The evolution of European Union conflict prevention policy

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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on a particular aspect of the international role of the European Union (EU), examining the evolution of EU conflict prevention policy in the post-Cold War period. In recent years the EU has extended its range of external relations policies, and conflict prevention has emerged as a prominent objective on the agenda, particularly as the Union faced political and economic instability on its borders. After introducing conflict prevention and analysing the EU's external relations and the post-Cold War security context, the thesis examines the EU's institutional set-up for conflict prevention. The incremental development and institutional structure of the EU renders the formulation and implementation of conflict prevention by the EU a particular challenge. The thesis then proceeds to an investigation of EU cooperation and conflict prevention policy coordination with the security organisations identified as the EU's key partners: the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

While post-Cold War conflict prevention requires a multilateral approach, the proliferation of European security organisations and the increasing overlap in their objectives makes policy coordination between the EU and other organisations particularly important.

It is concluded that the EU faces fundamental internal coordination problems and institutional divisions in its elaboration of conflict prevention policy. Conflict prevention is underdeveloped by the EU and is in danger of being marginalised in favour of shorter-term crisis management. Furthermore, internal coordination problems have a detrimental impact on the organisation's ability to cooperate externally with other security organisations. EU external priorities in conflict prevention focus on cooperation in crisis management with the UN and NATO, and fail to capitalise on the advantages of cooperation with the OSCE. The failure of the EU to fully adopt conflict prevention as an external relations priority and to coordinate its activities with other organisations could have implications for future stability in, and on the borders of, the EU.

KEY WORDS: EXTERNAL RELATIONS, POLICY COORDINATION, EUROPEAN SECURITY
Brothers, away from this Europe of graves:
Let us climb together towards the land
Where we will be men among men.
If I’m not for myself, who will be for me?
If not this way, how? If not now, when?

Primo Levi
‘Song of the Partisan’ If Not Now, When?

Never forget:
we walk on hell,
gazing at flowers.

Issa Kobayashi (tr. Lucien Stryk)
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ABBREVIATIONS

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (EU)
BCPR Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UN)
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (EU)
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives (EU)
CPC Conflict Prevention Centre (OSCE)
CPN Conflict Prevention Network
CSCE Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DG Directorate-general (EU)
DPA Department of Political Affairs (UN)
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
EC European Community
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (UN)
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EEC European Economic Community
EGF European Gendarmerie Force (EU)
EP European Parliament
EPC European Political Cooperation
ERRF European Rapid Reaction Force (EU)
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESS European Security Strategy (EU)
EU European Union
EUFFM EU Fact-Finding Mission
EUMC EU Military Committee
EUMM EU Monitoring Mission
EUMS EU Military Staff
GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
HCNM High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE)
IGC Inter-governmental Conference (EU)
ILO International Labour Organisation (UN affiliated)
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMTF Integrated Mission Task Force (UN)
JHA Justice and Home Affairs (EU)
MEP Member of the European Parliament
NAC North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NRF NATO Response Force
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP Partnership for Peace (NATO)
PPEWU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (EU)
PSC Political and Security Committee (EU)
QMV Qualified Majority Voting
TEU Treaty on European Union
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNSG United Nations Secretary General
US United States of America
WEU Western European Union
WTO World Trade Organisation
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: The Evolution of European Union Conflict Prevention Policy

1.1 Introduction
In the past fifteen years, the EU has been transformed from a tentative international actor to a major player in pan-European security politics, as illustrated by the current extent of EU external action designed to promote peace and prevent violent conflict. This thesis examines the evolution of the European Union’s (EU) conflict prevention policy during this period of rapid change both in the EU itself and in the European security context in which it operates.

This introductory chapter aims to provide a working definition of conflict prevention, a summary of the role of theory in the thesis, and a thesis outline. In further chapters, conflict prevention is discussed in the Cold War and post-Cold War context, the procedures and institutions of EU external relations are outlined, and the post-Cold War European security context is discussed. Proposing that the development of conflict prevention has been a particular challenge for EU policy coordination and coherence, the thesis then provides a critical analysis of the internal institutional development of EU conflict prevention. A further challenge for the EU has been the development of a clear, demarcated role for itself in this policy sphere in a Europe of multiple actors and overlapping organisational agendas. Identifying inter-organisational policy coordination as an important factor in pan-European conflict prevention, the thesis then examines EU cooperation with the other three key organisations active in pan-European conflict prevention: the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Conclusions are drawn regarding the EU’s record in conflict prevention to date, the prospects for EU external policy coordination for conflict prevention, and the future of the practice of conflict prevention.

1 The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created in 1951, and the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom) in 1957. The organisations ran in parallel until 1967 when a Treaty merging the institutions came into effect. After this, the organisation was generally known as the European Community (EC), becoming the European Union (EU) in 1993.
1.2 Defining Conflict Prevention
Conflict prevention has been widely adopted by the EU, international organisations and governments, yet it has remained a nebulous concept because of definitional difficulties compounded by its potentially wide-ranging nature.

Conflict prevention requires the identification of the causes of conflict, and entails attempts to address these causes before the outbreak of violence. Most definitions of conflict prevention do not imply that conflict per se is undesirable: only that the resolution of conflict through violence is destructive and does not lead to viable and lasting solutions (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999; Wallensteen 2002). As a concept, conflict prevention can be understood at various levels of analysis, whether at the personal, group or community level, or at a national or international level, and applied before, during and after a violent conflict erupts. In this study, conflict prevention is analysed at the international level, examining how the concept is applied by the European Union as an external security policy.

Conflict prevention has taken on a particular contemporary meaning that nevertheless has several variations and is subject to dispute. In general terms, conflict prevention in the international arena is taken to refer to any attempt by third parties to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict. Definitions tend to vary with regard to what actions are included in conflict prevention, with some analysts focusing entirely on the period before the outbreak of violence (e.g. Zartman 2001), and others adopting a broad definition, inclusive of strategies to prevent conflict escalation and/or recurrence (e.g. Carnegie Commission 1997). This study adopts a broad definition of conflict prevention: it is defined as a multi-faceted process ranging from long-term or structural policy to project stability, to short-term operational policy (preventive diplomacy and civilian or military crisis management) to resolve crises and prevent further escalation. It also refers to attempts to stop the recurrence of violence in conflict zones. It is primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with the period before the outbreak of war. For the purposes of this analysis, the practice of conflict prevention is divided into three stages: structural or long-term; early warning and analysis; and operational (see below, pp. 81-83). This categorisation is necessary to bring order and structure to the investigation, although it is not intended to suggest that conflicts follow linear patterns requiring structural policy, followed by early
warning and analysis then crisis management. Conflicts may require policy from all three ‘stages’ simultaneously, or move between categories. This categorisation of conflict prevention is used as an ordering device in the chapters examining EU conflict prevention, and EU cooperation in conflict prevention with the UN, the OSCE and NATO.

The value of conflict prevention as a policy is undermined by a simplification of its complexity. Yet since the policy, at least in this study, is categorised as embracing a wide number of concerns, it requires a high degree of internal and external organisational policy coordination for credible implementation. The utility of the categorisation adopted will be considered in the concluding chapter.

1.3 The Role of Theory: A Framework for Analysis

This thesis does not approach the evidence from a particular theoretical perspective. Rather, the thesis is informed by contemporary conceptual debates in European Union integration/foreign policy-making, International Relations theory and Peace Research. The research presented is discussed in the context of theory in the early part of the thesis, and the concluding chapter returns to these debates.

The dynamics of European integration have consistently defied traditional interpretation and no general theory on EU foreign policy-making has been developed (Smith, S. 2000: 3, Smith, K. E. 2004: 12). International Relations theory, long stuck in the neo-realist/neo-liberal institutionalist cul-de-sac, has been challenged in recent years by ‘reflectivist’ approaches focusing less on the behaviour of states, and more on non-state actors and the impact of cultures, norms and identities (Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 1996). Peace Research has traditionally emphasised alternative interpretations and solutions to conflict, and places institutions at the core of conflict prevention (Boulding 1992; Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999). These debates are discussed in the context of post-Cold War European security and international organisations in chapter 4.

While this thesis does not adopt the tenets of one particular theory, it does, by necessity, make some assumptions about the political world. The study draws loosely on concepts of cooperation established in neo-liberal institutionalist literature and on
neo-liberal/constructivist concepts of the autonomy and behaviour of international organisations. Studies in cooperation tend to focus on why state actors cooperate in institutions at the regional or international level (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Axelrod 1985). Similarly, and drawing on the same economic theories, liberal intergovernmentalism seeks to explain EU Member State policy coordination in terms of preferences and bargaining, advancing ideas developed in the neo-functionalist sphere (Moravcsik 1993). Cooperation in these studies is framed in terms of state-state and/or state-institution interaction. The thesis draws on definitions of cooperation established in this literature, contending that cooperation occurs as a result of potential or actual discord between [organisational rather than state) actors, leading to a process of policy coordination (Keohane 1984: 51). It is contended that cooperation between organisational actors was sought to offset the actual or potential discord created by parallel and overlapping conflict prevention policies and operations in the post-Cold War era.

In examining internal and external organisational policy coordination, it is assumed that international organisations have an institutional life of their own, with distinct institutional characters and priorities (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). It is not assumed, as in neo-realist interpretations of international relations, that organisations exist solely to serve the interests of their members (Mearsheimer 1995; Waltz 1979). As established in the neo-liberal institutionalist tradition, it is contended that institutions do ‘matter’, and that international organisations play an important role in establishing and upholding international values and commitments (Keohane 1989). However, it is not assumed that organisations are actors entirely independent of their members. Rather, a middle ground is explored in which it is accepted that states often constrain organisations, yet cannot entirely control institutional processes (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699).

The common link between neo-liberal institutionalists and neo-realists is the assumption that international organisations exist to serve the interests of states. In making this assumption, analysts tend to pay little attention to the impact of internal organisational politics on the behaviour and impact of organisations (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 706). Moreover, scholars of international organisation have tended to pay less attention to the impact of international organisations on world politics in
general, and their limitations in tackling global problems in particular (Gallaroti 1991: 185; Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 715). In establishing the relative autonomy, influence (and limitations) of organisational actors, as recognised in sociological and constructivist approaches to international organisations (Checkel 1999; Barnett and Finnemore 1999) we create a framework in which to examine the internal institutions of the EU in the planning and application of conflict prevention policy. Organisations, like states, are bureaucracies, with their own internal cultures and practices subject to the kind of 'bureaucratic politics' and 'organisational processes' explored by Graham Allison (1972) in reference to the US government. There is likely therefore to be internal organisational competition and inefficiency because of conflict over material resources, and differences in organisational cultures.

The establishment of conflict prevention as an area for cooperation between the EU and other organisations involves a complex interplay between states, organisational personnel and other interested parties, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). While this study focuses to a large part on the internal institutional workings of the EU, EU cooperation with other European security organisations brings in the impact of external pressures on the evolution of EU conflict prevention policy: to what extent was EU policy progress driven by the activities of, and increasingly necessary cooperation with, the UN, OSCE and NATO? Conflict prevention is an interesting area of internal and inter-institutional cooperation because the institutional logic of policy coordination for conflict prevention often fails to result in concerted and coordinated action. Why is this the case? Despite the adoption of the language of conflict prevention by every organisation featured in this study, policy coordination is not extensive. Evidently, this is the result of the complexity of the policy itself, and of the difficult theatres where it is practiced. Yet it is also the result of bureaucratic cultures and politics: intra-EU and inter-institutional conflict, ambition, competition, incoherence and confusion. The thesis considers the impact of these factors on the evolution of EU conflict prevention and EU external cooperation for conflict prevention, probing the conflict and cooperation at the heart of the politics of European security.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The chapters of the thesis are outlined below together with their primary objectives and the questions they address. Figure 1.1 illustrates the thesis structure in a flow diagram.

1.4.1 Chapter 2: Conflict Prevention in Contemporary Perspective
This chapter aims to introduce conflict prevention as idea and practice in the post-Second World War context. The chapter addresses the following questions:

- How was conflict prevention developed and practiced in the context of the Cold War?
- How has conflict prevention progressed in the post-Cold War era, and what are the problems associated with the implementation of conflict prevention policy?

1.4.2 Chapter 3: The External Relations of the European Union
The objective of this chapter is to outline the EU’s external relations institutions and procedures that form the basis of the EU’s conflict prevention policy. Since EU conflict prevention relies on policy deriving from both the intergovernmental CFSP ‘pillar’ and the supranational EC ‘pillar’, we focus in particular on the legacy of the EU’s divided external relations system.

- What are the origins of EU foreign policy and development cooperation?
- How did the EU’s role in external relations develop in the post-Cold War period, and what are the key institutions?

1.4.3 Chapter 4: Post-Cold War European Security and Conflict Prevention
This chapter examines the context of the development of EU conflict prevention, exploring the policy as a post-Cold War security strategy.

- What are the features of the post-Cold War European security environment, and where does the EU fit in?
- How does conflict prevention concur with the EU’s new security role?
- Why is policy coordination important for post-Cold War conflict prevention?
1.4.4 Chapter 5: The EU's Conflict Prevention Policy

Focusing in detail on the EU’s institutional development of conflict development, this chapter outlines and analyses the policies that comprise EU conflict prevention.

- How has conflict prevention policy developed in the EU context?
- Do internal institutional coordination problems impact on EU conflict prevention?

1.4.5 Chapters 6, 7 and 8: The EU and the United Nations (UN); The EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); The EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Having established that the OSCE, UN and NATO are the EU’s institutional partners in conflict prevention in the post-Cold War era; that together they make up the post-Cold War security architecture; and that policy coordination between the EU and the other organisations is a key factor in EU conflict prevention, these three chapters examine the developing dialogue and policy coordination between the EU and the UN, OSCE and NATO in the conflict prevention field. Each chapter addresses the same research questions:

- How has the EU’s relationship with the UN, OSCE and NATO developed?
- What is the extent of conflict prevention policy coordination between the EU and the UN, OSCE and NATO?
- What is the impact of internal EU coordination on external coordination with the UN, OSCE and NATO?

Chapter 9: Conclusions

Chapter 9 summarises the main findings of the thesis, assessing the evolution of EU conflict prevention and the development of external coordination in conflict prevention policy with the UN, OSCE and NATO. The chapter addresses the following questions:

- What are the prospects for EU conflict prevention?
- How far does EU – UN, OSCE and NATO coordination contribute to, or detract from, the practice of conflict prevention?
• What are the definitional and conceptual implications of the thesis’ findings?
• Having caught the attention of pan-European security organisations, what is the future of conflict prevention as a security strategy?
Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Conflict Prevention in Contemporary Perspective

Chapter 3: The External Relations of the European Union

Chapter 4: Post-Cold War European Security and Conflict Prevention

Chapter 5: European Union Conflict Prevention Policy

Chapters 6, 7 and 8: External Cooperation with other organisations

Chapter 9: Conclusions: The Evolution of European Union Conflict Prevention Policy

United Nations

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
CHAPTER 2
Conflict Prevention in Contemporary Perspective

2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses conflict prevention in contemporary perspective: we first explore conflict prevention in the context of the Cold War, charting its development as theory and practice. Conflict prevention in the post-Cold War period is examined in detail in the context of the European Union (EU) in the rest of this thesis. This chapter focuses secondly, therefore, on the more general problems of post-Cold War conflict prevention policy elaboration and implementation that were to impact on the EU’s adoption of conflict prevention as an external policy objective.

The prevention of war has been a central objective of international relations throughout history, and is closely linked to the history of international organisation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Claude 1971; Hinsley 1963). For the purposes of this thesis, conflict prevention is examined as a concept and practice in international politics in the post-1945 period: its rise to prominence in the post-Cold War era cannot be understood without reference to this formative period. Section 2.2 examines conflict prevention during the Cold War period. The prevention of conflict during the Cold War was firstly associated with the avoidance of war between the US and the USSR. The prevention of war became the concern of diplomats and strategists, who developed theories of deterrence and crisis management in order to prevent recourse to the nuclear trigger. We examine this debate, and argue that this rather narrow definition of, and approach to, conflict led to the birth of alternative views in the fields of Conflict and Peace Research.

Conflict prevention during the Cold War is also associated with the development of innovative instruments to prevent violent conflict within the UN system. While the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) pioneered conflict prevention through economic integration, the UN developed instruments for applied conflict prevention in its groundbreaking approach to the problem of inter- and intra-state conflict. The Cold War superpower confrontation hampered the UN’s efforts: both the US and the USSR possessed a veto in the UN Security Council and interfered in inter-state and regional
conflicts outside Europe. Nevertheless, the UN's development of peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy laid the ground for the adoption of conflict prevention by other international organisations in the post-Cold War period, as well as the further advancement of conflict prevention in the UN.

Strategies for conflict prevention rose to prominence in the post-Cold War era as a number of new violent conflicts broke out in Europe and Africa. This renewed interest in conflict prevention can be explained by drawing on various factors, including improved international cooperation in the UN Security Council, a broadening of the concept of security, and the increased prevalence of intra-state conflict. The post-Cold War security context will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. Section 2.3 examines some of the problems associated with turning conflict prevention theory, as developed during and after the Cold War, into practice. The post-Cold War debate on conflict patterns and conflict prevention terminology is examined. Finally, we address the practical and normative difficulties associated with the implementation of conflict prevention policy.

2.2 Conflict Prevention during the Cold War
Conflict prevention during the Cold War can be associated with, firstly, the overriding need to prevent conflict between the US and the USSR (Wallensteen 2002: 214), and secondly, the development of strategies to prevent conflict, or its escalation, by the UN (Claude 1971: 312). The two processes were, of course, closely linked: the period is a good illustration of Claude's contention that "international organisation affects international politics, but it is even more affected by international politics" (Claude 1971: vii).

2.2.1 The prevention of superpower conflict
Hostility between the USSR and the US had been simmering since the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the ideological and geographical divisions of the Cold War were visible by the final months of the Second World War (Cox 1990: 26). Despite the emergence of the US as the most powerful military and economic power in the world, fear of further Communist territorial expansion and ideological infiltration set the scene for 40 years of mutual distrust and competition. The onset of nuclear rivalry in the 1950s made the prevention of conflict between the superpowers even more
essential. With Europe divided into rival spheres of influence, the potential for and likely impact of conflict in Europe was considerable and would have been devastating. The Third World and Asia, however, became the theatre for most Cold War conflict as the superpowers intervened in regional and internal wars on the periphery (McMahon 2003: 56). Local conflicts during the Cold War period therefore often had an inter-state element: strategic/ideological rivalry between the superpowers led to attempts to control governments in third countries – for example, in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the 1950s and 1960s, and in Central and South America in the 1970s and 1980s (Wallensteen 2002: 87). Conflict prevention as an objective of superpower foreign policy and strategy must be distinguished from conflict prevention as an approach to the problem of conflict and the pursuit of peace. This section links these two developments: the narrow debate about security exemplified by superpower crisis management acted as a catalyst for the emergence of alternative approaches in the US and Europe. Conflict prevention, as understood in the context of Peace and Conflict Research, developed partly as a reaction to the arms race and superpower crisis management, and was the subject of more popular and academic interest in the climate of détente and with the eventual demise of superpower rivalry (Rogers and Ramsbotham 1999: 742; Dunn 1991: 56; Salmon and Alkadari 1992: 123).

Theories related to the creation of international peace developed in the context of international organisation, such as disarmament, collective security, and the peaceful settlement of disputes were coloured by the Cold War. Collective security, originally envisaged as a shared commitment to world order, and underlined by the indivisibility of peace (Claude 1971: 247), became more associated with military alliances and deterrence, symbolised by the overwhelming military power of two opposing military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact). Arms control as a means of war prevention emerged with renewed vigour, but a series of US-USSR strategic arms limitation treaties (SALT) in the 1970s, while politically significant, did not halt the arms race (McMahon 2003: 128). The build up of conventional and nuclear forces was seen as relevant to the prevention of US/USSR conflict. Reduction of nuclear forces did not

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2 Pioneered in the 1940s and advancing in the 1950s and 60s with the establishment of the Journal of Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan in 1957 and the Journal of Peace Research in 1964 (Rogers and Ramsbotham 1999: 743).
come about until the late 1980s (Dorman and Treacher 1995: 16). The superpowers largely managed their own Cold War crises, with the UN being either bypassed (e.g. the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962) or manipulated by the superpowers in the settlement of disputes (e.g. the Congo in the 1960s). Since no real attempts were made to reduce tensions until the 1960s, the prevention of conflict was initially narrowly associated with superpower ‘crisis management,’ the foreign policy catchphrase of the Cold War. As Wallensteen has contended, “prevention was connected to imminent crisis” (2002: 272).

Strategies for the avoidance of nuclear war as a result of superpower confrontation concerned a wide range of diplomats, academics and practitioners. Academics in the emerging International Relations field, particularly foreign policy analysts and those of the Strategic Studies school, were concerned with the control of superpower crises, and the prevention of nuclear war, developing theories on deterrence, crisis management and limited war (Strachey 1962; Brodie 1970; Williams 1976). Traditional concepts of strategy shifted from the pursuit of national objectives through war, to the careful extension of influence and power without resorting to war (Garnett 1975). War, according to some, was an inevitable feature of the international system, but the advent of nuclear weapons rendered the resort to war “unacceptable” (Strachey 1962: 3). Crisis management was the key tactic in averting the escalation of conflict between the superpowers - particularly after the apparently successful defusing of the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, when the US and USSR clashed over the installation of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. While the objective was to prevent conflict, it was a short-term strategy, paying scant attention to the causes of the crisis in question. A cynical interpretation of the technique was concerned with how to extract maximum gain from a crisis situation, using tactics such as brinksmanship and coercive bargaining (Schelling 1960). Questioning of such tactics prompted the development of alternative perspectives on crisis management, particularly after reassessments of the Cuban Missile Crisis resulted in doubts being expressed over the risk posed by the incident. Analysts of the Behavioural School emphasised the impact of stress and threat perception in crisis situations, challenging the contention that crisis situations could be so carefully controlled and manipulated (Hermann 1972; Lebow 1981). Nevertheless, the superpowers did develop crisis management
conventions, including a direct line of communication, in order to avoid misunderstandings that could lead to war.

The idea of crisis or conflict prevention rather than crisis management gained ground in the climate of détente, which led to more prospects of cooperation between the superpowers (Salmon and Alkadari 1992). The prevalence of crisis management as a tactic for preventing the outbreak of war reflected the fact that underlying causes of conflicts were more often than not ignored. The UN Charter was interpreted narrowly during the Cold War, with little focus on the domestic sources of conflict and threats coming from within states (MacFarlane 2002: 35). This was recognised by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair in a speech made in Chicago in 1999 during the Kosovo crisis: “twenty years ago we would not have been fighting in Kosovo. We would have turned our backs on it.” The norm of non-interference during the Cold War, however, suited the superpowers (who nevertheless abused it) and the growing number of newly independent ex-colonial states. There was, however, a concurrent growth of normative interest in the “international dimension of human rights,” within the UN and in academia (MacFarlane 2002: 34).

A wider approach to conflict and its sources emerged in the expanding academic fields of Conflict Resolution and Peace Research. These disciplines drew on the earlier themes and research methods of analysts such as Quincy Wright (whose A Study of War was first published in 1942) and Lewis Richardson (who compiled the Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, published posthumously in 1960). Central to these fields was the rejection of nuclear weapons and deterrence as a way of preventing war (Dunn 1991: 63). Drawing on the ideas proposed by Richardson and Wright, peace researchers were striving for a “policy for peace, not defence” (Boulding 1990: 47). Kenneth Boulding, founder of the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1957 and the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan in 1959, was an early advocate of conflict prevention through the development of research and early warning systems (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 43).

In Europe, Johan Galtung founded a research unit on conflict and peace at the University of Oslo (now PRIO, the International Peace Research Institute) in 1960, and the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964. Both American and European variants widened the scope of conflict studies by including concerns over human rights, justice, equality and ecology as contributing to conflict – whether inter- or intra-state. Galtung’s work in particular widened the scope of peace research beyond the immediate prevention of war. He was concerned with violence in general – at the state level (‘structural’ violence) and on an ideological level (‘cultural’ violence). The concept of structural violence identified problems in state structures and systems as precipitating violence in individuals, while cultural violence is, for example, nationalist, or religious aspects of culture used to justify direct or structural forms of violence (Galtung 1990). The key distinction is the difference between positive and negative peace; the former being classified as the removal of structural and cultural violence, while the latter as merely the removal of direct violence – the immediate cessation of hostilities (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 43). These ideas were developed by practitioners and academics, and gained credence with the rise of the anti-nuclear peace movement in the 1970s and 1980s (Burton and Dukes 1990). Nevertheless, Burton’s (1984) assertion that change in the international system and in the domestic structure of states was needed to tackle the root causes of inter and intra-state conflict, was not widely welcomed, nor accepted. The rise of conflict prevention as a policy rather than just an idea would have to wait until the fundamental changes that came with the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. A further dimension of conflict prevention, which we turn to next, was conflict prevention as a technique in the context of the United Nations. If Cold War conflict prevention was more often than not associated with superpower military and nuclear defence, then the UN was instrumental in developing conflict prevention as grounds for international intervention.

### 2.2.2 Conflict prevention and the United Nations

The United Nations was stifled by the superpower clash and veto in the Security Council, but “the realities of international politics did not prevent UN involvement in the affairs of dozens of countries across the world” (Simons 1994:106). According to
the Uppsala Data Project\(^4\), the number of violent armed conflicts rose steadily throughout the Cold War period with a peak in the late 1960s, probably as a result of decolonisation (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 620). There was therefore no shortage of violent conflicts to concern the UN in the decades following the end of the Second World War. Intra-state conflict has been the most common form of warfare since the late 1950s (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 623). The removal of colonial rule by European powers in the 1950s and 1960s led to internal instability and competition between rival factions in some of the newly independent African countries. The other notable arena for intra-state conflict during the period was Central and Southern America, with civil wars in Colombia and Guatemala, and state violence and terror in Chile, Bolivia and Argentina. The major inter-state wars of the period (the Korean war in the 1950s, the Vietnam war\(^5\) in the 1960s and the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s) each resulted in more than a million battle deaths (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 623), while a series of smaller, but no less intractable inter-state conflicts broke out in the Middle East and Asia.

The UN Charter, based on the post-war balance of power, and limited in its mechanisms, was not primarily designed to prevent the outbreak of all conflict, nor did the UN have expertise in conflict resolution. The rather narrow interpretation of threats to international peace and security that was prevalent both within the UN and in the governments of its members meant that conflict prevention, particularly in the case of civil wars, was not a prime interest of the UN (Mack and Furlong 2004: 59). According to John Burton\(^6\), of the delegates at the UN foundation conference in San Francisco in 1945, “few...had any clear ideas on the handling of conflict situations outside the traditional law-and-order and power framework...The goal was to prevent aggression of the German, Italian and Japanese type. Few were educated to ask why this aggression had occurred, what were the background circumstances, and were there problems that could have been solved” (Burton 1986: 43-44).

It is certainly the case that conflict prevention featured on the agenda of the UN only after the restraints of the Cold War were removed, (Mack and Furlong 2004: 60) and

\(^4\) The Uppsala Conflict Data Project is based in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University.
\(^5\) The Vietnam war was also intra-state.
\(^6\) John Burton attended the conference as part of the Australian delegation, and later became one of the founder-figures of the Peace and Conflict Research fields (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 45).
arguably after the UN had adopted conflict prevention and resolution techniques
developed by academics and practitioners. Nevertheless, key developments within the
organisation were important in establishing a foothold for international organisation in
conflict that was to be further developed in the post-Cold War period. The most
important UN innovations in this regard were preventive diplomacy and
peacekeeping. Preventive diplomacy was developed by the second UN Secretary
General Dag Hammarskjöld as a strategy for intervening to prevent the outbreak or
the escalation of violent conflict, either between or within states (Hampson 2002:
139). The strategy was developed particularly as a way of making the UN relevant in
the Cold War struggle; intervention was considered in areas either outside of, or
marginal to, superpower spheres of influence, and “was designed to forestall the
competitive intrusion of rival power blocs into that area” (Claude 1971: 313).
Preventive diplomacy in the UN entailed action by the Secretary-General and the
Security Council, including mediation, fact-finding missions, good offices and
economic assistance (Lund 1996: 33). It was further developed and extended in the
post-Cold War era by the UN, particularly after its revival by Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros Ghali in his 1992 Agenda For Peace (UN 1992). In the 1960s,
however, preventive diplomacy was most often interpreted as a synonym for
peacekeeping, which became the most visible preventive tactic (Claude 1971: 314).

Neither preventive diplomacy nor peacekeeping featured in the UN Charter, but were
developed as a result of the UN’s operational experience (Claude 1971: 312). The UN
had sent personnel into conflict situations before preventive diplomacy became a
familiar term – notably by sending a UN mediator to Israel in 1948⁷; a controversial
UN military observer group, then a military force under US command to Korea⁸ in
1950; and a UN emergency force to Egypt (Suez) after the illegal invasion by France,
Israel and the UK in 1956. The latter was the UN’s first peacekeeping experience
(Simons 1994: 123). The UN’s first complex law and order peacekeeping mission

⁷ Count Folke Bernadotte, president of the Swedish Red Cross, along with a UN observer, were
assassinated by Zionists 4 month later (Simons 1994: 108).
⁸ Korea, subject to Japanese occupation during the Second World War, was occupied by the
superpowers after the defeat of Japan in 1945. When North Korean troops invaded South Korea in
1950, the US, fearing the establishment of a communist regime, defended South Korea, and became
embroiled in a conflict with North Korean and Chinese forces. Korea was partitioned in 1953. The UN
was largely kept out of the subsequent conflict in Vietnam.
(ONUC)\textsuperscript{9} was dispatched to the Congo\textsuperscript{10}, Central Africa, in 1960, in response to a request for assistance from the new government after independence was gained from Belgium. With no preparation for self-government having taken place, Belgium then intervened militarily and was asked to leave by the UN Security Council. The key objective of UN intervention was to prevent civil war, and also to prevent intervention by the superpowers (Claude 1971: 319; MacFarlane 2002: 43). Difficulties with agreeing on and maintaining a mandate for intervention in a civil war situation soon arose: a problem that the UN faced forty years later in the former Yugoslavia. The impact of the 20,000 strong UN force (operating from 1960-1964) in establishing stability was marginal in light of the internal chaos and external disagreements (particularly the USSR’s withdrawal of support of the operation): at best the UN prevented the conflict from escalating into a major superpower confrontation (Claude 1971: 326-327). It terms of the size of the operation, only the force sent to Cyprus in the 1964 was comparable during the Cold War period (Claude 1971: 316). However, peacekeeping became firmly established as a UN competence as a result of this early action and experience. Conflict in the Middle East continued through the 1960s, 70s and 80s, and the UN gained further experience in trying to ensure Israeli withdrawal from areas of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. As the Cold War came to an end, peacekeeping was increasingly fundamental in the organisation’s response to conflict (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 141).

\section*{2.3 Conflict Prevention and the Post-Cold War Era}

The concept of conflict prevention gained support in Europe and the US in the 1970s and 1980s, partly as a result of developments in international politics, and partly as a result of advances made in the fields of Conflict and Peace Research. The concept gained greater attention as the Cold war drew to a close and international cooperation improved. The persistence of old conflicts, the difficulties of conflict resolution in peace processes, and the outbreak of a number of new conflicts across the world all contributed to the new appeal of conflict prevention.

\textsuperscript{9} A UN emergency force (UNEF) was sent to the Egypt-Israeli border in 1956 in response to the attack on Egypt by Israel, France and the UK.

\textsuperscript{10} The Congo (formerly Belgian Congo) was renamed Zaire in 1971, then became the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1997 (Smith, D. 2003: 90).
The first question to address in looking at post-Cold War conflict prevention is what was the nature of the conflict that international actors were trying to prevent? Conflict patterns after the Cold War are outlined and analysed. The contemporary period has seen an explosion of terms related to the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflict, of which conflict prevention is but one. However, there is no consensus on terms and meanings. We examine the terminological debate. Finally, the array of practical and analytical difficulties with conflict prevention related to conflict prediction, motivating preventive intervention, and proving policy success are explored. Normative problems concerning assumptions on root causes and the ethics of intervention have led to criticism of conflict prevention ethos, and discrepancies between the intention of conflict prevention policy and the likely outcomes of the policy paths followed.

2.3.1 Conflict after the Cold War
The perception that the nature and frequency of violent conflict had changed in the post-Cold War period was widespread (Carnegie Commission 1997: 25; SIPRI-UNESCO 1998: 13; Cahill 2000: XIII; Wallensteen 2002: 26; Kaldor 2001: 1). As the Cold War ended and the USSR disintegrated, conflict broke out in Yugoslavia and in Georgia, Moldova and the Nagorno-Karabakh territory between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the former Soviet Union. In Africa, Somalia was disintegrating, violence in Rwanda was escalating and civil war raged on in Sudan. Classical inter-state war had practically disappeared (SIPRI-UNESCO 1998: 13). Instead, the international community faced a number of complex, intra-state or regional conflicts, characterised by the targeting and expulsion of civilians, and resulting in acute refugee and humanitarian emergencies (Carnegie Commission 1997: xvii). These ‘new wars’ were a distinctive kind of organised, political violence in a globalised era (Kaldor 2001: 1-2). Some realist analysts lamented the end of Cold War stability, and predicted an upward trend in conflict within and between communities (Mearshiemer 1990; Huntington 1991).

In terms of the frequency of conflict, the pessimism of realist commentators was overplayed: while conflict trends show an increase in conflict frequency at the beginning of the post-Cold War era, data shows an overall global reduction in armed
conflict from 1989 to 1997 (Wallensteen 2002: 26; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001: 630; Smith, D. 2001: 2).\textsuperscript{11}

However, European and American analysts were responding to the return of violent conflict to Europe in particular, which “account[ed] for two-thirds of the increase in the annual incidence of war in the early 1990s” (Smith, D. 2001: 3). Intra-state conflict was prevalent, but this was a trend that dated back to well before the end of the Cold War (Wallensteen 2002: 76; Booth 1998: 43). Post-Cold War conflicts were, however, characterised by their complexity in terms of the number of actors involved in conflicts (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001: 633). The interdependency of security between regional states, or regional ‘security complexes’ (Buzan 1991: 190), is well illustrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans. The proliferation of state and non-state actors in post-Cold War conflicts add a further layer of complexity to mediation and prevention efforts (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998: 633). There is also a trend in intra-state conflict of rapid escalation to full-blown war, which makes crisis prediction more difficult, and reduces the time available for international organisations or other parties to act (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000: 640). Lederach (1997: 9) warned of the growing willingness of non-state actors to take up arms in the pursuit of political and social goals. Rapid escalation and the proliferation of small arms (a particular problem in South Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union) bring further difficult challenges for conflict prevention.

The continued trend of intra-state conflict, and more importantly, the recognition that intra-state conflict could be a threat to international peace and security, led to calls for greater international attempts to intervene earlier to prevent armed conflict, accelerating greater interest in conflict prevention techniques (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 109; Wallensteen 2002: 27). However, tackling the roots of a violent conflict requires an understanding of conflict causes and, where there are multiple actors involved, a consensus on these causes. During the Cold War, research on conflict causes tended to focus on inter-state, not intra-state conflict (Smith, D. 2001: 5). Theories on the causes of intra-state conflict in particular were therefore

\textsuperscript{11} The Uppsala Conflict Data Project defines armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state” (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 618-619).
underdeveloped and highly contested in the post-Cold War period. Intra-state conflict was frequently explained as a result of the removal of restraints imposed by the Cold War bipolar system, especially by neo-realist commentators (Mearshiemer 1990; Huntington 1991). Certainly this is one explanatory factor, but a rather narrow one. The causes of conflict are more likely to be complex and multiple. For example, the disintegration of Yugoslavia into rival ethnic groups may have been facilitated by the removal of the Soviet threat, but equally the political and economic crisis leading to Slovenian and Croatian succession had its origins in the 1980s (Woodward 1995). Those that rejected Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' (1991) thesis and Mearsheimer's (1990) pessimism and nostalgia for the stability of the Cold War era predicted an upward trend in conflict proliferation as the result of population growth, environmental degradation, and the growing disparity in wealth and resources between the countries of the Northern and Southern hemispheres (Rogers and Dando 1992; Hansen 2000).

The trend to label many of the intra-state wars of the period as 'ethnic' is not always helpful, and can mask fundamental causes of conflict by failing to identify the *politicisation* of ethnicity (Smith, D. 2001: 6). Conflict between groups is not necessarily rooted in ethnicity: intra-state war is more likely to be rooted in issues of political legitimacy and/or poor economic conditions (Smith, D. 2001: 7). 'Identity politics', a term used by Kaldor (2001) to refer to "movements which mobilise around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power" (2001: 76), is a better label to attach to such conflicts. Concern over ethnic/identity-based violence may provide a catalyst for conflict prevention efforts. Yet despite the publicity of 'ethnic' conflict in the post-Cold War years, it remains the case that the majority of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world are not at war (Smith, D. 2003: 16). Very little is known about the factors that trigger ethnic conflict when it does occur (Brown 2001: 218). Being too hasty to identify ethnicity as a root cause of conflict can certainly hamper attempts to prevent and manage conflict (Lederach 1997: 8). Susan Woodward (2000: 153) identifies 'Balkan determinism' as a key error in American and European analyses of the conflict in Former Yugoslavia. Lamenting that international mediation could not overcome historic ethnic enmity, diplomats missed the opportunity to prevent further escalation of the political crisis in 1990.
The causes of conflict are notoriously subjective (Smith, D. 2001; 2003), as are, to a lesser extent, empirical trends, which, by necessity, require subjective choices about definitions, categorisation and inclusion of evidence (see Gleditsch et al. 2002: 625-626). Nevertheless, renewed interest and research on conflict in the 1990s has undoubtedly contributed to the rise of and interest in conflict prevention. The outbreak of complex crises on the edge of the EU, characterised by the targeting of civilians, rapid escalation, regional security complexes and the proliferation of small arms has called for a response from European security organisations. The EU in particular can be accused of raising unrealistic expectations that it could respond to such conflicts (Hill 1993). Nevertheless, the prevention of further conflict has gained support in the EU, the UN and the OSCE in particular, as the basis of this response. This consensus, however, was not matched by a consensus on terms and meanings.

2.3.2 Problems with prevention: terminological confusion

The first problem with prevention addressed is the confusing number of terms associated with conflict and its prevention and management.

We have seen a move from the use of war more to the widespread use of conflict in the post-Cold War period, although this was common before then in UN parlance, (Miall 1992: 37) signifying a dispute not necessarily between states (symmetric disputes between actors of parity) but between varied and/or unequal actors (asymmetric disputes, such as revolts or civil war) (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 12). This concurs with a widening of the nature of violent clashes and number of actors involved in conflict, a trend visible since the end of the Second World War. The term conflict therefore denotes more general human activity, and comes about “when two people wish to carry out acts which are mutually inconsistent” (Nicholson 1970: 2). This is a general rule, and while referring to personal individual conflict, can be applied equally to international or intra-state conflicts. Conflict is not always violent and is not necessarily undesirable in itself (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 96). Further qualification is necessary – hence the use of violent or armed conflict. Violent conflict between two or more parties changes a normal non-violent conflict (e.g. between a union and an employer) into a situation where negotiation is more difficult, since at the inception of violent conflict or war, both sides want victory, not compromise (Nicholson 1970: 4). Armed
conflict is similar, but specifically denotes the use of weaponry. *Deadly conflict*, a term adopted by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, refers to the bloody and intractable disputes of the 1990s, characterised by mass violence and genocide, the victims mostly civilian. This can be seen as an updating of Lewis Richardson’s *deadly quarrels*.

This classification of conflict seems clear enough, but conflict *prevention* is more problematic, and confusion over terminology when referring to conflict prevention and other related terms continues unabated. Following on from Burton’s pedantic invention of *provention* (1990: 233) to signify true structural conflict prevention, commentators have used *coercive prevention*, *preventive statecraft* (Jentleson 2000: 5; 2001: 249) as well as the more popular *preventive diplomacy* (Lund 1996: 4; Cahill 2000: XIV, Jentleson 2000b: 3) as generally meaning conflict prevention. *Coercive prevention* simply denotes the use or threat of military force as part of a preventive strategy (Jentleson 2000: 5), while *preventive statecraft* is an extended preventive diplomacy practiced by the state (Jentleson 2001: 249). The proliferation of terms (especially by the same commentator) has been unnecessary, especially since conflict prevention can (as this thesis asserts), incorporate long-term strategies, as well as shorter-term military measures. A clearer definition of conflict prevention (broadly adopted in this thesis – see chapter 1) featured in the Carnegie Commission’s Report, *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1997). *Operational prevention* covers strategies in the face of conflict, while *structural prevention* covers strategies to address the root causes of conflict (Carnegie Commission 1997: xix).

Preventive diplomacy has advanced from its Cold War definition, but is still subject to dispute. According to Zartman, preventive diplomacy can mean anything “from broad structural measures to remove grievances to crisis diplomacy to bring conflict to an end” (Zartman 2001: 139). In the early 1990s, preventive diplomacy was a widely used term, particularly after it was revived and extended in UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, the blueprint for the UN response to the new international security context.¹² This definition significantly extended the Cold War

¹² “Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” *An Agenda for Peace* (UN 1992).
meaning of preventive diplomacy: it aimed to prevent all types of violent conflict; it envisaged preventive diplomacy being carried out by all parts of the UN system, not just the Secretary-General and Security Council; and it introduced new instruments such as preventive deployment and early warning (Lund 1996: 34). The extension of the concept indicated a sea change in the UN’s approach to violent conflict, and reflected a new era of cooperation in the Security Council. UN peacekeeping costs increased twelve-fold to nearly $3,000 million between 1986 and 1993 (Boutros-Ghali 2000: 190): clearly new instruments were required to address violent conflicts before the need for UN peacekeeping, particularly in the case of complex intra-state conflicts. By the end of the twentieth century, conflict prevention was popular parlance in the UN, incorporating preventive diplomacy strategies, but also bringing in strategies to address root causes of conflict (Mack and Furlong 2004: 60).

The term peacebuilding has been classified as being effectively the same as structural conflict prevention (Wallensteen 2002: 286). Nevertheless, it has post-conflict connotations and has been defined by others as action in the aftermath of conflict (SIPRI-UNESCO 1998: 39; UN 1992: 15). However, Boutros-Ghali later refined the UN definition to make a distinction between preventive peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding, emphasising that while the strategies are applied at different stages of conflict, they amount to the same variety of institutional, economic, and social activities (Boutros-Ghali 2000: 193). This illustrates the difficulty in establishing clear terminological classification of conflict resolution terms. Peacebuilding is the same process as long-term conflict prevention to stop the recurrence of conflict, and is effectively the same as structural prevention in conflict-prone areas, whether pre- or post-conflict. So while the different phases of conflict require different approaches, these phases cannot be kept separate, and a particular conflict can move back and forward between stages (Chayes and Chayes 1996: 6).

While analysts have invented and reworked terms in an attempt to spell out what they mean, the overall effect of this has been confusion rather than clarification. Definitions seem to be widely variable, and there is no clear consensus on meanings. International organisations notoriously use vague definitions in order to reach a necessary consensus and satisfy all members' interpretations of a phrase or term used. This tendency is visible in the EU, as well as the UN and the OSCE; clearly it is not
politically expedient for the advancement and clarification of conflict prevention (Cohen 1999). Terms are often used interchangeably and without qualification. Unfortunately, this does not provide the concept with a coherent and comprehensible focus.

These definitional problems reflect the complexity of conflict, which, as argued above, is greater in the post-Cold War period. It is often difficult to apply patterns and processes to situations that are vastly different, with different causal variables, and multiple actors. This is why debates about conflict prevention are often intertwined with theories of conflict in general, particularly in the post-Cold War period (see above). Deeper problems with the concept concern normative and practical setbacks to preventive policy application.

2.4.3 Problems with prevention: prediction, motivation, and proving policy success

Confusion over the barrage of terms which accompany any discussion of conflict prevention is an obvious obstacle to effective analysis, understanding and policy-making. However, there are more fundamental problems with the concept that act as greater impediments. The first of these concerns problems with predicting conflict, motivating actors, and establishing that conflict prevention can actually work.

Predicting conflict at the early stages is notoriously difficult, particularly in the case of internal war (Wallensteen 2002: 276). Establishing the likelihood of escalation to violence is complex and can lead to false alarms. Outside actors may not want to obstruct constructive change, or fear that intervention could increase rather than decrease tensions (Wallensteen 2002: 276). The lack of media and other interest in successfully defused conflict reinforces the perception that since scholars failed to predict events such as the break-up of the Soviet Union, there is little chance of successful conflict prediction in domestic cases. Such views are typified by Stedman (1995), who argues that the track record in prediction is not a basis for optimism, and that policy-makers do not have crystal balls (Stedman 1995: 16). The trend of rapid

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13 For example, the disputes between Slovakia and Hungary (1993-1997) over the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and a hydroelectric plant on the Danube; UN mediation of the governmental dispute in Burundi (1994-1997); and the UN preventive deployment in Macedonia (1993-1999) (Wallensteen 2002).
escalation to violence, as already mentioned, means that early prediction may be even more crucial in post-Cold War crises, and thus "early warning systems focusing on signs of impending conflicts are still most valuable" (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000: 640).

Unfortunately, the sophistication of early warning systems does not make up for the lack of will or motivation to act. Another major problem with conflict prevention concerns the mobilisation of outside actors when there is no pressing need to intervene or immediate threat to international security (Lund 1996: 27-28). Post-Cold War threats to international security are complex and diffuse, and the persistence of some realist mindsets in governments and international organisations leads to a reluctance to reconsider international norms on non-interference and sovereignty, and a lack of interest in far-flung conflict in regions of little strategic interest (Lund 1996: 28; Jentleson 2000b: 5). The US Clinton administration in the 1990s did place greater emphasis on a preventive approach to foreign policy (Lund 1996: 5-6), and by 1999 UK Prime Minister Tony Blair was outlining a new 'doctrine of the international community', based on the recognition that "national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration." Nevertheless, this type of rhetoric of intervention for peaceful purposes is often undermined by the selectivity of the trend, as well as the ulterior motives of powerful states that often lie, or are perceived to lie, beneath it (see below).

In any case, there is still significant resistance to the conflict prevention approach. It is berated by its critics as costly, risky, and potentially counter-productive (Stedman 1995). Supporters, on the other hand, argue for the realism of conflict prevention, asserting that the costs of prevention are overestimated, and the assessment of what constitutes interests is too narrow (Jentleson 2000b; Wallensteen 2002). This assertion is supported by the high costs to the international community of reconstruction in South Eastern Europe, and the ramifications of, for example, US support of distant terrorist movements that later become a threat to American security. National priorities tend to be based on short-term domestic political gains rather than long-term

commitments to international peace. This observation is neither novel, (cf. Burton 1990, who argued for domestic solutions to international conflict) nor easily changed, however.

The cost of prevention is nonetheless disputed, since at the early stages of conflict prevention the financial commitment necessary is often hard to estimate. A lack of international agreement on how to act often leads to a ‘wait and see’ approach (Wallensteen 2002: 276). However, logically the cost of military intervention in most cases far outweighs the cost of early prevention (Lund 1996; Brown and Rosecrance 1999; Griffin 2001). The real problem goes back to mobilisation. Decision-making processes in governments and international organisations are not conducive to conflict prevention, as argued above. While lack of action is often attributed to political will, some analysts place budget over will in explaining the lack of priority given to conflict prevention policy (Evans 2001; Ouellette 2002). The definitional problems discussed do not make conflict prevention an attractive option for policy-makers, nor does the wide nature of the concept translate into policy of “chewable chunks” with identifiable exit strategies (Ouellette 2002: 72). Governments face the same problem as international organisations: that of planning long-term policy with yearly budgets, and balancing urgent affairs with less pressing but equally important matters.

Even if the cost analysis supports early action, the problem of when to intervene remains. As we have seen, there is often no motivation to act early on in a conflict situation, and there is the fear that intervention may exacerbate tensions. The idea of a ripe moment for resolution, when intervention is deemed to have a high chance of success, could be helpful for outside actors (Zartman 1989; 2001). This moment usually comes at a stage after the outbreak of violence, when the actors involved reach a point where further violence will not aid their cause. It is therefore more concerned with conflict resolution, rather than earlier conflict prevention. It would be ludicrous to suggest a conflict preventive technique that sits back to allow for the parties to reach a “mutual, hurting stalemate” (Zartman 1989: 272). Nevertheless, since conflict prevention may be attempted at various stages of a conflict cycle, it could be important for identifying fruitful mediation moments in situations of recurring violence and unstable peace. On the other hand, the concept of ripeness has been criticised as too simplistic (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:163), and could
discourage policy-makers from attempting earlier mediation, allowing for conflict escalation. These contesting views complicate decision-making processes, once again making early intervention, and therefore conflict prevention, an unattractive option for policy-makers.

Another fundamental problem with prevention, which is closely linked both to the failure to mobilise third parties to act, and to the difficulty in predicting conflict escalation, is proving that conflict prevention policy has been a success. If success can’t be proven, and therefore precedents established, how can we gauge whether a conflict is likely to become violent, or persuade governments and organisations to practice conflict prevention? It is difficult to prove that preventive action, rather than other factors, stopped the outbreak of a violent conflict (Wallensteen 2002: 279). Perhaps internal dynamics in a domestic conflict changed, or the parties involved decided to resolve the conflict themselves. A preventive approach also assumes that the parties want to resolve the dispute; if not, then perhaps no amount of preventive policy will halt impending violence (Wallensteen 2002: 277). These problems do not undermine conflict preventive efforts, but make policy choices and the prediction of policy outcomes a complex undertaking.

2.3.4 Problems with prevention: competing assumptions about causation
Conflict prevention policy has to be based on assumptions about the causes of war and the conditions for peace. False interpretation of the causes of conflict can lead to ineffective conflict prevention policies. While there seems to be a vague consensus that poverty, lack of resources, and problems of governance and political legitimacy lead to instability (Smith, D. 2001; Levy 2001; Wallensteen 2002), there is much debate about how much these difficulties contribute to the outbreak of conflict, and how they should be tackled. So while a general consensus on the desirability of preventing violent conflict exists, there is a lack of consensus on the conditions that cause this conflict (Dwan 2001: 9; Levy 2001: 56). This makes the application of structural conflict prevention difficult to qualify and motivate.

Identifying root causes is therefore highly normative, and it is in this policy-making stage that the international consensus on conflict prevention begins to show cracks. While there is a wide belief in the notion of democratic peace, this is largely a
Western norm. Conflicts over governance and political legitimacy can certainly be relieved by the strengthening of democratic institutions. However, for the purposes of conflict prevention, a lack of democracy, or equally, human rights violations, are not conflict indicators in authoritarian states where such things are common place (Wallensteen 2002:278). The problems in establishing links between poverty, politics and conflict have already been mentioned. Indicators for structural conflict prevention that are too general only have limited effect. By the turn of the twenty-first century, the UN and the EU were adopting regional and country-specific strategies in order to improve their response to complex root causes of conflict (see chapters 5 and 6).

Long-term conflict preventive approaches are closely linked to development policy. The extent to which this type of policy tackles root causes of conflict is again highly debatable (Stokke 1997; Addison 2000; Wallensteen 2002). The linkage between development and security is a post-Cold War phenomenon that remains relatively underdeveloped (Barth Eide and Ronnfeldt 1998: 153). Political conditionality in terms of democratic practice and human rights is now common in EU trade and aid policies, and can do much to encourage stability in developing or transitional countries. However, this can be paradoxical in effect. Countries in the most need of help, for instance, fail to receive EU and other financial help because their governments don’t meet the stringent conditions on democracy and human rights (Stedman 1995: 19).

Economic conditionality is equally questionable in the promotion of longer-term stability. There is no guarantee that the enforcement of neo-liberal ideals (i.e. the free market, and economic development divorced from state control) by international organisations and financial institutions will promote stability and peace in developing countries (Dickson 2000; Thomas and Reader 2001; Sens 2004: 147). This leaves international organisations and governments open to the charge of projecting Western models sanctioned by international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, rather than projecting stability (Stiglitz 2002).
2.3.5 Problems with prevention: the ethics of intervention

Problems of legitimacy and the ethics of intervention remain a stumbling block for the promotion of conflict prevention, particularly in intra-state conflict. The interpretation of sovereignty became the “key normative challenge of the 1990s” (MacFarlane 2002: 51). In what circumstances is it legitimate for the UN or other actors to intervene in the internal affairs of a state to prevent conflict? The norms of sovereignty and non-interference may have been questioned by analysts and politicians in Europe and the US in cases of human rights abuses in particular, but they are guarded by governments and enshrined in the UN Charter. Developing countries such as India, Pakistan, Algeria and Egypt are suspicious of the principle of prevention, seeing it as an excuse for external interference (Griffin 2001: 486). Similarly, some third world countries equate short-term preventive diplomacy with Western intervention (Swedish Institute of International Affairs 2000: 23). The legitimacy of intervention, whether structural in the form of conditional development aid, or direct in the form of civilian or military intervention, is a fundamental problem for conflict prevention.

During the Cold War, the UN’s room to intervene was limited, and when it did intervene in a preventive capacity, it was generally invited. Of course, intervention was used by both superpowers to enhance their strategic positions, and they were not significantly held back by normative considerations (MacFarlane 2002: 45). Post-Cold War intervention changed in form and content - unilateralism gave way (to some extent) to multilateralism, raising the legitimacy stakes (MacFarlane 2002: 51) and heralding a period of new interventionism (Mayall 1996: 3). Motives and outcomes in post-Cold War interventions have been increasingly scrutinised and called into question. The military intervention in Kosovo by NATO in 1999 was not only criticised for triggering the humanitarian disaster it claimed to be preventing, but has been labelled as the beginning of a Western trend of neo-imperialistic disregard of international law (Chomsky 1999: 11). The selective nature of this trend is morally questionable. The rise of a new principle of acceptable limited intervention has been suggested in light of the Kosovo crisis in particular (Ortega 2001: 29). While strict

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15 MacFarlane (2002) argues that the early post-Cold War trend in multilateralism may give way to a new trend of US unilateralism if the US administration fails to get multilateralist authorisation for interventions under the ‘War on Terror’ rubric (MacFarlane 2002: 83).
conditions, such as a humanitarian catastrophe and the exhaustion of diplomatic efforts must be met before collective military intervention is acceptable, the emerging principle presents a wide interpretation of the UN Charter that does not contradict its tenets (Ortega 2001). Ortega’s suggestions were echoed in the conclusions of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. In 2000, in the wake of the unauthorised intervention in Kosovo by NATO, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for the international community to forge a consensus on the right of humanitarian intervention, and an international commission duly reported its findings in a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect in December 2001. The Committee concluded that “state sovereignty implies responsibility” and that the international community should have the right of humanitarian intervention “where a population is suffering serious harm” (The Responsibility to Protect, UN 2001b: IX). However, clearly states are reluctant to curtail their options by establishing unambiguous rules on intervention. Despite the Committee’s clear consensus and recommendations, many UN member states would prefer its conclusions to be quietly buried; indeed, the recent interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 show the continued lack of international consensus. They also weaken the case for conflict prevention interventions by associating them with unsanctioned pre-emption.

