Constructing Hong Kong identity: political contestations and press mediations

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Additional Information:

- A Doctoral Thesis. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University.

Metadata Record: [https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/7656](https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/7656)

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 The context of the project

Hong Kong is unique in the world in many ways: it represents a clash of two ideologies – communism and capitalism; it is a site of conflict between two major forces – the free market and the political centralization; it serves as a point of communication between two cultures – the traditional Chinese culture and the western culture; and as a point of interaction between two identities – the Chinese national identity and the local identity of Hong Kong. Due to its peculiar history and position as a global metropolis, the mixture of various elements and conflicts has become one of the city’s major features and attracted the attention from all over the world.

The importance of Hong Kong today lies in two aspects:

First, as a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, the developments in Hong Kong, in some ways, foreshadow the future of China as a whole. Hong Kong’s developed capitalist economy has provided a reference point for China’s economic reforms in the past decades. Furthermore, the interaction between Hong Kong and the mainland has spread from financial sectors to other fields. The controlled democratic reforms carried out in Hong Kong reflect China’s concern with and interest in further democratization on a nationwide scale. Considering the success in economic reforms and the opening-up to global exchanges, political changes are both unavoidable and necessary. As a part of China, Hong Kong provides an ideal testing ground for the rest of China. How can the free market function under a political system that is rather different from Western liberal democracy?

Second, along with the growth in wealth, other problems and conflicts have emerged in Chinese society. Especially in recent years, the political importance of national identity has grown rapidly. The long unsettled Taiwan and Tibet problems show that, beside politics and the economy, identity plays a crucial role in the processes of change affecting China today. National unification and national identity are not the same. In particular, the case of Hong Kong is an
example of national unification creating tensions and raising difficult questions because of the existence of different identities within one nation-state. The future of Hong Kong and its identity provides clues to the understanding of tensions between national and regional identities in China, as well as between different cultures, political preferences and religions associated with them. Investigating the transformations of Hong Kong identity in recent decades can provide insight into how identity is affected by political and economic changes, not only in China but also in the rest of the world.

To capture and understand the particularity of Hong Kong, the mass media are one of the most important places to look at, since they serve both as repositories of various representations of the social reality of Hong Kong and as actors of social changes. The mass media are considered crucial in the construction and consolidation of social norms and orders (Fairclough, 2006), and are necessarily involved in processes of social change. The beliefs, attitudes and identities that the mass media transmit to its audience, who are also the participants of the social change, may inflect their response, and shape the result of the whole process of change. After the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, the Hong Kong press remained vibrant and free and maintained a close relationship with the local population. It ‘absorbed Western values, transformed Chinese cultural particulars, articulated local experiences, and crystallized images of a distinct Hong Kong way of life’ (Ma and Fung, 1999: 500). Clearly, understanding the nature of political, economic and cultural changes in Hong Kong and in China at large necessitates an understanding of the role played by the local media.

1.2 Research questions and aims

The social, political and economic systems and changes leave an imprint on the mass media and on the meanings, interpretations, attitudes and identities they convey. A particular discourse is determined not only by the organization that produces it but, also, by the broader social, political and economic environment. On the one hand, different media institutions with different forms of ownership and political affiliations work in correspondingly different ways, yet, on the other hand, all news media in a particular country or region also unavoidably reflect the characteristics of the broader society, its politics and economy at that point of
time. These relationships between the meanings and attitudes conveyed by the media, on the one hand, and the characteristics of the media system and of the broader socio-political and socio-economic context, on the other hand, are at the forefront of this project.

More specifically, this project investigates the discursive construction of Hong Kong identity in mediated political communication in order to understand the relationship between media discourse and the political economy of the media in Hong Kong, as well as the political and economic context in Hong Kong. In doing so, the project aims to reveal the dynamic of the involvement of the media in the politics of Hong Kong identity.

The two core questions and central concerns of the thesis are as follows:

1. What kinds of Hong Kong identities are presented to local audiences in recent political communication?

2. How are these mediated identities affected by the nature of the political system, the media system and the political economy of Hong Kong?

The first question will help us identify the nature of Hong Kong identity. To define this identity, we need to ask the following two sub-questions:

a. Who is the self, who are the ‘others’?

b. What are the markers that define Hong Kong identity?

The second question investigates the dynamic behind the particular shape of the mediated identity, by further exploring the following issues:

a. What are the differences between the representations of Hong Kong identity provided by the different newspapers?

b. How are the particular strategies of identity construction adopted by the newspapers linked to their political affiliations, ownerships structure, readership and other aspects of the political economy?

The existing research on Hong Kong media focuses mostly on the media-politics
dynamics, e.g. freedom of speech, self-censorship, etc., and selected aspects of media economy, e.g. media ownership and concentration. This research takes another component into account: identity. The identity of Hong Kong has long been studied and debated. However, it has not been put into the context of modern media and the development of politics in Hong Kong. This dissertation fills this important niche.

As argued later on in the thesis, these research aims and questions require a close examination of the language used in the media coverage, using a combination of textual and contextual analysis and drawing on both quantitative and qualitative approaches.

1.3 The thesis chapters in brief

Chapter 2 introduces the political landscape of Hong Kong and its historical development. It introduces the key actors involved in Hong Kong politics since colonial rule, explains how their positions and relations changed over time, and provides an overview of the key events and developments in Hong Kong politics in recent history. This chapter provides a general picture of the political system in Hong Kong, which influences all other aspects of Hong Kong’s modern history, including its media and its identity.

Chapter 3 focuses on the identity of Hong Kong. It first discusses the definition of ‘identity’, and how it is related to the case of Hong Kong, then examines the evolution of a shared identity in the territory and further defines the key marker of this identity, and finally discusses the existing literature regarding the Hong Kong identity. The aim of this chapter is to define the Hong Kong identity both synchronically – identifying its key elements – and diachronically – looking at its development over time.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the landscape of the press industry in Hong Kong, presenting both its historical development as well as its current structure. It discusses all the important elements of Hong Kong’s media industry, including the local journalist culture, the structures of media ownership, the newspaper’s political affiliations and interests, the phenomenon of self-censorship, and the level of credibility the newspapers enjoy among their readers. These elements are
crucial for the analysis and interpretation of the news coverage, and the
discursive construction of Hong Kong identity explored later in the thesis. The
five major newspapers in Hong Kong that are covered in the analysis are also
individually introduced in this chapter.

Chapter 5 brings together the three key themes of this thesis – Hong Kong
politics, Hong Kong identity and the Hong Kong media – and explores the
relationships between them. It outlines the characteristics of Hong Kong’s
politics and political economy and then discusses the nature of the
media-politics-identity relationship in comparison with the one typically found in
the West.

Chapter 6 discusses and explains the rationale of the analytical framework
adopted in this study. It introduces the two key textual analysis methods relevant
to this project, i.e. critical discourse analysis (CDA) and corpus linguistics (CL)
and presents the research design as a whole. It also provides a general description
of the corpus used in the study and the chosen cases analysed in later chapters.

Chapter 7 brings the first case study, which focuses on the 2004 interpretation of
the Basic Law regarding universal suffrage. It introduces the social context and
key elements of this event and analyses the news reports from the five chosen
newspapers, focusing on the construction of the other, the sense of belonging and
the construction of the self. The results are interpreted in relation to the
characteristics of the political context and the media system of Hong Kong, as
introduced in previous chapters.

Chapter 8 follows up with the second case study: the Chief Executive Election in
2005. It examines how the different newspapers construct the identity of Hong
Kong, following the analytical approach used in Chapter 7. This event differs
from the one covered in the first case study in both its social background and its
key players. The results of this case study are, therefore, compared to those of the
first case study in order to ascertain how the newspapers maintain or change their
strategies of identity-construction depending on changes in the social, political
and economic context.

Chapter 9 summarizes the key findings of the two case studies, and reflects on
the contributions of this PhD project to the understanding of Hong Kong identity, its politics and the media, and the relationships between them. It concludes by outlining some of the open questions and suggesting possible directions for future research.
Chapter 2. Politics in Contemporary Hong Kong

2.1 Introduction

The political development in Hong Kong experienced a short period of rapid change after 1984 when the Joint Declaration was signed between the British and Chinese governments. The handover of sovereignty, political turmoil in mainland China, the gradually changes of the components of the population and its identity (e.g. the maturing of the second generation) have all had significant influence on the development of politics in Hong Kong. However, the process has consistently involved two main actors: the authority/government and the civil organizations, i.e. pressure groups and political parties. For the authority, unusually, it involves the complexity of the British-backed Hong Kong colonial government before 1997, the Chinese government as the important ‘cooperator’ before handover and the paramount authority, supporting the HKSAR government after the handover. On the civil level, it started with the cooperative elite since the establishment of the colony, and the emergence of a grassroots elite with the evolution of local identity and self-consciousness.

This chapter examines the political development of Hong Kong. Part 2 introduces the evolution of the key actors throughout different periods of time. Part 3 provides an overall review of the history of Hong Kong politics with the key events marking the period of development, and explains how the relation between the positions of the key political actors introduced in part 2 have changed over time. The history of the development is divided into four periods marked by key events and significant changes:

1. The pre-transitional period, from the establishment of the colony to 1984 when the Joint Declaration was signed between the British government and the Chinese government;

2. The transitional period, from 1984 to the handover in 1997;

3. The first Chief Executive (CE) terms, from 1997 to 2005 when the first Chief Executive Tong Chee-hwa resigned with the outcry of discontent from the
whole territory;

4. The second CE terms, from 2005 until today, with the newly-appointed and relatively popular Chief Executive, Donald Tsang Yum-kuen.

The overview of the division is identified according to the different juxtaposition of key political actors in each period. The first period is marked by the dominance of the incorporated elites. The second period saw the rise of the grassroots elites during the transition. With increasing discontent during the term of the first Chief Executive, the mass appeal of democratic reforms reinforced the development of the political parties led by the grassroot elites. The accession of the second CE Donald Tsang, with great popular support, and the ineffectiveness of the democratic parties, led the decline in support for democracy in recent years. Each period also saw the development and changes of other factors, especially the news media and the Hong Kong identity.

2.2 The key actors in Hong Kong politics

It is argued that Hong Kong is basically an elite political culture. To understand Hong Kong’s political development, one needs to take an essentially agency-based perspective (Beatty, 2003). Different groups of elites composed the major sources of political force. At the same time, however, these elite groups may have not been unified amongst each other: the existence of similar groups among the different camps could indicate inter-elite competition that would impact on the political landscape in Hong Kong.

The most politically active groups of the elite are the pro-business elite and the grassroots elite, which have both gone on to develop political parties that represented their interests in the 1990s and penetrated the government system to differing extents. Taking advantage of the long-term cooperation with the colonial government, the business elite participated in the administration in a much more straight-forward way, with various appointments in the government before and after 1997. Alongside the business elite without any evident party affiliation, they founded the pro-Beijing conservative Liberal Party (LP), which is one of the major political parties in Hong Kong. In contrast, the grassroots elite had not emerged until the 1990s, when democratic elections took place. They are
the backbone of the democratic camp, led by the Democratic Party (DP). However, the grassroots elite are not completely unified. The pro-Beijing group formed their own grassroots party: the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), which is the main electoral rival of the DP. As argued before, the relationships among the political actors, the parties and the authorities are complicated. This part of the chapter introduces the major groups of local elite in Hong Kong, and the political parties they are affiliated with.

2.2.1 The business/incorporated elite

The capitalist class in Hong Kong – the business, manufacturing, and shipping elites and tycoons of the territory – always ally themselves with the authorities: the British Hong Kong government before handover and the HKSAR after. There are two types of incorporated elite: the industrialists who participate most directly in government, and those who maintain very close ties to the authorities, but stay in the background.

The establishment of the Hong Kong colony came with the dichotomy of two levels of government and society. One was the colonial state and society as an extension of the British government. On the governing level, the Chinese population was legally and politically treated as a separate group from other expatriate populations (Sinn, 1989). The other level was that of the mass residents strongly connected with mainland China. This segregation from the very beginning was connected by the elites who led various forms of organizations following the Chinese traditions, like the regional committee or religious groups. These organizations filled the gap between the government and the residents, with cooperation with the former and leadership of the latter. Among these different forms of organizations, the top committee of the power pyramid comprised only the wealthy Chinese elite and became ‘the Chinese Executive Council of Hong Kong’ (Lethbridge, 1971: 116). The committee expanded from the local constabulary to an advisory board on Chinese affairs and governance with the elevation of the colonial government. The members of the committee, who have strong influence in economic and social aspects of the Chinese population and support from the authorities, represented the top elite group who has played a significant role in the political life of Hong Kong from
this early period of the colony until today. They have been one of the major actors in the political history of Hong Kong. With their help, the government maintained order and stability, practised new policies and reforms whilst maintaining segregation from the mass population. With different titles of organizations throughout different periods of time, the top elite group has maintained their relations with both the government and the lower class Chinese community.

The control of the incorporated elites over the mass population started to weaken in the post-war period. The society of this period underwent rapid socio-economic changes. The development of a capitalist economy and modernization brought structural changes to Hong Kong society, for example more comprehensive education and a higher material standard of living, and so on. Compared to the elite group, the mass local population was strengthened by power-sharing with the ruling group and the incorporative elite group.

2.2.2 The grassroots elite

The rapid social changes in the post-war period started the political liberalization in the region with the emergence of the first pressure groups in the late 1940s (Tsang, 1995: 223). The colonial nature of Hong Kong created the formation of an incorporated elite first. However, when it came to the post-war period, with the social and economic factors, the grassroots elite groups found their own space to perform and acted on local issues that could be exploited for further development. This period was marked by the rapid emergence of grassroots social movements that demanded an increasingly wide range of reforms from the Hong Kong and the British governments. With limited support and considerable monitoring, many other pressure groups had evolved. Although the pressure groups’ issues were mostly challenges to the supremacy of the colonial regime, the authority recognized that these groups were a natural evolution that could not be prevented. At the same time, these groups often raised issues which the regime needed to address. In other words, their movements helped the administration in many aspects, with the condition that, in each case, it was up to the regime to decide to what extent these groups could function and to what extent it would respond. In the end, it always turned to the incorporated elite
structure to provide a solution. The activities of pressure groups are viewed as a response from the administration to the concerns of the people and represented the government’s legitimacy.

The competition of the two groups of elites had started from the formation of grassroots pressure groups. The incorporated elites, legitimated by the state, had more advantage in the very beginning. The grassroots elites had to establish their own constituency to find their legitimacy. Issues that could be exploited were very limited, and, on the whole, not important enough to raise the attention of the majority. It was only with the introduction of direct elections into the political process in the transitional period that the opportunity really came. However, in the pre-transitional period, the development of the liberal civil society was only permitted within the limitations determined by the regime. At the same time, the liberal elements of Hong Kong’s civil society had always to compete with the incorporated elites who already occupied positions of power in the state. However, this political competition would determine how far Hong Kong’s political reforms in the transitional period would go. The tensions between the two groups increased as the colonial state began to overtly withdraw from the decision-making process and were complicated by the following Chinese government’s involvement.

2.2.3. The major political parties in Hong Kong

During colonial rule prior to the 1980s, there were no public elections that allowed citizens to select their representatives. Nevertheless, with the economic prosperity of the 1970s, the general public began to make demands with regard to social issues such as housing, education, and public utilities (Cheng, 1995). The grassroots elite began to organize and consolidate to address social issues. These groups sowed the seeds of democracy in Hong Kong by urging members of the public to fight for their interests and facilitated the emergence of the political parties in Hong Kong (Cheng, 2005: 254).

The democratic reform introduced by the colonial government in the 1980s sparked the explosion of political parties. Some political groups, such as the Meeting Point (MP), the Hong Kong Affairs Society (HKAS), and the
Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (ADPL), were formed to address the sovereignty problem as well as to strive for the development of democracy. These groups became the major forces pushing democracy in Hong Kong. Some of their members also participated in public elections introduced by the colonial government. With a series of limited democratic reforms, democrats began to form political groups to organize their participation in politics.

The first Legislative Council (LegCo) direct election in 1991 was the turning point for party development in Hong Kong. In 1990, democrats led by Martin Lee Chu-ming inaugurated the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK), which was seen as the first political party in the colony. This party was created as a vehicle for participation in the LegCo geographical elections. After that election, the UDHK became a significant force in the legislature by challenging the government and conservative force from the business sector.

Largely in reaction to the growth of the UDHK, the conservative forces established the Liberal Party (LP) in 1993 in order to unify themselves, compete with the democrats, and prepare for participation in the three-tier council elections in 1994 and 1995. The pro-Beijing forces in Hong Kong also created different parties. The Liberal Democratic Federation (LDF) was inaugurated by pro-Beijing businessmen in 1990 to compete with the UDHK in the 1991 LegCo direct election (Miners, 1998). In 1992, another group of pro-Beijing elite, including District Board members, legislators, and delegates of Chinese government institutions, founded the Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) (Lo, 1996). This became the flagship of the pro-Beijing forces in Hong Kong, competing with the democrats. Another pro-Beijing organization, the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance (HKPA), was organized in 1994. At the same time, the traditional pro-China labour union, Federation of Trade Union (FTU) became active in Hong Kong politics. The partial democratization of the political system and the emergence of the first democratic party encouraged the development of new political parties from all ideology camps in Hong Kong.

Facing the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, political parties and the elite took various measures to sustain their political future. On the democratic
side, the UDHK merged with the MP in 1994 to form the Democratic Party (DP) to unify the pro-democracy forces. In 1996, other democrats inaugurated the Frontier, which advocated a more progressive stance towards democratization. For the pro-Beijing camp, the LDF merged with HKPA for the union of pro-Beijing businessmen and professionals in 1997. The pro-Beijing FTU also adjusted its political role to support the patriotic forces competing with the democrats. The merging of these political parties and groups has marked the further development in Hong Kong politics.

The political parties in Hong Kong still remain as they were after the handover in 1997. The three major camps, led by the three largest parties in the territory, DBA, LP and DP, are the most active and influential forces in the politics of Hong Kong. Although they adjusted their approaches in different contexts, the essential positions are still the same as when they were established. All three parties are elite-dominated. LP represented the business elite, who desire good relations with China in order to keep a ‘healthy business environment’. The party is pro-Beijing on most issues, although it will offer criticism of the government. The LP is not stringently antidemocratic. They are a ‘strong believer in a free economic market [but] they have been opponents to a free political market and fearful of any expansion of the social welfare system in Hong Kong’ (Li and Newman, 1997: 218). The DBA is essentially a grassroots pro-Beijing party that enjoys strong support from the leftist trade unions and local organizations, as well as financial backing from mainland sources (Allen, 1997). The DP gets strong support from the mass population in elections. It addresses social issues such as housing and healthcare at grassroots level, and gets actively involved in protests and marches. However, since the late 1990s, they have suffered from the intra-party disagreement regarding the social orientation of the party and whether they should represent the interest of all classes or focus on a populist approach (Cheng, 2005: 15). All three parties, representing the three major camps, play as the key actors in the political development of Hong Kong. The local elites use the political parties as their vehicles for participation in politics since they were formed in the 1990s.
2.3 The key development of Hong Kong politics

This section introduces the key developments of the political history of Hong Kong, covering the period from 1984, when the Joint Declaration was signed, until today, when the second Chief Executive of HKSAR is taking up his second term of office. During this period of just two decades, Hong Kong has experienced rapid changes, especially in terms of political development. The last-minute democracy before handover did not grant local people much concrete benefit, considering the restructuring of the electoral system after handover. However, these elections gave Hong Kong people a taste of democracy and provided the ground for the democratic parties to grow. These effects determined the extent to which the democratic reforms after the handover pressed on by the democratic camp and by mass demand.

2.3.1. Transition, the first stage

During the transition, people started to demand more reforms and a more representative political system in order to have some institutional safeguards against potential overwhelming state intervention from the central government after transition. However, the British government was unwilling to carry out social and political changes on a large scale during this stage. One reason was the agreement in the Joint Declaration that Hong Kong would retain the status quo until the transfer. The other concerned Sino-British relations, which were a priority compared to the political development in Hong Kong at that time. At the same time, China began to implement strategies designed to challenge the existing legitimacy of both the British and Hong Kong governments by advisory panels in the pro-mainland media in Hong Kong. The local elite were also targeted to be united, through factional affiliation and support. As a result, a network was established of local elites who lent their support to the Chinese position on various issues.

The signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984 rapidly changed the operation of the Hong Kong administration, in mainly three aspects. First, the fully British-appointed and expatriate elite-dominating bureaucracy was joined by a nebulous administration from the Chinese government, to act in a ‘consultative’
manner. Second, the Hong Kong political apparatus experienced large scale localization of bureaucracy in a relatively short period of time. Third, a series of channels were opened to the local population to get involved in the decision-making processes.

For the first change, as stated in the Declaration, the Chinese government was accorded a cooperative role during the transition period (Sino-British Joint Declaration, Paragraph 4). This cooperative role was interpreted and correspondingly carried out by the Chinese government by creating a second power centre in the territory and inevitably resulted in the loss of power and credibility of the Hong Kong government (Scott, 1989).

For the second change, localization, a process which started after the post war period, was further developed from the lower to the senior level. The beginning of localization was attributed to the large-scale expansion of the civil service after WWII. However, further development in the senior ranks had been delayed until the transition period. The signing of the Joint Declaration provided the impetus and the tensions of this change, supported by the British government and required by the Chinese government. This change strengthened local Chinese identification with Hong Kong and increased the legitimacy of the Hong Kong government.

For the third change, initialised before the signing for the Joint Declaration, a set of reforms entitled The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong set out the decision of the government with regards to further political development in a measured, rather than radical, agenda. This reform created a significant change of the expansion of the Legislative Committee with more members drawn from several unofficial organizations and electoral representatives and functional constituencies. Within these categories, the functional constituencies were seen as a sign of further evolution of the Hong Kong’s corporatist style of government, which was a fundamental aspect of Hong Kong’s colonial administration. ‘A corporatist strategy did permit the inclusion of other groups previously excluded from the legislature, but they were deliberately outnumbered by government officials and their supporters. (Scott,
Working with the geographical constituency\(^1\) which was relatively more liberal, the members of functional constituencies could block the challenge raised by the former, who had similar numbers and tended to support the status quo. Therefore, although the political reform did allow for a measure of grassroots involvement in the central political processes, it was a measure that the government could always use to prevent having to move beyond their desired limit (Hong Kong Standard, 1984). Despite the limitation on many aspects, the response of the Chinese government to the 1984 reforms was overwhelmingly negative.

The first round of action in making the Hong Kong government more representative was the District Board election held in 1985. Previously, the District Board functioned as little more than an advisory institution and the response from the public was minimal (Cheng, 1986). In contrast, the 1985 election opened up the possibility of the candidate being further elected to the Legislation Council (LegCo). It also helped to politically socialize the Hong Kong population by giving the local population a political stake in the territory’s affairs. One indication was the active involvement of pressure groups, both in fielding candidates and in supporting other allies. In addition to persuading people to enrol to vote, these groups were also concerned with increasing the functions of the District Board. Motivated by the strategic needs of the election, many pressure groups began to form alliances, and further evolve throughout the election. Although the alliance at this point existed more for ‘technical and publicity convenience rather than as groups of candidates with united political aims’, they were viewed by political observers as the beginning of a multi-party system in Hong Kong (Choi, 1985). Those that had established a degree of grassroots support began to coalesce into quasi-political parties with both local and territory-wide agendas, whilst those that lacked such support remained as ‘opinion groups’ (SCMP: 1984).

Following the District Board election was the second set of 1985 elections: the

\[^1\] The geographical constituencies (GC), as opposed to functional constituencies, are elected by all eligible voters according to geographically-demarcated constituencies, including all districts in Hong Kong, i.e. Hong Kong Island, Kowloon East, Kowloon West, New Territories East, and New Territories West. Seats are returned by universal suffrage. The system is widely considered to give representative legislatures.
2 Functional Constituencies (FC) represent various sectors of the community which were considered as playing a crucial role in the development of Hong Kong in LegCo. Nowadays they include the Rural Assembly, agriculture and fisheries, insurance, financial services, transport, accountancy, finance, education, legal profession, information technology, medical and health services, architectural, surveying and planning services, real estate and construction, social welfare, tourism, commercial, industrial, import and export, wholesale and retail, textiles and garment industries, sport, the performing arts, culture and publication, catering, District Councils and labour.
that the elections had on the development of political parties in Hong Kong, with the main liberal and conservative groups forming territory-wide associations.

2.3.2. Transition, the second stage 1989–1992

The second period of transition was started and marked by the catalyst of the Tiananmen incidence in 1989, and ended with the last round of elections in 1995. The impact of Tiananmen had a traumatic affect on Hong Kong. ‘At a stroke, it seemed, the people of Hong Kong had come to care about politics…[it] has hugely reinforced that feeling. Hong Kongers are now more deeply tied to China’s democracy movement…Hong Kong is also keener on full democracy before China takes over’ (The Economist, 1989: 21). The incidence continued to affect the social and political systems of Hong Kong throughout the remainder of the transition period. It radically aided the formation of Hong Kong political consciousness, which helped to encourage the development of Hong Kong’s pressure groups into political parties. All three major camps, the conservative, the democratic and the pro-Beijing, all developed their political parties in this period.

The popular elections in Hong Kong were composed of three tiers of representative institutions. The District Boards are at the lowest level, primarily dedicated to consultation and offering recommendations to the government at the local level, with little authority except for organizing some recreational activities within the districts. The two municipal councils (Urban and Regional) have authority over civic, cultural, recreational, and hygiene issues in the two urban regions. At the highest level is the LegCo, which has authority over the drafting and approval of bills (Ma, 2001). The third series of elections in 1991 was the first set of elections at which candidates from political parties would directly stand for all three tiers.

The first of the three rounds of the 1991 elections to take place were the District Board elections. These elections provided the first opportunity for the newly-formed political parties to prove their relevance and legitimacy to the voting populace (Lee, 1994: 282). The competition amongst the three camps dominated the whole event. The high-profile democratic groups nominated
nearly a hundred candidates. By contrast, many candidates from the conservative camp and pro-China camp did not declare their party affiliation concerning their connection to the authorities and the worsening image of the Chinese government after 1989 (Lau, 1989).

Two months after the District Board elections, the two municipal Councils elections were held. During the elections, the party political system was enhanced to some degree of professionalization in the building of public relationships and image. In both series of elections, the democratic parties won the largest portion of the seats. The conservative camp and the pro-China camp both suffered from low voter turnout. The victory of the democratic camp built up the popular support for their parties and gained them an advantageous position for the final round of elections of LegCo in September.

The 1991 LegCo election was the first time that direct elections from geographical constituencies were held. It was described by Governor Wilson as ‘a significant step in the development of our system of government’ (Wilson, 1990: 45). Continuing the trend of party affiliation, the elections saw the affiliations of parties from the same camp and competition, and even attacks, between opposite parties (SCMP, 1991). The results of the election surprisingly showed a much lower voter turnout than expected. Of the registered electorate, less than 40 per cent of voters turned out to cast their vote (Scott, 1992). This result indicated that the anticipation of the political awareness of Hong Kong people was too optimistic and, in reality, Hong Kong’s citizens either did not desire democratic changes and were not interested in the elections, or were concerned about the China factor (Leung, 1992). Despite the generally low turnout, the democratic camp won a total victory in the elections. By contrast, none of the conservative or pro-China candidates were elected. This contrast was seen as ‘a clear repudiation’ of the political position of the pro-China and Hong Kong elites (SCMP, 1991). At the same time, the elections for the functional constituency were held. The functional elections saw a different allocation of seats among the three major groups. The democratic groups only won 4 seats out of 21. All other seats went to non-aligned members with some degree of conservative or pro-China affiliation (Scott, 1992). This result of the functional
constituency election plus the appointed members showed the fact that the Hong Kong government still held the balance and control over the political reforms, despite the democratic move in the territory.

The new picture presented by the 1991 elections of the three tiers of Hong Kong government indicated the future political direction of political development. Hong Kong society was politically mobilized throughout the series of events which resulted in requesting a greater stake in the political system. In addition to that, the elections and reforms allowed the grassroots political elite to develop. The long-term neglect and unwillingness to meet the grassroots' demands had started to change. This fact would be further changed by the coming of Governor Chris Patten, who led a series of radical political and social reforms that opened up more for the grassroots elite.

2.3.3 Transition, Governor Patten and the third stage 1992–1995

In 1992, Governor Patten took office, and embarked upon a series of radical reforms never before seen in the political history of Hong Kong. From the beginning of his years in office, he clearly expressed his position, both in his belief in democracy and the direction of further political reform in the territory. In his speech at the opening session of the 1992/93 Session of the LegCo, Governor Pattern stated:

The promotion of social justice and individual liberty does not necessarily mean the end of all efficient government…the pace of democratization in Hong Kong is –we all know – necessarily constrained. But it is constrained, not stopped dead in its tracks…what is more, and this was doubtless recognized by those who drafted the Basic Law, the community wants a greater measure of democracy. Whenever the community is asked that is the answer it gives…Above all, [democracy] provides a well-tried system for a mature and sophisticated people to have a say in how their community is run, and to tell those running it without fear where and when they have got it wrong. (Patten, 1992: 30–32)

These beliefs established the foundation for the implementation of political reforms in the remaining five years of colonial rule. Governor Patten was held in high standing by the local community, however, there was an overwhelmingly negative response from the Chinese government. In fact, sixteen days after
Governor Patten’s policy address, the Chinese government announced the formation of the Preliminary Working Committee (PWC) and the appointment of three tiers of advisers as a shadow government. The following two years saw a period of increased tension between the Chinese government and Governor Patten. With this tension, the third series of transitional elections took place between 1994 and 1995.

The first round of elections, for the lowest tier, i.e., the District Boards elections, were held in 1994. In line with Governor Pattern’s reforms, all seats except for the ex-officio Rural chairmen (27 out of 346 seats) were directly elected. This round of elections saw a significant increase in the political mobilization of the population. First, they had the highest number of candidates: 757 for 346 seats. Second, among the 757 candidates, more than half were nominated by political parties. Third, the majority of the party-nominated candidates were from the three major parties (Hong Kong Standard, 1994). Within the three main groups, the democratic group won the greatest number of seats. However, the largest bloc of seats was won by non-aligned independent members. As many of the non-aligned members actually held a conservative political outlook or had a close relationship with the pro-Beijing and/or the conservatives (Li, 1995: 59), the political orientation of the District Boards would remain conservative or pro-China.

Elections to Hong Kong’s second tier of government, the Multiple Council, were held in 1995. This round of elections saw continuing active involvement of parties from three political groups. However, both the two lower levels of elections were viewed as preliminary skirmishes for the main battle: the Legislative Council election held in September 1995.

The third tier of government, the LegCo, included directly-elected geographical constituencies and the functional constituencies (colleague election) based upon an expanded franchise covering the entire voting population. For the democratic group, the emergence of a relatively large number of minor liberal-democratic parties and groups had changed the dominant status of the Democratic Party. The recruitment of the democratic parties also increased significantly, along with development in the sense of party structure and discipline. For the pro-China
camp, an obvious trend was that the campaign was far more grounded among the grassroots. They also emphasized the ability to ‘intercede with the Chinese government on behalf of the Hong Kong people’, in contrast to the democrats (Scott, 1996:139). The conservative parties still suffered from their narrow business orientation, as well as the pro-China stance, which both led to the absence of grassroots links to the electorate. Another disadvantage for the conservative groups was the individualism within the group, with the clear contrast to the increasing sense of discipline in the democratic group and already well developed one in the pro-China party (SCMP, 1995).

The result for the elections of directly-electable seats was consistent with the two lower levels of elections. The democratic groups won the majority of votes and seats. In contrast, the pro-China groups and conservative groups only won three out of 20 seats altogether. However, the elections for the functional constituency seats did not continue this trend of liberal-democratic party dominance. The result showed a more proportioned location of different groups. The success of the democratic groups was seen as a reaffirmation by the Hong Kong people of their desire for a continuance of the democratization of the political system with a perceived end result of the introduction of full democracy along western lines (Wing, 1995; Fung and Lok, 1995; Godfrey, 1995). Although all the elections saw the active involvement of the pro-China parties and individuals, the Chinese government reiterated the stance that the LegCo would be replaced by a provisional legislature appointed by China after the handover (Xinhua, 1995).

2.3.4. Transition, the final stage 1995–1997

Immediately after the LegCo elections, people’s attention turned to the selection process of the Chief Executive-designate and the establishment of the provisional SAR legislature. The process of selecting candidates began with the creation of the Selection Committee (SC) by the Chinese-government-appointed Hong Kong Preparatory Committee (HKPC). 400 members were selected by the HKPC. This method of appointing the SC was criticized by the democrats as an indication of the undemocratic politics after the handover (Dickie in Thomas, 1999). After two rounds of voting amongst the SC, Tung Chee-hwa won by an overwhelming majority of 320 votes out of 400. In fact, China’s preference and a great deal of
support from influential business tycoons had made most observers expect Tung Chee-hwa to be the front-runner of the election at a very early stage of the Chief Executive election (Horlemann, 2002).

After the Chief Executive Selection, the most important event was the creating of the provisional legislature – the central decision-making body that was to replace the 1995-elected LegCo. As claimed after the 1995 LegCo election, China had claimed a clear position on the 1995 LegCo, and the provisional legislature was considered as a natural outcome, despite strong criticism by the democrats (Thomas quoted in Tan, 1999). The Democratic Party and other aligned independents lost all their seats and the pro-China and conservative parties’ seats were increased proportionally. From then on, the balance in the main decision-making body shifted from the relatively reformist to overwhelmingly conservative (Yeung, 1997). Two proposals created by the new provisional legislature caused contentious concern in the territory: the proposal of repealing the Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance and the Societies (Amendment) Ordinance. The repealing of the two amended Ordinances would give the SAR government the power to declare any political party illegal. Therefore, the democratic parties were most concerned. The repeal also required any society or political party to apply for police permission before holding a demonstration. Besides these two repeals, the provisional legislature also questioned the supremacy of the Bill of Rights. The proposal was to reduce the Bill of Rights to be subordinate to other laws. Despite the resistance from the democrats and the public, all the three proposals passed in the first meeting of the legislature after the handover, along with the introduction of national security as a guiding principle in defining public disorder. However, the ordinances regarding demonstrations were never utilized and demonstrations without approval or notice continued to be carried out on the streets of Hong Kong.

2.3.5. The first term of the Chief Executive 1997–2002

On 1 July 1997, the newly selected Chief Executive Tung, a shipping magnate of considerable wealth whose popularity was relatively high among the public at the time, took office. However, there were various potential problems before the new administration. Since the 1980s, when the transition started, the British
government had been almost totally absorbed in the Sino-British negotiations on the territory’s future and the associated diplomatic confrontations. As a result, no major reforms in economic and social services took place before 1997. When Tung took office, accumulated problems appeared in almost every major policy sector. His inclination to depart from the positive non-interventionism philosophy caused some concern in the business community. In addition, Chris Patten, the last British governor, with much more political skill and charisma, overshadowed the performance of Tung (Cheng, 2005).

What affected Hong Kong more seriously was the Asian financial crisis starting in 1998. The regional economy deteriorated rapidly after the crisis, driving Hong Kong into recession for the first time in thirteen years (SCMP, 1998). Despite massive government intervention, from the stock market, property market to retail sales – most industries suffered severely from the financial crisis. With unemployment at a fifteen-year high, the problems in the economic sector spilled over into the social sector, generating widespread discontent against the administration (Choy, 1998). Tung’s popularity plummeted to 47 per cent satisfaction at the end of August 2002 (Lord, 2002).

As a key component of national identity, the principle languages in use and recognized by the Basic Law in Hong Kong are English and Chinese. Bilingualism is closely connected to the culture and identity of Hong Kong. After Handover, the SAR government took a series of measures to downgrade the status of English and promote Chinese Mandarin in public education (Kwok, 1998). The rationale was to bring the local identity closer to the Chinese national identity, as in Chief Executive Tung’s words: ‘mother-tongue’. However, there was a public outcry against this policy, with parents worried that their children, deprived of an education in English, would be hampered in their future employment prospects (Shek, 1998).

Throughout these internal issues and external shocks, the administration was criticized for ignoring the needs of the people in favour of the needs of the greater polity. It was in this atmosphere that the first elections to the Legislative Council of the SAR were held. The elections in 1998 were the first in a series of elections to be held under the new regime. Compared to the previous elections
before handover, this series had three major differences: the introduction of multi-member geographical constituencies; narrower criteria for the enrolment in the functional constituencies; and the allocation of ten seats in the Council to an Election Committee to be constituted by a separate electoral process. In function, all of the changes led to limiting the seats won by the Democratic and other affiliated parties. For the Geographical Constituencies, the Democratic Party had a weaker position in the elections. The Functional Constituency was still dominated by the conservative and pro-Beijing parties. As to the Election Committee elections, the Democratic Party and affiliated parties chose not to compete in the election process in the first stage of voting among the 800 committee members. The conservative parties won the majority of seats as a consequence. In addition to the changes introduced in the LegCo, fundamental changes were also introduced in the operation of the District Boards and Municipal Councils, which were designated to limit the liberally-inclined political actions.

On 29 January 1999, the Court of Final Appeal, the highest judicial authority in Hong Kong, interpreted several Articles of the Basic Law in such a way that the Government estimated it would allow 1.6 million Mainland China immigrants to enter Hong Kong within ten years. This caused widespread concern amongst the public about the social and economic consequences. While some in the legal sector advocated that the National People’s Congress (NPC) should be asked to amend the part of the Basic Law to redress the problem, the HKSAR Government decided to seek an interpretation, rather than an amendment, of the relevant Basic Law provisions from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC). The NPCSC issued an interpretation in favour of the Hong Kong Government in June 1999, thereby overturning parts of the court decision. While the full power of NPCSC to interpret the Basic Law is provided for in the Basic Law itself, some critics argue that this interpretation undermined judicial independence.

The LegCo election in 1998 produced a two-year successor to the provisional Legislative Council which, in turn, was troubled by the Asian financial crisis and other conflicts at the very beginning of the new regime. In the light of this
situation, the LegCo election was held in 2000 for a full, four-year term legislature. Compared to the 1998 election, the LegCo election in 2000 saw a decline in the voter-turnout rate from 53.29 per cent to 43.57 per cent (Lau and Kuan, 2003:8). The elections returned 24 members from directly-elected geographical constituencies and 30 members from functional constituencies. Suffering from internal fragmentation, the Democratic Party and affiliated parties put on a poor performance in the elections, with a significant loss of voters (Lau and Kuan, 2003: 17). For the geographical constituencies, candidates from the pro-democratic camp won 17 out of 24 seats. The pro-Beijing/conservative candidates took 7 seats. In the functional constituencies in which the pro-democratic camp traditional had a disadvantage, they gained just 5 seats out of 30.

2.3.6. The second term of the Chief Executive 2002–2005

Despite the incompetence and unpopularity, Tung Chee Hwa, with the strong support from the central government, gained overwhelming nominations from the electoral college and was uncontested in the election for a second term in 2002 (Hong Kong Standard, 2002). The reappointment by the central government was considered as due to two reasons: first, for the first term of the new administration, it is crucial for the central government to build a prosperous image for the regime. Second, the proper successor required consultation and mobilization in order to generate support, which cost time and had a side effect for the current administration. To support Tung, the central government made a great effort to help Hong Kong solve the economic problem, including the Individual Travel Scheme on the mainland to increase the number of mainland tourists visiting Hong Kong; the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), which granted Hong Kong better access to the mainland market; and political influence on the neighbouring province of Guangdong to cooperate with the territory.

In an attempt to resolve the difficulties in governance, Tung reformed the structure of government substantially, starting from his second term in 2002 (Yau, 2002). In a system popularly called the Principal Officials Accountability system (ministerial system), all principal officials, including the Chief Secretary,
Financial Secretary, Secretary for Justice and head of government bureaus, would no longer be politically-neutral career civil servants. Instead, they would all be political appointees chosen by the Chief Executive. However, many of the ministers soon got into a series of scandals, during which Tung chose to defend his ministers and pay the political price of turning the public’s wrath on himself.

In 2003, the HKSAR Government proposed implementing Article 23 of the Basic Law by legislating against acts such as treason, subversion, secession and sedition. It stated that:

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.

However, there were concerns that the legislation would infringe human rights by introducing the mainland’s concept of ‘national security’ into the HKSAR. The initiative drew a hostile response from the pro-democratic camp, lawyers, journalists, religious leaders and human rights organizations (Hong Kong Standard, 2003). This stoked public concerns that the freedoms they enjoyed would deteriorate. The sentiment, together with other factors such as the SARS epidemic in early 2003 – when the government was criticized for its slow response, strained hospital services and the unexpected death toll – and the general dissatisfaction with the Tung administration, resulted in the largest mass demonstration since the establishment of HKSAR, with an estimated 500,000 people (out of the population of 6,800,000) marching on 1 July 2003. Many demanded that Tung step down (Lord and Lau, 2003). As a result, enactment of Article 23 was temporarily suspended (Wong, 2004). The LP supported the government from the very beginning. It was not until the demonstration on 1 July that the LP shifted its support away from the HKSAR government. Disregarding strong opposition from many Hong Kong citizens, the DAB kept supporting the government. Its reaction to criticism of the Bill antagonized many of Hong
Kong’s citizens and was, to a certain extent, responsible for the large scale of the demonstration of 1 July 2003.

In 2003, the District Council Elections were held. With the pro-democracy movements at their peak, the turnout rate of 44.1 per cent was a record. It was seen as evidence that the Hong Kong people were expressing their dissatisfaction with the government and their desire for democratization. Candidates from the pro-democracy camp won substantially, while the pro-government camp suffered serious defeat. The DAB had been penalized by the electorate in the elections for its political disarticulation to Hong Kong citizens on the Article 23 Bill (Cheng, 2005). At the same time, the dispute of how subsequent Chief Executives get elected began.

The Basic Law’s Article 45 stipulates that the ultimate goal is universal suffrage; when and how to achieve that goal, however, remains open and controversial. Under the Basic Law, electoral law could be amended to allow for this as early as 2007 (Hong Kong Basic Law Annex 1, Sect.7). The interpretation of the NPCSC to Annex I and II of the Basic Law made it clear that the National People’s Congress’ support is required over proposals to amend the electoral system under the Basic Law. On 26 April 2004, the SCNPC denied the possibility of universal suffrage in 2007 (for the Chief Executive) and 2008 (for LegCo). The NPCSC interpretation and decision were regarded as obstacles to the democratic development of Hong Kong by the democratic camp, and were criticized for lack of consultation with Hong Kong residents. However, they did not offer an alternative proposal for democratic reform in Hong Kong. On the other hand, the DAB, facing political pressure to align with the authorities against such proposals to accelerate the pace of democratization, considered NPCSC’s decisions to be in compliance with the Basic Law and in line with the ‘one country, two systems’ principle. At the same time, the party was anxious to avoid further antagonizing the public, as it did not want to be penalized in the next year’s LegCo election. The LP believed that the immediate changes to universal suffrage would represent an excessively rapid pace of democratization, which would undermine business interests in Hong Kong, and implied that the political demands of Hong Kong citizens burdened the territorial economy (Cheng, 2005).
In 2004, the LegCo Elections were held. Over 3.2 million voters (another record) registered for the election. The turnout rate was 55.6 per cent, with 1,784,406 voters casting ballots for the election. For the geographical constituencies, candidates from the pro-democratic camp secured 60 percent of the seats in the geographical sectors of the election, taking 18 seats in this category, and 62 percent of the popular vote. On the other hand, the pro-Beijing/pro-business candidates made greater gains, winning 12 directly-elected seats. Ironically, in the functional constituencies which the pro-democratic camp sought to abolish, the camp made gains of two more seats compared to 2000. Overall, the democrats took 25 seats and the pro-government, 35 seats. Bills initiated by the government can still be passed with pro-government support alone, but bills originated by members cannot be passed without democratic support, since these bills require absolute majorities in each sector (geographical and functional) of the legislature. Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds vote and, thereby, also require support from the democratic camp.

Despite the increase in the number of seats returned by the geographical constituencies and the record turnout, the Democratic Party lost the status of being the largest political party in the Legislative Council to the pro-government DAB (who secured 12 seats) and pro-business Liberal Party (who secured 10 seats), thereby becoming only the third-largest party. Some attributed the poor performance of the pro-democratic camp to tactical miscalculation in vote allocation. This was not helped by some of the democratic parties’ personal scandals. Overall, the pro-Beijing and pro-business parties succeeded in retaining the majority in the legislature. However, pro-democracy candidates have maintained the threshold to blocking changes (if necessary) to the Basic Law of Hong Kong (since a two-thirds vote is required for amendment).

The 2004 LegCo elections saw the significant decline of popularity with the pro-democracy camp. Scandals, hostile relationship with media and ineffective campaign strategies all contributed to the failure in the elections and further harmed the whole pro-democratic camp. In contrast, the pro-Beijing camp did unexpectedly well in the elections by keeping a low profile during the campaign period and relying on its networks built through the appeal to patriotism and
services at the grassroots level.

2.3.7. The second Chief Executive 2005–Now

With the subsequent improvement in the economy in 2004, unemployment fell and the long period of deflation ended. This resulted in a decrease in public discontent as the government’s popularity improved, and popular support for the democratic movement dwindled with a protest in January attracting a mere few thousand protesters compared to the 1 July protests of 2003. However, the popularity of Tung himself remained low compared to his deputies, including Donald Tsang and Henry Tang. In the January 2005 Policy Address, Tung gave a rather critical verdict on his own performance. The speculation soon followed with his actual resignation due to ‘health problems’ (Yau, 2005). Tung’s resignation was endorsed by the central government, followed by the confirmation of Tsang as Acting Chief Executive.

It was always clear that Beijing had already endorsed Tsang as the new Chief Executive. On 15 June, he handed in his nomination form which bore the signatures of 674 out of 800 members of Election Committee (Hong Kong Government Press, 2005). Two other would-be contenders failed to gain the necessary 100 election committee members’ endorsements, and their nominations were declared invalid. Tsang was formally appointed by the central government as the Chief Executive on 21 June 2005. However, an interpretation of the Basic Law by the SCNPC made it clear that Tsang would only serve out the remaining two years of Tung’s term, rather than the full five years originally mooted.³

Tsang began his civil service career as early as the 1960s, occupying various positions in finance and trade, and was appointed Financial Secretary of Hong Kong in 1995, becoming the first ethnic Chinese to hold the position under British administration. He remained in that position after 1997 before being appointed Chief Secretary for Tung’s administration. As an experienced

³ Nevertheless, Tsang was re-elected for a full 5-year term in 2007.
administrator, Tsang is known for his uncompromising style. Public opinion polls showed that Tsang enjoyed 74 per cent support from the public during his election campaign in 2005 (HKU, 2005) for his handling of the Hong Kong economy at that time. When he came to office, he promised strong leadership, harmony and people-based governance, pledging to build a strong and efficient government (Tsang, 2005).

As a former bureaucrat who was on friendly terms with some pro-democracy legislators in the past, Tsang hoped in the early days of his term to cultivate a stable working relationship with them, in order to broaden his administration’s political appeal. After the 2005 Chief Executive Election, Tsang announced that the Guangdong Provincial Government invited all 60 members from the Legislative Council to visit Guangdong. This was the first chance for most of the pro-democrats to visit mainland China since 1989. Tsang has talked of discriminatory treatment of political parties, and politicians, describing their relationships with him as either intimate or distant. This is what is known as the policy of the friend-or-foe dichotomy (Yeung, C., 2006). Later on, Tsang announced that the government no longer adopted the positive non-intervention policy, further distancing the relations between the democratic parties and the government.

In addition to his tensions with the pro-democratic camp, Tsang still suffers from the stressful Executive-legislative relations with a series of bills being blocked by the suspicious legislature, including the constitutional reform package proposed in 2005, the modified West Kowloon Cultural District development proposal in public-private partnership form in 2006 (Hui, 2006), and the consultation on the proposed ‘goods and services tax’ to help broaden Hong Kong’s tax base in the same year (SCMP, 2006).

Tsang televised the appeal for support on the 2006–2007 constitutional reform package in 2005. In his reform package, Tsang proposed to double the number of electors to the Chief Executive election of 2007 to 1600 members and add ten seats to the Legislative Council (to 70 seats). The former would enable all members of district councils, including appointed ones, to be members of the Election Committee and the latter would increase the number of seats elected.
through geographical and functional constituencies by five each. However, the proposal did not include a clear timetable for universal and equal suffrage. Opposing the package publicly, thousands of Hong Kong people demanding immediate universal suffrage demonstrated against the reform package four days later. Eventually, with the opposition of 24 pro-democracy legislators, both the election reform proposals for Chief Executive and LegCo were turned down (SCMP, 2005).

Generally speaking, Tsang’s administration has been considered more efficient and better coordinated. However there is growing criticism that he had become too close to pro-Beijing and business groups, as opposed to the pro-democracy parties, and too subject to the central government’s directives and support. His popularity ratings dropped significantly to 61 per cent in 2006 (HKU, 2006).

2.3.8 Summary

The development of Hong Kong politics has been marked by key developments and the evolution of key actors since the colonial period up until today. The earlier British administration was based on the cooperation of the business elite with almost all aspects of the Chinese population. With the modernization of the territory, more channels were open to the grassroots level; nevertheless the incorporative elite were still the major alliance for the government in solving concrete problems raised by the pressure groups. The transitional period from 1984 to 1997 saw the rise of the grassroots elite by the evolution of pressure groups into political parties, and with the introduction of popular elections on all three major levels of the government. The pro-democratic camp enjoyed a significant development during this period, whilst the pro-Beijing camp and the pro-business camp had much lower popularity with voters in various elections. However, they still remain as a strong force in the government through appointed seats, which have taken the majority of all seats in most of the elections. The ineffectiveness of Tung’s administration after 1997 caused strong discontentment in the public. Tung failed to maintain the support of both business elites and the grassroots. The mass protests in this period further promoted the pro-democratic force. However, it was also in this period that the democratic parties started to suffer from intra-party disagreement, worsening of relationships with the news
media and increasing distance from the grassroots. In contrast, the conservative and pro-Beijing camps have built up a better network from a low profile position. In recent years, the second Chief Executive has enjoyed a high popularity rate, whilst ineffectiveness of the democratic parties caused them to suffer from less support from the public.

