Peace in the Balkans: the influence of Euro-Atlantic actors in the promotion of security-community-relations in southeastern Europe

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PEACE IN THE BALKANS:
THE INFLUENCE OF EURO-ATLANTIC ACTORS IN THE
PROMOTION OF SECURITY-COMMUNITY-RELATIONS IN
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

By

Emilian Kavalski

Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of
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12 July 2005
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Among the people of the Balkans...they tell the legend of a captive eagle that manages to escape from captivity and return to his family. But his master had ringed his claws, and this stigma makes the fugitive a stranger among his own race. The family refuses to take back their own.

Ismail Kadare (2001: 5-6)
Abstract

This thesis examines processes of peace-promotion in the Balkans since the end of the Cold War. It is conducted from the perspective of International Relations theory and as such identifies peace as a pattern of order defined by the analytical framework of security communities. In this respect, the thesis argues that the initiation of a security community in the Balkans is a result of the post-1999 international socialisation of regional decision-making by the EU and NATO. It, therefore, advances the concept of an elite security community as the embryonic stage of security-community-building. The focus on state-elites is an outcome of the procedural dynamics of socialisation, where it is the decision-making behaviour that signifies compliance with externally-promoted standards. The conjecture is that the promotion of peace in the Balkans is the result of the extension of the Euro-Atlantic security community. The inference is that both the EU and NATO tend to be more convincing agents of socialisation as a result of their association/partnership and accession programmes. Being a complex and context specific process, the conditioning of Balkan states into a security-community-pattern of relations is underwritten by the Euro-Atlantic exercise of socialising power. This notion of power, however, is not defined as the control of policy-outcomes, but instead emphasises the ability of external actors to cause change in decision-making behaviour. The thesis also argues that the process of international socialisation has different effects depending on the nature of statehood in the target entities – in integrated states the external agency is both more immediate to discern and implement, while in awkward states the process tends to be longer and more intricate. Yet, as the case of the Balkans attests, the extension of the Euro-Atlantic security community to the region depends on the viable (even if distant) prospect of membership in the EU and NATO. In this way the thesis contributes to understanding the early stages of initiating a security community, as well as the role played by international actors in its promotion.

Key Words: BALKANS, EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY, INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISATION, ORDER, PEACE, POWER, SECURITY COMMUNITY.
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List of Abbreviations

CARDS – the EU ‘Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation’ programme for the Western Balkans
CFSP – the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF – Combined Joint Task Forces
EAPC – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC – European Commission
EIS – European Information Service
ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy
EU – European Union
FT – Financial Times
GIN – Global Information Network
HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union
ICC – International Criminal Court
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
IHT – International Herald Tribune
KFOR – the NATO Kosovo Force
MAP – Membership Action Plan
MC/EUMC – meeting of the NATO Military Committee and the EU Military Committee
NAC – North Atlantic Council
NAC/PSC – NATO’s North Atlantic Council meeting with the Political and Security Committee of the EU
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEDB – NATO Enlargement Daily Brief
NYT – New York Times
C/OSCE – Conference/Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCG/PMG – meeting to the NATO Policy Coordination Group and the EU Politico-Military Working Group
PfP – Partnership for Peace programme
RFE/RL – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RMFA – Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
SAA – Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SAP – Stabilisation and Association Processes
SFOR – the NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina
SP – Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe
SEET – Southeast European Times
UN – United Nations
UNMIK – United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force
WEU – West European Union
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problem Definition:
Yielding to the suggestion that international relations scholars are historians of world affairs (Puchala, 2003: 1-14), this thesis traces the interaction among Balkan countries, both in regional terms and with the wider international community (and specifically the Euro-Atlantic community as represented by the EU and NATO) since the end of the Cold War up to the spring of 2005. It concentrates on post-1999 dynamics, since the contention of the thesis is that the Kosovo crisis of that year marks a point of departure both in inter-state affairs in the Balkans and the international perception of the region.

The main question underlying this investigation is: How/in what way is peace initiated? The thesis consequently responds to the undisputed 'normative bias' of international relations theory – i.e. the search for the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Thies, 2004: 168). Specifically, the thesis aims to promote an understanding of how peace is promoted in an environment of mistrust and suspicion (Adler and Haas, 1992: 367). Owing to the broad investigative scope of such an inquiry, the terms of reference are narrowed geographically to the region of the Balkans – an area, which came to symbolise post-Cold War conflict and the difficulties external actors faced in coming to terms with the complexity of 'non-traditional' challenges.

Since the term 'Balkans' is quite contested, its geographical boundaries in this study follow the functional differentiation of the region developed during the 1990s by various international organisations. This conceives of two sub-regions: (i) the Western Balkans – including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia/Montenegro/Kosovo; and (ii) Bulgaria and Romania. Such a definition largely derives from the programmes implemented by international actors (primarily the EU and NATO) in the region, whose dynamics are different for the countries of the two groups of states. To put it crudely, while the countries from the second group were acknowledged as potential members of the main Euro-Atlantic organisations fairly early in their post-communist development, the membership prospect for the countries in the first group became articulated only at the end of the 1990s.

Another qualification demanded by the subject of the thesis relates to the notion of peace. Since, this research is conducted from the perspective of International Relations theory, peace is broadly defined as a pattern of order, characterising the relations between states and marked by
the absence of, and preparation for, the use of force in their international affairs. In this respect, the understanding of peace as order implicates the framework of security communities, which locates the study of peace at the heart of International Relations theory. Consequently, the emergence of order (i.e. security communities) is suggested as a result of a learning process (i.e. altering the behaviour of states as a consequence of taking past experiences into account), whose dynamic informs the requirement for the elimination of violence in inter-state relations (Cederman, 2001: 15).

In seeking to understand the phenomenon of peace the thesis tests the relative explanatory power of dominant International Relations theories. In this context, the main questions of this research are: How is peace (i.e. a security-community-order) initiated in the Balkans? Who are the dominant agents of such peace promotion? What processes suggest the initiation of (lasting) peace in the Balkans? Under what circumstances do regional states comply with international standards? The following section suggests why these research questions arise.