The decision to intervene is fraught with ethical difficulties. Initially, it could be unethical to intervene too early, and therefore prevent necessary change, or equally unethical to intervene too late, allowing for the escalation of violence and the loss of civilian life (Wallensteen 2002: 279). In deciding to intervene, there is always a moral question to ask, and there will always be those who disagree with the action taken or question the final consequences (Wallensteen 2002: 279). Post-Cold War interventions to prevent or manage violent conflict have been hampered by problems of impartiality.16 Neutrality is crucial if outside intervention is to help create a viable peace. Yet this can be particularly difficult for outside parties to maintain or achieve in internal war situations, and international organisations can be open to the charge of favouring one group over another (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 146).

The consequences of intervention in violent conflict can be unpredictable. While outside actors may be able to stop the violence, the long-term viability of internationally imposed peace is dubious. Even after a cease-fire or peace agreement, unless international intervention addresses the underlying causes of conflict, violent conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, as well as in Chechnya can be said to have been suspended rather than ended (Smith, D. 2001: 3). Peacebuilding projects have continued in Bosnia since the internationally-brokered 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, but outside assistance has failed to lead to a significant reconstruction of community relations between the divided groups (Chandler 1999). In Kosovo, conflict between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serb population will simmer until the roots of the conflict (the political status of the province) is adequately addressed. Clearly peace cannot be imposed from outside: its maintenance “has to be primarily the task of former adversaries supported by external assistance” (Jeong 2003: 301).

International organisations, like the EU in the context of the Cotonou Agreement with the ACP countries, have increasingly recognised this. In a phrase borrowed from the informal diplomacy practiced by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (‘track-two diplomacy’), the ‘ownership’ principle, stating that peace is the ultimate responsibility of the community itself, is stressed when promoting conflict prevention or peacebuilding. Nevertheless, the trade policy that is often at the heart of projects sponsored by the EU, the World Bank and the IMF undermines the ownership principle by removing national and local government control over social and economic policy. Enforced rapid privatisation and trade liberalisation in developing countries, for example, can result in a dearth of previously government-administered services and greater poverty and unemployment (Stiglitz 2002: 55). Again, the ethics of such practice reflects a gap between rhetoric and the true ramifications of policy.

These examples serve to illustrate the lack of international consensus on how conflict prevention should be carried out (Griffin 2001; UN 2001). The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan in his Report Prevention of Armed Conflict (UN 2001) reported that while the majority of UN Security Council members expressed overall support for conflict

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17 Emphasis added.
18 The 2000 Cotonou Agreement replaced the EU-ACP preferential trade agreement known as the Lomé Convention. In the new agreement, “the principle of trade liberalization has effectively replaced that of non-reciprocal privileged access... [signaling]... a paradigmatic shift in the focus and direction of EU-ACP relations” (Holland 2002: 219).
prevention, most had different views about the priorities for action. There is little indication that these opinions have changed in recent years. UN member states' views on conflict prevention did not feature prominently in the 2004 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (*A more secure world: our shared responsibilities*), although the states' 'responsibility to protect' was cited as an "emerging norm" which, if reneged, justifies UN intervention to prevent intra-state violence (UN 2004: 57). Despite evidence of shifting norms pertaining to intervention, the vague nature of the consensus on conflict prevention still hides the varied views on international norms and priorities, and hampers practical policy application (Dwan 2001: 10). Paradoxically, consensus can be seen as a liability as well as a strength for conflict prevention (Dwan 2000: 9). All actors trying to carry out conflict prevention policy planning and application face these problems.

2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has examined conflict prevention in contemporary perspective, identifying the prevention of superpower conflict and conflict prevention by the UN as key Cold War precursors to post-Cold War conflict prevention. Reaction against the superpower nuclear confrontation and associated management strategies contributed to the emergence of conflict prevention theory in the Peace Research and Conflict Resolution fields, and these ideas gained credence as public opinion in Europe and America increasingly turned against the policies of nuclear deterrence and crisis management pursued by the superpowers. Developments in Peace and Conflict Research laid the foundations for an expansion of interest in conflict prevention in the post-Cold War era. The UN and its Secretary-Generals pioneered conflict prevention, in the guise of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, as a policy of multilateral intervention. Both concepts were firmly established as UN competences during the Cold War period, enabling their further development as conflict prevention strategies in the post-Cold War years.

The problems associated with the implementation of post-Cold War conflict prevention were then outlined. The upheavals of the early post-Cold War period brought complex conflicts back onto the European continent. Conflict prevention emerged as an approach to violent conflict in the new climate of cooperation, but debates about the changing nature of conflict, trends in intra-state conflict, regional
complexity and arms proliferation, were to render post-Cold War conflicts difficult to prevent. Definitional difficulties did not help to make conflict prevention an identifiable and applicable policy. Additionally, gaining acceptance for a policy with inherent difficulties of policy prediction, actor motivation, legitimacy, and demonstrating policy success was to be a challenge for the EU and other actors. Yet the EU’s place in the emerging security environment of the post-Cold War period (see chapter 4) would accelerate the organisation’s policy responses, conflict prevention in particular, onto center stage.
CHAPTER 3
The External Relations of the European Union

3.1 Introduction
This chapter charts the origins and development of European Union (EU) external relations from the beginning of the European integration project in the 1950s, to the development of external relations policy and rudimentary foreign policy with European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s and 1980s, and finally to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the 1990s. European Union foreign policy is a post-Cold War phenomenon, but has a legacy of at least two decades in the CFSP's precursor, EPC. From the early 1970s, the EU practiced diplomacy and gained an international voice through Member State foreign policy cooperation. In terms of development policy, EU trade and aid relations with third countries date back to the beginning of the Union, and originate in EU Member State relations with former colonies.

In order to understand the context of post-Cold War EU conflict prevention, we therefore examine the history and development of EU external relations, focusing in particular on the EU's early aptitude for external stability projection through EPC and development policy. The problem of EU external relations coherence and coordination, identified as a particular issue for EU conflict prevention because of its cross-pillar nature, is introduced and explained in terms of the incremental development of EU external relations responsibilities and the different procedures and divisions between the two main EU institutions: the European Commission and the Council of the EU.

3.2 The Origins of EU External Relations
3.2.1 The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the precursor to today's European Union, was one of a number of regional and international institutions established after the end of the Second World War in response to the growing complexities of twentieth century government (Robertson 1973: 1). The ECSC was born out of the need for institutionalised relations between European states to allow for post-war...
economic construction. Post-war plans for a united and peaceful Europe promoted by the European movement, (a disparate collection of individuals and groups that supported the idea of European unity (Dinan 1994: 11)) led initially to the creation of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1947 to administer US-donated Marshall Plan aid, and the Council of Europe in 1949, an intergovernmental forum that fell short of the mark for supporters of a federal Europe (Smith, H. 2002: 39; Nugent 1999: 13).

The impetus for more substantial European integration came from France – arguably the country most at risk from the prospect of unfettered German economic and military revival. French politicians and diplomats Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman were the central figures in the planning of the ECSC, ratified in 1952. The signatories (France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) established a supranational High Authority, with Monnet as president. Monnet's insistence on shared sovereignty proved to be the stumbling block for British participation, but made the organisation the unique and sometimes controversial body its successor still is today.

The increasingly clear division between Western and Eastern Europe as the Cold War bi-polar system took shape provided a further impetus for Western European economic integration (Dinan 1994:16). However, Cold War Europe had developed, by the mid-1950s, not only a geographical division, but a separation between economic and defence/foreign policy - the latter being overseen by the United States in the West and the USSR in the East (Smith, H. 2002: 39). While both Schuman and Monnet saw economic cooperation as just the beginning of the European project, further plans for political cooperation were stifled by the international climate and by the real disagreements between the Member States over the pace and form of integration (Nugent 1999: 21). Plans for a European Defence Community and a European Political Community foundered in the 1950s, but proposals to expand the remit of the ECSC were accepted by the six original signatories, leading to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in 1957. These institutions ran in parallel until 1967 when a merger Treaty came into effect. After this, the organisation was generally known as the European Community (EC), and eventually the EU.
The institutional skeleton of the current EU was put in place, with a Commission, Council of Ministers, a Court of Justice and a small (as yet unelected) parliamentary assembly. The agreement to create a common market, with the removal of internal trade restrictions, a common external tariff, and dialogue on a common agriculture and transport policy, became the focus of European integration.

3.2.2 The origins of development policy

International institutional initiatives in development policy are a post-1945 phenomena, generally associated with the United Nations system (Luard 1977: 240). The EU, however, is a major contributor of development aid, and this legacy dates back to the origins of the Union.

Economic integration in Western Europe had external implications for third countries, particularly those that had colonial ties to ECSC/EC Member States (generally known as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries). As a result, associate status for overseas dependencies, (on the insistence of the French government) was granted in the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC (Holland 2002: 26; Smith, H. 2002: 183). This special relationship brought dependencies under the same economic rules as EEC Member States, discriminating against other developing countries, and creating a special EEC assistance fund, the European Development Fund (EDF) (Feld 1983: 105; Holland 2002: 26). The rules were reviewed in the 1960s as dependencies began to achieve independence, leading to the first of many conventions (Yaoundé conventions, later the Lomé conventions and now the Cotonou agreement) governing the relationship between the EEC and the former colonies (Holland 2002: 27). The privileges were extended to include ex-colonies and overseas territories of new EEC Member States - notably those connected to the United Kingdom after the first enlargement in 1973. Development cooperation was gradually extended to non-associated developing countries, with Asia and Latin America receiving assistance from 1976 (Smith, H. 2002: 207; 218).

Until the end of the Cold War, EU connections with developing countries were generally confined to trade and development issues, and primarily the remit of the European Commission (Smith, H. 2002: 221). Security issues in developing regions, apart from the few incidences of EPC engagement (see below), came to the fore in the
post-Cold War period as the EU expanded its international vision. Development cooperation was increasingly politicised by being linked to CFSP objectives, and featuring political conditionality clauses. From the origins of EU development cooperation, to today’s advanced EU development and humanitarian provisions, the EU has been subject to criticism both for perpetuating colonial dependency and for not achieving stated development objectives (Holland 2002: 27; Smith, H. 2002: 195). However, the EU’s role in development cooperation was to form a key element of its post-Cold War conflict prevention policy.

3.2.3 European Political Cooperation

European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established with the Luxembourg Report of 1970, but has its origins in decades of debate about the form, function and advantages of creating a European political community (Nuttall 1992: 30).

Initiatives during the 1950s and 1960s to create a European Defence Community and European Political Community stumbled, firstly because the French Assembly failed to ratify them, and then secondly because President de Gaulle opposed any further supranational integration (Allen and Wallace 1982: 22). His attempt to instigate regular meetings of Foreign Ministers raised fears among other EEC members that national cooperation would undermine the Community and jeopardise the NATO alliance (Allen and Wallace 1982: 22-23). Defence issues were therefore to remain predominantly the domain of NATO, established in 1949, and the Western European Union (WEU), an organisation of states that had signed the Brussels Pact in 1948 (UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), an alliance against Germany. Established in 1955, the WEU incorporated a mutual defence agreement and prepared the ground for wider discussions on defence cooperation.

The breakthrough for political cooperation was to come after President de Gaulle stepped down as French President in 1969. By this time, the EEC was under increasing pressure to act politically as well as economically. De Gaulle’s successor, Pompidou, adopted a more flexible approach which allowed for progress in political cooperation and the accession of the UK to the EEC, blocked by de Gaulle on two previous occasions (Nuttall 1992: 47). Decisions made by Member States at a conference in The Hague in 1969 were confirmed in the 1970 Luxembourg Report,
which established European Political Cooperation (EPC). EPC was to entail regular intergovernmental contact and dialogue between Foreign Ministers of the Member States; it remained divorced from the Community both to satisfy the French requirement for intergovernmentalism, and to allay the Dutch fear that institutionalisation of Heads of Government meetings would undermine Community institutions (Nuttall 1992: 48). The officials from Member State foreign ministries that drafted the report became the Political Committee, the main EPC body, meeting four times a year initially to prepare the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. The biannual Ministerial Meetings were to be chaired by the Foreign Minister of the state holding the Presidency of the Community (Nuttall 1992: 54). The Copenhagen Report of 1973 allowed the Political Committee to meet as often as was necessary, and formalised the role of Working Groups in the elaboration of EPC (Nuttall 1992: 76). The London Report of 1981 further extended EPC by outlining the ‘Troika’ procedure, (by which the Presidency would be assisted in political cooperation duties by officials from the preceding and succeeding presidencies), by creating a crisis procedure to allow the Political Committee to convene within 48 hours, and by finally fully associating the European Commission with EPC procedures (Nuttall 1992: 179-180). The Single European Act of 1986 brought EPC into the same legal and institutional framework as the EC, “paving the way ultimately to a single Treaty [the TEU]” (Nuttall 1992: 248). By this time, EPC had more than 20 Working Groups and was establishing a dedicated Secretariat (Nuttall 1992: 17). Institutional proliferation and complexity established EPC as a unique type of intergovernmental process before the inauguration of the CFSP (Bonvicini 1988: 52). Its development is doubly significant since the TEU did not fundamentally change the form and character of political cooperation.

As Nuttall contends, the association of EPC with the Community framework was not a foregone conclusion in the negotiations running up to the SEA (1992: 248). However, the acceptance that the EC and the EPC were part of the same project did not lead to a rationalisation of external relations procedures. Synergy may have been increasingly sought between economic and political policy, but parallel procedures made this a complex task, especially since Member States were reluctant for Community involvement in EPC for different reasons (either because they feared
supranational contamination of EPC, or intergovernmental contamination of the Community) (Nuttall 1992: 260).

3.2.4 EPC: an aptitude for preventive diplomacy?

EPC in the 1970s gave the EC a voice in international affairs when Member States could agree, and, by the 1980s was practicing "quiet, long-term, preventive diplomacy" in the context of East-West relations, the Middle East and Southern Europe (Hill 1992: 136). EPC was better known for reacting to situations and crises as they happened (Allen 1982: 69). However, longer-term considerations were increasingly prominent as EPC decisions became more closely linked to Community competences. EC economic clout was more and more employed in support of EPC decisions (e.g. sanctions), and the economic implications of foreign policy decisions were recognised (Bovinici 1988: 62).

Political cooperation in the early 1970s focused on issues with a direct impact on Western Europe: the Middle East and the development of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Nuttall 1992: 56). The CSCE process reflected a more cooperative turn in East-West European relations in the climate of détente, especially in tandem with the West German government's policy of recognition and reconciliation towards East Germany. The pan-European conference gave EC Member States the opportunity, through EPC, to develop a collective European position outside the Atlantic Alliance (Nuttall 1992: 57). The scope of the CSCE negotiations, inclusive of economics, science, technology and the environment, required the involvement of the Community, and therefore early contact and a degree of coordination between the parallel EPC-Community procedures (Von Groll 1982: 61). Close cooperation between Member States not only advanced the cause and procedures of EPC, but led to a leadership role for the EC in the CSCE which enhanced its international status, and which tested inter-pillar coordination and coherence (see below) (Von Groll 1982: 68). EC coordinated initiatives to establish a cooperative relationship between Eastern and Western Europe, through the CSCE process and other initiatives, can arguably be seen as preventive diplomacy, and a forerunner of the conflict prevention role that the EU was to adopt in the 1990s.
The EC, through EPC, established dialogue with the group of Arab States in the
Middle East known as the ‘Arab League’ in 1973-74 (‘Euro-Arab Dialogue).
Dialogue with the EC was sought by the Arab League in the aftermath of the Yom
Kippur war (during which Egypt and Syria tried, and failed to regain territory
occupied by Israel) and the oil-producing states’ subsequent oil embargo and massive
price increase aimed at states supporting Israel (Allen 1982: 69). EC Member States’
views on the Middle East were traditionally divergent, and, in 1973 complicated by
the different treatment they received from the oil-producing states (the UK and France
were unaffected, some states had their oil supply reduced, and the Netherlands, like
over the oil crisis, conflict in the Middle East, and the US negative reaction to EPC
negotiation with the Arab League (as well as continued Member State disagreements)
meant that these issues were ruled out by Member States as topics for discussion in
EC-Arab League dialogue (Allen 1982: 72). While discussion was narrow in scope,
this situation opened the door for the involvement of the European Commission in the
dialogue, thereby facilitating EPC-Community cooperation (Allen 1982: 74). EC
efforts to develop a political role in the Middle East continued to falter under US and
Israeli resistance and Member State divergences (Smith, H. 2002: 168), and this
situation did not change fundamentally in the post-Cold War era.

EPC was generally reactive to crises in Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain and Greece)
in the first half of the 1970s, but extended aid to post-revolutionary Portugal to help
promote democracy and made diplomatic démarches to Cyprus to encourage a
political settlement between Greece and Turkey (Van Praag 1982). It gained valuable
experience in traditional diplomacy during these crises, generally regarded as an
‘uninstitutionalised’ environment when compared to EPC progress in the context of
the CSCE, the UN, or Euro-Arab dialogue (Van Praag 1982: 104). Additionally,
enlargement to Spain, Portugal and Greece in the 1980s had a conflict prevention
dimension that foreshadowed the EU’s post-Cold War relationship with the
transitional states in Central and Eastern Europe.

Chris Hill recognised the EC’s conflict prevention potential when he argued that “its
comparative advantage is in the long-term effort to change the environments out of
which crises tend to spring – so as to inoculate against them” (1992:146). However,
the EU’s potential in conflict prevention was constrained by the Cold War system, and by a lack of shared external relations objectives by the Member States. The EC struggled to emerge from the shadow of US diplomacy, and its actions were inhibited by attempts to draw dividing lines between the political and economic spheres. Furthermore, European defence cooperation was inhibited by disagreements between Member States and by a fear that it could damage the Atlantic Alliance, and the US security guarantee it signified. Nevertheless, the EC did develop a second, distinctive Western voice that did not always agree with the US (Hill 1992). EPC established a foothold for the EC in foreign policy, and also demonstrated its potential for projecting stability beyond its borders.

3.3 The Post-Cold War European Union: External Relations Procedures and Institutions

3.3.1 Treaty reforms: From EPC to CFSP

EPC was legally codified in the SEA of 1986, although not incorporated into the EC treaty (Nugent 1999: 50). The SEA aimed to create a European Union, an objective that was the result of years of debates and initiatives throughout the 1980s (Smith, H. 2002: 85). The issue of consistency between EPC and the Community was formally recognised, but was to remain a fundamental problem (see below) (Smith, H. 2002: 92). By 1989-1990, the EC’s drive to create an economic and monetary union was affected by the dramatic international events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and Member States therefore convened a parallel intergovernmental conference (IGC) on political union (Nugent 1999: 61). The result was the declaration of a ‘common foreign and security policy’, which superseded EPC and was brought into the single institutional framework in the 1991/2 Treaty on European Union (TEU; signed in February 1992 and coming into force in November 1993).

The TEU created a European Union of three ‘pillars’, although the structure of the EU was not referred to like this officially (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 15). The new Treaty incorporated the European Community (pillar one), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (pillar two) and Justice and Home Affairs (pillar three). While Member State governments could largely agree on bringing foreign policy and cooperation in justice and home affairs within the ambit of EU responsibilities, they could not agree on relinquishing these policy areas to the ‘Community’ method of
policy-making and implementation, which gives considerable power to the European Commission and does not rely on unanimity among Member States at Council level. The pillar system was therefore established as a compromise, which allowed Member States to cooperate, but remain in national control of the development of the CFSP and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Holland 1997: 1). The CFSP did not include any legal instruments, and was not subject to rulings by the European Court of Justice. Community decision-making bodies are the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Decision-making in the CFSP and JHA pillars is carried out by the Council of Ministers and Member States, with the Commission and European Parliament playing lesser roles.

Community external relations underwent revision in light of the increased demand for EU development and humanitarian aid. The legal basis and objectives of development cooperation were fully outlined for the first time in the TEU. Community policy was to foster sustainable economic and social development, integrate developing countries into the world economy, and tackle poverty (TEU, Title II, Article 130u). The fall of the Berlin wall was to have a significant consequence for EU development cooperation: EU financial assistance was increasingly diverted from the South to the East (Holland 2002: 9). Political conditionality increasingly featured in EU trade and aid agreements (see chapter 5). Humanitarian aid was not explicitly mentioned in EU treaties, but had been a feature of EU external relations under the development banner since the 1960s. It underwent reform and centralisation in 1992 with the creation of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and the Union’s humanitarian objectives were finally fully outlined in a 1996 Council Regulation (1257/96).

The machinery of CFSP incorporated existing EPC structures (meetings of Foreign Ministers and Political Committee; working groups and secretariat), but also included some new procedures. Member States could agree on a ‘common position’, which specifies Union objectives, and with which national positions should conform. They could also adopt a ‘joint action’ in the CFSP field, agreeing on a certain course of action, from which Member States could opt out (Smith, K. 2004: 10).
As critics of the CFSP pointed out during the 1990s, the common element of the policy was misleading (Rosecrance 1998: 15). It was, at any rate, over-optimistic: the EU did not have a single common foreign policy (the CFSP sits alongside Member State national foreign policies), and neither was there enough common ground between Member States to plan or implement a coherent policy (Holland 1997: 5; Rummel and Wiedemann 1998: 53). Analysts identified a gap between the expectations of CFSP and its actual capabilities (Hill 1993), particularly in the case of EU disarray during the crises in Former Yugoslavia in 1991, and during the subsequent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. The EU was too hasty in proclaiming its ability to deal with the complex succession crises in Slovenia and Croatia before the CFSP reforms of the TEU were even in place, and suffered a blow to its reputation as its diplomacy failed, violent conflict erupted, and EU institutions and decision-making creaked under the pressure (Peterson 1998: 6). Nevertheless, early optimism was tempered by experience, and expectations, both within and outside the EU, became more realistic about what the EU could achieve in foreign policy (Hill 1998: 31). The conflict in Former Yugoslavia was to influence the CFSP reforms in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, with an emphasis on operational capacities, coherent foreign policy representation, and planning and analysis competences.

The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (ratified in 1999) revised the TEU to iron out some institutional difficulties, including problems with planning and implementing the CFSP. The Treaty was widely regarded as a disappointing result after the long-winded IGC negotiations; it lacked the necessary focus on institutional reforms needed for enlargement (Cameron 1999: 68; Nugent 1999: 81). However, progress was made in the CFSP area, with qualified majority voting (QMV) being extended to the CFSP (albeit with caveats to allow for Member States to block decision-making by QMV, and to abstain) (Nugent 1999: 85-86). Furthermore, the post of High Representative for CFSP was created within the Council of the EU to assist the Presidency in all CFSP matters (the post-holder would also be the Secretary-General of the Council). The High Representative was also tasked with heading the new Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) in the Council Secretariat, a small team of staff charged with monitoring and assessing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP, providing early warning of potential crises and producing policy options for the Council ('Declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning
The Union’s operational tasks were outlined by referring to the WEU’s ‘Petersberg Tasks’, including “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (Article J. 7 (2), Treaty of Amsterdam 1997). The Member States were divided over the proposed incorporation of the WEU into the EU, and therefore the WEU remained the arena for defence cooperation until the breakthrough in 1998 when the new UK Labour government agreed to pursue crisis management tasks under EU auspices. Finally, the treaty dealt with CFSP financing by charging CFSP expenditure (apart from operations with military or defence implications) to the EC budget.

CFSP reform was not on the agenda of the 2000 Nice Treaty (ratified in 2003), although the failure to fully address the institutional issues arising from the impending enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe were to have serious repercussions for the Union. At the Laeken European Council of December 2001, Member States agreed to convene the ‘Convention on the Future of Europe,’ appointing Valéry Giscard d’Estaing as chairman. The Convention was designed to facilitate a more open discussion on institutional reform and the future shape of the EU than was usual in IGCs. The resulting Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe of 2003 was finally agreed by Member State heads of government after more negotiations towards the end of 2004, but faces an uncertain future because of ratification problems in a number of Member States. The Treaty includes some important CFSP reforms that address lingering problems of coordination and coherency – notably the role of European Foreign Minister, a post bringing together the responsibilities of High Representative for CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations in order to improve external relations coherency. As Jolyon Howorth has pointed out, this post is the “first time in the history of the European project that the supranational and the intergovernmental functions have been merged in a single individual” (Howorth 2004: 502). Whether this would result in Council consolidation of power over the Commission, greater Community input into the CFSP, or a more equal institutional partnership, remains to be seen, as does the future of the Treaty itself. The post certainly has the capacity to increase inter-pillar and inter-institutional external relations coordination (see chapter 5).
At any rate, CFSP reforms during the 1990s did consolidate the Council’s domination of the foreign policy field, while the Commission’s external reach remained unmatched by institutional influence in foreign affairs. The incremental development of EU external relations resulted in a complex institutional set-up, with external duties being partly the responsibility of the European Commission through its development and trade policies, and partly the responsibility of the Council of the EU. The roles of the key institutions in external relations (the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament) are outlined below.

3.3.2 The European Commission’s role in external relations
The Commission’s underdeveloped role in foreign policy does not reflect its powerful role in the EU as a whole. The institution is at the centre of EU policy initiation and development (Nugent 1999). It is responsible for initiating policy exclusively for matters under EC jurisdiction, and jointly with Member States with policy under the intergovernmental pillars two and three (CFSP and JHA). The Commission is then responsible for overseeing the implementation of policy after decisions are made by the Council of Ministers. The institution has a hierarchical structure, with Commissioners at the top (led by the President), supported by personal cabinets, responsible for twenty-six policy-specific Directorates-General (DGs) and nine services, which in turn are divided into directorates and directorates into units. 19 With its powers largely concentrated in the economic sphere, the Commission was traditionally not associated with foreign policy. However, a strict division of policy responsibilities became increasingly difficult to maintain in contemporary times.

Indeed, the European Commission’s range of external responsibilities has expanded since the end of the Cold War. This reflects the increasing politicisation of the EU in the aftermath of the Cold War, as it had to respond to the changing political situation in Europe, and also a recognition of the interconnectedness of economic and political policies. In a security context where economic, environmental, social and political upheavals were viewed as threats to the stability of the EU, it became imperative to expand the scope of Commission activity. Economic policy was increasingly recognised as being a crucial facet of a comprehensive, joined-up foreign policy.

Moreover, the Commission's role in coordinating Western aid to the former Soviet countries, and subsequently negotiating association and accession agreements, gave the institution a key role in enlargement and the politics of the new Europe. This was not matched by a strong politico-security role, however. It was the U.S that dealt with the problems of the legacy of nuclear weapons in the Baltic states after the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The gradual extension of Commission responsibilities has not taken place without a considerable amount of resentment from Member States, and institutional in-fighting. The Commission is meant to stand for general EU interests rather than Member State interests, and as such represents a supranationalist agenda that often sits uneasily with national interests. Foreign policy is closely linked to national identities and issues of Member State sovereignty. The pooling of foreign policy decision-making at European level was always going to hit a brick wall of Member State recalcitrance and fear of supranationalism. The inauguration of foreign policy cooperation, as we have seen, was a reaction to the drive for internal integration and to international developments - détente as well as decolonisation, and political developments in the Mediterranean (Regelsberger 1988). These events were to have ramifications for the European Community that the Commission could not easily be divorced from; for example, the special relationship with former colonial countries and enlargement negotiations with Greece, Spain and Portugal. Nevertheless, despite the Commission's role in external economic affairs and the role of Commission delegations in third countries, the Commission was kept at arms length, being "more than an observer...but less than a full participant" (Nuttall 1988: 104).

The Commission was fully associated with the CFSP in the TEU. A Commission representative attends Council meetings at all levels, with increasing involvement commensurate with the creation of new structures for CFSP/ESDP since the late 1990s. While the Commission does not have the monopoly on policy proposals as in pillar one, it could now make foreign policy proposals like a Member State (although it has been reluctant to employ this right because of a fear of intergovernmentalising the EC pillar (Ginsberg 1997: 26)). Former areas of difficulty, like sanctions policy (relying on Member State political decisions outside the EC framework) were rationalised, leading to a more joined-up external relations policy, and the opportunity
to present to the world a single, coordinated EU voice. The Commission's overseas delegations, (originally established to give technical assistance to developing countries under the Lomé Convention) gave the Commission a global reach, increasingly not confined to the economic sphere. By 2004, there were 130 delegations (Allen and Smith 2004: 95), playing a role in the CFSP and managing development assistance. Commission external responsibilities have been subject to continual reorganisation in the 1990s, spread over 4 directorate generals - external relations (CFSP and non-ACP development), development (ACP development and ECHO), enlargement and trade (see Figure 3.1). This reflects an a lack of consensus on the best way to organise Commission external relations responsibilities (Nugent and Saurugger 2002: 348).

Figure 3.1: European Commission: External Affairs Directorates-General 1999-2004

3.3.3 The European Parliament and external relations

The European Parliament (EP), originating in the Assembly of the ECSC, and directly elected by European citizens since 1979, has a limited role in the mechanics of EU foreign policy. However, it has, since the Amsterdam reforms, joint control over the
CFSP budget with the Council. It has the right to be consulted and informed, and can influence policy in the early stages of its formation. The EU Presidency is tasked with presenting a report to the Parliament on EU foreign policy, and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can put questions to the Presidency on a monthly basis (Smith, H. 2002: 111). The Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Committee has been influential in its lobbying of the Council of the EU and the European Commission on foreign policy and external relations issues, and was instrumental in the initiative to set up the 1997 Conflict Prevention Network (CPN). In 1999, drawing on a report from the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), the EP recommended that the Council of the EU conduct a feasibility study on the establishment of an EU Civil Peace Corps, to carry out conflict prevention tasks in cooperation with NGOs (European Parliament 2000a). As yet, the proposal for an integrated civilian force has not been taken up by EU Presidencies. The EU is still developing civilian crisis management competences based on pledged contributions from Member States.

While the European Parliament’s input into the CFSP is limited, it has been a vocal critic of the CFSP’s lack of democratic accountability and the CFSP pillar structure (Monar 1997: 40). In 2001, a European Parliament Briefing Note20 (Instruments of Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management Available to the European Union) concluded that the EU should “shift its focus from crisis management to conflict prevention, including structural preventive measures”, and work closely with NGOs and other regional and international organisations in order to make an effective contribution to conflict prevention (European Parliament 2001: 12). A number of MEPs have contributed to the debate on EU conflict prevention.21 The Parliament’s role as watchdog on the development of ESDP, however, continues to be constrained by limited access to sensitive ESDP documents (see Tappert 2003b).

The Parliament’s influence is also visible in external relations in the context of development policy, since this Community policy is subject to the rules of the co-

20 Written by an independent researcher and therefore not necessarily expressing the official view of the European Parliament.

21 For example, German Green MEP, Elisabeth Schroedter has been a vocal commentator (see 'Kultur der Prævention – Anspruch und Wirklichkeit' [Culture of Prevention – Expectation and Reality] in Wissenschaft und Frieden, February 2004.
decision procedure, in which the Parliament has the right to amend and veto certain legislative proposals (Nugent 1999). In particular, it has the right to veto EU association and cooperation agreements with third countries, which gives it the power to influence political conditionality clauses, flexing its muscles in the field of human rights and good governance. The Parliament has been instrumental in instigating debates and policy on a number of development issues, including the role of women in development, healthcare issues and refugees (Holland 2002:13).

3.3.4 The role of the Council of the EU in foreign policy
The Council has the upper hand in external relations: it is the most powerful EU institution, and CFSP procedures largely rely on the unanimous decisions of Member States. The pillar framework brings foreign policy inside the EU, yet it remains a hybrid policy area, being neither entirely intergovernmental, nor subject to the rules and procedures of Community policy-making. As such, the Council has had to adapt to formally accommodate the CFSP, and ensure coordination and coherency with Community external relations (Galloway 1995: 211). The CFSP mirrors the nature of the Council: it is both an intergovernmental institution representing the interests of Member States, and a supranational institution with its own identity and Treaty provisions, increasingly taking decisions by qualified majority voting (QMV) rather than by unanimity (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 8).

As the key decision-making body of the EU, the Council operates in various formats:

- the European Council, consisting of heads of state;\(^{22}\)
- the Council of Ministers, consisting of ministers of Member State governments;
- the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), consisting of national delegations;
- the Council bureaucratic arm, the General Secretariat;
- Council working groups.

Each has a key role in the development of the CFSP. The bi-annual European Council sets politico-security priorities and guidelines. Formally institutionalised since 1974,

\(^{22}\)The European Council is officially a separate institution.
the European Council provides leadership and direction, underlining the key role of national governments in the institutional structure of the EU. The Council of Ministers consists of 9 (formerly 20) sectoral councils, with the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC; formerly General Affairs Council, GAC) being at the top of the hierarchy (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 11). The GAERC makes final policy decisions on the basis of overall objectives set by heads of state.

The work of the GAERC is prepared by COREPER, a permanent Brussels institution consisting of career diplomats and officials from Member States (Westlake 1995). Initially seen as an intergovernmental intruder on the Community process, COREPER can be regarded as being instrumental in the Brusselisation of European foreign policy (Allen 1999: 56), since its job is to negotiate a consensus between Member State positions – effectively to create a workable EU stance on foreign policy issues before the Council of Ministers level. Operating as two committees since 1962, COREPER I is concerned with technical issues, while COREPER II prepares meetings of the GAERC, the second most influential sectoral council, the Economic and Finance Council (ECOFIN), and also the European Council (Westlake 1995).

The General Secretariat of the Council consists of approximately 3000 staff working in nine Directorates-General (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 347; 354). As well as DGs dealing with CFSP issues, ESDP, defence and civilian crisis management, the General Secretariat houses the new CFSP/ESDP bodies (PPEWU, Situation Centre, Police Unit) and is headed by a Secretary-General, who is also the High Representative for CFSP. It is mainly responsible for preparation, record-keeping, processing and circulating documentation, translating, and providing legal services (Nugent 1999). In particular, it drafts reports of working group meetings during the first stage of the policy-making process (after a proposal from the Commission is received) (Westlake 1995).

The Council is also served by a number of senior policy committees and working parties. These bodies had grown to over 400 by the time the Council first released details of them in 1999, but have now been reduced to around 160 (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 217). The growth of Council responsibilities has gradually taken some preparatory power away from COREPER. Specialist policy committees are
established by treaties or by Council decisions, and include, in the CFSP sphere, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) as an example of the former, and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) as examples of the latter (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 217). Working groups (or parties) are described as the "life blood" of the Council (Westlake 1995: 312). Consisting of Member State experts and a Commission representative, they fall at the bottom of the preparatory hierarchy, and tend to be standing committees of a specialist nature. They are presided over by the Presidency, who has an important administrative role in the policy-making process, being responsible for arranging and chairing all Council meetings. The office is held on a rotational basis by Member States for six-monthly periods, during which the Presidency also represents the EU abroad in CFSP matters, including the diplomatic troika.

3.3.5 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

The European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) emerged as a central element of the CFSP, demonstrating the EU’s will to become fully operational in (primarily) external crisis management. The acronym “has come to cover both a specific policy and a set of dedicated institutions” (Ortega 2004: 58). As Brian White has pointed out, the emphasis was on ‘security’ rather than ‘defence’ (White 2001: 149). The emergence of an autonomous EU policy was stalled by Member State disagreements, the ambiguous stance of the US, and the consolidation of NATO as the prime European security organisation (Sjursen 1999: 6). Progress came in 1994 when the NATO Council accepted the idea of a European Security and Defence ‘Identity’ (ESDI), and in 1996 allowed for WEU (still regarded as the EU’s defence wing) command and control of the new rapid response military outfit – the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) for European operations (Ginsberg 1997: 31; Sjursen 1999: 6). However, these developments brought the EU closer to, and dependent on NATO, and were widely regarded as a victory for the ‘Atlanticist’ camp, led by the UK (Sjursen 1999: 6; White 2001: 149).

Throughout the 1990s, the EU’s CFSP had been criticised for its weak institutions, its lack of identity, and the differing approaches and interests of EU Member States (Edwards 1997; Rosecrance 1998; Zielonka 1998). By the beginning of the twenty-
first century, however, analysts were commenting on the rapid progress made in ESDP (Duke 2001; Deighton 2002; Cornish and Edwards 2001), and the EU High Representative for CFSP had produced an EU Security Strategy to guide external action. The breakthrough for ESDP came at the 1998 St. Malo Anglo-French summit, when the new British Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, agreed to the development of an autonomous EU crisis management force. This initiative gained further impetus from the failure to formulate a coherent EU response to the Kosovo crisis in 1999, as well as a gradual convergence of EU Member State foreign policy positions (Andréani, Bertram and Grant 2001: 12-13). The initial emphasis was on the military aspects of ESDP, and from 1999, after the appointment of Javier Solana as High Representative for CFSP and the decisions made at the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils, this dimension developed at a fast and ambitious rate.

Progress has developed on the basis of a consensus among Member State governments that an autonomous EU military capacity would not duplicate or challenge the role of NATO as Europe’s primary defence organisation. The ‘defence’ element was misleading, as the focus was on external crisis response, not defence in the traditional sense. The collective defence clause in the increasingly defunct WEU (Article 5) was maintained, in part because neutral members of the EU could not accept its amalgamation into the EU and because the EU could not be seen to be duplicating NATO’s role. Neither was there much progress made in defence industry cooperation, although this was changing by November 2003, when the Council decided to create an Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments, under the responsibility of the Defence Ministers (Council of the EU 2003e). The Agency was established by a CFSP Joint Action in July 2004, and will contribute to crisis management by improving defence capabilities and defining longer-term capability requirements.

Key decisions were taken, and concrete targets set, at the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki European Councils. EU leaders agreed to create an EU crisis management force, commonly called the ‘European rapid reaction force (ERRF)’ to undertake military Petersberg tasks. The target was a force of 50-60 000 troops to be deployable within 60 days, for a minimum period of one year. Capability action plans and Member State commitment conferences followed. ESDP was declared operational at the December
2001 Laeken European Council. Member State Ministers of Defence played an increasing role in the development of the headline goal, leading to separate Defence Ministers Council meetings in the GAERC by May 2002. By December 2002, the Union was preparing to replace the UN Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina with an EU-led operation. The EU’s first autonomous military operation (ARTEMIS), carried out in Bunia, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was successfully completed on 1st September 2003. The Headline Goal was declared met in 2003, and a new goal was adopted at the June 2004 European Council (Headline Goal 2010). The 2010 Headline Goal focuses on the quality of EU civilian and military capabilities, and includes the development of EU battle groups, consisting of highly skilled battalion sized groups (of 1,500 soldiers each), available for peacekeeping operations. The EU launched its most ambitious military operation to date in December 2004, when it took over NATO peacekeeping tasks in Bosnia (Operation ALTHEA).

Decisions made at the 1999 Cologne European Council also led to WEU crisis management functions being transferred to the EU. WEU military personnel joined EU military structures, and the WEU Satellite Center and Institute for Security Studies became agencies of the CFSP.

After WEU capacities in crisis management were transferred to the EU, dialogue began between the EU and NATO about protocols for EU use of NATO European operational headquarters and other assets. These facilities would be required for more ambitious military Petersberg operations. Negotiations, beginning in 1999 and leading to an agreement with NATO by the end of 2002, were known as the ‘Berlin-Plus’ arrangements. Agreement on EU use of NATO assets was reached by the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council, and the first Berlin-Plus military operation (CONCORDIA) was launched in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) on 31st March 2003, and completed on 15th December 2003. Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia uses NATO common assets and capabilities.

The Council of the EU has seen considerable institutional development to support the ESDP (see Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Council crisis management structures

- European Council
  - General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)
    - High Representative
      - COREPER
        - Political and Security Committee
          - General Secretariat
            - Policy Unit (PPEWU) and Situation Centre
              - DG External Relations
                - Directorates
                  - European Security and Defence Policy
                  - Defence Issues
                  - Civilian Crisis Management (including Police Unit)
            - Military Committee
              - Military Staff
            - Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)
New decision-making bodies were required to enable the EU to carry out Petersberg operations. Most importantly, the EU needed a body to provide strategic and political control of EU-led military and civilian operations - the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Established as an interim body (based in the Council of the EU) in March 2000 after commitments made at the 1999 Cologne European Council, the PSC became a permanent body in January 2001, and is composed of Member State representatives with political and security expertise. The EU lacked the necessary military expertise to undertake crisis management operations. The Military Committee (MC), supported by Military Staff (MS), were therefore established as interim bodies in the Council until becoming permanent in April and June 2001 respectively. The Military Committee, composed of Member State military experts, was tasked with providing military advice to the PSC. The Military Staff supports the work of the Committee, and is mandated to provide early warning through the integrated civil/military Situation Centre (SITCEN), linked to the PPEWU.

The development of civilian crisis management mechanisms followed the military emphasis, and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), was created in May 2000 as a Council working group. Reporting to COREPER and assisting the PSC, its aim is to advise these bodies on civilian crisis management operations and “to ensure a higher degree of inter-pillar coherence in the EU’s civilian crisis management” (Council of the EU 2000a). Civilian crisis management capabilities progressed in four priority areas: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civilian protection operations (see chapter 5). ESDP was developing capabilities and institutions, but lacked a strategy until the High Representative for CFSP presented the European Security Strategy (ESS) at the June 2003 Thessaloniki European Council. The immediate catalyst was the major rift between EU Member States over the US-led military attack on Iraq (Cameron and Quille 2004: 8). This followed previous patterns of progress in EU security policy being made in the aftermath of actual and perceived failures in cooperation and/or policy (e.g. Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo). Adopted with revisions in December 2003, the strategy identified international terrorism, failed states, regional conflicts, organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the key threats to European security, and outlined EU responses aimed at tackling these threats. These included a commitment to multilateralism, policy to build security in
the EU's neighbours, and working with partners (*European Security Strategy*, EU 2003). Overall, the EU was to be *more active, more capable and more coherent*, and an emphasis was placed on *preventive engagement* (as opposed to the controversial *pre-emptive engagement* in the first draft) (ibid. EU 2003).

The ESS outlined a firm European commitment to multilateral solutions to security risks that contrasted with the unilateral leanings of the US National Security Strategy (Wallace 2003: 3; Cameron and Quille 2004: 8). However, critics doubted whether Member States could live up to the aspirations for a more active and coherent EU laid out by the High Representative (Wallace 2003: 4; Gourlay 2003: 17).

These doubts about the viability of the ESS feed into the wider debate about unresolved issues in the elaboration of the ESDP. There is no clear indication of the geographical scope of ESDP, nor a consensus on the appropriate use of force (Cameron and Quille 2004: 11; Biscop 2004: 527). This ambiguity is exacerbated by the EU's often uneasy partnership with NATO (see chapter 8). ESDP missions to date have been relatively small, and critics still question the political will of Member States in the context of crisis response (ICG 2005: 2; Gourlay 2005: 8).

### 3.3.6 Coherence in EU external relations

The unique and particular history and development of EU external relations has resulted in a complex policy area that spans EU institutions and decision-making procedures.

The issue of coherence, and the related issues of consistency and coordination in EU external relations policy were identified as problematic back in the early days of EPC, and have increasingly received attention from analysts as the scope of EU external relations has widened and as the procedural duality persisted (Bonvicini 1982; Krenzler and Schneider 1997; Missiroli 2001). Consistency was raised in the SEA of 1986, when it was declared that the "external policies of the EC and the policies agreed in EPC must be consistent" (quoted in Krenzler and Schneider 1997: 134). The artificial division between foreign and economic policy had been maintained as a result of Member State opposition to supranationalisation of foreign policy cooperation, and also Community distrust of intergovernmentalism.
The scope for coherency and coordination between economic and political policies was increased as foreign policy cooperation was brought into the framework of the Union in the TEU. COREPER was tasked with preparing the meetings of the Foreign Ministers in the General Affairs Council (now General Affairs and External Relations Council - GAERC), and was well qualified to link the EU’s external political and economic policies and objectives (Ginsberg 1997: 17). As well as institutional arrangements to enhance consistency and coherence, the Council and the Commission were specifically cited in the TEU as being responsible for ensuring EU policy consistency (horizontal consistency)²³ (Nuttall 2000: 182). However, the fundamental procedural division between CFSP and Community policies was retained, and the intergovernmental hold over foreign policy did not loosen significantly (Ginsberg 1997: 25).

The expansion of EU external relations responsibilities in the post-Cold War period and the necessary institutional proliferation has meant that problems of consistency and coherency have become acute. The EU is active in a number of policy areas in many countries and regions across the world. It is important for the Union’s reputation, as well as best practice, to ensure that policies reinforce rather than contradict each other, and that EU action is visible, well-planned and efficiently executed. Missiroli (2001) argues that while consistency between policies has increased (i.e. economic and foreign policies are less contradictory), coherence still “leaves much to be desired” (2001: 3). Coherence often relies on the coordination of policy within and between units or bodies of an organisation. As a classic study showed, policy coordination in organisations can be negatively affected by conflict and competition (or ‘bureaucratic politics’) between institutions and organisational processes within institutions (Allison 1971). The long history of conflict within the EU between its key institutions (and between its Member States) over the procedures governing external relations is likely to continue to make the pursuit of coherence, and coordination, problematic in this wide policy area.

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²³ Vertical consistency refers to consistency between the policies of the EU and those of the Member States (Krenzler and Schneider 1997: 136).
3.4 Conclusion

The EU’s external relations procedures and responsibilities date back to the origins of the Union in the 1940s and 1950s, and have seen considerable incremental development to create the institutions and policies of today. The establishment of external economic relationships with countries and regions of the world contributed to the drive towards foreign policy cooperation as it became increasingly difficult to separate economic and political policies. EPC established a basis for EU external political action, and this was increasingly linked to the EU’s external economic action, enhancing the EU’s status and influence. Furthermore, early EPC experience showed considerable potential in projecting stability beyond the borders of the EU, an objective that became central in the EU’s post-Cold War external relations agenda.

EPC laid the foundations for the TEU’s CFSP, and while frequently criticised during the 1990s, CFSP has seen considerable progress with the development of ESDP. Many of the problems with the CFSP have been addressed: the EU has developed planning and analysis capabilities, military competences, and has agreed on a strategy to guide external actions and objectives. The EU has proved itself to be a capable actor in external crisis management, and has seen an unprecedented institutional expansion in support of the Union’s role. Additionally, the European Commission’s external relations responsibilities have expanded, and it now has an established reputation as an actor in development policy and humanitarian aid.

The legacy of the EU’s complex history and incremental development is, however, a continuing challenge for the organisation’s elaboration of a coherent and coordinated external relations policy. The traditional divide between those Member States that favour intergovernmental cooperation in foreign policy, and those that push for more supranationalism, persists, and contributes to a certain amount of tension and competition between the European Commission and the Council of the EU. These ideological and institutional problems are further explored in an analysis of the EU’s conflict prevention policy (chapter 5). They were also to have a bearing on the EU’s ability to respond to the complex security challenges of the post-Cold War era, to which we turn to next.
CHAPTER 4
Post-Cold War European Security and Conflict Prevention

“In the new Europe, it is already clear that three organisations will play a decisive role in shaping the contours of the evolving security system: the European Community, NATO and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The precise nature of the new security system will depend to a large extent on what sort of relationships develop between these three bodies” (Hyde-Price 1992: 39).

4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to locate the European Union in the institutional security order of post-Cold War Europe. Conflict prevention is explored as an EU strategy developed as a response to new security challenges, and the EU’s organisational partners in conflict prevention are identified. What are the features of the post-Cold War security environment, and where does the EU fit in? The EU was arguably unprepared for the rapid and extensive changes in wider Europe following the fall of the Berlin wall. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) developed with conflict prevention as a core objective largely as a result of experience gained after policy failures, particularly in the management of the 1991-95 Yugoslav conflict and the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Conflict prevention increasingly came to represent the EU’s comprehensive new security role, which, by the late 1990s, included ambitions in military crisis management.

We start by examining the changing perceptions of security in a transformed Europe: what was the nature of post-Cold War European security? We then explore the debate on sovereignty that accompanied an expansion of security concerns: did this offer a new challenge for international organisations? Turning to the EU’s response to the post-Cold War security environment, established concepts of the EU as a ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ power are examined, and conflict prevention is discussed as a policy with the potential to combine these roles. Finally, we explore the institutional complexity of post-Cold War Europe, and the adoption of conflict prevention as a shared objective. The UN, OSCE and NATO are identified as the EU’s main partners.
in conflict prevention, and together as forming the new European security
architecture. The need for organisations to cooperate in conflict prevention was clear, 
but is there a need for a deeper process of policy coordination? Hyde-Price (1992: 39) 
predicted that the nature of the post-Cold War European security system would be 
shaped by the emerging relationships between the EU, NATO and the OSCE. For 
conflict prevention in the pan-European area, cooperative relationships between these 
organisations, and the UN, was, and continues to be, crucial.

4.2 The Post-Cold War European Security Environment
The EU, like other international organisations, has had to adapt to a new set of 
challenges in the post-Cold War world. The demise of a world system dominated by 
the United States and the USSR has brought new opportunities in the field of 
international diplomacy and has increased expectations of the EU’s international role 
(Peterson & Sjursen 1998: 170). The fall of Communism in Eastern Europe appeared 
to herald a new era of peace and optimism. Commentators predicted the ‘end of 
history’ (Fukuyama 1990) as the great ideological battle of the twentieth century 
crumbled and was replaced by a scramble towards free markets and liberal 
democracies. This sense of optimism is reflected in the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), signed in February 1992, in which the new ‘European Union’ proclaimed a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the possibility of a common 
defence, and agreed to create a European Monetary Union (EMU) and cooperate in 
the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Yet clearly, as Chris Hill (1993) has 
argued convincingly, the EU’s capabilities did not match growing expectations that 
the organisation would form the lynchpin of post-Cold War European security.

In the early 1990s, as the states of Central and Eastern Europe emerged as new 
democracies, the Soviet Union collapsed and Yugoslavia began to disintegrate into its 
constituent parts, European security commentators reported a sense of uncertainty 
over the parameters of the new Europe, perceptions of security threats, and the likely 
future of the institutional architecture (Buzan et al. 1990; Booth and Wheeler 1992; 
Miall 1993). Not only did policy makers and academics fail to predict the end of the 
Cold War, but the future shape of Europe was by no means clear. Various scenarios 
were discussed. Would the NATO alliance survive the removal of the Soviet threat? 
Would European security be based on a more cooperative and broad collective system
under the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)? Would the EU emerge as a strong federal force, embracing the whole of Europe? Or would nation states reassert themselves in a multipolar Europe? (Hyde-Price 1992). The system emerging by the end of the 1990s was characterised by a complex interplay between states and international organisations and an unprecedented expansion of the EU’s security role. This section examines the new concepts of European security, the role of European states and organisations, and the adaptation of the EU in the face of these developments.

4.2.1 European security transformed
Changing attitudes to security and the acceptability of war can be traced throughout the twentieth century, but can be seen as accelerating in Europe after the historic revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989/90, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the Cold War years the term ‘security’ was primarily used in Western Europe to denote military defence against the perceived Soviet threat. In the discipline of Strategic Studies, dominated by realist interpretations of international politics, national security was supreme, and the state remained the central level of analysis. Security was defined in rather narrow terms, essentially referring to national territorial defence, and it depended on adequate nuclear deterrence, since, as the neo-realist argument went, the anarchic nature of the international system meant that conflict between states was inevitable (Waltz 1979). This interpretation of security had always had its challengers, particularly in the discipline of Peace Research, but was increasingly contested in the aftermath of the Cold War (Buzan 1991).

The transformation of Europe led to the questioning of traditional definitions, but not necessarily a consensus on new meanings. Defining ‘Europe’ was problematic in the post-Cold war period as old points of reference became obsolete. Europe during the Cold War was a divided continent, with little contact between blocs until détente in the 1970s. With the end of the East-West divide in 1989, came also a questioning of traditional assumptions; the new developments “shifted mental as well as territorial boundaries” (Miall 1993: 18). As the two halves of Germany reunited, the prospect of a united Europe became possible, while, at the same time, the differences between the integrated and economically successful states in the EU and the insecure states on its
borders were stark. Nevertheless, an enlarged EU, bringing in the states of Central and Eastern Europe, became possible for the first time in fifty years. Although a consensus on the meaning of Europe was difficult to identify, it was increasingly synonymous with the political institutions of Western Europe, and of the EU in particular (Wallace 1999; Smith and Timmins 2001).

'Security' became a difficult term, as what was to be secured, and the nature of the threat, lacked Cold War clarity. While non-military factors such as social, political, and environmental upheavals were recognised as security threats, the concept of security remained inadequately defined (Waever 1996: 105). According to Dorman and Treacher (1995: 72), the years 1989-1994 were marked by constantly shifting perceptions of security. Military issues retained their immediate saliency in light of Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe, the dispersal of nuclear weapons across the disintegrating USSR, and the military response from the US and allies to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The 'peace dividend' as a result of defence cuts was a false promise; Western European states modernised and professionalised armies as more pressure fell on Europe to contribute to UN and NATO operations in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere (Dorman and Treacher 1995: 63). Historically neutral states – Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria, were encouraged to rethink their status (Dorman and Treacher 1995: 63). The continued importance of military security coincides with the awareness of wider security concerns and the possibility of non-military solutions to perceived threats. This realisation gained ground in a (Western) Europe confronted with dual prospects of institutional cooperation and peripheral conflict in the early 1990s. The notion that security concerns had expanded from military considerations to include more diverse political, economic, and environmental issues therefore became widespread in the aftermath of the Cold war (Buzan et al. 1990; Booth and Wheeler 1992). Nevertheless, notions of security outside the state context were conceptually problematic. An expansion of security to include every upset considered detrimental to the way of life in Western Europe was not necessary a positive development (Waever 1996: 106). 'Security' could be used to justify secrecy, and if immigrants were considered to be a threat to security, a harsh asylum policy and public hostility towards non-nationals. The linkage between immigration and terrorism perpetuates this.
Despite different interpretations of security and threats, European states tended to agree that many of the threats of the 1990s required a collective response. Transnational crime, environmental risks, and the overspill effects of conflict could not be adequately addressed at the state level. This has led to a debate (see below) about how security threats and perceptions have challenged the role and interests of the state and established notions of sovereignty.