It is safe to summarize that the development of Hong Kong politics has been shaped, if not completely determined by the interactions of the key political actors. The rise and decline of any key actors are the consequences of a social context that changes all the time. It is also related to the evolution of the Hong Kong identity that has occurred in the same time. The top Chinese elite, incorporated with the colonial government, acted largely due to their identification with China among the population who are mostly immigrants from the mainland. The second generation in the territory grew up with a stronger sense of local attachment and increasing disagreement with the government on local issues, which led to the emergence of various pressure groups that eventually developed into political parties. After the handover, with the increasing interaction and conflicts with the mainland, politics still play a significant role in shaping Hong Kong people’s identification, which will be examined in the next chapter.
Chapter 3. The Hong Kong Identity

3.1. Introduction

Due to its peculiar history, Hong Kong has always attracted attention, from all over the world, from different people with different purposes. For social science researchers, ‘Hong Kong represents a social laboratory where the scheduled exchange of powers has sparked off a series of changes and repercussions in various domains’ (Chan and Lee, 2007:132). Hong Kong’s current predicament is especially interesting for two reasons: (1) because it represents a clash of two political cultures in close proximity – Hong Kong’s own, derived, with unique local admixtures, from the British colonial model; and that of the People’s Republic of China; and (2) because of the redefinition of a Hong Kong identity during the political transition. On the one hand, the people of Hong Kong wanted to preserve their own way of life under the principle of ‘one country, two systems’, which required non-intervention in each other’s affairs by both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong. This concern indicates a clear idea that the residents of Hong Kong believe that a distinct Hong Kong way of life does exist. However, on the other hand, the appeal to the central government reflects the belief that the future for democratization in Hong Kong was linked to the PRC and the identity of Hong Kong is closely related to the ‘motherland’.

Political changes have always presented the possibility for people’s social identity being defined in new ways. The recent transformation of identity of the Hong Kong people is closely associated with changes in the wider realm of politics. Chapter 2 examined the political development throughout the modern history of Hong Kong. This chapter will focus on the identity aspect during the same period of time. It is designed to demonstrate the evolution and characteristics of the Hong Kong identity. The first section discusses the definition of ‘identity’, and how it is related to the case of Hong Kong. The second section examines the timeline of the modern history of Hong Kong, focusing on the events that signify the key turning points in the development of a common social structure and shared identity. The third section takes a close look
at the crucial elements of identity and links them to the reality of Hong Kong. The fourth section discusses the existing literature regarding the identity of Hong Kong. The aim of this chapter is to define the Hong Kong identity both synchronically – identifying its key elements – and diachronically – looking at its development over time, and provide the second actor in the interacting triangle of politics, identity and media.

3.2. Defining identity

The concept of ‘identity’ is extremely difficult to define: it is the most mundane and it can be the most extraordinary. It is embodied in everyday life but only tends to be explicitly invoked when it is seen as ‘being in trouble’. To define identity, there are always debates regarding almost every aspect of the concept. In this section, I will limit the discussion to three aspects of the concept that are the most relative to this project. First, is identity a process or a thing? Is identity something we possess that is bounded, self-contained and somehow ‘locked away inside’ (see criticism of Elias, 1994: 206), or is it a process that is flexible for being shaped or even constructed by external changes? Second, who is the key player in the formation of identity – the individual or society? Does the ‘autonomy’ of self exist or to what extent is affect? Third, what is the relationship between the identity and difference, or belonging and exclusion? Is identity defined by the essential ‘internal’ elements that are shared by the members, or by difference, i.e. the construction of the other?

In the discussion regarding the existence of identity, Lawler introduced the long-recognized perception of Western point of view that it is

…some part of a person that is not produced by the social world, what is being posited is an essence: something that makes the person what she or he is. It is often seen as what lies ‘inside’, and is understood as being ‘deeper’ or ‘truer’ than what is ‘outside’…the idea that who they are can and will change, (but) accompanied by a notion of a ‘true’ or ‘deep’ self, which is seen as somehow outside all the social.’ (Lawler, 2008: 5)

The essentialist claim of the identity as an ‘inner core’ was taken for granted with a deep root in European intellectual and linguistic tradition (Elias, 1994: 211).
According to Eliot, this notion of an ‘inner’ ‘hidden’ core to the self is a consequence of a ‘civilizing process’ in the West, from about the time of Renaissance, when ‘self-control’ was emphasized. The call for managing ‘internal’ states led to a perception of ‘true identity’ being contained ‘inside’, in contrast with the social world which is ‘outside’. John Locke’s influential work argued that it is ‘consciousness’ that unites all the different actions and makes a personal consistent (Locke, 1964).

The perspective of identity as a ‘black box’ locked inside a person meant that identity is not amenable to sociological study. It is also expressed in the way that the ‘self’ is determined by the genetic inheritance or the society in which one lives. In contrast, the constructivist view sees that identity is formed and constantly shaped by the social world (Lawler, 2008). The identity, as a process, is ‘fundamentally oriented toward and dependent on other people throughout his life’ (Elias, 1994: 213). A more radically empiricist approach by ethnomethodologist Garfinkel claimed that there is no unified coherent self. The self is produced through the social interactive process (Garfinkel, 1967). This approach sought to address the how rather than the why or what of identity. The debates of identity have moved from a unified subject to a more changing construction of self (Woodward, 2002: 20–21).

The constructivist approach to investigate identity is adopted in this project, in accord with the recent radically changing society of Hong Kong, which has evidently changed the way local residents identify themselves. The aim of the study is to investigate how the politics, media and identity interact with each other, rather than what is the ‘true identity’ of Hong Kong. In fact, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to define what is the identity of Hong Kong. The investigation of the process that the identity has developed will be much more revealing to understand the Hong Kong people as a unity.

The second question regards the key player in the formation of identity: individual or society. The debate about individual vs. society has been long established in identity research. It has also been referred to as the interrelationship between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’, as to which one is the determining force in the formation of identity. Woodward concludes:
These debates can be presented along an historical storyline which sees the self as moving from a unified subject, whether assumed or explicitly defined as unique and distinctive, to more sociological accounts which present the self as constituted more collectively, in relation to others and the modern society...The unified subject is one who largely has responsibility for actions that are carried out, and exercises individual agency, whereas in the west with the development of capitalist industrialization came more complex and collective groupings of identity which could be seen as subject to social, structural forces. (ibid.: 20–21)

The Marxist analysis attempted to bring together the individual and society in the dimensions of class consciousness, with the famous formulation of relationship between a ‘class in itself’ and ‘class for itself’ (ibid.: 21). It is argued that a class (identity) is created by the society when it is realized by the members who share the identity – in the Marxist case, the working class can unify and challenge the social system that created the identity.

The complex relationship between the individual and the society was further developed from the Marxism in the work of Mead and Cooley. In their arguments, identities were produced through the interaction between self and society, through an internal-external dialectal process (ibid., 2002). This emphasis on the social dimensions of identity was further developed by the ethnomethodological approach of Garfinkel (1976). In his work, the self is one who negotiates in daily life. It is through this process of interaction that identities are constructed. This identity is not completely socially determined; rather, self is responsible and actively engaged in the social interaction. Riesman’s work presents a shift of identities that lack autonomy and independence. In his argument, the self is over-socialized in the context of a high degree of conformity (1950). The Foucauldian perspective (Foucault, 1983; Rose, 1999) is that social relations are ‘folded into’ the self. What seem to be interior states are aspects of subjectivity produced through relations of outside power/knowledge. They do not ‘belong’ to the individual; rather, the individual is produced as such through these relations (Lawler, 2008: 76).

To summarize, the anthropologist and sociologist approach has developed from the unified individual to the determining society. In this position, although to what extent the society works varies in different authors’ argument, the society is
the key player, if not the only determining force, in the formation of identity. In contrast, the psychological approach emphasizes the role of individuals. Psychoanalytic theories concern the internal psychic process and engage with what inner space constitutes the psyche. According to the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), individuals have a need for a positive social identity, or self-conception. Groups exist and legitimate only when individuals categorize themselves in group terms.

The divarication of the sociological approach and the psychosocial approach are primarily produced due to the different perspectives and focusing aspects. Any concept of identity is only legitimate if supported by the affected people who live with it. Both the individual and the society are important players in the formation of identities. In this project, the focus is on the interactions of identity with politics and media, which are significant aspects of the society. Therefore, the sociological theories are adopted in this project. To investigate the development of identity, a close examination of the social changes in recent history of Hong Kong will be made, according to the sociological approach.

Last but not least, the relationship between identity and difference is another issue to be discussed before any further defining of identity. The root of the word ‘identity’ is the Latin *idem* (same), but the notion of identity always presents the combination of sameness and difference (Lawler, 2008: 2). People are simultaneously the same and different. There is a sense by default that each individual is unique but somehow shares aspects of the identity with many others. ‘To identify’ is not only involved in classifying an individual, it always associates oneself with someone else. It is commonly understood that a shared identity is built on some essential ‘internal’ elements held by the members, or characters that mark the specific group of people. However, identities can also been defined by constructing the other. Similarity among the members is a necessary but not adequate condition for the construction of a shared identity. For example, the obviously common ethnic origin of Hong Kong people with the Guangdong province in mainland China has not made the former identify with the latter. Rather, the small variation of the language in Hong Kong Cantonese is sensitively recognized by local people as a symbol of difference with the other.
group off shore (for the discussion of variation of Cantonese, see Abbas, 1997). Some authors, following Freud, termed this creation of difference ‘the narcissism of small difference’ (1918: 199).

In wanting to see ourselves as unique, we magnify small differences until they become defining characteristics. What is shared is played down, what is different is played up, until identities come to seem ‘opposite’ (Lawler, 2008: 4).

These differences, minor or major, are expressed in Barth’s (1969) argument of ‘boundaries’. His work is dedicated to understand how difference is organized in and arises out of social interaction (Barth, 1969:14). In this interaction,

The features that are taken into account are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant. Not only do ecologic variations mark and exaggerate differences; some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied. (Barth, 1969: 14)

Barth suggested that identity boundaries are products of social interaction between people holding different identities. Cultural commonality results from the construction of identity at the boundary. If a group maintains its identity when members interact with others, this entails criteria for determining membership and ways of signalling membership and exclusion (Barth, 1969: 15). A group of people sharing the same identity only persist as significant unite when they imply marked cultural differences. It is ‘boundary that defines the group’, not the cultural essence that it encloses (Barth, 1969: 15).

The Social Identity Theory also emphasizes difference in the process of categorization. One category exists because it is distinguished from others. Applying this assumption to the issue of identity, to be a member of an ‘in group’ requires a distinction from an ‘out group’. One of the central points of Social Identity Theory is the emphasis on the sense of social division, which is brought by group identification and categorization (Billig, 1995: 66). To achieve a positive identity, groups tend to compare themselves positively with contrasting out groups, and they will seek dimensions of comparison on which they will fare well. The dimensions on which they can be proud of their own qualities, and feel superior to outgroups, ‘will maintain the positive self-identity, which is necessary
for the group’s continuing existence’ (Billig, 1995: 66).

To emphasize the significance of difference in the construction of identity does not mean that the relatively stable markers, e.g. ethnicity, territory or language, are not important. In the second section, these symbolic markers will be discussed. The third section will examine the markers that keep changing during different periods of time, with key turning points in history. Within this process, residents in Hong Kong have kept changing the appearance of their identity, or in other words, different markers of identity have been adopted or denied throughout the history of Hong Kong.

3.3. Crucial ingredients of the Hong Kong identity

A nation will only exist if a body of people feel themselves to be a nation (Tajfel 1981: 229). Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation as an ‘imagined community’ is one of the most widely recognized basis for analysing national identity. Anderson describes a nation as an imaginary construction formed by subjective values, including culture, religion and time, on the part of its proponents. These values are modified by the expansion of capital and vernacular languages, principally via the media (Anderson, 1983). Combined with a variety of political ideologies, a territorial unity and some form of economic development, these factors foster a national community.

As argued earlier, the definition of identity is never entirely fixed, and the various markers used to define a particular collective identity and distinguish it from its others can shift accordingly. Nevertheless, in most cases, some markers of identity tend to remain fairly stable over a longer period of time. These markers include ethnic origin, language, local culture and territorial attachment.

About 95 per cent of the people of Hong Kong are Chinese by ethnicity, the majority of which is Cantonese (Hong Kong statistics, 2008). The remaining 5 per cent of the population includes a south Asian population of Sindhis, Indians, Pakistanis, Nepalese and Vietnamese. There are also a number of Europeans, Americans, Australians, Canadians, Japanese, and Koreans working in Hong Kong's commercial and financial sector. Although Hong Kong has a variety of different languages and dialects, the two dominant
ones are Cantonese and English, representing the origin of major immigration from southern China and the colonial regime. The bilingual situation led to a partial melding of the two languages and, to some extent, separates ‘Hongkongese’ from the Cantonese spoken in Guangdong province of China. The unique character of Hong Kong makes the common language keep absorbing and incorporating terms from other language and, to some extent, formatted a hybrid language (Abbas, 1997: 28). This uniqueness of language melding is also seen as a linguistic unification of the Hong Kong nation. The variation from Cantonese rising from the post-Second World War period was due to several factors: the closure of the Hong Kong-China border after war separated the majority of the population from daily contact with the mainland; the colonial, elite-based English gradually intermingled with the local Cantonese in several decades of British rule; and the social-economic change undergoing by Hong Kong while the origin of Cantonese – the Guangdong province in mainland China – was rather isolated from the other parts of the world. From 1963 to 1991, Hong Kong witnessed a mass expansion of higher education with eight degree-awarding institutions’ opening, amongst which Cantonese is the predominant medium of instruction (Hong Kong Yearbook, 1996). After the handover, an increase in immigrants from mainland China and greater integration with the mainland economy have brought more Mandarin speakers to Hong Kong.

The change to a modern industrial-based economy, a common language and an educated population, all served to foster Hong Kong’s culture sector. The fusion of language was also reflected in the common culture. It is a blend of various sub-cultures and ethnic cultures that exist in the territory. This fusion matured in the early 1980s, when Hong Kong’s social-economic development was able to allow a broad-based cultural movement to flourish (Chan, 1994). The local media, transmitted through Cantonese, articulates the ideas of the community and strengthens its unique culture. This serves to reinforce the identity by binding the community together via a forum that all can understand and in which all can participate (Chen, 1995). In the 1980s, in the context of major change in the technology of mass communications, the younger generation began to absorb new elements into the local culture. ‘As Hong Kong became increasingly
integrated into the global economy, it became disassociated from China culturally…and began to create a distinctive cultural identity’ (Johnson, 1994: 674). The emergence of the Hong Kong film industry in this period is a symbol of this distinctive cultural identity (Lou, 1995). One of the key characters of films in this period is the uses of the Hong Kong variant of Cantonese as the medium of expression. The subjects of these films were either based in Hong Kong or the genre itself was promoted in Hong Kong, e.g. the Bruce Lee and Jackie Chan martial-arts films. These locally-produced films can be seen as an expression of the Hong Kong identity (Abbas, 1997).

Although Hong Kong’s population largely developed from migrants who, at least initially, could not construct an identity on the basis of territorial affinity, when the number of immigrants residing in the territory had steadily grown, the social and familial networks were re-established. The territorial identity was strengthened as the social network got more entrenched. And this growth in social stability was aided by the high degree of economic stability, which was then often in stark contrast to the situation on the mainland. This territorial affinity deepened and broadened as successive generations were born in Hong Kong. For the younger generation, although there was a familial contact via mainland-born parents or grandparents, Hong Kong is the only territory that they identified themselves with (Miners, 1998). This territorial identification was enhanced by the geopolitical position that Hong Kong occupied. The ‘capitalist vs. communist’ ideology created the ‘us vs. them’ identification. This, however, already brings us to aspects of Hong Kong identity that have changed over time and, thus, to the historical development of Hong Kong identity.

3.4. The Hong Kong identity and its modern history

After the Second World War, specifically after the four years of Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, the sharply decreased number of inhabitants numbering 1 million rapidly increased to 2.36 million by late 1940s (Destexhe, 1995: 25). The majority of new inhabitants came from across the mainland border to escape the civil war and the new regime of the Communist Party. This wave of immigrants changed the nature of Hong Kong society. Before the war, the Hong Kong community was largely comprised of temporary residents. From
this point on, it began to be comprised of potential citizens. This community was the foundation of the profound change in the socio-economic structure of the polity, which, in turn, affected the perceptions held by Hong Kong’s citizens. The successive waves of the mainland refugees brought to Hong Kong economy the key ingredient of a capitalist system: a large labour pool to form a manufacturing base. Hong Kong’s economy developed into a period of light industry, mostly the garment industry (Turner, et al: 1980). A symbol of the early stage of the evolution of Hong Kong identity is the Double-Ten Riots which happened in 1956. The incident started with the removal of a Nationalist flag at a public housing estate, followed by a protest by the Nationalist supporters, and ended up with the army deployed after three days of riots (Leung, B.K.P., 1990). The ideological motivation of the riot was perceived to be the communist versus the nationalist, reflecting the larger framework of the KMT and CCP conflict in the region of Greater China. The stronger influence of the incident was the arousing of political awareness and creation of political tension amongst the Hong Kong population. The experience of overcoming the riots and restoration of social stability created a common sympathy amongst the local population. The formation of such common sympathies would become the construction material of a shared Hong Kong identity.

Developed from the 1950s, the next decade saw the progression of the commercial sector to more advanced, labour-intensive industry (Chen, et al., 1991). This period witnessed another significant incident related to the development of a local identity: the 1966/67 Riots. The riots started with a government decision to increase the fares on the cross-harbour ferries (Miners, 1991:34). It was seen as a spill-over of the Cultural Revolution happening in mainland China at the time. There were continuing arson and bomb attacks during the riots, and disruption of the capitalist imperialism in the colony. The agitators did not achieve their aim but, on the contrary, their failure unified the territory and the local population by reinforcing the mainlander versus Hong Kong people dichotomy. The culture, governing ideology and way of life in Hong Kong were recognized more clearly against mainland China as a significant other. Also, as the aftermath of the riots, the administration introduced a variety of programmes with the purpose of fostering and promoting local
identity and community building. To some extent, these programmes affected the balance of power in the territory fundamentally by shifting the rule of the colonial elite towards the emphasis on the people. With the addition of improved living and working conditions (Scott, 1989:126), Hong Kong started the process of gradually being turned over to its citizens.

The 1970s saw a crucial year for Hong Kong when, in 1972, China’s ambassador to the United Nations presented China’s request that Hong Kong and Macau be returned to China. The retrocession would operate only between the Chinese government and the British government, and Hong Kong people would be denied formal representation (Miners, 1991). The agreement between the two governments isolated Hong Kong and this sense of isolation became a catalyst for the evolution of the Hong Kong identity.

In the 1980s, important changes in the economic sector occurred. With the increasing cost of living, as well as competition from other developing areas, Hong Kong again shifted its focus and began to emphasize its financial and human resources sectors. This shift, along with the coincidence of another important event that happened in mainland China at the same period of time, i.e. the Open Door economic policy in 1987, led to a movement of the industrial production from Hong Kong to mainland China. A considerably increased business interaction between Hong Kong and mainland China started in this period. With low-cost labour in mainland China for the manufacturing base, Hong Kong started to move to the service sector and formed a ‘front shop, back factory’ economy (Sit, 1995: 172). This interaction between Hong Kong and the mainland gradually moved from the economic sector to other areas of life, and began to influence the formation of the Hong Kong people’s way of life, including the local identity. The commercial interaction and the investment/support from the mainland have indicated that, to Hong Kong, the mainland is no longer a place populated by poor cousins and greedy distant relatives, or a source of cheap food and raw materials. It is now a significant source of capital, export earnings and tourist income. Some started to believe that the best future for the city involved improved integration with China; that is to say that further sinicization would be the path to tread (Lo, 2003). A different
view from others insisted that the very strength of Hong Kong depended on maintaining its uniqueness by keeping China at a safe distance (Lu and Lu, 2002: 50). No matter which direction, it is obvious that, with the interaction in the commercial field, mainland China had never been so close to the construction of Hong Kong identity.

The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in December 1984 settled the future of Hong Kong – to be handed over by Britain to the PRC in 1997. Hong Kong would become part of the PRC, albeit in the form of a Special Administrative Region. Only a small number of people who had acquired British National Overseas citizenship would be allowed to use passports issued by the British Government for travel but not for settlement in the United Kingdom (A Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong, 1984). Thus, by the time the Joint Declaration was signed, it was blatantly clear that most Hong Kong citizens of Chinese origin would become PRC nationals by 1997. The signing of the Joint Declaration enforced an imaginary concept of the Hong Kong identity. The shared perception of living on ‘borrowed time’ in a ’borrowed place’ was added to the construction of the Hong Kong identity (Hughes, 1968).

The Tiananmen incident in 1989 was another milestone for the evolution of the local identity. The demonstrations by students in mainland China raised many issues, like freedom, rights and democracy, that echoed the situation and concern of Hong Kong people at that period. The demonstrators received wide support in Hong Kong. The final crackdown of the demonstration was immediately seen by the citizens of Hong Kong as a foreshadowing of the future for them. This was the first time that the local community was forced to form an opinion about what constituted their identity (Tomas, 1999:88). The local residents debated and defined their identity around the individual’s rights within the community. During the event, the media had an influential role, transmitting both the event and following debates to all sections of the territory. The conclusion was that the ‘way of life’ that Hong Kong people shared showed a strong dissimilarity to that seen on the mainland China (McMillen, 1993).
With the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, Beijing achieved its first objective of national unification. Macao followed in December 1999, while unification with Taiwan seems to be under negotiation. However, national unification and national identity are not the same. Hong Kong identity is evidently different from the national identity as understood by the government in Beijing. The Beijing-selected Preparatory Communities for the handover of Hong Kong had a clear idea of Hong Kong’s identity: Hong Kong residents of ‘Chinese origin’ were regarded as Chinese citizens, including those who had a foreign passport but also held a permanent residence card. These people would become citizens of the People’s Republic of China automatically because of their blood lineage (Wen Wei Po, 1996). However, research on the status of collective identity in Hong Kong reveals a picture that is different from the idea of collective identity based on blood lineage. Other markers, e.g. cultural and territorial, play a significant role in the construction of identity. Among them, political value has played as an increasingly significant component for the identity of Hong Kong in the first few years after handover.

The uproar over Article 23 and proposals for the anti-subversion law in 2003, and institutional reviews regarding universal suffrage in 2004, revived Hong Kong identity, particularly in terms of political values, when the economic differences dramatically declined with the rapid development of the economy on the mainland. It is believed that the pride of being from Hong Kong ‘ultimately lies in the institutional edge represented by political pluralism, the rule of law, respect of human rights and civil liberties, accountable government and democratic institutions’ (Cheng, 2005: 65). Article 23 was greatly worried about because it could damage the political vibrancy of the city as the crucial component of Hong Kong identity. The denying of universal suffrage by the NSCPC’s interpretation of the Basic Law in 2004 limited the potential political development that contributed to the maintenance the political identity of Hong Kong. As a result, the debates and re-conceiving of the Hong Kong identity were brought forward once again.

The development of a capitalist economy under the British regime driven by the Chinese immigrants has acted as a unifying factor against their origins. When the
second and subsequent generations emerged, the new, locally-born citizens were in the majority. A common language and the rapid expansion of the education sector all added to the process of recognizing and defining the population by themselves and against the significant others. At the same time, constant pressures have been directed against the formation of a stable local identity. The family and friendship between the first generation and the Mainland continued to exert an influence, and the increasing interaction between Hong Kong and the mainland in the business sector continued shaping and modifying the identity of Hong Kong.

Social interactions between Hong Kong people and Mainlanders have increased dramatically in recent years. Although the change of identity is a complicated and conflicted process, there have been signs showing that, from a certain aspect, Hong Kong people’s identification with China has been on the rise (Lee & Chan, 2005). Surveys have shown that the percentage of people’s trust in the Chinese government has risen from 24.5 per cent in 1996 to 45.5 per cent in 2006. Confidence in ‘one country, two systems’ has increased from 42.3 per cent to 70.3 per cent during the same period. This change is described by researchers as a process of co-orientation which refer to ‘the acquisition of better information and achievement of increasing understanding between two individuals or groups through interactions, which may lead to convergence in attitudes towards external objects and mutual agreement on issues’ (Lee, B.K., 2007:141). It is believed that cultural co-orientation is happening between Hong Kong society and the Mainland (Lee & Chan, 2005; Lee, B.K., 2007).

Economy, culture, blood lineage, constant immigration and political development, all serve to shape Hong Kong people’s identity from different directions. When more and more elements tend to drive the identity closer to mainland China, political values emphasizing democracy still maintain the uniqueness of Hong Kong people, compared to their national counterparts, as a strong force, and has been seen increasingly important in recent years.

3.5 The existing literature regarding Hong Kong identity

The horizon confronted by Hong Kong after the handover is the possibility of
redefining its own position in relation to Chinese national identity. The process of becoming entails a mutual transformation of the two parties involved: Hong Kong and China. There have been – and likely will continue to be – many attempts by local and foreign scholars to describe the specificity of Hong Kong in terms of the development of its culture, identity, and local consciousness. Some works promote the idea that, because Hong Kong is so socially schismatic, it is impossible for the territory to have a ‘unifying cultural foundation’ (Chan, 1995: 23). So who ‘the Hong Kong people’ are will remain ambiguous and, for some cultural and literary critics, the amorphous, elusive, hybrid, slippery, and inconsistent nature of Hong Kong identity becomes its only consistent, identifiable characteristic (Siu, 1996).

Broadly speaking, the existing discussion revolves around three key issues: the origins of Hong Kong identity, the relationship between the local and the national (Chinese) in Hong Kong identity, and the question of assimilation. The following sections survey some of the main arguments and research for each of these three areas.

3.5.1 Questioning the (origins) of Hong Kong identity

Questions regarding the origins and even the sheer existence of a separate Hong Kong identity are constantly giving rise to disagreements. One of the reasons for these disagreements lies in the divergent, unacknowledged assumptions regarding (national) identity. In particular, the work of many mainland Chinese scholars is based on ethnic identity, namely the fact that national identity is inconceivable without blood ties (Wang, 1993; Liu, 2002). As a consequence, Hong Kong identity, which is primarily cultural and political, is not taken as important. It is not seen as a ‘real’ identity. Hence, from this point of view, there simply is no distinct Hong Kong identity, or, at the very least, Hong Kong identity is not an important issue, and certainly not an issue that should be of any relevance to political debate.

Some researchers argue that the Hong Kong identity, even if it does exist, operates according to the logic of what it means to be Chinese, rather than any determinate local position. Therefore, the study of Hong Kong identity is not a
search for a unique Hong Kong subjectivity. Instead, what should be taken into consideration is ‘how Hong Kong culture operates as an articulation of ‘transitional Chineseness’ (Lo, 2005: 4). The popular culture of Hong Kong moves towards or away from Chineseness at different historical moments in order to accommodate the changing needs of different ideological groups, rather than consciously aiming at a construction of a particular local identity.

Acknowledging a separate Hong Kong identity, some authors argue that the beginning of its formation was after the British rule. Hong Kong had no pre-colonial history to speak of: it was virtually a ‘cultural desert’ (Abbas in Tapp, 1999: 168). Following this argument, Hong Kong occupies a unique position in the history of colonialism. Unlike most other colonies, which had distinct (local) cultures before colonization, Hong Kong’s identity was created only with colonial rule. To the immigrants in the 1940s and 1950s, Hong Kong was a refuge and place to remake lives disrupted by revolution and political change. Their sentiments were still attached to the homeland. The younger generation, which came to maturity in the 1970s and 1980s, did not carry the emotional baggage of their elders. A sense of Hong Kong identity was established by the young Hong Kong-born population. Under the impact of the education system, and mass media, Hong Kong began to create a distinctive identity (Johnson, 1997). To summarize, the Hong Kong identity generated in the 1970s was created by the colonial history, rather than having much to do with Chineseness.

Regardless of whether one is acknowledging the existence of a separate Hong Kong identity, and regardless of when exactly the origins were located, this way of interpretation tends to share a common argument that Hong Kong identity is largely determined or even created by external factors, like mainland China or a colonial regime, and the influence is basically one-sided. That is to say that identity held by Hong Kong people is the object of external forces rather than self-oriented. What this project tries to explore is the Hong Kong side of the story in the interactions between the city and mainland China by examining the local news media and their representation and construction of the self-consciousness of Hong Kong.
3.5.2. Between nationality and locality

Among scholars who accept the assumption that there is a separate Hong Kong identity (and this is the majority), the major bone of contention lies in the precise balance of the local and the national in Hong Kong identity: some authors emphasize that Hong Kong identity is, predominantly, an identity defined in opposition to broader identities, while others insist that this local identity is in fact in harmony with attachments to broader communities. Furthermore, some assume that a separate Hong Kong identity is always and necessarily in conflict with the Chinese identity, while others allow for the possibility that the two are not necessarily in conflict.

Some researches predicted that Hong Kong inhabitants would differentiate the in group and the out group more strongly on trait dimensions that put their social group in a positive light as the handover approached (Hong et al., 1999). The Hong Kong identity that displayed an increased reliance on the economic achievement dimension would distinguish Hong Kong people positively from the Chinese Mainlanders. When categorizing the different national groups, people who claimed a primarily Hong Kong identity put more weight on the modernity dimension and less weight on the traditional-values dimension than those who claim a primarily Chinese identity. A study shows that individuals who identify themselves as ‘Hongkongers’ may have a need to be distinctive from the mainland Chinese group, whereas those who identify themselves as ‘Chinese’ may have a need to be included into the Chinese group (Brewer, 1999). Studies like these are built with the assumption that there is a fundamental difference, if not incompatibility, between two fairly homogenous identities: Hong Kong people and Chinese.

Some scholars argue that, after the handover in 1997, the sense of a separate Hong Kong identity was strengthened. The return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 has led to a contraction of the political sphere, as the convergence of political structures curbed the development of local identities (Fung, 2001). Although the high intensity of dominant national discourses during the political
transition created a favourable atmosphere for re-nationalization, as soon as the political transition was over, Hong Kong people would re-adhere to their own label in their struggle for cultural autonomy (Fung, 2001). It is also argued that in protecting Hong Kong’s economic interests, ‘the government deepened the cleavage between the people of Hong Kong and the Mainland’ (Chan, 2000: 500). In this way, local identity triumphs over national identity.

Works that attempt to affirm the existence of a distinct, unitary and homogenous identity of Hong Kong are more than adequate. There emerged a rigorous effort to define, through the study of its popular culture and social structure, a Hong Kong identity distinct from that imposed by Chinese nationalism. In other words, there is commonly believed to be a unique and authentic subjectivity evident in the everydayness of the Hong Kong lifestyle. In contrast to that, however, other literature presents Hong Kong identity as closely linked to – and even part of – Chinese identity.

Research revealed interesting parallels between Hong Kong and Chinese collective memory by examining how Hong Kong people represent world history in comparison to people from other nations. It found that Hong Kong people recognized more Chinese significant figures in history than Europeans while people from Japan, Australia, and New Zealand named more Europeans than people from their own national groups (Liu, 1999). Many of the most frequently mentioned events by Hong Kong participants happened in Mainland China. As such, Hong Kong Chinese’ perceptions of world history are largely linked to what happens in Mainland China. This discovery revealed that many Hong Kong people’s identities are deeply rooted in the culture and history of China. These findings are consistent with the contention that one of the bases of Hong Kong people’s identity is ethnic (Fu et al., 1999).

At least at first sight, the best solution to the dilemmas about the relationship between the local and the national in Hong Kong identity is provided by those studies that suggest Hong Kong identity should be seen as a ‘dual identity’. The term was used to describe the situation of Hong Kong people in transition with the assuming of a coexistence of both local and national attachments (Tsang, 2003: 231). The dual identity among the Hong Kong Chinese produces
conflicting urges. However, they have no choice but to try to strike a balance between these urges or try to reconcile them. They still think first and foremost of themselves as Hong Kong belongers, but they also now accept that they are PRC nationals. In other words, they identify themselves as a special group of PRC nationals, distinct from other citizens.

Still, arguments centred on the notion of ‘dual identity’ are not without weaknesses. Similar to arguments that see Hong Kong identity as entirely separate and distinct and arguments that see it as a sub-unit of Chinese identity, the ‘double identity’ idea assumes the existence of a unitary, homogenous Hong Kong identity. However, identity is never homogenous and we are, in fact, always dealing with competing and sometimes conflicting representations about ‘the same’ identity. In the case of Hong Kong, it is very likely that there are different conceptions of what it means to be Hong Kong people, some being more local, some more open to embracing various wider identities. Multiple parallel conceptions of the Hong Kong experience, ranging from the local to the global, exist among generations and form a pluralistic cultural universe. ‘This universe is connected to the world as much as it is attached to the real or imaginary China’ (Helen, 1999: 91). The Hong Kong experience has been neither entirely colonial/Western nor narrowly territorial. The territory’s residents have acquired overlapping identities of Hong Kong, Cantonese, Chinese, and global citizen, and exerted tremendous flexibility to accommodate, to manoeuvre, and to absorb. ‘They have created the phenomenon we now call Hong Kong’ (ibid.: 93).

3.5.3 Assimilation vs. integration

Even after embracing the existence of a multiple coexisting conception of Hong Kong identity and allowing for the possibility that a local and national identity is not in conflict, the arguments are still far from being exhausted. The issue of the multiplicity of available conceptions of identity, which is to say that Hong Kong inhabitants are not homogenous and relate to China in different ways, also leads to another and maybe more important discussion: the discussion about assimilation vs. integration. Almost all researchers above make no distinction between the two and simply assume that becoming PRC nationals necessarily
means assuming a mainstream mainland Chinese identity and culture. The disagreement is then between those who see this line of development as unnecessary and bad, and those who see it as necessary and good. In fact, integration may not necessarily go hand in hand with (cultural) assimilation and, therefore, Hong Kong may well be able to both become more integrated into the overall Chinese society while at the same time retaining a level of distinctiveness.

Study on the language attitudes of local people reveals that people with a stronger attachment to Chinese identity tend to be more willing to assimilate into the mainland Chinese group than those with a more distinctive Hong Kong identity (Tong, et al., 1999). The problem of this approach is that it assumes assimilation is a necessary corollary of integration. It is unavoidable, and excludes the possibility of integration without assimilation.

Examination of the self-construal in Asian societies found that Hong Kong Chinese were more than twice as likely to believe in a fixed social world than in a malleable social world. This contrasts with North American samples, in which the belief systems have approximately equal prevalence. Moreover, a fixed belief was systematically related to the tendency to assimilate into mainland China. In contrast, belief in a malleable social world was systematically related to the tendency to differentiate from the mainland China and retain a distinct Hong Kong identity (Chui and Hong, 1999). This study reveals how Chinese cultural values encourage the acceptance of the social world as a fixed reality, rather than a malleable world view. The fixed world view, in turn, is likely to encourage assimilation into China before the political transition.

Some researchers suggest that policies that strengthen people’s more inclusive identity without threatening the more distinctive identity may fulfil people’s need to be inclusive and distinctive at the same time, and thus would benefit intergroup relations beyond 1997 (Hong, 1999). Some suggest that keeping a “Hongkonger” identity may not necessarily lead to resistance to assimilation unless the social identity is politicized (Fu et al., 1999). The Hong Kong identity is only associated with resistance to assimilation when the social identity is situated in a political frame. Thus, there might be advantages to policies that
avoid politicizing the Hong Kong vs. Chinese social identity. This study defined
the distinction between the assimilation and integration, however, it still assumes
that assimilation is necessary and good, and it does not explain what precisely is
meant by assimilation.

3.6 Conclusion

Studies surveyed in this chapter provide a rich resource for the study of Hong
Kong identity. They examine the identity of Hong Kong people using many
methods and adopting different theoretical frameworks. With assumptions of the
existence of a distinct Hong Kong identity as a local identity or sub-identity
rather than national, or a parallel/conflict format of Hong Kong vs. China, or the
prediction of assimilation/integration, the existing literature either champions the
Hong Kong identity without examining what the core contents of it are, or
assumes the changes in Hong Kong identity are necessarily good or bad.
However, the identity issue is far more complex than that. It keeps changing
according to the social and political changes. While it may be interesting to
examine the individual constructions of identity as expressed by Hong Kong
people themselves, as many studies quoted above have done, the project focuses
on a far less explored subject in existing research – namely the changing and
competing constructions of identity provided by the media, and the links between
them and the Hong Kong media system and political developments.

As argued at the beginning of this chapter, the Hong Kong identity, no matter
what format it takes, does exist in a ‘Hong Kong way of life’ that the local
community are anxious to preserve and has been guaranteed of protection by the
Chinese government. It defines who the Hong Kong people are – to themselves
and in their relationships with others, especially mainland China. However, the
Hong Kong identity is also dynamic and adaptive.

The identity of Hong Kong gradually evolved over a period of time, with the
base rooted in the region’s pre-modern history and rapid development after the
Second World War that started Hong Kong’s modernity. The development of a
capitalist economy, primarily driven by the newly-arrived Chinese population,
acted as a unifying factor against their disparate origins. As the population grew,
in particular as the second and subsequent generations emerged, more ties
developed that created citizens out of migrants and led to the creation of a shared
identity. The gradual transformation accompanied the social development and
political changes and interacts with the other actors. However, under this
continuing changing veil, a set of structural elements, whose cumulative effect
has been to create an identity, has been identified. The use of a common
language provided the basic of a sharing identity. A rapid expansion of the
education sector resulted in an articulate population that was able to define
themselves. This definition is expressed through a variety of cultural media that,
in turn, aided the process of definition.

However, the interaction amongst the identity, media and political changes is not
a closed circuit. One of the crucial actors, politics is not driven by the territory
and local citizens. There is a more powerful director, the central government of
China, behind the politics of Hong Kong. Constant pressures have been directed
against the formation of a stable local identity. Additionally, there is a continued
existence of the first wave of immigrants with their mainland place-identification
and non-Hong Kong values and increased interaction in economic activity
between Hong Kong and the mainland. People’s perceptions of Hong
Kong/mainland differences are disappearing in terms of economic values. The
cultural and historical aspects are also identified. At the same time, there is still
conspicuous divergence in terms of political values. Identification in political
aspects remains weak (Ma & Fung, 2007:172) All these facts served to modify
the identity of Hong Kong. The social and political development will continue to
challenge the definition of what it means to be Hong Kong people. To reveal
how the changes happen, a close examination of the representation of the identity
by the local media is necessary.
Chapter 4. The Hong Kong Media Landscape

4.1 Introduction

Hong Kong is one of the most densely populated cities in the world, with a population of 7 million living in an area of 11,000 square kilometres. It has always been seen as the forerunner of press freedom in Chinese societies with the famous ‘non-intervention’ policy. In fact, the level of press freedom in Hong Kong is acclaimed as second in Asia, after Japan (Lee, C., 2000). At the end of 2006, there were 49 daily newspapers, 699 periodicals, 18 television services licensees including five domestic ones and 13 international television programme services. There is also one government-funded public service broadcaster, Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK). The registered Hong Kong press included 22 Chinese-language dailies, 14 English-language dailies, 8 bilingual dailies and 5 in Japanese (Hong Kong 2006 Yearbook, 2006: 342–3). The flourishing of media institutions allows the variety and diversity in voices and intense competitions.

The print media has gained in importance if not dominance in the total Hong Kong media market. Over the years, print media has increased its share to half of the total advertising market by 2007 (AC Nielsen, 2007). Hong Kong newspaper circulation is among the top 10 in the world, second to Japan in Asia, with 569.5 per thousand adult population in 2007 (World Association of Newspapers, 2008: 87). The commercial newspapers form the majority in the industry. Generally speaking, these newspapers present different aspects from marketing objectivity to mass appeal (Lee & Lin, 2006). Ming Pao, Hong Kong Economic Journal (HKEJ), and South China Morning Post (SCMP) are more elite-based. The high-circulation newspapers, like Oriental Daily and Apple Daily are more oriented to the mass and coexist with other media rooted more in politics, like Ta Kong Po (TKP) and Wen Wei Po (WWP), founded and supported by the Chinese

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4 RTHK is a government-owned-and-operated broadcaster. RTHK has insisted on following the BBC model and maintained its independence from any government influence. Even after the handover, RTHK has continued to produce programs critical to the SAR administration and has ‘become a major source of political criticism in the public arena’ (Lee, 2007:144). The debate regarding the future of RTHK has continued till today.
government. Between the two most circulated tabloids, ‘Apple Daily adopts a critical or even oppositional stance regarding the government whereas Oriental Daily is more pro-government’ (Ku, 2007:186).

This chapter provides a landscape of the press industry in Hong Kong, by a vertical perspective on historical development, and a horizontal examination of the press structure. Key elements including the local journalist culture, media ownership, media self-censorship and credibility are discussed individually and taking into consideration in further examination of major newspapers in the industry.

4.2 A brief history of Hong Kong newspapers

The early stage of the Hong Kong press can be either described as ‘depoliticized’ or ‘politically oriented’. From the 1950s, Hong Kong had developed as a refugee society with a large portion of the population from mainland China fleeing the political turmoil and natural disasters. Hong Kong was only viewed as a temporary safe haven for the majority of the population. People did not have a strong attachment to the local society and did not have strong political demands of the government. They preferred stability and tended to be politically apathetic. Therefore, in terms of local politics, the press was described as a ‘minimally integrated social political system’ (Kuan & Lau, 1988: 9). From another perspective, the local press was preoccupied with the struggles between the Communist and Nationalist ideologies in China. It was guided by the policy of the colonial government, that ‘[s]ympathizers of mainland China and Taiwan are permitted to set up their propaganda organs as long as they stay within the confines of the law and do not threaten the legitimacy of British rule’(Chan & Lee, 1991: 6). This period was marked by the dominance of partisan newspapers. They exhibited a full range of ideological positions, ranging from the far right to the far left. However, ‘newspapers were not rightist or leftist with regard to local political matters. Rather, the main reference point was politics in China…In fact, some of these partisan papers were financially supported by the two regimes. All of them paid close attention to Chinese politics rather than to local issues’ (Lee & Chan, 2009: 12). During this period, few newspapers actually made a profit, and
many of them carried very little advertising (Clark, 2005). However, commercial benefit was not the major objective of the press then.

After the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, the political change drastically shifted the mode of governance of the press and the traditional journalistic paradigm of the leftist/rightist press diminished in the late 1980s. The press system in Hong Kong experienced a gradual shift in favour of Communist China. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the restructuring and partial demise of party-press parallelism. The ideological equilibrium began to collapse as the pro-Taiwan papers withdrew from Hong Kong. ‘The rightist papers either found it impossible to survive in Hong Kong’s highly competitive media market in the 1990s or were forced to move toward a more centrist stance on political matters. As a result, the left-right distinction had become largely obsolete by the mid-1990s’ (Lee & Chan, 2009: 16). Substituted in its wake was a potpourri of pro-China newspapers and pro-Hong Kong newspapers. Following the democratization of political system and the reform of press regulation led by the Hong Kong government, the press industry gradually switched from being politically oriented to being commercially oriented. At the beginning of the 1980s, the media became actively involved in a series of political reforms and greatly increased its coverage of political and civic issues (Lee, 1993). It also began playing an increasingly important role in monitoring the government. The ideological conflicts in this industry were classified by Hong Kong and China contradictions (Lee et al., 1996). Under this situation, the Hong Kong press epitomizes the struggle between the pro-democratic camp and the pro-China camp. The press has split into two categories: the ideologically-laden press and the ‘centrist’ press, with the traditionally pro-China newspapers (like WWP and TKP, and the ‘opposite’ position (like Apple Daily), and the majority with a ‘neutral’ stance (like Ming Pao).

The decline of partisan newspapers and the rise of the commercial press can also be attributed to the demographic change. The proportion of the locally-born population increased as the overall Hong Kong population expanded. Between 1961 and 1981, the proportion of those born locally rose from 47.7 per cent to 57.2 per cent and the population grew from about 3 million to almost 5 million
(Wang & Tu, 2003). Those born locally were comparatively apathetic to the partisan politics of China and more interested in Hong Kong current affairs. Added to that, the booming of the advertising industry which increased business activities also attributed to the rise of a commercially-based press. Nowadays, the commercially-oriented newspapers like *Apple Daily* and *Oriental Daily* have taken the most significant position, and traditionally pro-China newspapers like *WWP* and *TKP* have become more and more marginalized. Alternatively, the major commercial newspapers treat their political stances in a latent way, rather than highly flag the slogan above the title, as in the old days of the party newspaper.

### 4.3 The contemporary journalistic culture in Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s journalistic culture depends much on the political context and the social environment. However, running on commercial principles, market forces play an important role in Hong Kong journalism. Professional values and a liberal press system are widely held by the journalists despite important changes in the larger social and political environment. Recent studies have shown that Hong Kong journalists have maintained a strong sense of professionalism (Lee & Lin, 2006; So & Chan 2007; Lee & Chan, 2009). ‘Professionalism involves the central idea that journalists are autonomous actors independent from political and economic power in the political communication process. It also involves a set of principles and norms guiding and justifying journalistic practice’ (Lee & Chan, 2009: 113). The liberal concept of the press has been ascribed to Hong Kong journalists since the colonial period (Chan, Lee, and Lee 1996).

However, professionalism has been under pressure from the very beginning of the press industry in Hong Kong, especially since the 1990s when the transition began. Journalists’ professional ideals have been challenged in actual practices, as evidenced by the lowering of journalists’ social status, the increase of self-censorship, and the decline in media credibility. These phenomena are the result of various pressures coming from both the political power centre and market forces. Self-censorship is on the increase as China’s weight sets in, accompanied by changes of media ownership and stepped-up cooperation of the media owners and the power centre. The media market, although believed to
provide room for the continuation of professionalism, is also considered to be breeding ground of sensationalism (Clark, 2005; So & Chan, 2007). All these factors have been acting to shape the contemporary journalistic culture in Hong Kong.

Despite the pressure and challenges from both political and commercial forces, ten years after the handover, journalists in Hong Kong as a whole still regard monitoring and criticizing the power-holders as an important media role and emphasize the need for media to protect the interests of the local public (Lee & Chan, 2009:113). Thanks to a set of factors that are seen as the backbone of the journalistic culture in Hong Kong, professionalism is still maintained as the core value in the journalistic culture today – the legacy of the professional culture in the journalistic community from the liberal ideas of the British regime; the entrenchment of press freedom in Hong Kong’s political culture; journalists’ need for a self-defence strategy and the balancing force rendered by the media market; along with the journalism training many young journalists have received in universities and professional courses established by the Western principles.

4.3.1 Journalism education and employment

The first university programme in journalism and communication was established at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (HKCU) in 1965. This undergraduate programme depended heavily on American models. It has a strong theoretical component and has attracted highly-qualified students, although it is also noted critically that the graduates show very little desire to engage in journalism (Clarke, 2005: 4). The second pioneer in local journalism education was Hong Kong Baptist University (HKBU), which started offering communication diplomas in the mid 1960s. ‘Its original design was heavily influenced by British polytechnic offerings of the era because external validation was at the time provided by the British National council for Academic Awards. The professional area occupies about half the course’ (Clarke, 2005: 5). The programme was upgraded from diploma to degree in the early 1990s.

The 1990s saw the development of journalism education in Hong Kong, which was still ‘primarily based on the U.S. Model’ and ‘the premise that freedom of
the press was a right to freedom of expression and information’, as a result of the prevalence of the American model and the large number of PhD students who had graduated in the U.S. (Lai, 2007: 149). The University of Hong Kong (HKU) launched both undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in the 1990s. Different from the programme offered by CUHK, there is very little communication theory, or areas like sociology, politics and law at HKU. There are also two private colleges in the business of journalism education but have shown less weight compared to the previous three. Also, what should be noticed is that many Hong Kong journalists, particularly in the English media, have undergone at least some part of their education outside the territory, mostly in English-speaking countries.

The educational level of the working journalists has been rising steadily, with over 90 per cent having post-secondary education in 2006, and a sizable portion (14 per cent) even having a master's degree. Journalism and communication education appears to form a steady and important part of journalistic training in Hong Kong (Leung, et al., 2006) as slightly more than half (52 per cent) of the respondents have a degree in journalism and mass communication, while some (17 per cent) have taken courses in journalism (So & Chan, 2007:149). However, generally speaking, little or no training is offered by news organizations. This actually might be the reason why most employers prefer recruits with a background of professional education (Clarke, 2005: 9).

One of the crucial features of Hong Kong journalism is the rarity of reporters who regard the activity as a career. Reporters who achieve five years of experience – a requirement for ‘senior’ status in some countries – are rare. They usually move to the Public Relations sector or are promoted to senior editorial/production level after a few years in the industry (Clarke, 2005: 11). The mean age of Hong Kong journalists is slightly over 30 and the average working experience is only seven years (So & Chan, 2007: 149). Hong Kong journalists are relatively young, well educated, but in general not very well paid. This plus low social status and huge career uncertainty have made most journalists leave the profession in a very short time. However, surveys show that they are still dedicated to independence and freedom of speech (Lo et al., 2001). The Western training culture with its liberal and democratic principles has been
playing an important role in shaping the journalism culture in Hong Kong. It is believed that a university education has more weight than the marketplace itself (Clarke, 2005).

4.3.2 Journalists Association and Press Council

The Hong Kong Journalists Association is the biggest industry-wide union of journalists and one of the most active. Formed in 1968, it has about 500 members (HKLRC, 2004: 88). It pays attention to press freedoms and ethics concerns as well as to professional training and the handling of labour disputes. (Hong Kong 2006 Year Book, 2006: 342–3). HKJA also serves as a channel for individuals to complain about unethical reporting in local media. During the transition period in the 1980s, HKJA had begun to become more political and protective of journalists’ rights. From 1993, HKJA started to produce annual reports on the status of press freedom in Hong Kong (Lau, 2008:14). The annual reports have been regarded as a significant reference to the status quo of press freedom in Hong Kong, and are often quoted in foreign media reports about Hong Kong.

In fact, HKJA members account for only a small proportion of local journalists (HKLRC, 2004: 89). The Association has no jurisdiction over the vast majority of journalists who are not its members. Nor are media organisations subject to its jurisdiction. Given the one-sided nature of evidence available, the HKJA has at times found it ‘very difficult’ to come to a definite conclusion (HKJA Ethics Committee, 1996). Nonetheless, from 1999, HKJA started to publish the findings of its Ethics Committee (which entertains ethical complaints, but has no power either to discipline journalists or to ensure publication of its findings) in its journal and on its website to increase the transparency of its adjudicating process (See <www.freeway.org.hk/hkja/ethics/index.htm>).