1.2. Core Assumptions:
Owing to its focus on the particular kind of peace as order (which has been defined as a security community) this research concentrates primarily on its initiation in the Balkans. In this way, the investigation: (1) fills the theoretical lacuna on how security communities are promoted; (2) makes an analytical proposition for this process through the concept of power in the initiation of security communities; and (3) contextualises its inferences through the case of the Balkans. The inquiry benefits from evolving scholarship on post-Cold War order-promotion, in particular, suggestions on the international socialisation of states and the literature on security communities.¹

The scholarship on post-Cold War order-promotion scrutinises the dynamics for attaining a particular pattern of international affairs (Rengger, 2000: 9). In order to provide a better understanding of peace as order, this research considers the dominant theoretical frameworks explaining inter-state affairs: neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism. Such conceptual discussion provides the analytical backdrop for a practice of peace-initiation in the Balkans. In spite of their various methodological strengths, this thesis finds all three frameworks wanting when it comes to understanding the issue of initiating a peace-order. Therefore, this research

¹ Ancillary to such investigation have been contributions made by the literature on critical security studies, conflict resolution and conflict prevention, post-communist democratisation and the growing scholarship on the EU and NATO enlargement. The suggestion of this investigation is that this body of literature, however, can be subsumed (as special instances) either within the broader framework of scholarship on order and security-community-building or the literature on international socialisation.
proffers an eclectic approach, combining neoliberal institutionalist practices with constructivist insights in order to suggest an explanatory pattern for initiating order in the Balkans. Such a stance suggests that rationalist theories are more compelling when they are combined with constructivist insights into the importance of norms and identities, while the explanatory value of constructivist ideation is furthered by the focus on power (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002: 601). It is also informed by the understanding that the disciplinary paradigms of International Relations are commensurate and their research agendas can be mediated (Makinda, 2000: 400). The main aspects of the neoliberal-constructivist approach to order advanced by this research are: (i) the significance of institutions – based on mutual agreements, whose normative 'stickiness' and institutional autonomy proffer cooperation; and (ii) the importance of interaction – the process of interest-formation, which develops experiential knowledge among actors and introduces positive identification and community-building. Thus, neoliberalism provides the rules and procedures for institutional co-binding, while constructivism facilitates the understanding of learning and the establishment of trust among actors.

In this respect, the proposition of neoliberal-constructivism suggests that the pragmatic question for initiating peace-order is 'what makes security communities get off the ground' (Acharya, 2001: 35). During the 1990s the analytical framework of security communities proffered by Deutsch et al. (1957) benefited from a number of important reconsiderations, most of them summarised in the authoritative volume by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998). A preliminary investigation of the notion of security communities in the context of the Balkans has been developed by Srdjan Vucetic (2001). The claim of this research is that despite the interest of mainstream literature on the initiation of security communities, their embryonic stages have received insufficient attention. The preoccupation with the optimal form of security communities instead is explained through the rarity of their occurrence (Down et al., 1996: 388). However, owing to the pragmatics of order-promotion, this investigation concentrates primarily on understanding the practical stages that initiate security communities. In this context, the contention is that the mainstream suggestion of a 'nascent security community' (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 86) is suggestive of a rather developed pattern of peace-order. This thesis advances the concept of elite security community as the embryonic stage of security-community-building. The focus on elites is a result of procedural dynamics of socialisation: it is the practices of decision-making that signify compliance with externally-promoted standards. Hence, the

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2 The concept of 'elite security community' borrows from the notion of 'elite peace' suggested by Kozhemiakin (1998: 129-48).
attention to elite-decisions allows for the study of the process and the patterns of observable change in policy-behaviour. In this way the research seeks to encourage and expand the possibility for constructive theory-building on initiating security communities.

The elaboration of the dynamic of promoting an elite security community in the Balkans benefits from the proposition that their initiation depends on the practice of the international socialisation of decision-making. The suggestion is that it is the socialisation of the policy-making practices of states (i.e. of their state-elites), which is central to the promotion of security-community-frameworks. In this respect, the thesis maintains that it is the focus on elite decision-making that allows for the study of the observable behaviour of states in terms of altering their habits in response to external demands. The contention is that the focus on state-elites helps unveil the process of the international socialisation of the Balkans; and, also, trace the influence of external conditioning both on the domestic practices and the foreign-policy-behaviour of regional states. During the 1990s a number of analysts commented on the processes of state-socialisation through the role of norms and ideas and opening scholarly potential for identifying the agents involved in such transformation (O'Neill et al., 2004). This thesis, therefore, follows Frank Schimmelfennig’s work on this issue and endorses his perspective that the end of the Cold War opened the post-communist region to the socialising effects of the dominant Euro-Atlantic actors (i.e. the EU and NATO). It also operationalises the notion of external agency with a focus on its hegemonic aspects. Being a complex and context specific process, socialisation (for the purposes of this investigation) is viewed as comprised of two complementary aspects: compliance (socialisation by international organisations) and learning to comply (socialisation in international organisations). The conjecture is that both aspects affect the introduction of security-community-order. The novelty of this research is the elaboration of the notion of socialisation power, which underwrites interactions in the process of socialisation. Recent scholarship on norms and rules has challenged conventional analysis that material power is the variable relevant to explaining the interests and preferences of states and has generated insights on how norms and ideas emerge, change and spread within international institutional contexts (O'Neill et al., 2004: 168). In this respect, the notion of socialisation power provides an analytical tool for understanding the mechanisms of socialisation; its purpose is not to reject the importance of material incentives, but to identify various aspects of their operation in which acquiescence emerges from the diffusion of normative ideals (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 3

For the purposes of this study, the notions of 'state socialisation' and the 'socialisation of state-elites' reflect coterminous processes and, therefore, are used interchangeably throughout this research.
284). In contrast to the dominant understanding of International Relations theory of power as control (Barnett and Duval, 2005: 43), this research thus recovers the original meaning of the term as the ability to cause change (Carroll, 1972: 589). In this context, the proposition of international socialisation indicates the initial stage of security community as a hegemonic peace order.

