 local government reorganisation in most of England and Wales, to the emphasis on governance, partnership and responsible entrepreneurialism of the end of the century. This thesis reviews the policy shifts, which have occurred over time in relation to local government and in particular their implications for local government leisure policy. A principal focus is on the development of partnerships in local government leisure policy, evaluated in part through an analysis of policy in a major British city, Sheffield, over the closing decades of the century.
1.2.1 The Rationale for Studying Policy Change

Historically local government in Britain was characterised by a period of relative stability after World War II, which gave way to a period of flux and unpredictability from the mid 1970s (Stoker 1991). The study of the nature of policy change in this period of instability may help us understand "the influence and interaction of social, economic and political processes, and... the confluence of factors that shape public decision making" (John 1998: 14). Thus, an aim of this thesis is to provide a detailed understanding of the processes that have shaped local government leisure policy in Britain after World War Two and in particular 1974 to 1999, that is from the last major reorganisation of the local government system up to the end of the period of data collection for this study.

Marsh and Smith (2001) identify a number of features that should be incorporated into any study of policy change:

- It should have a strong historical perspective, being theoretically informed but empirically grounded;
- It needs a sophisticated, rather than simplistic, conception of change;
- It should recognise the importance of political, economic and ideological factors in any explanation of change, rather than exclusively emphasizing one of them;
- It needs to be underpinned by a stated and developed epistemological position;
- It must utilise a dialectical approach to structure and agency, rather than giving priority to either;
- It must acknowledge that the relationship between the material and the ideational is crucial and, again, dialectical;
- It must recognise that any explanation has to take account of the inter-national as well as the domestic context within which change occurs.

The thesis attempts to incorporate these features into the study of policy change in Sheffield.
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.2.2 The Rationale for Studying Governance and Partnerships

The rationale for studying partnerships and local governance is linked to the global and national forces that have affected this context. British local authorities have, for example, faced challenges posed by conflicts with central government over expenditure control, the poll tax, and privatisation (Duncan and Goodwin 1988; Stoker 1991). In many instances these factors have resulted in authorities being unable, on their own, to meet their goals in respect of economic development and social welfare policy (Rhodes 1994). Instead, there has been a growing need for the public sector to develop collaborative arrangements with organisations from the private and voluntary sectors. This transformation of the control and delivery of services has been described as a shift from local government to local governance (Atkinson and Coleman 1992; Malpass 1994; Stoker 1995; Rhodes 1996). Whilst the state’s role in urban politics has altered, it...

...remains the key political actor in society and the predominant expression of collective interest... transformations in the role of the state are a key research problem for political scientists. Approaching the state in a governance perspective helps us to understand the new or emerging roles of the state (Pierre and Peters 2000: 25).

The concept of governance is difficult to define. Pierre and Peters (2000) suggest that governance can be explained as structures, processes and theory. In the study of political change in Britain, governance has been used to describe the development of the new structures such as networks, partnerships, devolution of powers to cities and regions, and community empowerment that emerged following the failure of the hierarchical, bureaucratic state agencies in the 1970s and 1980s. In process terms, governance is seen as a process of co-ordinating or steering of actors and organisations to produce desired outcomes. In theoretical terms, governance can be regarded "as a way of viewing the World of politics and government" (Pierre and Peters 2000: 24).

The literature on governance, has explored the construction of public-private sector coalitions (Molotch, 1976) and urban regimes (Stone 1989). These contemporary approaches to the study of urban politics have moved from a focus on community power debates and Marxist accounts to a concern with the question of how, in a complex,
fragmented world, certain interests are able to blend their capacities to achieve common purposes? (Stone 1993). For Stoker (2000: 2) governance...

...can be broadly defined as a concern with governing, achieving collective action in the realm of public affairs, in conditions where it is not possible to rest on recourse to the authority of the state.

As noted above, governance is associated with networking and partnership. However, the development of such collaborative arrangements in the British context has only recently been addressed in the literature (Digaetano and Klemanski 1993b; Harding 1991; Harding 1994; Stoker and Mossberger 1994). By providing an analysis of leisure policy change, governance and partnership, with reference to contemporary theories of urban political economy, the thesis seeks to contribute to the body of work in the field of urban policy.

Wilks and Wright (1989) argue that in order to gain an understanding of policy making within networks of organisations it is particularly important to acknowledge the actors and interpersonal relationships which shape it (Wilks and Wright 1989). Malpass (1994) suggests that change from local government to local governance has also resulted in a set of quite distinct changes and new decision-making environments at the local level. Within this system of governance, council officers have been required to be more engaged with other providers and to have a more open and outward looking approach (Malpass 1994). The thesis draws on a growing body of research concerned with the professionalisation of government officers, and more specifically those in leisure services departments (Coalter 1986; Bacon 1990; Coalter 1990; Torkildsen 1998; McNamee, Sheridan et al. 1999). This thesis explores whether these actors co-operate to achieve shared goals, drive the agenda or resist change. The issues of policy change, governance and partnership are addressed in the literature review.

1.3 Methodological Considerations

Issues of methodology "influence what should be studied, how research should be done and how results should be interpreted" (Bryman 1988: 4). This thesis adopts a critical
realist approach, accepting that some phenomena, such as the actions of individuals, cannot always be observed in an objective way and that the methods of the natural sciences are not appropriate for the study of complex social phenomenon. However, theory plays an important role in the thesis as it provides...

...a generalized explanation of political behaviour. A theory contains assumptions about the individual, accounts of human action and explanations of the role of social and political structures (John 1998: 15).

Theory, therefore, was used to help formulate the research questions and direct the methods of data collection and data analysis. Further, theory plays an important role in helping to interpret the result and, in particular, deeper [unobservable] social mechanisms involved in the study of policy change in cities.

1.4 Theoretical orientation

The study of policy change, governance and partnership is multi-disciplinary in nature, therefore it is necessary to draw upon literature from the study of politics, organisations, sociology, management sciences and economics as well as using specialist knowledge from the leisure field. To help explain the process of local government change, the thesis draws upon theories of the state, contemporary theories of urban political economy, policy network analysis and regulation theory. Each of these theoretical traditions is introduced in this section.

The thesis reviews the community power debate, which has traditionally been contested between pluralists and elite theorists. Pluralism, at least in prescriptive form, argues that to achieve democracy, it is desirable for power to be fragmented and decentralised to a degree where all groups have some resources to assert their case (Dahl 1961; Polsby 1980). In contrast, elite theorists suggest that a ruling elite commands urban politics (Hunter 1953; Bachrach and Baratz 1970). In the 1970s Marxist theory emerged as a theoretical challenge to these traditional views by highlighting the importance of class interests and the power of capital over decision making (Castells, 1977; Cockburn, 1977).
Pluralism, elite theory and Marxism have been developed over time with a growing body of literature helping to explain the challenges facing local government. Particularly within the neo-pluralist perspective, a range of literature has developed to explain a move towards partnerships and collaboration in urban contexts. Logan and Molotch (1987) investigate the way in which urban elites, in trying to promote the hegemony of their own business interests, attempt to stimulate economic development by turning cities into 'growth machines'. Regime theory emerged in the 1980s as an attempt to move away from a debate about "power over" as a means of social control to a discussion of how power is gained and exercised to achieve economic, social and political objectives (Stone 1989). Analysis of urban coalition and regime formation, despite the difficulties of cross-national comparison, has been used to help explain collaboration between local government and non-public agencies and actors within the fragmented system of British local government (Harding 1991; Digaetano and Klemanski 1993a; Digaetano and Klemanski 1993b; Harding 1994; Stoker and Mossberger 1994; Henry and Paramio Salcines 1999; Paramio-Salcines 2000).

The policy network literature also offers some insights into intergovernmental relations as well as styles of policy making between government and non-government agencies and actors. This literature is particularly important for this research as it contributes to an explanation of the way in which networks help to "determine the policy agenda and to shape policy outcomes" (Marsh and Rhodes 1992: 262). The literature on policy networks also helps bridge the gap between different levels of analysis. At the macro level it facilitates an understanding of the changing characteristics of British Government (Marsh and Rhodes 1992); at a meso level it aids the analysis of intergovernmental relations (Rhodes 1990); whilst at the micro level of analysis it can help the evaluation of sub-sectoral policy and, in particularly, the interpersonal relationships which shape it (Wilks and Wright 1989).

Neo-Marxist literature also provides a useful macro level account of broad economic and social changes in the organisation of capitalism. Regulation theory helps explain how economic growth and stability (a regime of accumulation) is maintained through certain
political, social and cultural activities (a mode of social regulation) (Jessop 1988; Stewart and Stoker 1989). Regulation theorists have suggested that these changes might be termed a transition from a Fordist regime of capital accumulation to a new period of post Fordism or neo-Fordism (Jessop 1990; Jessop 1995; Painter and Philo 1995). Literature on the transition framework includes studies of local government (Geddes 1989; Stoker 1990). Whether the contemporary context is described as a variant of Fordism or a structural shift, regulation theory may help to explain changes that have shaped the new social, political, cultural and economic environments of cities.

1.5 Aims Of The Research

As noted above, the primary aim of the research and the research questions were derived from the literature. The primary aim of the research is to provide a theoretically informed but empirically grounded account of leisure policy change in a contemporary British city. The review of the literature alluded to several important research objectives. These include:

- to review both the reasons for policy change and policy stability / continuity.
- to analyse the relationship between the state and the local policy context.
- to analyse the impact of broad economic, political and social factors as well as local factors.
- to evaluate the nature of change within institutions and the interorganisational relationships between the public, private and voluntary sectors organisations.
- to evaluate the inter-subject dimension. In particular, who has the power to influence policy change and to resist change and how this power is expressed.
- to address why collaboration occurs in urban policy-making and the manner in which actors create support for action.
- to review the outcomes and characteristics of collaborative arrangements but more importantly to analyse the mechanisms underpinning their formation.
1.6 Methods Of Empirical Investigation

1.6.1 The Rationale for the Case Study Approach

The single case study approach was adopted, rather than a comparative approach to allow a detailed gathering of in-depth information about a particular problem or situation by using a combination of methods (Yin 1984; Stake 1995). A number of criticisms of the case study approach have been presented within the field of contemporary urban politics. Mossberger and Stoker (2001) (using Sartori 1991) identify four potential pitfalls in the comparative approach: parochialism, misclassification, degreeism, and concept stretching. Parochialism: is the inventing of new terms or the misuse of old ones. Within a study of policy change, governance and partnership, this would be using a theory to describe any type of public-private partnership in a city. Misclassification is the ignoring of important differences and clustering together unlike phenomena. Degreeism is not qualifying differences. In this study, degreeism would occur if the study reported, for example, that an urban regime existed in the city to some degree rather than specifying the factors that need to be present in the city for the regime to exist. Degreeism is common in studies of urban policy and partnerships, as many of the 'models', such as regime theory, do not specify the 'sufficient' level of co-operation, stability or coherence for regimes to exist (Mossberger and Stoker 2001). Concept stretching refers to the removal of aspects of an original meaning so that it can accommodate more cases. Thus, the comparative approach can pay too much emphasis to locating, mapping, or producing new typologies to accommodate any type of public-private collaboration in a city rather than explaining the urban politics of the case study (Mossberger and Stoker 2001; Macleod and Goodwin 1999; Ward 1996).

A longitudinal approach has been adopted, as it is necessary in the study of urban policy change to take into account the interaction of structural factors and the impact of agents over a long period of time (Marsh and Smith 2001). By using an interpretive methodology it is possible to allow the main proposition of a study to emerge inductively from observation of urban scene (Stone, Orr et al. 1991). Qualitative methods can be used to gain actors interpretations of the evolution of events over time. In fact...
...it is possible to view a phenomenon... as a series of interlinked events; what prompted it, what people thought about it, how they reacted to it, how it developed, its outcome and what people thought of the outcome (Bryman 1989: 137).

1.6.2 The Rationale for Choosing Sheffield

The selection of a Post War case was made on the basis of its appropriateness in reflecting the themes of the policy and theory literature, and on pragmatic grounds of gaining access actors involved in partnership policies.

In the post war period Sheffield has undergone many of the changes that typified the restructuring of local government in Britain. Like many British cities in the post-war period, Sheffield benefited from a period of growth and relative stability (Seyd 1993). However, by the mid 1970s, along with other British industrial cities, Sheffield’s economic base had collapsed. In the period 1970 to 1985 over 50,000 jobs were lost in the city and unemployment rose from 3% to 16% (Price 1998).

Sheffield City Council, like many Labour controlled, British cities in the 1980s, introduced a number of measures to defend services and solve localised problems (Seyd 1987). The City Council and its neighbouring authorities were viewed as particularly radical, and Sheffield became labelled as the capital of the ‘socialist republic of South Yorkshire’ (Strange 1995). During this period, the city insisted on maintaining high levels of public services and employment, and local taxes were raised to meet the Council’s budget deficit. This drew the Authority into confrontation with a central government intent on reducing local spending. Furthermore, conflict developed between the Council and local businesses. The result of this conflict was a long running argument between the public and private sector in Sheffield, often conducted within the media, with both sectors blaming each other for the city’s demise (Price 1998).

A number of commentators (Lawless 1990; Seyd 1993; Strange 1993; McColl 1994; Henry and Paramio-Salcines 1999; Paramio-Salcines 2000) have suggested that by the mid-1980s many of the organisations involved in Sheffield’s governance recognised that
compromise and collaboration were the only solutions to Sheffield’s economic and social problems. From that period, representatives of the City Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the Universities and other organisations met regularly to plan the regeneration of the city. From these informal meetings, a new partnership approach emerged in the city, which was shaped into more formal collaborative relationships that were to have a sustained influence over local policymaking (Lawless 1990; Seyd 1993; Strange 1993; McColl 1994; Henry and Paramio-Salcines 1999; Paramio-Salcines 2000).

By the 1990s, Sheffield City Council was forced to work with a number of semi-autonomous agencies operating within the city, such as, the Sheffield Development Corporation and the Training and Enterprise Council (Middleton 1991). This, and the imposition of Compulsory Competitive Tendering, required the Local Authority to behave in a range of policy areas in a manner more akin to business (Strange 1995). Following from this, in the 1990s, Sheffield developed a new entrepreneurial approach to partnerships incorporating both economic and social goals (Strange 1993; Paramio-Salcines 2000). These evident shifts in policy aims make Sheffield a useful case study in which to evaluate the transformation from local government to local governance.

The case study of Sheffield, not only provides a useful example of local government change, but also provides a good example of a city that has undergone major leisure policy change. In the Post War period, leisure played a role in Sheffield's social welfare provision, although the city's leisure expenditure was significantly lower than that of many comparable British cities (Price 1998). However, towards the end of the 1980s a number of Sheffield organisations became concerned with regenerating the city and improving its image. Sheffield, like many British cities, developed a regeneration strategy based on sport, culture and leisure. The most prominent elements of this strategy were the transformation of a declining area of the city into a Cultural Industries Quarter and the hosting of the World Student Games in 1991 (Bramwell 1997; Henry and Paramio-Salcines 1999; Price 1998; Paramio-Salcines 2000).
By the 1990s the apparent failure of the market-led regeneration strategy to adequately address issues of inequality, poverty and social exclusion, led to the development of a socially progressive partnership approach. Partnership with the community became one of the Council's corporate objectives (Sheffield City Council 1991) and leisure was recognised as a central feature of this new approach (Sheffield City Council, University et al. 1992). This study analyses how the partnership approach evolved with specific reference to the development of three interrelated projects. The first of these was Sports Sheffield, a partnership forum which developed after the World Student Games. Despite some community development goals, Sports Sheffield was essentially a partnership vehicle for bidding for Sheffield to become the country's first city to acquire the designation City of Sport in 1995 (Sports Sheffield Association 1994). The second project was Sheffield Play Council, a partnership vehicle for implementing the recommendations of the 1995 Play Policy and essentially involved developing partnerships across the range of organisations involved in children's play in the city (Sheffield Play Policy Working Group 1996). The third partnership was Active Sheffield, a partnership with a remit to develop community recreation and health opportunities (Sheffield City Council 1999). In 1998 the Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy at Loughborough University was asked to conduct a study on the development of this partnership approach in the city. In practical terms, this enabled the researcher, acting as a research assistant on the project, to gain access to the policy-making environment and the actors involved.

1.6.3 Methods of data collection

As noted above, the study principally adopts a case study approach and primarily qualitative methods in the form of participant observation, semi-structured interviews and inductive document analysis. Qualitative methods were chosen to help provide a detailed description of the context and to help develop an understanding of the case (Cassell and Symon 1994). Further, by employing qualitative methods, the researcher is able to gain interpretations of policy change from actors within the context by attempting to see the phenomenon through their eyes (Silverman 1985).
There were various methods employed in this case study. Firstly, an inductive content analysis of documents including historical records and local newspapers. Analysis was also conducted on documents produced by the Council and other agencies in the city. These sources included strategy reports, other reports, minutes of meetings, internal memos and letters of correspondence between organisations. These sources were used to construct background information and to provide context for the research and to compare with accounts provided by interviewees. The document analysis was particularly useful for providing a chronology of events relating to local government and leisure policy change and the development of the partnership approach in the city.

The second research approach, was semi-structured interviews with council officers. These officers were working, or had worked, in the Leisure Services Department at some time between 1974 and 1999. The interviews were designed to develop an understanding of leisure policy change in the city as perceived by officers and the relationship between such changes to the values of officers. In particular, the respondents' interpretations of policy change and, where appropriate, their attitudes and beliefs towards partnership. The choice of respondents was made through examination of documents and from recommendations of other interviewees. This 'snowball' method of sampling helped identify individuals involved in leisure partnership work. It also indicated which individuals supported or resisted particular policies so an understanding could be made of these positions. It was initially also intended to interview local government politicians; this however proved unworkable as several politicians declined the request for a meeting.

Interviews were also conducted with representatives from public, private and voluntary / community sector organisations within the city. The local authority had invited a number of these representatives to participate in a city-wide partnership forum. Interviews were also conducted with representatives from organisations which were not invited to join this partnership approach. The aim of these interviews was to contribute to an understanding of the nature of local politics and decision making from the perspective of external actors.
Chapter 1

Introduction

The literature on policy change in Britain has generally been developed in two ways. Firstly, semantic accounts of policy change based on theoretical inference but devoid of empirical work. Secondly, empirical studies have been conducted on specific aspects of policy such as Compulsory Competitive Tendering or Best Value, but often with little theoretical content. This study attempts to provide a theoretically informed but empirically grounded construction of the nature of contemporary leisure policy in a major British city over a 25 year period.

As noted above, theory plays a central role in this thesis. However, this thesis does not attempt to build a model, make predictions or generate and test hypotheses. Rather, theory is used to inform the enquiry, to suggest the research questions and to help interpret the results. As such, the study provides a review of the Sheffield case through the prism of theories of politics, policy, studies, management studies, sociology and leisure studies. As a consequence, the thesis also aims to evaluate these theories in relation to their ability to account for policy change in the case. Furthermore, the thesis attempts to identify and address defined gaps in relation to these theories.

The study attempts to reveal the nature and significance of the issues involved in the Sheffield case through qualitative methods. Cities are complex social environments, therefore, it is impossible to observe and measure all the structures that exist. Thus, the research reports the accounts of local government officers, politicians and interest group representatives. The study examines these reflexive agents interpretation of the structural context and evaluates how this affects their actions and behaviour.

1.8 Structure Of The Thesis

The structure of the remaining seven chapters of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 is a review of related theoretical literature. It presents the evolution of theories of urban politics and evaluates the potential contribution these theories can make to the understanding of the nature of policy in contemporary British cities. Chapter 3 provides
a review of the literature on the changing role, organisation and management of British local government from reorganisation in 1974 to 1999. In particular, an analysis of the shift from local government to forms of governance and the emergence of partnership approaches is provided. The aim is to provide a context for understanding local government change within Sheffield. The chapter also aims to provide an understanding of leisure policy change in Britain and more specifically within British local government.

Chapter 4 presents the research methodology and the rationale for adopting a critical realist approach. The Chapter demonstrates how the broad research topics developed from a review of the literature and how the raw data themes emerged through a process of inductive content analysis. The Chapter also displays how patterns in the data were grouped into themes and how these were used to structure the three chapters presenting the results and the conclusion.

Chapter 5, the first of the chapters reporting results, offers a chronology of local government change in Sheffield between 1974 and 1999 drawn from an analysis of documents, interviews and secondary sources. Chapter 6, the second of the chapters reporting results, presents a chronology of leisure policy change in Sheffield during the same period. Both chapters develop a framework for understanding policy change. Within these chapters inferences are made about the structure, culture and interorganisational relationships of the local authority as well as the Leisure Department, drawing on theories of the state and contemporary theories of urban political economy.

Within Chapter 7, the third of the results chapters, an analysis of Sheffield's Leisure Partnerships is provided. The key aim of this Chapter is to investigate the impact of partnerships in leisure on the nature of policy making at the local level. The Chapter specifically evaluates the development of Sports Sheffield, the Sheffield Play Council and Active Sheffield. The examination of these partnerships is structured into four parts. The context of the partnership, the partnership structure and composition, the partnership aims and objectives and finally partnership issues and problems.
Chapter 8, the concluding Chapter, provides an overview of the research and attempts to address the objectives of the thesis by utilising a macro, meso and micro level distinction. At the macro level, the chapter provides an evaluation of broad shifts in economic, social and political changes at the national and global level. At the meso level an analysis of the nature of change at the organisational and interorganisational level is provided. At the micro level, there is an evaluation of perspectives of individual actors within Sheffield's leisure partnerships. The conclusion developed in this final chapter reflects on the contributions of theories of the state and contemporary theories of urban political economy (in particular regime theory) and aspects of organisation theory, to an understanding of the contemporary context.

Figure 1.1 below links the main phases of the research, the intervening processes and the structure of the thesis:
### Chapter 1: Introduction

#### Rationale for the Research:
Theory informs the research and provides a rationale for studying policy change, governance, partnership, and leisure in Sheffield over the period 1974 to 1999.

#### Literature Review:
Mapping and assessing the existing intellectual territory helped to specify a set of research objectives to further develop the existing body of knowledge.

#### Methodology:
Social structures are not independent of agents. Some structures cannot be observed, therefore, they have to be interpreted.

Predominantly qualitative methods were chosen to seek actor's accounts of their response to the structural context and its relationship to their policy behaviour.

*Interviews, inductive document analysis, observation*

Inductive content analysis was used to analyse the data. Patterns and ideas were formed from the raw data themes.

#### Results:
The structure of the chapters reflects the findings of the inductive content analysis.

Theory provides a means to interpret the findings and understand the underlying structural relationships.

#### Conclusions:
The Thesis attempts to make a contribution to knowledge through:
1. a theoretically informed but empirically grounded construction of the case;
2. a review of the case through the prism of existing theories;
3. an evaluation of these theories in relation to their ability to account for policy change in the case;
4. addressing defined gaps in relation to this theory;
5. using qualitative methods to study change through the interpretations of reflexive agents.

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CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL REVIEW

2.1 Introduction to the Chapter

The analysis of local government and leisure policy is multi-disciplinary in nature. Therefore, to aid the understanding of changes and events in these fields it will be possible to draw upon literature from a number of different disciplines. These include the study of politics, organisations, sociology, management sciences and economics as well as using specialist knowledge from the leisure field. These fields of knowledge are drawn upon at various stages throughout the thesis to aid the understanding of the case. These theories, though often complimentary, may be conflict. According to both Marsh and Stoker (1995) and John (1998), one overarching feature across all these approaches is the central and important role of state. Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) also argue that theories of state have emerged as a central linking element in contemporary political science and this large body of theory has guided research in a diverse range of fields within the discipline.

This chapter begins with an analysis of the three traditional theories of the state: pluralism, elitism and Marxism. The chapter outlines the basic tenets of each approach, and the implications for adopting them in this thesis. The chapter moves on to analyse contemporary theories of urban political economy. These include urban regime theory, which emerged from a neo-pluralist perspective, growth machine analysis, which emerged from an elite theory standpoint and regulation theory, which emerged from Marxism. The approach adopted follows the notion promoted by Marsh and Stoker (1995), which suggests that to gain a fuller understanding of a case study, concepts from different theoretical traditions can be used to explain policy making and outcomes. Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987), who argue that different theoretical concepts can be used in a complimentary manner, support this view. Finally, the chapter reviews the network approach. Within this approach Marsh and Rhodes (1992) provide an integrated
theoretical approach which can help explain urban political economies. The policy network approach also helps bridge the gap between the macro and micro levels (Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 1990; Wilks and Wright 1989).

2.2 Traditional Theories Of The State

This section provides an analysis of traditional theories of the state, pluralism elitism and Marxism. The discussion of each of these theories is structured into four parts. Firstly, the traditional characteristics of each approach are identified and evaluated. Secondly, an evolution of each approach is provided, showing that some convergence has occurred between these theories. Thirdly, the application of each theory to the study of cities is discussed. Finally, a critique of each approach is given.

2.2.1 Pluralism - The Characteristics of the Approach

Pluralism has been used for the study of nation state-society relations and has often been used as a starting point for the development of other theories (Dahl 1961; Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987). Therefore, an analysis of pluralism provides a useful starting point for this chapter. The most important feature of pluralism is diversity. Pluralists contend that within diverse and complex states no individuals or organisations hold enough power to dominate society. Thus, power within modern societies is dispersed, fragmented, and decentralised to a degree where all groups have some resources to assert their case, even if their demands are not necessarily acted upon. As Dahl suggests:

> the existence of a significant number of relatively autonomous social groups has come to be called pluralism (Dahl 1961: 219).

The role of government, within this diversity, is to regulate society rather than to dominate it. For pluralists, this requires the separation of power to allow group and individual autonomy (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987). For pluralists, power within governments is also dispersed preventing any single interest dominating it (Marsh and Stoker 1995). However, through interest group representation, individuals and groups can mobilise collective influence that can press governments to make, discard or alter decisions (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987).
Pluralists use the term polyarchy to describe the rule of the many as opposed to democracy, the rule of all citizens, and oligarchy, the rule of the few (Judge 1995). Polyarchy is a society that is...

...fractured into conglomeres of hundreds of small special interest groups, with completely overlapping memberships, widely diffused power bases, and a multitude of techniques for exercising influence on decisions salient to them (Polsby 1980: 118).

Pluralists concede that pressure groups do not exert equal influence, as some groups, such as businesses, may have more resources to assert their case. However, there are a number of factors, which ensure that society remains pluralistic. First, Marsh and Stoker (1995) suggest that the influence of all groups is not extensive, as any group will only be interested in a limited range of issues. Therefore, groups will not attempt to influence policy areas beyond their immediate interests. Second, if one group holds excessive power then, in many instances, counter balancing group will emerge that will act as a constraint (Finer 1966). Third, if one group holds a disproportionate level of influence due to their resources, they may well be worse off in other factors which are also important in influencing decisions, thus economically poor interest groups can influence decisions by other means such as through the media (Finer 1966).

Pluralists also argue that individuals, as well as groups, cannot directly control policy-making in polyarchies. Judge (1995) shows that the large number of citizens in a complex society reduces any individual's ability to affect policy. In addition, power over government decisions is made difficult, as elected politicians tend to follow long term party policy preferences rather than those of the electorate (Judge 1995). Thus, the...

...ways in which a mass public controls its government and its politicians have less to do with Parliaments and constitutional constraints, and more to do with elections, party competition, and interest group activity (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1986: 25).

Despite the value of elections, pluralists accept that they only provide an intermittent means of exerting pressure, whereas interest group activity provides a more continuous mechanism (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1986). However, individuals' willingness to participate in these groups will be minimal if the issue does not directly affect them:
If a man's major life work is in banking, the pluralist presumes he will spend his time at the bank, and not in manipulating community decisions (Polsby 1980: 117).

This results in few decisions being contested by citizens, but when interest group activity occurs involving groups voicing intense dissatisfaction governments are likely to take more notice (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1986: 35). Hence, for pluralists, government is often “the steady appeasement of relatively small groups” (Dahl 1961: 145).

For classical pluralists, political power reflects the ability of one or more actors to achieve ends against resistance by others. Polsby (1963) described this power as “the capacity of one actor to do something, affecting another actor, which changes the probable pattern of specific future events” (Polsby 1963: 5). Dahl, was more specific by stating that power was when “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1961: 202). Therefore, the fundamental issues regarding pluralist theory are: who is involved in the decision-making process? who is successful in getting their preferences accepted as decisions? and who can be seen to influence outcomes? (Marsh and Stoker 1995). The objectives of the pluralist study are to understand: who gains? who loses? and who prevails? (Polsby 1980).

2.2.2 Pluralism – The Evolution of the Approach

Pluralist theory has evolved over time to take into account changing historical conditions and the role of business over decision-making (Marsh and Stoker 1995). The emergence of political, economic, urban and social crisis in America and European cities, and the emergence of urban social movements in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in changes to the theory. During this period the role of the nation state was also questioned (Castells 1976).

A more radical alternative to traditional pluralism has been neo-pluralism. Neo-pluralism developed in response to the combination of the emergence of new social movements, the 'decline' of the nation state and the increasing role of businesses in state politics (Ross, Levine et al. 1991). Like traditional pluralism, neo-pluralism considers liberal democracy to be the best form of social organisation. However, neo-pluralism is less
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concerned with countering the methodological and ideological attacks from other urban theories, and pays much less attention to elections, party competition or interest group politics (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987). Instead, neo-pluralists accept that a multi-causal explanation is required to describe complex modern social phenomena. Unlike conventional pluralists, neo-pluralists are ready to accept the growing influence of business over public policy making (Ross, Levine et al. 1991).

A central problem with traditional pluralism was the tendency to treat business as just another group. However, the business community is already structured into organisations, which can easily cooperate to mobilise collective action (Olson 1965). Furthermore, businesses have resources that are unavailable to other groups (Lindblom 1977). In addition, governments are more responsive to business interests as economic success is crucial to their own survival. Thus, pluralist theory developed to take into account the role of business. This approach allowed for the taking of decisions by business about investment and employment that are not subject to democratic controls (Lindblom 1977).

Thus, businesses have structural power but do not completely dominate the policy process. Dunleavy (1984) suggests that corporations are also able to influence public decisions, through the mass media, through participation in voluntary organisations and through the deference of politicians towards corporate interests. Within the economic sphere the business elite also has the means of influencing the tastes and fashions of citizens, for example, through advertising. The interaction between the state and business has led critics to argue that within liberal societies there was an open process of group-state interaction and that groups were developing integrated relationships with the state, through a process of corporatism (Cawson 1982) (see the section on group and network approaches for a review of corporatism).

Despite the institutional arrangements that emerged, many pluralists maintain that states do not become corporate states. For Richardson and Jordan (1979) there may be closed and institutionalised relationships within one policy area, but groups and interests other
than the state and other organisations are involved (Richardson and Jordan 1979). Jordan (1981) describes the open and flexible nature of policy communities:

On different aspects of policy, different sets of participants are involved. While some groups are very much part of the department's 'legitimised clientele', others enjoy less comfortable co-existence with the department. Thus it is not possible to give a static and exhaustive listing of groups in a community (Jordan 1981: 105).

Thus, despite the recognition of the influence of businesses, Dunleavy (1984) suggests that the neo-pluralist model stops well short of accepting the complete domination over politics that elite theorists and Marxist critics assume.

### 2.2.3 Pluralism – and the Application to Urban Politics

Dahl (1961) applied a normative methodology to reject the highly stratified view of the power structure identified in Atlanta by Hunter (Hunter 1953). Hunter (1953) argued that politicians and businessmen held power within Atlanta and these individuals held power over decision making (see the section on elitism). In contrast, Dahl in a study of New Haven attempted to test two rival hypotheses: that a unified oligarchy governed the city of New Haven or that there was a system of polyarchy in operation (Dahl 1961). To test his hypothesis, Dahl looked at the exercising of this power in three areas of decision making: urban development, public education and political nominations. The study focused on who was involved, and how they were involved, in making important political decisions.

Dahl concluded that over a period of two centuries, New Haven had changed from an oligarchy to a system of stratified pluralism. The city, Dahl argued, was pluralistic as political power was neither equally distributed, nor cumulatively structured in the hands of the few. Dahl showed that most citizens had the potential to use their power to influence indirectly elected leaders, who remained important in decision making. However, power was stratified, as there remained a small number of individuals who were more highly involved in the politics than the rest of the population. These individuals held a moderate amount of direct influence on the city's politics but their influence was specialised, in that different interest groups would emerge around certain
issues but would not influence other areas beyond the scope of their interests. Thus, Dahl concluded that there were “dispersed, non-cumulative inequalities” (Dahl 1961: 89).

2.2.4 Pluralism – Criticism of the Approach

Much of the critique of pluralist urban theory has been based on methodological grounds. Dahl has been criticised for the choice of political decisions adopted in his study. Waste (1986) argues that urban development, public education and political nominations were chosen because they were the most politically salient, thus were the most likely to appear pluralistic. Critics also argue that pluralists make assumptions about power that predetermine their findings (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Lukes (1974) identifies three ‘dimensions’ of power that can be used to review local policymaking. The first ‘dimension’ locates power by focussing on decisions made at a local level. Pluralists generally address the question of who has the power to influence policy decisions and to resist opposition. Thus, Dahl and other pluralists have adopted this ‘dimension’ of power. The second ‘dimension’ arises because many issues do not become the sites for public contestation, and so remain ‘non decisions’. Thus, a second face of power exists, the power to prevent demands for change from entering the political arena in the first place (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Bachrach and Baratz 1970). Bachrach and Baratz argue that pluralism...

...takes no account of the fact that power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision making to relatively ‘safe’ issues (1962: 948).

Waste (1986) has defended the pluralist approach by stating that...

...decisions can be studied, agreed upon and analysed. In contrast, ‘invisible’ issues almost by their definition present the opposite problem (Waste 1987: 83).

Polsby (1980) went further by arguing that non-decisions actually represent a certain type of decision as the “second face of power merges with the first thus it becomes identified” (Polsby 1980: 212-213).
The first and second dimensions of power identified by Lukes (1974) help explain power as an individual action. However, Marxists and radicals went further by arguing that a third face of power exists, arising out of structural constraints imposed by capitalist society. Structuralist Marxist theorists such as Althusser (1969) and Poulantzas (1974) have argued that people in capitalist societies cannot realise their real interests because of false consciousness, which masks their economic, political and social conditions, and that the only way for the masses to achieve their real interests would be through overt struggle to replace capitalist structures.

2.2.5 Elite Theory – The Characteristics of the Approach

Although the tradition of elitism has a long history, it is most commonly associated with the work of Pareto (1935), Mosca (1939) and Michels (1911). These theorists, writing in the early part of the twentieth century, argued that rule by elites was both inevitable and brought benefits and that in industrialised and democratic states the bourgeoisie would always use their resources to influence politics. Both Pareto (1935) and Mosca (1939) refuted pluralist claims that society was made up of many groups, all of which attempted to influence decisions but in which no single set of interests dominate. Elite theorists also reject Marxist assumptions about society and class struggle. For elitists, communism was no nearer to overcoming the domination of the ruling elite as...

...any Marxist revolution would simply generate a new ruling class: The socialists might conquer, but not socialism, which would perish in the moment of its adherents triumph (Michels 1959: 391, Quoted in Dunleavy 1986: 139).

Michels' (1911) 'iron law of oligarchy' has historically been used to describe elite rule. Michels argued that the majority of citizens are psychologically incapable of handling complex decisions and therefore consent to be ruled by those have access to material and intellectual resources. Or as Dunleavy (1986: 139) suggests, the...

...masses need leaders who can stir them out of apathy and organise them [and] once organised they (the masses) defer to leaders and accord them steadily greater levels of discretion to pursue their own rather than mass interests.
2.2.6 *Elite Theory – The Evolution of the Approach*

Weber's (1947) analysis of bureaucracy combined elements of elite theory and pluralism to explain organisation as the basis for oligarchy. For Weber (1947) bureaucracy was the emergence of a system of rational-legal administration within large businesses and government agencies. Weber (1968) argued that, conceding power to a capable few through bureaucracy, was the most effective form of administration. Bureaucracy is rule governed, has clear specialisation of roles and authority runs from one level to the next in a well-defined hierarchy of domination. A 'pure' type rational bureaucracy involves:

- the organisation of functions on a continuous and regulated basis;
- a functional division of spheres of competence;
- hierarchical organisation with control of higher over lower levels;
- working rules which may be technical, or norms requiring training;
- officials who are separated from the ownership of the means of production and administration;
- officials who cannot appropriate their office;
- administration which involves a written record; and
- a bureaucratic administrative staff

(adapted from Evans 1995)

However, whilst this position accepts that a small number of individuals hold a disproportionate amount of power in society, unlike radical elitists, Weber conceded that representative politics also had many values. Other democratic elite theorists have viewed democracy, not as a pluralist system of equality and mass participation in decision making, but rather a system that produced two or more elite groups competing for power. For Schumpeter, democracy only served as a source of legitimisation for the ruling elite, he stated democratic government was...

...an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote (Schumpeter, quoted in Dunleavy and O'Leary 1986: 142).

Radical elite theorists suggest Weberian accounts are ideological, as they believe policy level bureaucrats are either directly controlled by an external business elite or they act for the "benefit of people with the same background, incomes and interests as themselves" (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1986: 176). Radical elite theorists believe that decision-making
goes beyond symbolic leaders to a core of a power elite. The greater the significance of the decision the more likely that it will be dealt with out of view from the media and public's attention by the power elite. Radical elitism is seen in the work of Mills (1956). Mills (1956) argued that there were three levels of power in society. At the top there is a power elite, involving the executives of national government, businesses and the military. This group had the ability to mould public policy to meet its own ends. The Second tier is made up of semi-organised groups and lower tiers of government. At the bottom level there is a fragmented society of the masses (Mills 1956). According to Mills (1956), despite coming from different institutions, the power elite is drawn together by...

...coincidence of interests among economic, political, and military organisations. It also rests upon the similarity of origins and outlook, and the social and personal intermingling of the top circles from each of these dominant hierarchies (Mills 1956: 292).

2.2.7 Elite Theory – and the Application to Urban Politics

Dunleavy and O'Leary (1986) suggest that elite theorists offer three other conflicting accounts of the way local government operates. The first model is the dual polity account, which argues that local governments are fundamentally pluralist in their organisation and operations, because they only handle secondary issues of little importance to the national elites. Thus, the...

...'real' elites find the political formulas and consecrated myths of decentralisation or a fragmentation of powers a convenient cover for their monopoly control of the key decisions of the state (Dunleavy 1986: 179).

Dunleavy (1986) suggests a second model, a technocratic account, which regards local government as an efficient division of political labour that allows a functional segmentation of the state. Local control is not just managerially advantageous but it also relieves the load on national elites and local policy makers can take the blame for unwelcome decisions.

The third model is the community power account, authors argue that national elites do not act in a disconnected manner but maintain dominance over the masses by gaining support from a structure of regional and local elites. These sub-national policy-makers
play a major role in channelling diverse influences from external business and social elites into government (Hunter 1953).

Hunter's (1953) study of Atlanta, was the first comprehensive empirical study of elite theory in the urban setting. Hunter applied a reputational analysis to identify community influentials. To do this he assembled the names of members of the community elite into categories of business, government, civic associations and society activists. A panel was asked to rank these people, depending on their perception of how powerful they were. The top forty people were interviewed to ascertain who was the most powerful, how they interacted and how they related to community projects.

Hunter found that the mayor was the only member from the public policy making group who was perceived as having influence over decisions. The remaining powerful individuals were from Atlanta’s business sector. This business elite mobilised their resources to exert influence on the issues that affected its interests:

In other words, nothing in the governance of Atlanta moved if it did not originate within, or gained approval of, a business-dominant elite (Hunter 1953: 39).

2.2.8 Elite Theory – Criticism of the Approach

Like pluralism, elite theory has been criticised on methodological grounds. In particular, Hunter (1953) was accused of using empirical methods that were inadequate and predetermined his findings (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987). Second, the study showed that certain people were powerful but it failed to analyse why they were powerful (Dahl 1961; Polsby 1963). Third, the 'power' identified by Hunter was simply people's reputation for having power and the study did not look at the use of this power by these individuals (Harding 1995). A further criticism of elite theory has been that writers have concentrated on a power elite and particularly the role of businesses, and as such have underestimated the role of politicians (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987; Harding 1995). It has also been suggested by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) that elite theorists, like pluralists, often confine the scope of studies to relatively safe issues, thus ignoring non-decisions. In the elite theory case, elites might influence the decision-making environment, ensuring
that only those issues that they want to reach the political agenda will do so (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). A further critique has been offered by Harding (1995) and Stoker (1995), in their analysis of growth coalitions and regime theories they suggest that earlier elite oriented studies focused on understanding power and how it could be measured, but failed to take into account wider socio-economic change and its impact on states.

2.2.9 Marxism - The Characteristics of the Approach

Marxist theories of the state have sought to provide an understanding of the relationship between the state and particular classes in society. Whereas pluralism argues that power in society is dispersed, Marxists argue that because capitalist societies are dependent on economic production, ownership of the means of production results in economic power. Since societies are structurally dependant on economic production, economic power presides over political power. This, according to Marxists, inevitably results in class conflict, as a dominant few who own the means of production are able to accumulate enough resources to pursue their long-term interests and exploit the masses (Marsh and Stoker 1995).

Instrumentalist Marxists believe that urban politics is solely concerned with capital accumulation. Instrumentalists argue that the state, especially the local state, has little autonomy over decision making and is simply an 'instrument' of the dominant class to pursue its interests. (Cockburn 1977; Pickvance 1995). Structuralist Marxists, in contrast, recognise that there is considerable autonomy between the wishes of the dominant class and the policies of the state, which has greater unity. Structuralist Marxists, therefore suggest that the state is relatively autonomous from the ruling class (Miliband 1973; Poulantzas 1974).

2.2.10 Marxism – The Evolution of the Approach

Gramsci (1971) developed the notion of hegemony to aid the understanding of class rule. Gramsci suggests that the state consists of an entire complex of political and theoretical activities within which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but
manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules (Gramsci 1971: 244). For Gramsci, class struggle was therefore ideological, political and cultural. Taylor (1995) states that the contribution Gramsci, has made to Marxist theory has been a move away from looking at economic relations as the determinate of class relations. Gramsci also altered the focus of Marxism away from just a structuralist interpretation to take into account the role of agents in the process.

Beyond the basic position of Marxism, that is the relationship between the state and class struggle within capitalist society, writers have developed the theory further. Poulantzas (1974) suggest that if the capitalist state was to function in the long term interests of the bourgeoisie, then it must retain some independence from the ruling class. However, the state’s autonomy is constrained by the outcome of past class struggles, which privilege some interests over others. Poulantzas argued that policy is made in terms of strategic causality, a process emerging from class struggle.

Poulantzas (1974) further argued that individual actors within the state are not autonomous but respond to structural changes within the state. Miliband (1973) also acknowledged the importance of the state but suggested individuals played a greater role in policy making. Miliband argued that during periods of economic growth the state is more autonomous and responds to different classes in society. In contrast, during periods of economic crisis, the state responds to the dominant class which owns the means of production (Miliband 1973). Milliband, like some power elite theorists (see Mills 1956), regards the role of individuals as crucial to the understanding of policy making. In particular, Milliband argues that both elites from the capitalistic sector and the states apparatus share similar backgrounds and have the same objectives, of advancing the interests of the capitalist class.

Jessop (1982 1990) advances the claim that economic accounts and class conflict within capitalist states. Instead, Jessop argues that there are a “multiplicity of possible causal mechanisms or principles of explanation” (1982: 228). Thus other social forces such as gender can shape political outcomes. The state according to Jessop...
...has no power, it is merely an institutional ensemble: the power of the State is the power of the forces acting within the State (Jessop 1982: 149).

Jessop also suggests that structuralist accounts of policy making are inadequate, instead he suggests that policy decisions are the outcome of agents making strategic decisions within the state (Jessop 1990). Thus, the...

...state is not simply something towards which one must adopt a political strategy but is something (or better, a social relation) which can be fruitfully analysed as the site, the generator, and the product of strategies (Jessop 1989: 129).

Jessop's account outlines the value of analysing the strategic decisions of actors involved in policy making and the relationship between agents and state structures.

O'Connor (1973) argues that within capitalist society, the state has two main functions, to provide the prerequisites for production, such as a monetary system, a labour force, and a basic infrastructure. Secondly, the state tries to maintain social order by the creation of institutions to suppress social conflict by introducing concessionary policies for the working class. He termed these two functions an 'accumulation function' and a 'legitimisation function' (O'Connor 1973).

O'Connor (1973) argues that the state's accumulation function requires it to spend on 'social capital' expenditure in areas such as housing, education and health, which he termed 'social consumption', and spending on utilities, which he termed 'social investment'. O'Connor also argued that the state was required to spend in non-profit areas such as the police force and state benefits to fulfil the 'legitimisation function'. O'Connor argues that any society committed to these two functions would eventually result in crisis.

Urban fiscal crisis is seen as a result of a combination of underlying economic stress and a local government that has low political capital. O'Connor (1973) argues that there are two routes to crisis: First, monetary crisis develops if the state's expenditure outstrips its income, making it an unattractive proposition for lenders. Second, social and political
crisis occurs if the state reduces its legitimisation function. For O'Connor where resources are unequally distributed, as they are in large cities, the likelihood of financial crisis is greater.

Fiscal crisis is most prevalent where local expenditure is increased to promote business success, but the state is incapable of paying for such investment. As the rate of profit falls, businesses seek to reduce costs by pressing for lower taxation, whilst working class demands for benefits from the state increase. Thus the cost of collective consumption exceeds revenue resulting, for Marxists, in the basic contradiction of capital. If collective consumption were reduced, then non-statutory services, such as leisure policy, are likely to suffer expenditure cuts. However as social spending is cut, opposition increases, potentially resulting in social and political crisis.

2.2.11 Marxism – and the Application to Urban Politics

Traditionally, instrumentalist Marxists have paid little attention to the importance of local government and policy making. Cockburn (1977) provides an instrumentalist Marxist approach to the study of urban politics in Lambeth. Cockburn suggests that local government had little independence from the central state for which it simply performed several functions. Cockburn argued that the interests of this dominant group related well to the central government, but “scarcely notice a local council” (1977: 45). However, Cockburn does concede that the local council has a role to play in community development by reproducing the local labour force, by providing housing, social services and additional facilities such as the provision of leisure. She shows how localised councils help manage the local population by improving communications and to help break down barriers between councillors and residents. Despite this, Cockburn argues that the local state also creates conflicts. As the local rate of profit falls, employers press for lower taxation whilst demands are put on businesses to become more productive. Furthermore, local residents suffer from reduced expenditure and become dissatisfied. If the demands for benefits from the state are ignored then crisis can result.
Saunders (1984) separates the key functions of politics into those which are the responsibility of the central government and those which are the responsibility of the local state. For Saunders, separating these functions into the different tiers of government, can minimise or overt conflict. Saunders (1984) separates issues into two types. The first set of issues are production issues that generate a politics that is class-based and are the concern of central and regional governments. The second set of issues are about consumption and collective services. These are less class-based and are the main concern of local governments:

At the local level, where government activity is addressed primarily to the provision of consumption, most political mobilisation will occur around such sectoral, as opposed to class cleavages (Saunders 1984: 32-33).

Castells (1976) suggests that instead of simply responding to the demands of capital, the state needs to play a role in regulation, subsidy and direct provision. Castells sought to explain the crisis of the local state as a consequence of its contradictory functions: meeting the long term needs of capital while responding to working class demands (expressed through urban movements) for increased social expenditure. Social movements, according to Castells (1976) arise from consumption crisis, especially when governments make social concerns secondary.

2.2.12 Marxism – Criticism of the Approach

One of the main criticisms of Marxist accounts is that they explain state activity only by reference to general principles (such as the need to produce labour power) and fail to explain how and why particular policies arise at particular points in time (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987). Marxists also argue that any form of state intervention which might appear to benefit working-class interests, such as the development of welfare services, can be explained as representing the interests of capital. However, Marxist theory fails to allow the counter argument that the state acts against the interest of capital. This, according to the critics, suggests that Marxist conclusions that are drawn from an empirical study are built into its premises rather than reflecting analysis of empirical findings (Marsh and Stoker 1995).
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Pickvance (1995) takes this argument further. He argues that O'Connor's (1973) assumption, that there is opposition to state policy in favour of the interests of capital, is not evident in most capitalist societies. According to Pickvance (1995), the concept of class, central to Marxist theory, is abstract and can be 'applied' to concrete situations with little attention being paid to the actual empirical evidence. The lack of evidence in O'Connor's study is explained unconvincingly and this causes problems with regard to the evidence needed to ground an explanation. Therefore, the theory is often applied to any situation simply because class conflict provides an easy explanation of state intervention (Pickvance 1995).

A second criticism is that of class reductionism. Marxists regard class as of primary importance and dismiss other divisions in society (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987). Other divisions, for example home ownership, gender, or car ownership, are defined in the distribution sphere, not that of production, thus any conflicts between groups merely reflect conflicts amongst particular classes. A continuation of this argument is given by Pickvance (1995) argues that Cockburn's analysis of conflict between consumers of council services and the local state and between the local state and female employees, and Castells's concept of urban movements, are both outdated images of male class conflict against private employers.

The shortcomings of the traditional Marxist analysis of the local state led Saunders to develop the dual-state thesis, but this too has problems. The separation of production and consumption functions is not evident in all policy areas. Many production issues are the responsibility of local government and some consumption services have been spread between different tiers of government (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987).

Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) are critical of Saunders assumption that local government is pluralist. They argue that if this were the case then there would be a greater variation in the level, quality and variety of consumption policies between local authorities. Instead, policy over large areas is influenced by the role of public sector professionals who influence 'fashions' nationally and which are adapted with little variation between
authorities. British state policy under the Conservatives further reduced local government autonomy, which has meant provision has been increasingly influenced by the centre (Dunleavy 1984).

Despite this criticism, the dual state thesis does encourage the researcher to look at policy questions without isolating them from other issues or the context in which they are made. Marxist theories have also helped divert attention away from an analysis of political parties, elections and from the internal functioning of the local state as...

...it has offered alternative answers to existing questions and has placed new questions on the agenda but has left many questions unaddressed (Pickvance 1995: 274).

2.3 Contemporary Theories Of Urban Political Economy

This section analyses contemporary theories of urban political economy, which have developed from the traditional theories of the state. These include urban regime theory, which emerged from a neo-pluralist perspective, growth machine analysis, which emerged from an elitist standpoint and regulation theory, which emerged from Marxism. The argument put forward here is that each of these theories, whilst having its main foundations in one tradition, also draws from the other theories of the state. In addition, an integrated theoretical approach is the best way to explain urban political economies. This section is structured to address the four contemporary theories: urban regime theory, growth machines, and regulation theory and groups and network analysis. Discussion is divided into two parts in each case. First, the characteristics of the approach are analysed and subsequently a critique of each approach is given.

2.3.1 Urban regime theory – the Characteristics of the Approach

Urban regime theory draws on the community-power-structure literature of the 1950s and 1960s (Dahl 1961) and the urban-political-economy perspective, which emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s to aid the understanding of how cities respond to urban change (Elkin 1985; Elkin 1987; Fainstein and Fainstein 1989; Stone 1989). Urban regime theory sought to identify the conditions under which effective long term, independent local
coalitions come together to meet their objectives and defend the city against economic, social, political, cultural and physical challenges (Stone 1989).

Urban regime theory, like neo-pluralism, acknowledges that modern societies are fragmented and any group is unlikely to be able to exercise comprehensive control in a complex world (Orr and Stoker 1994: 49). Thus, urban regime theory...

...is about, how in the midst of diversity and complexity a capacity to govern can emerge within a political system (Stoker 1995: 57).

Urban regime theory also draws on elite theory by arguing that the 'investor class' is the most organised, best resourced, and the most capable group, enabling it to have a pronounced role in decision making. Urban regime theory also holds that the composition, relationships and resources of a city's coalition can shape local politics. The actors in the coalition are likely to be different in different cities but will always include government and business interests. The coalitions are...

...the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions (Stone 1989: 6).

In addition, regime accounts refute hyper-pluralist explanations, where the number of organised interests and the size of social and economic problems lead to a process of instability. Instead, urban regime theory, like elite theorists, argue that coalitions are “denoted by a sense of permanency or continuity” (Rosentraub and Helmke 1996: 504). Therefore, a regime is an...

...informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions (Stone 1989: 4).

Furthermore, once in operation, regimes are often hard to challenge as...

...if collective goals set for a regime do not change, if its social production performance is adequate, and if alternative institutional means do not exist, the regime can become self-entrenching and impervious to external threats (Deleon 1992: 557).
Urban regime theory also has commonalities with neo-Marxist accounts, in particular, regime theorists argue that the composition, relationships and resources of a city's governing coalition can shape urban politics. Stone also accepted some elements of Hunter's (1953) account of Atlanta, in particular, that the business elite had a disproportionate influence over city politics. However, Stone moved beyond elite theory, arguing that elected officials remained vital to the effective governance of the city. Therefore, urban regime theory is not reduced to a focus on individual actors and the interaction between them, as elite theorists and neo-Marxists assume, instead politics still matters (Stone 1989).

Stone's (1989) study evaluated why, despite some elements of change and despite significant opposition and alternative policy options, Atlanta retained a stable coalition, with an agenda of economic development despite changes in political leadership over an extended period. Stone maintained that two groups dominated the regime in Atlanta the downtown business elite and the black political leaders. The business elites desired economic success and expansion, and the black political leaders had the objectives of high quality housing, employment and small business opportunities in their constituencies. The black leaders, he argued, were adept at mobilising their supporters, which enabled them to manipulate their political resource for their benefit (Stone 1989: 63). What is important, and contrasts to Hunter (1953), is that neither the business elite nor the political leaders could pursue their interests without the support of the other. Thus the regime gave the city...

...a means to achieve a publicly significant result that an otherwise divided and fragmented system of authority could not provide (Stone 1989: 198).

Stone argued that regimes rely on informal arrangements and tacit understandings, which bind actors together and help mobilise effort, to cope with and adapt to, change (Stone 1989: 255). In such societies the issue is not about social control but to do with social production, which is the ability to "bring enough co-operation among disparate community elements to get things done" (Stone 1989: 227). Thus, in contrast to the debate, discussed earlier, between pluralists and elitists who focus on the issue of 'Who Governs' (Dahl 1961), in the social production perspective the...
...power struggle [between rulers and challengers] concerns, not control and resistance, but gaining and fusing a capacity to act - power to not power over (Stone 1989: 227).

Stone holds that public policies are shaped by three factors; the composition of the communities governing regime; the nature of the relationship in that regime and the resources the individuals brought to the coalition (Stone 1989). Two key groups, coordinate to formulate the regimes (elected officials and businesses leaders); and two subsidiary groups (organised groups and technical/professional officials). Stone states that the 'investor class' is the most organised, best resourced, and the most capable of engaging in a system of co-operation and coalition activity, which lays the foundation for a regime. Regime theorists accept that the members of the regime hold a privileged position, but acquire this through possessing the resources to make them an attractive coalition partner and by possessing of strategic knowledge of social transactions (Stoker 1995).

Regime theorists have studied various development strategies, which can build, and sustain different kinds of political regimes and have attempted to categorise the range of approaches used (Stone 1989; Digaetano and Klemanski 1993b). Despite differences, most typologies distinguish between pro-growth, progressive and caretaker regimes (Stone 1989). Pro-growth regimes can be either government-led through public subsidies aimed at stimulating the market into growth, or market led where development is facilitated in a free market with minimal intervention by the state. Progressive regimes seek to limit major developments in favour of community participation in decision-making. Such regimes also termed social-reform regimes, often target disadvantaged groups or deprived neighbourhoods. Caretaker regimes attempt to avoid development issues in general and instead attempt to induce financial stability and seek to limit the role of governance to routine governing tasks.

Stoker and Mossberger (1994) offer a variation on the classical typology of urban regimes which is valuable to the study of the modern city. They argue that three types of regime exist: organic regimes, instrumentalist regimes and symbolic regimes. Organic
regimes attempt to sustain the existing conditions within the city and, like the classic caretaker regime, they oppose city developments. Instrumentalist regimes promote particular types of urban development around a core development project, with the primary concern of improving the economic development of the city. Symbolic regimes attempt to alter the image or orientation of cities, for example promoting a service-based structure for the city as a reaction to economic restructuring in its traditional industries (Stoker and Mossberger 1994).

Harding (1994: 376) suggests that urban regime theory is valuable for analysis of the effects of institutional structures on the decision making behaviour of different organisational actors; the range of actors involved, formally and informally, in urban development strategies; the differential importance to place on various sections of the business community; and the implications of different forms of regime/coalition on patterns of resource distribution. For Harding (1994), urban regime theory also helps to tell us who is in the partnership and how coalitions are formed, and how they make decisions. In these respects, urban urban regime theory is useful in helping to build an understanding of modern urban decision-making.

A number of commentators (Harding 1990; Digaetano and Klemanski 1993a; Digaetano and Klemanski 1993b; Harding 1994) have used urban regime theory to help explain the changes in the governance of British cities since the 1970s. DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993a) argue that both Birmingham and Bristol have developed strategies that have been determined by local elite. Within Birmingham, a regime of council leaders, local officers, and local business leaders, promoted a public-led, pro-growth strategy. In contrast, a regime is harder to discern in Bristol's case, however, governance of the city does involve an alliance of various partners who implement mixed pro-growth and growth management strategies. For DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993a) Birmingham's pro-growth regime enabled it to adapt fairly well to global economic restructuring, whilst Bristol's regime failed to implement its goals. DiGaetano and Klemanski argue that a regime will be weak if there is an absence of a consensus around a given strategy or set of strategies, and where there is a fragmentation of the city's institutional structure, and
where central government constraints on local initiatives are adversely high (DiGaetano and Klemanski 1993: 78).

As DiGaetano and Klemanski have shown, urban regime theory enables the analysis of political power in a city and can provide an understanding how the relationships between partners affect the development of that city. The regime approach shows how cities react to socio-economic and political forces and as DiGaetano and Klemanski note, cities can...

...transform themselves through the capacity generated by regime formation and maintenance by taking advantage of the opportunities offered by that same context. In this manner cities become part of the process of urban development, not simply passive subjects of world economics and national state restructuring (DiGaetano & Klemanski 1993a: 79).

2.3.2 Urban regime theory – Criticism of the Approach

The regime framework is still new and less well developed than the traditional pluralist and elite theories discussed earlier. As such it suffers from a number of criticisms. Stoker argues that the approach works on the premise that power in urban politics can be defined, observed and measured. Unlike elite theorists and pluralists who debated who influenced politics, regime theorists cannot easily measure the causal relationships underlying policy development, which are extremely complex in modern cities (Sites 1997).

A further criticism is levelled by Stoker (1994) who argues that the theory is often applied to atheoretical case studies. Stoker advocates that researchers need to move away from theory, through empirical study, and back to theory (Stoker and Mossberger 1994). Stoker takes this argument further by commenting that a regime need not be identified in a city for the analysis to be valid, as a study with a sound theoretical understanding that can explain why a regime has failed to materialise and explores the factors that have made coalition activity weak can be of more value (Stoker and Mossberger 1994: 66).
Critics of urban regime theory state that it focuses too heavily on local-state actors resulting in a serious underestimation of social (nonstate) pressure (Sites 1997). For Sites (1997), the wider economic and political environment presents local officials with a number of opportunities and constraints that change over time. Within market-driven economies, cities are dependent on resources from the state which they cannot control. In Britain, for example, the vulnerability of cities to the adverse effects of economic change in the 1970s and pressure from neo-liberal central government has resulted in different strategies to respond to change, but generally an expenditure squeeze over the last two decades has put a hold on public sector pro-growth strategies (Sites 1997).

Sites (1997) also argues that the regime approach concentrates too heavily on public officials. He argues that developers, financial organisations and community groups can influence local politics through pressure groups more than the theory accepts and should therefore be given a higher profile in the analysis. Sites (1997) also argues that temporary shifts in policy can be easily mistaken for a long term policy orientation a regime. For example, a pro-growth regime advocating the launch of a new...

...policy innovation - or even significant increases in concessionary benefits to lower income groups - does not necessarily indicate a shift in the growth paradigm (Sites 1997: 539).

Therefore, Sites suggests a city's regime should be studied over time to analyse the long-term policy goals.

Despite the use of the urban regime theory and growth machine terminology to describe British urban affairs, critics argue that whilst partnership and coalition activity is evident, there is no body of evidence showing US style private sector dominated growth coalitions emerging in Britain (Harding 1990). Cooke (1988) suggests that the public sector plays a far greater role in urban affairs in the British case. But Cooke does argue that British local authorities play a strategic management function which enables development by the formulation of partnerships with the private and voluntary sectors, which are informal, based on interpersonal relationships, tacit understanding and mutual co-operation.
DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993a) argue that Stone's conception of urban regime theory cannot be successfully used as the model to explain coalition activity in Britain. They argue that the American political economy, where the business sector influences capital investment and public officials control public authority is not evident in Britain. Keating (1991) agrees with this view, suggesting that in Britain, business interests have traditionally been excluded from policy making. Furthermore, until recently, it has not been necessary for the public sector, with its planning and regulatory powers, to engage in partnerships with the private sector. Instead regimes in Britain have often been alliances between councillors and permanent public sector officials (Stoker 1991).

DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993a) argue that what is needed is a broader conception of regimes, they suggest that regimes are...

...modes of governance that entail formal and informal arrangements for policy making and implementation, both across public and private domains and within the public domain, the balance of which differs among nations and over time (DiGaetano and Klemanski 1993a: 58).

Therefore, what DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993a) suggest is that, instead of looking at pragmatic relations built by tacit understandings, selective incentives and small opportunities, regimes can also be built...

...around common conceptions about what mode of governance (tasks and strategies) should be employed (DiGaetano and Klemanski 1993a: 59).

The application of urban regime theory to British urban politics is developed further in methodology and the concluding chapter of this thesis.

2.3.3 Growth Machines – The Characteristics of the Approach

In the 1970s and 1980s commentators began to look at how urban elites, in trying to promote their own business interests, attempt to stimulate economic development by turning cities into what they term ‘growth machines’ (Molotch 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987). Molotch (1976) argues that growth machines emerge after urban crisis and are evident in American cities from the 1950s. Mollenkopth (1980) suggests that many of these cities developed regeneration programmes which were led by coalitions of elected politicians and business elites.
Growth machine theory, like all the contemporary theories of urban political economy analysed in this section, emerged from traditional theories of the state. The growth machine analysis stems from the community power debate and is a refined elite theory response to the development of neo-Weberian and Neo-Marxist approaches. Like traditional elite theory the growth machine approach is less concerned with the question of who, if anyone, rules but rather who has the greatest influence over the physical restructuring of places and whose interests such restructuring meets (Molotch 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987). The concentration on place, like urban regime theory, stems from the economic perspective of commentators such as Elkin (1985; 1987) and Stone (1989). Growth machine theory, like urban regime theory, also pays particular attention to the systemic nature of power, in particular the ability of the business elites to attain strategic advantage by virtue of their social, political and economic position (Molotch 1988).

Molotch (1976; 1988), the first commentator to use the term growth machine, suggests elites...

...have business or professional interests that are linked to local development or growth. These elites use public authority and private power as a means to stimulate economic development and thus enhance their own local business interests. They turn their cities, as active, dynamic units, into instruments for accomplishing the growth goals that will enhance their fortunes. The city becomes, for all intents and purposes, a 'growth machine' (Molotch 1988: 25).