There are three other journalists’ associations in Hong Kong: Hong Kong Federation of Journalists (HKIFJ), Hong Kong News Executives’ Association (HKNEA), Hong Kong Press Photographers Association (HKPPA), among which the most noticeable is the (HKFJ). As the HKJA became more political and began publishing regular reports of free press issues in 1993, in 1996, HKFJ was founded with support from Mainland-controlled media, like Wen Wei Po and
Xinhua, as well as the public backing of property tycoons. HKFJ was then called a ‘Beijing-aligned press association’ ‘pro-China’ by the local media (Gilly, 1996: 22). In 2000, the HKFJ, along with HKNEA and 11 newspapers, founded the Hong Kong Press Council ‘to promote the professional and ethical standard of the profession of the Newspaper industry and, in particular, to deal with the complaints of the public to the acts of the members of the Newspaper industry’ (HKLRC, 2004: 93). However, among the member, the most circulated newspapers, Oriental Daily and Apple Daily, along with several other prestigious papers (in total, with 80 per cent readership of the newspaper market) are not members, as well as HKJA and HKPPA.

The lack of membership and jurisdiction has been a limitation for all journalism associations in the territory. Thus, all associations have clear objectives and have become increasingly political but the effectiveness has been very low. The journalism ethic is largely maintained by journalists and media institutions themselves.

4.4. Media ownership, self-censorship and credibility

In a society in which a media industry is well-developed and plays as a strong force in politics, the independence and autonomy of media from the political power centre are particularly important and of prominent concern to the researchers, local citizens and international observers. To define press freedom, there are more aspects to examine besides professionalism, i.e. the local journalist culture. This section looks at three key aspects that define the status of the media in Hong Kong: the changes of media ownership since the handover when rapid political change was taking place; increasing self-censorship when China’s influence on Hong Kong has been noticeably increased; and the decline of credibility for the whole media industry in recent years as a result of the interplay of a few factors, including the previous two.

4.4.1. Media ownership and its impact

Concerns about conglomerates and owner interference have existed in every free market in the world for decades. The concentration of ownership of media organizations under a single giant corporation is often considered as leading to a
narrowing marketplace of political ideologies. In the case of Hong Kong, the form of media concentration is different. It is created by the various ownership acquisitions. However, the acquisition of newspapers by business barons sharing common interests would be, in terms of consequences, highly similar to the concentration of media in the hands of a single conglomerate.

Under the principle of ‘one country, two systems’, China did not impose the Mainland’s censorship system on Hong Kong. However, it did attempt to control the media through a variety of strategies (Chan and Lee 2007, Lee 2007). One of the most important strategies has been the cooptation of media owners. Before and after the handover, a few prestigious newspapers originally run as family businesses, including Ming Pao Daily, Sing Tao Daily, Sing Pao and HKEJ, were bought by business tycoons (Fung, 2007:161). There are two major impacts regarding the issue of ownership: more media proprietors with Mainland business interests or officially appointed in Mainland governmental bodies, and the increasing desire to tap into the Mainland’s booming consumer market (Lau, 2008).

Although the number of media organizations remains large and they have no connection to finance, management or operations, they are increasingly concentrated in the hands of business people who have significant business interests with, or in, China and operate their media under the same political and economic constraints (Fung, 2007). These pro-China businessmen, from the point of the view of the authorities, are all part of the political united front (Fung, 2007:163). In consequence, more and more media owners have been seen sitting on government bodies.

Besides the cooptation strategy of the authorities, there are desires of getting closer from the media institution themselves. Since the 1980s, international investors were showing increasing interest in buying Hong Kong’s media outlets in order to set up a base to enter the Chinese media market. The intense competition within the territory and limited space to expend in the local market made the media proprietors desire increasingly to expend their business to the Mainland.
The impact of the changing of ownership can be both significant and invisible in the operation of media institutions. ‘The owners may not dictate daily news operation, but they can exercise influence through making basic allocative decisions, such as the use of resources and hiring of top level personnel’ (Lee, 2007: 136). Observers also argued that changes in ownership structure have led to the depoliticization of media content and journalists’ apprehension about criticizing China (Fung and Lee, 1994). Most significantly, it is connected with the increasing concern of self-censorship in the industry.

4.4.2. Self-censorship

‘Media self-censorship refers to nonexternally compelled acts committed by media organizations aiming to avoid offending power holders such as the government, advertisers, and major business corporations’ (Lee & Chan, 2009: 112). The principle of ‘one country, two systems’ defined by the Basic Law and China’s willingness to maintain the existing systems means that official media censorship has not been institutionalized. ‘Instead, by the early 1990s, it had already become clear to observers that self-censorship, rather than formal censorship, would constitute the major threat to press freedom in Hong Kong’ (Lee & Lin, 2006: 333). To researchers, self-censorship is particularly dangerous to press freedom because it is elusive and difficult to document by anecdotal evidence (Lam, 2003). Suggested by a series of survey studies, journalists in Hong Kong recognized the practice of self-censorship as being widespread within the industry. A survey in 1996 showed that Hong Kong journalists in general regarded the media as apprehensive when criticizing the Chinese government (Lee, 1998). The latest survey in early 2007 found that 58.5 per cent of Hong Kong journalists interviewed regarded self-censorship as having become more serious than it was ten years ago (Lee & Chan, 2009: 112).

The pressures leading to self-censorship came from various directions, mainly from the power centre and the media organizations. Over the years, the central government has been trying to define the norms of political correctness for the Hong Kong media, especially on the issues of Taiwan and Tibetan independence, as well as personal attacks on Chinese leaders, through formal and informal
speeches and criticism. The direct/indirect pressure from the central government applied mainly to these sensitive national issues.

The application of self-censorship is difficult to detect due to its elusive nature. While surveys provide a general idea of journalist’s recognition of self-censorship (Lee, 1998; So & Chan, 2007), in-depth interviews show that it has been practised by allocating journalists with different political views into specific positions and selecting the top news managers with less liberal political views (Lee & Chan, 2009). The frontline reporters tend to learn about the rules and norms prevalent in a news organization through their daily observations and interactions with others. In fact, conscious self-censorship exists to a very limited extent, due to the general prevalence of professional norms. However, self-censorship can be practiced without explicit order and journalists’ conscious intent.

Generally, it is still believed that press freedom remains intact today. Hong Kong media have been left largely free to criticize the SAR government on local matters, which are the priority to most Hong Kong media. Journalists have developed various strategies to deal with the pressures and preserve their own integrity by juxtaposition of different views, division of editorials from columns, and adopting certain narrative forms like factual and plain languages (Lee, K. S., 2000). The diversity of media organizations with different political stances also adopted different tactics and strategies to deal with the pressures on press freedom.

In addition, the politics of self-censorship is complicated by the commercial nature of the city’s media system and the professionalism of the practitioners. As business organizations, Hong Kong media have to concern themselves not only with political pressure but also with their credibility in the eyes of the consumers. Circulation and readership play as a powerful balancing force that keeps the self-censorship to a limited extent. This is especially important for newspapers due to the highly competitive local market. At the same time, ‘providing information to the public, monitoring the government, and being independent from political and economic power are also the core values of Hong Kong journalists (Lee & Lin, 2006: 333–4). Professionalism is also an effective force
in limiting self-censorship. As long as a significant part of the Hong Kong media has a strong commercial and professional orientation, the media would be ‘cyclically bold and tame, public-spirited and self-serving’, and media reactions to political and economic pressures would be ‘highly situational, erratic, partial, and even contradictory’ (Lee, C., 2000: 323).

4.4.3. Market orientation and credibility

The newspaper industry in Hong Kong was shaken by two rounds of new entrants in recent years. The first one was the launch of Apple Daily in 1995, which broke the price cartel at that time and started a circulation war by putting tabloid journalism firmly on the map. The arrival of Apple Daily converted the cosy scene of media industry into a cut-throat market (Shi, 2006). The circulation war ended up in shrinking the industry, with a number of media outlets closed down because of financial difficulties. Nevertheless, in the second five-year period after the handover, the previously-shrinking newspaper industry was unexpectedly shaken up by a few new entrants of free tabloids (Metro, AM730 AND Headline News) that rely entirely on advertising revenues. The highly-competitive market serves as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it constitutes a force that fosters the rise of sensationalism. At the same time, it serves to limit the extent of sensationalism and self-censorship to maintain credibility (So & Chan, 2007).

From the negative aspect, there are two main reasons. The first is the sensational approach to news that some media outlets have adopted to lure the audience. The media’s ethical standard is considered low even by journalists themselves and this is particularly evident in the media’s blatant disregard of citizens’ privacy in their coverage. In 1999, the Hong Kong government proposed to establish an official Press Council to monitor media ethics. Although it was strongly opposed by the journalists, who feared that it would open up a channel for press censorship, opinion polls at the time showed that the majority of citizens actually supported the government proposal. It illustrated how deeply dissatisfied citizens were with the media’s ethics (Lee & Chan, 2009: 29).
The second reason for the decline in the credibility of media organizations is the shift in political stance toward the central government (So & Chan, 2006). As discussed above, various factors have contributed to the shift of the whole media industry in general.

From the positive aspect, as, in Hong Kong, it is not the state that meted out rewards and punishments, but the public, who decided with their consumption, ‘only media that provided probing, critical, dynamic and interesting coverage could achieve the circulation and readership numbers needed to turn a profit and survive’ (Lau, 2008: 4). The Hong Kong public largely believes in the media’s role in providing an independent forum for public debate and in monitoring the power holders (Chan and So, 2004). Meeting these public expectations helps the media organizations to prosper. The competitive market means that there is no space for the media institutions to wait for the delayed reward by turning the media pro-China, when competitors would take any chance to erode the advertising revenues and drain them of readership. The media have to pursue a strategy that can surmount the political demands as well as the competition in the market (Fung, 2007:162). Since the need to obtain readership overrode the need to gain the authority’s favour, the media in general take the pro-Hong Kong position rather than pro-China, especially regarding the democratic reforms (Lee, 2007).

Taking all elements into account, when a news organization covers the story with less sensationalism, and positions itself more in line with the Hong Kong public, it will have higher credibility. The interaction between these two factors determines the credibility of a media outlet. ‘That explains why the pro-Hong Kong elite newspapers receive the highest credibility ratings whereas the mass newspapers or the pro-China newspapers are perceived to be less credible’ (So & Chan, 2007: 154).

**4.5 Major categories in the newspaper industry**

The criteria of classification of news media in Hong Kong changes with the social context. As discussed in the previous section, before the 1980s, the media were largely defined by their political stance towards mainland politics. With the
pulling out of the rightist media and the shift in focus from mainland to local matters in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the pro-China vs. pro-Hong Kong continuum has served as a better basis for classification (So, 1999). As market-orientated journalism has taken the dominant position in the industry in the late 1990s, a tripartite structure was suggested (Lee, C., 2000), constituted by the leftist papers, the centrist elite-oriented information press, and the market-oriented story press.

The tripartite structure was useful shorthand in describing the press structure in Hong Kong at the time. However, the complexity created by the interplay between political and economic force has made each news institution adopt a different position from the others. Market-oriented news media did not necessarily depoliticize their content. Instead, with the concern of credibility, market-oriented journalism can be the most politically daring and critical, exemplified by the *Apple Daily* (Lee, C., 2000). Adopting the same tabloid journalism and mass circulated as the top two sellers in the market, the *Apple Daily* and the *Oriental Daily* obviously have huge differences regarding political coverage. The same could also be said about the *Ming Pao* and *HKEJ*, two elite-oriented papers which, arguably, have visibly different stances toward the power centre. What should not be ignored are the new entrants of free tabloids which have changed the landscape of the media market by attracting a great portion of the advertising investment. The traditional leftist newspapers have also obviously changed their positions under pressure of the market. The daily newspapers in Hong Kong newspapers cover the full political spectrum, as well as various journalism styles and enjoy different levels of credibility accordingly. This section introduces five major newspapers that serve as the best examples that represent the characteristics of news media in Hong Kong.

**4.5.1 Popular tabloids: *Oriental Daily* and *Apple Daily***

The two business leaders in the print media are the Oriental Group and Next Media Group. The former owns the most-widely circulated newspaper, *Oriental Daily*, and another tabloid, the Sun, controlled by the Ma family. The latter owns *Apple Daily*, Next Magazine, Easy Finder, etc., all founded by Jimmy Lai.
Between them, the two groups are estimated to control almost 80 per cent of the newspaper market.

The *Oriental Daily* was established in 1969. By then, when the partisan paper was still dominant in the local press industry, the *Oriental Daily* was the first newspaper to emerge that put its main emphasis on local news for local readers. It ‘built a mass circulation by providing a popular diet of human-interest stories, celebrity gossip and hard-hitting opinion’ (Clark, 2005: 3). The paper has been number one in the circulation figures since 1976 (*The Standard*, 2007). The paper provides daily coverage of various kinds of news, including local, international, financial, real estate, entertainment, and sports news. It is not much different from other Chinese language newspapers in terms of content. It is defined as a tabloid mainly because of its focus on soft news, i.e. entertainment news, and the journalism style it adopted, which is more sensational even when reporting hard news. The sensationalism decided that, even with a high circulation, the paper is not recognized in terms of credibility. According to a series of surveys on the credibility of newspapers, the *Oriental Daily* was placed seventh amongst 15 daily newspapers in 1997, falling to ninth by 2006 (*Ming Pao*, 2006).

Before the Next Media Group founded *Apple Daily* in 1995, the Oriental group’s paper was viewed as a pro-Taiwan newspaper because of the good relationship between the Ma family and the Taiwan Authority at that time. In 1977, the Ma brothers were charged by the Hong Kong government in connection with one of Asia’s largest drug-trafficking operations and series of corruptions in the 1970s. They fled to Taiwan and never returned to Hong Kong. In 1994, the accusation that the Mas channelled the money to the Conservative party of Britain was reported in the *Oriental Daily* News. According to the report, the payment was made in an effort to smooth Ma’s return to Hong Kong from Taiwan (*BBC News*, 1998). It is suspected that the failure of the deal seriously damaged the relationship between the Oriental Group and the Hong Kong colonial government. In 1999, after a series of disputes with the main competitor, Next Media (*World Legal Information Institute*, 1999), the newspaper has arguably changed its stance towards Pro-Chinese government on sensitive political reports,
to compete with the so-called pro-democracy newspaper *Apple Daily* from Next Media (Huang, 2007). Oriental Group’s pro-government stance has earned itself the recognition by the authority’s granting them permission to publish in mainland China.

Although commercially oriented before the 1990s, the Hong Kong newspapers were still in a normal competitive atmosphere without any extreme tactics to marginalize counterparts. In the mid-1990s, the success of the weekly magazine *Next* led to its proprietor Jimmy Lai, a garment magnate, opening *Apple Daily*. The birth of *Apple Daily* in 1995 gave an electric shock to the whole ecology of the Hong Kong press. By starting a circulation war, it pushed the Chinese newspaper market into a state of fierce cut-throat competition (Shi, 2006). Jimmy Lai invested HK$700 million (about US$90 million), to sustain losses for three years after establishment (Lau, 2008: 9).

In order not to be marginalized, the *Apple Daily* adopted a pure market-oriented philosophy, left aside ideology and moral values, and put readers’ needs as the top priority. Consequently, aggressive marketing tactics, including sensationalism and unethical journalistic practices, in the late 1990s led to a public outcry and a call to take action on the freedom of speech versus social responsibility.

In terms of political stance, *Apple Daily* is arguably libertarian in that it supports minimum government control on economic matters and on personal and political freedom. It is also claimed to be explicitly opposed to Beijing and the Hong Kong government. It is the newspaper most identified with the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong. Jimmy Lai contends that the self-censorship practised by many newspapers has left readers desperate for a paper that dares to criticize. ‘Someone has got to tell the truth. A lot of other newspapers try to hide critical coverage of China on the second or third page. We put on the front page what we think Hong Kong people should know’ (Jimmy Lai quoted by Steinberger, 1996: 17). As a source of different voices, the *Apple Daily* shares a large proportion of the circulation and, as shown in Chart 4.1, it is regarded as an important reference for important current affairs, even higher than the so called ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ elite newspaper *Ming Pao*. The figure indicates that, regarding
important news, people tend to check *Apple Daily*’s information and comment. Although it does not mean that *Apple Daily* stands for the ‘truth’ or ‘justice’, the figure does suggest that even as a tabloid, with its pro-democracy political stance, *Apple Daily* is considered as a significant reference for people’s acknowledgement.

![Chart 4.1](chart.png)


There is no publication from Next Media that is allowed to publish in mainland China. The organization is denied the opportunity to enter China’s media market (Lam, 2003) and the Central Government does not allow the reporters from *Apple Daily* to gather news on the mainland. The reporters were excluded from the informal debriefing sessions by the Hong Kong government. It is believed that even advertisers pulled out for political reasons (Wong, 1999). Figures released by the research house admanGo show *Apple Daily* to be losing out dramatically to its competitors in the property-advertising category (Moir, 2004). It is no coincidence that the Next Group has chosen to expand the business to Taiwan rather than the mainland (Clark, 2005: 10). However, *Apple Daily* remains at or near the top of the market in Hong Kong. It is believed that the popularity of *Apple Daily* is ‘a testament to the continued pro-democracy sympathy among the population in general’ (Clark, 2005: 11).

The *Oriental Daily* and *Apple Daily* are the most popular Chinese dailies in the market. They target basically the same group of readers and apply a similar type of sensationalist journalism. Together, the two newspapers caused an outcry among the public for the government to take action on journalist ethic. In 1999, HKJA mourned the fact that the past years have been difficult for professional ethics, particularly when leading newspapers (referring to the *Oriental Daily* and
Apple Daily) have resorted to greater sensationalism in order to increase their market share. Apple Daily and the Oriental Daily competed to see which newspaper could print the most outrageous, attention-grabbing pictures. Numerous complaints from the public have had little effect on the practice, which continues unabated. They both refused to join the Press Council founded by the other eleven daily newspapers in 2000. The readership of the two most popular tabloids, especially Apple Daily, mainly focuses on the younger generation and average citizens with relatively low income (Chart 4.2-4.5).

Chart 4.2 Oriental Daily Readership: by Age, 1998–2006 (Neilson Research Hong Kong)

Chart 4.3 Apple Daily Readership: by Age, 1998–2006 (Neilson Research Hong Kong)
These surveys of readership show that the two papers have been most popular among the 35–44 year-old readers. *Apple Daily* has kept the second highest readership among 25–34 age group throughout the years, while the *Oriental Daily* has seen increasing popularity with the 45–54 age group, which has become the second largest readership since 2002.

![Chart 4.4 Ming Pao, Oriental Daily & Apple Daily: Average Personal Income (HK$) 2005 (Neilson Research Hong Kong)](chart)

![Chart 4.5 Ming Pao, Apple Daily, Oriental Daily Readership: by Education 2006 (Neilson Research Hong Kong)](chart)

In terms of personal income, the readers of the two tabloids are lower paid than that of the elite broadsheet *Ming Pao*. The average educational level is also lower with fewer university and graduate readers. *Apple Daily* enjoys a slightly higher university and above readerships than the *Oriental Daily*, but still considerably lower than the quality broadsheets. To summarize, the two popular newspapers target the less-paid and lower-educated readers, which form the majority of the population. *Apple Daily*, especially, focuses on the younger generation.
The educational level and average income are arguably related to the tabloid approach of journalism that the two newspapers intentionally adopted. Despite the low ethical standard and credibility, the popularity of the two papers remains high. The pro-democratic stance of *Apple Daily* is well accepted by the young generation readers, considering the increasing liberal-democratic outlook that is widely held by the younger population in the territory. Competing with the pro-democratic stance, the pro-government stance adopted by *Oriental Daily* is also not rejected among the readers, especially among the older group of ages. This may due to the pro-conservative philosophy of the older generations, who prefer order and stability and holding more traditional values.

4.5.2 Elite broadsheet: intellectual and commercial—*Ming Pao* and *HKEJ*

Louis Cha, the founder of *Ming Pao*, is one of the most famous and influential Chinese writers alive and his fictional works have garnered praise across China and Southeast Asia. In 1981, Cha was received by Deng Xiaoping, then leader of China. Three years later, Cha was invited to join the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law of the HKSAR to draft the Basic Law of HKSAR before the handover. In 1993, Cha prepared for retirement from editorial work, selling all his shares in *Ming Pao*. In 1995, the newspaper ended up in the hands of a Malaysian merchant from the timber industry, Tiong Hiew King, who is among the richest people in the world (Forbes, 2006), and owns a large slice of industry in Mainland China (Vinces, 2007).

Instead of writing sensational headlines designed to shock the readers, as *Apple Daily* and the *Oriental Daily* do, *Ming Pao* prefers to use moderate wording and a less aggressive approach. Its articles are considered to be fair and neutral. According to the survey in 2006, *Ming Pao* is the most-trusted Chinese language newspaper in Hong Kong (*Ming Pao*, 2006). In recent years, it is believed that *Ming Pao’s* style has become more conservative than previously, as it used to be quite opinionated and prone to discuss sensitive issues, especially in terms of democratic reforms in the city. The neutral stance is argued to be questionable when the majority of public opinion is clearly in favour of speedier democratization, and the emphasis on rational discussion is considered to be misplaced when political power is fundamentally unequally distributed (Lee,
2007: 143). It is viewed as a pro-China paper compared to *Apple Daily* (Lee & Lin, 2006; Vines, 2007). Also, one point that should be noted here is the large proportion of real estate advertisements carried by *Ming Pao*. Compared to the *Apple Daily*, *Ming Pao* has full-page advertisements from the big property developers.

The popularity among property developers is also interpreted as indicating the higher standard of *Ming Pao*’s readership. Compared with the tabloids, *Ming Pao* has more readers from the higher-educated group, or the so-called elites (see Chart 4.4 and 4.5). As shown in Chart 4.5, *Ming Pao* is the choice of about half of the college students in Hong Kong – much higher than *Apple Daily*, even though it targets younger readers. *Ming Pao* has a good reputation in higher education circles. This popularity also promises the favour of the elites in society, since the college students are the most likely group of people to develop into the powerful in society. Besides the popularity with college students, the major readership is actually among the older population, and recent years have seen a visible trend towards the groups of upper ages, which are more likely to hold senior positions in society (see Chart 4.6). In Mazzoleni’s study on tabloid media, he suggests that the elite media tends to show more support for mainstream politics (2004). *Ming Pao*’s position undoubtedly supports this argument. Together with another important elite newspaper *HKEJ*, *Ming Pao* is one of the most trusted sources of information for Hong Kong people. It performs as the mainstream in the media world.

Chart 4.6 *Ming Pao* Readership: by Age, 1998–2006 (Neilson Research Hong Kong)
The *Hong Kong Economic Journal (HKEJ)* was founded by Lam Shan-muk, who first worked for *Ming Pao*. He saw the possibility of developing an economic journal in Hong Kong in the early 1970s. The newspaper was first published in 1973 and later became one of the most influential newspapers in the Chinese media industry of Hong Kong (*Asian Economic News*, 2006). The reports and commentaries of the newspaper are always regarded as objective, fair and well-balanced among the Hong Kong newspapers. According to the survey in 2006, the *HKEJ* as well as *Ming Pao* were regarded as the newspapers with the highest degree of credibility in Hong Kong. As the *HKEJ* mainly focuses on reporting government policies and financial affairs, soft news plays a minor role. Unlike the tabloids, the *HKEJ* reports its news mainly through text, with few graphics. Due to all these elements, the journal does not circulate as widely as other newspapers. However, it serves as a symbol of high culture and the elite.

After 1997, the most highlighted acquisition is probably that of the *HKEJ*, ‘the daily known for its independence, in-depth analysis and bold criticism’ (*Fung*, 2007: 161). Lam Hang-chi, the former owner, said that ‘during Sino-British negotiations, China-funded organizations boycotted *HKEJ* and did not place advertisements in the paper, saying that the paper’s editorial board was “pro-British”’ (*Lai*, 2007:162). *HKEJ* was the territory’s least-circulated albeit most reputable financial dailies, and the last intellectually-owned and independent Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong. The *HKEJ* is regarded as the last example of the tradition of intellectuals as newspapermen. The changing of ownership of *HKEJ* symbolized the ending of an era of intellectuals publishing newspapers.

The political standard and the reputation in the industry made the change of ownership attract considerable attention in 2006, when PCCW chairman Richard Li Tzar-kai, the son of billionaire Li Ka-shing, spent HK$280 million to acquire 50 per cent of the journal (*Asian Economic News*, 2006). He further increased his stake from 50 per cent to 70 per cent in 2007 (*South China Morning Post*, 2007). ‘Media reports of the deal highlighted the public fear that Li’s investment would put its editorial independence at risk, though Li more than once publicly denied that he would intrude into the current editorship’ (*Fung*, 2007: 161).
Compared to *Ming Pao*’s mainstream position, *HKEJ* is more attractive to the elites (see Chart 4.7). The very small circulation and the great reputation reflect that this newspaper serves more as a brand for a higher-standard social group. Also, it focuses more on business affair (see Chart 4.8), however, surprisingly, it is not a complete advocator of the mainstream politics and calls for social stability. Rather, it is objective and even radical on the attitudes toward politics of Hong Kong. Till today, no obvious change in the editor’s principle has been observed since the change of ownership.

**Chart 4.7** *Ming Pao, Apple Daily, Oriental Daily & HKEJ* Readership: by Education 2005 (Neilson Research Hong Kong)

**Chart 4.8** *HKEJ, Ming Pao, Oriental Daily & Apple Daily*: Important business reading 2005 (Neilson Research Hong Kong)

### 4.5.3. Partisan papers: political ‘without’ commercial: *Wen Wei Po*

*Wen Wei Po* (*WWP*) was first established in Shanghai in 1938; its Hong Kong version was launched in 1948. As wholly-owned subsidiary of Hong Kong Wen Wei Po Ltd., the newspaper is a state-supported newspaper registered in Hong Kong. The former head of the newspaper Zhang Guoliang was the general editor.
of Reference News (a mainland newspaper published by Xinhua News Agency, which is the official press agency of the Chinese government), and the head of the Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong in the 1990s. The current Chairman and General Editor Wang Shucheng was the Director of the Xinhua News Agency Beijing Branch, and the Chief Editor of the Economic Information Daily (a mainland newspaper published by Xinhua News Agency). WWP supports the position of the central government, carries out the policies of the central government and delivers the latest development of the Mainland to Hong Kong readers. Apart from this, it also covers the local news in all aspects, with comments and editorials. The newspaper has always been considered as the ‘clean’ newspaper, with more coverage of serious issues, like politics, the economy, society, education and culture, especially from mainland China, but fewer entertainment or human-interest stories, and fewer sensational reports and bloody pictures. Nowadays, WWP has become closer to other newspapers in the industry in its layout, with big photos, big headlines, and big summaries; few words and few subjects (Xu, 2007). Even with these efforts and changes, the traditional pro-government stance still made the credibility of WWP be the sixteenth, nearly the bottom, in the list from the survey in 2006 (Ming Pao, 2006).

WWP is regarded as a pro-central government newspaper. Consequently, the reports are mainly on the positive side about China. The former head of the newspaper Zhang expressed that before the handover, WWP was discriminated against by the British government in Hong Kong. The officials would not accept interviews with the WWP. The newspaper was always subject to marginalization and pressure (Xu, 2007). After the handover, the newspaper has had to uphold the stance of supporting the central government and to be accepted by the general readership in Hong Kong. It originally only had positive, not negative, reports about the mainland and the SAR. There was only praise and not criticism, but this did not fit the needs of Hong Kong readers. The head of WWP, Zhang, said there was a ‘big problem’ in trying running a pro-Beijing paper that would also blend into Hong Kong. It was too much to ask that Hong Kong people to ‘like’ WWP; Zhang simply had the goal of having them ‘accept’ it. In 2000, WWP was nearly closed down. Later, with the change of personnel at the administrative
level, corresponding changes followed. The first thing ‘was to make a paper that the Hong Kong people could accept…We had to run a paper according to Hong Kong rules’. Currently, the layout and content of WWP is now closer to that of a Hong Kong paper. The paper began reporting on democrats, social problems and minor criticism of government projects. ‘We now have to report as complete and accurately as possible, In Hong Kong, news must be well-rounded and objective’, Zhang commented (ibid.). The reporting has expanded to both the good and bad, the Democrats as well. As one of the most popular Hong Kong newspapers on the mainland, WWP carries a lot of advertisements from enterprises of different mainland cities.

4.6 Summary

The media landscape and its corresponding effect on the discourse is what this project is trying to find out. Following Fairclough’s assumption that the discourse is shaped, if not completely determined, by the structure of institution and social context, the development history of the Hong Kong news media, the influencing factors and individual newspapers are all examined. According to Fairclough (2006), in the situation of major social change, various groups of people develop strategies, particularly discourse, to try to regulate, direct and control elements of these real processes and, if these strategies are successful, they may inflect and partly redirect the trajectory of actual social changes. The media organizations are undoubtedly one of these groups, with great power to direct people’s minds. They represent and narrate to their audience what has happened in the past and is happening in the present and imagine and advocate possible alternatives for the future; possible orders which might overcome existing problems and offer better futures (ibid.: 28). Generally speaking, since the handover, Hong Kong news media has remained relatively critical, varied and influential in shaping public opinion. What is their representation of the current politics? What kind of identity do these newspapers transmit to their readers? Is their language in the news reports consistent with their conventional position in the industry? This chapter provides the background and initial information for further analysis.
Chapter 5. The Relationships between Politics, the Media and Identity

in Hong Kong

5.1. Introduction

The previous three chapters each focused on one of the three key factors that are of relevance to the dissertation: Hong Kong politics, Hong Kong identity and the Hong Kong media. It is now time to look more closely at the relationships between these three factors, and explore issues that do not become fully apparent when considering them individually. This project focuses on the political communication aspect of media institutions, i.e. (a) what kind of identities are presented to the audiences during political events; and (b) how are these mediated identities affected by the nature of the political system, the political economy in Hong Kong and the characteristics of the territory’s media system? As discussed in the previous chapters, the existing research on Hong Kong media often focuses on the media-politics dynamics, and takes into account selected aspects of media economy. This research adds a third component: identity. Both politics (including political economy) and the media are seen as the broader context that helps explain the nature of mediated forms of Hong Kong identity in political reporting.

The specificities of media portrayals of identity in Hong Kong lie in the specificities of Hong Kong’s political system and its political economy: the underdeveloped political parties, with their short history and various restraints suffered by all the major camps, which have made party politics in Hong Kong quite weak; the central/HKSAR government insistence on an uncompromising approach on the crucial political development to further democracy; and a well-developed market economy with minimal state intervention. The combination of all these factors results in a special context for the identity politics communicated by the local news media.

The next part of the chapter outlines the characteristics of Hong Kong’s politics and political economy. The third part discusses further the nature of the relationship between politics and the media in comparison with the one typically
found in Western media. The last section concludes by looking at the overall relationship between politics, the media and identity.

5.2 The specificities of Hong Kong politics and political economy

The political landscape in Hong Kong is unique due to its particular history. In contrast to the West, the integration of Hong Kong into a capitalist economic system did not go hand in hand with the development of a fully-functioning liberal democracy. Instead, elite administration and a strong presence of the state was the defining characteristic of the political system both during the colonial period and after the changeover in 1997. The political party system remained rather weakly developed and only partially representative, failing to act as an effective representative of popular opinion. While the state has traditionally exerted strong influence in the realm of politics, its involvement in the realm of the economy remained minimal. Since the colonial period, Hong Kong has practised a ‘positive non-interventionist’ economic policy (Cheung, 2000: 295). Under the logic of maximum continuity, China has dictated that the territory be kept essentially intact with no ‘systemic change’ for 50 years after handover. As a result, Hong Kong still remains the limited democracy along with a strong market orientation.

5.2.1. Weak parties, strong state

As noted in Chapter 2, the last attempt to develop a representative democracy – shortly before the handover to China – was implemented in a rush. Under pressure from the Chinese government, the process of democratization initiated before 1997 remained incomplete, and Hong Kong never reached the stage of a fully-functioning democratic polity. The political parties remained rather weak and overshadowed by the powerful state, and never achieved the status of influential political actors they normally have in established Western democracies. Therefore, the political system in Hong Kong was left somewhere half way between the Western-style liberal democracy with a functioning plural party system, and the Chinese-style centrally-managed, single-party political system.

Although the local democracy movement could be traced back to the 1970s
(Cheng, 1989), when there were pressure groups participating in various protest activities to attract the mass media’s attention and to influence government policies, most pressure groups appeared to articulate their interests concerning social issues rather than democracy at that time. Party politics has not begun to develop until the mid-1980s when the British government started representative elections on a limited scale, when few pressure groups formed alliances, and further evolved throughout the election. The alliance at this point existed more for ‘technical and publicity convenience rather than as groups of candidates with united political aims’; they were still viewed by political observers as the beginning of a multi-party system in Hong Kong (Choi, 1985). The pluralism of party politics further developed in the transitional period, with a range of mainly three categories of liberal-democratic, conservative and pro-China by the attitudes regarding various issues shown during the transitional period. The last two have merged to a great extent later on and have even been assimilated into the state after the handover. The liberal-democratic is the only major opposition left in the system.

Although the democratic parties have developed in numbers and with more exposure of activities in public view in recent years, they have never gained sufficient significance to influence the policies or reformation in Hong Kong. Despite being described as a multi-party system, with numerous parties from the three categories formed in the transitional period, no one party has a chance of gaining power by controlling the Legislative Council. The Chief Executive is selected by the Central Government and is non-partisan. The limited scale and nature of the party involvement determined that party politics is in a much weaker position compared to the state force. The democrats have also been criticized for failing to adopt a more radical strategy to push for democratization in Hong Kong (Wong, 1996). Therefore, the support from the local population is also limited due to the lack of trust about effective action.

In contrast to the awkward position of political parties, the state has always been the overwhelmingly leading force in the politics of Hong Kong. However, the power of the state in Hong Kong rests on different grounds than the power of the state in established liberal democracies. In the latter, the legitimacy of the state is
at its highest ‘when the state appears to be accountable to a democratic electorate that can replace its officials and revise its priorities through competitive elections’ (Connolly, 1991: 202). In Hong Kong, however, the crucial link that established the link between the electorate and the state – namely, the party system – is too week to ensure popular legitimacy. Instead, the HKSAR government derives its power to an important extent from the Central Government. In the colonial period, the situation was similar: the Hong Kong administration derived its legitimacy from the British government and has never been fully representative of the local population. Both the British government and the Chinese government have thus largely decided the future of Hong Kong without taking much account of its residents, treating Hong Kong as a part of a larger polity. However, the welfare of either the British territory or other Chinese nationals has not been a priority for Hong Kong citizens. This situation has created an imbalance between the state and the citizens. The policies are often seen as problematic by the receivers but the space of negotiation is limited. Political parties, as actors in between, have not been capable of influencing the state, on one hand, and have not gained enough support from the public on the other and, therefore, are not able to fill the gap between the state and the public.

However, the general stability of the territory reflects that, to certain extent, the public has accepted the status quo provided by the state and allows time and space for any further development required. This trust from the majority of the public has further reinforced the strength of the state as the most and only effective source of any further development towards democracy, or other directions.

5.2.2. The media as a replacement for weak parties?

The relationship between the media and the political process is dialectical, involving a constant interaction between the two. The media report on and interpret political activity, but they are also part of it. Given the close interaction between the media and politics, it is hardly surprising that the specific nature of the political field in Hong Kong and its relationship with the economy have direct consequences for the functioning of the media.
One could argue that the media are, at least occasionally, trying to fill in the gap created by the combination of weak parties and a strong state. The absence of effective representation of different camps by the political parties has been supplemented by the media institutions that reflect different political positions and attitudes. Take the newspaper industry, for example: the pro-government camp, the conservative/elite camp and the pro-democratic camp all have media outlets that support them. The newspapers, therefore, act as an intermediary between the population and the government and fulfill some of the roles typically performed by the parties – for instance, representing the ‘will of the people’ or criticizing the government. In this sense, their function comes close to the functions of the media in Western liberal democracies, where the media ‘have claimed the right to represent the people and to uphold democracy, and the consumers of newspapers and television have come to treat these media sources as the basis on which to think and act in the world’ (Street, 2001:7). However, if the Western media perform such democratic functions alongside the parties, and often echo and filter the views expressed by party representatives, the Hong Kong media do so virtually instead of the parties.

At the same time, it is important to note that the media institutions in Hong Kong have grown as a sector of the ‘cultural industry’, and that their involvement in politics is not led solely by political convictions or interests. As a part of the cultural industry, the media are mostly run under commercial principles and take profitability into account in their operation. As a commercial product, the media industry has the characteristics of all the other commercial institutes – it is prompt, responsive, quick, and it is always in search for new or expanded markets, and thus audiences. Even after reunification with China in 1997, Hong Kong media still remained free and robust (United State Policy Act Report, 2000). Under the notions of press freedom and social responsibility, government intervention in the press of Hong Kong is minimal. There is no government censorship of news in Hong Kong. People are free to criticize the government. Hong Kong still retains one of the most varied, vibrant and free media sectors in East Asia. From the point of view of the involvement of the state in media affairs, the Hong Kong media system functions in a way that is very similar to some of the Western media systems, for instance the US or Canada.
The density and variety of media outlets, the ease of access and the absence of state intervention, as well as the commercial imperatives and the need to attract audiences, have all contributed to the involvement of the media in the political process. The particular combination and mutual interaction of political and economic factors – the absence of strong parties, minimal state involvement in the economy and a vibrant commercial media sector – has pushed the media to develop a distinctive relationship with the public. The absence of effective representation of different camps by the political parties has been supplemented by the media institutions that reflect different political position and attitudes. Take the newspaper industry, for example: the pro-government camp, conservative/elite camp and the pro-democratic camp all have media outlets that support them, and these outlets often play a far more influential role in the political process than the political parties do.

5.3. The specificities of the Hong Kong media system

It is useful to take this comparison between the politics-media dynamics in Hong Kong and the West a step further. A useful starting point is provided by the tripartite typology of media systems developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004). Their typology is meant to describe the key similarities and differences between the media systems in Western Europe and Northern America, and explain how they are shaped by the wider political and economic context as well as by specific historical developments. To understand why the different media systems are as they are, Hallin and Mancini (ibid.) propose a framework of four major dimensions: the development of media markets, political parallelism, the development of journalistic professionalism and the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system. With the help of these variables, the different media systems are classified into three categories: Polarized Pluralist Model, Democratic Corporatist Model and Liberal Model (See Table 5.1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model</th>
<th>Northern European or Democratic Corporatist Model</th>
<th>North Atlantic or Liberal Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland</td>
<td>Britain, United States, Canada, Ireland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Newspaper Industry | Low newspaper circulation; elite, politically-oriented press | High newspaper circulation; early development of mass-circulation press | Medium newspaper circulation early development of mass-circulation commercial press |

| Political Parallelism | High political parallelism; external pluralism, commentary-oriented journalism; parliamentary or government model of broadcast governance – politics-over-broadcasting systems | External pluralism especially in national press; historically strong party press; shift toward neutral commercial press; politics-in-broadcasting system with substantial autonomy | Neutral commercial press; information-oriented journalism; internal pluralism (but external pluralism in Britain); professional model of broadcast governance-formally autonomous system |

| Professionalization | Weaker professionalization; instrumentalization | Strong professionalization; institutionalized self-regulation | Strong professionalization; non-institutionalized self-regulation |

| Role of the State in Media System | Strong state intervention; press subsidies in France and Italy; period of censorship, ‘savage deregulation’ (except France) | Strong state intervention but with protection for press freedom; press subsidies, particularly strong in Scandinavia; strong public-service broadcasting | Market dominated (except strong public broadcasting in Britain, Ireland) |

Table 5.1. The Three Models: Media System Characteristics (Hallin & Mancini, 2004:67)

By applying this analytical framework to the Hong Kong media system, we can understand not only how the Hong Kong media differ from their Western counterparts but also why they are as they are. For instance, why do the Hong Kong media, despite being run as commercial enterprises, get involved in political advocacy and act as replacements for political parties? How can we explain this by examining the interaction between the media and the political and
economic context in which they operate? Finally, this inquiry can also help us develop the necessary basis for understanding the mediated forms of identity constructed in the Hong Kong media reporting of political events. The following sections discuss the four key aspects of the analytical framework developed by Hallin and Mancini, starting first with general considerations and the moving on to assessing how the Hong Kong media fare on that dimension. The analysis is limited to the newspaper industry, as this is also the focus of the dissertation.

5.3.1. The structure of the newspaper industry

Media systems differ in the size of the newspaper market, as well as in its structure, e.g. the presence/absence of tabloid newspapers, the commercialization of media institutions and the distribution of media readerships (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Hong Kong newspaper circulation is among the top 10 in the world, second to Japan in Asia, with 569.5 per thousand adult population in 2007 (World Association of Newspapers, 2008: 87). Newspaper reading is not limited to a small elite who are well-educated and politically active (See table 5.3). They mediate between political elites and ordinary citizens, as well as play a role in the process of inter-elite communication (Hallin & Mancini: 22). The gender difference of readership is very low; in contrast to most regions in the world, the female readership is slightly higher than the male readership. The age difference is relatively low as well. Newspapers are popular in the whole population of literacy from teenagers to the old (see Table 5.2). The high circulation newspaper market has sustained commercial media enterprises. These high-circulation newspapers, like Oriental Daily and Apple Daily coexist with other media rooted more in politics, like TKP and WWP, which are founded and supported by the Chinese government through the years. From the point of view of its newspaper industry, then, the Hong Kong media seem to fit in the Democratic Corporatist Model, and resemble countries such as Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands.
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Female</th>
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<tr>
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<td>3,401</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>1,661</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: Nielsen Media Research

Definition of adult status

AB=professionals, managers, executives and skilled white & blue collar with post-secondary education or above,

C1=skilled white & blue collar with secondary education completed,

D=skilled white & blue collar with some secondary education or below, unskilled white & blue collar with secondary education completed or above, and unskilled white collar with secondary education or below

E=unskilled blue collar with secondary education or below; aged 18–64

5.3.2. Political parallelism and professionalization

According to McNair (1995:21), the communication media in ‘ideal type’ democratic societies perform five key functions. All of these functions are relevant to the political process:

- First, the ‘surveillance’ or ‘monitoring’ functions of the media that inform citizens of what is happening around them.

- Second, the ‘education’ function that explains the meaning and significance of the ‘facts’, which requires the objectivity of journalists as educators.
Third, the ‘platform’ function that facilitates the formation of ‘public opinion’ and feeds the opinion back to public with the space for expression of dissent.

Fourth, the ‘publicity’ function for governmental and political institutions that provides the ‘openness’ of the political class toward the public, and puts the acts of the decision-maker under public scrutiny.

Fifth, the advocacy functions for certain political viewpoints that the media serves as a channel for one or two particular political camps.

At first sight, the above-listed functions may seem incompatible. In particular, the advocacy function may seem at odds with the educational function with its reliance on ideals of objectivity. The majority of journalists, especially political journalists, subscribe to the professional ethic of objectivity, which ‘is important to the democratic process because it permits the media to report political events accurately, fairly, and independently’ (ibid.: 66). At the same time, objectivity is also crucial for securing audience support. Driven by the market, media cannot afford to abandon a basic level of creditability: ‘no media organizations – whether those of downright vulgarity or those of serious purpose and high instinct – can survive the critical market test if their reportage or commentary should be seen as seriously lacking credibility or consistency’ (Lee, C., 2000: 289).

Yet the ethic of objectivity does not mean that the media only exist as a mirror of politics. As Hallin and Mancini note, political advocacy was a central function of the print media virtually from their inception, and in particular since the Protestant Reformation (2004: 26). The media not only provide cognitive knowledge, informing the audience about what is happening, but they also order and structure reality, allotting events greater or less significance according to their presence or absence on the media agenda (McNair, 1995: 49). The same principles apply to the media reporting of politics, where media institutions do not only ‘objectively’ report politics, but also constitute the very milieu in which politics happens: ‘They contribute to policy discussion and resolution, not only in so far as they set public agendas, or provide platforms for politicians to make
their views known to the public, but also in judging and critiquing the variety of political viewpoints in circulation’ (ibid: 67).

However, although it is clear that media can never be completely neutral or ‘objective’, it is equally undeniable that the media’s involvement in political advocacy can differ considerably. While the media in Germany can easily be ‘mapped’ onto political parties, the links between media outlets and political parties in the US are far less transparent (McNair, 1995: 27). In other words, there are two modes in which media system handle the diversity of political loyalties and orientations: external pluralism and internal pluralism. The former can be defined by the ‘existence of a range of media outlets or organizations reflecting the points of view of different groups or tendencies in society’. The latter refers to the cases where ‘media organizations both avoid institutional ties to political groups and attempt to maintain neutrality and ‘balance’ in their content’ (ibid: 29).

Which type of political parallelism is characteristic of the Hong Kong Media? There is no clear-cut answer to this question. The majority of Hong Kong newspapers (except a few pro-China newspapers who may unofficially receive subsidies from the central government) are run as commercial institutions, whose purpose was to make money rather than to serve a political cause, and that was financed by advertising. In the case of Hong Kong, both internal and external pluralism can be recognized in the industry. On the one hand, we have newspapers with a clear political orientation: the Apple Daily is clearly a liberal and pro-democracy paper, while WWP defends the line of the Central Government. On the other hand, we have papers like the HKEJ or elite broadsheet Ming Pao, which tend to hold a ‘neutral’ position and thus come closer to internal pluralism. In general, the internal and external pluralism coexist in Hong Kong media system.

We could therefore argue that, with respect to political parallelism, the Hong Kong newspaper industry is a mixture of the Polarized Pluralist model, characterized by a high degree of political parallelism, and the Liberal Model, characterized by internal pluralism. Yet this is not the only peculiarity of the Hong Kong newspaper industry. We also need to keep in mind that although
these newspapers are differentiated politically, they are not associated with particular political parties but, rather, with more general, diffuse political tendencies without a strong organizational base. This is, in part, a consequence of their commercial nature, which has led them to avoid any close ties with the political party system. Apart from a few central-government-supported newspapers, most of the others attempt to insulate themselves from any party or government interests.

Compared to the situation in Western Europe and North America, the organizational connections (indicated by the tendency for media personal to be active in political life and tendency for the career path of media personnel to be shaped by political affiliations, see Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 28) between the Hong Kong newspapers and political parties or civil society organizations are weak. Although some media owners, mostly the business tycoons, keep a close relationship with the central government, there is no official connection and appointment seen in the major newspapers in Hong Kong. The majority of the news media do not receive any subsidies from political organizations, except for the few traditional pro-Beijing papers that are financially supported by the mainland source. Despite the strong support of *Apple Daily* for the pro-democratic parties, there is no organization affiliation between the two at all. The support is mainly due to Jimmy Lai’s personal political position.

The state of affairs with political parallelism in Hong Kong is not very much different from the situation in Western Europe, where newspapers tend to have a distinct political position, yet are not linked, organizationally, to specific political parties. They are also very influential – even more influential than political parties themselves in the case of Hong Kong – in the political process; this is often referred to as the ‘mediatization’ of politics. However, the situation in Hong Kong is different historically – while most newspapers in Western Europe arose as political party outlets, and later disassociated themselves from the political field, the partisan newspapers had largely disappeared from the Hong Kong media industry and the major newspapers were not politically-oriented since the establishment, except the pro-central government newspapers like *WWP*. 
5.3.3. Professionalization

The level of professionalization is indicated by three dimensions: autonomy, distinct professional norm, public service orientation. It is also related to the professional training of journalists (Hallin & Marcini, 2004: 34–6). The level of autonomy in Hong Kong media is relatively high, despite facing the increasing challenge of self-censorship due to ‘pressure from the management’ (ibid, 35). The professional norm is also under challenge because of the prevalence of tabloid journalism. According to the local research, the public service orientation remains very high (Chan, Lee, and Lee 1996; Lee & Lin, 2006; So & Chan 2007; Lee & Chan, 2009). Journalism and communication education is an important part of journalism training in Hong Kong. Surveys show that more than half of the journalists have a degree in journalism and mass communication and a considerable number have taken courses in journalism (So & Chan, 2007:149).

In general, the level of professionalism in Hong Kong is similar to what one would find in Southern Europe, i.e. fairly high in elite broadsheets, but less so in other parts of the sector. However, unlike in Southern Europe, where limitations to autonomy come from the political sector, in Hong Kong they come mostly from commercial pressures. On the one hand, newspapers in Hong Kong generally sustain a high degree of autonomy, with minimum authority intervention. The limitation to autonomy is more likely coming from commercial pressures like media ownership rather than from political instrumentalization, except in the case of the government-supported WWP. There is no official professional norm of journalism in Hong Kong. The HKJA is the largest and most active association for journalists. However, its members account for only a small proportion of local journalists (Hong Kong Law Reform Commission, 2004) and the Association has no jurisdiction over journalists who are not its members and any media organizations.

5.3.4. The role of the state and the market

All media systems are, in some way or another, influenced by the state and its policies. The media has been constantly criticized for being the advocate of power, involved in the manufacturing of consent (Chomsky and Herman, 1988).
Indeed, as McNair notes, ‘structural dependence on official sources frequently allows an official view of events to prevail’ (McNair, 1995: 59). However, to take this as a general interpretation of the media’s involvement with the state is simplistic: ‘Elite sources are not always successful in their attempts to dictate the agenda. The political elite is not homogeneous and the divisions are reflected in the media’s reporting’ (Williams, 1993: 326). The commercialization incentive of pursuing something spectacular and dramatic to maximize the sale decides that most news media are attracted by political scandals. In some cases, the media has ‘largely arrived at a consensus which challenged the legitimacy of the state in its handling of the affair’ (Murphy, 1991: 262), for example, the Watergate scandal in the US in the 1970s and the recent large amount of coverage of the MPs’ expenses scandals in Britain. Although the reporting of corrupt or unethical behavior by the political class may cause fragmentation and disunity amongst the establishment, ‘the media are contributing to a wider popular belief in the self-rectifying properties of the system’ (McNair, 1995: 60).