4.2.2 States, sovereignty and intervention

Traditional state-centrism in Security Studies has, to some extent, been challenged by the increasing importance of the role of international organisations and non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and terrorist groups. With the changing perception of security, came the questioning of the state as the key actor in the international politics of peace and security. Security was no longer solely about territorial defence, and could no longer be best tackled at the national level. Therefore, with the internationalisation of security, came the internationalisation of sovereignty (Gow 2000: 296).

The principle of sovereignty underpins traditional international politics, and is upheld in international law through the UN Charter. As an established convention protecting the sovereign rights of governments, sovereignty protected states from external interference in domestic affairs. Territorial integrity could be upheld, with the UN (in the post-1945 period) arbitrating in cases of disputes between states. In practice, states continued to apply the rule of sovereignty selectively: intervention (especially by the United States) continued covertly and unhindered throughout the twentieth century, although it was increasingly considered to be against established convention (MacFarlane 2002).

The questioning of traditional notions of sovereignty accelerated in a post-Cold War world characterised by a widening concept of security and a trend towards intra-state rather than inter-state conflict, the victims mainly civilian (Gow 2000; Deng 2000). Calls for humanitarian intervention within states were backed by the realisation that conflict and human rights abuses had an international impact. International peace and security was threatened by events within states - such as ethnic conflict leading to refugees, or the economic effects of political instability, or transnational effects of
small weapon proliferation or environmental disasters. Additionally, Europe’s mixed
cultural and ethnic heritage, cutting across national boundaries, means that internal
conflict between communities has the potential to turn into inter-state disputes,
especially with the loosening of superpower control. These problems are
exacerbated by the fact that interdependence is an expanding feature of modern life;
disruptions on a global scale can have far-reaching domestic implications, and vice-
versa. Keohane and Nye (1989), amongst others, explored this phenomenon before
the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, James Rosenau (1997: 4) has
explored the “new and wide political space” that, in his analysis, replaces the porous
domestic-foreign boundary. In a time of rapid change, states not only “seem ever
more vulnerable to the demands of both domestic constituents and international
organisations, but they also have to contend with the advent of new global actors and
processes that confound their roles, constrain the limits of their authority, and
undermine their territorial appeal” (Rosenau 1997: 219).

Closely linked to changing notions of sovereignty is the increasing emphasis on
human rights, or individual human security. Debates in the UN Security Council, and
statements by national leaders, show that the rights of individuals increasingly can
take precedence over sovereign rights (although this remains a distinctly selective
trend, acted on, according to Gow (2000) only when a state threatens to destabilise the
international order). Sovereignty can therefore be said to have been ‘individualised’
rather than internationalised (Griffin 2000: 425) – although clearly a renewed global
concern over good governance of states and the rights of people within them signifies
that both terms are valid. Commentators (notably, Liotta 2002; Rosenau 1997) have
argued for a convergence of national and human security, leading, it is argued, to a
blurring of domestic and foreign policy concerns.

As with theories pertaining to war, the primacy of human rights over state security has
a tradition outside the field of International Relations: in Peace and Conflict Research.
John Burton’s (1972) human needs theory showed a move from state-centric research

24 For example, those of Russian origin living in states of the Former Soviet Union; Albanians in the
countries of Former Yugoslavia; the long-running dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus.
25 Notably, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, in a speech in Chicago in 1999. ‘The Blair Doctrine’
in the 1970s (Halliday 1994: 53), while Johan Galtung (1990) was concerned with the effect of state violence on the individual. The questioning of the prime role of the state has a longer legacy than may at first be clear. Nevertheless, sovereign rule has been increasingly debated during the 1990s, in the context of the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states (as in Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003), and in an integrating Europe pooling sovereignty at the EU level.

The claim that Western Europe is emerging as a “post-sovereign regional system” (Wallace 1999: 223) or a “post-modern world...collapsing into greater order” (Cooper 2004: 26) must, however, be qualified by the struggle for sovereignty to be granted in wider Europe – such as in Kosovo, Abkhazia and Chechnya. Clearly, sovereignty remains of prime importance for those that don’t possess it, since gaining statehood is perceived to ensure the protection of cultural, religious and ethnic rights when these are under threat from a hostile or indifferent regime. Sovereignty remains a central issue in Western Europe too; in Britain arguments against further EU integration warn that British sovereignty will be passed to Brussels. Analysts of the realist school of International Relations insist that national security remains of prime importance (Wylie 1997). Other critics maintain that internal wars signify the continuing importance of the state, not its demise (Knudsen 2001: 362-363).

International organisations have risen to a new prominence in the post-Cold War era, although it is debatable how much this indicates an erosion of state-centrism. Analysts of different schools of thought disagree as to the significance of this development. Neo-realists predicted the disintegration of regional organisations such as NATO and the EU after the Cold War (Mearshiemer 1990), but then justified their continuation as being due to their utility in the pursuit of the national interests of states (Waltz 2000). Mearsheimer further argued that international organisations are a “false promise”, wrongly held up as a cause for peace by academics and policy-makers (1995: 47). Mearsheimer conveniently omits the legacy of the EU as an institution fostering peace and, in citing Bosnia as an example of the failure of institutions, falls prey to the narrow and simplistic argumentation that he claims to be exposing in institutionalism. Nevertheless, the endurance of the EU has led to various theories about the role of the state in modern Europe. Alan Milward (1994), for example, argues that European integration has progressed as a way of maintaining the primacy
of the state in a complex world. Integration occurs when states can’t manage certain policy dilemmas on their own.

While states clearly have the power to stall progress in international policy-making, the role of international organisation (and the EU in particular), cannot simply be explained by the pursuit of state interest. Neo-liberal institutionalists (e.g. Keohane 1984) concede that states are driven by national interest, but claim that organisations moderate the conflictual nature of state interaction, leading to cooperation over common interests (Terriff et al. 1999). This approach best explains the state-institution interaction that characterises the EU; it accepts the autonomy of the state and the institution (Smith, M. 1996: 11). Social constructivists are interested in levels of analysis other than the state, such as domestic structures (Terriff et al. 1999), and recognise the importance of international organisations in agenda and norm-setting. In particular, international organisations form the basis of security communities (Adler 1998). Influenced by behaviouralism, and generally put under the neo-liberalism heading is the work of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1989), who developed the theory of complex interdependence. Questioning the one-dimensionalism of realism, Keohane and Nye emphasise the importance of informal transnational interactions and the falling importance of military issues in relations between states (Keohane and Nye 1989). In such an interdependent system, international organisations have a key role in setting the international agenda, helping to form coalitions, and launching political initiatives (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1989).

The idea that the state has been either significantly weakened or strengthened in the post-Cold War era is clearly a simplification of the complexities of contemporary political processes (Webber 2001: 34). Issues of identity and nationhood have become security issues, perhaps as a reaction to political integration in Western Europe, and as a result of state-building in multi-national/ethnic communities in Eastern Europe. Waever (1996: 114) identifies a ‘decoupling’ of notions of state and nation in the West, and a simultaneous ‘recoupling’ in Eastern Europe. In the latter case, this has led to conflicts of identity and the rise of nationalism. The state maintains its place as the key actor in international politics, and as a source of conflict where nationality and statehood don’t coincide. International organisational activity cannot necessarily be interpreted as an erosion of nation state influence. It is more accurate to concede that
the concept of statehood has differing implications and wider interpretations in the post-Cold War period; importantly, the integrity of statehood is no longer automatically protected by the convention of non-interference in international law. Moreover, the pooling of sovereignty at the supranational level may not indicate the demise of sovereignty, but nation state adaptation in an interdependent, complex international order. The emergence of the EU as a security actor is an interesting example of this trend.

4.2.3 The EU as a new security actor

We now investigate the links between the new security environment and the adaptation of the EU as a security actor. Certainly, the dramatic revision of European security had broad implications for the EU and the development of the CFSP. The EU’s place was uncertain in the new Europe; previously it had had a distinct role, with clear boundaries represented by the Cold War division of Europe (Smith 1996). Security threats to Western Europe became less about conventional and nuclear war and more about the spill-over effects of political and economic instability in the new states of Eastern and Central Europe (Dorman and Treacher 1995). The EU, a civilian organisation with economic and diplomatic strength, was uniquely qualified to develop non-military security solutions, and had pressing reasons to project stability in an expanded Europe. As the 1990s progressed, the EU played a key economic and political role in the new Eastern democracies and induced peaceful change and the protection of minorities in the new states through a greater emphasis on political conditionality for future EU membership (Rummel 1996; Pinder 1996). Former EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, later argued that the projection of stability was the EU’s ‘essential mission’, and that enlargement “is the single greatest contribution the Union can make to European – even to global – stability” (Patten 2000: 19).

Early setbacks, however, undermined the EU’s ambitions. The CFSP was tested before the TEU was even signed, when the EU took initial responsibility for trying to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Yugoslavia towards the end of 1991. The decision, pushed by a newly reunited Germany under strong domestic pressure, to officially recognise Croatia and Slovenia, was widely perceived to have accelerated the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and led to a dejected EU ceding responsibility
for the management of the Bosnian crisis to the UN, and eventually to NATO (Cohen 1993; Woodward 1995; Zucconi 1996). The failure of EU diplomacy in Yugoslavia was a setback, but also was to become a catalyst for the development of EU mechanisms to prevent and manage conflict (Bildt 1998; Hill 2001). The development of mechanisms was slow because of the lack of common objectives in foreign policy, and a lack of consensus on the creation of EU military competences. Yet progress in the development of the CFSP was a necessity, not an option. As argued in chapter 3, the EU’s subsequent disarray in the face of the crises in Albania in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 led to significant progress in the ESDP.

The EU’s adaptation can be seen in the context of extensive institutional activity at this time. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; from 1995, Organisation for Security and in Europe, OSCE), despite its wide membership and agenda, did not become the leading security institution, but developed recognised expertise in the protection of minority rights (Forster and Niblett 2001: 29). The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) survived the removal of the USSR, and expanded its role to include the military management of post-Cold War crises. NATO undertook its first ever military operation in 1995 in Bosnia, with the bombing of Serb targets that contributed to the ending of the Bosnian war (Forster and Wallace 2001b: 107). The United Nations (UN), for the first time in its history, launched a humanitarian and peacekeeping mission on the European continent, but was to encounter difficulties in adapting its practices to the complexities of the Yugoslav conflict (Woodward 2000), and in the ongoing conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda and elsewhere. Despite suffering criticism over its role in the Yugoslav conflict, the UN, on the whole, retained its legitimacy. By the end of the 1990s, analysts argued that the EU and NATO had emerged as the principal European security organisations (Cottey 1998; Flockart and Wyn Rees 1998), although this can also be interpreted as signifying reluctance on the part of EU/NATO Member States for fundamental change (Forster and Niblett 2001: 51). Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s, the EU had embarked on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), sparking a renewed debate about its civilian identity and possible military role. It is to these debates that we turn to next.
4.2.4 Civilian and military power EU?

The EU's shift in recent years from an organisation with civilian competences, to one acquiring military means, has provoked an extensive debate (Whitman 1998; Smith, K. E. 2000; Andréani, Bertram and Grant 2001; Bono 2002; Deighton 2002; Ehrhart 2002; Sangiovanni 2003; Treacher 2004; Cameron and Quille 2004). Paradoxically, while non-military security solutions and issues characterised early post-Cold War European security, by the late 1990s EU Member States had agreed that 'soft' (politico-diplomatic) security policies were not sufficient if the organisation was to tackle the full range of security challenges and undertake 'harder' (i.e. military) Petersberg tasks (White 2001: 150; Haine 2004: 43). The initial emphasis was on capability-building, with EU Member States laying the debate about the EU's military doctrine to one side (Ortega 2004: 73).

The EU's identity as civilian power was largely dictated by the Cold War international system. After the failed attempt to create a European Defence Community in the 1950s, Western Europe's security identity was unequivocally linked to the United States through NATO. The Atlantic Alliance provided the military security that Western Europe required. The concept of 'civilian power' Europe was suggested by Duchêne in the 1970s and referred to the political value of economic and diplomatic power as an alternative to military power (Duchêne 1972). As outlined in chapter 3, European Political Cooperation (EPC) indeed played a significant role in the 1970s and 1980s in establishing an EC political identity based on low-key (and often lowest common denominator) diplomacy. Galtung (1973) did not welcome the emergence of the EC as a 'superpower in the making'. Other commentators argued that the EC could not be considered a significant actor until it gained military power; civilian power Europe was a "contradiction in terms" (Bull 1982: 149).

The end of the Cold War freed the EU from its previous constraints, and the possibility of a common defence was raised in the TEU, as outlined in chapter 3. The military role of the EU can now be characterised as one of military crisis response, linked increasingly to defence cooperation and armaments procurement.

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26 At the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki European Councils.
(Missiroli 2004a: 69). The EU has a much wider civilian remit, ranging from traditional development and aid, to diplomacy and new competences in civilian crisis management and other measures (see chapter 5). The new military and the new and existing civilian roles of EU security have often been juxtaposed in post-Cold War European security commentary (Smith 2000: 11). However, these roles are not necessarily mutually incompatible for the EU.

There are many sound reasons for reconsidering the traditional civilian-military dichotomy in relation to the EU and other actors. After the perceived ending of the Bosnian conflict with military means, the lack of an EU collective response to the 1995 Albanian crisis, and the subsequent military response to the 1999 Kosovo crisis, it was widely believed that military solutions were necessary when civilian power failed. Traditional operational distinctions between types of interventions are, in any case, increasingly difficult to validate (Griffin 2000: 423). Military-civilian cooperation between military organisations such as NATO and civilian organisations like the OSCE and NGOs has characterised the post-Cold War period. Peacekeeping operations, particularly in internal war situations, such as in Bosnia, have come close to peace enforcement, if not war fighting. Conflicts of the 1990s have been typified by a crossing-over of military and civilian operations, such as the Kosovo crisis of 1999 (Pugh 2000). This is reflected in the development of the NATO civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) concept to facilitate partnerships between the growing number of actors involved in conflict management and peacebuilding projects. Military-civilian synergy is increasingly important in the EU as the ESDP project develops. This type of cooperation has been particularly important in the aftermath of war in Southeastern Europe.

Despite the advantages of military-civilian partnerships, the relationship between military units and civilian organisations such as NGOs is problematic. The humanitarian tradition of political impartiality has been challenged by cooperation with military units, and different approaches by civilian organisations and the military on the ground are exacerbated by different organisational structures and different objectives (Ehrhart 2002: 54-55). Nevertheless, civil-military synergy is valuable in complex crisis situations, and is now an important factor in the EU context as the Union takes on more conflict prevention/crisis management tasks. The Union is also
in a good position, with its civilian and military competences, to bring these different operational cultures together at the headquarters and field level.

The security challenges of the 1990s therefore require a rethinking of the EU’s traditional security identity that surpasses notions of ‘military’ and ‘civilian’. As civilian crisis workers relied on military protection, and military forces undertook humanitarian tasks, it became more important to develop comprehensive responses to crises, incorporating military and civilian personnel. The EU’s foreign policy has developed in this climate of changing responses to crises. In particular, the EU’s conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms developed as a response to the failure of the EU to prevent and then manage the conflicts in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

Recent EU documentation reflects this. The *European Security Strategy* (EU 2003), prepared by the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, in 2003, and developed by the Member States, framed the EU’s development of civilian and military competences as a comprehensive response to the security challenges facing the EU (Haine 2004; Cameron and Quille 2004). The strategy was important in that it represented the first clear and relatively detailed outline of security threats (namely, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and failed states), and a consensus on EU responses to these threats (the creation of a ‘zone of security’ around the EU, support of multilateral institutions, and conflict and threat prevention). Preventive engagement emerged as one of the key themes in a strategy encompassing both a civilian and military role for the EU in international politics. The Constitutional Treaty, signed by Member State governments in 2004, sought to extend the Petersberg tasks to include conflict prevention, joint disarmament, military advice and assistance, and post-conflict stabilisation tasks, binding the EU’s civilian and military operational roles together in one article. While the future of the Treaty is currently in doubt after rejection by referendum in France and the Netherlands, this is unlikely to

27 The tasks read as follows: “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” Constitutional Treaty, Article III-309.
derail the extension of the Petersberg tasks, or the EU’s present and future civilian and military operations.

In conceptual rather than pragmatic terms, the EU’s emergence as a military actor is undoubtedly a turning point. The development of military means and objectives by the EU may represent the adoption of ‘state-like’ characteristics that diverge from, or even undermine the EU as a legitimate security actor (Smith 2000: 27; Treacher 2004: 66). The difference between the EU and a state, however, is that EU military action is governed by collective decision-making, underpinned by shared values and interpretations of appropriate security solutions. The development of institutional support for effective military missions, and commitment to the common strategies set out in the European Security Strategy, will therefore be crucial if the EU is to maintain its legitimacy outside the civilian sphere. The commitment to work with other multilateral organisations towards common goals will further enhance the EU’s prospects as a military actor. Conflict prevention is therefore not only a useful EU policy, but also, potentially, provides a normative framework for EU military activity.

4.2.5 Conflict prevention: a new EU norm?

EU conflict prevention, it can be argued, is a policy that binds together the traditionally disparate notions of military and civilian power into a comprehensive strategy to deal with the complex security problems of the post-Cold War era (Hill 2001: 315). Its rise to prominence is closely linked to the nature of new security threats, which have widened the perception of state interests in the 1990s to include conflict and disruptions in the EU’s neighbours and in the wider world. This change has been reflected in states’ goals to protect human rights, and willingness to contribute resources for humanitarian intervention (Weiss 2000). Most European states have recognised that not only is conflict prevention best practiced at the multilateral level, but that international organisations are the most legitimate actors to question sovereignty in failing states.²⁸

²⁸ The commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ is stated in the European Security Strategy and in recent European Commission documents e.g The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism (EU Comission 2003c).
Conflict prevention has emerged as a pragmatic response to the security challenges facing the EU. As a new expectation, or standard, conflict prevention also has a normative element. Norms are considered to be prescribed standards of behaviour that not only regulate the conduct of an actor, but that partly represent, or constitute, an actors' identity (Katzenstein 1996: 5). The power of values and ideas in changing political landscapes was underlined by the peaceful internal implosions of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe (Manners 2002: 238). Moreover, conflicts of the 1990s have demonstrated that civilian and military intervention in a crisis zone is likely to be limited in effect without a corresponding commitment to fostering regime legitimacy and support through the promotion of shared values such as the protection of human rights and the rule of law (Smith, K. 2003: 203). The EU's civilian role has long been seen to support certain behaviour and values (Duchene 1973), most recently by Manners (2002), who argues for a greater consideration of 'normative power Europe' in conceptualising the EU's international role. Certainly, conflict prevention is a EU commitment that sits alongside, and is intimately linked to, EU values such as human rights, good governance and multilateralism. It undoubtedly has a normative basis, since it is underpinned by values such as non-violence and peaceful change. Conflict prevention is not a neutral term; in prescriptive form, it promotes an approach to national and international society based on respect for human needs, dialogue, and compromise. The promotion of conflict prevention by the EU has therefore been interpreted as the outcome of normative changes in the European security discourse (Björkdahl 2002b: 148).

Whether conflict prevention can be considered an emerging international norm, as Björkdahl (2002b) suggests, is, however, questionable. While not denying that norms do matter in international politics, and particularly in the multilateral context, the consensus on conflict prevention isn't solid enough to justify this claim. Certainly, rhetorical support of the idea of conflict prevention from diplomats and policy-makers is a trend that shows a more proactive approach to violent conflict in recent years. The inevitability of war is no longer widely accepted; instead questions arise as to why conflict was not prevented, and who is to blame for this (Lund 2000) — for example, after the genocide in Rwanda — an atrocity that permeates all arguments making the case for conflict prevention. It could be conceded therefore, that a norm in support of the principle of conflict prevention is gaining more ground in an
international community that expects international organisations to act to prevent, or at least manage, conflict (Lund 2000: 24). This expectation no doubt arises from increased media coverage of violent conflicts across the world, followed by domestic pressure to act. However, domestic support for conflict prevention is not widespread or influential enough to transform policy-planning practices at national and international levels. Missed opportunities to prevent conflict (the Kosovo crisis being the best European example\(^{29}\)), suggest that conflict prevention is not a "settled" norm (Björkdahl 2002b: 190). Additionally, it would be difficult to claim that the conflict prevention ethos has permeated the thinking of the majority of national governments. As outlined in chapter 2, governments are not always effective in long-term planning, and, in any case, many governments consider conflict prevention as a Western idea that could be used to justify intervention. Even in Europe, the 1990s were characterised by preoccupation with domestic and regional concerns such as unemployment and the reunification of Germany (Forster and Niblett 2001).

It is difficult to argue that conflict prevention has emerged as an established European norm in this climate of "denial rather than reconceptualisation" (Forster and Wallace 2001: 124). Nevertheless, the very visibility of conflict prevention in the post-Cold War period does point to a re-evaluation of state interests and the role of organisations. This cannot be fully explained in terms of the self-interest of states. While the development of post-Cold War norms has to be set against the continuation and endurance of Cold War security thinking (Booth 1998: 29), the influence of conflict prevention as a normative force both driving external EU action, and representing a fundamental aspect of EU international identity, is considerable. Commitment to conflict prevention at the institutional and normative levels serves to justify the EU's transition from civilian to integrated civilian-military actor. Its further adoption by a range of security organisations also indicates conflict prevention's practical and normative appeal.

4.3 Conflict Prevention and International Organisations in the Post-Cold War Period

The prominence of international organisations reflects a move away from the superpower domination of conflict resolution during the Cold War, to more collective solutions being attempted in the post-Cold War period. International organisations have emerged in the 1990s as important actors in their own right, partly as a result of the changing perceptions of security and state interests, leading to a consensus among states that many security threats and problems could no longer be properly addressed at state level. In this final section, the institutional architecture of post-1989 Europe is explored: with organisational enlargements and adaptations, Europe has become the most institutionalised region in the world. We examine conflict prevention as a shared priority among international organisations, identifying the UN, OSCE and NATO as the EU’s main institutional partners. Finally, the desirability of policy coordination between these actors is introduced as an important factor in pan-European conflict prevention.

4.3.1 Institutional complexity

The future shape of Europe’s institutional order at the beginning of the 1990s was unclear (Hyde-Price 1992). Analysts expected Cold War institutions to disband, or one organisation to dominate. The adaptation of organisations was complicated by major political developments, such as the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the USSR, although the growing importance of non-military security considerations increased the visibility of international organisations (Imber 1992: 175). The institutional complexity emerged therefore not as a result of grand design or consensus, but as a result of the short-term political decisions and preferences of national governments. Unlike the initially questionable future of NATO, the EU clearly had a key role to play in the reshaping of Europe; it was the nature and extent of the EU role that was in question. The OSCE lost its centrality after it presided over the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) arms reduction Treaty by members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The UN’s role in European security was underlined by its involvement in the Yugoslav conflict. All organisations responded to the new environment with institutional proliferation – creating new units and
mechanisms – and by expanding their jurisdiction and objectives. However, adaptation was not accompanied by a division of tasks or labour.

Expanding memberships led to a redefinition of actual, as well as conceptual and institutional boundaries (Smith 1996: 21). Membership of organisations for the new democracies was important in symbolic and practical terms, and institutional memberships were to undergo frequent revisions during the 1990s. The OSCE immediately enlarged to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Countries (Commonwealth of Independent States – CIS), and NATO and the EU drew in a reunited Germany. The EU started the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on a long road towards membership, and absorbed Sweden, Finland and Austria in 1995. The first NATO post-Cold War enlargement proper brought in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999. Finally, the dual EU-NATO enlargement of May 2004 absorbed Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus, Slovakia and Malta into the EU; Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia into both organisations; and Romania and Bulgaria into NATO. The EU and NATO now share 19 European members out of a NATO total of 26, and an EU total of 25. Similarly, EU states now dominate the OSCE, and have become a larger faction in the UN General Assembly (see Figure 4.1).

The overlapping institutional memberships illustrated below might suggest that the OSCE is the most important European organisation, since it embraces a pan-European and transatlantic membership. Inclusiveness does not translate into influence, however, and the slowing down of enlargements of the EU and NATO may produce a permanent institutional line of division, excluding most of the CIS. NATO and the EU are reluctant to state their geographical limits, but the EU’s objective of a ‘zone of stability’ around the EU (as outlined in the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)’ and the European Security Strategy) may be difficult to achieve if enlargement to certain states is ruled out.

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30 The European Neighbourhood Policy arose in the run up to the May 2004 enlargement, after which the EU would border Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. Outlined in a GAERC report in June 2003 ('Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood'), the policy was expanded to include the Southern Mediterranean and aimed to launch a long-term, integrated approach to these countries by offering partnership and cooperation without necessarily offering future EU membership. (See Batt et. al 2003).
Figure 4.1. Overlapping Institutional Memberships (adapted from diagram in SIPRI-UNESCO Handbook 1998).

*EU applicants
Certainly, the 2004 enlargement of the world's most powerful military alliance and
the world's most economically successful regional organisation, and their shared
membership, have undoubtedly contributed to the endurance and influence of NATO
and the EU. The lack of parity between membership of NATO and the WEU
complicated the early stages of the development of the EU security and defence
identity (ESDI), and then EU access to NATO assets at the end of the 1990s.
However, overlapping membership is not always conducive to fast and effective
responses to crises. Member States may choose to work through a particular
organisation for political reasons, rather than choosing the organisation best suited to
the job (e.g. the US promoting political change in the Ukraine through NATO rather
than the OSCE). This is a particular post-Cold War problem because overlapping
institutional membership has been accompanied by overlapping objectives and
competences. The OSCE's wide membership, including Russia, has, for example led
to the comparative underdevelopment of the organisation, as powerful states such as
the US choose to work through NATO, or avoid the multilateral route all together.
This is a result not only of realpolitik, but also a recognition that a consensus will not
be found among OSCE participating states (or, in future, among NATO member
nations).

Expanding security concerns also led to increasingly overlapping organisational
agendas and the development of parallel security objectives and mechanisms. The
overlapping of organisational memberships and competences is a new development in
European politics. During the post-Second World War period, the competences of
international organisations were clearly separated. NATO was concerned with
military security and the EC was largely concerned with economic integration in
Western Europe, and trade and development relations with the third world. The UN
was the universal organisation responsible for the maintenance of international peace
and security, with the CSCE (from 1975) facilitating a pan-European forum in the
field of civil, political, and minority rights. The international system was dominated
by the superpowers, and, as argued in chapter 2, the ability of the UN to carry out its
central objective to maintain international peace was seriously curtailed because of the
superpower clash in the Security Council. While there was inevitably some
overlapping of security concerns during the Cold War, especially with growing
political integration at the European level, the separation of responsibilities meant that
coordination was rarely an issue. Mitrany (quoted in Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970: 51) emphasised the difference between the UN and the EC/EU as international actors, citing the EC’s ‘divisive’ role internationally as precluding any role in the prevention of war. While the EU remained a regional actor in the post-Cold War era, its role was nevertheless transformed. The European Union and its representatives were, by the early 2000s, citing conflict prevention as one of the organisation’s main external objectives (Patten 2000; *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts* (Council of the EU 2001b). Differences and dividing lines between roles and responsibilities were no longer clear. The need to adapt from the particularities and predictability of the Cold War era to meet the security challenges of the 1990s was urgent. Yet adaptation was in danger of leading to a clash of organisations rather than a process of dialogue and coordination.

4.3.2 Conflict prevention as a shared priority

As conflict returned to the European continent as an actual or potential threat, crisis response became an expanding institutional policy area. The difficulties of post-conflict reconstruction in South-Eastern Europe led to a widespread approval of conflict prevention in particular as an approach preferable to dealing with the financial and human costs of violent conflict. By the late 1990s, international organisations had taken notice of influential reports such as the Carnegie Commission’s Final Report on *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1997), and related studies providing empirical evidence of the cost-effectiveness of conflict prevention in the cases of Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia (Brown and Rosecrance 1998). In Europe, studies on conflict prevention proliferated (e.g. Munuera 1994; Rummel 1996; Clement 1997; Hill 2001; Van Tongeren, Van de Veen and Verhoeven 2002; Björkdahl 2002b), and the EU sponsored the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) of academics to develop conflict prevention policy recommendations (e.g. CPN Yearbooks, 1997-2001).

By the late 1990s, conflict prevention had therefore become a common stated goal for a plethora of organisations. While the UN has continued to play the primary role in maintaining international peace and security, its objective of conflict prevention (as understood in the post-Cold War period) has been adopted by regional organisations in Europe. This was not necessarily an unwelcome development: the organisation,
facing an increased demand for its services and a simultaneous crisis in funding, has encouraged the transference of burdens to regional organisations. In South-Eastern Europe especially, the UN and a number of regional organisations (the EU, NATO and OSCE) have all been involved, all with the common objective of preventing further conflict. Cooperation between organisations has become a new necessity in the politics of European security. Additionally, the number of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) involved in conflict prevention has exploded in recent years, adding greater complexity. Many of the INGOs concerned with the prevention of violent conflict were established in the late 1980s as a response to the changing international situation and the continued prevalence of intra and inter-state war.31

Figure 4.2 shows the stages of conflict prevention, from *structural conflict prevention* through to *early warning and analysis* and *operational activities*, and the organisations with the mandate for conflict prevention tasks under these broad categories. This categorisation provides the template for the examination of EU conflict prevention in chapter 5, and EU cooperation in conflict prevention with the UN, the OSCE and NATO in chapters 6, 7 and 8. The conflict prevention process has been simplified and divided into clear pre-and post-conflict stages. While this belies the complexity of conflict prevention, it is helpful to have a visual representation of the similar tasks carried out by different organisations.

*Structural conflict prevention* in the form of development aid is a central feature of EU conflict prevention, as is also practiced by the UN. The tendency to identify all aid as contributing to conflict prevention means it can be difficult to identify aid allocated to prevent conflict in a specific country or region, although both organisations have developed particular conflict prevention funding mechanisms in recent years. Longer-term conflict prevention is not limited to aid, but includes the promotion of democracy and human rights by other means – such as membership criteria, diplomacy, or inclusion in programmes or forums.

31 These include Saferworld, International Alert, International Crisis Group, and field organisations such as the International Red Cross.
Figure 4.2. Overlapping Organisational Competences

Structural Conflict Prevention

Development Aid

EU

OSCE

UN

NATO

Promotion of Human Rights/Democracy

Early Warning and Analysis

EU, UN, OSCE, NATO

Operational Conflict Prevention

Preventive Diplomacy

OSCE

UN

EU

Civilian Crisis Management

Military Crisis Management

NATO
This is clearly a feature of EU external relations, but is also practiced by the UN, NATO and the OSCE. NATO has been included because its expanding agenda includes these concerns, although the extent of NATO contribution is debatable (see chapter 8).

The EU gathers and assesses information and intelligence for *early warning and analysis* purposes, as do the other three organisations (although competences do vary considerably). While this would seem to confirm the maxim that it is early action rather than early warning that is the problem, it must be pointed out that most of the organisations rely on their members to supply information. The reluctance of members to share national intelligence precludes the building of a comprehensive early warning system within and between organisations. Nevertheless, all the organisations do have personnel in the field that can provide valuable information on likely conflicts, and most have access to a body of information for analytical and predictive purposes.

The situation becomes more complex at the *operational* level. This is not surprising, since organisations and governments have a tendency to act only when a crisis can no longer be ignored. At the early operational stage, EU preventive diplomacy competences are mirrored in the UN and the OSCE. Civilian crisis management is also carried out by the UN and OSCE as well as the EU. This broad category covers a wide range of activities which may not always be applied in the pre-conflict stage e.g. election monitoring and police missions. The line between civilian and military crisis management is admittedly blurred, but some attempt has been made to distinguish between the two in order to increase the clarity of organisational activity. Civilian in this context means 'non-military' but does not necessarily mean unarmed, since police missions, (inclusive of maintaining order and training local personnel) are likely to be armed. The EU has been developing a role in civilian crisis management, in the form of cease-fire monitors (in former Yugoslavia), administrative roles (in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo - UNMIK) police missions (Macedonia and Bosnia), and a rule of law mission in Georgia. This activity mirrors similar civilian police, administrative and military monitoring personnel in the UN. Military crisis management covers peacekeeping, peace enforcement, preventive deployment, military sanction enforcement and close air support. Broadly, peacekeeping activities
are now carried out by the EU and NATO, as well as the UN.

In a study of international organisation, Pentland (1976) predicted increasing “conflicts over organisational jurisdiction” (1976: 65 8) and problems with attempts to coordinate, rationalise and restructure international institutions as a result. This analysis seems prescient in a post-Cold War Europe of crowded actors and overlapping policies. The adoption of conflict prevention tasks by all these organisations raises problems of duplication, competition and coordination. What is the extent of cooperation underway to counter these developments?

4.3.3 The problem of policy coordination
The EU and other organisations have adopted conflict prevention rhetoric and mechanisms as a strategy to address post-Cold War security, and have identified the policy, best practiced at the multilateral level, as a key area for cooperation. Yet has cooperation between the EU and other organisations in conflict prevention led to a deeper process of policy coordination? This entails considerably more than declarations to cooperate in official documents and infrequent meetings between officials. It requires dialogue and cooperation between institutional personnel and member states at all stages of the conflict prevention process illustrated above: from the structural to the operational. It requires a consensus on the root causes of conflict to ensure that organisations are working towards the same objectives with local partners. It requires complementary rather than competing strategies.

While the tasks of different organisations can be grouped around conflict prevention stages, the variation in organisational structures and priorities between the EU and the other organisations does not necessarily lead to shared definitions or understandings of conflict prevention. The EU’s practice of conflict prevention outside its membership area gives it considerably more leverage than the OSCE or the UN, who have to develop a consensual approach in order to ensure cooperation from their members. The EU may find itself with a different agenda from other organisations if dialogue is not actively sought – for example if the EU is preparing a country for enlargement, technical and economic considerations may be at odds with the OSCE’s agenda to foster better long-term community relations. Policy coordination between the EU and the other organisations is therefore particularly important in conflict
prevention not only because all organisations claim to practice it, but because lack of coordination between the organisations in the same country/region can lead to conflicting policy aims and practices (e.g. in the Baltic countries – see Birckenbach 2000 and Van Elsuwege 2002).

Policy coordination is a problem at all levels of government – local, national and international. Coordination is normally defined as “working together harmoniously” (Collins English Dictionary). In a seminal study of political cooperation, Keohane contends that if harmony existed between actors, there would be no discord, and therefore no need for cooperation to improve policy coordination (1984: 12). Cooperation “requires that the actions of separate individuals or organisations – which are not in pre-existent harmony – be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as policy coordination” (Keohane 1984: 51). Clearly, cooperation for conflict prevention has been on the agenda of the EU and other organisations since the early 1990s, as the possibility of competing and conflicting agendas arose. What is not clear is how much this cooperation has led to a process of policy coordination. Keohane suggests that the “impact of cooperation could be evaluated by measuring the difference between the actual outcome and the situation that would have obtained in the absence of coordination” (Keohane 1988: 380). The outcome of coordination for conflict prevention (or much else, for that matter) cannot be measured in this way. As argued in chapter 2, one of the main difficulties with conflict prevention as a policy is that it is impossible to know if the implementation of a certain policy prevented a specific conflict. Therefore, we cannot predict the outcome in the absence of coordination: a conflict may have been prevented by the action of one organisation alone, by coordinated organisational policies, or some other factor located at the domestic or regional level. Nevertheless, it can be suggested that coordinated effort on the part of organisations will increase the chance of a positive, non-violent outcome. If organisations are to practice this policy, reinforcement is preferable to contradiction.

The number of organisations responding to crises, particularly in the Balkan region, has meant that cooperation between the EU and other actors has become common practice. The EU has been developing cooperative partnerships with the UN, OSCE and NATO in recent years, and particularly in the post-1999 ESDP period.
Operational partnerships began as an ad hoc necessity in the early 1990s, and have become more formalised in recent years. The UN first began meeting with regional organisations biennially in 1994 in order to improve cooperation (biennial UN-Regional Organisation Meetings (UN 1996)), and the OSCE, in its 1999 *Charter for European Security*, adopted the Platform for Cooperative Security as a blueprint for strengthened cooperation between the OSCE and its partners (OSCE 1999).

While there is a vast amount of rhetoric in the documents of the EU and the other three organisations on ‘working with partners’ and ‘international cooperation’ (European Commission 2001 and 2003c; Council of the EU 2001a and 2001b; OSCE 1999; UN 1992 and 1996) it is not clear that the lessons of inter-organisational disunity in the 1990s have been sufficiently heeded. The tendency, as in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, for states to resort to the creation of additional decision-making bodies (the Contact Group) led by national governments indicates a failure of organisational cooperation – either on the part of the member states, or within an organisation, or both. There has also been more organisational cooperation in the aftermath of conflict (i.e. for post conflict reconstruction) rather than in the pre-conflict stages: for example the administration of Kosovo (UNMIK). This suggests that crisis response, decision-making and dialogue between organisations is too slow and cumbersome in the pre-conflict stage.

For the EU, it is not only policy coordination with other organisations that is problematic for conflict prevention. Intra-EU policy coordination not only mirrors the need for inter-organisational coordination, but may be a prerequisite for its success. Luard (1977), in his study of the United Nations, highlighted the lack of coordination between the UN and associated agencies in the 1970s. He argued that the growing complexity of the international system and the demands on the UN required “a clear definition of the responsibility of each agency in particular fields, and regular consultations to overcome any overlap that may arise” (1977: 278). Coordination in this context meant not merely the “avoidance of any overlap and duplication” but more broadly the “attempt to establish a conscious and deliberate order and relationship among various activities [of government] …to impose a pattern of priorities among a multiplicity of programmes…to draw up an overall plan for the
whole system” (1977: 278-279)\textsuperscript{32}. If this was required for the UN system in the 1970s, it is even more essential for a multi-institutional organisation like the EU today, which, as explained in chapter 3, has different procedures for decisions under different pillars. Moreover, the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention mechanisms depends to a large extent upon the avoidance of overlap and duplication, the establishment of order and relationship between EU institutions, and the drawing up of overall strategies within and between EU institutions through a process of consultation for the achievement of common and compatible goals. Chapter 5 analyses EU conflict prevention policy and also examines how the pillar structure of the EU, inter-institutional problems and internal institutional problems impact on intra-EU conflict prevention coherency and coordination. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 examine EU cooperation in conflict prevention with the UN, the OSCE and NATO, and also assess the impact that shortcomings in intra-EU coordination have on policy coordination with the three organisations.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the post-Cold War security context, focusing particularly on the impact of the new security environment on the development of the EU as a security actor. It has also identified the UN, the OSCE and NATO as the EU’s key partners in post-Cold War conflict prevention. Ideas about European security were transformed in the aftermath of the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perceptions of security and security threats underwent major revision, and, as a result, the role of international organisations was enhanced. The role of the EU in Europe became crucial in the development of peace and stability in the wider Europe. By the end of the 1990s, the Union had started to develop a comprehensive approach to security, surpassing its traditional role as a civilian organisation. While the development of the EU as a military actor has been controversial, it can be seen as a pragmatic response to European security challenges. Conflict prevention as a policy encapsulates the Union’s international aims and identity, and its normative basis serves to rationalise the EU’s military role. Its adoption by the EU therefore undoubtedly reflects normative trends in the European security discourse, although in practice it has not necessarily become a ‘settled’ norm.

\textsuperscript{32} Emphasis added.
The European continent, inclusive of transatlantic partners, is the most institutionally complex region in the world. A general consensus on security concerns has led to the development of shared priorities and parallel mechanisms in crisis response. The rhetorical success of conflict prevention as a security strategy has resulted in a situation in which the EU has to pursue its objectives alongside three other major organisations. This indicates positive progress in organisational approach to the problem of violent conflict in the post-Cold war era, and a renewed desire for legitimacy and multilateralism. However, while organisations have been obliged to cooperate, it is less clear that this has resulted in a process of policy coordination of conflict prevention efforts. The trend to resort to ad hoc partnerships and short-term military solutions suggests that mechanisms for coordinating long-term preventive action are lacking, despite the apparent international consensus on long-term security solutions.

The next step is to investigate the institutional evolution of EU conflict prevention. Crucially, the following chapter also examines the impact of the EU’s complex external relations policies and procedures (as described in chapter 3) on intra-EU conflict prevention policy coordination. We then move on to EU external cooperation with the three organisations identified in this chapter as the EU’s key partners in conflict prevention. What is the extent of cooperation in conflict prevention between the EU and the UN, the OSCE and NATO, and how do internal EU procedures impact on the Union’s ability to implement a process of conflict prevention policy coordination with these organisations?
CHAPTER 5
European Union Conflict Prevention

5.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses in detail on the development of EU conflict prevention policy. The competences and mechanisms that comprise EU conflict prevention policy (inclusive of crisis management mechanisms) are described, and the development of the policy within the EU institutions is explained. Conflict prevention policy combines the EU's external economic competences i.e. development and humanitarian aid, with the 'high' politics of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It therefore presents a particular challenge at the EU level, despite the establishment of the single institutional framework in the 1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU), which brought foreign policy cooperation into the formal institutional set-up.

As explained in chapter 3, the EU is the product of a fifty-year evolutionary process based on pragmatism, negotiation and compromise. Inevitably, this has not resulted in the development of an optimal set of institutions and procedures with mechanisms to coordinate policy across an increasingly wide array of policy agendas. Efforts to establish conflict prevention as a policy priority at the EU level during the post-Cold War period highlight the difficulties resulting from this incremental institutional development. EU ambitions to forge a role as conflict preventor reflect, moreover, the influence of external developments and rising expectations of EU abilities. The attempt to run before it could walk in the early 1990s, particularly in former Yugoslavia, left the EU with a tarnished reputation on the international stage, which has tended to overshadow the efforts made to overcome its foreign policy 'paralysis' (Zielonka 1998).

In fact, considerable progress in the development of foreign policy mechanisms has been made since the early 1990s, when the Union was frequently criticised for having neither a foreign policy, nor the clear strategic objectives needed to develop one. The EU now has policy competences, planning and analysis capabilities, operational mechanisms and a security strategy to guide external action. In the EU Programme
for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, adopted at the Göteborg European Council in June 2001, the commitment was made to "pursue conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of the EU’s external relations" (Council of the EU 2001b: 1/paragraph 5). Preventive engagement subsequently emerged as one of the key objectives of the EU Security Strategy, prepared by Javier Solana, EU Secretary General/High Representative for CFSP (SG/HR) and adopted in December 2003.

Conflict prevention capacities are categorised as long-term (structural) policy aimed at addressing root causes of conflict, medium-term early warning and analysis competences, and finally short-term preventive diplomacy and civilian and/or military crisis management (operational). The EU has developed mechanisms to contribute to external conflict prevention in each of these areas, and the chapter examines the EU’s competences in these fields in turn. Identifying EU mechanisms highlights the fact that the development of conflict prevention policy has involved EU institutions with different approaches and decision-making procedures. The final section of the chapter addresses some of the key implications of this set-up. Policy-making is divided between the European Commission and the Council of the EU, which not only complicates the planning and formulation of policy, but also requires sufficient dialogue, coordination of policy, and shared objectives. The difficulty in creating a coordinated conflict prevention policy at the EU level is primarily due to this fragmentation of policy across different pillars and institutions. This is compounded by the lack of coordination between civilian and military approaches and mechanisms. Lack of internal coordination has two serious implications: the EU’s reputation as an international actor in conflict prevention is undermined; and the ability of the EU to practice external policy coordination in conflict prevention with the international organisations identified as the EU’s key partners in chapter 4 - the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) - is compromised.

5.2 The Emergence of EU Conflict Prevention Discourse

The emergence of conflict prevention in the EU external relations discourse is intimately connected to Western Europe’s desire for stability on its periphery, and the development of the CFSP. Table 5.1 ('The Emergence of EU Conflict Prevention Discourse') shows some key extracts from EU documents pertinent to the rise of
conflict prevention and crisis management as EU foreign policy objectives. Analysis of EU documents shows conflict prevention to be an implicit aim of the CFSP in the 1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU). Listed as objectives of the CFSP are “to preserve peace and strengthen international security” and “to develop and consolidate democracy” (see extract 1, Table 5.1). This link between democracy and peace is frequently emphasised by the EU, reflecting a consensus on the democratic peace thesis, underscored by the history of European integration. Indeed, the promotion of democracy was central to early foreign policy initiatives under European Political Cooperation (EPC), particularly in Portugal and Spain, where the transition to democracy was linked to EC aid and trade agreements in the 1970s (Van Praag 1982). The EU’s intention of being part of a wider European security system is reflected in the objective to “promote international cooperation” for these ends. The actual substance of the CFSP is vague, particularly in the context of a future common defence (see Article J.4 in extract 1). The Western European Union (WEU) is put forward as the potential ‘operational’ wing of the EU. The lack of clarity over defence and the role of the WEU indicated a lack of Member State consensus on these issues.

By the June 1992 Lisbon European Council, conflict prevention became an explicit stated objective of the CFSP (see extract 2, Table 5.1). While still tentative (“the likely development of the CFSP”) the Presidency report suggests for the first time that the EU should have the capacity to tackle root causes of conflict. Moreover, EU interests were being framed in terms of “the creation of a more favourable international environment”. In light of the Union’s failure to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Yugoslavia, the refocusing of CFSP objectives towards “contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts” and “contributing to a more effective international coordination in dealing with emergency situations” was understandably seen to be important in establishing some credibility for EU foreign policy. The geographical focus of CFSP action was henceforth to be Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Stability on the borders of EU territory was paramount, and conflict prevention was at the core of EU efforts.
## Table 5.1 The Emergence of EU Conflict Prevention Discourse

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<th>Document</th>
<th>Extract</th>
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2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:
   - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
   - to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member states in all ways;
   - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
   - to promote international cooperation;
   - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

**Article J.4**

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.

| **2. June 1992 Lisbon European Council Presidency Conclusions** | **Annex I Report to the European Council in Lisbon on the likely development of the CFSP** |

3...the CFSP should contribute to ensuring that the Union's external action is less reactive to events in the outside world, and more active in the pursuit of the interests of the Union and in the creation of a more favourable international environment. This will enable the European Union to have an improved capacity to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of crises.

10. For each area, the Union should define specific objectives in order to select the issues in which joint action may be envisaged. These specific objectives may be inter alia:

   - strengthening democratic principles and institutions, and respect for human and minority rights;
   - promoting regional stability...
   - contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts;
   - contributing to a more effective international coordination in dealing with emergency situations;
   - strengthening existing cooperation in issues of international interest such as the fight against arms proliferation, terrorism and the traffic in illicit drugs;
   - promoting and supporting good government.
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event/Document</th>
<th>Statement/Conclusion</th>
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<tr>
<td>3. December 1994</td>
<td>Essen European Council Presidency Conclusions</td>
<td>The European Union is making an essential contribution to overcoming the legacy of past divisions, and promoting peace, security and stability in and around Europe.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1....The development of an EU military crisis management capacity is to be seen as an activity within the framework of the CFSP (Title V of the TEU)... The atlantic alliance remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>The aim of the efforts made since the Cologne, Helsinki and Feira European Councils is to give the European Union the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and of assuming its responsibilities in the face on crises by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defence field...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. April 2001</td>
<td>Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>The ever-growing list of causes of conflicts calls for international cooperation and multilateral action of a new order. The EU, itself an on-going exercise in making peace and prosperity, has a big role to play in global efforts for conflict prevention. For this, it has at its disposal a wide range of instruments for long term or short term action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. June 2001</td>
<td>Göteborg European Council Presidency Conclusions</td>
<td>52. The European Council endorsed the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts which will improve the Union's capacity to undertake coherent early warning, analysis and action. Conflict prevention is one of the main objectives of the Union's external relations and should be integrated in all its relevant aspects, including the European Security and Defence Policy, development cooperation and trade.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. June 2001</td>
<td>EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts</td>
<td>The EU will:</td>
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<td>- set clear priorities for preventive actions,</td>
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<td>- improve its early warning, action and policy coherence</td>
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<td>- enhance its instruments for long and short-term prevention, and</td>
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<td>- build effective partnerships for prevention.</td>
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<td>9. December 2003</td>
<td>Thessaloniki European Council, European Security Strategy</td>
<td>...we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early. We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future.</td>
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The 1993 Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions introduced the EU’s draft Pact on Stability in Europe as an initiative designed to prevent conflict in Central and Eastern Europe. The Pact is generally viewed as being one of the most comprehensive and successful early CFSP joint actions (Cameron 1998). By 1994, as stated in the Essen European Council Presidency Conclusions, the EU saw itself as “making an essential contribution to...promoting peace, security and stability in and around Europe” (extract 3, Table 5.1). By the mid-1990s, wider interpretations of the causes of conflict prompted the European Commission to link development aid to political conditions, and to promote the ‘mainstreaming’ of conflict prevention considerations into EU policy-making. The development context became the basis for EU structural conflict prevention. The Commission was also keen to play a role in the development and elucidation of non-military crisis management mechanisms to ensure its involvement in operational aspects of conflict prevention and to complement its role in structural prevention.

In the wake of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (ratified 1999), the EU had made marginal improvements in the CFSP by creating a planning and analysis unit in the Council Secretariat, and the role of High Representative for the CFSP. Additionally, the EU’s operational capacity was defined in terms of “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (the Petersberg tasks: Treaty of Amsterdam, Title V, Article J.7 (2)). The year 1999 saw considerable progress in the development of an EU military capacity also as the result of the 1998 Franco-British St Malo Summit, during which the UK government indicated that it would no longer object to an autonomous EU crisis management force. The June 1999 Cologne European Council stressed that the development of the ‘Common European Policy on Security and Defence’ came under the CFSP umbrella, and reiterated the British position with regard to the continued supremacy of NATO in European defence (see extract 4, Table 5.1). The Helsinki and Nice European Councils outlined new bodies to manage and develop the EU’s roles in military and civilian crisis management, and set a target for the development of an EU rapid reaction force. These were designed to allow the Union to play “its full role on the international stage...in the face of crises...” (see extract 5, Table 5.1).
The publicity that the development of a potential European army attracted tended to overshadow the progress made by the European Commission in elucidating the EU’s interpretation of conflict prevention. The 2001 *Communication on Conflict Prevention* linked the EU’s legacy of peace with external relations policy objectives in conflict prevention (see extract 6, Table 5.1), and outlined a vast number of long and short-term EU instruments. This was the first time that a clear definition of conflict prevention, distinguishing between long-term structural prevention (‘projecting stability’) and short-term prevention (‘reacting quickly to nascent conflicts’) had appeared in an EU document (European Commission 2001a: 6). The evolution of the term in EU documents and parlance reflects confusion surrounding this and related terminology such as preventive diplomacy, crisis response and crisis management. After the Commission adopted this holistic definition, the institution’s website still defined conflict prevention as “actions undertaken over the short term to reduce manifest tensions and/or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict.”

This confusion was not confined to the EU; as discussed in chapter 2, academics and practitioners define conflict prevention in a number of different ways. By 2001-02, the EU had adopted a wide definition of conflict prevention, in contrast to its earlier association (in the EU and elsewhere) with narrow preventive diplomacy (Cottee 1998:4).

Progress in conflict prevention was encouraged by the Swedish Presidency, which was instrumental in the drafting of the 2001 *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict*. The four pledges for a more effective EU prevention policy (reproduced in extract 8, Table 5.1) pick up on key areas of perceived EU shortcomings: priority setting; early warning, action and policy coherence; enhanced long and short-term prevention; and effective partnership-building. The document calls mainly on Council institutions to implement these improvements, particularly the European Council, COREPER and the High Representative. Conflict prevention emerged as a central theme in the 2003 *European Security Strategy (ESS)*, confirming its rhetorical success in EU security discourse (see extract 9, Table 5.1).

EU publications on conflict prevention and military and non-military crisis management mushroomed after 2000 (see Figure 5.1). The bar chart shows the result of a search of Council documents from 1999 through to 2003 to include the term ‘conflict prevention’ in the text. From 10+ documents in 2000, the figure rises to 35+ in 2001, to 40+ in 2002. The increase from 2001 indicates that conflict prevention considerations were increasingly taken into account (or at least recognised) across a range of EU policy areas. This evidence provides rhetorical support for the stated objective at the 2001 Göteborg European Council to integrate conflict prevention into ESDP, development cooperation and trade (see extract 7, Table 5.1). It also shows that the institutional focus for conflict prevention had shifted from the Commission to the Council as new units and committees were created in the Council of the EU to support the ESDP. EU developments were also clearly influenced by parallel developments at the UN and OSCE level, and efforts to cooperate with these bodies in conflict prevention is increasingly stated as an objective in EU documents, especially by the 2001 Göteborg European Council Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy. Negotiations with NATO over the use of NATO assets for EU crisis management became increasingly crucial as a possible EU mission in Macedonia was discussed.

The explosion of EU interest in establishing conflict prevention as a guiding principle in foreign policy follows on from a rise in academic interest in the EU's conflict prevention role. A search of a journal database (JSTOR) for articles containing the phrases ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘European Union’ shows an increase over the 1990s. Figure 5.2 shows the result of this search. It is important to note that the development of conflict prevention mechanisms at the EU level is far from divorced from a wider interest in conflict prevention as a new security strategy in academia, research institutes and other international/regional organisations and NGOs. Not only was the EU influenced by external perceptions of where the organisation had previously ‘failed’ in its foreign policy, but it was also quick to construct its international presence and objectives in a way that was acceptable to its Member States and its critics. Moreover, the EU advanced its role at a time when conflict prevention was increasingly on multilateral and national agendas. We now move on to a detailed inventory of the EU’s conflict prevention policy, divided here into structural, early warning and analysis, and operational.
Figure 5.1 Number of documents published 1999-2003 with the term 'conflict prevention' in EU texts available on the Public Register of Council Documents. (A Consilium simple search was performed on 1/8/03).

Figure 5.2 Number of articles published with the terms 'conflict prevention' and 'European Union' in the text available on JSTOR. (An advanced search was performed on 1/8/03. JSTOR is an electronic database which searches a large number of political journals including: British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), International Organisation, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Politics, Midwest Journal of Political Science, PS, Political Science Quarterly, Public Opinion Quarterly, Western Political Quarterly, World Politics, MERIP Reports, Political Theory, International Security, Political Behavior, Conflict Resolution, Political Science and Politics, Political Research Quarterly, Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939), International Affairs Review Supplement. Most journal articles are available from the inception of the journal to between 3-5 years before present. The last 3-5 years are often unavailable, being restricted by fixed or moving walls to protect copyright, hence the fall in the number of records from 2000 onwards.)
5.3 Structural Conflict Prevention: The Commission’s Domain

The European Commission is largely responsible for structural, or long-term conflict prevention, as it manages the EU’s external aid programmes. Aid contributes to the tackling of root causes of conflict caused by poverty, inequality and economic underdevelopment. Additionally, the EU promotes basic conflict prevention tenets like democracy, human rights and good governance through political conditionality in aid and trade agreements. Enlargement is another form of structural conflict prevention largely managed by the Commission (subject to Council agreement). The extensive acquis communitaire\(^{34}\) requires candidate countries to meet economic and political criteria, inclusive of respect for human rights and minorities. The following section examines the roles of development cooperation, political conditionality and humanitarian aid in EU conflict prevention.