In the case of the Balkans, the suggestion is that it is through the socialisation of state-elites that security-community orders are initiated (in the sense of diffusion and extension of Euro-Atlantic practices). The model of security-community-building advanced by this exploration engages in negotiating the rough conceptual terrain between various analytical assumptions of the study of international affairs and the complicated empirical reality of the practice of inter-state relations in Europe. In pursuing such approach, this research seeks to bridge the gap between positivist-empirical and relativist-interpretative approaches (Adler and Haas, 1992: 368). In this respect, the current inquiry contributes to understanding the early stages of initiating security communities by providing insights into the required conditions and factors that facilitate their promotion.

1.3. Main Findings:
The theoretical framework of this research posits external agency and elite compliance as the main features of international socialisation of inter-state affairs in a security-community order. Reflecting this proposition, the empirical study of peace-promotion in the Balkans argues that:

1. The initiation of peace in the Balkans underwrites a process of extending the Western security community into the region. The implication here is that security-community-building in the Balkans does not involve a separate/independent pattern of regional order; instead it suggests the incorporation of regional states into the Euro-Atlantic/West European order. In other words, the thesis suggests that there is a process of regional security-community-building going on, but the argument here is that this is not autonomous from the wider community-building project of the EU and NATO.

2. The extension of the Western security community to the Balkans was not apparent until the Kosovo crisis. The argument is that in its context the dominant Euro-Atlantic actors elaborated the terms of the post-1999 European order. In this respect, 1999 marks an

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4 The point of modelling in International Relations theory is borrowed from Thies (2004: 165-67).
5 In this way this study refutes the suggestions of a large body of literature on post-Cold War, Balkan affairs that peace in the region is dependent on endogenous (or what Uvalic (2002: 326) calls "autochthonous" process of) 'regional cooperation initiatives' (see Bartlett, 2003; Uvalic and Bianchini, 1997). Instead this research suggests that Balkan cooperation is an outcome of elite-congruence with externally promoted standards.
important milestone in the external perception of the Balkans, which had significant impact on regional dynamics.

3. This research also suggests that the initial stages of security-community-building in the Balkans depend on the socialisation by external actors, which do not specifically insist on regional cooperation but on individual compliance by state-elites. Such domestic congruence consequently seems to affect the foreign policy behaviour of state-elites. This rationale (at least in the Balkans) can be explained as a result of the extension of an already existing (Western/Euro-Atlantic) security community rather than the promotion of a regional (Balkan) security community.

4. One of the effects of the post-1999 European order is that both the EU and NATO acknowledged their socialising centrality for the Balkans – i.e. they indicated their ability and willingness to socialise regional elites. This was most conspicuously suggested through the extension of the prospect of membership to all countries of the Balkan region. In this respect, conditionality (adherence to externally-promoted requirements) has become a pragmatic approach for introducing compliance.

5. Furthermore (again as a result of the post-1999 European order), ‘9/11’ and the subsequent ‘war on terror’ did not alter the socialising significance of the EU and NATO in the region. The contention is that this is an outcome of the functional differentiation between the two in the context of the Kosovo crisis and as a result of the enduring cooperation between the EU and the US in the region.

6. Another inference is that both the EU and NATO tend to be more convincing agents of socialisation (i.e. demonstrate ability to produce compliance) as a result of their association/partnership and accession programs. In this respect, the prospect of membership is not simply a ‘carrot’ for aspirants, but an increasingly appealing instrument for initiating peace.

7. The process of international socialisation has different dynamics and effects depending on the nature of statehood of the target entities. Thence, in consolidated nation-states (in this research they are referred to as integrated states) its effects are more immediate to discern and more straightforward to implement. In (what would be described as) awkward states, the process of international socialisation first aims to achieve a consolidation of (a modicum of) statehood (i.e. the creation of state-elites) and only then international actors begin to exert their socialisation power.
Taken together, these findings provide insights both to the processes of peace-promotion, in general, and the patterns of security-community-building in the Balkans, in particular. Further, they contribute to the explanatory potential of International Relations theory by further elaborating the analytical implications of the concept of power to the study of security communities and the dynamics of international socialisation.

1.4. Note on Methodology:
This section addresses the methodological approaches, which this investigation has adopted in response to its research queries. In this respect, the current research initially infers a theory of peace-promotion on the basis of mainstream scholarship on this issue and in light of previous instances of advancing security communities. Consequently, it tests the theoretical propositions by contextualising their inferences to the post-Cold War experience of the Balkans. Thus, its research program (based on the concept of security communities) aims to generate new findings and illuminate new perspectives on the practices of order-promotion in the region.6

Part One of the thesis advances a number of assumptions concerning post-Cold War practices of order-promotion in Europe, with a particular emphasis on the Balkan region. The purpose here is to consider theoretical propositions from the discipline of International Relations, and specifically their understanding of peace-initiation. At the same time, Part One scrutinises these theoretical points in relation to the way they explain extant instances of security communities. This study assumes that the initiation of security communities is dependent on three propensities: (i) external actors, who would initiate and maintain the process as a result of their perception that an area/region is a place where peace should be established; (ii) elites, representing state decision-making and who could be induced by the external actors to follow prescribed patterns of policy-behaviour; (iii) international socialisation – the complex process of various programs and dynamics employed by the external actors to condition the target state-elites into peaceful international relations.