Logan and Molotch (1987; 1996) have developed the theory further. They argue that the growth machine primarily constructs itself around land values and the rentier groups, and suggest that, whilst most people are content to gain use values from their property, there are also those who wish to make a financial gain from their assets. Landowners, who frequently do not have the expertise to make money from their assets, attempt to make profits by renting land (Logan and Molotch 1987) (the feature of use values and exchange values also have antecedents in Marxist theory). Logan and Molotch (1996) state that land rentiers gain three types of associates in society: businesses that profit directly from the development process such as developers and financiers; those organisations which
benefit when sales of their product rise; and finally organisations that have local ties and so benefit indirectly from growth, such as universities and sports clubs. Logan and Molotch (1996) argue that these local elites stimulate urban growth to ensure that they maintain their advantage, they...

...stress that the activism of entrepreneurs is, and always has been, a critical force in shaping the urban system, including the rise and fall of given places” (Logan and Molotch 1996: 293).

Molotch (1988) argues that the growth elite has some degree of discretion to carry out its objectives. However this discretion is shaped by a number of economic, political, physical and social constraints. These constraints force interaction between the elites, leading to coalition formation and the promotion of joint strategies and objectives for overcoming them. These constraints are in operation at different times and in different places, thus these constraints give rise to differences between local growth machines.

Harding (1995) contends that local government supports the growth elite as politicians rely on finance from the business community and they can also boost citizen's confidence in the government's ability to govern. Economic growth binds the group together as...

...a growth machine tries to legitimise the gains of its members and disarms critics by espousing an ideology of 'value free development' which claims economic growth is good for all (Harding 1995: 42).

In post industrial societies, competition for public and private investment is a deciding factor on which cities grow and which do not. Therefore, cities are in a position to affect the factors of production that can drive local growth. Politicians are valued in the coalition as local governments can lower the cost of raw materials by improving the infrastructure such as transport networks. Local governments can be sympathetic to businesses with regard to taxes and preventative legislation, and wages can be kept low by controlling union activity and reducing welfare payments.

Cities are also advertising themselves as being suitable sites to which businesses can relocate, and for growth, and many are using leisure for this purpose because...
...whilst a good opera or ballet company may subtly enhance the growth potential of some cities, other cultural ingredients are crucial for a good business climate” (Logan and Molotch 1996: 298).

As such, sports events...

...are considered ways of meeting short term goals of generating revenue as well as ways of meeting long-term goals of attracting outside businesses (Logan and Molotch 1996: 312).

Logan and Molotch accept the value of recreation in the maintenance of a healthy workforce and realise that arts and culture may help instil civic pride. However, more importantly...

....it is all part of the ideological ground for other civic goals, including the successful competition of cities for growth-inducing projects. Professional teams serve many latent social functions; sustaining growth ideology is clearly one of them (Logan and Molotch 1996: 315).

Logan and Molotch remain critical of the growth machine, as growth is not beneficial to the city's entire populations. Instead...

...in many cases, probably in most, additional local growth under current arrangements is a transfer of wealth and life chances from the general public to the rentier groups and their associates, use values of the majority are sacrificed for the exchange values of the few” (Logan and Molotch 1996: 325).

Resistance to urban growth often comes from those who desire use values rather than exchange values from their resources. An example of this resistance to growth is where it may bring adverse environmental effects or loss of community exclusivity. Furthermore, local growth often redistributes jobs from other areas rather than creating new positions, therefore, the benefit to the urban disadvantaged is dependent on the type of growth that is involved and the degree to which local disadvantaged groups are given an advantage over migrants in the competition for jobs. Logan and Molotch also acknowledge that local growth activists may exaggerate the projected benefits of the city's growth, which may lead to fiscal difficulties in the future (Logan and Molotch 1996: 321).
2.3.4 Growth Machines – Criticism of the Approach

The application of growth machine literature has rarely been used in the British case and where studies have been made, writers have used growth machine analysis alongside urban regime theory, and have generally accepted that the latter is more adequate (Harding 1991; 1994).

The major criticism of the growth machine model is that it is ethnocentric. The model, drawing on the experience of urban development in the US, cannot be replicated in other countries, without adequate consideration given to differences in the economy, institutions, politics, and ideology (Harding 1994). In particular, the US government system is fragmented; it has high levels of control over land use decisions by urban authorities and a heavy reliance on taxes raised locally from business and residents. Therefore, local politicians in the US are more likely to be receptive to the needs of local businesses than in the UK (Logan and Molotch 1987). Critics also argue that the growth machine model is too simplistic and sweeping (Harding 1994). In particular, it is hard to decipher exactly what empirical studies were undertaken and many have been criticised on methodological grounds (Harding 1995).

Logan and Molotch (1996) focus on a single aspect of the local economy, the property market, in which rentiers drive the machine towards one single goal, growth. However, in a globalised economy, international property speculation has meant fewer assets are owned locally. Instead, large companies have added property to their portfolio of assets to supplement their mainstream business in an attempt to spread business risk. These companies are far less likely to take a driving role than the local rentiers (Harding 1995: 45). Furthermore, growth is often not the only goal for the urban elite and, in particular, the theory offers a weak explanation of why local government desires to be part of coalitions and for failing to explain why some local governments do not participate in the growth machine in some instances (Harding 1994).

The needs of the business community are also more than just low cost rent. Instead, there is a massive variety in the “local social relations of production” (Eisenschitz and Gough
Companies require local skills, good relations with unions and good networks of suppliers and businesses, communication and technology to consider locating in an area. Therefore, businesses are unable to ‘play off’ local authorities against one another for incentives and subsidies in the manner suggested by Logan and Molotch (Harding 1994).

2.3.5 Regulation theory – The Characteristics of the Approach

Regulation theory developed from an economic-Marxist perspective to explain the changing character of capitalist states in the 1970s. It has also developed within other disciplines to explain broader shifts in urban politics. Unlike many other theories it attempts to explain changes in economic, social, political and cultural aspects of society and the interrelationships between them (Stoker 1990). Thus, regulation theory attempts to avoid the reductionist explanations of early Marxist accounts, which concentrated on economy and class struggle (Goodwin, Duncan et al. 1993). However, the regulation approach is diverse and there is no single, universally accepted theory (Jessop 1988).

Theorists use the term regulation widely but in this sense it is the regulation of the crisis of capitalism. As Jessop (1990: 307) notes, regulation theory is concerned with the...

...social processes through which capitalist expansion is secured within an inherently unstable and class divided society.

This regulation does not occur inevitably, but neither is it the product of deliberate efforts to induce it (Painter 1995).

There are several concepts that are vital to an explanation of the regulation approach. Firstly, regulationists refer to the labour process, which is the form of labour in the production process (Jessop, Bonnett et al. 1990). The key factor for regulationists is wage relations, which link consumption to production and economic growth. Secondly, regulationists refer to a regime of accumulation, meaning the nature of the macro-economic relationships which allow capital accumulation without being undermined by crisis. Specifically, it is the nature of the relationship between investment, production and consumption (Jessop, Bonnett et al. 1990).
Chapter 2

Theoretical Review

The third term of reference for regulation theorists is a mode of regulation. This refers to the political and socio-cultural institutions and practices that secure the relationship between investment, production and consumption (Jessop, Bonnett et al. 1990). In such circumstances there is a balance between the demand and supply of labour and capital. Stability is not just brought about by economic processes but also the combination of social, political and cultural activities. However, these activities are not necessarily established for the purpose of sustaining a regime of accumulation. The fourth concept used in regulation theory is the mode of societalisation, which is a pattern of institutional integration and social cohesion. This cohesion helps secure the dominance of the regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation (Jessop, Bonnett et al. 1990).

Regulation theorists argue that capitalism only survives and maintains growth because of regulatory mechanisms (Painter 1995). When these mechanisms fail, the result is crisis. However, from this crisis a new regime of accumulation can appear. Regulationists generally refer to three such shifts in the regime of accumulation. Firstly, a period of competitive regulation from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1920s. Secondly, from the 1930s to the 1970s a new regime of accumulation appeared with a new dominant set of rules, institutions and social relations developed. This has been termed Fordism. Finally, regulationists have debated whether, since the 1970s, there has been a transition from Fordism to a period of Post Fordism or whether one can simply claim that traditional Fordism arrangements have been exhausted but not replaced by a clear alternative (hence references to late Fordism, or after-Fordism in the literature) (Jessop 1992a; Jessop 1992b; Goodwin, Duncan et al. 1993; Jessop 1995; Painter 1995).

The concept of 'Fordism' was introduced by Gramsci (1971). The term has been used to describe a regime of capital accumulation characterised by standardised production of uniform goods, produced by an industry operating by rationalised production tasks, hence its title being derived from Henry Ford’s production principles. As a regime of accumulation...

...Fordism involves a virtuous circle of growth based on mass production and mass consumption (Jessop 1992a: 47).
In order to offset the alienation caused by the production processes, the workforce is rewarded by increases in real wages, generated by growth, which in turn increases the demand for mass-produced goods. Keynesian demand management polices, which gave transfer payments to those in need maintained Fordism, in post-war Britain. Within Fordism, the mode of societalisation involved the consumption of mass-produced goods and services in the nuclear family (broadly middle class, with a male breadwinner) as well as the provision of these goods by a bureaucratic state (Jessop, Bonnett et al. 1990; Painter 1995).

Regulationists maintain that a mode of regulation can only offset crisis temporarily, and therefore, in time, crisis tendencies will prevent it from operating. Stoker (1989) has identified a number of crisis tendencies in Fordism. First, the commitment to mass production has the potential to lead to overproduction and saturated markets. Second, Fordism places unskilled workers at the heart of the production process and this group is prone to strikes and periods of low productivity (Stoker 1989). Third, the processes of Fordism are incapable of being applied to certain industries (Stewart 1989). Stoker argues that the British crisis in Fordism began in the 1960s and ended in the 1970s during the period of the global economic crisis. Jessop (1990) also argues that the Keynesian welfare state led to crisis, as demand management policies resulted in wage costs rising and growing welfare demands being placed on the government.

Painter (1995) talks of the 'virtuous circle' of Fordism changing into a downward spiral in which productivity could no longer support the regime of accumulation. The Keynesian Welfare State, was only sustainable so long as economic growth gave it the means to operate. During the early 1970s global economic crisis followed the fall in the value of the US dollar and dramatic rise in the price of oil in 1973-4. These two factors had a catastrophic effect on Britain's economy. The emergence of an unregulated world credit system led to a loss of control of interest rates (Peck and Tickell 1992). In addition, Peck and Tickell (1992) argue that international competition between countries, made wages a burden on competitiveness for developed countries. Thus, many countries, such as Britain, were forced to reduce public expenditure and abandon Keynesian
demand management policies. As both inflation and employment rose, so did a crisis in confidence in the government's ability to cater for the economic and social needs of the population. Britain continued its spiral into crisis as it attempted to meet the cost of joining the European Community. The weakening power of the government was exemplified by Britain's need to receive a substantial loan from the International Monetary Fund by the Labour government in 1976. This resulted in the tightening of Britain's economy. Thus, wages were dropped, resulting in less demand for goods and the "virtuous cycle of Fordism had turned vicious" (Peck and Tickell 1992: 291).

During the 1970s all parties began to reassess the Keynesian Welfare State. Battles with the public sector trade unions occurred in the 'winter of discontent' 1978-1979. For radical socialists such as Benn (1982) the period resulted in the death knell of revisionist policies (Benn 1982) and with the British economy in decline, utopian socialism was no longer seen to be viable, particularly after the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 espousing a new right ideology.

Since the 1970s regulationists have debated the prospect of a post-Fordist mode of regulation. Most regulationists have agreed that fully-fledged post-Fordist social relations have not yet emerged and there are...

...conceptual reasons for doubting whether a new mode of regulation may do so (Painter 1995: 285).

Despite this, many writers have used post-Fordism as a concept to describe the emergence of flexible, automated production processes and communications, and information technology industries, which have prospered since the 1970's (Jessop 1990; Goodwin, Duncan et al. 1993; Painter 1995).

Painter (1995) suggests that under a post-Fordist mode of regulation there would be a greater flexibilisation in the labour market, which would cause a polarisation between the skilled core and the unskilled peripheral workforce. Bureaucratic structures would give way to leaner flatter structures, with the increased use of subcontracting, resulting in the decreased size of central organisations. International influence would increase,
particularly through monetary systems. Importantly, the link between production and consumption would increasingly become a matter of segmented, rather than mass-market, production.

Jessop (1988) argues that the role of the state would alter under a post-Fordist mode of regulation. This would involve a decline of the Keynesian welfare state in favour of a Schumpeterian workfare state. Whilst the Keynesian Welfare State was committed to full employment, social welfare and the management of aggregate demand, the Schumpeterian workfare state is characterised by a commitment to market opportunity, popular capitalism and supply-side economics (Jessop 1993). These factors would...

...promote product, process, organisational, and market innovation and enhance the structural competitiveness of open economies mainly through supply side intervention; and to subordinate social policy to the demands of labour market flexibility and structural competitiveness (Jessop 1993: 19).

Jessop also suggests that under post-Fordism, supranational bodies would grow in importance. This results in a loss of autonomy for national governments. For Jessop (1994) there is also a downward trend with the increased devolution of powers to lower tiers of governance. This is part of what has been termed the 'hollowing out of the state' (Jessop 1992b; Rhodes 1994).

Local government played a major part in implementing the goals of the Keynesian welfare state during the period of Fordism. Government institutions during Fordism tended to be bureaucratic, hierarchical and centralised. Painter (1995) argues that, whilst government under Fordism appeared to reflect the principles of Fordist production, it was not a straightforward mimic of it, but instead played a role in filling gaps left by the private sector. Jessop (1993) suggests that local government in a Schumpeterian workfare state would be less concerned with social and spatial equity and full employment and were more concerned with flexible structures and the efficient and effectiveness of the private sector. Hoggett (1987) suggests that local government service delivery, since the 1970s, has developed the same characteristics as private production principles. This makes it fertile ground for technological change and the
growth of new managerial forms (Hoggett 1987). In support of this contention he points out that many local governments have adopted new management doctrines which engender a leaner, fitter, flexible and democratised public service provision such as that proposed by Peters (see Peters and Waterman 1982).

Stoker (1989; 1990) regards the labour process within local government to be of central significance. For Stoker the contracting out of services to the private sector was an example of the move towards a post-Fordist city (Stoker 1989; 1990). Stoker, like Hoggett, acknowledges the contribution of new technologies to this transformation:

The availability of information technology in all its forms – data processing, communications and control, computer-aided design, office automation – offers the possibility of recasting traditionally labour intensive service activities. And one major use of such technology is to reduce the aggregate cost of a particular service and the employment within it (Stoker 1989: 160).

For Stoker (1990) the post-Fordist city requires a very different form of local government strategy than under Fordism. Under Fordism central government predominantly dealt with production concerns through the corporatist mechanisms while the local state, together with the quangos took care of consumption issues. Under the Conservative Government (1979-1997) local spending levels were cut and local service delivery structure and urban planning mechanisms were altered or controlled (Stoker 1990). Local government itself has been encouraged to scale down its activities. Stoker (1990) also argued that structural change is a product of political ideology. Within the British context, political, economic, social and cultural change are not the direct result of a change from Fordism to post-Fordism but has been shaped by the Thatcherite vision (Stoker 1990) (the issue of ideology and local government is developed in the next chapter).

2.3.6 Regulation theory – Criticism of the Approach

Like the regime and growth machine approaches, regulation theory is in its infancy and has been criticised on a number of counts. Painter (1995) offers a four-fold critique. Firstly, Painter argues that regulation theory is teleological, that is, it describes history
unfolding by an inevitable logic of development from one regime of accumulation to another without allowing for political intervention or conflict and evaluates events simply by whether or not they advance the society towards post-Fordism (Painter 1995). Secondly, Painter argues regulation theory is functionalist, as it explains the development of a new mode of regulation in terms of its effects in securing capital accumulation. Therefore, post-Fordism has arisen because the process of capital accumulation needed it. This is problematic, as the effects of a phenomenon cannot serve as an explanation of its origins (Painter 1995). Thirdly, Painter suggests that regulation theory is technological determinism, that is that social development is essentially driven by new technology. Hoggett’s (1987) interpretation in particular is a technology dominated one. Fourthly, Painter (1995) argues that regulation theory overstates the coherence of the mode of regulation, which is itself a class compromise in which hegemony ensures that the working class and other subordinate groups wait patiently until the crisis tendencies reach saturation point. This for Painter is an unrealistic assumption.

At the local government level criticism has also been common. Cochrane (1993) in particular argues that private sector organisational forms and the local state are overstated and do not adequately explain why local government has adopted certain methods. The organisation and reorganisation of local government since World War II has been infinitely more complicated than regulationists analysis of functionalism, uniformity and hierarchy would suggest (Cochrane 1993). Stewart (1986) also illustrates the diversity and lack of uniformity in local government service delivery. Furthermore, competing department and professional interests within local governments have often worked against standardised procedures, services and regulations (Stewart 1986).

Cochrane (1993) is also critical of Stoker’s (1990) notion of ideology shaping urban processes. For Cochrane, Stoker’s analysis is simplistic and idealist in the sense that he claims the concepts allow for generalisations and simplification of economic and social complexity to illustrate the key features of change. In particular, Stoker’s conclusions fail to adequately theorise economic changes within western industrial economies and do not adequately account for the differences between them (Cochrane 1993). For Cochrane
(1993), regulationists acknowledge many of the changes identified within a transition framework without being convinced that they have taken place. Cochrane is particularly critical of Stoker's notion that Thatcherism has the stability to represent a mode of regulation.

2.3.7 Group and Network Approaches – The characteristics of the approach

From the 1960s writers examined the role of groups in defining the policy process (see Truman 1964). The group approach suggests that the behaviour of all actors needs to be understood in the group context and the state itself is made up of groups which act together to shape policy (John 1998). The British literature on group policy making originally concentrated on pluralist and corporatist models, whilst in the American literature it has concentrated on a micro level analysis of sub-governments, dealing with personal relations between key actors rather than structural relations between institutions. To some extent these three models have been superseded by the policy network approach (Marsh and Rhodes 1992). The Section will analyse these four positions in turn.

The pluralist model, as discussed previously, suggests that interest group representation is characterised by a large number of groups and society is fragmented to a degree that there is an equal balance of power between interests. The approach argues that...

...the patterns of alliances that build up between outsider groups and the bureaucrats themselves structure policy rather than the institutions of the state. The group approach abandons the idea of a strict public/private or a state/non state distinction. In practice a maze of official and quasi legitimate groups share the exercise of authority and jointly make most public decisions (John 1998: 67).

However, the approach can also be linked to the neo-pluralist/elitist position that groups are unequal participants in the policy process (Lindblom 1977). For Lindblom (1977), three types of actors shape policy, citizens, group representatives and proximate policy makers (mainly office holders). For Lindblom, citizens rarely participate in political decision, rather policy is shaped by the privileged few. Such a position moves away from pluralist incrementalism (policy arising from slow moving bargaining between groups).
The second group and network approach has been corporatism. Corporatism can best be seen as a modern elite theory explanation. In contrast to pluralist explanations, corporatism suggests that policy decisions are made through a process of bargaining between state actors and certain elite actors. The elite actors (usually the areas of economic and industrial policy) negotiate with government and take on some of the functions of government. In turn governments support these interests financially and promote their interests in policy-making (Evans 1995). Schmitter offers a definition:

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports (Schmitter 1974: 94-95).

Cawson (1982) has argued that corporatism can also be used to characterise relationships in the welfare state during the 1970s. He suggests central departments, local councils, and the professions who administer services within local authorities; bargain over issues especially those relating to structural, financial and manpower policies (Cawson 1982). Within this context, elites emerge because governments need economic growth to stay in power. Therefore, business interests inevitably become privileged within society and in policy making. Cawson (1985) also acknowledged the role of trade unions in representing Labour. Thus policy making is developed after negotiation and bargaining between the groups representing capital, labour and the state (Cawson 1985). Despite adhering to the view that inequality and hierarchy exists, Cawson (1985) does not attribute this to class structure, as Marxist theories suggest. Instead, groups acquire functional interests, which gives them the capacity to become corporatist groups. Once, they gain a monopolistic position this offers them systemic power (Cawson 1985).

Marsh and Stoker (1995) argue that whilst corporatism was useful to help understand policy in the 1970s it is of little use in helping specific policy developments over the last two decades. Furthermore, neo-corporatism according to Evans (1995) became a catch-all phrase for the existence of monopolies of sectoral interests bargaining with the state. Thus it provides...
Chapter 2 Theoretical Review

...a poor understanding of how and why policy networks operate in the fundamentally elitist way that they do. In this sense, corporatism and neo-corporatism provide insufficient methodological tools for analysing power monopolies within policy networks (Evans 1995: 245).

John (1998) argues that the American literature has concentrated on micro level analysis of sub-governments, dealing with personal relations between key actors rather than structural relations between institutions. A sub-government typically involves members of the Senate, congressional staffs, bureaucrats and members of private groups and organisations interested in the policy area. Later the sub-government literature described the interaction between central government, the Congressional Committee, and the interest groups as the 'iron triangle' in which all three were dependent on one-another. Marsh (1992) argues that neither the sub-government nor the iron triangle models work in the British case because the Parliamentary Select Committees play no role remotely similar to the American Congressional Committees.

British local politics, as noted previously, has an elitist power structure, as some interests are favoured and in many cases access to the policy-making arena is restricted to the groups with resources and knowledge. Therefore, “producer groups and professional groups are the groups which, together with the government, dominate the policy networks” (Marsh and Rhodes 1992: 264). Furthermore, unlike urban regime theory, where coalitions are primarily initiated by the private sector, within policy networks the government often holds a key position. Individual departments within government often develop common interests and policies and form networks with other departments or external organisations to foster their interests (Marsh and Rhodes 1992: 264).

The concept of policy networks has focussed principally on two levels of analysis. The first is a meso level analysis as it emphasises the structural relationship between political institutions in a policy network. This model addresses the relationship between the broader questions about the distribution of power within urban society and the impact of inter-institutional networking on urban policy decisions (Rhodes 1981). In Rhodes’ first model (1981), central-local relations are viewed as a game in which both central and local participants manoeuvre for advantage, each ‘player’ using his/her resources to
influence policy, but remaining independent of the other 'players'. Rhodes (1981), drawing on literature on inter-organisational relations, suggests that all organisations are dependent upon one another and need to exchange resources to achieve their goals. Although decision-making within networks is often constrained, dominant coalition members retain some discretion. This discretion is "a product of the resources of each organisation, of the rules of the game, and of the process of exchange between organisations" (Marsh and Rhodes 1992: 11). A network of interests can employ strategies within the 'known rules of the game' to regulate the process of exchange.

Rhodes' (1981) model was criticised for not distinguishing between macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. In reaction Rhodes (1988) developed a second model using the British national government environment as a context for the operation of policy networks. In this account, he argues that a number of key factors have changed British policy networks, specifically...

...an unstable external support system; the decline of the mixed economy; the growth of the welfare state; the extension of the allied processes of functional differentiation and professionalisation; the development of a social structure characterised by a two-party system, a unitary institutional structure and a central elite ideology defending the mixed economy welfare state (Rhodes 1988: 282).

Rhodes (1988) divides policy networks into various categories between tightly integrated policy communities and loosely integrated issue networks, which are at opposite ends of a continuum. The characteristics of policy communities and issue networks are shown in table 2.1 below:
Table 2.1: Policy Communities And Issue Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Community</th>
<th>Issue Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A small number of participants due to restricted membership</td>
<td>Generally they involve a large number of groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominated by economic and professional interests</td>
<td>Large number of members which are interested in a broad range of issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is frequent interaction</td>
<td>They have less dependence on one another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues are constant over time</td>
<td>There is no regularity to interactions and membership fluctuates frequently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All participants have resources and share basic values</td>
<td>Some participants have access to resources but they are limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The policy community is hierarchical</td>
<td>There is also unequal power within the network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a balance of power among members resulting stability and a positive sum game</td>
<td>There is some agreement in the network but no continuity, which results in a zero-sum game.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is interdependence vertically, based on shared service delivery responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is limited horizontal articulation or the ability to penetrate other networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Marsh and Rhodes 1992)

Marsh and Rhodes (1992) suggest professional networks, intergovernmental networks and producer networks fill the middle ground in the continuum. Professional networks are similar in characteristic to policy communities except that they serve the interest of a profession, such as the health service. Intergovernmental networks are based on the different tiers of local government, they have an extensive pattern of interest across a range of services (Rhodes 1990). Within producer networks economic interests have a prominent role. There is limited vertical interdependence and there are often fluctuating memberships (Marsh and Rhodes 1992).

The second level of policy network analysis is a micro level analysis which evaluates sub-sectoral policy and, in particular, the interpersonal relationships which shape it (Wilks and Wright 1989). Wilks and Wright distinguish between a 'policy universe' and a 'policy community' and a 'policy network'. The policy universe consists of a large number of actors who share a common interest and who contribute to the policy process at regular intervals. The term policy community describes a more disaggregated system involving the actors that share an interest in a particular sector and interact with each other to balance and maximise their relationships. The policy network is an outcome of the exchanges between policy communities (Wilks and Wright 1989).
Marsh and Rhodes (1992) suggest that networks can be affected by four environmental factors. Firstly, changes in the economy and the market can help develop or alter networks. The authors suggest that a number of policy networks emerged in Britain during the 1970s to combat the worsening economic and social conditions and to ameliorate the problems associated with youth unemployment. Secondly, the ideology of the central government can also have an impact on networks. During the 1980s the...

...Conservative Party and the ideology of the New Right have been a wellspring of policy initiatives during the 1980s, giving the policy agenda a distinctive twist and mounting a serious challenge to the established routines of policy networks (Marsh and Rhodes 1992: 258).

Thirdly, knowledge, or a change in the understanding of the subject, is likely to have a major impact on the network. Marsh and Rhodes (1992) use the example of a smoking network being substantially altered after the linking of smoking to ill health. Fourthly, institutional change such as the emergence of supra-national institutions, like the European Commission, can bring about change to both policy and relationships within networks as well as foster the emergence of trans-national policy networks.

Whilst both Rhodes (1988) and Wilks and Wright (1989) argue that networks can change, they suggest that networks are usually stable and that any change is likely to be incremental. Policy communities, in particular, are associated with continuity by favouring the status quo and satisfying the existing balance of interests in the network (Rhodes 1988). However, networks are not closed and impenetrable by actors outside the public sector. Indeed...

...one of the strengths of the network approach is that it recognises that the government is not an undifferentiated whole. It is a department or a section of a department which is involved in a policy network or community, not the government itself (Marsh and Rhodes 1992: 259).

Furthermore, the more peripheral the issue and the more distant from the central governments agenda and the more limited the range of interests affected, the more likely the network will be able to work independently (Marsh and Rhodes 1992).
2.3.8 Group and Network Approaches – Criticism of the Approach

Kassim (1995) argues that policy networks are too all encompassing, therefore studies using the approach can become descriptive. Therefore, the researcher needs to ensure that the interests, ideas and institutions, which determine how a network functions, need to be analysed rather than just the network itself (John, 1992). Dowding (1995) states that network studies focus on the relationships within networks and on labelling networks as open or closed. However, the theory is limited in helping explain why inter-institutional relationships form and why they change. For Dowding, the structure and operation of policy networks merely reflect changes that are occurring in a policy area. Networks are not responsible for changes but they are the products of bargaining strategies and the various interests involved (Dowding 1995).

A further critique offered by Kassim (1994) is that policy network analysis fails to provide an adequate account of power as policy network analysis generally assumes that network actors co-operate and agree. Within shifting, more diffuse issue networks collaboration cannot be assumed. Therefore, the...

...practice of policy-making, whether carried out with a large number of actors or in a small selection, usually involves conflict, bargaining and coalition formation. Even though actors agree on the 'rules of the game' there is usually room for manoeuvre on what those rules mean (John 1998: 88).

Unlike urban regime theory, policy network analysis focusses on the state and sub-sectoral governments, therefore, it may be of limited use in analysing policy initiated by the commercial sector (Marsh and Rhodes 1992). In addition, Wilks and Wright's (1988) micro level network analysis evaluates the roles of individuals in the policy process by focussing on individual behaviour, this makes generalising the results problematic (Marsh and Rhodes 1992: 254).

2.4 Conclusion To The Chapter

This chapter has provided an analysis of the three traditional theories of the state: pluralism, elitism and Marxism. The chapter has also analysed contemporary theories of
urban political economy, in particular, urban regime theory, growth machine analysis, regulation theory and policy network analysis. The thesis adopts the notion that to gain a fuller understanding of policy making, concepts from different theoretical traditions can be used in a complimentary manner (Marsh and Stoker 1995; Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987). In particular a combination of theories can help facilitate an understanding at the macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. At the macro level, theories can aid the understanding of the changing characteristics of British Government. At a meso level it aids the analysis of interorganisational relations. Finally, at the micro level of analysis theories can help us understand the inter-subject relationships within the policy-making system. Reference to theories at each of these levels will be made throughout this thesis. In the conclusion these theoretical approaches are used to help explain the complex leisure policies and partnerships which have developed in Sheffield.
CHAPTER THREE

POLICY CHANGE, GOVERNANCE AND PARTNERSHIP IN BRITISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEISURE SERVICES

3.1 Introduction to the Chapter

Since the 1970s global socio-economic and political forces have affected the function, structure, and culture of local governments. Despite these impacts local authorities have maintained two predominant and relatively distinct roles, the first being economic development (Wood 1996) and the second being the maintenance of social welfare (Colenutt 1992). Leisure policy (including sport, culture and tourism), despite being a non-statutory service, has been provided by local governments to contribute to these two priorities (Henry 1993). In addition to global socio-economic forces, ideology has also played a role in shaping British local government, in particular, the ideology of the 'New Right' Conservative government after 1979 posed new challenges in the areas of expenditure, taxation and privatisation (Duncan and Goodwin 1988; Stoker 1991). In many instances these factors have resulted in authorities, when acting alone, being unable to meet the goals of economic development and social welfare (Rhodes 1994). Instead, there has been a growing need for the public sector to develop collaborative arrangements with organisations from the private and voluntary sectors. This transformation of the control and delivery of services has been described as part of a wider shift from local government to local governance (Atkinson and Coleman 1992; Malpass 1994; Stoker 1995; Rhodes 1996). Within this environment of change, the management of public services has altered resulting in a corresponding shift in the role of public sector leisure professionals. To review these changes the Chapter is divided into four sections. First, there is a discussion of political ideology and its implication for local government.
Second, there is a discussion of broad shifts in local government and leisure policy. Third, there is an analysis of partnership and local government. Fourth, the role of public sector leisure professionals is evaluated.

3.2 Political Ideology

Within this chapter, a central position is given to the role of ideas and ideology in explaining policy change. There are three reasons for such an approach. Firstly, political ideology has traditionally influenced the policy process, as Weber notes:

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determine the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest (Weber 1948: 280, quoted in John 1998: 144).

The second reason for analysing political ideology is to provide a progression from the evaluation of the theories of the state in the previous chapter. Pluralists argue that ideas reflect the balance of group power in society and that each group has the ability to influence the policy agenda by mobilising resources, which can be ideological. Elitists argue that some groups shape the policy agenda and ensure decision-makers discuss a limited set of ideas. Within decision-making, factors such as ideas and political language can marginalise certain interests. Marxists argue that ideologies help explain how economic and political power holders maintain their hegemony and reproduce the socio-economic system. Thus, the ideologies characteristic of capitalism derive from the private ownership of the means of production. Within urban regimes, coalitions or policy networks, ideas as well as interests bring together and unite groups. Organisations would not collaborate if there was little consensus about solutions to public problems.

The third reason for addressing political ideology is that from the 1970s ideological divisions between the two major parties became a feature of British politics. Furthermore, ideology has had a profound impact on the function, structure and culture of local government and more specifically on leisure policy over that period (Henry 1993) (even though more recently ideological divisions are said to have declined with the advent of New Labour). Therefore before an analysis of the changes that have occurred
in local government during the period, it is important to evaluate political ideology, and its implication for local government policy.

The concept of ideology used here is that employed by (Hall 1982):

A framework or network of values, concepts, images and propositions which we employ in interpreting and understanding how society works (Hall 1982: 16).

Henry (2001) adds that ideology can also be prescriptive, defining how society should work, he also suggests that ideology has an impact at the individual level as ideologies...

...reflect, implicitly or explicitly, sets of interests pertaining to particular groups, politicians, professionals, 'clients', consumers, or others (Henry 2001: 25).

The relationship between ideologies is multi-faceted and there are difficulties in providing a simple definition. The key ideologies addressed in this chapter are the 'New Right' (liberalism), 'traditional conservatism', socialism and the 'third way' commentary on the first three of these follows Henry's (1993) account.

3.2.1 Liberalism and the 'New Right'

Liberalism has traditionally drawn from the philosophy of Locke and the economics of Smith. Locke argued that individuals make a universal social contract with the state, or more simply, they consent to be governed. Within a liberal state there are no special rights, only the natural rights to life, freedom and property (Locke 1689). Smith argues that individuals should be free to maximise their interests in the free market supported only by the 'invisible hand', the government's stabilisation of the currency and the maintenance of public order (Smith 1790).

Understanding the basic tenets of liberal philosophy is important for an analysis of the 'New Right' policies of the Thatcher administration. The New Right, with its support for individualism, free markets, and private enterprise, advocates minimal state involvement in most areas of public life. As a consequence, the Conservative government, which came to power in 1979, was critical of the failure of state intervention policies of the
1960s and 1970s (by both Conservatives as well as Labour administrations). However, both Friedman (1962) and Hayek (1976), the primary writers, from whom the New Right draws, acknowledge that the market cannot deal with all processes and therefore state intervention is justified, in some cases, if the public benefits exceed the cost to individual's freedom.

In addition to advocating freedom and individual responsibility, the New Right also promotes a minimal role for the state in economic affairs. From the 1940s to the 1970s British governments had adopted Keynesian demand management policies which supported industry and provided social benefits from public expenditure. One of the fundamentals of Keynesian economics was to increase effective demand (Stewart 1986). Whilst effective demand is evident when there is spare capacity in the economy, during times of full employment excessive demand results in higher prices. Inflation is further produced by rising costs notably from excessive wage demands from trade unions. Monetarists argue that to pay for public expenditure there are only two options, either taxation must be increased, or the government needs to print money. Raising taxes increases price levels and burdens industry whilst printing money devalues the currency (Stewart 1986).

Liberal ideology and New Right philosophy is inherently linked to monetarist fiscal policy. Stewart (1986: 157) suggests that there are a number of reasons why monetarism developed:

One reason was that it was new, and in an era beguiled by novelty the appeal of a new way of looking at the world... Another reason for the appeal of monetarism lay in its essential simplicity... Thirdly it was a message in tune with the instincts of the more right-wing elements in the Conservative party... But the most important reason of all for the emergence of monetarism as the predominant economic doctrine of the 1970s and 1980s was the simplest of all: monetarism promised a cure for inflation.

For Monetarists the government's role is a neutral one where it balances its own budget and ensures that the country's money supply grows at a stable rate over time. To contend with high unemployment monetarists prescribe supply side measures to increase
flexibility in the labour market such as reducing taxation, reducing state benefits (thus making unemployment more unpleasant) and reducing the power of the trade unions (Stewart 1986).

3.2.2 Conservatism

There is some debate as to whether conservatism constitutes a political ideology, or whether it is simply a reaction to social change. Scruton (1980) argues that conservatism represents a systematic and reasonable set of beliefs based on tradition, allegiance and authority (Scruton 1980). Scruton's position is anti-liberal, arguing the state has a more substantial role, in ensuring authority and allegiance, than liberals concede. Scruton argues that governments have a key role in providing social stability, which enables people to bind to the traditional networks of the family, community and the state.

The main characteristic of conservatism is the maintenance of the status quo. Conservatism draws from the writing of Hobbes and Burke. Hobbes (1651) argued that the monarchy should be maintained since radical change may result in unforeseen consequences even anarchy. Burke (1881) suggests that current institutional arrangements represent the wisdom of history and should be protected (Burke 1881). Conservatism also draws on the Weberian conceptions of bureaucracy and rationality. For conservatives, hierarchies are natural as the most able individuals are promoted to positions at the pinnacle of society. However, despite supporting the authority of the elite, conservatives also recognise that with authority comes responsibility for the less fortunate, and hence advocate policies that assist those in need in society. This has been evident in the mild Keynesian and moderate collectivist policies implemented by the Macmillan and Heath administrations. Such support for mild interventionist policies was not evident in the Conservative Party from 1979, when supporters of such measures - the 'one nation conservatives' were eliminated from positions of power within the party in successive Thatcher administrations (Henry 1993).

3.2.3 Socialism and the 'Old Left'

The key characteristics of socialism are equality and freedom. For socialists the two are interrelated, as freedom of the individual is impossible without equal access to the
resources to pursue his or her own interests through the market. Socialist philosophy also stresses the need for collective action as the market fails to meet the needs of certain individuals and groups in society. Therefore socialists argue that the state has an important role in correcting the inequalities generated by capitalism.

From these basic tenets, different forms of socialism are evident. Cole (1974) distinguishes between scientific socialism and utopian socialism. Scientific socialism is a Marxist interpretation where, as long as there is unequal access to economic power, inequality will manifest in the substructure of society resulting in class oppression. Utopian socialism offers a vision of society based on co-operation, equality and social justice.

Marxist ideology argues that any reform that provides real benefits for working class groups must involve the socialisation of capital, either throughout struggle in the workplace or through the 'nationalisation' of industries. Fundamentalist Marxist writers are supportive of the 'Old Left' Labour Party's policies which aimed at public control over private sector interests, giving a dominant position to trade unions in economic affairs. Supporters of fundamentalist socialism attempted to maintain trade union influence by retaining Clause IV in the Labour Party constitution. However, in 1995 Clause IV was abolished as part of the 'New Labour' approach adopted by Tony Blair.

Utopian socialism maintains that the state has a role to play in redressing inequalities in the distribution of wealth, income, health and education, which would allow the democratic participation of all groups in society. The major mechanism for achieving socialism in post-war Britain was to be the Keynesian Welfare State and the nationalisation of industry and services. Socialist policies were implemented through parliamentary politics not class struggle, which, according to Crosland, was no longer viable (Crosland 1956).
3.2.4 Ideology and British Local Government

King (1989) argues that there are five ideological positions associated with British local government (Figure 3.1). These range from the liberal right to the statist left. The liberal right attempts to...

...devolve power and accept the consequent inequality and variation across districts. The Statist left pursues the elimination of inequality and, on that basis, constructs national priorities and criteria to be satisfied in local policies (King 1989: 204).

Figure 3.1: Five Theories of Local Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological level</th>
<th>New Right</th>
<th>Left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variants</td>
<td>Liberal new right</td>
<td>Conservative new right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Liberty, participation, efficiency</td>
<td>Central authority / efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of local government</td>
<td>Serves community</td>
<td>Serves community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrative policy</td>
<td>Community Charge</td>
<td>Enterprise boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy outcome</td>
<td>Promotes variation and inequality</td>
<td>Central pattern of services within efficiency criteria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(King 1989: 205)

According to King, the policies of the Conservative Party since 1979 have oscillated between the liberal new right and the conservative new right. The Community Charge, is an example of ‘New Right’ thinking as it links consumption of local services and their cost. Voters are then able to compare levels of service and cost in different authorities and if their local authority becomes uncompetitive they have the option of either voicing their opinions or can take up residence in an authority that better serves their needs (King 1989). However, the adoption of new forms of delivery, such as Urban Development Corporations, indicate a more authoritarian, centrally controlled policy indicative of conservative new right policy (King 1989).
3.2.5 The Third Way and 'New Labour'

The Labour Party since 1993 has sought to modernise the party and break with its socialist past. A number of commentators have suggested that a new politics has been sought which combines elements of the 'Old Left' ideology of social democracy and the 'New Right's' commitment to neo-liberalism. Giddens (1998) suggests that this 'Third Way'...

...seeks to go beyond the two hitherto dominant political philosophies of the postwar period... Each of these positions... still has its adherents. Yet it is plain that each is out of touch with the demands of the moment. Few People – certainly not the bulk of the electorate in the developed countries – want to go back to top-down, bureaucratic government. But it has become equally obvious that society cannot be run as if it were a gigantic marketplace... people want something different... the Third Way is that something. It is not yet a fully fledged political philosophy, but it is fast becoming one (Giddens 1998: 25).

For Giddens (1999) the Third Way would be characterised by a radical centre rather than the traditional left-right distinctions. The key role of the state is social investment and forming working relationships between sectors. Giddens (1998) suggests there would be consensus around privatisation, competition and deregulation or a 'new mixed economy'. This is a balance between economic and non-economic, rather than notions of public and private (Giddens 1998). Giddens also suggests that the Third way would include the notion of a 'new democratic state', this is based...

...on the devolution of power, not just downwards but upwards too: devolution downwards to localities and regions, and upwards to transnational agencies (Giddens 1998: 20).

Giddens (1998) also talks of a 'cosmopolitan nation', this viewpoint holds that the nation plays a stabilising force within a pluralist and decentralised democracy. Instead of a welfare state there is a need for a 'social investment state', for Giddens this is because...

...some of the criticisms offered by the new right about the welfare state are valid. Welfare institutions are often alienating and bureaucratic; welfare benefits create vested interests and may have perverse consequences, subverting what they were originally set up to achieve. The welfare state stands in need of radical reform, not in order to cut it back, but to make it responsive to the altered circumstances in which we live today (Giddens 1998: 20).

69
An overview of the main features of the ‘Third Way’ and the differences to the ‘Old Left’ and the ‘New Right’, are shown in the table below:

Figure 3.2 Giddens’ Third Way in Comparative Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Democracy</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>The Third Way</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(the old left)</td>
<td>(the new right)</td>
<td>(the centre left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class politics on the left</td>
<td>Class politics on the right</td>
<td>Modernising government of the centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old mixed economy</td>
<td>Market fundamentalism</td>
<td>New mixed economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatism: state domination over civil society</td>
<td>Minimal state</td>
<td>New democratic state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism</td>
<td>Conservative nation</td>
<td>Cosmopolitan nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong welfare state; protection ‘from cradle to grave’</td>
<td>Welfare safety net</td>
<td>Social investment state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Giddens 1998: 18)

3.3 Policy Change In British Local Government: 1974 – 1999

This section seeks to evaluate the changing role, organisation, and management of local government between the re-organisation in 1974 to 1999. The chapter also provides an overview of the major changes in central government leisure policy, as well as an analysis of changes in the delivery of leisure services at a local level. The section is divided into several elements. First, there is an analysis of local government and leisure policy during the post war period, where the growth in leisure services provided by local government was dramatic. Second, there is an evaluation of the squeeze on local government spending in the 1970s during the Wilson / Callaghan administrations in response to the requirements of the International Monetary Fund in granting a loan in 1976. The chapter goes on to review the evolution of local government and leisure policy under the political leadership of Thatcher, which was a fundamental departure from post war economic and social policy. The fourth section reviews the policies under John Major and section five analyses the policies under Tony Blair. In particular, these latter sections review the impact of Compulsory Competitive Tendering introduced in the 1989 Local Government Act and the impact of Best Value introduced in the 1999 Local Government Act.
3.3.1 The Post War Period

The Second World War had both negative and positive effects on Britain. The cost of the War suddenly “transformed Britain from a great power to a minor one” (Stewart 1986: 141). The incoming Labour government faced severe economic problems, yet it also acted as a catalyst for change. The defeat of the Churchill government in 1945 has been termed the result of an ‘inspection effect’ whereby the electorate voted for changes to the society for which they had sacrificed so much. By the 1950s Britain's economy began to emerge into a sustained period of economic growth. Output rose to meet the demands of consumers, who had been frustrated at not being able to spend during the War. At the same time resources were invested to repair the physical destruction created during the conflict. These two factors resulted in sufficient effective demand in the economy to reduce unemployment to an average of 1.8% in the years 1945 to 1970 compared to the 13% experienced during the inter-war years (Stewart 1986).

Between 1945 and 1955 Gross Domestic Product rose by about 20% and full employment was maintained. Such was the rate of growth in the economy, that Macmillan famously stated in 1957 that “most of our people have never had it so good” (quoted in Stewart 1986). In a buoyant economy, Local authorities had the powers to guide and control development through statutory planning legislation...

...as well as the resources to carry out comprehensive redevelopment, which included house-building and the provision of community and leisure facilities (Bailey 1995: 5).

Stoker (1991) suggests that the period 1955-75 was characterised by the expansion and modernisation of local governments. Local Authority expenditure in 1975 was nearly three times larger in real terms than in 1955 costing the nation £15.40 in every £100 in 1976, as opposed to £9.10 in 1955 (Stoker 1991). Furthermore, “in the two decades from 1952 the number of employees in local government increased by 50%” (Stoker 1991: 10). This expansion, Stoker (1991: 9) argues, had a positive impact on leisure as...

...larger, more elaborate leisure centres were provided, as well as better staffed and stocked libraries. Better roads, pedestrian lights and public buildings were developed.
Local governments during the immediate post war period lost some functions but gaining other responsibilities (Stoker 1991). Newton and Karran (1985) have produced a relatively comprehensive list of post war legislation, which had implications for local government expenditure and created new responsibilities to ensure that local government was the prime vehicle of the Welfare State (Newton and Karran 1985: 59-64). Stoker (1991) argues that despite new responsibilities the apparatus of local government remained largely unchanged. There were 81 county boroughs in England and Wales and 61 county authorities and 1356 county districts and London was the responsibility of 28 metropolitan boroughs and the London County Council (Stoker 1991).

3.3.2 Leisure Policy in the Post War Period

In contrast to the provision of other public services, Henry (1993) argues that leisure policy during the immediate post war period was not driven by a welfare rationale. Instead, the leisure organisations that were formed during the period such as the Arts Council in 1946, and the National Parks Commission in 1949, were far more concerned with preserving the cultural heritage (in terms of art and landscape) of the country. Likewise, the establishment of the Sports Advisory Council following recommendations from the Wolfendon Committee (1959) was not justified by reference to sport and recreation as intrinsically worthwhile (Henry, 1993).

Henry (1993) argues that it was not until the Labour Governments of 1964-70 and of the mid-1970s that “such reformist thinking became evident in government policy” (Henry 1993: 116). He goes on to argue that the period from the mid-1960s was particularly important for leisure with the appointment of the first minister for sport and the establishment of the (Advisory) Sports Council in 1965 and the granting of quasi autonomous status in 1971.

3.3.3 The Crisis of the 1970s

By the mid 1960s the rate of growth in the economy began to fall and could no longer sustain the growth of local-authority redevelopment programmes. The problems of Britain's economy intensified during the 1970s following the fall in the value of the US
dollar and the dramatic rise in the price of oil in 1973-4, these two factors had a catastrophic effect on Britain's economy (Stewart 1986). At the same time rising inflation made British goods less competitive in an increasingly globalised marketplace. Keynesian demand management policies could no longer trade off inflation against unemployment and as both rose simultaneously, so a crisis in confidence grew in relation to the government's ability to cater for the economic and social needs of the population. Bacon and Eltis (1978) argue that the fundamental fault in Britain's economy was that too few people produced marketed goods and services. Instead there were too many non-marketed products such as defence, education, the National Health Service and local government which like a parasite on the market sector caused chronic economic problems, and ultimately economic disaster (Bacon and Eltis 1978). Whilst the parasite thesis has a number of flaws (see Newton 1985: 34) the work published by Bacon and Eltis in the late 1970s...

...was exactly right for the political climate of the time. The thesis became firmly established in the views of many leading politicians and economists and it became the central tenet of government policy (Newton 1985: 35).

Britain continued its spiral into crisis as it attempted to meet the cost of joining the European Community. In 1974 Heath's government collapsed and, eventually in 1975, the Labour chancellor, Dennis Healey, in his budget, abandoned the goal of full employment. The weakening power of the government was further exemplified by Britain's need to receive a substantial loan from the International Monetary Fund in 1976. For Benn (1982) Britain's limited economic growth in the 1970s and the International Monetary Fund loan in 1976 signalled the end of socialist policies at the national level.

Inner city areas suffered the worst aspects of unemployment, poor housing and poverty brought about by the economic restructuring (Bailey 1995). In response, Harold Wilson launched the Urban Programme and the Community Development Programme in 1968, based on American models (Parkinson, 1989; Hambleton 1989). By the 1970s local government was already being criticised for being unwieldy and unresponsive to local needs (Brindley 1988). However, despite the widespread acceptance that the structure of local government was inadequate, only minor adjustments were made to the system,
except in London, which underwent reorganisation in 1963-5, resulting in the formation of the Greater London Council (GLC) and 32 boroughs. Widespread reform did not occur in other areas until 1972 (Brindley, 1988). The Redcliffe-Maud Committee advised on the reform of local government, which was set out in the 1972 Local Government Act. The re-organisation reduced the number of local authorities in England and Wales from approximately 1500 down to 500. Stoker suggests this resulted in modernised local authorities which...

...covered larger areas and local authorities were, in general, bigger and had new and streamlined management structures (Stoker 1991: 12).

The restructuring of local authorities in 1974 separated the functions of government between County Councils and District Councils. The division of responsibility has created tension between the two tiers of government. This was not simply a matter of status but reflects the feeling that a major city does not necessarily have the same interests as the county in which it is located (Stoker, 1991). The streamlining of local government also meant some of its functions were moved to non-elected bodies such as the health authorities. However, most leisure provision, remained a non-statutory requirement for local government through Section 16 of the Local Government Act (1976) which empowered local governments to provide such recreational facilities as they saw fit both within and outside their areas.

3.3.4 Leisure Policy in the 1970s

The new large-scale, bureaucratic, local government organisations of the 1970s invested heavily in leisure. The rationale for supporting leisure, according to Henry (2001), was the corporate management ideology that underpinned the new service departments. For the first time leisure departments were set up to co-ordinate the management of facilities, which had previously been separated into different functions. The period was also characterised by the professionalisation of local government and leisure management organisations. Leisure began to grow in stature and qualifications in leisure management legitimised the profession. These factors enabled local authorities to attract able and ambitious employees by offering higher wages (Henry 2001).
The growth in leisure facility provision was dramatic during the 1970s. In 1972 there were 30 municipal sports centres and under 500 indoor swimming pools operating in England. By 1978 there were 350 sports centres and over 850 pools (Sports Council 1983). The Sports Council was also given autonomous status in 1971 and was given direction in the 1975 White Paper, Sport and Recreation, which introduced a social democratic rationale of providing 'recreation for all' recognising it as 'one of the communities everyday needs' (Department of the Environment 1975). However, Henry argues that such developments were not solely concerned with providing equality of opportunity through direct state provision. He goes on to argue that the state's involvement was a traditional pluralist approach whereby state interference in the free market was justified in terms of the externalities that may accrue. For example support for leisure was given to rectify Britain's failure in international sporting competition and to nullify the negative problems associated with youth sub-cultures (Henry 1993: 17).

3.4 The Policies of Margaret Thatcher 1979-1991

The main response to the fiscal crisis of the state, by the Conservative Government of 1979, was to cut public expenditure. Thatcher rejected Keynesian policies in exchange for a commitment to monetarism. Local government was one of the main recipients of central government expenditure and thus was regarded as a legitimate area for savings. Therefore within...

...weeks of taking office local government was strongly criticised by ministers who claimed that it was wasteful, profligate, irresponsible, unaccountable, luxurious and out of control (Newton 1985: 116).

The key tool used by the centre for reducing local government spending was to reduce grant aid. Since 1967 the method of distributing government grants to local authorities had been the rate support grant. Within this were three elements, a domestic rate relief or per capita subsidy to domestic ratepayers, the resource equalisation grant which attempted to remove differences in the tax base of different local authorities, and the needs equalisation grant which was used to equalise the expenditure requirements of different local authorities. From 1981 the resources and needs equalisation elements
were combined into one block grant paid to all local authorities. The criteria for entitlement to grant aid was determined by what it would cost a typical local authority to provide a basic standard service, thus central government determined what authorities ought to be spending. If spending increased above Westminster’s benchmark, financial penalties were introduced in the form of reduced grant aid. In practice it was only the larger metropolitan authorities, typically Labour controlled, that were subjected to ‘clawback’.

The Local Government Finance Act of 1982 legalised the system of targets and penalties introduced in the 1981 Act. The Act also created the Audit Commission to oversee the auditing of local authority finance and to encourage value for money or the 'three Es' economy, efficiency and effectiveness. In total £713 million was ‘held back’ from local authorities between 1981 and 1984 (Travers 1986). In 1983-4 Conservative authorities were penalised by £24 million compared with £217 million on Labour controlled authorities (Henry, 1993).

Conflict between the centre and local authorities intensified in the mid 1980s and the law courts were frequently used to decide cases (Stoker 1991). The 1983 Rates Act further increased the Secretary State for the Environment powers to determine the maximum level of rate an authority could set. It was followed by the 1984 Rates Act, which enabled the Secretary of State to limit the rates of local authorities. Of the 18 authorities that were rate capped in 1985/1986 only one was not Labour controlled (Henry 1993). A campaign to combat cuts in funding was launched by a number of rate capped authorities. Despite failing to achieve its objectives, Blunkett and Jackson (1987) argue that it raised local consciousness about public services and helped bring into focus the Conservatives’ attack on democracy and forced “politicians and officers to break new ground and extend the boundaries of financial ingenuity” (Blunkett and Jackson 1987: 189).
3.4.1 **The Local Socialist Response**

As a result of the failure of the Fabian socialist policies of the post-war Labour government to achieve socialist goals, some Authorities introduced radical socialist policies oriented towards a working class electorate (Gyford 1985). Henry (2001) argues that the New Urban Left drew their inspiration from critical local government analysts such as (Benington 1976) and Cockburn (1977) and from the political commentary of Gramsci (1971). The New Urban Left policies were grounded in the student politics of the late 1960s, the Community Development projects of the 1970s, the women's movement, black organisations, protest groups, opposition to public service cuts, and the radicalisation of public sector professions (Boddy and Fudge 1984).

In economic terms the New Urban Left sought to respond to the expenditure squeeze by raising local rates, “Sheffield Council, for example, put its rate up by 41% in 1980 and 37% in 1981 and was still supported at the polls” (Blunkett and Jackson 1987: 154). The second response was to introduce a number of imaginative strategies to raise funds such as the sale of mortgage debt, lease back arrangements, the building up of rate fund balances and creative accounting. The New Urban Left also resisted economic constraint by strengthening local authority economic development agencies such as the Greater London Enterprise Board. These bodies provided risk capital for local industries. For Blunkett and Jackson (1987) these tactics “became a major form of political opposition” (Blunkett and Jackson 1987: 155). For Rhodes the central-local relations at the time were like a...

...boxing match with each change in the system a new round in the contest as centre and locality probed each others defence (Rhodes 1994: 217).

The philosophy of the New Urban Left was also built on the rejection of class based politics in favour of other forms of disadvantage, such as sexism, racism, economic disadvantage and disability (Gyford 1985). The New Urban Left also employed non-economic tools in addressing inequality, thus culture and leisure became a significant tool in political battles (Henry 2001). Such a rejection of the predominance of economic factors is linked to Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony where moral and political leadership can be challenged by non-economic factors.
In cultural and leisure policy the New Urban Left advocated the establishment of different forms of provision for disadvantaged groups, such as the establishment of leisure card schemes offering concessionary prices (Henry 2001). The New Urban Left also used festivals, events and other activities like the London Marathon to promote campaigns such as the London for Jobs campaign and the Rock Against Racism (Bianchini 1987; Garnham 1987; Bianchini 1989).

The policies of the New Urban Left were also concerned with the function and processes of local government. Central to this was the democratising of local government and enabling public participation in urban affairs. In many local authorities decentralisation policies were also introduced to reduce the negative effects of the large-scale bureaucratic authorities and to make provision of services more responsive to the needs of users. This concern also led New Urban Left authorities to engage in widespread consultation.

Some of the most aggressive of the New Urban Left measures were implemented by the GLC. The Conservatives response was to abolish the GLC in the Local Government act of 1985, which also swept away one tier of government, the metropolitan counties. Stoker (1991) argues that this arose from a...

...manifesto commitment in 1983 premised to a large extent on a 'gut reaction' against the political style of the GLC's left-wing Labour leader, Ken Livingstone (Stoker 1991: 19).

The 1986 and 1987 Local Government Acts squeezed expenditure tighter. In particular the acts prevented the sale of mortgage debt and removed the right of local authorities to appeal against central decisions regarding the allocation of grants or accounting practices. Councillors from Liverpool and Lambeth were also surcharged and disqualified for refusing to set a legal rate in 1987. Thus, during the mid-1980s, the scope for policy innovation at the local level was constrained and finally crushed by central government financial and legislative powers.
3.4.2 Privatisation and CCT

The period after the 1987 general election saw the Conservative government becoming more concerned with the role, function and organisation of local government (Stoker, 1991). In particular, the centre became increasingly concerned with reforming the internal operations of local authorities in an attempt to 'marketise' their activities and services and narrow the gap between the public and private sectors (Stoker 1991). Many industries traditionally owned and managed by the public sector such as British Gas and British Telecom were sold and the Government attempted to replace public services by private investment. Although there has not been the wholesale privatisation of services provided by local authorities, many of the utilities outside the control of elected local government have been transferred to the private sector. Privatisation in local government includes the sale of council houses, the sale of local authority assets and, most importantly for leisure provision, the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (Walsh 1988).

By introducing the discipline of the market into the public sector the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) was designed to realise significant financial savings for councils and improve the quality of their services. CCT introduced a new mantra to local government: economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The introduction of CCT was a clear indication of New Right ideology as CCT had...

...the virtue of forwarding a number of different Government policy objectives. It provides more work for the private sector, it reduces the power of the local authority and it weakens the public sector trade unions (Stewart 1989: 52).

CCT was originally introduced in the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 and was extended in the 1988 Local Government Act to include a number of additional services. Sport and leisure facilities were added by parliamentary order subjecting sports and leisure facilities to competition in November 1989. With the exception of educational institutions, the management of virtually all facilities under public ownership, was required to open up to competition by 1993.
Despite the central government’s commitment to CCT, local governments have been slow to implement pure market solutions. According to the Sports Council, in the first round of contracts, 60% of contracts went uncontested, with a further 22% attracting only one external bid (Wheeler and Richards, 1993). Wheeler and Richards (1993) show that 84% of contracts were won by local authority’s own direct services organisations. In addition, 51% of the contracts won by the private sector were by only five companies (Wheeler and Richards, 1993).

Although CCT did not introduce purely market solutions to public sector services it did have a major effect on the function, structure and culture of local government. The change from public provision to CCT enforced a client-contractor split in service delivery with the former retaining policy control and the latter concentrating on managerial efficiency (Stabler and Ravenscroft 1994). The Act meant that local authority departments became the clients of contractors who manage their services. In the event of a local authority winning its own contract it was still required to operate on a quasi-commercial basis by establishing internal trading systems. This required either separate sections within a department, or separate departments, or management boards. The principal forms of contract were as follows:

1. ‘deficit guarantee’, or ‘franchise’ contracts where the operator ran the facility at a preset level of subsidy, or for a fixed fee to be paid to the authority, with the operator taking all income and costs;
2. ‘profit sharing’, where the net income was shared;
3. ‘income-sharing’ where the gross income was shared;
4. or the simple ‘management fee’ where an authority simply paid the contractor to operate a given facility or service.

(Henry 2001)

Within the service agreement the local authority could specify the terms of the contract, as well as monitor implementation. The contracts could require pricing policies and programming within facilities and could therefore be used to target specific groups (Henry 2001).

Commentators have outlined a number of the problems of CCT. Firstly, Wheeler and Richards (1993) argued that following CCT there was a decline in stand alone leisure
departments and these non-specialist departments were less likely to implement a sport and recreation strategy (26% of multidisciplinary departments implemented these compared to 41% of specialist departments). Thus, leisure policy became fragmented, providing a range of services with little corporate outlook (Wheeler and Richards 1993).

A second critique of CCT has been given by Nichols and Taylor (1995) and Nichols (1999). They argue there was no fundamental review of the role of leisure services under CCT. They also suggest that the problem was heightened because leisure is not a legal obligation for local authorities and there is direct competition from private and voluntary sectors (Nichols and Taylor 1995). Therefore, leisure service departments had to justify their subsidy and show they were achieving more than the private sector. Nichols (1999) argues that instead of a review, officers gauged political opinion and incorporated appropriate objectives:

Thus contract specifications were written with the objective of ensuring the existing service was provided, within the limits of department budgets, and possibly with a further objective of influencing who was awarded the contract (Nichols 1999: 2).

A third criticism of CCT is provided by Stabler and Ravenscroft (1994). They suggest that because operators generally gained from income from facilities they were more inclined to programme profit generating activities. Thus, the results of research after the first round of contracts indicated that many of the social objectives of leisure policy had become secondary or obsolete (Stabler and Ravenscroft 1994). Nichols and Taylor (1995) also argue that the combination of budget cuts and the change in attitude amongst leisure managers fostered a market-led service where revenue maximisation was paramount (Nichols and Taylor 1995). Nichols (1999) suggests that income from market oriented services could have been used to cross subsidise less profitable activities and take into account non-users, however this rarely occurred, instead...

...a more market oriented service, directed by the need to increase income, would mean that paying customers has a greater influence over the development of policy (Nichols 1999: 3).
A fourth criticism of CCT was that of measuring performance in leisure, a service that often produces non-financial outputs. Stabler and Ravenscroft (1994) argue that authorities even with a strong commitment to public service can be handicapped by not setting objective and operational measures on output, but instead relying on lower order measures such as participation (Stabler and Ravenscroft 1994). Thus, one of the main problems with CCT was ensuring policies were achieved in practice. Wheeler and Richards (1993) identified this problem by showing that 85% of authorities targeted disabled people yet only 15% had identified a throughput target for this user group (Wheeler and Richards 1993). Nichols (1999) also argues that leisure is an area of policy where it is difficult to see a clear relationship between objectives and outcomes. He suggested that CCT did not increase the effectiveness of services instead the emphasis was usually on selecting the cheapest way of delivering the service.

Sanderson (1998) offers a fifth critique of CCT by arguing that the emphasis on performance measures and meeting objectives reoriented the role of managers and gave them more influence at the expense of a more pluralist local democracy (Sanderson 1998). Nichols (1999) also suggests that if officers selected performance indicators, then they might also exercise power by directing the consultation process. By determining...

...who was asked and why they were asked? What were the parameters of consultation? the range of decisions on which local people were consulted?... Did consultation ask if local people wanted a leisure service at all or if they wanted a particular type of leisure provision? (Nichols 1999: 3).

In summary, CCT undoubtedly had a significant impact on local government leisure services. It forced local authority departments to radically re-appraise the services they provided. In terms of economic savings local government departments have...

...risen admirably to the challenge increasing their financial efficiency with such success that it is unlikely the private sector could in many cases do any better (Wheeler and Richards 1993: 26).

However, CCT also altered the structure and culture of local government leisure departments by splitting functions between a client and contractor. In many cases the process...
...has not been one of getting commercial operators into the public sector leisure management arena, but rather one of commercialising the existing management interests in the field (Henry 1993: 161).

In addition to the requirement to separate out the functions of services, the new system focused on economy and efficiency, while often neglecting effectiveness. In leisure, a non-statutory service, social goals were often secondary to commercial gain (Henry 2001).