5.3.1 Development cooperation

The connection between development aid and strategies to prevent conflict is a post-Cold War phenomenon, linked to the politicisation of development aid. While the targets of assistance, (typically economic and social development), are obviously crucial in establishing the basis of a conflict-free society, the link between the two issues is complex and often controversial. This is largely due to the frequent inability to predict the impact of aid on situations with unique and different political, social and economic variables. The controversy arises from moral questions about the application of conditionality and the conflicting nature of external policies.

As discussed in chapter 3, the EU has a long history in the promotion of development in third world countries. Legal agreements with third countries on aid, trade and economic issues form the backbone of Community external relations (e.g. Cooperation, Association, or Accession Agreements). While always implicitly political, these agreements increasingly include overtly stated political conditions to be met by the third country, reflecting the Union’s commitment to human rights, democracy and good governance, for example. The type of agreement concluded with the Union also reflects a hierarchy of privilege, with future members and/or peripheral countries receiving preferential treatment (Smith, K. 2003: 56). The fact

\(^{34}\) The laws and policies already adopted by the EU.
that political commitments don't always square with economic policy is not something that the Union is unaware of. The increasing call for coherence and consistency across EU policy and pillars reflects a recognition of the possible contradiction between the promotion of free trade in third countries and the protectionism of the Common Agricultural Policy, for example (Smith, K. 2003: 65), or the discrepancies between development/conflict prevention objectives and Member State arms sales to developing countries.

The context of Community development policy changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War. The traditional assumptions of EC policy and strategy in the development sphere came increasingly under pressure in a world vastly changed in economic and political terms. Holland (2002: 9) cites the fall of the Berlin Wall as precipitating a redefinition of the development context, resulting in a rerouting of aid from the Africa to Eastern and Central Europe. Griffin, citing foreign aid as a product of the ideological confrontation of the Cold War, correctly predicted a fall in the levels of official development assistance, but continuing widespread support for disaster relief and emergency aid (1991: 670-671). The process of change is exemplified by the renegotiation of the Lomé Convention, a unique EU cooperation agreement with the ACP countries, linked originally to EU members through colonial ties. The 2000 Cotonou Agreement reduces economic privileges for ACP countries, includes new political conditions, and reflects the trade liberalisation agenda of the big players on the global economic stage. This revision of the aid hierarchy is no short-term development either, since it is questionable whether current aid levels can be sustained in light of EU enlargement to states that are economically poor by Western standards (Holland 2002: 9).

Inconsistency and confusion over EU development objectives undoubtedly reflects the 'aid fatigue' of the 1990s, and the widely held conclusion that aid just wasn't working. The influx of aid to developing countries over the preceding decades had not resulted in a widespread move towards political and economic stability. The restructuring of EC external affairs and reforms in the implementation of aid in recent years was a response to this. This realisation was also to fuel a new wave of 'second generation' conditionality, designed to improve the targeting and effectiveness of aid:
political conditionality. The linking of stability enhancing instruments with foreign policy objectives became increasingly visible, enabling the Union to seek greater coherence in its external policies. It is widely believed that linking aid to political objectives is an effective way the EU can contribute to preventing conflict (Barth Eide and Ronnfeldt 1998; Eavis and Kefford 2002; Smith, K. E. 2003). Development policies and aid can be controversial, however, when linked to strategic and political policies.

5.3.2 The objectives of development: where does conflict prevention come in?
The European Union (inclusive of Member State bilateral programmes) is the world’s largest donor of development aid, and therefore has a key role to play in structural conflict prevention. Examining the objectives of development aid throws up some paradoxes. Despite the Commission’s emphasis on structural conflict prevention, little mention is made of conflict prevention in development policy documents. Table 5.2 (‘EU Conflict Prevention: Development, Early Warning and Operational’) begins with some extracts from EU documents pertaining to development cooperation. The 1992 Treaty on European Union outlined development objectives as centered on sustainable economic development and the eradication of poverty in developing countries. Additionally, development cooperation would contribute to the wider objectives of “developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law... respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms” (see extract 1 in Table 5.2). The Union’s inclusion of political conditionality clauses in development and trade agreements with third countries was increasingly visible in support of this objective.

Conflict prevention was emerging as an issue in the EC development sphere by the mid-1990s, particularly in the African context, in the aftermath of violent conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda. Lying on the boundary between development and security, conflict prevention gained support as a way of managing change in Africa in particular. The EU (as recently confirmed in the European Security Strategy) recognises that “development depends on peace and peace depends on development” (Stokke 1997: 196); stability in recipient countries is paramount if aid is to be

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35 Political conditionality can be defined as entailing “the linkage, by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid), to the fulfilment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles” (Smith, K. 1998: 256).
36 Interview with European Commission official, 25/10/04.
effective in assisting social and economic development. Development Commissioner's were vocal about the contribution the EU could make to conflict prevention. According to Poul Nielson, development cooperation is the greatest contribution to conflict prevention that the EU can make in developing countries, where the threat of EU military intervention is less credible. More controversially, he cites the Community method as the only way that the EU can establish a credible and common foreign policy. Former Development Commissioner Joao de Deus Pinheiro in 1998 cited the new 'peace-oriented approach' to development cooperation as the primary reason behind the enhancement of Commission policy planning and analysis initiatives. By the year 2000, the Commission's Communication on Development Policy focused on poverty reduction as the overall aim of EU development policy, and this was reiterated by the Council and the Commission in a November 2000 statement (see extract 2 in Table 5.2). Conflict prevention was increasingly mentioned as an issue to be mainstreamed into Community programming (European Commission 2004a).

While there was clearly recognition that the effectiveness of development cooperation, with poverty reduction as its main objective, relies on stability within countries receiving aid, and states that the strategy “must contribute to strengthening democracy, to the consolidation of peace and the prevention of conflict” (extract 2, Table 5.2), these issues were less visible. Moreover, strategies to reduce poverty will not necessarily contribute to strengthening democracy and preventing conflict.

Economic and social development designed to alleviate poverty may incite conflict in communities, depending on which social, sectoral or ethnic groups are favoured. The primary focus on poverty reduction doesn’t directly address issues of inequality (whether economic, political or cultural) in developing countries, which may be more likely to fuel conflict than poverty (Addison 2000: 405). Poverty reduction also sits uneasily beside the parallel insistence by international financial institutions and the EU on trade liberalisation and privatisation in developing countries.

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39 In line with the UN’s Millennium Development Goals.
40 i.e. horizontal inequalities, as identified by Frances Stewart (2002).
Table 5.2 EU Conflict Prevention: Development Cooperation, Early Warning and Operational

<table>
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<tr>
<th>1. 1992 Treaty on European Union, Title XVII, Article 130u, Maastricht.</th>
<th>1. Community Policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the member states, shall foster:</th>
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<tr>
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<td>- the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.</td>
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2. Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

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<tr>
<th>2. November 2000 Statement by the Council and the Commission. The European Community's Development Policy</th>
<th>The principal aim of the Community's development policy is to reduce poverty with a view to its eventual eradication.</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Poverty...results from many factors. The Community is therefore determined to support poverty reduction strategies which integrate these many dimensions and are based on the analysis of constraints and opportunities in individual developing countries. These strategies must contribute to strengthening democracy, to the consolidation of peace and the prevention of conflict, to gradual integration into the world economy, to more awareness of the social and environmental aspects with a view to sustainable development, to equality between men and women and to public and private capacity-building.</td>
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| 3. April 2001 Commission Communication on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An Assessment | The pursuit of effective linkage is not simply a matter of ensuring a smooth transition from emergency to development assistance. It must be seen in a broader context, as part of an integrated approach towards preventing crises and disasters, in particular through disaster preparedness, as well as preventing and resolving conflicts... |

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<td>6. Declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit</td>
<td>The Conference agrees that:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1. A policy planning and early warning unit shall be established in the General Secretariat of the Council under the responsibility of its Secretary-General, High Representative for the CFSP. Appropriate cooperation shall be established with the Commission in order to ensure full coherence with the Union's external economic and development policies.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. The tasks of the unit shall include the following: (a) monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP; (b) providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas where the CFSP could focus in future; (c) providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may have significant repercussions for the Union's foreign and security policy, including potential political crises;</td>
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(d) producing, at the request of either the Council or the Presidency or on its own initiative, argued policy options papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council, and which may contain analyses, recommendations and strategies for the CFSP.

3. The unit shall consist of personnel drawn from the General Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission and the WEU.

4. Any Member State or the Commission may make suggestions to the unit for work to be undertaken.

5. Member States and the Commission shall assist the policy planning process by providing, to the fullest extent possible, relevant information, including confidential information.

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<th>5. June 1999 Cologne European Council Presidency Conclusions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Decision Making</td>
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<tr>
<td>...necessary arrangements must be made in order to ensure political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations. Furthermore, the EU will need a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capacity for relevant strategic planning.</td>
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<td>This may require in particular:</td>
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<td>- regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the GAC, as appropriate including Defence Ministers;</td>
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<td>- a permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee) consisting of representatives with political/military expertise;</td>
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<td>- an EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- an EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre;</td>
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<td>- other resources such as a Satellite Centre, Institute for Security Studies.</td>
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<th>6. 30 November 2000 GAC Contribution by the Secretary General/High Representative: reference framework for crisis management</th>
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<tr>
<td>2. In order to ensure consistency between the instruments available to the Union, it is essential that a single body should have access to all the information, proposals and initiatives relating to the crisis involved in order to make a global assessment; following the conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, this role would fall to the Political and Security Committee.</td>
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<tr>
<th>7. December 2000 Nice European Council Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of the European Union in the Field of Conflict Prevention. Report by the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Key recommendations in the short term [selected]</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Early consideration of conflict prevention by the GAC...periodic identification of priority areas for EU action;</td>
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<td>- SG/HR and Commission to assist in overseeing implementation of policies;</td>
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<td>- The Political and Security Committee invited to develop role as focal point in developing conflict prevention policies in CFSP and CSDP;</td>
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<td>- Better coordination of information sources available to the Union and regular preparation by the Policy Unit and by the Commission of papers on conflict prevention issues for consideration by policy makers.</td>
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<td>In order to ensure early warning, action and policy coherence:</td>
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<td>- Coreper will continue to ensure coherence between different policy areas of the Union, paying specific attention to the question of coherent preventive activities,</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The PSC will further strengthen its role in developing and monitoring</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. December 1999
Helsinki European Council Presidency
Conclusions

**Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence**

A common European headline goal will be adopted for readily deployable military capabilities and collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport will be developed rapidly, to be achieved through voluntary coordinated national and multi-national efforts, for carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks.

...by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily they [member states] will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks...including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons).

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10. June 2000
Feira European Council Presidency
Conclusions

**Presidency Report on Strengthening the CESDP Appendix 3: 'Study of European Council Concrete Targets on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management'**

The reinforcement of the Union’s capabilities in civilian aspects of crisis management should, above all, provide it with adequate means to face complex political crises by:
- acting to prevent the eruption or escalation of conflicts;
- consolidating peace and internal stability in periods of transition;
- ensuring complementarity between the military and civilian aspects of crisis management covering the full range of Petersberg tasks.

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11. December 2002
Council of the EU
‘EU crisis management and conflict prevention – Guidelines on fact-finding missions’

Fact-finding missions have an importance and a value, which may go beyond those of a mere information-gathering and assessment tool. They are also a signal which may be considered highly politically sensitive with respect to the host country, the neighbours in the region and the international community. In fact, FFMs will generally prove to the international community the EU’s awareness of a given crisis, they will point out that the EU is seriously concerned with the situation in the crisis area, and they may indicate a potential willingness actively to manage that crisis.
These policies often result in greater poverty and inequality for the majority, again fuelling conflict (Addison 2000: 405). The fact that the bulk of EC aid is now not going to the poorest countries also serves to undermine the poverty reduction objective (Smith, K. 2003: 59). This is largely as a result of the prioritisation of the EU's near neighbours. It is far from certain that political conditionality is the answer to development failures, especially since conditions are not properly monitored or consistently applied (Kanbur 2000; Smith, K. E. 2003). The suspension of agreements in response to violations of human rights or democratic principles relies on a series of cross-pillar and inter-institutional mechanisms, and the institutions are not always in agreement with each other or the Member States on the proposed action. Member States appear to have the upper hand in the employment of blocking proposals and delaying tactics. In a study of EU political conditionality, Karen Smith found that in some cases, strategic and/or economic interests overrode concerns over political conditions, and neither positive nor negative measures were applied consistently (Smith 1998). This self-interest undermines the principles that the EU claims to be promoting. Upholding the EU's stance on human rights and democracy, while justifying aid cuts, the conditionality debate exemplifies the 1990s paradox of political rhetoric for aid in a climate of falling levels of overseas aid (Thérien and Lloyd 2000: 21). Narrow poverty reduction strategies and inconsistent political conditionality do not indicate a commitment to 'peace-oriented' development.

Indeed, the Conflict Prevention Newsletter, published by a group of NGOs (The European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation) argued that the 2000 Communication on Development Policy relegated conflict prevention in the priority stakes, and focused instead on trade liberalisation and foreign investment as key to economic growth in developing countries. Conflict prevention is not cited as a clear priority in EC development cooperation, and the 'mainstreaming' of conflict prevention will only succeed if development staff are properly trained. According to a Commission official, staff across a range of external policy areas subject to mainstreaming (including delegations) lack conflict prevention expertise.

42 Interview with European Commission official, 25/10/04.
The inconsistent record of conflict prevention in EU development documents undoubtedly reflects difficulties in defining the concept and tying it in with other pressing development objectives. Internal Commission politics also provides an explanation. The reorganisation of Commission portfolios in 1999 meant that conflict prevention expanded from its base in DG Development, where it had originated. The EuropeAid Cooperation Office, established in 2001 to handle the planning, management and implementation of EC aid downsized DG Development’s responsibilities, as did the decentralisation of aid management, gradually transferred to EC delegations in developing countries.

Crucially, the waning record of conflict prevention in development documents described above coincides with the establishment of the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit in the Commission’s DG External Relations in 2000. DG External Relations were far better placed to utilise conflict prevention as an instrument of foreign policy linked to the CFSP project. The link with development cooperation was aided by the fragmentation of development in the Commission – with DG Development dealing only with the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, and DG External Relations responsible for development in other countries apart from the candidate countries (the responsibility of DG Enlargement). Additionally, DG External Relations were henceforth responsible for ACP political issues. A certain marginalisation of DG Development resulted in the ascendancy of DG External Relations, headed by Chris Patten. Interestingly, Patten seized on the idea of conflict prevention as enhancing the role of the Commission in the CFSP, having previously regarded the concept as beyond the scope of Commission activity (Björkdahl 2002: 118). DG External Relations were henceforth to develop the Commission’s long-term approach to conflict prevention: the Country Strategy Papers, Country Conflict Assessments, and the Check List for Root Causes of Conflict.

5.3.3 Country Strategy Papers, Conflict Assessments and Check List for Root Causes of Conflict

Located in the CFSP Directorate of DG External Relations, the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit developed the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), Country
Conflict Assessments (CCAs) and Check List as key tools in structural conflict prevention. The production of Country/Regional Strategy Papers is ongoing, with more than 100 drafted by March 2002 (they are subject to approval by the Commission and Member States). In July 2005, 56 CSPs and 10 Regional Strategy Papers were available to download from the Commission's website. Country Conflict Assessments are drawn up on a yearly basis, and remain confidential documents. The Check List for Root Causes of Conflict provides a set of conflict indicators used when drawing up the political analysis section of the CSPs, and the CCAs, which then helps in the targeting of aid. The Check List utilises a series of questions grouped under the following headings:

- Legitimacy of the state
- Rule of law
- Respect for fundamental rights
- Civil society and media
- Relations between communities and dispute-solving mechanisms
- Sound economic management
- Social and regional inequalities
- Geopolitical situation

The Check List represents EU-wide agreement on root causes of conflict, and encourages the comprehensive inspection of social, political and economic conditions in third countries. Internal consensus was not problematic because the Commission was given a free hand by the Member States. The Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) founded in 1997 after a joint European Parliament – Commission initiative, assisted with the early stages of the drafting process, and the UN was consulted. The CPN project, which provided a vital link between academics and policy-makers, was axed prematurely by the Commission (without consultation with the Parliament) at the

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46 Interview with Commission official, 25/10/04.
47 A network of academic experts, practitioners and NGOs, headed by the think-tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin from 2000.
48 Interview with Commission official, 25/10/04.
end of 2001. A note on the CPN website ‘setting the record straight’ denied the accusations of unprofessionalism that Commissioner Patten had used to justify the termination of the project. Lack of communication and poor Commission management and understanding of the project are cited by former CPN director Reinhardt Rummel as particular problems. After 3 years, CPN is now under new tender as a pilot project funded by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office.

The Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) bring together all the various instruments and agreements the EU has with a particular country, assesses economic, political and social developments, and outlines an EU strategy and approach. In theory, both the Check List and Strategy Papers assist in the mainstreaming of conflict prevention considerations, and provide opportunities for the better targeting of aid and political dialogue. In general, analysis of political/societal conflict (whether potential or ongoing) is thin. More attention is paid to economic and financial issues, and points raised in the Check List, such as civil society and political legitimacy, are not dealt with in any depth. In the case of Georgia, for example, a country split by two unresolved internal conflicts from the early 1990s, the primary EU objective is “to establish a business climate conducive to foreign and domestic investments.” (European Commission 2002a) While the conflicts are mentioned as impediments to Georgia’s development, no concrete EU role in conflict resolution is outlined, nor is political conditionality a key tool in aid implementation. In stark contrast, the Country Strategy Paper for Macedonia cites conflict prevention and resolution as key objectives in EU cooperation with the country. This lack of consistency reflects a selectivity based on geographical and political priorities. If conflict prevention/management generally emerges as a minimal concern, the value of the Check List is compromised. The new inter-service ‘Quality Support Group’, which brings together human rights, trade, economic and conflict prevention experts are tasked with the coordination of Community provisions in the drafting of CSPs, yet a balancing of these considerations is not evident. The CCAs are evidently more relevant for conflict prevention, but the confidential nature of these documents does

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not permit any assessment of their utility. Moreover, there is little indication that information and strategies outlined in the CCAs have informed the drafting of many of the CSPs.

The impact of initiatives originating in the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, with a staff of around 12 (two working specifically on conflict prevention), are minimal when it is noted that up to 5 000 Commission staff are involved in external relations (Müller-Wille 2002: 71). This means that an integrated and consistent conflict prevention approach relies on dialogue and coordination between the DGs and desks within DGs. The Check List is distributed to geographical desks and delegations. The more comprehensive ‘Conflict Prevention Handbook’ promised by the Commission several years ago, never materialised probably because of the axing of CPN.

The politicisation of development aid and the key role of DG External Relations in conflict prevention has led to a concurrent depoliticisation of humanitarian aid. Conceptually, humanitarian aid is deemed to be apolitical in ethos, and institutionally, political issues have been effectively removed from the DG responsible for humanitarian assistance – DG Development. Keeping politics out of humanitarian aid in crisis situations, is however, problematic, and inconsistencies in the EU’s position are liable to undermine its role in crisis response.

5.3.4 Humanitarian aid

Like development assistance, the post-Cold War humanitarian context demanded a better response from Western Europe, and an opportunity for the EU to advance itself as an international actor (Holland 2002: 101). The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was established in 1992 to provide an efficient and effective EU response to humanitarian emergencies, natural or man-made. In 2002, the Office distributed more than €500 million (European Commission 2002b) making the EU (inclusive of Member States’ bilateral aid) the world’s largest donor of

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52 Four DGs have external relations responsibilities: External Relations, Development, Trade and Enlargement.
53 Interview with Commission official 25/10/04.
54 The Office provides and coordinates funds to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and UN agencies. It employs an average of 151 staff and around 40 field experts who are independent consultants (ECHO Annual Review 2002).
humanitarian aid (Holland 2002: 105). Run by its own Commissioner, Emma Bonino until 1999, the Office was under the jurisdiction of the Development Commissioner, Poul Neilson until 2004.55

Since its inception, ECHO has been caught up in a debate about its core mandate. On the one hand, the Commission has recognised the need to link short-term relief projects with the objectives of longer-term development projects. This is designed to fill the aid gap between short-term emergency assistance and longer-term development assistance in order to improve the consistency and effectiveness of aid granted. The 2001 Communication from the Commission, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (European Commission 2001d) explained the Commission’s position. The Commission emphasised that the transition from emergency to development assistance must be part of an overall strategy to prevent crises (see extract 3 in Table 5.2). Bringing ECHO under the jurisdiction of the Development Commissioner in 1999 was an attempt to make this linkage more visible and effective.

At the same time, the apolitical nature of ECHO has been consistently emphasised, and it has been urged to concentrate on emergency relief as its core mandate. A 2003 report from the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit stressed, “EC humanitarian assistance cannot be considered a crisis management tool” (European Commission 2003a). This contradicts an earlier paper from the Council Secretariat and the Commission, which included humanitarian assistance in a list of crisis management activities (Council of the EU 1999a). Obviously, humanitarian assistance is part of the response to man-made crises, and cannot easily be separated from subsequent or concurring crisis management actions; “when international assistance is given in the context of a violent conflict, it becomes a part of that context and thus also of the conflict” (Anderson 1999: 145). The linkage of humanitarian aid with development assistance does not concur with this drive to depoliticise ECHO, and reflects a certain amount of conflict within the Commission about the role of humanitarian aid as a crisis response tool. If the objective is to make ECHO truly apolitical, then humanitarian aid provided to conflict zones must be distinguished

55 Louis Michel heads Development and Humanitarian Aid in the new Barroso Commission
from emergency relief in response to natural disasters. The objective of aid on the basis of need is not therefore jeopardised, but the role of humanitarian assistance can be better integrated into an overall response to a conflict, with the possible political/military implications of aid delivery and distribution given due consideration. The current line of political linkage and simultaneous political detachment only serves to undermine the Union's rhetoric of consistency and coherency. The confused message reflects internal Commission divisions. According to one Commission official, ECHO is striving to maintain its impartiality in order to continue to support the main humanitarian crises in Africa, and has resisted pressure to reroute aid to Afghanistan and Iraq. The downgrading of DG Development and ECHO's apolitical nature has allowed DG External Relations to take central stage in conflict prevention.

5.3.5 Defining conflict prevention: From structural to operational?
While the prevention of conflict was tentatively included in the 1992 Lisbon European Council Presidency Conclusions as one likely area for CFSP activities, EU progress in structural conflict prevention came primarily during the mid-1990s from DG Development in relation to Africa. Evidence suggests that by the late 1990s conflict prevention at the EU level lost its association with the development sphere (and therefore its structural emphasis) and became more and more linked to operational ESDP issues.

This is supported by Olsen (2002), who argues that in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, the EU as a whole increasingly placed more emphasis on conflict prevention and conflict management at the expense of the promotion of democracy throughout the 1990s. Interested more in stability than democratic governance, "promoting democracy via aid became less and less important to the European Union", while developing the ESDP, with conflict prevention as a key component, became a top priority (Olsen 2002: 324). While this signals a widening of the concept beyond the development sphere, the separation of conflict prevention from the promotion of democracy, (which go hand in hand) does not indicate that appropriate linkage between structural and operational conflict prevention is taking place. Certainly, Olsen cites the emphasis on conflict prevention as part of the EU drive to assert itself

56 Interview, European Commission, 25/10/04.
as an international security actor, in support of developments in the military crisis management sphere.

This policy shift could suggest that Africa was now the subject of strategic EU interest: was the geographical priority for CFSP moving beyond the confines of the EU’s ‘near abroad’? The EU’s 2003 ARTEMIS operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is evidence of EU interest in Africa as a testing ground for new operational capacities. Nevertheless, an emphasis on operational conflict prevention will not succeed in the longer-term if it remains detached from structural objectives. The conflict prevention/development debate highlights the tensions between the EU’s global and regional roles. The emphasis on conflict prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa indicates that EU does aspire to a global conflict prevention policy. However, the fact remains that the EU has more influence on its borders, and more consistency between political, economic and security policies are evident in countries on the EU’s periphery. The linkage between structural conflict prevention such as aid, and operational activities like police missions and peacekeeping, is more visible and pressing in Macedonia than in the DRC. This discrepancy undermines the Union’s global ambitions, and suggests that the “range of ...interests and partnerships is still rather selective and corresponds to that of a regional power with some clearly identifiable overseas interests” (Missiroli 2003: 30).

The new institutional structures in the Council, to support the ESDP, were in a strong position to take back the conflict prevention baton from the Commission. While structural conflict prevention has been effectively relegated with DG Development, the Union has developed an array of early warning and policy planning capacities to support operational activities.

5.4 Early Warning and Analysis Mechanisms: Commission and Council
At the EU level, early warning and analysis competences have gradually emerged in the framework of the CFSP, but are fragmented across the Council and the Commission. While the Commission is responsible for much of the fact-finding and analysis, the Council’s capacity for planning and analysis has increased greatly with

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57 This was a small military force, (less than 2000 personnel) sent to the DRC in June 2003 to stabilise the capital, Bunia, before the arrival of UN peacekeepers in September 2003.
the development of the ESDP. Additionally, it is in the Council where decision-making power in terms of appropriate action lies. New bodies created to undertake *early warning and analysis* are important in the creation of an 'EU' perspective, which in turn is vital for the creation of a coherent and operational CFSP (Müller-Wille 2002: 62).

An inventory of EU early warning and planning capacities reveals a wide and complex capacity. However, Council attempts to keep Commission bodies at arms length from new Council military structures jeopardise effective early warning capacities.

5.4.1 EU institutions and early warning

Early warning is an essential tool in conflict prevention, and requires follow-up mechanisms in terms of policy planning and analysis to make an effective contribution to a comprehensive prevention policy. The post-Cold War trend of intra rather than inter-state war means that early warning systems need to pay attention to internal political, economic and social developments ('conflict indicators'). Repression based on ethnicity, religion or nationality is a particular cause of post-Cold War intra-state armed conflict. Since the international response to such 'low-level' conflict is selective, early warning systems can provide vital information on situations likely to escalate (Gurr 2000). Information is important; in particular, “to buy time – time to build political support for action, time to design and implement proactive strategies, time to plan for assistance and rescue” (Gurr 2000: 243). Early warning therefore constitutes the basis of a foreign policy claiming a proactive approach to crises as its core rationale (as stated by the EU in 1992 - see extract 2 in Table 5.1).

The type of information constituting useful early warning data is difficult to categorise. Information sources generally consist of data obtained through espionage or diplomatic reporting (human intelligence); imagery intelligence obtained from aircrafts or satellites; signals intelligence obtained by intercepting communications; and publicly available published information (open-source intelligence) (Müller-Wille 2004: 8-9).
The division between the planning and analysis needed for conflict prevention-oriented development assistance/humanitarian aid, and early warning, is indistinct in practice. The European Commission in particular undertakes a variety of tasks designed to monitor and analyse social, political and military developments in third countries, which supports development projects and also provides early warning in support of the CFSP/ESDP.

5.4.2 An inventory of EU capacities

- Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU)

Situated in the Council Secretariat and operational from 1999, the PPWEU was designed to tackle several of the main drawbacks of the CFSP: the lack of planning and foresight in the development of a distinctive EU foreign policy, and the lack of intelligence to allow for a proactive approach to crises. The original remit for the Unit was wide: monitoring CFSP-relevant developments, the assessment and identification of foreign policy interests, producing policy option papers and the pooling of information (see extract 4 in Table 5.2). It has a small staff of 24, made up of national, Commission and WEU officials (Smith, K. 2003: 45), and is headed by the High Representative, Solana. It was not clear how the Unit would coordinate work with the existing CFSP Unit in the Council Secretariat; this apparently caused tension between the established and the new body (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002: 273). Similarly, Solana was in a position to counter the strong role of the rotating Presidency in CFSP/ESDP issues (although his official role was to ‘assist the Presidency’).

Critics have highlighted the lack of personnel and adequate long-term funding as a particular problem for the Policy Unit (Müller-Wille 2002: 65; Smith, K. E. 2003: 45). The Unit incorporates the intelligence-pooling Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), a civil/military crisis management crisis cell formed by PPEWU and Military Staff, mandated to support the Political and Security Committee and the Military Committee (Ehrhart 2002: 45). The Centre has links with crisis centers in the UN, OSCE and NATO, although the extent of contact and information sharing it is not clear.
• Political and Security Committee (PSC)
As outlined in chapter 3, new decision-making bodies were required to enable the EU to carry out Petersberg operations, and the PSC was of central importance (see extract 5, Table 5.2, for reproduction of relevant decision at 1999 Cologne European Council). The PSC receives early warning reports from the PPEWLJ and the Military Staff/SITCEN, and makes political/strategic decisions based on information pooled from these sources, and from Member States. As further outlined at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council, the Committee is composed of national representatives at ambassadorial level, mandated to "deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP...In the case of a military crisis management operation, the PSC will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation" (Council of the EU 1999b). It has a key role as a coordinating body, having access to all information relating to potential EU operations. This point was emphasised by the High Representative in a General Affairs Council meeting in November 2000 (see extract 6 in Table 5.2). Working with the Commission, he furthermore invited the PSC "to develop [the] role as focal point in developing conflict prevention policies in CFSP and CSDP" (extract 7 in Table 5.2).

• Military Committee and Staff
Established as permanent bodies in 2001, the EU Military Committee (EUMC), supported by Military Staff (EUMS), are charged with providing military advice and recommendations to the PSC. The Military Staff is mandated to provide early warning through the integrated civil/military Situation Centre (SITCEN), linked to the PPEWLJ. SITCEN provides external intelligence\(^\text{58}\) to support political rather than operational decision-making in the PSC (Müller-Wille 2004: 29). The intelligence division (INTDIV) of around 30 national officers is the focus for EU military intelligence exchange; staff write reports based on national intelligence that then support ESDP decision-making (Müller-Wille 2004: 23). The Military Staff is composed of around 135 officials, compared to 24 at the PPEWLJ, a discrepancy that seems hard to justify (Smith, K. 2003: 159).

\(^{58}\) "...all source assessments drawing on military, security and criminal intelligence reports." (Müller-Wille 2004: 8).
• Commission CFSP Directorate
The CFSP Directorate (A) in the External Relations Directorate-General is largely responsible for the Commission's contribution to early warning and conflict prevention planning and analysis, as described above in the context of structural conflict prevention. The directorate also manages the network of Commission delegations. While not originally mandated to make political reports back to Brussels, the utility of the delegations in information gathering for the CFSP and conflict prevention in particular has been recognised, and they increasingly provide diplomatic reports to the Commission. The 2001 EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts called on delegations and Council Special Representatives\(^{59}\) to provide regular information on potential conflict situations (see extract 8 in Table 5.2). Additionally, DG Environment includes a monitoring and information center for civil emergencies. However, its key task is to organise the mobilisation of civilian intervention teams in the event of a natural or man-made disaster, rather than to gather intelligence (Müller-Wille 2004: 27).

• WEU Transfers: EU Satellite Center and EU Institute for Security Studies
Decisions made at the 1999 Cologne European Council led to WEU crisis management functions being transferred to the EU. WEU military personnel joined EU military structures, and the WEU Satellite Centre and Institute for Security Studies became 'agencies' of the CFSP. The Satellite Centre, based in Southern Spain, is a misnomer; it does not own or operate any satellites, but buys commercial imagery and analyses it for the EU and Member States (Müller-Wille 2002). It plays a role in early warning by providing satellite imagery to the SITCEN for crisis surveillance and monitoring purposes. The EU (formerly WEU) Institute for Security Studies provides independent research and analysis, linked to EU institutions through the PSC.

5.4.3 Coherence in early warning and analysis
The dispersal of intelligence, planning and analysis capabilities, with some obvious crossover in responsibilities, does not add up to a coherent and visible early warning capacity at the EU level. Critics have highlighted the trend to compilation rather than

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\(^{59}\) Council appointed personnel posted either to long-running crises, or in the crisis build-up stage, on the basis of a CFSP unanimous joint action.
analysis, and have questioned the need for four separate analytical units in the Council alone (Military Staff, PPEWU, Council DG External Relations staff, and SITCEN (Müller-Wille 2002). If Commission analytical capacity is added, it seems unlikely that all information and analyses could be pooled and duly considered in a time of impending crisis. COREPER is responsible for cross-pillar coordination, and is tasked in the 2001 EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts to pay "specific attention to the question of coherent preventive activities" (see extract 8 in Table 5.2). This is a tough call, especially in early warning, since COREPER doesn't possess the political and military expertise of the PSC. While the PSC is supposed to be the 'linchpin' of the CFSP, and the single body in receipt of all crisis information, it can be over-ruled by the higher-ranking Political Committee (Andréani, Bertram and Grant 2001). These complex structures compound the need to coordinate military and civilian early warning. The Commission has much information at its fingertips, but is kept distant from Council politico-military structures. The SITCEN, staffed from the Military Staff, the PPEWU and increasingly national representatives, is charged with bringing military and civilian information together, but has little contact with civilian experts in the Commission. It also lacks the staff and resources to become the functioning 'European intelligence agency' that the EU needs to support the CFSP/ESDP (Müller-Wille 2004: 37). The new integrated civil-military cell within EUMS (established in 2004) may contribute to more balanced early warning assessments.

Intelligence for early warning in the civilian sphere is sparse because, unlike military intelligence, structures for this are not in place at national levels, and civilian crises are difficult to predict (Müller-Wille 2002: 61). Yet while military intelligence is available from EU capitals, Member States have been reluctant to pool intelligence at the EU level. National information is closely guarded, and information that does get passed to the Military Staff goes directly to national representatives only (Müller-Wille 2002: 78). Where is the value of EU intelligence cooperation if it does not produce information and assessments of enhanced national quality? Moreover, the EU could develop a unique role in early warning by properly integrating civil and military intelligence (Müller-Wille 2002: 79). Current institutional divisions would seem to prevent this.
5.5 Operational Conflict Prevention: The Council’s Prerogative

The EU’s operational capacity is defined in terms of “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking,” (the Petersberg tasks) introduced in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (Title V, Article J.7 (2)). The 2004 Constitutional Treaty expanded the scope of the Petersberg Tasks to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilisation, and combating terrorism (Part III, Chapter 2 Article III-309).

Operational mechanisms can be described as ‘acute’ conflict prevention, designed to cover a range of activities, including, at the ‘civilian’ end, preventive diplomacy, crisis assistance, monitoring (border patrols, ceasefires), training civilian personnel (police, judiciary, local government officials) and at the military end, protection of civilian personnel and peacekeeping. A characteristic of the management of post-Cold War conflicts has been the difficulty in separating civilian and military responses to complex intra-state crises. The traditional ethoses of both civilian and military operations have been strained as civilian teams have relied on military protection and military teams have become more involved in civilian missions, such as the delivery of humanitarian aid. The EU needs to coordinate civilian and military capacities from the early planning and analyses stages through to the operational stage in any EU mission. This is a particular challenge.

Operational capacities remain largely under the control of the Member States, and the institutional primacy of the Council in the CFSP/ESDP project was underlined with the creation of the post of High Representative for CFSP and the host of new crisis management structures. The Commission has some competence in civilian crisis management, but the necessary institutional coordination in civil-military operations is yet to be established. This section examines EU operational conflict prevention capacities – preventive diplomacy, civilian crisis management and military crisis management.

5.5.1 Preventive diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy has been practiced by the EU since the times of EPC by the ‘Troika’ of representatives consisting of the current Council presidency, previous
presidency and future presidency. It still remains a key element of EU conflict prevention, and has been expanded beyond the Troika with the role of HR for CFSP and Special Representatives appointed to actual or potential crisis zones.

The HR for CFSP is tasked with assisting the Presidency of the Council in CFSP matters, acting on behalf of the Council in political dialogue with third parties, and heading the PPEWU; the current post-holder, Javier Solana is instrumental in highlighting the need for Union involvement in conflict hotspots. His role in political demarches and the Troika is also important in terms of preventive diplomacy and information gathering. The role of EU Special Representatives is similarly important. These personnel are generally posted either to long-running crises, or in the crisis build-up stage, on the basis of a CFSP unanimous joint action. In recent years, the Union has sent representatives to the Great Lakes region of Africa, the Middle East, Macedonia, and most recently (in July 2003) to the South Caucasus. This latest appointment indicates the increasing flexibility of the mandate for Special Representatives, more traditionally sent to implement a clear EU strategy, particularly in peace negotiations, now appointed in a more investigative/consultative role for a shorter period of time (Lynch 2003: 185).

5.5.2 EU crisis management concept and procedures
Before examining progress in civilian and military crisis management, it is useful to consider how the EU approaches crisis management generically. The Union has been developing a complex set of crisis management procedures, outlining sequential EU activities and protocols to be followed in the event of a crisis. The procedures include the development of a crisis-specific ‘crisis management concept’. If, based on EU early warning and analysis reports, an EU response to a particular crisis is desired, the crisis management concept will “set down the EU political interest and political objectives as well as broad options for an overall EU response to a crisis and highlight the recommended comprehensive course of action” (Council of the EU 2003a: 36).

An ad hoc ‘crisis response coordinating team’, comprised of officials from the Council Secretariat and the Commission, will prepare the draft concept, drawing on information and advice from the EUMC/MS, the PPEWU and SITCEN, the Police

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60 For example, in his 2003 Security Strategy, Solana stressed the need for the Union to become more involved in the conflicts of the South Caucasus region.
Unit and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). This will ensure overall consistency in external policy, and coordination between civilian and military measures. The draft concept would then go to the PSC and the Council for decisions on the appropriate EU response. The concept would provide the backbone in EU crisis management procedures, and include any combination of measures outlined in this paper. The procedures are described in a 45-page document, (Council of the EU 2003a) and are staggering in their detail and comprehensiveness.

EU action is divided into six distinct phases, from ‘routine’ (phase 1), to ‘refocusing of EU action and termination of operations’ (phase 6). The Council’s planning and analytical focus on operational crisis management as opposed to longer-term strategies is exemplified in this document.

5.5.3 Civilian crisis management

While the development of EU military means has gained much public and media attention, it was evident that the Union was more likely and more often to be called on to undertake non-military crisis management tasks. The rationale for the development of EU civilian aspects of crisis management, as outlined in the Santa Maria de Feira European Council in June 2000, reflect this (see extract 10, Table 5.2). The ambition to ‘face complex political crises’ by preventing conflict, consolidating peace and coordinating military and civilian aspects of crisis management in fact cover the remit of the Petersberg tasks, and all EU operations carried out to date. Civilian capabilities are additionally central in the Union’s relationship with the UN and the OSCE, and EU progress in the civilian sphere has driven much of the cooperation between the organisations. The four priority areas for civilian crisis management missions were outlined at the Santa Maria de Feira European Council in June 2000. They are:

- Police operations

The commitment was made to establish a pool of up to 5000 police officers for international missions, with 1000 to be deployable within a period of 30 days. This target was met, and Member States had pledged 1400 officers available within 30 days by November 2003. To date, police missions are the operational area in civilian crisis management where the EU has the most experience (in Bosnia and FYROM). Concerned about issues of interoperability and training, the EU carried out a police exercise in 2003 and a handbook was developed for police personnel deployed on EU
missions (Council of the EU 2003b). A Police Unit operates within the Council Secretariat, providing advice and recommendations to the PSC on police operations. At an informal EU defence ministers meeting in September 2004, representatives from France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands announced an initiative to create a European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), a rapidly deployable core of 800-900 multinational paramilitary police.

- Rule of law

Following the pledge at Feira, a commitment was made by the Member States at the 2001 Göteborg European Council to provide up to 200 officials in the field of law by 2003. While rule of law missions are generally envisaged as supporting police missions (by providing advice, training and monitoring to local judicial and penal institutions, or actually performing these duties), they could be carried out without concurrent police missions. Currently, 282 officials have been pledged for international operations (including 72 judges, 48 prosecutors, 38 administrative personnel and 72 penitentiary personnel). Up to 60 officials are available within 30 days. The EU launched its first small Rule of Law mission (8 personnel) to Georgia in July 2004 (Operation EUJUST themis).

- Civil administration

As in rule of law missions, civilian administration missions will carry out advisory, training, monitoring and executive services. Civilian administration missions potentially involve a wide variety of personnel, deployed to carry out general local administrative functions such as civil registration, taxation and custom services; social functions such as social services, education and health; infrastructure functions, such as water and energy supply, telecommunications and transport (Council of the EU 2001c). Member State contributions are still ongoing. By November 2003, 248 officials had been pledged for civil registration, local administration and custom services.

- Civil protection

Civil protection missions entail the protection of people in the event of major emergencies, “but also of the environment and property...including natural,
technological, radiological or environmental accidents occurring inside or outside the Community” (European Commission 2002d: 2). Composed of national emergency services staff, such EU missions would also be deployed to armed conflict zones, for search and rescue tasks, construction of refugee camps, and to assist humanitarian actors. Commitment targets set at Göteborg include small teams of rapid response experts and civil protection intervention teams (up to 2000 personnel). 61

5.5.4 Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)

The development of the above civilian crisis management mechanisms is managed by CIVCOM, created in May 2000, and reporting to COREPER and assisting the PSC. It is mandated to develop procedures and common practices in EU civilian crisis management, identify opportunities to pool civilian resources and improve coordination of Community, Union and Member State resources. The Committee uses information provided by the Commission, and is central in the planning and elucidation of EU civilian crisis management mechanisms.

Along with CIVCOM, a ‘coordinating mechanism’ was created in the Council Secretariat to enhance and better coordinate the Unions’ and Member States’ non-military crisis management response tools. As well as running capabilities initiatives, it has been developing an inventory of resources relevant for crisis management, including databases of rule of law, police, civil administration and protection capabilities. It works in close cooperation with SITCEN and the Commission. In the event of a crisis, the coordinating mechanism “may set up an ad hoc center to coordinate the effectiveness of EU Member States’ contributions” (Council of the EU 1999b: 3).

5.5.5 Other civilian crisis management capabilities

- EU Monitoring Missions (EUMM)

The use of EU Monitoring Missions for crisis management is being developed. This remains a concept rather than a specific capacity to date, although the EU has had monitors in the field in former Yugoslavia since the early 1990s. Led by an

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61 Numbers of personnel cited in the civilian crisis management areas reflects the situation as of December 2003
Ambassador from a Member State, (appointed by the Council), the mission comprises more that 100 monitors, giving special attention to border monitoring and refugee return. EU experience is therefore time and location specific, but it is hoped that the concept can be expanded to a “broader monitoring capability...[to include] confidence building among former disputing parties...low level conflict resolution and de-escalation assistance, [and] facilitating contacts between civil society and government and/or disputants” (Council of the EU 2003c: 5). A Joint Action would establish a Monitoring Mission, with Heads of Mission relaying information to the appropriate Council Working Group, who would then report to the PSC. The Mission would be under the authority of the High Representative.

- EU Fact-Finding Missions (FFMs).

Like EUMM, Fact-Finding Missions are tasked with information gathering, but are more ad hoc, “tasked to collect and assess all required information and/or to execute other specified tasks (according to a given mandate) in a defined crisis area to which it is deployed and where a possible European Union involvement in the management of the crisis is envisaged” (Council of the EU 2002a: 5). As a Council CFSP mechanism, it can be triggered by the High Representative or the PSC. A decision to set up an EU FFM does not affect FFMs decided by the Commission within the framework of the EC, although the EU FFM may include Commission staff, and the Commission is informed and may be invited to make recommendations. EUMMs would help elucidate and confirm the crisis management concept for a particular crisis, and are also intended as visible signals that the EU is willing and able to act in a particular crisis (see extract 12 in Table 5.2).

- The Commission’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM).

The RRM, established in 2001, is a Community funding mechanism allowing for the fast release of funds for conflict prevention and crisis management operations. It is intended to fund “targeted assistance, fact-finding missions, mediation or the dispatch of observers” (European Commission 2001a). Funds can also be released in support of NGO, OSCE or UN missions. In its 2002 Annual Report, the Commission stated its intention of using the RRM to fund conflict prevention team deployments of independent experts, with specialist knowledge in security, governance, development...
or regional issues. Information gathered is then integrated into CSPs, and presumably the crisis management concept, if Union action is likely. The RRM has funded conflict prevention missions to Nepal, Indonesia and the South Pacific. The mechanisms can also fund civilian crisis management in Community-CFSP crossover areas such as civil protection/administration, rule of law, and some police missions.

- **Peace Facility for Africa**
  Like the RRM, the African Peace Facility (APF) is a Commission-Council managed mechanism designed to support peacekeeping missions undertaken by the African regional organisation, the African Union (AU). Unlike the RRM, however, the facility (worth 250 million euros in total\(^62\)) is funded from the European Development Fund (EDF) for ACP countries, resourced directly by Member States rather than from the EU budget. The facility was agreed in 2003 and came into effect in May 2004. The facility reflects a reluctance on the part of Member States to send their own personnel on peacekeeping missions to Africa (Keane 2004a), and has raised concerns in some quarters that more money for peacekeeping will result in less money for development (Schneider 2004). Indeed, both the RRM and the APF are reactive, last minute mechanisms, indicating again that EU conflict prevention has lost its base in long-term policy.

5.5.6 Civilian setbacks
Institutional tensions exist between the Council and the Commission in the control of civilian crisis management mechanisms, highlighting competing views on the development and direction of EU crisis management (see below). The other main setbacks for the development of EU civilian crisis management are as follows:

- **Personnel**
  Common training programmes are being developed for all aspects of civilian crisis management, but the Union is faced with the problem of a shortage of professionals willing and/or able to take part in international operations. In June 2004, the European

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Council endorsed an Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, including a Civilian Capabilities Conference in November 2004, indicating that the EU is taking the shortage of civilian personnel seriously.

- Financing

Providing the funds for EU operations has stretched budgets and highlighted cumbersome procedures. Operations with a military component are generally straightforward, being charged to Member States. A permanent financing mechanism for common military operational costs was agreed by the Council in September 2003. Civilian financing is more complex, since some operations can be funded through the Community budget and others through the CFSP budget (i.e. pillars I and II). The Community budget line can be used in civilian emergency assistance, civil protection, human rights, institution building, rule of law, police operations, and reconstruction (European Commission 2001b). Many of these categories can be considered as falling under the CFSP. The Commission identifies financing as posing a real problem for EU ambitions in crisis management - “both procedural and budgetary constraints...threaten to reduce the potential and credibility of the European Union’s new global role” (European Commission 2001b: 5). While an agreement on increasing the CFSP budget has been reached, it will be some time before this is visible in terms of resources (Ehrhart 2002: 43). Guidelines for CFSP financing of civilian crisis management operations, based on the identification of cost categories, were adopted by the Council during the 2003 Italian Presidency (Council of the EU 2003d). Critics have also highlighted potential problems in the voluntary nature of civilian crisis management contributions, since some Member States may carry more of the burden than others (Ehrhart 2002: 50).

5.5.7 Military crisis management: developments and divergences

Defence issues were naturally delicate in the EU, long seen as a ‘civilian’ power, leaving defence issues to the NATO alliance. The focus on conflict prevention and crisis management can be understood in this context as representing relatively uncontroversial EU military ambitions. Key developments were outlined in the ESDP section in chapter 3, and include the ‘Headline Goal’ (agreed at the 1999 Helsinki European Council – see extract 9, Table 5.2), the Berlin-Plus negotiations with NATO.
Developing military capacities at the EU level has undoubtedly been problematic. Internal difficulties have been compounded by external events that have put additional strain on the transatlantic relationship. The building of an EU defence culture has highlighted differences in national approaches to security and defence issues amongst the Member States. The financing of military missions has led to disagreements about whether costs should be charged to the Union budget or be met by Member States. As already mentioned, the negotiations over EU access to NATO assets have been long and drawn-out, not least because Turkey’s position has been coloured and complicated by its EU membership bid, its relationship with Greece, and the Cyprus conflict. Moreover, a clear definition of the capabilities and assets the EU wants access to has been consistently absent since negotiations began between NATO and the WEU in 1996 (although commentators agree that it is the US-owned assets (i.e. strategic lift, intelligence, command, control and communication) rather than the capabilities (i.e. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) - the Europe-based operational planning headquarters) (Missiroli 2002: 13).

The impact of Member State divisions over Iraq in 2003 was deeply felt. EU relations with the US were further strained with talk of the need for autonomous EU operational headquarters. The leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg held a mini-summit on European defence in April 2003, where they pledged to cooperate on defence issues and proposed the establishment of an EU operational planning base at Tervuren, Belgium. A compromise deal was reached between Britain, France and Germany in the context (although not officially) of the 2003 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) whereby a permanent EU planning cell would be set up in the SHAPE headquarters for Berlin-Plus operations, and national headquarters would be used for autonomous EU operations, with the possibility of creating a Brussels headquarters using national officials.

With much of the commentary on European defence capabilities being caught up in transatlantic and intra-European politics and machinations, it is easy to lose sight of the end product and purpose of EU military crisis management. It is important that
progress meets projected needs so that the EU can act in a crisis situation. Doubts have been raised about the ability of the EU to deploy and sustain forces at the harder end of the Petersberg tasks. Hagman (2002) has identified three major problems likely to be encountered by the EU in the event of larger-scale missions: one-year sustainability, sixty-day readiness, and self-sustainability.

In order to avoid a credibility crisis, the EU tested its crisis management procedures before taking on any operations. The first crisis management exercise, carried out in conjunction with NATO in May 2002, tested decision-making procedures for ESDP and the coordination of military and civilian instruments. The exercise highlighted the need for further strengthening of civil-military coordination. This military-civilian overlap is at the heart of EU crisis management, and indeed, conceptually and operationally, a strict division between the civilian and military cannot be maintained when managing complex crises. Nevertheless, national foreign policy and intra-institutional traditions are hard to break. Member States typically favour either conflict prevention (Sweden) or crisis management (France) (Björkdahl 2002: 114). The artificial division between the terms is mirrored in the control of traditional civilian and military measures by the Commission and the Council respectively.

The expansion of the Petersberg tasks in the context of the 2010 Headline Goal and the Constitutional Treaty, has arguably added to the confusion about the EU’s military role, since a disarmament operation “could include anything from providing personal security to UN inspectors to a full scale invasion à la Iraq” (Cameron and Quille 2004: 12). The EDA has been created in part to better predict and prepare for future crisis management needs, but also to enhance the European armaments industry. This has prompted some critics to argue that an arms dynamic is taking hold of Member States and EU institutions, including the Commission, which is undertaking defence research under the guise of security research (Mawdsley 2004). Others have identified a general militarisation of the EU, with a growing gap between the military and political goals and decision-making processes of the ESDP (Bono 2002: 22). In relation to conflict prevention, it is important that EU military power is not developed as an end in itself, but in conjunction with progress in civilian and longer-term capabilities and objectives. As we shall see below, the balance between civilian and military capacities
is compounded by the structure of the EU and the division of competences between EU institutions.

5.6 Institutional Competition or Coherence?

5.6.1 The complexity of EU structures: implications for coordination

Internal and inter-institutional drawbacks permeate every stage of the conflict prevention process – structural, early warning and operational. Incoherency in the organisation of the EU can be identified on various levels of analysis, each contributing to a complex and obscure policy-making machine. The levels of analysis considered here are the overall pillar structure of the EU, the interaction between institutions (inter-institutional), and finally the individual institutions themselves (internal institutional).

- The Pillar Structure

The single institutional structure of the Treaty on European Union (creating the three pillar structure of the EC, CFSP and JHA) was designed to provide a more coherent EC/EU. The artificial divisions between political and economic policy could, to an extent, be bridged – in the implementation of sanctions, for example, and the elucidation of comprehensive and consistent relationships with third countries. These new linkages were to facilitate the emergence of conflict prevention, (a policy requiring economic, political and security instruments) on the EU agenda.

However, the consequences of different rules for policy initiation and decision-making falling under pillar one and pillars two and three reverberate down through the organisational structure. For policy under pillar one, the Commission has the exclusive right of initiative, and decisions are not normally subject to unanimity at Council level. For pillars two and three, the Commission has to compete with Member States in putting forward policy proposals, and decision-making is subject to Council unanimity. Acting at a disadvantage in pillars two and three, the Commission understandably competes with the Council and Member States to ‘own’ external policy initiatives, such as civilian crisis management. This should be an opportunity to bridge the pillar gap. Instead, the Commission and the Council are set up as rivals.
Pillarisation artificially compartmentalises policy, and is increasingly an anachronism. The CFSP is a case in point. Not only does the division of external policies require *horizontal* coordination between pillars one and two, but also *vertical* coordination between Union and Member State policies. Police cooperation of some sort (for international missions or cooperation in anti-terrorism) takes place in the context of all three pillars. The frequent inability to achieve effective linkage undermines the EU's attempts to present a single, coherent and coordinated response to international events and crises. Critics are well aware of the fallibility of the EU's 'single' structure. Zielonka observes that "the whole institutional system lacks clarity, hierarchy, and coherence...it hardly ever works in an accountable and effective manner, especially when coping with crises" (1998:177). As well as hindering a quick response to crises, the structure is problematic for the development of longer-term, cross-pillar policies like *structural conflict prevention*. Dwan cites the EU's structure as "an impediment to the effective coordination of prevention policies within the EU and with other international actors" (2001: 10).

- Inter-institutional Problems

The relationship between the Council and the Commission has been characterised as based on mutual dependence, and increasingly mutual conflict (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). While both institutions need each other, and should be working together for common goals, commentators increasingly talk of 'turf battles' over policy responsibilities and agenda setting, exacerbated by the pillarisation discussed above. The objective of conflict prevention as a guiding principle in EU external affairs reflects an internal paradox. According to Bjorkdahl, (2002: 119) "one reason for the Commission's and the Council Secretariat's acceptance of conflict prevention could be that both perceived that they could strengthen their influence in the ongoing institutional turf battle within the EU." At the same time, "the relative failure of conflict prevention can be attributed to deep-rooted organisational habits and associated vested interests" (Ehrhart 2002: 33). Conflict prevention is in danger of becoming a token objective claimed by both institutions, but practiced by neither.

Coordination of conflict prevention objectives and policy between the institutions relies on informal contacts and ad hocery. The Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit works with the High Representative to identify conflict issues for
consideration by the GAERC. This seems to have been based more on the good working relationship between Commissioner Chris Patten and Solana rather than any formalised process. At the operational stage, the Council is reluctant to involve the Commission in ESDP structures, with Member States wanting to retain firm control over crisis management capacities. This fear of supranational contamination is not constructive in a policy area relying on good inter-institutional relations for its success.