Part Two, thereby, tests the hypotheses submitted in Part One. This research adopts two complementary methods of testing its analytical propositions: case studies and process-tracing. A number of commentators have suggested that the case study, despite its wide use for studying moving targets, continues to occupy a vexed position in the discipline of International Relations (Gerring, 2004: 341; Lijphart, 1971: 691; Van Evera, 1997: 51). Without getting involved in the

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6 This point benefits from the methodological framework of the 'epistemic communities approach' developed by Adler and Haas (1992: 367-71).
debate on the utility of case studies to International Relations research, this investigation concurs with the suggestion that they offer a convincing method for testing the ‘observable implications’ of theory (King et al., 1994: 28-29). Following Gerring’s (2004: 342) definition, the case study approach is understood to be ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units. A unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon... observed at a single point in time or over some delineated period of time’. In this respect, Part Two conducts two case studies in order to test empirically the hypotheses of this research. The suggestion of Part One is that the hegemonic socialisation of state-elites by external agents initiates peace. The independent variable therefore is the external agency; the dynamics of socialisation of state-elites the dependent one; and the initiation of peace is the study variable. Bearing in mind the research focus on the Balkans, this investigation conducts two case studies — of the EU and NATO as the dominant external actors involved in the socialisation of Balkan state-elites. In this respect, the case studies reflect the suggestion that the test of theoretical assumptions depends on the selection of cases that maximises the strength and the number of tests that can be performed (Van Evera, 1997: 78-79). In this respect the case studies of the EU and NATO benefit from: (i) their data richness – i.e. availability of documentary evidence as well as the possibility to conduct interviews with participants in the socialisation dynamics; (ii) the value of the independent variable – i.e. the selection of the dominant socialising actors suggests that if the hypothesis is confirmed as a result of the empirical test, such outcome is unlikely to stem from other factors; (iii) the large within-case variance in the value of the independent variable – that is change in the agency of the external actors over time within the period covered by the case studies as well as its diversity across different state-elites in the Balkans (in this context, the case study of the EU tests its socialising agency in the instances of Bulgaria and Croatia; while the case study of NATO examines its relevance in the examples of Romania and Serbia/Montenegro). Such understanding of the case studies allows both for analysing the cross-case comparison between the EU and NATO as well as (potentially) for replication of such test to their agency in other regions, or testing the agency of other units of analysis (i.e. external actors) both in the Balkans as well as in other areas.

In order to suggest a better appreciation of the dynamic of the external socialisation of Balkan state-elites, this research adopts a process-tracing approach to study the ‘decision-process, by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes’ (Van Evera, 1997: 52). Applying it to the case studies, it suggests an advanced mode for tracing the evolving perceptions and subjective interests of decision-makers and exploring the policies considered and chosen since
the end of the Cold War in the Balkans (Shannon, 2000: 306). It is argued that process-tracing allows for better assessment of the logical consistency of theoretical assumptions (King et al., 1994: 105). In this respect, when applied to the analysis of international affairs, process-tracing provides a convincing approach for studying the alteration (specifically, the dynamics of such alteration) of the socialising programs adopted in the Balkans by external actors. It indicates the processes by which agents and their expectations are created and through which their socialising programs are defined (Adler and Haas, 1992: 371). In particular, it is a relevant test for examining the public discourses and statements of policy-makers (Van Evera, 1997: 54). Bearing in mind that for process-tracing it is important to know the background conditions – both case studies establish the circumstances and the chronology of the involvement of the EU and NATO in the Balkans. In this way, Part Two tests their socialising effectiveness in light of the theoretical propositions advanced in Part One, by interpreting the dynamics of their programs in the Balkans. Such process-tracing considers whether inter-state war/conflict in the Balkans is less of an occurrence after 1999 when both the EU and NATO asserted their socialising centrality in the region. Furthermore (and more significantly), by exploring the decision-making process of state-elites, the process-tracing approach facilitates an understanding of the various antecedent conditions required for the operation of the hypothesis of peace-promotion (i.e. the presence of committed, yet flexible external agency), as well as the conditioning variables for the effective socialisation by external actors (in the instance of the Balkans, the nature of statehood has been suggested as an important conditioning variable). 7

Although this investigation is driven by a search for understanding the patterns of peace-promotion in the Balkans, it also consciously sidesteps some paradigmatic debates in an attempt to provide a problem- rather than an approach-driven investigation (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002: 600). This research, therefore, makes available a ‘useful model’ (King et al., 1994: 49) for understanding the complex process of post-Cold War dynamics of extending security-community-practices to the Balkans. Such a style of analysis (as instanced by the eclectic neoliberal-constructivist proposition) not only helps to push outward the boundaries of knowledge on peace-promotion, but also helps to provide a policy-relevant theoretical work. Concurring with the recent insistence by Stephen Walt (2005: 23) that International Relations theory has to reassert its relevance to policy-makers, this study advances the point that theoretical

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7 On the issue of antecedent conditions and conditioning variables see Van Evera (1997: 74).
assumptions are central to ‘diagnosing events, explaining their causes, prescribing responses and evaluating the impact of different policies’.

1.5. Research Framework:
The following outline sketches the roadmap of the thesis. This investigation into the external promotion of peace in the Balkans is broadly divided into three parts.

Part One delineates the theoretical outlines of the exploration, introduces the main concepts and defines their meaning in relation to the research question. In this respect, Chapter Two provides a procedural explanation of peace as a pattern of order. This chapter introduces the main issues of promoting ‘appropriateness’ in international relations through the establishment of a particular framework for inter-state interactions. It thus considers the main orthodoxies in IR theory: neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist perspectives on order and identifies their benefits and flaws for proffering an analytical framework for the discussion of a peace-order in the Balkans. On this basis it puts the case for adopting a neoliberal-constructivist perspective for the conceptualisation of cooperative order in the region that is suggestive of a security community.

Chapter Three thus examines the conceptual framework of security-communities by applying the suggestions of the neoliberal-constructivist perspective. This chapter considers the optimal form of security community – i.e. a democratic security community (as represented in Western Europe, and the larger Euro-Atlantic area). Such a community alludes to the importance of external agency in the early stages of development. This study therefore proffers the hypothesis that in its nascent stage a security community could be described as an elite security community – a framework for strategic interaction between the Euro-Atlantic agents (mainly, the EU and NATO) and Balkan state-elites, through which the former advances its interests and values, while building regional consensus on the objectives of policy-making among the latter. From this follows the notion of hegemonic practices of order-promotion.