3.4.3 Delocalised Service Delivery

A further policy of the Thatcher administration was the establishment of Enterprise Zones (EZs), Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), Inner City Task Forces and Freeports. Parkinson (1989) argues that the Conservative Government introduced EZs as they believed that the bureaucratic planning and high taxation in Labour authorities was preventing local economic development. Thus by...

...eliminating physical and financial controls in specific parts of cities, the Government argued, enterprise, investment and new jobs would be created (Parkinson 1989: 431).

In addition, tax exemptions and capital allowances were given as incentives for firms moving into EZ areas. Between 1982-4 the Secretary of State designated 24 EZs and more were added in 1987 (Henry 1993). In total 20,000 jobs were created, however, in many cities the development of an EZ resulted in the transfer of jobs from other parts of the city. The EZ programme cost £180 million in the first five years (Parkinson 1989).

The Conservative Urban Programme in the 1980s also introduced Urban Development Grants to encourage local authorities to collaborate with the private sector in development projects. In 1986 the Government changed the grant system to one that could offer grants directly to the private sector and in 1988 the City Grant was introduced to remove the local authorities from the development grant process (Parkinson 1989).

Further initiatives were introduced to increase the centre's role in urban redevelopment. City Action Teams were introduced in England's six largest cities and Task Forces,
consisting of central government officials and representatives from the private sector, were set up in twelve areas. Within all these projects at...

...best the notion of a partnership with the local authorities was weakened, at worse the local authorities found themselves being by-passed (Parkinson 1989: 433).

The first UDCs were introduced in 1980 and were followed by a further 11 in the following years. According to some writers these represented the 'flagship' of the Conservative's urban policy (Bailey, 1995). Instead of trying to rectify inner city problems, the new non-elected agencies were set up to introduce and sustain market led, property based regeneration. As Parkinson (1989) states:

UDCs are the most important example of the current government's philosophy, presenting its distinctive view about urban regeneration, the way it should be organized and financed and the results it should achieve. The model assumes regeneration should be led by a single-purpose agency, free from the restraints of local democracy, which should establish at minimal public cost the conditions for private investment, which will generate wealth that will eventually flow back into the community (Parkinson 1989: 110).

Imrie and Thomas (1992) note that despite differences in scale and population and the strategies of UDCs, they all share some basic features. They are all directly accountable to the Secretary of State for the Environment, and it is a Government decision to make a designation, to define an area and appoint a board. All UDCs are required to have regard for local authority planning policies, although these are often taken flexibly. Imrie and Thomas (1992) also state the importance of place marketing to UDCs, which is regarded as important to building commercial confidence in cities.

UDCs were given powers over land acquisition, finance, and occasionally direct ownership of land. In all cases UDCs were given planning responsibilities for their areas. UDCs followed a different regeneration philosophy than local government by adopting a property-led policy often encouraging major projects, which were intended to improve the environment and image of an area (Parkinson, 1989). Therefore UDCs...

...embody a particular phase of new right ideological thinking about how best to institutionalise processes of urban regeneration, the interests to be included
and supported, as well as those to be excluded and bypassed (Bailey 1995: 53).

Within many UDC projects, the ‘trickle down’ benefits were not accrued by local communities as...

...little attention was paid to providing the training, jobs or low income housing to meet the needs of the original residents, who paid many of the economic, social and environmental costs of regeneration while deriving relatively few of the benefits (Parkinson 1989: 437).

This problem was compounded where UDC funding fuelled development in certain areas but where surrounding districts were suffering from reduced local government expenditure.

Henry (2001) suggests that leisure investment within UDCs fell into three categories. Firstly, commercial investment for generating profit such as the marina developments. Secondly, investment to attract or support commercial activities such as the greening of open space. Thirdly, city tourism investment. As the major goal of UDCs and EZs was to reduce local government control and to provide savings, it is...

...hardly surprising that leisure investment proposed for these designated areas tended to focus on issues other than social welfare (Henry 1993: 104).

In 1987 The Conservative Party’s commitment to enterprise culture led to more investment in property-related developments and a greater role for the private sector. During the late 1990s local authorities retained influence over only one tenth of the £3000 million central government expenditure in the inner cities (Lawless 1991). In 1989 the Audit Commission described the complex and fragmented nature of urban policy and finance as a “patchwork quilt of complexity and idiosyncrasy” (Audit Commission 1989: 9). The Audit Commission suggested the way forward was a partnership approach involving co-ordination between the different levels of government and the development agencies. However as Bailey (1995) argues, in England...

...partnership was perceived by ministers as the principle means of regenerating the inner city, but was seriously flawed in its application in that it was fragmented, exclusionary, biased towards one sectoral interest, and
increasingly used as a smokescreen for the centralization of power and the reduction of local accountability (Bailey 1995: 62).

3.4.4 Leisure Policy Under Margaret Thatcher

In 1983 the Sports Council produced its report *Sport in the Community: The Next Ten Years* which suggested, at least in the early 1980s, that sports policy remained in favour of mass participation. In particular, the Sports Council identified the unemployed, ethnic minorities and women as priority target groups. According to Henry (1993) the rationale for central government involvement in sport was far more ideologically driven in the late 1980s, as the...

...socio-democratic strands in the leisure policy of central government, such as the concern to tackle recreation disadvantage, to 'plug the gaps' in provision in the commercial and voluntary sectors in order to foster cultural democracy or 'recreation for all' gave way in the late 1970s and early 1980s to the pragmatic cost-benefit analysis of policies based largely on financial savings in other areas (Henry 1993: 75).

Holt and Tomlinson (1994) argue that the Thatcher years were important for leisure for a number of reasons. Firstly, the striving for economic growth engendered a leisure ethos stressing high consumption and the 'work hard, play hard' ethic. Secondly, the public's expenditure on leisure increased encouraging the provision of services by the commercial sector. However, this meant that leisure lifestyles became polarized between those that could and could not afford leisure services. Thirdly, under Thatcher's administration the rationale for subsidised leisure provision was challenged. The leisure market that flourished under these conditions was the home entertainment industry, at the expense of sport and physical recreation participation (Holt 1994). However, some sports grew such as squash and aerobics as they espoused a philosophy of "physical culture as yuppie competitiveness" (Holt and Tomlinson 1994: 451).

3.4.5 The Demise of Thatcher

There are a number of factors that led to Thatcher's fall from office. Monetarist fiscal policy accelerated the restructuring of British industry and had particularly adverse effects in the older industrial cities. Whilst unemployment rose, the service sector, particularly in the south, grew. Commentators often refer to the development of a two
tier society, whereby growth in the service sector modern technologies led to improved living standards for some, whilst the full effect of the reduced welfare system was inflicted on the peripheral workforce and the unemployed (Lash and Urry 1994).

A further problem for Thatcher was a series of unpopular policies such as the Community Charge (commonly termed the Poll Tax), which was created in the 1988 Local Government Finance Act and was introduced to England in 1990. The Community Charge was introduced to replace the domestic rates by a system that placed pressure on high spending local authorities to reduce expenditure and to ensure that almost the entire electorate would be required to contribute to their authority's spending bill. The Government believed the Community Charge would prevent councils spending in ways that the local electorate found unappealing because many local authorities were able to raise rates "without many of the electorate (e.g. those receiving rate relief) feeling much of the increase (Travers 1989: 112). The Community Charge was an attempt to make virtually all adults pay for the services they receive, making local government 'fairer' and 'more accountable'. The Community Charge was to be paid by 38 million adults compared with the 18 million ratepayers (Travers 1989). The main problem with the Poll Tax was that it was more onerous for relatively lower income groups and less of a burden for households of with the highest incomes. The British public reacted against the Poll Tax in a series of demonstrations and riots and there was a high degree of tax evasion.

The third Thatcher administration also introduced a number of unpopular policies such as the Education Act (1988), which began the phasing out of grants in favour of student loans. Thatcher also introduced policies to allow schools to opt out of local government control, and cut spending on the National Health Service. During 1987 the chancellor, Nigel Lawson, resigned from office after disputes with Thatcher and her personal economic advisor, Sir Alan Walters, over a number of economic policies. These problems included Britain's entry into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the increasing difficulty of balancing interest rates and other forms of monetary restraint, and the maintenance of exchange-rate stability. The radical economic and fiscal policy of the
third Thatcher government became too much for the British public and led to Thatcher's fall from office.

3.5 The Policies Of John Major - 1991 To 1997

For many writers, the re-election of the Conservative Party under John Major in April 1991 did little to alter the Thatcher legacy since "beyond repealing the poll tax there was little support for rolling back its main planks" (Kavanagh 1994: 8). The main reason for this, according to Kavanagh (1994), was because the inclination in British politics over the century had been towards incremental change. Thatcherism, in contrast was such a fundamental departure from the political consensus of the past, that it left John Major with no option but to fine-tune the economy to make the Conservative Party more appealing at the polls (Kavanagh 1994). The fine-tuning according to Kavanagh (1994) was the continued assault on inflation, the continuation of privatisation and the contracting out of parts of the public sector such as the post office. In education Major influenced a number of policies such as the General National Vocational Qualifications and in Europe, Major promoted the Maastricht process and took the Party closer to European Union than Thatcher had allowed.

John Major also implemented a number of policies that affected local government and leisure policy. Major altered the approach to urban funding with the introduction of the City Challenge. Introduced by Michael Hesteltine in 1991, the City Challenge allocated grant aid on the basis of the quality of the bid rather than social or economic need. Henry (2001) states that by 1993 more than a quarter of all urban aid (£800 million per annum) provided by government was subjected to a competitive bidding process.

The Citizens' Charter, introduced in July 1991, had a fundamental effect on local government. The Charter aimed to empower people and give them more opportunity and choice. It provided consumers with...

...more information about their rights and about the performance of services; there is more regulation of the providers, targets for improved performances, more competition between service providers, more choice for consumers, independent inspection and better complaints procedures... In short it is
taking the best of private sector practices and introducing them to the public sector (Kavanagh 1994: 10).

3.5.1 Leisure Policy Under John Major

John Major established the department of National Heritage shortly after the election campaign in 1992 with the aim of bringing together the arts, broadcasting, sports, museums/galleries and tourism under a minister of cabinet rank. One of the first tasks of the Department, under the leadership of David Mellor, was to introduce the National Lottery, which produced an entirely new source of funding for charities, sport, the arts, heritage and the millennium. The National Lottery Act passed in October 1993 aimed to distribute around £255 million per annum to sport alone (Department for Culture Media and Sport 1998). Between the introduction of the Lottery in November 1994 to September 2001 it was projected that £1.5 to £1.7 billion would be allocated to sport in England (Department for Culture Media and Sport 1998). The other four good causes have also benefited from Lottery funding. At the end of 1997 the Arts Council of England had made 7,334 awards totalling £936 million and at the end of January 1998 £892 million had been awarded to heritage projects (Department for Culture Media and Sport 1998). The Millennium Commission, established 1994, is projected to spend £2 billion on various projects (Department for Culture Media and Sport 1998). However, despite the benefits that the Lottery has brought, there has been a reduction in the money available for leisure from other sources. The following table illustrates this trend by taking the example of sports funding:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENT</th>
<th>OCT 1993 (£m)</th>
<th>DEC 1997 (£m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old GB Sports Council</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Sports Council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Sports Council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation for Sport and the Arts</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football Trust</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sportmatch</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>138.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>66.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Department for Culture Media and Sport 1998)
The cut in funding for sport has occurred at a time when the traditional providers of leisure expenditure, the local authorities, were increasingly pressured financially and politically to cut non-statutory services such as leisure. Therefore, the result has been an increasing reliance on the Lottery to support leisure in general.

The context of sport and leisure policy has shifted in cities from a dominant emphasis on achieving social benefits to one that stresses economic efficiency. During the 1990s many older industrial cities tried to combat the problems of global economic change by introducing regeneration strategies based on leisure, and in particular tourism (Law 1992). Such policies reflect the potential importance that leisure and tourism could play in bringing income and jobs to an area. Leisure also has a symbolic function which was perceived to help the marketing and selling of an image (Bianchini and Schwengel 1991). For Bianchini and Schwengel (1991) city reimageing can help bring inward investment from the private sector and from central government and can trigger a process of physical and environmental regeneration by opening new economic niches. Leisure-led developments have often resulted in improved physical environments and infrastructure for local residents and can increase community participation in leisure activities and may help boost civic pride (Bianchini and Schwengel 1991). Some cities have reimaged using the title ‘City of Sport’ by demonstrating a commitment to providing facilities for holding major events and promoting sports development (Sports Council 1995). In 1995 Sheffield became the first British City to acquire the title, followed later by Glasgow and Birmingham.

In July 1995, the Government published the White Paper Sport: Raising the Game, outlining its aspirations in respect to sport. John Major’s personal endorsement of the White Paper appeared to indicate a clear departure from Thatcherite ideals when he wrote:

I have never believed that the quality of life in Britain should revolve simply around material success. Of equal importance, for most people, is the availability of those things that can enrich and elevate daily life in the worlds of the arts, leisure and sport (Department of National Heritage 1995: 1).
Raising the Game encouraged improvements in youth sport and excellence and reformed sports in schools by ensuring that physical activity had a prominent place in the National Curriculum. However, whilst acknowledging sport's intrinsic values, the neo-liberal Government also recognised...

...that such concepts as fair play, self discipline, respect for others, learning to live by laws and understanding one's obligations to others in a team are all matters which can be learnt from team games properly taught (Department of National Heritage 1995: 7).

The White Paper encouraging youth sport and advocated stronger links between schools and clubs and new roles for the regional sports councils and the governing sports. Raising the Game also aimed to encourage the promotion of excellence. To promote excellence, Raising the Game introduced the notion of a coherent and unified programme to promote talent from a central base - the British Academy of Sport (BAS). Three sites were shortlisted for the BAS, these were the city of Sheffield, a British Olympic Association sponsored bid to redevelop a former United States air base at Upper Heyford and a consortium of Loughborough University, Queens University Medical School (Nottingham) and the two National Sports Centres at Lilleshall and Holme Pirrepont. Whilst the foundations were laid by Major's administration the final decision on the site was made after his fall from office.

The impact that the Major administration has had on leisure is contested. Holt (1994) argued that John Major displayed a personal enthusiasm for sport and culture. He notes that "the corner shop was for Maggie, so the cricket pitch is for John" (1994: 444). Hewison (1995) also notes that Major had a concern for people to "lead a decent life in a civilized community through the states' provision for the material expressions of culture" (Hewison 1995: 420). Major obviously had a desire for sport and the arts to become a more important part of British society, however the major contributors to leisure in the post war period, the local authorities, continued to suffer from financial constraint and reducing autonomy. Others argue that Major could not restore what had been lost before as...

...the Thatcherite juggernaught had run out of control, bringing down the symbols of national identity: cultural consensus, the Church, the Monarchy,
and eventually the Conservative Party itself. The arts were brushed aside in the crush. John Major was unable to pick up the pieces (Hewison 1995: 430).

3.6 The Policies Of Tony Blair - 1997 Onwards

As indicated earlier, the Labour Party has traditionally been linked to socialism and the goals of equality and solidarity. However, since 1979 inequality has been growing in Britain at a rapid pace, the gulf between the top socio-economic classes and the poorer bands had widened (Lash and Urry 1994). After Smith’s 1993 election-losing tax reform, Labour appeared to abandon, at least in the short run, its commitment to treating these problems through the welfare state in favour of the view that citizen's interests would best be served through public action and market decisions (Sopel 1995).

In the 1980s Kinnock and Hattersley began to reorient the Labour policy to overcome the lack of trust in the party and to regain lost electoral support. Based on a market socialism approach the Labour government under Blair distanced itself further from the Labour of the past. This was because the New Right (according to Blair)...

...had struck a chord. There was a perception that there was too much collective power, too much bureaucracy, too much state intervention and too many vested interests around it (Sopel 1995: 209).

Blair’s speech at the 1994 Labour Party conference committed the party to the abolition of Clause IV and with it its commitment to public ownership. The reason for this according to Rubinstein (1997) was that the Labour Party...

...learned to its cost since 1979 that privatisation has been generally popular, that trade unions were a convenient and even a popular scapegoat for economic drift, that Thatcherite patriotism or xenophobia found and echo in the British people and above all that, from the 1960s, to be working-class did not necessarily mean to be poor (Rubinstein 1997: 340).

Leading politicians failed to achieve much popular interest at the 1997 elections and there appeared to be little difference between the two dominant parties on their election manifestos, indeed prior to the election the Economist when reviewing the party's manifestos suggested voters...
...will soon be asked to choose between five more years of conservatism under John major and five more years of conservatism under Tony Blair (Economist 1996: 3).

Rather than based on politics the British...

...general election was fought over the issue of competence. New Labour, it is crucial to note, was not about projecting a new vision to the British electorate. This is probably just as well, since it does not posses such a vision (Hay 1997: 377).

However, Blair tackled the Labour's traditional weaknesses of income tax, the trade unions, public spending and law and order, prior to the election. This increased the Party's popularity to a degree that it won the election with a comprehensive majority. On economic policy, Labour argued that there must be substantial improvement in Britain's international competitiveness and a rejuvenation of the country's industrial base. New Labour's contention was that to become competitive in a...

...modern global economy, where capital, raw materials and technology are internationally mobile and tradable world-wide, it is people - their education and skills - that are necessarily the most important determinant of economic growth (Brown 1994: 1).

However, the Labour Party has been reluctant to alter spending patterns radically to achieve growth. During the campaign, Blair stated that the Party would stick to the outgoing Conservatives' spending limits for the first two years of their administration. On economic policy, the policies of New Labour, considering its dominant majority in the Commons, has been steady. Thus, the new "Labour Government has striven not to shock" (Pimlott 1997: 326).

Hay (1997) argues that there is now a new convergence between parties as "we are moving, from a Keynesian welfare settlement towards a neo-liberal post Thatcher settlement" (Hay 1997: 373). New Labour, argues Hay, cannot depart from the unassailable neo-liberal economic and political paradigm. What has been evident in the discourse of the Labour Party is the support for many of the ideological standpoints of the New Right. Indeed, "the Chancellor did not offer much that Kenneth Clarke might not have provided on the back of improving economic times" (Pimlott 1997: 326). Pimlott
(1997) goes further by arguing that William Hague in opposition may promote a "New Conservatism" that owes as much to Blairism as New Labour owes to Thatcherism" (Pimlott 1997: 327).

Despite the adherence to an economic policy reminiscent of the Conservatives, New Labour introduced a number of policies that impacted upon local government. One such policy change was a commitment to...

...dispersing power to lower political levels, so that a pluralist democracy with a healthy local government may actually modify the distressing recent trend to electoral dictatorship (Rubinstein 1997: 343).

This is evident in the setting up of a separate parliament in Scotland and assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland through referendum. The election of a Mayor for London, together with a strategic local government for the nation’s capital were likely to...

...presage exciting opportunities for other local authorities to experiment with new policy-making and managerial structures, including directly elected mayors, community for a, citizens’ juries and other forms of decentralization (Elcock 1998: 15).

A key feature of the Labour Party rhetoric since the election in 1997 has been the 'stakeholder society'. This, according to Henry (2001) was trust-based capitalism based on co-operation and mutual respect. For Coates (1999) the New Labour used...

...its own language to set against Thatcherism's litany of market choice and freedom. New Labour's language is of community, solidarity, inclusiveness, fairness. It is the language of stakeholding (Coates 1999: 357 quoted in Henry 2001: 33).

Stakeholding also places an obligation on citizens to contribute to rather than depend on, the state. Other policy objectives of New Labour have been training, education, re-skilling and investing in people. For New Labour the state's role is one of protection, by reinforcing the importance of citizen's rights. Therefore, the Government has reintroduced the minimum wage and signed up to the social chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. Furthermore, New Labour has sought to tackle social exclusion and inequality by establishing a Social Exclusion Unit within the Cabinet Office.
3.6.1 Local government re-organisation

In 1997 local government was reorganised in many cities, which led to the establishment of new councils and unitary authorities, drawing together the strategic planning functions of the County Councils and the delivery of services traditionally associated with the District Councils. For services that were not traditionally shared between the County and District, there was little change in the service delivery. In others, such as leisure, the unitary authorities took responsibility for leisure in schools and the library service, which had previously been the duty of the County Councils. By unifying these functions the aim was to...

...address and meet the needs of its community in its leisure time and to interface with the Department of National Heritage and associated non-government agencies on strategic leisure issues (Institute of Leisure and Amenity Management 1994: 16).

In terms of leisure, the advent of unitary authorities in 1997 provided the opportunity to create integrated customer/citizen oriented services delivered through flexible and dynamic structures. These structures enabled councils to work with the private and voluntary sectors as an enabling authority. Therefore, the...

...key issue for the new unitary authorities is to enable everyone to spend their leisure time purposefully and creatively. New forms of leisure provision will evolve; liaison between the public, private and voluntary sectors will be progressed and redrawn, but the benefits of an integrated, planned, partnership approach are clear (Association of District Councils 1997).

3.6.2 Best Value

In reaction to the problems encountered with CCT nationally, the Labour Party in its Manifesto announced the agenda for modernising Local Government and the change from CCT to Best Value. Best Value was introduced in the Local Government Act of 1999 and was introduced to local government in April 2000. Forty authorities were chosen to pilot Best Value and in these authorities implementation began in 1998. In many other authorities preparations were made for Best Value from 1998. Initially the Best Value framework would enable local authorities to continually search to improve the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of all its services (ILAM 1997). However, the three Es (economy, efficiency and effectiveness) were replaced with a new mantra for
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local government, the 4 Cs (Challenge, Consult, Compete and Compare) (Audit Commission 1998).

The challenge element of Best Value requires local authorities to demonstrate how leisure contributes to the corporate objectives of local authorities through service reviews. Such goals include social and economic regeneration, anti-poverty, healthy lifestyles, community safety, community development and job creation (Henry, 2001). Nichols (1999), in a study of the pilot authorities, found that the councils that established clear corporate objectives had found these to be useful in the planning process and...

...where there were not clear corporate objectives, reviews of parts of leisure services did not have a point of reference to direct them (Nichols 1999: 20).

Best Value also made it a legal requirement for local authorities to consult with local communities, users and non-users and other stakeholders. Davies and Girdler (1998) argue that dedicated users are easy to consult, however consulting the whole electorate, including non-users, is a more difficult proposition (Davies and Girdler 1998).

Under CCT councils had to accept the most cost-effective option, however, under Best Value local authorities can employ contractors that provide the best service. In leisure services the comparison element of Best Values is achieved through the monitoring systems provided by the Audit Commission's performance indicators, QUEST quality award (Sports Council 1996) and Benchmarking (Keehley, Medlin et al. 1997). The general health performance indicators (Audit Commission 1995) are also generic to local government services such as: quality of service management, financial management, people management and accountability.

Local councils are required to provide two forms of documentation. The first is a fundamental service review, which requires local authorities to demonstrate that they are fulfilling the challenge, compare, consult and compete elements of Best Value. Secondly, authorities are required to produce Best Value performance plans which incorporate standards (both national and local) and performance targets based on wide community consultation (Henry 2001: 111). Despite these controls, Ravenscroft (1996)
argues that meaningful sets of performance standards cannot be found in public leisure services (Ravenscroft 1996). The Audit Commission itself has stated that...

...good indicators of the quality of outcomes remain elusive because of the nature of the service provided (Audit Commission 1998).

Nichols (1999) suggests that comparison between authorities was viewed by many councils as valuable, but...

...it was a very complex problem to make such comparisons realistic, and at present they were not. Even if there were standard ways of producing performance indicators they would still have to be interpreted with reference to local circumstances (Nichols 1999: 21).

Williams (1999) argues that Best Value has been too reliant on existing quality systems such as Investors in People (Maynard 1995), ISO 9002 (Johnson 1993) and Service First (Cabinet Office 1997). Williams (1999) suggests that Best Value adopts the inherent faults of each of these systems, rather than taking a fresh approach. She also suggests that the Audit Commission's performance indicators (1998) still concentrate on economy and efficiency and omit effectiveness (Williams 1999). She goes on to argue that...

...the aims and objectives encompassed in the philosophy of Best Value are not being transferred into practice. From the early evidence available, the author would propose that in practice the DETR and Audit Commission rather than customers and other stakeholders will be driving a large part of the service delivery specification (Williams 1999: 12).

3.6.3 Modernising local government

Perhaps the major impact of the Labour administration on local government has been its modernisation agenda. For Falconer (1999: 10), The White Paper, Modernising Government, published in March 1999 sought to improve the performance of local government across three principles:

- Ensuring that policy making should be ‘joined up’ and strategic;
- Ensuring that public services users, not providers, are the principle focus;
- Demonstrating efficiency and a high level of quality in public service provision.
The White Paper emphasises the need to involve and consult users of public services in making decisions about service provision. The joined up approach also attempts to combine the elements of policy making with policy delivering, thus avoiding the tensions which formed from separating functions (as with CCT). In addition, partnership was emphasised both within government and with the private and voluntary sectors (the modernisation of local government is analysed more fully in the final two sections of this chapter).

3.6.4 Leisure Policy under Tony Blair

At the national level, the Lottery continued to support the good causes and has been used to pay for a number of national sports facilities. Lottery funding has also been used to support other major prestige projects such as the Millennium Dome and the National Stadium. In December 1997 the Secretary of State for Culture, Media & Sport announced that Sheffield was the preferred location to host the headquarters of the United Kingdom Sports Institute (UKSI) and would benefit from an investment of £160 million. However, in 1999 the National Government withdrew its original plans for the UKSI in Sheffield and decided upon a system of regional centres rather than one hub site.

At a local government level New Labour's commitment to decentralisation and a strategic approach has led to new forms of planning. Local government leisure departments have been required to produce a variety of sports, leisure and cultural strategies in partnership with other council departments, local, regional and national agencies and organisations from the private and voluntary sectors. Within this strategic approach, the role of leisure goes beyond the simple intrinsic rewards for individual participants to one of improving the quality of life of communities by:

- creating life enhancing skills and opportunities;
- improving the health of the community, both physically and mentally, and promoting the concept of preventative care;
- promoting active citizenship and empowering communities to act for themselves within the framework of local democracy;
- providing the opportunity for personal self-development, which is a life-long process;
- optimising the contribution of local leisure services to the potential of the area for attracting inward investment and job creation;
generating civic and local pride.
(Association of District Councils 1997: 1).

3.7 Modernising Government, Governance And Partnership

Having provided a chronological review of generic local government change and leisure policy change, this section moves on to a detailed analysis of new managerialism and the modernisation of local government. The review then proceeds with an analysis of the interrelated themes of governance, partnership and the enabling authority.

3.7.1 The Origins Of Local Government Modernisation

'Modernisation' of local government began in the 1960s with a number of reports issued to investigate the role, organisation and management of local government. In 1967 the Committee on the Management of Local Government, chaired by Sir John Maud. The Maud Committee suggested that there were too many committees and departments that were slowing the management of local government. The effect was over-specialisation, segmented decision-making, fragmentation and lack of co-ordination among departments. The Report suggested that a corporatist approach should be adopted, in this case...

...corporatism when applied to the management of local government in the 1970s was planning as an authority rather than by departments in the major areas of the authorities work... it implies that planning is carried out in the knowledge of defined and agreed objectives, that the plans once formulated are plans for action, and are flexible and responsive to changing needs (Skitt 1975 in Haynes 1980: 83).

The Report of the Royal Commission in 1969 echoed many of the corporatist principles of the Maud Report and reiterated the need for a central committee to act as a focal centre to advise councils and allocate resources. The Commission also advocated the appointment of a clerk or chief executive who would be the official head of the authority's paid staff. The leader would come from a professional background to provide specialist skills.

The Bains Report, The New Local Authorities: Study Group on Local Authority Management and Structure, was published in 1972. Among the main recommendations of the Bains Report were:
1. An elected Policy and Resources Committee with overall policy formulation and implementation responsibility,
2. 'Resource subcommittees' to handle more routine matters and a performance review subcommittee,
3. A committee structure based on the communities' general development plans,
4. Fewer committees.
5. An appointed chief executive, and
6. Improved personnel management.

Many of the principles contained in the Bains Report were implemented in the new authorities created by the Local Government Act of 1972 (Bains 1972).

3.7.2 Modernising Government under the Conservative Party

A feature of local government under Thatcher was the change in the management of local authorities. In the post war period local authorities were able to adopt a non-strategic approach based on self sufficiency, size, and independence from other organisations (Leach, Stewart et al. 1994). From the 1970s the incremental changes of the previous 25 years made way for reorientation of the management of local authorities from corporatism to new managerialism. In essence local government...

... in the 1980s and 1990s has had to make fundamental changes to the way that it works, as a result of changes in the context that it faces, and the content of those changes has been conditioned by the existing culture and structure of the organisation (Leach, Stewart et al. 1994: 48).

New managerialism can be used to describe the structural, organisational and managerial changes that have taken place in the public services in recent years. In essence it has been the application of private sector management systems and managerial techniques into the public services (Farnham and Horton 1993). Much of the thrust of new managerialist thinking has been developed over the previous sections but it worth highlighting some of the changes in new public service management since 1979. The New Right introduced a number of policies that resulted in privatisation or contracting out, or have aimed at making the service more cost efficient. These policies and the ideology underpinning them have changed the orientation of public service providers from the...
...traditional principles of public administration and bureaucratic hierarchies, co-ordinated by generalist administrators or professional specialists and focusing on free services based on need, equity and fairness and altruism. They are now based, in part at least, on the principles of 'public business' and 'customer awareness', focusing on the instrumental objectives of economy, efficiency and effectiveness and the agency of professional management (Farnham and Horton 1993: 241).

Like many private sector organisations in the early 1980s, local governments began to implement organisational strategy. Organisational strategy became apparent in the 1980s in reaction to several management writers such as Peters and Waterman (1982). Strategy is about...

...responding to external circumstances and the actions of others, it is also about developing organisational patterns that are appropriate to the environment - in the marketing jargon developing strengths and reducing weaknesses in the face of external threats and opportunities - the SWOT analysis (Leach, Stewart et al. 1994: 49).

Farnham and Horton (1993) identify a further nine key features of the new managerialist approach, these are listed below:

1. There was the adoption of a rational approach to managing, which emphasises the role of strategic management in setting objective and clarifying policy issues.

2. There was a change in the organisational structures of local government, which was designed to separate policy from administration and create executive units with delegated responsibility for service delivery, whether internally to other parts of the organisation or externally to the public.

3. The change to the organisational structures were designed to shorten hierarchies, devolve managerial responsibility for achieving set targets of performance and hold individual managers responsible for achieving them.

4. Organisational achievement was measured in terms of the criteria of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

5. The development of performance indicators enabled comparisons and measures of achievement to be made and provided information upon which future decisions could be determined.
6. Local authorities developed active policies for changing the cultures of public organisations, from ones dominated by traditional public service values to ones attuned to the market, business and entrepreneurial values of the ‘new’ public service model.

7. Human resource management techniques were implemented to weaken collectivist approaches and introducing individualist ones, including seeking to mobilise employee support and commitment to continual structural and organisational change.

8. Authorities sought to create flexible, responsive and learning public organisations.

9. Councils developed a ‘public service orientation’ focusing on the public as clients, customers and citizens, with a move away from supply-led to demand-led services, no longer dominated by professional providers but responsive to the needs of those being served.

(Farnham and Horton 1993: 238).

Farnham and Horton (1993) identify both positive and negative benefits of introducing new managerialism. Public sector organisations have become ‘leaner and meaner’, they are more efficient and productive and are more rational in their allocation of resources. In addition, they are becoming more rational in their strategic direction and are using more sophisticated techniques to evaluate their performance. The new public services are also attempting to be more responsive to their customers and are giving more information to the public. New managerialism reduces the powers of public officials and the unions. Furthermore, it has increased flexibility by giving more opportunity for managers to innovate and adapt their organisational policies to meet local circumstances (Farnham and Horton 1993: 238).

3.7.3 Modernising Government Under New Labour

As was indicated earlier, the main tenets of the White Paper Modernising Government, published in March 1999 sought to improve the performance of local government across three principles. Firstly, ensuring that policy making should be ‘joined up’ and strategic. Secondly, ensuring that public services users, not providers, are the principle focus.
Thirdly, demonstrating efficiency and a high level of quality in public service provision (Falconer 1999: 10). Thus for New Labour there is a need for:

- improved policy making, through a commitment to the delivery of ‘outcomes that matter’;
- responsive public services, meeting the needs of citizens, not the interests of providers;
- quality public services;
- the use of information technology to meet the needs of citizens in relation to public services;
- a strong public service ethos, which values public services.

(Falconer 1999: 11)

An analysis of the White Paper reveals the differences between the New Labour approach and that of the New Right. The White Paper clearly states the importance of engaging users of public services and placing an importance on front line staff. The New Labour approach has reduced the emphasis on competition. The second change has been a move away from the Conservatives' attempt at separating policy matters towards a system of 'joined-up' public services (Falconer 1999). Thirdly, the ideological approach adopted by the Conservatives has been replaced by a more pragmatic position for Labour:

Overall, with ‘New Labour’, the nature and practice of public service delivery and public sector management has been cast within the language of partnership, stakeholding and pragmatism, all of which are discussed within the wider political, ‘post-ideological’ discourse of ‘the third way’ (Falconer 1999: 4)

3.7.4 Governance, Partnership and Enabling

Although the work of authorities has traditionally involved relationships with other organisations, the majority local governments prior to the 1980s assumed the role of provider (Leach, Stewart et al. 1994). Since the 1980s the private and voluntary sectors have played a greater role in urban politics, this...

...transformation of the control and delivery of services has been described as a shift from local government to local governance and is recognised as a profound change which requires to be carefully analysed and understood... the new local governance creates a new decision making environment, requiring council’s and their staffs to be more engaged with other providers and have a more open and outward looking approach (Malpass 1994: 302).
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The term 'governance' has been used by different ways by a variety of writers but few have agreed upon a definition. Harvey simply notes "governance refers to more than urban government" (Harvey 1989: 6). He goes on to state that it...

...is unfortunate that much of the literature (particularly in Britain) concentrates so much on [government] when the real power to reorganise urban life so often lies elsewhere or within a broader coalition of forces with which urban government and administration have only a facilitative and co-ordinating role (Harvey 1989: 6).

Thus for Harvey governance is about power distribution and the exercising of influence in the urban setting. However, other writers suggest governance is about the processes and relationships within urban policy making. As Davoudi and Healey suggest,

The term governance is now being used to convey the range of 'service' delivery mechanisms and regulatory systems which now exist to devise and implement policies. It expresses the shift from provision by formal local and central government structures to the contemporary fragmentation of agencies and of responsibilities between public, business, voluntary and household/kin/friendship spheres (Davoudi and Healey 1993: 7 quoted in Malpass 1994: 303).

Rhodes (1994) contends that governance describes the situation where direct control of policy and service delivery is stripped away from elected councils and shifted both, downwards to private and voluntary sectors organisations, and upwards, to central government and trans-national bodies (Rhodes 1994). Rhodes (1994) terms this transformation the hollowing out of the state. Whilst not suggesting that the era of the hollow state has been reached Rhodes (1994) does suggest large parts of the British state has been eroded or eaten away.

For Rhodes (1994) there are four interrelated themes to the hollow state. Firstly, local government has become constrained by privatisation and other policies, which have limited the scope and forms of public intervention. Secondly, local authorities have lost some of the functions of government to alternative service delivery systems (such as agencies). Thirdly, Rhodes (1994) argues that British governments have lost functions to European Union institutions. Finally, within government, policy change has limited the discretion of public servants through the new public management, with its emphasis on managerial accountability, and clearer political control through a sharper distinction.
between politics and administration (Rhodes 1994). Rhodes (1994) suggests that this has resulted in massive changes in the role, organisation and management of local authorities. He argues government, action by the public sector alone, has given way to a system of local governance involving complex sets of organisations drawn from the public and private sectors (Rhodes 1996: 658). Stoker and Pyper (1997) describe this situation as one where...

...new or at least refashioned, policy delivery mechanisms have emerged, and public-private ‘partnerships’ become common currency, as governments have attempted to come to terms with the ‘hollowing-out’ of the state while adopting new modes of governance as enablers, contractors and regulators. (Stoker and Pyper 1997: 1).

The shared characteristics of governance according to Rhodes are detailed below:

1. Interdependence between organisations. Governance is broader than government, covering non-state actors. Changing the boundaries of the state meant the boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors became shifting and opaque.
2. Continuing interactions between network members, caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes.
3. Game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants.
4. A significant degree of autonomy from the state. Networks are not accountable to the state; they are self organising. Although the state does occupy a privileged, sovereign position, it can indirectly and imperfectly steer networks.

(adapted from Rhodes 1996: 660).

Much of the literature on governance can be linked to North American literature on the shift from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989). The governance literature has also indicated a shift from the provision of local welfare to the deployment of resources to attract investment by private capital and economic regeneration through a growth coalition (Logan and Molotch 1987; Logan and Molotch 1996) (see chapter 2).

Local authorities have in many respects moved from a position of power to one of influence and that effective provision of services for the local area often depends on a multi-agency approach (Painter and Isaac-Henry 1997). The result has been that local
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Authorities have been required to use alternative methods of operation. Leach, Stewart and Walsh (1994: 37/38) identified a number of the possible method authorities can use, they can:

- give grants to the voluntary sector;
- form partnerships with the private sector or other organisation;
- open its resources of information, skills and knowledge to other organisations;
- make land and property available;
- regulate, license and inspect;
- influence, advocate or campaign.

The Labour Party has advocated the second of these methods, the partnership approach, and the rhetoric of partnership has emerged at national, regional and local levels. In short...

...Labour has promoted the idea of partnership arrangements as the key to efficient and responsive public services, and to value for money for citizens in public service provision (Falconer 1999: 5).

For New Labour, partnership involving organisations from the public, private and the 'third' (voluntary and non-profit) sectors is central to the provision of public services. New Labour has also advocated partnership across service providers, communities and citizens. However, within local government...

...no one model of partnership exists, instead there is a highly pragmatic view, acknowledging the need for a flexible system of public sector funding and service provision which makes the best use of what the public, private and voluntary sectors have to offer, through the establishment of a wide variety of partnership arrangements (Falconer 1999: 5).

New Labour's use of the language of partnership has not been without criticism. For Falconer, (1999: 5) the broad use of the term has raised "the danger of its value as a term being eradicated through repetition and a lack of specific content in its precise meaning" and for Beckett (1998) the term partnership has been used...

...not for its intrinsic meaning, but as a hurrah-word. In Blair's Britain, words like new, community, innovative and partnership are used to convey a feeling of comfort rather than an exact meaning (Beckett 1998: xxiv)

Alongside, governance and partnership, the role of local authorities as enablers has become common in the dialogue of local government. Rhodes (1996) talks of policy
decisions as 'steering' and service delivery as 'rowing'. Within the system of local government, there is more of a...

...concern with competition, markets, customers and outcomes. This transformation of the public sector involves 'less government' (or less rowing) but more 'governance' (or more steering) (Rhodes 1996: 655).

Leach, Stewart and Walsh (1994: 235) suggest enabling is “finding new ways of delivering services through agencies other than the local authority”. However, Clarke and Stewart (1989) argue that enabling is more complex and involves...

...strengthening the capacity for self-governance within a local community, using whatever resources and channels (internal or external) seem most appropriate (Clarke and Stewart 1989: 39).

Clarke and Stewart (1988) have attempted to provide a list of themes, which characterise an enabling council, they are:

1. A capacity for learning the needs and problems faced within communities;
2. A determination to be close to its public;
3. A strategic approach;
4. An appreciation and realisation of community capacity;
5. A deployment of a wide range of powers, influence and resources;
6. Development of organisational capacity;
7. New roles for councillors;
8. New management skills and attitudes;
9. New styles of leadership by officers and members.

(Clarke and Stewart 1988: 40)

Leach, Stewart and Walsh (1994) argue that different local authorities are selecting contrasting priorities from amongst a set of wider core values which, if pursued, will lead ultimately to varying patterns of organisational structure, strategy, systems and staff orientation. They suggest that there are four ideal types of enabling authority: the traditional bureaucratic authority, the residual enabler, the market-oriented enabler, and the community-oriented enabler.

For Leach, Stewart and Walsh (1994) the 'traditional bureaucratic' organisations were the dominant form of local government during the period 1945 to 1980, although many authorities maintain this focus. These authorities combine a strong public-sector
emphasise with a strong governance role to maintain a high degree of self-sufficiency. Residual enabling authorities are those that are "provider of last resort" (Leach, Stewart and Walsh 1994: 240). Thus, they are responsible for a limited set of services, which cannot be provided directly through the private market or other mechanism. Despite this, residual enabling authorities rarely provide services directly and, instead, they contract out services to external providers. The residual enabling approach therefore can be linked to the philosophy of liberalism, where the state has limited intervention in economic affairs. Leach, Stewart and Walsh argue that the market-oriented enabling authority retains a strong role in the area's economic affairs. As the key planning and regulatory agency, the authority 'pump-primes' other organisations and supports private enterprise. Contracts written by the authority would not be simply concerned with least cost but would use it as a regulatory mechanism. The philosophy underpinning the market enabling approach can be linked to the 'One-Nation' Conservative approach.

Leach, Stewart and Walsh (1994) argue that many authorities are now concerned with community-oriented enabling. This they argue is an ideal type, whereby authorities exist to meet the varied needs of the population, using whatever channel of provision (either directly, through the private or voluntary sectors, or by influence). There is an emphasis on the role of citizens which goes beyond simple customer / consumer roles. The Authorities are more concerned with representative democracy (involving more accountability than periodic elections) and participatory democracy (involving citizens and communities in policy process) making. This...

...implies an outward-looking, 'networking role' through which influence can be exerted. It is the alternative within which decentralised forms of local government logically fit (Leach, Stewart and Walsh 1994: 243).

White (1992) also suggests that many authorities are striving towards a position of community oriented enabler, by providing communities with the resources to help themselves. For White (1992), the new authorities implement a system which uses all means available to meet needs, working with and through others by "aiding, guiding and stimulating, and providing the means by which people can meet their needs directly" (White 1992: 22).
3.7.5 **The Role of Individuals in the Policy Process**

Within much of the governance and enabling literature, the role of the voluntary sector, interest groups, communities and citizens has been emphasised (Held 1989; Kearns 1995; Rumbold 1991; Waterhouse 1995; Painter, 1997). As suggested above, the literature has discussed the notion of community governance, which involves a willingness on the part of the local authority to look beyond the confines of its own organizational boundaries, championing the interests of local people (Painter and Isaac-Henry 1997). For Waterhouse (1995) community governance places a premium on the skills local government councillors and officers, especially their ability to influence and empower as well as on the management of change given the changing nature of the society. Therefore, in addition to the arguments about power and influence, which are debated using theories of the state and urban political economy, there is also a need to look at ideology and ideas, argument and debate which form the interaction between participants in the policy process (John 1998). Therefore, this section considers the role of individuals within the decision-making environment by looking at the roles played by advocates from community groups, citizens, politicians, and particularly officers (as professionals / experts).

Literature on the role of citizens in decision-making has existed for many years. This traditional literature evaluated the nature of community involvement in decisions. For Arnstein (1969) participation in the planning process is structured around degrees of citizen participation. She argues that citizen participation is a term for citizen power to allow the people without access to political and economic processes to be included (Arnstein 1969).

As figure 3.2 illustrates, Arnstein argues that the first two levels in her ladder of participation represent ‘non participation’, where planning decisions are made with little recognition of the views of the community. The middle three levels, represent ‘degrees of tokenism,’ refering to planning that involves information transfer, either from the
council to the consumer or via consultation where community groups are invited to make suggestions to the Council about its policy or specific issues. Alternatively, the community as a whole is shown plans that have already been prepared and responses are solicited. In either case the community usually has little or no power to modify plans and the Council is under no obligation to take submissions into consideration. The last three levels of participation, the degree of citizen power, refers to planning that involves community groups throughout the planning process and in which they hold at least equal power to the council.

Figure 3.4 Arnstein’s Eight Levels Of Community Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Manipulation</td>
<td>This does not permit any real public participation but rather involves the creation by government of ‘neighborhood councils’ as a means of defusing and diffusing public action on contentious issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Therapy</td>
<td>Entails the planner’s or administrators use of the individuals or groups within the community to perpetuate their own ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Informing</td>
<td>Potentially the most important first step towards legitimate citizen participation, informing is usually carried out after critical decisions have been made. There is consequently little opportunity to modify decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Consultation</td>
<td>This most frequently occurs by way of community surveys and public meetings and, while an improvement over informing, it still denies the community any decision-making role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Placation</td>
<td>Although citizens are appointed to official planning boards and authorities, the ‘traditional power elite’ are still in the majority and can override any unacceptable citizen initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Partnership</td>
<td>Partnership occurs when power is ‘redistributed’ through negotiation between citizens and postholders. Citizens may have decision-making powers equal to those of the professional planners or may even be employ their own planners, lawyers and community organisers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Delegated Power</td>
<td>An extension of partnership, this rests on the citizens’ achieving dominance at the decision-making level so that they are able to initiate, develop and vote into operation plans for recreation development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Citizen Control</td>
<td>This involves total community management of policy-making, planning and implementation without any intermediaries between the community and the source of funds.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Marriot 1980: 114)
Literature on community citizenship grew in the late 1980s in reaction to the changes introduced by the Conservative administration. Thatcher advocated an individualistic approach where responsibility for welfare was passed from the state to individual citizens, whose motivation to become active was derived from their personal morality and the prospect of the approbation of others, rather than from feelings of community belonging and community endeavour (Kearns 1995). Despite the rhetoric of central government, the involvement of citizens in political affairs has been more difficult to realise in practice (Rumbold 1991; Kearns 1995; Waterhouse 1995). Rumbold (1991) suggests that the role of the public in the political process has been reduced as political movements have become obsolete, the rise of consumerism, and the reduction of differences between political parties (Rumbold 1991). Following from this argument, Kearns (1995) suggests that policies such as the Citizen’s Charter simply diverted the public’s energies into complaints to the service provider rather than into an engagement with, or involvement in, governance.

There are a number of other problems that restrict the public's involvement in governance. Firstly, unlike politicians within government, citizens within interest groups are not accountable to the general public (Held 1989). Kearns (1995: 158) also points out that if...

...the authority to govern does not come in full measure from those subject to the governance in question, will the governors act, or feel they ought to act with responsibility to the locally governed?

The second problem identified by Held (1989) is that interest group advocates are accountable to their members, but their memberships rarely match the local population thus they are unrepresentative. Thirdly, within the British case; central government is both the client and the master of the system, thus individuals, regardless of their position rarely exert political power (Held 1989). Kearns (1995) agrees with this point, suggesting that...

...on paper, at least, local governance provides opening for the active citizen to exercise power and influence within a pluralist system for devising collective strategies and providing public services... In the main the activities in which citizens are to be engaged are to be far removed from any levels of real political power (Kearns 1995: 159).
Held (1989) and Kearns (1995) also argue that since the 1970s central government’s desire has been for economies of scale, resulting in sharing of resources or funding being given to fewer organisations, in the growth of some organisations, but also resulting in smaller firms with restricted autonomy. For Kearns (1995: 156) the organisation and management of these organisations puts them at a disadvantage...

...by virtue of their own internal democracy; poor relations with local government, unclear definitions of governor and governed, and variable and intermittent mechanisms for granting consent to be governed all serve to weaken the resistance of such organisations to central regulation.

A fourth constraint on citizen’s involvement in decision making is that the typical local councillor is male, middle aged, middle class and white and this has changed little since the 1960s (Gyford, Leach et al. 1989). Kearns (1995) argues that a similar pattern applies to politically active citizens...

...only a small group of wealthy, professional citizens are expected, selected or provided with opportunities to exercise control functions, or power, in the new structures of public sector management being put into place as government and the welfare sector are reformed. Many more ‘ordinary’ citizens will increasingly be given the chance to engage in the more mundane activities of citizenship, such as face-to-face welfare or service provision. (Kearns 1995: 158).

The problems of community involvement in decision-making identified by Held (1989) and Kearns (1995) suggest that individuals and community groups are restricted in the influence that they can exert on the policy process. On the scale used by Arnstein (1969) this would suggest that any ‘degree of citizen power’ is difficult to achieve. However, the political climate in Britain has changed towards a system of governance, which is “getting things done through other organizations” (Metcalfe and Richards 1991: 220). Such an approach has forced local authorities to work in conjunction with the private and voluntary sectors through a variety of partnership arrangements. According to Painter (1997), within such an environment, community participation in decision making...

...may be a concept forced on the consciousness of local authorities because of the loss of powers and services and because of the increasing realization that any strategy to be implemented must take place in an environment of shrinking local government resources (Painter and Isaac-Henry 1997: 46).
Henry (1993) combines an analysis of community participation in the leisure policy process with the roles of public sector professionals. Based on an empirical study of a major local authority he suggests that officers may assume one of four types, each of these professionals adopted a 'preferred' mode of interaction when assessing the needs of groups within the community. Henry’s typology can be summarised in tabular form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer Approach</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market analyst and marketer</td>
<td>The professional employs their expertise and knowledge, they may supplement this knowledge with some market research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternalist</td>
<td>Either (i) the professional assists communities identifying the means of achieving their own wants or (ii) the professional supplies what the community needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatist</td>
<td>Local needs, and adequate or innovative responses to those needs, would be best decided by a public/private/voluntary/central government partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>Concern with establishing opportunities for community self determination in provision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Henry 1993)

Other commentators have addressed the role of public sector professionals in the policy process. Perkin (1996: 198) argues, “the modern world is the world of the professional expert”. He suggests that, just as pre-industrial society was dominated by landlords and industrial society by capitalists, so post-industrial society is dominated by professionals. Therefore, as...

...pre-industrial landlords controlled the scarce resource of land for agriculture, capitalists controlled scarce resources of physical capital in machinery and factories or the financial capital that lay behind it, professionals in today’s society control the scarce resource of human capital, the capitalised value of their education, training and experience (Perkin 1996: 198).

Perkin (1996) drawing from elite theory argues that, like the landed and capitalist elites before them, the professional elites, notably the corporate managers and bureaucrats at the head of the system, control the flows of income and strive to steer more and more of it to themselves.
Other writers have concentrated on an analysis of the notion of a leisure profession. Bayles (1988) argues that there are three main criteria, which must be satisfied for professional status: it requires extensive training; it is intellectual in kind and is related to an important service (Bayles 1988). A number of writers have debated the extent to which leisure fulfils these criteria and what constitutes the term leisure professional (Coalter 1986; Bacon 1990; Henry 1993; Torkildsen 1998; McNamee, Sheridan et al. 1999). McNamee (et al, 1999: 6) suggests that leisure is a profession where paternalism is evident, as this justifies the need for leisure services for groups such as...

...the unemployed, the elderly, and single parent families. Although these groups are not dependant on leisure providers in the sense that they might be dependant on a doctor if they had a life threatening illness, they are nonetheless dependant in the sense that leisure providers have the means to enhance the quality of their lives through leisure.

But such a use of paternalistic leisure professionals in the sense used by McNamee is based on the notion that local government will deliver leisure services that the market will not or cannot provide. This stands in contradiction to the idea of liberalism and the New Right, of limited state intervention. For McNamee (et al, 1999) if this paternalistic element is lost then there is...

...serious doubt whether leisure managers at the point of delivery, guided only by market demand can justifiably make the claim to professional status. In order to retain professional status, it must be the case the customer is not always right, or better they cannot be thought to be right simply because they are the customer. That the leisure professional has superior knowledge, skills and experience to know what is best for the client and that they act accordingly underwrites their moral and technical authority. The alternative, underwritten by recent neo-liberal policies, designed to infuse public sector leisure with free market ideology, is to have our leisure provided by ‘experts’ who concerned exclusively with techniques or means to financial profit potentially at the expense of the client (McNamee et al, 1999: 7).

A number of commentators have attempted to provide typologies of the changes in the status of leisure within local government. Bacon (1990) argues the leisure profession has risen in status across three stages, which are linked to different types of leisure department. These are shown below:
Table 3.3: Typology Of Leisure Departments And Management Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Department</th>
<th>Type of Management Activity</th>
<th>Management Status</th>
<th>Management philosophy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Amenity Section of a Technical Department</td>
<td>Operational and Technical</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Operational Technical Excellence. Reactive Problem Solving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amenity and Recreation Department</td>
<td>Operational, Technical and Developmental</td>
<td>Rising</td>
<td>Operational and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Leisure Services Department</td>
<td>Integrated, Consultative, and Co-ordinating</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Developmental Proactive Strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Bacon 1990: 83)

Bacon (1990) argues that during the 1970s leisure professionals suffered from conflicts with other groups and difficulties with their role, mission, occupational identity and philosophy. Bacon suggests that...

...people working in leisure enjoyed low status and a marginal social role within the hierarchy of British public administration. This was a function partly of their social antecedents, and partly of the kind of work they did (Bacon 1990: 79).

However, since the 1970s leisure has become more important and influential in local government affairs. Bacon (1990) identifies five factors that have led to the changes in the status of leisure. Firstly, there has been a growing awareness that leisure provision can contribute to the quality of life of the population. Secondly, there has been a recognition that leisure provision can act as an economic generator in that it attracts both tourism and business relocation. Thirdly, government policy has encouraged, through the agency of the Sports Council, grant aid to expand sport and leisure provision in Britain. Fourthly, leisure has developed through the ongoing quest for municipal status and prestige in local government where good local leisure provision has not only increased the reputation of politicians, but has also improved the image of administrative districts, which sought to market themselves in the quest to persuade commercial organisations to relocate their operations. Fifth, government policy has encouraged the development of
targeted provision in areas of urban dereliction and decay in order to defuse social unrest amongst young people (Bacon 1990: 80).

For Bacon, the development of large-scale local government departments has given leisure managers the ability to enhance their career development and has allowed leisure managers to move towards the centre stage of public administration. However, Bacon argues that this process is not uniform, but in a few...

...large authorities where executive managers enjoy high status. They are regarded as equals by the heads of other large departments, and belong to the authority’s corporate management team (Bacon 1990: 84).

Bacon also provides a typology of the backgrounds of leisure managers and how these have changed over time. Bacon argues that during the 1970s leisure managers generally came from facility management positions, however, by the 1980s a new breed of self confident, middle class, generalist graduate managers attained key ‘gatekeeper’ positions within leisure. These individuals could...

...offer their employers precisely the range of leadership skills which can enable public agencies to take a broad strategic and developmental view of their role in an increasingly turbulent society (Bacon 1990: 86).

**Table 3.4: Typology Of Leisure Managers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leisure Manager Type</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditionalist Managers</td>
<td>Park, amenity of swimming bath managers, joined leisure from school, started in basic leisure jobs like pool attendant. Many came into leisure prior to reorganisation in 1970s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Centred Managers</td>
<td>Sports enthusiasts, games teachers or PTI instructors. Many came to leisure management in the mid to late 1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalist Graduate Managers</td>
<td>Joined leisure management after completing degrees such as a degree in Recreation Management, their studies helped them achieve senior posts in the public and private sectors in the 1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The second chance careerist Managers</td>
<td>Moved into leisure later in life, have a variety of backgrounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from Bacon 1990)
Henry (2001) has also provided a typology of managerial orientations of leisure professionals, these he accepts are ideal types and in practice management may draw on more than one approach:

Table 3.5: Changing Management Styles in Public Leisure Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timescale</th>
<th>Managerial Orientation</th>
<th>Management focus</th>
<th>Management styles</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early 1970s</td>
<td>Facility Manager / Engineer</td>
<td>Facility focus</td>
<td>Centralised</td>
<td>Maximise income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1970s to early 1980s</td>
<td>Bureau / Liberal Welfare Professional</td>
<td>Activity / group focus</td>
<td>Decentralised</td>
<td>Maximise participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid 1980s</td>
<td>Bureau / Liberal Welfare Professional</td>
<td>Community focus</td>
<td>Decentralised, advocacy, catalytic role</td>
<td>Maximise opportunities for 'problem groups'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1980s to early 1990s</td>
<td>Competitive / Contract Manager</td>
<td>Market focus</td>
<td>Expert marketeer</td>
<td>Maximise revenue and economic efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1990s</td>
<td>Transformational Manager</td>
<td>Quality focus</td>
<td>Agent of organisational change</td>
<td>Maximise quality and best value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Henry 2001: 120)

Henry’s (2001) typology is particularly valuable as it provides the typology of leisure professionals alongside a chronology of local government change. The typology indicates how the goals of leisure managers have reflected more generic local government leisure policy change where concern with welfare objectives has altered to a concern for economy and efficiency during the late 1980s and 1990s to a concern with quality and effectiveness under the Best value regime at the end of the 1990s.

Commentators have also argued that officer-member relations in local government have changed since the 1970s. Henry’s (1987) study of the assumptive worlds of local government leisure professionals identified a six-fold model of officer-councillor relations. Henry maintains that individual officers may not conform to a single category or role and may vary their behaviour according to the situation. The categories found by Henry (1987) are summarised in the table below:
Chapter 3  
Policy Change, Governance and Partnership in British Local Government Leisure Services

Table 3.6: Officer / Member Relations In Local Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer Type</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional model</td>
<td>Councillors decide policy and Officers implement it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-traditional model</td>
<td>Professional expertise of the officer is more dominant than the unqualified expertise of the member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Model</td>
<td>Overlapping roles - members are involved in operational decisions and officers in policy formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-Political</td>
<td>Focus on policy goals involving either officers of members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Advisor to a</td>
<td>Party affiliation held by certain officers who act as advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Advisor Role</td>
<td>Officers steer political thinking of policy development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from Henry 2000)

For Henry, the traditional model, where policy is decided by politicians and implemented by officers, was mainly evident during the 1970s and early 1980s. Although the 1972 Bains Committee argued members and officers of the new local authorities should play an integrated role (Bains 1972). Cockburn (1977) argues that the role of local government officers in the late 1970s and early 1980s was secondary to that of politicians. These politicians, according to Elcock (1998), assumed four roles within local government. Firstly, they were required to make policy and think strategically. Secondly, they represented their communities as a whole. Thirdly, they sat on committees in order to control the activity of the council’s officers and staff. Fourthly, they represented their wards and constituents.

However, since the mid-1980s some writers have suggested that officers in many authorities have assumed the political advisor role identified by Henry (2001). According to Wolman and Stoker (1992) public sector officers during the 1990s have held...

...a large amount of discretion in determining their own work patterns, as well as their ability effectively to make decisions about important areas of policy in their chosen fields (Wolman and Stoker 1992: 156).

The power of professional officers, according to Wolman and Stoker (1992) arises from three main forces. They are experts in their particular area, thus elected councillors, who are not involved in the day to day running of the authority, find it difficult to question the decision of officers. Council officers also set the agenda and produce reports. Finally officers control public access to the local decision making process (Wolman and Stoker...
1992). Bacon (1990) also suggests that by the mid to late 1990s the 'power elite' within the leisure field the 'leisure gatekeepers' were the chief officers and directors of leisure services because they held strategic managerial positions.

Elcock (1998) argues that there are two critical factors in influencing the nature of officer-member relations in the 1990s. The first is the relationship between the chief executive officer and leading councillors. The second is council meetings, where the exchange of views can take place, for Elcock (1998) such meetings are only of value if the participants take the opportunity to think more widely about policy. Most decisions, according to Wolman and Stoker (1992), are made between these first two groups in committees but principally by a chair, a deputy chair and the senior officials. Despite the important role of officials over recent years they have lost discretion by financial cutbacks and privatisation of services as well as the new public managerialism, which has changed their role from being directly responsible for the provision of services to one where they set the parameters for provision and monitor provision. (Rhodes 1994).

Elcock (1998) maintains that in council's where party politics is strong this helps council's develop coherent policies but...

....the absence of overall control tends to produce stronger officer control and weaken member's control over both policy and the administration (Elcock 1998: 17).

Where party politics is weak and there is little overall control and no agreement amongst parties policy outcomes are uncertain until the council meeting. This may produce "a policy vacuum into which officers will step" (Elcock 1998: 17).

### 3.8 Conclusions to the Chapter

This Chapter sought to identify the main changes in local government policy since the 1970s. These changes have had a profound effect on the function, structure and culture of local government and on the provision of leisure. The review of the literature, which has documented these changes, alongside the ideological rationales for change, will provide a valuable background for the analysis of policy change in the case study of
Sheffield in Chapters 5 to 8. The analysis of governance in the second part of the chapter has shown that, to understand the partnership arrangements which have formed at a local level, there is a need to explain them, not only both in terms of their internal structure, power, and decision-making procedures but also as a response to external changes to the urban economy and the national policy context. In addition, the influence of individuals whether interest group representatives, citizens, elected members or officers is an important consideration as they play significant roles in either advocating or resisting policy change.
CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction To The Chapter

A concern with methodology represents more than a concern with methods. Rather it reflects the theoretical and epistemological rationales for adopting the methods used in a given study. The focus of this chapter therefore is on the epistemological assumptions underpinning the adoption of theory, and the methods adopted for generating and analysing data through which to explore theoretical accounts.

The structure of the chapter is therefore as follows. The following section outlines the critical realist assumptions on which the research approach adopted is founded. This is an important exercise since, as Marsh and Smith (2001) suggest it is impossible to make sense of the world without some form of formal framework. For critical realists, social action takes place within the context of 'deep' structures, which, while unobserved, are important and can affect observable structures and outcomes. To help interpret these deeper structures the critical realist explanation takes into account of how a phenomenon is discursively constructed and 'lived out' by people within the context:

There is a material world out there, which is independent of our knowledge of it. However, that real world is mediated by our discursive construction of it and those discursive constructions... have real material effects. (Marsh 1999: 14)

Epistemological concerns affect what is studied, how it is studied and the status the researcher gives to his / her findings (Marsh and Smith 2001).

Section 4.3 links the epistemological assumptions with the research strategy outlining the iterative process between deductive and inductive approaches.
Section 4.5 outlines the research aims, while Sections 4.6 and 4.7 highlight the approach adopted in collecting the data employed and subjecting it to analysis. Qualitative data collection methods were chosen to help provide a strong sense of context, which facilitates an understanding of the case (Cassell and Symon 1994) and to seek actor's accounts of the structural context and their response to it. Methods included semi-structured interviews, qualitative document analysis and observation. The findings of the study emerged from the data through a process of inductive content analysis (facilitated by the use of NUD*IST qualitative data analysis software). This Chapter describes in detail how the raw data themes were structured into first, second and third order themes and general dimensions (Patton 1980; 1990). Also consistent with critical realism, urban policy related theory was used in reflecting on the data analysis and to interpret the findings, and where necessary to reflect upon the deeper structures at play in the research context. Unlike positivists, critical realists believe that it is impossible to provide definitive explanations. The aim is to produce an interpretation of leisure policy change in Sheffield based on empirical observation and theoretical inference, which is coherent, corresponds with data appropriately generated and which represents a convincing account.

4.2 Epistemological Position

For Patton (1978) a paradigm is "a world view, a general perspective, a way of breaking down the complexity of the real world" (Patton 1978: 203). Research paradigms whether in the natural or social sciences influence what is studied, how it is studied, and the status, which the researcher gives to the findings. This section compares three epistemological paradigms positivism, interpretivism and critical realism. The aim of the section is to provide a rationale for adopting the critical realist position.