Until recently, no clear strategy had been put forward to address the problem of Council-Commission incoherence in external relations, since there was no consensus between Member States on how to rationalise the burgeoning institutional framework without changing the balance of power between the Commission and the Council. The Constitutional Treaty proposed the creation of an EU Foreign Minister, a post merging the position of High Representative for CFSP with the head of the Commission's External Relations DG. If implemented, this will go some way towards ensuring more coherence between Council CFSP and Commission external relations activities. However, the post could also challenge Member State/Council control of foreign policy, and potentially change the balance of power in the Commission's favour. The lack of details relating to the post in the Treaty allows for a personal interpretation of the duties involved, and Council jurisdiction over the Minister is more likely to consolidate the stronger position of the Council in CFSP/ESDP.

- **Internal Institutional Problems**

A further level of complexity is revealed if an attempt at dissecting institutions is made. The Council of the EU consists of a number of personnel, units and committees responsible for CFSP/ESDP. The role of High Representative was overlaid on an institution already consisting of a Council of Foreign Ministers (the Political Committee), Presidency, Committee of Permanent Representatives dealing with CFSP matters, a CFSP Unit in the Council Secretariat and various working groups. The High Representative was to manage the new PPEWU "to increase policy information and coordination" (Hix 1999: 345), but a clear description on how he was to do this was lacking. The PPEWU is also under-staffed and under-funded, limiting the High Representative's influence. The addition of new bodies for ESDP such as the PSC, CIVCOM and the EUMC/MS further complicates foreign policy-making. Where is
policy coming from? Who ensures policy coherence? The PSC has, in theory, overall political control, but the Political Committee, comprising of senior Member State officials from Foreign Ministeries, reserves the right to meet as the 'senior' PSC, implying the potential renationalisation of policy direction (Howorth 2001: 774). The overlapping responsibilities of COREPER and PSC in the preparation of GAERC meetings are also not conducive to efficient and joined-up foreign policy-making (Howorth 2001: 775). This concurrent institution-building and Member State reluctance reflects a recognisable Euro-schizophrenia, characterised by underlying tensions about the ownership and location of the EU foreign policy project. Moreover, the structures at the Council level have largely been created to support operational (if not exclusively military) conflict prevention activities. This puts pressure on the Commission to defend structural conflict prevention as a key component of EU crisis response, inextricably linked to operational activities.

The role of the Commission in the CFSP, and how this relates to Community external policy, remains unclearly defined, and undoubtedly too ad hoc to ensure optimal coordination of policy. The best way of organising Commission external responsibilities is inevitably unclear in these circumstances, and their reorganisation three times since the early 1990s reflects this.

While the 1999 Prodi Commission reduced the number of external relations portfolios from six to four, the benefits of a division of responsibilities based on function (e.g. trade, development), as opposed to a geographically-based division are subject to diverging views (Nugent and Saurugger 2002). Prodi changed the focus from geographical regions back to functions in his 1999 reorganisation, facilitating more coherence in separate policy fields (horizontal coherence), but less coordination between policy fields (vertical coherence) (Nugent and Saurugger 2002: 351). A geographical division of responsibilities facilitates better coordination between policy fields, reducing the possibility of contradictory policies in particular regions or countries. The present horizontal structure of the Commission requires internal coordination for coherent external policy-making. Patten, as External Relations Commissioner (until 2004), had responsibility for external policy coordination between DGs, but his power was limited beyond the confines of his own DG (Nugent and Saurugger 2002: 351).
The necessary focus on development policy as the Commission’s key *structural conflict prevention* tool has been jeopardised by internal reorganisation. Not only do DG Development staff feel relegated by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office, (Nugent and Saurugger 2002: 361), but responsibility for development issues is dispersed between DG Development and DG External Relations undermining the advantages of a functional division of duties. This leaves scope for the marginalisation of the ACP countries (dealt with separately from other developing countries) and the fragmentation of policy considerations, since all trade matters dealing with ACP have been removed from DG Development (Holland 2002: 91). This will not assist the alleged attempts to ‘mainstream’ conflict prevention. The External Relations DG has been expanded, at the expense of DG Development. This has implications for the success of *structural conflict prevention*, and may lead to a narrowing definition of the concept to civilian crisis management. This trend is mirrored at the Council level. *Structural conflict prevention* expertise is lacking in the Council structures: CIVCOM has no experts in conflict prevention, and the Council of Development Ministers has been scrapped, leaving development issues to be dealt with in the GAERC, overwhelmingly preoccupied by operational crisis management.

5.6.2 Competing crisis management visions?

The development of ESDP has been repeatedly linked to conflict prevention in EU rhetoric, and is presented as one component of EU crisis response. However, if civilian and military analyses, planning and operations are kept separate, then the link between conflict prevention and ESDP becomes tenuous. Integrating civilian and military responses is undoubtedly problematic because of the traditionally different approaches and practices of the two fields, as well as national differences. Nevertheless, the ESDP project can only contribute to conflict prevention if coordination between civilian and military mechanisms is actively sought.

Analysts tend to disagree about the implications of the EU developing a military role.63 The point to be made here is that, in fact, the EU needs to develop both military

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63 Views vary widely, from those who believe this weakens the EU’s traditional civilian role (Sangiovanni 2003), to those who assert that “militarisation” is strengthening the EU’s civilian role (Stavridis 2001).
and civilian capabilities, in an integrated way, in order to consider itself able to undertake the full range of conflict prevention/crisis management tasks. This requires some re-balancing to bring resources for civilian operations to the level of those available for military operations.

Problems in civil-military cooperation are not specific to the EU, but are a generic problem in post-Cold War crisis response. For the EU, it is not just about cooperating in the field with different types of actors with different mandates and approaches. The EU itself carries out a range of military and civilian operations, some of which will be simultaneous, joint, or concurrent missions (e.g. EU Police Mission in Macedonia taking over from EU peacekeeping mission). For successful and effective missions, the EU needs to integrate civilian and military advice, intelligence, analysis, training, strategic and operational planning, and finally field communication and command. The following issues may jeopardise the EU’s unique role in civil-military crisis management.

- Resources

Critics have increasingly questioned the discrepancy between resources available for civilian and military crisis management (Rummel 2003). Staffing levels to support the new Council military structures far outweigh early warning and analysis staff and civilian experts. It has already been noted that the PPEWU lacks personnel. Other than the contribution of CIVCOM, there is insufficient civilian crisis management input within the Council, and no humanitarian advisors at all. This discrepancy was highlighted in the plan to create a civilian planning and mission support unit. This capability was overdue. On the military side, there are up to 150 Military Staff in the Council Secretariat working on strategic planning, and they have recourse to high quality national and NATO headquarters for operational military planning. Conversely, while the EU is more likely to be carrying out civilian operations, there are only 15 staff in the Council Secretariat available to carry out civilian planning and mission support functions – and they are responsible for strategic and operational planning and mission support (Tappert 2003a: 17).

The Commission understandably saw the creation of a civilian mission support unit in the Council Secretariat as an encroachment on its responsibilities in civilian crisis
management, as it already has experience in planning international monitoring missions, and managing the civil protection mechanism, not to mention a considerable budget available for financing civilian crisis management missions. The Commission’s suggestion that a joint Council-Commission service should be created to reflect the cross-pillar nature of civilian crisis management was, however, vetoed by the Council. An embryonic civilian mission support unit was operating in the Council Secretariat by June 2004 (Council of the EU 2004a). With the civilian support unit and the civil-military cell in the Military Staff, the Council of the EU has consolidated its control of the civilian crisis management agenda.

- Overlapping civilian responsibilities
Disagreements over the location of the new civilian planning unit highlights the fact that both the Council and the Commission can claim competence in civilian crisis management. Rivalry between institutions over the ‘ownership’ of civilian crisis management is not conducive to the best use of available EU resources.

The Commission, as we have seen, has lost ground in recent years to the Council in the control of operations, training and recruitment. Its remaining strength lies in the control of the Community budget, which has funds for non-military crisis management operations. However, Member States might be prepared to cover operational costs themselves, or increase the CFSP budget, rather than allow Community control of civilian crisis management. This is not good news for the development of a comprehensive conflict prevention approach, linking long-term and short-term responses to crises. Cutting the Commission out of civilian crisis management would have the concurrent effect of undermining civil-military coordination.

- Lack of mechanisms for coordination?
The lack of resources for civilian measures is mirrored in the lack of formal mechanisms for civil-military coordination. There seem to be more structures in place for coordination at the operational stage. The Crisis Response Coordination Team (CRCT), for example, draws together Commission and Council General Secretariat services in crisis situation to ensure coherence. A Committee of Contributors,
(consisting of Member State/ non-EU contributors to a civilian or military operation) meets regularly during EU operations to review the situation. These groupings facilitate the coordination of civilian and military measures in the final stages of operational planning (coordination in the field is another matter, and subject to the proper training of EU civilian and military personnel). There is less evidence of coordination of civil-military capabilities at the *early warning and analysis* stage, particularly in terms of input on long-term considerations from the Commission. It is far from clear if and how the PSC balances military and civilian advice and information. The fact that military intelligence is more available, and Military Staff outnumber civilian experts, suggest that the balance is tipped in favour of military assessments. This could lead to missed opportunities for longer-term and civilian security solutions.

5.7 Conclusion

The European Union is undoubtedly developing a new role for itself in conflict prevention as one of the key guiding objectives of the CFSP/ESDP. EU foreign policy discourse in the 1990s increasingly featured conflict prevention as an external objective of EU activity. However, various internal problems highlight the discrepancies between the EU’s rhetoric and the reality of institutional capacities available for the development of a comprehensive and coordinated conflict prevention policy.

It is clear that the definition of conflict prevention at the EU level remains inadequately comprehensive. The lack of visibility of *structural conflict prevention* on the EU’s agenda contrasts with the meteoric rise of crisis management in the Commission and the Council. Development issues have been effectively phased out of external relations policy in the Commission. The attention to root causes of conflict is marginal, and dependent on the geopolitical significance of the country in question. There is little input of development issues at the Council level, and therefore little chance that ESDP/CFSP policy will be coordinated with long-term conflict prevention, or even short-term humanitarian objectives. Civil-military coordination has been recognised as important for EU operations, but it is short-term in focus. Conflict prevention is becoming more and more associated with short-term crisis management, at the expense of long-term structural solutions to security problems.
Even new Community mechanisms such as the RRM and the APF are reactive, short-term instruments. Where does **structural conflict prevention** appear on the EU’s agenda? While the *European Security Strategy* emphasises preventive engagement, it is ambiguous, lacks detail, and “continues to adopt a more reactive approach to crisis and post-conflict situations” (International Alert and Saferworld 2004: 5).

Furthermore, a preference for reactive military crisis management over long-term conflict prevention may be accelerated by the defence procurement agenda of the European Defence Agency. Chapter 4 suggested that the EU could legitimise its military role through its commitment to comprehensive conflict prevention. If the focus on comprehensive conflict prevention is lost, then the EU’s objectives as a military actor are likely to be questioned.

At the *early warning and analysis* stage, coordination is crucial to bring together all the information and analysis across and within institutions. The lack of shared intelligence from Member States, and the lack of Commission and delegation contribution to early warning, undermines the EU’s potential in broad information gathering and assessment. The possibility of a coordinated crisis management capacity is undermined by EU institutional rivalry and a discrepancy between resources available for civilian and military measures. The development of crisis management mechanisms has resulted in institutionalisation at the expense of coherence. Lack of effective coordination of long and short-term objectives and operations may lead to missed opportunities in **structural conflict prevention**.

Conflict prevention has gained rhetorical success in EU discourse and policies, but this could be at the expense of a broad definition of the concept, inclusive of long-term commitment to addressing root causes of conflict. The evolution of EU conflict prevention policy features a significant commitment to cooperate with other international organisations, which, as argued in chapter 4, is particularly important for viable conflict prevention in the post-Cold War era. Problems raised in terms of the EU’s approach to conflict prevention and EU internal coordination problems have an impact on the EU’s ability to form effective partnerships with other organisations. This is what we turn to in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 6
The EU and the United Nations (UN): Building a Partnership for Peace?

“We resolve...To strengthen the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter. We resolve...To ensure greater policy coherence and cooperation between the United Nations, its agencies, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organisation, as well as other multilateral bodies, with a view to achieving a fully coordinated approach to the problem of peace and development.”
*United Nations Millennium Declaration, September 2000 (UN 2000b)*.

“Conflict prevention and crisis management lie at the intersection of the development and security agendas. They are also areas in which the EU and the UN are united...The need for complementarity of purpose and operations is therefore beyond debate.”

“...this emerging partnership is not unfolding by design, by any pre-strategic logic, but rather by default and happenstance.”
*Michael Barnett (1995: 431)*

6.1 Introduction
The United Nations (UN), as the intergovernmental organisation primarily concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security, is a key global partner for the EU, not least since all EU states are members, with two (France and the UK) being permanent members of the UN Security Council (Laatikainen 2004). The European Community (EC) has been a permanent observer at the UN since 1974. The relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) has become increasingly important in the post-Cold War era. Both organisations have played key roles in fostering pan-European peace, and the enhanced opportunities for multilateralism have led to operational partnerships in the Balkans and sub-Saharan
Africa. Support for the UN system is traditionally high in Europe, with smaller EU Member States in particular advocating support for the UN as a key foreign policy principle (Tonra 1997: 187). EU Member States are important contributors to the UN budget (about 40% of the world total before the 2004 enlargement) and have provided the majority of troops for UN-authorised peacekeeping operations in Bosnia (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR).  

The EU has understandably seen itself as a regional model for conflict prevention, and as a regional organisation willing to take on UN-mandated missions to relieve the pressure on UN resources. Recent years have seen a system of 'enhanced cooperation' between the two organisations, particularly at the senior level. Specific areas for EU-UN cooperation were outlined in an annex to the 2001 Göteborg European Council Presidency Conclusions. These included conflict prevention, civilian and military crisis management, and coordination in regional policy in the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa (Council of the EU 2001a).

Studies of EU/UN relations tend to deal with EU Member State coordination in the UN General Assembly or Security Council, or focus on the role of the EC/EU in the UN system. The role of EU states is important in the UN system; a recent commentator reports that "nothing gets accomplished in many UN bodies unless the Europeans are on board" (Laatikainen 2004: 4). The EU is increasingly speaking as one voice in the UN Security Council through its permanent members, the UK and France, and the Troika works to coordinate the EU position in the General Assembly (Laatikainen 2004: 4). Additionally, the EU frequently stresses the authority of the UN Charter, and reaffirms the EU's commitment to multilateralism in Treaties and policy documents. In The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism (European Commission 2003c: 3), the EU's commitment to multilateralism was cited as "a defining principle of its external policy," while the European Security Strategy (EU 2003: 9) described the UN Charter as "the fundamental framework for international relations."


This chapter takes a different focus, and examines the inter-organisational dialogue on conflict prevention between the organisations in the post-Cold War period. In other words, what is being examined is the way in which the EU works with, (rather than in), the UN. The UN has led the debate on conflict prevention, and conflict prevention and crisis management have been identified as key areas for cooperation between the organisations. Section 8.2 sets the context for EU-UN cooperation. The post-Cold War security environment has been characterised by a reconsideration of the utility and value of regional organisations in the prevention of conflict (Duke 2003; Job 2004). The EU’s development of conflict prevention competences concurs with this trend. Section 8.3 follows with a discussion of the conceptual, legal, and practical difficulties inherent in the study of EU-UN cooperation.

Sections 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 go on to examine the extent of policy coordination between the organisations in conflict prevention, structured around the categories identified in chapter 1, outlined in chapter 4, and utilised in relation to the EU internally in chapter 5: structural conflict prevention, early warning and analysis, and operational conflict prevention. Most studies of the UN’s role in conflict prevention focus on the UN’s operational role, and indeed the most visible cooperation between the UN and the EU is evident in operational partnerships such as in SE Europe, or delegation of duties, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. UN conflict prevention competences are generally located in the Office of the Secretary-General and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This study looks at coordination of conflict prevention efforts across the full range of structural, early warning and analysis and operational tasks.

Formal, regular EU dialogue with the UN became more important as the Union developed its operational role. At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the EU committed itself to cooperate with the UN, as well as the OSCE and the Council of Europe “in a mutually reinforcing manner in stability promotion, early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction” (Council of the EU 1999b). Despite the progress in EU-UN cooperation made since 1999 in particular, the 2004 UN Report of the High-Level Panel on threats, Challenges and Change (A more secure world: our shared responsibilities), instigated by the Secretary-General in the aftermath of UN member state divisions over the 2003
Iraq war, stressed the need for more consultation and cooperation between the UN and regional organisations (UN 2004). Michael Barnett, in the mid-1990s described the relationship between the UN and regional organisations as being more based on “default and happenstance” (1995: 431) than grand design. In light of the statement in the UN’s High-Level Panel report, how much has the situation described by Barnett changed in recent years? This chapter examines whether increased EU-UN cooperation has resulted in more structured policy coordination for conflict prevention.

6.2 Setting the Context: From Global to Regional Conflict Prevention?
The post-Cold War security context has enhanced the role of regional organisations in the prevention and settlement of disputes. In the post-Second World War context, when the UN Charter was drawn up by the big powers, the creation of competitive regional alliances was seen to have led to two world wars (Barnett 1995: 411). The UN retained overall superiority over regional organisations, and although Article 52, clause 2 of the Charter made the provision for regional solutions to disputes before recourse to the UN, this rarely occurred in the Cold War years because of the overriding influence of the two superpowers (Barnett 1995: 411).

The EC/EU was not generally classified as a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Articles 52-54 state broadly that nothing precludes the existence of regional arrangements in the maintenance of peace and security; that pacific settlement should be sought through these arrangements before being referred to the Security Council; that the UN will use regional arrangements for enforcement actions; and that the Security Council shall be kept informed of any regional action in the maintenance of peace and security (Charter of the UN, Chapter 8, Articles 52, 53 and 54). The EU, although established to prevent war between its members, was, during the Cold War, primarily an economic organisation, not explicitly mandated to oversee the pacific settlement of disputes between its members. While the UN Charter does not define ‘regional arrangements’, most regional groupings such as the Organisation for African Union (OAU, now African Union) and the OSCE are intergovernmental, designed to solve disputes between members.66 The EU is not simply an

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66 NATO was not regarded as a ‘regional arrangement’ as understood by the UN Charter.
intergovernmental organisation, but an organisation *sui generis*, mixing elements of supranationalism with an increasingly distinctive type of intergovernmental cooperation. Moreover, the EU is now primarily concerned with preventing conflict in states outside its membership, unlike other regional organisations⁶⁷, (although the prospect of membership is a key factor in determining EU action and leverage to prevent conflict). The external focus of EU conflict prevention is therefore likely to render it distinct from UN conflict prevention. The UN must build consensus among members to promote conflict prevention, while the EU’s action outside its membership is more akin to a state-like foreign policy. This distinction may lead to different interpretations of conflict prevention: one based on building a consensus for long-term peace, the other inclined to impose peace from the outside.

Nevertheless, the post-Cold War development of the CFSP/ESDP changed the nature of EU-UN cooperation, with the EU increasingly becoming a partner organisation concerned with the maintenance of peace and security. The EU took on the role of informal dispute settler in Eastern Europe, and formal negotiator, with the UN in the Balkans. By the turn of the twenty-first century the EU became an agency able to take on UN enforcement action. Overlapping objectives and the recourse to regional solutions in the post-Cold War period have led to a new partnership between the organisations. With the European continent being unusually rich in regional organisations (OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO and the EU), dialogue between the UN and these organisations became more pressing in the maintenance of peace and security in Europe. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 report *Agenda for Peace* urged the forging of new partnerships between the UN and regional organisations.

There are other reasons for the return to favour of regional organisations in the prevention and settlement of disputes in the post-Cold War era. The growing strain on UN peacekeeping resources from the late 1980s, compounded by the continuing financial crisis of the organisation as members defaulted on financial contributions, led to a reconsideration of regional organisations in conflict prevention and resolution. Also important was the ending of the bipolar international system: “the centrifugal

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⁶⁷ NATO has also moved towards “out-of-area” crisis management activities.
nature of post-Cold War politics has encouraged regionalism, and hence a reconsideration of regional security organisations” (Barnett 1995: 412). More conflicts were igniting within states, challenging the fundamental premise of the UN, established primarily to prevent conflict between states. The cultural, ethnic and/or religious nature of many of these 1990s conflicts more often than not had regional origins and implications, and therefore could best be tackled at the regional level (Eliasson 2000: 227).

The UN has been under considerable reform in order to address the new security challenges. Traditional UN peacekeeping, based on the principles of consent and impartiality, was not always transferable to intra-state wars, where the actors were not necessarily governments and there was no ceasefire, no demarcation line to police, or indeed, no peace to keep, as was the case in Bosnia. Job (2004) has shown how the world’s big military powers withdrew personnel from UN operations and increasingly turned to regional organisations and ‘coalitions of the willing’.

In theory, the UN has always relied on either regional organisations or coalitions of the willing for enforcement action, since the original intention of having an autonomous stand-by UN military capacity was never realised (Wilson 2003: 89). In practice, a decentralised approach to peacekeeping, with personnel made up by members, was not necessarily a problem during the Cold War years, when missions were few and far between, and mandates relatively simple. This changed in the post-Cold War years; while the Security Council was no longer crippled by the veto, it didn’t have the means to intervene successfully in complex and intractable disputes within states, and the norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states tied its hands (Job 2004). The problems the UN faced in dealing with the internal wars of the 1990s were driven home during the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda. The premise that regional organisations, with more local knowledge, with more at stake, and (in Europe) with more resources, should be the first port of call in any conflict between UN members gained currency (Barnett 1995; Mariko 2003). In his 2001 Report, Prevention of Armed Conflict, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, called on UN Member States to build on the inter-organisational dialogue from biennial meetings and support

68 In 1992, France and the UK had 6,175 and 3,756 personnel deployed to UN missions respectively, making them the top two contributing countries. By 2002, these two countries don’t even make it in to the top 10 contributors; the top two are Pakistan and Bangladesh, followed by India and Ghana (Job 2004: 231).
further cooperation in conflict prevention between the UN and regional arrangements (UN 2001).

The new proliferation and expansion of regional organisations has created problems for the world organisation, however, and has serious implications for the maintenance of international peace. The UN is struggling to maintain its traditional authority over regional organisations. The assumption that regional organisations would turn to the UN for support and a legitimate mandate before intervention in regional conflicts has been breached by NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and the US-led coalition attacks on Afghanistan in 2001-02 and Iraq in 2003 (Job 2004: 227). This trend shows a waning of universal UN legitimacy; there is a tendency to seek post-hoc legitimisation, often leaving the UN to pick up the pieces after military intervention (Job 2004: 236). Critics of the UN announced its redundancy during the high profile disputes preceding the US-led attack on Iraq in 2003. However, while the UN’s credibility may have been damaged by the Iraq conflict, the unauthorised military action of the US and allies was followed by a return to the UN as problems of legitimacy emerged and the difficulties of reconstruction became clear (Berdal 2004: 83). The Report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change included a specific recommendation for regional organisations to seek authorisation from the Security Council for regional peace operations (UN 2004: 89).

Adam Smith (2003) has noted the shift in UN priorities in the mid-1990s from promoting democracy to preventing conflict. Yet commentators tend to share the view that while implicit in the Charter, conflict prevention is an uphill struggle for the UN (Smith, A. 2003; Mack and Furlong 2004). Undoubtedly, the problems discussed above led to the conclusion in the mid-1990s that prevention was better than cure. However, just as the pursuit of conflict prevention is a challenge for the EU system, divisions in the UN preclude a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy. Development and security are separate parts of the UN system, with different cultures and entrenched institutional habits (Smith, A. 2003: 360), much like the development/CFSP gap within the EU. Moreover, the geographical divide in the UN General Assembly precludes a proactive conflict prevention consensus. Many African

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69 Olsen (2002) argues that the same shift from promoting democracy to preventing conflict has taken place in EU policy towards Africa.
countries associate conflict prevention with unsanctioned intervention, a view supported by the 1990s trend of humanitarian intervention. Likewise, Security Council members Russia and China oppose long-term conflict prevention for similar reasons (Bredel 2003: 63-64). Establishing an institutional connection between conflict prevention and development was also a delicate matter, with Southern countries wary of the neo-imperial motives that this implies (Bredel 2003: 64).

The broad definitional problem may hinder the UN’s drive for conflict prevention cooperation with regional organisations too. The apparent consensus on conflict prevention masks different interpretations of the term that may differ significantly from the UN’s approach. The extent of EU commitment to come to a common understanding of conflict prevention with the UN, and to support and coordinate activities with the global organisation, is important in ensuring the UN’s future credibility and utility.

6.3 Understanding EU-UN Relations in the Post-Cold War Period

6.3.1 The complexity of inter-organisational dialogue

The compilation of dialogue between the UN and the EU on the full range of conflict prevention activities inevitably becomes a task of piecing together communication and commitment between different institutions of the two organisations; with the UN it is even more difficult to identify a coherent single organisation in the investigation than with the EU. Who does the EU ring at the UN to talk about conflict prevention?

While the UN does have a clearly identifiable figurehead in the position of the Secretary-General, it is nevertheless a broad and complex organisation, with often tenuous links between its various components. The UN system consists of five primary ‘organs’ (Security Council, consisting of five permanent members and ten non-permanent members; General Assembly, composed of representatives from all Member countries; the Economic and Social Council; the Secretariat; and the International Court of Justice) and a plethora of connected programmes, funds and specialised agencies (see Figure 6.1). Many of these structures date back to progress in multilateralism made with the 1920s/30s League of Nations, the UN’s predecessor. Security Council permanent membership was dictated by the balance of power at the end of the Second World War, and although subject to criticism, this set-up endures
today, with the only change being an increase in the number of non-permanent members.

The other main change in the UN system has been the steady increase in membership, from 51 in 1945 to 191 today. This has had most effect in the General Assembly, resulting in a move from an East/West geographical split to a North/South (or more accurately rich/poor) divide. The Security Council is the decision-maker, while the General Assembly is effectively a discussion forum, with no power over the specialised agencies (Luard 1979). The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has its origins in the 1930s, set up to instigate international research on economic and social issues. Just as with the EC/EU in the 1950s, supporters hoped that cooperation would spill over to the more difficult arena of politics (Luard 1979). The Council has the difficult job of coordinating the work of the specialised agencies.
Figure 6.1. The United Nations System.\textsuperscript{70}

\begin{itemize}
\item Security Council
\item General Assembly
\item Economic and Social Council
\item Secretariat
\item International Court of Justice
\end{itemize}

Programmes and Funds
- UN Development Programme (UNDP)
- UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
- World Food Programme (WFP)*

Other UN Entities
- Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)*
- *and other UN funds and entities

Functional and Regional Commissions

Specialised Agencies*
- International Labour Organisation (ILO)
- Food and Agricultural Organisation of the UN (FAO)
- UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
- World Health Organisation (WHO)

Related Organisations
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- World Trade Organisation (WTO)*
- *and others

Office of the Secretary General (OSG)
- Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)
- Department of Political Affairs (DPA)
- Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA)
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)*
- UN Office at Geneva
- UN Office at Vienna
- UN Office at Nairobi
- *and other UN departments and offices

\textsuperscript{70}Adapted from UN Department of Information Diagram DPI/2299 – February 2003.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the organisation of EU external relations is far from straightforward either. Who speaks for the EU in the context of international organisations? While this study is not primarily concerned with the legal and political implications of EC/EU participation in the UN system, the question of who is responsible for dialogue and policy coordination, and at what level, inevitably becomes important. The opacity of EC/EU external representation renders this a difficult task. The EC has legal personality, meaning that it can become a member of another international organisation, and sign international agreements on behalf of the EC. This primarily translates to the EC being a member of an organisation (e.g. the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation, FAO) alongside Member States, who are generally reluctant to allow the EC to act fully on their behalf (Govaere, Capiau and Vermeersch 2004: 165).

The EU, inclusive of CFSP and JHA, has no legal personality, and provisions in the 1999-ratified Amsterdam Treaty allowing for international agreements on these issues did not make it clear if the Council was acting for the Union or on behalf of the Member States (Govaere, Capiau and Vermeersch 2004: 160). While the Commission is largely responsible for external representation (negotiating with third countries on accession and aid, with over 130 global delegations), the Presidency represents the EU in CFSP matters, assisted by the High Representative. It is not entirely clear who does the talking and in what capacity (EC, EU or Member States?), especially on cross-pillar issues, such as conflict prevention. This creates an anomalous situation where the EC has legal personality, but no real power to act on behalf of the Union as a whole, while the Member States hold all the cards on CFSP and JHA issues, but have no clear legal mandate to make international agreements on behalf of the EU. The debate about a permanent EU seat on the UN Security Council highlights these issues; if the question of legal personality were put aside, EU Member States could act on behalf of the Union if a common position was agreed. However, the UN Charter provides for membership of states only, therefore any progress on achieving this would take place in the context of wider UN reform to allow for regional representation in the Security Council. Some experts question the utility of EU

71 The exception is of course in economic competence: Member States allow the Commission to act on their behalf in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), on a Council mandate.
representation at the UN, arguing instead that the UN should be represented at the EU.\footnote{This view was expressed to the author by Dr Hanne-Margret Birckenbach.}

The question of greater EU coordination in the UN was debated at length in the European Convention. The Constitutional Treaty provides some answers to the complexities of EU external action: it groups all EU external action in Title V of the Treaty, blurring the distinction between pillars I and II. It also allows the Union as a whole to conclude agreements with third countries and international organisations, effectively giving the EU legal personality (although the relevant articles do not use this phraseology) (EU 2003a, Article III.323-325). However, these reforms still distinguish between CFSP and Community issues, maintaining the different rules for different policy areas. As commentators have argued, the changes “relate to the ‘wrapping’ rather than ‘the content’” (Govaere, Capiau and Vermeersch 2004: 186). The Council also has the monopoly in authorising the opening, adoption, signing and conclusion of agreements with third countries or international organisations (EU 2003a, Article III-235). Like many Constitutional Treaty reforms, outcomes will depend on the interpretation of roles by individuals, particularly the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.\footnote{The Constitutional Treaty arrangements for the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs were described by a Council official as “personal rather than functional”, open to interpretation by the personnel involved. Interview, Council of the EU, 27/10/04.} The adoption of reforms will also, of course, depend on the future of the Treaty in the face of ratification problems.

6.3.2 Modalities for EU-UN cooperation
As previously mentioned, EU cooperation with the UN can be understood in the context of new roles for regional organisations in peace and security in the post-Cold War period. Biennial UN-Regional Organisation meetings to enhance cooperation began in 1994. It was agreed at this first meeting “that rather than a universal model for cooperation, it would be more appropriate to develop a flexible, pragmatic approach on a case-by-case basis”(UN 1996). The third meeting in 1998 discussed cooperation for conflict prevention, on the suggestion of Secretary-General Kofi Annan. During this meeting, the need to develop a ‘culture of prevention’ to mobilise Member States was reiterated. Specific modalities for cooperation between the UN
and regional organisations in conflict prevention were also agreed. These modalities include:

- Regular consultation at the headquarters level, including in early warning.
- More systematic coordination of preventive activities in the field, including joint missions.
- The development of common indicators for early warning.
- The establishment of a database of the conflict prevention activities of the UN and regional organisations.
- Better flows of information.
- Exchange of liaison officers and visits of working-level staff between headquarters.
- Joint training of staff in conflict prevention.
- Building specific links to civil society to increase awareness of the value of prevention (UN 1996a).

Dialogue between the UN and the EU proceeded on the basis of these modalities agreed on by the UN and at least ten other regional organisations. The EU was, and continues to be, represented at these meetings by the Presidency and a representative of the Commission.

To reiterate, in examining coordination between the EU and the UN system, we are not so much concerned here with EC/EU membership, or observer status in UN agencies, but the extent of the working relationships between roughly equivalent agencies of both organisations in the field of conflict prevention. *Structural conflict prevention* therefore deals with the dialogue and coordination between the European Commission and the UNDP and other UN entities. *Early warning and analysis* focuses on the dialogue between the Commission and the Council with the Secretary-General and his offices, while *operational prevention* primarily involves cooperation between the latter and EU Council bodies. This is dealt with in the following sections.
6.4 Coordinating Structural Conflict Prevention Policy

6.4.1 The UN and structural conflict prevention: development aid

Multilateralism in development aid is a relatively recent phenomenon, and was not a high priority in the early years of the UN in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The UN’s procedures for granting development assistance to developing countries accelerated after many colonial countries gained independence, and especially after the merging of the Extended Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA) and the Special Fund in 1964 to create the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Luard 1977: 246). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, part of the World Bank family), set up primarily to assist in post-war European reconstruction, became increasingly active as a UN Special Agency in development assistance in the 1960s and 1970s, although much of its work was uncoordinated with other UN activities (Luard 1977: 244 & 249). Internal coordination of programmes was problematic; competition between agencies such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) over available resources was rife, and the centralisation of programmes was resisted. Increasingly, the World Bank became the dominant force in financial aid provisions, and was subject to criticism over its dominance by rich Western donors and its conservative and pro-capitalist lending policies (Luard 1977: 253).

In the post-Cold War years, the role of the UN in development has been minor in terms of resources, but considerable in terms of the setting of international standards and norms in development. The UN has systematically mainstreamed conflict prevention considerations into development and humanitarian programmes. In 2001, the executive board of the UNDP stated that programming should take place through a “conflict prevention lens” (Griffin 2003: 204). The UNDP is funded by voluntary UN Member State contributions, and received a total of $2.9 billion in 2002. It has offices in more than 160 countries worldwide.74 This figure is small compared to resources distributed by the World Bank, and even the EU.75 However, unlike the EU the UN

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74 http://www.undp.org
75 In 2000, the Community external action budget was 5.5 billion euros (Smith, K. 2003: 57). Much of this goes towards UNDP projects e.g. in Kosovo and the Palestinian territories. The UN development budget stands at less than 10% of the World Banks’ i.e. around $30 billion (Mack and Furlong 2004:71).
has incorporated conflict prevention into short-term as well as long-term
development. The Emergency Response Division of the UNDP is now the Bureau for
Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), and assists UNDP country offices in
providing quicker and more effective responses to natural disasters and man-made
violent conflicts.\textsuperscript{76} The bureau helps to fill the gap between short-term relief and
longer-term development objectives. The UNDP has close links with the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC), which in turn consults closely with NGOs in member
countries (Mariko 2003: 189). This can facilitate targeted assistance and best practices
in conflict prevention, linking local UNDP offices with local NGOs.

Contemporary commentators highlight continuing coordination problems in the UN
system as a particular challenge for the integration of development and humanitarian
programmes with security policies; arguably important for a comprehensive UN
conflict prevention approach (Hampson and Malone 2002: 78). The sprawling nature
of the UN system makes the setting of common objectives among agencies
problematic, and the Security Council has no control over the budgets, personnel or
programmes of the agencies (Hampson and Malone 2002: 81). The lack of direct
connection between the UNDP and the Security Council exacerbates linkage efforts
(Mariko 2003: 191). Bureaucratic interests and turf wars, familiar from the discussion
on internal EU coordination, have negative implications for cross-cutting policy areas.
Mack and Furlong (2004: 63) argue that the renewed interest of the Department of
Political Affairs (DPA) in conflict prevention is more to do with pessimism about
peacekeeping operations than anything else, and that staff know little about
development issues.

While the UN system (discounting the World Bank group) pioneered multilateral
development, it is a small player in terms of development resources, and therefore has
the prospect of only a minor role in \textit{structural conflict prevention} (Mack and Furlong
2004: 71). Nonetheless, it retains credibility and respect in developing countries, and
plays a major role in the development of norms such as human rights, sustainable
development, and crucially, conflict prevention. This role is bolstered by cooperation
and complementarity between the UN and other organisations.

\textsuperscript{76} \url{http://www.undp.org/bcpr/about.htm}. Accessed 21/05/04
6.4.2 EU-UN coordination in structural conflict prevention

Lack of coordination between UN funds, programmes and agencies inevitably makes EU coordination with UN objectives and operations difficult. However, the development objectives and discourse of the organisations are increasingly convergent in the post-Cold War era. In the field of *structural conflict prevention*, both organisations have made commitments to improve the targeting of development aid to tackle root causes of conflict. The UN Millennium Declaration and the European Commission’s 2000 Communication, *The European Community's Development Policy* (European Commission 2000) make the same commitments to sustainable development and poverty eradication. This reflects at least a rhetorical international consensus on development objectives, forged throughout the 1990s in the context of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in conjunction with the Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank and IMF) and the UN. This consensus increasingly includes an awareness of conflict prevention considerations in the development and trade spheres. It is less clear how these rhetorical pledges translate into policy in developing countries and cooperation between organisations in the planning stages and on the ground. Indeed, the Commission’s communication doesn’t elaborate on how the EC coordinates the planning and implementation of development aid with UN bodies.

The EU institutional drive for cooperation with the UN accelerated in 2001, significantly, during the Swedish Presidency, largely responsible for drafting the *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts*. The Commission produced a Communication entitled *Building an Effective Partnership with the United Nations in the Fields of Development and Humanitarian Affairs* (European Commission 2001c) in May 2001, a month before the Council concluded a draft paper on EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management (Council of the EU 2001a). The Communication proposed a strategy “to strengthen the involvement of the EC in the upstream policy dialogue and to build a more transparent, financially predictable and easier to monitor partnership with chosen UN agencies, funds and programmes” (European Commission 2001c: 2). Clearly, given the emerging EU-UN modalities in *operational conflict prevention* (see below), high visibility for the Commission in EU-UN dialogue was important; Commissioner Patten was, of course, present at the first EU Troika meeting with the UN Secretary-General in New York in September 2000.
Consensus building on development and human rights issues between the UN and the EC had been taking place for many years in international forums and conferences. Much of this inter-institutional dialogue has its origins in contact between offices in Geneva, Switzerland, home to the headquarters of UN Agencies, ECOSOC, the WTO, a Commission delegation office and a EU Council Secretariat UN liaison office. The latter dates back to the 1960s and was primarily set up for GATT negotiations. Now the office deals with UN issues falling under the scope of the CFSP. Over one thousand internal EU ‘coordination’ meetings, covering the six main committees of the General Assembly, as well as ECOSOC, are held annually in Geneva and New York to agree on common positions so that the Presidency or the Commission can negotiate on behalf of the EU as a whole in international forums. The Commission delegation has stepped up cooperation with the UN agencies in Geneva with the inception of more structured dialogue, particularly with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The Community has been a full participant in major UN World Conferences – including the 1995 Conference on Women in Beijing, and the 2002 Conference on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.

The 2001 communication therefore builds on existing dialogue with UN agencies; a strategy which also gains much support from the European Parliament. It also followed on from high-level meetings between Secretary-General Annan and former Commission President Prodi. Much of the 2001 communication centres on the lack of consistent and predictable EC funding for UN programmes, a problem exacerbated by insufficient internal coordination on both sides, and different institutional cultures and procedures. The Commission recommended a simplification of EC financial regulations to allow for EC funding on a UN programmatic rather than case by case basis. This would consolidate efforts already made under the initial EC/UN Framework Agreement on financing principles, completed in October 2000. Of course, the Commission wanted permanent representation in UN agencies responsible for programming and administering policy in return for more direct and effective funding. Explicit in EU documentation is the drive to increase the ‘visibility’ of the

Community/Union as a key player in the UN system; both in terms of financing and policy planning and in presenting a united EU caucus in the General Assembly, ECOSOC and UN agencies. This suggests that the Commission and the Union as a whole is seeking an enhanced international status through cooperation with the UN.

An updated Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) was concluded between Development Commissioner Poul Nielson and UN Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette in New York, April 2003. Longer-term programme funding was agreed, with more emphasis on transparency, the aforementioned ‘visibility’ of EU funding to UN programmes, and focus on ‘output’ rather than ‘input’.

Yearly consultation meetings will allow for ‘fine-tuning’—clearly an outcome falling short of Commission ambitions for permanent representation on UN programming boards.

The FAFA also covered humanitarian aid. ECHO has supported the UN’s call for more effective international funding for humanitarian crises, participating in UN Consolidated Appeals (CAPs) to facilitate a coordinated multilateral response (European Commission 2003b). ECHO also works with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), joint-hosting the launch of the ‘Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies’ (MCDA guidelines) in 2003 (European Commission 2003b).

The 2003 Communication from the Commission, *The EU and the UN: The choice of multilateralism* (European Commission 2003c) built on earlier EU commitments to work closely with, and in, the UN in issues of development, peace and security. EU commitments include adopting a ‘front-runner’ approach to negotiation and implementation of UN goals. The EU will take into account ‘global targets’ when negotiating agreements with third countries e.g. on human rights, sustainable development, organised crime. More specifically, the Commission will accelerate dialogue at country-level, increasing dialogue between Commission delegations and UNDP Offices in the field, and sharing information for the formation of EU Country

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Strategy Papers and the UN’s equivalent, Common Country Assessments. The Commission will also step up working level contacts with the DPA, DPKO, and the OCHA. Regular dialogue is promised with the UN Secretariat by the Presidency, Commission and the EU Council Secretariat, and common training programmes will be developed for personnel working in civilian crisis management in particular.

Much of this cooperation is therefore in its early stages. However, the legacy of EC-UN cooperation and consensus on development issues suggests that policy coordination in structural conflict prevention is making considerable progress. The improvement in EU funding for UN agencies and EC financial and rhetorical support for the OCHA gives weight to this assessment. Cooperation is, however, concentrated very much between the Commission and the UNDP and OCHA. Other factions of the UN system such as the ILO and the financial institutions are still lagging behind in conflict prevention mainstreaming (Bredel 2003: 62; Björkdahl 2002a: 107). It is worth noting, for example, the different approach of the World Bank, with whom the European Commission has various partnership programmes. Cooperation, in this case, does not improve the coherence of EU conflict prevention policy. Despite being part of the ‘UN family’, the World Bank does not share UN assumptions on the root causes of conflict (Bredel 2003: 63), and, while it has paid some attention to conflict prevention (see Cleves, Colletta and Sambanis 2002), it still focuses more on post-conflict situations (Björkdahl 2002a: 109). Being in the business of encouraging privatisation and private investment in developing countries (which is unlikely to improve the lot of ordinary citizens), it is perhaps not surprising that the World Bank rejects inequality and poverty as root causes of conflict, and takes more interest in post-conflict ‘restructuring’ situations. Nevertheless, EU partnerships with the World Bank, for example, the Private Participation in Mediterranean Infrastructure (PPMI; launched in 1997 in the context of the Barcelona Process79) could undermine perceptions of Union commitment to conflict prevention.

6.5 Coordinating Early Warning and Analysis

6.5.1 The UN early warning system

Improvement of early warning capacity has increasingly become a key component of the UN reform agenda under the leadership of Secretary-General Annan, who took up office in 1997. Undoubtedly, the perceived UN failure to warn of the impending Rwandan genocide in 1994, and the operational failures in Bosnia, Somalia and elsewhere, highlighted the need for early warning and analysis to prevent violence and to prevent more damaging UN entanglements in complex civil wars (Cockell 2003: 183).

Provisions for early warning before the end of the Cold War were concentrated in the office of the Secretary-General, who has a mandate to bring potential conflicts to the attention of the Security Council. Envoys were dispatched to forestall violence in a preventive diplomacy capacity under the direction of 1950s Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold (Claude 1971). Cold War politics stifled more proactive UN engagement in early warning, but, by the 1980s, early warning at the UN took another step forward with the development of fact-finding missions under SG Pérez de Cuéllar (Clingendael Conflict Research Unit 1996: 23). Fact-finding missions are valuable because of the transparent and consensual nature of the activity, designed to establish an objective account of the conflict or dispute that can then be used in preventive diplomacy or conflict resolution (Birckenbach 1997: 31). Unfortunately, competing Security Council Members were more interested in their own versions of the 'facts', giving short-shrift to proposals to institutionalise fact-finding (Clingendael Conflict Research Unit 1996: 24). Information gathering in general was, and is still, regarded with suspicion, since states in which the UN operates are members of the organisation, and governments often resent or forbid interference in their domestic affairs. The UN Office for Research and Collection of Information (ORCI) was established in the late 1980s in the Secretariat, to centralise information gathering. ORCI was disbanded in 1992, and its components distributed between the DPA and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), for reasons that remain unclear (Clingendael Research Unit 1996: 28). Cockell (2003: 186) suggests the tendency of the ORCI to gather information without suggesting proactive strategies for action for the decision-makers, as a likely explanation. The boost to early warning given by Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, followed by the reforms following his replacement
by Annan in 1997 led to the creation of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS; supported by the interdepartmental Framework Team)) and the reformed interdepartmental Framework for Coordination; the former is designed to coordinate decision-making, while the latter coordinates analysis (Cockell 2003: 183). However, the jury is still out on the success of the diffusion of UN early warning activity. While the DPA is primarily responsible, the DPKO, OCHA, and UN field agencies like the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), all play a lesser role in early warning (Cockell 2003: 186). It is not clear how this information is channelled to and used by the DPA.

The Department for Political Affairs (DPA), as the current focus of UN early warning capacity, analyses political developments and identifies potential conflicts. The Department was restructured by Kofi Annan in 2000, as illustrated in Figure 6.2. It is organised hierarchically, headed by the Secretary-General, and supported by the Under Secretary-General and two Assistant Secretaries-General, who each head particular units and regional divisions. The Department has a wide remit, inclusive of supporting the Secretary-General in the prevention, control and resolution of conflict, as well as post-conflict peacebuilding. It is also the focal point for Chapter VIII cooperation with regional organisations. Four regional divisions (two for Africa, one for Asia and one for Europe and the Americas) are responsible for monitoring potential crises and gathering information from member states (UN 2000). Despite the creation of a DPA Prevention Team in 1998, early warning is still inadequate in terms of the availability of information for DPA desk officers to make accurate assessments (Mariko 2003: 179). While fact-finding teams provide valuable information to the DPA that members may be reluctant to provide, teams cannot operate without permission within sovereign states (Mariko 2003: 180).

The four-tiered early warning system has been criticised for its less than immediate analysis, prompting commentators to argue that the UN favours lengthy coordination over prompt reactions to conflict situations (Mariko 2003: 180).
Figure 6.2. The United Nations Department of Political Affairs
6.5.2 EU-UN coordination in early warning and analysis

A UN press release on the eve of the Second UN-Regional Organisation meeting in 1996 stated that the "exchange of information on emerging crises at an early stage [is] the key to closer coordination between the United Nations and regional organisations" (UN 1996). This was reiterated in 1998 when the agreed 'modalities for cooperation' between the UN and regional organisations included consultation on early warning, the development of common conflict indicators, and better flows of information. Council of the EU conclusions on EU-UN cooperation in 2001 cited "the exchange of information and analyses concerning on-going and potential crises" (Council of the EU 2001a: 3) as a key area for cooperation. Why then is there little sign of progress in EU-UN policy coordination for early warning and analysis?

Whilst the sharing of information for early warning purposes is widely regarded as crucial in organisational cooperation for conflict prevention, the realities of cooperation are more problematic. As discussed in the EU context, Member States are often reluctant to pool national intelligence. However, for information gathering the EU is generally working outside its current membership, while the UN has the added difficulty of gathering information from its own members, with all the issues of sovereignty and partisanship that this entails.

Despite the apparent emphasis on early warning, there is a dearth of information in Commission and Council documents about specific early warning cooperation with the UN. According to the Commission Communication The EU and the UN: The choice of multilateralism (European Commission 2003c), the focus for information sharing is in the drafting of the Commission's Country Strategy Papers. This consultation occurs in the country in question and between Commission officials in Brussels and UN officials in the DPA. In early 2003, the Commission and the UN Secretariat agreed on this desk-to-desk dialogue on conflict prevention and risk assessment 'in certain focus countries' (European Commission 2003c), confirmed in the June 2004 annual conflict prevention report as the sharing of early warning information in five pilot countries (Council of EU 2004b). Information sharing is still therefore fairly limited. Contact between UN and EU Special Representatives in certain countries is also a possibility, although it is not clear how such dialogue would be coordinated with dialogue between Commission delegations and UNDP offices, for
example. Country-specific information sharing is important for early warning, but this
doesn’t necessarily mean that there is more structured intelligence sharing between
the organisations. The extent of dialogue between the UN and EU Council structures
on early warning is also unclear, although Ehrhart (2002: 45) claims that the SITCEN
has contact with the UN. The 2003 Thessaloniki European Council report on the
Implementation of EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (Council of
the EU 2003f) cited staff to staff meetings on early warning between the EU and the
UN, OSCE and NATO, but is not specific about the institutions involved. The report
also cites EU contact with the UN Framework Team for Coordination.

The relatively recent nature of the early warning systems in both organisations,
combined with difficulties in information gathering, preclude immediate progress in
policy coordination for early warning purposes. Internal problems in the gathering,
compilation, and coordination of information in both the UN and the EU make
external coordination for conflict prevention particularly difficult. However, progress,
as reported in both EU and UN documents, is being made as contacts between the
organisations are being intensified. Whether this cooperation will result in the sharing
of anything more than general information and post-hoc analysis, however, remains to
be seen.

6.6 Coordinating Operational Conflict Prevention
6.6.1 UN operations: from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and peace
enforcement
The post-Cold War operational context was a challenge for the UN, as traditional
peacekeeping was no longer sufficient in tackling conflict (Ruggie 1993: 26).
Preventive diplomacy, however, still features strongly in UN strategies to prevent
conflict, with an increase in fact-finding, Special Representatives, and high profile
diplomatic visits by the Secretary-General, and the offering of his ‘good offices’. The
UN Security Council has also taken on a more proactive role in the prevention of
conflict, sending its own missions to countries and supporting the preventive
diplomacy of the Secretary-General and his Special Representatives (UN 1999).
Nevertheless, the UN has had to develop a wider range of skills to cope with the
complexities of intra-state war situations. In UN parlance, peacebuilding has emerged
as an additional and often alternative strategy to traditional peacekeeping, as a way of both averting the conditions causing violence and restoring the conditions for peace after war (Sens 2004: 144). While it encompasses strategies to prevent conflict and rebuild peace after conflict, peacebuilding employs a range of shorter-term strategies, including civilian crisis management competences such as election assistance and police training.

Civilian crisis management under the wide banner of ‘peacebuilding’ has therefore become an expanding area for UN action. Strategies such as election monitoring were traditionally seen to encroach on the domestic domain, and there was therefore not a great deal of support for such missions in independent countries during the Cold War period. However, the UN increasingly provided technical assistance for plebiscites in post-colonial Africa in particular, usually as an extension of peacekeeping missions (Morphet 1993: 237). This has expanded in recent years, and the DPA now has an Electoral Assistance Unit to advise on, and coordinate, electoral assistance programmes in Member countries.

Military crisis management is more problematic for the UN. Peacekeeping has increasingly been authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (‘threat to international peace and security’) rather than Chapter VI (‘pacific settlement of disputes’) (Morphet 1993: 231). This reflects a new post-Cold War complexity in terms of actors involved in conflict and the ability to gain consent for UN action. In the post-Cold War context, therefore, action to compel compliance, stop fighting and protect civilians has been labelled ‘peace enforcement’. Military crisis management can be seen as a component of wider enforcement action, which may include sanctions, arms embargos and blockades (Osman 2002: 20). The term has also seen wider post-Cold War usage in acknowledgement of the inapplicability of traditional peacekeeping (based on non-violence and consent) in post-Cold War conflicts. Assumption of a peacekeeping framework in civil war situations has been damaging for the UN and for civilians. While the Security Council can call for the use of force (Article 42, Chapter VII), it relies on coalitions or regional organisations to carry out enforcement actions. The original Charter created a Military Staff Committee to provide military advice to the Security Council, and envisaged a UN standing army. However, Cold War divisions left the former a token body, undeveloped in the post-
Cold War era, and the latter a complete non-starter. The crisis in Somalia in 1992 was the first time that the Security Council authorised peace enforcement action in a civil war situation (Osman 2002: 198). The mandate in Bosnia was extended to peace enforcement in 1994, but the complexities of the situation on the ground left a glaring hole between mandate and practice (Osman 2002: 198). The UN struggled to reconcile experience and resources with protracted intra-state war and increased demand for its services. The chain of command in enforcement situations between UN Headquarters and Member State-commanded troops was weak and unclear. The result was the failure to protect civilians and a blow to UN credibility. In light of these problems, it is clear to see why the UN is keen to share the burden of military crisis management/peace enforcement missions with regional organisations. Nevertheless, this requires efforts on both sides to ensure that civilian/military operations are effectively coordinated.

6.6.2 EU-UN coordination in operational conflict prevention
While the EU and the UN had some ad hoc experience working together in the Former Yugoslavia, specific modalities for field cooperation were slow to emerge on the EU agenda. This was largely because cooperation in operational conflict prevention with the UN was not envisaged until significant progress had been made in the development of the EU’s security and defence policy. The EU’s role in the UN administration of Kosovo (UNMIK) from June 1999 is largely restricted to economic reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. By contrast, EU objectives in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, (in the framework of the December 2001 Bonn Agreement) are more ambitious and wide-ranging. This reflects progress in EU competences and ambitions as well as the smaller number of international organisations active in Afghanistan as opposed to SE Europe.

The June 2001 Council Conclusions, EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management identified conflict prevention and civilian and military crisis management as priority areas for EU-UN cooperation. The Western Balkans, Middle East and Africa were cited as key regions for cooperation. The modalities outlined for

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80 EU objectives include crisis prevention, the support of civil, military and social structures, and the promotion of democracy, as well as economic development

this cooperation were Troika meetings with the UN Secretary-General; meetings between the EU High Representative for CFSP and the External Relations Commissioner and the UN Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General; Political and Security Council (PSC) meetings with the UN Deputy Secretary-General and other UN officials; contacts between the Commission and the Council Secretariat and the UN Secretariat (Council of EU 2001a). Preventive diplomacy coordination would also take place with dialogue on fact-finding, diplomatic activity and concurring messages/declarations. There is no indication of how the EU institutions will coordinate in order to present a consistent message to the UN. Neither is there any indication of who has the authority to make decisions on behalf of the EU in dialogue with the UN Secretary-General and his deputies. This could lead to a process of slow decision-making in the event of a crisis.

These protocols were followed up by a Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management (Council of the EU 2003j) in September 2003. The declaration aimed to deepen dialogue between the organisations in light of the positive cooperation in Bosnia (where the EU replaced a UN police mission) and in the Congo (where the EU reacted promptly to UN requests to assist in stabilising the security situation in the capital, Bunia, - both in 2003). The organisations agreed to establish a joint consultative mechanism to examine how mutual coordination and compatibility could be established in four key areas: planning (reciprocal assistance in assessment missions and greater contact between mission planning units); training (including establishing joint training standards); communication (including between situation centres and the exchange of liaison officers); and best practices (including the systematic exchange of lessons learned) (Council of the EU 2003j).