In this context, Chapter Four develops a framework for understanding the international socialisation of the Balkans by Euro-Atlantic institutions. This socialisation occurs in terms of altering domestic practices through compliance and learning, and in changing external behaviour. These processes, in turn facilitate the conditioning of decision-making within the region and thus, the emergence of an elite security community. Such a proposition benefits from the suggestion that in the nascent stages of order-promotion, elite-cooperation is instrumental and conditioned by the kind of power exerted by the external agents.
In the wake of these analytical propositions Part Two provides an empirical study of the organisations involved in the security-community-socialisation of the Balkans. It tests the analytical hypothesis for the emergence of a distinct type of an embryonic security community in the region: elite security community. In this respect, Chapter Five is crucial for elaborating the centrality of the EU and NATO in the process of international socialisation of the Balkans. This chapter argues that despite the involvement of other international actors in the region, it is the EU and NATO, which have developed into the main (and more conspicuous) agents for socialisation of regional elites. Circumstantially, this chapter notes the emergent centrality of both the EU and NATO as a result of their reaction to events in the Balkans, in particular the Kosovo crisis. From this emerged what can be referred to as 'the terms of the post-1999 European order'. These are marked by: (i) a formal securitisation of norms by both organisations; and (ii) functional differentiation between the two in terms of their socialising mechanisms. The chapter also demonstrates that '9/11' did not impact dramatically upon the EU and NATO initiatives in the Balkans, since the region is an instance of continuing (if not increasing) cooperation between the two organisations.

Chapter Six tests the analytical assumptions of this research with the case of the EU. In particular it elaborates: (i) the development of the European democratic security community; (ii) the historical record of EU involvement in the Balkans; (iii) the implications of the post-Kosovo promotion of order to the Balkans in the context of enlargement; (iv) the emergence of an EU-maintained elite security community in the Balkans, through the examples of Bulgaria and Croatia. The chapter concludes that it is as a result of the post-Kosovo extension of the EU accession programs to the entire Balkan region that its socialisation dynamics have been able to facilitate the development of peaceful and cooperative relations in the Balkans. This has largely been an outcome of the increasing congruence between regional policy-making with the standards promoted by Brussels.

Likewise, Chapter Seven tests the socialising effects of NATO in the Balkans. The chapter elaborates: (i) the implications of the Euro-Atlantic security community for the post-Cold War period; (ii) the role of Partnership for Peace and the development of (a) association-socialisation (Romania) and (b) enforcement-socialisation (Serbia/Montenegro); (iii) the prospects for NATO membership and its consequences. The inference of this chapter is that NATO has been an ambiguous security-community-builder and that it is the dynamics of the Alliance's partnership activities, which tend to facilitate the gradual co-optation of regional elites to comply with externally-promoted standards.
Finally, Part Three pulls the inferences from Parts One and Two together and suggests how the interaction between neoliberal and constructivist frameworks in the field of International Relations can further the understanding of the dynamics of order-promption and security-community-building. In this respect, Chapter Eight provides a summary and evaluation of the results from Part Two and juxtaposes them with the theoretical framework of Part One. It also discusses the implications from the involvement of Euro-Atlantic institutions in the Balkans and their socialisation of regional actors to initiate a security community-type of order. Chapter Eight also draws broader conclusion about the dynamics of order-promotion (in the sense of security-community-building).
CHAPTER TWO

PEACE AS ORDER

It will not be a perpetual peace indeed, but at least it will not be an empty dream; it will be practicable and real peace.

Benedetto Croce (1949: 119)

2.1. Introduction:

As the comment above suggests, the objective of the chapter is to explain the concept of peace not merely as an abstract notion, but as a particular pattern of 'practicable and real peace', which can both be studied empirically and considered analytically. As it has been outlined in Chapter One, the suggestion of this research is that peace is a pattern of order that can be explained through the socialisation of state-elites into non-war policy-making. In this respect, the current investigation perceives the phenomenon of peace not merely as an unpredictable 'conjectural event' (Hirschman, 1970: 343) but rather as the outcome of a particular practice of socialisation, which 'instils a sense of responsibility for others' (Curtis, 1922: 176). Its framework of predictability is, thereby, the result of the experience of learning and interaction around the 'war prevention objective' (Van Wagenen, 1965: 815).

Such an inference thus informs the study of what kind of order the Euro-Atlantic organisations were/are trying to promote in the Balkans. The pragmatics of their post-Cold War involvements have befuddled the debate on the type of order that their activities are advancing something which has made the discourse on Balkan stability strikingly atheoretical. The task, therefore, is to uncover the most suggestive theoretical approach for understanding the initiation of a security community in the Balkans. In this respect, this chapter initially approaches the concept of order as the interaction between two distinct (yet overlapping) aspects: cooperation and security. Subsequently, it locates the issue of order in the dominant neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist perspectives of international relations theory. This exploration indicates that wedding approaches from neoliberalism and constructivism can suggest an analytical template for theorising the promotion of a security-community-type of relationship in the Balkans. The conjecture is that a neoliberal-constructivist framework allows one to examine and to explain the

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8 Socialisation is broadly defined as the transmission and internalisation of the rules of legitimate behaviour in international relations. The issue of socialisation is treated at length in Chapter Four.

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dynamics of conflict and cooperation from the same perspective and not as two separate phenomena, whose understanding would require their own sets of theories (Thies, 2004: 168).

2.2. What Is Order?
The issue, which this section tackles, is the arrangement of 'practicable and real peace' as a particular framework of order. Here, peace is perceived in both its positive definition as security community and its negative (i.e. as negating/opposed-to-something-else) meaning - as a non-war order. Both are implicated in the process of nascent-security-community-building (see Adler, 1998). In this sense, peace as order is discerned as a political modus operandi, characterised by interaction between states and marked by 'the absence of direct violence' (Senghaas, 1987: 3).

The study of peace is located at the heart of International Relations theory. However, this investigation into order is not undertaken with the aim of providing some definitive answer as to its nature. Instead it is providing a background (in the sense of common ground) for the discourse on the initiation of a particular kind of peace-order in the Balkans. In other words, to appropriate Nicholas Rengger's (2000: 9) queries regarding order-promotion, this section makes preliminary suggestions on 'how order can be attained', 'what should it seek to pattern itself' and 'who or what should impose the pattern'.