From its basic foundations in the natural sciences, positivists hold that for a phenomenon to be termed legitimate knowledge, the concepts must be measurable (Kidder and Judd 1986: 40). Knowledge is gained by gathering verified facts or generalisations about facts, which are often referred to as laws. Our understanding of the world is gained through a
process of deduction where hypotheses, in the form of presumed causal relationships, are derived from theories and are tested. Positivists maintain that reality is external and independent from the observer, thus the researcher must detach him/herself from his/her work and remove all subjectivity. For positivists...

...knowledge of reality is obtained by the measurement of its properties using objective methods. The researcher’s task is to identify generalisable causal explanations and fundamental laws concerning relationships between variables (Partington, Tranfield et al. 1999: 4).

A positivistic study of leisure policy change in Sheffield would examine direct empirical evidence of the change. For example the study may test the level of agreement between actors in the process or the extent of change that had occurred over a defined time period. The positivist would not accept that change could be influenced by deeper structures, which may not be directly observable, or at best inferred from direct indicators.

In contrast, interpretivists argue that the methods of the natural sciences are not suitable for the study of the complex human phenomena as 'objective' social science or historical analyses are not possible. Interpretation is based on Verstehen or understanding of social action "in order to arrive at a causal explanation of its cause and effects" (Weber 1947: 90). Interpretivists subscribe to relative notions of knowledge, (that the world exists but there are multiple realities that are socially defined), and subjectivist methodology, (which seek to understand how subjects create the understanding of reality). This leads on to postmodernist claims that truth is what is agreed to be true at a given time by the subjects in the process, and there may therefore be multiple realities and multiple truths:

Reality is socially constructed, and consists of individuals’ interpretation of their circumstances. Knowledge comes from the penetration by the researcher of the meanings that make up the individuals’ views of reality. The researcher’s role is to interpret and reconstruct those meanings (Partington, Tranfield et al. 1999: 4).

For the interpretivist the world is socially constructed, therefore, interpretive studies require an understanding of the discourse of actors within the context. Thus, to study leisure policy change in Sheffield the study would need to gain an understanding of how
change was discursively constructed and 'lived out' by people within the city. This element of interpretivism is beneficial as it acknowledges that social constructions of phenomena and discourse can affects policy outcomes.

Interpretive studies reject the deductive strategy of the natural sciences. According to Glaser and Strauss (1967) the basic problems with the established hypothetico-deductive approaches are...

....the substantive hypotheses have to be formulated before actually beginning the research. They are deduced from general theories, which have often been developed in other fields of research or originate from some researchers' speculative thinking. The possible detrimental effect of this procedure is that social reality of a specific field of research has to be pressed into categories of an 'alien theory' developed in quite another field (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 2-3).

Glaser and Straus (1967) argue that the researcher should use an inductive approach to build a theoretical framework from the data. They argue that to...

...generate theory... we suggest as the best approach an initial, systematic discovery of the theory from the data of social research. Then one can be relatively sure that the theory will fit the work (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 2-3).

However, the radical grounded theory approach, that the researcher should purge her / himself of all prior knowledge and become in effect 'theory free' before engaging with data, is simplistic. When one looks for data, what one takes as significant, and how one collects data are all reflections of the influence of theory on the research approach. Thus, critical realists reject the grounded theory approach as "it is impossible to make any sense of the world without some sort of theoretical framework" (Marsh and Smith 2001: 532).

Critical realists use a theoretical framework to inform the research and to develop the research questions. The data collection stage of a research project may observe the observable processes going on, but also needs to analyse the discursive construction of those processes by the actors within the context. Critical realists also use theory in the data analysis stage of a research project to help interpret the complexities of the social situation. As such, theory may infer the underlying structures of a particular context,
theory provides a way of constructing a narrative that helps us identify and explain the underlying structural relationships (Marsh 1999). The main tenets of each epistemological position are summarised in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: The Main Tenets of Positivism, Interpretivism and Critical Realism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITIVIST POSITION</th>
<th>INTERPRETIVIST POSITION (Radical Interpretivism)</th>
<th>CRITICAL REALIST POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The world exists independently of our knowledge of it</td>
<td>The world does not exist independently of our knowledge of it.</td>
<td>The world exists independently of our knowledge of it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are regular relationships between social phenomena.</td>
<td>The word is socially, or discursively, constructed.</td>
<td>There is necessity in the world - objects / structures do have causal powers, so we can make causal statements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are no deep structured that cannot be observed.</td>
<td>There is no extra-discursive social sphere, no 'real' social world beyond discourse.</td>
<td>There are deep structures, which cannot be directly observed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no dichotomy between appearance and reality; that the World is real and not mediated by our senses or socially constructed.</td>
<td>Social phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretation of them and it is this interpretation / understanding of them which affects outcomes. It is the interpretation of social phenomena which is crucial.</td>
<td>Social phenomena exist independently of our interpretation, or discursive construction, of them, nevertheless that discursive construction affects outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The social scientist, using theory to generate hypotheses, can test, and falsify the relationships between phenomena, by direct observation.</td>
<td>Meanings can only be established and understood with discourses. Objective analysis is therefore impossible, knowledge it discursively laden.</td>
<td>Structures do not determine outcomes, rather they constrain and facilitate, social science involves the study of reflexive agents who are capable of constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing structures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Adapted from Marsh and Smith 1999: 11-14)

As noted above, neither the positivist or interpretivist positions provide an adequate conceptualisation of reality. To overcome these weaknesses Bhasker (1975) developed a multi level ontology which argues that reality exists in three overlapping domains: the empirical (experiences or observed events), the actual (events whether observed or not), and the real (the underlying tendencies or mechanisms which may in a given situation give rise to events or may lie dormant, being cancelled out by other forces). Bhasker's overlapping domains of reality is shown in Figure 4.1:
Bhasker's multi-level ontology is valuable for this study as it...

...allows the assumption that contexts/stimuli, meanings/cognitive processes, and responses/behaviors are real, and that while some of their elements are revealed as observable, some may be accessible only through the subjective accounts of managers and other organizational actors, and still others may only be uncovered through the researcher speculation over apparent causal tendencies, demanding further enquiry and verification (Partington, Tranfield et al. 1999 p. 11).

4.3 **Linking the Epistemological Position with the Research Approach**

To operationalise the approach described above, the research process was divided into several stages. These are described below:

**Stage 1: Review of existing theory:**
The research requires the mapping and assessing of all relevant literature to inform the study and to help construct the research questions. In this thesis, literature reviewed draws on the fields of politics, policy studies, organisation studies, sociology, management sciences, economics and leisure policy. The principal findings from this review are outlined in Chapter 2 and 3 an Section 4.4.

**Stage 2: Development of the Primary Research Aims and Objectives**
The review informed the research and helps the construction of research questions. The primary aim of the research and the research questions are provided in Section 4.5.
Stage 3: Data Collection: Interviews, document analysis, observation

Some theories/models (such as growth machines, regimes and policy networks) may provide testable propositions. However, given the complexity of the study, and the fact that it is a single case study, the hypothetico deductive approach is inappropriate. Such models are likely to oversimplify the social relationships involved. Cities are complex social environments and, while some surface structures are relevant (such as the economic or political structures of the city), deep structures (such as gender, class or race) cannot be directly observed. Thus, the research approach must take into account reflexive agents who are capable of providing an interpretation of the phenomena. The research interprets everyday concepts and the meanings, and reports the accounts of local government officers, politicians and interest group representatives. The study must examine these agents' interpretation of the structures and evaluate how this affects their actions and how their actions alter the structural context. To understand why people act as they do there is a need to grasp their understanding of external reality.

Qualitative data collection methods were chosen to help provide a strong sense of context, which facilitates an understanding of the case (Cassell and Symon 1994) and can be used to seek actor's accounts of the structural context and their response to it. The specific benefits of interviews, document analysis and observation and how they were used in this study are developed below (in Section 4.6).

Stage 4: Data Analysis: Inductive Content Analysis

Inductive content analysis (Patton 1980, 1990) provides a method of analysing the data gathered from interviews, observation and document analysis. In addition to identifying key themes and concepts, inductive content analysis allows propositions to emerge from the data and these can be subjected to further analysis. Furthermore, existing theory can be used to help interpret the findings and to explain the case. The overall aim of the thesis is not to provide definitive answers to leisure policy change in Sheffield but to provide an interpretation, a coherent and convincing account, based on empirical observation and theoretical inference. The process of inductive content analysis is described in Section 4.7.
The strategy for developing a theoretically informed but empirically grounded research is shown in Figure 4.2.

4.4 Reviewing the Literature

As noted above existing theory helped to inform the enquiry and suggest questions for the research to address. Existing theory was also used following the data analysis to help interpret the results and explain the case. This section summarises the main findings.
from the literature review and the methodological debates within the field on urban politics. The aim of the section is to demonstrate how the primary aim of the research and the research questions were drawn deductively from this literature.

As noted in Chapter 2, pluralists focus on the decisions made at the local level by attempting to address the question of who has the power to influence policy decisions and to resist opposition. Dahl (1961) applied a positivistic methodology to reject the highly stratified view of the power structure identified in Atlanta by Hunter (1953) (where society was described as a pyramid capped by the ruling elite). Dahl outlined two rival hypotheses: that a unified oligarchy governed in New Haven; or that a system of polyarchy was in operation (Dahl 1961). To test these rival hypothesis, Dahl looked at the exercising of power in three areas of decision making: urban development, public education and political nominations, by studying who was involved and how they involved in the important decisions. Later Polsby simplified the objectives of the pluralist study to: 'who gains? who loses? and who prevails?' (Polsby 1980). Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and Judge, Stoker and Wolman (1995) criticise Dahl's approach, arguing that the political decisions were chosen because they were politically salient, thus were the most likely to be contested by multiple actors making the situation appear more pluralistic. Thus pluralism "takes no account of the fact that power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision making to relatively 'safe' issues" (Bachrach 1962: 948). Further, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argue that many issues fail to become the site for public dispute, and therefore remain non-decisions. This they attribute to the second face of power, the power of professionals and politicians to prevent issues or demands for change from entering the political arena in the first place (Bachrach 1962).

The methodological approach of urban elite theorists, following Hunter (1953), has been based on a reputational analysis to identify community influentials. Hunter (1953) assembled the names of community elite into categories of business, government, civic associations and society activists. A panel was asked to rank these people, depending on their perception of how powerful they were. The top forty people were interviewed to ascertain who was the most powerful, how they interacted and how they related to
community projects. Judge, Wolman and Stoker (1995) argue that the elitist studies are useful as they identify who holds power but they fail to analyse why these individuals are powerful or how people use this power. Elite theory has also been criticised as they fail to take account of non-local issues.

The policy network approach evaluates how the existence, membership and characteristics of networks affect policy outcomes. Within a network the distribution and exchange of resources is central to the maintenance and use of power by individuals or organisations. Key to the policy network approach is the need to integrate macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. Thus, at the micro level there is a need to explain how individuals in a network act within the constraints of their environment. At a macro level there is a need to explain why networks came about and what factors affect network change. As Marsh and Stoker (1995) argue, it is impossible to explain the membership, characteristics or the outcomes of a policy network without locating it within the context of a theory of power and the relationship between the state and civil society. Marsh and Stoker (1995) also argue that...

...policy network analysis addresses the first two of four questions any theory of the state should address: ‘Who rules/makes policy?’ and ‘How do they rule/make policy?’... Network analysis does not directly, or necessarily, address the two more important questions: ‘why are certain actors in a privileged position in the policy-making process?’ and ‘in whose interest do they rule, and how does their rule result in that interest being served?’ These last two questions are the key concern of political sociologists and state theorists (Marsh and Stoker 1995: 293).

Regime theorists adopt an interpretive methodology and suggest that the main proposition of a study should emerge inductively from observation of the urban scene (Stone, Orr et al. 1991). One of the distinctive contributions of regime theory is the social-production model of power which is the ability to “bring enough co-operation among disparate community elements to get things done” (Stone 1989: 227). Thus, in contrast to the debate, discussed earlier, between pluralists and elitists who focus on the issue of 'Who Governs' (Dahl 1961), the social production perspective reflects the...
...power struggle [between rulers and challengers] concerns, not control and resistance, but gaining and fusing a capacity to act - power to not power over (Stone 1989: 227).

Regime theory is a relatively new concept and, in general, researchers have attempted to theory build through case study research. However, a number of authors have argued that the regime approach has been diluted by paying too much emphasis to locating, mapping, or producing new regime typologies to fit any type of public-private collaboration in a city (Mossberger and Stoker 2001; Macleod and Goodwin 1999; Ward 1996). The danger of producing different regime types is that the regime concept does no work in explaining the urban politics of the case study (Dowding 2001).

The wide use of regime is a recognition of its value and insights but that some applications have stretched the concept beyond its original meaning to a point that the concept itself runs the risk of becoming meaningless and a source of theoretical confusion (Mossberger and Stoker 2001: 817).

Thus, researchers should avoid producing different descriptive regime types whenever the regime concept does not explain the urban politics of the case study (Dowding 2001). Rather theorists need to return to the...

...mechanisms underpinning the forming of regimes rather than superficially similar concrete outcomes which will provide urban regime analysis with theoretical power (Ward, 1996: 429).

A recurring criticism of regime theory is the ethnocentrism of the approach. Within the United States the local state owns less land, has fewer planning powers and is more dependant on business for its income (through development and maintenance of the tax base) than European local governments (Dowding; Dunleavy; King, and Margetts 1995; Digaetano and Klemanski 1993b; Harding 1994). Thus,

Stone's regime theory assumes the weak state system of American federalism in which local governments lack sufficient authority to accomplish significant governing tasks. As a result, local officials must garner private-sector support to generate critical resources to compensate for the deficient governing capacity of the American local state (Digaetano and Lawless 1999: 547).

Further, whilst US local governments have been concerned with development, European local governments have generally been concerned with service delivery and consumption
(Harding 1994). Within the US, local businesses often comprise of indigenous firms whereas in Europe businesses are often branches of national or international companies. Further many European banks and utilities have centralised headquarters. This makes attracting coalition partners with systemic power more difficult in the European context (Harding 1994). The European central state has often been more involved in local growth policies than the US state (Digaetano and Klemanski 1993b; Harding 1994; John and Cole 1998). Within Britain (John and Cole 1998) and France (Levine 1994) the central state has also influenced local growth policies through ideological conflict. Within Britain non-elected agencies have also influenced urban politics and have often assumed a governing role (Strange 1997; Stewart 1996; Bassett 1996). Therefore,...

...economic development partnerships in Europe are more likely to be led by the public sector, with less participation from local businesses and with less policy autonomy from national government (Mossberger and Stoker 2001: 821).

Despite the cross-national differences, a number of authors have argued that that the regime approach can be applied in Europe (Digaetano and Klemanski 1993a; 1993b; Harding 1994; John and Cole 1998). However, a greater emphasis must be placed on public sector actors (Digaetano and Klemanski 1993b).

Ward (1996) identifies three themes from the regime literature, which are acknowledged to be of particular relevance to the theoretical approach:

Regime formation (the processes lead to regimes forming), sustenance (how and why regimes form / fail) and characteristics (the outcomes of regimes, which have been identified through the construction of ideal types) (Ward 1996: 429).

Regime Theory has concentrated on regime formation and sustenance or the internal politics of long-term coalition building (Stone, 1989: 178) and the manner in which actors create support largely through small-scale material side payments. The theory, thus far, has not provided an adequate account of regime change and the potential for regime failure or non-emergence. Stone's study, in particular, concentrated on stability and the theory has failed to address regime change (Dowding 2001). The regime approach has also placed too great an emphasis on local factors in the setting of urban
governing agendas rather than addressing changes brought about by economic, social and political restructuring (Dowding 2001). Further, the theory has not dealt with changes in business cycles and the differences in governing strategies brought about by periods of growth and recession (Digaetano 1997). For many authors the lack of this macro level analysis has led to the merging of regime theory with regulation theory (Jessop et al 1997; Ward, 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Lauria 1998).

As noted above, this thesis uses this theory in two primary ways. Firstly, to inform the research prior to the development of the research strategy. Theory is also used to define the primary goal of the research and the research questions. The second role of theory is to help interpret the findings of the empirical study and to help explain leisure policy change in Sheffield.

4.5 The Primary Aim of the Research and the Broad Research Objectives

As noted above, the primary aim of the research and the research questions were derived from the literature. The primary aim of the research is to provide a theoretically informed but empirically grounded account of leisure policy change in Sheffield. The review of the literature alluded to several important research objectives. These include:

- to review both the reasons for policy change and policy stability / continuity.
- to analyse the relationship between the state and the local policy context.
- to analyse the impact of broad economic, political and social factors as well as local factors.
- to evaluate the nature of change within institutions and the interorganisational relationships between the public, private and voluntary sectors organisations.
- to evaluate the inter-subject dimension. In particular, who has the power to influence policy change and to resist change and how this power is expressed.
- to address why collaboration occurs in urban policy-making and the manner in which actors create support for action.
to review the outcomes and characteristics of collaborative arrangements but more importantly to analyse the mechanisms underpinning their formation.

4.6 The Case Study

The case study method was used to study this context as it allows the gathering of in-depth information about a particular problem or situation (Yin 1984; Stake 1995). The case study also enables the use of a combination of methods. According to Bryman (1989) by using case study research the researcher can convey to the reader what it is like to be in the organisation or situation being studied. Stake (1994) argues that one of the most unique aspects of case study research in the social sciences is the selection of the case or cases to be studied. In the introduction, a number of reasons for choosing Sheffield were presented. In short, Sheffield was chosen on the basis of its appropriateness in reflecting the themes identified the literature. Sheffield, provides an interesting example of local government change and leisure policy change in which to conduct the study. The case was also chosen on pragmatic grounds of access to documents and the actors involved in the policy process. Combinations of methods were used in this thesis including observation, informal interviews and qualitative document analysis.

4.6.1 Observation

The first method of data collection used in this study was participant observation. As noted above, Sheffield City Council approached a research team at Loughborough University to help facilitate the development of the partnership approach. This provided the researcher with access to the policy-making environment and the actors involved. Fieldwork involving the use of observation (with the approval of the chief officer and participants) was employed to allow the researcher to develop an informal relationship with the staff of the Leisure Services Department and to observe them in their natural setting. Observation studies have been criticised, as the group being studied will not act naturally, if they are aware of the researcher's purpose (Haralambos and Holborn, 1990). However, within this case the officers were used to having students working within the Department. Further, many of the officers observed were also involved in the partnership
approach, so worked closely with the researcher. In addition, the study was legitimised by senior management, who helped to negotiate access.

In total 26 days were spent as participant observer of the development of the *Active Sheffield* partnership. During these sessions observation was unstructured allowing flexibility, thus the researcher was able to benefit from chance remarks or unforeseen events and could initiate new line of investigation (Firestone, 1984). Field notes were taken during these sessions. One of the main sources of data for this thesis was informal discussions held with individuals involved in the partnership process. This included officers, politicians and interest group representatives. During these encounters no notes were taken at the time but detailed descriptions of events were produced as soon as practicable afterwards. 16 meetings with senior management were attended over the course of twelve months (October 1998 to October 1999). Detailed notes were taken of these meetings and these noted were transcribed. All field notes were entered into NUD*IST and inductive content analysis was conducted (see below).

Whilst participant observation is often used to facilitate a detailed understanding of the environment and actors under study, in analysing policy change and partnerships, this was not the primary aim of this study, instead participant observation served two primary purposes. Firstly, the aim was to "forge interpretations in terms of their [the subjects] own natural language" (Bryman 1989: 137). Therefore, one aim was to identify the experiences as perceived by the actors themselves, which would provide valuable information on policy change and partnerships. In particular, informal discussions with those in favour and those in opposition to partnerships helped provide material against which to compare data drawn from interviews.

### 4.6.2 Document Analysis

The second method of data collection used in this study was qualitative document analysis. Document analysis was used in this case because it enabled the researcher to gather data unobtrusively. Document analysis also provided the opportunity to evaluate
policy changes and events over long periods of time. The first aim of the document analysis was to provide a basic understanding of the case prior to conducting the detailed interviews. The analysis was particularly useful for providing a chronology of events relating to local government change and the development of the partnership approach. The second aim was to perform qualitative analysis, where key themes and meaning were drawn from the data. The third aim was to provide a means of contextualising the critical incidents which interviewees had reported (see below).

The documents analysed in the study included local newspaper reports, documents produced by the Council and other agencies in the city. These sources included strategy reports, other reports (such as committee reports), minutes of meetings, internal memos, documents and letters of correspondence between organisations. The main documents analysed are listed below:

Table 4.2: The Main Sources of Documentary Evidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Twelve Years.</th>
<th>City of Sheffield Parks, Cemeteries and Allotment Department</th>
<th>1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ten Years: A brief account of the work of the Parks and Burial Grounds Committee from 1952 to 1962</td>
<td>City of Sheffield Parks, Cemeteries and Allotment Department</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation: An Account of the Changing Role of the Parks, Cemeteries and Allotments Department 1966-1969 Culminating in the Formation of the Recreation Department. Sheffield, Sheffield City Council</td>
<td>City of Sheffield Recreation Department</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Accounts.</td>
<td>Sheffield, Sheffield City Council</td>
<td>1981 to 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in Sheffield, Yorkshire and Humberside, and Great Britain: Results of the Census of Employment</td>
<td>Sheffield City Council</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure Challenge: A Prospect for the Lower Don Valley.</td>
<td>Sheffield, Sheffield City Recreation Department</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure Challenge: A Prospect for the Lower Don Valley. Sheffield</td>
<td>Sheffield City Council Recreation Department</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Don Valley : Final Report</td>
<td>Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh Tracks I: A Strategic Proposal For The Re-Orientation Of The Organisation For The 1990s</td>
<td>Sheffield City Council Recreation Department</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership in Action</td>
<td>Sheffield City Council</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh Tracks II: A Business Plan For Viability And Success</td>
<td>Sheffield City Council Recreation Department</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield 2000: The Development Strategy</td>
<td>Sheffield City Council</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards A Cultural Plan For Sheffield In The 1990s</td>
<td>Sheffield City Council, Sheffield Hallam University, Yorkshire and</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The main difficulty in conducting an analysis of these documents was that they were not necessarily a full or even representative sample of all such materials. In many cases they were often written by different authors or departments and were often targeted towards different audiences. These included generic regeneration strategies, arts and cultural strategies, leisure strategies and more specific sports, play and tourism plans. This lack of comprehensive meant that only a partial inductive content analysis was conducted. Where possible these documents were scanned into a computer and coded using the
NUD*IST software package for qualitative data analysis. The method of inductive content analysis is described below.

4.6.3 Interviews

It is impossible, in a study of local government policy in an authority over a twenty-five year period, to observe the major events in that period, therefore there is a need to rely on the interpretation of what has been observed by others. The chosen method for doing this was a semi-structured interview. The content of the interview schedule was focused by research objectives drawn from the relevant literature. The interviews were focused by the researcher to obtain research-relevant information. A predetermined agenda was set for all interviews and, where possible, similar wording and order of questions was employed so that data from the interviews were more likely to be comparable. However, a flexible approach was adopted, as the researcher was required to adapt the questions to make them more appropriate to the understanding of the subject or to the situation. This approach also enabled the researcher to deal immediately with any misinterpretation problems that respondents faced. This approach also enabled the researcher to follow any interesting leads and to probe deeper into respondent's answers. The subject's interpretations of leisure policy change, alluded to at interview, could be compared to the definitions provided by historical records or other materials. The researcher explained the purpose of the investigation and the confidentiality of the responses, and permission was also sought to quote respondents in the subsequent reporting of the study.

The interview schedule was divided into two parts. The first section addressed themes relating to policy changes and events that had occurred in Sheffield. To aid the construction of an interview schedule, some elements of the critical incident technique were employed. The critical incident technique is generally used as a phenomenological method, administered through an unstructured interview. The method is...

...a qualitative interview procedure which facilitates the investigation of significant occurrences (events, incidents, processes or issues) identified by the respondent, the way they are managed, and the outcomes in terms of perceived effects. The objective is to gain an understanding of the incident from the perspective of the individual (Chell 1998: 56).
The main advantage of the technique is that it allows the researcher to identify the most important events and changes but also to gain an understanding of those incidents and the people involved by gaining access to the context in which they happened and which shaped future actions. They were asked to identify the major changes or events that had occurred during their period of involvement and the implications that this had on the city, their organisation and on themselves. As with the other methods of data collection the critical incident technique was not used alone, but rather with observation and document analysis. These other sources of information were used to supplement the material provided by the respondents. The interview schedule is shown in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3: Interview Schedule (Critical Incident Section)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEISURE POLICY CHANGE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The questionnaire began with a discussion of leisure policy change during the period of their involvement in the city. The main questions were as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What have been the major changes in leisure policy over the period or your involvement? Why do you think that these changes have occurred?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Who have been the most influential organisations in determining leisure policy in the city? Why do you think these organisations were important?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Who have been the most influential individuals or groups in determining leisure policy in the city? Why do you think these people were important?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Are/were there any policies which you feel are/were unrepresentative of the general public? Are/were these decisions contested? By whom?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Has there been any leisure policy issues that you or others have felt were important but have failed to make the political agenda? Why don't you think that they became important issues?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4  

Research Methodology

NETWORKS AND PARTNERSHIPS:
Interviewees were also questioned about networks and partnerships in the city and their influence on leisure policy development. The main questions were:

- Do/did organisations collaborate to achieve shared leisure policy goals? Which organisations / individuals are/were involved? Why do you think that these collaborative arrangements formed? What kind of leisure policy issues do/did they deal with?
- How would you describe nature of the collaboration [e.g. contractual agreement/partnerships/networks/forums]? What have they achieved? How well are they organised? How do/did they create support for action? What resources do/did they have?
- Has nature of collaboration between organisations changed over time?
- Does your organisation support the partnership approach? Do all organisations support the approach [if no - why not]?
- What do you think are the benefits of a partnership approach? What are the challenges? Do you support the local authority's desire for a partnership approach in leisure services [e.g. Sports Sheffield, Active Sheffield and the Play Council]? How much influence over decision making should these partnerships have?
- Why do you think that the partnership approach [e.g. Sports Sheffield, Active Sheffield and the Play Council] has encountered the problems that it have?

PREDICTED LEISURE POLICY CHANGE

- Respondents were also asked to comment on what changes do you think will occur in leisure policy in Sheffield in the next five 5 years and what policies they would like to see developing in the next 5 years?

The second set of questions related to the life histories of respondents. The aim of these questions was to understand what experience, background and interests they brought to bear on the policy context. Miller (1996) argues that the life history perspective provides a method of researching both social structure and the individual as a social actor. Thus, to...

...tell us about one's bibliography means telling about the constraints and opportunities that were available in the past and how one dealt with these – circumventing (or being thwarted by) obstacles, taking advantage of (or missing) opportunities... it is about the interplay between actor and social structure – how the individual has negotiated their path through a changing societal structure (Miller 1996: 74).
Although the approach adopted in this study does not incorporate a full life history approach, a number of 'professional life history related' elements were useful, specifying the subjects' education, career history and experiences in leisure services. Further questions were asked about the positions respondents had held within their respective organisations and their views as to the roles their organisations and other organisations should be playing in leisure policy. From the responses the interviewer was ascertain information for each interviewee ranging from knowledge of their career route, their professional affiliations, to more specific knowledge and experiences of particular policy events. The interview schedule was unstructured to facilitate a deeper understanding. The themes addressed are provided in Figure 4.4.

4.6.4 Sampling

The research benefited from access to key decision-makers and senior management support and encouragement for the study. Through the process of developing the Active Sheffield Partnership the Council identified 16 community groups who were invited to participate in the leisure partnership process. Senior representatives from each of these groups were interviewed. It was also considered necessary to interview representatives from organisations that had not been invited to participate in the partnership process. In particular, some organisations such as Sheffield International Venues and some play organisations were consciously excluded from the process. In total 5 representatives from these organisations were interviewed.

Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with 14 council officers. These officers were working or had worked in the Leisure Services Department at some time between 1974 and 1999. The choice of respondents was made through examination of documents and from recommendations of other interviewees. This 'snowball' method of sampling helped identify individuals involved in leisure partnership work. It also indicated which individuals supported or resisted partnerships so an understanding could be made of both positions. Attempts were made to interview all relevant officers and at least one person from each of the different sections within the Department. Only one officer declined a
request for an interview. Towards the end of the data collection period it was considered that a point of saturation had been reached, where one additional interview provided no or at least very little additional information.

Figure 4.4: Interview Schedule (Life History Section)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONAL BACKGROUND:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Respondents were asked to provide a chronology of their career histories including education, professional qualifications attained, and all jobs held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Respondents were asked how they became involved in leisure and the nature of their involvement. The interview covered a discussion of interviewees voluntary involvement in leisure, such as activities participated in, roles held [e.g. club secretary, coach, community leisure organiser] and affiliations [e.g. to governing bodies]. The interview also covered their involvement in leisure in their career including affiliations to professional bodies [e.g Institute of Leisure and Amenity Management], and the type of work they had been involved in [e.g community sports development, leisure facilities management]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Respondents were asked about their involvement in their current organisation [organisation e.g. Sheffield City Council]. Including, their roles and responsibilities, the nature of involvement in leisure policy, committees, sub-committees reported to, the kind of issues that they dealt with, and how they interacted with other organisations and people within them [such as Council officers and members]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Where respondents had worked in other organisations / cities they were asked to comment on the differences and similarities between these contexts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONAL ROLE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Interviewees were asked to describe their present role, what kind of issues they were dealing with and the challenges that they faced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Interviewees were asked to state what they thought the role of their current organisation [e.g. Sheffield City Council] should be in leisure policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Respondents were asked to remark on what they thought were the roles of other organisations in the city's leisure policy [e.g. the public, the private, and community / voluntary sectors and specific organisations such as the local authority, the universities or the health authority].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Interviewees were asked to comment on the role of individuals in leisure policy in the city [e.g. council officers and members, interest group representatives].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Respondents were asked to comment of specific leisure policy objectives [e.g. sports development, facility management, sports events, the arts, culture, parks etc].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The shortest interview lasted 55 minutes the longest 2 hour 10 minutes. A number of individuals were interviewed more than once. It was intended to interview local government politicians, however several politicians declined the request for a meeting so this line of enquiry was abandoned. A list of interviewees is given below:

**Table 4.3: Council Officers Interviewed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification used in the thesis</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer 1</td>
<td>Head of Leisure Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 2</td>
<td>Assistant Head of Leisure Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 3</td>
<td>Ex Acting Assistant Head of Leisure Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 4</td>
<td>Regeneration and Funding Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 5</td>
<td>Planning and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 6</td>
<td>Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 7</td>
<td>Head of Regeneration and Partnership (Chief Executives Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 8</td>
<td>Public Relations Unit Officer, Sheffield City Council,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 9</td>
<td>Assistant Regeneration and Funding Partnership Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 10</td>
<td>Community Leisure and Health Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 11</td>
<td>Senior Sports Development Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 12</td>
<td>Head of Events Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 13</td>
<td>Assistant Head of Events Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer 14</td>
<td>Community Partnership Manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.4: Organisations Invited To Participate In The Development Of The Active Sheffield Partnership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representative 1</td>
<td>Health Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 2</td>
<td>Hallamshire Sports Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 3</td>
<td>Northern General Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 4</td>
<td>UKSI/Sports Sheffield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 5</td>
<td>Sheffield Hallam University (Leisure Policy Research Unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 6</td>
<td>Sheffield Hallam University (Institute of Sports Medicine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 7</td>
<td>Sheffield College (Recreation Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 8</td>
<td>Sheffield First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 9</td>
<td>Sheffield Steelers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 10</td>
<td>South Yorkshire Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 11</td>
<td>Sport England (Yorkshire and Humberside)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 12</td>
<td>Voluntary Action Sheffield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 13</td>
<td>Sheffield Youth Voluntary Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 14</td>
<td>Sheffield Play Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 15</td>
<td>Schools Education Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative 16</td>
<td>Sheffield Sports Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

143
Table 4.5: Additional Organisations That Were Not Invited To Participate In The Development Of The Active Sheffield Partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other 1</td>
<td>Commercial Director, Sheffield International Venues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 2</td>
<td>Assistant Manager, Ponds Forge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 3</td>
<td>General Manager, King Edwards Pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 4</td>
<td>Manager, The Centre for Popular Music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 5</td>
<td>Chair, Play Policy Implementation Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.7 Data Analysis

The basic problem for qualitative researchers is managing the large volumes of unstructured textual data collected in a study. According to Henwood and Pigeon (1995) there is no one correct way to handle qualitative data. The method of analysis should be appropriate to the data and the research questions. One method of analysing rich qualitative data from observations, documents and interview transcripts is 'content analysis' (Patton 1980). Content analysis is "any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying special characteristics of messages" (Holsti 1968: 608). Because content analysis can be employed to analyse almost any form of communication the analysis may focus on both quantitative and qualitative data (Berg 1995). Berg (1995) suggests that content analysis can describe both the manifest content of communications or the latent content. The former involves the simple identification and recording of the physical elements in the communication. Latent content takes the analysis further by attempting to interpret the deeper meaning conveyed by the material.

Content analysis can also be inductive or deductive. Deductive analysis organises quotes around predetermined themes and categories. According to Glaser and Strauss (1967) the basic faults with this approach is that...

...the substantive hypotheses have to be formulated before actually beginning the research. They are deduced from general theories which have often been developed in other fields of research or originate from some researchers speculative thinking. The possible detrimental effect of this procedure is that social reality of a specific field of research has to be pressed into categories of
an 'alien theory' developed in quite another field (Glaser and Straus 1967: 2-3).

Inductive content analysis, in contrast, allows themes to emerge from the data (Patton 1980). Using this method the researcher is in a better position to assess whether the data conforms to the emerging theoretical framework. Patton (1980; 1990) provides a useful procedure for inductive content analysis in analysing interview transcripts. These procedures have also been applied to the field notes and documents in this case. The first step was to organise the raw data into interpretable and meaningful themes and categories (Patton 1980). Specifically, the researcher clustered quotes or portions of text around underlying uniformities, which become emergent themes (Patton 1980). The common threads emerged by comparing and contrasting each quote of similar meaning and separate quotes of different meaning (Patton 1980). The same procedure was used to compare and contrast emergent themes. This process continues until it is impossible to create a higher theme level. All themes at a given level of analysis are distinct from one each other (Patton 1980).

To assist the organisation and management of textual data and the inductive content analysis QSR NUD*IST (version 4) software was used. The software allowed the division of documents into line numbers and text segments, which can be coded. The advantage of using a software programme is that the index system is flexible as it allows nodes to be moved, deleted or altered in line with the emergence of new themes or ideas about the study. Further, all text segments stored in the system can be browsed for interpretation and analysis without altering the original text.

The documents, field notes and interview transcripts were inductively content analysed following the procedure suggested by Patton (1980 1990). Each text unit (one line of text) was tentatively coded, these raw data units (called free nodes in NUD*IST) were organised into emergent themes and categories. Common links emerged by comparing and contrasting each text of similar meaning and separate text units of different meaning. The same procedure occurs by comparing and contrasting emergent themes. Within NUD*IST the coding of first order, second order and third order themes are structured
into an index tree, nodes within the tree are associated hierarchically in 'parent/child' relationships.

4.8 The Results

The interview transcripts, field notes and documents were analysed using the inductive content analysis outlined above. As a consequence of the analysis 387 raw data themes or 'free nodes' were formed from lines of text. These were grouped into 185 first order themes. These were further organised into 24 second order themes. These were additionally organised into 9 third order themes. Finally, these themes were organised into 3 general dimensions - Broad national and global factors (macro), organisational and interorganisational factors (meso) and individual factors and inter-subject relations (micro). The first, second and third order sub themes and general dimensions are shown in the following Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8.

4.9 Conclusions to the Chapter

In summary, this thesis has adopted a critical realist position. It has been argued that some phenomena, such as the actions of individuals, cannot always be observed in an objective way and that the methods of the natural sciences are not appropriate in this study. However, it has also been argued that theory plays an important role in research. It influences what is studied and how it is studied. Further, theory plays an important role in helping the researcher to interpret complex human phenomena and, in particular, deeper [unobservable] social mechanisms.

The research strategy reflects these epistemological assumptions. The primary aim of the research and the broad research questions were constructed from an analysis of the relevant literature and, in particular, theory from the field of urban political studies. Participant observation, unstructured interviews, and qualitative document analysis were considered the most appropriate methods to gain an understanding of observable events and social actor's interpretations. The data collected was analysed using inductive content
analysis, where raw data themes emerged from the data. Generalisations were inductively drawn as to the relations between themes and these generalisations were subjected to further analysis. In total 387 independent or 'free nodes' were grouped into 185 raw data themes. These were eventually refined to 3 general dimensions. The results of the content analysis are used to structure the next three chapters in which the empirical findings are recount. Within these chapters and the conclusion which follows, reference is made back to existing political and social theories to help interpret the findings and help to explain leisure policy change in Sheffield.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Order Sub Themes (n=49)</th>
<th>Second Order Sub Themes (n=11)</th>
<th>Third Order Sub themes (n=3)</th>
<th>General Dimensions (n=1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reliance on steel</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training / re-skilling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Decline</td>
<td>City restructuring</td>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global competitiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Taxation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing to services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raising of rates</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extern...</td>
<td>National / Global Factors (Macro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction of the Poll Tax</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government restriction on local authority expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial management / ingenuity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burden on the people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Challenge</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extern...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Regeneration Budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European Funding</td>
<td></td>
<td>Finance of leisure</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Central Government Funding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lottery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Expenditure on facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic benefit of sports events</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost of World Student Games</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuts in Leisure Budgets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Events / income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing need</td>
<td>Welfare policy</td>
<td>Social role of leisure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability to electorate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local responses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social goals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating disadvantage</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process v objectives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Leisure Card</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social exclusion and leisure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References to Labour Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References to Liberal Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New Urban Left</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction on LA autonomy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities didn't want</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Led to slimming down of workforce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was budget led</td>
<td>CCT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feared by officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Led to closing of facilities</td>
<td>Best Value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best value for money</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked to budgets</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked to consultation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Value general</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-liberal policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thatcherism / Conservatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.5 Results of the Inductive Content Analysis: Broad National / Global Factors (Macro)
Chapter 4

First Order Sub Themes (n=49)

- Was a contentious issue
- Was for elite athletes only
- Borrowed excessively for
- Was a flagship projects
- Public didn't want
- Organising committee
- Bidding process for
- No private sector support for

- City Centre redevelopment
- Meadowhall
- Lower Don Valley
- Cultural Industries Quarter
- National City of Sport
- UKSI / Phoenix

- Are too expensive / unprofitable
- Detrimental to other leisure policies
- Lack of spending on in past
- Public didn't want facilities
- Closure of community facilities

- Leisure seen as a luxury
- Differences agendas in department
- Importance of leisure
- Issues of facilities management
- Lack of local expenditure
- Arts / culture policy
- Parks policy
- Events policy

- Reorganisation of
- Strategy / planning in
- Structures
- Processes systems
- Finance - budgets of
- Client - contractor split

- Social welfare approach
- Competition
- Decentralisation
- City Image
- Regeneration
- Corporate agenda
- Defence of services
- Quality of Life
- Community agenda
- Enabling
- Social v economic goals conflict
- Elite v participation goals conflict
- Economy and efficiency
- Effectiveness

- Sheffield University
- Sheffield Hallam University
- Sheffield College
- Chamber of Commerce
- City Liaison Group
- Urban Development Corporation
- Sports Council (Local & national)
- SERC
- Sheffield First
- City Trust
- Sheffield International Venues
- Governing bodies of sport
- Health Authority

Second Order Sub Themes (n=11)

- World Student Games
- Flagship projects
- Leisure Policy

- New leisure infrastructure / facilities (Ponds Forge / Don Valley Stadium / Arena)

Third Order Sub themes (n=3)

- Sheffield City Council (organisation of)
- Sheffield City Council (Culture / aims of)

General Dimensions (n=1)

- Developments / policies
- Local Organisational Factors (Meso)

Research Methodology

Figure 4.6 Results of the Inductive Content Analysis: Local / Organisational Factors (Meso)

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Chapter 4 Research Methodology

Community forums
Area action
Large number of community groups
Community involvement in decisions
Community dissatisfaction
Finding representatives
Empowerment

Network of actors in
Definition of
Officer responsibility in
Commitment to
Central - local relations
Local partnerships
Influence of Council
Influence of Voluntary sector
Influence of Private sector
Relationships with trusts
Achievements of
Resourcing of
Burngreave in Action

Interdepartmental differences
Problems working with ourselves
Lack of communication
Rhetoric is just lip service
Talking shops
Council wants to be in control
Inequality of
Lack of understanding of
Partnership papers / strategies
Council's Partnership unit
Resistance to
Retention of power
Proliferation of
Values of
Empowering people in
Seen as a threat
Different agendas
Commitment of organisations to
Choosing the right partners

Partnership Structure
Partnership Composition
Partnership Aims and Policies
Partner-related issues and concerns

Partnership Structure
Partnership Composition
Partnership Aims and Policies
Partner-related issues and concerns

Partnership Structure
Partnership Composition
Partnership Aims and Policies
Partner-related issues and concerns

Organisations voluntary / community

Partnership / collaboration

Inter-organisational relationships

Active Sheffield

Sports Sheffield

Play Council

Figure 4.6 Results of the Inductive Content Analysis: Local / Organisational Factors (Meso) - CONTINUED
Figure 4.7 Results of the Inductive Content Analysis: Individual factors and inter-subject relations (Micro)

First Order Sub Themes (n=49)
- Role of members
- Councillors involved in leisure
- Role of officers
- Officers are advisor
- Officers as experts
- Paternalism of officers
- Managerialist approach
- Professionalisation
- Role of business elite
- Role of community influencers
- Role of End user (e.g. customer)

Second Order Sub Themes (n=11)
- Influential individuals
- Professionals guiding policy
- Power to prevent policy
- Power to drive policy
- Other power / influence issues
- Delegation of power
- Loss of personal influence
- Position v personality
- Empowering the community

Third Order Sub themes (n=3)
- Individual Roles
- Power and Influence
- Relationship issues

General Dimensions (n=1)
- Individual factors and inter-subject relations (Micro)
CHAPTER FIVE

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CHANGE:

SHEFFIELD 1974 TO 1999

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 outlined a chronology of local government change nationally over the period 1974 to 1999, this chapter develops the analysis by evaluating the main events and changes which have occurred specifically in the city of Sheffield. The Chapter is structured into five chronological periods. Firstly, between the Second World War and the mid 1970s Sheffield enjoyed a period of expansion and modernisation, built on the success of the city's traditional metal works industries. However, by the mid 1970s the city began to suffer from the economic downturn. Despite this, the newly formed Sheffield Metropolitan District Council continued to increase the provision of services and adopted a traditional welfare approach. Secondly, after 1979 the Conservative Central Government led a politically driven reform agenda against local authorities, dismantling its function, finance and organisation. During the period 1980 to 1985 Sheffield City Council set about the defence of its services by rejecting non-elected agencies, by introducing radical policies and increasing the level of the local rates. Thirdly, during the period 1986 to 1991 the City Council and the business community accepted that, to achieve the shared goals of regeneration and reimagining, they would need to establish collaborative and non-adversarial partnership arrangements. Fourthly, in the period 1992 to 1999 there was a realisation within Sheffield that, not only had the state failed to address the city's economic, and particularly its social problems, so had the public-private partnership approach. In response, the Council assumed an enabling role and sought to deliver its goals through a range of partnerships with the community sector.

While the explanation of these shifts are presented here as a unitary phenomenon, their explanation represents an analysis of the explanations derived from interviews and
documentary analysis. At the end of each section a summary table is provided, this outlines the main changes under four headings. The First aspect of change is broad national / global factors (macro), which comprises of the main political, economic and social changes or events, which shaped policy in the city. The second aspect of change is local / organisational factors (meso). These are changes to the existing, and the emergence of new, public, private and voluntary sector organisations and partnerships in the city. The change in organisational culture including change in the ideologies, discourse, goals, and values of the Council and other organisations is also given. The third aspect of change is individual factors and inter-subject relations (micro), in particular policies that were shaped, or resisted, by officers, politicians and interest group members. This Chapter does not evaluate leisure policy in Sheffield, as this is the topic of the next Chapter.

5.2 The Traditional Welfare Approach: World War Two To 1979

The abundance of iron ore, oak woods and fast flowing rivers in the Sheffield region provided the city with excellent conditions for the development of metal industries. Cutlery manufacture in the city began in the Middle Ages and by the 1500s it was a thriving industry. In 1624 the Company of Cutlers in Hallamshire became a self-governing body for the trade, and allocated the brand name 'Made in Sheffield' to the city's metals products. The Company of Cutlers had a fundamental role in shaping the image and development of the city through to the Twentieth Century.

During the next three and a half centuries Sheffield was fundamentally changed by a number of major discoveries. In 1740 Huntsman developed the process of steel making and Boulsover discovered the process of silver plating. Sheffield took advantage of these technologies and by the mid-nineteenth century the city became renowned for high quality steel manufacturing. In 1856, Bessemer discovered the means of mass-producing steel and in 1912 stainless steel was first produced in the city. These two events accelerated Sheffield's industrialisation and by the First World War the city had out-grown Leeds to become the largest city in Yorkshire. Industrial growth continued through to the Second World War and accelerated with the production of armaments for
the conflict. During the 1950s Sheffield steel continued to prosper in both the domestic and international markets. In 1967 the Iron and Steel Act brought 14 of the nation's steel manufacturers, many Sheffield based, into public ownership as the British Steel Corporation. During this period Sheffield enjoyed low unemployment and real incomes rose. However, in the 1960s the city's economic position became less stable. Barriers to international trade were falling under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, competition from abroad was increasing and Sheffield's companies failed to invest adequately in new technologies to raise productivity to the level of world leading (especially Japanese) steel manufacturers.

The Labour Party took control of Sheffield in 1926 and, with the exception of only two years, held office through to the late 1990s. Local governments were reorganised nationally in 1973 / 1974 and in Sheffield this led to the formation of the Metropolitan District Council. The Council drew together the existing city districts with the Stocksbridge Urban District, Bradfield and the Ecclesfield parishes of Wortley Rural District transforming the size of the authority from 45,000 to 90,000 acres. Although the size of the authority increased, its structure was streamlined with some of its functions being moved on to non-elected bodies. Both the police and fire services as well as responsibility for structural planning were transferred to the South Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council (Seyd 1990). The reorganisation enabled the Liberal Democrats to gain a foothold in the city by winning three of the newly formed seats. However, the Labour Party maintained a large majority and between 1973 and 1990 the percentage of votes won by Labour never fell below 46% (Seyd, 1993).

In the post war period the City Council supported the city's traditional local industries and developed a close working relationship with the trade unions (Hampton 1970; Seyd 1987; Lawless 1990). Seyd (1993) suggests that this relationship was enhanced by the fact that a number of the city's councillors actually came from working class or trade union backgrounds. However, during this period of strong local government service provision the business community...
played no direct role in city affairs at the time...their network of contacts was with through the Chamber of Commerce or the Cutlers' Company but this was very different from the political world of councillors and chief officers (Seyd 1993: 156).

Sheffield's industrialisation and population growth put demands on the city's housing supply and the local parishes resisted any expansion of the city's boundaries. This led to a policy of high-rise housing funded by grant aid from central government. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the Council owned around 45 per cent of the city's housing stock. However, much of this housing was of poor quality and deteriorated during the economic downturn of the 1960s and 1970s. At this time the Council was forced to balance its housing revenue account and its only solution was to raise the rents. In reaction, Sheffield suffered a rent strike between 1967 and 1978. The rent strike, according to Seyd (1993), Lowe (1987) and Hampton (1970), enabled a new breed of more radical politicians to unseat the old guard regime of the Labour right wing in Sheffield. Whilst these New Urban Left members had varied backgrounds, according to (Seyd 1993), they shared an affinity with the working class in their constituencies and were therefore supported at the polls. The New Urban Left became known for their resistance to central government (whether Labour or Conservative) and in particular its inability to combat the rising problems of unemployment and other social problems.

The New Urban Left implemented a number of radical schemes that fostered the image of Sheffield as the 'Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire'. Workers co-operatives were financed out of local state capital and other campaigns, such as Sheffield's designation as a nuclear free zone and a peace centre, were advanced. After 1974 the city adopted the Labour Government's social contract, where the Trade Union Council agreed to implement wage controls and productivity bargaining if the Council developed special units to implement the Employment and Tribunals Acts, the Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974, the Women's Equal Pay Act of 1975 and the Sex Discrimination and Race Equalities Acts of 1975 to 1977. However, towards the end of the 1970s, increasing pressure was being placed on the Council to reduce its expenditure, whilst at the same time the city's worsening economic climate increased the demands for social welfare
services. In 1978 Blunkett and Betts produced a report into the plight of disadvantaged groups in the city. The report recommended that the council adopted a "radical socialist approach to solving the problems of those in greatest need in the city" (Blunkett and Jackson 1987: 52).

Table 5.1. Local Government Change in Sheffield 1974 to 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>World War Two to 1979 The Traditional Welfare Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broad National and Global Factors (Macro)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>40% of workforce employed in the steel industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Labour dominated local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Urban Left gain control from the Labour right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Council expand services to reduce disadvantage through community oriented policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers cooperatives funded from public finances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local / Organisational Factors (Meso)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developments</td>
<td>Sheffield Metropolitan District formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High levels of public sector employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Traditional social welfare approach based on the City Council's provision of services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>Strong links between the Council and the trade unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector held little direct influence over policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Factors and Inter-subject Relations (micro)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power shifted to a small number of New Urban Left political elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional local government officers occupied the Town Hall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical explanation</td>
<td>Left Fordist Approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, in the period up to 1979 the City Council adopted a traditional welfare approach. Throughout the period, the local Labour Party dominated the city's politics and as a provider of services sought a range of social objectives. This welfare approach was reinforced by the city's economic growth provided by the city's traditional industry, particularly the steel works, with its mass production systems and standardised operations. The period was therefore indicative of a period of what has been termed left Fordism (Henry 2001). The relationship between the business elite and the political elite was one of mutual support rather that active collaboration. The rent strikes of the late 1960s enabled the New Urban Left to attain positions of power within the District Labour Party. The New Urban Left, despite the worsening economic position, expanded service
provision and implemented a series of policies that funded workers co-operatives and sought to break down inequalities in the city. Table 5.1 highlights the main changes during this period.

5.3 The Defence of Services: 1980 – 1985

Until the early 1980s, the economic success of Sheffield’s metals industry secured the city an unemployment level below the national average and the steel industry employed 40% of the city’s workforce directly or indirectly (Seyd 1993). However, following the fuel crisis in the 1970s Sheffield’s manufacturing industry began to suffer severe collapse. For a city dependent on a limited number of industries, the result of 42,000 job losses in metal goods, engineering and vehicle manufacturing between 1971 and 1986 was dramatic (Bailey 1995). Unemployment rose from 2% in 1975 to 12.7% in 1982 (Sheffield City Liaison Group 1997). One interviewee described the effect on the city:

> We had major companies that had been long established in the steel and engineering industries, and literally within a 5 to 10 year period they had all disappeared... it really was that dramatic. The east end of Sheffield, which had been the industrial heartland, became a desert... derelict. Massive factory areas were closed down and the roofs were taken off to avoid paying business rates. There was tremendous unemployment and there were social problems associated with that. The city had never had to face those problems before because it had been a very traditional, a northern city with a strong work ethic. We went from that situation to one where we had got virtually mass unemployment. There were 50,000 at one stage... unemployed, particularly where there was enormously high levels of youth unemployment. You can't really begin to imagine the sort of problems that creates unless you actually worked in it, lived though it (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).

Throughout the 1980s the relationship between the City Council and the Chamber of Commerce deteriorated. Both blamed the other for the city's economic decline. The business community was particularly critical of the level of the local rates and used the local press to openly express their discontent.

In 1980 David Blunkett was elected leader of the local Labour Party. Under his leadership the New Urban Left began to have a more concerted influence over the city's
politics. One of the central tenets of the New Urban Left approach in Sheffield was a resistance to conservatism and neo-liberalism, particularly after the election of the Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher in 1979. As one interviewee noted:

A new breed of more radical left wing politicians took control of the ruling Labour Group. Your David Blunketts, your Clive Betts, Peter Price himself and a number of other councillors emerged in the late 1970s and gradually assumed control and changed the direction of the council, made it much more radical, much more left wing. As the 1980s progressed they tried to make a stand against the growing influence and control that was being exerted by the Conservative Government (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).

During the early 1980s the City Council directly resisted a number of central government policy decisions. In 1981 the Council refused to apply for enterprise zone status and in so doing, openly challenged the government's intention for collaboration between the public and private sectors. In contrast, the New Urban Left held the belief that it was able to achieve its economic objectives without support from the centre or from local businesses. This "in contrast with the City Council's partnership policies ten years later could not be more striking" (Seyd 1993: 161).

In 1981 the New Urban Left leadership introduced a radical shift in local economic policy by established an Employment Department. Seyd (1960: 160) suggests that the Employment Department had a broad remit "to prevent further loss of jobs in the city and alleviate the worst effects of unemployment". To achieve this it sought effective training, and investment to create new kinds of employment. The Employment Department attempted to diversify job opportunities in the city and explored new forms of industrial democracy and co-operative control over work. The department's budget was limited to only £1 million in 1981 but rose to £5 million in 1987-88. The New Urban Left in Sheffield also introduced community-oriented policies, as one respondent stated:

David Blunkett was pursuing a policy of decentralisation of services, making them more community accessible and more community accountable. There were initiatives that tried to take those policies on board and convert them into meaningful action (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).
The main focus of central-local conflict was over the level of the local rates. During the early 1980s, despite economic recession, the Council continued to increase service provision in the city. To pay for this, the City Council had to increase the level of rates by 41% in 1980 and 37% in 1981 (Blunkett, 1987: 154). However, in 1984 the Conservative Government introduced the Rates Act to give the Secretary State for the Environment legislative powers to deal with Council's not complying with the expenditure squeeze. The District Labour Party was faced with the likelihood of losing it main source of income. As the largest employers in the city, the Council thought it could offset the job losses in the city's industry by implementing a no-redundancy policy within the Council. However, the policy ran the government into deficit. In 1985 the central-local conflict came to a head when the Council refused to set the central government's 'ratecapping' reduction. The District Labour Party had a two to one majority in favour of setting no rate. However, 20 Labour councillors broke from the party to defeat the motion. The setting of the rates on the 7th May 1985 was a capitulation to the Party's right and broke the party unity. It can also be seen as the end of radical socialist policies within the City Council and announced a shift from new socialism to new realism (Seyd 1990; Lawless 1994; Henry and Paramio Salcines 1999).

In summary, during the early 1980s the city suffered from a collapse in its traditional industrial base signaling a crisis in the Fordist mode of regulation. The Council began to realise that the city's traditional industries would not recover from the severe deindustrialisation. In response to expenditure squeeze espoused by central government, the New Urban Left raised the level of the rates to fund a wide range of small-scale projects orientated to local need (Dabinett and Ramsden 1993). During this period the Council also directly resisted the establishment of non-elected agencies in the city. However, the Council did acknowledge that economic restructuring was inevitable and trusted its newly formed Employment Department to deliver regeneration and jobs. Therefore, the changes that occurred in the city was indicative of a period of Left Post Fordism and a challenge to neo-liberalism (Henry 2001).
Table 5.2. Local Government Change in Sheffield 1980 to 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1980 – 1985: The Defence of Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Broad National and Global Factors (Macro)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Global economic restructuring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42,000 jobs lost in the metal goods and vehicle industries (1971-86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment reached 20% in some wards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council refuse to cut public spending in line with central government demands and instead raise the rates by 41% in 1980 and 37% in 1981.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Labour continued to dominated local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Local responses to centralisation of power and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council policies attempted to reduce disadvantage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community oriented policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local / Organisational Factors (Meso)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developments</td>
<td>Establishment of an employment department (1981) to encourage regeneration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>A growing acceptance within the Council that restructuring was inevitable and a desire to foster its positive elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decentralisation of services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New discourse of regeneration through publicly financed schemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>Strong links between the Council and the trade unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor relations between the Council and central government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council and Chamber of Commerce blame each other for the declining economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Factors and Inter-subject Relations (micro)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical explanation</td>
<td>New Urban Left retain influence over the Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5.4 Towards Partnership with Business: 1986 – 1991**

The establishment of the Employment Department in 1981 was a radical shift in the Council's policy. Alongside this, other projects, such as Centres Against Unemployment, were used to create jobs to offset those lost in the steel industry. By the mid 1980s the City Council began to realise, that in order to implement alternative schemes, cooperation with local businesses was necessary. Workshops were developed to retrain workers who had been deskilled by the new technologies, and for advancing the opportunities for women and ethnic minorities. Significantly, in 1984 the Employment Department, declared that the “local authority aims for a constructive partnership with the private sector” (Sheffield City Council 1984: 1).
Seyd argues that during the 1980s, more radical professionals, particularly planners, who were thought to be the most qualified group to deal with the city's problems, replaced the traditional local government officers. The City Council's management style was like a well run political machine with chief officers being professionals who were increasingly accorded discretionary power to act (Seyd, 1993). These professionals were given the remit of designing projects for the city's regeneration and the political elite legitimised them in the City Council. The resulting "discourses set the pattern for Sheffield's political future" (Hampton 1993: 120/121). The neo-liberal discourse argued that state-led policies were inadequate and that the market must be given a greater role.

By 1986 Sheffield City Council could no longer resist the neo-liberal commitment to competition and the increasing the prominence of the private sector in the city. As one officer noted:

   There was a financial restriction. There was also the curbing of what local authorities were involved with and increasingly directing of local authorities into certain channels of activity, culminating with the ultimate attempt to move large chunks of the previously public sector activity into the private sector (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).

The private sector became more influential in the city's decision-making networks and this was mainly through the Chamber of Commerce, and its Chief Executive. In 1986 the Chamber of Commerce established an Image Working Party headed by its Vice President. Its remit was to determine what was the best method of securing internal investment to boost Sheffield's declining economy. The Image Working Party attracted representatives from the Council, the Universities, the Cutlers Company, the Chamber of Trade, the Trade Unions, and the Sheffield Industrial Mission (Strange, 1995). This group helped to improve the relationship between the Chamber of Commerce and the City Council. It also acted as a catalyst for encouraging private sector involvement in the city's affairs and rose the awareness of the role it could play. The Image Working Party encouraged collaboration between the sectors and this helped lay the foundations for the development of partnerships.
The City Council and the Chamber of Commerce shared the desire to regenerate the Lower Don Valley, a part of Sheffield's industrial heartland, which had suffered the worst effects of the city's economic decline. In 1986, the Council established an officer-working group to explore the potential for the Lower Don Valley. The final report argued for more flexible land-use patterns and the need for a 'land bank' to cater for potential industrial growth and the possibility of changing land use patterns. The strategy for urban renewal identified four 'action areas' these were: building internal confidence, improving Sheffield's image; attracting inward investment; and developing a long term plan for the economic diversification and social regeneration of the city. To fulfill these objectives the city's decision-makers rejected the traditional metal works industries, in favour of the service industry. In 1986 the City Council accepted planning applications for Meadowhall, a regional shopping centre. With an investment totaling around £240 million this project was the largest development ever attempted by the city (Seyd 1993).

The Image Working Party report recommended that the Council incorporated other organisations in the revitalisation of the Lower Don Valley, it also identified potential partners and encouraged them to cooperate. As such it helped lay the foundations for partnership in the city (Sheffield City Council, 1984). In 1986 the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee was established. The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee was comprised of many of the organisations involved in the earlier partnerships but shaped them into a formal collaborative forum. The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee acted as...

...a kind of board of directors for the city, upon which were represented the city council, the business community, central government agencies and local organisations (Seyd 1993: 170).

The key individuals included in The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee were the Chairman of J & J Dysons Plc, the Chairman of Sheffield Insulations, and the Chairman and Chief Executive of Bassetts Plc (Lawless and Ramsden 1990). These people were not from the city's traditional manufacturing base but were from new industries. The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee's remit was to develop partnership arrangements to regenerate Sheffield's economy and more particularly the
Lower Don Valley by co-ordinating investment from its members. The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee was not only important as a formal coalition of political and business elite it also reinforced the neo-liberal discourse of city regeneration through public-private partnerships. It also introduced a new element to that discourse, that of improving the city’s image.

In 1987 the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee commissioned a report from Coopers and Lybrand. The Twin Valleys Report echoed many of findings of the officer-working group. It outlined six programmes of work including a programme for the areas suffering the most from Sheffield's industrial decline. The report also argued for an improvement in the development of business and technology, as well as in training and research.

Any strategy for regeneration will be based on new sources of finance: from new sectors of economic activity, from other categories of financial institution, and from the public sector (Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee 1987: 8)

Importantly the Twin Valleys Report suggested that the city needed to improve its image to encourage tourism and inward investment.

The city now needs to demonstrate it vitality and future potential to encourage new investment, to diversify the economy, and to attract visitors to Sheffield. To do this, the city and the city council are looking outwards as well as inwards, promoting Sheffield, developing tourism, entertainment and cultural facilities (Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee 1987: 25).

The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee Report concluded that any city competing for mobile capital required a specific feature. The report argued that the Lower Don Valley needed a flagship investment, to shift priorities from manufacturing to the service sector and to embrace an entrepreneurial development perspective. The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee report also recommended the setting up of an urban regeneration authority.

The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee attempted to provide a long-term vision for Sheffield with the Sheffield 2000 Strategy. Sheffield 2000 represented a
business-oriented vision for the regeneration of Sheffield’s economy by making three key contributions. Firstly, it identified seven ‘outlook themes’ to indicate the kind of city Sheffield’s wanted to be (Caring City, Green City, World City, Productive City, Information City, Learning City, Healthy City). Secondly, the Report argued for the creation of five ‘growth networks’, each would attempt to develop activity through growth and diversification and would aim to attract inward investment and resources.

The immediate priority is the creation of a clear image of Sheffield as a visitor destination - Sheffield, 'The Welcoming City'... [the strategy] has to be supported by efforts to enhance the quality of the visitor and shopping experience and improving the physical and visual environment - particularly the city centre (Sheffield City Council 1991: 16).

The growth networks were manufacturing, public services, information, leisure, and green growth. Thirdly the report argued that Sheffield needed to focus on quality, by becoming a quality city, by improving the quality of life, and by engaging in quality developments.

Sheffield's reputation for quality will be extended into new fields. Our reputation was based on the traditional products of steel and cutlery. For Sheffield 2000 quality is all embracing... throughout the Growth Networks and institutions in Sheffield to create new quality -industries, products, jobs and buildings (Sheffield City Council 1991: 5).

In 1988 the Chamber of Commerce and the City Council, in a joint promotional campaign, launched Sheffield Partnerships in Action. Its aim was to improve, in a short period of time, the image of the city. The report portrayed Sheffield as an attractive place to live and invest. It also argued that Sheffield was a centre of excellence that needed to foster an entrepreneurial environment. The report adopted a neo-liberal discourse and reinforced both the Chamber of Commerce and the City Council’s commitment to public-private partnerships.