Both the assertions of a ‘hegemonic role’ for the media (Chomsky and Herman, 1988: 63) and those who emphasize the media’s flexibility and adaptability (Hallin, 1987) should be accounted for in the relation between media and power. The latter put the media ‘in the context of a fluid, dynamic political system, governed not by a single ruling class but by rotating elites drawn from different parties and factions within parties’ (McNair, 1995: 60). To have a full view of the power relationships, the manufacture of consensus must be accommodated with the ‘breakdown of consensuses’ and the splitting of elite groups: ‘The process of media production is an arena of contest and negotiation in which official sources cannot always take it for granted that they will be able to set the agenda’ (Miller and Williams, 1993:129).

However, although it is clear that the hegemony of the state and the ruling political elite is never complete, and that their control of the media is never absolute, it is equally undeniable that the extent to which the state becomes involved in managing the media system can vary enormously. State intervention varies in different media systems. In the relatively liberal system state intervention is limited and the media are left primarily to market forces. In
contrast, state intervention can take a greater role in ownership, funding and regulation of media.

In recent years, the relationship between government and media in Hong Kong has been very tense. The boundary between politics and entertainment has increasingly blurred world-wide (Street, 2001). This phenomenon has been represented very well in Hong Kong. Difference between entertainment news and so-called mainstream news is diminishing (Woo, 2006). The chasing of scandal and the private life of political figures by the tabloids following the trend of tabloidization has increased the tension between authority and the press. In 2003, the proposal of Article 23, the subversive law, pushed the relationship between the government and journalists to the edge. The legislation, it is believed, would destroy press freedom in Hong Kong. With the mutual benefit, the tension between the authority and journalism is rather temporary. Many reporters are happy to keep a good relationship with the authorities. Since the government is the dominant political power in Hong Kong, it has become the main source of political news. The government has taken this chance to improve its public relationship strategies and favoured some media organizations. Giving a positive image of the government in the newspapers in exchange for the first hand material and exclusive reporting from the government is popular (Lai, 2002). In general, freedom of the press and publication are enshrined in Article 27 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, and the government generally respects these rights in practice (World Association of Newspapers, 2008: 424). Government intervention in the press is minimal and the mass media is basically independent of any political powers. There is no ‘media law’ as such in Hong Kong, instead, the media are governed by statutory laws. While the level of state intervention is very low, it has, however, slightly increased over time in a indirect way.

Besides the complicated relationship of the media with the political ruling class, ownership is another issue addressed or criticized by scholars. The commercial nature of media institution not only brings the flexibility on attitudes towards the political class, it also comes with increasingly conglomerate monopolization as happened in other industries. ‘On the one hand the free flow of market forces is
viewed as the most justifiable influence on the range and nature of news and views made available by the press. On the other hand such forces are seen as a simple reflection of the distribution of power in society – a distribution which the press therefore comes to represent and thus to reinforce’ (Murdock and Golding, 1978: 148). It has been argued by some that the commercial status of newspapers overrides any political objectives which they may have. However, others (Curren and Seaton, 1991) have also argued that the benefits of newspaper ownership are not just short-term profits achieved by serving the media proprietor’s current interest. This is also the declarations of the media barons since the critique emerged (McNair, 1995:70).

In fact, the commercial and political power cannot be divided neatly in most circumstances. A mere commercial decision by a media institution would always have a political impact. ‘But at the same time, commercial power…does not translate directly or simply into politics. If we want to claim that owners play a direct political role, we need to look more closely at the operation of power within media organizations’ (Street, 2001: 130). In many cases, the commercial interests are not accordant with the political position of a media institution. In other cases, media bodies that share the same proprietor or similar pattern of ownership may vary a lot in their political position. Although the economic interests and incentives of the news media are crucial to explaining elements of their behaviour, they do not necessarily account for a paper’s politics: ‘There is no simple correlation between economic interest and the political content of papers or the pressure they put on governments’ (ibid.:130).

In Hong Kong, media ownership has always been put on the spot when questioning the political position a media institution chose to take. For example, the two business leaders in the print media are Oriental Group and Next Media Group. The former owns the most circulated newspaper, *Oriental Daily* and another tabloid, the *Sun*, controlled by the Mas family. The latter owns *Apple Daily, Next Magazine, Easy Finder*, etc. All founded by Jimmy Lai. Three newspapers owned by these two groups are in the top rank of circulation and revenue (World Association of Newspapers, 2008: 426). Between them the two groups are estimated to control almost 80 per cent of the newspaper market.
Before the Next Media Group founded *Apple Daily* in 1995, the Oriental group was viewed as pro-Taiwan because of the good relationship between the Ma family and the Taiwan Authority at that time. Later, the Ma brothers were charged in connection with one of Asia’s largest drug-trafficking operations and series of corruptions in the 1970s by the Hong Kong government. According to the report released by *Oriental Daily*, some payment was made in an effort to smooth Ma’s return to Hong Kong from Taiwan (Boggan, 1998; BBC News, 1998). It is suspected that the failure of the deal seriously damaged the relationship between the Oriental Group and the Hong Kong colonial government.

However, the owner’s interest has not been the only factor that determines the media’s position. Market and competition sometimes play an even more important role. As in the case of Oriental Press Group, the emergence of Next Media Group had a significant impact on political trends. In 1999, after losing a lawsuit with Next Media, the newspaper took several actions and was later found guilty of ‘scandalizing the court’, an extremely rare criminal charge that the newspaper's conduct would undermine confidence in the administration of justice (World Legal Information Institute, 1999). Afterwards, the Oriental group changed its stand towards authority on sensitive political reports, to compete with the so-called pro-democracy newspaper, *Apple Daily* from Next Media (Huang, 2007).

Market forces play an important role on Hong Kong journalism as Hong Kong media are run under commercial principles. Ratings largely determine the income of the media organizations and ‘infotainment’ is often the mainstream product of mass media. In order to get a scoop, reporters may use all means to obtain news, some of which are even unethical and victims can sue. With the pressure of advertising investment, there is a degree of self-censorship by some media, especially with regards to mainland China on ‘sensitive issues’.

Most of the media corporations in Hong Kong are privately owned. The role of the state is limited and the role of the market is stronger than that of the state. Party control and penetration of media is very low and ineffective. Generally speaking, state intervention is very low and there is an absence of state owned
media (except RTHK), and no official funding for any media from the state, including the pro-government papers. The regulations on media are also very loose, considering there is no media law operating in Hong Kong.

5.3.5. The Hong Kong media system: a liberal model, but not quite?

Generally, the media system in Hong Kong come closest to the Liberal Model, but with a number of important ‘diversions’ from the ideal-typical model developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004). The newspaper industry is highly developed, with the mass circulation, dominance of commercial news institution and the distribution of media readerships similar to the Liberal and Democratic models. Political parallelism is visible in both internal and external ways. Professionalization remains high, although faced with the increasing challenge of self-censorship, and state intervention is low.

The political system that relates to the media system is quite different from all the models that Hallin and Mancini identified, i.e. North America and in Western European countries, where democratic politics are carried out despite early or late development. Party parallelism has a very low influence on the media system. Rather, the divarication is basically the authority and the advocators of liberal democracy. The relationship between media system and political system proposed by Hallin and Mancini does not accurately apply, possibly due to the special history and social context of Hong Kong. Although Hallin and Mancini emphasize that the three-model framework is basically generated from Western countries, it can be applied to a larger map and media operations in the rest of the world. The most basic link between democratic politics and the liberal market does not apply to Hong Kong. As one of the world’s freest markets, the development of democracy has been considerably limited. However, this nonconformity between the economic system and political system has pertained in most of Hong Kong’s history, and is predicted to continue for a long time.

The strong role of Hong Kong media in the arena of politics means that as a ‘switcher’ (Arsenault and Castells, 2008), in particular the monopolies of the industry like the Oriental Group and the Next Group who control about 80 per cent of the press market, are capable of connecting the political agenda,
economic networks and media influence to facilitate their financial interests. The media institutions in a relatively free market are essentially driven by business expansion and work around this principle. They can move their political contestation flexibly according to policy favour and market potential, rather than political loyalty. Therefore, the connection between the media system and political system is not always consistent but constantly changing.

5.4. Hong Kong politics, identity and the media

5.4.1 The overlapping of political and territorial identities

The last issue to discuss in this chapter, and one of greatest relevance to the dissertation, is the question of how the above-described characteristics of the political and media system in Hong Kong affect the mediation of collective identity and, in particular, the mediation of political identity. As discussed in Chapter 4, identity is not some kind of ‘essence’ possessed by a person or a group of people from the moment they are born, but an ongoing process. In other words, the definition of an identity is never entirely fixed, and the various markers used to define a particular collective identity and distinguish it from its others can shift with time and space. Among various markers, political life has always played an important role in the ways which people have understood themselves.

As Preston explains, political identity indicates the ways in which ‘agents come to understand themselves as members of political collectivities, how such understanding are expressed in routine practice, and how such understanding are institutionally embodied and thereafter formally legitimated in the public sphere’ (Preston, 1997: 54). The awareness of an individual as a politically-active agent in a collectivity makes certain aspects of politics a marker of his/her identity. This identity is constructed and latterly reinforced in the daily practice of direct or indirect political involvement. However, the various political communities people identify with can differ considerably. On the one hand, people can identify with particular political ideologies and programmes; they can thus consider themselves to be liberals, democrats, socialists, republicans, conservatives and so on. This kind of political identification is particularly
common in well-established democracies with a functioning political party system. On the other hand, however, people can also identify with a particular national, local or regional community, and see that community as a whole – regardless of any internal political differences – as a political actor. In fact, this kind of political identity, which is amalgamated with a particular culturally- or territorially-defined community, became a norm in the modern world. According to Ernest Gellner’s explanation of the origins of nationalism (1983), the impact of industrial forms of production results in a central demand for ‘generic training’, which is the ability to be able to do anything and in turn, requires a universal, standardized system of education. This process linked the polity and culture, and created nationalism: ‘Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture’ (Gellner, 1983: 36). In the modern world, political identities are therefore almost inevitably intertwined with cultural and territorial identities.

In well-established democracies, these two types of political identity – let us call them ‘non-territorial’ and ‘territorial’ – usually coexist. At least in domestic politics, the non-territorial political identities normally take precedence over territorial ones. For instance, if we take the example of Britain, one participates in a public debate as a Labour supporter, a Conservative, or a Liberal Democrat. Political parties that tie their political identities to cultural or territorial identities – such as the British National Party or the UK Independence Party – are normally at the fringes of domestic political debate, except when it comes to issues such as immigration. However, in Hong Kong, the situation is considerably different. Here, the key political identities are always territorial: on the one hand, we have the pro-Beijing camp, which is clearly tied to the territory of the Greater China (and sees Hong Kong as an integral part of that), and on the other hand, we have the pro-democracy camp, which is linked to the territory and culture of Hong Kong (and see it as fundamentally distinct from the mainland China). Other non-territorial political identities that internally divide either the pro-democracy or the pro-Beijing camp are subordinated to territorial ones.

Furthermore, for the pro-democracy camp, the political identity is not only linked to the territory of Hong Kong, but also seen as politically fundamentally different
from mainland China, and inherently more democratic. In other words, a particular type of politics – democracy – is seen as the marker of Hong Kong identity. As explained in the Chapter 3, there are complex historical reasons for this particular link between Hong Kong identity and democracy. The development of a capitalist economy under the British regime has acted as a unifying factor that attracted the Chinese immigrants away from their origins, and contributed to the development of a distinct identity. When new generations emerged, the new, locally-born citizens became the majority. A common language and the rapid expansion of the education sector all added up to the process of recognizing and defining the population by themselves and against the significant others. This identity was defined in relation to capitalism and the British way of ruling, and was seen as more ‘Western’.

In particular, towards the end of the British rule, another marker of Hong Kong identity began to be emphasized: democracy. As described in Chapter 2, the status as a colony, the conservative position the British government adopted and the pressure from the Chinese government all played as suppression to any effective democratic development. After the handover in 1997, the concern of colonial nature of government was removed and the principle of ‘Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong’ was announced. However, anxiety of unsure future under the communist state and the fear of being assimilated into China and become an ordinary megacity of China have started to accumulate since the very first stage of transition. All these factors called up a dramatic promotion of a sense of identity. Hong Kong was emphatically trying to distinguish itself from mainland China as a more advanced society in every aspect, not only because they are economically more affluent or materially better endowed. The sense of difference was seen to lie largely in the belief in an institutional edge as represented by political pluralism, the rule of law, respect for human rights and civil liberties, accountable government and democratic institutions.

Yet, as noted earlier, the actual reality of democracy in Hong Kong is not quite as bright as these identity battles may make us believe. Political parties remain weak and only partly representative and, as a result, Hong Kong has been plagued by political apathy. In fact, the absence of politics has become a marker
of the identity or a stereotype by outsiders. Hong Kong people have been portrayed as economic animals, who value family connections and discard politics by the refugee nature of the territory where most population fled mainland China because of political turmoil (Lam, 2004: 1). Yet, despite these limitations of Hong Kong’s democracy – or perhaps precisely because of them – democracy has become a key way of defending oneself and an instrument of distancing oneself from the Central Government and other parts of the Chinese nation. Four representative-sample surveys conducted between 2003 and 2004 showed that between 70 per cent and 80 per cent of Hong Kong people wanted full democracy for Hong Kong by 2008 (Sing, 2005: 244). This sudden and quite dramatic increase in popular interest in current political affairs among the population of Hong Kong has clearly brought the political element into the identity of Hong Kong shared by the majority of its residents. The transformation of identity is closely associated with changes in the wider realm of politics. The demand for more rights, especially rights of political participation and thus democracy; the notion that residents and rulers alike have certain obligations to protect and nurture Hong Kong’s way of life have defined Hong Kong from the mainland specifically in the realm of politics (Baehr, 2001: 101). On the one hand, politics – or, more specifically, democratic politics – is considered as one of the crucial contents or markers of Hong Kong identity: the Hong Kong people are seen as more democratic than the inhabitants of mainland China. On the other hand, identity is used as an instrument of legitimation when requesting (more) political rights: without more autonomy and more political rights, runs the argument, the Hong Kong identity may be under threat.

However, as mentioned before, the vision of Hong Kong identity as uniquely democratic is not the only vision of identity on offer in Hong Kong politics. Instead, different political actors in a system promote different political identities according to their interests. The government, political parties and pressure groups, with their different positions, interest and advantage all have different versions of identity to the population in the same territory. The pro-democratic parties and pressure groups in Hong Kong, as a major opponent of the Central Government, tend to promote an identity that sees Hong Kong as unmistakably distinct from the rest of China, more liberal and democratic. The pro-central government camp,
however, as the full advocator of the central government’s will, tends to project an identity that is fully obedient to the Chinese identity, or even denies a unique identity of Hong Kong in any form. Finally, the HKSAR government, as a subordinate of the central government, and at the same time also the guardian of local population, tries to maintain a balance between the two. What remains to be seen is how this array of identities is reflected in the media.

5.4.2. The mediation of political identity in Hong Kong

The media, and the print media in particular, are important to the construction of identity. We are constantly faced with different mediated identities in our everyday lives. The different forms of media entertainment serve to remind us of our social identities and the associated commonsense perceptions of the social world; adverts link our identities to political-economic structures, and the various news genres reproduce our political preferences and identities (Preston: 1997: 46). At social, economic, cultural and political levels, the media help establish and maintain the ties to different forms of ‘imagined communities’ (cf. Anderson 1983), both national and of other kinds. In other words: ‘As public stages, mass media rank among the most important institutionally regulated venues for each community to express discursively its shared experiences and to disclose its underlying cultural and ideological premises’ (Edelman quoted by Pan et al., 2000: 272).

Although Benedict Anderson’s theory of ‘imagined communities’ (ibid.) refers specifically to national imagined communities and only considers newspapers and books, many of his general ideas apply to other types of the media and identity. For instance, we can argue that the distribution of the printed word on a large scale brought by the invention of print accelerated not only the sharing of a nation-wide imagination, but also the sharing of other types of large-scale political and cultural identities. By reading the same newspaper people became aware of other readers – members of the same group – without ever meeting in person. The nature of print capitalism, namely the drive to maximize its readership, led the modern media to search new markets, and thus create new identities. Some of these identities were, as Anderson shows, national, but others could be local, regional, political etc.
In the case of Hong Kong, we can expect that the identities projected by the Hong Kong media will be similar to the identities promoted by the different political actors – the government, the political parties, or the pressure groups – these media are associated with. This means that *Apple Daily*, being affiliated to the pro-democratic camp, will probably treat its readers above all as members of an imagined community of ‘Hong Kong citizens’ who are distinctly democratic. On the other hand, *WWP*, the traditional pro-government paper, is more likely to promote the Chinese national identity and patriotism. While others who maintain a ‘neutral’ stand may balance the voice. By examining the identity presented by media institutions, we can reveal their relationships with political actors and find out why is the media chose to present an identity as it is.

The peculiarities of the political system in Hong Kong are reflected at the level of mediated identities. It is feasible to expect that, given the absence of strong political parties and the prevalence of territorialized political identities in the political field, the media discussions will also be framed by territorial identities. We can expect that the Pro-Hong Kong stands vs. pro-China stands as seen in the political divisions will also be seen in the mediated identities.

The key characteristics of the media system may also impact on mediated identities. As we saw earlier, the Hong Kong media are characterized by a mixture of internal and external pluralism. We can expect this will be reflected also in the identities they construct for their readers. Elite broadsheets like *Ming Pao* which embrace more on internal pluralism are more likely to present a more inclusive identity that bring the Hong Kong factor and the Chinese factor into harmony. The pro-democratic tabloid *Apple Daily* is more likely to promote a distinctive Hong Kong identity, and the role of democratic politics as a significant marker to distinguish the identity. The pro-central government papers like *WWP* may even weaken the importance of democratic politics as a marker of Hong Kong identity or avoid the presentation of a unique Hong Kong identity.

The commercial nature of media makes the role of service provider, who considers the audiences as pure customers, as the main purpose of the press in a free market and is producing news as a commodity, and maximizes revenue by selling to the largest possible number of readers (McNair, 1995:61). In this
circumstance, the media may closely examine how the audience identify themselves in the society and sell to suit the preference of the customers. According to the readerships, newspapers owned by same or similar proprietors may have a very different ‘voice’ and address the same issues in very different ways. There is ‘a commercial motive for a newspaper to ‘speak the language’ of its readers, or at least to speak in a language which does not offend them unduly’ (ibid.: 70). In an intensifying commercial environment, the identification of readers could maximize the number of consumers, promote the effectiveness of media products and justify the advertisement investment. ‘Readers and viewers certainly matter to the rhetoric of mass media. They help to legitimate the activities of journalists: sales and ratings are taken as indications of popularity and public interest. The underlying assumption is that mass media reflect the tastes of those who buy their papers or watch their programmes’ (Street, 2001: 139).

To understand why the media present an identity as it is, readership is also a crucial factor to examine. For example, if it is proposed that a democratic political identity is mainly been embraced by a later generation with stronger liberal ideas and less attachment to the mainland China, a newspaper dependant on a younger readership may promote democracy as an essence of Hong Kong identity to stand as the ‘voice’ of its reader, like Apple Daily. Business-oriented newspapers, with their readership mostly business elites who have commercial interests in mainland China, are more likely to promote an integrated identity of Chinese nationalism.
Chapter 6. Methodology

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapters built up a general context of Hong Kong’s political developments and an understanding to the key political actors, examined the theories of identity and the particularity of Hong Kong identity, introduced the media landscape in Hong Kong, and examined how the three actors interact with each other in the social system. This chapter discusses and explains the reasons for adopting the research methods that were used in this study. It starts with a brief recapitulation of the research questions set at the beginning of the study, and discusses them in relation to methodological issues relevant for the study – in particular, the understanding of discourse, its involvement in social change and its links with the broader social context. The chapter then proceeds, first, with the discussion of the two key textual analysis methods relevant to this project, i.e. critical discourse analysis (CDA) and corpus linguistics (CL). It then continues with an outline of the contextual analysis, provides a description of the corpus used in the study and the chosen cases analysed in later chapters, and concludes with a brief summary of the research design as a whole.

6.2 Research questions

According to Fairclough (2006), in the situation of major social change, discourses constructed in the public space ‘represent and narrate what has happened in the past and is happening in the present, including why previous systems have failed, and imagine and advocate possible alternatives for the future, possible economic (social, political, cultural) orders which might overcome existing problems and offer better futures’ (ibid.: 28). The mass media play an important part in constitution, legitimization of social changes, mobilization of the publics and the ‘generation of consent to or at least acquiescence with change’ (ibid: 97). The beliefs, attitudes and identities the mass media transmit to the audience, who are also the participants of the social change, will inflect their response, and shape the result of the whole process.

Within the mass media, different media institutions with different backgrounds
and interests work in a correspondingly different way. The social systems and organizations are closely interconnected with particular sets of meanings, interpretations, attitudes, identities and so forth. It means that the particular discourse is determined partly by the social structure of the organization that produces it, and the broader social system. Fairclough’s theory of framing CDA within cultural political economy allows us to pay attention not only to discourse, but also to the social conditions that shape the production of the discourse.

These conditions are not purely discursive in character. They include structural characteristics of particular societies, features of their institutions, aspects of their history, as well as factors to do with the beliefs, attitudes and values of their people. In short, it helps avoid the real danger that in placing a necessary emphasis on often neglected discursive aspects of economic, political and social systems and processes, we throw the baby out with the bath water, and end up overstating the causal effects of discourse, or even treating process such as globalization as if they were purely discursive. (Fairclough, 2006: 29)

Indeed, this study connects the non-discursive elements, e.g. the political economy of the media, with the discursive strategies present in the media products. It investigates the relationship between the mediated construction of identity, the Hong Kong media landscape, and the wider context of political discourses.

As pointed out in the introduction, the existing research on Hong Kong media focuses mostly on the media-politics dynamics, e.g. freedom of speech, self-censorship, etc., and selected aspects of media economy, e.g. media ownership and concentration. This research takes another component into account: identity. The identity of Hong Kong, as introduced in Chapter 3, has long been studied and debated. However, it has not been put into the context of modern media and the development of politics in Hong Kong. This dissertation fills this important niche.

This project explores the mediated discourses about Hong Kong identity from the perspective of political communication of media institutions, with the aim of increasing the understanding of the relationship between media representations and the political economy of the media in Hong Kong in recent years, and to
reveal the dynamic of the media strategy regarding the politics of identity, and the factors that have influenced the development of Hong Kong identity after the handover and the significance of mass media as both messengers and actors in the process.

In the research, two core questions were raised:

1. What kinds of Hong Kong identities are presented to the audiences during political events?

2. How are these mediated identities affected by the nature of the political system, the political economy in Hong Kong and the characteristics of the territory’s media system?

The first question investigates the media strategies used to construct Hong Kong identity when reporting selected political events. In relation to the question of ‘who are the Hong Kong people’, two subsidiary questions were raised:

a. Who is the self, who are the ‘others’?

b. What markers are used to distinguish the Hong Kong people from their others?

The second question examines the reasons behind the particular shape of the mediated identity during the political events, to see what elements affect or determine the media representation of identity. To answer this broad question, the following sub-questions were devised:

c. What are the differences between the representations of Hong Kong identity provided by the different newspapers?

d. What are the relationships between the media ownership’s structure, readership and other aspects of the particular newspapers, and the prevailing strategies of identity construction used in their coverage? How do the media position themselves between the political interests and market pressures?

e. What is the relationship between the role of the media and the political structures in Hong Kong?
To answer these research questions, it is crucial to examine the language used in the media coverage in detail, and then interpret it in relation to relevant contextual factors. To achieve this, a multilayered research design was adopted, which involves both qualitative and quantitative textual analysis as well as contextual analysis. The quantitative layer uses insights from CL, while the qualitative layer of textual analysis is derived from methods used in CDA. The following sections discuss each of these layers and corresponding methods of analysis one by one.

6.3. Textual analysis I: critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis

Critical Linguistics is one of the most influential linguistically-oriented critical approaches to discourse analysis. The basic premise of critical linguistics consists of the belief that discourse is intimately intertwined with power struggles and wider social relationships. Consequently, critical linguists believe that the analysis of the linguistic structures and discursive strategies of a discourse could uncover the nature of the power struggle, social trends and other forms of social and political phenomena that a particular discourse supports. When applied to the analysis of representations of a social event, this form of analysis could thus give an account of how the discourse structures, which are established through various linguistic patterns and structures, work in their specific ways to convey a particular kind of social cognition, which in turn contribute to the change and development of the social structures.

Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar is considered as the best model for examining the connections between linguistic structure and social values and ideologies (Fowler, 1991). He sees language as performing simultaneously the ‘ideational’, ‘interpersonal’ and ‘textual’ functions, i.e. (i) representing the world (ideational function), (ii) enacting social relations and identities (interpersonal function) and (iii) relating to the context of situation (textual function) (Halliday, 1985: 53–4).

The analytical methods of critical linguistics have been inherited by other important traditions in discourse analysis. Norman Fairclough’s model of Critical Discourse Analysis (1995) is currently the most influential among them,
particularly so in the field of media and communication studies. ‘Fairclough observed that texts constitute a major source of evidence for grounding claims about social structures, relations, and processes. Though connections between language use and the exercise of power are generally invisible, he maintains that close examinations of speech and writing can bring to light concealed mechanisms of domination’ (Tu & Kvasny, 2006: 55). In Fairclough’s three-dimensional analytical framework (texts, discursive practices and social practices.), the discursive practice is emphasized as the medium between the text production at micro level and the social and cultural structure at macro-level. ‘The mediating processes of text production channel macro-level structures (e.g., ideologies, power relations) down into the micro-level text, leaving traces in the rendered product’ (ibid., 55). His framework provides a complementary perspective on the significance of intertextuality in critical discourse analysis. It goes beyond interpretative analysis to provide a critical analysis: one that explores issues of power related to language.

However, Fairclough’s framework is not omnipotent. Although the analysis is insightful, it is difficult to operationalize in a way suitable for the analysis of relatively large samples of texts. Compared to Fairclough’s theory, Roger Fowler’s approaches are more easily operationalized and thus better suited to fit the research aims of this project. Also, as Bell and Garrett (1997:18) argue, Fowler’s (1991) approach of critical linguistics is ‘the most accessible framework for analyzing media language’ (ibid).

Fowler’s model of critical linguistics comprises the analysis of language structures such as transitivity, passives, modality, nominalization, and lexical choice in functional terms. In his studies of news discourse, Fowler illustrated how media discourse (as a particular form of discourse) is constructed according to the stylistic and ideological conventions of the newspaper, not of the writer. That means that ‘the news discourse activates an institutional voice rather than a personal voice. The writer is constituted by the discourse, which is embedded in the social and institutional ideologies’ (Flowerdew, 2002: 7). Acknowledging that ‘socio-cognitive strategies are embedded in the discourse structures which serve to transmit the ideologies and attitudes of the newspaper to the readers
through various linguistic forms and patterns’ (ibid: 8), and that the essential function of language and conversation is to influence others, analysis of the discursive strategies could uncover the power negotiation and other forms of social phenomena that a particular discourse supports. When applied to the analysis of social events, Fowler’s approach can give an account of how the discourse structures, which are established through various linguistic patterns and structures, work in their specific ways to convey a particular kind of social cognition which, in turn, contribute to the change and development of the social structures.

To recapitulate: compared to other alternatives, Fowler’s approach is (a) more applicable to large data sets, considering its explicit way of recognizing the indicators, for example the transitivity and actor/subject. It is easier to transfer the theory into a coding system; (b) It allows me to undertake analysis of aspects of the textual material that are absolutely central to the argument, e.g. exploring the power relationships underneath the construction of a text, and the various meanings lying in the category labels. The following sections discuss the aspects of the textual material examined in my study – namely category labels and the choice of actor and subject – and explain how exactly they were analysed.

6.3.1. Category labels

Fowler suggested that the popular press presents the world with the help of a culturally-organized set of categories.

> If we imagined the world as a vast collection of individual things and people, we would be overwhelmed by detail. We manage the world, make sense of it, by categorizing phenomena, including people. Having established a person as an example of a type, our relationship with that person is simplified: we think about the person in terms of the qualities which we attribute to the category already pre-existing in our minds. (Fowler, 1991: 92)

Therefore, category labels could tell us much about the structure of the ideological world represented by the newspapers, by providing a list of the preoccupations of the paper, and it would be illuminating to examine the labels and their meanings. Different meanings or various layers of meaning provided by
the newspapers are the clues to underlying abstract themes of the discourse, the values and relationships that underpin a particular newspaper’s illustration of how the situation is going on and of how it should be. Let me take examples from selected reports published on 5 December 2005 to demonstrate these points:

Example 6.1 Two hundred thousand Hong Kong people taking to the street is a proud thing for the Chinese, and we’ve made the first step (Ming Pao).

Example 6.2 Among the marchers, there were indigenous Hong Kong people, and there were also foreigners who have come to Hong Kong in recent years (Apple Daily).

Meanings under the same identity label ‘Hong Kong people’ are obviously different in these two quotations: one is evidently embracing a broader identity, i.e. identifying Hong Kong people with a part of the Chinese nation, and the other limits the meaning of this label on to local, native Hong Kong people, excluding immigrants from other parts of China.

6.3.2. The choice of actor/subject and object

One of the most enlightening analytical approaches suggested by Halliday, and developed further by Fowler, is the examination of the choice of actors/subject and objects. Indeed, since the choice makes options available, a choice always means that the other possibility is suppressed. Therefore, the choice of actors/subject and objects indicates one’s point of view on a particular event or process, which is ideologically important. The reports of Hong Kong newspapers provide abundant examples of the ideological significance of these linguistic choices. For example, the following four quotations from newspapers of 5 December 2005 position Hong Kong in significantly different ways:

Example 6.3 The central government trusts Hong Kong people (Ta Kung Pao).

Example 6.4 Hong Kong people strive for universal suffrage (Apple Daily).

Example 6.5 Hong Kong people are protected by the Basic Law regarding the freedom to march (HKEJ).
Example 6.6 Hong Kong people should be rational (*Ming Pao*).

In the second and last of these quotations, ‘Hong Kong people’ is an actor/subject (Example 6.4 & 6.6), while in the remaining two cases, it is put into the position of an object – i.e. in a passive position (Example 6.3 & 6.5). While all sentences refer to the same event, the degree of activeness suggested by them has different implications. When Hong Kong (or Hong Kong people) is positioned as an object of somebody else’s action (Example 6.3), this implies its subordination to whoever was the instigator of this action. Conversely, if Hong Kong is in the position of the actor (Example 6.4), this obviously suggests that it is, at least as far as the action in question is concerned, fairly autonomous, and gives no clear clues about its relationship with other actors. Arguably, in the former instance, such sentences would suggest a view of Hong Kong as an integral and subordinated part of China while, in the latter case, such sentences could be read as suggesting that Hong Kong is autonomous.

6.4 Textual analysis II: corpus linguistics

CDA is an effective tool for providing insights into the relationship between language and ideology. The methods introduced in previous sections are usually conducted on small samples, i.e. by using a qualitative approach. Undoubtedly, critical discourse analysis is a powerful tool when dealing with the analysis of media content. However, it is not without its critics: it is argued that CDA focuses too closely upon arbitrarily selected texts rather than seeking systematic features of language. ‘They tend to be fragmentary [and] exemplificatory’ (Fowler, 1996: 8). Qualitative approaches have the disadvantage that ‘their findings cannot be extended to a wider population with the same degree of certainty with which quantitative analysis can’ (McEnery & Wilson, 1996: 76). The specific findings of the research cannot be tested to discover whether they are statistically significant or more likely to be due to chance (See Stubbs, 1997; Koller and Mautner, 2004).

It is also criticized that CDA ‘relies too much upon the analyst’s own intuitions to establish the author’s intentions or effects on readers’ (Cook et al., 2006: 7). The data is analysed in such a way as to bear out the analyst’s preconceptions
(Sharrock and Anderson, 1981; Widdowson, 1995). The analysed items could be simply selected to fit the case one may want to prove – for example a particular pattern of representation developing over time. Arguably, in such cases, research was in fact guided by pre-existing prejudices and assumptions, and analysis was then conducted on certain selected, and perhaps unrepresentative, quotations and images used to prove an a priori established evaluation or conclusion (Deacon et al. 1999: 133).

As the alternative, quantitative methods are clearly not without their disadvantages, especially when dealing with subjects which require a deep investigation into materials, like the issue of identity. The interpretation of the results of quantitative data is always under question, ‘since its application does not take place in the context of a theory of human communication that can specify what the magnitudes and frequencies our measurements give us actually mean’ (Beardsworth, 1980: 389). For example, to conceptualize the awareness of national identity of Hong Kong people through the press, what should be counted? Would a high frequency of the word ‘China’ mean a high sense of belonging transmitted by the newspapers? Without a further examination within context on the specific meanings attached toward the word, numerical data is difficult to interpret. A fully-rounded conclusion could only be achieved through a more qualitative investigation. Indeed, it is suggested that ‘the qualitative analysis of the manifest content of a document is very often the most obvious and sensible way of judging the ideas and intentions of the communicator who produced it’ (George in Beardsworth, 1980: 389).

Therefore, it has been suggested that CDA be complemented by corpus analysis as the basis for making reliable generalization about language use (Stubbs, 1996). It could provide a basis of credibility for generalizations based on the results of the study of a particular sample, and ensure a degree of rigour and precision when investigating the patterns and internal dynamics of media representation over a longer span of time. This is what the usual form of discourse analysis lacks. The findings from a discourse analysis can be tested on a larger corpus to see whether these features are actually tied to the specific social practices. The corpora can be used alongside discourse analysis to discover how far certain
features are distinctive of the selected texts under examination and how far they occur elsewhere in the language as a whole. The conclusions of corpus analysis can therefore be extrapolated (McEnery & Wilson: 1996: 59). What is more, using the corpus enables results to be quantified and compared. Corpus-based analysis has been practised to examine the discourse in various genres of texts (see Atkinson, 1999; Fairclough 2000) especially regarding media representations (Van Dijk, 1991; Baker, 2006; Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008).

However, the application of corpus linguistics to the Chinese language brings with it specific problems, especially when it comes to applying software packages. It has been long recognized that there are some fundamental differences between English and the Chinese language (See Levy and Manning, 2003; Xue, et al. 2005; Chang et al., 2009) One of the major obstacles to processing Chinese script with English-based software, like WordSmith, is that Chinese written texts do not contain word delimiters, i.e. space. Segmentation is the first step for text processing. To segment Chinese text into words requires a large language source as well as a complicated processing system. However, to this day, there is no such widely recognized system or computer application software. Because of the difficulty of segmentation and other problems related to the language differences between Chinese and other Latin alphabet-based language, computer-aid tools that work well for English do not work for Chinese. Therefore, in this project, the data are manually scanned and coded. The corpus is managed to a practical size for hand-tagging while maintaining the maximum representativeness.

In order to retain some of the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative methods, while trying to overcome their weaknesses, the project uses a combination of both types of methods. In the following two sections, two methods characteristic of corpus analysis are discussed in more detail: (a) the analysis of frequencies and (b) the analysis of collocations. As explained below, frequency analysis can be used to quantify the analysis of identity category labels, while collocation analysis can be used to quantify the analysis of the choice of subjects/actors and objects.
6.4.1. Frequency and proportions

The counting of frequency and proportions is the most basic and straightforward approach to working with quantitative data, and can also be used an effective way in combination with CDA. The term frequency statistics has been adopted by discourse analysts to examine lexical choices (Cook, et al, 2006; Orpin, 2005; Ding, 2007; Higgins, 2004). Using frequency count is to ‘classify items according to a particular scheme and to perform an arithmetical count of the number of items (or tokens) within the text which belong to each classification (or type) within the scheme’ (McEnery & Wilson, 1996:82). Counting and comparing the results of a selected language token or pattern can reveal the significance of a particular language incidence. In combination with discourse analysis, the arithmetical results can be interpreted with more detail and insights, while keeping the credibility and rigour provided by quantitative technique. For example, by comparing the frequencies of certain identity categories, and classifying the different meanings of each token, one can ascertain how often a label appears in connection to a particular meaning, and reveal the differences in material from different sources.

Given the nature and history of Hong Kong identity as discussed in Chapter 3, it is to be expected that the most important identity categories for our project will include labels such as ‘Hong Kong’, ‘China/Chinese’, etc. Based on an initial qualitative analysis of the smaller sample, it is concluded that the most interesting identity categories were ‘inland/mainland’, ‘communist/socialist’, ‘China/Chinese’, ‘Beijing’, ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’. These identity labels are closely related to the construction of a Hong Kong identity from the aspects of the other, the sense of belonging and the self. This initial analysis has also served to identify the prevailing meanings of each of the labels, and these were then used as a basis of coding the data in the quantitative part of the analysis. The sections below discuss the key meanings for each of the labels, and their relevance for the analysis.

Label ‘inland/mainland’

The inland/mainland of China has long served as the significant other in the
development of Hong Kong identity (see Chapter 3). The changing of meanings of the label indicates significant change of the self identity of Hong Kong. It differs from Hong Kong in economy, history, cultural, politics, etc., and the negative image of under-development has promoted Hong Kong’s advantage in almost every aspect of social life. Highlighting these differences or diminishing them can provide important clue to the current identification of Hong Kong.

Label ‘communist/socialist’

Another label that has always distinguished Hong Kong from the rest of the country is the ideology label: communism. No matter how integrated in economic segment, the ideological difference has been the marker that is uncompromising. Accepting it in default or crying it out loud could make an evident difference in the way Hong Kong identifies itself.

Considering the relative simplicity in meanings, i.e. no evident variations in the meanings they refer to, ‘inland/mainland’ and ‘communist/socialist’ are examined primarily by counting of frequency. Further interpretations are also assisted by CDA, which we will discuss later.

Label ‘China/Chinese’

Three key meanings of ‘China/Chinese’ were identified during the analysis:

(1) The whole of China including Hong Kong.

(2) The mainland excluding Hong Kong.

(3) The Central Government.

The three meanings are related to different relationships between Hong Kong and ‘China’ and, therefore, indicative of three different constructions of Hong Kong identity and also three types of relations between Hong Kong and China (see Table 6.1). In the first case, Hong Kong is perceived as a part of China, and the relationship between the two is presented as neutral or unproblematic (See Example 6.8) In the second case, when the label ‘China’ is used to refer to mainland China only, the relationship is seen as a relationship between equals (See Example 6.9). In the third case, Hong Kong is seen as a part of China, yet
the relationship is perceived as unequal, since China is seen as ruling Hong Kong from above. In these cases, ‘China/Chinese’ is often followed by ‘government’. In other words, ‘Chinese government’ is the alternative of ‘the central government’ (see Example 6.12), or possibly political figures representing the central government (see Example 6.11). This meaning often involves a relationship of subordination; the central government plays a role as Hong Kong’s master. From the meaning of the label ‘China’, we can therefore also infer the self-identification of Hong Kong.

Example 6.7: Let’s respect the history…turn the outrage into power, make effort to Hong Kong’s development and strive for China’s future. (Oriental Daily, 2005-06-10)

Example 6.8: Seven hundred and eight people (the election committee) took part in the election and be partial to one side. It’s the typical new China politics.(Apple Daily, 2005-06-18)

Example 6.9: He (Tsang) emphasized that Hong Kong is the south gate of China, indicating that the economics of China and Hong Kong will be closer in the future. (Oriental Daily, 2005-06-03)

Example 6.10: In China, the authority holds the power of naming tightly; in Hong Kong, it’s a little different, because the fortune can make a name related to honour. (HKEJ, 2005-06-06)

Example 6.11: Now we should not only hope China’s leader trusts us, but also reward this trust.(Ming Pao, 2005-06-18)

Example 6.12: If China government decides to choose an administrator by election in Hong Kong, Article 25(2) would be applicable. (Ming Pao, 2005-06-15)

Table 6.1 Meanings of label ‘China’

Label ‘Beijing’/ ‘Central Government’

The name of China’s capital ‘Beijing’ appears in the news stories with high frequency. It not only refers to the city, but is often used as a metaphor to refer to the government and the communist party (see table 6.2). There could be many
different ways to represent the central government. Using ‘central’ implies a relation of centre and periphery. Referring to the ‘central government’ without mentioning the fact that this is the Chinese central government can be seen as an example of banal Chinese nationalism: such a label suggests that the Chinese central government is perceived as ‘the’ central government, as ‘our’ government (cf. Billig 1995). In contrast, by choosing the label ‘Beijing’ the writer is refusing to present the Chinese government as unambiguously ‘ours’. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the label ‘Beijing’ is also used, among some newspapers, to describe the pro-central government camp in Hong Kong (See Example 6.14). Due to all this, counting the frequency of ‘Beijing’ and its different meanings can provide an additional insight into the materials and the strategies used to represent Hong Kong identity.

| 1. Central Government/Communist Party | Example 6.13: As long as somebody got appointed by Beijing as the future Chief Executive, most of the Election Committee could only support him. (Apple Daily, 2005-06-20) Example 6.14: During the period of election, many pro-Beijing fellows criticized Donald Tsang. (HKEJ, 2005-06-20) |
| 2. Geographical | Example 6.15: Donald Tsang will go to Beijing with his wife, to meet the leaders of the Central Government. (Oriental Daily, 2005-06-22) |

Table 6.2 Meanings of Label ‘Beijing’

The character of layered meanings of the two sets of labels was noticed in early stage of the pilot study. Therefore, they are examined by counting of frequency and proportions of different layers of meanings.

6.4.2. Collocations

Collocation, i.e. the characteristic co-occurrence of patterns of words, is one of the favourite tools when considering applying discourse analysis upon corpus linguistics. The co-occurrence of a group of words with a substantial number of incidents is revealing and particularly useful to the analysis of lexical choices. As Higgins argues, ‘the text is a social product that embodies and reproduces attitudes of power and political interest’ and ‘close consideration of lexical
choice and arrangement will offer some insight into these attitudes’ (Higgins, 2004: 638). The significant collocates of a word and their pattern can provide a semantic profile of a word, and ‘thus enable the researcher to gain insight into the semantic, connotative and prosodic meanings of a word’ (ibid: 39). In other words, the semantic profiles of words can be coloured by the collocates they attract.

Label ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ and their collocations

In the context of my project, I decided to examine the collocations of particular identity labels and verbs, and then examine how often a particular label collocates with active or passive verbs. By examining the collocations of the selected identity label with active/passive verbs, one can build up a profile of the meanings and associations of the label. Such an application of collocation analysis can be used to quantify the analysis of the choice of subjects and objects; if an identity label appears in connection with an active verb, it is positioned as a subject (i.e. doing the action) if it appears in connection with a passive verb, it is positioned as an object of somebody else’s action. For example, an identity category such as ‘Hong Kong people’ or ‘the central government’ can appear together either with active verbs such as ‘demands’, ‘expects’, etc. or passive verbs such as ‘is asked’, ‘was forced to’ etc. The position of the collectivity denoted by the label will change accordingly: when followed by an active verb, it will be in the position of an active subject; when followed by a passive verb, it will be in the position of a passive object. Let us look at the following two examples (Table 6.3) to demonstrate this:
Example 6.16: The central government forces the criterion of ‘love the country, love the Party’ to Hong Kong people and ignore Hong Kong people’s resistance to the communism. (*HKEJ*, 2005-06-17)

**Subject:** the central government

**Active verb:** forces, ignore

**Object:** Hong Kong people

Example 6.17: Hong Kong people trust the central government, and improve the relationship with the central government. (*Apple Daily*, 2005-06-03)

**Subject:** Hong Kong People

**Active verb:** trust, improve

**Object:** the central government

Table 6.3 Examples of Verbs

In Example 6.16, ‘the central government’ is followed by the active verb ‘forces’, and ‘the central government’ is in the position of the active subject. In contrast, the ‘Hong Kong people’ are in the position of a passive object; they are the powerless in the interaction with the central government. The ideology is forced on them, their sentiments are ignored. Obviously, the particular choice and sequences of verbs and identity labels in this case provides a clear indication of a particular form of power relationship between the central government and the Hong Kong people.

In the second example, Hong Kong people are more active. The writer emphasizes their dynamic involvement in the interaction and relationship with the central government by choosing active verbs ‘trust’ and ‘improve’. In this case, Hong Kong people are in the position of an active subject, while the central government is an object of their action. Evidently, the collocations of active/passive verbs with identity categories can provide us with a good indication of how often a particular identity category appears in an active or passive position, and thus provide an appropriate quantitative complement to the more qualitative analysis of the choice of identity categories. In the analysis, the
analysis of collocations of selected identity labels and active/passive verbs were used to investigate the representation of Hong Kong’s self identity in comparison with the central government.

Examining the power distribution in reporting language, there is one thing worth considering before the large scale survey of the corpus: the language customs which vary in different languages. There is a possibility that in certain languages, the passive or active model is the habitual or dominant modal of the language. Concluding that one identity label is constructed as predominantly passive or active without comparing it to other identity labels can be misleading. Therefore, another label – the central government – was chosen to compare with the self-identified labels, to provide a reference of how identity labels are used generally in Chinese language. The rationale in choosing ‘the central government’ rather than other labels such as ‘mainland/inland’ or ‘China’ is because that these other labels – as demonstrated earlier – are not always used to refer specifically to the government but often have a more neutral geographical meaning and, hence, are not adequate for exploring different representations of power relationships between Hong Kong and mainland China. The meaning of ‘central government’ is clearer without more variations and as a result it provides a better reference for comparison.

The three aspects of Hong Kong identity – construction of the other, the self and the sense of belonging/not belonging to China – are all closely intertwined, but it makes sense to separate them for the purpose of the clarity of presentation. However, counting and categorizing identity labels is not adequate to fully understand the presentation of the Hong Kong identity. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are adopted in each part of analysis.

6.4.3. Interpreting the findings of CL with CDA

As discussed earlier, CL can bring quantification and objectivity to the investigation. However, it becomes difficult to further interpret the findings generated from large numbers of figures. To understand how the characteristics and patterns work in an actual context, CDA is adopted in every section of the three-layer analysis. Typical excerpts of each specific way of representation are
analysed in detail and full reports are provided to give a clearer picture of how language strategies are practised. The rationale of choosing these examples is based on a manual scan of the whole sample by the principles of (a) editorial being preferred as they tend to be more expressive of opinions and attitudes compared to plain reports; (b) medium length samples that can provide enough context for the analysis but not too long, since word to word translation is labour-intensive and can bring some scale of deviations in meanings; (c) articles with denser identity labels so that an overall look at the interaction with more identity labels can be seen in a limited text.

6.5. Contextual analysis and description of the corpus

After having analysed the textual materials using the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods outlined above, it is important to examine how the discursive patterns identified correlate with the broader media and political structures in Hong Kong. To be able to do that, it is important to conduct the analysis with an appropriately chosen and structured corpus of data, which includes newspaper articles derived from all the key types of newspapers published in Hong Kong, taking into account their ownership patterns, readership characteristics and political affiliations. The following paragraphs explain how this corpus was selected, what it includes and why.

Newspaper reports were retrieved from the Wisers electronic news database. Wisers’ service offers the searchable aggregation of articles and news sources such as newspapers, magazines, journals and newswires dating back to 1998 across Greater China, including both Chinese (simplified and traditional) and English content. The technical foundation of Wisers’ service was originated as an academic research project at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. It was incorporated as the Wisers Information Limited and later funded by the HKSAR Government’s Applied Research Fund for further development. The information content started from 20 sources to over 1500 today (Wisers, 2010). The most important reason for choosing an online database is the ease of information retrieval and access. Using digital text to carry out the study is the most economical and practical way. It allows me to get the corpus of news material quickly, remotely and systematically. However, that does not mean that this is the
perfect way of collecting material. As Deacon suggested, the digital text database has some significant problems, including the difficulties of ‘capturing complex thematic issues via key words’ (Deacon, 2007: 19), the loss of the layout of news and missing data. These problems are borne in mind when the analysis is carried out.

Two political events are selected to be investigated in this project:

1. The interpretation of the basic law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) regarding universal suffrage in 2004.


The two essentially political events are particularly interesting for the analysis of the dynamics of identity construction in relation to the media and political landscape of Hong Kong from different perspectives.

The interpretation of the Basic Law regarding the possibility of universal suffrage in 2007 and 2008 started with the proposal for universal suffrage (of CE in 2007 and all LegCo seats in 2008) by the democratic camp in 2004. Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic law stated that the method for selecting the CE ‘shall be specified in the light of the actual situation’ and ‘in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress’, and the ultimate aim is to select CE by universal suffrage.

The different understandings of ‘principle of gradual and orderly progress’ and ‘in the light of the actual situation’ among different political camps led to fierce controversy in 2004. It was finally settled by the interpretation of the Basic Law by the NPCSC that ruled out the possibility of universal suffrage in 2007 and 2008, followed by a massive protest about the final interpretation and decision. The democratic camp regarded the interpretation as a postponement of the political development of Hong Kong and criticized the authority’s lack of consultation among Hong Kong residents. The two major actors in the controversy were the central government, in the form of the NPCSC, and the Hong Kong residents represented by the pro-democracy camp. As such, the event
involved a direct encounter between the Hong Kong identity and its significant other – or, alternatively, its broader self. The different media representations of the event and the power struggle between the two actors can therefore reveal the competing projections of Hong Kong identity promoted by different newspapers.

Five newspapers, i.e. *Apple Daily, HKEJ, Ming Pao, Oriental Daily* and *WWP*, were searched for articles with the keywords ‘interpretation of Basic Law; ‘universal suffrage’, ‘democracy’ and its several synonyms and abbreviations in Chinese for 34 days. The corpus for this case study is composed of 225 news items, including both news reporting and editorials.

The Chief Executive Election is one of the most important events in Hong Kong politics. The 2005 election was particularly interesting in two respects: first, Hong Kong had just experienced strong discontentment with the former Chief Executive which ended up with rounds of massive protests and his final resignation in the middle of his second term. Hong Kong people started to realize the importance of having a voice in the process of decision-making. Second were the political actors, i.e. the political parties and elites from different camps who were actively involved in the election. All the key political actors discussed in Chapter 2 were involved in the event. At the same time, the central government acted more in a shadowy yet powerful way. The media representations of the elections, and especially of the interactions between various actors, including both elite actors and the broader public, can help us identify the different conceptions of Hong Kong identity fostered by different Hong Kong media. Particularly important in this respect were media debates over ‘what *should* Hong Kong people do/how *should* they react’. Selected newspapers were searched for articles with ‘Chief Executive’ and its several synonyms and abbreviations in Chinese, as well as the names of the candidates as keywords. There are 500 news items in this set of corpus covering 21 days.