The point of departure is Hedley Bull's (1977: 93) insight that order involves regulation (marked by negotiation, coercion and restriction) of the extent to which interactions are worked out in the political domain, while at the same time promoting a 'condition of justice and equality among states or nations'. Thereby, pragmatically, order is understood to be a framework of predictability. Predictability (in the sense of self-sustaining continuity) characterises 'both the process and the condition' of the 'implementation' of 'peaceful change' in international life (Van Wagenen, 1965: 815).

Since the argument advanced by this research is that external actors are extending their security-community-type-of-order to the Balkans, the conceptual goal is to provide an analytical framework for understanding the possibility of transforming inter-state interaction to produce an order of peace (Thies, 2004: 161). Instrumentally, security communities have been suggested through the relationship between states 'which have become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions and practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change' (Van Wagenen, 1952: 10-11). The current study espouses Richard Van Wagenen's (1965: 819) assertion that two aspects are of particular significance to security-community-promotion: (i)
cooperation – the encouragement of ‘closer compatibility of values’; and (ii) security – the environment of ‘peaceful coexistence’. As the security community literature suggests these aspects are not independent of each other and, instead, they overlap. In order to provide an analytic suggestion for informing the practices of order in the Balkans, this chapter is elaborating the implications of cooperation and security.⁹

2.2.1. The Cooperation Aspect:
At the height of the Cold War, Senator James Fulbright (1963: 789) conceded that ‘modern warfare has become so destructive that it has ceased to be a rational instrument of national policy’; instead, he proffered ‘international cooperation’ as the pattern for both war-prevention and the dictum of decision-making. It is possible to interpret Fulbright’s demand for rationality in international relations as a call for more formalisation (in the sense of legal regulation) in the exchanges between states.

Historically, the system of international order is traditionally dated to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and is currently interpreted in the light of the nineteenth-century phenomenon of nationalism. However, various schools of International Relations theory have argued that in their decision-making states often find it beneficial (for a variety of reasons) to organise their international interactions through attempts to adjust incompatible/conflicting policies (Thies, 2004: 169). As some scholars have noted ‘the most basic form of cooperation is to abstain from mutual injury’ (Lipson, 2005: 189). The conjecture, therefore, is that cooperation is conditioned both by complementarity of the political will among states and a structural capacity with which to act (Penksa and Mason, 2003: 260). In this context, Michael Williams (2001: 539) has suggested that the normative conformity (i.e. the maintenance of peaceful change) among states in cooperative patterns of interaction derives from the ‘self-recognition of the need for limitation and a corresponding construction of institutional limits – checks and balances’.

2.2.2. The Security Aspect:
As well as cooperation, the other aspect of security-community-promotion suggested by Van Wagenen is the establishment of a sense of security. In this respect, the notion of security is underwritten by the knowledge that disruptions to the patterns of predictability of order would be overcome successfully (without disintegration into violence). The security aspect of order-

⁹ The following analysis is primarily suggestive since, these aspects would be expounded upon in the discussion of what this study describes as the main orthodoxies of international relations theory in the following section of this chapter.
promotion, thereby, relates (broadly speaking) to the 'preservation of the system and society of states', as well as the protection of the 'common goals of all social life' (Bull, 1977: 16, 19). In an applied sense, the security of states in international life indicates 'a low probability of damage to acquired values... and not the presence or absence of "threats"' (Baldwin, 1997: 13).

This characteristic is intimately related to the stability aspect of order. Stability does not imply that the durability (or self-reinforcing arrangement) of international order is indicated by slow, gradual changes, while the opposite necessarily indicates instability. Instead, stability indicates an 'ability of political order to contain and overcome disturbances to order' (Ikenberry, 2001: 45).

Such suggestion indicates the normative features of the security aspect of order. Duncan Snidal (1985: 582-83) has argued that in a 'technical sense' the stability of order 'can be measured in terms of the persistence of [its] rules and procedures'. Therefore, Snidal concludes that even a prolonged period of international conflict — i.e. war — 'could be a stable outcome'. In contrast, this study does not perceive the persistence of violence as a stable order. Although the security aspect of order does not entail 'an unchanging preservation of the status quo', it still reflects the peaceful developments in the relationship between states, which is marked by both 'structural solidity, and flexibility' (Hyde-Price, 2000: 55). The key aspect in the adaptation of such changes is the scope within which order can accomplish the accommodation without recourse to violence.

The definition of order as interaction between its two aspects (cooperation and security) facilitates its understanding as a distinct pattern of inter-state relations. The significance of this framework of order (i.e. for the discussion of Balkan order) derives from its emphasis on international relations as a process of learning and socialisation, during which actors develop a cognitive understanding (based on their experience of interaction in the international arena) of the reciprocity of international society as a security community. Reciprocity in this context relates to the attainment of shared-understanding of decision-making that eliminates 'the use of violence as a means of statecraft' (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 75). The argument here is that in international life the concept of peace suggests a pattern of order. The following section develops further the understanding of order in light of the main assumptions of international relations theory.
2.3. Different Theoretical Views on Order:

As has already been mentioned, the purpose of this examination of order is not to exhaust its meaning, but rather to position it in a way that would suggest an analytical framework for introducing a peace-order in the Balkans. Bearing in mind this pragmatic approach to the issue, the present research is objective to the extent of its awareness of the different theoretical perspectives on order. In order to understand better the subsequent investigation of Balkan socialisation, it is deemed necessary first to consider the frameworks of the dominant rationalist (neorealism and neoliberalism) and sociological (constructivism) theories of international relations. This conceptual discussion has the objective of exploring certain theoretical positions that could serve as the analytical backdrop for understanding the pattern of socialisation. The focus is on the 'kind of knowledge' (Wendt, 1999: 377) of international relations that the three analytical frameworks produce. Consequently, the issue is how such knowledge can be used for arriving at a set of useful theoretical indicators suggesting a security-community-type of order among Balkan states.