Working in partnership is envisaged with other city agencies, businesses, the Government and European institutions. To succeed in these objectives, we shall have to link this cultural change to our Committee Structures, management processes, consultation initiatives, performance reviewing and training (Sheffield City Council 1988: 7).
By the late 1980s both the City Council and the private sector shared the goals of regenerating and re-imaging of Sheffield. Furthermore, both realised that a formal company, comprising of a coalition of public and private interests, would be in the best position to develop promotional activity in the city. To fulfill this role, the Sheffield Partnerships Ltd was formed in 1988. To some extent the Sheffield Partnerships Ltd was an extension of the Chamber of Commerce 's Image Working Party, as its principle aim was to contest the view that “the popular image of Sheffield as a city of economic decline and political division had to be challenged, in order to attract grants and investments” (Strange 1995: 19).

The proliferation of partnership bodies in the city continued with the emergence of the Hallamshire Group. This group had the remit to develop local economic initiatives and enterprise in the Sheffield. The group worked in partnership to encourage Sheffield citizens to invest in their city, to help manage and raise funds for investment projects, and to encourage potential investors to the region. The group also formed Hallamshire Investments to act as a local venture capital company to help the creation of new local businesses.

It was within the context of partnership and a shared discourse, that the City Council, unlike its earlier rejection of the Government’s enterprise zone, accepted the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) in 1988. The Sheffield Development Corporation initially had a budget of £50 million and a seven-year schedule to regenerate 2,000 acres of the Lower Don Valley. The Sheffield UDC originally set a target of generating 12,000 new full time equivalent jobs by 1995. This was later increased to 20,000 jobs following the development of Meadowhall. Whilst the Council accepted the designation of the UDC, it attempted to negotiate with the Department of the Environment to make it more responsive to local needs. To some extent, the negotiations had the desired effect as the boundaries of the UDC were modified in line with the Council's demands. Furthermore, the UDC's board of directors was extended to include a stronger representation from local councilors and businessmen. In 1989, the UDC signed an agreement to work with the Council. The Training and Enterprise Council, like the UDC, was met with caution by
both the Council and the Chamber of Commerce (Strange, 1995). A development team was set up to ensure that the TEC fitted in with the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee's partnership vision for the city (Strange, 1995).

The relationship between the Council and the UDC continued to be adversarial, in particularly, disagreements ensued over the balance of industry, office space and retailing in the Lower Don Valley. The uneasy working relationship between the UDC and the Council culminated in an argument over a proposal for a 20,000 square foot retail park in the Lower Don Valley, the Council argued that the development, in addition to Meadowhall, would seriously damage commerce the city centre.

The problems of the city centre prompted a £55,000 study of Sheffield's central area. The partners included the Chamber of Commerce, Sheffield City Council, the Sheffield Development Corporation, the University of Sheffield, Sheffield Hallam University, the Chamber of Trade as well as the police, local media, major retailers, developers and property agents. The report encouraged the city's elite to embrace the service industries, and in particular leisure and sport, as the vehicle for economic and social regeneration. At the end of the 1980s the Council approved a bid to hold the World Student Games on the premise that expenditure on facilities to host the competition could be covered by national grant aid, charities and from private sector resources. Consistent with the city's discourse and partnership approach, numerous documents produced at this time argued that the Games would improve Sheffield's national and international reputation and image and this, in turn, would attract inward investment.

A new 12,000 seat indoor arena will also be built in the Lower Don Valley and is expected to host international sporting events for years to come, as well as providing the city with new cultural, exhibition and conference opportunities to support the expanding tourist and leisure industries (Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee 1987: 28).

The planning and staging of the World Student Games is considered in detail in the next chapter.
Table 5.3. Local Government Change in Sheffield 1986 to 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broad National and Global Factors (Macro)</td>
<td>Economic regeneration is sought using large-scale development projects in the service sector (e.g. 1986 planning for Meadowhall granted and World Student Games bid approved)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large-scale investment in the City’s leisure infrastructure.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment Department budget increased to £5 m (1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council submits a bid for City Challenge funding to help regenerate the City (unsuccessful)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>The Labour Party Continue to hold a strong majority in the City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>The main concerns were regeneration, city image. Partnership with business is seen as a means to achieving these goals.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The benefits of regeneration through the public-private partnerships would ‘trickle down’ to all sectors of society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local / Organisational Factors (Meso)</td>
<td>Sheffield Urban Development Corporation created (1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several partnership forums are formed SERC (1988), SPL (1988), Hallamshire Investments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developments</td>
<td>A shared neo-liberal discourse that public-private partnership would solve the City’s economic and social problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>The business community became more influential, initially through the Chamber of Commerce and the Cutlers Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Council conceded to work with non-elected agencies and after some dispute signs an agreement to work in partnership with the UDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>Blunkett, as leader of the Party, concedes to the Labour right in 1985.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is an emergence of a band of political elite and business elite from Sheffield’s new industries.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Traditional local government officers replaced by professional town hall planners</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual Factors and Inter-subject Relations (micro)</td>
<td>Governance and Regime Theory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, during the period 1986 to 1991 the notion of the traditional industries as the producer of economic growth and the Council as provider of services was rejected in favour of a partnership approach between the City Council and the new business sector. The period saw the emergence of various partnership bodies alongside specific funding strategies to lever in private investment. The establishment UDC demonstrates that the central government believed it was necessary to impose a government appointed agency to take control of urban development in part of the city. However, within Sheffield, the
new partnership approach gradually shifted the political system away from control by the public sector alone towards a quasi-privatised system of policy making, often termed a system of governance. Within the city partnerships with limited but interconnected memberships formed and had a sustained role in influencing decisions over the period. These groups espoused a new discourse of reimagining and regeneration.

 Certain areas of Council activity, such as the improvement of the appearance of the Valley, may provide intangible inducements to private sector investment. It is apparent that the City Council should take the lead in planning for the requirements of economic regeneration either on its own or in conjunction with appropriate partners (Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee 1987: 7).

These goals were communicated through their strategies and documents. The emergence of the coalition of public and private interests has led many authors (Henry and Paramio Salcines 1999; Strange 1993; Seyd 1993) to use urban regime theory to help explain the city's policymaking network. However, there is considerable disagreement as to whether a regime emerged during this period (and this will be taken up in later chapters).

5.5 The Enabling Role 1992–1999

In the early 1990s, although some economic recovery had occurred, Sheffield continued to suffer from the legacy of its deindustrialisation. The City Council was subjected to sustained expenditure cuts imposed by central government and was no longer able to increase local taxes. The cumulative affect of these constraints led the Council in 1987 to argue that it required £650 million to modernise its housing and over £70 million to refurbish educational facilities (Lawless and Ramsden 1990). Against this economic background, the Council supported large-scale development projects such as Meadowhall and directly contributed to the cost of staging the World Student Games in 1991 (at an estimated cost of around £180 million). The rationale for these capital-intensive flagship schemes was that they would regenerate and reimage the city to make it more attractive to investors and tourists and the benefits would 'trickle down' to disadvantaged groups.

However, within Sheffield there was a failure to account for the impact that the property-led regeneration would have on the Council's revenue expenditure and by the early 1990s
the Council was forced to cut its expenditure on services by around £10 million a year (Lawless and Ramsden 1990). Furthermore, by adopting this approach, the Council had abandoned one of its tenets of its traditional welfare approach, that of funding small-scale projects to rectify local problems. The result was increasing economic and social degeneration of Sheffield’s poorer neighborhoods. Balancing urban regeneration and its subsequent economic objectives with improving the quality of life of the city's residents and particularly those who suffer disadvantage continued to be the council's major challenge throughout the 1990s.

The spending restrictions placed of the council condemned it to the role of enabler rather than provider of services. For one officer, the Council's role was...

...less about providing anymore, it is more about enabling and it is by accident and because of budgetary reasons rather than principle, that services in Sheffield are much more about enabling or externalisation, would be an appropriate word to use (Interviewee 3, Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999).

However, as an enabler the City Council believed that it had an important role to play in Sheffield's economic prosperity by supporting partnerships. In 1992 a new partnership body, the City Liaison Group subsumed the responsibilities of the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee. The City Liaison Group had a smaller membership (12 instead of the previous 24 members). However, the City Liaison Group, like the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee, had no executive powers, had limited resources and was comprised of a number of individuals that had been involved in the earlier partnership arrangements. These were the Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the UDC and TEC, the two Universities, the Cutlers Company and the Sheffield Health Authority.

In 1993 the new leader of the council, launched three efficiency reviews. The first, a Service Review examined the reasons why the council provided the services. This review led to the exploration of how a number of the services could be provided in different ways, including through partnership with other agencies. The second, an organisational and management review examined organisational structures, administrative procedures and management costs. The third, a review of cross-
department functional areas sought to identify cost savings. The Council also attempted to attract alternative sources of funding, particularly from Europe. To bid for national and European funding and urban development programmes, organisations in Sheffield had to bid for financial support through partnerships made up of bodies and organisations with a direct interest in the regeneration of poor and declining communities. A Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) Partnership was formed between 11 organisations with 15 voting members. The Sheffield SRB Board was responsible for the delivery of approved schemes and acted as an accountable body and a legal entity nominated to act on behalf of the partnership. In 1991 another partnership forum was formed specifically to bid for City Challenge funding. Sheffield was one of fifteen authorities encouraged to submit for funds and its proposals included a National Environment Centre, the creation of a Media and Exhibition Centre, and the development of a National Centre for Popular Music (Sheffield City Challenge Bid, July 1991). These initiatives are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

The city's first two bids for City Challenge funding failed, however in 1994 the city was successful. The awards amounted to £74.4 million from the Governments Single Regeneration Budget over a seven-year period and from the European URBAN initiative for four years. One senior manager suggested that...

...the primary aims of the SRB are to improve economic performance, job prospects, the social and physical environment, and the quality of life in needy areas. Leisure and sports can also play a part in improvements to the quality of life, health, enhancing the capacity of local people (Interviewee 7, Head of Regeneration and Partnership, Chief Executives Office, Sheffield City Council, 14 July 1999).

In 1995 the City Liaison Group wrote a strategic plan The Way Ahead which provided a strategic plan for the economic and social regeneration of the city. The City Liaison Group continued the strategic approach to development with a second document Sheffield Growing Together in 1996. The Aim of Sheffield Growing Together was to increase well-being through wealth creation, jobs and lessening geographical and social divisions. The Council and other organisations, through their strategic documents, began to develop a discourse around community involvement in decision making. Community partnerships were seen as a way of extending democracy beyond the local elections by enabling
citizen's to take part in decision-making and improving the effectiveness of service provision:

SRB forces us into partnership work, it involves a great deal of consultation and involvement of the community, it provides a means for them to have a continuing say in the management and further development and implementation of the Scheme in their area (Interviewee 7, Head of Regeneration and Partnership, Chief Executives Office, Sheffield City Council, 14 July 1999).

The change within the City Council from provider to enabler was amplified with the imposition of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) which took effect in the early 1990s. According to a number of interviewees, the introduction of CCT helped the Council achieve significant financial savings and enabled it to improve the quality of the services in the city. CCT altered the Council's departments so they became the clients of contractors who managed their services. Where the Council's own direct services organisation won a contract it was forced to generate an organisational structure to allow for the dual functions of client monitoring of management performance and contract management of the service. CCT caused the Council to create new sections and new functions for some officers. However, not officers welcomed CCT:

There was real paranoia in Sheffield about what might result from Competitive Tendering and some officers, I think, fuelled that paranoia because they saw it as a means to personal gain. They could develop their own function, their own role, and their own responsibility. We had an emerging number of specialists who were involved with Competitive Tendering and managed to create a niche for themselves in that sort of environment (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).

One of the main effects of CCT and the externalisation of services was a massive reduction in staff, this fueled fear within the council:

There's been a major reduction in the number of the people who work for the Council now. It has gone down by thousands in the last few years... you start to think to yourself is that going to happen to us in the same way it happened to other services. So then it was like a cloud overhanging you (Interviewee 11, Senior Sports Development Officer, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).
Despite job losses, by the mid 1990s CCT began to viewed more positively by many officers. The Sheffield Direct Services Organisation (DSO) won a large number of contracts but was still required to operate on a quasi-commercial basis by establishing internal trading systems and later externalising many facilities to trusts (the issue of trusts will be developed in the following chapters). One officer noted that...

...it [CCT] made us stronger and more open to the challenges... it created changes and had an effect of turning us from being providers to one where we became a client. That has continued as we saw the Trust being formed and we had a new role to play within that. (Interviewee 11, Senior Sports Development Officer, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

Another said that CCT...

...attracted people with private sector experience and commercial experience to come and do the job, and in real terms the revenue cost to certain of the facilities has fallen. It brings in some cases, conflict. They do things in programming which we as a local authority, protecting the public, may disapprove of (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

The change from public provision to CCT gave rise to a client-contractor split in service delivery, with the former retaining political control and the latter concentrating on managerial efficiency:

A lot of the change was about a new managerialist agenda, about being more efficient, not necessarily effective, but certainly because it is about management mechanisms most of the time, so that is about providing efficient services and it is about providing cost efficient services (Interviewee 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

As a one council officer admitted, CCT had its faults, namely it was concerned with maximum quantity and minimum price and the criteria that the council had to deal with were crude. Another stated that...

...when you asked questions like ‘are we running it effectively and efficiently’ well CCT was supposed to bring that discipline to us, it didn’t improve performance, I don’t think, because we didn’t set output targets. It was input targets we were setting, in terms of the cost of doing something (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).
Furthermore, other officers indicated that working within the CCT framework had meant that the social objectives often became secondary:

In some cases, more recently because of financial constraint, some of the social issues that moved down the agenda and financial issues have moved up (Interviewee 13, Assistant Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

By 1997 Sheffield's economic and social environment had not progressed, "job losses of 3,000 to 5,000 per year are projected for Sheffield's foreseeable future" (Sheffield First Partnership 1998: 7). Projected annual growth for 1997-2003 was just 0.9% annually, versus 2.1% nationally. Long term unemployment reached 12% in some areas of the city, such as Manor, and 37% of households in some areas, such as Burngreave, were on income support (Sheffield First Partnership 1998). It was within this context that the Liberal Democrats began to make inroads into to the Labour domination. In 1992 the party won nine seats and in 1994 they won 22, principally at the expense of the Conservatives. However, in May 1999 at the local government elections, control of the once Labour stronghold and capital of the 'socialist republic of South Yorkshire' was won by the Liberal Democrat Party with 47 seats to Labour's 39, the Conservatives held just one seat. Figure 5.1 shows how Sheffield's political landscape changed between 1980 and 1999:

One officer noted that the...

...City Council has been for many years a Labour controlled authority, but I don't think it [the loss of local elections] had anything to do with Labour, I just think it is people being disenchanted with the city's problems. (Interviewee 3, Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999).

another said the...

...general public has made its views known through the recent elections... there have been large minorities, people where discontented and have had their way now and the elected members are changing things, I think that is democracy at work and I think that is good (Interviewee 4, Regeneration and Funding Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999).
Figure 5.1: Sheffield's Political Landscape 1980 to 1999

However, many of its officers felt little had really changed under the new administration:

The Liberal Democrats throughout argued against the big facilities, argued against the World Student Games, argued against major events, and I think that was just classical oppositional politics. I don't think really, listening to the two of them in committee, that there is much difference in terms of basic values or policy really. I think is simply the fact that one of them has been in opposition and the other one has been in power, one has had to face up to the reality and the other one hasn't, that has switched over and they have almost reversed roles now, but there is no clear water between them I don't think. (Interviewee 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

In reaction to the problems encountered with CCT nationally (see Chapter 3), the Labour Party nationally in its Manifesto announced the agenda for modernising Local Government and the change from CCT to Best Value. The Best Value framework replaced the three Es of CCT (Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness) with 4 Cs (Compare, Consult, Challenge and Compete). Sheffield embraced many of the principles of Best Value before its official introduction. By 1998 Sheffield City Council introduced
an internal document called *Best Managed Council*. The *Best Managed Council*, as pointed out by one officer was about providing the best quality services, to introduce systematic planning and review systems and improving communication. The Council was also working towards quality systems and in particular *Investors in People* accreditation (Interviewee 7, Head of Regeneration and Partnership, Chief Executives Office, Sheffield City Council, 14 July 1999).

*Investors in People* had four main principles. Firstly, a commitment from the top to develop all employees to achieve business objectives. Secondly, regular reviews of needs, and plans for training and development of all employees. Thirdly, action to train and develop individuals on recruitment and throughout their employment. Fourthly, evaluation of investment in training and development to assess achievement and improve future effectiveness (Internal Circular, 1999). In addition to these changes, the Council also advocated that service plans were put in place, increased team briefings were established as well as improved staff training (Interviewee 7, Head of Regeneration and Partnership, Chief Executives Office, Sheffield City Council, 14 July 1999) and as one officer pointed out that...

...alongside the *Best Managed Council*, we have been preparing for Best Value by setting a specialist policy unit and training Best Value Officers, this is done through the Chief Executive's office, these three things will drive Best Value and strengthen the corporate management dimension. (Interviewee 7, Head of Regeneration and Partnership, Chief Executives Office, Sheffield City Council, 14 July 1999).

The introduction of the Best Value regime required a cultural change throughout the Council, as one senior officer acknowledged...

...CCT has gone but Best Value is probably more of a challenge, certainly affecting more of the council than CCT ever did... CCT was restricted to certain areas of service namely blue collar em whereas Best Value, everyone is going to be challenged by and will have to compete, to be compared and consulted on and all the rest of it. Over five years every bit of the Council's service has got to be subjected to that, it is much more pervasive and therefore more challenging and more real for some people. (Interviewee 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).
Chapter 5 Local Government Change: Sheffield 1974 to 1999

Best Value forced the Council to compare itself against other local authorities and against the practices of the private and voluntary sectors. The Council was also required to benchmark its services by using national and local performance indicators. This brought a fundamental change to the Council, as one senior officer noted the issue was about...

...being clear what your actual objectives and targets are, it is something we have to give serious thought to... if you look at it now and analyse the traditional agenda, is being about what you are putting into something, not what you’ve been getting out of it (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

The Council’s role as a partner in the city also began to be questioned and partnerships began to be regarded with a degree of cynicism, particularly where the rhetoric of public-private partnership failed to result in meaningful action. Furthermore by the end of the 1990s a degree of resistance to partnership emerged where to some it was viewed as a threat to the Council’s role:

I think the Council has fully embraced the idea of partnership in terms of dialogue, consultation, joint initiatives and to secure funding. Where there has been resistance is where partnership is a polite term for competition and take-over. So for example there is a big struggle for housing benefits, payroll services and other financial systems which were contracted out and the unions resisted it. So I think partnership has been embraced where it has been comfortable, where there has been no threat to the council in terms of its own resources and giving some of those resources away. But there is resistance to outsourcing, where it means getting people to do what the council currently does and therefore replacing what the council does.

and

I think there is also a lot of talk about partnerships simply because people recognise that inside the Council they should talk that language. If you do not you are frowned upon, you are not going to get the resources. It is almost not politically correct to not talk in terms of partnership. (Interviewee 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

However, in 1998 the City Liaison Group changed its name to Sheffield First and produced a document Achieving Excellence: A Draft Strategy for Sheffield. This strategy was one of the first documents to question the partnership approach. It stated that the...

...arrangements for partnership working are too unwieldy and their structures reflect earlier days when relationships were dogged by suspicion (Sheffield First Partnership 1998: 12).
It also suggested that...

...historically, there was a relatively high level of suspicion among private, public and voluntary organisations in Sheffield. This has been overcome with some success. However, for the most part, the partnerships that exist have not yet become dynamic and effective delivery agents. Therefore, there remains a confusing array of partnerships, frequently with too many members for operational efficiency. Partnerships are necessary, but they could be fewer and simpler. (Sheffield First Partnership 1998: 52).

By the end of the 1990s a number of individuals and organisations also challenged the public-private partnership approach, and in particular its apparent failure to deal with the city's problems of inequality, poverty and social exclusion. In response the Council began to develop a new partnership approach with the voluntary and community sector and a new discourse emerged around consultation, participation and empowerment. Consultation, in particular, became a major issue for the Council and in 1998 it produced a strategy document *In Partnership with the Community*. The strategy sought to improve partnerships with the community is based on four approaches. Firstly, the Strategy called for cultural change in the Council, in particular, how it offered services, consulted with people, planned, and made decisions. Secondly, the Strategy argued for more support for community networks. Thirdly, the Strategy suggested that the Council should develop joint programmes with other agencies, public authorities and community groups, to fund, run and deliver services. Fourthly, the Strategy advocated a management review of progress across all service sectors and increased training for staff and volunteers. The Strategy concluded that...

...to succeed in these objectives, we shall have to link this culture change to our committee structures, management processes, consultation initiatives, performance review and training. (Sheffield City Council 1998: 35).

The Council's new discourse concentrated on three core corporate objectives. The first two corporate objectives, regeneration and improving the quality of life, had been core to the Council’s philosophy from the mid 1980s. The third objective, partnership with the community, was important as it confirmed that the Council's had changed emphasis from partnership with the private sector to partnership with the community (Sheffield City Council 1998: 35).
Chapter 5  Local Government Change: Sheffield 1974 to 1999

The importance of corporate policies was evident from this interviewee who, when asked how policy decisions were made in the council, stated that...

...we go through what is the corporate vision first. The corporate vision for the Sheffield City Council and then that comes down to us and we fit it with our priorities... so it cascades down. One of the visions of Sheffield City Council is working in partnership with local community so that has a knock on effect on what do. (Interviewee 5, Planning and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

The need to consult widely, particularly with disadvantaged groups, was particularly evident after the Liberal Democrats won control of Sheffield in the 1999 elections. The new administration developed the 'Sheffield 100 Forum'. This was a diverse group of individuals representing a structured sample of local people, which the Council used to test, shape and influence its policies. Thus the community partnership approach was being espoused from the...

...Liberal Democrats, National government, and Kerslake [leader of the Council]. Those three influences talk about partnership and joined up thinking. I do not think working in partnership is a choice that we have got, it is something you have to do whether you like it or not. (Interviewee 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

Despite the advocacy of the community partnership approach, some officers regarded this policy as problematic. As one officer noted, the Council needed...

...to find better ways of consulting our users and non users about services, we have no systematic processes for identifying the communities needs. We find it difficult to determine which services to provide. We are not good at getting feedback as to whether they are the right services, whether they are meeting the needs of the public. I think we are typical of the public sector in that sense, we don't really do enough consultation, we are not terribly skilled at it, we have no tradition of it. (Interviewee 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

The community partnership approach was enhanced by the introduction of Area Panels. The aim of these panels according to one officer was to make public services more sensitive to local needs and to strengthen links locally between the various Council services and other agencies. It was also about attracting external funds and promoting
local regeneration and to help councillors work together more effectively in representing
the interests of local communities (Interviewee 9, Assistant Regeneration and Funding
Partnership Officer, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 11 November 1999).
Twelve area panels, plus one for the city centre, were developed. These panels
comprised of local councilors with five to ten members from the community. However,
the panels were only advisory, they held no budget, and remained responsible to the
Council's Regeneration and Partnerships Committee. Despite these restrictions, for many
officers, particularly those working in deprived areas, the Panels were seen as a positive
step in providing a form of empowerment. One officer, stated that he...

...would like to see the area panels get going, I think people need to realise
that they don't need the City Council, what the City Council needs is an
alternative power base and that does not exist in the city, but the area
panels... well its the nearest thing the city has to an alternative power base.
(Interviewee 3, Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield
City Council, 2 August 1999).

Another suggested that the Council could...

...totally reorient around Area Action Zones, which may not be a bad thing,
at least we would be focussed on the needs on the ground that every area of
the city would be covered not just a few areas or a few interest groups. So
perhaps Area Action is a more equitable way to go and I can see that being a
good thing as long as it is done in an even-handed way (Interviewee 4,
Regeneration and Funding Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City
Council, 2 August 1999).

Despite the enthusiasm towards the Area Panels expressed by officers working in
deprived areas, others felt that the Area Panels were subject to control or manipulation by
professionals and politicians. This would undermine the bottom up approach to policy
the Council sought to implement. Adopting a bottom up approach was especially
difficult, as required a change to the established management culture of an organisation
that, throughout the 1980s, relied upon the expert opinions of professionals to guide
policy. The issue for Officer 3 (Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services,
Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999) was about how...

...you make experts less expert and users more expert, that is the problem.
To do that you have got to be committed and they have got to trust you.
You have got to tell people that they should have views about things and
most of the time, or a large part of the time, those views will be listened
to... We go out to communities because we are told to, because if we do not we will not get SRB or Challenge funding. I think many officer would not talk to anybody if they did not have to.

The desire for consultation brought into question issues of democracy and accountability and the role of officers and members. A number of officers suggested that councillors roles were to decide on the broad strategic goals and then to consult people on how these goals could be achieved. However, these officers noted that there was a conflict between...

...local elected members going out into the community and members themselves representing there communities. I think we probably have to redefine the role of members and I think they need to become sort of champions of their community. They need to go out and do more work and try to reflect the views of their communities. But I believe politics is about leadership not about following. Therefore it is not just about identifying the community views, it is about influencing the community’s view. (Interviewee 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

In summary, the period after 1992 in Sheffield was a period of uncertainty, with the Council searching to find and develop and define its role as an enabler. Throughout this period, there was a growing realisation that the public-private partnerships had achieved some success in regenerating the city economically, but had failed to solve the city's problems of inequality, poverty and social exclusion. Therefore, the Council began to question partnerships with business in favour of partnerships with the community and voluntary sectors.

There are many reasons for seeking partnership with those we provide services to and with those agencies, like the Health Authority, Universities, the business community and so on... the most important of these has to be in order to reduce social exclusion, inequality and poverty and promote good services, improve employment and educational opportunities and support the high aspirations for the people of Sheffield (Sheffield City Council 1998: 9).

Through these partnerships the Council sought to provide an environment for positive action and attempted to influence others through a new discourse emphasising consultation, accountability and democracy.
Controlling community groups or directing the agendas of others, particularly smaller agencies, is not partnership. For the Council, partnership is the involvement, in an all encompassing way, of these groups previously mentioned, in the shaping and directing or our key policies and services, including education, personal and welfare services, leisure services and economic development. But partnership is also about our ability to encourage others, willingly, to involve us in their plans, service delivery and reviews to achieve a common purpose (Sheffield City Council 1998: 12).

The Council also implemented a decentralised system of Area Panels, which provided a bottom up approach, based largely on consultation. The new approach fitted with New Labour's desire for 'joined-up' policy. The period might best be described as a period of Left Neo-Fordism. However, these organisational and political changes required a cultural change within the Council and other organisations within the city, which would challenge the established system of decision making, and ultimately the role of public sector professionals and elected politicians.

5.6 Conclusions to the Chapter

This Chapter has illustrated how, in the post World War Two period, Sheffield enjoyed a period of what has been characterised as Left Fordism, with economic growth, public ownership of much of its industry and a high level of social welfare provision provided by the local Labour Party. However, from the 1970s Sheffield suffered an extended period of economic decline allied, in the 1980s, to a series of restrictive policy initiatives imposed by Central Government. These broad national and global influences reshaped politics in the city. In response, a New Urban Left leadership emerged, firstly challenging neo-liberalism with radical policies and by increasing local taxation. However, during the 1980s there was a growing recognition that the state was no longer able to address the economic and social problems faced in the city and that the market must be given a greater role.

Sheffield's environment became increasingly complex, yet Sheffield's political and business elite realised that best way to achieve the goals of economic regeneration and city reimagining was through partnership. Business participation in economic policy in
Sheffield changed from virtual business alienation in the 1970s to sustained incorporation in the late 1980s. A number of the partnership arrangements had a prolonged impact of the city’s governance. In particular, the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee provided a vehicle for partnership activity, providing an environment that was conducive to the non-elected public agencies such as the UDC and the TEC, it also acted as an umbrella organisation to smaller partnerships, as well as having members on the boards of major projects such as the World Student Games.

Table 5.4. Local Government Change in Sheffield 1992 to 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1992 – 1999: The Enabling Role</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Broad National and Global Factors (Macro)</strong></td>
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</table>
| Economic | Sheffield economic and unemployment problems eased.  
A growing concern for attracting external funding especially from Europe |
| Political | Labour Party loses popularity throughout the 1990s and finally the Liberal Democrats win the local election (1999).  
Early 1990s - Economy and efficiency sought though CCT  
Late 1990s - Movement towards Best Value and challenge, consult, compare, compete. |
| Social | Towards the end of the 1990s there was a growing concern with being more effective not just economic and efficient.  
Late 1990s a growing concern with community Involvement in decision making |
| **Local / Organisational Factors (Meso)** | |
| Developments | Externalisation of services forced by CCT  
City Liaison Group formed (1992).  
Sheffield SRB Partnership formed  
Formation of trusts and other interorganisational relationship (e.g. Sheffield for Leisure Trust).  
1998 A decentralised system of area panels introduced  
CLG changed to Sheffield First (1998). |
| Culture | A growing cynicism about partnerships with growth based goals  
A new discourse of partnership with the community expressing consultation, participation and empowerment. These are communicated through strategic documents. |
| Relationships | City Council realises that government has failed and a system of governance was required. However, partnership with the business sector was challenged and partnerships with the community was sought. |
| Individual Factors and Inter-subject Relations (micro) | |
| | A questioning of professional role in decision making. |
| Theoretical explanation | Left neo-Fordist approach, community governance, regime theory and policy networks. |
However, in the 1990s market-led solutions had failed to adequately tackle issues of inequality, poverty and social exclusion and further pressures were placed on the Council to reduce its expenditure. This led to a greater role for the community and voluntary sectors in dealing with the city's problems and in the delivery of services. Sheffield's response was to embrace partnerships with the community and a new discourse was constructed around the notions of consultation, participation, accountability and empowerment. In the next chapter there is a specific analysis of the development of the leisure policy in Sheffield, while a detailed analysis of the operation and practices of three leisure-related partnerships in the city is provided in Chapter 7.
CHAPTER SIX

LEISURE POLICY CHANGE IN

SHEFFIELD 1974 TO 1999

6.1 Introduction to the Chapter

The preceding chapter gave a chronological account of local government change in Sheffield from the Second World War to 1999. This chapter develops the analysis further by analysis of leisure policy change in the city. As with the discussion in the preceding chapter, discussion of policy change in Sheffield will be structured into four parts. In the period from World War Two to 1979 a period of traditional welfarism was evident in Sheffield. The local authority expanded its service provision and developed a Recreation Department with a range of social welfare goals. During the period 1980 to 1985 the Council carried out a defence of its services and leisure, despite being a non-statutory service, was safeguarded by the Council. Leisure policy in the period 1986 to 1991 was characterised by efforts by the public sector to engage in partnerships with business, during this period a number of collaborative arrangements were created with the primary goal of economic development and high cost culture and sport developments were used to promote regeneration and re-imaging of the city. During the period 1992 to 1999 the Council assumed an enabling role. In this period the public sector continued to operate within a climate of financial constraint preventing it providing a full range of leisure services alone. Instead a range of leisure trusts and partnership forums emerged to deliver of leisure services in the city.

At the end of each section a table is provided to summarise the main changes under four headings. The first aspect is broad national / global factors (macro), comprised of the main political, economic and social changes or events, which shaped leisure policy in the city. The second feature is local / organisational factors (meso): these are changes to the existing, and the emergence of new, public, private and voluntary sector organisations.
and partnerships in the city. The change in organisational culture including change in the ideologies, discourse, goals, and values of the Recreation Department and other organisations is also identified. A related characteristic of change is 'interorganisational relationships', in particular the resistance to, or support for, collaboration and the development of partnerships. The fourth facet of change is termed individual factors and inter-subject relations (micro). In particular, some policies were shaped, or resisted, by officers, politicians and interest group members. Theoretical explanation of change is also alluded to. This chapter introduces three partnership forums, *Sports Sheffield*, *Sheffield Play Council* and *Active Sheffield* but the detailed information regarding the operation and policies of these forums is discussed in Chapter Seven.

### 6.2 The Traditional Welfare Approach: The Second World War to 1979

In 1940 Sheffield was one of the last major cities to set up an autonomous parks department, responsible for open spaces and the provision of facilities for active recreation. Prior to this the Estates Surveyor's Department held responsibility for leisure in the city. During the Second World War the usual functions of the Department, though continued under difficulties, became of secondary importance:

> So many varied, unusual and extra tasks consequent of war vicissitudes had been passed to the staff and workpeople that during almost every week of each war year they were either preparing for or taking part in some special duty, such as 'Food Production', 'Horticultural Advisory Service', 'War-time Allotments', 'Music in the Parks', 'Dig for Victory Exhibitions', 'Holidays at Home', 'Food Production Shows', and 'Garrison Theatre Concerts'. (City of Sheffield Parks 1952: 7).

In 1951 the Parks Department was expanded to take responsibility for cemeteries and allotments. The new department also took responsibility for horticultural work on the Corporation's housing estates and grass cutting and roadside maintenance work from the Highways Department. The provision of recreation opportunities during this period was predominately in the form of outdoor sports:

> We want Sports Fields - Sports Fields laid out to the modern requirement of our various National games - and though one cannot altogether defeat the city's difficult contours (City of Sheffield Parks 1952: 42).
During this period leisure policy was not regarded as a significant component of social welfare policy. Instead, there was a concern to preserve the city's cultural heritage and in particular its open spaces:

We shall try wherever possible to make our sports areas part of the landscape. Landscaping is important (City of Sheffield Parks 1952: 42).

During the period of post war growth expansion, Sheffield benefited from the continued success of its steel and cutlery industries. However, the city's expansion put pressure on these sports facilities:

The demand for sports pitches particularly football and cricket still remains unsatisfied and at the present moment the number of teams or our waiting lists is high... at the last check there were 48 teams waiting for football pitches and 27 for cricket... the contours of the city and the land used for housing and education purposes does not leave enough for public playing fields (City of Sheffield Parks 1962: 18).

The Department also called for a greater variety of leisure facilities:

In order that the Department can fulfil its proper function in the life of the city we need much more. In the existing Parks and Recreation Grounds we need Pavilions, Shelters, Lodges - all substantial in construction, beautiful in design... We need more bowling greens, more tennis courts, more boats on our lakes, more putting greens, more miniature golf courses, an open air skating rink - yes, indeed - a skating rink. It would be a great boon (City of Sheffield Parks 1962: 44).

In 1967, as a result of a boundary extension, the city incorporated several parks and open spaces from neighboring authorities. The Parks Department also began to liaise more closely with the departments of the Sheffield Corporation and with a number of sporting organisations at local and regional level. A Local Sports Council was set up to provide a link between the Council and the Regional Sports Council on issues such as planning and financing of new projects. The Council also began to emphasise the provision of opportunities for children, in particular children's play grounds, the development of a Play Leadership Scheme and the assistance at pre-school playgroups.
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 demonstrate the growing importance of recreation expenditure during this period:

**Figure 6.1: Parks and Amenities Section Income and Expenditure 1941 to 1970**

Source: Adapted from Sheffield City Council Accounts 1941 to 1970

**Figure 6.2: Parks and Amenities Section Income and Expenditure 1941 to 1970 (Expressed in 1970 Prices)**

Source: Adapted from Sheffield City Council Accounts 1941 to 1970

As can be seen, the Council's expenditure rose sharply after the war and the growing gap between expenditure and income demonstrates willingness on the part of the council to subsidise provision. In figure 6.2 the figures are expressed in 1970 prices to take account
of inflation. For the purposes of this study the GDP deflator was used. There is little variation on the overall trend.

In March 1969, the Parks Department was merged with the Baths Section of the Cleansing and Baths Department to form the Sheffield City Council Recreation Department. The new department took responsibility for four school swimming pools, making them available for public use. The rationale for developing the Recreation Department was explained thus:

[The] trend towards increased leisure time has continued to highlight the need for the purposeful use of this time in various forms of recreation, sport and other activities. It has been a major function of this department to provide as many and as diverse recreational facilities as could be fitted into the existing parks system and to determine the areas of priority for new development schemes which can be carried out during present period of financial stringency. The role of the Parks Department has changed direction to meet this need and the process has resulted on a major reorganisation of the functions of the Department and this process is still continuing (City of Sheffield Recreation Department 1969: 3).

During the 1970s, other welfare services provided by the Council aimed to be accessible and accountable, decentralised and redistributive and community orientated (Sheffield Recreation Department 1988). There was a need to...

...let the public know what is going on in the department. Advisory committees have been set up to meet representatives of individual sporting organisations using parks facilities and this has resulted in a much better understanding of each other's problems (City of Sheffield Recreation Department 1969: 4).

As one officer noted:

In the 1970s it was very much about community provision, very much about local provision. And the development of a community Recreation Section in which I think Sheffield was quite forward thinking... it put officers into local communities and directed work there (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).

Although Sheffield separated recreation provision from parks, the Department remained under the influence of officers from the old Parks Section. According to one officer this

The GDP deflator takes account of total spending, not just that of households, as the Retail Prices Index. The GDP deflator is a good indicator of inflation in the whole domestic economy over one or more years (National Statistics Office, 2002).
contributed to the insufficient spending on sports facilities:

They were trying to sustain and improve the natural environment of the city, the woodlands, parks and so on. Baths were grafted on to the Recreation Department at the end of the 1960s. Instead of Parks and Recreation it became the Recreation Department but there was no investment in facilities by the department in terms of spending by the department through the 1970s when money was available. There was spending on parks and open spaces, as that was the dominant force in the Department (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).

As can be seen in the diagram below, Sheffield City Council only committed around 3% of the general rate on recreation. This lack of spending on leisure facilities was untypical for a British city during this period. According to Stoker (1991), the majority of cities had gone through a period of expansion, modernization and growth in services including leisure. Sheffield's limited expenditure of its leisure infrastructure meant that by 1980 the city had a limited number of facilities and those, which did exist, were in need of repair.

![Figure 6.3 The percentage of the general rate spent of facilities for recreation](image)

Source: Adapted from Sheffield City Council Annual Accounts 1976/77 to 1980/8
The lack of expenditure on leisure was intensified during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Sheffield's economy began to experience economic decline. The metal industries were no longer competitive in the global economy and following the oil price rise in the 1970s, the city began to suffer severe deindustrialisation. The low spending on active recreation was matched by a lack of funding given to arts and libraries. The following diagram shows that the percentage of the general rate spent of libraries and arts remained between two and three percent:

For Interviewee 1 (Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000) the Council's lack of spending on leisure infrastructure, was a factor in the Council's decision to invest in leisure facilities in the 1980s:

The difference in Sheffield had been that, although Recreation was formed in 1969, the city hadn't had a huge growth in leisure centres or sports centres. If you look at a map of the city we've never had an intensity of facilities on the ground, that elsewhere has had. That does lead on to the argument about why we invested what we did at the end of the 1980s. (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).
Table 6.1. Leisure Policy Change in Sheffield World War Two to 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>World War Two to 1979 The Traditional Welfare Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broad National / Global Factors (Macro),</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Expansion and growth in the City fuelled primarily by the Steel industry put pressure on existing recreation facilities (especially playing fields)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of maintenance expenditure led to deteriorating on existing facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of expenditure on new facilities throughout the period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Labour dominated local government with social democratic goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Council used leisure policy to serve local communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary goals of leisure policy in the 1970s were participation and redistribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing demands for new forms of leisure such as ice skating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growing concern to provide opportunities for children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local / Organisational Factors (Meso),</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developments</td>
<td>1940 Autonomous Parks Department formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1951 Parks Department expanded to take responsibility for cemeteries, allotments and grass cutting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1967 Local Sports Council formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968/1969 Recreation Department formed with responsibility for museums, libraries alongside sport and recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>The primary goals of the Department were accessibility, accountability, decentralisation, and redistribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>Council provides leisure services with little input from the private and voluntary sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some liaison with sports organisations at local and regional level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collaboration with the Sheffield Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual factors and inter-subject relations (Micro).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical explanation</td>
<td>Officers from the Parks Section dominated the Recreation Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sheffield City Council provided leisure to help achieving participation and redistribution. Ideological the Council was driven by social democratic goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, the traditions of recreation policy in Sheffield stem from the Parks Department which, after 1940, assumed responsibility for recreation facilities. During the early years leisure policy was regarded as a peripheral service and was not a significant element of social welfare policy. Instead, the Council was concerned with preserving the city's open spaces and landscape. After the War the Council became more concerned with providing outdoor sports pitches and swimming baths. Throughout the period the importance of leisure provision increased incrementally, leading to the development of a Recreation Department in 1968. Leisure policy during the 1970s became part of social democratic welfare provision. The primary goals were participation, redistribution and serving Sheffield's communities. Despite the growing prominence of leisure, Sheffield still did not experience the growth in leisure facilities.
that many British cities enjoyed in the 1970s leaving the city with insufficient facilities to meet a growing market for leisure opportunities. A summary table of the Leisure Policy Change in Sheffield World War Two to 1979 is given in the table 6.1.

6.3 The Defence of Services: 1980 to 1985

By the 1980s, Sheffield’s industry had suffered severe collapse resulting in unemployment and widespread deprivation. Following the Conservative Party’s election win in 1979, the City Council’s budget was squeezed further by successive central government policies. Under the restrictive financial regime, recreation spending remained marginal. As shown in figure 6.5 the Department’s expenditure rose only slightly in cash terms throughout the period.

![Figure 6.5 Leisure Expenditure 1980 to 1987](image)

Source: Sheffield City Council Annual Accounts 1980/81 to 1986/87

![Figure 6.6 Leisure Expenditure 1980 to 1987 (at 1986/1987 prices)](image)

Source: Sheffield City Council Annual Accounts 1980/81 to 1986/87
The figures were converted into 1986/1987 prices to take account of inflation (using the GDP Deflator). Figure 6.6 shows that in real terms leisure expenditure remained fairly constant throughout the period. When calculated as percentage of the total council expenditure, the amount spent on recreation and amenities and libraries and arts remained about 6% throughout the period:

![Figure 6.7 Leisure Spending as a Percentage of Total Council Expenditure](source: Sheffield City Council Annual Accounts 1980/81 to 1986/87)

Under the New Urban Left (NUL) leadership (see Chapter 5), the goals and delivery of recreation policy changed from being simply a peripheral component of a larger social welfare policy to a more important and central area of Council policy. The Council began to express a desire to...

...do more for people’s involvement in sport. Sport was higher on the political agenda of a number of politicians, sport was the culture of the masses and they were determined to do more for it (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).

Despite leisure being given greater importance, the Council still failed to extend the provision of indoor leisure facilities. Instead, the Council introduced a renovation programme for the city's older swimming pools. Greater consideration was also given to the extension of the dual use facilities with the Education Department and the facilities of one school were made available to the public. In Arts provision a new purpose built library, financed from the Urban Programme, was opened in Darnall in 1981. However,
the Museums Section and the City Arts Galleries suffered from the lack of finances, and no expansion of services was made from internal resources throughout the period.

Consistent with New Urban Left policies, leisure provision concentrated on small-scale projects within local communities. During the period the Department provided facilities for 23 adult and community centres which mounted exhibitions from their community base. A Community orientation was also evident within sports provision where...

...in the 80s when Blunkett and co tried to bring about change within the authority, there was some spending on sports facilities with regard to a youth programme. It emerged out of a sports development policy. But it was small... We're talking about a quarter of a million here - a quarter of a million there. (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).

Despite the lack of expenditure on leisure, the Council began to recognise that its conventional measures, such as supporting sports clubs with small grants, neglected whole segments of the community. Instead they began to trial...

...different approaches to attract people. We needed to experiment and there was a positive response (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).

As a result of this experimentation, Sheffield was one of the first cities in the country to establish sports development as part of its recreation work. An extensive sports development programme was started, incorporating various sport coaching and sports 'tasting' schemes set up as part of the urban programme. In 1984 the Council introduced a passport to leisure scheme, which made facilities available for the unemployed and senior citizens. This was expanded in 1985, so that all Sheffield residents were entitled to a passport and 60,000 acquired one. The sports development officer's remit was to develop initiatives across the three functional sections of the department: Outdoor Services, which were responsible for parks and open spaces; Indoor Services with responsibility for swimming pools and sports halls; and a Facilities Development Section.

Also consistent with the New Urban Left policies, the Recreation Department experimented with radical pricing policies. For a trial period it made many of its sports facilities available free of charge to disadvantaged groups. Coaching was available at
reduced rates and special initiatives were introduced to encourage people to engage in sport. For example, in 1983/1984 the Parks and Open Spaces Section used two mobile sports vans to make coaching visits to over 40 sites to provide a range of sports instruction (Sheffield City Council, 1984). However, the City Council's policy of making facilities available to more people through pricing policies and free use to young, old and unemployed, began to put pressure on existing facilities and on the Department's budget:

So there were a whole host of measures that we were being encouraged to investigate and to implement; almost without concern for the consequences. The consequences were that the costs rose because you were trying to do more for a community that was not actually paying for services or contributing in any way to the cost of those services (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).

In 1983 the Recreation Department opened a Department of Arts, unifying arts provision for the first time in the city. The Department co-ordinated, promoted and encouraged a wide spectrum of arts activities. The new department also implemented schemes to break down disadvantage. It opened an Ethnic Minorities Unit to identify what the ethnic minorities of Sheffield wanted from their library service. For the Department art was...

...open to all and not the cultural property of a few and the department will seek increasingly to encourage access for all to all that is best in the field of visual arts and music (Sheffield City Council 1984: 12).

The Council was not only interested in widening access to existing art forms but also adopted a policy of providing popular art forms such as a civic cinema that it acquired in 1983:

The arts are not just about provision, they are about public involvement and participation.... Public involvement ranges from participation in classes to picking your own exhibition, as was done in the permanent collection display, *The Choice is Yours*, and the Department's staff are constantly involved in organising and providing back up to exhibitions through courses of lectures, talks, complementary events and an expanding film and video service (Sheffield City Council 1984: 21).

The New Urban Left influence extended to arts and galleries provision and the Council sponsored exhibitions to raise money for causes such as an aid fund to combat Apartheid in South Africa. In 1985 the council also introduced a project placing two 'artists in
residence' in the Kelvin flats and on the Manor Estate, two run down inner city areas. These residences stimulated considerable local interest and were followed by an exhibition of the work.

In 1984 the Recreation Departments was reorganised to make it more responsive to the public. In particular, four recreation officers were made responsible for local areas. They were supported by a number of new development workers located within communities.

In summary, leisure policy in Sheffield in the period 1980 to 1985 was shaped by economic and political factors. Whilst there was a growing recognition that leisure was an important service, the city's economic decline and deindustrialisation combined with the restrictive neo-liberal policies of the central government prevented any increase in the funding made available for it. However, consistent with New Urban Left policies, the Council supported a wide range of small-scale, community oriented leisure projects. Radical pricing policies were also introduced to reduce disadvantage, and experimentation in service delivery was encouraged. Throughout this period, the provision of leisure opportunities by the private sector continued to be limited and detached from those of the City Council. However, by the mid 1980s the Council began to realise that the city's traditional industries would not recover from the severe deindustrialisation. In this climate, leisure facility developments and the commercial sector emerged as possible vehicles for economic and social regeneration.
### Table 6.2. Leisure Policy Change in Sheffield 1980 to 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1980 to 1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Broad National / Global Factors (Macro)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Economic | Global economic restructuring caused rapid deindustrialisation and led to only minor increases in leisure expenditure.  
Little expenditure on new facilities, some renovation to the existing facilities. |
| Political | New Urban Left raised the profile of leisure as part of social welfare provision  
New Urban Left used leisure to draw attention to issues such as apartheid in South Africa |
| Social | Council policies attempted to reduce disadvantage with a leisure card scheme, sports development work and radical pricing policies  
Policies to make arts available to all, but also the provision and development of popular art forms  
Community oriented policies e.g. artists residencies within run down areas |
| **Local / Organisational Factors (Meso)** |  |
| Developments | Sports Development section established (1980)  
The Recreation Department is split between indoor and outdoor recreation  
Arts Department formed (1983)  
Employment in the Department reached 1000 people |
| Culture | Encouragement of experimentation in service delivery  
Council provision of leisure services with the goals of equity, redistribution and community development  
Some realisation that leisure could play a role in the regeneration and economic restructuring of the City |
| Relationships | Poor relations with Central Government  
Little contact with the private sector for the provision of leisure. |
| Individual factors and inter-subject relations (Micro). | Leisure professionals accepted as playing a legitimate role and regarded as the most appropriate decision makers. |
| Theoretical explanation | New Urban Left policies implemented as a reaction to the neo-liberal ideology of central government. |

### 6.4 Towards Partnership with Business: 1986 to 1991

In the early 1980s there had been a growing realisation, within the Council, that it needed to find new ways to improve the economic and social plight of the city. This was expressed in a strategic document produced by the Recreation Department in 1984 entitled *Leisure Challenge: A Prospect for the Lower Don Valley*. The report suggested leisure could be used to improve the city’s image and could contribute to economic regeneration (*Sheffield City Council 1984*). The report provided a strategic vision for
leisure policy in the city by improving the City's image to attract tourism and inward investment. This recommendation laid the foundation for council plans to submit a bid to host the 1991 World Student Games and develop cultural facilities within the city.

In 1987 the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee commissioned produced a report on the Lower Don Valley. The report argued that Sheffield needed to improve its image to encourage tourism and inward investment. More specifically they suggested that the city required a specific feature or 'flagship' investment. The report was consistent with central government political ideology at the time, which argued that public services should achieve efficiencies through competition. The private sector was encouraged to bring business practice to public services and the city accepted that priorities were shifting from manufacturing to the service sector (see chapter 5 page 163 for extracts from this report). Sheffield City Council also produced a vision for the city with its Sheffield 2000 strategy. This report argued that leisure was a to play a role in the city's regeneration proclaiming leisure was a "significant and legitimate growth network" (Sheffield City Council 1991). These documents played an important role in providing a strategic vision for Sheffield's leisure policy and raised its profile.

During the mid 1980s Sheffield City Council, through the Department of Employment and Economic Development raised the profile of cultural policy. In 1986 the Council opened the Red Tape Studios, Britain's first municipal rehearsal recording and sound training facility. The Red Tape studios raised interest in the cultural industries and attracted attention from a number of cultural and media companies. The city's cultural infrastructure was further enhanced in the late 1980s with renovations to the Lyceum Theatre at a cost of £12 million. The Lyceum Theatre had been derelict for over ten years, but once restored it formed part of a unique arts square in the City Centre, along with the Crucible Theatre, the Library Theatre and the Ruskin Gallery. This area was used to host a number of outdoor festivals. The renovation of the Lyceum was also conducted as part of the city's commitment to a cultural festival linked to the World Student Games.
During this period the Council maintained its goals of reducing disadvantage and encouraging the development of young musicians, especially the unemployed (Sheffield City Council, University et al. 1992). However, there were a number of problems that inhibited the implementation of this policy. The Recreation Department continued to suffer financial constraint at a time when the demand for grant aid from community groups was increasing. Furthermore, the Department's budget was tied to its existing cultural infrastructure, such as the arts galleries and museums. These facilities had high maintenance costs but had low revenue returns, resulting in high levels of subsidy paid from the Department's budget (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000). By the 1990s, the City Council began to support consumer-oriented developments (Dabinett, 1993) and sought a link between culture and sports events:

One thing the city learnt was that the combination of sport and culture maximises the commercial impact of events (Price 1998: 264).

Alongside cultural development, sport was used to reduce disadvantage by expanding activities for target groups. The Department ran a number of multicultural events and seconded a development worker to a Caribbean sports club to develop a training programme for young Afro Caribbeans who wanted to work in recreation and leisure. The Council also appointed a development worker for people with disabilities, jointly funded by the Health Authority, Sports Council and Recreation Department.

1988 was declared a year of partnership for the Recreation Department with many of its schemes and activities being achieved in conjunction with other agencies and bodies. The Council was involved in a number of joint ventures such as the Flower Estate Wildlife project, a scheme that attracted national attention with local wildlife groups. The Sheffield Play Forum was also established in conjunction with the voluntary sector. Its aims of this were to...

...ensure better co-ordination between council departments and voluntary organisations, enabling improved planning for play work training and to encourage a more cohesive and streamlined service to take play provision into the next decade as a service that is lively, responsive and effective. (Sheffield City Council 1989: 17)
A truly joint project was the completion of a small community recreation centre at Verdon Street in Burgreave. This was located in a multi-cultural, multi-racial inner-city area suffering from poor housing and high levels of unemployment, crime, vandalism and graffiti. The Verdon Recreation Association was formed to manage the centre to put it in the hands of local people rather than the local authority. A Community Recreation Assistant was appointed to develop a programme of activities.

In 1986 the Council submitted a bid to host the 1991 World Student Games. The rationale for bidding for the Games according to Interviewee 12 was to improve Sheffield's national and international reputation, which would, in turn, attract inward investment:

They made a decision in 1986 to commit to the World Student Games. Obviously, it wasn’t all that money just for a 2 weeks period. It was based around using leisure as a central focus for its economic development, and sports events being part of that. (Interviewee 12, Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

The importance of Sheffield's previous lack of spending on sport can also be seen as a reason for hosting the Games. As one officer stated:

[Councilor 1] was contacted by the British Student Sports Federation, as it was then, with the brochure outlining the fantastic opportunity for any city in this country that was prepared to go with it. But it wasn't put as an opportunity for facilities development; it was put as opportunity to stage the Games. When we read through the prospectus we said 'look we don't have the facilities portfolio that is required' we don't have a single Olympic standard facility in this city. [Councilor 1's] attitude was 'well give us an opportunity to get them' (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).

Councilor 1's vision was for Sheffield to become a World centre for sport, leisure and tourism, beyond the Games. He later summarised his objectives:

1. To lift the image and profile of the city of Sheffield, nationally and internationally, by hosting not just the Universiade but many, many more events. It was for this reason that we built high quality facilities with a much longer-term use than just for Universiade.
2. To attract tourists to Sheffield. One of the fastest growing sections of the economy is of course tourism and it was important that Sheffield got its share.

3. To provide some better sports facilities for the people of Sheffield and to begin to build on social cohesion... All our sport facilities were built with full community access in mind, not just for hosting elite sports.

4. To improve the environment, removing two centuries of industrial pollution.

5. Something that would lift the civic pride of its citizens who had taken the severe knock of the previous 10 years.

(Price, 1998: 4)

To campaign for the Games a public-private organising committee was formed. This group comprised of six directors, all of whom had been involved in previous partnership arrangements in the city. Within this group, the chair of the Recreation and Leisure Committee, Peter Price, was “the single most influential member with an agenda of just about one hundred percent sport” (Interviewee 4, Regeneration and Funding Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999). According to all the officers interviewed, it was Peter Price's personal influence that helped shape sports policy in Sheffield throughout the 1980s:

[Councilor 1] was Sheffield's Mr. Sport and the drive behind the World Student Games. Facilities were derived because [Councilor 1] forged an alliance with the then leader and the Chair of Finance, they formed a triumvirate that convinced the Labour Group to put that drive behind it. (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

In early 1987 Sheffield beat Edinburgh by a substantial majority to win the British nomination for the Games. Work then began on detailed proposals for the British bid to be presented at the 1987 Games in Zagreb. To organise the bid, a development team was created with core workers seconded from the Recreation, Housing, Publicity, and Finance Departments. The team spent three months working on a fact file to include detailed information on all the various components of the Games. This file was used to prepare the official bid document - a 40-page full colour brochure spelling out the city's case for hosting the Games. In 1987 a delegation from the Fédération Internationale du Sport
Universitaire visited Sheffield and announced that the city had won the bidding for the Games. The bidding and planning process had an impact on the Recreation Department:

It went on for a couple of years, sporadic involvement, sometimes very intense, very in depth, where all the other work was stopped. We worked on this for a while, then we were back on normal duties. It didn't help in terms of trying to operate a service, develop a service and sustain a service in a climate of change and increasing difficulty (Interviewee 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000).

Throughout the late 1980s the Council came under criticism for the high level of spending on the Games. However, this was refuted by the leader of the council in a message sent out with the local rates:

Many myths have sprung up about our financial crisis which are simply not true. 'The World Student Games is costing the Council too much' - this year we will be spending no more than £100,000 on the Games, a tiny fraction of our remaining spending power, and we believe it a worthwhile investment in the regeneration, jobs, improved leisure facilities and international status the Games will bring to Sheffield (Betts 1989).

However, in 1988 the plans suffered a major set back when the Government introduced legislation to reduce the capability of local authorities to raise the finances for publicly funded schemes. As a consequence, a private trust Sheffield Leisure and Recreation Trust (SLRT), was established in March 1988 to generate investment for the development of the Games facilities and to manage them after construction. These two functions were subsequently divided between two subsidiary companies. The first, Sheffield for Health Limited was established to manage the sporting event and two facilities (Ponds Forge International Sports Centre and the Don Valley Stadium). The second, Universiade GB Limited, was given the remit of raising the finances needed to construct the facilities and the capital needed to run the event. The city decided to build 4 major high quality facilities and 3 smaller facilities. The following table provides a brief description of the major development schemes:
Chapter 6 Leisure Policy Change: Sheffield 1974 to 1999

Table 6.3: The Major Facilities Built For The World Student Games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don Valley Stadium</td>
<td>25,000 seat athletic stadium. The first purpose built athletics stadium in Britain for 50 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield Arena</td>
<td>12,000 seat multi-purpose facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponds Forge</td>
<td>50 metre x 10 lane swimming pool, which has the ability to be transformed for community use with floating bulkheads and moveable floors to give variable depths. Diving pool. Sports Hall with automatic seating for 1,000 people and lighting suitable for television. Leisure pool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillsborough Centre leisure</td>
<td>25 metre pool Leisure pool Sports hall with 500 seats.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sheffield City Council had made the decision to bid for the Games on the premise that its income would cover its costs and the expenditure on facilities could be covered by national grant aid, charities and from private sector resources (Roche 1992). However, by the end of 1989 Universiade (GB) Ltd. ceased trading, with debts of £3 million, having only raised half a million pounds of external sponsorship (Seyd 1993). Furthermore, the merger of British Satellite Broadcasting and Sky Television 1990 resulted in the city’s negotiated deal with the former being withdrawn resulting in the loss of potential television sponsorship (Dobson and Gratton 1996). The inability of Sheffield Leisure and Recreation Trust to raise commercial sponsorship meant that in June 1990, the City Council was forced to take direct responsibility for the Games.

Considering the financial setbacks, the 1991 World Student Games and the cultural festival held alongside the Games were a success. The festival involved a number of volunteers from a range of community bodies and set up various partnerships with the higher education sector. Importantly, for many residents the...

...spirit of '91 festival marked an important psychological moment for Sheffield, successfully transforming initial grudging scepticism into widespread enthusiasm in the space of a few weeks. For a temporary period Sheffield regained a vision of itself in relation to the world (Sheffield City Council, University et al. 1992: 29).

However, the economic costs of the Games escalated to around £180 million (Seyd 1993) with five sixths representing capital costs of building new facilities and the remainder the
cost of running the Games. Despite being portrayed as a public-private partnership, the financial contribution from the business sector was minimal and largely consisted of an investment of £34 million from SMGI, an American Company who took responsibility for the Arena. To fund the capital programme the Sheffield Leisure and Recreation Trust borrowed money from a consortium of overseas banks with a repayment period of twenty years, this was underwritten by the Council and meant that, in essence, the World Student Games was funded from local taxation.

With such a high cost strategy, criticism of the Council’s decision to host the Games came from a number of sources. Prior to the Games, resistance also came from a number of members of the local Labour Party, who voted to reduce the size of the Games. Furthermore, the former Deputy Chairman of the Employment Committee resigned from the Council over the Games expenditure (Seyd 1993; Strange 1993). Despite the criticism of the Games, Seyd (1993) argues that the public-private partnership had held up surprisingly well throughout the pre- and post-Games period. However, one member of the group finally transgressed a convention established by members in 1986 that criticism of the coalition should not be voiced in public (Seyd, 1993).

During the Games, there was some direct resistance in the form of a local activist group ‘Stuff the Games’, which publicly demonstrated against the staging of the event. However, in general Sheffield’s population supported it with around 8000 volunteers assisting (Interviewee 17, Member of Sheffield Youth Voluntary Project, 12 April 1998). Prior to the Games, a number of studies were undertaken to estimate the economic cost of the event and the facility development. Foley (1991) argues that these pre-Games estimates were over optimistic and suggested that the costs would be higher than the Council’s estimates, and concluded that the job creation potential was insufficient, considering the high levels of public expenditure. Dabinett and Ramsden (1993) also argue that Games created few direct jobs in the city and whilst some gains were made in the hotel sector, employment in recreation was limited. In fact...

...three swimming pools were closed in the city in the run up to the Games and many staff were redeployed in the process. The management of the
Arena and Stadium was contracted out to a specialist Canadian firm who employed 50 people (Dabinett and Ramsden 1993: 133).

Taylor (1992) also argues that the funding of the event (around £180 million) represented a massive investment, which reduced the Council's ability to spend on its traditional services. He has suggested that this reduction in spending equated to £35 million in 1991 alone. Roche (1992) has also argued that the facility-led regeneration strategy was too high risk to be merited (Roche 1992). The Council was also criticised for not commissioning an official study to evaluate the economic impact of the Games on the city (Dobson and Gratton 1996; Bramwell 1997).

After the Games a number of the Council's officers criticised its decision to host the event. Many officers felt that the Games were not viable at the time because there were no sources of external funding. As one officer suggested it was...

...great what he (Price) achieved at that time, we have spent a long time paying for it since and because he was probably ahead of his time, it is... a lot of people feel it is very unfair because if it was happening now it would be on the back of lottery money or other public money and we wouldn't have to mortgage the goods to pay for it (Interviewee 3, Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999).

The high level of public expenditure is particularly poignant as a number of officers suggested that the majority of Sheffield's population did not support the Council's regeneration strategy:

Back in 1991, I think that if you had done a poll, any sort of survey, you would have probably found... well you wouldn't have done it, the vast majority would have said no (Officer 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

The primary justification of the high level of public spending on the Games used by politicians and officers was that it would bring long term benefits to the city, especially for the local population. The Council argued that the Games would be for elite athletes but in turn they would encourage the local population to participate in new sports
(Representative from Sheffield Hallam and UKSI, 9 February 1999). However, the perception amongst a number of people was that...

...it [the Games] didn't seem to do anything for the grass roots, it wasn't for communities. It was primarily arranged for elite athletes, and the city borrowed a great deal of money to cater for elite athletes, and although after-use was taken into consideration at the time it certainly wasn't the main concern. People are paying for that (Interviewee 4, Regeneration and Funding Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999).

Thus, the Council was criticised because the Games and the design and location of the facilities constructed to host the event were oriented towards elite athletes. Many officers and community representatives felt that facilities such as Ponds Forge, an Olympic sized swimming pool situated close to the city centre, were not most suitable for community sports provision. Furthermore, the cut in funding of leisure services meant a number of community facilities were closed and charges for leisure facilities increased. This had a major impact on leisure policy in the period 1992-1999. This is addressed in the next section.

In addition to the use of leisure for economic regeneration, the second major change in the period 1985 to 1991 was the imposition of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT). The impact of CCT began to affect the Department from 1989 in grounds maintenance. CCT was designed to realise significant financial savings for the Council and to improve the quality of the services it provided by introducing the disciplines of the market into the public sector. CCT ensured that the local authority department became the client of a range of contractors who managed services.

In three reports, under the title *Fresh Tracks*, produced at the end of the 1980s, the Recreation Department stated that CCT led to a cultural change within the Department as Council policy thereafter had to be translated through the language of service effectiveness and competitive efficiency. Through *Fresh Tracks* the Department outlined its approach in opposition to losing contracts to the private sector by committing the Department to achieve the efficiency of operation necessary to win contracts with its own Direct Services Organisation (DSO).
One of the Department's first responses was a rationalisation in its staff:

The first round of CCT in recreation concerned grounds maintenance and that led to a slimming down of the workforce and the abolition of park keepers. They were basically people on the ground, basically looking after our open spaces. It seems that the whole thing was budget led (Interviewee 4, Regeneration and Funding Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999).