18 news items were removed from the final corpora after manual scan of the headlines and first paragraphs of each article to remove irrelevant news stories. Since the content of the corpus could influence the results, reading and confirming each news item’s relevance to the study is necessary.
In both of the events, the media discourses from different newspapers constructed the identity of Hong Kong in different ways. By comparing the key traits of media representations taken from different types of newspapers, we can examine the relationships between competing projections of identity and the wider socio-political and economic context in which they were produced.

To obtain a representative sample, we have chosen newspapers belonging to different newspaper types that were introduced in Chapter 4: broadsheets or ‘quality’ newspapers with low- to medium circulation, and high-circulation tabloids, highly-respected newspapers and the less trusted ones, pro-democracy and pro-government newspapers, government-sponsored and privately-owned newspapers, and newspapers read by different socio-economic strata and different age groups. Together they represent the major information sources for Hong Kong residents, especially for ‘hard’ news such as politics (see Table 6.4). In terms of political affiliations and ownership, the sample covers the full spectrum of media ownership in Hong Kong: newspapers owned by business tycoons with huge commercial interest in mainland China (e.g. *Ming Pao*); newspapers originally owned by intellectual elites that were traditionally regarded as the conscience of the society – these newspapers are still highly regarded despite changes in ownership (e.g. *HKEJ*); a newspaper owned by the high-key advocator of democracy who is explicitly opposed to the central authority; and a newspaper financed by the Chinese central government. The readership ranges from the younger generation to the old. All these factors are closely related to the constructed identity with which each newspaper provides their readers. The rationale for selecting these five newspapers is to allow for a comparative analysis that takes into account the bias in reporting generated by ownership, owner’s economic interests and political affiliations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Newspaper type</th>
<th>Political affiliation</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Readership</th>
<th>Credibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apple Daily</td>
<td>Tabloid mass circulation</td>
<td>Pro-democracy No permission to publish in mainland China Extend to Taiwan rather than mainland</td>
<td>Jimmy Lai Ex-garment magnate</td>
<td>Younger generation Lower income group less-educated</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEJ</td>
<td>Financial orientated Low circulation</td>
<td>Critical and radical to government</td>
<td>Transferred from previous owner intellectual Lam Shan-muk to electrical billionaire Richard Li Tzar-kai in 2006</td>
<td>Older generation High education High income</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ming Pao</td>
<td>Quality broadsheet Medium circulation</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Transferred from previous owner intellectual Louise Cha in 1995 to Malaysian timber merchant Tiong Hiew King, owning large business in mainland</td>
<td>Older generation High education High income</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriental Daily</td>
<td>Tabloid mass circulation</td>
<td>Pro-government Permission to publish in mainland China</td>
<td>Ma family Improving relationship with the Chinese government</td>
<td>Older generation Lower income group Lower education</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWP</td>
<td>Broadsheet Low circulation</td>
<td>Government mouthpiece Permission to distribute in mainland</td>
<td>Chinese government sponsored</td>
<td>Older generation Low education Low income</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4 Newspapers chosen for the analysis and their main characteristics

It is to be expected that these newspapers will promote different understandings of Hong Kong identity in line with the economic and political interests of their owners. For instance, it is feasible to expect that newspapers whose owners are known for their affiliations with the pro-democratic camp (*Apple Daily*) will be inclined to construct Hong Kong identity in opposition to the mainland, and emphasize democracy as a key marker of Hong Kong identity. In contrast,
newspapers with either clear political ties with Mainland China (*WWP*) will most likely promote the notion of Hong Kong as an integral part of China, or even suppress the idea of a unique identity of Hong Kong. Finally, newspapers whose owners are interested in keeping a good working relationship with the mainland due to their economic interests (e.g. *Ming Pao*) will most likely try to remain ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ in their reporting, trying to protect the economic interests of the owner in the mainland while at the same time maintaining credibility with local residents. As a consequence, we shall expect these newspapers’ representations of Hong Kong identity to be characterized by different textual patterns and discursive strategies. By establishing links between these textual patterns and the different types of newspapers, contextual analysis will allow us to connect the micro-level linguistic practices with the macro-level social, political and economic structure and reveal the dynamic that shapes the process of text production. The data collecting procedure resulted in the following sample in Table 6.5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004 Interpretation of Basic Law (34 days)</th>
<th>2005 Chief Executive Election (21 days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apple Daily</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>HKEJ</em></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ming Pao</em></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Oriental Daily</em></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>WWP</em></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5 Number of articles sampled in the two events

The whole corpus is used for quantitative analysis of frequency and collocation. Sets of data from each newspaper for the two layers of quantitative analysis (frequencies of identity labels, collocations of identity labels and active/passive verbs) are compared to reveal the relations between the language patterns and the ownership and political affiliations of newspapers, as well as the whole social environment. Each section of quantitative analysis is assisted with qualitative CDA to extend and complement the findings to allow a deeper insight into
linguistic strategies and its actual practice.

It is worth noting that even the larger corpus, used for quantitative analysis, is still rather small compared to the samples typically used in corpus analysis. Typically, corpus analysis has been employed to examine large general corpora on the principle of ‘the more words the better’, for example the British National Corpus (BNC) containing 100 million words. Recently, however, smaller specialized corpora have been employed to analyse language use in specific fields of language use (Flowerdew, 1998; Ding, 2007). ‘What typically distinguishes such corpora from large ones is that they are far more specialised, by topic, by genre, or both’ (Aston, 1997: 53). When the analyst’s objective is to become familiar with highly specific texts, like newspaper reports on specific topics, a small specialized corpus may provide more plentiful features of that type than a large general one. Small corpora also allow both qualitative and descriptive analyses which can not only categorize and count linguistic patterns but also describe and interpret language usage in context and enriched details. As such, smaller corpora are clearly better suited for the purposes of our project. Finally, a small corpus is also necessary due to the fact that we have been compelled to use manual rather than automatic coding, due to the particular limitations involved in applying corpus analysis to the Chinese language, as described in 6.3 in this chapter. The corpus used in this project consists of approximate 900 pages, 750,000 Chinese characters. The Chinese language is calculated in the form of characters. A word may contain from one to several characters. The most usual form of words is of two characters.

6.6. Summary: research design at a glance

This chapter outlined the research questions based on the background literature reviewed and arguments developed in the previous chapters on the politics, media landscape, and identity of Hong Kong. To answer the research questions, a research design consisting of a combination of textual (qualitative and quantitative) as well as contextual research methods was developed, drawing on literature on critical linguistics and corpus linguistics, as well as on arguments developed in the previous four chapters.

To recapitulate, my analysis consists of two distinct but closely intertwined
layers, one textual, the other contextual. The first one is split into two layers – qualitative and quantitative – each of which comprises several analytical sub-layers. The starting point and main basis of textual analysis is provided by discourse analysis methods discussed earlier: the analysis of identity categories, the choice of actors/subjects and objects, and banal identification. Methods derived from corpus linguistics – specifically, frequency analysis and collocation analysis – are then used to quantify selected aspects identified with the help of discourse analysis.

The second, contextual layer of analysis involves linking the discursive patterns identified in textual analysis to the patterns of media and political landscapes in Hong Kong, and establishing in what ways the identities promoted by different newspaper vary depending on their political affiliations, ownership, readership structure and other aspects of the media system examined in Chapters 4 and 5.

The research design can be summarized schematically in the following manner (Table 6.6):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual analysis</th>
<th>a. identity categories</th>
<th>Quantitative analysis</th>
<th>Frequency and distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. active/passive verbs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Collocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual analysis</td>
<td>Connections between discursive patterns identified in textual analysis and the patterns of media and political landscapes in Hong Kong</td>
<td>Qualitative analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6 Research Design at a Glance
Chapter 7 Case Study: Interpretation of the Basic Law in 2004

7.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the first case study for this project – the 2004 debate over the interpretation of the Basic Law. With a social context, the research methods introduced in Chapter 6 are applied to the corpus formulated for the chosen event. All elements introduced in previous chapters, i.e. politics, media and identity of Hong Kong, are brought into the spotlight of the event. Located in an important stage in the political development in Hong Kong, this event is a significant reference for the investigation of Hong Kong’s current identification. The development of the event and the direct interactions between Hong Kong and the Chinese central government were represented in different ways by newspapers according to the factors introduced in Chapter 4, including ownership, readership, history and traditions, and styles of newspaper. The pattern of representations can be summarized into these two major categories: pro-democracy vs. pro-authority (ownership, history and traditions) and elite broadsheet vs. tabloid (readership, style of report).

7.2 The interpretation of the Basic Law in 2004: the context

7.2.1 The Basic Law

The Basic Law is the mini constitution of Hong Kong Special Administration Region (HKSAR). It is based on the principle formulated by the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong (The Joint Declaration). Besides the basic principles like ‘one country, two systems’, ‘a high degree of autonomy’ and ‘Hong Kong People ruling Hong Kong’, it also prescribes the various systems to be practised in the HKSAR (The Basic Law, 1997). In particular, Articles 45 and 68 are the part of most concern to the democratic groups in Hong Kong. They stipulate the methods of the elections of the Chief Executive (CE) and Legislative Council (LegCo):

**Article 45:**

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected
by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People’s Government.

The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.

Article 68

The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by election.

The method for forming the Legislative Council shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage.

The specific method for forming the Legislative Council and its procedures for voting on bills and motions are prescribed in Annex II: ‘Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Its Voting Procedures’. (The Basic Law, 1997)

Annex I and II (see Appendix) provide details of the election methods for both CE and LegCo. The principle ‘gradual and orderly progress’, as stated in both articles, is understood and interpreted differently by the pro-democratic camp and the central government and pro-government groups. The democratic camp believes that the ‘actual situation’ is that the demand for universal suffrage has increased dramatically since the handover. They emphasize ‘progress’ more than ‘gradual’ and argue that the institutional reforms have to ‘move forward’ rather than stay ‘still’ or go ‘backward’ (HKHRM, 2004). The SAR government and pro-central government group argued that Hong Kong had just experienced severe challenges and turmoil and was still in a recovery and adjustment period. Rapid institutional change would damage the stability in Hong Kong and harm investments and, ultimately, the life of Hong Kong people (The Chinese Manufactures’ Association of Hong Kong, 2004). This difference led to the controversy in 2003 and 2004 regarding the possibility of universal suffrage for
CE and LegCo as early as 2007/2008, which followed according to the interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) in April 2004.

7.2.2. The Interpretation

Another article that is crucial for understanding the context of our case study is Article 158, which authorizes the Hong Kong courts to interpret the contents of the Basic Law on their own. However, it also stipulates that the ultimate authorization of interpretation of the Basic Law is vested in the NPCSC, which is the legislation institution of the whole of China.

Article 158

The power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress shall authorize the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to interpret on their own, in adjudicating cases, the provisions of this Law which are within the limits of the autonomy of the Region.

The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may also interpret other provisions of this Law in adjudicating cases. However, if the courts of the Region, in adjudicating cases, need to interpret the provisions of this Law concerning affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People’s Government, or concerning the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region, and if such interpretation will affect the judgments on the cases, the courts of the Region shall, before making their final judgments which are not appealable, seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress through the Court of Final Appeal of the Region. When the Standing Committee makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned, the courts of the Region, in applying those provisions, shall follow the interpretation of the Standing Committee. However, judgments previously rendered shall not be affected.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress shall consult its Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region before giving an interpretation of this Law. (The Basic Law, 1997)

According to Article 158, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal should seek an
interpretation from the NPCSC before making a final judgment. After 1997, there are three occasions of interpretation of the Basic Law regarding different issues: the Right of Abode issue in 1999, the universal suffrage issue in 2004 and the term of new CE after the original CE resigned in 2005. The first and the third were sought by the HKSAR government.

**1999: The right of abode controversy**

In the beginning of 1999, the Court of Final Appeal, the highest judicial authority in Hong Kong interpreted Articles 22 and 24 (see Appendix) of the Basic Law, in such a way that an estimated 1.6 million Hong Kong people’s mainland-born children would acquire the status of Hong Kong resident and enter the border within ten years. The interpretation caused wide concern among the Hong Kong public regarding the consequences for various social sectors. In the end, the NPCSC issued an interpretation in favour of the Hong Kong Government and overturned the original court decision. The result triggered a debate on judicial independence in Hong Kong (Chan, 2000).

**2005: The term of the new CE after the original CE resigned.**

This question arose after the first CE, Tung Chi-hwa, resigned in 2005. The controversy was between the legal community and the pro-democracy camp and the Hong Kong government pro-central government group. The legal community and the pro-democracy camp argued that the term of next CE should be 5 years, according to Article 46 of the Basic Law (see Appendix). The SAR government and the pro-central group claimed that it should be the remaining term of the original Chief Executive, which was 2 years, based on different interpretation of the Basic Law. The NPCSC ruled that if any CE resigns in or before 2007, the new CE should serve the previous CE’s remaining term. Similar to the first episode of interpretation, this result was considered by some as the central government’s intrusion into the Hong Kong legal system (HKBA, 2005).

**2004: Universal suffrage in 2007 and 2008**

Those two rounds of interpretation by NPCSC both raised concerns about the autonomy of HKSAR, and it was argued that they were violations of the
principle of ‘one country, two systems’ and ‘the rule of law’. However, the fiercest controversy was the 2004 interpretation regarding universal suffrage, as it was not originated by the Hong Kong government but by the NPSCC on its own initiative.

2003 witnessed the largest demonstration in Hong Kong’s history. Half a million residents took to the streets to protest against the Article 23 legislation of the Basic Law (see Appendix), which was the basis of the national security law proposed by the HKSAR government. The legislation caused various concerns, especially regarding the freedom of speech. Following the Article 23 controversy, the democratic camp begun to call for universal suffrage for the election of the CE in 2007 and LegCo in 2008 in the light of Article 45, 68 and Annex I and II of the Basic Law. Both Annexes mentioned ‘if there is a need to amend’ ‘after 2007’ to ‘subsequent to the year 2007’. The democratic camp noticed mention of the year 2007 and debate started about whether ‘2007’ was included in the period ‘after 2007’. The controversy was also related by a series of mainland newspapers commentaries in February 2004 which argued that the autonomy of Hong Kong should be compliant with ‘patriotism’. Debates happened between the pro-democratic group and conservative group in Hong Kong, who were backed by mainland law experts.

The interpretation on 6 April accepted that the Basic Law’s terminology ‘subsequent to the year 2007’ and ‘after 2007’ encompassed the year 2007. Therefore, there was a possibility of universal suffrage for the election of the Chief Executive in 2007, and of the Legco in 2008. At the same time, the interpretation also specified that the CE would be required to issue a report to the central government regarding the need for changes. On 15 April, the required report from the CE was submitted, acknowledging the need for change in the election methods and, at the same time, emphasizing the actual political situation. On 26 April, NPCSC promulgated the decision that ruled out direct elections in 2007 and 2008 and specified that the ratio of directly-elected to functional legislators must be maintained at the same 50-50 ratio for the 2008 Legco election (Davis, 2006). The decision was criticized as an obstacle to the democratic development of Hong Kong by the democratic group, and for the lack
of consultation with Hong Kong residents. The discontentment led to another massive protest on the decision on 1 July 2004 (Fong, 2008).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 April 2004</td>
<td>NPCSC Interpretation on Annex I and II of the Basic Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 April 2004</td>
<td>CE report on whether such methods need to be amended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April 2004</td>
<td>NPCSC’s Decision on the method for selecting the Hong Kong Chief Executive in 2007 and LegCo in 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 2004</td>
<td>Demonstration on universal suffrage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1 Timeline of the interpretation of the Basic Law in 2004

This event happened during a period of turmoil in Hong Kong. The tension between Hong Kong people, the pro-democratic groups in particular, and the central government was increasing during 2003 and 2004. The central government had to abandon the conventional method after 1997 and come out from behind the curtain to settle the controversy, which had inevitably increased the tension by that time. The discontent of the public had shifted from the SAR government and the CE himself to the central government. The Chief Executive resigned one year after the interpretation of the Basic Law, quoting health problems. The consequence of the event has shaped the political development and the relationship between HKSAR and the central government up until today.

The identity of Hong Kong, or in other words, Hong Kong’s identification with China, was once again put in the spotlight and was closely connected to the political development of Hong Kong. Even the central government started to be concerned with the identity issue of Hong Kong, which was neglected (see Chapter 3), when, speaking through mainland newspapers, it held that Hong Kong’s political development should comply with ‘patriotism’, i.e. identification with China. The significance of this event in respect to the relationship between identity and politics in Hong Kong is unique. The news media’s representations provide rich resources for the investigation that would fulfill the research aim of this project.

7.3. Data and sampling

The five newspapers chosen were searched for articles with keywords
'interpretation of Basic Law 解釋基本法; ‘universal suffrage 普遍選舉/普選’, ‘democracy 民主’ and its abbreviations in Chinese, including 釋法 and 普選.

The chosen period includes two phases: the first is from 1 April 2004, six days before the interpretation of NPCSC till 28 April, two days after the final decision was made by NPCSC. The second is from one day before the protest on 1 July 2004 and four days later. The total period is 34 days. The exact dates of the start and finish were decided on a general review of the density of related reports in order to maximize the coverage in a limited period of time. 225 items were retrieved from Wisers’ database, including plain reports, editorials, features, and news analysis and discussion forums. The data collecting procedure resulted in the following sample:

As the Oriental Daily had significantly fewer reports than the others, which led to irregular data and low counts in following quantitative examination, this newspaper was eliminated from the quantitative analysis.

7.4 Analysing the corpus

The analysis of the corpus is divided into four parts by the main subjects of the analysis. They are: (i) the amount of coverage. (ii) the construction of the other, by analysing the identity labels of the main others, and meanings associated with them; (iii) the sense of belonging and not belonging to China, by examining whether China is represented as an entity that includes or excludes Hong Kong; (iv) the building of the image of ‘self’, by exploring the meanings associated with Hong Kong self-identity labels, especially from the point of view of power distribution, i.e. the extent of activity allocated to different identity labels. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are adopted in each part of analysis.

7.4.1 Amount of coverage

Differences in the number of articles and average length of articles (and proportion of editorials are partly dependent on the type of newspaper (broadsheet/tabloid) and at least partly on political orientation (pro-democracy/pro-central government). From the aspect of article numbers, Oriental Daily contributed the fewest items and Apple Daily the most. By nature of the newspaper type, the tabloids might pay less attention to the ‘serious topic’
of the interpretation of the Basic Law. The number of articles contributed by Oriental Daily (the pro-government tabloid) provides obvious evidence. However, Apple Daily defies this rule. This could be explained by reference to its political position, as this event was crucial to the development of democracy in Hong Kong. Therefore, the pro-democratic tabloid Apple Daily contributed the most articles for the event (see Table 7.2).

From the aspect of article length, WWP and HKEJ have the longest articles on average, and Oriental Daily has the shortest. Although there is not a high proportion of editorials, like HKEJ, WWP is the only newspaper that gives the full coverage of the speeches from central government officials. The plain news reports are also relatively longer, with more analysis. Short, instant, plain news reports are rare in WWP’s coverage.

From the aspect of editorial proportion, HKEJ has the highest ratio of editorials to plain news, and Oriental Daily, again, has the lowest. The pro-democracy broadsheet tends to be more analytical, with more than half of its coverage as editorial. The other elite-oriented Ming Pao, which claims to be neutral, is about in the middle in all three aspects of numbers of articles, average length and portion of editorials. From the basic figures of the corpus, the five newspapers can be recognized in two major aspects: type of newspaper and political stand.

Both tabloids, especially Oriental Daily, have relatively shorter-length of their reports, considering the tabloid nature (p=0.01). There is no statistically significant difference in average length of articles depending on political orientation in this sample (p=0.055).
7.4.2 The construction of the Other

This section starts with the straightforward identity labels and method of examining the frequencies of the chosen labels, i.e. label such as ‘communist/communism’ and ‘inland/mainland’. These two sets of labels are used to refer to the ideological other and the differentiating of Hong Kong residents from the rest of the country. Examining the pattern of using these two labels provides a starting point for the more complicated analysis in the following sections.

7.4.2.1 Label: ‘Communist/socialist’

The most basic and important principle of the Basic Law, and Hong Kong’s daily operation is the principle of ‘one country, two systems’. In other words, the communist system and polices will not be practised in Hong Kong society. Therefore, emphasizing this label or not can provide a basic picture of how a newspaper dealt with the differences in ideology between Hong Kong and the rest of the country.

Examining the frequency of label communist/communism ‘共產黨/共黨/中共/共產主義’ (the different abbreviation and sequence of the same label in Chinese. Noun and adjective can be expressed in exactly the same way in Chinese) and socialist/socialism ‘社會主義’ (N=55), a significant difference (p=0.003)
between the pro-democracy and critical newspapers and the other two can be clearly recognized (see Chart 7.1). *Ming Pao* and *WWP* chose to overlook the ideology difference between Hong Kong and the mainland, where *Apple Daily* and *HKEJ* put much more spotlight on both labels: communist/communism and socialist/socialism.

In addition, by scanning the paragraphs where the labels are used, we can find that the majority of the appearances are related in a negative context. For example,

**Excerpt 7.1** The future of Hong Kong lies in democracy and rule of law. Chinese Communist please don’t poison Hong Kong with the dirty stuff of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, with the makeup of ‘one country, two systems’. Then Hong Kong would be very lucky. (*Apple Daily*, 23 April 2004)

Emphasizing the existence of the communist/socialist force, which is the biggest difference between Hong Kong and the rest of China politically, can project an image of an alienated other who is associated with ‘poison’ and ‘dirty stuff’. To the pro-government newspapers, when the difference cannot be transferred into something more positive, they tend to minimize it by overlooking the existence of the difference. The appearance and absence of the ideology label distinguishes the different strategies of representation of the other.

**7.4.2.2 Label: ‘Inland/mainland’**

If communism and socialism are seen as the markers of ideological difference between Hong Kong people and their fellow compatriots, ‘inland’（內地）and
‘mainland’ (大陸) indicate the perception of Hong Kong as a geographically-distinct and delimited unit.

Chart 7.2 shows actual use of the labels (N=87), demonstrating that, contrary to result of the label of ‘communist/socialist’, the label of ‘inland/mainland’ is used more often by pro-government newspapers. Compared to the ideology labels, the pro-government newspapers are keener on the ‘inland/mainland’ label. Using this label, and hence distinguishing HK geographically, is in a way more neutral, less contentious than mentioning ideological differences.

At the same time, the image of ‘mainland/inland’ can be very different in certain contexts. The mere absence/appearance cannot give a clear picture of the label. To provide a more holistic textual context for analysis, let us take a closer look at the following excerpts from different papers and see how they use the labels differently. Considering the relatively low frequency of the label, all paragraphs containing this label were picked out and analysed. In most cases, the one with the densest use of identity labels was chosen for qualitative analysis. In the examination of the label ‘inland/mainland’, the following excerpt is a case in point:

Excerpt 7.2 Geographically, Hong Kong is also jointed with the mainland. There are tens of thousands of commuters between the two places every day. Hong Kong media have great influence on the Guangdong region, especially Pearl River delta. Hong Kong’s future political development will closely interact with the inland. It’s impossible for us to make a development in politics by closing the door. (We) should cooperate with the
First, the difference between Hong Kong and the mainland is basically geographic. In fact, in WWP’s words, not even different, they are ‘jointed’, by commuters and media. As the journalist took the position of a member of the public, the connection is a reality that we cannot overlook. Therefore, a sensible way should be to accept the reality and make the best out of it, which is ‘cooperating’. As introduced in Chapter 4, WWP’s overall readership strategy is to make Hong Kong ‘accept’ them, even if it is too much to ask Hong Kong to ‘like’ them.

The sense of integrating on the basis of ‘accepting reality’ is adopted throughout the newspaper. Similar uses of lexical choices when representing the mainland/inland can be spotted. The label is more often put as ‘inland of mother country’ (e.g. 3 July 2004), ‘inland fellow compatriots’ (e.g. 2 July 2004). To Hong Kong people, they are, for example, tourists and workers – resource and kin by blood. The relationship of Hong Kong with the inland is ‘getting closer and closer’ (e.g. 3 July 2004). Hong Kong and the inland are the ‘same’ (e.g. 27 April 2004), are ‘one part’ (e.g. 7 April 2004). They ‘interact’ (e.g. 7 April, 2004), they ‘cooperate’ (e.g. 3 July 2004), ‘discuss’ (e.g. 27 April 2004) and ‘achieve agreement’ (e.g. 15 April 2004). The inland/ mainland plays as the backup and supporter of Hong Kong.

Excerpt 7.3 What do the majority of Hong Kong people want? To summarize, there are only two points: internally, good administration, which should be fair, efficient, participative and balanced with inspection. [They] fear to lose the protection of ‘two systems’ to the inland, and the central government could expand some bad things from inland to Hong Kong, by the authority of ‘one country.’ (HKEJ, 27 April 2004)

The label ‘inland’ is used more with the sense of border and difference – from where Hong Kong needs to be ‘protected’. The lexical choices of HKEJ constructs the mainland as both geographically and politically distinct; the ‘two systems’ arrangement is presented as ‘protection’; the relationship between HK people and the inland is described using the term ‘fear’. It is also worth noting that HK people’s preferences are described sympathetically: they ‘only’ want two things – the use of the word ‘only’ suggests that their demands are within
reason; limited. In contrast, ‘inland’ is associated with ‘bad things’ throughout the news coverage of HKEJ; ‘inland’ and ‘mainland’ are related to a ‘lack of democracy (e.g. 27 April 2004)’, are ‘different in the views to things’ (e.g. 26 April 2004) and against ‘Hong Kong’s pride’ (e.g. 2 July 2004). In the almost rare appearance of the label ‘inland/mainland’ in HKEJ, these similar ways of expressions can be seen repeatedly.

By projecting different meanings of a certain label, the newspapers manage to construct clearly different images of the rest of the country. To a pro-government newspaper, ‘inland/mainland’ is positive and constructive; to their opponent, it is negative and different. For WWP, ‘inland’ is difference that is purely geographical; for HKEJ, on the other hand, the difference is both political and ideological. The differences lie in their construction of the relationship between the mainland and Hong Kong: cooperative and friendly in one case, tense and full of fear in the other.

7.4.3. The sense of belong and not belonging to China

This section looks at identity labels that are more easily differentiated between themselves and, hence, more amenable to coding and quantification than the meaning of inland/mainland, which needs a more qualitative approach: the name of China’s capital ‘Beijing’, and the label ‘China/Chinese’. To some extent, these two labels are superior labels in the sense of inclusiveness with others – like ‘inland/mainland’ or Hong Kong. However, are they used as the country and the capital of Hong Kong, only without mentioning whose country/capital (Billig, 1995). By expressing the meaning of China/Beijing without mentioning the labels, they are used as by default and common sense. The following section examines the frequencies and different meanings of the two labels in newspapers of different types and political association.

7.4.3.1 Label: ‘Beijing’

The frequencies of the label ‘Beijing’ (京/北京) (N=300) in the four papers again show a significant difference (see Chart 7.3). The two pro-democracy titles have much more frequent usage of the label, about twice in each piece of news, when the other two have only 0.5 times. To explain this, it is important to take
into account that the label can be used in two different meanings: ‘Beijing’ the geographic city or as a metaphor for the political regime, the government and the communist party. Using ‘Beijing’ as the way to represent the central Government or the communist party can create a distance between ‘us’ and ‘them’ or ‘there’. It is not the (i.e. ‘our’) central government, not the party (i.e. ‘our’ party), but just ‘Beijing’. It is another city, like Hong Kong, but which, however, holds the power to rule. One could argue that the hierarchy becomes invisible in this kind of discourse; at the same time the distance is highlighted. Similar ways of constructing sovereignty can be seen in the UK newspapers when using the word ‘Brussels’ to refer to the EU parliament and, more broadly, the EU. Especially in tabloids, these references go along with a very negative meaning: ‘Brussels’ is a label for illegitimate power that is trying to control and exploit the UK people, endangering sovereignty (Dougal, 2003).

It is also worth noting that there could be many different ways to represent the regime. Using ‘central government’ implies a more neutral administration and a relation of centre and periphery. On the contrary, by choosing the label ‘Beijing’ the writer is refusing to present the government as unambiguously ‘ours’. Therefore, combining the counting of the frequencies of label ‘Beijing’ with an analysis of its different meanings can provide a deeper insight into the materials and the strategies used to represent Hong Kong identity.

All appearances of the label ‘Beijing’ in the whole corpus were examined, looking at the meanings of the label in the specific context. Considering the
different number of news items sampled from different newspapers, the following comparison is based on the proportion of meanings in one newspaper rather than totals. It should also be noticed that the total counts for *Ming Pao* and *WWP* are only 32 and 22. Given the low count, the results are not entirely reliable. To understand the usage of label ‘Beijing’, both features need to be considered: i.e. the total frequency and the meaning differences. Chart 7.4 shows that the government-backed *WWP* has a different pattern of usage of this label, with a clearer lower proportion of political meaning and higher proportion of referring to it only as a location. Although the ratio is not overpowering, when it is compared to the other newspapers, a significant difference appears. As mentioned earlier, the pattern of using the label ‘Beijing’ fits *WWP*’s general strategy as the mouthpiece for the central government, while at the same time being accepted by the Hong Kong public.

When it comes to this label, *Ming Pao* shows a similar way of using it as the pro-democracy papers. However, it cannot be concluded that *Ming Pao* shares a similar image of the regime with *Apple Daily* and *HKEJ*. Taking reference from *WWP*’s ratio, using the label ‘Beijing’ politically may be due to the reason that the newspaper is trying to ‘speak the language’ of the general public. Rated with the highest credibility for years by the public (see Chapter 4), this image of ‘speaking for the public’ is crucial to *Ming Pao*’s position among the readers and industry, whereas *WWP* does not emphasize that much. Except for *WWP*, the other three papers overwhelmingly use the label as the central government or the communist party. For example:
Excerpt 7.4 Although Beijing has put up rounds of barriers to political reform, Hong Kong people do not need to make a stand against Beijing yet, but should temporarily put aside the controversy of interpretation and prepare a larger scale, more decisive and more peaceful way to propose our appeal of universal suffrage this July and September. (Ming Pao, 17 April, 2004)

‘Beijing’ is used as a metaphor for the central government or the ruling party, who ‘put up barriers’ or need/not to be ‘against’. The relationship between Hong Kong and what the label ‘Beijing’ referred to is distant and alienated. ‘Beijing’ is neither what ‘we’ look up to nor different from the central or the party. It appears as any other capital city, like Washington or London. At the same time, Ming Pao is also trying to argue that this relationship should change, that Hong Kong people should try and use more ‘peaceful’ way to achieve their goals. ‘Beijing’ appears to be less negative – or at least, it appears as equally negative as Hong Kong people themselves, who are, supposedly, being too pushy, not peaceful enough.

Excerpt 7.5 The 1 July mass demonstration is about to happen. Beijing authorities have been using stick and carrot strategy recently: first cracking down on Hong Kong people’s universal suffrage dream with the NPCSC interpretation, and then making a compromise gesture to intenerate Hong Kong people and the democratic camp, stirring many people into taking to the streets on 1 July. (Apple Daily, June 30, 2004)

Apple Daily adopted a quite different tone regarding the label ‘Beijing’. In this excerpt, Beijing, it is implied, uses conspiracy and ruthless power. Hong Kong people only ‘dream’ of universal suffrage, which is less than ‘peaceful’. The paper is encouraging people to take to the streets and resist Beijing’s conspiracy by implying it is actually a fact that many people have faith in demonstrations. Even if people did not take to the streets, it is because Beijing may jeopardize it. Hong Kong people are reasonable and faithful, while Beijing is playing tricks.

Excerpt 7.6 The Hong Kong problem dealt with by the central government must be a problem that is urgent and couldn’t be resolved by Hong Kong by itself. That is what Mr. Deng Xiaoping said: ‘a problem that cannot be solved without Beijing’s leadership’. Therefore, the central government has always been very cautious and responsible when dealing with Hong Kong problems, and wouldn’t take action carelessly without necessity. (WWP, 3 July 2004)
On the contrary, in this excerpt from *WWP*, Beijing is in a parental position that solves problems for Hong Kong. Hong Kong is the one who is, first, problematic and, second, incapable of solving problems. Beijing is only acting on Hong Kong’s behalf as a responsibility. It is not only legitimate but also helpful. Beijing is an authority endowed with positive meanings, as something to look up to.

Even within the way of referring to Beijing as the authority, different discourses can build a completely different image of this authority. By putting the label in a negative or positive context, Beijing’s authority can be interpreted in an absolutely positive meaning: necessary and responsible, or with a very negative interpretation: conspiratorial and autocratic. Newspapers build the spectrum from an overwhelmingly negative, balanced or neutral, to a completely positive image with their different discourse strategies, according to their political economy.

7.4.3.2 Label: ‘China/Chinese’

The label ‘China/Chinese’ (中國) (N=170) can have various meanings (Chart 7.5). Having a glance at the general frequency, the pro-democracy tabloid *Apple Daily* has twice as many uses as all the others. Is this a way of flying the national flag? A closer count on the real meaning of the label would tell differently.

‘China/Chinese’ can be used in a cultural context, like tradition, ancient philosophy and way of life. It can also mean the region or the political regime, like the label ‘Beijing’. In general, the meaning of ‘China/Chinese’ can be
summarized into three categories: (a) China that includes Hong Kong; (b) China (as a region) that in parallel with Hong Kong; (c) China as the regime that rules Hong Kong.

In general, as shown in Chart 7.6, the largest proportion of meaning is ‘China including Hong Kong’. This is basically consistent with the mainstream or official proposal for the identity of Hong Kong: it is a part of China. However, other meanings do exist, in particular ‘China’ as only mainland China excluding Hong Kong, forming nearly one third of the whole set of meanings. With the whole Hong Kong community gradually integrated into China, the existence of a unique ‘Hong Kong’ identity is still recognized strongly. That is also the dynamic of the continuing proposal for more autonomy and democracy.

However, as shown in the individual analysis of each newspaper (Chart 7.7), with the exception of Apple Daily, those newspapers analysed do quite often – in fact in majority of cases – take HK’s integration into China for granted. Ownership and the operation of the media organization can tell a lot when interpreting their discourse. As the integration of the economy with China will be promising and beneficial, the integration of identity is also supported to a considerable extent in newspapers’ discourse, regardless of ownership structure and political affiliations of newspapers.
Apple Daily has the lowest proportion of referrals to ‘China’ as ‘including Hong Kong’; the two other meanings of ‘excluding Hong Kong’ and ‘in charge of Hong Kong’ share a significant percentage, and the percentage of exclusion is the highest among all four papers, followed by the other critical paper HKEJ. This reflects the fact that Apple Daily and HKEJ tend to assume more possible ways of identification. The meaning variation in Apple Daily represents that the identification with ‘China’ is relatively weak, compared even with HKEJ, which has higher portion of inclusion and the occasions of using the label of ‘China’ as superior are obviously less than all the other papers.

The rare appearance of the meaning ‘China in charge of Hong Kong’ is adopted in HKEJ’s news language. Based on quantitative data alone, I cannot conclude that the appearance of this usage means a negative image of China or Hong Kong, because, in different and specific contexts, this ‘ruling’ could mean both Hong Kong being submissive and China being dictatorial. Considering Apple Daily and HKEJ’s similar pro-democratic position, the ruling position can be interpreted in different ways.

For Ming Pao, the trend fits very well with the pro-government stance. Balanced with different ways of representing the relationship between China and Hong
Kong, in just above one third of the cases, higher but not much more than the other two relationships, ‘China’ is represented as the combination of embracing both Hong Kong and the mainland. The newspaper tries to hold a balance among different meanings, but is generally positive about the integration of the nation, indicated by the high proportion of ‘China including Hong Kong’. In the traditionally pro-central-government newspaper *WWP*, ‘China’ never refers to exclusion. The label is either used as denoting inclusion or superiority. Two thirds of the use of label ‘China’ means ‘China including Hong Kong’, which leaves one third with the meaning of superiority.

Another category that should be noticed is the ‘other’. By ‘none’ it usually means the tokens are parts of a title, for example ‘National Peoples Congress of China’. The tokens of such usages in three newspapers except *WWP* suggests that, when referring to an institution or title, these three papers are more likely to portray the fact that they are ‘China/Chinese’, rather than the institution or the leader which are well-known, or ‘ours’. This again indicates that, for *WWP*, mainland China is a taken-for-granted part of the extended Hong Kong Self, and there is no need to remind the readers that these institutions are ‘Chinese’. In general, despite the differences, three out of four newspapers do most often portray Hong Kong as a part of China, regardless of their political orientation and ownership.

Although quantitative analysis provides important insight to the language patterns of the corpus in general, it does not allow us to appreciate all the nuances of meaning. For instance, when China is portrayed as an actor that is superior to and rules over Hong Kong, there is plenty of room for nuances: Hong Kong could be presented as a helpless victim of the central government (as in the following example from *Apple Daily*), or as a subordinated but fairly active agent (*HKEJ*), or as an actor that is legitimately subordinated to the mainland and should behave accordingly (*WWP*). To understand how the label is used in a real context and how the summarized three relationships are represented, let us look at the examples, with a different sense of belonging and not belonging.

Excerpt 7.7 Talking about political laboratory, China is the biggest political laboratory in
In this text, China is clearly distinguished from Hong Kong. China is the place where people have been tested like ‘laboratory rats’. Hong Kong is under threat from China. The radical almost outcry-like language is very much consistent with Apple Daily’s pro-democracy stand and tabloid style. The tension between Apple Daily, the owner Jimmy Lai, the journalists who are forbidden to cross the border and the central government is reflected in the image built by Apple Daily in editorials like this. ‘China’, which actually refers to mainland China, is presented with a dark and violent history and unpredictable future and, most importantly, is a potential threat to Hong Kong.

Excerpt 7.8 As far as impression goes, the protesting public’s appeal yesterday was not as obvious as last year, which reflects that Hong Kong people still have the will and freedom of expression. This is an important reference to the quality of the public. It is also obvious evidence that China has no interest in using military force in Hong Kong to drive out the protestors. (HKEJ, 2 July 2004)

‘China’ in this piece of text is not inclusive. It does not refer to the mainland which is the counterpart part of Hong Kong. It is used more like the central government, as a superior, or ruler of Hong Kong. The label is used as a metaphor of the central government or ruling party who can ‘use military force’ in Hong Kong. However, the sense of ruling does not come with corresponding ‘submissive’ position of Hong Kong as we discussed in the quantitative analysis of the label. In this text from HKEJ, ‘China’ is presented simply as the ruling power, which appears to be more benign than may have been expected (‘has no interest in using military force’) – and definitely more benign than the ‘China’ we encountered in the excerpt from Apple Daily. Also, Hong Kong people are presented as actors with their own ‘will’ and ‘freedom of expression’, rather than
as helpless victims comparable to ‘rats’ in a laboratory. As introduced in Chapter 4, HKEJ is considered as the symbol of the elite in Hong Kong; the language used in the excerpt is exactly consistent with the self-professed position of the paper: critical but also rational.

Excerpt 7.9 Making any political opposition in Hong Kong, [one] has to face a reality, that Hong Kong is a part of China. Constitutional or practical relationship, SAR’s political reform is not Hong Kong’s own business, but a national issue, which the central government will never let go of completely. (WWP, 15 April 2004)

In this text from WWP, ‘China’ is in every sense inclusive of and superior to Hong Kong. The central government-backed paper has a clear picture of the relationship between Hong Kong and China. As ‘the access point’ or ‘a part’ of China, Hong Kong is not in parallel with China as another city state or business partner. China is the superset of Hong Kong, like other cities of China. No matter how important this city is, like Shanghai or Guangzhou it is under the national flag. WWP also makes it very clear that this is how things should be, i.e. that Hong Kong is legitimately subordinated to the mainland, and should behave accordingly: it ‘has to face reality’ and accept that SAR’s political reform ‘is not Hong Kong’s own business, but a national issue’

The construction of the other, and sense of belonging and not belonging, provides an insight into the mediated construction of the identity of Hong Kong, by defining ‘who are they’ and ‘where do we belong, or not’. These examinations help answer the first research question ‘who are we’, by sketching out the boundary between the self and the other (see Pickering, 2001). Newspapers with a different political stance and position in the market are distinguished from each other by projecting different representations of the other, and different kinds of relationship between the self and the other. The pro-democracy papers that are owned by the all-time opposition leader Jimmy Lai and by independent critical intellectuals, project the identity of Hong Kong emphasizing the existence of the communist Chinese ‘other’ which is both ideologically and physically different from the Hong Kong self, and is associated with more negative meanings. They tend to distance Hong Kong from both the
rest of the country and the national regime. In contrast, the pro-government papers tend to build a positive image of mainland China, or overlook the difference in ideology. They promote a sense of belonging by referring to Hong Kong as a part of China. This strategy is also reflected in the absence of the label in titles of institutions and figures, when they are presented as ‘China/Chinese’ by default.

7.4.4 The construction of the self

The construction of the self answers the second major research question raised at the very beginning of the project: What do we do? The power distribution in reporting not only indicates the attitudes to power, but also the position of certain identity categories allocated by the newspapers in the power hierarchy (see Fowler 1991). This section examines the key identity labels studied in this project: ‘Hong Kong people/citizen’. By scanning the verb collocated with the identity label, we can make a profile of the verb collocations and, to some extent, quantify them for comparison, and gain a sense of the meanings associated with the Hong Kong self in different newspapers.

7.4.4.1 Labels: ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ and verb collocations - general

To have a clearer view on the pattern of verb collocation of the labels concerned, i.e. ‘Hong Kong people’ (香港人/港人) and ‘citizen’ (市民), we first started with a comparison with another frequently-used label, ‘the central government’ (中央/中央政府) (N=1190). As evident from the previous section, the nature of the relationship between Hong Kong and mainland China varies significantly from newspaper to newspaper. It is therefore feasible to assume that some newspapers will construct ‘Hong Kong people/citizens’ as either more active or passive in relation to the ‘central government’ than others.

To make our analysis meaningful, we also had to take into account that the label
‘Hong Kong people/citizen’ does not always appear in the context of a relationship with the central government. Due to that, our analysis was limited to all tokens of the label ‘central government’ that appeared in the same paragraph with ‘Hong Kong people/citizen’.

Chart 7.8 shows that just under half of the label tokens are collocated with active verbs, which shows the label either taking an action on something or on oneself: for example, the central government refuses to accept reforms, or takes an action on others; the central government intervenes in Hong Kong. More than one third of the label tokens collocate with the passive and under the action of someone else: for example, the pro-democracy camp requested the central government to reconsider the decision. 7.37 percent of the label tokens collocate with verbs of mental activity, like ‘feel’, ‘think’, ‘look forward to’, and 3.53 percent describe a status, like ‘Hong Kong people are calm’; or with a modal verb, for example, ‘Hong Kong people should be sensible’.
Compared with the labels ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ (further analysis of these two labels will be conducted in the following section), the structure of verbs collocated with ‘the central government’ differed significantly from the structure of verbs collocated with the two self-identified labels, which, in general, are roughly the same (Chart 7.9). Both self-identity labels are constructed as more passive – the differences in the proportions of categories ‘taking action on others/oneself/something’ and ‘affected by others action’ are most indicative in this respect. In other words, despite the mainstream request for more democracy and autonomy in the majority of the newspapers, their language characterizes the people/citizens of Hong Kong as inherently powerless compared to the central government, which is the questioned object by the democratic camp and the public. Further analysis will show the differences between newspapers when using these two most obvious identity labels regarding Hong Kong identity.

7.4.4.2 Labels: ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ and verb collocations – differences and similarities between newspapers

The most frequently used labels referring to residents in Hong Kong are ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’. Chart 7.10 shows the frequencies of the two labels in all four papers. In general, use of ‘Hong Kong people’ is about as twice as
frequent as ‘citizen’ in every chosen paper. Although the tendency applies in all four newspapers, differences do exist between them. The pro-democracy papers Apple Daily and HKEJ use the label ‘Hong Kong people’ more often than the other two (p=0.002). The higher frequency can be explained by the fact that they put more emphasis on Hong Kong as an actor in their reporting than the other two, which is consistent with their political affiliations. By using ‘Hong Kong people’, the two papers put more emphasis on the distinctiveness of Hong Kong, as opposed to ‘citizens’. However, merely looking at frequency does not provide much insight into the actual meanings associated with these labels and, therefore, a more detailed analysis is needed.

As shown earlier in Chart 7.9, there are differences among different newspapers regarding the level of activity associated with each label and, hence, power distribution between Hong Kong and the central government, according to the paper’s style and political affiliation. Before further investigation of the power distribution, let us note another interesting difference in the use of self-identity labels by different newspapers: the difference between the use of the labels ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’. Chart 7.10 has shown that ‘Hong Kong people’ is the more frequently-used label in every chosen newspaper. Further survey of the whole corpus was conducted to provide evidence of the difference in meanings associated with the two labels. All tokens of the two labels that appear in the same paragraph with any main others are counted and compared as
On average, ‘Hong Kong people’ is about as twice as likely to appear with labels of the significant others discussed in previous sections, including the ‘communist/socialist’, ‘inland/mainland’, ‘Beijing’, ‘China’ and the ‘central government’, although the ratio differs in different papers. Therefore, we can conclude that, on average, ‘Hong Kong people’ is the more preferred label in a context with the others. In other words, the ‘Hong Kong people’ label is more likely to co-appear with the labels for the main others, and ‘citizen’ is used more when discussing events or issues internal to Hong Kong. As chart 7.11 shows, the pro-democracy papers are particularly likely to use ‘Hong Kong people’ rather than ‘citizens’ in combination with labels for the other. The tendency of preference decreases when it comes to the more pro-government papers. A qualitative analysis will bring more details and evidence for the interpretation of the result (see later analysis).

![Chart 7.11 Label 'Hong Kong people' (N=808) and 'citizen' (N=564) appear in same paragraph with main others, by newspaper (2004)](chart)

Besides differences in the choice of the self-identity label when mentioning the main others, are there any other differences between the newspapers in the way they use the two self-identity labels? Our analysis of verb collocations suggests
that there are interesting differences in the level of activity associated with each of the two self-identity labels. To compare the scale of activity in the four papers, the rather complex categorization of verbs used for coding (and appearing in earlier charts) was simplified: some categories of activity are combined or removed. All categories of ‘active’ verbs, including those referring to actions on oneself/something/others, are put into one category. The categories of verbs involving mental activity, status and modal verbs were removed since they were creating difficulties and were not really that relevant for this part of analysis. For example, if a paper often collocates Hong Kong people with verbs denoting mental activity, it is difficult to say whether this promotes a more active/passive image of Hong Kong people.

Chart 7.12 shows that the scales of activity regarding both ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ are shifting with each newspaper’s political stand. The two pro-democracy newspapers, the tabloid Apple Daily and financial elite broadsheet HKEJ, tend to empower ‘Hong Kong people’ by using more active verbs and fewer passive verbs. ‘Citizen’ in these two papers is the preferred label when associated with passive verbs. In contrast, the pro-government broadsheet Ming Pao and the strongly government-backed WWP promote a more active image of the ‘citizen’, and more passive one for ‘Hong Kong people’. Drawing on the conclusions we arrived at earlier in this section, that the ‘Hong Kong people’ label is more likely to co-appear with the labels for main others, and citizen is used more when discussing events or issues internal to Hong Kong, we can conclude that the pro-democracy papers promote a more active Hong Kong identity when it is related to the significant others. The pro-government papers tend to reduce the scale of activity when the identity labels are related to others like Beijing, the central government, etc. They allocate more power to the identity label ‘citizen’, which is most often used when discussing events internal to Hong Kong. In other words, the activity of the Hong Kong population in internal matters is not seen as controversial, as long as it stays within the prescribed boundaries.
To summarize the construction of the self, the investigation of verb collocation indicates that newspapers with different political stances adopted different patterns of representation to promote or suppress a separate Hong Kong identity or a particular type of relationship between Hong Kong and mainland China. The attitudes to the power centre (Fowler, 1991) distinguish newspapers according to their political association. *Apple Daily*, as the major oppositional paper among Hong Kong news media, together with *HKEJ*, the traditional critical elite broadsheet owned by independent intellectuals, construct an identity that is more actively involved in the political event. The neutral, though considered as pro-government, broadsheet *Ming Pao* and mouthpiece of the central government *WWP*, limit the actions inside Hong Kong by minimizing the connection of such actions with the significant others, i.e. labels referring to the rest of China. However, as discussed at the beginning of this section, the identity of Hong Kong, including both labels ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’, is much more passive compared to the typical labels of the main other: ‘the central government’, even in the papers that are ostensibly critical of the power centre and champion autonomy and democracy in Hong Kong. Compared to the label ‘central government’, ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ are characterized as
inherently powerless. This structure is encoded in all the chosen papers that represent all major categories in the Hong Kong newspaper industry.

The following section conducts detailed discourse analysis to present a concrete picture of how such power distribution was practised in reporting and discussing the interpretation of the Basic Law. By examining selected examples in more detail, one is able to ascertain whether the interpretations suggested on the basis of quantitative analysis are indeed correct.

**Excerpt 7.10. Stop setting up barriers for universal suffrage!** *(Apple Daily Editorial, 12 April 2004, italics added)*

Although some people think that the interpretation of NCPSP has become a finality, although some insightful people think *Hong Kong people should look ahead* and *shouldn’t indulge* in the issue of interpretation, tens of millions of *citizens* still *took to the streets* yesterday, *chose to oppose* the interpretation and still *request universal suffrage* as soon as possible. We believe that *citizens’* persistence is not only *respectable,* *valuable* but *a blow* to those who *request Hong Kong people* to submit and accept this interpretation and look ahead.

We emphasize from time to time, NPCSC’s sudden interpretation of the Basic Law on its own initiative without necessity and adequate excuse does serious damage to Hong Kong’s principles of ‘rule of law’ and ‘one country, two systems’. Although *Hong Kong people did not manage to overturn* the decision, at least we *should clearly express* our stand of opposing the interpretation and *make Beijing central government understand* that such behaviour is wrong and will not be *accepted* by the *Hong Kong people.* Only in this way, can [we] *push* the central government to consider carefully before action in the future, and *urge* the central government not to abuse this special and emergency power. Only in this way, can [we] *let international society know* that the *Hong Kong people’s determination to uphold* the constitutional ‘one country, two systems, high degree of autonomy’ is uncompromising.