Given that (as it will be elaborated in Chapter Three) the literature on security communities has advanced their main value as their capacity for 'peaceful change' (Möller, 2003: 318), this study considers the concept of order through its aspects of security and cooperation in each of the three theoretical approaches. However, as the following sections make apparent, this research concurs with Donald Puchala's (2003: 21-22) remark that when applied to 'unobservable wholes' such as order, rationalism (despite – if not because of – its empiricism) evinces 'considerable uncertainty about whether the parts observed are actually elements of the wholes inferred'. At the same time, the following overview acknowledges the number of issues raised by sociological approaches, which Vaughn Shannon (2000: 297) has summarised as their broad claims of structural variables and subsequent inability to account for deviations and their focus on norms as 'decision shortcuts', to the exclusion of other possibilities. Consequently, this chapter suggests the potential from adopting 'neoliberal constructivism' as the analytical framework underscoring the socialisation of the Balkans into a security-community-order by the Euro-Atlantic actors. In its objectives, such exploration aims to respond to Samuel Makinda's (2000: 390) call for a 'creative eclectic approach' to the phenomena of the international relations among states.

2.3.1. Neorealist Perspective on Order:

The neorealist-neoliberal debate has helped shape International Relations theory. It involves different interpretations of the main factors in international politics: power, preferences, beliefs
and information (see Baldwin, 1993). Both, neorealism and neoliberalism, study these categories with effect to their implications for interpreting inter-actor relations in the system of order. Some have put forth the argument that their debate is, in fact, 'a debate within one world view': namely rationalism (S. Smith, 2000: 36). In a further challenge, Cameron Thies (2004: 159) suggests that the distinction between neorealism and neoliberalism is 'based upon a flawed understanding of the operation of process and structure within the international system. This misunderstanding, when clarified... indicates that the two competing theories are actually variants of a single underlying model'. In this context, rationality is understood as the maximisation of gains or the minimisation of losses in the process of decision-making. Neorealism reflects this in its suggestion that actors behave in a way, which is most advantageous for them individually — i.e. utility-maximisation (thus, putting the concept of trust beyond the considerations of rationality) (see Waltz, 1959, 1979; Lake and Powell, 1999).10

For neorealists, inter-state relations are 'always power politics' (E.H.Carr, 1981[1939]: 145). Within the neorealist paradigm, power politics are contextualised as coercion employed by states to enhance their position in the international arena (Keohane, 1986: 113).11 International order is viewed as anarchy, meaning that there is no central authority to mediate the relations between states and these states are dependent upon themselves (their resources) for the protection of their national interests. The inability of states to 'operate within a common framework of moral precepts' (Morgenthau, 1973: 257) prompts the assumption that 'war may at any moment occur' (Waltz, 1959: 232). In this context, inter-state interaction is driven by the logic of a 'self-help' system, in which collective security and closer cooperation are impossible, because of the egotistic, self-interested and suspicious-of-the-other attitude of each actor.

Consequently, the issue of security is essential to the neorealist understanding of international order. It underscores the ability to preserve the national sovereignty of states (i.e. survival) and is defined 'in terms of military security' (F.Carr, 1998: 5). Within such a pattern of relations one state's gain is perceived as another's (if not all the others) loss. This has suggested that international affairs are marked by the 'security dilemma' (Herz, 1950) and 'prisoner's dilemma' (Jervis, 1978), both of which arise from a situation in which one state's attempts to increase its own security makes another feel less secure and urges it to take reciprocal measures.

10 Interestingly, Guzzini (2004: 535-36) has suggested that despite (or rather because of) the stature acquired by Waltz in the neorealist paradigm there has been a pointed 'diversity of realist writings', which have appeared in 'a general move to get realism out of the Waltzian straitjacket'. In this respect Guzzini exclaims that it is 'paradoxical that IR (and indeed realists themselves) seem unable to agree on a definition of realism when this very school, we are told, has held sway over the discipline for so long'.
11 By 'coercive threat/force' neorealist thinking usually implies military force.
In order to avoid a situation of constant war, the neorealist framework has developed a hierarchical order of states through which they influence each other's interests. The two dominant patterns for establishing and maintaining a system of hierarchy are balance-of-power and hegemony. Both models presuppose the existence of stronger (more influential) and weaker (less influential) states. On the one hand, hegemony proffers one dominant state (hegemon), which utilises its resources and capabilities to organise inter-state relations. In this way, hegemonic stability theory ascertains that 'the fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia' (Gilpin, 1981: 7). However, in contrast to the 'hegemonic peace' concept advanced in Section 3.3.1 of Chapter Three (where inter-state interactions are often conflictual, but change is achieved through non-military means), the neorealist suggestion of hegemonic stability expects change to occur mainly through war when 'there is incompatibility between crucial elements of the existing international system and the changing distribution of power among the states within the system' (Gilpin, 1988: 601; Petrova, 2003: 118). Balance-of-power, on the other, explains order 'as an ongoing process of balancing and adjustment of opposing power concentrations or threats among states under the conditions of anarchy' (Ikenberry, 2001: 11).

In this context, the pattern of socialisation is one conditioned by the logic of anarchy; otherwise states are eliminated (Sigel, 1970: 19-23). Thus, compliance is achieved only to the extent that an actor is forced to abide by certain rules, delineated by the threat from an immanent punishment (or annihilation). In this respect, Kenneth Waltz (1979: 74-77) considers the processes of 'socialisation' and 'imitation' mainly in terms of 'effects on behaviour', which do not affect constitutive beliefs and practices. Mearsheimer (1994/95: 48) has described such relations through a 'billiard ball' model, according to which the domestic practices of states do not affect their international affairs. In foreign-policy, states bounce off each other with only their hard surfaces — i.e. the governments — coming into contact.12 Thereby, the context and circumstances of international relations are assumed to have little effects on the legitimising values of the state. For instance, (as it will be elaborated in Chapter Seven) the post-Dayton Accords behaviour of Serbia/Montenegro reflects this logic. As soon as what was left of the former Yugoslav union perceived that the threat from the international community would not be acted upon, the Kosovo conflict became a trial of the military capabilities and mostly commitment of the international community to deliver on its promises. Regardless of different

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interpretations, the Kosovo conflict proves that without compulsion some actors would not submit to the socialising signals of the international system.