The Göteborg European Council of June 2001 also outlined the modalities of EU cooperation in civilian aspects of crisis management with international organisations (the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe). EU options for operational cooperation were cited as follows: Member States could contribute nationally to a UN/OSCE controlled mission; the EU could make a coordinated contribution to such a mission; the EU could lead a whole component of an international mission, as in Kosovo; the EU could lead an operation with help from other organisations; and finally the EU could lead an autonomous operation (Council of the EU 2001c). Joint training programmes...
in civilian crisis management have also been mentioned, in line with one of the modalities for cooperation set at the Third UN-Regional Organisations meeting in 1998. However, despite this, a recent document describing the EC Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, (a European Commission initiative in partnership with a network of EU-based training institutions) does not mention any joint projects or dialogue with the UN on staff training (European Commission 2003d).

While ‘joint missions’ were raised as a modality for UN-regional organisation cooperation in 1998, it is unlikely that the EU will find itself undertaking a joint peacekeeping mission with the UN. What is more likely is the EU taking on a particular component of a UN mandated or controlled operation, such as the EU controlled pillar IV of UNMIK in Kosovo. However, the Kosovo mission has not been a resounding success in inter-institutional coordination. UNMIK is one of two UN-headed international administration projects in the post-Cold War era (the other is East Timor), concurring with the organisation’s new expanded role in peacebuilding. These projects have been a challenge, however, and UNMIK has had mixed results partly because it is supporting a policy of containment while Kosovo’s final status remains unresolved (ICG 2004: 36). Internal institutional and inter-institutional problems are also evident. While there is little secondary analysis of the work of the EU’s economic ‘Pillar IV’ of UNMIK, a recent report attributes economic failure in Kosovo in part to the shortcomings of the EU pillar: not only have there been allegations of corruption, but there are no institutional links between Pillar IV staff in Kosovo and Brussels, and no Commission officials are involved (ICG 2004). This inadequate contribution to the UN project does not concur with EU rhetoric on conflict prevention as central to EU external relations, and neither does it reflect a well-developed cooperative relationship with the UN in Kosovo.

Other options for cooperation with the UN are EU civilian/military crisis management missions as a contingency before the arrival of UN peacekeepers (as in Bunia in the Congo); or finally EU personnel taking over a formerly UN controlled operation, such as the EU takeover of the police mission in Bosnia in 2003. The Congo mission was relatively modest, although the EU is pushing forward with a framework for EU-UN military crisis management. This entails more contact between the EU Military Staff
(EUMS) and the UN DPKO, as well as the development of the Battle Group concept with UN operations in mind (Council of the EU 2004a). Commentators have cited potential problems with the chain of command procedure in the event of an EU military operation in support of the UN, as well as the danger of EU Member States allowing civilian crisis management to be relegated in EU-UN relations (Manca 2004: 4). The Kosovo example illustrates that modalities for better EU-UN coordination outside the military crisis management sphere are required.

The relatively recent nature of EU-UN dialogue on civilian and military crisis management means that coordination efforts are still in the early stages. Nevertheless, a lack of coordination and planning between the organisations at the early warning stage could mean that operational coordination remains ad hoc. Admittedly, 'flexibility' is necessary to allow for different conflict situations with different regional and global implications. Yet this tentative analysis reveals unnecessarily complex modalities for cooperation between the organisations, involving too many officials in both organisations. More policy coordination across the full range of conflict prevention activities is required for a comprehensive partnership for peace.

6.7 Internal EU coordination problems: Implications for coordination with the UN

Lack of effective internal coordination in both the UN and the EU makes external coordination in conflict prevention policy difficult. Despite the apparent international consensus on conflict prevention, global disparities and internal instability result in a host of UN nations being inherently suspicious of the domestic interference that conflict prevention implies. Even within the more homogenous EU, the consensus on conflict prevention is vague in order to mask over differences of opinion about exactly how the term is defined and what it entails. Inevitably, the agreement to make conflict prevention a key component in inter-organisational cooperation would show some cracks in the surface when a closer look at specific modalities and progress was examined. This conclusion, however, belies the claims made in documents and declarations produced by both organisations over the past ten years that operational partnerships exist.
The UN has put much effort into tackling internal coordination in recent years. The UN 'Framework for Coordination' in particular has been successful in bringing together information and identifying conflict prevention opportunities (Björkdahl 2002a: 111). Additionally, while many of the specialised agencies and programmes have yet to have their expertise and findings properly integrated into the UN system, the development of the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF; first used October 2001-February 2002 in the context of Afghanistan) to coordinate the work of UN officials, agencies and peacekeepers in the field is a step in the right direction (Griffin 2003: 211). If efforts to coordinate in the UN have tended to dominate over policy development, the opposite could be argued in reference to the EU. Conflict prevention policy has taken off in the EU without the necessary internal coordination mechanisms needed to coordinate externally with the UN. Using the three levels of analysis identified in the previous chapter, we now turn to how EU coordination problems at each level (the pillar structure, inter-institutional and internal institutional) may impact on the success of EU coordination with the UN in conflict prevention.

6.7.1 The pillar structure

As discussed in the previous chapter, the pillar structure of the EU artificially compartmentalises policy. Policy-making is subject to different rules and procedures, with pillar one (EC) policy being more supranational than the intergovernmental-based policies of pillars two and three. The different legal personalities of the European Commission/EC and the EU as whole present a confusing international picture, and there is no consensus between Member States on the extent of EC representation of their collective interests in UN forums. This partly reflects the different character of the two organisations: until the intergovernmental UN is reformed to allow for greater regional representation, then EU Member States will continue to value their national representation (particularly in the Security Council) over EC/EU representation. As the situation stands at present, the EU and its Member States do not always present a consistent and united front in the UN. This was shown most damagingly in the disagreements over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Neither is there an EU intra-organisational system in place to ensure consistent and coordinated dialogue with the UN. The division of conflict prevention competence
between pillars (development and humanitarian aid in pillar one, and CFSP-ESDP policies in pillar two) makes overall dialogue with the UN difficult. The UN Secretary-General has had meetings with former Commission President Prodi, former Commissioners Patten and Neilson, and with EU Presidencies that change every six months, as well as with the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana. This dialogue is supplemented by individual dialogue between UN agencies and different parts of Commission, and the Commission and Council secretariat with various parts of the UN Secretariat. The pillar structure dictates this situation where there is no institutional or personal focus for external relations dialogue with the UN. This has a particularly deleterious effect on the coordination of a cross-pillar policy such as conflict prevention. As already mentioned, the new role of European Union Foreign Affairs Minister (if implemented) could provide a bridge between the pillars, but will not necessarily provide the appropriate balance between policy areas subject to different EU procedures.

6.7.2. Inter-institutional problems

This pillar division is mirrored in inter-institutional divisions between the EU institutions responsible for conflict prevention policies. Just as it is not clear who is in charge of policy, it isn't clear who is in overall charge of dialogue between the EU and the UN. The large number of points of contact between the EU and the UN has been mentioned. Cooperation with the UN was enhanced by both institutions mid-2001, and conflict prevention was a central component. Yet both the Commission and Council of the EU seem to be wrangling for the highest visibility in this inter-organisational cooperation. Separate dialogue between the Commission-UN and Council-UN with minimal coordination at the EU level limits the chance of coordinating a comprehensive conflict prevention policy across the organisations. The internal civilian-military policy divide will be perpetuated externally. This may be overcome if dialogue with the UN was focused in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), enhanced by sufficient civilian crisis management and development expertise from the Commission. The lack of Commission input into joint projects such as the EU pillar of UNMIK represents a missed opportunity in structural conflict prevention: not only does the EU need to take political control of pillar IV, but EU institutional expertise would greatly enhance the EU's contribution to lasting peace in Kosovo.
6.7.3 Internal institutional problems

*Internal institutional* problems present another layer of complexity which impacts on external coordination with the UN. The Council has too many points of contact with the UN in the Presidency, High Representative, PSC and Council Secretariat. It is also not clear what role the Council Working Group on the UN plays in external coordination with the UN. The internal fragmentation of duties in the Council renders early warning dialogue with the UN problematic, as does the real dearth of intelligence pooled at the EU level. For crisis management, the relative lack of capacity for civilian operations could let the EU down in the one area most in demand by the UN. Lack of internal coordination in this area of shared competence between the Council and the Commission may also jeopardise the added value of EU coordination in civilian crisis management with the UN.

Commission coordination with the UN throws up a number of paradoxes. The high visibility of EC-UN development dialogue contrasts with the downgrading of DG Development within the Commission. Moreover, the internal lack of consistency between economic and development policy is exported in the EU’s external relationships with the UNDP and the World Bank. Forging a consensus on poverty reduction with the UN, and funding many UN conflict prevention strategies via the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), is not always consistent with supporting privatisation in partnership with the World Bank. While this might be perceived as a common and even inevitable contradiction in world politics, it does much to highlight the hollow nature of the conflict prevention consensus, particularly in the eyes of developing countries. In this case, internal inconsistency leads directly to inconsistency in external action.

In terms of the coordination of conflict prevention strategies, the functional, rather than geographical division of external relations in the Commission could make dialogue with the UN on geographical regions for early warning purposes more complicated, since geographical desks are dispersed. There is no indication that the Commission’s *Check-List for Root Causes of Conflict*[^1] conforms with UN early

warning indicators. Additionally, Commission confusion over the links between development and humanitarian aid is not conducive to effective ECHO coordination with the UN OCHA.

The competing EU visions of crisis management could be detrimental for coordination with the UN in this area. The lack of linkage between civilian and military components not only jeopardises the EU's ability to provide international services to the UN that are desperately needed, but may result in poorly coordinated operations under UN authority. The Council's momentum on the development of EU military capacities is mirrored in progress in military crisis management modalities with the UN, potentially at the expense of coordination in civilian crisis management. Internal EU coordination mechanisms are insufficient, and the 'last minute' nature of coordination that does exist (the Crisis Response Coordination Team and the Committee of Contributors) will preclude earlier coordination of EU objectives/plans with the UN.

The EU conflict prevention system is still in its infancy, and is subject to major revision with the effects of enlargement and the Constitutional Treaty. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that although the EU places cooperation with the UN at the top of its agenda, EU rhetoric is not matched by the current level of policy coordination in conflict prevention.

6.8 Conclusion
Undoubtedly the move towards coordination between the leading global multilateral organisation, and one of the most resourceful and advanced regional organisations, in a key post-Cold War policy area, is a positive development. Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations has emerged as a post-Cold War leitmotif in the maintenance of international peace and security. Cooperation with the EU in particular has led to the emergence of conflict prevention on the global agenda.

This chapter has examined the extent of policy coordination in conflict prevention between the UN and the EU. This relationship has developed in the context of UN
increased recourse to regional organisations and EU development of a range of foreign policy instruments in the post-Cold War era. Both organisations have been challenged by pan-European security problems, particularly in SE Europe, and perceived organisational failures led to the development of more frequent and structured dialogue. Conflict prevention was central in this dialogue because it was perceived to be at the root of a comprehensive and cost-effective security strategy. However, the complexity of both organisations in terms of factions, units and programmes relevant to conflict prevention renders the EU-UN relationship particularly difficult to untangle. The organisations are also different in terms of their nature and the way they operate.

EU-UN cooperation has developed over a wide range of conflict prevention tasks, and, to date, has not lost its momentum. However, it is concluded that while conflict prevention has been consistently raised as an area for enhanced cooperation, specific progress in the coordination of structural policy, early warning and analysis and operational conflict prevention (particularly civilian crisis management) has been slow. The logic of coordination is generally accepted; the practicalities of inter-organisational policy planning and implementation are far more complex. There are clear links between internal and external coordination in both organisations. However, it is in the case of the EU that this link is most acute and problematic. The pillar structure contributes to these problems by giving different policy areas different rules and procedures in terms of initiation, formation and implementation. This results in a situation where different institutional actors are representing the EU in different policy areas. This becomes confusing when the EU acts in the context of an international organisation, and is particularly problematic for conflict prevention since both pillars one and two have competence in this area. Cooperation with the UN has therefore been coloured by institutional rivalry between the Council and the Commission.

Finally, internal complexities in both the Commission and the Council result in no clear focus for EU-UN coordination in terms of personnel or organisational unit. This is compounded by a lack of internal consensus on the focus of conflict prevention, with a promising partnership with the UN in structural conflict prevention being jeopardised by an institutional drive for short-term crisis management. The fast
development of EU military capacities has led to a focus on EU-UN coordination in military crisis management at the expense of coordination in civilian crisis management. In short, conflict prevention is hindered by the lack of internal EU policy coordination outlined in chapter 5. This type of problem is a common one in governments and organisations, but real efforts to circumnavigate the institutional barriers are needed if EU coordination with the UN is to lead to a fruitful partnership for peace.
CHAPTER 7

The EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE): Pan-European Coordination for Conflict Prevention?

"We affirm that European security requires the widest cooperation and coordination among participating States and European and transatlantic organisations. The OSCE...is particularly well suited as a forum to enhance cooperation and complementarity ...The OSCE will work in partnership with them, in order to respond effectively to threats and challenges in its area."


"We recognise...the shared commitment of the EU and the OSCE to democracy, prosperity and stability in Europe as a whole, and beyond. International organisations like ours should not be working solely in parallel but in joint efforts towards the same goals...Cooperation is not an option, it is an imperative."


7.1 Introduction

The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began as a diplomatic process in the 1970s, sparked by the dual influences of détente and the desire for territorial consolidation in Cold War Europe (Hyde-Price 1998: 25). Renamed ‘Organisation’ in 1995, in tune with its institutional expansion, it emerged as a key player in human rights monitoring and conflict prevention in the post-Cold War period. Its wide membership of 55 states, spanning the Atlantic and inclusive of Russia and the former Soviet countries, add to its legitimacy, but also limits its capacity to enforce its main tenets across a wide and often politically unstable membership area, fraught with the legacy of Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’ (Cottee 2001: 43). Nevertheless, it has undergone a transformation from an intergovernmental agreement designed to reinforce sovereignty, to a functioning institution working to establish peace, democracy and human rights within and between its participating...
states (Mychajlyszyn 2003). The OSCE’s approach to security precluded the expansion of the concept in the post-Cold War era: it incorporated political, economical and environmental concerns into its security remit, creating three ‘baskets’ for cooperation (politico-military, economic and environmental, and the human dimension). The new era of cooperation between OSCE participating states in the 1990s allowed for a more comprehensive and effective linkage between these fields.

The European Union has strong links with the OSCE in terms of the history of European integration, and in ethos and objectives. EU Member States now make up close to half of OSCE participating states, contributing more than fifty percent of the OSCE budget. The EC played a critical role in the 1970s in the origins of the Conference. Member States coordinated their contribution through the European Political Cooperation (EPC) process, and cross-bloc dialogue led to the pan-European Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which established basic agreements on human rights across Cold War Europe, as well as a forum for cooperation between blocs (Von Groll 1982). The CSCE played a significant role in the gradual ending of the Cold War by encouraging democratisation and supporting dissident movements in Communist countries.

The Cold War focus of the organisation on arms control and confidence-building measures was an obvious pan-European concern. Today, the OSCE, with its work in the field of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, endorses the ‘soft’ approach to security that the EU is developing in tandem with a military capacity. Naturally, political and economic stability in the OSCE area is of key interest to the EU, not least since OSCE field missions are, and have been, active in EU candidate countries, helping applicants to work towards the democratic standards and protection of minority rights necessary for EU accession. A cooperative and complementary relationship continues to be in the best interest of both organisations (Schneider 1997). The EU is developing conflict prevention policies that can be considered as

82 “Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) are provisions for the exchange and verification of information regarding the participating States’ armed forces and military activities. [CSBMs]...promote mutual trust and dispel concern about military activities by encouraging openness and transparency” (OSCE 2002: 120)
OSCE tasks in the OSCE’s area of jurisdiction. Has policy coordination been developed to offset the discord that parallel competences could create?

Like the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to investigate the extent of EU cooperation and conflict prevention policy coordination with a key organisation in the European security architecture. We are therefore concerned with EU coordination with OSCE institutions and Missions, rather than EU coordination of policy within the OSCE. Section 7.2 outlines the role of the OSCE in the post-Cold War era, then section 7.3 moves on to examine EU-OSCE relations. Sections 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 examine EU coordination with the OSCE in structural conflict prevention, early warning and analysis, and finally operational conflict prevention. Following the outline of the previous chapter on the UN, section 7.7 examines the ways in which lack of internal EU coordination in conflict prevention impacts on external coordination with the OSCE. Is EU cooperation with the OSCE moving from an option to an imperative, as the High Representative for the CFSP claims?

7.2 Setting the Context: The OSCE and Post-Cold War Organisational Cooperation

Expectations that the OSCE would emerge at the centre of the post-Cold War European security architecture were short-lived. The politically (rather than legally) binding nature of the organisation, as well as the consensus-based process of decision-making and the lack of enforcement mechanisms were seen as procedural disadvantages. More crucially, the veto power of Russia in the CSCE/OSCE, and the increasing political instability in participating OSCE states in eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Caucasus left NATO and the EU as the favoured security organisations for Western European powers and the new states in the east (Cottee 2001: 46). The OSCE emerged as an important ‘second order organisation’, with a functional and specialist role, rather than the successor to Cold War security alliances favoured by (from 1991) the Russian Federation (Forster and Niblett 2001: 29).

However, the OSCE did preside over the international conference widely seen to mark the end of the Cold War: the November 1990 Paris Summit, during which the Charter of Paris for a New Europe was signed. The Charter saw government leaders embrace democracy and market economics as the basic norms of the new Europe. Participating states had already declared a commitment to free and fair elections and the protection
of human rights in Copenhagen, June 1990, during a Conference on the CSCE human
dimension (*The Copenhagen Document*).

Arguably, the OSCE has been the most vocal in its call for cooperation between
organisations in the pan-European area. It is the only organisation (from 1999) to
make regular and detailed reports on its coordination and cooperation with other
organisations working within its area of jurisdiction. OSCE cooperation with other
organisations is primarily concentrated in the Office of the Secretary General,
particularly the External Cooperation section of the Secretariat. The focus is on
dialogue at the headquarters level, although cooperation in the field and at other
institutional levels is becoming increasingly important.

The OSCE declared itself a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter in 1992. Its growing partnership with the UN is less complex than the EU’s
relationship with the UN: the OSCE can clearly provide specialist, ‘hands on’ skills in
the pan-European area, which contrasts and complements the UN’s global seniority
and legitimacy. Both organisations share a consensus-building approach to conflict
prevention, and aim to prevent conflict within their membership area. An effective
division of labour (largely as a result of UN-OSCE dialogue) has developed\(^{83}\) -- the
OSCE’s work in Europe leaves the UN to concentrate its efforts in areas with less
regional competence in conflict prevention, such as the Great Lakes region in central
Africa (Hopmann 2003: 88). The OSCE signed a framework agreement on
cooperation with the UN in 1993, and, like the EU, participates in the UN-Regional
Organisations Biennial Meetings.

Ad hoc cooperation between European security organisations emerged as states and
institutions recognised the need to support democratisation and the peaceful
settlement of disputes in Eastern and Central Europe. The Stability Pact for Europe,
launched by the EU in Paris in May 1994, was a blueprint for inter-organisational
cooperation for conflict prevention. Uniquely, the EU gained legitimacy for its
objectives by combining bi-lateral political and financial agreements with the new

\(^{83}\) The UN and OSCE signed a framework for cooperation and coordination in 1993, and the UN
General Assembly adopted a resolution on strengthening cooperation with the OSCE in 2002 (UN
2002).
democracies, with a multilateral political declaration involving east and west
European states, Russia, the United States, EU institutions, the OSCE, Council of
Europe and the UN. The Pact was officially entrusted to OSCE supervision in 1995,
entailing early contact between the EU and OSCE Troikas (Rummel 1996: 216). The
Pact encouraged a common political commitment for peaceful solutions to border and
minority problems, which would, for the new states, lead to membership of Euro-
Atlantic organisations. While it led to inter-organisational cooperation, however, the
results of the Pact were mixed, and the ‘Round Table’ discussions between states to
foster good neighbourly relations failed to get off the ground in the Baltic states
(Hurlburt 2000: 106). The Stability Pact offered to the states of SE Europe in the
aftermath 1999 Kosovo crisis used the same idea, and it was again developed under
the auspices of the OSCE. The Pact provided a framework for organisational activity
and assistance in the Balkan region, but the offer of EU membership was premature,
with huge implications for the EU enlargement process. Despite intensive
organisational cooperation and presence, much of SE Europe still lacks political and
economic stability. Nevertheless, this sustained contact and cooperation between
organisations, based on common political and economic objectives, underlined the
political advantages and the practical benefits of multilateral action for conflict
prevention purposes. The countries of former Yugoslavia now host a wide array of
organisations (OSCE, UN, NATO, EU, Council of Europe) as well as international
NGOs. It is the exemplification of the most concerted and comprehensive inter-
organisational cooperation, unmatched in any other crisis-prone region. Nevertheless,
the result of this has not been resounding success in the establishment of stability in
the SE Balkan region. While coordination of organisational activity undoubtedly helps
the international community to provide effective conflict prevention, it is clearly no
miracle solution without concurrent domestic commitment to the avoidance of
conflict, or its recurrence.

By 1999, the OSCE Istanbul Summit was proclaiming a new Charter for European
Security, although the final document was more limited in scope than it sounded
(Cottey 2001: 59). Nevertheless, the ‘Platform for Cooperative Security’ to strengthen
inter-organisational cooperation was a key element of the Charter. It pledged the
further development of partnerships with other security organisations, offering the
OSCE platform “as a flexible coordinating framework to foster cooperation, through
which various organisations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular strengths. We do not intend to create a hierarchy of organisations or a permanent division of labour among them" (OSCE 1999: 4). The qualifying sentence concurs with the agreement between the UN and Regional Organisations at the Third UN-Regional Organisations Biennial meeting in 1998 to maintain flexibility in organisational cooperation, in order to deal with the unique political circumstances of particular crises. The modalities for cooperation are equally similar, including regular contact, continuous dialogue, increased transparency and practical cooperation, and increased cooperation in the field.

The EU took on the role of regional leader in conflict prevention when it organised a regional conference on conflict prevention in 2002 in Helsingborg, Sweden. The Partners in Prevention conference was the result of a request by the UN Secretary-General that regional organisations improve regional cooperation for conflict prevention. The conference was organised by the Swedish government in cooperation with the Spanish and Danish Presidencies, and with support from the Commission. It was the first meeting between all European organisations and the UN, attended by high officials from the EU institutions, the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and NATO, as well as practitioners and NGOs. A report of the conference in English is not available to the public. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs provides an overview of the Chairman’s (the late Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh) conclusions on its website. Other than the familiar ‘common commitment to translating the conflict prevention agenda into concrete action’ the conference laid down some practical measures to improve cooperation between organisations. These recommendations are: increased transparency and substantive exchange of information; cooperation between situation rooms; development of common indicators on root causes of conflict; joint fact finding and development of ‘country teams’; establishment of ad hoc working groups in specific situations; sharing of conflict prevention experience; and development of joint training programmes for conflict prevention. These recommendations broadly echo those established at the 1998 UN-Regional Organisation Meeting, although they are more specific in terms of

85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
early warning and conflict indicators. The EU and the other organisations involved were responsible for following up on these aims. Yet the EU has developed its own conflict indicators, early warning system and training programmes with no explicit reference to these commitments. A suggestion by Gareth Evans of the International Crisis Group (ICG) that a Working, or ‘Contact’ Group be set up to coordinate international efforts in a country/region of conflict prevention concern\(^{87}\) seems to have disappeared into the ether. This tends to underline the belief that policy coordination for conflict prevention is all talk and little action. The plethora of ‘modalities for cooperation’ has not visibly resulted in greater coordination.

Despite the OSCE’s attempts to regulate pan-European organisational cooperation, it has not yet emerged as the accepted central coordinating body.\(^{88}\) Neither has its desire to avoid a hierarchy of institutions prevented the OSCE from finding itself firmly at the bottom of it. The OSCE is inevitably embroiled in the politics of European security. The development of the EU and NATO in the post-Cold War era has implications for the OSCE. Since accession to these organisations tends to result in the termination of OSCE Missions (in Estonian and Latvia, for example), the geographical area for OSCE activity is increasingly reduced. This OSCE withdrawal may result in unfinished business in new EU states, despite the political criteria of EU membership. Those countries ruled out of membership of these favoured organisations will inevitably feel more stigmatised by OSCE presence (Zagorski 2002: 224). Writing in 2002, Andrei Zagorski argued: “the forthcoming enlargement is largely seen as a manifestation of the fact that the European Union and NATO are becoming more relevant than the OSCE” (2002: 227).

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7.3 Understanding EU-OSCE Relations in the Post-Cold War Period

7.3.1 OSCE structure: strengths and weaknesses

The CSCE began as a diplomatic process rather than a consistent and continuous organisation, and as such consisted of infrequent meetings between participating states. It retains these features, with the principal decisions being made at periodic Summits of Heads of State and yearly meetings of the Ministerial Council. However, since the end of the Cold War, institutional proliferation has led to the establishment of permanent structures, and direct mechanisms that are not hindered by the lengthy decision-making associated with the consensus requirement at the political level. The structure of the organisation can be best understood by drawing a distinction between the political decision-making bodies and the operational structures (Cohen 1999: 16). The former consist of (in hierarchical order) the Summits, Ministerial Council, Senior Council, Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation, while the latter include the Chairman-in-Office, the Troika, the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), field Missions (including Missions of Long Duration), the Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Various bodies are attached to these structures, including the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in the Secretariat (see Figure 7.1).

 Unlike the UN Secretary General, the office of OSCE Secretary General is largely an administrative rather than a political post. Political leadership is provided by the Chairman-in-Office, (a post taken by participating states on a rotating annual basis), the Troika (current, previous and subsequent Chairmen) and to a lesser extent, the High Commissioner on National Minorities (Max van der Stoel from the inception of the position in 1992 until 2001; now Rolf Ekens). For an organisation with a small budget, the scope and width of OSCE competence is impressive. From a focus on political and military confidence-building measures during the Cold War, the organisation has moved towards a central objective of conflict prevention within states. It was the first organisation to focus its attention specifically to the ethnic intra-

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89 Six Summits were held between 1975-2000.
state conflicts that characterised the post-Cold War era, creating the position of High Commissioner on National Minorities in 1992. Its role in economic cooperation has decreased as the EC/EU emerged as an economic giant, and military cooperation is more low-key in the post-Cold War context.

Despite its post-Cold War adaptation to new security challenges, OSCE operations have been subject to criticism from host states and other interested parties. Operationally, the organisation suffers from understaffing, lack of resources, and insufficient mandates. Mission staff are seconded from participating states, and are therefore largely appointed on the basis of political decisions rather than expertise. Missions vary from small teams consisting of six or seven personnel to larger operations of twenty or more staff. The traditional approach of seconded diplomats is not always appropriate in dealing with deep-seated local tensions (Cohen 1999: 87). Moreover, the entitlement of all participating states to contribute personnel to Missions means frequent changes of staff. While Missions make up the lion’s share of the OSCE budget, resources are limited, necessitating a low-key presence. Mission mandates have been criticised by participating states for being vague, with no
indications of likely duration (Cohen 1999: 113). However, establishing a mandate for
an OSCE mission is a highly political process, and mandates are often vague in order
to secure agreement from the host participating state. Furthermore, the lack of details
in a mandate can allow the Head of Mission more room to manoeuvre and extend the
mission as necessary. Host states, while they indeed invite the OSCE to assist them,
often feel stigmatised by an extended OSCE presence, fearing in particular that being
labelled a potential crisis area will discourage foreign investment (Cohen 1999;
Zagorski 2002; Birckenbach 2000). Domestically, the host government may resent
OSCE interference and criticism and begin to withdraw cooperation. This may, in
turn, lead to OSCE complicity in less than acceptable human rights standards (for
example in the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where OSCE activity has been criticised for under-
emphasising human rights – see ICG (2002)).

At the organisational level, the relationship between Heads of Mission and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) is unclear, as is the freedom of Heads
of Mission to make decisions without the consent of the Chairman-in-Office and the
Permanent Council. Politically, the organisation is criticised by some participating
states for concentrating its activities in transitional states, and ignoring issues of
OSCE concern in Western democracies, such as discrimination against minorities.
More damagingly, OSCE activities have been criticised for being selective and
patronising to host countries, or simply not upholding expected standards in its role as
election monitor, for instance (Meyer 2000). Fair criticism is increasingly coloured by
the geopolitical concerns of the big powers: why should Russia allow interference in
Chechnya when the UK refuses interference in Northern Ireland? Western states have
continued to condone Russian military presence in Georgia and Moldova in order to
maintain wider Russian commitment to the OSCE process (Ghebali 2004: 6). This,
however, has not silenced Russian criticism of the OSCE. In July 2004, the
government of the Russian Federation released a statement criticising the OSCE’s
“double standards and selective approaches” in human rights and election monitoring,
which are undermining state sovereignty. 90 This was followed by an appeal from the

90 ‘Statement by CIS Member Countries on the State of Affairs in the OSCE’ [Moscow Statement],
Accessed 23/03/05.
CIS states in September echoing Russia’s stance. A vigorous defence of the OSCE was subsequently launched by a group of NGOs based in the CIS and Eastern and Central Europe, expressing “categorical disagreement with the negative evaluation of OSCE activity in the region,” considering the statement by Russia and the CIS states to be “an attempt at ‘preventative impact’ on the OSCE... at a time when [it] has started paying more serious attention to the manifestations of arbitrariness and lawlessness on the territories of the former USSR.” The EU, in a December 2004 Draft Assessment Report on the EU’s role vis-à-vis the OSCE, recognised that “a well coordinated policy of the EU vis-à-vis the OSCE appears to be all the more important in a period when Russia and some CIS states express doubts on the role of the OSCE,” and warned of a “values and commitments gap emerging on the borders of the EU” (Council of the EU 2004d: 5).

As a broad organisation acting on the basis of consensus, with no enforcement capabilities, the OSCE is accustomed to being the arena for the gripes, criticisms and rivalries of participating states. Nevertheless, this perceived weakness could be regarded as more of a strength in the promotion of OSCE values (Chigas 1996: 27). The organisation’s inclusive and comprehensive approach to security aims to persuade participating states to establish and maintain stable democracies and human rights cultures, not exclude those that don’t, thereby losing all influence. Similarly, democracy and human rights cannot be enforced militarily, but must originate in domestic structures and civil societies. One of the key aims of OSCE missions is to help foster these domestic conditions by working closely with host governments and representatives of local NGOs and civil society. This must be kept in mind when considering the OSCE’s position at the bottom of the organisational heap: it is no reflection of its worth or potential, but more the interests of its participating states.

7.3.2 OSCE-EU cooperation: crossing competences?

Relations between the two organisations have developed as the OSCE expanded its presence in Europe and as the EU began to take on a substantial role in conflict prevention. This relationship is decidedly different to the EU’s relationship with the UN, since both the EU and the OSCE are regional, European-based organisations. Yet despite this convergence of tasks in the post-Cold War era, the OSCE is also a very different organisation from the EU. Like the UN, it is an intergovernmental organisation, with a consensus-based decision-making procedure, aiming to prevent disputes between and within its participating member states. The only occasions in which the OSCE has worked outside its area of current membership were in Macedonia and Kosovo while the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia-Montenegro) was suspended from the organisation. Its legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian Federation is particularly important, and this is one of the reasons why the OSCE is such an important partner for the EU, particularly in areas of Russian interest and influence such as Central Asia and the Caucasus.

In February 2003, the Council of the EU published Draft Conclusions on EU-OSCE cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation (Council of the EU 2003g). Similar to the EU Conclusions on cooperation with the UN, particular modalities were not discussed until a concrete role in EU civilian crisis management had emerged. This was despite the rhetoric on organisational cooperation evident in European Council Presidency Conclusions and other EU documents throughout the 1990s, as well as ad hoc cooperation with the OSCE in the Balkans in particular, including the Stability Pact for Central and Eastern Europe, cooperation between the OSCE and the EUMM in former Yugoslavia, and joint fact-finding missions. The document identified five key areas of ‘enhanced cooperation’:

- exchange of information and analyses, cooperation on fact-finding missions,
- coordination of diplomatic activity and statements (including consultations between special representatives), training and in-field cooperation (Council of the EU 2003g).

These areas for cooperation draw on the recommendations made at the Helsingborg Regional Conference. The modalities for cooperation are concentrated on the political level. They are:
- A meeting between the EU Troika, the OSCE Troika and the OSCE Secretary-General during each EU Presidency.
- Invitations of representatives of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Secretary-General, OSCE Heads of Missions and heads of other OSCE institutions to informal meetings with the PSC during each Presidency.
- Visits by EU Troika to Vienna for meetings with the OSCE Troika, EU Permanent Representatives to the OSCE and third countries.
- Briefings by the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for external relations to the Permanent Council in Vienna.
- Continued contacts between the High Representative, the external relations Commissioner and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Secretary General.
- Coordination among EU Member States’ representatives to the OSCE and the European Commission delegation in Vienna and coordination between them and the EU institutions in Brussels in order to facilitate synergies.
- The invitation of representatives of the OSCE Secretary General and Chairman-in-Office, Heads of Missions and Heads of OSCE institutions to informal meetings with relevant working groups (Council of the EU 2003g).

The remaining modalities include field level cooperation between EU Special Representatives, heads of EU crisis management operations, EU Member State embassies, European Commission delegations and OSCE field missions and personal representatives, and staff to staff contacts between the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, the European Commission and the OSCE Secretariat and institutions. The first formal staff-level meeting between the OSCE Secretariat and EU institutions took place in Vienna in May 2003 (OSCE 2003). The general nature of this cooperation, combined with the fact that commitments are recent, means that analysis of EU-OSCE coordination is tentative, drawing on contemporary trends to highlight the viability of inter-organisational partnership.

The EU’s development of conflict prevention competences has encroached onto traditional OSCE territory. A recent commentator remarks on the concern of OSCE officials over a possible EU takeover of OSCE tasks (Doyle 2002). The implications of this development could be far reaching. Firstly, the scope for competition and
overlap between the organisations is increased. Secondly, the OSCE’s ethos, interests and practices result in a particular approach to conflict prevention. In some cases, this may be a rather different approach from the EU, an organisation with wider interests and resources, including those tied up with the single market, financial assistance, and enlargement. It may be important to ensure that cooperation between the organisations starts with a common understanding of conflict prevention and the objectives in particular countries or regions. This could increase the chance of coordination resulting in reinforcing rather than conflicting policies.

The structure of the OSCE has implications for effective coordination with the EU. Its structure is loose, with a distinction between its political and operational factions. It has a relatively small staff; personnel consist mainly of diplomats working at the intergovernmental level in the Permanent Council, and in the field missions. It has a small number of international staff working as experts and advisers in the various offices and institutions. Frequent changes of staff are not conducive to the development of longer-term partnerships on the ground. The distinction between the political/diplomatic and operational levels creates two different institutional cultures within the same organisation. The most visible forum for coordination between the organisations is on the ground i.e. between EC delegations/Special Representatives and OSCE Missions or the HCNM. Nevertheless, it is in this kind of situation that the organisations may have different priorities, especially in EU candidate countries. Estonia, for example, is a case in point, and is considered below. Another draw-back is the nature of OSCE reports, many of which are confidential and non-accessible, and also the secretive nature of dialogue, or ‘hidden’ diplomacy. For these reasons it is particularly difficult to disentangle the objectives of organisations’ from those of member states, and to assess the impact of organisational activity in particular countries.

An overview of the current extent of EU-OSCE dialogue and coordination in structural conflict prevention, early warning and analysis and operational conflict prevention follows, with a summary of OSCE activities in these categories preceding the discussion. We then move on to the implications of internal EU policy coordination for external coordination with the OSCE.
7.4 Coordinating Structural Conflict Prevention Policy

While the OSCE’s dialogue on economic, military and environmental aspects of security is relevant for conflict prevention, this chapter primarily examines EU coordination with OSCE bodies concerned with the political and human dimensions of security (i.e. the political aspects of the politico-security basket, and the third human dimension basket, dealing with human rights and fundamental freedoms), largely because cooperation in the other OSCE fields is minimal. EU-OSCE cooperation therefore entails cooperation between the organisations on structural conflict prevention (democracy and human rights promotion), early warning and analysis and operational conflict prevention.

7.4.1 OSCE structural conflict prevention

The OSCE’s role in structural conflict prevention is not based on aid or targeted financial assistance, but in its long-term and low-key role in the promotion of human rights, democracy and the peaceful settlement of disputes. OSCE tasks contributing to structural conflict prevention overlap with its activities in early warning and civilian crisis management. For example, OSCE activity under the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) contributes to short-term needs for election monitoring and longer-term training in democratisation and human rights protection. Similarly, the HCNM and OSCE Missions can perform early warning functions as well as structural conflict prevention in the promotion of long-term stability.

The OSCE’s role in long-term conflict prevention is best illustrated by its Missions of Long Duration – in situations of potential rather than actual conflict.\(^{93}\) Mandates for the Missions are drawn up by the Permanent Council, are subject to consensus, and reviewed every six months. Objectives of Missions are specific to particular circumstances, but generally tend to be concerned with improving the relationship between conflicting communities, and/or promoting peaceful negotiations between conflicting parties (for example, in Georgia, Moldova, Latvia and Estonia). Conversely, some missions, for example those in the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, are more limited in scope because of host government objections to wider OSCE involvement in human rights

\(^{93}\) Preventive missions include those to Latvia, Estonia and Macedonia.
issues. It is in such cases, (as the EU itself recognises) that regional organisational coordination is particularly important in persuading governments to improve human rights and political freedoms (ICG 2002: ii). Operationally, OSCE staff host community round-table meetings, negotiate and liaise with host governments and NGOs, and provide regular reports to OSCE headquarters. While these reports are normally classified information, the Missions also provide information and a support network to local citizens. As previously mentioned, Mission members are seconded from participating states, with the Head of Mission being a senior national diplomat. The long-term strategy is deemed to have been a success in Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine (Mychajlyszyn 2003), although it is debatable whether these states effectively resolved minority issues before the closure of OSCE Missions. Additionally, it is difficult to assert that violent conflict would have broken out in these states without OSCE intervention. This, as explained in chapter 2, is a common dilemma in conflict prevention, especially since, in these cases, the host governments refused to accept that there was conflict to prevent, and invited OSCE interference for external, rather than internal security reasons (Mychajlyszyn 2003: 148). Nevertheless, the stabilising influence of OSCE field presence is important and unique in addressing root causes of conflict.

7.4.2 EU-OSCE coordination in structural conflict prevention
On-site dialogue and cooperation between OSCE Mission offices and European Commission Delegations takes place in states where dual presence exists, although the extent of this cooperation is variable and difficult to measure. However, clearly most of the dialogue takes place in EU candidate or associate states, for example, formerly in the Baltics, and now mainly in the Balkans, including Albania. In SE Europe OSCE missions work with EU representatives, helping host countries in the context of the EU Stabilisation and Association Process – for example on issues such as judicial reform, civilian crisis management, democratisation, and human rights. According to the latest available OSCE Annual Report, EU-OSCE cooperation “has been successful in providing a climate conducive to stabilization, normalization, and ultimately integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures” (OSCE 2003: 172). EU-OSCE cooperation on the ground also takes place in Albania, and OSCE offices have contact with the new EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus.
The EU and the OSCE have cooperated to promote democracy and acceptable human rights standards on the EU's periphery. Since 1998, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has carried out joint programmes with the EC, funded in part by the EC's European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (OSCE 2003). A third joint programme started in summer 2004 in Central Asia, focusing on human rights monitoring, the promotion of fair trials and action to abolish the death penalty.94

While cooperation in the field for structural conflict prevention clearly takes place, it is difficult to assess the extent and effectiveness of this dialogue. Successful inter-organisational coordination will often depend on the individual diplomats and officials on-site. It may also depend on the nature and number of EU representatives on site: whether this is a delegation, Special Representative, a head of a crisis management or monitoring mission, or some combination of these. This is important, since there is likely to be various points of contact, and successful coordination with the OSCE may depend on internal coordination among EU actors present. The proposals for EU overseas representation featured in the Constitutional Treaty (EU External Action Service), if implemented, could vastly improve the coordination of EU external policy, creating EU diplomatic offices in third countries with staff from the Council, Commission and national diplomatic services (Everts and Keohane 2003: 173).

The EU and the OSCE have generally worked towards the same objectives in EU candidate countries with an OSCE Mission presence. The EU holds the carrots of membership and financial assistance, which can be very persuasive in conjunction with OSCE pressure for democratisation and human rights observance. However, cooperation in the field may not always contribute to long-term conflict prevention aimed at addressing root causes of conflict. In Estonia and Latvia, the European Commission underplayed minority problems in order to accept the countries as EU candidates, and then members in 2004. This had a direct and often negative effect on the OSCE Missions of Long Duration sent to the countries in 1993 to persuade the

host governments to grant acceptable rights to the resident Russian minorities. It has been suggested that the European Commission gave a favourable but unsubstantiated opinion on the protection of Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia in order to accept the applications for membership in 1997, thereafter concentrating more on the economic rather than political criteria for membership (Van Elsuwege 2002). This concurred with the wider EU objective, driven by the influence of the Nordic states, to bring the Baltic states (already classed as Central European rather than former Soviet) into the EU as soon as possible. While the OSCE had a positive effect on the EU’s agenda in Estonia by highlighting ongoing citizenship problems, the EU was not an impartial player, and the objectives and standards of the two organisations were not always reinforcing (Birckenbach 2000). The different approaches were, to an extent, exploited by politicians of the host government, who played off the organisations against each other and finally used imminent EU membership as a way of closing down the OSCE mission to Estonia in 2001 (Birckenbach 2000). Arguably, the OSCE’s work in Estonia in particular was unfinished. In this case, it seems that the EU enlargement agenda conflicted with the human rights agenda of the OSCE. Unresolved issues in Estonian and Latvian society may become future conflicts that the EU failed to prevent.95

Interestingly, the OSCE was kept firmly outside EU-Russia negotiations on Kaliningrad. The Russian oblast is situated on the Baltic coast between Poland and Lithuania, and was destined to be surrounded by EU territory after the 2004 enlargement. Negotiations broke down in 2002, as disagreements between the EU and the Russian Federation arose over the issues of visas and transit for Russian citizens over EU territory. An international group of experts called on OSCE involvement for more positive and productive dialogue on the Russian enclave, especially in light of the wide-ranging problems in the region, including organised crime and poor economic performance and health services (Kiel International Group of Experts on Kaliningrad 2002). While an agreement on transit and visas was reached at the EU-Russia summit in November 2002, the issue is likely to become another hangover.

95 There are already signs of this: in April 2005, less than a year after the accession of the Baltic states, Tatjana Zdanoka, Latvia’s only Russian-speaking MEP, accused the Latvian government of discriminating against non-Latvian speakers in its insistence on citizenship tests. She claims that the Latvian government is violating European racial discrimination laws and called for EU action to protect human rights (‘Latvia’s Russians call on EU for help with human rights’ Euobserver, 19/04/05 http://euobserver.com/?aid=18885&print=1. Accessed 26/04/05.
from the Baltics requiring careful diplomacy with the government of the Russian Federation, arguably not one of the EU’s strong points.\footnote{The EU pledged €12 million in February 2003 to meet Lithuania's costs in transiting Kaliningrad citizens through EU territory (see http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/news/jp03_301.htm). It is not clear how much Kaliningrad itself will benefit from its proximity to the EU. The oblast is in economic decline and has the highest HIV infection rate in Europe. According to a BBC journalist, the area is not a priority for the Russian government, and President Putin had to show Russian journalists where Kaliningrad was on a map during a press conference in 2004 (Steven Paulikas 'Kaliningrad: The forgotten land' BBC Radio 4, From Our Own Correspondent, broadcast 26/03/05. Accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/4382145.stm, 15/06/05).}

In some cases, therefore, \textit{structural conflict prevention} objectives may be undermined by conflicting organisational objectives in host countries. Coordination of activities in such situations will be problematic, and to an extent, success will depend on common interpretations of the root causes of potential conflict. The European Commission did not consult the OSCE when it developed the EU ‘Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict’. The OSCE itself does not provide an explicit list of conflict indicators in its official publications. Nevertheless, the development of common conflict indicators was prioritised during the Helsingborg conference in 2002. Delivering on this promise may help to ensure stronger and more effective partnerships between the organisations in future.

\section*{7.5 Coordinating Early Warning and Analysis}
\subsection*{7.5.1 OSCE early warning and analysis}

The OSCE's comprehensive definition of security leads to a broad early warning focus. OSCE early warning capabilities were established in the post-Cold war period, with the creation of mechanisms for direct action and consultation — primarily the Permanent Council and the post of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). While the OSCE was created with early warning for conflict prevention as a core tenet, the term is insufficiently defined in organisational documents, and the distinction between early warning and preventive diplomacy remains blurred in the OSCE system (Clingendael Conflict Research Unit 1996: 11). Analytical capacity is dispersed between various offices — including the Office of the HCNM, ODIHR, and the Conflict Prevention Centre in the Secretariat.
A clear distinction can be made between early warning mechanisms in the military and human dimension categories. The former tends to relate to inter-state warning, while the latter generally refers to intra-state developments. Various confidence and security-building measures exist in the military sphere: the Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as regards Unusual Military Activity and the Mechanism for Cooperation as regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature. Both are designed to prevent misunderstandings and increase transparency between states. The intra-state nature of most contemporary conflict has increased the need for early warning in the human dimension. The OSCE Permanent Council, consisting of participating States’ ambassadors and meeting weekly, is the main early warning forum, where states can raise issues of concern. This body is headed by the Chairman-in-Office, who can gather early warning information by visiting potential crisis areas or sending a Personal Representative.

With a clear mandate for early warning in the human dimension field, the post of High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) was established in 1992 to deal directly with ethno-political tensions in the OSCE area. Supported by a staff of 11, the Commissioner’s role is described by the OSCE as follows: “first, to try to contain and de-escalate tensions and, second, to act as a ‘tripwire’, meaning that he is responsible for alerting the OSCE whenever such tensions threaten to rise to a level at which he cannot contain them with the means at his disposal” (OSCE 2002: 94). The HCNM operates as a direct instrument for preventive diplomacy and early warning because his actions are not subject to the OSCE consensus decision-making procedures, although his success depends on support from participating states. Activities involve on-site visits and the issuing of recommendations to governments. The HCNM provides high profile influence and support to Missions of Long Duration in host states. Additionally, fortnightly reports from Heads of Missions to the Chairman-in-Office have an early warning function (Cohen 1999).

Fact-Finding and Rapporteur Missions, defined by the OSCE as “short-term visits by experts and personalities from OSCE participating States with the task of establishing facts, reporting on their findings, and...making recommendations to OSCE decision-making bodies” (OSCE 2002: 42) have an important early warning function in potential conflict situations. The idea is to establish an objective and transparent
commentary on the conflict or dispute, which then facilitates the acceptability of organisational recommendations to the parties in the dispute (Birckenbach 1997: 31).

The OSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna (part of the Secretariat) has had its early post-Cold War focus on politico-military security and mission logistical support adapted to more of a specific role in operation planning and early warning. It now consists of various units, including the Operations Centre (established in September 2000), incorporating the Situation/Communication Room. Staffed around the clock, the Situation Room acts as an emergency management cell (for the evacuation of OSCE staff, for example) and as a data gathering and analysis point.

Finally, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) gathers some information in the human dimension field, although it remains an underdeveloped resource. It is far from clear how all this information is coordinated and analysed to enable timely political decision-making. While an internal lack of staff and resources is often cited as the key drawback, others assert that it is the lack of assertive action by participating states that renders OSCE early warning cumbersome and ineffective (Clingendael Conflict Research Unit 1996: 19).

7.5.2 EU-OSCE coordination in early warning and analysis
Cooperation for early warning purposes has been slow to develop. The OSCE Operations Centre held working-level meetings with representatives of the European Commission, the European Council Secretariat, and NATO in Brussels in May 2001, during which discussions took place on the development of better cooperation between the OSCE and partner organisations (OSCE 2001).

At the Partners in Prevention conference in Helsingborg in 2002, both the OSCE and the EU agreed on the need for an increased level of information sharing between organisations. However, the mechanisms for information exchange and cooperation between the OSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre and the EU SITCEN are still largely ad hoc (Doyle 2002: 6). This reflects the familiar problem of how to share potentially

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97 The other units are the Mission Programme Section and the Forum for Security-Cooperation Support Unit (http://www.osce.org/publications/factsheets/cpc_e.pdf Accessed 21/07/04).
98 Ibid.
99 According to OSCE expert Dr Hanne Margret Birckenbach.
sensitive information. The OSCE's openness is not reciprocated by the Union. The EU receives restricted information from the OSCE but is unwilling to share information with non-EU/NATO members (Doyle 2002: 7). OSCE officials have requested greater cooperation, but the EU (the PSC in particular) is reluctant to create more structured dialogue and prefers to work on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis (Doyle 2002: 7). This, in fact, could be interpreted as going against the commitments made in the 2003 EU-OSCE Council Conclusions for enhanced cooperation in the exchange of information and analyses. It does not bode well for the development of cooperation on fact-finding missions.

As established in earlier chapters, coordination for early warning purposes should involve more than dialogue at the first sign of a crisis. More regular and structured exchanges are needed, and EU cooperation with the OSCE should include dialogue with other OSCE institutions, such as the HCNM and the ODIHR. This point was made by Max van der Stoel at the Helsingborg conference, who stated that a large body of information, gathered by the HCNM, was available to the EU, but that no dialogue had taken place between the EU and the HCNM since 2001 (during the Swedish presidency) (Doyle 2002: 7).

7.6 Coordinating Operational Conflict Prevention

7.6.1 OSCE operational conflict prevention

Civilian crisis management emerged as an increasingly important OSCE operational conflict prevention activity in the post-Cold War era, although it is not generally associated with situations where conflict has actually erupted. OSCE crisis management largely involves border and election monitoring, and rule of law/police training. The role of the OSCE is small-scale and specialist: it does not send large teams of police officers to crisis areas, for example, but concentrates its efforts in the areas of training and reform. Its civilian staff have increasingly worked in areas of crisis in partnership with military organisations (mainly NATO), whose personnel provide security and protection. This kind of arrangement with NATO allows the OSCE to run an important mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Hopmann 2003: 91).

A notable exception to this was in Chechnya, during the first war with Russia (1994-1996), where a limited OSCE assistance group was established in 1995. The Mission had to leave in 1999 after an escalation in violence, but was reinstated in 2001 (Hopmann 2003).
OSCE Missions also have crisis management functions, depending on the mandate of particular missions, or as a result of an increase in tensions on the ground. For example, the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje was deployed to Macedonia in 1992 to monitor the border with Serbia. It therefore has a number of functions, and has adapted its mandate from early warning and crisis management to the fostering of better inter-ethnic relations between the Macedonian and Albanian populations (OSCE 2002: 55).

Rule of law and police training have increasingly featured among the OSCE’s competences. The decision to strengthen OSCE capabilities in police-related activities was taken at the Ninth Ministerial Council Meeting in Bucharest, December 2001. A Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) was established in the OSCE Secretariat, with a staff of eight providing expert advice to OSCE Missions and participating States. 101

Election assistance is organised under the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). It was established as the Office for Free Elections in 1990 and subsequently enlarged to include practical assistance in elections or referendums in participating states. The Office now employs more than fifty people, and deploys observation missions up to two months before election date to monitor the whole election process (OSCE 2002: 109). It also provides election training and assistance to participating states, organises grass roots democratisation projects and provides training in the rule of law. In 2004, the ODIHR deployed 3,500 personnel on 12 election observation and assessment missions (OSCE 2004: 19). This included a mission to the US to observe the November 2004 presidential and congressional elections. In addition to election observers, the OSCE also provides impartial military observers, tasked with monitoring borders, cease fires, or observing peacekeeping operations.

A system for the deployment of Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT) was developed after decisions made at the 1999 Istanbul Summit. This system reflected the growing role and demand of the OSCE in civilian crisis management, allowing for timely responses to emergency situations. An Operation

Centre was created in the Conflict Prevention Centre to assist in the planning and deployment of REACT and other Missions. A pledge was also made to develop an OSCE role in peacekeeping, either directly or in the mandating of missions to other organisations. While a High Level Planning Group has been established for peacekeeping planning, a consensus is yet to be reached between participating states on the extent and efficacy of an OSCE peacekeeping role (Hopmann 2003: 76).

7.6.2 EU-OSCE coordination in operational conflict prevention
The EU’s development of civilian crisis management competences has led to increased cooperation with the OSCE in election monitoring and police missions in particular. Much of this cooperation and coordination is concentrated in SE Europe, and the examples cited here are from this region. There is a dearth of cooperation in the Caucasus and Central Asia, partly as a result of the lack of a clear EU strategy in these areas (Lynch 2003: 172) and partly as a consequence of resistance to organisational intervention by local governments.

The situation in Kosovo has arguably become a case of crisis management rather than post conflict reconstruction. Since the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 in response to the growing humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, sparked by Serb-instigated expulsions, the status of the territory is yet to be confirmed, and Kosovo is under UN-led administration, in partnership with the EU, and the OSCE (both heading administrative ‘pillars’), with military protection from NATO. Despite international efforts, stability in Kosovo is tenuous and subject to frequent outbreaks of tension and violence between the Albanian and Serbian Kosovars. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, previously a much-cited example of conflict prevention, tensions broke out between the Albanian and Macedonian communities in 2001. The UN’s first preventive deployment force in 1992 prevented the overspill of violence from Southern Serbia during the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but the country’s proximity to Kosovo and growing Albanian disquiet about the rights offered by the Macedonian government led to violence. The international community, with the EU playing the lead role, brokered a peace agreement in 2001 (the Ohrid Agreement, or ‘Framework Agreement’). The situation requires acute conflict prevention to prevent the recurrence of violence.
The EU has worked closely in crisis management with the OSCE in both Kosovo and Macedonia. While Kosovo is primarily under UN control, both organisations play key roles in implementing UN Security Council resolution 1244 of June 1999, designed to foster the political, economic and societal stability needed for some form of future self-government. As mentioned in chapter 6, the EU heads the UN Mission in Kosovo's (UNMIK) Pillar IV, financing and carrying out economic reconstruction and development. The OSCE has the more political role of heading the Pillar responsible for institution and democracy-building and human rights. The OSCE had previously orchestrated two missions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: a short-lived Mission in 1992 to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina; and the six month Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) of 1998-1999, active in monitoring the cease-fire, military movements and human rights on the Kosovo border with Serbia before withdrawal in March 1999, shortly before NATO military action (OSCE 2002: 47). The EU, on the other hand, had less field experience in Kosovo; other than its economic role in UNMIK, and the small team of EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) members in Kosovo, its relations with the province came to centre on the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western Balkans. Additionally, EU Member State contributions make up the majority of the NATO force in Kosovo (KFOR), 11 Member States have diplomatic ('Liaison') Offices in Kosovo, and the European Agency for Reconstruction has an office in Pristina to manage the EU’s primary financial assistance programme for Kosovo (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS)) (Council of the EU 2004c). The EU and Member State presence in Kosovo is therefore rather dispersed and opaque. This is recognised by the High Representative, but results in a confusing number of OSCE points of contact with EU officials on the ground.