If the *Hong Kong people accept* the interpretation by default, as certain people suggested, or only *look ahead* without expressing the stance of opposing the interpretation, it would misleadingly make the central government think that *Hong Kong people have been used to* interpretations. By then, the central government will easily utilize this political tool to
meet its policy or political needs. This would do more harm than good to Hong Kong’s
development, to ‘one country, two systems’ and Hong Kong’s rule of law. We believe
that only with a firm stance does ‘look ahead’ become meaningful. If [we] are standing
on a quicksand, ‘looking ahead’ would only make [us] buried.

Of course, besides opposing the interpretation, yesterday’s protest repeated the appeals
of last year’s July 1st protest and this year’s New Year protest, which are requests for
autonomy as soon as possible and universal suffrage for CE and LegCo as soon as
possible. We believe that Hong Kong people’s appeals to democracy have been
expressed very clearly and very strongly through these protests. SAR government or the
central government should both listen carefully to these appeals, and take action to let
Hong Kong people practice full democracy, rather than setup barriers this way or another
with different methods and excuses.

This text is one of the typical editorials of Apple Daily. The style of language is
straightforward, to some extent aggressive. The position is clear and forcefully
argued. It also tends to build the image that the newspaper is taking the people’s
side. By analysing the use of verbs in the text, we can build up a profile of the
identity labels projected by this text and the associated power distribution
between them, and thereby throw some light on the whole discourse that is
inherent in Apple Daily’s news reporting. In this case, it is also worth examining
the use of deictic expressions and, in particular, how they are used to
established a link between the journalist and the audience – the imagined
community of Hong Kong people. Although the deictic expression is an
important indicator when examining identity, it is impossible to analyse them
quantitatively, but a qualitative analysis can provide really interesting insights
that complement other layers of analysis.

I would start first with the analysis of the relationship between the journalist and
the reader. The journalist put him/herself in a higher position by defining the
nature of the demonstration and evaluating the citizens as ‘respectable’ and
‘valuable’. In this way, the newspaper not only supported but also legitimatated
the action. At this stage, ‘we’ represents the journalist who took an objective
perspective that judge the event from a distance. When the text continues, the
position of the journalist shifted and he/she includes the wider population in
membership with talk about ‘although Hong Kong people did not manage to overturn the decision, at least we should clearly express our stand’. By this time, Hong Kong people are ‘we’: journalist and public. The text ended with the shifting of self-position in the last two paragraphs so that the journalist tends to speak and think for the public from an objective angle. ‘We’, again, are the newspaper rather than a member of the public or demonstrator. From a third-party angle, ‘we, the newspaper’ summarizes and expresses the appeal for the public. This way of taking side with the readers is typical in tabloid reporting in order to invoke identification.

Second, the identity label as positioned by the journalists is considerably active. ‘Citizens’ ‘took to the streets’, ‘chose’ and ‘request’. ‘Hong Kong people’ ‘managed’, ‘expresses’, ‘make understand’, ‘will (not) accept’, ‘let know’, ‘uphold’, etc. Although still ‘requested’, the identity labels referring to Hong Kong public are overwhelmingly active. In this way, Apple Daily endows the self-identity labels with more power and more influence compared to the authority, namely ‘the central government’ and ‘Beijing’. The image of Hong Kong people/citizen built in this text is participative and politically active. Although ‘we’ cannot make decision for ourselves, ‘we’ practice our freedom and enthusiasm to the greatest extent by taking to the streets, expressing ourselves and making the authority listen. This image is consistent with Apple Daily’s position in Hong Kong as the major opponent of the central government. As introduced in Chapter 4, as the extension of the owner’s political position, the paper suffers from such critical claims. However, it is supported by the readers, who are mostly from the younger generation. The oppositional position and sensational language have earned the newspaper a large circulation and the strength to survive in the competitive market.

**Excerpt 7.11. Sudden final verdict weakens SAR government’s prestige** *(Ming Pao, 27 April 2004, italics added)*

NPCSC’s decision yesterday regarding universal suffrage of CE in 07 and LegCo in 08 has clearly denied the double universal suffrage. This is consistent with the recent central official’s information and inclination. It is even predictable. However, surprisingly,
NPCSC suddenly stated that the equal ratio of functional constituency and geographic constituency in 2008 LegCo will not be changed, before any public discussion and SAR government’s consultation report of political reform. This sudden decision will have great influence on Hong Kong’s political development.

The first consequence is: NPCSC has frozen the ratio of constituencies in 2008 LegCo. [It] slows down the schedule of LegCo general election. *Hong Kong citizens* have obviously increased the requests for democratic developments since last year’s July 1st demonstration. More than half of the interviewed [citizens] hope for general elections for the CE in 07 and LegCo in 08, but only a few believe it can be realized. However, citizens generally hope to achieve the goal of universal suffrage gradually and orderly for all seats in LegCo under the stipulation of the Basic Law. What [they] get today is freezing the 50% level of elected seats in 2008. This is far from the citizens’ expectation.

The second consequence is: NPCSC bypassed the SAR Government Constitutional Development Task Force’s consulting process and setup concrete limitations to political reforms directly. [They] not only do not understand Hong Kong people’s mainstream opinion, but also cracked down upon the prestige of the special task force appointed by the CE. What’s more, making the final verdict to limit the LegCo reform before discussing concrete political reform plan will confine the space for manipulating administrative and legislative issues. The central leaders always hope that Hong Kong people will put their attention on economic development, as the deputy Prime Minister Zeng Qinghong said yesterday: ‘Developing economic and improving people’s lives are the ultimate themes. Hong Kong must seize these themes firmly’. We do not question the goodwill of the central government but, under the circumstance of lacking public discussion, and setting a limitation on LegCo reform, [it] has not accurately understood public opinion [in Hong Kong].

… …

The third consequence is: after this incident, the Hong Kong citizen should clearly see the central government or the new leadership’s attitude to Hong Kong – Hong Kong’s politics can be developed, but has to be led by the central government. Whether we like it or not, this is political reality. If [we] can depart from a one-sided wish from now on, never to hope for Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s new leadership to open up and let Hong Kong freely draw its own blueprint of political development, then Hong Kong people can still actively participate and fly in the confined space after adjusting the expectation of democracy, and exercise ourselves by this opportunity, and expect that one day [we] can fly high and free.
The language tone in the whole text is mild comparing with *Apple Daily’s* outcry. The journalist accepts the reality and the authority of the central government. This is the pre-condition of the whole text and, possibly, even the newspaper itself. Within a confined space, Hong Kong people can express and act on their own behalf. The sense of encouragement recognized in *Apple Daily’s* language is never adopted. The text is consistent with calm and sensible analysis and only ends up with suggestions.

The verbs collocated with identity label of ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ are more various than *Apple Daly*. Different formats of verbs appear with the labels. ‘Hong Kong’ and ‘citizen’: ‘increased the request’, ‘hope’, ‘believe’, ‘should see’ and ‘can participate and fly’. They are also ‘understood’ and ‘hoped’ by the authority. They take actions, have feelings and are affected by other’s action. The variety of verbs reflected the newspapers position as the neutral and objective elite broadsheet. The effort to balance different voices is practised throughout this text and the whole reporting and discussion of the event. However, it also should be noticed that the use of real active verbs is actually very rare. Hong Kong people and citizen are more likely collocated with mental activities or feelings. In some cases, they are supposed to be told what they ‘should’ and ‘can’ do. Unlike the discourse adopted by *Apple Daily*, the image of Hong Kong people is much more inert, if not completely passive.

*Ming Pao* has played as mainstream media opinion in Hong Kong. Its stand of integration or compromise reflects a significant tendency of Hong Kong’s identity. With an owner who has huge current and potential financial interest in mainland China, *Ming Pao* can never play as an opponent, as *Apple Daily* does. On the one hand, due to the large portion of advertisement from industries like real estate that are closely related to the authority and mainland resources, *Ming Pao* can never be released from corresponding pressure and influence. On the other hand, the paper cannot turn itself into the government’s mouthpiece, like the *WWP*. The strength of the paper lies in its claim of having a neutral stance and objectivity. The main readership of highly-educated groups does not welcome one-sided champions of either rapid reform or complete submission. Balancing different voices and ways of thinking has been a persistent strategy of
the newspaper and it is clearly evident in the above text and reflected in its use of identity labels and verbs.

**Excerpt 7.12. NPCSC’s interpretation of the Basic Law defend ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’** *(WWP, Editorial, 8 April 2004, *italics added*)

Obviously, NPCSC’s related interpretation conforms to Hong Kong’s reality, and provides inspiration for Hong Kong’s future political development. NPCSC’s interpretation insisted on defending ‘one country, two systems’, ‘Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong’ and a high degree of autonomy, which is *Hong Kong people*’s blessing, and make investors feel relieved.

… …

Reinforcing implementation of ‘high degree of autonomy’

After the interpretation, some viewers pointed that the central government sets up barriers, *forfeits Hong Kong people’s* ‘high degree of autonomy’. In fact, this is a kind of deception. [We] must point out that Hong Kong’s political development is very important in political, economical and social aspects. SAR’s constitutional configuration and development is the actual reflection of the orientation of ‘two systems’ under ‘one country’, and related to the reflection of the central authority and national sovereignty. [It] has never been ‘Hong Kong’s internal issue’ like some politicians agitated. Only when HKSAR strictly follows the stipulation of the Basic Law, insists on principles of gradual and orderly, balanced participation and benefit for capitalist economical development, and *promotes citizen’s* patriotic sense to improve widely, will there be increasing guarantee to ‘Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong’ and a ‘high degree of autonomy’, ‘dominated by the patriots’. Only political development in this way will benefit Hong Kong’s long-term prosperity and stability, and *conform to general citizens’* sharing benefit and happiness.

Reality has proved, NPCSC’s interpretation will never *weaken Hong Kong people’s* ‘high degree of autonomy’. On the contrary, [it] is more beneficial to reinforcement and implementation of a high degree of autonomy. Therefore, both the SAR government and people from all walks of society should first carefully and thoroughly study the content of the interpretation and the spirit in which it is delivered, and, secondly, honestly practice, under the stipulation of the interpretation, to launch the next step’s exploration of political development. [They] should contribute counsel and advice to the administrative officers and submit a draft that is agreed upon by people from all different
walks of life to the central government as soon as possible. Of course, administrative officers and the SAR government should enhance citizens’ democratic participation, and try their best to meet citizens’ democratic appeals and increase political transparency.

Unlike the ambiguous stand in Ming Pao’s text, WWP has a clear position in its editorial. The tone of the text is strong and uncompromising, almost like an official statement. The anonymous ‘we’ are either ‘we the newspaper’ or ‘we the authority’. The journalist has not invited the Hong Kong population to join the newspaper’s membership throughout the text. Rather, the journalist is saying what the public should do and have to do and providing a solid conclusion to the nature of the event from the very beginning.

Verbs collocated with the identity labels ‘Hong Kong people/citizen’ are overwhelmingly passive: ‘forfeited’, ‘promoted’, ‘weakened’ or ‘enhanced’, etc. One way or another, Hong Kong people or citizens are always the object of others’ actions, from central government to officials of SAR government. The identity labels are consistently powerless and not in a position that can have actions and effect on others. The distribution of power by the journalist reflects the stand taken by the WWP as the mouthpiece of the central government. Looking down from the level of the central government, the ‘Hong Kong people/citizen’ should be told what to do and wait for arrangements from above. The text does not even mention any feeling or mental activity by the Hong Kong people. This is an extreme example of an uncompromising stand taken by the newspaper. To some extend, this IS the statement to Hong Kong from the central government. WWP, as the centrally-backed newspaper, is one of the major channels for the authority to speak to the public in Hong Kong. Similarly strong and sharp, the two texts from WWP and Apple have given out a completely different image of Hong Kong people, and stand at the two ends of the political spectrum.

7.5. Conclusion

From the case of the Interpretation of the Basic Law in 2004, some general findings emerge. Newspapers can be distinguished from each other in every aspect investigated in this chapter. Political affiliation stands out as the major
dynamic working behind the news language. By three layers of analysis, the identity of Hong Kong is sketched out. In the different construction of the others, ideologically and geographically, the pro-democracy newspapers build images of the dark negative of ‘communism’ and the ‘mainland’, while the pro-government papers try to overlook the ideology difference and represent the mainland in terms of ‘compatriots’ and ‘resources’. This difference between pro-democracy and pro-government newspapers reappears with the investigation of the sense of belonging. Although the image of Hong Kong as an integral part of China generally dominates across all newspapers, pro-democracy papers also often portray the Chinese government as somewhat alien to, and distant from, Hong Kong. Finally, pro-democracy and pro-government newspapers also differ in their construction of self-identity. The pro-democracy papers tend to promote a more active image of the Hong Kong ‘self’, particularly when describing its actions in relation to significant others. In contrast, the pro-government newspapers portray the Hong Kong ‘self’ only as active primarily when writing about matters internal to Hong Kong. Similarly clear differences in the construction of self-identity are also identified in discourse analysis of whole texts. The level of activity attributed to Hong Kong in different papers again indicates different ways of constructing the identity of Hong Kong, with pro-democracy newspapers promoting a very active image of Hong Kong people and pro-government newspapers offering a more passive, static image.

Will these patterns continue to be repeated in other political events? Will the newspapers develop their strategies and how will they change? The following chapter examines the case of Chief Executive Election in 2005 and provides illustrations of further political development in Hong Kong and an investigation of the newspapers’ construction of Hong Kong identity in a very different context.
8.1 Introduction

This chapter follows up on the questions raised in the previous chapter. It examines how different newspapers construct the identity of Hong Kong according to their institutional and economic positions, the political affiliation and other factors introduced in Chapter 4 by building the image of the self and the other, the sense of belonging and not belonging and power distribution among the main actors in Hong Kong politics. Unlike the previous case, the ‘Beijing factor’ or, in other words, the central government, played as a shadow influence in the CE Election in 2005, and social conditions were improving by this year. With a GDP growth of 7.3 per cent by the end of 2004, economic growth had recovered and reached its best since the Asian financial crises. Employment and local consumption had both improved and reached an historical high. The economic recovery was closely related to the rapid growth in mainland China, which has brought increasing consumption of both products and services as well as investment in Hong Kong’s local market (Tsang, 2005). In regard to this circumstance, with a different nature and social context, the chapter shows how different newspapers maintain and change the representation and construction of Hong Kong identity. In line with our research questions, the main aim is to ascertain whether we can detect a similar dynamic of relationships between politics, the media and identity as in the previous case study, despite a somewhat different socio-political context and a different nature of the event in question.

8.2. The 2005 CE election

8.2.1 The Basic Law

The Chief Executive (CE) is the head of the Hong Kong government. The position was established on the handover of 1997, replacing the Governor of the British colonial regime. Article 43 of the HKSAR Basic Law stipulates, ‘The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the head of the HKSAR and shall represent the Region’. In other words, the CE
should represent and serve the interests of Hong Kong people. At the same time, ‘The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be accountable to the Central People’s Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the provisions of this law’ (Basic Law Article 43), i.e. be accountable to the central government of China. Defined by the two paragraphs of the Basic Law, the Chief Executive ‘is a politically sandwiched leader who is placed between the Hong Kong people and the central government, but in reality the CE must toe Beijing’s line as the source of his or her powers come from the central government’ (Kwong, 2007: 309).

According to Article 45 of the Basic Law, ‘The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People’s Government’. The CE was elected by a 400-member Selection Committee in the first term from 1997 to 2002, and an 800-member Election Committee (EC) for the second term, 2002–2007, and the third term from 2007 till now. In the 2005 election, the majority of EC members (664) were produced by a complicated formula involving 180,000 voters representing 35 elected sub-sectors. Candidates in many sub-sectors were uncontested. The election is therefore criticized as a ‘small-circle’ election, and is biased in favour of the business sector and professionals (HKHRM, 2006).

8.2.2. The first Chief Executive

The first chief executive Tung Chee-hwa was a shipping magnate before taking office in 1997. In the first few years after handover, Hong Kong witnessed the Asia financial crisis, the bird-flu epidemic and the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). The series of crisis challenged the administration to the full. Despite wide criticism of his governing performance, Tung was granted a second term in 2002.

However, in 2003, his handling of security legislation led to series of large-scale protests and convinced the central government to look for alternatives. The attempt of the Tung’s office to legislate on Article 23 of the Basic Law, which requires the SAR government to enact laws to combat ‘treason, subversion and
sedition’, led to a public outcry and a protest by about half million citizens on 1 July 2003. In the aftermath, two cabinet members resigned and the law was shelved indefinitely (Lo, 2007). In March 2005, Tung was appointed to an advisory post and he resigned his office within days – citing health reasons. The outcry for democracy was about the greatest in Hong Kong because of the maladministration of the Tung era, which exposed the institutional defect in the SAR government, and would have to be remedied by democratic reforms.

8.2.3. The election

The resignation of Tung paved the way for the succession of the former British-trained bureaucrat-turned-politician Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, previously chief secretary. Tsang is a devout Catholic and he was knighted by the British government in 1997 before the handover for his long service to Hong Kong. He was widely seen as more competent than his predecessor (Sing, 2009). After Tung’s resignation in March 2005, Tsang became the acting Chief Executive. He was regarded as the central government’s preferred successor to Tung.

When Tsang formally announced his decision to run in the replacement CE election, a lot of election committee members who were business and political elites publicly expressed their support of Tsang. However, the patriotic camp had also publicly criticized his past service under the British. Nevertheless, after the confirmation of the central government’s favour, all pro-government elites and organizations eventually united to support Tsang (Kwong, 2007: 407).

The Chief Executive Election Ordinance (CEEO) enacted by the Legislative Council on 21 September 2001 stipulated that the election process can close at the end of the nomination stage if only one candidate is able to secure the necessary minimum of 100 nominations. Tsang obtained the support of 714 EC members while his major competitor, Democratic Party (DP) chair Lee Wing-tak, received only 52 nominations. Lee and another contestant failed to qualify. Therefore, Tsang was elected unopposed. He was appointed Chief Executive on 21 June 2005 by the Council of State of China. Although supported by the central government, The NPCSC ruled that the new Chief Executive will only serve for approximately two years (till 2007), ‘being the end of Tung’s prior
term, as set forth in the electoral timetable contained within the Basic Law’ (Axworthy and Leonard, 2007: 538).

Although enjoying popularity among not only pro-Beijing groups but also the wide population, the unchallenged victory of Tsang sparked public concern over the fairness and validity of the election. Both the democrats and pro-Beijing parties complained that members of the EC faced pressure exerted by officials from the central government and Tsang himself (HKHRM, 2006).

The 2005 CE election was chosen as the second research case due to the following considerations: first, the CE election is one of the most important political events in Hong Kong since the hand-over, which cannot be ignored when investigating any issues related to political development in Hong Kong. Second, the 2005 election happened at a turning point for Hong Kong, when all social factors were under rapid change. The resignation of the first CE and economic recovery changed the atmosphere in Hong Kong. The election in the crucial time of 2005 can provide valuable clues to the development of Hong Kong’s political identity in this rapidly-changing socioeconomic and socio-political context. Third, the 2005 election is the starting point of the performance by the popular (by that time) CE Donald Tsang. He is still in the position today. Will the appointment of a popular CE ease the tension between Hong Kong and the central government and, further, bring more integration? Will this be reflected in less-pronounced tension between Hong Kong identity and Chinese identity in the media? All these factors make the 2005 election a particularly interesting case study for our examination of Hong Kong identity and its development, and in particular its relationships with the media and politics of Hong Kong.

8.3. Data and sampling

The sample covers a time period of three weeks, from 3 June, the date nominations for Chief Executive Election were released, to 23 June, two days after Tsang’s triumph was approved by the central government. All related news stories of Chief Executive Election are downloaded from online database Wisers.
The five newspapers were searched for articles with ‘Chief Executive’ and its synonyms and abbreviations in Chinese (特別行政區行政長官/特首/行政長官), as well as the names of the candidates (曾蔭權，李永達，詹培忠) as keywords. After collecting all the news items in the three weeks, from the nomination day for the CE Election to two days after the result was approved, every story was manually scanned to determine if they are appropriate for the analysis. The data collecting and review formulated a corpus composed as the following:

8.4 Analysing the corpus

This chapter repeats the structure of analysis applied in chapter 7, i.e. by analysing (i) the amount of converge; (ii) the construction of the Other; (iii) the sense of belonging/not belonging to China; (iv) the construction of the Self. Processing material from a different event with the similar method can provide interesting results that may reinforce the patterns that were already identified in the last case, or provide clues for further development or modification of our argument. Given the difference in the nature of the event, and the different atmosphere in society arising from economic and political shifts, papers may adopt different strategies in their news reporting, or the main object in question, i.e. the identity of Hong Kong, may evolve and be reflected in newspaper’s reports in a different way compared to the previous case.

8.4.1 Amount of coverage

In the reports on the Chief Executive Election, again the two tabloids show very different figures in the same period of time (see Table 8.1). Oriental Daily carried only 66 news stories, which is very few considering the scale of the newspaper, and not only fewer than the two ‘high-brow’ newspapers but also fewer than the other tabloid Apple Daily, which devoted 108 news items in the same period. Oriental Daily’s strategy behind the fewer column inches is similar to many tabloids in the world. With a function that is mainly commercial, its political role is essentially passive, and it wishes to maintain the status quo and encourage conditions that help maximize profits (Rooney, 2000: 92–3). However, newspaper type is not the only factor that determines the amount of coverage of a paper. As seen in Chapter 7, political affiliation also plays as a significant factor.
This can explain why *Apple Daily*, the other tabloid in our sample, contributed many more reports during this event. The CE election, as one of the most important events in the development of democracy in Hong Kong, attracted a large amount of attention from the pro-democracy tabloid *Apple Daily*, with its more than 100 reports for the event. Still in its founder’s hand at that time, *HKEJ* has 78 news items sampled from the CE election. The relatively lower amount of reporting can perhaps be explained by its business orientation and the scale of the paper. The other broadsheet *Ming Pao* devoted the most (130) stories during the three weeks period. *WWP* also carried 118 news items in the same three weeks, which is a relatively large number, only a few less than *Ming Pao*. As the election was a major political event in Hong Kong and an important battle field of opinions, neither of the two papers could take their attention off the event.

The lengths of the two tabloids’ reports are shorter then the three others (p=0.047), considering their relatively younger and less-educated reader groups. *WWP* and *HKEJ* again provide the longest articles on average, determined by the elite paper status and emphasizing editorial and discussion rather than daily reporting. One feature which should be noticed is the proportion of editorials in *Oriental Daily*. With nearly half its coverage as editorial, *Oriental Daily*’s editorials still had a low average length. This is because the format of editorials in *Oriental Daily* was quite different from other newspapers: they are short and all with names of their authors, many of whom are not employees of the newspaper. In other words, these editorials were produced in the format of mixed voices from the society. Different from conventional editorials in the two broadsheet papers, they read more like informal comments rather than serious, well-thought-out arguments. This feature of mixing and simplifying the issues and arguments at stake can be interpreted by the tabloid position of the newspaper. With a younger and less-educated readership (see Chapter 4), long and complicated editorials would not be popular among its readers. Consistent with the pattern seen in the 2004 Interpretation case, the differing amount and length of coverage in the five newspapers can be explained in relation to two main factors: political affiliation and newspaper type. Another point that should be noticed is that, regarding coverage length, the type of newspaper is the only statistical actor that is relevant in 2004 case. In this case, political affiliation also
becomes significant in relation to article length (p=0.012). In other words, statistically, the pro-democracy papers had more news-column inches for the event than the pro-government papers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Titles</th>
<th>No. of articles</th>
<th>No. of editorials</th>
<th>No. of characters</th>
<th>Average length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apple Daily</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>26(24.07%)</td>
<td>95890</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKEJ</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>35(44.87%)</td>
<td>95065</td>
<td>1219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ming Pao</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>46(35.38%)</td>
<td>127145</td>
<td>963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriental Daily</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>28(42.42%)</td>
<td>61770</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wen Wei Po</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>36(30.51)</td>
<td>118303</td>
<td>1003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>171(34.20%)</td>
<td>498173</td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1 Basic Corpus Data of the case 2005 CE Election

8.4.2 Construction of the Other

Given the different nature of the event in question, the examination of labels ‘communist/socialist’ and ‘mainland/inland’ is of particular interest in this case. Are these two sets of labels still being championed in a way that promotes an image of mainland China as the Other, both ideologically and geographically? Do newspapers use the labels in different ways to define the boundaries between Hong Kong and the rest of China, and are these differences in line with their political affiliations and with economic interests of their owners?

8.4.2.1 Label: ‘communist/socialist’

The overall frequency of the label communist/socialist (in 45 of 500 news items) is low compared to the interpretation case (in 55 of 207 news items) (see Chart 8.1). This is particularly surprising in the case of HKEJ, which had a rather high frequency of the label in the first case, comparable to that of the pro-democracy tabloid Apple Daily. Despite different political orientations, four out of five papers have used the label only sporadically or not at all. Ming Pao had only one use of the label and WWP never in more than a hundred news items in three weeks. Apple Daily is the only one with a higher frequency of the label. Apart
from *Apple Daily*, the main opposition paper, all the major papers do not seem to think that the ideological differences are important in reporting the CE election, or choose to overlook them.

However, there is still a difference of general preference between pro-democracy papers and pro-government papers (p=0.005). In fact, we can also spot the relatively higher frequency from the *Oriental Daily*, the other tabloid. The preference of using the label ‘communist/socialist’ can also be defined between newspaper types. In this sample, tabloids are more likely to use the label than broadsheets (p=0.001). In *Apple Daily*, the overall frequency of the label even increased slightly from 0.48 per article in 2004 to 0.59 per article in 2005. ‘Communist/socialist’ is still closely related to the politics in Hong Kong, for example:

Excerpt 8.1 Hong Kong is facing a challenge right now: striving for democracy against the Chinese communist. There will be twenty democratic LegCo members as main actors in this challenge, and countless citizens who take to the streets to protest. Where would Tsang (the CE) be then? (*Apple Daily*, 15 June 2005)

The Chinese communist is seen as the main barrier to democracy in Hong Kong and responsible for holding back the development of democracy that Hong Kong deserves. The issue is divided into the Chinese communist vs. the democratic members and citizens of Hong Kong. Everyone would have to choose a side. *Apple Daily* presumes that the new CE has to take a side: either with the communist party or with the democratic camp and citizens, and the choice is without compromise. The improved socio-political conditions in 2005 and the
resignation of the first CE did not create a better relationship between *Apple Daily* and the central government; the tension remains even when the general conflicts had reduced from the 2003–2004 peaks. From the excerpt we can see that the journalist believes that even with the new, highly popular CE, the conflicts of ideology still exist and should not be ignored.

It is also worth noting that in the other four newspapers, the label ‘communist’ often appears as part of the name of an institution rather than as a marker of ideological differences. For instance, four out of eight tokens of the label in *Oriental Daily* are part of a formal title, for example:

> Excerpt 8.2 When asked if he (Tsang) had discussed his idea of administration with the nine members of the Central Committee of the CCP (Communist Party of China), he laughed and said: I didn’t have many opportunities to meet the Central Committee members. (*Oriental Daily*, 3 June 2005)

Not only is choosing to use ‘communist’ not a way of highlighting the ideological difference, we can argue that it is actually a way to promote the importance of the title, by using its full name. We can notice the presence of high prestige and authority in this excerpt by comparing two ways of introducing the same person: the President and Mr President of People’s Republic of China; the sense of authority is much more evident in the latter.

In general, the absence or rare appearance of the label ‘communist/socialist’ shows the lesser prominence of ideological difference in this event. Although the pro-democracy paper still tried to hold the oppositional position, the emphasis on the label has declined in the overall picture.

**8.4.2.2 Label: ‘inland/mainland’**

The general frequency of label ‘inland/mainland’ (see Chart 8.2) in the sample (122/250) remains similar with the 2004 interpretation case (87/207). However, the relationship between pro-democracy and pro-Central Government is now almost reversed: the higher frequency appears on the pro-democracy side of the chart. The frequency in *HKEJ* is more than twice as high as in all the other four newspapers. Given that the same newspaper scored very low with respect to the
‘communist/socialist’ label, we could argue that the absence of ideological difference was compensated by a greater emphasis on geographical differences. This helps explain the anomaly noted in chart 8.1. The construction of the Other does not appear in the name of the communist but in the repeating of the label ‘inland/mainland’.

Unlike the 2004 case, where the frequency of ‘mainland/inland’ was highest in the two pro-Beijing papers, WWP and Ming Pao now have the lowest frequencies of the label. The quantitative data again cannot provide a clear picture of how the labels are used and why they appear in such a pattern. The following qualitative analysis will bring a clearer picture of the differences in frequencies of the label ‘inland/mainland’.

Excerpt 8.3 The central government forces the inland criteria of ‘love country, love Hong Kong – the party’ – on Hong Kong people uncompromisingly, ignoring that Hong Kong people cannot accept communism at this stage (this is why there has to be the promise of ‘one country, two systems’) and divides Hong Kong citizens into ‘enemy, friend and us’, leading the SAR into the partisan struggle without realizing it. This is what is called tragedy. (HKEJ, 17 June 2005)

In this excerpt from HKEJ, the geographical label ‘inland’ is closely related to the ideological labels, ‘the party’ and ‘communism’. The journalist assumes that ‘inland’ equals ‘communism’, and defines that this feature is the difference between Hong Kong and the inland. Hong Kong needs the ‘promise of one country, two systems’ to protect itself against inland and communism. Bringing in inland communism would damage Hong Kong and end up with ‘tragedy’.
Portraying the negative image of ‘inland/mainland’ as somewhere that is dark, violent and even mysterious can be spotted throughout the newspapers reports. ‘Inland/mainland’ is the one who sets up ‘hypocritical’ political institutions’ (20 June 2005), ‘arrests’ journalist (e.g. 4 June 2005), restrain ‘permit to enter’ (11 June 2005), has many ‘national secrets’ (13 June 2005) and is haunted by ‘large scale corruption’ (4 June 2005), and denotes a location one should ‘better keep distance from’ (13 June 2005). In fact, ‘inland/mainland’ is not a geographic label anymore. Rather it is the government or regime that equals the communist party. The ideological difference is built into the geographic label.

However, different newspapers with the opposite political stance can build a completely different meaning of the same label. Take WWP for example:

Excerpt 8.4 There’s analysis that suggests that citizens are worried that the resignation of Tung Chee-hwa who has a good relationship with the central government would obstruct the support operations of the inland to Hong Kong. (WWP, 16 June 2005)

Excerpt 8.5 In the aspect of the economy, we should consider how to maintain Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity, impose the economic transformation and the close cooperation with the inland, especially the great Zhujiang triangle zone. (WWP, 3 June 2005)

Again, ‘inland’ is assumed to be supportive of Hong Kong, especially in the aspect of the economy, which is presented as a topic of interest to the public (‘citizens’, or ‘we’). To Hong Kong, ‘inland/mainland’ is not a negative actor that would bring harm. It is a supportive and economically-attractive partner. ‘Inland/mainland’ is constructed as a partner with stronger economic power that would assist Hong Kong to resolve problems and bring further development. This image of supporter and resource can be traced in almost every appearance of the label. The ‘inland/mainland’ is where Hong Kong ‘promotes’ its ‘[entertainment, social service] industry’ (17 June 2005), and a partner that Hong Kong ‘cooperates’ (3 June 2005) and ‘integrates’ (21 June 2005) with. Far from a negative force that would harm Hong Kong, ‘inland/mainland’ is who Hong Kong should look up to.
As evident from these examples, the two geographical units – Hong Kong and the Mainland – were associated with different levels of development, be it economic or political. The ways these developmental differences were constructed varied depending on the political orientation of the newspaper and, in each case, the difference in the level of development also implied the direction of the preferred future development for Hong Kong. In the case of *HKEJ*, Hong Kong was portrayed as the better and more developed side of the relationship, and integration with the ‘mainland/inland’ would only bring a setback. On the contrary, *WWP* put the ‘mainland/inland’ in a more powerful position that would support Hong Kong’s development, especially in the economic aspect, and put the economic factor as the most important issue that concerned ‘us’ citizens. Therefore cooperation and integration would be the only direction for ‘us’ to go.

To conclude, it is clear that the exact meanings associated with the boundary between Hong Kong identity and its Other were different from those identified in the 2004 case. Most newspapers avoided emphasizing the ideological difference explicitly. Only *Apple Daily* was characterized by a relatively higher frequency of using the ‘communist/socialist’ label. Others chose to overlook this difference or transfer to other ways of representation, e.g. *HKEJ*’s emphasizing geographic detachment by using the term ‘inland/mainland’ rather than ‘communist/socialist’. The two pro-democracy papers *Apple Daily* and *HKEJ* adopted different strategies to promote the image of the Other. By pointing out the ideology difference explicitly or building the negativity into milder label ‘inland/mainland’, the boundary is still built between Hong Kong and the rest of the country. On the whole, we could therefore conclude that the boundary between Hong Kong and its Chinese other still persisted in the coverage of the 2005 election, but that the markers of identity and difference shifted somewhat: ideological markers were to an extent replaced by geographic ones.

### 8.4.3 The sense of belonging and not belonging to China

As shown in Chapter 7, by using labels with inclusive meanings like ‘Beijing’ and ‘China/Chinese’ in different ways, newspapers can promote the sense of belonging or not belonging accordingly. Will the 2005 case bring similar results to the 2004 case?
8.4.3.1 Label ‘Beijing’

The overall frequency of label ‘Beijing’ (145/500) is considerably lower than in the 2004 case (300/207). This is most likely due to the reason discussed in Chapter 6 – namely the fact that in the election event, the central government was not a direct participant of the event.

Chart 8.3 shows that pro-government tabloid Oriental Daily has the highest frequency of label ‘Beijing’, followed by the two pro-democracy papers tabloid Apple Daily and broadsheet HKEJ. The other two broadsheets Ming Pao and WWP both have very low frequency of use of the label. By repeating the label, Apple Daily, HKEJ and Oriental Daily may promote ‘Beijing’ as an important actor in the election event. The other two chose to put it in a rather low-key position. However, to provide a clearer picture of how the label is used in different newspapers, further examination of the meanings of ‘Beijing’ is needed.

Chart 8.4 provides a more revealing pattern of uses of the label ‘Beijing’, which the mere counting of frequencies cannot present fully. Both the two pro-democracy papers Apple Daily and HKEJ use the label more to denote a political regime rather than the city of Beijing in the geographic sense. On the contrary, the other paper with high frequency of the label ‘Beijing’, Oriental Daily, much more likely to use the label as the name of the city rather than the central government or the communist party. Ming Pao and WWP, not only have a low frequency of use of the label, but also use the label in a more neutral way by referring it as the city. In fact, WWP never uses it as political regime in more than
100 articles in 3 weeks. *Ming Pao*, positions itself as the neutral and credible broadsheet by balancing with different voices, however it is more likely to use ‘Beijing’ with a neutral meaning.

As in the 2004 case, by using ‘Beijing’ as the alternative of the central government or the party, papers created a distance between Hong Kong and the authority. The political orientation again distinguishes the five papers. The tendency to use the label’s political meaning decreases as we move from the pro-democracy side of the chart to the pro-government side. However, when looking at the figures in general, the tendency to use ‘Beijing’ as a substitute for the political regime or the party has decreased, compared to the 2004 example, from above 4/1 to exactly 2.5/1 (cf. Chart 7.4). The contrast in ratio appears due, in part, to the overwhelming preference of *Oriental Daily* and *WWP* for using the label in its geographic sense. Although the pro-democracy *Apple Daily* and *HKEJ* have more cases where the label is used to denote the political regime, the preference is not as striking as in the 2004 interpretation.

Let us now turn to a more qualitative analysis, to ascertain whether these quantitative shifts in the proportion of political and geographic meanings were accompanied by any further, more subtle changes in meanings of the label.
Excerpt 8.6 He [Tsang] understands that Hong Kong citizen’s recognition has never been as important as that of the Beijing leadership. Any attempt to get the Hong Kong public’s recognition would reduce Beijing’s recognition indirectly. Throughout the process of the CE election, the most important message released by Beijing is that only the central government is the true ‘King maker’. (Apple Daily, 17 June 2005)

This excerpt is a typical example of how the label is used in the Apple Daily. ‘Beijing’, when used as the political regime, is constructed as the uncompromising power that controls Hong Kong. It is clearly opposed to the ‘Hong Kong citizen’. Taking Beijing’s side is assumed as a betrayal of Hong Kong. However, the lexical choices associated with the label ‘Beijing’ in this excerpt and other articles we examined are somewhat different from those found in 2004, and do not contribute to such a sharply negative image of the central Government. In fact, the lexical choices seen in Apple Daily’s reports in 2004 – for instance, Beijing will ‘destroy Hong Kong’s democracy’, ‘infringe and erode Hong Kong’s autonomy’ (Apple Daily 27 April 2004) – now hardly appear at all. Instead, ‘Beijing’ is related with ‘appointment’ or ‘order’ (e.g. 17 June 2005), ‘holds the power of ruling Hong Kong’ (e.g. 17 June 2005), and ‘controls the election’ (e.g. 16 June 2005). Similarly as in the above excerpt, all these cases evidently associate ‘Beijing’ with power. In fact, in this respect, Apple Daily’s use of the label ‘Beijing’ is not much different from Ming Pao’s:

Excerpt 8.7 When administrative efficiency is promoted and the democracy reforms agenda is slowed down, it will end up that the SAR which has returned (to China) long ago almost slides back to the old colonial age, and the SAR government become the ‘kind dictator’ that nobody can counterbalance except the central Beijing. Then the SAR AOs [administrative officer] can happily sing the out-of-tune song of victory. (Ming Pao, 14 June 2005)

We can note that ‘Beijing’ is not overpowering but ‘counterbalancing’ the SAR government. The paper assumes that Beijing is the only power that can avoid Hong Kong been administered by a ‘dictator’ that may not be ‘kind’ anymore. Again, ‘Beijing’ is placed as the saviour of Hong Kong, the only power that can save Hong Kong from going downhill.

The examination of the label ‘Beijing’ shows different tendencies that clearly set 2005 apart from the 2004 case. The differences between the pro-democracy
papers and pro-central government papers still persist. The pro-democracy papers prefer using the label as a substitute for the political regime rather than the geographic city, and construct the regime as the enemy of Hong Kong. In contrast, the pro-government papers are more likely to use the label only as the name of the city or, when using it in the political sense, associate the label with a more neutral lexical choice. Unlike in the 2004 case, the majority of all 'Beijing' labels are now used in the geographic rather than political sense. Is this because the political ‘Beijing’ did not now play such a major role as in the 2004 case, or, perhaps, because it behaved in the way that won Hong Kong’s, or the papers’ agreement? Or are these results an indication of a tendency among newspapers’ editors and journalists to compromise and adopt a more neutral position vis-à-vis ‘Beijing’? Further analysis of other labels will help us answer some of these questions.

8.4.3.2 Label: ‘China/Chinese’

The overall frequency of the label ‘China’ (117/500) is again lower than in the previous case (170/207). Despite that, differences between the pro-democracy papers and pro-central government papers persist: the former have a higher frequency of the label ‘China/Chinese’ than the latter (see Chart 8.5). One possible reason for the lower prominence of this label is that the ‘China factor’ is simply not seen as important as in the 2004 case. However, for a fuller explanation and interpretation of this result, we need to take into account other data, in particular the relative distribution of the meanings of ‘China’.

![Chart 8.5 Frequency of label 'China/Chinese' by newspaper (N=117)(2005 Election)](chart.png)
Chart 8.6 shows that, in general, nearly half of the tokens of label ‘China/Chinese’ are used as inclusive of Hong Kong. Considering the high frequency of the label in *Apple Daily* and *HKEJ*, a considerable portion of the inclusive usage of the label should come from these two pro-democracy papers. By further quantifying the data, we can see how individual papers contribute to the picture we have seen in Chart 8.6.

The highest frequency of exclusive meaning of China appears in the pro-democracy papers *Apple Daily* and *HKEJ*, although the difference between the pro-democracy and pro-central government papers is no longer as marked as it was in 2004 (see Chart 7.7), where the two pro-democracy newspapers had more than twice as many exclusive labels as the pro-central government ones. In line with its political orientation, *Apple Daily* also has the lowest proportion of ‘China’ labels that refer to a unit that embraces both the mainland and Hong Kong; only one in three of all references to ‘China/Chinese’ fall into this category (Chart 8.7). Yet, at the same time, this proportion is significantly higher than the one we encountered in 2004 (18 per cent). From the perspective of this tabloid, the identification of Hong Kong with ‘China’ is therefore clearly still relatively weak compared with the other newspapers, but nonetheless stronger than in 2004.
In *Ming Pao*, the proportion of the inclusive meaning of China is higher than in *Apple Daily* and appears in 41 per cent of the cases, but the other two meanings are also adopted rather frequently. This proportion of inclusive meanings is also higher than the one we encountered in the same newspaper in 2004 (34 per cent). Similarly as in 2004, the newspaper tries to hold a balance among different meanings, but remains generally inclined to a positive attitude to national integration, as indicated by the higher proportion of the inclusive meaning. This is consistent with the political positioning and economic interests underpinning the newspaper: *Ming Pao* is owned by the billionaire who also has a large amount of investment in mainland China yet, at the same time, the newspaper also positions itself as the neutral elite broadsheet.

In *Oriental Daily*’s reports, the label ‘China’ is overwhelmingly used to refer to a unit including Hong Kong. A small portion refers to a parallel relationship, and ‘China’ is never seen as a ruler of Hong Kong. This is consistent with the newspaper’s political affiliations. In a similar vein, the traditionally pro-government *WWP* virtually never uses ‘China/Chinese’ to refer to anything else except the nation or state including Hong Kong. The spectrum of meanings is very homogeneous compared with the other newspapers, and even more homogeneous than in 2004 (68 per cent). It is also worth clarifying that of the 12 tokens of the label, 7 are used when the paper quotes articles from the Hong Kong edition of China Daily, the only official state-run English language
newspaper in Hong Kong. This accounts for the high proportion of meanings that do not fall into any other category (‘none’ in the chart). In the 2004 case we found that the pro-democracy papers have more tokens in the ‘none’ category (when the label is used as a part of a title), which maybe implies that these papers tend to highlight that these institutions or leaders are ‘China/Chinese’, rather than the institution or the leader of Hong Kong. In the 2005 case, when we exclude the labels that fall into the ‘none’ category in WWP, which are all used as reference to a news source, the results would be approximately the same as the 2004 case, i.e. the pro-democracy papers are more likely to highlight a title as ‘China/Chinese’ than the pro-government papers.

To recapitulate, the inclusive meaning of the label ‘China/Chinese’ is dominant in all the newspapers in the sample, regardless of political orientation. This is consistent with our interpretation that the appointment of a popular CE will go hand in hand with a different portrayal of Hong Kong identity in the newspapers – one that will be somewhat more favourably inclined to national integration compared to the 2004 case. However, the exclusive meaning still does take a significant proportion in four out of five papers. From the analysis of the relationship between Hong Kong and China, one can conclude that national integration is the preferred position. Yet the possibility of other identifications, tied to more exclusive meanings of China/Chinese, still exist. How do the nuances of these inclusive and exclusive meanings of the label compare to those characteristic of the 2004 coverage? To answer this, we need to turn to qualitative analysis of selected excerpts, such as this characteristic passage from Apple Daily:

Excerpt 8.8 He [the CE] should be able to push the Hong Kong economy onto the international stage, use Hong Kong as the window that takes China out, and uses Hong Kong as the access board that brings the world to China, and at the same time turn Hong Kong into a cosmopolitan city. The current issue of Hong Kong is not how to get into the mainland but how to open up the international market. Only the international stage is where Hong Kong should perform. Otherwise, Hong Kong would only become a city likes China’s Shanghai or Guangzhou. If that happened, Hong Kong’s advantage would be wiped out. (Apple Daily, 19 June 2005)
In this excerpt from *Apple Daily*, even in the economic aspect, Hong Kong is not subordinate to or integrated into China: the two units exist in parallel. Hong Kong acts as an agent that mediates between China and the rest of the world. ‘China’ is the one that needs Hong Kong’s support of gaining access to the international stage. Hong Kong’s future does not depend on mainland China but on the international market. The economic uniqueness of Hong Kong is undoubted but needs to be maintained. Apart from the economy, politics also occasionally serves as a marker that distinguishes Hong Kong from China and therefore prevents us from seeing ‘China’ as a label that embraces both Hong Kong and the mainland, as in this example from *HKEJ*:

Excerpt 8.9 His [Tsang’s] way of expression, not only caused the discontentment from members of the last administration, but also does not comply with the tradition of being virtuous and sincere among the Chinese people and in Chinese politics…In the west, politicians get the regime through elections every four/five years. In the name of ‘authorization by the people’, they can totally abandon the promises made during the election and do whatever they want. In China, just because there is no clear legitimization, the leaders of the communist party who need to keep the reins have to be trembling with fear, cautious as in front of an abyss and walking on thin ice. They need to keep coming up with achievements, to gain popular acceptance of their legitimacy. (*HKEJ*, 7 June 2005)

This excerpt includes two ways of using the label ‘China/Chinese’: one inclusive and one exclusive. When ‘Chinese’ is related to tradition (i.e. ‘the tradition of being virtuous and sincere’), it is inclusive, and refers to something that Tsang, as Hong Kong’s leader, may need to comply with as well. When related to politics, ‘China’ – where the communist party rules – does not include Hong Kong anymore. The description of the political situation in ‘China’ (meaning only the mainland in this case) is compared with the situation in Hong Kong. These examples are typical of *HKEJ*’s and *Apple Daily*’s uses of exclusive meanings. Compared to the nuances of ‘China/Chinese’ in 2004 in the same newspapers, even in cases where ‘China/Chinese’ is used in its exclusive meaning, it is no longer associated with starkly negative characteristics as in 2004, when it was seen, especially in *Apple Daily*, as a threat to Hong Kong.
Interestingly, the pro-central government papers are also inclined to invoke culture when using ‘China/Chinese’ in its inclusive sense, as for instance in this excerpt from *Oriental Daily*:

Excerpt 8.10 Maybe China is a nation that emphasizes sensibility rather than sense. In Taiwan, Song Chuyu can kneel to the public to get votes; Chen Shuibian even played a grand design of ‘assassinating the president’ on himself, one day before the voting date, to gain the sympathetic votes of the whole Taiwan people, and ended turning defeat into victory. (*Oriental Daily*, 12 June 2005).

In this case, China not only includes Hong Kong, but also the controversial Taiwan. Yet ‘China’ is not the country or the government. It is used as the label of the nation, which shares the same way of thinking and acting. By using ‘China/Chinese’ as tradition or culture, the papers invoke the ‘imagined community’ of the Chinese in the broad sense. Despite the political difference, mainland China and Hong Kong, even Taiwan, are part of the same traditions and ways of living. It also should be noticed that, in *HKEJ*’s text, it has only the cultural meaning; ‘China/Chinese’ becomes inclusive. When the political meaning applied, the label has retreated to mainland China that does not include Hong Kong.

Similar expressions of inclusive meaning in the aspect of culture can also be spotted in *WWP*’s converge,

Excerpt 8.11 Tsang has always been low-key, maintaining Chinese people’s humble and modest manner. He did not reveal Chairman Jiang’s note till a few month later when Chairman Jiang mentioned he used to write to Tsang during a meeting with the representatives from Financial Sector. (*WWP*, 17 June 2005)

Here, ‘China/Chinese’ is used to refer to a broad meaning of tradition and culture shared by an ‘imagined community’. Tsang is praised for practising the nation’s virtues. In the 2005 Election, there is a greater emphasis on cultural similarities (rather than necessarily economic or political ties) in all newspapers, regardless of political orientation. This helps explain the lower prominence of labels for the Other, as well as the greater proportion of inclusive meanings of ‘China/Chinese’. The newspapers seem to be inclined to build a sense of a Chinese national community that is based primarily on common culture and traditions rather than
politics. This is in line with the growth of Chinese cultural nationalism and the parallel decline of communism as the defining feature of modern Chinese identity in post-1978 China (see Zheng 1999; Gries 2004). The differences in the 2004 Interpretation and the 2005 Election trace not only the gradual mediated integration of Hong Kong into China, but also a parallel shift in the meaning of Chinese identity – away from political markers of identity and towards cultural markers.

8.4.4. The construction of the Self

This section continues the examination of the two major labels of self-identification: ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’. In Chapter 7 we saw how the newspapers differed in their uses of self-identity labels, namely that the pro-democracy papers tended to promote a more active self identity when it is related to the main others, while the pro-government papers tend to restrict the use to an internal scope. We also noted the overall tendency to project an image of Hong Kong as a passive actor when related to its main others, namely Beijing and the mainland. However, our analysis of the 2005 case so far revealed a marked shift in attitudes towards mainland China, and a rise of a more inclusive, integrated Chinese identity that encompasses Hong Kong. Will the construction of the Hong Kong Self mirror these shifts?