The loss of jobs in grounds maintenance was followed by further losses in the leisure department as CCT began to influence other facilities. In the year 1990 / 1991 alone employment in the Department was reduced by 18%. This was largely through voluntary severance and voluntary early retirement schemes.

According to several officers, the job losses, as shown in Figure 6.8, had a damaging effect on the Department as it led to the loss of many experienced employees. The job losses fuelled resistance to CCT, which in turn provoked a resistance to the private sector's involvement in leisure policy. The language of Fresh Tracks expressed the Council's defensive attitude towards service provision:
The leisure sector overall is in a considerable state of growth in this second half of the century so it would be a contradiction if any established supplier were not to benefit from this; folly if it lost any of its market share. We have every reason to want to stay in the game. (Sheffield Recreation Department 1988: 9).

*Fresh Tracks* was also used to justify the Council's role in leisure provision:

The private sector, for all its strength, still cannot proceed without considering local government as competition... The voluntary sector for all its justified independence of spirit, would make little progress without the help of grants... For local government there are key strategic positions which should always be exploited for the best (Sheffield Recreation Department 1988: 9).

*Fresh Tracks* provided a new vision and direction for the Department, which had suffered as the

...sense of core mission has not been cascaded far below the top and middle management echelons yet, so there is a degree of polarisation between sections still and some complain of incoherence (Sheffield Recreation Department 1988: 10).

*Fresh Tracks* questioned the position of community recreation and sports development. The document asked whether such activities “should be economically viable” and "do they justify subsidies?" (Sheffield Recreation Department 1988: 18). *Fresh Tracks* also suggested that within the new economic confines many of the Council's workforce “appear not to understand what these services are for and some... appear resentful of such activities claiming resources”. (Sheffield Recreation Department 1988: 18). Furthermore, managers were being

...torn between being asked to "deliver", which requires a "leadership" style, and being asked to engage in democracy and partnership which requires a more non-directive style (Sheffield Recreation Department 1988: 9).

To overcome these problems the Department appointed its first Business Development Manager, responsible for the expansion of business opportunities and reviewing the Department's approach to its business. The review of business led to a restructuring of the Recreation Department into four sections: Events and Festival, Environmental
Recreation, Community Recreation and Sports Development. The Department was also split into two functions, one delivering services in Sheffield's parks and sports centres, and a client division setting business objectives and monitoring performance. The delivery of local leisure services largely remained with the Council's own Direct Services Organisations, who made successful bids in open competition for both parks maintenance and sports centre management contracts. The Recreation Department's hostile attitude towards competition for services traditionally provided by the Council was evident in the discourse of Fresh Tracks, which stated that...

> Competition for leisure... this is essentially a battle for the hearts and minds of customers. Competition from leisure / grounds maintenance operators... this is essentially a 'business to business' battle. Competition from ideologues wishing to reduce and marginalise local government's recreational role in equalising opportunities and providing for the disadvantaged... this is a battle for position and principle (Sheffield Recreation Department 1988: 3).

Within the Leisure Department the twin pressures of the...

> ...World Student Games and the competitive challenges [described in Fresh Tracks] mean that our mission has to be translated through the language of service effectiveness and competitive efficiency (Sheffield Recreation Department 1988: 3).

A number of officers suggested that the result of working within the CCT framework was that a number of the "social issues moved down the agenda and financial issues moved up" (Interviewee 13, Assistant Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999). The problem of maintaining social objectives was highlighted in Volume II of Fresh Tracks where the Recreation Department acknowledged the problems of "serving its traditional publics and the disadvantaged, whilst at the same time achieving economic viability in a sector which is becoming increasingly commercial" (Sheffield Recreation Department 1989: 13). CCT reduced the Council's ability to implement a social welfare approach on two counts. Firstly CCT led to reduced quality of facility provision:

> If you want to play on a decent cricket pitch in our parks or play tennis in the park you ain’t got a prayer of finding decent facilities. That’s not just an issue to do with the fact that we’ve neglected for sports reasons, it was
because the parks budget, which looked after the outdoor environment became the victim of CCT and that diminished what we had been doing on that front (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

The second effect of CCT was that the traditional goals of the Department of equity and combating disadvantage became secondary to concerns of economy and efficiency:

A lot of the change was about a new managerialist agenda, about being more efficient, not necessarily effective, but certainly because it is about management mechanisms most of the time, so that is about providing efficient services and it is about providing cost efficient services (Interviewee 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

As one council officer admitted CCT had its faults, namely it was concerned with maximum quantity and minimum price rather than the quality and effectiveness of service delivery:

When you asked questions like 'are we running it effectively and efficiently'? well CCT was supposed to bring that discipline to us. It didn’t improve performance, I don’t think, because we didn’t set output targets. It was input targets we were setting, in terms of the cost of doing something (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

In summary, throughout the period, there was a realisation that new ways were needed to improve the economic and social problems of the city. In reaction to deindustrialisation, it advocated a shift in priority from manufacturing to the service sector and the desire for specific features or 'flagship' investments such as the World Student Games facilities. The Council's new goals were communicated through a series of strategies and documents, which also raised the profile of commercial sector in policy making. A public-private organising committee was formed for the World Student Games and this group had associations with other partnership bodies such as SERC. However, only the Arena attracted any significant funding and the Games were principally funded by the public sector.
### Table 6.4: Leisure Policy Change in Sheffield 1986 - 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1986 to 1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Broad National / Global Factors (Macro),</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The report Leisure Challenge: A Prospect for the Lower Don Valley recommended the leisure provision could contribute to urban regeneration. (1984)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further citywide strategic documents advocate the role of leisure and the private sector in City reimagining and regeneration.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large scale development projects for the World Student Games and renovation of the Lyceum Theatre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little private finance received for the Games facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of facilities escalated to £180 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council assumed the financial responsibility for the Games</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government ideology espousing efficiency and competition in public services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Games are criticised by a number of politicians and interest groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural policies remained oriented towards developing local talent and breaking down disadvantage by targeting certain groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The benefits of regeneration through 'flagship' projects would 'trickle down' to all sectors of society given as a justification for the Games expenditure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local / Organisational Factors (Meso),</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A public-private partnership committee established for the World Student Games is made up of members from other coalitions (e.g. SERC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield Leisure and Recreation Trust (1988), a private trust set up to manage the Games</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLRT’s functions split between Sheffield for Health Limited and Universiade GB Ltd</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universiade GB Ltd ceased trading with £3 million debt (1989)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring of Leisure Department following CCT, resulting in large-scale job losses. 18% in 1990/1991 alone.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major leisure facilities handed to Sheffield for Health Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competition for the operation of Sheffield’s older facilities was largely won by the Council’s in-house DSO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CCT encouraged competition and business practices to the Leisure Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure Department is divided between the maintenance of social welfare provision whilst acknowledging that competition and being more efficient were necessary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership with business is seen as a means to achieving economic regeneration.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership forums formed for the World Student Games</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where competition resulted in job losses there was resistance and 'business to business battle' with the private sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual factors and inter-subject relations (Micro).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A small number of key politicians and officers persuade the Council to bid for and host the World Student Games.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The organising committee’s convention agreed to a convention no to voice dissatisfaction with the coalition. This was later broken due to the escalating cost of the Games.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical explanation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An emergence of a liberal new right ideology.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Compulsory Competitive Tendering led to the restructuring of the Recreation Department and a number of job losses. This led to a paradoxical situation where the Council was advocating partnership and an increased role for the private sector, yet where this would lead to job losses, the Department was engaged in a 'business to business battle' to protect service provision and jobs. CCT also changed the orientation of the department from a concentration on social goals to a pursuit of economy and efficiency. Control of a number of the city's facilities was given to external leisure trusts, the largest being the Sheffield for Health Trust, a private company set up to manage the new facilities built for the World Student Games. In the 1990s these factors could be said to have altered the role of the Council from provider to enabler. Despite the shifts from the manufacturing sector to the services sector and from public provision to competition, the Recreation Department maintained the objective of local sports and cultural development, particularly for young people and the unemployed. This contrasts with cultural developments in the 1990s, which were more consumer-oriented. The main changes are highlighted in Table 6.4.

6.5 The Enabling Role: 1992 to 1999

During the early 1990s the council continued to suffer severe economic restriction. In 1991/1992 it was forced to cut its budget by £30 million (Sheffield City Council, 1992). Despite this, the Council made efforts to maintain service levels and cuts amounting to only £14.03 million were made to service committee budgets. The Council covered the additional losses by making efficiency savings of £7.55 million. It also saved £18 million through 'one off financial measures'. The largest proportion of the savings was made from employee costs (Sheffield City Council, 1992). To avoid compulsory redundancies the Council introduced a policy to provide schemes for voluntary severance and early retirement. These schemes were part-funded through a system under which most employees took three days unpaid leave. This achieved a saving of £1.3m. In 1992/1993 a further £40 million was cut back and in 1993/1994 another £38 million was removed from the budget. Staff, who agreed to reduce working hours to avoid redundancies, offset almost one third of these reductions (Sheffield City Council 1994). As the Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show the Council's policies of maintaining service levels was successful:
As can be seen the amount of expenditure on leisure continued to grow in cash terms until 1994/1995. These figures were converted to 1997/1998 prices to take inflation into account. The amount of expenditure on leisure increased in real terms during mid 1990s but fell during 1994/1995 and leveled at the end of the decade.

When expressed as a percentage of council spending, the level of expenditure allocated to leisure remained fairly constant throughout the 1990s:
During the early 1990s the Department was divided between the parks, museums and arts, sports development and events sections. The Parks Section maintained responsibility for the management of over 500 sites, comprised of 1,830 hectares of parks and open spaces and 1,400 hectares of woodland. However, it suffered the same cuts in expenditure as other recreation services. In addition, the Parks Service had been affected earlier and more intensely by CCT than other recreation services. Greater concern with the new World Student Games facilities and cultural developments meant that the parks section, once the core service of the Department, rapidly became less important and influential. These factors also made it...

...increasingly difficult to maintain these precious public open spaces as they would wish” (Sheffield City Council 1993: 1).

The result was a lack of investment and maintenance of the open spaces:

The parks are a good example of how things have gone. Their physical condition has significantly declined since the late 1960s to early 1970s. They were once the pride of the Department. The introduction of CCT and the general reduction in local authority budgets, and lack of statutory nature, has resulted in almost infrastructure collapse. (Sheffield City Council 1994)
In response the Council and the Sheffield City Wildlife Trust studied eight parks and produced the *Sheffield Parks Regeneration Strategy* in 1992. This outlined a vision for Sheffield's parks:

A collection of fine and diverse park landscapes supporting a variety of activities and interests, ecologically balanced to support a wide range of wildlife habitats, well regarded and used by local communities and, collectively, adding up to a major enhancement of the urban environment with tangible benefits to the social and economic life of the City” (Council and the Sheffield City Wildlife Trust 1993: 2).

The Strategy recommended that a partnership be created between the City Council, Sheffield City Wildlife Trust and the Universities of Sheffield to plan the improvement and future management of the city’s parks.

The Council's policy on urban parks was linked to community development:

Public parks have the potential to improve the quality of life for our communities through offering a range of recreational, leisure, social and wildlife experiences. People of all ages, abilities and from all walks of life enjoy the parks. Our research has shown that the parks achieve more person visits than any other leisure facility. (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

However, this respondent also suggested that the parks had a wider role, as the...

...provision of a sustainable, viable park can have a knock on benefit to wider economic regeneration through encouraging external business investment and tourism. Healthy urban parks are central to a sustainable society and the achievement of agenda 21. (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

The report also questioned the role of the leisure professional. Instead it was in favor of the public being more “involved in the setting standards, introducing change and monitoring their use of, and satisfaction with, the service” (Sheffield City Council and Sheffield Wildlife Trust 1993: 8). The *Parks Regeneration Strategy* is therefore indicative of two policy changes in Sheffield during the mid 1990s. Firstly, Sheffield has scrutinised its internal structures and policies, the result were an intense focus on improving the effectiveness of the service and a new strategic approach, communicated
through a series of documents. The second was a greater concern with consulting with and involving the public in leisure policy.

The changes that took place in the parks section, were mirrored by those in children's play. During the 1980s the City Council operating nearly 200 formal playgrounds in the city. These were managed by Leisure Services and the Housing, and Planning, Departments of the City Council. In the 1990s, a number of community groups recommended the establishing of a play policy to develop playwork in the city. To facilitate this, an open conference was held in March 1995 and a series of workshops were also held during the year. A Play Policy Implementation Group was set up and over 200 people contributed to a strategy document *A Play Policy for Sheffield*.

The Play Policy, like the Parks Strategy, questioned the role of the leisure professional. It argued that too often officers made decisions without adequately consulting with and involving children. Fundamental to the *Play Policy* was that children should have their opinions taken into account, the “emphasis will always be on the child’s choice and control over their own experience” (Sheffield Play Policy Working Group 1996: 7). The *Play Policy* also advocated a partnership approach which would help share resources, support better play provision for children and lead to “increased financial resources, financial effectiveness and improved physical and practical resources” (Sheffield Play Policy Working Group 1996: 9). The partnership approach, according to the *Play Policy* would be strengthened by the development of a *Play Council* to implement the strategy's recommendations. As Interviewee 5 (Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group, 22 February 2000) suggested, a *Play Council* would be more successful than a play section within the Council, as the *Sheffield Play Council* would be in a better position to build partnerships throughout play. Joint funding initiatives could be prepared earlier and information could be shared faster. The *Play Council* would also stimulate community involvement “so that the community can participate on an equal footing with other partners” (Sheffield Play Policy Working Group 1996: 22). The policies and organisation of the *Sheffield Play Council* will be discussed in the next chapter.
In 1992/1993 the Arts and Museums Departments were integrated and the Council, partnered by Sheffield Hallam University and the Yorkshire and Humberside Arts Board, produced a Cultural Strategy *Made in Sheffield*. The aim of the strategy was to build upon the success of the 1991 World Student Games festival and to develop cultural policy in the city. It also attempted to provide...

...a more strategic role and, at the same time, the need to work more closely in a variety of partnerships at a local, regional and national level (Sheffield City Council, University *et al.* 1992: 47).

In 1992, the City Council submitted a bid for £188000 to the Foundation for Sports and the Arts to fund a four-year local community programme. Although the bid was unsuccessful it suggests that the Council, at least in the early 1990s, remained committed to cultural development. However, during the 1990s the Council's rationale for supporting cultural policy shifted from the goals of 'arts and culture for all', and 'developing local culture', to a concentration on consumer oriented developments.

Following the Red Tape studios, the Council designated a declining industrial area in the city centre a Cultural Industries Quarter (CIQ). The funding for the Cultural Industries Quarter came from a number of sources, including the Council, the Arts Council, Urban Programme and from private and voluntary organisations, from the British Film Institute and Channel Four Television. In total over £2.5m was spent on the CIQ, which included the Leadmill Arts Centre, Red Tape Recording Studios, Yorkshire Arts Space Studios, and Sheffield Independent Film Group, as well as a number of independent film and video groups. The Council used revenue from a number of the small-managed workspace facilities to cross subsidise the Red Tape studios. The following table indicates the range of facilities and organisations involved in the Cultural Industries Quarter:
### Table 6.5: Developments Within The Cultural Industries Quarter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Type of Facility</th>
<th>Main Developer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audio Visual Enterprise Centre</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Managed Workspace providing 40,000 sq ft to 15 businesses</td>
<td>Sheffield City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Tape Studios</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Communal access studio and sound training centre</td>
<td>Sheffield City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Workstation</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Managed Workspace providing 70,000 sq ft to 30 businesses and exhibition and conference facilities</td>
<td>Paternoster Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Showroom Independent Cinema (Phase 1)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2 cinema screens</td>
<td>Sheffield Media Centre Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workstation Children's Centre</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>30 place nursery and crèche to support CIQ organisations</td>
<td>Paternoster Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Showroom Bar and Café (phase 2)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>350 capacity public café and bar</td>
<td>Showroom Catering Co. Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise Workshops</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6,000 sq ft workshop accommodation for small cultural and media enterprises.</td>
<td>Various organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Showroom (phase 3)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2 further cinema screens and conference facilities</td>
<td>Sheffield Media Centre Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Republic</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>£1.4m Night Club, Café and Bar</td>
<td>University Coalition Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science Park</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Centre for Popular Music</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>£10m Visitor attraction based on popular music</td>
<td>Music Heritage Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotia Works</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Exhibition Space, offices, bar-café</td>
<td>Scotia Projects Limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from [http://www.syspace.co.uk/CIQ/history.htm](http://www.syspace.co.uk/CIQ/history.htm)

In addition to the support for these developments, the Council implemented a 'Dirty Stop Outs Campaign' to support to local businesses such as restaurants, nightclubs and conference facilities. In 1996 the council supported plans to develop a Centre for Popular Music and in 1996 the Arts Council granted a £11 million lottery award for a National Centre for Popular Music and in 1997 a £12 million Live Arts Centre was opened. The Centre of Popular Music is a good example of consumer-oriented development built upon partnership funding. Funding for the project came from the European Regional Development Fund (£2 million), English Partnerships (£1 million) and local sponsorship and fundraising (£1 million). Sponsorship also came from a number of commercial companies who supplied the majority of exhibits. The Centre was opened in spring 1999.
Dabinett (1993) argues that this change from production-focused to consumer-oriented strategy based on flagship developments and income generation, had only a marginal benefit to employment in the city. Furthermore, many of the cultural facilities, such as the Technology Park, the Cultural Industries Quarter and the Science Park, had problems attracting visitors. This problem continued with the Centre for popular music whose manager suggested that...

...the main problem is we haven’t had the numbers through the gate that were projected, nothing like the numbers. Hopefully when some more visitor attractions are built around us we will achieve a critical mass, that is people will be attracted to the site rather than just the Centre (representative from the Centre for Popular music, presentation to student visiting group, 12 April 2000).

Following the World Student Games, Sheffield was left with a number of high quality leisure facilities. These were used for a variety of sports events, community use and non-sport activities such as music concerts. Despite, the benefit of these first class facilities, the funding of the World Student Games represented a massive investment at a time when the Council’s expenditure on services was cut by around £10 million a year. The result of the high burden placed on the Sheffield population resulted in the Recreation Department cutting its services by one fifth (Seyd 1993). As Seyd notes the...

...availability of recreation and leisure facilities declined and charges for the use of these facilities was increased. Libraries were closed, their book purchasing budgets were reduced and their opening hours were cut (Seyd 1993: 183).

Immediately following the World Student Games the Hillsborough, Glossop Road, Sheaf Valley and Park swimming pools were closed during. Figure 6.12 shows how the number of swimming pool reduced between 1980 and 1991:
According to a number of interviewees, the closing of local facilities had a number of negative effects on the City. As one officer noted:

The down side, some of the smaller pools have been taken away. For example in an area like Woodthorpe/Manor there was a small community pool, which was a wonderful resource. It was very well used, people met there, we ran schemes from that facility, and now that has gone. So where do these people travel now? How do they afford to? (Interviewee 5, Planning and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

By the mid 1990s the problems associated with the Council’s leisure policy contributed to the political difficulties faced by the ruling Labour Party. The combination of public expenditure for the Games, the closing of community facilities and high cost of the new facilities led to increasing criticism. The political debate was intensified, as a number of the community facilities that were closed, were located in the Liberal Democrat run wards. According to Interviewee 4 (Regeneration and Funding Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999) these problems...

...contributed to the decreased support for the Labour Party in Sheffield, the World Student Games expenditure is still being talked about and people don't like what has happened. Now they have shown their views in the local elections.

Others interviewees believed that the reduced support for the Labour Party was a result of Sheffield's economic and social problems, not necessarily associated with leisure. Either
way, the decline in Labour's vote was dramatic and in 1999 they lost control of the city (see chapter 5).

The problems associated with the closure of community facilities were increased as people felt the new facilities were more expensive than the community centres that were closed and "the new facilities are perceived to be outside people's price range" (Interviewee 5, Planning and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

The problems associated with the high charging for leisure activities was acknowledged by a senior officer in the Department:

> Our facilities tend to be in the upper quartile of charges, which goes against what we are trying to do... socially. The costs have driven up the prices. Actually, I think it has alienated some of the elements of the market we wish to deal with. (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

The Recreation Department attempted to rectify this situation by maintaining schemes, such as the leisure card, to target certain sections of the population. However, officers accepted that as a concept, the Sheffield leisure card was not successful:

> I inherited a situation where the recreation officers told me that the leisure card price (the discount price) was actually the market price. I said, ‘are you telling me, therefore, that the price that you charge that is a non leisure card price is by definition a non market price? Therefore, the normal price was a disincentive for anybody to pay for it... it was crude (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

During this period, the Council began to work more closely with the business sector and the barriers that had emerged between the two sectors declined. One reason for this was the Council realised that Sheffield needed to attract...

> ... people with private sector experience and commercial experience to come and do the job, and in real terms the revenue cost to certain of the facilities has fallen (Interviewee 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

CCT forced the Department to reorganise and operate on a quasi-commercial basis by establishing internal trading systems with a client monitoring section. For some officers...
Chapter 6 Leisure Policy Change: Sheffield 1974 to 1999

this made the Department "stronger and more open to the challenges" (Interviewee 11, Senior Sports Development Officer, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999). Following the World Student Games, the Sheffield for Health Trust retained the responsibility for the operation of Sheffield's major sporting facilities. The Trust changed the role of the Council:

Increasingly now, on the back of that Trust vehicle, the Council had moved to a position whereby as a facility provider, its stepping back (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

In 1995, Sheffield for Health Trust was replaced by a more commercial-like, private company, Sheffield International Venues Limited. The change according to Interviewee 2 (Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999) was because the private facility operators felt constrained by the Council:

There was a bit of a push by the manager of Ponds Forge and Head of DSO [Direct Services Organisation] who didn't like working within the constraints of the local authority. The head of DSO had been working within the constraints of a local authority political structure. He was a powerful advocate of looking whether there was a way of resolving that (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

The remaining facilities operated by the Council continued to suffer a steady rate of decline through lack investment. As a consequence, on September 25th 1997 the Leisure and Tourism Services Programme Committee passed a proposal to transfer a further eight leisure facilities to Sheffield International Venues. The Committee gave a number of reasons for handing over these facilities. First, if the Council retained the operational management of these facilities then it would be subject to another round of CCT, at a considerable economic cost. Second, the transfer would enable an amalgamation of the property management functions and the operational functions, which would lead to better operational efficiency. Thirdly, the committee report suggested that in terms of budgetary control the "optimum position would be achieved within one organisation" (Leisure Services Committee Report 1998: 5). Fourthly, the transfer would...

...enable outside funding to be obtained more readily and which, through improved investment opportunity, would ensure a greater security to continue the future provision of services for the citizens of Sheffield (Leisure Services Committee Report 1998: 11).
Finally, the transfer would...

...enable the continued co-ordination citywide of the provision and keep the facilities in the 'public' domain with a degree of accountability (Sheffield City Council 1998: 11).

Although these last two points suggest a need to provide effective services, according to Interviewee 5 (Planning and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999) little concern was given for delivering services that would meet the Council's social goals. Therefore, initially it was resisted by a large number of officers. Resistance also came from a number of officers who saw the externalisation of leisure services to trusts as a loss of personal influence:

At that time, with a fairly powerful lobby of staff who didn't like that motion of transfer, I had a battle with the then Director of Recreation who was second officer under me, who didn't like what she saw as a diminution of her responsibility. However, we eventually did transfer the facilities to Sheffield Health (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

The Council's fear of losing influence was also evident in the management agreement that it formed with Sheffield International Venues. The Council used this agreement to ensure that it retained its strategic role on facility and other development issues, particularly those, which had potential financial implications for the City Council. The Council also ensured that it retained responsibility for securing and co-ordinating citywide sporting events through its Major Events Unit. Through the contract, the City Council also retained responsibility for the co-ordination and promotion of all sport and development issues including work with the sports governing bodies. Fundamental to the agreement was not the Council should...

...retain its strategic role and maintains ownership of the responsibility for determining leisure and recreation policies (Leisure Services Committee Report 1998).

Thus, the shift from virtual sole provider of leisure services to the enabler resulted in the council redefining and protecting certain 'core' or 'sovereign' functions. Furthermore, the City Council reserved the right to terminate agreements and remove grant aid if it felt that its partners were not acting in the best interests of the city. In essence the grant allocation
"bought the Department its influence" (Interviewee 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999)

Despite being written into the management agreement, many leisure officers felt that the social objectives of its leisure policy, which had been traditionally core to the Department's work, were not shared by SIV. The following comments from officers working in Sports Development, Community Recreation and Events, respectively reflect the uneasy working relationship which developed between the Sport and Community Recreation Department and Sheffield International Venues over this issue:

We have a client intervention budget, where we can spend the money at this facility to be spent either here (Ponds Forge) or at Don Valley, for disadvantaged kids. When we ask them for some scheduling for some space to do that, they make it difficult for us to have that access because they know that they are going to get that money anyway. And that's what I am trying to say to you about getting out of that cycle of profit. (Interviewee 11, Senior Sports Development Officer, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

There are some activities that we have to keep challenging - like Ponds Forge. I began to think it was a church, because every Sunday it is used for church activity. Now it is supposed to have been built as a sports centre but because its attracting money in (this church is paying all the money) - all the sports have gone out of the window. So what seemed to be a great place with all other areas of vast improvement, is not always. You can't get in the place. (Interviewee 5, Planning and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

They haven't got too much of a remit in terms of a city profile, so they might take something that has more direct financial benefits to Sheffield International Venues whereas we might be interested in something that has got a wider benefit from a city point of view. So there is conflict there. The need for correct service agreements, policy documents to guide that. I think we need to pay more attention to them than we are doing at the moment (Interviewee 13, Assistant Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

Interviewee 18 (Assistant Manager Ponds Forge, 12 January 1998) accepted that conflict arose between the commercial aspect of providing the service and the Council's goals of using sport for social inclusion. However, she argued
Whilst there is conflict, we are working to overcome the problems. We are in a partnership with the Council to deliver services and to be successful at it we need to trust each other more and improve the communication between the two organisations (Interviewee 18 Assistant Manager Ponds Forge, 12 January 1998).

The Operations Director of Sheffield International Venues (presentation to postgraduate group Loughborough University, 12 April, 2000) stated that social objectives such as community recreation were incompatible with their business goals:

> If we put social objectives first then that would equal a deficit in the budget and you lose the things we are aiming at... we wouldn’t survive. It works better if the Council has the social objectives and we have the commercial ones. (Operations Director, Sheffield International Venues, 12 April, 2000).

He also alluded to the different cultures of the two organisations:

> We are more aggressive and cut corners. We are ruthless, like when it comes to employee's contracts, the terms and conditions. You would never do that in the Council. There is too much bureaucracy, everything goes through committees and they can’t make decisions that people don’t like (Operations Director, Sheffield International Venues, 12 April, 2000).

He went on to argue that grant aid status gave Sheffield International Venues the company financial security needed to raise external funding:

> We recently borrowed £1 million for a health suite at Hillsborough Leisure Centre. We knew it was viable, but even so no financial institution would ever decline us a loan, as the Council is always there for security (Operations Director, Sheffield International Venues, 12 April, 2000).

Despite the criticism, throughout the period, the Council continued to hand over the operation of its services to a proliferation of trusts and partnership bodies particularly for the city's parks and some indoor and outdoor facilities:

> From the situation when I first took over in leisure when there was almost a reluctance to give anything to anybody to operate, it’s almost second nature now. The first question is ‘is there a partner who's willing to work with us’? We are now in a position whereby on bowling greens the Council used to cut, maintain, used to collect the money – the bowlers would turn up, pay the money and go away. They might have a club to organise the matches but they didn’t do anything else. We’ve now got to the position where we have got 25 bowling greens, which are, what we would term, self managed (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).
Chapter 6 Leisure Policy Change: Sheffield 1974 to 1999

The management of three community swimming pools was put out to external groups in the 1990s:

There have been a number of smaller trusts... minor ones like King Edward's swimming pool, Chapletown swimming pool, there are several charitable trusts involving parks. These are tailor-made for partnership work. (Interviewee 5, Member of Sheffield University, 22 December 1998)

King Edwards Pool is a good example of a successful leisure trust. The facility was traditional pool in the West Side of Sheffield that was due to be closed during the rationalisation of Leisure Services after the World Student Games. Three local businessmen formed an independent trust to save the pool in 1992 and took over the management of the facility in 1993. Under trust status the pool remained open and available for public use. The facility which had been operating at a deficit, made significant savings mainly through tax relief, but also through savings on staff time and by giving the manager greater flexibility to negotiate with suppliers (Manager King Edwards Pool, 14 March 2000). From 1993 to 1999 the King Edwards Pool Trust made a profit of £100,000 having also reinvested £20,000 on refurbishments. This was purely operating profit as the pool received no grant aid from the Council or external sources.

According to the Pool's Manager, once the facility was handed over to the trust, the Council lost interest in the Pool. This was surprising for the general manager who suggested that when facilities were lost from the public sector after the World Student Games the Council could have remained responsible for the service by retaining a partnership agreement with the trusts or joining the board of trustees. Such an arrangement would have enabled the Council to maintain some form of control and accountability. Instead he suggested:

I think we've done them a favor, once the pool was passed to the trust, they were no longer politically responsible for it's demise (Manager King Edwards Pool, 14 March 2000).

Indeed, even after the success of the facility, the general manager said the Council was reluctant to retain links with the facility:

I have advised a lot of other Council's about running small community pools, but in Sheffield I am still considered someone not to ask. But a
month ago I was asked to join the pools working group to look at facilities in the City. It was the first contact from the Council in 6 years (Manager King Edwards Pool, 14 March 2000).

Whilst a number of officers argued that the transfer of facilities to trusts made them less accountable, the General Manager of King Edwards Pool suggested that trust status gave him greater autonomy and this enabled him to be more responsive to the customer than his predecessor:

I took a pool that didn't really have a programme, I have used time effectively and efficiently. I have also brought in good staff, flexible staff that use their brains and work hard. I think at King Edwards we listen to our customers and that has led to a sense of ownership amongst our users (Manager King Edwards Pool, 14 March 2000).

Indeed, he argued that the city's major facilities were not in touch with their customers with their programming and services:

Two weeks ago they (Ponds Forge) had some World Cup Event, well they have these lesson groups that turn up week in week out and they forgot to tell them this event was on, well they turned up and couldn't get in the place so we picked up twelve people that day (Manager King Edwards Pool, 14 March 2000).

By the end of the 1990s the Recreation Department's shift from provider to enabler had been almost complete. As one senior officer noted

If the current plans go forward, after April 1st we may only be responsible for 2 small swimming baths and one community leisure centre. The dual use facilities have been handed directly onto the schools who host them, to run themselves, and SIV will be operator of most of the big facilities in the city (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

As Table 6.13 indicates, by 1999/2000 68% of the Department's budget was used to commission services from other providers such as the in-house sports centre operator, Sheffield International Venues and smaller providers such as school sports facilities or venues such as Chapletown Pool.
Table 6.13: Cost of the Community Recreation Service 1999/2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client and Partnerships</th>
<th>£392,300</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Recreation and Play</td>
<td>£614,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport and Events</td>
<td>£712,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant-Aided Community Facilities</td>
<td>£179,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities managed by DSO</td>
<td>£1,142,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities Managed by SIV</td>
<td>£2,257,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Net Expenditure</td>
<td>£5,297,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure Per Head of Population</td>
<td>£10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sheffield Leisure Services Plan 1999-2000

The only direct provision was of an outdoor pursuits centre, a play resource centre and two adventure playgrounds and six small community leisure facilities. The Department also acted as an enabler by supporting the work of community groups and individuals with grant aid. It also acted as advisor to a number of groups on attracting external sources of funding such as from the national lottery. As an enabler the Department also provided a community leadership role on sport and recreation issues by working with a number of key agencies through partnerships.

In addition to enabling leisure opportunities for the city's population, the Recreation Department continued to utilise sports events as a tool for economic regeneration. Prior to 1990, apart from the World Snooker Championship and a limited number of other events Sheffield held very few national or international events. As such the city...

...did not compete in the events market in the same way many other British cities did and we lost ground. It became obvious that hosting events had significant and lasting benefits for cities and as such competition for staging events is increasing at both the national and international levels. (Interviewee 13, Assistant Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

The World Student Games provided the City with the momentum, skills and facilities to stage other sporting events:

When Sheffield first started to do it a number of years ago, there wasn't a lot of competition about, there weren't many of these facilities and a lot of the events came to us: came because of these new facilities. (Interviewee 12,
Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

The city appointed an officer with the remit of developing and coordinating major sports events. By the mid 1990s the Council developed a Special Events Unit with a team of five staff. The Special Events Unit adopted a business-oriented approach and worked closely with Destination Sheffield, the organisation charged with 'city marketing' and promotion, the city's Visitor and Conference Bureau and other private sector companies. These organisations came together to give support for bids for events (Sheffield City Council 1995). In particular the Special Events Unit has to work closely with...

...the national governing bodies as often bids can only be made by the national federation of a sport, although some will accept bids from a host city, especially if they are multi-sport events. (Interviewee 13, Assistant Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

The Special Events Unit ensured that every event was evaluated against a set of criteria set by the Council. The basic premise behind hosting national and international events was to raise the profile of Sheffield and to stimulate the local economy through multiplier effects. The events would help...

...change Sheffield's image nationally and to raise its profile on the international stage providing a focus for sport and leisure as part of the diversified economic base which the city has created and a means to attract inward investment by demonstrating that 'made in Sheffield', albeit in another context, is as true as it has ever been, synonymous with quality and achievement... events also have a role in stimulating the local community to collaborate and participate in sport and therefore increase the usage of sports facilities in Sheffield (Interviewee 12, Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

During the 1990s the city has attracted a range of events including the...

...21st European Swimming Championships, Special Olympics 4th National Summer Games, the 6th FINA World Masters Swimming Championships. These were some of the biggest events staged in the UK. The Unit also helped UEFA in the management of Euro '96. (Interviewee 13, Assistant Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).
In total, the city hosted over 300 major events, from regional to world championships, generating an estimated £31 million in income between 1991 and 1995 (Sheffield City Council 1995). A further report *The Economic Impact of Sports Events Staged in Sheffield 1990-1997* produced by Kronos suggests that 495,000 additional visits to Sheffield for sports events have been made since 1990. In addition, 732 full time job years have been created, an equivalent to 105 full time jobs at an average cost per job of just £2,039 (Kronos 1997). The Kronos Report found that swimming, football and athletics were the sports that had the biggest impact on the city’s economy, contributing around 75% of the income. The events had a positive effect on the city as one officer noted:

> I think a lot of people are recognising what we are doing now. And they are realising the benefits that come to the city from having a major sports events programme, using these facilities, getting the City seen on TV, national profile, international profile, getting the city a good name, nationally and internationally through sports and whatever mechanism. Its not easy but I think we are getting there now (Interviewee 13, Assistant Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

In addition to sports events, the city hosted several professional teams. Sheffield had two established professional teams Sheffield Wednesday and Sheffield United. However, following the World Student Games a number of other professional sports teams were established in Sheffield. These clubs took advantage of the new facilities offered by the city after the World Student Games, the Sheffield Eagles (rugby league) were located in the Don Valley Stadium, the Sheffield Sharks (basketball) were based in the Sheffield Arena, as were the Sheffield Steelers (ice hockey). A representative from Sheffield Steelers suggested that Sheffield provided them with an ideal location:

> we have a wider catchment than just Sheffield, we would consider it to be Chesterfield, Rotherham and even further, we gain attendances of up to 8,000 spectators per match and it is getting more popular every year (Interviewee 19, Representative of Sheffield Steelers, 17 December 1998)

Alongside the sports events strategy, the *Sports Sheffield Association* was established in 1992 to host national teams and squads in the city. The aim was to stimulate local community sports development and attract external finance. The *Sports Sheffield Association* was a collaborative organisation between the City Council, the Chamber of
Chapter 6 Leisure Policy Change: Sheffield 1974 to 1999

Commerce, the Sheffield and Hallam Universities, the City Tertiary College, the Central Sheffield University Hospitals and the Northern General Hospital Trust as well as a number of national sport agencies and governing bodies. The main aims of the *Sports Sheffield Association* were...

...to establish a nationally recognised and supported, but locally managed network to accommodate the long term competitive preparation requirements of selected national sports squads who base their operations in Sheffield [and] to utilise the profile and human resources which will accompany national squads based in Sheffield to stimulate and support community based sports programmes – especially for young people*" (Sports Sheffield Association, 1992: 1).

The operation and policies of the *Sports Sheffield Association* are analysed in the next Chapter.

The continued support for sports events was reinforced in 1995 when the Council made a submission for National City of Sport Status. The aims of the *Sheffield City of Sport Plan* were to bid for World, European, Commonwealth and National sports events. The Plan argued that the National City of Sport was consistent with the Council's objectives of both economic and social regeneration of the city. The *City of Sport Plan* was written by the City Council working with a number of other city institutions and demonstrated a genuine commitment to develop partnership in Sheffield:

> The *City of Sport Plan* now demonstrates that Sheffield has the foundations laid, the building blocks in place, and the commitment of organisations within and outside the city, to work in genuine partnership. This plan shows how we intend to work together, to harness the strength and enthusiasm of the city, and to play a leading role for Britain as the first nationally recognised City of Sport (Sheffield City Council 1995: 37).

The bid document also developed the notion of community sports development and empowerment in decision making which would be harnessed through, skills development, facility control and resource support (Sheffield City Council 1995). The Plan indicated that the development of an activity programme which would encompass the foundation, participation and performance areas of sport and would target sport
provision for women, the disabled, ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged communities.

After Sheffield was successfully designated as one of the nations ‘Cities of Sport’, a strategy document was produced to put in place to guide the city's sporting development. This included ways of developing performance sports at local and regional levels but addressed the local implications for the citizens of Sheffield. The document was a reflection of the Council's commitment to partnerships which were necessary as the “current funding arrangements for sport, including the National Lottery, are almost exclusively designed to function through partnership arrangements” (Sheffield City Council 1995): 5). However, a number of officers were skeptical of the National City of Sport status:

Lots of people in Sheffield don't have the confidence in the way that we deliver services at the local level so how can they compete for... attract... to be the National City of Sport and attract all the various governing bodies to Sheffield to develop the national scene when we can't even get the local scene right. (Interviewee 9, Assistant Regeneration and Funding Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 11 November 1999).

Sheffield's policy of attracting elite sport and events continued when it sought to host the British Academy of Sport. The Conservative Government first raised the issue of establishing an Academy of Sport, later to become the United Kingdom Sports Institute (UKSI), in its policy statement Sport: Raising the Game (July 1995). The City Council had agreed to support the bid in principle after the Policy Committee considered a report in November 1996. It was reported that the cost of the bid was to be funded by a combination of sponsorship and 'in kind' support from a variety of interests. The budget for the bid involved an element of professional advice and consultancy, which was competitively awarded. It was indicated at the time that the City Council, along with the other three principal partners, the Sheffield City Trust and the two Universities, could be required to underwrite the cost of the bid. Subsequently a provision of £20,000 was made within the Leisure Services capital programme as a contingency contribution against any liability that might arise. The bid required a combination of 'in kind' support and cash.
£128,000 was raised in sponsorship leaving approximately £146,000 to be split between the four principal partners. The cost to the City Council was therefore £36,500, which was offset against the provision made within the Leisure Services capital programme.

Evidence of the importance of the United Kingdom Sports Institute to Sheffield can be seen by the Chief Executive of the Council who submitted a brief report to the Policy Committee in January 1998 seeking authority for him to serve as a Director of Phoenix Sports Ltd, which was created as the local partnership vehicle for taking the development of the project forward. A representative from Sheffield Hallam University led Phoenix Sports Ltd and was supported by a small team, which included a senior officer seconded from the Leisure Services Section. Phoenix Sports Ltd prepared and submitted applications for funding from the National Lottery Sports Fund and worked with the National Governing Bodies (NGBs) of the 8 sports (Athletics, Swimming, Squash, Netball, Judo, Road Cycling, Table Tennis and Triathlon) which at the time agreed to relocate to Sheffield.

In 1997 Sheffield City Council produced a document, *Going For Gold: The British Academy of Sport*. This reinforced Sheffield's commitment to attracting elite sport. It stated that the city had many of the services, the knowledge and the expertise, along with much of the infrastructure required for the *United Kingdom Sports Institute*. The document outlines the need not only for world-class facilities but also support services through a range of sports, medical, scientific, administrative and teaching accommodation, together with conference facilities. The Sheffield-based Institute was to provide all the facilities, resources and services necessary to achieve gold medal performances. The *United Kingdom Sports Institute* head quarters would concentrate the majority of services and facilities in one area, on a complex built around the existing Don Valley Stadium and linked to other facilities already in the Don Valley area. Positioning the national institute in Sheffield was seen as “part of the natural progression arising from the city's dedication to sporting excellence” (Sheffield City Council 1998: 18).
In December 1997 the Secretary of State for Culture, Media & Sport announced that Sheffield was the preferred bid to host the headquarters of the United Kingdom Sports Institute (UKSI). After the announcement the Leisure Department wrote a progress report to members with two aims; to outline the costs of hosting the headquarters and to outline the potential impacts on the local community and the action being taken to involve the local community in the development. However, in 1999 the Government withdrew its original plans for the United Kingdom Sports Institute in Sheffield and decided upon a system of regional centres rather than one hub site. This followed objectives from some of the 8 governing bodies required to move to Sheffield under the plan, and from other governing bodies in relation to the establishment of 'national' rather than 'regional' training locations. At the time of writing the impact that the United Kingdom Sports Institute will have on Sheffield is unknown but it left the Leisure Section deeply disappointed, as these officers suggest:

The United Kingdom Sports Institute was a mechanism where we were allowed to go and compete on what was a level playing field... we had the opportunity, we were successful. But there seems to have been a number of changes in policies and decisions which have been, in one sense, to the detriment of Sheffield (Interviewee 12, Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

My personal view is that the minute after the decision was made, there were interests in the establishment of sport who had no intention of basing anything outside of London. I just think we fought an uphill battle for the last two years. (Interviewee 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

There were quite a few letters to the Star [local newspaper] about it [UKSI]... it is almost as if Sheffield has tried to get on its feet and it used that and took a chance and gambled quite a lot (Interviewee 9, Assistant Regeneration and Funding Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 11 November 1999).

By the end of the 1990s the Sport and Community Recreation Section faced a number of pressures. As the previous chapter has shown, the Department had to implement the Council’s Best Managed Council initiative, 'Best Value' and 'Investors in People'. It was dealing with a new political leadership with their priorities of 'sound finance' and
working with better communication with the public alongside the government's aim of social inclusion, 'joined up policy' and community leadership by councils. Importantly there was a growing need to tackle inequalities and disadvantage throughout the city. It was within this environment that the officers within the Sport and Community section began to re-address community sports provision. They did this by attempting a new approach to partnership work. Firstly with *Burngreave in Action* a localised partnership forum to developed active recreation in one run down area of the city, and proposed to establish *Active Sheffield*, a city wide strategic partnership group associated with sport, health and community recreation. The main aim of *Active Sheffield* was to provide constructive leisure for the young, and to stimulate an active provision for people of all ages and backgrounds (Interviewee 3, Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999). In addition to these partnerships the City Council attempted to revive a third initiative, *Sports Sheffield*, to develop citywide sports policy, and also attempted to develop a more significant role for the *Sheffield Play Council*. The development, policies and actions of these partnerships are the subject of the next chapter.

In summary, during the 1990s Sheffield continued to suffer from severe economic restriction. The large expenditure on the World Student Games facilities increased the financial pressure. Despite a number of schemes to prevent cuts to service budgets, invariably expenditure on leisure was reduced. This resulted in staff cuts and the closure of a number of community facilities. During the 1990s, the Conservative Government relaxed its ideological position, and a subsequent election of Labour brought about a change from CCT to Best Value, which reduced the emphasis on competition and efficiency and called for the delivery of effective services. A new rhetoric or discourse of partnership, stakeholding and community consultation and involvement replaced the neo-liberal ideology of the 1980s. Within this climate there was a growing acceptance of the private sector as a legitimate provider of leisure services in Sheffield.
### Table 6.6. Leisure Policy Change in Sheffield 1992-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1992 – 1999: The Enabling Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Continued financial restriction forces the closure of some community facilities. The council offsets the large cuts in its budget by encouraging voluntary redundancy and 'one off financial measures'. Leisure expenditure was around 6% of the Council's budget throughout the period. New facilities considered to be too expensive. World Student Games facilities and the Cultural Industries Quarter had little impact on employment generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>A number of community facilities that were closed were in Liberal Democrat run wards, adding to local political friction. Potentially the World Student Games expenditure and the closure of community facilities added to the political demise of the Local Labour Party - Liberal Democrats win the local election (1997).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>A shift in cultural policy from development and equity to consumer oriented provision.Towards the end of the 1990s there was a growing concern with being more effective, not just economic and efficient. Late 1990s a growing concern with community involvement in decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developments</td>
<td>Externalisation of services forced by CCT resulted in job losses and resistance. The number of people employed in Leisure Services fell to 60 full time staff in 1999. World Student Games facilities handed over to Sheffield for Health Trust. Sheffield for Health Trust became a more commercial entity Sheffield International Venues to allow it to operate without the constraints of the Council. Special Events Unit and Destination Sheffield set up to attract sports events, tourists and inward investment. A proliferation of partnership bodies and trusts formed to prevent facility closures within local communities. Council supports externalisation as a policy with a rationale of cost savings, operational efficiencies. City Liaison Group changed to Sheffield First (1998).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>The Department became more strategic, with long term policy planning and expenditure targets. Council only provided services where market intervention was necessary. A new discourse of partnership with the community expressing consultation, participation and empowerment. These are communicated through strategic documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>Professional teams encouraged to locate in the city’s sports facilities. The Council forms partnerships with the Universities, the Hospital Trusts and various other bodies to bid for City of Sport Status and the British Academy of Sport. Sports Sheffield Partnership formed (see Chapter 8). Sheffield Play Council formed (see Chapter 8). Active Sheffield Partnership formed (see Chapter 8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Resistance to externalisation from some officers - attributable to the loss of personal influence that this brought. An increasing need to consult with and involve the community in decision-making and a questioning of the role of the leisure professional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical explanation</td>
<td>Collaboration and partnering in local government may be explained by regime theory and policy network analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During the 1990s the Council adopted a new managerialist approach and produced strategies for all aspects of service delivery. These allowed it to review its role, structure and expenditure priorities. During the 1990s the Council changed from the provider to an enabler of leisure opportunities. As an enabler the Council clearly felt that it had an important role to play in the city's economic prosperity through its continued contribution to the development of the leisure infrastructure. It also continued to operate some services where the circumstances of the market made intervention necessary. Furthermore, it promoted social and economic development with its cultural policies, which attempted to improve the city's image and attract tourists. The Council also felt that it had an important role to play in defining and guiding policy. In some areas of service delivery, such as children's play, there was a greater concern with consulting with and involving the public in leisure policy and in some cases the role of the leisure professional was questioned. Overall, the transition from provider to enabler was difficult and was resisted by many public officials. In many cases the Council redefined and in some cases protected core functions and ensured that it continued to exercise influence in the urban setting through its contract with the leisure providers such as SIV. Conflict was particularly prevalent over the Council's desire to pursue social welfare and the commercial objectives of Sheffield International Venues.

6.6 Conclusion to the Chapter

This Chapter has sought to map out the main changes and events in leisure policy in Sheffield from 1974 to 1999. During the post war period Sheffield failed to invest in its leisure facilities and by the 1980s, the Council's spending limits were tightened the city was left with an aging stock of leisure facilities. However, by the mid 1980s there was a realisation amongst the city's political and business elite that the city required significant regeneration and a new image. Leisure and culture played a significant role in this change. The council invested heavily in the city's leisure infrastructure and the city was successful in altering its image from Steel City to City of Sport. However, Council policy of investing in expensive 'flagship developments' was heavily criticised for failing to satisfy the needs of Sheffield's population.
Towards the end of the 1990s, attempts were made to allocate a greater role to the community and voluntary sectors in delivery of leisure services. This was also linked to a renewed emphasis on citizenship, democracy and empowerment. The Leisure Services Department, adopted a new approach to partnership work with Burngreave in Action a localised partnership forum to developed active recreation in one run down area of the city and Active Sheffield, a city wide strategic partnership group associated with sport, health and community recreation. These partnerships, alongside Sports Sheffield and Sheffield Play Council are analysed in more detail in the following chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN

SHEFFIELD'S LEISURE PARTNERSHIPS

7.1 Introduction to the Chapter

The previous two Chapters have shown that, within Sheffield, partnerships for economic regeneration emerged as a policy response in the mid 1980s, when forums such as the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee, developed and had a sustained influence over the city's policy making. Partnership played a significant role in Sheffield's regeneration and reimagining strategy and played a significant role in the development of the Cultural Industries Quarter as well as the bidding for and hosting of the World Student Games. Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) required the Council to enter into a variety of arrangements with private and voluntary organisations. To overcome the risk of losing the operation of services to the private sector, the City Council formed a private trust to manage its major facilities. Throughout the 1990s, central government slowly relaxed its ideological position bringing a new rhetoric or discourse of partnership, stakeholding and community participation. Further, the apparent failure of market-led solutions, such as the city's leisure trust, to address the issues of inequality, poverty and social inclusion led to a call for a greater role for the community and voluntary sectors. Therefore, in the late 1990s Sheffield's leisure partnerships gradually shifted from their pro-growth economic development orientation towards the goals of redistribution and community empowerment.

The previous two Chapters have, in general, highlighted the importance of macro level factors such as the impact of environmental or contextual changes including economic political / ideological and social change. This Chapter addresses the meso and micro level issues such as institutional, cultural and interpersonal factors and issues of power and influence. These factors had significant implications on Sheffield's leisure partnerships and ultimately determined the success and failure of the partnership approach.
This Chapter evaluates the development and policies of three of Sheffield's leisure partnerships during the 1990s. The first of these is *Sports Sheffield*, a partnership primarily focused on economic development and city-re-imaging, but with some community development orientation. The second and third, *Sheffield Play Council* and *Active Sheffield*, represent two partnerships primarily concerned with involving and empowering the community and voluntary sectors to overcome the city's social problems. Under each partnership several issues are evaluated. These include the context within which the partnership was formed, the partnership composition and structure, the policies of the partnership and issues or problems in developing the partnership approach. At the end of each section a table summarises these issues.


#### 7.2.1 The Context of the Partnership

During the early 1990s Sheffield suffered from severe economic restriction brought about by a sustained period of deindustrialisation. The large expenditure on the World Student Games facilities added to the financial pressure on the Leisure Department. Despite a number of schemes to prevent cuts to service budgets, invariably expenditure on leisure was reduced (see Chapter 6). Within this climate there was a growing acceptance of the partnership approach as the mechanism of choice for leisure policy in Sheffield:

> Again we recognised that if we wanted to move into a different market for us, which is delivering of elite sport, then we need to bring round the table a number of partner organisations. The big players within the city being the Universities, being the Health Service, being Sheffield College, being the City Council, Chamber of Commerce, were all brought together to develop a forum (Officer 12, Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

The development of the facilities for the 1991 World Student Games was a key departure from Sheffield's traditional leisure policy and can be seen as a significant event in the development of partnerships in leisure (see Chapter 6). Following the Games a
partnership body, the *Sports Sheffield Association*, was given the task of providing citywide strategic direction for sports policy and to maintain the role of sport in the economic regeneration of the city. In a briefing paper produced in 1993 the aims of *Sports Sheffield Association* were highlighted:

Sheffield is determined to tackle the industrial decline of the 1970s and 1980s and has a vision of its regeneration needs. The city has leaders from business, commerce, education, and the City Council collaborating on a number of initiatives to regenerate the local economy. Leisure, sport and tourism together constitute one of these initiatives (*Sports Sheffield Association*, 1993: 1).

To achieve the goal of city-wide economic development, the *Sports Sheffield Association* would provide the infrastructure and support for national sports squads to base their operations in Sheffield. In addition to this, the *Sports Sheffield Association* would attempt to stimulate and support community based sports programmes (*Sports Sheffield Association*, 1992: 1). As *Sports Sheffield* developed it became more involved in ambitious plans for economic regeneration and city reimagining. It was instrumental in Sheffield's bid to become the first National City of Sport and subsequently played a significant role in bidding for the British Academy of Sport (later United Kingdom Sports Institute).

### 7.2.2 The Partnership Structure and Composition

In 1992, the Council brought together a number of organisations to specifically focus on bringing elite sport to the city. The list of original members is given below:

**Table 7.1. Members of Sport Sheffield Association 1992**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chair of Leisure Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Officers of Sheffield Recreation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield Hallam University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Volleyball Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds Polytechnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield Diving Development Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (*Sports Sheffield Association*, 1992)
At an individual level, the Leader of the Leisure Committee and Later Deputy Leader of the Labour Group (Councillor 1) dominated Sports Sheffield. This was the same individual that was influential in the bidding process for the World Student Games. He was identified throughout the interviews of both officers and community representatives as the main promoter of sports policy in the city. Through sports policy, he was instrumental in embracing a working relationship with the private sector and it was through this relationship that *Sports Sheffield* was formed (*Sports Sheffield Association*, 1992). A number of officers asserted that this councillor was the central and most influential member of the *Sports Sheffield Association*. His influence was not only due to his position within the Council, but also his drive and enthusiasm for sports:

> You need that visionary... but you still need that doggedness... somebody who's going to be flattered by refusal. 'Councillor I', if you know him, is the proverbial one, who will land on his feet if he fell of a cliff or like a bollard, if you knocked him over he'd spring back up, he's dogged with it. He is also somebody who people had a great deal of love and affection for, you might say. People in the present administration have said that he has been the downfall of the Council in its spending plans. But, people like him. He is a personable individual, he gets away with a lot through that (Officer 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000)

The *Sports Sheffield Association* was comprised of an executive committee with three sub groups dealing with sports science and medical services, finance, and support services. Throughout the life of the *Sports Sheffield Association*, the City Council maintained the position as secretariat. Not only did the Council manage the partnership it also brought the partners together. An ex-senior officer and member of *Sports Sheffield* noted:

> I recognised that we needed to co-ordinate an effective partnership within the city, across the public, the education sector. The Universities were a major player in terms of athletes as well as in terms of having facilities to bring to the mix, so there was a partnership there. There was a partnership that involved the medical services in the city. There were a lot of services in the city and a lot of interest in sports medicine, which had developed as a result of the Student Games. We did not want to lose that expertise. There was also the private sector, the fact that companies could be involved, they could benefit our sports initiatives and sports activities (Officer 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000 and member of the *Sports Sheffield Association*)
According to this officer, the selection of partners was not a natural or even accidental occurrence but a tactical decision, based around organisations and individuals chosen by the Council. As participation within partnerships was selective, this led to the segregation of many groups, particularly the community. One officer argued that, whilst the *Sports Sheffield Association* brought together some organisations, it almost entirely failed to consult with community groups or involve the electorate and citizens in the decision-making process (Officer 6, Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000 and member of the *Sports Sheffield Association*).

Further, community development was seen as a possible supplementary affect of basing national sports squads, which it hoped, would “provide both a stimulus and a resource for community sports activity” (*Sports Sheffield Association*, 1992: 3). The benefits of holding sporting events and playing host to elite athletes would have a 'trickle down' benefit for Sheffield's citizens. Further, it was hoped that sports participation would be encouraged through elite players and coaches making links with the community. However, in practice this was limited to only a small number of sports and the overall benefit was marginal. According to Officer 6 (Ex Head Sports Development, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 January 2000 and member of the *Sports Sheffield Association*) the community aspects of *Sports Sheffield* were secondary to the goals of regeneration in the minds of the partners, but were vital for the project to gain wider support, particularly from within the Council.

### 7.2.3 Partnership Aims and Policies

When the *Sports Sheffield Association* was initiated in 1992 its main goals were to provide the infrastructure and support for sports squads and support community sports based programmes. To fund these the *Sports Sheffield Association* sought financial support from the Foundation for Sports and the Arts. The bid was submitted for £188,000 to fund a four-year programme; the overall cost of the project was estimated to be £230,000 (*Sports Sheffield Association*, 1992). The bid was unsuccessful, but the bidding process helped to develop the relationship between partners. However, the
Chapter 7

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failure to secure external funding forced the *Sports Sheffield Association* to implement new plans to develop small-scale projects based on 5 sports, but concentrating on volleyball and diving. The main aims were...

...to establish a nationally recognised and supported, but locally managed network to accommodate the long term competitive preparation requirements of selected national sports squads who base their operations in Sheffield.

and

...to utilise the profile and human resources which will accompany national squads based in Sheffield to stimulate and support community based sports programmes – especially for young people (*Sports Sheffield Association*, 1992: 1).

The estimated cost of these projects was £51,000, which was shared between *Sports Sheffield Association* members. The resource was mainly an 'in kind' rather than 'in cash' contribution (Officer 12, Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999). A breakdown of costs of the programme is given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sports Club and Coaches and Officials</th>
<th>£10,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outreach Workers</td>
<td>£10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coaching Facilities Hire</td>
<td>£15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition Venue Hire</td>
<td>£3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>£7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coach and Officials Education Programme</td>
<td>£5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: <em>Sports Sheffield Association</em>, 1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1994 a document was circulated to *Association* members to communicate and reinforced the partnership strategy. The two primary goals were reiterated:

To establish a nationally recognised and supported, but locally managed network to accommodate the long term competitive training requirements of selected national sports squads who base their operations in Sheffield

and

To improve opportunities for the development of talented sports persons within the Sheffield community and surrounding region (*Sports Sheffield Association*, 1994: 1)
Chapter 7 Sheffield's Leisure Partnerships

The document also announced that the *Sports Sheffield Association* would broaden its remit by developing four centres of excellence for young athletes. The aim was for "Sheffield to become the centre of excellence for the South Yorkshire and Humberside region" (*Sports Sheffield Association*, 1994). These centres would form a practical part of the regional system for "identification, development and referral of young people with the potential to compete at regional and national levels". The cost of the new project was estimated at £34,460 (*Sports Sheffield Association*, 1994: 5). These costs were covered by the *Sports Sheffield Association* partners, who made contributions, either directly via budget allocation, or more commonly by some form of concessionary arrangement (*Sports Sheffield Association*, 1994). A breakdown of these costs is given below:

**Table 7.3: The Cost of Sports Sheffield 1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production of the Development Plan for Basketball</td>
<td>£5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Coaching Centre – 8x monthly sessions</td>
<td>£7280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Coaching Centre – 8x monthly sessions</td>
<td>£2640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Performance Centre – 35x twice weekly</td>
<td>£7770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sessions facility cost</td>
<td>£5250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coaches cost</td>
<td>£2520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment for the 3 Centres</td>
<td>£2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration of the 3 Centres</td>
<td>£2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*Sports Sheffield Association*, 1994)

In May 1994 the *Sports Sheffield Association* sought to further expand its policies with the development of Sportex 2000. Sportex 2000 was a project in conjunction with Sheffield College to provide access to high quality sports coaching and other essential sports support activities. It was aimed mostly at local youngsters aged 16 to 19 who wanted to combine vocational training and development in elite sport. The sports made available were football and hockey, netball and tennis, basketball and volleyball, in addition to diving and swimming. The sports were chosen because the city had existing facilities and coaches of sufficiently high standard in these activities (*Sports Sheffield Association* 1994).

Despite developing the notion of the four regional centres of excellence and Sportex 2000, by the end of 1994 *Sports Sheffield* had achieved only modest aims. It had arranged entry to further education courses for only 4 divers and 12 volleyball players,
and it played a small role in establishing the Sheffield Universities Institute for Sports Medicine and Exercise Science (*Sports Sheffield Association* 1994). This apparent lack of success led the *Sports Sheffield Association* to develop more ambitious plans.

In 1995 the *Sports Sheffield Association* began to play a more active role in supporting the city’s policy of attracting and hosting major sports events. The *Sports Sheffield Association* was also used to strengthen Sheffield’s bid to be the country’s first National City of Sport. The *Sports Sheffield Association*’s involvement demonstrating to central government that it was committed to the partnership approach. This can be seen in the City Council’s *Sheffield City of Sport Plan*, which advocated bidding for World, European, Commonwealth and National sports events. The *Plan* endorsed the partnership idea and made it clear that the *Sports Sheffield Association* was a key vehicle to initially submit the application and later to implement the plan (Sheffield City Council 1995).

The partnership approach also enabled Sheffield to demonstrate that it had a mechanism for community sports development:

> The view from the city was... we felt we were successful in attracting the words ‘National City of Sport’. It was not just being built for the facilities. That accolade was about facilities, yes, it was about events, yes, but it was equally being careful about what we were doing for sports development on the ground, in terms of input. I think that equally as important is how we develop that infrastructure to community level (Officer 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

The (British) Sports Council recognised the city’s commitment to sport by designating Sheffield Britain’s first ‘City of Sport’ in 1995. The City Council produced a document *City of Sport: Towards a Citywide Strategy*. This outlined five sets of objectives: for Sports Events, Performance Sport, Community Sport, Sports Education, Sports Business and Administration. The structural links between these objectives is shown in Figure 7.1:
Figure 7.1: The Structure and Objectives of the National City of Sport

(Source: Sheffield City Council 1995)

The Strategy also identified four areas of activity that should be developed across these five themes. These were:

1. The development of a strategic city-wide sports policy
2. Consideration of facilities and infrastructure in an integral manner
3. Issues of communication, publicity and the marketing of Sheffield as a National City of Sport
4. The development of a Sheffield Sports Institute
   (Sheffield City Council 1995)

These four objectives were seen to be outside the capabilities of Sports Sheffield in the informal organisational form it had taken since 1992. The Sports Sheffield Association therefore decided that it needed to reconstitute itself and gain a greater commitment from members though a memorandum of cooperation. This was...
...a symbol of willingness of city-based organisations to collaborate in the promotion of local, regional, and national level sports development. It signifies the existence of a collaborative network active in the City and augurs well for the future of Sheffield as Britain's flagship 'International City of Sport' (Sports Sheffield Strategy Group, 1996).