Nevertheless, the multinational nature of organisational activities in Kosovo has led to competent coordination between the EU and the OSCE, largely facilitated by high-level cooperation in UNMIK’s Interim Administrative Council, representing the Heads of the various organisation-led Pillars. Additionally, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo receives funding for its institution-building projects from the European Agency for Reconstruction, allowing for working-level contact between offices, and the OSCE Mission regularly exchanges information with the EUMM (OSCE 2001).
International intervention in Kosovo has, nevertheless, been particularly controversial in light of the NATO bombing of Serb targets from March – June 1999. In particular, the impartiality of the OSCE KVM has been questioned. The Mission was dominated by American personnel, widely believed (by OSCE officials and the Serb community alike) to be gathering intelligence information on behalf of NATO (Johnstone 2000: 162). Moreover, critics accuse the Mission of being manipulated by Kosovo Liberation Army members desperate to accelerate a NATO intervention on their behalf (Johnstone 2000: 163). The OSCE has lost credibility as a result, and the legacy of this incident has implications for the success of OSCE activities in Serbia-Montenegro, as well as in other parts of SE Europe. Close working relationships between organisations may therefore be used to cover up the pursuit of the interests of participating states, undermining stated organisational objectives and commitments.

Close cooperation has developed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia between the OSCE and the EU, particularly in the implementation of the 2001 internationally-brokered Ohrid Peace Agreement between the Macedonian government and leaders of the Macedonian-Albanian community. The OSCE had, however, been active in Macedonia since 1992, with the Spillover Mission to Skopje, mandated to monitor border developments for preventive and early warning purposes. The Mission then turned its attentions to improving inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia. The EU’s relationship with Macedonia has shifted from being based primarily on financial assistance and diplomacy to include an operational element. In March 2003, the EU took over NATO’s preventive peacekeeping role in Macedonia, the first proper, though small-scale (350 personnel) test of its military crisis management capabilities (operation CONCORDIA – see chapter 8). After the mission ended in December 2003, the EU’s operational presence in Macedonia was replaced by an EU Police Mission (PROXIMA) of 200 personnel to assist in reforming the Macedonian police service. The Union’s strategy towards Macedonia focuses immediately on the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, coordinated by the EU and initially aided in implementation by the presence of the military force. This primary objective is encompassed in the wider context of the 2001 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Macedonia and the regional cooperative framework of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.
The EU and OSCE are working towards the same goals with their presence in Macedonia, and the organisations are linked by the OSCE's management of the Stability Pact commitments and in the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, coordinated by the EU, with confidence-building measures carried out by the OSCE. These measures include election assistance, police issues, and media and inter-ethnic relations. The Ohrid Framework Agreement requires regular coordination meetings between organisations involved (EU, UN, NATO and OSCE), and these are hosted by the OSCE Mission. The Mission additionally liaises daily with European Commission officials to exchange information (OSCE 2001), and, funded by the EU's CARDS assistance programme, the EC works jointly with the OSCE in the reform of the Macedonian police service (European Commission 2002c). At headquarters level, the OSCE's Strategic Police Matters Unit is in regular contact with the EU Council Secretariat Police Unit. The OSCE Head of Mission also works with the EU Special Representative. A close working relationship has developed between the EUMM team in Macedonian and OSCE monitors attached to the Mission. The EUMM receives OSCE Mission reports, and joint border patrols have taken place. Additionally, the EUMM has a permanent seat in the joint monitoring operations centre established by the OSCE Mission (OSCE 2001).

Despite extensive organisational activity, Macedonia is far from stable. According to an International Crisis Group (ICG) report, the new multi-ethnic police force struggles to gain legitimacy and maintain law and order. Corruption and organised crime undermine economic progress, and unemployment and ethnic tensions are high (ICG 2003a). The ICG accuse the international community of complacency in Macedonia, and a lax approach to the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, which could result in a recurrence of violence. A more proactive mandate for the EU Police Mission i.e. actually assisting rather than observing incidents, is suggested, as well as a more concrete role for EUMM (ICG 2003a: 24). Time will tell if organisational activities and cooperation succeed in creating a self-sustaining stability in Macedonia.

Coordination in these cases is facilitated by the extent and nature of international involvement in Kosovo and Macedonia. Not only do the EU and the OSCE focus most of their civilian crisis management activities in the Western Balkans, but in both
cases the international community has been instrumental in brokering peace agreements/cease-fires, and administering their implementation. This has entailed meetings and dialogue between representatives of international organisations from the beginning. The international spotlight on these countries has encouraged and necessitated coordination. The same cannot be said in regions where organisational intervention is more problematic and low-key, such as Central Asia and the Caucasus. If lessons in cooperation have been learned, EU and OSCE experience in coordinating in the Balkans should provide a firm basis for the development of coordination of activities in other areas. Clearly, there is scope for greater coordination of activities in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The OSCE is stepping up its role in police reform and capacity building in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The impact of international pressure for reform would benefit from a more proactive EU effort to work alongside the OSCE in these countries.

In light of the situations in Kosovo and Macedonia, it must again be repeated that coordination of organisational activities is no panacea: clearly it cannot be the only answer for successful conflict prevention. However, it is difficult to come to firm conclusions about the extent of coordination in the field. Inevitably, a study relying on documentation and secondary material will only paint part of a complex picture awash with hidden diplomacy and institutional secrecy. The very nature of OSCE activity requires the organisation to underplay its contribution in order to encourage local ownership of the dispute or conflict. Critics do indeed, however, doubt the commitment of international actors to tackle root causes of conflict in the Balkans. A lack of commitment cannot result in optimal coordination. Admittedly, there is no easy solution to the societal and political problems still reverberating through the region in the aftermath of the break up of Yugoslavia. However, it can tentatively be concluded that greater coordinated effort to address these underlying problems is the only option if international actors are going to be able step back from the Western Balkans in the coming decades.

102 'Conflict prevention in action: OSCE’s role in police reform’
7.7 Internal EU Coordination: Implications for EU Coordination with the OSCE

This section follows the structure of the previous chapter, examining how internal EU coordination problems impact on external coordination with the OSCE. While the UN study focused largely on coordination for conflict prevention at headquarters level, and between corresponding institutions, the nature of the OSCE's work means that coordination between the organisations is also vitally important in the field i.e. between OSCE Missions and Heads of EU civilian/military crisis management missions, EC Delegations, Special Representatives and also Member State embassies. While coordination of Member State policies is not central to this study, the role of EU Member State embassies in countries of OSCE presence will be considered here, since the actions of Member State officials in countries of EU conflict prevention activity may have a direct impact on how the EU is received and perceived. The three problems in EU coordination identified previously are the pillar structure, inter-institutional coordination, and internal institutional coordination. We therefore consider how much these coordination problems at the EU level are likely to impact on external coordination with the OSCE.

7.7.1 The pillar structure

The pillar structure of the EU frustrates attempts to present a single, coordinated and coherent response to international crises. This has particular implications for external coordination with the OSCE.

In terms of the EU presenting a single and coordinated approach in its dealings with the OSCE, the CFSP arrangements under the pillar system are clearly inadequate. The Council, Commission, and Member States do not present a united foreign policy or diplomatic front. While Member States pledge to follow national foreign policies broadly consistent with those pledged at the European level, coordination and complementarity between Member States and the EU institutions is inadequate. This has implications for the EU's reputation and for coordination with the OSCE, and is particularly visible in the interplay between Member State embassies, EC delegations and OSCE Missions. The EU pledged to step up coordination in the field between these actors. Yet consistent messages are not relayed to host governments, particularly in transitional states. A prime example of this can be seen in the countries of Central Asia. Admittedly, international engagement in these countries has been problematic,
with OSCE mandates being restricted by governments and the EU having less political leverage with the absence of the offer of membership. Nevertheless, the region is still awash with dictatorial, corrupt regimes lacking legitimacy and frequent and serious abuses of human rights. The strategic importance of the region in the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan and in the wider context of the ‘war on terror’ has overridden human rights concerns in Western relationships with the unstable states, while international financial institutions have overlooked widespread political corruption (ICG 2003b). In the assessment of the International Crisis Group, “The EU has failed to make any serious political impact in Central Asia, and its member-states are often too concerned about narrow commercial interests. EU member-states are generally weak in addressing human rights concerns…” (ICG 2003b: 15).

The action of Member States can undermine the EU’s rhetoric on promoting human rights in the region. Uzbekistan, the largest and most populated republic in Central Asia, is a case in point. The EU recognises that “freedom of expression is today severely limited” and that “basic human rights are not applied in Uzbekistan.” In July 2004, EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten confirmed “the focus to promote democracy and human rights in Central Asia is a common goal we share with the OSCE and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.” Yet the British Ambassador in Tashkent was reprimanded by the British government as a result of speaking out against the human rights abuses of the Uzbek government. Breaking a diplomatic conspiracy of silence in the wake of the states’ new strategic partnership with the US, Craig Murray succeeded in drawing attention to Western double standards, but at great personal cost (Paton Walsh 2004). While this is a problem of consistency between the EU and a Member State, i.e. an issue of vertical rather than intra-EU or horizontal consistency (Krenzler and Schneider 1997: 136), it impacts directly on EU coordination in third countries where the EU is in dialogue

105 UK military advisers were also involved in training Uzbek troops in marksmanship in 2004-2005, months before Uzbek forces massacred up to 500 civilians in the town of Andijan (‘UK trained Uzbek troops weeks before massacre’ The Guardian, 30/05/05.)
with the OSCE. If EU Member State embassies are generally reluctant to acknowledge the political situation in host countries, it is difficult to see what can be gained from contact between Member State, EC and OSCE offices. Moreover, discrepancies between EU and Member State rhetoric project a poor image of the Union in a region where concerted and consistent dialogue is needed to promote the acceptance of international human rights norms, as well as stability.

The pillar structure confuses external coordination attempts because of the different decision making procedures and hierarchy of institutions in different pillars. Civilian crisis management coordination with the OSCE is important, but the cross-pillar nature of this policy at the EU level dictates that the OSCE will run into coordination problems at the headquarters and field level. Who is responsible for civilian crisis management in the EU? Responsibilities are dispersed between the Council and the Commission, therefore should OSCE officials contact the PSC or the External Relations Director-General of the Commission? Contacting both may result in more confusion, given the different crisis management competences and priorities of each institution. The dispersal of competence may also cause confusion in the field, if multiple EU actors are present. Likewise, police cooperation takes place in the context of all three EU pillars. Conflict prevention activities do not fit neatly into the pillar structure, and therefore external coordination attempts are likely to be unnecessarily complicated or stymied. As already mentioned, the creation of an EU External Action Service (as outlined in the Constitutional Treaty), if implemented, may help to give the EU and Member States greater coherence in host countries. The proposed reform indicates that lessons have been learned, although the divisions between Commission and Council competences will remain.

7.7.2 Inter-institutional problems

Rivalry between the European Commission and the Council of the EU over the conflict prevention agenda may have a detrimental effect on external coordination with the OSCE. Turf battles at headquarters level will be particularly damaging if transferred to the field context. Tensions between representatives of the Commission and the Council may not result in optimal coordination with the OSCE in countries where both organisations are active. Returning to the example of Macedonia, a report from the field urged the EU to better incorporate the activities of the EUMM to the
wider EU security presence in the country (military operation CONCORDIA) (ICG 2003b). This suggests a lack of linkage between EU civilian and military operations on the ground, and reflects a division between the Commission and the Council in Brussels. The OSCE’s expertise in civilian crisis management could be bolstered by a clearer EU commitment to less high profile, but vitally important, civilian operations and projects. Moreover, EC delegations, the Heads of military and/or civilian missions, and, when appropriate, EU Special Representatives, need to develop productive working relationships in order to facilitate the best possible coordination with the OSCE.

7.7.3 Internal institutional problems
Both the Council and the Commission consist of multiple actors, making dialogue and coordination with outside organisations more difficult. With the Council, OSCE officials meet at headquarters level with the PSC, High Representative, the Presidency, the Troika and Council Working Groups. Are they sending the same message to the OSCE? How is this facilitated internally? Despite all the frequent rhetoric and stated commitments to improve information sharing between the EU and the OSCE for early warning and analysis purposes, the PSC is not prepared to make a permanent arrangement to uphold these promises. No doubt this inconsistency, largely as a result of multiple actors and false promises, makes OSCE officials hesitate to consider the EU a true partner in conflict prevention.

Commission actors relevant to OSCE activities largely consist of officials in the External Relations DG, although in the field the Commission could have EC Delegations and civilian mission members present. The Commission’s ambiguous role in the CFSP could make the institution an uncertain partner for the OSCE. The Commission has a key role in outlining EU strategy and objectives towards individual countries in the drafting of the Country Strategy Papers. These country overviews are cited by the Commission as central in identifying root causes of conflict. Cooperation with other organisations is crucial if structural conflict prevention by the EU is to have a positive effect. Yet the Commission’s Country Strategy Papers tend not to include details on other organisations working in the country in question, or what the EU/EC is doing to coordinate its activities with them. The inclusion of sections on ‘other donors’ only, underlines the economic priority of the EC in its external
relations, even in a country such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, with exceptional international presence. This is an oversight if the Commission wants to emphasise its role in conflict prevention, and is particularly noticeable in comparison with OSCE practices. It is impossible to assess the Country Conflict Assessments (CCAs) in terms of inter-organisational cooperation because of their classified status.

7.8 Conclusion
The EU and the OSCE are strongly linked in terms of history, membership, and increasingly in overlapping objectives and activities. The drive for greater cooperation between the organisations can be understood in the context of broadening security objectives in the post-Cold War pan-European area, and the Union’s development of conflict prevention competences. The OSCE has retained its saliency, but hasn’t acquired the elevated status of NATO and the EU, in part because it lacks the respective military and economic clout of these organisations. All European institutions were affected by a return to Cold War security thinking as the initial optimism of the early post-Cold War period waned (Booth 1998: 39). The social and political problems in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics that the EU and the OSCE addressed were particularly acute. Without a clear consensus on the best way to tackle these problems, cooperation between the organisations was not optimal. However, the OSCE is exceptional in its commitment to cooperate with other organisations, and has institutionalised this through the Platform for Cooperative Security. Unfortunately, OSCE efforts are not always reciprocated, and the Platform tends to fall in with other ‘modalities for cooperation’ that have yet to result in substantially improved organisational policy coordination.

Despite the fact that the EU and the OSCE practice conflict prevention activities in the same countries in and around Europe, EU coordination and dialogue with the OSCE is less visible on the EU agenda than cooperation with the UN. The organisations have been accused of being “interblocking rather than interlocking” in recent years (Keane 2004b: 8). This suggests that the EU places more importance on being a partner of the UN, confirming the impression that the OSCE is regarded as a lesser organisation. This may be short-sighted in light of the growing proximity of the EU’s borders towards the Russian sphere of influence, not to mention the political and societal instabilities in Central Asia and the Caucasus that need to be addressed. The
frozen and/or simmering conflicts in this region are not a priority for UN action, and therefore require better coordination of objectives and activities between the OSCE and the EU. The December 2004 Draft Assessment Report on the EU's role vis-à-vis the OSCE (Council of the EU 2004d), does, however, suggest a new internal momentum for increased cooperation with the OSCE. Progress in EU-OSCE cooperation is particularly important in light of the recent criticisms levelled at the OSCE from the Russian and CIS governments.

Cooperation between the organisations has progressed from an ad hoc basis towards a more structured relationship in recent years, with some coordination of activities. However, the EU priority, visible in the Council conclusions on cooperation with the OSCE, seems to be dialogue at the headquarters level, between senior officials in Brussels and Vienna. This may be the wrong focus in light of the nature of OSCE activity, which is largely field-based. A pragmatic culture of cooperation needs to be fostered between actors on the ground, so that dialogue becomes common practice. High-level diplomacy at respective headquarters is not enough.

An overview of coordination in conflict prevention activities highlighted successes and failures. For structural conflict prevention, the EU supports many OSCE-run projects, and EU officials work with OSCE Missions of Long Duration. The extent of cooperation in countries of dual presence is, however, variable and difficult to assess. Operational conflict prevention coordination is generally satisfactory in areas of considerable international presence, although much of the on-site cooperative initiative seems to come from the OSCE rather than the EU. Bearing in mind that coordination alone cannot guarantee success, an increase in dialogue on the coordination of activities in countries and regions of less international attention is required if organisational pressure is to have any impact. Least progress has been made in coordination for early warning and analysis purposes, belying commitments made for improvements in this area.

Lack of internal EU coordination in conflict prevention impacts on external coordination with the OSCE in two key ways: firstly, the EU, at headquarters and in the field, fails to convey a single, coordinated line on international crises and conflict prevention. This can cause confusion at headquarters level, but more importantly,
damage to activities and reputations in the field, as EC delegations, Member State representatives, and EU representatives, do not convey a consistent message to the OSCE or to host governments. Secondly, the conflict prevention activity arguably most crucial in EU-OSCE coordination, civilian crisis management, has no clear institutional focus. It is a policy subject to institutional turf battles. While partnerships have emerged between the organisations because of unprecedented international activity in SE Europe, more widespread coordination could result from a honing and simplification of EU conflict prevention competences. In the meantime, the EU could improve its commitment to pan-European conflict prevention by taking a more proactive approach to coordination with the OSCE, if, after all, cooperation is an imperative rather than an option.
CHAPTER 8
The EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): A Strategic Partnership in Conflict Prevention?

"NATO and the EU are working together to prevent and resolve crises and armed conflicts in Europe and beyond." NATO website.\textsuperscript{106}

"The question is not one of creating a defence organisation which would substitute for NATO, but of knowing the limits of the Atlantic Alliance, and of its military organisation, of its competence and of its geographic area, to know that Europe must not miss any opportunity to build itself a common policy and its own defence."
President Francois Mitterrand, at the Franco-German summit in Lille, May 1991.\textsuperscript{107}

"NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests. Both institutions working together towards the same strategic ends will enhance security and stability in Europe and beyond. In the new strategic environment of the 21st century, a closer and trusting partnership between NATO and the EU remains as important as ever."
Joint Press Statement by the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency, NATO-EU Ministerial Meeting, 4 December 2003 (NATO 2003).

8.1 Introduction
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), after a brief period of uncertainty, has reinvented itself in the post-Cold War era. The organisation has been restructured and redesigned; its out of area missions are more visible than its original function of territorial defence, and, by May 2004 it had completed two membership enlargements. The need for a clearer EU relationship with NATO came hand in hand with EU commitments to develop a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). EU Member States did not possess the full range of military capabilities and assets to carry out military Petersberg tasks, and, with no increase in military spending and the desire to avoid any duplication of capabilities, the EU had to arrange to use NATO assets, a decision that was bound to be controversial.

\textsuperscript{106} http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/index.html. Accessed 26.08.04
\textsuperscript{107} Quoted in Adrian Hyde Price (1992:45).
Formal dialogue between the two organisations dates from the inception of the ‘Berlin-Plus’ arrangements at the 1999 Cologne European Council. However, the Union’s relationship with NATO had been a central feature of transatlantic relations throughout the 1990s, ever since the possibility of a common defence was raised in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty (TEU). Before 1999, NATO dialogue on the development of what, in the NATO context, was called the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), was with the Western European Union (WEU), linked explicitly to the EU in the TEU where it was named as the defence arm of the EU. Arguably it was a more similar organisation in terms of structure and mandate. WEU functions (apart from the mutual defence clause) have now been incorporated into the Council of the European Union. The complexity of negotiations has hinged on the problem of arrangements for non-EU European NATO members’ participation in EU led operations, and U.S reaction to the development of an EU military capacity. The former problem has led to difficulties with Turkey in particular, a member of NATO, but as yet only an aspiring EU member. The latter difficulty impinges on transatlantic relations, especially since the EU states have consistently different and competing visions of the ESDP. Moreover, it has led to the U.S trying to win the right of first refusal for NATO, and EU assurances of action only when NATO as a whole is not engaged. Negotiations were successfully concluded by the end of 2002, allowing the EU to use NATO assets for its first military operation in March 2003 (Operation CONCORDIA in Macedonia).

NATO is not naturally associated with the concept and practice of conflict prevention. War prevention, as the goal of Cold War nuclear deterrence, is fundamentally different from the definition of conflict prevention adopted in this study. However, the broad definition of conflict prevention used here encompasses a military element. NATO, as an alliance of powerful states with pooled military capacity, has emerged as an organisation contributing to international efforts to manage crises and prevent the recurrence of violence outside its membership area. While it is recognised that military measures can play only a minor role in pre-conflict situations (Chayes and Weitz 1996: 385), NATO has nevertheless declared itself as an organisation contributing to conflict prevention, and the EU’s full range of conflict prevention and crisis management competences relies on use of NATO-owned capabilities. The
organisations therefore have the opportunity to be partners or rivals in conflict prevention. However, the elaboration of NATO’s role in conflict prevention has not been without criticism and controversy.

Academic work on NATO tends to focus less on NATO as an institution, and more as a theatre for transatlantic relations (Sjursen 2004: 688). Yet, in an era characterised by the rhetoric (if not always the practice) of multilateralism, it is an appropriate time to examine NATO in this context, especially, as some commentators contend, it has transformed itself from a defensive alliance to an instrument of collective security (Cotter 1998; Yost 2001). The EU’s relationship with NATO also touches on deeper internal divisions within the Union. There is no common vision on the current or future military role of the EU. Member States military doctrines vary widely – from the strong military traditions of France and the UK, to the more civilian tradition of the Netherlands, and neutrality in Ireland and the Scandinavian states. Convergent views on the extent of the autonomy of EU military competences are another divisive factor, splitting the two military-oriented states, France and the UK. While the agreement at St. Malo in 1998 between the two states allowed for the development of ESDP, periodic divisions are still cropping up as the details are thrashed out. The European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted at the December 2003 Brussels European Council only indicates a loose consensus on EU foreign policy objectives, and does not tackle the difficult issue of when to use force. The introduction of structured cooperation to allow for groups of states within the EU to cooperate further on defence issues addresses the problem pragmatically, but does not provide a long-term solution to the lack of consensus on the extent of militarisation of EU structures. The role of the US as the most militarily powerful state in NATO adds a further complicating external factor, particularly in light of the Bush administration’s controversial foreign and military policies. Will the EU be able to practice a foreign policy fundamentally different from that of the US and have unconditional access to NATO assets? Despite progress made in inter-institutional arrangements, there is no clear division of labour between the EU and NATO, and no clear indication of the conditions for EU use of NATO assets. These problems could have serious implications for the ability of the EU to carry out military crisis management for acute conflict prevention. Moreover, continued smooth cooperation between the
organisations is essential for stable reconstruction in the Balkans, as the EU takes over NATO’s military role in Macedonian and Bosnia.

This chapter looks closely at NATO as an organisation and charts its relationship with the European Union, focusing on cooperation for conflict prevention. Section 8.2 sets the context by outlining NATO’s institutional structure and examining the organisation’s role in post-Cold War European security. Furthermore, NATO’s role in conflict prevention is discussed. Section 8.3 explains the development of NATO-EU relations in the post-Cold War period, from the early 1990s Western European Union (WEU) negotiations to the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Following the structure of previous chapters, NATO-EU coordination in structural policy, early warning and crisis management is examined in sections 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6. Finally, Section 8.7 examines the impact of EU internal coordination on external coordination with the Atlantic Alliance.

8.2 Setting the Context: NATO after the Cold War

As a traditional defence alliance basing its strategy on ‘forward defence and flexible response’, NATO’s survival in the post-Cold War era was not a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, the Alliance retained its saliency in light of instability in the former Soviet Union, and the new Central and Eastern European states’ need for security assurances. The early hope that military force would be less relevant after the Cold War was quashed with the effective display of military power in the first Gulf War in 1991. The utility of military power was further reinforced when NATO air strikes were perceived to have ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, and then NATO military presence enforced an uneasy peace. In the aftermath of Bosnia, and then the NATO air strikes in response to Serb atrocities in Kosovo in 1999, commentators argued that the limited use of military force was often necessary to back up international diplomacy (Bildt 2000: 148). The use of military power to counter security threats remained highly relevant in the post-Cold War period, even if the relationship between force and diplomacy remained controversial. These developments were to have a key influence on the defence debate within the European Union, underlining the need for the creation of an EU military crisis management capacity. Meanwhile, forty years of transatlantic defence collaboration provided a framework for transatlantic dialogue and cooperation that was regarded as valuable by member
nations (Hyde-Price 1992: 42). NATO’s survival and transformation, for some commentators, was evidence that alliances can be more than just the sum of national power; they can be security institutions, facilitating cooperation, and therefore worth adapting to new international circumstances (Wallander 2000: 705).

In 1949, when the twelve founding members signed the North Atlantic Treaty, the organisation’s structure consisted of only the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the main decision-making body composed of permanent representatives from the member countries. Further institutionalisation took place in the 1950s, with the establishment of an integrated military command structure and prolonged US military presence in Europe (Yost 2001: 592). NATO’s structure is now relatively extensive, with political headquarters in Brussels hosting member nation permanent representatives, high level policy committees (Defence Planning and Nuclear Planning) with supporting committees, a Military Committee supported by an international military staff and the Office of the Secretary General, supported by an international civilian staff (see Figure 8.1). NATO Headquarters host approximately 3150 staff, with about 1300 civilian personnel working in the various divisions of the international staff (NATO 2001: 219). The structure of NATO’s International Staff was reformed over 2003-2004 to create six divisions, each led, as before, by an Assistant Secretary General. The reforms, driven by the Secretary General, were designed to streamline the staff in preparation for enlargement, decentralise decision-making and improve the capacity of NATO structures to deal with contemporary security challenges (Monaco 2003b).

The office of NATO Secretary General is important both within and outside the organisation. The Secretary General (George Robertson from 1999 to January 2004; now Jaap de Hoop Scheffer from the Netherlands108) chairs the NAC and acts as the main spokesperson for NATO. NATO’s decision-making procedures were to remain intergovernmental, but all member nations agreed on the need for NATO to redefine its purpose and reform its institutional structures.

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8.2.1 The reform of NATO strategy and structure

NATO's reform required a new strategy to rationalise its continuation beyond the end of the Cold War (with the military adjustments to support it), and a new relationship with non-members, including the possibility of enlargement of the Alliance.

During the Cold War, détente between the East and West first encouraged the Alliance to extend its concerns beyond the military sphere. The *Harmel Report* of 1967 underlined NATO's role in the promotion of détente and stated that "the ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees" (NATO 1967). The end of the Cold War required fundamental changes in NATO strategy and structure. The London declaration of July 1990 articulated the organisation's intentions to extend its concept of security beyond the military sphere. NATO strategy was to be based on "smaller, more mobile multinational forces, with reduced emphasis on nuclear weapons" (Dorman and Treacher 1995: 47). The Rome Declaration of November 1991 further elaborated on NATO's strategic concept in the new security environment. NATO would extend its tasks to include out-of-area missions, on the authority of the UN Security Council, or the OSCE. The promotion of a network of 'interlocking institutions' emerged as a NATO-favoured alternative to a new security system managed by the CSCE (Dorman and Treacher 1995: 47). New relationships were launched with former adversaries in the east, and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created to facilitate 'partnerships' between NATO and non-NATO members in the Euro-Atlantic area, leading to dialogue and consultation on military policy. The NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), extending NATO dialogue beyond Partnership for Peace countries.
The main institutional reforms centred on the NACC and efforts to institutionalise NATO's relationship with the Russian Federation. Partnership for Peace ( PfP) Agreements, inaugurated in 1994, allowed for cooperation in military reform and non-NATO member contributions to NATO-led operations. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed in 1997, allowing for tentative, if limited, dialogue in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Military reform centred on the need to develop multinational forces for rapid and well planned military crisis management interventions. This encouraged the reform of
military forces at national levels, involving the professionalisation of armed forces. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept was launched in 1994 as a flexible military force for crisis management missions. Allowing for European-only missions under the WEU framework, it anchored European security and defence ambitions within the framework of the Alliance. The idea of ‘separate, but not separable’ military capacities became a recurring theme in European negotiations for access to NATO assets, as EU states strove to avoid accusations firstly of unnecessary duplication, and secondly, of challenging NATO primacy (i.e. US leadership).

Lack of EU consensus (until the late 1990s) on the development of an EU military capacity, and US leadership in the 1991 Gulf War, meant that NATO retained its position as primary defence and security organisation. As Forster and Niblett contend, “this attachment to the institutional status quo was strengthened by the divergent national views of the key protagonists as to the benefits and losses associated with change” (2001: 35).

NATO took on its first operational out-of-area role in the former Yugoslavia, where it monitored naval operations in the Adriatic to support the UN arms embargo against Yugoslavia in 1992, and subsequently began enforcement operations in conjunction with the WEU. NATO gave air support to the UN mission in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and carried out air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets in 1995. The organisation, unlike the EU, then played a key role in providing security for the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (NATO Stabilisation Force, or SFOR) which created a new, but ethnically divided Bosnian state, propped up by the authority of the internationally appointed High Representative. NATO has only recently extended its crisis management role beyond SE Europe in its role in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Interestingly, although the Article 5 collective defence protocol was invoked for the first time when terrorists attacked the United States on September 11th 2001, NATO was not chosen by the US as the forum in which to respond to the attack.

8.2.2 NATO and conflict prevention: A difficult linkage?
The North Atlantic Council declared in 1993 that it would ‘contribute actively’ to the new tasks of conflict prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping (Chayes and
The 1999 New Strategic Concept further underlined NATO’s intention to “contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management” (NATO 1999: 3/Part 1). NATO has not elaborated at any length a comprehensive concept of conflict prevention. However, NATO, like other organisations, adopted the popular rhetoric linking crisis management to conflict prevention, without clarifying the meaning of either terms.

NATO’s adoption of this language of conflict prevention has been controversial. Some interpretations of conflict prevention would not include a military component. Conflict prevention, as interpreted in this study, does include military operations designed to prevent the escalation or recurrence of violence. Nevertheless, NATO operations can arguably only be characterised as contributing to comprehensive conflict prevention in conjunction with other organisations addressing the wider causes of a particular conflict. Military operations, for example, can help to provide a more secure environment for local communities and for civilian personnel working for other organisations such as the OSCE and the UN, or NGOs. Military personnel can keep apart warring parties, stop the overspill of violence into neighbouring territories, and generally discourage the recurrence of violence by their presence. Yet a robust military component remains controversial in peace operations, challenging traditional peacekeeping notions of impartiality, consent and non-violence. The balance between providing security for conflict prevention and humanitarian activities and partial intervention in civil war situations is a delicate one; NATO, it has been argued, can provide peacekeeping or peace enforcement, but not both simultaneously (Chayes and Weitz 1996: 395). The nature of military intervention means that NATO’s individual contribution to conflict prevention is relatively marginal, although some commentators would argue that the organisation’s normative role in the promotion of democracy and civilian control of the military are important longer-term effects of enlargement and partnerships (see below).

NATO’s potential role in conflict prevention is stymied by problems of legal and political legitimacy (Chayes and Weitz 1996: 395). As an organisation, NATO lacks the global legitimacy of the UN and the consensual basis and the expertise in human rights of the OSCE. By the mid-1990s, it had failed to develop an appropriate doctrine for peace operations, or sufficient training, to support the rhetorical shift from
collective defence to out-of-area crisis management (Chayes and Weitz 1996: 390). The difficulties of working in conjunction with the UN during the war in Bosnia has led to a fall in NATO commitment to support UN missions, or even to seek a UN mandate for NATO military action. Indeed NATO military intervention is increasingly interpreted as US power and will thinly disguised, particularly in the aftermath of the NATO bombing of Serbia during the 1999 Kosovo crisis (Ali 2000). Critics rightly doubted the effectiveness of aerial bombing in protecting civilians on the ground. Bosnia, following the 1995 US-negotiated Dayton Peace Agreement, has been seen as a NATO (now EU?) protectorate, a country without the means to establish democracy because of the overbearing power of NATO and other international organisations, and the autocratic role of the High Representative (Chandler 2000).

Operational trends point to deeper conceptual controversies. The Cold War approach to security that NATO represented was far removed from alternative interpretations rooted in Peace Research, where the concept of conflict prevention can arguably claim its origin. Even in the post-Cold War era, it could be argued that NATO and its most powerful members still represent a mindset where military solutions to security remain paramount, with the threat simply shifting in focus from the USSR to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The dangerous trend of pre-emptive military strikes against terrorist targets, while not a NATO concept, is favoured by the current US administration, its most powerful member. This is a direct throwback to Cold War security thinking, and undermines competing approaches aimed at tackling root causes of terrorism. There is a real risk that longer-term conflict prevention will become detached from short-term military objectives.

NATO's role in cooperation for conflict prevention also presents difficulties. NATO rhetoric, while ostensibly in support of 'interlocking institutions' does not highlight inter-organisational cooperation. Indeed, NATO is a distinctly different type of organisation from the other institutions featured in this study. While NATO has taken on a more political role in the post-Cold War era, its representatives (namely the Secretary-General) are not in the habit of making political declarations to the same extent as the EU, UN and OSCE. Indeed, it is more difficult to identify cooperation between NATO and other organisations as has been documented in earlier chapters.
NATO does not declare itself to be a regional organisation as defined by the UN Charter, and does not participate in Biennial UN-Regional Organisations meetings. NATO documentation acknowledges the primary responsibility of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security, and cites the juridicial link between the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty (i.e. the right of UN member states to form alliances for collective defence) (NATO 2001). The relationship between the organisations has been limited to operational cooperation in former Yugoslavia. Similarly, NATO cooperation with the OSCE is not visible as an Alliance objective.

It is only relatively recently that NATO has adopted the language of inter-organisational cooperation. During a keynote address at a conference entitled 'The UN, the EU, NATO and other regional actors: Partners in Peace?' in Paris in October 2002, NATO Secretary General George Robertson urged organisations to be proactive in developing effective cooperation.109 Significantly, he cited the threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as pressing reasons to enhance cooperation. This renewed NATO interest in organisational partnerships appears to have been driven by the threat of global terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 more than anything else. Cooperation in earlier NATO documentation is primarily conceptualised in terms of cooperation with sovereign states rather than with other organisations (for example, the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Partnership for Peace Agreements). Given the centrality of military means to notions of sovereignty, perhaps the NATO emphasis on states is unsurprising. However, this does make NATO a peculiar player in post-Cold War organisational conflict prevention.

8.3 Understanding EU-NATO Relations in the Post-Cold War Period
NATO and the EU are strikingly different organisations. While they both originated in the early days of the Cold War, NATO and the EC were far apart in terms of ethos and practice (although analysts of the realist school of International Relations (e.g. Waltz 1979) argue that the military security provided by NATO allowed the EC to exist). Even with the growing number of shared objectives and members in the post-Cold War era, the organisations are not natural partners. In contrast to the hybrid

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intergovernmental-supranational nature of the EU, NATO is more strictly intergovernmental; its few institutions are composed of member nation representatives only, and its international staff are few compared to the other organisations. While the UN in particular, and arguably the OSCE and the EU have an institutional drive that can at least be partially separated from the whims of the members, NATO’s institutional character is often portrayed as identical to that of its most militarily powerful members. Indeed, NATO external objectives, for example in the Caucasus, are difficult to distinguish from national policies (Bhatty and Bronson 2000). Also, NATO’s remit and competences are narrow compared to the other organisations. It does not have a wide role in conflict prevention, and yet the EU’s relationship with NATO has become crucial in the elucidation of the full range of Petersberg tasks. Arguably, NATO negotiations with the WEU were facilitated by the similarity in structure and objectives between the two defence organisations. NATO negotiations with a largely civilian organisation such as the EU have not been without problems, despite the fact that after the twin EU-NATO May 2004 enlargement, EU Member States make up 19 of the 26 NATO member nations.

Nevertheless, the ‘Europeanisation’ of NATO (Cottee 1998: 56), illustrated by the CJTF concept and the promise of enlargement of the NATO area across the European continent, tied the objectives and the fortunes of the EU and NATO together. From the joint objective of stabilisation in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, NATO-EU cooperation moved up a gear when EU ambitions to undertake military operations became clear.

NATO dialogue with the EU proper began after the Union decision taken at the 1999 Cologne European Council to adopt the crisis management role of the Western European Union (WEU). This decision represented the culmination of the 1990s debate among EU Member States about if and how to develop an EU crisis management capability, and was facilitated by the arrival of the UK New Labour Party onto the political scene. The British receptivity to an EU capacity, crystallised by the Franco-British agreement at St. Malo in 1998, resulted in real progress for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
The Berlin-Plus discussions originate in the 1996 NATO Ministerial Council meeting in Berlin, which allowed for WEU use of NATO assets. The Washington Summit of 1999 extended this to EU ESDP operations, allowing for “assured EU access to NATO operational planning; use of NATO capabilities and assets; NATO European command options for EU operations; and adaptation of NATO defence planning system to incorporate availability of forces for EU operations” (Quille 2003: 7). One of the main stumbling blocks of the EU’s 1999 Helsinki Presidency arrangements for EU consultation with NATO was the involvement of non-EU NATO members (at that time, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Czech Republic and Canada and the US) in future ESDP missions. The arrangements were finalised in 2002 after the Greek, and then the Turkish governments, finally dropped their objections to EU use of NATO assets. In the meantime, a deeper partnership between the organisations had been developing in joint NATO-EU ad hoc working groups, where security policies and modalities for cooperation were discussed. Additionally, the organisations agreed on regular joint Ambassadorial/Ministerial level and NAC-PSC meetings (NATO 2001).

The December 2002 EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, as part of the final Berlin-Plus agreement, declared the establishment of a ‘strategic partnership’ between the organisations (NATO 2002). This relationship, it was declared, is founded on a mutually reinforcing partnership; effective mutual consultation; equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of both organisations; respect for Member States’ interests; respect for the principles of the UN Charter; and the “coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations” (NATO 2002: para. 2). The real extent of equality between the organisations is questionable: it is the EU that relies on NATO assets for crisis management, not the other way around. Furthermore, while U.S. governmental rhetoric frequently (and confusingly) calls for the ‘strengthening of the European pillar’, the Bush administration did not hesitate to exploit EU Member State disagreements in the run up to the war in Iraq in 2003. A recent Assembly of the WEU report claimed that the removal of the WEU as the link between the EU and NATO has led to a competitive relationship between the organisations, noting that “with few exceptions, the European Union authorities avoid using the word “cooperation” to describe relations with NATO and/or the United
States” (WEU 2004: 15). Nevertheless, it is in the interest of the US administration to maintain good relations with European allies, and therefore the relationship is framed in partnership terms by both the EU and NATO.

The EU-NATO Security Agreement on information sharing, of March 2003, brought the Berlin-Plus negotiations to an end. The arrangements were tested by a joint EU-NATO crisis management training exercise in November 2003.

In July 2003, the EU and NATO agreed on a Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans (Council of the EU 2003h). The agreement followed the successful EU takeover from NATO (using NATO assets) of military crisis management in Macedonia. Recognising that the endgame for the Western Balkan countries is integration into Euro-Atlantic organisational structures, the agreement cites the EU-NATO partnership as the key factor in ending conflict in the region (interestingly, no mention of the UN and the OSCE), and identifies conflict prevention and crisis management as one of six core areas for cooperation. Cooperation will be ensured by regular meetings between the organisations and their institutions, and security information will be exchanged. This document proclaimed a partnership between the organisations in the Balkans that presumably could be developed for similar objectives in other countries or regions. A closer look at modalities for cooperation in structural policy, early warning and analysis and military crisis management examines the centrality of conflict prevention in this inter-organisational partnership.

8.4 Coordinating Structural Conflict Prevention Policy

8.4.1 NATO and structural conflict prevention

NATO’s role in conflict prevention is most contested in the field of structural policy. NATO does not distribute aid or assign personnel to address root causes of conflict. Nevertheless, commentators argue that NATO’s enlargement and partnership agenda has an important long-term influence on civilian control of the military in candidate and partner countries, which could contribute to the prevention of intra and inter-state conflict (Edmunds 2003: 145). More broadly, NATO has long been cited as a vehicle for the promotion of democracy both within and outside its membership (Larrabee

110 The other areas are defence and security sector reform, strengthening the rule of law, the threat of terrorism, border security and management and arms control and the removal of small arms.
2003). Karl Deutsch argued that the development of NATO “may be one of the most effective ways to advance the development of political community in the North Atlantic area, and to contribute to the eventual abolition of war” (Deutsch 1957: 203). More recently, NATO has been conceptualised as a ‘security community’ of states sharing the same values (Adler 1998: 143).

NATO’s enlargement agenda can be interpreted as the Alliance’s contribution to structural conflict prevention. Membership action plans for aspiring members embed the norms of liberalism and capitalism (Webber et al. 2004: 13), although NATO does not impose strict conditions on membership, like the EU. Yet it is difficult to substantiate the claims that NATO embodies a commitment to democracy, or that NATO enlargement spreads democracy. It was not originally an alliance of democratic states; Portugal was a dictatorship, and Turkey’s poor democratic credentials have delayed its EU membership bid (Sjursen 2004: 695). Reiter (2001) argues that NATO did not contribute to democratisation with its Cold War enlargements, and neither was it NATO that instigated democratic reforms in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, who became NATO members in 1999.

Neither does NATO practice democratic decision-making or possess civilian competences (Sjursen 2004: 695), although its post-Cold War role in former Soviet states such as Ukraine could be characterised as diplomacy. Indeed, NATO could be said to practice preventive diplomacy, particularly in the Balkans. NATO documents increasingly emphasise the organisation’s political aims, although clearly the extent of NATO activity in structural conflict prevention is debatable. Nonetheless, the new NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, emphasised NATO’s role in ‘projecting stability’ at a recent international conference (a term also adopted by External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten and in the Commission’s 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention). De Hoop Scheffer highlighted the importance of strengthened relationships with states in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Mediterranean, defining stability projection as “

111 Ukraine has contributed personnel to NATO operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. Dialogue takes place in the NATO-Ukraine Commission, where the NATO SG frequently urges Ukrainian leaders to implement political and economic, as well as defence, reforms (Monaco 2004b: 5).
building partnerships to maximise our collective ability to defend the peace.” While essentially a political goal, the idea of ‘defending’ the peace unwittingly indicates that NATO’s agenda remains military in essence.

8.4.2 EU-NATO coordination in structural conflict prevention
Given the lack of a clear NATO role in structural conflict prevention, charting EU-NATO coordination in this field is problematic. The language of long-term stability and democracy promotion can, however, be identified in the documents of both organisations, indicating at least a rhetorical consensus on these issues. Documents such as the above-mentioned EU and NATO Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans indicate that the organisations are working together to promote long-term conflict prevention, even though most joint initiatives are operational. The organisations’ joint enlargement in May 2004 also indicates an agreement to coordinate to enhance stability in Europe by bringing many of the same ex-Soviet countries into European and transatlantic institutions. The ‘return to Europe’ phraseology of the early 1990s may have lost its intensity for the candidate states after years of difficult adjustments, but if enlargement is a tool for conflict prevention, then the EU and NATO took joint and reinforcing action in May 2004.

8.5 Coordinating Early Warning and Analysis
8.5.1 NATO early warning
NATO’s military credentials result in an unsurprisingly military early warning focus. NATO early warning is provided by the NATO Situation Center (SITCEN). The Center is located in the Crisis Management and Operations Directorate within the International Staff (Division of Defence Planning and Operations). The Directorate provides advice and technical expertise on crisis management, peacekeeping and Council operations. SITCEN has three roles: to assist the NAC, Defence Planning Committee and Military Committee in fulfilling functions in the field of consultation; to serve as the focal point for the receipt, exchange and dissemination of political, military and economic intelligence and information; and to act as a link with similar facilities of member nations and of NATO Strategic Commands (NATO 2001: 227). It is not clear from NATO documentation how many personnel staff SITCEN or the

Directorate as a whole. While intelligence comes directly from member nations, the extent of analysis undertaken by SITCEN and associated staff is not detailed by NATO. The lack of transparency and secondary material on the effectiveness of NATO early warning means that assessment of NATO competence is hardly possible.

NATO also has specific technology for surveillance purposes. NATO member nations collectively own a fleet of modified, radar-equipped Boeing 707s known as Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) (formerly known as NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force – NAEWF). AWACS undertake a variety of missions, including air surveillance, air support and reconnaissance.114 This fleet was used in 2004 to patrol the skies over the Olympic Games in Greece and the European Football Championships to protect against terrorist threats.

8.5.2 EU-NATO coordination in early warning

NATO SITCEN has links to the EU SITCEN, although NATO would only agree to information exchange with the EU after tight security arrangements were in place (Andréani, Bertram and Grant 2001: 36). This was reached in March 2003 in the EU-NATO Security Agreement (Council of the EU 2003i). The Agreement represents the final document under the Berlin-Plus arrangements, and entails the release of security information by the High Representative for CFSP to NATO on ESDP matters. How much information NATO shares with the EU is unclear, as is whether this arrangement brings any added value to the early warning capacity of either organisation.

In the EU and NATO Concerted Approach to the Western Balkans document, the organisations agreed on specific early warning consultation mechanisms, focusing on dialogue between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and also between NATO’s Military Committee and the EU Military Committee. Overlapping national memberships of the Committees undoubtedly helps to maintain consistency. Coordination between organisations is particularly aided by the ‘double-hatting’ of military representatives; EU Alliance members send the same

Cooperation in *early warning and analysis* has been boosted by the threat of global terrorism. NATO’s objectives have become increasingly focused on supporting the US-led ‘War on Terror’, and this included enhanced intelligence sharing. In April 2004, the 26 members agreed on a *Declaration on Terrorism* declaring the establishment of a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, to be operational by the June 2004 Istanbul Summit. Additionally, NATO pledged to step up information sharing with the EU on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Monaco 2004). It remains to be seen if this focus will be beneficial to wider conflict prevention. Information sharing appears to be narrowly focused on military and terrorist activities, and it is difficult to see how this could enhance anything but a restricted range of security concerns.

8.6 Coordinating Operational Conflict Prevention

8.6.1 NATO crisis management

It would be misleading to characterise NATO operations as limited to military peacekeeping or enforcement. While NATO does not generally practice civilian crisis management as defined by this study, it has increasingly found itself operating in areas requiring large-scale humanitarian relief. Additionally, NATO has developed special military police and carabinieri units for lower-key operations. NATO has developed a civil/military concept (CIMIC) to improve coordination between military missions and relief operations. This type of arrangement has been particularly important in SE Europe, to facilitate some synergy between military and humanitarian operations and objectives. Yet this has not led to the ‘civilianisation’ of NATO: CIMIC is not a partnership arrangement between the military and civilian organisations. In fact, humanitarian organisations are invited to integrate into a military mission, and “the politico-military goals have priority at all times” (Pugh 2000: 238). The adaptation, when there has been one, has been on the side of
humanitarian organisations, who have had to balance the need for impartiality with the safety of their staff and the secure delivery of aid. NATO has only cooperated with civilian organisations extensively in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo. The CIMIC concept was developed in this context as NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) troops found themselves contributing to larger-scale efforts to reconstruct the country in the aftermath of war. CIMIC experience was then beneficial during and after the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 (Pugh 2000). Operation ‘Allied Harbour’ in Albania (April-September 1999) was NATO’s first humanitarian mission: NATO troops and military police erected refugee camps, distributed aid and then helped with the return of refugees to Kosovo.115

A better example of NATO’s move beyond the military sphere is the organisation’s frequent forays into preventive diplomacy. NATO is beginning to take on a diplomatic role in its own right. A NATO Special Representative was appointed to Macedonia (Mace 2004: 477), and NATO SG Robertson and EU HR/SG Solana went on a joint diplomatic offensive in Macedonia in 2001 when violence flared up between Albanians and Macedonians. This is a good example of EU-NATO policy reinforcement to prevent conflict.

Despite these developments, NATO does still concentrate on its military expertise in its out-of-area operations. This has been expanded beyond the Balkan theatre with NATO ‘going global’ in Afghanistan. Reflecting the linkage between NATO objectives and the US-led ‘War on Terror’, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of around 6 500 troops, sent to Kabul in the aftermath of the US bombing in 2001, came under NATO auspices in 2003. NATO members agreed to extend the mission beyond the Afghan capital at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, creating ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), in part to increase security for the first post-Taliban elections in September 2004 (Monaco 2004b). However, NATO members were accused of dragging their feet over Afghanistan, by not providing the military resources fast enough, and underestimating the situation on the ground (Monaco 2004b). While NATO was not the organisation through which the US government (and allies) pursued its assault on Iraq in March 2003, NATO members

agreed in 2004 to provide assistance and training to security forces in Iraq. The allies were, however, divided on the details, with France and Germany insisting that training be carried out on home soil rather than in Iraq itself (Monaco 2004b). Evidently the acrimonious disagreements of 2003 would continue to impact on NATO’s potential role in Iraq. These problems could impact on the smooth transfer of NATO Balkan missions to the authority of the EU. On a more low-key level, NATO has been running a maritime interdiction mission in the Mediterranean since 2001 to deter and detect terrorist activities (Kobieracki 2004).

Moving on to NATO’s capabilities for military crisis management, plans for a NATO Response Force (NRF) have been underway since September 2002, on a US initiative. The force of 21 000 troops, deployable within 7-30 days, is designed for high intensity missions and includes weapons and defences against biological, nuclear and chemical weapons (Monaco 2003c). The NRF was declared initially operational by NATO SG Jaap De Hoop Scheffer on 13 October 2004, and will be fully operational by 2006. Combining elite land, air and sea units, missions may include "collective defence, managing the consequences of natural or man-made disasters, serving as an ‘initial entry’ force for a larger follow-on force, or to demonstrate the Alliance’s determination and ability to act effectively in the early stages of a crisis."117

While the NRF is designed to improve NATO’s response to crises, critics cite slow national decision-making as an impediment to fast deployment (Monaco 2003c). In terms of military decision-making, NATO has been streamlining its command structure in recent years for greater efficiency. The reforms entail creating two strategic level commands (Allied Command Operations in Belgium and Allied Command Transformation in the US, the latter supervising the development of NATO forces and capabilities); two operational standing Joint Force Commands (reduced from five); and six Joint Force Component Commands (reduced from 13) (Monaco 2003c).

117 ibid.
NATO has undergone considerable reform in the post-Cold War era to emerge as a powerful military crisis management outfit. Nevertheless, the organisation’s relative lack of expertise in civilian measures means that cooperation with civilian organisations is vital. The EU is a key partner for NATO in making this link.

8.6.2 EU-NATO coordination in operational conflict prevention
Crisis management is the raison d’être of EU-NATO cooperation, and inevitably where the focus of this chapter lies. As already mentioned, cooperation is facilitated by regular contact between the NAC and the PSC, and between the NATO SG and the EU High Representative for CFSP. Additionally, cooperation on the ground takes place, for example, in Macedonia and Bosnia, where NATO maintains a residual presence and the EU is active.

While the EU can provide civilian crisis management to complement NATO military operations, as explained, the EU currently relies on NATO-owned assets to undertake some military crisis management missions. The Berlin-Plus arrangements, as Operation CONCORDIA in Macedonia demonstrated, entail close working relationships between EU and NATO personnel. NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (DSACEUR), a post always held by a European, was the Operational Commander of the EU mission, and EU personnel liaised at the Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) with NATO staff in the EU cell. Operational planning arrangements have emerged as one of the key issues in EU-NATO cooperation, and have highlighted differences between EU Member State ambitions. Frustrated at relying on NATO capabilities, and in the context of Constitutional Treaty discussions and EU Member State divisions over Iraq, the governments of Belgium, Germany, France and Luxembourg proposed the establishment of autonomous EU planning headquarters in April 2003. The initiative of the so-called ‘Gang of Four’ provoked a negative response from the US Administration and other EU Member States, particularly the UK, at a time of fraught transatlantic relations due to the impending war on Iraq (Monaco 2003c). Critics argued that the headquarters would duplicate SHAPE, and the existing national capacities of the UK and France. A compromise (brokered by the UK, Germany and France) was agreed by the December 2003 European Council: an EU cell would be created in SHAPE, and there would be an option of a temporary Operations Centre for autonomous missions when national HQ
were not identified. The further militarisation of EU structures, resisted by the traditionally neutral EU countries, was avoided, but inevitably this will lead to deeper contacts with NATO.

Naturally enough, given the experience of Member State defence cooperation in the NATO context, NATO’s military structure became the model for the EU’s military structure. The EU’s military staff (comprising around 135 military officers and support staff) was modelled on NATO’s international military staff (Andréani, Bertram and Grant 2001: 41). Double-hatting of NATO officials for EU-led operations means that NATO military doctrine and practices will greatly influence the development of the EU as a military actor. This has generated some controversy. Giovanna Bono (2004) suggests that NATO has too much influence in EU operational planning and military thinking. Others have asked, “how far should [the EU] defer to expertise coming from an organisation whose aims may not always coincide with its own?” (Andréani, Bertram and Grant 2001: 69). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the organisations have different crisis management visions. Mawdsley and Quille argue, “although the EU and NATO are not different in their global ambitions, their organisational outlook makes them emphasise distinctly different military needs and visions of combat intensity” (Mawdsley and Quille 2004: 15). The EU emphasises multilateralism and has a more holistic approach to security, while NATO does not always seek partnerships and practices operations of high intensity. It is difficult to imagine EU Member States agreeing to undertake an EU military operation without a UN mandate, as NATO member nations did in 1999 in regard to Kosovo. However, there has been little discussion at the EU level about such a scenario. NATO-EU cooperation in Macedonia can be cited as an occasion when operational differences came to the fore. Operation CONCORDIA, undertaken by the EU using NATO assets, saw close working relationships between NATO and EU personnel, especially since the EU took over NATO’s former role and NATO retained a residual presence based at its Skopje Headquarters. The militarily low-key nature of the deployment, (designed to help the Macedonian government implement the security requirements of the Ohrid Agreement) meant that the EU did not actually need NATO assets to carry out the mission. However, the political context of the operation required the settlement of EU-NATO negotiations to allow for a Berlin-Plus mission, not least since continuity on the ground was crucial in maintaining the confidence of the
Macedonian government and people (Mace 2004: 480). While the EU-NATO relationship was reportedly good, there were some differences between the organisations on who was responsible for helping the Macedonian government to manage the country's borders. According to Mace, "NATO regarded border management as a military issue, which fell within the policy remit of its advisors at the Macedonian Ministry of Defence, while the EU argued that border management should be matter for the civilian authorities...the two organisations sometimes gave contrary messages to the Macedonian government" (Mace 2004: 483).