8.4.4.1 Label ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ and verb collocations - general

Using the same method of comparison (cf. 7.3.4), we have counted the verb collocations of the label ‘central government’. This second round of comparison will test the result from the previous case to see if the difference that appeared previously still exists. The total frequency of the label ‘central government’ (664/500) is lower than the in the interpretation case (1190/207), which is consistent with the fact that the central government played a less prominent role in the 2005 case. Will this also be reflected in verb collocations, in the sense that ‘the central government’ will now be portrayed as less active than in the first case? The following figures reveal the answer.
Chart 8.8 shows that the most active categories of verbs still occupy the largest portion of all verbs that occur where ‘central government’ appears in the same paragraph with ‘Hong Kong people’ or ‘citizen’ (50 per cent). The verbs that indicate a passive position for the Central Government only appear in about one third (33 per cent) of the whole data. The more neutral verbs, including mental activity, status and modal verbs, take the remaining 10 per cent. The overall scale of activity is active rather than passive. In fact, compared with the 2004 case (cf. 7.3.4.1), ‘central government’ appears even more active, as the proportion of active verbs is somewhat higher (45 per cent in 2004 as opposed to 50 per cent in 2005) and the proportion of passive verbs somewhat lower (38 per cent in 2004 as opposed to 33 per cent in 2005). Despite the lower frequency of appearance in the election case, the label ‘central government’ thus remains very active. This would be consistent with the widely-held opinion at the time that the central government was the real actor that directed the CE election, while the Hong Kong people – the nominal voters – did not really have much opportunity to take action.
Chart 8.9 shows the striking differences between verb collocation of ‘the central government’ and ‘Hong Kong people/citizen’. In relation to the most active category, taking action on somebody, ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ are clearly associated with much lower proportions than the ‘central government’. With respect to verbs indicating ‘taking action on oneself/something’, the contrast is not that sharp. In fact, the label ‘Hong Kong people’ is even associated with a slightly higher percentage of such verbs than the ‘central government’. However, as we move to the categories of verbs that indicate a greater level of passivity, the two self-identity labels clearly have a much higher percentage. Both of them have a higher frequency of collocations with verbs indicating mental activity, i.e. compared to the ‘central government’, they are more likely to be engaged in activities such as ‘feel’, ‘think’, ‘hope’, etc. The most indicative differences appear in relation to passive verbs. In over half of all instances, ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ both collocate with passive verbs, i.e. they are represented as being affected by others’ actions. In contrast, the ‘central government’ appears in such a passive position in only about a third of all cases. In general, one can conclude that, in the coverage of the 2005 election case, the self-identity labels, ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ are less active than ‘central government’. This result is very similar to the one we found in the 2004 case, and indicates that, overall, little has changed in terms of power relations as represented by the newspapers. How about the differences between newspapers with different political orientations and positions in the industry? Will these also be similar to the ones identified in the 2004 case?
8.4.4.2 Labels: ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ and verb collocations – differences and similarities between newspapers

The first feature shown by Chart 8.10 is the difference in frequencies between ‘Hong Kong people’ (N=449/500) and ‘citizen’ (N=939/500). In all five newspapers, ‘citizen’ has a higher frequency than ‘Hong Kong people’. Statistically, the pro-democracy papers are more likely to use ‘Hong Kong people’ than the pro-government papers (p=0.005). The most obvious case is WWP, in which ‘citizen’ appears nearly three times more often than ‘Hong Kong people’. This result is the exact opposite of the one we had in the 2004 interpretation case, when the frequency of the label ‘Hong Kong people’ was about twice that of the ‘citizen’ (cf. Chart 7.10). We concluded in Chapter 7 that ‘Hong Kong people’ is the label more likely to be related to the ‘Other’, while ‘citizen’ is more preferred to be used in an internal scope. If this conclusion can be extended to the 2005 election case, the result of Chart 8.10 can be interpreted as indicating that the CE election event is represented by all five newspapers as an internal affair. This would also be in line with lower frequencies of labels for most of the main others, i.e. ‘Beijing’, ‘China’, the ‘central government’. The self-identity label preferred in coverage of this event is ‘citizen’ rather than ‘Hong Kong people’.
If this interpretation is correct, then this should be evident once we limit our analysis to only those uses of self-identity labels that co-occur with labels for the main others, i.e. ‘communist/socialist’, ‘inland/mainland’, ‘Beijing’, ‘China’ and the ‘central government’. One would expect that in these cases – unlike in the whole sample as shown in chart 8.10 above – ‘Hong Kong people’ will still be the preferred label. The first thing to note is that the proportion of cases where the self-identity labels co-occurred with labels for main others was lower than in the 2004 case (449/500 vs. 808/207), which is again consistent with the fact that, in 2005, the role of the central government was less prominent. And as expected, in those relatively rare cases where the self-identity labels did co-occur with labels for the ‘Other’, the preferred label was ‘Hong Kong people’ (as in the 2004 case) rather than ‘citizen’.

Chart 8.11 shows a similar pattern as seen in the 2004 interpretation case (cf. Chart 7.11), in that ‘Hong Kong people’ is the preferred label when co-occurring with the main others. However, in the 2005 case, the difference between pro-democracy papers and pro-central government papers (with pro-democracy papers preferring to use ‘Hong Kong people’ rather than ‘citizen’, p=0.005) is not as obvious as in the 2004 case. Although Apple Daily still keeps a strong preference for ‘Hong Kong people’, the other pro-democracy paper HKEJ is less keen on using ‘Hong Kong people’ than the tabloid, and the difference between proportions of the two labels is much smaller than in Apple Daily. A similarly
small difference appears in the other two broadsheets *Ming Pao* and *WWP* as well. To put it differently, if, in the 2004 case, the preferences for self-identity labels differed in accordance with the political orientations of the papers, they now differ in accordance with the newspaper type (i.e. broadsheet vs. tabloid). Despite the different political orientation, the similar socioeconomic and educational background of the readership may explain the similarities between pro-democracy and pro-Central Government papers. The non-elite readers of the two tabloid papers are perhaps more likely to identify with a more exclusive self-identity label. Considering that the elite group is more likely to be in the front line of integration, in both economic and political aspects, they may be more willing to accept a more integrated way of self-identity. Of course, this is only a tentative explanation that would need to be supported by further audience research. Also, we need to keep in mind that, in the 2004 case, we could not draw an adequate comparison between tabloids and broadsheets since we had to exclude the *Oriental Daily* from subsequent analysis due to the low count of relevant articles.

In general, we can conclude that ‘Hong Kong people’ is the preferred self-identity label when related to the main others, but that on the whole, ‘citizen’ is a much preferred self-identity label in this case. This is consistent with the fact that, in contrast to the 2004 event, the overall representation of the 2005 CE
elevation event is less related to external factors, and, instead, the event appears more as an internal matter.

A final aspect worth considering is the differences in verb collocations for the two self-identity labels, by newspaper. Will the patterns be broadly the same as the ones found in 2004? Will the main differences again appear between pro-democracy and pro-central government newspapers, as in 2004? Or will we also come across interesting differences between broadsheets and tabloids, as in Chart 8.11 above?

To start with (Chart 8.12), it is worth noting that the results are far less clear-cut than in the 2004 case. This is in line with what we saw in the previous analysis. In the election case, the differences between the papers represent two political camps that are not as polarized as seen in the interpretation case. The striking distinction diminished with the tension. Newspapers did not deliberately choose a clear position according to political affiliations. The difference regarding distribution of power between the two self-identity labels still exists in the 2005 election coverage. The difference in empowerment from ‘Hong Kong people’ (full lines) to ‘citizen’ (dashed lines) from the two pro-democracy papers to the pro-government WWP can be recognized. However, the Oriental Daily and Ming Pao jump out of line in this case.
In some respects *Oriental Daily* resembles the pro-democracy papers. It does not quite fit the expectations of a typical pro-government paper. Its tabloid character and the loose beneficial relationship of its owner with the central government can help to explain its difference to Beijing’s mouthpieces *WWP*. The other interesting case is *Ming Pao*. Located in the middle, *Ming Pao* does have a more balanced way of representation regarding verb collocation. The four points for *Ming Pao* are the most concentrated compared to other papers. Both the difference between active verbs and passive verbs and the difference between ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’ are least marked in this newspaper. This balanced way of representation is consistent with other aspects we examined in previous sections. Dominated by the pro-government stance as it is, covering different voices is, however, the repeating pattern seen in *Ming Pao’s* coverage.

When excluding *Ming Pao* and *Oriental Daily* and looking at the results for the remaining three papers, a clearer difference in power distribution can be recognized. The pro-democracy papers put more emphasis on the self-identity label co-appearing with the main others. The pro-government *WWP* distributes more power in the self-identity label used for internal reference. In other words, the pro-democracy papers promote a more active identity of the Self when related to the significant others, while the pro-government reduces the scale of activity from the externally-related label and empower the internally-applied label. *WWP* does not reject a more active self-identity, as long as it is limited in the internal scale.

To recapitulate, the quantitative analysis on the two self-identity labels – over 1000 in total – revealed interesting differences and similarities with the 2004 case. On the whole, the scale of activity of both self-identity labels is more passive than that of the label ‘central government’, similar to 2004. Although the label ‘Hong Kong people’ is less frequently used in this case than in 2004, and the label ‘citizen’ is much more popular, a similar pattern of power distribution between Hong Kong and the central Government appears as in the previous case. Turning to the comparison between pro-democracy papers and pro-central government papers, we can again find interesting differences and similarities, both with regard to the choice of self-identity labels and with respect to verb
collocations. Broadly speaking, the patterns of these differences and similarities were, to an extent, similar to the ones found in the first case. Pro-democracy newspapers promote a somewhat more active identity of Hong Kong people when they appear in relationship with the main others. In contrast, the pro-government papers build a more active identity for Hong Kong primarily when reporting on affairs internal to Hong Kong, while maintaining a more passive position for Hong Kong when it appears in a relationship with the central government. However, the differences are not strictly in line with the political affiliations as seen in the earlier case. Both Ming Pao and Oriental Daily, i.e. the two papers that basically reflect Hong Kong’s interests, show obvious difference from the central-government-backed WWP. With the renewed inclusion of the Oriental Daily in the 2005 case, we can spot another difference in relation to tabloid/broadsheet. Despite the completely different political orientation, the two tabloids have shown some similarities in its language.

Let us now turn to a qualitative examination of selected articles from each of the newspapers to demonstrate how these broad, quantitative trends identified earlier become apparent in single articles.

**Excerpt 8.12. The political reform should not serve for renewing CE Tsang’s term of office** *(Apple Daily Editorial, 22 June 2005, italics added)*

With the official appointment issued by the central government yesterday, Donald Tsang becomes the Chief Executive finally, not the acting Chief Executive, not the CE Election candidate and not the Chief Executive designate. With this change of position, the public’s expectation will also change visibly. They won’t satisfy with some sensational talks or some sales-man stories, but helping to solve citizens’ difficulties practically, reflecting Hong Kong people’s opinions to the central government honestly, governing Hong Kong’s affairs justly and listening to citizen’s idea and expectation verily.

According to CE Tsang, because his term is only two years, he does not plan to develop any significant policy, but will focus on the work of politics, including preparing the blueprint for the 2007/08 political reform. We think this is a practical action, because a two-years term is very short, and there is not enough time to achieve an agreement for important social policies or reforms, let alone that the 07/08 reform plan that involves in the production methods of next Chief Executive
and how Hong Kong citizen’s democratic politics would step forward, and more importantly how to untie the knot of the Hong Kong political system. It is very necessary for Executive Tsang to view this work with focus.

... ...

The more important thing is, when Hong Kong people can secure a road map for the universal suffrage, Hong Kong people would be able to consider according to the blueprint on how to make 2007/08 election opener, more competitive and more compatible to candidates who hold different political views. For example, how to reduce the nomination requirement; for example, increase the number of the Election Committee; for example, prescribing that even with only one person participating in the election, there has to be a credit voting. In fact, the high rate of nomination and automatically-elected results in the last two CE Elections are not very ideal and are very absurd. The 2007 Election must not repeat it, and must not mark time. If in 2007 the third CE Election blueprint is the same as the second CE Election, isn’t it virtually paving the road for renewing Mr Tsang’s post? Isn’t the 2007 reform blueprint tailored for Mr. Tsang in disguised form?

The pattern we saw in quantitative analysis of self-identity labels can be partially recognized in this text from Apple Daily. First, let us isolate all the verbs related to the self-identity labels in the above text:

- the public’s expectation change. They won’t satisfy
- solve citizens’ difficulties
- reflecting Hong Kong people’s opinions to the central government
- listening to citizen’s
- Hong Kong citizen’s step forward
- Hong Kong people can secure
- Hong Kong people would be able to consider

First we can spot that the journalist uses ‘citizen’ in sentences where no significant others are mentioned (e.g. ‘solve citizens’ difficulties’). In the sentence where the journalist shifts to ‘Hong Kong people’ also the label for the main other, i.e. the ‘central government’, appears. Although this pattern does not appear in every single case, as seen in the quantitative result, this example shows how the two labels are used differently depending on the presence or absence of the significant other. Second, the self-identity labels are mostly used in an active way. Although we do not see any direct action on others, the self is endowed with the power to ‘expect’, ‘satisfy’, ‘secure’, ‘consider’. The article constructs a
more active image of the self. However, the Hong Kong people are still portrayed with a lower status with respect to the central authorities.

Let us now look at an example of a text in which *Ming Pao* voices the concerns of Hong Kong people, affirms the need for more democracy while, at the same time, discursively perpetuating the perception of Hong Kong as a passive, dependent actor.

**Excerpt 8.13. Uncontested victory is not adequate to unite Hong Kong people** (*Ming Pao*, Editorial, 16 June 2005, *italics added*)

HAVING won 714 Election Committee members' support, Donald Tsang is bound to become Chief Executive (CE) uncontested. *Citizens* have mixed and conflicting feelings about the CE by-election. Agreeably *surprised* at ‘Tung's departure and Tsang's elevation’, they are *happy* that the central government has courageously taken the exceptional move and that Hong Kong will have a leader more capable of governance. On the other hand, they are *disappointed* that Mr Tsang's pledge that his campaign would be *oriented towards all Hong Kong citizens* has proved to be plain talks rather than action. Furthermore, it is baffling and worrying that, though he vowed to bring about social harmony, Mr Tsang has made not a few enemies during his campaign.

*Citizens do have expectations* of Mr Tsang. That is precisely why they are *sorry* to have seen that, during his two-week campaign, Mr Tsang exuded arrogance and stubbornness from time to time.

Such mixed feelings presage the challenges and potential woes the SAR government may be faced with in the next two years. Mr Tsang should draw lessons from what has happened in his campaign. He should, with magnanimity (which becomes a CE), try to *unite Hong Kong people*, put up with those who differ from him and heed their views. He should do so to make it possible to bring about social harmony in Hong Kong and lay the groundwork for his bid in the next CE election.

Mr Tsang has always been quite popular. It has everything to do with his campaign that *people have conflicting feelings*. We have repeatedly stressed that, during his campaign, Mr Tsang should aim not only at winning the office of CE but also at *winning hearts in the territory*. He should have sought to increase his legitimacy with a campaign *oriented towards the general public*. Mr Tsang himself did say he would have to *face* not only the 800 Election Committee members but also *all Hong Kong*
citizens. However, from the outset, he made it the aim of his campaign to obtain over 700 nominations to make sure that none could run against him and that the by-election would end on the expiration of the nomination period. The by-election would turn out to be a "one-man show" without candidates' debates and without in-depth discussions of social issues. Since his campaign began, Mr Tsang has only appeared in a fishing boat and some shopping malls and hospitals and taken part in several radio programmes. He has devoted most of his time to canvassing Election Committee members for support behind closed doors. The by-election should be one oriented towards the seven million citizens. However, it will be one oriented towards fewer than 800 people. It is lamentable that Mr Tsang has missed a golden opportunity of forging consensus through his campaign…

If we isolate again all verbs that are used in combination with self-identity labels, we get the following list:

- Citizens have feelings, they are surprised, they are happy, they are disappointed
- oriented towards all Hong Kong citizens
- Citizens do have expectations, they are sorry
- unite Hong Kong people
- people have conflicting feelings
- winning hearts in the territory
- oriented towards the general public
- face all Hong Kong citizens
- oriented towards the seven million citizens

Compared to the text from *Apple Daily*, the first noticeable characteristic of this text is that we cannot recognize a clear preference for either of the two self-identity labels – both appear equally often. Second, the self-identity labels appear overwhelmingly as objects of someone else’s actions. They are ‘surprised’, ‘disappointed’, ‘orientated (or not)’ and their hearts are ‘won’. They are subjects only in relation to their own ‘feelings’ and ‘expectations’, their actions never have an effect on others. Instead, in this text, the self-identity labels are associated with passive verbs, which express Hong Kong’s dependency on another agent.

The power difference in this context is obvious: on the one hand, the Hong Kong people, who do not have the right to vote, and, on the other hand, the politicians and administrators, who have the authority to govern. The language used in the
text strongly encodes this power difference as if it was natural that Hong Kong people are powerless, and they can only depend on the authorities and elites, rather than being active themselves. Paradoxically, although the newspaper is ostensibly critical of Tsang’s ‘uncontested victory’, and explicitly appears to champion the citizen’s interests, its language characterizes Hong Kong people as inherently powerless, and the political figures in SAR government and the central government as inherently powerful, and so it tends to reproduce the power differences. This particular combination of criticism and status quo is closely related to Ming Pao’s political affiliations and perhaps newspaper type, i.e. pro-government ownership and high-rated broadsheet. Compared to Apple Daily’s bold and active language that is backed up by its pro-democracy owner and tabloid orientation, Ming Pao has to maintain to be ‘objective’ or voicing people’s concern but reinforcing the status-quo at the same time.

Let us now examine whether we can establish a similarly tight link between the use of self-identity labels and the newspaper’s political affiliation also in the case of Wen Wei Po.

Excerpt 8.14. Hong Kong people hope to build a harmonious new phase (WWP, editorial, 20 June 2005, italics added)

After being appointed by the central government, Tsang will become the second CE of HKSAR. He published the election platform of ‘leadership, harmony, and people-based governance’, promising that once elected he will enhance the administrative quality of the government, based on economic development, focus on the improvement of employment, build a harmonious society, enhance citizen’s political participation, and commit to build a better Hong Kong. Tsang expressed rightly after he was elected as the new CE automatically that he won’t disappoint the central government and Hong Kong citizens’ hope, and must realize the promises made during the election period.

Hong Kong people see the by-election as the chance to rebuild a strong and effective government, and hope to elect a CE with political experience and administrative ability, who can lead the administration team to build a real governing system according to the Basic Law’s requirement, resolve the conflicts, reduce in-fighting, cohere consensus, integrate different powers of the society, lead Hong Kong to seize the opportunity, and concentrate on construction and development. Tsang’s strong
manner during the election catered to Hong Kong people’s years’ hope of building a strong government. Therefore he won extremely high public support and successfully returned uncontested…

The SAR government’s difficulty in administration in the past was directly related to the lack of communication with the public opinion to large extent. Tsang’s dialogue with the public during the election should be a start, not an end. Although the future two years is only ‘the left term’, with the nature of transitional government, there’s still huge responsibility. Tsang should not only keep communicate with the citizens down to the community, he should also improve the discussion of administration concept between the government and citizens, and among citizens from different classes…

Of course, focusing on economic development is the first priority of the administration under Tsang’s leadership. ‘Developing the economy in every field’ is not only the general requirement of the citizens, but also the sincere hope of the central government. People-based governance is the best way to gain the public’s trust. It is believed that the political conflicts can be resolved in the harmonious environment of economic development and social stabilization, and HKSAR will open a new chapter under the new CE leadership.

If we isolate the self-identity labels and verbs collocated with them, we end up with the following list:

Hong Kong people hope
enhance citizen’s participation
disappoint Hong Kong citizens
Hong Kong people see, hope
catered to Hong Kong people’s years’ hope
won public support
communicate with the citizens
improve the discussion between the government and citizens, and citizens from different classes...
requirement of the citizen
gain public’s trust

Again, the self-identity labels appear overwhelmingly powerless, and are mostly objects of other’s actions: this participation is ‘enhanced’, their support ‘won’, they are being ‘communicated’ with, and the discussion between them and the
government is being ‘improved’. Even the mental activities related to Hong Kong people or citizens are a product of someone else’s action: they are ‘disappointed’; their ‘hope’ is ‘catered to’ and their ‘trust’ is ‘gained’. The self-identity labels are used in a way that constructs Hong Kong inhabitants as incapable of independent actions and even incapable of their own thoughts and feelings. They have to be led or manipulated by another agent – most often, the CE. In fact, the journalist assumes that it is the Hong Kong public’s own will to be led by the elites. The power differential is presented not only as natural but also as something that is welcomed by the public. The uncompromising manner of the CE criticized by other newspapers is described as the strong point that ‘catered’ to people’s hope. This construction of Hong Kong’s self-identity is clearly in line with the political affiliation of WWP as the mouthpiece for the central government. Yet again, we can see a clear link between the use of self-identity labels and the newspaper’s political background and ownership.

8.5 Conclusions

Combining the quantitative results and qualitative results, this case shows similar patterns of identity construction as those we found in the previous case. However, important differences do appear in this later event. As we explained at the beginning of this chapter, the different nature and context of the 2005 event determine the strategies adopted by the newspapers, and this was confirmed in our analysis. The main similarities and differences can be summarized in the following manner:

First, in both cases, pro-democracy papers were more inclined to draw a sharp contrast between Hong Kong and its mainland Other than the pro-central government papers. However, in the 2005 election case, there is greater prominence of culture and less prominence of labels for the main others, especially those indicating ideological differences, e.g. ‘communist’.

Second, similar to 2004, pro-democracy papers construct a more distant relationship between Hong Kong and mainland China. However, integration is the dominant element in all the newspapers, and this is even more pronounced in 2005 than in 2004.
Third, in both case studies, the Hong Kong self is constructed mostly as passive and powerless, in both pro-democracy papers and pro-government papers. Different choices with regard to the self-identity labels show that newspapers build the self-identity according to their relationship with the power centre. Active identity is promoted by the pro-democracy papers particularly when Hong Kong appears in relationship with significant others. The pro-government papers prefer to construct Hong Kong’s active when the mainland Other is not involved.

Fourth, pro-democracy and pro-government papers also position Hong Kong and mainland China differently with respect to their perceived levels of development. The pro-democracy papers put Hong Kong in a more developed position, and the rest of China at a lower stage of development. Hong Kong thus indicates the direction of development that the whole of China should follow. In contrast, the pro-government papers assume that the future of Hong Kong lies in integration with mainland China, as the latter provides the only route to its further development.

Fifth, and on the whole, the dominant factor that determines the construction of identity in each individual newspaper is its political affiliation and ownership. The newspaper type (broadsheet/tabloid) does play a role as well, but is subordinated to political orientation. The three broadsheets and two tabloids thus share some similarities among themselves, as, for instance, evident in relation to the choice of self-identity labels (when these co-appear with the labels for main others). However, these similarities are generally far less pronounced than those determined by the political orientation of the paper.

What do these results tell us about the nature of the relationships between politics, the media and identity, both specifically in relation to Hong Kong, as well as more generally? Can the subtle differences between the two case studies be interpreted as an indication of long-term changes in Hong Kong identity and its relationship with the mainland? It is to these broad questions that we turn to in the next, concluding chapter of the thesis.
Chapter 9 Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

Let us first go back to the beginning of this thesis, where we set out our main research questions and aims. The unique history of Hong Kong has constantly put the identity of Hong Kong people under question. In the process of development, various factors have contributed to construct or destruct a distinct identity of Hong Kong, among which politics is no doubt one of the most influential factors. It is related to other key factors, e.g. economic policies, business ownership, elite culture, the particularities of the media system, etc. To understand how the identity is shaped by these factors, we directed our attention at the media representation and construction of the Hong Kong identity in the coverage of major political events, and asked the following questions:

1. What kinds of Hong Kong identities do the newspapers present to their readers during political events, i.e. how does the media define the ‘self’ and the ‘others’ and what markers are used to define the border between them?

2. How are these mediated identities affected by the nature of the political system, the political economy in Hong Kong and the characteristics of the territory’s media system?

To answer these research questions, two corpora of news stories were analysed, one related to the Interpretation of the Basic Law in 2004 and the other to the Chief Executive Election in 2005, from five major newspapers in Hong Kong. This chapter starts by summarizing the key results of the analysis, focusing on (a) key similarities and differences between the mediated constructions of identity revealed by the two case studies, and (b) the main factors affecting the mediation of identity in the two case studies. The second part of the chapter reflects on the implications of these results, and identifies the key original contributions of the dissertation project as a whole. I conclude by considering some of the remaining open questions and possible routes for further research.
9.2 Key results: the two case studies compared

Although the two events are separated by only a year, the social, economic and political conditions had changed significantly in the meantime. The nature of the two chosen events was also considerably different. The 2004 Interpretation event was characterized by a sharp and direct confrontation between the pro-democracy camp and the central government, and high levels of public support for the pro-democracy camp. During the 2005 election, the government-packed CE candidate was rather popular, the pro-democracy camp was considered incompetent and destructive, and the tensions between the pro-democracy camp and the central government had decreased. Despite the fact that both events are closely related to the issue of universal suffrage – the key issue for supporters of democracy in Hong Kong – they were represented in very different ways, and were accompanied by considerably different mediated constructions of Hong Kong identity, as summarized below.

9.2.1 Similarities and differences between the two case studies

The most important common patterns of mediated constructions of Hong Kong identity in both case studies were:

First, although the markers used to designate Hong Kong’s main other differ from newspaper to newspaper, a sense of boundary between the Hong Kong self and the mainland Chinese other is visible throughout the coverage. In other words, there is no open contestation of the existence of a separate Hong Kong identity as such. The image of the other is mostly negative, at least in the sense of the mainland being seen as less developed than Hong Kong, and, often, the coverage suggests that Hong Kong needs to protect itself from the rest of the country. While the individual newspapers differ in the way they construct the mainland Chinese other, these differences can, in both cases, be explained in relation to the political affiliations and ownership structures of these newspapers.

Second, the newspapers accept that Hong Kong is a part of China. However, the representations of Hong Kong identity continue to be organized around a central tension between integration and resistance, dependence and autonomy, domination and equality – all tied to the opposition between the pro-government
camp and the pro-democracy camp. This tension is a major issue in the coverage, and does not seem to be likely to disappear any time soon.

Third, the Hong Kong self is constructed mostly as passive in both cases, i.e. the Hong Kong people or citizens are mostly objects or victims of others’ actions, and rarely feature as active subjects whose actions have an effect on others. This relative powerlessness remains a prevalent trait of Hong Kong’s self-identification throughout both case studies. Also stable are the newspapers’ strategies of allocating passivity and activity; in both case studies, the pro-democracy newspapers promote a more active identity of Hong Kong in relationship with the main others, while the pro-government papers build a more active identity for Hong Kong when reporting on events internal to Hong Kong.

On the whole, the key stable elements of the mediated projections of Hong Kong identity can be summarized as follows: Hong Kong identity is presented as a distinct yet nevertheless integral part of the wider Chinese identity, and is constructed as relatively powerless. The strategies of representation employed by the different newspapers are fairly stable as well; while the constructions of Hong Kong identity differ considerably from newspaper to newspaper – an issue we return to later in this chapter – these differences are broadly similar in both case studies (i.e. none of the papers suddenly changed the way it constructs Hong Kong identity).

On the other hand, the key differences between the mediated constructions of Hong Kong identity in the two case studies were as follows:

First, in the newspaper coverage of the second event, the frequency of labels indicating the main others (the central government, the communist party, Beijing and China) was lower, while the frequency of self-identity labels (Hong Kong people and citizens) increased. This indicates that the Hong Kong people/citizens were a more prominent actor in the 2005 Election case, while the involvement of significant others was less pronounced.

Second, the markers used for designating Hong Kong’s main others were different: in the second case, the frequency of markers indicating political and ideological differences (‘communist/socialist’ and ‘Beijing’) was lower, while
markers indicating geographical or cultural differences were more prominent.

Third, the meanings of the label ‘China’ changed accordingly: in the second case study, the inclusive meaning of China as a unit that encompasses Hong Kong became more prominent. This change went hand in hand with a shift from a more explicitly political meaning of China to a more neutral meaning, where ‘China’ is used to refer simply to a country or the whole Chinese nation.

Given that the individual newspapers’ strategies of identity construction have remained broadly speaking the same in both cases, it is not possible to explain these general differences between the 2004 and the 2005 case with reference to media-related factors. Instead, we need to consider a number of external factors.

9.2.2. External factors that determine or affect the similarities and differences between the mediated constructions of identity

Two sets of interrelated external factors – that is, external in relation to the media system – can help explain the broad patterns of similarities and differences we have just identified: the first one comprises economic factors, the other political factors. Below, we briefly outline how these economic and political factors interacted to create the conditions favorable for the above-outlined discursive shifts at the level of mediated constructions of Hong Kong identity. It is important to consider these factors first before moving on to the role of the media, since the media themselves will be affected by these broader economic and political factors.

At the beginning of 2004, the Hong Kong economy was still trapped in the downturn caused by the Asian financial crisis and SARS. The Beijing-appointed SAR government was identified as the main culprit, in part because its incompetence did not help to relieve the anxiety in the society. The voices calling for universal suffrage reached their peak; the population of Hong Kong wanted to choose its own CE and parliament, which would lead them out of the recession and improve the living conditions. The pro-democracy camp proposed a double general election to be organized – 2007/2008, and the proposal gained wide support from the public. The complete rejection of this proposal by the central government only reinforced the discontent and tensions. The central government
(‘Beijing’, ‘China’ or ‘the communist party’) was seen as the evil ‘Other’ that abused Hong Kong and deprived its people of their democratic rights. The identity of Hong Kong was, in part, aroused to strive against this evil, undemocratic ‘other’. The relatively higher prominence of the mainland other as a key actor, the emphasis on political and ideological markers of difference, and the somewhat less inclusive meaning of the label ‘China’ are all compatible with this state of affairs.

By 2005, the economy of Hong Kong had recovered from the recession. The employment, consumption and investment all increased rapidly. The support from the central government and the mainland was considered as one of the most important factors that boosted Hong Kong’s economy. At the same time, the first CE, who was criticized sharply for mismanaging the crisis, had resigned under pressure from the central government. These developments helped reduce public dissatisfaction with the central government and the SAR government. The strong administration proposed by the new CE struck a familiar chord: it fed on nostalgic recollections of the colonial past, which revolved around a fascination with a strong and effective government that would bring prosperity back to Hong Kong. In this context, the voices coming from the pro-democracy camp, critical of the absence of universal suffrage, did not manage to attract such wide support as in the previous year. On the contrary, the pro-democratic camp was even criticized for its lack of administrative ability and its supposedly destructive attitude to recent developments. Although the new CE was effectively still appointed in advance by the central government, he also received a firm backing from the population, suggesting that the central government’s choice was in agreement with the preferences of the Hong Kong public. It seemed that the ‘we’ of Hong Kong were not that different from the rest of China, after all. Also worth mentioning is the rise of China’s new nationalism, centered on ideas of common culture and a prosperous economy rather than a distinct political (communist) identity (Gries, 2005). Given these contextual factors, it is hardly a surprise that the mainland other was presented in more neutral terms – as merely geographically distinct – and that the prevailing meanings of label ‘China’ were more inclusive than in 2004, and were also used to refer to the ‘greater China’ defined in cultural rather than political terms.
9.3 Contributions to existing knowledge

What are the broader implications of these results, and how do they contribute to existing knowledge? The following pages first summarize the key contributions of my research in relation to the understanding of Hong Kong identity, its political culture, and its media system. This is followed by a concluding reflection on the broader theoretical and methodological implications of this study and venues for future research.

9.3.1 Contributions to the understanding of Hong Kong identity

As discussed in Chapter 3, the identity is not a solid and unchangeable ‘thing’ or ‘essence’ that an individual or a group (in this case the people of Hong Kong) possess or are born with. Rather, it is a process that keeps changing and is reproduced and negotiated through a variety of different practices, including media representations. The markers of an identity vary as well. Some of them might be salient in some context and become invisible or openly rejected in others. For instance, while a pro-central government newspaper might emphasize the cultural traits of Hong Kong identity, a pro-democracy newspaper might stress political traits (e.g. an inclination to democracy). However, this is not to say that the construction of identity is a haphazard process. Instead, it is a process shaped by economic, political and cultural factors, and – in the case of the media – by the media’s political affiliations and ownership structures. In other words, although we cannot capture and define a particular identity once and for all, we can describe and explain how and why it is constructed in a particular way. This is exactly what we endeavored to do in our analysis.

The Hong Kong identity has changed substantially over the past few decades, and these changes – detailed in Chapter 3 – have been shaped by broader political changes, economic developments and cultural shifts. Indeed, the same logic is also at work in the two case studies we analysed: as explained earlier, the broad differences between the mediated constructions of identity in the two cases can be explained as a consequence of political and economic developments in Hong Kong.

The two case studies also suggest some interesting changes at the level of the key
markers of Hong Kong identity. For several decades – more precisely since the ‘economic miracle’ of the 1970s (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.4) – a developed economy and wealth were seen as essential to Hong Kong identity, especially in relation to the economically less-advanced mainland China. These identity markers were occasionally still visible in the material we have analysed, especially in the first case. However, far more important than these were political-ideological markers (especially in the first case) and the more ‘neutral’ geographical markers (particularly in the second case). Based on these two cases alone it is, of course, impossible to draw firm conclusions about long-term shifts in the understanding of Hong Kong identity. Still, the following two tentative conclusions can be proposed: (a) when economic differences between Hong Kong and the mainland are reduced, economic markers of identity and difference are likely to give way to political-ideological, geographic and cultural ones, and (b) the relative prominence of political-ideological markers (vis-à-vis geographical and cultural ones) is likely to diminish if both Hong Kong and the mainland are doing well economically.

9.3.2 Contributions to the understanding of Hong Kong politics

With respect to the characteristics of politics in Hong Kong, our analysis suggests the following conclusions:

First, although full democracy and a higher degree of autonomy have been the key political goals of the Hong Kong population ever since the handover in 1997, our analysis suggests that their prominence fluctuates depending on public satisfaction with the Hong Kong administration and with the socio-economic situation in Hong Kong. When the administration is considered or at least expected to be effective, as during the 2005 Election, the satisfaction with the existing level of democratic politics rises. When the administration is regarded to be incompetent (as during the 2004 Interpretation period, which is also around the end of Tang’s terms) the dissatisfaction on the level of democracy increases dramatically (HKU, 2007). This change of attitudes toward democracy and government is reflected in the media coverage analysed. In the 2004 Interpretation case, the overall image of the authority is basically negative. It is considered to be only obstacle against the ultimate goal of democracy, i.e. the
universal suffrage. In the later case, the image turned out to be more neutral in some newspapers’ reports. Although the status of democratic politics did not objectively improve in the later case, the absence of universal suffrage did not act as an obstacle to the election and the central-government-supported candidate.

Second, the elite culture, as introduced in Chapter 2, obviously continues to play a key role in the political life of Hong Kong. Since Hong Kong has never enjoyed full democracy, elite groups have historically acted as the agency mediating between the external authority and the public. Rather than being accountable to the public, these groups have always been essentially accountable primarily to the external authority (the British government in the colonial period and the central government of China after the handover). The public did not have direct access to choosing their representatives at higher levels. In other words, the public has always been in the position of the ruled rather than the ruler. This power relationship is reflected in the news reports examined. In both cases, the self-identified labels, i.e. the ‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizens’, are essentially passive. The scale of activity is very low compared to the other label ‘the central government’. Although ‘Hong Kong people’ were requesting universal suffrage from the central government or electing their Chief Executive, they have always been put in a powerless position. Their actions are limited to mental activities like ‘think’ or ‘hope’. They are more likely to appear as an object of others’ action. This suggests that the media tend to maintain the status quo and reinforce it as a natural state of affairs – even in cases where (as is the case with the pro-democracy papers) they are actually critical of the lack of democracy in Hong Kong. The media themselves are thus marked by, and help reproduce, the particular form of political culture in Hong Kong, which presupposes a passive role for the public.

These results suggest that the central government and the lack of institutional reforms in the SAR government may not be the only obstacle to the attainment of full democracy in Hong Kong. The political culture of Hong Kong, sustained by its elites and the media, including pro-democracy ones, and shared (or at least tolerated) by the whole population, is also not entirely consistent with democratic ideals, and is likely to act as an obstacle to further democratization. Other aspects
of our analysis are consistent with this. As pointed out earlier, public participation and support for democracy fluctuated and were in fact lower in the second case. During the 2005 election, preference was given to the CE candidate backed by the central government – not because he was in favour of democratization but because he promised a ‘stronger’ government. To summarize, judging from our results, the Hong Kong people are not consistently and constantly striving for full democracy, and the influence of the central government (although clearly very important) is not the only obstacle to the attainment of full democracy. The legacy of the long history of elite rule helps sustain the essentially passive political culture, and is also, in part, responsible for the lack of administrative capability of the pro-democracy camp, all of which obstruct further democratization. Taken together with the shifts at the level of Hong Kong identity summarized earlier, in particular the growing prominence of cultural and geographic markers of identity, these characteristics of Hong Kong politics have important implications for the future of Hong Kong. If the Hong Kong identity indeed developed into a mere regional identity, fully integrated into the wider Chinese identity or even subordinated to it (as a consequence of China’s economic success and growth of cultural nationalism), it will be increasingly difficult to see full democracy taking root in Hong Kong without simultaneous reforms taking place in the rest of China.

9.3.3. Contributions to the understanding in the Hong Kong media

The most important conclusions drawn from this project concern the relationship between the mediated construction of collective identity, and factors such as the newspaper type, ownership, readership and, most importantly, political affiliations of newspapers. Each of these factors shapes the representations of identity the newspapers offer to their readers. The following paragraphs will first summarize the five newspapers’ major strategies of identity construction, as identified in the two case studies, and then explain how they were influenced the above factors.

*Apple Daily*, the resolute supporter of the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong, dedicated a considerable amount of column inches to both events, despite the tabloid’s conventional lack of interest in serious politics. The ideological
difference between Hong Kong and mainland China has always been in the spotlight in *Apple Daily’s* reports. This difference also serves as one of the major identity boundaries for the Hong Kong self. Considering the relatively stable nature of this difference in recent decades (despite significant political and economic changes in recent decades, there is no sign of China adopting a full-blown Western-style liberal democracy and economic liberalism, or Hong Kong embracing communism yet), this trait of *Apple Daily’s* idea of Hong Kong identity is not likely to disappear any time soon. In addition, *Apple Daily* tends to build an entirely negative image of mainland China as a dictatorial and corrupted country that presents a threat to Hong Kong. In *Apple Daily’s* view, there is no compromise between communism and democracy, and therefore no possibility for a common identity embracing both Beijing and Hong Kong.

As indicated in the examination of the label ‘Beijing’, *Apple Daily* uses the label in a way that implies distance between Hong Kong and the central government, and does so more often than other newspapers examined. ‘Beijing’ is presented as the ruthless ruler that controls Hong Kong. *Apple Daily* is also the leading voice that rejects the inclusive idea of broader Chinese identity. Compared to other papers, ‘China’ in *Apple Daily’s* reports most often refers to mainland China or the Chinese government rather than the whole country including Hong Kong. ‘China’ is parallel as a partner, a ruler or even the threat to Hong Kong. In general, the identification with the broader Chinese identity is the weakest among all the newspapers examined.

In terms of self-identity, a relatively active Hong Kong identity is promoted in *Apple Daily’s* reports; Hong Kong people not only engage in mental activities but also take effective actions on others, namely the government and political elites. This identity is particularly active in contexts that involves significant others, i.e. mainland China. To summarize, in *Apple Daily’s* representation, Hong Kong people are not only different from and better than the people of the rest of China, and therefore deserve democracy and autonomy, but also have the ability to take action and strive for their rights. Achieving full democracy is the ultimate and only goal for the Hong Kong people. What should also be noted is that *Apple Daily* does not promote such a clear, rigid demarcation of Hong Kong
identity. As the comparison between the two case studies suggests, it does actually adjust itself according to public opinion. For example, the language is evidently toned down when reporting the 2005 CE Election, compared to the Interpretation case. Arguably, staying in tune with the public voice is *Apple Daily*’s key reporting strategy.

The identity promoted by *Apple Daily* is closely related to the factors introduced earlier, i.e. type of newspaper, readership, ownership and political affiliation. As a tabloid, *Apple Daily* has more interest in conflict-driven news stories and tends to adopt strong language and provide exaggerated depictions of current events. With a younger generation, that has less attachment to mainland China than the older generations, as the main audience and given the paper’s circulation figures, fostering an active and independent identity for Hong Kong is an effective strategy for attracting the intended audience. However, the most important factor that determines *Apple Daily*’s overall reporting strategy is the combination of its ownership and political stance. The owner of the paper, Jimmy Lai, is a staunch opponent of the Chinese government. As a consequence of the owner’s political position, *Apple Daily* suffered from a loss of advertising investment from the mainland and no permit to publish in the mainland market. However, the oppositional position and sensational language have earned the newspaper a large circulation and the strength to survive in the competitive market. Since the media industry in Hong Kong is free from official censorship, *Apple Daily* has not only survived but grown into one of the highest-circulation papers in Hong Kong.

*HKEJ*, the business-oriented elite broadsheet has long been considered as critical of the government and supportive of the pro-democracy camp. The relatively smaller size of the newspaper helps explain why the number of reports dedicated to the two events is not as high as in other broadsheets like *Ming Pao* or in tabloids like *Apple Daily*. This does not mean that *HKEJ* does not see the political events as important as other newspapers do. The high proportion of editorials and the longest average length indicate that the newspaper dedicated a lot of attention to these events.

Taking a similar position to *Apple Daily* regarding democracy, *HKEJ* nevertheless adopted a different strategy to represent the identity of Hong Kong.
The paper emphasized ideological differences in the Interpretation case but paid more attention to cultural and geographical differences in the second case. This change indicates that HKEJ does not promote such a stark ideological contrast between Hong Kong and the mainland as Apple Daily does. However, discourse analysis still revealed elements of the negative image building of the mainland/inland China. The geographic border may not coincide with ideological-political differences, but nevertheless serves as an identity border that divides and protects the more advanced Hong Kong from the rest of the country. HKEJ also offered its readers a greater range of identifications regarding the sense of belonging to China. Besides being a part of China, Hong Kong also plays the role of the business partner of, or agent for, mainland China. The relationship between Hong Kong and China is not presented in as extreme language as seen in Apple Daily’s reports. In HKEJ’s reports, ‘Hong Kong people’ are also relatively active, rather as in Apple Daily. However, this activity is not associated with a conflict-ridden relationship with the mainland as in Apple Daily. Rather, Hong Kong people/citizens are active in a more cooperative or even submissive way. In other words, Hong Kong does not necessary fight for its identity; rather, it can develop as the agent of China that would benefit both sides.

The broadsheet character of HKEJ prevents it from being as aggressive or sensationalist in its reporting as the tabloids, as this would not be appreciated by the mostly elite readership. The business orientation means that the paper is expected to provide calm and relatively objective opinions for its reader in order to help him or her to better understand the political and especially economic dynamic in the country. Due to its observance of this principle, HKEJ has been rated as one of the most credible news media in Hong Kong. Owned by a group of independent intellectuals, it can also more easily keep a distance from close, obvious political affiliations. There is neither an obvious tension nor a close political connection between the paper and the Chinese government. Arguably, this is exactly the position that is most likely to appeal to HKEJ’s business-minded readership. We can therefore see HKEJ’s ‘balanced’, separate yet non-conflictual vision of Hong Kong identity as a direct result of the newspaper’s ownership structure and (lack of) clear political affiliation.
The strategy behind *Ming Pao*'s reporting can be described as – paradoxically – both simple and complicated. To summarize it in simple terms, the main trait of newspaper’s coverage is the balancing of different voices. However, this balancing also means that the newspaper’s position can be very flexible. For example, in the Interpretation case, when the majority public voice tended to be critical of the authority and supportive of the pro-democracy camp, the paper took a similar position by placing itself closer to the pro-democracy camp, and providing coverage similar to that found in pro-democracy papers. In the 2005 case, the paper moved, along with the mainstream public opinion, closer to the pro-government position and thus also the pro-government papers. This delicate balancing effort is reflected in *Ming Pao*'s use of language and identity constructions. In the 2004 case, its use of the ‘Beijing’ label is similar to the one seen in pro-democracy papers, although *Ming Pao* carefully avoids emphasizing ideological or geographic differences. While criticizing the central government for obstructing Hong Kong’s democratic reforms, *Ming Pao* also implies that the government is not the only one to blame. The critical position is further reduced in the 2005 Election case, in which the pro-central government voice always takes the lead (although some pro-democracy voices remain present). The negatively-described Beijing has even turned into the saviour that helped Hong Kong from sliding further down into economic recession.

As for the relationship to China, *Ming Pao* prefers to use ‘China’ in its inclusive meaning, although other options are available as well. The newspaper tries to hold a balance among different meanings, but is generally inclined to be supportive of integration. The same strategy is also adopted in dealing with the scale of activity of the self-identity labels. There is no clear-cut preference for any of the two labels (‘Hong Kong people’ and ‘citizen’), and the active and passive verbs are also arranged in a way that suggests an essentially passive stance for ‘Hong Kong people/citizens’. By sticking to the status quo, *Ming Pao* maintains and reinforces the uneven power relationship between the public and the government. When the power to act is granted to the public, it is limited – Hong Kong people appear active primarily in matters internal to Hong Kong. In general, *Ming Pao* avoids having any direct conflict with the government in every aspect examined.
The balancing strategy of Ming Pao can be well explained by the combination of the newspaper type, its readership, ownership and political connections. As an elite broadsheet, the paper has to keep its credibility and close representation of the mainstream public opinion. The selling point of the paper is its objectivity. However, unlike HKEJ, which is owned by an independent group of intellectuals and aimed at the local business elites, the paper cannot avoid the influence of its owner who has huge financial interest in mainland China. A large portion of Ming Pao’s advertising revenue comes from the real estate industry that is closely related to mainland political elites. Furthermore, the paper also has potential for expansion in the mainland market. All of this means that offending the central government cannot be Ming Pao’s choice.

Unlike Ming Pao, which is targeted at the higher-educated readership, Oriental Daily does not worry too much about keeping the impression of professionalism and credibility. In fact, this paper is neither a fighter for democracy nor a guardian of the central government, and is not particularly interested in taking a political stand at all. As the most circulated newspaper in Hong Kong, Oriental Daily actually tends to avoid commenting on political disputes and does not take a position on political matters unless absolutely necessary. This is confirmed by the low number of reports in both cases. In the 2004 Interpretation case, the paper only devoted 18 reports including editorials (which were also quite short compared to other papers). Even in the 2005 CE election, the most important political event in Hong Kong in years, the amount of the news coverage was still lowest among the five chosen papers. Oriental Daily’s tendency to avoid political issues fits the general principles of many tabloids throughout the world. At the same time, the paper also never attempts to offend the power centre and, when pushed to take sides, generally sides with the pro-government option.

Oriental Daily’s representations of Hong Kong identity are in line with these trends. In its limited amount of coverage, Oriental Daily never evoked a boundary between Hong Kong and the mainland, either geographically or ideologically. Although frequently using the label ‘Beijing’, it is mostly used in a neutral way and refers to the name of the city. Oriental Daily also uses ‘China’ in its inclusive sense in most cases and promotes a basically passive identity of
Hong Kong. If this was the complete story, then this paper would not be very different from the pro-government WWP (discussed later). However, it is worth pointing out some minor differences that tell us a lot about the different political economies of the two papers. In particular, compared to WWP, Oriental Daily more often uses labels related to the main others, and promotes a slightly more active self-identity.

As with the previous papers, these general traits of identity construction can be explained with reference to the newspaper’s type, ownership structure, political affiliations and readership. As the most widely-read tabloid, which targets a less educated and slightly older readership, Oriental Daily does not need to choose a clear political position – in fact doing so would mean risking losing those readers who take a different political stand. The owner has established its relationship with the Chinese government since Hong Kong’s colonial period and has permission to publish in the mainland. As the major competitor of Apple Daily, the cooperative relationship between Oriental Daily and the government has brought benefits to both the owner and the paper itself. This loose, mutually-beneficial relationship with the central government largely determined the picture of Hong Kong identity we saw from Oriental Daily.

Being a government-owned newspaper, WWP has quite a different story. It acts purely as the mouthpiece of the central government in Hong Kong and does not need to pay much attention to either professional journalistic conventions or market pressures. Therefore, the news coverage from WWP is quite one-sided. The paper dedicated a large amount of coverage to both events. The average length of articles was also considerably longer than in most of the other papers. It is also the only paper that reproduced the speeches from the central government officials in full. Both events were presented in a way that unambiguously defended the position of the central government and its interests.

In the 2004 Interpretation case, when the pro-democracy papers highlighted the ideological differences between Hong Kong and the mainland, WWP choose to overlook ideology and limited its attention to purely geographical aspects. It also constructed the mainland/inland as the positive companion and supporter of Hong Kong. In the 2005 Election, when the ideology was not as much in the
spotlight as in the 2004 case, WWP minimized the differences between Hong Kong and the mainland, be they ideological or geographical. It seldom used ‘Beijing’ to refer to the central government and never used ‘China’ as a label for the mainland excluding Hong Kong. The central government was put in a parental position that solves problems for Hong Kong, which is legitimately subordinated to China. Finally, WWP constructed an active identity for Hong Kong inhabitants primarily in relation to events that were internal to Hong Kong, and not in relation to the mainland.

Unlike all the other newspapers examined in this thesis, WWP generally does not hesitate to choose a clear political position. Its stance is strong and uncompromising. As one of the major channels for the central government to speak to the public in Hong Kong, the paper unavoidably speaks in the name of the central government, and tends to tell ‘Hong Kong people/citizen’ what to do and what not to do. Similarly sharp and uncompromising in their positions, WWP and Apple Daily stand at the opposite ends of the political spectrum.

To summarize, the mediated construction of Hong Kong identity is closely related to the political economy of individual newspapers – the newspaper type, its readership, ownership, political affiliation and commercial orientation, as detailed in Table 9.1. Although political affiliation is the most important among these factors, it does not suffice to explain the characteristics of each individual newspaper as outlined earlier. Had political affiliations been the only factor that matters, the Hong Kong media landscape would be dominated by populist pro-democracy tabloids like Apple Daily and government mouthpieces like WWP, which is clearly not the case. To be able to explain the diversity of Hong Kong newspapers and their attitudes to Hong Kong identity in full, we need to take into account how political preferences and affiliations are themselves moulded by economic interests of newspapers’ owners, as well as readership preferences. Together, these factors interact and counterbalance each other and produce the final picture we have seen in the news reports.
Table 9.1 The mediation of Hong Kong identity: Links between the political economy of Hong Kong newspapers and their discursive construction of the self and the other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Apple Daily</th>
<th>HKEJ</th>
<th>Ming Pao</th>
<th>Oriental Daily</th>
<th>WWP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Newspaper type</strong></td>
<td>Tabloid</td>
<td>Broadsheet</td>
<td>Broadsheet</td>
<td>Tabloid</td>
<td>Broadsheet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Readership</strong></td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>Well educated</td>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>Well educated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ownership</strong></td>
<td>Anti-Chinese government businessmen</td>
<td>Independent intellectuals</td>
<td>Pro-Chinese government businessmen</td>
<td>Pro-Chinese government businessmen</td>
<td>Chinese government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political affiliation</strong></td>
<td>Pro-democracy</td>
<td>Pro-democracy</td>
<td>Pro-government</td>
<td>Pro-government</td>
<td>Pro-government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commercial orientation</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction of the other/differences between the self and the other</strong></td>
<td>Emphasis on ideological and geographic differences</td>
<td>Emphasis on geographic and cultural differences</td>
<td>No emphasis on differences between the self and the other</td>
<td>No emphasis on differences between the self and the other</td>
<td>No emphasis on differences between the self and the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sense of belonging to China</strong></td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction of the self/level of activity</strong></td>
<td>Most active</td>
<td>Relatively active</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Passive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.4 Broader theoretical and methodological implications of the study

This study suggests that the parallel investigation of mediated identity construction and the political economy of the media have a lot to offer and could be fruitfully applied to other cases around the world. We saw the promising combination of CDA and CL, which helps overcome the weaknesses of the two respective methods and builds on their strengths. The existing media research deals either only with issues of cultural identity, or only with the political economy of the media. In the first case, preferred methods are typically qualitative and textual (and often include discourse analysis) based on small samples. In the second case, analysis focuses on ownership structures and
political affiliations. If media content is analysed at all, quantitative content analysis is usually employed. Although such approaches have, of course, a lot of strengths, they are unable to explain the relationships between the economy and politics of the media and their identity construction in the way seen in this project. Given how important issues of identity are in the contemporary world, it is clear that a better understanding of their links is very important.