A list of signatories is given in Table 7.4:

Table 7.4: Members of the Sports Sheffield Association 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chair of Leisure Committee</th>
<th>Director of Leisure Services City Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Chair Sheffield City Trust</td>
<td>Sheffield for Health Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Chair Sheffield City Trust</td>
<td>Sheffield and Rotherham Chamber of Commerce and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>Sheffield College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield College</td>
<td>Sheffield Hallam University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The University of Sheffield</td>
<td>Central Sheffield University Hospital Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern General Hospital</td>
<td>(Sports Sheffield Strategy Group, 1996)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To achieve the policies advocated in the City of Sport: Towards a Citywide Strategy, the Sports Sheffield Association needed to employ a Strategy Co-ordinator, an Implementation Manager and an Administrator. The cost of this was £24,500 and was funded by the partners for six months. These costs were covered by seconding personnel from the existing members and drawing contributions from the partners (Sports Sheffield Strategy Group, 1996). According to a number of officers, despite bringing little inward investment, the National City of Sport status had a benefit on the city's image and was a significant achievement for the partners (Officer 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

During the mid 1980s the Conservative Government outlined that it would put investment into establishing a British Academy of Sport, later to become the United Kingdom Sports Institute. At a Leisure Policy Committee in November 1996 Sheffield Council decided to bid for the British Academy of Sport. The diagram below shows how the Council's plans for positioning Sports Sheffield Association within the proposed structure of the British Academy of Sport in Sheffield.
After consideration the Council decided that the project required dedicated individuals working full time on the project, within a purpose built association. This led to the development of Phoenix Sports. This body subsumed many of the members of the Sports Sheffield Association, resulting in the Sports Sheffield Association becoming defunct in 1997. As one member of the Sports Sheffield Association stated:

I think Sports Sheffield has probably pedaled time in the last two years, not least because the individuals involved in that initial section got transmitted into going off to do UKSI work... So leading personalities, who were driving that agenda got diverted. (Officer 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).
During 1998 Sheffield City Council outlined plans to re-establish the *Sports Sheffield Association* as one of three related partnership groups (along with the *Play Council* and *Active Sheffield*), a development to which we will return later in the Chapter.

### 7.2.4 Partnership Issues and Problems

The major partnership issue for *Sports Sheffield Association* was related to its two primary goals, to attract elite sport and to develop community sport. In particular, the University felt the Council's role was on the community side:

> Effectively 'Representative 1' (Sheffield Hallam and UKSI, 9 February 1999) was always keen the Council's role was about community, the sports development side, and that was a leg we needed to look after. (Officer 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000)

Representative 1 (Sheffield Hallam and UKSI, 9 February 1999) developed this argument further by arguing that there were five parts to the *Sports Sheffield Association*: education, community, performance, industry and research (Representative 1: Sheffield Hallam and UKSI, 9 February 1999). However, in general, there was a mutual belief amongst other respondents that the *Sports Sheffield Association* was primarily committed to performance sport.

The values and goals of *Sports Sheffield Association* were expressed in several strategy documents, all advocating a partnership approach. However, within the Leisure Department the partnership involved only senior officers and the strategy was not clearly communicated to all officers:

> We did not have any involvement; it was just the senior management and Councillor I (Ex leader of the leisure committee and Ex deputy leader of the Labour Group). They would go off and have meetings with the other organisations. We weren't involved and didn't really know what was going on (Officer 11, Senior Sports Development Officer, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

Whilst there was almost universal support for the *Sports Sheffield Association* 's overall objectives, the role and aspirations of individual partner organisation were not clearly
identified or communicated. This led to a situation where none of the organisations were willing to commit resources to the project:

The difficulty in that is, when people came into that partnership they were coming with their own aims and objectives. In doing that, they all didn't mind taking something out but did not necessarily invest in it financially. So one of the difficulties was that there was never any financial support around *Sports Sheffield*, other than the partners providing officer support. So when it needed investment to move that programme forward or provide some stimulus for activity, it became very difficult and it often wasn’t there. (Officer 12, Head of Events Section, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999)

Not only was a lack of financial support a problem for the *Sports Sheffield Association*, but it also suffered because members were not able to gain a commitment to change from the organisations they represented. For these organisations to fully embrace the partnership approach it would require a cultural change within their operation, as one member of the *Sports Sheffield Association* stated:

When it came to going back to their host organisations to try and preach the gospel and try to bring about those minor adjustments and changes - it would prove very difficult. There is tremendous organisation inertia, there is tremendous resistance to organisations doing things differently from the way they perceive to be right and proper and necessary. It just reinforced to me the fact that whilst the public sector got it wrong so do, very often, many other organisations in other sectors get it very wrong, find it difficult to make change and think in different ways. (Officer 1, Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 1 February 2000).

In summary, the economic, political, and institutional factors evaluated in Chapter 5 and 6 clearly gave rise to new forms of partnerships evident in Sheffield during the 1980s and 1990s. These processes drew the city into international competition for sports events and tourists. It was within this context that the *Sports Sheffield Association* was formed. The *Sports Sheffield Association* was indicative of a partnership form of urban governance based on the goals of economic growth as the development of sports policy was seen to have several functions. These included attracted sports events and sports teams, which would develop the sports tourism market, hosting governing bodies in the city, attracting external funding and reimagining the city around symbolic projects such as the National City of Sport and the National Sports Institute. Such an approach has commonalities with
American growth machine literature. According to Logan and Molotch, the growth ideology...

...is all part of the ideological ground for other civic goals, including the successful competition of cities for growth-inducing projects. Professional teams serve many latent social functions; sustaining growth ideology is clearly one of them (Logan and Molotch 1996: 315).

Despite this, at an operational level, the development of Sports Sheffield had a number of issues. The Sports Sheffield Association provided a further arena for debate between those in favour of the growth ideology and those wanting to concentrate on social and community objectives.

Table 7.5: Summary of the Characteristics of the Sports Sheffield Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership structure</th>
<th>Initially an informal arrangement, later more formalised by a memorandum of co-operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership composition</td>
<td>Sheffield City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sheffield City Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sheffield for Health Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sheffield and Rotherham Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Sheffield College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sheffield Hallam University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The University of Sheffield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Sheffield University Hospital Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern General Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Sheffield City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aims and Policies</td>
<td>1992 to 1994: Attracting elite athletes to train in the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attracting governing bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving opportunities for community recreation through the 'trickle down' effects of the previous objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994 to 1996: Improving the city's image (National City of Sport and the British Academy of Sport). Demonstrating a commitment to the partnership approach to external agencies to attract funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner-related issues and concerns</td>
<td>Social versus economic goals and elite sport vs. community recreation, Partnership composition was selective leading to many groups and interests being neglected. Lack of resources committed by members Resistance to partnership and change within the partner organisations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation within the Sports Sheffield Association was also selective, involving leading actors from the Universities, the City Trust, the Hospital Trusts and the Chamber of
Commerce. However, the roles played, a resources committed by these non-
governmental partners was minimal. Sheffield City Council began the process and chose
the partnership members and retained the secretariat role throughout. As a member of
Sheffield suggested, it...

...is about this control issue, if you are in a partnership you have to learn to
let go and trust another organisations to take it on. If the City Council does
not chair it they won't relinquish control. (Representative from Sheffield
University, 22 December 1998).

7.3 Towards partnership with the Community: Sheffield Play Council
(1995 to 1999)

7.3.1 The context of the partnership

During the 1980s the City Council provided a considerable children's play service,
operating nearly 200 formal playgrounds in the city, managed by both the Leisure
Services and the Housing and Planning Departments. However, in the 1990s, as in other
areas of leisure policy, the Council's role changed. According to the Chair of the Play
Policy Implementation Group (22 February, 2000) this led to a number of community
groups recommending the need for a Play Policy to develop playwork in the city. To
facilitate this, an open conference was held in March 1995 and a series of workshops
were also held during that year.

The Play Policy, produced in 1996, advocated the partnership approach, which would
help share resources, support better play provision for children and lead to “increased
financial resources, financial effectiveness and improved physical and practical
resources” (Sheffield Play Policy Working Group 1996). The partnership approach,
according to the Play Policy would be strengthened by the development of a 'Play
Council' to implement the strategy's recommendations. As the Chair of the Play Policy
Implementation Group (22 February 2000) suggested, a Play Council would be more
successful than a play section within the council, as the Sheffield Play Council would be
in a better position to build partnerships throughout play sector. Joint funding initiatives
could be prepared earlier and information could be shared faster. The Play Council
would also stimulate community involvement “so that the community can participate on an equal footing with other partners” (Sheffield Play Policy Working Group 1996: 5).

From the mid 1990s, numerous attempts were made to form the Play Council, however the process has been fraught with difficulties and by the end of 1999 the Play Council had not been established.

7.3.2 Partnership composition and structures

During the process of producing the Play Policy, over 200 people were consulted. These included several new partnership forums such as the Out Of School Network and the Pre School Learning Alliance (Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group, 22 February 2000). The Play Policy emphasised the value of consultation:

This Play Policy has been prepared as a citywide document. Play in Sheffield is provided by many different organisations: volunteers and the community, the local authority departments amongst others. Many of these people and agencies have contributed to the production of this policy. Their work is a demonstration of the effectiveness of a partnership approach to play work (Sheffield Play Policy Working Group 1996: 2).

Fundamental to the process of consultation was the need to determine the views of all groups, particularly the disadvantaged:

As part of the Play Council, we held a series of interest group meetings in the city to gauge people’s views. There have been questionnaires circulated as part of this Play Policy Process and leaflets delivered in different languages. We have done a great deal, through signs and translation, to try and include people. We have actively going out to seek people’s views and in particular children’s views. These are paramount to us (Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group, 22 February 2000).

Following the recommendations of the Play Policy a Play Policy Implementation Group was developed. However, according to the Chair of this group, getting people to speak on behalf of the community was not easy:

I was asked to be chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group, they asked people to come forward and no-one wanted to do it and because no-one came forward the process was having difficulties (Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group, 22 February 2000).
Despite this problem, *Sheffield Play Council*, unlike *Sports Sheffield* was initiated and managed by the community and not the City Council. This was desirable for the community in order to maintain equity and inclusiveness. This was also made possible as in the area of children's play, the Council did not have a political 'champion' (Officer 3, Ex Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999). Further, in the area of children's play, the Council perceived its role to be different than within sports as there had traditionally been a greater involvement of the voluntary sector within play. Within the Department there was a division between those who supported the community management of the *Play Council* and those who felt the Council should retain a stronger input into its operation. These issues led to conflict within the department, which would have a major effect on the Department's partnership policies during the late 1990s.

7.3.3 Partnership Aims and Policies

Since the *Play Council* had not formed by 1999, it is not possible to analyse policies subsequently developed. However, since the intention was to form the *Play Council* to implement the objectives of the *Play Policy*, some elements of this document will be significant. The rationale for producing the *Play Policy* was to help overcome some of the problems being experienced by play providers in Sheffield (Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group, 22 February 2000). Firstly, play in Sheffield was "undervalued, it has a low profile and struggles to attract sufficient resources" (Sheffield Play Policy Working Group 1996: 15). Secondly, play providers in Sheffield were extremely diverse by organisation, founding beliefs, rates of pay, age ranges and styles of delivery. It was therefore deemed necessary to improve interagency liaison and co-operation. In addition, due to the large number groups involved in play, there was no common voice for the sector. Further, despite many agencies working together on a team or project basis, these were often localised partnerships dealing with local issues. Therefore, the more strategic aspects were missing in play development. (Sheffield Play Policy Working Group 1996). Thus it was hoped the *Play Council* would, through a strategic approach...

...promote ways of working together, sharing resources and support better play provision for children. This will lead to increased financial resources,
Chapter 7 Sheffield's Leisure Partnerships

financial effectiveness and improved physical and practical resources (Sheffield Play Policy Working Group 1996: 9).

The *Play Council* would also be able to apply for charitable status, which would enable it directly to win funding, and indirectly campaign for play within the various regeneration initiatives (Sheffield Play Policy Working Group 1996).

A further aim of the *Play Council* was to empower children to make choices. It stated that the *Play Council* would...

...aim to create play opportunities that allow children to explore, manipulate, experience and affect their environment within safe, challenging but secure settings, regardless of gender, race, culture or range of abilities. The emphasis will always be on the child’s choice and control over their own experience (Sheffield Play Policy Working Group 1996: 7).

However the issue of children's rights and the involvement of community groups led to a number of problems and brought a number of play groups into conflict with the City Council.

7.3.4 Partnership Issues and Problems

As mentioned previously, the development of a *Play Council* was supported and encouraged by some officers in the Department but was resisted by others. One officer who encouraged the process was Officer 3 (Ex Client And Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council). He had strong beliefs about democracy and community participation in the development of policy. These were grounded in his past experiences:

I started to do basically community recreation type work, working with a range of groups such as at a day centre, to doing youth work and working in a youth camp. Parallel to that I went to college and did an A level in sociology and a degree in recreation and community studies and came to Sheffield and did a PhD (2 August 1999).

One of the main concerns of Officer 3 (Ex Client And Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council) was that there was...
...sufficient capacity in the policies that we have got in this authority, without changing any pieces of paper to be very empowering, but nobody is doing it. Well maybe some people are doing it, it does happen but that it is not in the culture that we have. It is not an empowering one; it is pretty opposite to that. It is about paternalism, to describe it as best you could (2 August 1999).

Whilst Councillor 1 (Ex-leader of the leisure committee and Ex deputy leader of the Labour Group) was seen as the visionary in developing Sports Sheffield, Officer 3 was regarded by a number of officers, as single most important person in developing the community partnership work between 1997 and 1999. Between 1997 and 1998 Officer 3 held the position of Acting Assistant Head of Leisure Services. This position, albeit temporarily, gave him enough resources and control to initiate the partnership work. This partnership work included the re-formation of Sports Sheffield, the support and enabling of the Play Council and development of Active Sheffield, a third forum for health and community recreation.

Officer 3’s view that the community should have more influence was supported by a number of staff within the Sport and Community Recreation Section:

I would like to see the local community gain more control... I think that for many years there has been an awful lot of control exerted and the reason why we are in a situation where community groups are developing so rapidly is because local authority officers are not doing their job right. I think in some ways I can understand the anger and hurt in the way people feel, because I have found it particularly frustrating in the five years I have been involved (Officer 9, Assistant Regeneration and Funding Partnership Officer, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 11 November 1999).

Officer 3 argued that the 'leisure professional’s approach' adopted by many officers in the section was incompatible with community participation and empowerment:

Policy that is empowering should engage people in generating agendas, in the development of service plans and the review of them. They need to be involved in the production and consumption of policy but that doesn't happen.... What is the incentive for us to do it? There isn't any. The only incentive is for us to do it sufficiently well to win some external funding. (Officer 3, Ex Client And Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999).
Within the Sport and Community Recreation Department many officers held an opposing view, that public sector leisure professionals should remain central to the process. Whilst Officer 3 was attempting to engage and empower the community, another officer from the Leisure Department took a very different view:

I think there are one or two people out there in the 'play world'... I think I can support part of their agenda because part of it is insisting, rightly, that the council does do some of the cultural change that is required to truly work in partnership, and maybe then I could support that. I however, think part of their agenda is destructive and negative. So although I support part of their agenda I find it difficult to engage at that level, while ever I feel they are not being positive or constructive with us. (Officer 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

The conflicting views held by individuals relating to play in Sheffield became evident during a series of play conferences held in the city during 1998 and 1999. These conferences proved controversial and brought the City Council into direct conflict with community groups. According to the Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group (22 February 2000):

The community obviously had a stance that it wanted a fully inclusive process at the conferences. And if we are talking about children, then children should be integral to the overall process and should be treated with parity and equality. Sections of the community, including my own community and the play organisations I am linked to, see the whole process as children's emancipation not participation. Emancipation is a legal rights issue, as it would be with race or disability or women or whatever. They don't see it any differently. They see childhood as having its own status and value and that caused conflict with officers in the Leisure Department who saw it as their remit to ban children from the process (Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group, 22 February 2000).

The conflict between the Council and the play community came to a head at a conference held on 27 March 1999. The conference was intended to draw together a number of organisations and individuals to decide upon the best organisational form for the Play Council to adopt, and in particular, whether it should become a charitable trust. However, before the meeting began Councillor 2 (Chair of the Leisure Services Development Committee), announced that there was a problem. The Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group confirmed this and stated that two children wanted to make a statement. The two children, from a local play centre, in a formal statement, said that,
due to the importance of this meeting, 70 children were going to attend. However, officers in the Council had informed some children from a play centre in a deprived area of the city that they could not attend the meeting. This was regarded as a restriction on their rights. As a result, the children who had attended the conference walked out in protest, returned to their play centres and subsequently made a statement to the local press¹. In this statement, entitled ‘You’ve Got to Listen’, the supervisor of the adventure playground, whose children claimed to have been banned stated that:

I was told by Sheffield Council that neither play leaders nor kids could go to the meeting... We decided to meet at the playground and go down and protest. We were the only area excluded. I was just told we couldn’t go, but not given a reason why. At the end of the day it’s important that kids here have a say (Pitsmore Adventure Playground Supervisor, The Star, Tuesday March 30, 1999).

Councillor 2 (Chair of the Leisure Services Development Committee), who launched the meeting promised to find out the root cause of the problem to inform everyone present of the outcome. However, this failed to satisfy the audience, as a number of individuals argued that without the children the process would be inappropriate and should be abandoned. A representative from Loughborough University, who had been working with both the Play Policy Implementation Group and the City Council, urged those present to continue the meeting to avoid the potential of causing irreversible damage to the process of establishing the Play Council. The audience narrowly voted to continue with the meeting, however, around twelve people left in protest (from a total of 64).

Later Officer 3 (Ex Client And Partnership Manager) explained that there had been some prior incident between officers from the Council and playworkers in the city. He argued that there were...

...too many professional reputations at stake. No-one will take risks or let go. It was one of the officers on that top table that caused all the problems. The worst thing was we all knew what had happened, but he just sat there through it all saying we don’t know what happened, we will find out. He just sat there and didn’t admit to making a mistake (Officer 3, Ex Client And Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 29 March 1999).

¹The views expressed by the activists were representative of all the children at the play centre. It was a majority decision to pursue this course of action.
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Sheffield’s Leisure Partnerships

The officer referred to in this account (Officer 14 Community Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council), was reluctant to discuss issues relating to the *Play Council*. However, he did suggest that...

...quite frequently we ask people to make decisions without giving them adequate information. I don't mind people making decisions as long as they are informed. So yes we could do a lot more to empower people but it is how realistic that is. I think the reality of the world is a long way from that (Officer 14, Community Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November, 1999).

The Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group (22 February 2000) stated that this officer (Officer 4) and some of his colleagues wanted to...

... professionalise play in order to make play workers elite and expert. They are trying to create this fountain of knowledge and this fountain of expertise so they can make informed decisions for children. But it is wrong as the expertise is with the children themselves. (Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group, 22 February 2000).

The Conflict between Officer 4 and the play community intensified over what is referred to as a franchise scheme (Interviewee 16, Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group, 22 February 2000). This scheme was an attempt by several council officers to develop an excellence centre for play:

The Early Years Development Partnership was required by the Department of Education to submit a plan for the city. As chair of that process, I should have been consulted on the submission of that plan. The lead officer in play (Officer 4) submitted the plan behind my back. When I saw the plan I was appalled because it was saying that if children don’t engage in certain forms of play, the play that he is trying to develop with this franchise, then they will become dysfunctional. Those aren’t terms we would want to advocate.

According to the Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group (22 February 2000) the planning for the 'Excellence Centre' had not involved any consultation with community groups. She also argued that the Council was trying to decrease support within the city for the communities own ‘flagship’ centre called the Shack:

There became clear blockages about supporting the Shack. There was also a de-legitimisation process of the children that we included within meetings. The Council and one particular officer were also passing on the wrong information to the politicians. He made appalling comments, which have been very offensive. Yet this centre has been launched officially by David
Blunkett on the 10th November, it is a trailblazer for the British Government, it has shown imagination, it has massive profile world-wide, it's also been recognised within the European Parliament structure. Yet because of this block in the city, these children who have fought for years are being blocked. You know the officers just wield too much power (Interviewee 16, Chair of the Play Policy Implementation Group, 22 February 2000).

The problem faced by the Play Council was primarily one of poor interpersonal relationships and interactions between people engaged in the partnership. Within the city there was climate of distrust and a history of conflict between some council officers and community influentials. There was a fundamental issue regarding different play philosophies, which, in turn, led to a lack of respect between members of the partnership. Whilst it was impossible to ascertain the legitimacy of the claim that the 'Excellence Centre' was a hidden agenda of some council officers, it is important from a partnership perspective that it was seen to be by community groups. Others believed that the reluctance to support the community agenda was due to the insecurity felt by officers in the Council felt, as they felt their jobs were threatened by the partnership approach. One senior officer noted:

We were talking about empowering the community and working in partnership and one of the officers said to me 'where do I fit into the big picture, it will be the end for me'. He was someone working at senior level and was concerned with the development of the Play Council. I thought that is just one senior manager what is it like across the board? So there is resistance to try and get the partnership framework off the ground (Officer 9, Assistant Regeneration and Funding Partnership Officer, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 11 November 1999).

A conflict of philosophies also existed between those that held the view that the community should be empowered and those that argued that public sector professionals held the expertise to make decision. Officer 2 (Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999) admitted that the two opposing views caused problems between individuals:

There were certain key players, individuals within the service where there was tension between them. If you add to that people from outside the organisation potentially in conflict with people inside the organisation you have got the dynamic there that was almost impossible to manage.
In summary, The Play Council represents an attempt by the community groups to form a vehicle for developing a new, strategic approach to play provision. Certain interest groups within Sheffield, including some officer of the City Council, recognised that the voluntary and community sectors should be empowered to tackle the city's social problems and deliver services.

The aim of the Play Council was to bring together organisations with complimentary aims and objectives, based on the mutual belief that partnership offered mutual benefits such as attracting external funding, sharing information and resources and stimulating community involvement. However, the partnership failed at the level of individual actors. Some officers, from with the City Council, resisted the partnership, as its goals required a transfer of decision-making and influence to the community. Further, a history of conflict at an individual level between some officers and community influentials resulted in a lack of trust between actors. This was reinforced by a lack of respect between parties created by widely divergent play philosophies.

Table 7.6: Summary of the Characteristics of the Sheffield Play Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership structure</th>
<th>An informal arrangement between community groups led to the establishment of a Play Policy Implementation Group. Attempting to formalise this group into a Play Council with a Citywide remit and gaining charitable status was not achieved by 1999.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership composition</td>
<td>Around 200 individuals from a range of bodies contributed to the process including the Out Of School Network, the Pre School Learning Alliance and the Sheffield Children’s Centre as well as the Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Play Policy Implementation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aims and Policies</td>
<td>Promoting and developing play across the city Sharing resources Submitting joint bids for funding, Improving communication, Allowing communities and particularly children influence over policy decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner-related issues and concerns</td>
<td>Conflict between the community and the council over empowering children. Play Officers as experts attempted to shape the policy process Lack of trust and respect between the community and the Council from contrasting views on play provision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.4 Partnership and the Management of Community Participation:  
Active Sheffield (1997 to 1999)

7.4.1 Context of the Partnership

Chapter 6 highlighted how, by the end of the 1990s, macro level economic, political and social changes conspired to create a new urban environment. Within this context, a new rhetoric or discourse of partnership, stakeholding and community participation became widespread. Further, the apparent failure of market led solutions in Sheffield, such as the city's leisure trust, to address the issues of inequality, poverty and social inclusion led to a call for a greater role for the community and voluntary sectors in leisure policy. During this period the Leisure Department searched for...

...a new generation of partnership work. The new partnership approach builds upon the existing relationships but is characterised by being strategic about identifying need. It will require a more aggressive approach towards procuring external funding (to address unmet need) and which positions the service as an exemplar of good local government practice in terms of democratic renewal and Best Value (Sheffield City Council 1998: 5).

Active Sheffield was an attempt by the Department to develop this new generation of partnership work in the area of health and community recreation. Active Sheffield was not intended to operate in isolation but was part of a wider strategic approach involving the Play Council and the rejuvenation of Sports Sheffield. The combination would provide an integrated partnership approach across the three aspects of sport, play and community recreation. This is shown in Figure 7.3:

Figure 7.3: The Integrated Partnership Approach to Sport, Play and Community Recreation as Proposed in 1998
The motivation and rationale for *Active Sheffield* developed from the Burngreave Community Action Forum, a localised community partnership approach established in Burngreave, a particularly run down area of the city. The Burngreave Community Action Forum was launched in September 1997 to provide a forum for local people of all ages and from all ethnic, cultural and religious communities to contribute to, and influence, the social and economic regeneration of their community. This was achieved through a variety of measures, one of which was leisure (Burngreave Community Action Forum 1999). One of the fundamental aims of the project was to facilitate 10% of the 16000 residents to become active (active meaning 30 minutes of exercise five times a week). The project attempted to achieve this by a setting up a number of schemes such as exercise classes in community halls (Burngreave Community Action Forum 1999). Local doctors were encouraged to send patients who they believed would benefit form increased exercise. The Burngreave Community Action Forum also targeted disadvantaged groups such as women and ethnic minorities. One of the founders of the project said:

*Burngreave in Action* shows that inner city environments can be changed to promote healthy activity. Regular activity improves health and social contact, attitudes and behaviors can be changed across communities (Representative from Sheffield University, at the Burngreave Community Action Forum Conference March 22 1999).

The Burngreave Community Action Forum brought together a number of agencies such as the City Council, the health agencies and universities. The Director of Public Health (March 22 1999) suggested that the Burngreave Community Action Forum was a good model to promote the benefits of the partnership approach. He also stated that the government was backing health and leisure alliances:

It is there, its on the agenda, you are pushing at an open door, it is as good as it has been (Director of Public Health, at the Burngreave Community Action Forum Conference March 22 1999).

However, he also acknowledged that:

Partnership is a word that is making us all sick, but partnership working is a reality, we are pushed in that direction and we will be performance monitored on the way we work with other agencies (Director of Public

According to Interviewee 17 (representative from the Health Authority, July 12, 1999) the Burngreave Community Action Forum was successful as the partner organisations had mutual objectives. Further, because they were working in partnership they could apply for funding, which was not available to organisations working in isolation:

*Burngreave in Action* had its flaws but one of the positive things that came out of it was the relationship between the organisations, because for the first time we moved away from thinking about our own agendas and started to think what was best for individuals in Burngreave. I know that sounds dead simple, but it was a big change. Previously all of us in health were concerned with... 'X' and the things to achieve it. Leisure, on the other hand, had to achieve 'Y'. We all had budgets allocated to meet these goals. Burngreave gave us a bit of money that was separate from our budgets it was such a plus. I have to say that to get this money all we needed to do was to put some time and involvement into it. (Representative from the Health Authority, July 12, 1999).

This respondent also argued that the Health Authority had adopted the partnership approach earlier than Leisure Services. It had therefore, learnt many lessons about partnership working and had senior management support for the policy. It was the interest for partnerships amongst senior individuals from the health field and the enthusiasm for the community partnership approach from Officer 3 (Ex Client and Partnership Manager) that committed the Council, first to the Burngreave Community Action Forum and later to *Active Sheffield*. Officer 3 commented that partnerships involving the Health Authority helped him gain support from within the Department as this organisation was respected, it legitimised its projects.

The alliance between leisure and health developed during Burngreave Community Action Forum project and during the late 1990s Sheffield’s Sport and Community Recreation Service met regularly along with the Sheffield University and the hospital trusts to plan the way forward for enhancing the health benefits of exercise in the city. At an individual level, the Director of public health, a representative from Sheffield University, and Officer 3 (Ex Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services) were particularly influential.
The representative from Sheffield University, in particular, was involved in a four year project involving 8,000 elderly citizens, in four areas in Sheffield: Foxhill, Woodseats, Shiregreen and Ecclesfield. The study compared changes in physical function, personal health perceptions and use of health services. The populations of the exercise areas were compared with similar subjects in other areas of Sheffield that had not had the community exercise programmes. The research concluded that

Physical activity is good for health. Significant benefits have already been demonstrated in Sheffield on a community scale. The partnership approaches embodied in the research summarised above must become a part of public policy, and be supported, if the goals of prolonged disability-free life expectancy and the reality of being a 'healthy city' are to be achieved (Cochrane 1999: 2).

The collaboration between health and leisure services intensified during 1998/99 with a series of meetings. These involved a broader group of organisations. A list of representative organisations is given below:

Table 7.7: Collaboration Between Health and Leisure Services Group 1998/99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Director of Leisure Services Sheffield City Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representative from Age Concern, Sheffield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Manager Home Care, Social Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer from the Environment and Regulatory Services Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair of Leisure Services Development Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer - Community Recreation Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager of the Sheffield Play Resource Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative from Community Sciences Centre, Northern General Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative from Sheffield University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer from the Collaboration and Agenda Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative from Trent Regional Health Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative from Public Health Medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative from the Dept of Gastroenterology, Northern General Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor – Committee for Older People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor – Committee for Environment Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 representatives from Sheffield Health Authority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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sheffield's leisure partnerships

this group met on a number of occasions to discuss issues relating to services for elderly, disabled and other disadvantaged groups. they also discussed a broader framework, including the encouragement of inter-agency working and the "communication of the message, that leisure and recreation improves health" (interviewee 18, chair of community rehabilitation, northern general hospital, 12th april 1999). however, the collaboration had actually achieved very little by the end of 1999. interviewee 18 (chair of community rehabilitation, northern general hospital, 12th april 1999) argued that, despite the regular meetings, operating in a partnership with the council was difficult:

we have made a start with this work, we have got some committed people who are meeting on a regular basis and these issues are important to us. however, there are still problems in working together, there is still a lack of communication, particularly with the city council (interviewee 18, chair of community rehabilitation, northern general hospital, 12th april 1999).

despite these tentative initial stages, the burngreave community action forum and the alliance meetings between leisure and health laid the foundations for active sheffield. the aim of active sheffield was to spread the benefits of the partnership approach across the city. the decision to develop active sheffield was made by the leisure services development committee on the 10 september 1998. a report produced for this meeting stated:

partnership work has always been fundamental to the work of the sport and community recreation services. for example in community recreation a community partnerships manager post was created as long ago as 1993. that officer has taken a lead role in the development of the leisure services community partnerships policy in 1997, as well as contributing to other services and council wide programmes. similarly, sports development, major events and play service activities are notable for pioneering new ways of working at both high profile and local neighborhood levels. this is evident in the way in which partnerships such as sports sheffield and burngreave at leisure have which have inspired similar models of practice in other parts of the country (sheffield city council 1998)

a research group from loughborough university was asked to help facilitate the process of active sheffield in october 1998 and the author of this thesis worked as research assistant on the project. in total, 18 meetings were held with senior managers in the department between october 1998 and october 1999. the process of active sheffield
involved a leisure audit of the city, including all organisations involved in community recreation or health. This had an objective of identifying the range of stakeholders in the city. 16 of these stakeholders were consulted and were invited to join a steering group. The objectives of the consultations were to discuss the concept of Active Sheffield with the stakeholder groups. In more detail, the objectives of the meeting were:

1. To explain the notion of Active Sheffield and illustrate the concept of a citywide partnership.
2. To identify key stakeholder interest in the areas of community recreation, sports and play.
3. To gain a commitment from the key stakeholders to the partnership and ask them to join a steering group, which would be charged with managing the process.
4. To identify any potential problems in the partnership work.

It was intended to launch Active Sheffield at a public meeting, scheduled for 25 June 1999. At a late stage this meeting was postponed and subsequently rescheduled for the autumn of 1999. This second meeting was postponed indefinitely. The circumstances surrounding these postponements are discussed below.

7.4.2 Partnership composition and structure

Although the local Health Authority played an important role in developing the community partnership approach, Active Sheffield, like Sports Sheffield, was principally led by the City Council. The City Council initiated and resourced the preliminary study and chose who and who not to involve in the process. The champion of Active Sheffield was Officer 3 (Ex Client and Partnership Manager). He initiated and developed the work and took the idea to the Leisure Committee for approval. He also asked Loughborough University to help facilitate the process.

Officer 3 developed Active Sheffield whilst in the position of Acting Head of Sport and Community Recreation. Whilst in this position he arranged for two senior officers to assist with the consultation process. These two officers were, however, omitted from the initial planning process. Officer 3 also failed to adequately brief these officers prior to the interviews. This led to them both being uncomfortable and not fully committed to the
process. At one meeting the author was held up in traffic and was late, the officer was unable to start the meeting before he arrived. Afterwards she said

I was pleased to see you arrive, I had to stall them, as there was no way I could talk to them about Active Sheffield. We weren't in on this process from the start and, we haven't been adequately briefed and we don't know much about it, I could never have done it alone (Officer 5, Planning and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November 1999).

Despite this, Officer 5 (Planning and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services) found it easy to communicate in the meetings and was clearly committed to the objectives and philosophy of Active Sheffield. During the meetings this officer became involved, often quite passionately, about discussing the potential outcomes and benefits that the partnership could make within communities. She attributed this to her past experience of working with community groups and her personal familiarity with implementing small-scale, local projects.

The second officer given the responsibility for developing Active Sheffield was Officer 4 (Regeneration and Funding Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999). He had worked as an architectural technician in the Council and a building officer within Sheffield Polytechnic before becoming involved in sport during the World Student Games. Unlike officer 5, he was less comfortable with the notion of community empowerment. Instead he reiterated the central and valuable position that the Council had in the delivery of leisure services. In particular, he argued that the Council was vital to any partnership...

...as the primary vehicle for gathering and disseminating information and providing expert advice on many matters... such as funding.

It was also required to establish a...

...coherent assessment of strategic need in the city. The assessment of need would allow officers to deal with grant applications and allocate funds. (2 August 1999).

Whilst the Council made the first contact with the key stakeholders and was keen to be seen as initiating the process, on many occasions the author (a researcher brought in from
an independent organisation) was left to discuss Active Sheffield with outside bodies alone. This de legitimised the process as many of the stakeholders commented that...

...if this is so important and the Council is so keen for this forum, and if means anything to them, then why aren’t they here to sell the idea (Representative from Hallamshire Tennis and Squash Club, 12 March 1999).

Despite extensive work on compiling a database of every leisure provider within the city and a list of all potential stakeholders to interview, when it came to deciding the individuals and organisations to consult, Officer 3 determined these. Later Councillor I (Ex leader of the leisure committee and Ex deputy leader of the Labour Group) intervened to add a number of other individuals to the list. The stakeholders identified by Officer 3 were, however, diverse and encompassed groups from local to national bodies, and from the public, private and voluntary sectors. A list of groups identified for the briefing meetings is provided in Chapter 4.

7.4.3 Partnership Aims and Policies

The Council informed stakeholders that the aims and policies of Active Sheffield were not predetermined but instead would be decided by the partner members along with wider consultation. Further, a steering group would be formed to monitor the aims and objectives and the performance of Active Sheffield. However, the Leisure Committee of 9 September 1998 set a vision and objectives for the forum. The overall vision was

To establish a new vision for sport, community recreation and play in Sheffield through joint working with a range of stakeholders.

There were also a number of objectives of the partnership:

1. to improve opportunities for sport, recreation and play participation at all levels, especially for those who suffer from disadvantage;
2. to establish effective and efficient collaborative relations and mechanisms for dialogue and decision-making which encourage participation, efficacy, an shared understanding and commitment to achieving the above aim;
3. to identify strategic need of sport, community recreation and play in Sheffield for the next five years and to maximise the use of existing and potential resources;
4. to identify priorities for collaborative activity, which works towards meeting the identified need by Sheffield City Council and its partners.
5. to support the United Kingdom Sports Institute in respect of ensuring that opportunities are provided for the identification, fostering and progression of local talented sporting individuals.
(Sheffied City Council 1998)

As can been seen, Active Sheffield was not an isolated initiative but was linked to the Play Council and, with objective five added by Councillor 1 (Ex leader of the leisure committee and Ex deputy leader of the Labour Group), was linked to Sports Sheffield. However, the presentation to the Leisure Committees (9 September 1998) highlights the Council's concern with supporting other aims of the Council. In particular, there were a number of external pressures for developing the partnership approach:

Comments from the English Sports Council indicate that our current strategic capacity falls far short of what is required for us to act professionally as a key consultee for the sports lottery. For example, we need to be able to show that we have evaluated and produced recommendations for the type and level of sporting activity across the City. These plans would have to include the comments of essential partners to be effective (Sheffield City Council 1998).

Although not documented, informal discussions with officers revealed that the partnership approach was also being used to boost Sheffield's chances of attracting inward investment. During the period 1998 to 1999 Sheffield was in the process for bidding for the United Kingdom Sports Institute, for which the city needed to "at least, give the appearance that it was united" Officer 5 (Planning and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services). During this period Sheffield was also in a position to bid for European Objective One funding and to bid for round four of SRB funding. These sources of funding both required a demonstration of purposeful partnership activity. Importantly, the Council acknowledged that there was also the possibility to gain funds though its partnership with health (Sheffield City Council 1998) and it was also notable that one of the officers given responsibility for the partnership was the Regeneration and Funding Manager, despite his limited experience in community recreation.

A further aim of the partnership work was to contribute to the Council's corporate regeneration work. In particular, sport and community recreation was expected to play a
part in tackling social exclusion. It was also compatible with a number of Council schemes such as the Area Initiative and Healthy Sheffield and was to take the lead in physical activity, training and vocational activities (Sheffield City Council 1998). Officers also acknowledged the role that this partnership work would play in meeting of the Councils Corporate objectives:

> Any policy has to fit with the corporate vision first. It cascades down from there. Obviously one of the visions of Sheffield City Council is working in partnership with local community, therefore that will have a knock on effect about what we operate (Officer 9, Assistant Regeneration and Funding Partnership Officer, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 11 November 1999).

In addition to contributing to bids for external funds and to the Council's core objectives, partnership was required to demonstrate a real commitment to partnership to comply with the democratic dimensions of Best Value, particularly the challenge and consultation elements (Sheffield City Council 1998). It was also intended for Active Sheffield, the Play Council and Sports Sheffield to play a role in the development of a Leisure Strategy for the city. The Leisure Services Plan (Sheffield City Council 1998) refer to this requirement. One senior officer also acknowledged this:

> Active Sheffield is important to us as we are putting together the leisure strategy for the city. Partnership work is an important element in that, and Active Sheffield helps us develop that role, Active Sheffield also builds on a lot of issues around consultation, which we will need to look at (Officer 7, Head of Regeneration and Partnership, Chief Executives Office, Sheffield City Council, 14 November 1999).

### 7.4.4 Partnership Issues

As was mentioned previously, the process of establishing Active Sheffield had stalled by the end of 1999 and the public launch, which was due to take place on 25 June 1999, was cancelled. This section discusses five main sets of issues that contributed to the partnership postponement. Firstly, issues concerning the structure of the partnership. Secondly problems associated with the process of developing the partnership. Thirdly, factors relating to influence, power and control. Fourthly, pragmatic reasons, concerning the resourcing and managing the partnership. Finally, a set of issues relating to internal problems within partners organisations, particularly the City Council.
The leisure audit identified several thousand organisations with an interest in sport and community recreation in the city. Despite this, the Council identified only 16 groups to be consulted and involved in the steering group. Whilst this was mainly due to pragmatic reasons of time and cost, there were some important issues raised by respondents relating to the composition of the partnership. Despite the efforts of Officer 3 to make the process inclusive (through partnership community groups would be engaged in the decision-making process) several of the organisations interviewed argued that the Council was the only organisation capable of leading the process:

Although it is a partnership process, it wouldn't happen without the City Council. We rarely come into contact with some of the organisations you have mentioned, so the Council is the only one with the contacts and the ability to bring us all together (Representative from Hallamshire Tennis and Squash Club, 12 March 1999).

A further set of issues associated with the organisations involved in the partnership was related to the involvement of some organisations in previous partnership work. The health sector had been within the Burngreave Community Action Forum and the education sector had been involved in leisure partnership work in the city from the mid 1980s. These sectors were also represented in Sport Sheffield. Many interviewees felt that the triumvirate of the City Council, along with the health and education sectors formed a coalition that had a sustained influence over leisure policy. However, the frequency with which these groups met diluted the benefits of partnership:

It is always the same groups, the Hospital trusts, the City Council, the two Universities, the agencies of the City Council, Sheffield College, it is the same individuals, and you could end up having a partnership group every evening and still get nothing done (Representative from Sheffield University, 22 December 1998).

A number of other organisations, which had not been involved in previous partnership work, perceived breaking into this triumvirate difficult. Further, many of them felt that the contribution of their organisation to such a forum would be of limited value:

I am not sure why the Council has asked me to be involved. We have an active community programme and run a lot of sessions and coaching for disadvantaged groups, especially the young. But surely the Council, and the health groups and the Universities can sort this out and then tell us how we
can help (Representative from Hallamshire Tennis and Squash Club, 12 March 1999).

A further important issue related, not to who was invited to participate in the process, but who was excluded. One noticeable absentee was Sheffield International Venues, the organisation responsible for managing the main sport and leisure facilities in the city. Indeed only three private sector organisations were consulted, out of 16 organisations. This reflected the fact that the commercial aspects of the partnership were secondary to social and community goals. This was a contrast to the leisure partnerships of the 1980s and early 1990s where economic and business goals dominated. Following a meeting with Sheffield First, the citywide commercial sector partnership forum (see chapter 6), Officer 3 poignantly stated:

It's not so important we get them on board, it would be nice to have them but as long as we have the health people we shall be ok, they are our core partner (Officer 3, Ex Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, Car journey from Sheffield First, 23 March 1999).

As the consultation process was conducted with limited time and resources, inevitably some people were omitted from the process. According to a representative from a local association for disabled sport, this would cause the City Council a number of problems:

Have you spoken to the forum of disabled people as well as us? They are not really a sport body but are a political body. They can be very antagonistic and political, so be aware of it. You should consider talking to them as if you ignore them totally you would hear about it. It is better to have them on board and hear it directly rather than hearing about it in the press (Representative from Disport, 13 April 1999).

Choosing partners was particularly problematic within the voluntary sector, where it was difficult to locate individuals with both an understanding of leisure issues but also people that could be representative of such a broad sector. As one interviewee stated:

The problem is that we have 45 forums in the Sheffield area, with lots of networks that we are personally involved with, but none are particularly tied to sport, but there may be some. You will just have to root around to find some people with an interest who may want to be involved. I couldn't say that there were 2 or 3 individuals that would help. The sector is just so big
in the city, I could not do that (Representative from Voluntary Action Sheffield, 9 February 1999).

This interviewee also suggested that the task of clarifying the strategic goals of the partnership would be difficult:

The problem the partnership will face is that you need people with understanding, about the community and its needs, but they would also need a strategic overview. The community sector is so big I can't see how you can get that kind of input from one or two individuals. Even if you did identify the need how would you prioritise it? (Representative from Voluntary Action Sheffield, 9 February 1999).

A representative from Sheffield College argued that very few community groups had the ability to think strategically:

I went to a meeting in Leeds with the Sports Council with the intention of looking at the 'bigger picture'. However, ten people were there saying "Hold on we just need some badminton rackets and shuttle cocks. We want some money for this team to go to a competition in York. We do not need a sports pavilion that we have to look after, worry about, manage, staff, keep alive". If we are not careful the bigger picture does not take account of the fact that if they don't get the badminton rackets the sport dies. (Representative from Sheffield College, 14 April 1999).

Further, many of the respondents suggested that even using the term partnership would put off some groups:

The word partnership makes it sound negative to the man on the street. Forget the word partnership, you will have to sell it as holistic, Active Sheffield – making the lives of people better, a city on the move that kind of thing (Representative 1: Sheffield Hallam and UKSI, 9 February 1999).

Some organisations went further, arguing that a citywide partnership was the wrong approach. Instead the partners should be used to identify and tackle local issues:

We would like to contribute to a well-planned approach, which would co-ordinate small-scale projects helping specific areas for example, Foxhill. We don't want to be involved in projects because it sounds good, we want to be involved in something co-ordinated... we don't want to duplicate what others are doing (Representative from South Yorkshire Police, 12 March 1999).
A number of representatives thought the concept of a citywide partnership was flawed:

I am not sure about the merits of such an approach. I am concerned with the overlap to the Leisure Strategy and about the perceived 'Top Down' approach, which the Council is adopting. It will just turn into a talking shop and there are practical examples of the way in which partnerships have stuttered or failed or just never got off the ground in the past. I would desperately like to see the situation improve, but as soon as I see it become a talking shop, I'm out. Working partnerships are needed, with measurable results. (Representative from Sheffield University, 22 December 1998).

The issue of the partnership turning into a talking shop was a concern for many of the interviewees. Many argued that previous partnership failure meant that there was a great deal of skepticism:

If Sports Sheffield has folded then maybe this whole thing is a waste of time. The Play Council has also had problems and we have been talking about it for two years, why is this going to be any different? (Officer 8, Public Relations Unit Officer, Sheffield City Council, 17 March 1999).

Some representatives argued that the issue of the partnership turning into a talking shop could be overcome, if Active Sheffield could attract high profile individuals to the steering group:

I think the difference would be in how successful you are in attracting the right people to that group (Representative from Sheffield College, 14 April 1999).

Another representative also argued that is was crucial to get the right people to join the steering group:

It is a difficult balance, you could not have just a single person to represent an area such as equity, it is impossible. Also you cannot just have someone who is experienced in all areas. Therefore you need to be directive when you ask for nominations for a steering group. If you don not you could end up with the wrong people on it. Democracy only works if you shape it (Representative from Disport, 13 April 1999).

Officer 3, however, was skeptical, that a steering group would work. He suggested that in the past, the process of making decisions through such groups was getting...

...as many officers as you can and all the partners in a room with as many people from the community as you can get in there as well. As long as you are in there long enough, they think that the assumption is that something
will come out. (Officer 3, Ex Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999).

As with the Play Council, a number of issues were raised relating to related to the control and the degree of parity amongst potential members of Active Sheffield. A representative from the university sector argued that previous experiences with the Council suggested that the would not relinquish control of Active Sheffield:

We did some work on the feasibility study with architects from outside of Sheffield, and architects from the University, and came up with a fantastic plan for the UKSI and what went round it, urban regeneration of the whole area. This was Sept 1995, the first thing the City Council did was remove the architects and from the minute they did that, they lost all the ideas that went around the UKSI. The only thing they are going to build now is a hexagonal building, the administrative building. It's the only thing they will fund out of lottery money. To me they have stolen that idea of the UKSI and the property rights were stolen. Its not untypical of a Local Authority, the creation of a concept from outside was ruined because it wasn't from one of the main players, they are all mates together, and try to keep control and power. It is why I withdrew and haven't gone back (Representative from Sheffield Hallam University, 22 December 1998).

Officer 3 accepted that conflict occurred because of the Council's desire to retain control, he said that the Council's policies on partnership were not about empowering the community, but were in fact about managing community participation:

The thing about control is very important, managing the community is the real issue. It is not empowering the community, the partnership stuff is about managing the community. Managing the process in which the community engages with you. You set the environment and that is the key. (Officer 3, Ex Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999).

This conflict over the devolution of power and resources was seen by many to arise from fear and protectionism amongst officers:

I think our role is to ensure that it happens. So if someone is in a better position to run our adventure playgrounds, a truly better position that will help us achieve the overall objectives. I think we have to face that, it is extremely uncomfortable, actually, when it could mean people's jobs, people's livelihoods, people's futures. It is also challenging what inevitably will be resistance and the defence mechanisms that will come into place. (Officer 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).
Another officer said

When I was doing the partnerships review a lot of people were refusing to see what the issues were. The classic answer was 'if you want me to get into this partnership thing then you will need to create partnership officer and we need to throw more resources at it'. They said 'I will keep doing my job and the partnership officer can do that messy stuff'. I think that has changed quite a lot in the last three years and people have softened around the edges, but there is still a deep resistance to giving up services which they rightly or wrongly see as theirs (Officer 14, Community Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 16 November, 1999).

The issues relating to power and control show that whilst the Council supported partnership as a policy, it was reliant on individuals to make them work at an operational level. Any disagreement at this level could prevent partnership formation. As one officer noted:

The classic scenario is the power to make something happen, but there is also the power to stop something happening and that is the key to understanding local government, I think it was Mrs T that came out with the line that local government had the engine of a lawnmower and the brakes of a Rolls Royce and virtually at any tier... well in fact anyone can stop something happening but very few people can say yes lets do it. (Officer 3, Ex Client And Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999).

Perhaps the most significant reason for the failure of Active Sheffield was that three of the key individuals involved in the process left their positions during 1999. An important representative of the Health Authority changed roles within the organisation and by the end of 1999 nobody had replaced her within the partnership (representative from the Health Authority, 12 July, 1999). A key representative of Sheffield Hallam had also changed jobs. Officer 3 (Ex Client And Partnership Manager, Leisure Services) was also absent from work over an extended period during 1998/99. The representative from the Health Authority suggested that loss three individuals were crucial to the partnership:

It is easy to sign up to something without actually having to do anything but turn up to a conference. The reality was it needed me and Officer 3 in our respective departments to run around and get people excited, to persuade them it was worthwhile doing, persuade them to come along to the conference and to actually sign up to stuff. We could have continued to do that, but all of a sudden it was no longer my job and his job was in chaos.
For this type of change you need an advocate. With *Burngreave in Action* we had advocates in all the organisations, the University, the Council, the Health Authority and the community. They are the reason why it worked and that is why the Community Health Wise and the Health Action Zone projects got off the ground, because we had advocates. Once you lose your advocates you lose your voice and all of a sudden it dies and that is what I think happened. (Representative from the Health Authority, 12 July, 1999).

However, she went on to suggest that there were other factors involved:

The individuals that were carrying it and maintaining it, disappeared one by one into different things, through no fault of their own. They were just pulled into different areas or got different jobs. Both Officer 3 and 'the representative from Sheffield University' were very frustrated with their respective organisations which also I found extremely difficult. A very difficult situation to be involved in. I backed off because I didn't want to get caught up with the politics that was going on in the Council and in the Leisure Department (Representative from the Health Authority, 12 July, 1999).

The frustration and politics referred to here related to the internal conflict within the Leisure Department and within the Council:

Partnership is a core value and we have already started work on it and we have a commitment to further improve our partnership work with communities and external agencies. The problem is that if we can't work together ourselves within the teams better, then we don't stand much chance collectively with people outside (Officer 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

Other officers confirmed this:

You have to understand what it means when the City Council wants to work in partnership. First of all, it has to work in partnership with itself, irrespective of anyone else. There are at least ten ... 'bods' in the Authority that never speak to each other, right. So the City Council struggles to find a coherent view about what it collectively wants let alone what it wants to do with the community. (Officer 3, Ex Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999).

A number of community groups also held the view that the internal problems facing the Council prevented it from working in partnership with others:

To have a successful partnership involving the council you need a whole network of sympathetic officers from different sections and departments in the council which aren't competing with each other, or you'll thrash around
like a manic bull getting nowhere and the partnership will be destroyed (Representative from Sheffield University, 22 December 1998).

Therefore, *Active Sheffield* like the *Play Council*, was fraught with difficulties from an early stage. Officer 3's desire to empower communities and to use leisure for participation and improving equity was not shared by the majority of his colleagues. Further, his role and position within the Department was unusual. He described it as an...

...organisational anarchist as I am partially divorced from the central mainstream activities of local government service provision. It is like someone sitting on a boundary looking in at the council's activities in the centre (Officer 3, Ex Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 September 1999).

He suggested that this position enabled him to "look at the 'bigger picture' and plan strategically without being blocked by bureaucracy". During one meeting he stated that the rules and regulations and formalities of the Council were not compatible with community empowerment and partnership as "bureaucracy and democracy are antagonistic" (Officer 3, Ex Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 24 September 1999). Officer 3 became increasingly frustrated with the partnership process, this intensified because he retained responsibility for partnerships after being passed over in the permanent appointment of an Assistant Head of Leisure.

The new Assistant Head of Leisure argued that he did not adopt a "provider only position" and that he was personally in favour of the ideology behind partnerships but admitted he was not as enthusiastic as Officer 3:

Although I believe in this work in principle and will support it, I can't sit outside the organisation, as I am the custodian of the organisation and the people in it (Officer 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

However, Officer 3 argued that the newly appointed Assistant Head of Leisure Services did not share the same commitment to community goals:

I think that is where I feel frustrated and disappointed. I think because circumstances were leading to the community agenda. When I first joined the council the community agenda was almost the conscience of the
Recreation Department. We were there to allow the facilities to have more legitimacy, and because they were externalised there was a real opportunity for the community agenda to be a centre of everything. That was why the community agenda... that was why I fought tooth and nail and did all sorts of peculiar things to get that where it went and that is why I am really disappointed that my successor has effectively put it into reverse. (Officer 2, Ex Client and Partnership Manager, Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 2 August 1999).

During 1999 the internal problems of the Council intensified, Officer 3 was absent from the council for six months due to illness. During his absence two inexperienced officers were given the responsibility for Active Sheffield. These two officers had not been involved in any of the previous work. Officer 2 (Assistant Head of Leisure Services) did not take responsibility for the project, his rationale was that...

...in terms of the Active Sheffield it was purely a matter of resourcing, although I suppose you could argue at a Macro level that well Officer 3 was sick and is now leaving and so on. So if that was truly a priority then why didn't I allocate myself to it or someone else to it? I suppose that is possibly a sign of us being too internally focussed, you know the internal priorities have taken precedent. I think I would still have to make that choice now even if we reran it. I suppose when I came in January there were all sorts of problems to be sorted and until we got rid of some of those internal problems we weren't really going to be able to perform with our partners outside. Things like the budget... the budget was all over the place, we put in place a new structure and now we have got that in place. Also all the internal conflict I mentioned had to be sorted and dealt with and it has been largely now. I took a decision to prioritise some of the internal problems first, and to deal with the partnership agenda later. (Officer 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services, Sheffield City Council, 25 November 1999).

In November 1999 the development of Active Sheffield was postponed indefinitely. Officer 3 subsequently resigned.

In summary, during the 1990s Sheffield City Council called for a 'new generation' of partnership work. This strategic partnership approach would concentrate on identifying need and procuring external funding and would build upon the success of localised partnership work such as the Burngreave Community Action Forum. Certain officers within the Leisure Department developed Active Sheffield with strong support from senior representatives from the health and education sectors. This triumvirate held the
opinion that the voluntary and community sectors should be empowered to tackle the city's social problems.

*Active Sheffield*, like the *Play Council*, had a number of problems at the meso, organisational level and at the micro level of individual actors. The main difficulties related to the perception that there was little parity amongst the members asked to participate in the process. Further, many organisations were omitted from the process, and notably the private sector had only a limited role. In addition, the proliferation of partnership bodies in the city, and the failure of the majority of these to make a positive impact, led to considerable scepticism towards the partnership approach. The notion of community involvement also caused conflict between those who sought community empowerment and those who wanted to use partnership for managing community participation. This raised significant issues relating to influence, power and control. This conflict also caused considerable internal difficulties within the Leisure and finally led to the postponement of the process of developing *Active Sheffield*. These issues will be further developed in the concluding Chapter.

*Table 7.8: Summary of the Characteristics of the *Active Sheffield***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership structure</th>
<th>Informal Citywide partnership, attempt at developing a steering group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Partnership composition | The City Council, Health and Education sector were central to the partnership.  
|                        | 16 organisations were consulted and invited to a steering group. |
| Secretariat            | City Council                                                        |
| Aims and Policies      | Community Recreation and Health.  
|                        | Empowering local communities, tackling disadvantage,  
|                        | identifying strategic need.  
|                        | Attracting inward investment  
|                        | Meeting Council objectives such as the consultation element of Best Value |
| Partner-related issues and concerns | Issues concerning the structure of the partnership.  
|                        | Problems associated with the process of developing the partnership. Factors relating to influence, power and control.  
|                        | Pragmatic reasons, concerning the resourcing and managing the partnership.  
|                        | A set of issues relating to internal problems within partners organisations. |


7.5 Conclusion to the Chapter

During the 1980s Sheffield developed a structure of governance consonant with the 'needs' of economic growth. This led to urban regeneration developments based on facility-led regeneration with the assumption that the benefits of such regeneration would 'trickle-down' to disadvantaged groups. These partnerships were also committed to the process of improving the image of the city to attract inward investment. *Sports Sheffield* was one such partnership, with the goals of attracting sports events and sports teams, which would develop the sports tourism market. Further, *Sport Sheffield* attempted to attract sports governing bodies to the city, attract external funding and reimage the city around symbolic projects such as the National City of Sport and the United Kingdom Sports Institute.

During the 1990s, when it appeared that the growth-oriented partnerships had failed to regenerate the city and, in particular, improve the position of disadvantaged groups, a new model of urban partnership emerged, involving community participation and community empowerment. *Sheffield Play Council* and *Active Sheffield* are indicative of this new partnership approach. However, within a fragmented urban environment, these partnerships faced the problem of reconciling the city's leisure stakeholders. The main issues were how to co-ordinate these groups, combine their resources, and align their different interests around a common goal. This Chapter has discussed the meso and micro level factors, which conspired to obstruct the progress of the three partnerships. These were mainly in the form of institutional, cultural and interpersonal factors, particularly those related to issues of power and influence. These factors had a significant implication on Sheffield's leisure partnership and ultimately determined the success and failure of the partnership polices. These issues are developed in the Chapters eight and nine.
that development is not always the primary issue in cities and no group can amass the resources needed to exercise comprehensive social control (Dahl, 1961). Urban regime theory "explores the middle ground between" (Stone, 1989: 2) these structuralist and pluralist perspectives. For Stone (1988: 17) economic forces are important but "politics still matters". Imbroscio (1998) suggests that both the market and the local state are important within cities. The market provides investment, jobs and taxes and is controlled by business and local government provides a range of collective services and is controlled via elections. For Imbroscio local government is central to any regime, as it provides a degree of democratic legitimacy (i.e. the winning of electoral support). Stone also noted that a...

...regime is specifically about the informal arrangements that surround and complement the formal working of governmental authority (1989: 3).

However, the local state is reliant on business as without development the local state's tax income is reduced and unemployment intensifies the burden on the social welfare system. This dependence requires public officials to develop collaborative arrangements with private interests to govern effectively (Imbroscio 1998).

The association between market forces and political control preoccupied early regime theorists such as Fainstein and Fainstein (1989) and Elkin (1987). However, Stone's (1989) study of Atlanta took the regime analysis further by explaining why continuity in policy had occurred in the city between 1946 and 1989, despite a succession of mayors with different agendas and different bases of electoral support. Stone attributed the continuity to the development coalition formed with the business sector (Stone, 1989).

Since Stone's seminal study other authors have shaped the regime concept. Whilst there is relative agreement as to the defining characteristics of the approach regime (see the table below), there is little agreement as to which are critical for a regime to exist and to what extent they need to be present. Each of the main characteristics of regimes is evaluated below. The Chapter then discusses whether these attributes were present in the Sheffield case.
CHAPTER EIGHT
A THEORETICALLY INFORMED
INTERPRETATION OF THE SHEFFIELD CASE

8.1 Introduction to the Chapter

The aim of this chapter is to consider the application of existing theory to help explain policy change, governance and partnership in Sheffield between 1974 and 1999. Some commentators have explained the changes using regulation theory, arguing that there has been a transformation from a Fordist towards a post-Fordist regime of 'flexible accumulation' (Jessop 1995; Ward, 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). In the 1980s there was a reported shift from corporatism towards a more entrepreneurial form of urban development (Harvey, 1989). North American concepts, such as growth coalitions and regimes, also emerged to form what Cox (1993) has termed a new urban politics. Of these, Urban regime theory has emerged as the dominant (though not unchallenged) paradigm in the field on urban policy (Mossberger and Stoker 2001). The Chapter is structured into two further sections. Section 2 evaluates the central tenets of urban regime theory and Section 3 uses several theoretical approaches to help explain the Sheffield case.

8.2 Regime Theory and Urban Politics

Urban regime theory originates from a political economy perspective and draws on elements of both elitist and pluralist theory (Stone, 1989). A number of commentators have argued that economic forces encourage cities to pursue developmental policies for the good of the city as a whole or in the interests of capital (for electoral gain and as part of the legitimisation process) (O'Connor, 1973; Castells, 1977). Some approaches, such as the growth machine model, are deterministic as they regard urban politics to be generated entirely by the needs of growth. In contrast, pluralists assert
that development is not always the primary issue in cities and no group can amass the resources needed to exercise comprehensive social control (Dahl, 1961). Urban regime theory "explores the middle ground between" (Stone, 1989: 2) these structuralist and pluralist perspectives. For Stone (1988: 17) economic forces are important but "politics still matters". Imbroscio (1998) suggests that both the market and the local state are important within cities. The market provides investment, jobs and taxes and is controlled by business and local government provides a range of collective services and is controlled via elections. For Imbroscio local government is central to any regime, as it provides a degree of democratic legitimacy (i.e. the winning of electoral support). Stone also noted that a...

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Table 8.1: The Main Tenets of Urban regime theory

| • identifiable policy agendas that can be related to the composition of the participants in the coalition; | • a distinctive policy agenda, which is |
| • a longstanding pattern of co-operation rather than a temporary coalition | • relatively long lived and |
| • collaboration based on social production - the need to bring together fragmented resources for the power to accomplish tasks; | • sustained by coalitions of interests or personnel not formally or fully specified in institutional structures, often in the form of a 'grand coalition' or large majority coalition of interests, and often |
| • partners drawn from government and non-government sources, requiring but not limited to business participation; | • cross-sectoral or institutional boundaries. |

(adapted from Mossberger and Stoker 2001) (adapted from Dowding 2001)

8.2.1 Distinctive Policy Agendas

The regime literature has been used to explain the ability of a coalition to develop a strategic vision and mobilise the collective action of others to support or resist particular projects or modes of governance (Stone 1989; Harding 1994; Stoker and Mossberger 1994; Strange 1993; Digaetano and Klemanski 1993a). Central to urban regime theory is the key question:

How in a world of limited and dispersed authority, do actors work together across institutional lines to produce a capacity to govern and bring about publicly significant results? (Stone, 1989: 3).

Different cities often strive for different policy agendas and for Stone (1989) these are shaped by the participants in the governing coalition, the nature of the relationship between participants in the coalition and the resources they bring to it. The policy agendas identified by Stone were not restricted to development or growth, as in the deterministic growth machine accounts, but also included middle-class progressive, maintenance or caretaker and lower class opportunity expansion regimes. Caretaker or maintenance regimes attempt to avoid development issues and are concerned with routine service delivery and achieving low taxes. Middle class progressive regimes seek to achieve varied aims such as environmental protection and affordable housing. Lower class opportunity expansion regimes attempt to widen access to employment and ownership and often target disadvantaged groups or deprived neighbourhoods.

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A number of authors produced variations on Stone's typology. Stoker and Mossberger's (1994) argue that three types of regime exist: organic regimes, instrumentalist regimes and symbolic regimes. Organic regimes attempt to sustain the existing conditions within the city and like the classic caretaker regime they oppose city developments. Instrumentalist regimes promote particular types of urban development around a core development project, with the primary concern of improving the economic development of the city. Symbolic regimes attempt to alter the image or orientation of cities, for example promoting a service-based structure for the city as a reaction to economic restructuring in its traditional industries (Stoker and Mossberger 1994). A number of authors have applied urban regime theory to other policy agendas such as civil rights (Bailey, 1999), urban school reform (Henig et al., 1999; Stone, 1998), sports policy (Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999), public transport (Marichal, 2000).

8.2.2 Relatively long lived

Urban regime theory offers an approach that recognises the role of the wider political, social and economic factors in restructuring of cities. Regimes mediate these forces and develop strategies, alliances and policies to maintain their position and to reconcile decision-making (Stoker and Mossberger 1994). It is the ability of the leadership based within local government and the private sector to develop a strategic vision and co-ordinate the actions and capacities of others that provides this stability. Thus a regime is "an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enables it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions" Stone (1989: 4). In Atlanta Stone found that this stability lasted for a period of 40 years and survived changes in leadership. Where 'regime like' activity is present in a city but has influenced policy for only a short period of time the regime is said to be 'emergent' (DiGaetano and Lawless 1999).

8.2.3 Collaboration Based On Social Production

Regime theorists argue that power within complex modern cities is fragmented due to the division of labour between the market and state (Elkin, 1987: 18). DiGaetano (1997) and Dowding (2001) identifies four forms of power in the urban setting.
Systemic power enables certain interests (particularly the private sector) to influence decision making through their position in society (Stone, 1989). Command power is the ability of one group to exercise domination over others (Stone, 1989: 82). Bargaining power is used to build coalitions through collaboration and negotiation rather than control and conflict. Pre-emptive power is a complex form of power and is "the capacity to occupy, hold, and make use of a strategic position" (Stone, 1988: 83). For Stone...