While the EU's reliance on NATO experience has impacted on operational planning, there is less cooperation on military hardware. Defence investment has been identified as the other key area of EU-NATO cooperation (Lindley-French 2003), yet despite rhetoric against duplication, the organisations are not developing military capabilities in synergy. It is still not clear how NATO's Response Force (NRF) will interact with the EU's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), or the planned Battle Groups. The two forces do not exist independently; the same national resources in EU and NATO Member States are allocated to both forces. To avoid a situation in which the forces are needed simultaneously, the EU and NATO have agreed to meet in the event of a crisis in order to clarify intentions. It is not clear if the latter development concurs with the EU's earlier agreement at the 1999 Helsinki European Council to act 'when NATO as a whole is not engaged.' The 'primacy' of NATO is still the subject of dispute among Member States. In terms of defence procurement, both organisations have agreed on defence capability targets, with minimal cooperation. According to Monaco, "NATO's PCC [Prague Capabilities Commitment] and EU's European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) remain parallel and duplicate initiatives" (2004b: 3).

Nevertheless, a joint EU-NATO statement in December 2003 proclaimed that the existing NATO-EU Capability Group tries to ensure consistency between the ECAP and the PCC, and synergy between the NRF and EU RRF (NATO 2003). Meanwhile, the EU established the EDA to deal with defence research and procurement.

There are conflicting views within NATO about an appropriate division of crisis management labour with the EU. A recent NATO Parliamentary Assembly defence and security report suggests that it is likely that "the EU [Rapid Reaction] force will focus on stabilisation and humanitarian operations rather than high intensity
operations, while the NRF will be used more for those high intensity operations that require a comparatively large force at a higher degree of readiness” (NATO 2004: 12). This has indeed been the common view, since the EU has less capabilities for fast, large troop deployments. Nevertheless, the development of the EU battle group concept, as well as the extension of the Petersberg tasks in the Constitutional Treaty, have prompted the NATO SG to suggest that the battle groups could ‘go to war’ rather than keep the peace, adding that “we shouldn’t think the EU is for soft power and NATO for tough power.”

Despite the successful completion of the Berlin-Plus negotiations, NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management is likely to be effected by the ups and downs of transatlantic politics. As with other multilateral organisations, it is often difficult to identify institutional aims from the objectives and concerns of the Member States of the EU and NATO. If, as some commentators contend, the success of future EU-NATO cooperation relies on the maintenance of good relations between the US and Europe (Mace 2004: 486), then the case for ‘constructive’ duplication of military capabilities is strong (Schake 2003). If EU governments cannot meet the capability shortfalls at the national level, then more collaborative projects on defence procurement are required to fill the military crisis management gaps. The increasingly different strategic cultures on both sides of the Atlantic in the context of the US-led ‘War on Terror’ require a readjustment of EU security thinking. Already popular commentators are labelling NATO a ‘threat to Europe’, and ‘no more than a “coalition of the reluctant”’ (Steele 2004). Meanwhile the NATO SG has accused Europe of lagging behind the US in the fight against terror, adding “if you want to have a trans-Atlantic dialogue between grown-ups, any President and any American administration is willing to listen to the European voice as long as it is one European voice. If it is five different voices, they will not take the trouble to listen and they will wonder what is Europe (sic).”

Assuming that EU Member States want NATO to persist, they would fare better within the Alliance by thrashing out a clearer military security doctrine (i.e. clearer than the European Security Strategy). Paradoxically, this, despite the comments made by the NATO SG, is exactly what the US and its

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118 ‘NATO chief would not rule out EU states going to war,’ euobserver 11.03.05, http://euobserver.com/?aid=18639&sid=9. Accessed 15/03/05.
closest transatlantic allies oppose. The lack of democratic accountability inherent in current ESDP developments only serves to prevent a wider discussion at the public and governmental levels about implications of the militarisation of the EU and the concurrent partnership with NATO.

The EU takeover of the NATO stabilisation force in Bosnia in December 2004 under Berlin-Plus arrangements was a further test of EU-NATO cooperation. The EU HR/SG Solana at the 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit cited the operation as reflecting the ‘NATO-EU strategic partnership,’ while more critical observers argue that the partnership “has yet to become strategic, but remains a mechanism for the EU to support NATO’s withdrawal from the Balkans” (Monaco 2004b: 3). Overall, EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management allows the EU to carry out military operations, but, as the NATO SG implies above, this is far from an arrangement between equal institutional partners. As long as the US administration characterises the EU as a group of quarrelsome children, and the EU teeters on the wrong side of an autonomous military crisis management capacity, this situation is likely to continue. It undoubtedly impacts negatively on the possibility of an EU-NATO strategic partnership for conflict prevention.

8.7 Internal EU Coordination: Implications for Coordination with NATO

Following the structure of the previous two chapters, we now move on to how EU internal coordination impacts on external policy coordination with NATO. Cooperating with a military organisation has undoubtedly presented challenges for the EU and its Member States. While cooperation in military matters within the NATO framework has been common practice for some EU Member States, it is an anathema for Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Austria. The increasing participation of these non-NATO states in multi-national peacekeeping deployments (in Bosnia, where Swedish troops have served under NATO command since 1995, and also Kosovo and Afghanistan) (Giegerich and Wallace 2004: 173) indicates a commitment to multilateral crisis management. However, the general EU consensus on conflict prevention does not necessarily extend to military cooperation with NATO to allow for potentially controversial military interventions under the EU flag. The levels of coordination considered follow the pattern of previous chapters: we examine the pillar structure, inter-institutional coordination and internal institutional coordination.
8.7.1 The pillar structure

The overall pillar structure of the EU tends to perpetuate the lack of strategic doctrine that makes EU dialogue and cooperation with NATO problematic. While the EU has the competences of all three pillars at its disposal, there is not enough synergy to ensure a clear and uncontested line on when economic and diplomatic means should make way for the use of force. A clear doctrine on the need for and use of military force would help to clarify the EU’s relationship with NATO. The current crisis management procedures are not a substitute for this, and reflect a continuing lack of consensus between Member States. The pillar structure has been cited as hindering a quick EU response to crises (Zeilonka 1998: 177). This could be important time lost if the EU also has to make arrangements to use US-owned NATO assets. A period of long planning, as in the EU takeover of SFOR in Bosnia, cannot be assumed.

The pillar structure also dictates a particularly narrow dialogue with NATO, as compared to EU dialogue with the UN and the OSCE. Cooperation is concentrated in intergovernmental pillar two, the domain of ESDP, curtailing any wider dialogue with the EU system as a whole. The Commission is kept at a distance from the military structures in the Council of the EU, and by extension is kept from dialogue with NATO. The emphasis on ‘strategic’ partnership with NATO narrows the boundaries of cooperation, stifling a partnership on military-civilian cooperation that could benefit both organisations. The government-to-government focus of NATO-EU cooperation leads to a situation of dependency without institutional dialogue.

8.7.2 Inter-institutional coordination

Lack of coordination between the Council and the Commission in the event of complex EU operations in crisis areas could impact on cooperation on the ground with NATO. The Commission’s lack of input into military operations could result in poor civil-military coordination. It is not clear if Commission officials have any contact with NATO representatives in the Balkans, for example, or whether dialogue is restricted to NATO representatives and Council representatives e.g. EU Special Representatives or Heads of crisis management operations. Better inter-institutional dialogue on military crisis management could improve the effectiveness of EU
missions and increase the scope of coordination with NATO at headquarters level and in the field.

The establishment of the European Defence Agency in 2004, attached to the Council, and the European Commission's move into security and defence research are parallel initiatives that may lack proper synergy because of existing inter-institutional divisions. According to Cameron and Quille, "considering that the [European Defence] Agency is looking to the future in its analysis beyond 2010 to inform decision makers on key defence capability choices for the future and the Commission is simultaneously funding research in areas that will produce technologies of the future available to be integrated into defence or crisis management capabilities, one must ask the question whether these two processes are properly integrated" (2004: 28). If not properly integrated, dialogue with NATO on capabilities will lack a key EU component. The Commission cannot be kept out of defence issues without jeopardising the EU's most important contribution to conflict prevention: the ability to invoke a range of instruments across the development, civilian and military spheres. However, it is important that the Commission does not under-emphasise its civilian expertise to compete for a role in ESDP. Better Council and Member State engagement with the Commission, as well as with the European Parliament, would avoid this.

8.7.3 Internal institutional problems
Lack of internal coordination within the Commission barely impacts on EU coordination with NATO, since the Commission has little contact with NATO, except through its own contacts with the High Representative and the PSC.

However, the wider implications of the Commission's role in the ESDP project, with its close links to NATO, can be considered. The Commission's schizophrenia about its role in ESDP could reinforce EU militarisation through NATO rather than encourage a more broadly-based security partnership. In recent years, the Commission has been pushing for more influence in defence industrial markets (the armaments industry, being so closely linked to national governments, is exempted from the Single Market), and is investing in defence (or 'security') research (Mawdsley 2004). The rush to gain a greater stake in the arms dynamic that is partially responsible for
driving the ESDP (Mawdsley 2004) contrasts sharply with the Commission’s role of defending and promoting civilian crisis management and conflict prevention. There is a danger of a marginalisation of supporters and resources for longer-term security solutions.  

It cannot be assumed that the Council of the EU is internally united behind a vision for the ESDP project. The 2003 European Security Strategy tried to fuse the concerns of two men: the realpolitik of Robert Cooper, Head of DG External Relations, and the ‘softer’ security solutions preferred by Christoph Heusgen, Head of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU). It is debatable how successful the Security Strategy is in integrating these concerns; certainly, the European Commission’s civilian expertise had very little input, and some regard it as a vague document, open to competing interpretations. Divisions over agendas could impact on the extent and quality of EU-NATO cooperation. This is compounded by competing Member State agendas. Who owns the ESDP project? It has been disproportionately driven by the governments of France and the UK. It lacks democratic accountability to the extent that defence initiatives have been fast-tracked from the Constitutional Treaty before national referendums, unbeknown to peace campaigners (Mawdsley 2004). Admittedly, the Commission has recognised this. ESDP’s democratic deficit has recently been the subject of a Commission-funded research network project, engaging practitioners and research institutes. However, internal EU divisions may prevent a single EU voice on ESDP, as called for by the NATO SG, for some time to come.

8.8 Conclusion

NATO’s operational record in the post-Cold War era points to the emergence of a transformed military alliance that has successfully restructured, and enlarged its membership. The organisation, with largely military expertise, does play a role in acute conflict prevention, but this contribution is of wider value only in conjunction

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120 Particularly if we consider that only two people are currently working on conflict prevention in the Commission’s RELEX DG.
121 Interview with Council foreign policy adviser, Brussels, 27th October 2004.
with other actors addressing the longer-term causes of conflict and instability. Additionally, NATO enlargement is considered to have a positive impact on democracy and the civilian control of the military, thereby promoting conflict prevention within the Alliance (Edmunds 2003; Larrabee 2003).

The EU and NATO are linked by membership and history, although in Cold War times the organisations’ functions were well delineated. In the post-Cold War era, both organisations have adopted conflict prevention as an objective. However, NATO remains an organisation with relatively narrow competences in comparison to the EU, and the organisations are very different in terms of structure and ethos. EU cooperation with NATO for conflict prevention cannot be identified in all our conflict prevention categories, but is largely concentrated in the sphere of military crisis management. The ‘strategic partnership’ for conflict prevention, as claimed by the EU HR/SG is, at best, tenuous. EU dialogue with NATO is shallow and restricted; the organisations, on occasion, reinforce each other rhetorically and diplomatically. In addition, the organisations now share information and intelligence through respective situation centres, although the extent and added value of this cooperation is difficult to assess. Cooperation in military crisis management will be maintained to allow for the transference of peacekeeping in the Western Balkans from NATO to the EU. However, the extension of cooperation to include wider civil-military cooperation is not guaranteed now that the Berlin-Plus arrangements are in place. According to Julian Lindley-French, NATO-EU institutional meetings “all too often...appear to resemble summer diplomatic garden parties in which polite small talk is exchanged while the weeds growing in the corner are ignored. There needs to be far more intensive interaction between officials of the two organisations on a day-to-day basis across the security spectrum.” (Lindley-French 2003).

Of course, intensive interaction need not translate as unequal dependency. The Berlin-Plus negotiations were largely a political exercise, driven more by transatlantic security sensitivities and resistance to change than a pragmatic consideration of how emerging crises were to be prevented or managed. The uncertainty over the future military role of the EU, and how this will relate to NATO’s role perpetuates this debate. The NATO SG’s suggestion that EU battle groups could be used to fight a war is not likely to be welcomed by traditionally neutral EU Member States in particular.
The extended Petersberg tasks, as included in the Constitutional Treaty, add to the ambiguity rather than clarifying the function of EU military capabilities.

If the ESDP is to succeed, EU institutions and Member States need to be working towards the same goals and reading from the same script. Lack of EU internal coordination and consensus on the Union’s military role prevents a single, strong EU position vis-à-vis NATO. This tends to perpetuate the NATO SG and US Administrations’ assessment of the Union as weak and divided. ESDP would benefit from an input of democracy and legitimacy, based on a process of consensus-building across the EU institutions and within EU Member States. The assertion that cooperation with NATO in order for the EU to develop a role in military crisis management may not be the best way forward, has to be raised and discussed. Undoubtedly the Atlantic Alliance represents a crucial political link, as well as an important forum for dialogue and defence cooperation. Yet deferral to NATO has costs as well as benefits for the EU. NATO used as a US-wielded tool in the ‘War on Terror’ could not only undermine the legitimacy of the Alliance in out-of-area operations, but undermine the EU by association. Ironically, the development of European owned military assets and the emergence of a more equal transatlantic partnership may actually save the Alliance from more damaging fractures. Unfortunately, EU Member States currently lack the consensus and the will to develop a true and equal partnership for conflict prevention with NATO.
CHAPTER 9
Conclusions: The Evolution of European Union Conflict Prevention Policy

9.1 Introduction
This thesis has examined the evolution of European Union conflict prevention: both as an internal policy driven by institutional development and external foreign policy pressures, and as an area of external cooperation with other European security organisations. The problem of policy coordination was explored as a theme uniting the internal and external problems faced by the EU in the organisation’s development of conflict prevention policy and practice.

Conflict prevention has been adopted as an EU external policy aim, and has become a commonly expressed term in EU documentation and discourse. However, it can be broadly concluded that EU conflict prevention policy remains underdeveloped. Despite the EU’s history as a civilian organisation, the development of military capacities is overshadowing structural conflict prevention. The pursuit of military means divorced from a commitment to longer-term security solutions could jeopardise the EU’s legitimacy as a military actor. The EU’s elaboration and application of conflict prevention is constrained by the pillar structure, a lack of intra-institutional coordination, and internal institutional policy divisions, exacerbating the civilian-military policy split. Furthermore, while inter-organisational cooperation in conflict prevention has become a common theme and aim of European security organisations, EU policy coordination with the UN, OSCE and NATO in conflict prevention is inconsistent, and is adversely affected by poor intra-EU policy coordination. EU external cooperation for conflict prevention does not reflect a commitment to a comprehensive conflict prevention policy.

This final chapter presents a summary of the thesis’ findings and addresses the following questions: 1) What are the prospects for EU internal and external conflict prevention? 2) What are the conceptual and definitional implications of the findings? 3) Having caught the attention of the EU and other European security organisations, what is the future of conflict prevention as a European security strategy?
9.2 Cold War and Post-Cold War Conflict Prevention

Chapter 2 examined conflict prevention in contemporary perspective, focusing on its development as an idea and policy in the post-Second World War context. Chapter 4 continued the debate, focusing specifically on the adoption of conflict prevention by the EU and other security organisations in the post-Cold War European security context.

Conflict prevention during the Cold War was generally associated with, firstly, the activities of the UN, and secondly, the prevention of conflict between the two superpowers, the US and the USSR. The UN was mandated to prevent conflict, but in practice not only was the organisation constrained by the confrontation between the superpowers in the UN Security Council, but the anticipation of violent conflict (as conflict prevention is understood in the post-Cold War period), was not an overt UN objective (Burton 1986: 43-44). Nevertheless, the UN developed innovative approaches to the problem of violent conflict during the Cold War era – notably preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping (Claude 1971). These activities led the way for the adoption of conflict prevention as an explicit objective by the UN, and other security organisations in the post-Cold War period (Hampson and Malone 2002; Carment and Schnabel 2003).

Conflict prevention was also associated with the avoidance of conflict between the superpowers, although the tactics propounded by strategists bare little resemblance to conflict prevention as practiced by international organisations today. Conflict prevention as a wider idea and approach to international conflict gained support from a reaction (in Europe and the US) to the politics of the Cold War superpowers and their strategists. More generally, it gained currency in the European and American academic research communities, spurred on by the relaxation of superpower tensions in the 1970s and by the growing anti-nuclear weapons movement during the 'Second Cold War' of the early 1980s (Burton and Dukes 1990; Dunn 1991; Salmon and Alkadari 1992).

Conflict prevention rose to prominence in Europe in the post-Cold War era (Lund 1996; Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999; Hampson and Malone 2002; Carment and Schnabel 2003). However, there were a significant number of difficulties
associated with transforming the idea of conflict prevention into substantive policy. What did conflict prevention mean in the post-Cold War context? Defining the policy was problematic and fraught with subjectivity (Lund 1996; Dwan 2001). Like all policy aiming to address the root causes of problems, it generated competing assumptions. No-one would deny the difficulties associated with addressing social exclusion or racism at the national domestic level, but policy-makers tend to come up with different solutions depending on their interpretation of the problem. Those advocating conflict prevention as an approach to post-Cold War instability faced the same challenges, with the added problem of trying to find consensus at the international level among a multitude of national, international and non-governmental actors. It was difficult to establish general rules and criteria that could be applied to conflict situations that were, in many ways, unique. Generally, conflict prevention came to denote, firstly, an outlook that was sensitive to the effects of external economic or development policy on particular countries or communities prone to conflict (‘mainstreaming’ conflict prevention), and secondly, an operational stratagem designed to limit the escalation or recurrence of violent conflict with diplomatic, civilian or military means as necessary.

Violent intra-state conflict was widely perceived to be a post-Cold War problem, but the contested nature of conflict led to different interpretations about appropriate policy responses. Neo-realist commentators predicted an escalation of inter-ethnic conflict, a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington 1993) that could not be addressed by the ‘false promise of international institutions’ (Mearsheimer 1995). Peace researchers stressed the growing propensity of conflict as a result of the disparity of wealth and resources between the wealthy North and the poor South (Rogers and Dando 1992). Competing assessments of conflict patterns complicated the debate. However, by the late 1990s, it was apparent that the proliferation of conflict at the beginning of the decade was not an upward trend, although complex intra-state conflict continued to be prevalent (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000).

Conflict prevention was inevitably viewed as an unrealistic policy for those who believed in the inevitability of conflict and the redundancy of international organisations. For Stedman (1995) the rise of preventive diplomacy was a result of academic ‘oversell’ to optimistic policy-makers. The implementation problems
associated with conflict prevention were grist to the “knee-jerk negativism” (Lund 1995: 160) mill, but were not shunned by its supporters. Whilst conflicts are difficult to predict and actors difficult to motivate, subtle changes in governmental and organisational structures can improve early warning, and information can contribute to proactive, informed policy choices (Lund 1995; Wallensteen 2002). Analysts challenged those who criticised conflict prevention as costly and risky, showing “the realism of preventive statecraft as a strategic calculation” (Jentleson 2003: 42). The estimated cost of prevention in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia and Haiti were convincingly juxtaposed against the cost of inaction, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction (Brown and Rosecrance 1999). The Carnegie Commission’s final report of 1997 concluded that “preventing deadly conflict is possible” and appealed for, inter alia “an international commitment to the concept of prevention” and “a habit of preventive investment” (Carnegie Commission 1997: xvii). The ethics of prevention, however, have to be recognised and addressed: in particular the problem of legitimising interference in the internal affairs of states. However, support for operational conflict prevention designed to prevent the escalation or recurrence of intra-state violence is diluted by military interventions unsanctioned by the UN. Moreover, a loose international consensus supporting structural conflict prevention is undermined by the neo-liberal global economic regime, which protects the interests of rich countries and often keeps poor countries poor (Stiglitz 2002: 17). Clearly, the problems with prevention reflect wider problems with the international system, but should not be used to undercut the basic sound tenets of the preventive approach. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, conflict prevention is not so much “a concept in search of a policy” (Carment and Schnabel 2003: 1) as a policy in search of genuine governmental commitment.

Chapter 4 examined the post-Cold War security context. The 1990s became the era of conflict prevention as the EU and other European security organisations adopted the term as an approach to pan-European instability. The end of the Cold War and the democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-1990 led to instability as well as the prospect of enhanced international cooperation. The idea of conflict prevention may not have been new, but its development as a security policy by the EU and other actors reflected a wider and more comprehensive approach to the problem of violent conflict, as well as a pragmatic response to instability on the borders of the
Conflict prevention stood some chance of moving beyond theory towards practice because of the general re-thinking of security in the aftermath of the Cold War (Buzan et al. 1990; Booth and Wheeler 1992). Security was perceived in wider terms, and the end of superpower conflict led to more attention to root causes of conflict that could be tackled earlier through targeted development and humanitarian aid, and if this failed, concerted preventive diplomacy. The experience of failed prevention in the Balkans led to the development of conflict prevention policies by Western governments and organisations. The proliferation of intra-state conflict, with regional and global repercussions meant that they had to be better prepared to intervene with civilian experts, or military personnel, in order to prevent conflict, or contribute to post-conflict reconstruction.

The EU found itself a part of a complex and crowded post-Cold War security system. Each organisation considered in this study adopted the language of conflict prevention as purposes and policies collided in the new political and security context of post-Cold War Europe. Yet while the logic of cooperation was obvious, in practice policy coordination between different organisations, with different histories, priorities, and memberships was, and still is, problematic. Different organisations have different strengths and expertise, and there have been no agreements on the division of labour. Organisations existed more independently during the Cold War, where security risks, as well as dividing lines between organisations, were more clearly defined. Overlapping membership between organisations often compounds rather than aids inter-organisational difficulties, as it is no longer clear which organisation, or which combination of Member States, is best for the job. Policy coordination relies on a common assessment of the causes of conflict, common purpose, and reinforcing operations and interventions. This has been a challenge for the EU and the other organisations featured in this study. The implications of poor organisational coordination in conflict prevention are potentially deleterious for pan-European security.
9.3 European Union Conflict Prevention

Chapter 3 analysed the history of the EU’s external relations, and outlined the institutions and procedures of EU external relations. Chapter 5 proceeded specifically to examine the substance of EU conflict prevention policy.

The development of the EC had unavoidable external implications, and EPC and parallel community activity demonstrated the EU’s aptitude as a long-term stability promoter (Hill 1992). However, the history and development of EU external relations policy resulted in a complex and divided policy area hovering between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. This legacy was to have a particular effect on the elaboration of conflict prevention as an external relations objective in the post-Cold War era.

The EU developed conflict prevention as a key aspect of its post-Cold War external relations agenda (Hill 2001; Duke 2003; Smith, K. E. 2003). The EU’s transformation from internal conflict preventor to external conflict preventor gradually concurred with the organisation’s key role in the new Europe, although it took policy failures in Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo for significant institutional reform to take place. Conflict prevention became tied up with the EU’s security objectives in the wider Europe, and the process of enlargement. Evidence shows a steady increase in the use of the term in EU discourse, reflecting its wide employment in the rhetoric of the UN, the OSCE and NGOs, and revealing its centrality in the expansion of the CFSP.

Conflict prevention’s development in the EU can therefore be attributed to a number of internal and external factors. Internally, the EU was a peace project, and increasingly marketed itself as such. Conflict prevention represented an achievement of the EU, and therefore encapsulated the EU’s identity. Furthermore, CFSP ambitions required a rationale for external action, and ‘exporting stability’ was a relatively uncontroversial external objective. Externally, pressure was exerting on the EU to act to manage and prevent crises, and it proved itself not to be up to the task when conflict broke out in Former Yugoslavia. The EU’s further failure to prevent, and then manage the crisis in Kosovo in 1999 drove forward the ESDP project and (arguably) over-emphasised the need for force to back up diplomacy.
In the early 1990s then, conflict prevention was a vague objective without policy instruments: it was the unstated aim of EU policy in Eastern and Central Europe, but not yet a clear policy elaborated in EU documentation. Structural conflict prevention was developed by the Commission in relation to EU policy in Africa in particular, and the Commission has mainstreamed conflict prevention considerations into development policy-making and general external relations with the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and Country Conflict Assessments (CCAs). Yet to some extent at least, conflict prevention was hijacked by the Commission External Relations DG’s CFSP ambitions, and is now overwhelmingly dominated by Council structures and personnel. The EU has developed competences in early warning and analysis and in operational conflict prevention. However, conflict prevention in the EU context is increasingly associated with civilian and military crisis management, denoting a policy based on the response to problems such as state failure rather than a policy proactively addressing root causes of conflict. The problem with this outcome is a tendency in EU institutions to decouple structural conflict prevention from operational conflict prevention. A holistic definition of conflict prevention may still exist on paper, but given the resources available for structural conflict prevention (and current trends), in practice it is becoming more and more synonymous with crisis management. MEP Elisabeth Schroedter (2004: 42) concluded in a recent article on EU conflict prevention that the broad aim of prevention, supported by the European Parliament, has been reduced to reactive mechanisms.

The Council of the EU’s rapid development of institutions to support ESDP, has continued with the innovations for military cooperation enshrined in (and fast-tracked from) the Constitutional Treaty – structured cooperation for the speedy deployment of EU military operations and the European Defence Agency (EDA) for defence research and procurement. As one analyst commented, while the development of the ESDP was viewed as one of the greatest challenges in the drafting of the EU Constitutional Treaty, it was, paradoxically, the policy area in which most substantial progress was made (Howorth 2004: 483).

9.3.1 EU structures and conflict prevention: a challenge for coordination
While internal and external factors may have encouraged the EU’s adoption of conflict prevention as an external objective, in practice internal policy coordination
was problematic. Policy coordination is a familiar problem for all types of bureaucracies. Conflict prevention, like other cross-cutting policies, is also a challenge for national governments: work needs to be divided across bureaucracies, but this can lead to fragmentation and a lack of ‘joined-up’ policy. Lying at the development-security inter-section, conflict prevention found no natural home in the EU institutional set-up. The policy requires synergy between the Commission’s external relations and development DGs and the CFSP/EDSP structures located in the Council of the EU. Chapter 5 argued that the complexity of EU structures is an impediment for EU conflict prevention policy coordination. Coordination was analysed on three levels: the overall pillar structure, the interaction between the European Commission and the Council of the EU (inter-institutional), and the institutions themselves (internal institutional).

The pillar structure, inaugurated in the TEU (ratified in 1993), does not provide a solid foundation for coherent and coordinated external policy. For conflict prevention in particular, the different policy-making and decision-making procedures for economic and development policy, as well as positions adopted under the CFSP, does not encourage synergy. Until 1999, there was no EU figure capable of effectively bringing together the different strands of policy relevant for conflict prevention. The appointment of Javier Solana as EU High Representative for CFSP improved the situation, since he had regular contact with the Commission, and the Commissioner for External Relations in particular. Nevertheless, he remains answerable to the Council only, and dialogue with the Commission depends on personal initiative rather than any role specified in EU documentation. The inability of EU Member States to agree on common decision-making procedures across policy areas led to the pillar compromise, which allowed cooperation in foreign policy and justice and home affairs to be brought into the EU institutional structure. The pillar system established with the TEU is typical of the incremental development that has characterised the EU since its birth, but as recognised in the reforms proposed in the Constitutional Treaty, it is far from optimal.

Inter-institutional problems exacerbate coordination attempts. The European Commission and the Council of the EU have developed their own working cultures and compete for central resources. Graham Allison, in his 1971 study of the US
government’s response to the Cuban Missile crisis, used his ‘bureaucratic politics’ conceptual model to illustrate how government action can be understood as the result of the “compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence” (Allison 1971: 162). Alternatively, the ‘organisational process’ model interpreted government decisions “as outputs of large organisations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior,” (1971: 67), underlining the tendency of governmental units, each with its own routine and culture, to work independently, requiring coordination by government leaders who can not necessarily control the organisational output (Allison 1971). The problems identified in Allison’s study of national foreign policy-making are recognisable in the EU’s elaboration of conflict prevention policy, with bureaucratic politics referring to problems between the EU institutions and organisational processes referring to problems within institutions.

Clearly, the Commission and the Council have developed separate and distinct cultures over the years, and the relationship between them is characterised by conflict and compromise. Tension between the institutions was already deep-seated because of the inherent frictions between a supranational institution representing the interests of the organisation (the Commission) and a hybrid intergovernmental-supranational institution representing the interests of Member States (and arguably its own institutional interests), and relying more on negotiation and compromise to find common positions (the Council of the EU). The incorporation of the CFSP into the EU in 1993 underscored the continuing intergovernmental nature of foreign policy cooperation, and denied the Commission its role as prime policy initiator and elaborator. Competition between the institutions over the ownership of conflict prevention has left the policy bereft of its long-term focus as the Council has consolidated its role in the ESDP and as the Commission has clambered for a place in the project.

*Internal institutional* developments have tended to perpetuate the traditional division between the Council and the Commission. Organisational units within the Commission and the Council of the EU have developed their own patterns of behaviour, and coordination is also required within these institutions. In the Commission, conflict prevention was elevated from a low-key concept in the development sphere to a key element of the CFSP partly as a tactic to gain more
influence in the CFSP/ESDP. The Commission, in its 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention, was very thorough in its spelling out of the vast number of Community policies and initiatives that contribute to short and long-term conflict prevention. However, the gradual downgrading of DG Development, and the transfer of its responsibilities to the EuropeAid office and the delegations, has left structural conflict prevention largely undeveloped in comparison to civilian crisis management. The Commission had competence and funding for the latter, and as the ESDP project gained ground in the early 2000s, DG External Relations’ desire to play an important role in the process led to an emphasis on the development of short-term initiatives such as the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, EU Monitoring and Assessment missions, and the African Peace Facility. In short, internal divisions in the Commission have not encouraged a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention.

The Council has seen major changes and institutional proliferation in support of the CFSP/ESDP, and conflict prevention has moved increasingly up the agenda as a way of rationalising and legitimising the EU’s new military role. However, the Council is not a homogeneous unit; the High Representative may not be in agreement with other Council actors, such as the Head of DG External Relations, or the Presidency (further complicated by the six-monthly change in Presidency personnel). Furthermore, the institutional balance in the Council does not necessarily favour comprehensive conflict prevention. Input from civilian experts is lacking in the Council Secretariat; CIVCOM is “a political lightweight without real influence [and with] very little capacity to respond to emergency” (Keane 2004c: 9). Without strong council institutions to push for early action, conflict prevention opportunities for the EU will be lost. This is arguably the case with the situation in Darfur, Sudan, where an acute humanitarian crisis persists. According to a Commission official, Commission experts went to the PSC with early warning information about mass displacements and an impending humanitarian crisis in the country in 2003. No action was taken. Commentators have noted the lack of EU action on Darfur, and, according to Rory Keane, the problem lies with the weakness of CIVCOM and the sidelining of conflict prevention in the Council Secretariat in favour of terrorism, defence and

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124 Interview with Commission official, 25/10/04.
9.3.2 Peace project or martial union?

Undoubtedly, the development of military capabilities fundamentally changes the traditional civilian identity of the EU as understood during the Cold War period. This was a pragmatic adaptation to post-Cold War crises, reflecting unprecedented progress in intergovernmental cooperation. It also shows that the EU was less attached to its civilian image than many commentators assumed (Smith, K. 2000: 14).

Nevertheless, it has mixed blessings for EU conflict prevention. On the positive side, the EU is extending its competences by equipping itself with the appropriate means to intervene militarily to prevent the escalation of a conflict or to keep the peace. This in theory complements the array of EU civilian competences, making the EU a well-rounded actor in European security. However, if the development of military means becomes an end in itself, (whether for the benefit of the armaments industry or otherwise) then the purpose and utility of these military competences must be questioned. Not only could the military dimension "diminish the [EU's] civilian power image" (Smith, K. 2003: 170), but the EU faces a serious legitimacy problem if the trend, identified in this thesis, of a decoupling of long-term conflict prevention from military crisis management continues.

According to the Head of DG External Relations in the Council, "in an age in which security will depend on taking early action against emerging threats abroad, legitimacy is more important that ever" (Cooper 2004: 167). Europe will need "more power, both military power and multilateral legitimacy" (ibid.: 172). These latter aims (military power and multilateral legitimacy) are not compatible if the EU loses its commitment to long-term security solutions.

9.3.4 The impact of Constitutional Treaty reforms

The reforms outlined in the EU Constitutional Treaty address a number of problems of coherency and coordination, indicating that the treaty drafters (EU, Member State and NGO officials) had learned lessons from the EU’s post-Cold War external relations experience. However, the Treaty has run up against serious ratification problems, with its rejection by referendum in May/June 2005 by France and the
Netherlands. It is not yet clear whether the Treaty will be renegotiated, but treaty revisions are likely to be necessary for many of the reforms to take place. Commentators have, nevertheless, speculated at some length on the impact of the external relations reforms outlined in the Treaty.

The proposed post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is of particular significance, since it is the first ever EU position that straddles the supranational-intergovernmental external relations divide (Howorth 2004: 502). The Treaty effectively abolishes the pillar structure, but the Commission loses its right of initiative in CFSP, and CSFP/ESDP decision-making remains solidly intergovernmental (Cameron 2003: 17). The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs\(^\text{125}\) will have a large number of tasks in the field of CFSP, including chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, representing the Union in CFSP matters, conducting political dialogue and heading the European External Action Service (Constitutional Treaty Article III- 296). Moreover, the post-holder will be charged with coordinating CFSP and Community policies, and coordinating Member State positions at international organisations and conferences. As Jolyon Howorth has contended, “the requirements of coordination in the broad field of the CFSP and in the more critical field of the ESDP are now so urgent that the creation of this post literally imposed itself” (2004: 501). The idea had been floated in academic and NGO circles for some time, and was a firm proposal in the European Convention (Missiroli 2004: 146). However, as commentators have argued, the post is a difficult one and will rely very much on good relations between the Minister, the new appointed President of the European Council and the European Commission President\(^\text{126}\) (Allen 2004; Crowe 2004; Missiroli 2004b). “The Treaty makes it a personal rather than functional relationship”, as an official in the Council of the EU commented to the author.\(^\text{127}\) It can be assumed, and is indeed supported by the findings of this thesis, that an improvement in the EU’s internal coherence will also result in improved external coordination with other international organisations.

\(^{125}\) In 2004 the European Council decided that the first Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will be Javier Solana, current High Representative for CFSP, if the Treaty is ever ratified.

\(^{126}\) The proposed President of the European Council will be appointed by the European Council on a 2½ year, renewable basis.

\(^{127}\) Interview with Council official, Brussels, 26/10/04.
The Constitutional Treaty states that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will be supported by a European External Action Service, consisting of relevant departments of the Council General Secretariat, the Commission, and staff seconded from national diplomatic services (Constitutional Treaty, Article 111-296 (3)). The Treaty was vague about the details of the Service, leaving the all too important decisions about the organisation and functioning of the Service for a later date. Simon Duke has outlined the institutional and financial minefield that further decisions on the details of the External Action Service are likely to involve (Duke 2004: 5-6). The Treaty may be creating a new high-level post with institutional support, but this is also likely to create a whole host of new "institutional scuffles" (Duke 2004: 6), exposing the familiar gulf at the heart of EU external relations.

9.4 EU External Cooperation in Conflict Prevention

9.4.1 General conclusions

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 looked in detail at the emerging relationships between the EU and the UN, OSCE and NATO. Before outlining specific conclusions about the EU's external coordination in conflict prevention with these organisations, some general concluding remarks can be made. Broadly, while cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis response has become a central theme in pan-European security, cooperation in conflict prevention has not led to significant progress in EU-UN, EU-OSCE and EU-NATO policy coordination. There are various reasons for this lack of progress. The first concerns conflict prevention itself. The broad nature of the policy means that it is difficult to mainstream into international organisations. Bureaucratic and organisational politics within and between organisations compound this, and it is also difficult to make positive assessments of the impact of policy. Secondly, the conflicts of the post-Cold War period were challenging for international organisations, particularly the trend in intra-state conflict, which rendered intervention difficult for legal and practical reasons. The post-Cold War climate of institutional reform and the concurrent development of new policy areas (of which conflict prevention was but one) did not therefore lead to sufficient inter-organisational dialogue: there was no immediate incentive for policy coordination, and progress was made only after the implications of inter-organisational failures in coordination became clear. This was largely because organisations were not accustomed to cooperating, and in some instances were competing to survive as viable security organisations in the post-Cold
War context. Successive enlargements confused the policy space further. Member States were not clear about the future of their organisations and have not designed a coherent system because of lack of planning and political will.

It is important to reiterate that, while reinforcing organisational conflict prevention policies is best practice, policy coordination is no panacea. International organisations may cooperate well at every level, but this will not prevent conflict if domestic actors see violent conflict rather than peace as the solution. Furthermore, while diverging conflict prevention policies may exacerbate tensions, coordinated policies may do the same if they are based on a shared false interpretation of the causes of the conflict. EU cooperation with the UN, OSCE and NATO has risen exponentially in the post-Cold War era, as this study has shown. However, the extent of EU cooperation with the UN, OSCE and NATO varies considerably. Overall, there is still not enough commitment to coordinate policy at the early warning stage; early warning information is not widely shared between the EU and the other organisations. The EU’s operational priorities are reflected in the organisations’ cooperation with the UN, OSCE and NATO – policy coordination in structural conflict prevention and early warning and analysis lags behind.

9.4.2 EU-UN coordination in conflict prevention
Cooperation between the EU and the UN reflects the new dialogue between regional organisations and the world organisation in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, EU cooperation in conflict prevention is most advanced with the UN. EU coordination in conflict prevention with the UN spans the conflict prevention categories used in this study: from structural conflict prevention through to operational conflict prevention. The emergence of conflict prevention in the UN context has arguably had the greatest influence on the EU’s adoption of conflict prevention as an external relations objective. The European Commission has developed close links with the UNDP and other UN institutions, and the organisations’ have developed common development goals. The EU has responded to the UN’s requests to regional organisations to take on crisis management and peacekeeping duties. High-level meetings between UN personnel and the High Representative for CFSP, the Presidency, the External Relations Commissioner and the President of the European Commission are now common practice. This indicates that EU sees the UN as key partner in conflict
prevention: but does this have more to do with EU status and visibility rather than realities of the practice of conflict prevention? Ironically, while chapter 6 concluded that EU-UN coordination was too complex, involving too many personnel from both the Commission and the Council of the EU, more dialogue and cooperation is needed between a wider range of staff in the EU and the UN – not just between high-level officials. According to a European Commission official, there is not enough dialogue between EU desk officers and UN colleagues, and part of the problem is the lack of equivalence between EU and UN bodies and units.128 Dialogue on the ground in countries where there is dual presence is not yet common practice. The sharing of early warning information is still underdeveloped. Furthermore, the EU contribution to the UN's administration of Kosovo (UNMIK) has been criticised (ICG 2003), and the emphasis on military crisis management risks relegating EU-UN cooperation in civilian crisis management (Manca 2004: 4).

9.4.3 EU-OSCE coordination in conflict prevention
EU-OSCE coordination in conflict prevention is relatively underdeveloped in comparison to EU coordination with the UN. This is surprising considering the overlapping nature of the two organisations in terms of geographical area and civilian competences. Nevertheless, the EU has developed a relationship with the OSCE since it became an organisation in 1995, with particular impetus for cooperation coming from the EU in recent years. The EU funds many OSCE initiatives, and the organisations have carried out joint projects in recent years. Dialogue takes place between the leading external relations figures of both organisations (EU High Representative, Troika, External Relations Commissioner and PSC and OSCE Chairman-in-office, OSCE Troika, OSCE Permanent Council), and cooperation takes place in the field between EU Special Representatives and Heads of Mission and OSCE Missions, particularly in SE Europe. The network of organisations in SE Europe necessitates policy coordination in this region, and EU-OSCE cooperation is most developed in this region. Nevertheless, the EU neglects to make use of early warning information that the OSCE is willing to provide (Doyle 2002: 7), and the record of cooperation is patchier in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

128 Interview, 25/10/05.
The delay in setting out modalities for cooperation with the OSCE (Council of the EU 2003g) can be explained by the initial emphasis on military, rather than civilian competences in ESDP. However, the EU had an existing, and wide-ranging array of civilian competences before the post-1999 progress in ESDP, and we therefore must question why it took so long for the EU to prioritise cooperation with the OSCE.

There is evidence of tension between the organisations that is not conducive to progress in policy coordination. However, as one commentator pointed out, better EU cooperation with the OSCE in the pan-European area (e.g. the Caucasus and Central Asia) would allow the EU to focus its resources further field, such as in Africa (Keane 2004: 8).

The OSCE is uniquely qualified for conflict prevention (Chigas 1998; Zellner 2002). However, analysts note the tendency for member government reluctance to invest in conflict prevention before violence breaks out, and urge an improvement in cooperation both within the OSCE and between the OSCE and other conflict prevention actors (Zellner 2002: 24). The OSCE has been vocal in its efforts to coordinate its work with other European organisations, and it could be more successful in this with explicit and sustained support from the EU.

9.4.4 EU-NATO coordination in conflict prevention

The EU’s relationship with NATO has arguably undergone the most change since 1989, and particularly since 1999, when the EU launched the ESDP project. The EU has progressed from NATO’s underling during the Cold War, to NATO’s potential rival in the post-Cold War, with both organisations adopting the objective of ‘projecting stability’. The EU has successfully cooperated with NATO in order to secure access to NATO assets, and has taken over former NATO crisis management duties in Macedonia and Bosnia. The organisations have cooperated in preventive diplomacy, have made an agreement on information sharing, and underwent a joint (though uncoordinated) enlargement in May 2004, underlining their shared objective of pan-European stability.
However, it is difficult to characterise the EU-NATO relationship as a strategic partnership for conflict prevention, as the organisations have claimed. The EU’s reliance on NATO assets for some military crisis management missions makes the relationship an unequal one, too dependent on amicable relations with the US. Furthermore, EU dialogue with NATO is far too restricted to the military sphere for a strategic partnership to exist, and even here there is evidence to suggest the development of parallel competences (e.g. NRF and ERRF). The EU’s lack of consensus on the rationale of military operations complicates its relationship with NATO, opening the Union to accusations from the NATO SG of being weak and divided. NATO itself seems confused about its relationship with the EU, with the NATO SG and NATO Parliamentary Assembly contradicting one another (as outlined in chapter 8). This reflects an uneasy relationship, better characterised as rivalry than partnership. What seems clear is that the EU’s objective of conflict prevention (in the widest sense) will not be enhanced, and may even be undermined by, a relationship with NATO restricted to narrow military cooperation.

9.4.5 Links between EU internal and external policy coordination

EU relations with the UN, OSCE and NATO are affected by the structure and procedures of EU external relations. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 also examined the impact of EU-level coordination problems (the pillar system, inter-institutional, and internal institutional, as identified in chapter 5) on external cooperation with the UN, OSCE and NATO. Problems at the EU level were identified as impacting significantly on the EU’s ability to coordinate conflict prevention policy with all three organisations.

EU conflict prevention policy coordination is most advanced with the UN, but internal problems have a negative effect on EU-UN cooperation. The pillar structure results in a confusing EU presence in the UN, with the EC having a legal presence alongside Member States in some UN institutions. The breadth of both organisations, as well as the number of policy areas relevant to conflict prevention, render EU-UN cooperation particularly complex, and undoubtedly EU inter-institutional and internal institutional divisions add further stumbling blocks. As already mentioned, the vast number of EU

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129 Joint Press Statement by the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency, NATO-EU Ministerial Meeting, 4 December 2003 (NATO 2003).
points of contact with UN figures has not led to a sufficiently comprehensive EU-UN dialogue. Lack of internal EU coordination, for example in the context of the EU-managed pillar on UNMIK, results in a poor EU contribution to a key UN-led international project. Better EU civilian-military policy coordination could improve the EU as a viable partner for the UN.

The EU and the OSCE have similar organisational objectives, particularly in the promotion of stability in the pan-European area, but internal EU divisions and EU-Member State inconsistency contribute to the lack of policy coordination between the organisations. On-site cooperation in preventive diplomacy in target countries is particularly important for EU-OSCE conflict prevention, but it is in this area that the EU often struggles to present a single, coordinated voice. The pillar structure creates a situation in which external relations rhetoric and policy originates from three sources: the European Commission, the Council of the EU, and Member States. EU-Member State coordination in foreign policy may be a case of vertical rather than horizontal consistency (Krenzler and Schneider 1997: 136), but in this case vertical inconsistency compounds horizontal consistency because of the nature of OSCE work. OSCE missions can be faced with multiple EU presences in the countries in which they operate: EC delegations, Member State embassies, and in some cases Heads of EU civilian or military missions, and they do not necessarily present a consistent EU line (e.g. in Uzbekistan – see chapter 7). Member State diplomatic positions are not always aligned with EU rhetoric and policy, and this can undermine statements from Brussels, as well as confuse OSCE personnel. Additionally, inter-institutional and internal institutional divisions can impact negatively on cooperation with the OSCE in the field if they result in a lack of civil-military synergy between the Council of the EU and Commission personnel, and multiple institutional actors who fail to communicate effectively.

Conflict prevention policy coordination with NATO is affected by the EU’s internal uncertainties about its military role. The pillar structure tends to perpetuate this lack of consensus, since dialogue with NATO is dominated by pillar II institutions (i.e. the Council of the EU). Deep-seated inter-institutional divisions lead to a reluctance of EU Member States to involve the European Commission in the intergovernmental ESDP project. This does not allow for extensive dialogue with NATO, covering all
aspects of conflict prevention (not just military). Additionally, internal institutional
divergences in the Council of the EU do not indicate a consensus on the EU’s military
role, nor, by implication, on the EU’s relationship with NATO.

9.5 Definition and Theory
9.5.1 Defining conflict prevention
As explained in chapter 1, there is no definitive classification of conflict prevention,
and therefore it was necessary for this investigation to adopt a particular definition of
the term. The resulting wide definition adopted led to a broad survey of organisational
activity, ranging from development policy to military operations. While this may have
been at the expense of a more detailed single study, it is, in any case, debatable
whether more conclusions could have been drawn from a detailed, but narrow case
study in EU conflict prevention.

Nevertheless, the wide definition adopted in this study did create some conceptual
problems. While the study is comprehensive, it was on occasion difficult to find parity
between the EU and the other organisations. The EU is unique in its set-up and
institutions, and while, like the other organisations, it has adopted conflict prevention
as an external objective, the study confronted the problem of comparing like with like.
EU conflict prevention policy coordination could not be examined in all categories
(structural, early warning and analysis and operational) with all the organisations.
For example, the EU can coordinate its development objectives with the UN, but not
the OSCE and NATO. Military crisis management cooperation is important with
NATO, but not with the OSCE. Applying a systematic approach was therefore not
always possible, since the organisations are not always comparable and do not
necessarily interpret, or practice, conflict prevention in the same way. What is
highlighted, however, is the EU’s wide and varied capacity for conflict prevention in
all the categories. If the current focus on crisis management is not matched by a
commitment to structural conflict prevention, the EU could lose this unique
capability.

Of all the organisations, breaking down OSCE activities into our conflict prevention
categories was particularly difficult. This highlighted a categorisation problem rather
than a lack of clarity in OSCE activities and institutions. Long-term conflict

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prevention blurs into early warning and crisis management particularly in the case of the OSCE, largely because of the organisation’s long-term field presence in target regions. Missions evolve as the situation on the ground changes, and many are present throughout the cycle of a conflict, using the same tactics in post-conflict reconstruction as in pre-conflict prevention. There was therefore a considerable, and unavoidable overlap of OSCE functions in structural conflict prevention, early warning and operational conflict prevention in the OSCE chapter.

9.5.2 Theoretical implications of findings

This thesis provides evidence in support of the contention that international organisations both drive international agendas, and have the capacity for considerable autonomous action (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). The widespread organisational interest in conflict prevention in the early post-Cold War period was crucial in transforming the concept into a policy, and clearly its multilateral location, linked to the expanded notion of security, was seen as a way of expanding organisational action and influence (see Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 712). The EU and other security organisations featured in this study have demonstrated considerable autonomy and power in their classification and elaboration of the conflict prevention agenda, and have been supported by a large number of international non-governmental organisations in their endeavours. Furthermore, as this study of the EU has shown, the internal workings of organisations, long ignored by some IR scholars, do have a significant bearing on policy outcomes. It is necessary not only to recognise the influence and impact of international organisations, but also to recognise, and investigate, the factors limiting their potential (Gallarotti 1991; Barnett and Finnemore 1999).

Peace Researchers have long been interested in international organisations as creators of peace and security, with a more recent debate in the discipline about whether the EU is emerging as a “hope or a threat to peace” (Wallensteen 2001: 15; Dembinski and Brock 2004). This study underlines the centrality of the EU and its relationship with other organisations in the prevention and resolution of conflict. The EU’s ability to further extend the zone of peace on the European continent will depend very much on how the military element is developed internally, and implemented and perceived externally.
Theories of cooperation, usually applied to state-state or state-organisation interaction (Keohane 1984), provided a useful way of thinking about the EU’s cooperation with other organisational actors in the post-Cold War security environment. However, despite the considerable overlap of organisational policies and objectives (creating the circumstances for discord between security organisations and their members), cooperation between organisations has not led to significant policy coordination across conflict prevention categories. This finding challenges assumptions made in neo-liberal literature that cooperation entails a process of policy coordination. The progression from cooperation to policy coordination is in fact complex and problematic, compounded by difficulties in establishing clear boundaries between the processes. Neither does neo-liberal theory take account of other factors that constrain cooperation, such as organisational and bureaucratic politics; clearly these factors have a negative impact on the ability of the EU to coordinate policy both internally and externally.

There is evidence to suggest a certain amount of ‘externalisation’ in driving forward EU conflict prevention (Smith, K. 2004: 20). Other security organisations (especially the UN) have undoubtedly exerted external influence on the EU in bringing conflict prevention onto the external relations agenda. The need for the EU to cooperate externally for conflict prevention may have provided an impetus for the EU to rationalise and streamline its external relations procedures and representation, particularly the proposed creation of an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and associated European External Action Service (EEAS).

9.5.3 Researching the EU
Piecing together the evolution of EU conflict prevention using primarily public documents and secondary sources has been a lengthy undertaking, and this work does not claim to be wholly comprehensive or free of errors. The changes in EU external relations since this work was started have been considerable, culminating recently with the Member State governmental agreement on the Constitutional Treaty. Researching an evolving (and dynamic) organisation made the project exciting and frustrating in equal measures: the recent years have certainly not been a stagnant period for European Union external relations. However, the lack of transparency and
complexity of the EU system is undoubtedly a setback for researchers. This inevitably contributes to the vast quantity of misinformation and conflicting accounts that anyone researching the EU comes across.

In a recent report the International Crisis Group (ICG) concludes,

The EU's conflict prevention and management resources remain unknown to most... Had we attempted to write this report from public documents alone, it would have been a more arduous and less rewarding task (ICG 2005: 52).

There are two conclusions to draw from this comment and the experience gained in researching this thesis. Firstly, the EU needs to better inform its citizens of its wider potential and purpose (and not just in conflict prevention) in order to dispel the damaging myths disseminated by the British tabloid press and Eurosceptical politicians that it exists only to dictate the shape of bananas or subsidise European farmers. Secondly, EU information and documentation has to become more accessible if the Union wants to reconnect with the EU public, especially in the aftermath of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands. Without these changes it will continue to be difficult for future researchers to take on Hazel Smith's challenge to "investigate the difference between what goes on paper (the treaties and procedures) and what the Union actually does in the world (the foreign policy outcomes)" (Smith, H. 2002: 275).

9.6 The Future of Conflict Prevention in Europe and beyond

The future of conflict prevention as a security strategy is difficult to predict. This study shows that while conflict prevention has achieved some rhetorical success, it has not reached its potential in the EU context. The European Security Strategy demonstrates the success of conflict prevention rhetoric, but evidence suggests that conflict prevention has come to mean threat prevention and has lost its crucial long-term focus. As a key politico-economic actor in Europe, the EU's failure to reverse this trend impacts negatively on the ability of other actors (particularly the UN and the OSCE) to carry forward a conflict prevention agenda in the pan-European area.
In the wider world, it is not clear what impact the focus on international terrorism will have on conflict prevention. According to Michael McCGwire,

one result of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre has been an increased willingness to reflect on the state of the wider world, to consider the growing disparity between the rich and the poor, to recognize the stresses induced by modernity, to acknowledge the growing imbalance in the global economy, and to question the overwhelming dominance of Western political and economic orthodoxies (McCgwire 2002: 1).

Several days after the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, the European-based and EU-affiliated Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) released a commentary assessing the links between conflict prevention and terrorism. Two different outcomes were predicted: conflict prevention would either become mainstream in order to prevent terrorist attacks and associated problems; or the emerging paradigm of conflict prevention would disappear as all ‘soft’ security solutions become discredited.130 While the war in Iraq may be evidence that the latter scenario is emerging, there is also a discernable global reaction against this type of military response to terrorism, and a growing awareness in the West of the links between poverty and unfair trade,131 both of which could contribute to the prevention of conflict. However, whether the reaction against the US’ militaristic unilateralism, and a (no doubt) transient and superficial public campaign against poverty will result in a resurgence of structural conflict prevention remains to be seen. Dwan (2002: 123) argues that “the current approach to the prevention of terrorism risks undermining the entire notion of conflict prevention,” while Rogers (2001: 102) contends that, according to current trends, the response to violent conflict will be to regain and maintain control rather than to address root causes. The EU has a key role in shaping the future of conflict prevention as a security strategy, and it will be the responsibility of the Union and its Member States to ensure its persistence as a fundamentally realistic approach to instability on its borders and beyond.

131 For example, the ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign in the UK to coincide with the July 2005 G8 Summit at Gleneagles.
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