Another breakthrough is carrying out CDA and CL with the Chinese language. As we discussed in the methodology chapter, the language differences have been one of the major obstacles to applying the linguistic theories and tools to Chinese as well as other Asian language that are essentially different from the European. With increasing globalization and increasing integration of China into the rest of the world, it is not only valuable but also necessary to include more understanding of Chinese literature and materials. The theories generated from the European-American base can be tested out in a different social system and culture, and Chinese academics can benefit from these achievements. This project is an exploration to overcome the language differences in a relatively large scale.

The practice of applying Fowler’s work as the basis for quantitative analysis, based on CL, has also brought interesting results. As discussed in the methodology chapter, Fowler’s approach is adopted in this project for its explicit way of recognizing the indicators that can help transfer the theory into a coding system applicable to the analysis textual material. However, these advantages also bring their shortcomings. First, in the process of coding it became apparent that the meaning of words or phrases was often blurred or highly dependent on context, or that language structures were far more complicated than envisaged by Fowler, which meant that some aspects of Fowler’s framework had to be modified. For example, although the examination of transitivity is adopted, it had to be adjusted to a less specific system: instead of identifying and categorizing the transitivity of verbs related to identity labels, this project looked at the actual power relationship between the self and the other by examining the status that an identity label takes, i.e. affecting others, oneself or being effected by others. Although this method is not as explicit as the one originally suggested by Fowler,
it actually provides more accurate results and is more appropriate for processing large amount of language material. Second, although textual analysis proved to be fruitful, it is clear that the external factors, for example the social context and changes discussed earlier in this chapter, can not be abstracted from the texts. Looking at the textual material alone is thus not enough to provide the whole picture and understand the broader social processes that shape media discourse.

In short, combining CDA, CL and the political economy of the media in order to analyse the media-politics-identity dynamics has only started in this project. The approach designed in this project has its unique originality. It could be used elsewhere, to analyse cases which involve different media systems from the one found in Hong Kong. For instance Scotland is a potentially interesting case for comparison, where differences between identities are also linked to different political preferences (e.g. at the 2010 general election, most of Scotland voted Labour, while England voted mostly Conservative and/or Liberal democrat), yet the media system is different from the one in Hong Kong.

Yet there is also a lot to learn from doing further research of this kind in Hong Kong, especially in relation to forthcoming developments. The above conclusions do not mean that we have resolved the puzzle of Hong Kong’s politics, media and identity. On the contrary, it may provide more questions than answers. The rough image we have is only a snap shot of the particular period of time and a particular context. To achieve a clearer direction of how the identity of Hong Kong would develop, we certainly need more case studies in a longer time span and to compare the data and results from time to time. Although the media landscape in Hong Kong is relatively stable, all other elements change rapidly. The media may change their strategies accordingly. Since the two case studies, politics in Hong Kong have kept on developing.

In 2007, Donald Tsang was re-elected for a second term as the Chief Executive. However, public support has dropped dramatically compared to the time when he took up office in 2005. It is almost certain that he will not serve another term. Who will be the next CE, or most importantly, which camp will he/she come from? How would the future CE be elected? In 2007, NPCSC also stated a resolution regarding universal suffrage which confirmed the possibility of
universal suffrage for the CE election in 2017 and LegCo in 2020. Does that mean that the long struggle for universal suffrage would end by then and that the political landscape in Hong Kong would not be defined by so called pro-democracy and pro-government? If that was the case, then how would the media identify themselves? And how will the identity of Hong Kong end up? Does it mean that politics, or democratic politics, do not serve as a marker of Hong Kong identity? With the reduction of economic difference and cultural communication, what markers would appear to be salient in that case? Or if universal suffrage does not happen, how would the politicians, media institutions and the public respond? All these questions cannot be answered within this project. However, we have learnt how to investigate and understand the way politics, identity and media works. This understanding would help us to find the clue for future developments.
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Appendix I Related Article of the Basic Law

Annex I: Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

1. The Chief Executive shall be elected by a broadly representative Election Committee in accordance with this Law and appointed by the Central People's Government.

2. The Election Committee shall be composed of 800 members from the following sectors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrial, commercial and financial sectors</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The professions</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour, social services, religious and other sectors</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the Legislative Council, representatives of district-based organizations, Hong Kong deputies to the National People's Congress, and representatives of Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The term of office of the Election Committee shall be five years.

3. The delimitation of the various sectors, the organizations in each sector eligible to return Election Committee members and the number of such members returned by each of these organizations shall be prescribed by an electoral law enacted by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the principles of democracy and openness.

Corporate bodies in various sectors shall, on their own, elect members to the Election Committee, in accordance with the number of seats allocated and the election method as prescribed by the electoral law.

Members of the Election Committee shall vote in their individual capacities.

4. Candidates for the office of Chief Executive may be nominated jointly by not less than 100 members of the Election Committee. Each member may nominate only one candidate.

5. The Election Committee shall, on the basis of the list of nominees, elect the Chief Executive designate by secret ballot on a one-person-one-vote basis. The specific election method shall be prescribed by the electoral law.

6. The first Chief Executive shall be selected in accordance with the "Decision of the National People's Congress on the Method for the Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region".

7. If there is a need to amend the method for selecting the Chief Executives for the terms subsequent to the year 2007, such amendments must be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for approval.
Annex II: Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Its Voting Procedures

I. Method for the formation of the Legislative Council

1. The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be composed of 60 members in each term. In the first term, the Legislative Council shall be formed in accordance with the “Decision of the National People's Congress on the Method for the Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”. The composition of the Legislative Council in the second and third terms shall be as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members returned by functional constituencies</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members returned by the Election Committee</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members returned by geographical constituencies through direct elections</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Except in the case of the first Legislative Council, the above-mentioned Election Committee refers to the one provided for in Annex I of this Law. The division of geographical constituencies and the voting method for direct elections therein; the delimitation of functional sectors and corporate bodies, their seat allocation and election methods; and the method for electing members of the Legislative Council by the Election Committee shall be specified by an electoral law introduced by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and passed by the Legislative Council.

II. Procedures for voting on bills and motions in the Legislative Council

Unless otherwise provided for in this Law, the Legislative Council shall adopt the following procedures for voting on bills and motions:

The passage of bills introduced by the government shall require at least a simple majority vote of the members of the Legislative Council present.

The passage of motions, bills or amendments to government bills introduced by individual members of the Legislative Council shall require a simple majority vote of each of the two groups of members present: members returned by functional constituencies and those returned by geographical constituencies through direct elections and by the Election Committee.

III. Method for the formation of the Legislative Council and its voting procedures subsequent to the year 2007

With regard to the method for forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and its procedures for voting on bills and motions after 2007, if there is a need to amend the provisions of this Annex, such amendments must be made with the
endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record.

**Article 22 of the Basic Law**

No department of the Central People's Government and no province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government may interfere in the affairs which the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region administers on its own in accordance with this Law.

If there is a need for departments of the Central Government, or for provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the Central Government to set up offices in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, they must obtain the consent of the government of the Region and the approval of the Central People's Government.

All offices set up in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by departments of the Central Government, or by provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the Central Government, and the personnel of these offices shall abide by the laws of the Region.

For entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other parts of China must apply for approval. Among them, the number of persons who enter the Region for the purpose of settlement shall be determined by the competent authorities of the Central People's Government after consulting the government of the Region.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may establish an office in Beijing.

**Article 23 of the Basic Law**

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.

**Article 24 of the Basic Law**

Residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("Hong Kong residents") shall include permanent residents and non-permanent residents.

The permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be:

(1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;

(2) Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;
(3) Persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of those residents listed in categories (1) and (2);

(4) Persons not of Chinese nationality who have entered Hong Kong with valid travel documents, have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years and have taken Hong Kong as their place of permanent residence before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;

(5) Persons under 21 years of age born in Hong Kong of those residents listed in category (4) before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; and

(6) Persons other than those residents listed in categories (1) to (5), who, before the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, had the right of abode in Hong Kong only.

The above-mentioned residents shall have the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall be qualified to obtain, in accordance with the laws of the Region, permanent identity cards which state their right of abode.

The non-permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be persons who are qualified to obtain Hong Kong identity cards in accordance with the laws of the Region but have no right of abode.

**Article 43 of the Basic Law**

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the head of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall represent the Region.

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be accountable to the Central People's Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the provisions of this law.

**Article 45 of the Basic Law**

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government.

The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.

**Article 46 of the Basic Law**

The term of office of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be five years. He or she may serve for not more than two consecutive terms.

**Article 68 of the Basic Law**
The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by election.

The method for forming the Legislative Council shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage.

The specific method for forming the Legislative Council and its procedures for voting on bills and motions are prescribed in Annex II: Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Its Voting Procedures.
Excerpt 7.1 The future of Hong Kong lies in democracy and rule of law. Chinese Communist please don’t poison Hong Kong with the dirty stuff of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, with the makeup of ‘one country, two systems’. Then Hong Kong would be very lucky. 香港前途在民主与法治，拜托中共不要把「具有中国特色的社会主义」那套脏东西，用「一国两制」包装来毒害香港，则香港幸甚。(Apple Daily, 23 April 2004).

Excerpt 7.2 Geographically, Hong Kong is also jointed with the mainland. There are tens of thousands of commuters between the two places every day. Hong Kong media have great influence on the Guangdong region, especially Pearl River delta. Hong Kong’s future political development will closely interact with the inland. It’s impossible for us to make a development in politics by closing the door. (We) should cooperate with the inland society’s development strategy. 事实上，从地域来说，香港也是和内地连成一体，每天来往两地的人数高达几十万，香港的传媒对广东地区，尤其是珠江三角洲产生很大的影响。香港未来的政制发展，将会和内地产生较为密切的互动关系，我们根本不可能关起门来搞政制发展，应该和内地社会的发展战略相配合。(WWP, 7 April 2004)

Excerpt 7.3 What do the majority of Hong Kong people want? To summarize, there are only two points: internally, good administration, which should be fair, efficient, participative and balanced with inspection. [They] fear to lose the protection of ‘two systems’ to the inland, and the central government could expand some bad things from inland to Hong Kong, by the authority of ‘one country.’ 绝大部分港人政治上要求什么？归纳起来，不外两点：内部要优良管治，要公平、要有效率、要参与决策、要有监督制衡，对内地，害怕失去「两制」之间的保障，中央可随意凭一国的权威，把内地一些不好的东西，蔓延到香港。(HKEJ, 27 April 2004)

Excerpt 7.4 Although Beijing has put up rounds of barriers to political reform, Hong Kong people do not need to make a stand against Beijing yet, but should temporarily put aside the controversy of interpretation and prepare a larger scale, more decisive and more peaceful way to propose our appeal of universal suffrage this July and September. 虽然北京对政改设下了重重关卡，但港人现时还未须与北京「扎马」对峙，而应暂时放下释法争议，积极准备在今年 7 月与 9 月，以更大规模、更坚决、更平和的方式向当权者提出我们的普选诉求。若到时我们的诉求仍未得到积极回应，民主派再提出较抗争性的口号，也为时未晚。(Ming Pao, 17 April 2004)

Excerpt 7.5 The 1 July mass demonstration is about to happen. Beijing authorities have been using stick and carrot strategy recently: first cracking down on Hong
Kong people’s universal suffrage dream with the NPCSC interpretation, and then making a compromise gesture to interenate Hong Kong people and the democratic camp, stirring many people into taking to the streets on 1 July. 7.1 大游行举行在即，北京当局近期以「软硬兼施」的攻势，先以人大释法敲碎港人普选梦，再摆出和解姿态软化港人及民主派，令不少人 7.1 再上街的信念动摇。天主教香港教区主教陈日君在游行前夕再次站出来，呼吁港人毋忘 7.1 精神，继续上街争取普选：「话畀佢哋（北京）听，我哋唔会咁易忘记呢件事（人大释法）。」（Apple Daily, 30 June 2004）

**Excerpt 7.6** Excerpt 7.6 The Hong Kong problem dealt with by the central government must be a problem that is urgent and couldn’t be resolved by Hong Kong by itself. That is what Mr. Deng Xiaoping said: ‘a problem that cannot be solved without Beijing’s leadership’. Therefore, the central government has always been very cautious and responsible when dealing with Hong Kong problems, and wouldn’t take action carelessly without necessity. 中央处理香港问题一定是香港急需解决而又自身又难以解决的问题。也就是邓小平先生讲的「非北京出头就难以解决的问题。」因此，中央处理香港问题是非常审慎而负责任的，非万不得已，不会轻易出手。（WWP, 3 July 2004）

**Excerpt 7.7** Excerpt 7.7 Talking about political laboratory, China is the biggest political laboratory in the world. Launching so-called ‘socialism’ and ‘communism’ in the economically underdeveloped China, starving tens millions of people to death, and starting so-called ‘unprecedented’ Proletarian Cultural Revolution, [it] ended up with fratricidal fighting. Up until today’s ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, ‘socialist market economy’, aren’t they using billions of Chinese people as rats in a laboratory? Talking about Hong Kong, then ‘one country, two systems’ is ultimately using Hong Kong as a terrible political laboratory, because this is another ‘unprecedented’. 如果要说「政治试验场」，中国才是全世界最大的政治试验场。在经济落后的中国搞所谓「社会主义」和「共产主义」，饿死几千万人；还搞甚么「史无前例」的无产阶级文化大革命，以至人们自相残杀。直到现在搞「具有中国特色的社会主义」、「社会主义市场经济」，还不是拿十几亿中国人当白老鼠做试验？如果说香港，那么「一国两制」才是把香港当作可怕的政治试验场。因为这又是「史无前例」的。（Apple Daily, 23 April 2004）

**Excerpt 7.8** Excerpt 7.8 As far as impression goes, the protesting public’s appeal yesterday was not as obvious as last year, which reflects that Hong Kong people still have the will and freedom of expression. This is an important reference to the quality of the public. It is also obvious evidence that China has no interest in using military force in Hong Kong to drive out the protestors. 以效应而言，昨天游行群众的诉求也许不像去年那么明显，可是由此反映港人仍有表达意见的意志和自由，那是弥足珍贵的因应国民水平的重要参考，亦
Excerpt 7.9 Making any political opposition in Hong Kong, [one] has to face a reality, that Hong Kong is a part of China. Constitutional or practical relationship, SAR’s political reform is not Hong Kong’s own business, but a national issue, which the central government will never let go of completely. 在香港搞任何政治抗争，必须正视一个现实，就是香港乃中国的一部分，从宪政上或现实关系上看，特区政制改革都不是香港单方面的事，而是整个国家的事，中央不可能完全放手。(WWP, 15 April 2004)

Excerpt 7.10. Stop setting up barriers for universal suffrage! (Apple Daily Editorial, 12 April 2004)

Although some people think that the interpretation of NCPSP has become a finality, although some insightful people think Hong Kong people should look ahead and shouldn’t indulge in the issue of interpretation, tens of millions of citizens still took to the streets yesterday, chose to oppose the interpretation and still request universal suffrage as soon as possible. We believe that citizens’ persistence is not only respectable, valuable but a blow to those who request Hong Kong people to submit and accept this interpretation and look ahead.

We emphasize from time to time, NPCSC’s sudden interpretation of the Basic Law on its own initiative without necessity and adequate excuse does serious damage to Hong Kong’s principles of ‘rule of law’ and ‘one country, two systems’. Although Hong Kong people did not manage to overturn the decision, at least we should clearly express our stand of opposing the interpretation and make Beijing central government understand that such behaviour is wrong and will not be accepted by the Hong Kong people. Only in this way, can [we] push the central government to consider carefully before action in the future, and urge the central government not to abuse this special and emergency power. Only in this way, can [we] let international society know that the Hong Kong people’s determination to uphold the constitutional ‘one country, two systems, high degree of autonomy’ is uncompromising.

If the Hong Kong people accept the interpretation by default, as certain people suggested, or only look ahead without expressing the stance of opposing the interpretation, it would misleadingly make the central government think that Hong Kong people have been used to interpretations. By then, the central government will easily utilize this political tool to meet its policy or political needs. This would do more harm than good to Hong Kong’s development, to ‘one country, two systems’ and Hong Kong’s rule of law. We believe that only with a firm stance does ‘look ahead’ become meaningful. If [we] are standing on a quicksand, ‘looking ahead’ would only make [us] buried.
Of course, besides opposing the interpretation, yesterday’s protest repeated the appeals of last year’s July 1st protest and this year’s New Year protest, which are requests for autonomy as soon as possible and universal suffrage for CE and LegCo as soon as possible. We believe that Hong Kong people’s appeals to democracy have been expressed very clearly and very strongly through these protests. SAR government or the central government should both listen carefully to these appeals, and take action to let Hong Kong people practice full democracy, rather than setup barriers this way or another with different methods and excuses.

不要再为普选设置障碍！

虽然有些意见认为人大常委释法已成定局，再反对也没有甚么意义；虽然一些有识之士认为港人在人大常委释法后该向前看，不应再在释法问题上纠缠；但是数以万计的市民在昨天依然选择走上街头、依然选择站出来公开反对人大释法、依然选择要求尽快普选。我们认为市民的坚持不单可敬、不单可贵，更是对那些要求港人俯首接受今次释法、要求港人「向前看」的人的当头棒喝。

正如我们一再强调，今次人大常委突然在无必要、无充份理由下主动释法，是对香港的法治制度、是对「一国两制」的一次严重损害；港人虽然没有能力推翻有关决定，但我们至少该清楚响亮的表明我们反对释法的立场，令北京中央政府明白，这样的做法是错误的，是港人不接受的。只有这样，才能促使中央政府在日后再释法时会三思而行、才能促使中央政府不会滥用这项特殊及紧急的权力；也只有这样，才能让国际社会知道港人捍宪「一国两制、高度自治」的决心是非常坚定的。

假若港人像某些人建议那样不吭一声接受释法，又或是只从「向前望」而不清楚表明反对释法的立场，那将会令中央误以为港人已对人大释法「习以为常」。到时候，中央政府便会更轻易的动用这个「政策工具」来切合它的政策或政治需要。这对香港的发展，对一国两制、对香港的法治肯定是弊多于利的。我们认为，只有在站稳脚跟、站稳立场的情况下，「向前望」才有意义；若果只是站在「流沙」上，「向前望」只会随时没顶而已!

当然，昨天的大游行除了反对释法以外，也延续了去年七一大游行、今年元旦大游行的诉求，那就是要求尽快当家作主、要求尽快普选特首及立法会。我们认为，港人对民主的诉求透过这几次大游行已非常清楚、已非常强烈，不管是特区政府或中央政府都应该认真聆听这样的诉求，并采取措施让港人可以尽快实践全面的民主，而不是透过不 同的方法、不同的借口，为全面普选设立这样那样的障碍。
NPCSC’s decision yesterday regarding universal suffrage of CE in 07 and LegCo in 08 has clearly denied the double universal suffrage. This is consistent with the recent central official’s information and inclination. It is even predictable. However, surprisingly, NPCSC suddenly stated that the equal ratio of functional constituency and geographic constituency in 2008 LegCo will not be changed, before any public discussion and SAR government’s consultation report of political reform. This sudden decision will have great influence on Hong Kong’s political development.

The first consequence is: NPCSC has frozen the ratio of constituencies in 2008 LegCo. [It] slows down the schedule of LegCo general election. Hong Kong citizens have obviously increased the requests for democratic developments since last year’s July 1st demonstration. More than half of the interviewed [citizens] hope for general elections for the CE in 07 and LegCo in 08, but only a few believe it can be realized. However, citizens generally hope to achieve the goal of universal suffrage gradually and orderly for all seats in LegCo under the stipulation of the Basic Law. What [they] get today is freezing the 50% level of elected seats in 2008. This is far from the citizens’ expectation.

The second consequence is: NPCSC bypassed the SAR Government Constitutional Development Task Force’s consulting process and setup concrete limitations to political reforms directly. [They] not only do not understand Hong Kong people’s mainstream opinion, but also cracked down upon the prestige of the special task force appointed by the CE. What’s more, making the final verdict to limit the LegCo reform before discussing concrete political reform plan will confine the space for manipulating administrative and legislative issues. The central leaders always hope that Hong Kong people will put their attention on economic development, as the deputy Prime Minister Zeng Qinghong said yesterday: ‘Developing economic and improving people’s lives are the ultimate themes. Hong Kong must seize these themes firmly’. We do not question the goodwill of the central government but, under the circumstance of lacking public discussion, and setting a limitation on LegCo reform, [it] has not accurately understood public opinion [in Hong Kong].

The third consequence is: after this incident, the Hong Kong citizen should clearly see the central government or the new leadership’s attitude to Hong Kong – Hong Kong’s politics can be developed, but has to be led by the central government. Whether we like it or not, this is political reality. If [we] can depart from a one-sided wish from now on, never to hope for Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s new leadership to open up and let Hong Kong freely draw its
own blueprint of political development, then Hong Kong people can still actively participate and fly in the confined space after adjusting the expectation of democracy, and exercise ourselves by this opportunity, and expect that one day [we] can fly high and free.

突然拍板设限 削弱港府威信

全国人大常委会昨日就 07 年特首和 08 年立法会的产生办法作出决定，明确否定了「双普选」 (即 07 年普选特首和 08 年全面普选立法会)，这与近期中央官员流露的信息和倾向是一致的，甚至可以说是意料中事；但令人感到意外的是，人大常委会在完全没有公众讨论之前，在特区政府政改谘询报告之外，突然拍板宣布 2008 年立法会功能团体和分区直选产生的议员各占一半的比例维持不变。这项突如其来的决定，对香港的政治发展有深远影响。

第一个影响是，人大常委会冻结了立法会 2008 年的两类议员比例，客观上拖慢了立法会全面普选的进度。香港市民自去年七一大游行之后，对加快民主步伐的要求虽然明显增加，超过一半受访者希望 07 年普选特首和 08 年立法会全面普选，但相信能成事的只属少数。然而，市民普遍希望能循序渐进地达至《基本法》规定最终全面普选立法会所有议席的目标。但今天得到的是冻结 08 年的普选议席在 50%的水平，这与市民的期望相去甚远。

第二个影响是，人大常委会绕过特区政府政制发展专责小组的谘询程序，直接为政改加设非常具体的限制，不单止予人不掌握港人主流意见的感觉，更打击了由特首委任的专责小组之威信。而且，未讨论具体政改方案前，中央便「落闸」限制立法会的改革，将局限未来处理行政立法问题的空间，不利解决特区政府所遇到的具体管治问题。人大常委会继 4 月 6 日释法后，现在更具体地为政改设限，中央领导人多次希望港人把注意力放在经济发展，正如国家副主席曾庆红昨日所言：「发展经济及改善民生是永恒的主题，(香港)必须紧紧抓着这个主题。」我们不怀疑中央的良好意愿，但今次在欠缺公众讨论的情况下，直接为立法会的改革设限，并未有准确拿揑民情。

……

第三个影响是，经此一役，香港市民应该清醒地看到中央政府或胡温新领导层对香港的看法——香港政制可以发展，但必须由中央主导；不管我们是否喜欢，这是政治现实。如能自此告别一厢情愿的想法，不再寄望胡锦涛和温家宝的新领导人会网开一面，让香港可以海阔天空地绘画政制发展的蓝图，则港人在调节民主期望后，仍可积极参与，在有限空间飞翔，借此锻炼自己，望有朝一日可以振翅高飞。
Excerpt 7.12. NPCSC’s interpretation of the Basic Law defend ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’ *(WWP, Editorial, 8 April 2004)*

 Obviously, NPCSC’s related interpretation conforms to Hong Kong’s reality, and provides inspiration for Hong Kong’s future political development. NPCSC’s interpretation insisted on defending ‘one country, two systems’, ‘Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong’ and a high degree of autonomy, which is Hong Kong people’s blessing, and make investors feel relieved.

… …

Reinforcing implementation of ‘high degree of autonomy’

After the interpretation, some viewers pointed that the central government sets up barriers, forfeits Hong Kong people’s ‘high degree of autonomy’. In fact, this is a kind of deception. [We] must point out that Hong Kong’s political development is very important in political, economical and social aspects. SAR’s constitutional configuration and development is the actual reflection of the orientation of ‘two systems’ under ‘one country’, and related to the reflection of the central authority and national sovereignty. [It] has never been ‘Hong Kong’s internal issue’ like some politicians agitated. Only when HKSAR strictly follows the stipulation of the Basic Law, insists on principles of gradual and order, balanced participation and benefit for capitalist economical development, and promotes citizen’s patriotic sense to improve widely, will there be increasing guarantee to ‘Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong’ and a ‘high degree of autonomy’, ‘dominated by the patriots’. Only political development in this way will benefit Hong Kong’s long-term prosperity and stability, and conform to general citizens’ sharing benefit and happiness.

Reality has proved, NPCSC’s interpretation will never weaken Hong Kong people’s ‘high degree of autonomy’. On the contrary, [it] is more beneficial to reinforcement and implementation of a high degree of autonomy. Therefore, both the SAR government and people from all walks of society should first carefully and thoroughly study the content of the interpretation and the spirit in which it is delivered, and, secondly, honestly practice, under the stipulation of the interpretation, to launch the next step’s exploration of political development. [They] should contribute counsel and advice to the administrative officers and submit a draft that is agreed upon by people from all different walks of life to the central government as soon as possible. Of course, administrative officers and the SAR government should enhance citizens’ democratic participation, and try their best to meet citizens’ democratic appeals and increase political transparency.

人大释法维护「港人治港」
显而易见，人大常委会的有关解释既符合香港的实际情况，亦使日后的香港政制发展有规可循。人大释法坚持维护「一国两制」、「港人治港」、高度自治，实乃港人之福，亦使投资者放心。

……

巩固落实「高度自治」

这次人大释法后，有舆论指中央设置关卡，收回港人的「高度自治权」。实际上，这是一种误导。必须指出，香港的政制发展，无论是在政治、经济和社会各方面的意义都非常重要；特区政制的设置和发展，实际上就是回归后「一国」之下「两制」定位的体现，关乎到中央的权力和国家主权的体现，绝不是有些政客所鼓吹的什么「香港内部事务」。香港特区在政制上只有严格依照基本法的规定，坚持循序渐进、均衡参与和有利资本主义经济发展等原则，并促使市民的爱国爱港认识普遍有了较大进展，对落实「以爱国者为主体」的「港人治港」「高度自治」才会有更大保障，这样的政制发展才会对香港的长期繁荣稳定有利，才真正符合广大市民的共同利益和福祉。

事实已证明，人大释法决不会削弱港人的「高度自治」，相反更有利于巩固和落实高度自治。因此，无论是特区政府，还是社会各界人士，首要应认真、详细地研究认识这次人大释法内容及其传递的精神；二要真心诚意地按照释法规定行事，展开下一步的政制发展探索，为行政长官出谋献策，尽快向中央提交一份各界人士基本认同的报告。当然，行政长官及特区政府应积极提高市民的民主参与程度，尽可能地满足市民的民主诉求，增加政改的透明度。

Excerpt 8.1 Hong Kong is facing a challenge right now: striving for democracy against the Chinese communist. There will be twenty democratic LegCo members as main actors in this challenge, and countless citizens who take to the streets to protest. Where would Tsang (the CE) be then? 香港現在就面臨挑戰：向中共爭取民主選舉。這場挑戰的主將有二十位民主派立法會議員，有無數上街遊行的市民。曾蔭權卻不知在哪裏。(Apple Daily, 15 June 2005)

Excerpt 8.2 When asked if he (Tsang) had discussed his idea of administration with the nine members of the Central Committee of the CCP (Communist Party of China), he laughed and said: I didn’t have many opportunities to meet the Central Committee members. 至於有否與中共中央政治局九名常委談過其治港理念，他笑言：「我不是常常見到常委嘅……」他又說：「都無試過同胡主席坐低傾。」(Oriental Daily, 3 June 2005)

Excerpt 8.3 The central government forces the inland criteria of ‘love country, love Hong
Excerpt 8.4 There’s analysis that suggests that citizens are worried that the resignation of Tung Chee-hwa who has a good relationship with the central government would obstruct the support operations of the inland to Hong Kong. 有分析指市民擔心與中央[7]關係良好的董建華離職後，有可能會令內地挺港措施帶來阻滯。 (WWP, 16 June 2005)

Excerpt 8.5 In the aspect of the economy, we should consider how to maintain Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity, impose the economic transformation and the close cooperation with the inland, especially the great Zhujiang triangle zone. 在經濟方向，我們便要考慮如何維持香港的安定繁榮、推動經濟轉型、與內地，尤其是泛珠三角地區緊密合作(WWP, 3 June 2005)

Excerpt 8.6 Excerpt 8.6 He [Tsang] understands that Hong Kong citizen’s recognition has never been as important as that of the Beijing leadership. Any attempt to get the Hong Kong public’s recognition would reduce Beijing’s recognition indirectly. Throughout the process of the CE election, the most important message released by Beijing is that only the central government is the true ‘King maker’. 君深深明白，香港市民的認受性絕對比不上北京領導層的認受性重要。他的任何爭取香港民意認受性的舉動，都間接削弱了北京的認受性。整個特首選舉過程，北京釋放的最重要訊息，就是中央是真正的「造王者」。(Apple Daily, 17 June 2005)

Excerpt 8.7 Excerpt 8.7 When administrative efficiency is promoted and democracy reforms agenda is slowed down, it will end up that the SAR which has returned (to China) long ago almost slides back to the old colonial age, and SAR government become the ‘kind dictator’ that nobody can counterbalance except the central Beijing. Then the SAR AOs [administrative officer] can happily sing the out-of-tune song of victory. 當管治效率問題被高高抬舉而民主改革議程被緩緩拖慢，結果便是，早已回歸的香港特區幾近倒退到殖民舊代，特首政府將成為除了中央北京即無人能夠制衡的「善性的獨裁政府」，特區公務員將可欣然吹奏五音不全的治港凱歌。(Ming Pao, 14 June 2005)

Excerpt 8.8 He [the CE] should be able to push the Hong Kong economy onto the
international stage, use Hong Kong as the window that takes China out, and uses Hong Kong as the access board that brings the world to China, and at the same time turn Hong Kong into a cosmopolitan city. The current issue of Hong Kong is not how to get into the mainland but how to open up the international market. Only the international stage is where Hong Kong should perform. Otherwise, Hong Kong would only become a city like China’s Shanghai or Guangzhou. If that happened, Hong Kong’s advantage would be wiped out. 他還應該有能力把以祖國為後盾的香港經濟推向世界舞台，把香港作為中國走出去的窗口，也把香港作為世界進入中國的跳板，同時把香港變成一個國際大都會。香港當前的問題，不是打進大陸的問題，而是開拓國際市場的問題，只有世界舞台才是香港高歌狂舞的天地，否則只能慢慢變成中國的上海或廣州的一個地方城市，到時香港的優勢就會被抹掉了。(Apple Daily, 19 June 2005)

**Excerpt 8.9** His [Tsang’s] way of expression, not only caused the discontentment from members of the last administration, but also does not comply with the tradition of being virtuous and sincere among the Chinese people and in Chinese politics…In the west, politicians get the regime through elections every four/five years. In the name of ‘authorization by the people’, they can totally abandon the promises made during the election and do whatever they want. In China, just because there is no clear legitimization, the leaders of the communist party who need to keep the reins have to be trembling with fear, cautious as in front of an abyss and walking on thin ice. They need to keep coming up with achievements, to gain popular acceptance of their legitimacy. 但是他這種表達方式，不但引起前朝遺老如鄔維庸兄的不滿，而且也不符合中國人和中國官場上厚道的習慣…在西方，政客通過四至五年一次的選舉，取得政權，之後便打着得到人民正式授權的旗號，可以把競選時的承諾拋開，為所欲為。在中國，恰恰是因為沒有這一清晰的全面授權，要持續執政的共產黨領導層反而要每一分鐘都「戰戰兢兢，如臨深淵，如履薄冰」，要不斷拿出政績，以繼續取得人民的默許授權。 (HKEJ, 7 June 2005)

**Excerpt 8.10** Maybe China is a nation that emphasizes sensibility rather than sense. In Taiwan, Song Chuyu can kneel down the public to get votes; Chen Shuibian even played a grand design of ‘assassinating the president’ on himself, one day before the voting date, to gain the sympathetic votes of the whole Taiwan people, and ended turning defeat into victory. 不知是否中國人天生就是一個重情不重理的民族，在台灣，宋楚瑜可以為了選票，竟然以當眾下跪來拜票；陳水扁為了要贏，在投票的前一日，竟然就在自己身上搞了個「行刺總統」的大計，博取全台灣人民的同情票，結果就反敗為勝了。 (Oriental Daily, 12 June 2005).

**Excerpt 8.11** Tsang has always been low-key, maintaining Chinese people’s humble and
modest manner. He did not reveal Chairman Jiang’s note till a few months later when Chairman Jiang mentioned he used to write to Tsang during a meeting with the representatives from Financial Sector. 但曾一直保持低调，保持中国人的忠厚，直至两个月后江主席在深圳接见香港工商界代表时，透露曾写字条给曾荫权，他才将事情和字条公诸于世。(WWP, 17 June 2005)

**Excerpt 8.12 The political reform should not serve for renewing CE Tsang’s term of office (Apple Daily Editorial, 22 June 2005)**

With the official appointment issued by the central government yesterday, Donald Tsang becomes the Chief Executive finally, not the acting Chief Executive, not the CE Election candidate and not the Chief Executive designate. With this change of position, the public’s expectation will also change visibly. They won’t satisfy with some sensational talks or some sales-man stories, but helping to solve citizens’ difficulties practically, reflecting Hong Kong people’s opinions to the central government honestly, governing Hong Kong’s affairs justly and listening to citizen’s idea and expectation verily.

According to CE Tsang, because his term is only two years, he doesn’t plan to develop any significant policy, but will focus on the work of politics, including preparing the blueprint for the 2007/08 political reform. We think this is a practical action, because a two-years term is very short, and there is not enough time to achieve an agreement for the important social policy or reforms, let alone that the 07/08 reform plan not only involves in the production methods of next Chief Executive and not only how Hong Kong citizen’s democratic politics would step forward, but also involves how to untie the knot of the Hong Kong political system. It is very necessary for Executive Tsang to view this work with emphasis.

… …

The more important thing is, when Hong Kong people can secure a road map for the universal suffrage, Hong Kong people would be able to consider according to the blueprint on how to make 2007/08 election more open, competitive and compatible to candidates who hold different political views. For example, how to reduce the nomination requirement; for example, increase the number of the Election Committee; for example, prescribing that even with only one person participating in the election, there has to be a credit voting. In fact, the high rate of nomination and automatically-elected results in the last two CE Elections are not very ideal and are very absurd. The 2007 Election must not repeat it, and must not mark time. If in 2007 the third CE Election blueprint is the same as the second CE Election, isn’t it virtually paving the road for renewing Mr Tsang’s post? Isn’t the 2007 reform blueprint tailored
政改 不能為曾特首連任服務

隨着中央政府發布正式的任命，曾蔭權先生昨天終於成為新的行政長官，不再是署理特首、不再是特首參選人、不再是候任特首。而隨着這樣的身份轉變，公眾對曾先生的期望也將有明顯的轉變，他們不會再滿足於一些感性的說話或甚麼推銷員的故事，而會實實在在的協助市民[1]解決困難、老老實實的向中央政府反映港人的意見、公公正正的管理好香港的事務、真真正正的聽取市民的想法及期望。

據曾特首說，由於他的任期只有兩年，他不打算推動甚麼重大的政策，反而會集中精力在政治工作上，包括搞好○七、○八年的政制改革方案。我們認為，這是一個實事求是的做法，因為兩年任期轉眼即過，根本沒有足夠時間為重大的社會政策或變革凝聚共識；更何況○七、○八年的政制改革方案不僅涉及下任特首及立法會如何產生，不僅涉及香港的民主政制如何向前邁進，更涉及如何打開目前香港政制死結的問題，曾特首把這項工作視為重點是很有必要的。

不過，我們要特別提醒曾特首，整個政制檢討工作必須要在公平公正的情況下進行、必須要朝更民主更開放的目標邁進。我們絕不能接受政制檢討方案變成是曾特首連任度身訂做的方案，我們絕不能接受一個原地踏步或倒退的政制方案。

更重要的是，當港人[2]能為全面普選訂下時間表或路線圖（road map）後，港人[3]便可以按未來的普選藍圖考慮如何令○七、○八年的選舉模式變得更開放、更具競爭性、更能容納不同政見的人參選。例如降低參選特首的提名人數、例如大幅擴大選委會的人數、例如規定即使只有一人參選也要進行信任投票等。事實上過去兩次特首選舉那種高票提名自動當選的情況是極不理想、極不合理的，○七年的特首選舉絕不能再重蹈覆轍、絕不能再原地踏步。若果○七年第三屆特首選舉方案還是跟第二屆特首選舉一樣，那不是無形中為曾先生連任特首鋪路、那○七年的政改方案不是變相為曾先生度身訂做嗎？

Excerpt 8.13 Uncontested victory is not adequate to unite Hong Kong people (Ming Pao, Editorial, 16 June 2005)

HAVING won 714 Election Committee members' support, Donald Tsang is bound to become Chief Executive (CE) uncontested. Citizens have mixed and conflicting feelings about the CE by-election. Agreeably surprised at ‘Tung's departure and Tsang's elevation’,
they are happy that the central government has courageously taken the exceptional move and that Hong Kong will have a leader more capable of governance. On the other hand, they are disappointed that Mr Tsang's pledge that his campaign would be oriented towards all Hong Kong citizens has proved more cry than wool. Furthermore, it is baffling and worrying that, though he vowed to bring about social harmony, Mr Tsang has made not a few enemies during his campaign.

Citizens do have expectations of Mr Tsang. That is precisely why they are sorry to have seen that, during his two-week campaign, Mr Tsang exuded arrogance and stubbornness from time to time.

Such mixed feelings presage the challenges and potential woes the SAR government may be faced with in the next two years. Mr Tsang should draw lessons from what has happened in his campaign. He should, with magnanimity (which becomes a CE), try to unite Hong Kong people, put up with those who differ from him and heed their views. He should do so to make it possible to bring about social harmony in Hong Kong and lay the groundwork for his bid in the next CE election.

Mr Tsang has always been quite popular. It has everything to do with his campaign that people have conflicting feelings. We have repeatedly stressed that, during his campaign, Mr Tsang should aim not only at winning the office of CE but also at winning hearts in the territory. He should have sought to increase his legitimacy with a campaign oriented towards the general public. Mr Tsang himself did say he would have to face not only the 800 Election Committee members but also all Hong Kong citizens. However, from the outset, he made it the aim of his campaign to obtain over 700 nominations to make sure that none could run against him and that the by-election would end on the expiration of the nomination period. The by-election would turn out to be a "one-man show" without candidates' debates and without in-depth discussions of social issues. Since his campaign began, Mr Tsang has only appeared in a fishing boat and some shopping malls and hospitals and taken part in several radio programmes. He has devoted most of his time to canvassing Election Committee members for support behind closed doors. The by-election should be one oriented towards the seven million citizens. However, it will be one oriented towards fewer than 800 people. It is lamentable that Mr Tsang has missed a golden opportunity of forging consensus through his campaign…

自動當選不足恃團結港人繫前途

成功取得 714 名選舉委員會成員的支持，築定自動當選。對於這次特別補選，市民的感覺是複雜和矛盾的。一方面，市民對「董落曾上」感到意外驚喜，既為中央勇於作此破格安排而欣慰，也為香港有一個管治能力較強的領袖而高興；但另一方面，市民
對曾蔭權聲稱要經營一個面對全港市民的選舉工程，結果卻講多做少，令人失望；至於曾蔭權承諾締造和諧社會，自己卻在選舉過程中多番製造敵人，令人費解和擔憂。

香港市民對曾蔭權確實有期望，正因此，大家才會在過去2周的競選過程中，見到他不時流露的傲慢與偏執，感到難過。

這種矛盾的感覺，預告了未來2年特區管治將面對的隱憂和挑戰，曾蔭權應好好總結選舉過程的得失，以特區之首的廣闊胸襟，積極團結港人，容納異己，兼聽異見，為香港建造和諧社會締造有利條件，也為自己競逐第3屆特首打好基礎。

曾蔭權的民望一直甚高，社會上出現這種喜憂參半的情緒，與他的競選工程有密切關係。我們多次強調，曾蔭權競選的目標，不但要贏得行政長官的職位，更要贏得民心，透過面向市民的選舉工程，建立認受性。曾蔭權本人也強調，選舉不單要面向800名選委，更要面向全港市民。可是，曾蔭權的選舉工程由一開始，就將目標設定為爭取逾700個提名，以阻止其他參選人成為正式候選人，令選舉在提名完畢便告終，成為一個沒有候選人辯論、沒有就社會議題深入探討的「個人秀」。

選舉，他只是到商場、醫院、漁船走動一下，上幾個電台節目，大部分時間都花在閉門拉票上，一場本應面向700萬人的選舉，結果變成只面對700多人，失去透過選舉凝聚社會共識的大好機會，令人扼腕嘆息。

曾蔭權競選工程的最大敗筆，在於他沒有把握選舉的機會，團結一切可團結的力量，反而無端製造更多敵人。舉例說，他在面對醫學界選委史泰祖時，直斥對方「一票兩投」的策略是「無道德」，為「想在第一個回合擊倒」對手，他矮化幾十名贊成這策略的選委的道德水平；他「結束7年惶恐」的說法，則刺痛不少左派人士的傷口；他反對港台直播賽馬的言論，也擴大了與重視政府「恰當程序」的中產和專業人士的距離。曾蔭權曾經引用毛澤東的「雄關漫道真如鐵，而今邁步從頭越」，呼籲社會團結，跨過難關。可是，曾蔭權在選戰之中，卻與他提倡的和諧社會背道而馳。

作為管治的法寶之一，毛澤東視團結為必要的手段。他說：「國內國外，一切可以團結的人，都團結起來。」可是，市民在過去2星期看到的，不是一個努力團結各方的曾蔭權，而是一位高高在上的準特首，他不但輕蔑對手，而且敵我意識強烈，公開宣告說：「今次選舉，使我認清誰是敵人，誰是朋友。」這句話引起了許多人的質疑，難道不支持的就等於是敵人？

我們曾經指出，在宣布參選的記者會上，出現了「兩個曾蔭權」，一個是官僚精英出身，熟悉香港內部事務，充滿自信的曾蔭權；另一個是處理中港政治矛盾時左支右絀，欲
言又止的曾蔭權；這「兩個曾蔭權」的浮沉升降，將會反映中央對香港的政策是趨於寬鬆還是嚴厲。

過去2星期，市民同樣看到「兩個曾蔭權」，一個是剛開始參選時，突顯清貧背景、謙卑地宣揚努力上進的「香港夢」的曾蔭權；另一個是取得逾700選委支持前後、不自覺地流露霸氣與傲慢的曾蔭權。這「兩個曾蔭權」的起伏，將會反映未來特區的政治氣氛。只不過是短短2星期，已令人開始懷念不久之前當政務司長的曾蔭權。

曾蔭權雖然取得714名選委的支持，但他們當中有多少人是因為各種政治現實原因而支持曾蔭權？如果沒有中央的祝福，他們是否仍會挺曾？很明显，這份壓倒性的選委會支持並不可靠，絕不等於有份提名的人日後便會對曾蔭權給予忠實的支持。為了拿這714人的公開支持，曾蔭權在政治上已負債纍纍，選舉後有大量的關係需要修補，與民主派和建制派都要重新尋求合作之道。

雖然曾蔭權錯失了利用選舉過程提高政治認受性的良機，但我們仍希望他能汲取今次選舉過程的教訓，收起驕矜之心，努力團結港人、容納異己、兼聽異見；只有這樣，福為民開的願景、和諧社會的美夢，才有可能實現。

Excerpt 8.14 Hong Kong people hope to build a harmonious new phase (WWP, editorial, 20 June 2005)

After being appointed by the central government, Tsang will become the second CE of HKSAR. He published the election platform of ‘leadership, harmony, and people-based governance’, promising that once elected he will enhance the administrative quality of the government, based on economic development, focus on the improvement of employment, build a harmonious society, enhance citizen’s political participation, and commit to build a better Hong Kong. Tsang expressed rightly after he was elected as the new CE automatically that he won’t disappoint the central government and Hong Kong citizens’ hope, and must realize the promises made during the election period.

Hong Kong people see the by-election as the chance to rebuild a strong and effective government, and hope to elect a CE with political experience and administrative ability, who can lead the administration team to build a real governing system according to the Basic Law’s requirement, resolve the conflicts, reduce in-fighting, cohere consensus, integrate different powers of the society, lead Hong Kong to seize the opportunity, and concentrate on construction and development. Tsang’s strong manner during the lection catered to Hong Kong people’s years’ hope of building a strong government. Therefore won extremely high public support and successfully returned uncontested…
The SAR government’s difficulty in administration in the past was directly related to the lack of communication with the public opinion to large extent. Tsang’s dialogue with the public during the election should be a start, not an end. Although the future two years is only ‘the left term’, with the nature of permanent government, there’s still huge responsibility. Tsang not only should keep communicate with the citizens down to the community, he should also improve the discussion of administrative concept between the government and citizens, and among citizens from different classes...

Of course, focusing on economic development is the first priority of the administration under Tsang’s leadership. ‘Developing the economy in every field’ is not only the general requirement of the citizens, but also the sincere hope of the central government. People-based governance is the best way to gain public’s trust. It is believed that the political conflicts can be resolved in the harmonious environment of economic development and social stabilization, and HKSAR will open a new chapter under the new CE leadership.

港人盼建和諧新局

在獲得中央任命之後，曾蔭權將成為香港特別行政區的第二位行政長官。他在選舉期間公布了「強政勵治，締造和諧，福為民開」的參選政綱，承諾一旦當選後將會提升政府管治質素，以發展經濟為本、改善就業為要，構建和諧社會，提升市民的政治參與，共同致力建設好香港。曾蔭權在自動當選為新的行政長官人選後已即刻表示，決不會辜負中央政府和香港市民的期望，一定要落實在選舉期間作出的各種承諾。

港人把今次特首補選視為重建強勢高效政府的契機，希望選出一個有從政經驗和管治能力的強勢特首，率領管治團隊，構建起《基本法》所要求的、名副其實的行政主導體制，以化解紛爭、減少內耗、凝聚共識、整合社會不同力量，領導香港抓住機遇、聚精會神中搞建設、一心一意謀發展。而曾蔭權參選特首所表現的強勢態度，迎合了廣大港人對構建強勢政府的多年企盼，因此贏得極高民意而成功自動當選。

加強行政主導 建立強勢政府

香港作為單一制國家的一個高度自治地方，作為一個複雜而多元的國際性城市，容易受到很多方面因素的影響，高效的政府運作是維繫其國際都會地位和確保「一國兩制」落實的不可或缺的要素。為此，新特首當前首要任務之一是必須樹立強勢且堅定的政府形象，推行貫徹《基本法》精神的行政主導原則，同時知人善任、放開胸襟，組織、凝聚、團結新的領導班子，將政府班子各方面人員有機結合起來，充
分發揮他們的特長，排除內部大小「山頭」，整合出特區政府的整體力量，議而決、
決而行，群策群力，有效推行政府各項政策，貫徹「一國兩制」方針。

正確構建和完善行政主導的政治體制，是希望新特首在工作中能強化特區政府的職
能，決策果斷，敢於承擔，加強與立法會的配合，改善行政、立法的關係。兩者之
間既要相互監督又要互相配合，但仍是行政主導。一旦「行政主導」原則弱化，就
有可能留下「權力真空」。政府面對立法與司法挑戰時就會顯得力不從心。

爭取民意構建共同理念

特區政府過往施政不暢，在一定程度上與民意脫節有直接關係。曾蔭權參選期間與
外界展開的對話，應只是開始，不是終結。未來兩年雖然只是「剩餘任期」，有過渡
政府性質，但新特首責任同樣重大，任務同樣光榮。曾蔭權不但要繼續落區與市民
直接溝通，更要促進政府與市民、以及不同階層市民之間深入討論施政理念，令特
區政府的方針政策措施在香港各階層所代表的層面有更廣泛的認同和支持。只有各
方求同存異、達成共識，才能達致各階層團結、和諧，並合力開創前路，政府施政
才有方向和效率。香港多元化社會涉及不同價值觀、不同群體利益與目標，要協調
並推動社會不同階層建立共同理念，不啻是巨大的社會工程。從曾蔭權參選過程中
與各派人士打交道的細緻工作以及取得部分「民主派」人士提名的成果來看，曾蔭
權有一定能力協調處理好香港各方面關係、整合各階層意見、使之統一並為香港建
設出謀劃策。新特首應盡可能團結各方面人士共同邁向建設香港的新里程。

當然，曾蔭權領導下的特區政府工作，集中精力發展經濟是重中之重。「全方位發展
經濟」，不僅是市民的普遍要求，也是中央[3]的殷切期望。施政為民，福為民間才是
最得民心的做法。相信政治上的紛爭可以在經濟發展、社會穩定的和諧環境中逐漸
得到解決，相信香港特區在新特首領導下將掀開新的頁。