...power may also lie in the details; that is, in capacity to guide the piecemeal evolution of new practices and make marginal adjustments in prevailing patterns of cooperation and exchange. (Stone, 1989: 221).

The regime approach moves away from analysis of 'who rules' and 'over whom' to a social production perspective which develops the 'capacity to act (Stone, 1989). This form of power comes from the ability of collaborating organisations to accomplish goals though a creative combination of resources, skills and objectives. It is the power to achieve collective action rather than the power over (Stone, 1989). This model is particularly valuable for helping us understand the policy development in Sheffield as it places considerable emphasis on the role of subjects in the process.

Collaboration is achieved through informal, not formal networks. Co-operation does not necessarily mean consensus over values and beliefs but participation in the regime is to realise "small opportunities" (Stone, 1993: 11). Any successful regime will make use of selective material incentives to manage conflicts within the governing coalition and with outside forces. These selective incentives may include contracts, jobs, or facilities for a particular neighbourhood (Mossberger and Stoker 2001). The selective incentives may be purposive as well as material and may simply be the perceived opportunity for an organisation to achieve its goals. Selective incentives may also be used to include some and exclude others, thereby disorganising any potential opposition. However, if a challenge is mounted on a regime this will require an alternative strategic vision. Most opposition fails because it lacks this and because it tends to focus on 'small opportunities' which do not provide the basis to build wider alliances (Stone, 1989). Moreover, oppositional forces are unlikely to possess the resources and capacities necessary to construct a new regime.
8.2.4 Cross-sectoral partners

Regimes may occur at different times in different cities and the existence will depend upon the relative strength of business, the composition of particular businesses engaged in the coalition and the presence of other interests, such as neighbourhood groups or environmental groups (Digaetano and Klemanski 1993). Thus, regimes emerge out of the co-operation based on mutual self-interest between public, private and community actors. It is the...

...informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions (Stone, 1989: 6).

As outlined above, the business sector brings capital that generates jobs, tax revenues and financing. Local government brings legitimacy and policy-making authority (Mossberger and Stoker 2001). The relationship is collaborative it is not...

...public agencies using electoral power to coerce the business sector to work alongside it; nor is it the business sector riding 'roughshod' over the public authorities to serve the needs of capital (Ward, 1996: 428).

8.3 Theory And The Sheffield Case

As noted in chapter four, the findings of the empirical study revealed 3 general dimensions national and global factors, organisational and interorganisational factors and inter-subject factors all affected the urban policy making environment. The study also suggests that Sheffield

This section attempts to use existing theory to help interpret the results of the empirical study to help provide an understanding of the Sheffield case.

8.3.1 The Formation and Sustenance of Sheffield’s Nascent Symbolic Regime: National and Global Factors

By the mid-1980s Sheffield’s local government was unable to pursue its policy agenda alone. Therefore, regeneration, reimagining and tackling social exclusion had to be addressed via an approach which co-ordinated and integrated the activities and resources of public, private, voluntary and community sectors. A regime emerged intent on regenerating Sheffield's industrial heartland and altering the image of the city from a declining industrial city to a centre for tourism, leisure and inward
investment. Such a regime fits closely to what Stoker and Mossberger term a symbolic regime and particularly, an urban revitalisation regime in terms of its mode of functioning and purpose (Henry and Paramio-Salcínes 1999).

8.3.2 The Formation and Sustenance of Sheffield's Nascent Symbolic Regime: Organisational and Interorganisational Factors

Chapter 6 argued that within the new political economy of the 1980s, there was a clear decline in the power of public sector trade unions and the city's traditional industries. The decline in influence of the Council's established collaborators (the Steel Industry and the Trade Unions), coupled with a drive to break from its industrial past, led to a need for new partnerships with the city's new businesses. During this period the private sector became more influential in the city's decision making networks and this was primarily through the Chamber of Commerce. Like the City Council, the Chamber of Commerce shared the desire to regenerate the Lower Don Valley. During the mid 1980s several important strategic reports were produced. These reports argued that Sheffield required new forms of employment generation, particularly in business and technology. The regime's strategy argued that to cope with the socio-economic and political uncertainty of the 1980s, regeneration and reimagining based on flagship economic development projects would give Sheffield a competitive edge.

To achieve results Sheffield's regime had to attract actors and organisations that had access to key resources and capacities. Therefore the regime privileged certain interests, particularly those with systemic power such as the new business elite and the city's universities. The regime provided material incentives such as jobs and new facilities as well as the opportunity for organisations to come together to develop shared agenda for the future, to position the city/region in the new economy, to enthuse residents, businesses and potential inward investors:

The Chamber of Commerce, our Universities, the City Council and the Chamber of Trade met regularly to try and plan a way forward for the city. Investments were made in the environment and infrastructures were laid down but it proved not to be enough! We were desperately looking for a catalyst that could start off the revival to lift the image of our city both nationally and internationally. It was clear that we were on our own without little help coming from Government or Europe (Price 1998: 4).
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The regime was based upon the interorganisational relationships between these organisations. In particular, it sought to break down the previous image of confrontation between Sheffield City Council and Central Government and local businesses and to overcome resistance internally and externally to the regimes local strategies:

What we did agree to do was to work together closely and it became apparent that the more we talked, the more we agreed on our basic aims and objectives. We all wanted quality services and a place we could live in with pride and confidence. (Price 1998: 5).

The members of the regime had interlocking memberships of the various partnership forums in the city. The most prominent was the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee. The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee brought together 24 members, including representatives of the Council, the city's business community, trade unions, higher education institutions, central government agencies and community organisations (Lawless, 1990; Seyd, 1993; Strange 1993; 1997; Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999). The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee was recognised as a mutual dependency partnership between the elected politicians and local business groups in the promotion economic development. The partnership was about communicating intentions and symbolic rewards such as the commitment to local regeneration and the fostering of an entrepreneurial climate (Strange, 1993, 1997). The nascent symbolic regime was not restricted to public and private sectors and when it required the collective mobilisation of large interest groups, for example for the Word Student Games, the voluntary and community sectors became part of the governing coalition, although their role was somewhat peripheral.

It has been argued above and elsewhere (see Ward 1996: 429) that regime theorists have often paid too much attention to analysis of the policies of regimes and reasons for continuity once a regime has formed, without evaluating why organisations become involved in inter-organisational collaboration. The considerable but fragmented literature relating to interorganisational relationships may develop our understanding. Oliver (1990), for example, examined both the reasons for relationship formation and the conditions under which these relationships are established:
Organisations consciously enter into relationships for specific reasons within the constraints of a variety of conditions that limit or influence their choices (Oliver, 1990: 242).

Based on an integration of the literature from 1960 to 1990, Oliver (1990) developed six generalisable determinants of relationship formation: Necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability and legitimacy. Although each one is a separate and sufficient cause for interorganisational relationships formation, they may interact or occur concurrently.

An organisation often establishes linkages, through necessity, in order to meet legal or regulatory requirements. Within Britain, partnership working has often been a mandatory requirement. Interorganisational relationship’s also form because they offer the potential for the exercising of power and control over another organisation or its resources. Oliver argues that this asymmetric determinant is likely to occur when there is resource scarcity. Furthermore, the reluctance of organisations or their agents to relinquish control reflects asymmetrical decision-making. This determinant can be linked to the organisational literature and the theories of political economy, hegemony and elitism introduced in Chapter 3. Coalitions formed for asymmetric motives are likely to face conflict and competing factions. As these partnerships are...

...characterised by injustice, information distortion, manipulation, exploitation, coercion, inequality or conflict (Oliver, 1990: 244).

In contrast to issues of domination, power and control, reciprocal relations occur when organisations display cooperation, collaboration and coordination. Here relationships are formed for the purpose of pursuing common or mutually beneficial goals or interests, for example attracting inward investment. As with asymmetry, reciprocal relations may emerge from resource scarcity, which may induce cooperation rather than competition. Potential partners will anticipate that the benefits of forming the relationship will exceed the disadvantages. This determinant is closely linked to regime formation, as it is the ability of regimes to attract organisations through reciprocity that leads to enduring co-operation and the use of pre-emptive rather that command power. Efficiency motives are internally rather than externally oriented and are concerned with an organisation attempting to improve its internal input/output ratio. This may come about by an anticipation of an increasing return on investment, or reductions in unit cost, waste, downtime or cost per patient.
(Oliver, 1990). The *stability* determinant is concerned with responding to environmental uncertainty, this is caused by resource scarcity, and imperfect knowledge, and interorganisational relationships are formed to provide stability, predictability and dependability.

Organisations also join to justify their outputs in terms of the prevailing norms, rules, beliefs or expectations of the industry or other external constituents. For example being a partnership may demonstrate some degree of social responsibility, which can enhance image and reputation. For this determinant to be used the *legitimacy* of the partner organisations must be higher than their own.

In addition to providing a means of evaluating the rationales for interorganisational collaboration, Oliver argues that there will be a variety of different interorganisational relationships at work concurrently, and that at any given time one may dominate. Therefore, this classification is a particularly valuable addition to the regime approach as it provides a framework for evaluating how collaboration changes over time and within different contexts. Table 8.3 demonstrates how each of these determinants was evident within Sheffield’s *nascent symbolic regime*.

Once formed, the *nascent symbolic regime* implemented a property / facility-led regeneration and reimaging programme, which was built on ‘flagship projects’ such as the World Student Games. If one regards the Games as a place-marketing exercises linked to property-led development, then the Games were a success. The presentational politics of the bidding process required a local partnership. The partners argued that the Games would have a broadly positive impact on the city. This legitimised the local state-aided development policy, and provided the context in which the various dilemmas of partnership were managed in the short-term.
Table 8.2: Determinants of Interorganisational Collaboration in Sheffield’s Nascent Symbolic Regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbolic regime</th>
<th>Mandatory</th>
<th>Asymmetry</th>
<th>Reciprocity</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for interorganisational relationship formation</td>
<td>Central government legislation and ideology insisted upon active collaboration between the public and private sectors</td>
<td>The need for collective power.</td>
<td>A need to promote the collective good: The mutual benefits from an enhanced city profile</td>
<td>The need to gain an economic advantage in attracting tourists and events.</td>
<td>A reaction to the climate of economic and political uncertainty</td>
<td>The need to demonstrate the norms of cooperation between groups in formal partnerships e.g. SERC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the Games provided a 'flagship' project for developing a broadly consensual local accumulation strategy and vision. It provided the basis for changing the profile of the Don Valley from a deindustrialised inner-city area; it secured property-led regeneration; it enhanced the image of Sheffield; it led to further sporting events being held in the city; and promised benefits to the city's population. Further, the Games laid the foundations for further leisure-related projects in the city and a reimaging strategy based on Sheffield becoming a National City of Sport.

Alongside the sporting facilities, Sheffield's nascent symbolic regime also invested in its cultural industries. A declining industrial area in the city centre was designated the city's Cultural Industries Quarter (CIQ). Funding for this venture came from a number of sources, including the Council, the Arts Council, the Urban Programme and from private and voluntary organisations. The nascent symbolic regime used cultural policy to contribute to the regime's vision and shifted this policy from the 1970s and 1980s concern with 'Arts for All' and developing local culture, to a concentration on consumer-oriented developments that would help the regeneration and reimaging of the city.

A further outcome of the regime's activities was the work of the Sports Sheffield Association. The SSA was a collaborative organisation between the City Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the Sheffield and Sheffield Hallam Universities, the City
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Tertiary College, the Central Sheffield University Hospitals and the Northern General Hospital Trust as well as a number of national sports agencies and governing bodies. The *Sports Sheffield Association* attracted some external finance and managed to stimulate a degree of local community sports development. The *Sports Sheffield Association* can be seen as part of the Nascent Symbolic Regime’s vision for citywide development based on sport. In particular, the *Sports Sheffield Association* attempted to develop an infrastructure and support services for national sports squads to base their operations in Sheffield. As *Sports Sheffield* developed it became more involved in ambitious plans for economic regeneration and city reimagining. It was instrumental in Sheffield's bid to become the first National City of Sport and subsequently played a significant role in bidding for the British Academy of Sport (later the United Kingdom Sports Institute). The vision espoused by the regime and the facilities it could provide attracted a number of professional sports teams to Sheffield during the 1990s.

8.3.3 The Formation and Sustenance of Sheffield's Nascent Symbolic Regime: Inter-subject factors

Sheffield's *nascent symbolic regime* was developed, not only as a reaction to macro level political, social and economic factors and interorganisational relationships, but also as a function of the development of informal interpersonal networking among business leaders, political figures, and other local elites. The inter-subject dimension formed the basis of trust for interorganisational negotiations and the formation of a broad-based vision for the region. Mollenkkopf (1983) argues that political entrepreneurs often promote coalition formation. A political entrepreneur can be defined as "one who gathers and risks political capital or support in order to reshape politics and create new sources of power by establishing new programs and policies" (Mollenkopf, 1983: 134). Sheffield's *nascent symbolic regime* had such political entrepreneurs.

Councillor I (Leader of the Leisure Committee and later Deputy Leader of the Labour Group) achieved a high profile in the World Student Games bidding process as 'Sheffield's Mr. Sport'. Other members of the local authority also performed key roles. The drive and leadership of this urban elite was crucial to the *nascent symbolic*
regime. They set the objectives and it was their personal attributes (in particular Councillor 1), which heightened the visibility of the regime. Strong competent leadership was also essential to draw in reluctant partners (in the authority and outside) and drove forward the regeneration and reimaging agenda, thus ensuring that partnerships within the regime, such as Sports Sheffield, did not turn into mere ‘talking shops’.

### 8.3.4 Failure of Sheffield’s Nascent Symbolic Regime: National and Global Factors

Whilst most urban regime accounts evaluate the reasons for continuity and stability, few have addressed the issue of urban regime failure. Whilst not providing a case of urban regime failure, Digaetano (1997) suggests that the process would adhere to several stages. Firstly, there would be a questioning of the established regime and doubts would be expressed about its capacity and about the goals it was pursuing. Secondly, there would be a redefinition of the scope and purpose of the regime and the city’s politics would be characterised by uncertainty and debate. This stage would be a struggle for the "hearts and minds" of established actors to support a new way forward. Thirdly, there would be an institutionalisation of the new regime with new material incentives and a new ideological outlook.

Dowding (2001) also fails to provide empirical evidence of a regime failure but suggests that they are only viable if they are able to mobilise the resources supportive of a policy agenda. Each regime is required to match resources to the requirements of their supporters. Therefore, maintenance regimes may fail when there are no growth demands placed on the regime. Development regimes are also dependent on the prevailing economic conditions. When development promises cannot be met the regime may fail. Unpopular developments may also result in regime failure. Progressive politics may fail if they do not increase employment opportunities and mass mobilisation regimes will fail if they are unable to understand the needs of their constituency.

Within Sheffield, the nascent symbolic regime began to weaken during the early 1990s and its members began to distance themselves from large-scale facility-led regeneration and reimaging projects. Several social, economic and political changes...
contributed to the fragmentation and dilution of the regime. Whilst the Council continued to suffer from a lack of funding, Sheffield's economic situation improved. The nascent symbolic regime had been successful in achieving a consensus around a growth-oriented and reimaging project to overcome deindustrialisation and an image of urban decline of the 1980s. However, by the mid 1990s, the city had undergone a shift in employment structure from manufacturing to the service industries. It had attracted new businesses, created jobs and developed a new image as a City of Sport. In many respects the regime's policy agenda had become redundant.

In addition to economic change, central-local relations improved, firstly under John Major's Conservative administration and later under New Labour. Major's government espoused the rhetoric of citizen empowerment, opportunity and choice through vehicles such as the Citizen's Charter. New Labour also emphasised training, education, re-skilling and investing in people. The new consensus across political parties suggests a move away from a Keynesian welfare settlement towards a neo-liberal post-Thatcher settlement (Hay 1997: 373). Under such conditions the requirement for citywide regeneration and reimaging became secondary to easing social problems in specific areas of need, and enhancing community involvement in decision making. Within this new context the city's organisations began to distance themselves from large-scale business oriented developments towards enhancing the notions of community development and empowerment in decision-making. In addition, it is argued below that the internal politics of the regime was more fragile than some have suggested and the regime thus failed to sustain its input into city politics.

8.3.5 Failure of Sheffield's Nascent Symbolic Regime: Organisational and Interorganisational factors

Most regime accounts demonstrate how the business community mobilises with the public sector to initiate collective action and to stabilise the decision-making environment. In the US regimes have often developed from a longstanding pattern of co-operation between the business and public sectors. However, Sheffield had a history of antagonism between these two sectors:

When the City Council and the private sector started working in partnership, there was still the remnants of a socialist agenda, where the Authority blamed
government and the private sector for everything (Officer 3, Ex Acting Assistant Head of Leisure Services).

During the 1980s Sheffield's local government lost its capacity to act alone and became dependent on the business community to achieve its policy agenda. The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee, unlike the Chamber of Commerce previously, was able to attract and mobilise the new business community. However, the business sector continued to play a less significant role in Sheffield, than played by businesses in US regimes. Apart from the SMGI investment of £34 million into the Arena development in the run up to the Games, Sheffield's regime failed to secure significant business funding, either for the Games or during the post-Games period. The inability of Sheffield Leisure and Recreation Trust to raise funding from the business sector forced it to borrow money from a consortium of overseas banks, which meant that, in essence, the World Student Games was funded from local taxation. The high cost of the Games was seen as a reason for the regime's unity and support being dissipated. Further, during the post-Games period Sheffield City Council suffered further cuts in expenditure. Despite managing to offset some of the cuts against financial ingenuity, voluntary redundancies, and encouraging staff to take unpaid leave or reduced working hours, the Department was forced to cut service provision. The cut in funding of leisure services meant a number of community facilities were closed and charges for leisure facilities increased. This brought widespread hostility from the community and the opposition parties.

In contrast to the business sector, Sheffield City Council played a major role in developing and sustaining the nascent symbolic regime and it was senior officers and politicians that initiated many of the regime's strategies (such as the bid for the World Student Games). It could be argued that Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT), gave the council more time to develop strategies by freeing the members from involvement in detail in order to focus more on matters of strategy. Osborne and Gaebler's (1993) suggest governments were able to give up "rowing" in order to focus on "steering". However, this separated policy formation from implementation and led to what Mintzberg (1994: 254) has described as "the fallacy of detachment". In the post Games period there were clear difficulties in separating the client and contractor roles. The new public-private partnerships and trusts, like Sheffield International
Venues, were expected to serve the public interest as well as to deliver private benefits.

Ranson and Stewart (1994) argue that local government should not attempt to import private sector models of management into the public sector. Many officers felt that Sheffield International Venues, as the city's major provider of public leisure facilities, was too commercial-like and that it had lost sight of what had made public services distinctive. This was evident in the disagreements over the valid use of leisure space. The local government officers felt that the public-private arrangements allowed the exploitative use of public resources for private purposes, whilst Sheffield International Venues was resistant to any attempts made by the Council to extend the state's reach into the market economy to serve the interests of the state or the governing party. Thus, throughout the period there were underlying tensions between the public and private sectors. For Imbescio (1998: 216) this is always the case as "the dynamics of democracy clash with the dynamics of capitalism, resulting in an enduring tension". This thesis has suggested that by the mid to late-1990 the nascent symbolic regime could no longer accommodate or check these tensions. When economic conditions are not favourable for the particular regime performing the governance role, then the regime is likely to suffer (Imbescio, 1998).

Within Sheffield the goal of integrating urban development and reimagining policy was paramount, even if this meant subordinating social policy. Sheffield's community sector was fragmented and a proliferation of partnership bodies existed within the city. Within this environment it was easier to exclude interests, particularly groups deemed unhelpful or potentially disruptive. Despite this, the regime encountered little resistance, as it used selective material incentives to pacify opposition and argued that the benefits of regeneration and reimagining would 'trickle down' to disadvantaged groups. However, by the mid-1990s partnerships in the city, such as the Sports Sheffield Association, had to address and satisfy the internal politics of the urban regime as well satisfying growing demands for a more inclusive 'vision'. However, even during the 1990s when the regime articulated community-oriented goals, it failed to demonstrate a full commitment to their objectives. When the Sports Sheffield Association attempted to develop short-term participation exercises and modest revenue funding for community sport, it failed to gain resource commitments from its
principle partners. Attempts, such as the leisure card, were made to encourage marginalised / excluded groups to use the 'flagship facilities' whilst in other parts of the city community facilities were being closed. Endeavours to protect community facilities through business-community partnerships, as in the case of the management of King Edwards Swimming Pool, were isolated from the regime. Further, the proliferation of these small-scale partnerships led to the fragmentation and duplication of partnership activity. Therefore, attempts to include community recreation can be seen as a form of legitimisation or symbolism, which masked the continued dominance of a facility-led form of regeneration and reimagining. This led to the regime's vision being discredited and erosion of the collaboration that held the regime together during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Sheffield's nascent symbolic regime also failed to attract new coalition members. Most significantly, it failed to demonstrate a strong commitment to the United Kingdom Sports Institute (UKSI), which led to its failure to attract sports governing bodies to the city. Many of these governing bodies failed to regard Sheffield as a legitimate location for the UKSI headquarters and refused to relocate outside of London and Manchester. The figure below uses Oliver's (1990) determinants of interorganisational relationships, to help explain the difficulties in sustaining interorganisational relationships:
Table 8.3: Factors that Weakened the Interorganisational Collaboration in Sheffield’s *Nascent Symbolic Regime*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems of sustaining interorganisational relationships in Sheffield.</th>
<th>Mandator</th>
<th>Asymmetry</th>
<th>Reciprocity</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong government intervention weakened the regime by preventing local autonomy.</td>
<td>Strong domination of the Council and Education Sector.</td>
<td>Inadequate and unequal contributions to the regime in terms of resource (financial and human).</td>
<td>Strive for efficiency led to closure of community facilities.</td>
<td>The cost of the large-scale ‘flagship’ development policy was high risk and contributed to instability.</td>
<td>Low community awareness of the regime’s programmes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusion of the community sector</td>
<td>Private sector contributes very little accept for the Arena.</td>
<td>Conflict over economic goals and social inclusion.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Explicit public criticism of the World Student Games</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.3.6 *Failure of Sheffield’s Nascent Symbolic Regime: Inter-subject factors*

There are a number of reasons why the human aspects of Sheffield’s *nascent symbolic regime* were an important determinant of its failure. Firstly, for the regime to survive, public, private and community sectors and the individuals within them had to work to develop trust and reciprocity rather than distrust and asymmetry. Regimes require complex inter-personal and organisational interactions whereby participants recognise that collaboration will provide pre-emptive power and the capacity to act for the good of the city (Stone 1989). Within Sheffield the interpersonal relationships within the regime, particularly after the Word Student Games became more antagonistic. The financial burden of the Games led to resistance from politicians and one member
resigned. Further, the convention between members of SERC that disagreements would not be voiced in public was broken.

Within Sheffield a limited number of politicians were central to the strategic direction of the regime, in particular its bidding for the World Student Games. However, during the 1990s Sheffield's politicians faced the problem of balancing the short-term interests of the public with long-term regeneration and reimagining objectives. As the electorate provides politicians with political power, regime activity is dependent on electoral support. As the support for the Labour Party in Sheffield declined through the 1990s members began to distance themselves from the regeneration and reimagining strategy. Whilst New Labour enjoyed unprecedented support in national opinion polls during the late 1990s, Sheffield's local Labour Party lost power in the 1999 local elections. A number of interviewees directly attributed this to the failure of the regeneration and reimagining strategy.

8.3.7 The formation of a new socially progressive politics: National and Global Factors

By the mid 1990s, the apparent failure of mixed market solutions to adequately address issues of inequality, poverty and social exclusion began to dilute the nascent symbolic regime. The City of Sport Plan, the mainstay of the new image for Sheffield, argued for an end to the large-scale facility led developments and a greater concern for community development and empowerment. This would be harnessed through, skills development, facility control and resource support (Sheffield City Council 1995). This document argued that the city needed to embrace the foundation and participation, as well as the performance areas of sport and would target sport provision for women, the disabled, ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged communities (Sheffield City Council 1995). However, the fragmented nature of the city meant that it was impossible to return to the hierarchical, bureaucratic and authoritative methods of government structures of the 1960s and 1970s to tackle social problems. Instead, an attempt was made to develop a new partnership approach espousing a socially progressive politics. This aspiration acted as a focal point bringing together the public, private and voluntary sectors.
The improvement in Sheffield's economic position meant that regeneration and reimaging goals became less significant considerations. However, the authority found itself operating in a rapidly changing international, especially European, environment. Many European funding programmes stemmed largely from concern about the local effects of the decline of traditional, industrial sectors and associated increases in unemployment, making Sheffield a prime candidate. These funding initiatives stressed, as a precondition, that the "local community" should play an enhanced role in formulating local plans and priorities:

The fact that we are now competing nationally for resources and on a European basis and nearly all those funding regimes suggest that if we can't reflect partnership in the bids and ensure partnership will be the vehicle for implementing any programmes then you ain't going to get anywhere. So there are strong levers in there, I think without those levers I am not sure the culture of local authorities would be sufficient to effect those partnerships. I think you needed that leverage from funding and political pressure for use to truly move in that direction. (Officer 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services).

These EU funding sources also stated that councillors should not channel these investments alone, but should involve the community in decision-making. As a result the authority was forced to develop ways of consulting with and involving representatives from the community sectors.

In addition to economic changes, the 1990s also saw national politics continuing to have an impact at the local level. The modernisation agenda led to an increasing interest, not just in decentralising services, but also in introducing new democratic structures, including networks, neighbourhood meetings, area committees, and citizens panels. Further, local authorities were encouraged to experiment with their internal departmental and committee structures, as well as new methods of service delivery to promote the interests of traditionally under-represented sections of the community. Many of these changes were brought about by a desire to address what is perceived to be a crisis of local democracy, resulting from the widespread disinterest and lack of participation in local politics. In response Sheffield City Council ensured that its objectives were addressed by securing a leading role for councillors on partnership boards and/or formal agreements with other agencies.
8.3.8 The Development of Sheffield's Socially Progressive Organisational and Interorganisational Factors

Arnstein (1969) developed an eight level model of community participation (as shown below / for more detail see chapter 3) which can be used to explain the changing attitudes towards the community sector in Sheffield.

Table 8.4 Arnstein's Eight Levels of Community Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Manipulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Therapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Informing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Placation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Delegated Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Citizen Control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Marriot 1980: 114)

During the late 1980s and early 1990s Sheffield nascent symbolic regime adopted a position of informing the community after a decision had been made. The decision to commit to the World Student Games was almost entirely taken by the city's urban elite with no consultation with the population. Through the 1990s Sheffield moved to a position of consultation. Consultation was advocated in Best Value and led to the development of Area Committees and Citizens Panels. By the end of the 1990s Sheffield's socially progressive coalition attempted to introduce a level of community participation at Arstein's partnership level. For Arnstein, partnership occurs where power is redistributed and citizens may have decision-making powers equal to those...
of professionals. The aim is for the community to be self-regulating and self-governing, acting and thinking according to criteria which accord with the aims of other partners. Such a level of was clearly articulated in the Council’s documents:

Through partnerships citizens will be able to take part in the Council’s decision-making and service development more effectively and more often. Community partnerships could: Promote interest, involvement and understanding of the business of the Council; Improve services and, therefore, public satisfaction; Create confidence and satisfaction by giving people greater control over their lives (Sheffield City Council 1998: 12).

Arnstein’s (1969) model has been criticised on a number of counts (see Burns et al, 1994: 153-79). In particular, the space between increments is equidistant yet in reality progression towards more community participation is likely to get increasingly harder. In the Sheffield case the gap between consultation and partnering was particularly difficult to bridge.

Sheffield City Council was not the only organisation that sought to ameliorate the position of disadvantaged groups and within the city. A number of organisations came together to develop a 'new generation of partnership work', with the shared goals of improving community participation and community empowerment. This coalition brought together actors and organisations that had access to key resources, particularly the Council, and the health and education sectors. In contrast to the nascent symbolic regime, the progressive coalition discounted the role of the business sector. This was apparent within the Burngreave in Action Partnership, Sheffield Play Council and Active Sheffield. The members of the coalition had interlocking memberships of various citywide and local partnerships. These partners were willing to support the coalition financially and in terms of developing community knowledge, confidence building and self-organisation. The vision was to work with local communities, in a way that would empower local people to improve services.

Oliver's (1990) determinants of interorganisational relationships can be employed to summarise why organisations were attracted to form a coalition with socially progressive goals:
Table 8.5: Determinants of Interorganisational Collaboration in Sheffield's Community Partnership Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandatory</th>
<th>Asymmetry</th>
<th>Reciprocity</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Coalition Reasons for interorganisational relationship formation</td>
<td>Some organisations e.g. Health Authority had a statutory obligation to work in partnership.</td>
<td>Increase collective influence over the allocation of funds e.g. SRB.</td>
<td>Developing knowledge, confidence and self-organisation.</td>
<td>Reduce cost of social service delivery</td>
<td>Share risk and reduce uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Funding regimes required a partnership bid</td>
<td></td>
<td>A need to promote the collective good of social inclusion</td>
<td></td>
<td>The coalition increased the councils community visibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.3.9 *A Nascent Socially Progressive Regime?*

One of the central questions that emerged from the case is whether the shift to a new progressive politics evident in Sheffield represents a change in the policy agenda of the city's (previously symbolic) regime, an emergence of a new regime, or a change to a different form of governance. It has been argued above that Sheffield's *nascent symbolic regime* was more fragile than some commentators have suggested and that the failure to account for the goals and values of the community contributed to its failure. This precludes any notion of the regime changing its policy agenda. This section evaluates whether the coalition can be termed a nascent socially progressive regime.

As argued above, regimes have a number of defining characteristics including identifiable policy agendas, they are relatively long lived, they base collaboration on social production and draw partners from government and non-governmental sources. The progressive coalition had an identifiable policy agenda based on improving community participation and community empowerment. However, unlike the regeneration and reimaging vision of the 1980s, the coalition failed to gain unanimous support for this policy from all stakeholders, particularly the business sector and some elements of the City Council. The longevity of a regime is also an important factor. Whilst regimes can be emerging, the failure of the Sheffield coalition to formalise...
either the Play Council or Active Sheffield by 1999 suggest that there was a lack of cohesion within the regime, precluding any notion of it sustaining long-term collaboration.

Collaboration within regimes has traditionally been between the public and private sectors. However, urban regime theory does not rule out the notion of the community sector as a legitimate regime member (Stone 1989, xi). Indeed, there is "the potential for a third sector - neither truly public nor private - to play a significant role in accumulation" (Imbroscio 1998: 238-239). These,

Community based regimes would be centered around a governing coalition dominated by two sets of actors: the leaders of community based groups, rooted largely in the city's neighbourhoods, and their allies who have captured the public power of city government via the electoral process (Imbroscio 1998: 242).

The potential for a community dimension to regime politics is dependent on whether communities can exert a strategic influence within local power structures. Within regimes this strategic influence arises from the resources partners can bring to the regime and systemic power. Under capitalism, business has an advantage due to its systematic relationship with the economy (Imbroscio 1998). The private sector invests capital, creates jobs and generates tax income. The community sector does not necessarily have this advantage. However, during the 1990s a community dimension to partnerships was sometimes necessary for, or increased the chances of, attracting Government and European funding. Smith and Beazley (2000) argue that the ability of community groups to attract extra-local funding may provide them with a way into regimes.

Whilst community groups may become members of a regime, it is debatable whether...

...such progressive regimes that do emerge actually strive for qualitative shifts in local power or, instead, accept quite limited - and often temporary - concessions to lower income residents within a standard pro-growth orientation (Sites, 1997: 551).

The final central tenet of Urban regime theory is that partners must be drawn across sectors. However, Sheffield's progressive coalition challenged and in some cases excluded the business sector (for example Sheffield International Venues was not
invited to join). As noted above, one of the great strengths of urban regime theory is its ability synthesise political economy by bridging the divide between the popular control of government and private control of the economy. However,

...although the nature of business involvement extends from the direct and extensive to the indirect and limited, the economic role of business and the resources they control are too important for these enterprises to be left out completely (Stone 1989: 7).

Thus, the theory is not pluralistic and if...

...regimes are simply coalitions that bring together actors in a complex policy environment but where the division between market and state is not a factor, then how do urban regimes differ from networks? (Mossberger and Stoker 2001: 812).

Bassett (1996: 550) argues that regimes may form "in certain contexts, perhaps marked by strong leadership and the dominance of one network or ideology, that different networks cohere into a recognizable urban regime". However, the policy networks concept may be better placed to describe some forms of cross-institutional collaboration, like Sheffield's socially progressive coalition. The policy network approach acknowledges that as society becomes more complex, policy-making is subject to fragmentation into different policy domains. Different relationships form between the state and civil society and can be...

...defined as policy networks insofar as they involve some recognition by the state of group-interests, and involve various forms of institutionalised access and exchange of information" (Bassett, 1996: 551).

The policy network concept highlights the role and interests of key actors in the making of public policy, as well as the pattern of policy-making that emerges. The general model has evolved over a number of years as means of analysing and explaining policy-making processes in various contexts. According to Rhodes (1981), the broad parameters of behaviour in policy networks are informed by the following assumptions. Firstly, organisations depend on each other for resources. Secondly, to achieve goals there must be resource exchange of various kinds between organisations. Thirdly, although inter-dependency exists, dominant organisations/coalitions exercise most power and tend to regulate the process of resource exchange within generally accepted parameters. Fourthly, the degree of discretion exercised by the dominant organisation/s in a network is a function of both
the goals and the relative power potential of the network's members (Rhodes 1981; cited in Marsh and Rhodes 1992: 10-11).

Many different types of policy network can exist. These are best considered as being located on a continuum according to the stability or otherwise of the network; its insularity or permeability, and the strength of the resource dependencies therein. At one extreme of the continuum are policy communities, at the other issue networks. The various collaborative arrangements in Sheffield constructed in the general field of leisure and health policy all espoused a commitment to community partnership, participation and empowerment. Like an issue network, Sheffield's coalition comprised of a proliferation of partnerships occupying the policy arena. These bodies had interlocking memberships and most had some degree of autonomy. In terms of membership there was a core and a periphery, the key organisations were drawn from the local authority, the health and the education sectors. These organisations were involved in key decision-making and resourced the network. Other public organisation such as the police, voluntary organisations and community groups played a more peripheral role. The issue network is characterised by a multitude of participants, a low degree of integration and institutionalisation, and conflict instead of consensus and participants having unequal resources and structural power (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). Such conditions existed in Sheffield at the end of the 1990s and help explain why consensus and stability was not achieved.

8.3.10 The Development of Sheffield's Socially Progressive politics: Inter-subject Factors

Central to the development of the coalition was the ability to attract people that could represent the interests of key sections of their local communities, particularly disadvantaged groups. For some organisations, such as the City Council, this required a cultural change. The new culture required officers to acquire new skills and adapt to new ways of decision-making, and there was a need to share power with the community. Committed officers working within the Leisure Department triggered these processes of change. These officers, and in particular Officer 3 (Ex Acting Assistant Head of Leisure Services), during his brief control of the Department, was cast as a change agent. Three distinct attitudes were apparent within Sheffield's public, private and community organisations. Firstly, those concerned with
community development sought to provide opportunities for community self-determination in leisure provision. Secondly, there was a paternalistic view that professionals or elites should help the community identify its needs. Thirdly, there was a view that professionals or experts should supply what the community needs.

8.3.11 The Failure of Sheffield's Socially Progressive politics: Organisational and Interorganisational Factors

Stone (1989) alluded to the difficulty of tackling community goals within the regime framework. He argues that a regime will strive to achieve its objectives (i.e. effectiveness), but at the same time a regime needs to be aware of the implications of its actions for the whole community (i.e. the issue of equity). This in turn requires a regime capacity for 'understanding' or 'social learning' (Stone, 1989: 221-212) whereby the partners in the coalition engage in a process of 'mutual account taking'. In certain circumstances social learning can have the effect of intensifying co-operation and redefining the identity of the individual partners, thereby producing a new, more inclusive, corporate identity for the regime (Stone 1993: 13-14). However, if the issue of equity is not compatible with the regimes policy agenda, then the construction and operation of such partnerships will be inherently biased in favour of the governing coalition, and it is quite possible that rather than participation being empowering for the community it will be disempowering (Stone 1989: viii).

Involving the community offered both opportunities and threats to governance in Sheffield. It helped to attract and target resources and some success was achieved in improving community self help, empowerment and democratic participation. However, it also produced resistance to projects and demands for more expenditure from limited budgets. Further, whilst the city had experienced numerous examples of community involvement in urban partnerships, there was little notion of what it entailed in practice:

I don't think many officers understand what they are saying when they use the word partnership, they don't understand it and they don't communicate it to other people who then don't understand. I think that is why there are very few real partnerships in the city (Officer 3, Ex Acting Assistant Head of Leisure Services).

This meant that there was widespread misunderstanding of the goals and values of community partnerships like Active Sheffield. The police and commercial operators
and the Universities, in particular, argued that the Council had directed the vision and strategic objectives of this partnership and therefore it was not representative. In addition, the fragmented nature of Sheffield's urban environment increased the problem of co-ordination among them. For many respondents, the lack of a consensus around the vision for the coalition would lead to partnerships turning into talking shops and, therefore, they would not commit to it.

The fragmented nature of the urban environment also meant that making and selecting genuine community representatives (as opposed to vocal activists with minority views) difficult. A number of community respondents stated that they were not willing to represent broader sections of the community. There were clear concerns that there were known, and probably unknown, groups and individuals who did not have the resources or capacity (including knowledge, self-confidence and the language) to organise themselves to participate in the partnerships.

As the composition of the coalition reflected the interests of a dominant partner (the City Council) it was perceived that certain interests were omitted. The omission of certain interests can threaten partnerships: as Cockburn (1977), argues community participation in local governance can be a 'two edged sword'. By involving the community, barriers to development can be removed and resources deployed more effectively, but it can produce a form of paralysis when community representatives block proposals for the goals (Cockburn, 1977). However, within Sheffield the community sector had been weakened:

When it comes to partnership with the community it is quite sad really, if you compare the level of activity with the level of articulate people and groups who are prepared to take the City Council on. Compared to other places, say the North East, or Merseyside or wherever, it has gone very stagnant (Informal discussion, Officer 3, Ex Acting Assistant Head of Leisure Services).

Therefore, stakeholders who believed that the coalition was not representative often did not question whether the interests of the partnership were in the community's best interests as there was a fear that if they challenged this notion, they would be labelled troublemakers and would be marginalised.
8.3.12 The Failure of Sheffield's Socially Progressive politics: Inter-subject factors

For the progressive politics to succeed two changes needed to take place at the inter-subject level. The first change would require individuals to adopt an innovative approach, to engage with individuals in partner organisations. However, according to Officer 3, the Council's employees lacked the foresight or the risk-taking to make policy change that was radical. He complained of a culture of conservatism, which stifled entrepreneurs and risk takers:

In the Council you are never rewarded for trying new things. In the private sector they reward entrepreneurs, in the Council they suppress them (Informal discussion, Officer 3, Ex Acting Assistant Head of Leisure Services)

Furthermore, in filling the full-time position of Assistant Head of Leisure Services, the Council decided not to employ the protagonist of the community partnership approach. Instead they employed a manager who, by his admission was regarded as "a leader of the organisation and a custodian of its values and standards" (Interviewee 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services). Other officers resisted community involvement in decision-making as they held the belief that the Council, and particularly the experts employed by it, should continue to make 'informed' decisions on behalf of the community. These...

...values of established professional groups are deeply rooted, shaped by socialisation processes and are likely to survive attempts at top down restructuring even if driven underground (Pettigrew, Ferlie et al. 1992).

This group did not resist partnerships with the community, as faced with the loss of formal powers and increasing restrictions on decreasing budgets, partnerships provided a means of retaining influence over services which they no longer control directly. Partnerships also enhanced the capacity to secure funding or to give political legitimisation for projects. The cultural differences between these groups shaped power relationships and struggles within the Department, which centred on the legitimisation and delegitimisation of particular ideas or ideologies.

The second change required for the progressive coalition to succeed was the requirement for those individuals who held power to relinquish control over policy. However, there were individuals, who directly resisted this change,

There are groups of people, some that I work with closely, who are holding on to the past. They see community empowerment as a threat to their
position. That's where the Play Conference faltered. Individuals that I work closely with had no intention of asking the children. They believe they know what is best. There are professional reputations and pride at stake (Informal discussion, Officer 3, Ex Acting Assistant Head of Leisure Services).

Another officer noted that partnering was...

...extremely uncomfortable actually when it could mean people's jobs, people's livelihoods, people's futures eminent and it is also challenging their professional roles, inevitably there will be resistance and the defence mechanisms will come into place (Interviewee 2, Assistant Head of Leisure Services).

In many instances local government officials blocked partnership policies. Therefore, instead of forming the 'capacity to act' (Stone, 1989) through the creative combination of resources, skills and objectives in a partnership, these professions exerted command power to the detriment of the less powerful.

Some writers have argued that structural changes in post-industrial and post-modern society resulted in organisations becoming increasingly dependent on experts for knowledge of competitive advantage (Scarborough 1995). Local government professionals, in particular, developed a history of influence over decision-making. During the 1980s the changes affecting local government introduced a new ideas system which has accorded managers special status as 'elite', decision-makers (Pettigrew, Ferlie et al. 1992).

Public sector professionals achieved a body of expert knowledge over which their profession exercises a degree of control. Having achieved this position individuals expect a degree of autonomy over their work and their work processes (Pettigrew, Ferlie et al. 1992). Elston (1991) argues that professionals have three main types of autonomy: Firstly, political autonomy, the right of the profession to make decisions as legitimate experts; secondly, economic legitimacy, the right to determine remuneration; thirdly, technical autonomy, the right to set standards and control performance (Elston 1991). Crompton (1990) goes further arguing that professional status is best understood as a mode of control rather than an occupational grouping or label that professionals employ control and status, and defensive tactics during periods of change (Crompton 1990). This was clearly evident in Sheffield where many officers working within the Leisure Department resisted community
participation and empowerment, as this was perceived as undermining directly their professional power. The most prominent case of policy obstruction was *Sheffield Play Council*.

### 8.4 Conclusion to the Chapter

This Chapter has sought to present the main findings, in terms of policy, governance and partnership, of the inductive data analysis through the prism of existing theory, in particular, regime theory and policy network analysis. This thesis suggests that prior to the mid-1980s governance in Sheffield was dominated by the public sector and in particular the City Council. However, during the late 1980s the governance of Sheffield changed to resemble a *nascent symbolic regime*. However, the regime was more fragile than some authors suggest and during the early 1990s cracks began to appear and by the late 1990s the regime failed. From the mid 1990s a new socially progressive and collaborative approach developed between the public and community sectors, espousing an inclusive policy agenda. However, due to underlying tensions between the organisations and the actors involved, this coalition had failed to emerge by 1999. The changes in policy, governance and partnership outlined in this chapter suggests that broad global / national factors, organisational / interorganisational influences as well as inter-subject factors have affected the Sheffield context.
CHAPTER NINE

A SUMMARY OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH

9.1 Introduction to the Chapter

A criterion for evaluation of a thesis is that it should make a contribution to knowledge based on original empirical work and / or analysis. The aim of this chapter is to provide a summary of the research undertaken in the study and to summarise the main theoretical, practical and methodological contributions made by this thesis. To address the issues raised in the research objectives identified in Chapter One an inductive empirical study was conducted on the city of Sheffield. As noted in Chapter 4, qualitative methods, including semi-structured interviews, document analysis and observations, were used to develop a detailed understanding of the case and in particular reflexive agent's interpretations of policy change, governance and partnership. The findings emerged from the data through a process of inductive content analysis (Patton 1980). The categories drawn from the data were used to structure the chapters presenting the results. During the data analysis stage of the research theory, theoretical frameworks were evaluated in structuring and interpreting the findings.

9.2 Summary of the Key Features of the Argument

The following brief summary is designed to highlight and illustrate ways in which the empirical and theoretical content of the thesis might be said to advance understanding. In total 450 pages of interview transcripts, 39 documents and field notes were inductively content analysed producing 387 raw data themes or 'free nodes'. These were grouped into 185 first order themes and were further refined until 3 general dimensions national / global context (macro), local / organisational (meso), inter-subject (micro) were developed. The main findings under each of these 'dimensions' is provided below:
9.2.1 National / global context (macro)

At a macro level, the findings revealed that throughout the period 1974 to 1999 broad economic, social and political factors influenced Sheffield's urban politics. Furthermore, these forces created a climate of instability, fragmentation and complexity. In the post war period Sheffield enjoyed economic stability and a political consensus based on Keynesian economics, which espoused a strong welfare state provision and a central role for local authorities. The local Labour Party governed almost unchallenged throughout the period. However, from the mid 1960s social, political and economic influences conspired to break the period of continuity. Sheffield's economic base, over reliant on the metals industries, collapsed leading to deindustrialisation, unemployment and severe social problems. The New Urban Left initially resisted cuts in services and developed schemes to alleviate local problems and an employment department to help regenerate the city. However, following the Conservative Government victory in 1979 the Council was subject to a series of radical change programmes, many ideologically driven, altering the structure, management and role of the local authority and espousing a greater role for the private sector in local affairs. By the mid 1980s Sheffield's socialist resistance capitulated. In the 1990s Sheffield's climate improved and the city's elite began to demonstrate a greater concern for social rather than economic regeneration. This was allied with a relaxation of neo-liberal ideology, firstly under the Major administration and subsequently under New Labour. New Labour's modernisation agenda emphasised re-skilling, 'join-up policy', community participation and partnership between sectors. The main elements of these changes are summarised below:
Table 9.1: Summary of the National / Global Influences on Sheffield (Macro)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stable climate and economic growth</td>
<td>Volatile and declining economy. Deindustrialisation.</td>
<td>Improved economic climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Working conditions improved and standard of living rose. Council provided strong welfare state services 'from cradle to the grave'.</td>
<td>Failure of government (under New Urban Left) to maintain social conditions. Welfare state only acted as a safety net.</td>
<td>Failure of the mixed economy of public and private sectors results in social issues being placed higher on the political agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Labour Party maintained power, almost unchallenged. Corporatism - state domination over society</td>
<td>Legislation used to reduce expenditure and autonomy of local authorities.</td>
<td>Modernisation agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>Neo-liberal ideology - market fundamentalism Minimal state with representative democracy - community preferences is expressed through the electoral system.</td>
<td>Relaxation of neo-liberal ideology New democratic / accountable state: participation of local communities through democratic forums e.g. citizen panels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.2.2 Local / organisational (meso),

This thesis suggests that in Sheffield, between 1974 and 1999, there have been three forms of governance each with a different policy agenda. Whilst the periods in which these forms of governance occur overlap, in general, local government with a social welfare agenda dominated policy in the period 1974 to 1985. Policy in the period 1986 to 1995 was influenced by a nascent symbolic regime with the aims of economic regeneration and city reimagining. Policy in the period 1996 to 1999 was guided by a partnership approach with a socially progressive agenda. The thesis has concentrated on the interorganisational relationships within these latter two periods.
### Table 9.2: Summary of the Local / Organisational Influences on Sheffield (Meso)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy / planning</strong></td>
<td>Incremental short term planning</td>
<td>Strategic - Long term planning by the Nascent Symbolic Regime- mechanisms and incentives to encourage economic development. Strategic use of symbols and purposive incentives.</td>
<td>Strategic long term planning by the coalition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals</strong></td>
<td>Accessible and accountable, decentralised and redistributive and community oriented.</td>
<td>Regeneration through economic growth and city re-imaging.</td>
<td>Social inclusion. Community empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structures</strong></td>
<td>Traditional Bureaucratic Local Government</td>
<td>SERC and other partnerships (e.g. SSA) formed with overlapping memberships.</td>
<td>Area Panels, Citizen's Panels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Processes and Systems</strong></td>
<td>Centralised system of local government provision. Fordist - mass, standardised public service provision.</td>
<td>Post-Fordist - Contractual arrangement for the provision of services (e.g. CCT) split between client and contractor roles.</td>
<td>Post-Fordist - Contractual arrangement for the provision of services. Best Value continued split between clients and contractor roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
<td>Corporatism: state domination over civil society</td>
<td>New Public Management: Economy and efficiency</td>
<td>Best Value: Challenge, Compare, Compete and Consult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local authority</strong></td>
<td>Service welfare delivery and provider role</td>
<td>Provider of last resort Monitor of contractor performance. Strategic centre and active networking and advocacy role</td>
<td>Local authority exists, or should exist, to meet the varied needs of the population. - using whatever sector necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private sector</strong></td>
<td>Working relationship between the trade unions and the City Council.</td>
<td>Greater involvement through Chamber of commerce and involvement through partnerships e.g. SERC Regeneration strategy is primarily business focused but the actual investment from this sector is limited. Direct provider of services (e.g. through Sheffield City Trust / Sheffield International Venues)</td>
<td>Excluded - negotiation of contracts which maximise the benefits to the City rather than least cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community / voluntary sector</strong></td>
<td>Little identification of needs of the community. Some local discretion in service provision</td>
<td>Subverted - little identification of needs of the community.</td>
<td>Empowered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End User</strong></td>
<td>Centre not end user focused</td>
<td>The professionals employ their expertise and knowledge.</td>
<td>Less emphasis on the role of the professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leisure Policy</strong></td>
<td>Almost non-existent. Linked to council goals of improving equity and participation.</td>
<td>Customer / consumer focused. Linked to the goals of the regime - events, facilities developments</td>
<td>Community focused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facilities policy</strong></td>
<td>Little expansion of leisure facilities. Those public facilities that existed were owned, maintained and run by council</td>
<td>Facility contracts based on least cost - most efficient use of space</td>
<td>Run by leisure trusts which act as commercial operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.2.3 Inter-subject (micro).

There was also the need for a third level of enquiry, a micro level analysis of individual actors within Sheffield Leisure Partnerships. The thesis has argued that underlying values and beliefs of professional groups and interpersonal relations between subjects had a profound impact on the Sheffield case.

Table 9.3: Summary of the Inter-subject Influences on Sheffield (Micro)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council employees</td>
<td>Senior positions within the Council were highly professionalised. Council was the largest employer in the city.</td>
<td>Increased power to public sector managers and 'experts'</td>
<td>Some officers sought the devolution of power to communities and were viewed by their peers as change agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>Leisure professionals lacking any great authority. Officers in the Parks Section dominated the Department.</td>
<td>Role of leisure professional increased</td>
<td>Espoused three types of values: Community Development: community self determination in provision Paternalistic: Either (i) the professional assists communities identifying the means of achieving their own wants (ii) the professional supplies what the community needs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.2.4 Theoretical Implications

This section identifies the theoretical contribution of this thesis by exploring those aspects of the findings that have confirmed existing knowledge categories as well as those that have amended existing concepts. Also outlined are novel conclusions drawn from the work that introduce new ideas, categories and concepts that further extend theory.

9.2.5 Urban theory, change and the broad national / global context

A number of theoretical approaches have been utilised in this thesis to help explain the case. In particular, urban regime theory has been used to help explain why collaboration occurs between public and private sector organisations, how regimes mediate wider political, social and economic influences and how they achieve significant results. However, urban regime theory has often placed too much emphasis on local factors in the setting of urban governing agendas, rather than
addressing changes brought about by economic, social and political restructuring. Further, the theory has been criticised for not dealing with changes in business cycles and the differences in governing strategies brought about by periods of growth and recession (DiGaetano 1997). This thesis draws on aspects of regulation theory and theories of the state, in addition to urban regime theory, to help provide an understanding of macro level change. The thesis has also argued that a greater analysis of extra-local factors can be achieved within the regime framework. As such the thesis has leant some support to DiGaetano and Klemanski's (1993) claim that wider forces can actually drive regime formation within the British context.

9.2.6 Urban theory, change and the organisational/interorganisational context

The thesis has drawn on urban regime theory, and literature on policy communities and interorganisational relationships to help explain the organisational and interorganisational dimensions of change. Traditionally urban theorists, both pluralist and elitist, have concentrated on asymmetric determinants of interorganisational relationship formation, usually expressed as command power. Studies have generally concentrated on who governs and who prevails in urban politics. Urban regime theorists, however, have addressed reciprocal motives, usually expressed as the social production model of power. Regime studies have moved the urban analysis to questions of why collaboration occurs and how regimes are able to achieve their goals. This thesis has argued that the reasons why Sheffield's organisations formed collations changed over time and in many instances mandatory, reciprocity, asymmetry, efficiency, stability and legitimacy motives were all evident.

9.2.7 Urban regime theory and the Sheffield Case

This thesis is not the first study to apply urban regime theory to Sheffield. DiGaetano and Lawless (1999) suggest that the city underwent a change from a managerialist pro-growth agenda in the period 1980 to 1985 to a more entrepreneurial pro-growth agenda between 1986 and 1997. This thesis suggests that the pro-growth agenda was unstable and resulted in underlying tensions between the public, private and voluntary sectors. The apparent failure of the pro-growth agenda was abandoned for socially progressive approach.
Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) adopted Stoker and Mossberger's symbolic regime to explain Sheffield's re-orientation from City of Steel to City of Sport. This thesis supports aspects of their account but suggests that claims of sustained collaboration are exaggerated.

Urban regime theory has often concentrated on stability and the success of regimes. However, within complex and fragmented cities the most likely outcome of attempts to govern over an extended succession of governments and in business cycles is failure (Jessop 2000). Furthermore, regimes may not prove any more effective than markets or states as means of economic or political co-ordination.

This research provided empirical data to support Dowding's (2001) claim that regimes will fail if they are no longer able to mobilise the resources supportive of a policy agenda. By the mid 1990s Sheffield's symbolic regime could no longer count on support for its city regeneration and reimagining agenda. The case also lends support to Digaetano's (1997) suggestion that regime failure would develop through several stages. Firstly, during the early 1990s the nascent symbolic regime began to be questioned and doubts were being expressed about its capacity and unpopular developments, such as the cost of the World Student Games facilities were criticised. Secondly, by the mid 1990s the scope and purpose of the regime, and its internal partnership groups such as Sports Sheffield, made attempts to take account of the new community agenda. Thirdly, a socially progressive coalition emerged with new material incentives and a new ideological outlook based on stakeholding and community development.

This study also lends support to claims by a number of commentators that a regime's goals do not have to include economic development. This study has explored the possibility that a nascent progressive regime developed in Sheffield during the 1990s. However, it has been argued that this coalition did not have the essential characteristics to be termed a regime. It did have a distinctive policy agenda, but was not long-lived, was not comprised of actors from both the public and private sector and failed to develop the collaboration required have a sustained influence over policymaking in the city.
9.2.8 Urban theory, change and the inter-subject context

Urban regime theory and policy network theory allude to the importance of both structural relations between institutions, organisations and companies and the interpersonal relations between regime or network participants. Regime theorists have suggested that actors within an established regime are able to blend command power and systemic power in ways that can subdue the opposition (Stoker and Mossberger 1994). This thesis has argued that the values and beliefs held by some individuals and professional groups can also lead to regime failure or non-emergence. In the Sheffield case control was exerted over community groups to prevent them from influencing decision-making and precluded the development of both the Play Council and Active Sheffield.

9.2.9 Practical Implications

Although the aim of the study was to explain leisure policy change, governance, and partnership in Sheffield, rather than to inform policy, there are a number of practical implications of the findings. In particular, it would be beneficial to disseminate the findings to council officers and interest group representatives in order to increase awareness of the policy issues and, in particular, the reasons for the failure of the partnership approach. Furthermore, the findings suggest that policy-makers need to consider the impacts broad global and national factors, organisational and interorganisational factors and inter-subject factors on the urban policy-making environment.

9.2.10 Methodological Contributions

This study is unusual as it provides an empirically grounded construction of urban policy over an extended time period. Furthermore, it is uncommon to find studies of urban policy that attempt to reveal the nature and significance of the issues involved in a case through qualitative methods. In Chapter Four it was argued that cities are complex social environments, therefore, it is impossible to observe and measure all the structures that exist. Furthermore, some phenomena are socially constructed,
therefore, to gain an in-depth understanding of the case, the study must report the accounts of reflexive agents. The study examines local government officers and interest group representative's interpretation of the structural context and evaluates how this affects their actions and behaviour. To facilitate this process, a semi-structured interview schedule was devised (see Chapter 4). The study also employed observation and document analysis. The data was analysed using inductive content analysis. The methodology adopted in this thesis may provide a template for the study of other urban policy environments.

9.2.11 Methodological strengths

A single case study approach was adopted to provide rich insights information about a post-war British city. Further, comparative approaches have been criticised for locating, mapping, or producing new typologies to fit any type of public-private collaboration in cities rather than explaining the urban politics of an in-depth case study (Mossberger and Stoker 2001; Macleod and Goodwin 1999; Ward 1996). The selection of Sheffield as a case was made on the basis of its appropriateness in reflecting the themes of the policy and theory literature.

A further strength of the research was access to actors involved in contemporary partnership policies. On reflection, although difficult to justify and quantify in detail, the quantity and quality of the data obtained appeared to be aided by the researcher's role being legitimised by senior management within the City Council. The research also benefited from observation of the urban policy-making process. Although the observation studies were not used to provide a detailed description of the urban scene, spending time with actors involved in the process enabled the researcher to take advantage of chance remarks and informal conversation, which helped uncover conflicting perspectives and competing values.

9.2.12 Methodological Limitations

Although the researcher attempted to minimise intrusion, used multiple techniques of data collection and the encourage trust and openness in data gathering, it is recognised that the case study relies on interpretations of actors within the city. All interpretations
rely heavily on previous experience, values, beliefs and taken for granted assumptions. Therefore, it is not the aim of this thesis to provide a definitive answer but to provide an accurate, albeit limited, interpretation of the case that is theoretically informed and empirically grounded.

The interviews were retrospective and in many instances were reliant on interviewee’s recollections of events, which had occurred over a 25-year period. In general, the difficulties associated with memory decay have been well-documented (Kvale 1994) and apply equally in this current work.

A further limitation of the study relates to sampling. The author made attempts to interview politicians as part of the data collection. However, local government elections were being conducted within Sheffield during the data collection period and few politicians were available for, or were willing to give, an interview. Furthermore, attempts were made to interview stakeholders from all organisations in Sheffield with an interest in leisure. However, the leisure audit that was conducted as part of the study identified over 2000 such organisations. Given time and resource constraints, it was impossible to interview representatives from all of these organisations. In addition some important groups may have been marginalised and thus may have been invisible to the leisure audit.

A further limitation is that, although the study provided an in-depth insight into one city, by definition single cases studies have limited general application for use in studying other cities. Cities are unique, therefore, the findings should not be viewed as transferable to other contexts. In this thesis generalisability was traded off against the benefits of depth of analysis.

The thesis has analysed a number of policy agendas, in particular urban regeneration, city reimagining, community development and social inclusion. However, the research has predominately concentrated on leisure policy (including sports, arts, parks, culture, tourism and play). Other important policy agendas such as transport, education and health have been largely omitted or referred to in passing as they relate to the leisure agenda.
9.3 Future research

This section considers three areas of further research; further studies of the Sheffield case, further case studies; theoretical considerations; methodological issues.

9.3.1 Further studies of the Sheffield case

In essence the main contribution of this research has been to create an overall picture of the political landscape in Sheffield over the period 1974 to 1999. Therefore in order to extend current understanding of the city research may consider investigating policy change, governance and partnership in other service sectors in Sheffield over an extended period (e.g. transport or education). Detailed studies of specific policy changes (e.g. the impact of the Cultural Industries Quarter, the World Student Games, Compulsory Competitive Tendering or Best Value) may also prove beneficial. Detailed studies of the Council's relationship with the business sector (e.g. with Sheffield International Venues) and detailed studies of the Council's relationship with voluntary / community sector groups may also be valuable.

9.3.2 Further case studies

One of the strengths of this study is that it has adopted theoretically informed but empirically grounded approach to policy in a city over an extended time period. Over studies may adopt this approach. Such studies could address policy change, governance and partnership in leisure services in other British cities. Future studies of other cities may also consider other service sectors. This thesis is essentially UK based. Consequently, in order to extend current research in urban studies, researchers may consider undertaking similar studies in other countries. If several studies were conducted in this way, researchers may also consider producing a synthesis of several in-depth case studies of cities in the UK or from a number of different countries to identify commonalities and difference between cities.

9.3.3 Theoretical considerations

This study has drawn upon theories from a number of disciplines in particular theories of the state and theories of urban political economy. Further studies may investigate
the use of a multi-theoretical approach to understanding the broad global / national, organisational and inter-organisational and inter-subject factors that influence policy change in other contexts.

More specifically, regime theory has traditionally evaluated why stability and successful outcomes are achieved through consensus and collaboration. Further research may address why some regimes fail to have a sustained influence over city politics. Researchers may also address regime change rather than concentrating on the stability of regimes. Additional studies may focus on the factors that lead to regime failure and unsuccessful outcomes and the reasons why some partnerships and coalitions fail to emerge into regimes.

This thesis has also identified a defined gap in understanding relating to the development, sustenance and/or failure of socially progressive urban regimes.

### 9.3.4 Methodological considerations

In order to contribute to methodology in the study of urban policy, research may consider adopting qualitative methods to investigate case study cities. In particular, using interviews, document analysis and observation to gain access to actor's interpretations of change. Further, longitudinal research designs enable studies to take account of historical perspectives and investigate policy change over long time periods.

### 9.4 Conclusion to the Chapter

The literature on policy change in Britain has generally been developed in two ways. Semantic accounts of policy change based on theoretical inference but devoid of empirical work or empirical studies on specific aspects of policy with little theoretical content. The overall aim of the thesis is to provide a theoretically informed but empirically grounded account of the nature of contemporary leisure policy in a major British city over a 25-year period. This thesis has furthered the development of understanding in a number of ways.
Firstly, a review of theories of politics, policy, studies, management studies, sociology and leisure studies was conducted to identify the current state of knowledge in these fields. On the basis of this review, a number of research objectives were determined and the Sheffield case was reviewed through the prism of these theories.

Secondly, the thesis is an empirically grounded construction of the Sheffield case, revealing the nature and significance of the issues involved through qualitative methods. Cities are complex social environments, therefore, it is impossible to observe and measure all the structures that exist. Further, some phenomena are socially constructed therefore, to understand them, the research must report the accounts of reflexive agents. The study examines local government officers, politicians and interest group representative's interpretations of the structural context and evaluates how this affects their actions and behaviour.

Thirdly, the study provides a sophisticated, rather than simplistic, conceptualisation of policy change, governance and partnership in Sheffield. The study takes into account the historical perspective by reviewing a 25-year period. The study recognises the importance of the global or international context within which change occurs. The study also recognises the importance of political, economic and ideological factors but does not exclusively emphasise one of them. Further, the study recognises the importance of both structures and the agents that operate within the urban environment.

Fourthly, this research has made a series of contributions, which have theoretical value. The study evaluates existing theories in relation to their ability to account for policy change in the case, and has identified and addressed a number of defined gaps in relation to these theories. It is thus is the context of this mix of careful empirical analysis and theory construction and commentary that this thesis claims to have made an appropriate contribution to the literature.
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