Owing to the logic of anarchy, the closest nation-states can come to working together is by forming alliances, since all kinds of formalised inter-state associations are perceived as epiphenomenal (Snyder, 1990: 110). Neorealist thinking suggests that states would naturally prefer not to entangle themselves in such institutional arrangements, due to the incipient risk of entrapment – or what Inis Claude (1962: 145) defines as ‘the freedom of the state to pick and choose’ how to act in case of aggression. However, because of necessity (i.e. the peremptory concern of states ‘to maintain their positions in the system’ [Waltz, 1979: 162]) alliances are formed according to perceived hostile intentions of a state (or a group of states) against another (or a group), and as such they represent a ‘balance-of-threat’ mechanism as opposed to balance-of-power (Walt, 1987: 32). In this respect, Morgenthau (1973: 175) postulates that ‘alliances are formed... on the basis of what... individual nations regard as their separate national interest’. Such framework suggests that ‘cooperation can only be directed at implementing or blocking outcomes that are disadvantageous for some and advantageous for others’ (Niou and Ordeshook, 1990: 1208). Alliances in a neorealist threat-based security system, are seen as short-lived and temporary formations (i.e. they are not a permanent route to order): first, because as soon as the perceived threat disappears, they dissolve, too (since there is no other incentive to keep them together); and second, because they are seen as a hindrance to actors’ interests for expanding their influence over (and at the expense of) the others (since alliances are ‘far less effective than states in producing and deploying power internationally’ [Wohlforth, 1999: 29]).

Neorealist logic was most notoriously confirmed by the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, which began almost as soon as the bipolarity in international relations disappeared. However, such affirmation of neorealism is to be taken only as an indication that its paradigm is good for explaining some of the causes of the current problems in the region; but not for understanding how a security-community-framework can be analytically suggested. Although, Gilpin (1981: 226-27) has suggested neorealism as a ‘science of peace’ aimed at achieving ‘more just and more peaceful world’, this research disagrees with such a claim. The contention is that neorealism is incapable of suggesting an analytical model of instrumental peace, owing to its proposition that international affairs are defined through the persistence of conflict (Thies, 2004: 176). This issue stems from the very logic of anarchy, which stipulates that states are ‘driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others’ (Herz, 1950: 157). The problem of neorealist thinking according to the ‘(former) realist’ Stefano Guzzini (2004: 557) is that it is a
‘theory without a vision’. Therefore, although the analytical suggestion of cooperation is not entirely impossible in the neorealist paradigm, it is not likely that it would be retained – which makes neorealism an unlikely framework for understanding the process of initiating security communities.

2.3.2. Neoliberal Perspective on Order:
The other major tradition in rationalist international relations theory is neoliberalism (and this exploration focuses on ‘neoliberal institutionalism’ (Baldwin, 1993; Keohane, 1989; Keohane and Nye, 1993)).

Scholars working from the neoliberal institutionalist perspective have suggested a plethora of institutions for states as important participants in the process of international relations, which constrain state-behaviour. Institutions in this context are understood to be ‘a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations’ (March and Olsen, 1998: 8). Thereby, the claim is that institutions have noticeable effects that can ameliorate realism’s security dilemma (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002: 576).

Significant in this context is the understanding of inter-state relations as a dynamic of complex interdependence, suggested through ‘distinctive political processes, which translate power’s sources into power as control of outcomes’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 33). The relations of authority are embodied in institutions and, thereby ‘reduce the uncertainty [of the anarchic system], lower transaction costs, and solve collective action problems’ (Ikenberry, 2001: 15). Owing to the increasing interdependence, military power is losing its appeal as a means for achieving state objectives and survival is no longer perceived as the primary concern of states (Schimmelfennig, 1999: 204). This, however, does not negate, but rather reinforces the rationalist (self-interest) paradigm of material, individual gain underlying neoliberalism (Shannon, 2000: 296). In other words, interactions are formalised in institutions because the ‘benefits outweigh the opportunity costs of not acting on short-run interests’ (Klotz, 1995: 457).

It is argued that due to this long-term (although self-interest-driven) perspective, the concept of security acquires a much broader rationalisation than in the neorealist case. As Randall Schweller (1994: 99) has suggested, because of the difficulty to determine the cost-benefit analysis of different actors, it is a ‘balance of interest’ (rather than balance of power or balance of threat) dynamic, which informs policy-making. Security, therefore, includes notions such as

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13 Thies (2004: 162,167) has noted that unlike neorealism, ‘no single authoritative version of neoliberalism has yet been created… neoliberalism lacks its own version of Waltz’. 
welfare, human rights and the environment alongside the more traditional military interpretations of the term (Wight, 1966: 103). Thus, the issue of preserving security becomes the responsibility of the society of states, rather than just the individual responsibility of each state (as it is in the realist self-help system).

The concept of inter-state cooperation fits more naturally within such an analytical framework. Owing to neoliberalism's take on rationalism it is ascertained that 'institutions... can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are evenly divided over time' (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 45). Their resilience tends to perpetuate the 'self-enforcing agreement', which mitigates the danger from violence in the international system (Weingast, 1993: 290). In this context, interstate cooperation tends to be prompted by institutional co-binding, on the one hand, and the creation of international regimes, on the other.

The process of 'co-binding' makes balancing unnecessary, since it ties (i.e. constrains) the actors into agreed upon relationship-patterns (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999: 182). Co-binding presupposes the establishment of a set of rules (based on certain norms and/or aspirations) aimed at regulating (often restricting) state behaviour in the international arena. This approach has been referred to as constitutionalisation of international interactions (owing to its emphasis on international law) (see Falk, 1987: 14-18; Clark and Sohn, 1960). In this pattern cooperation arises from agreed-upon institutions (found on mutual commitment and reassurances) through reducing the implications of 'winning' in politics (Ikenberry, 2001: 4). Hence, the power of each actor, in such legalised order, 'is exercised through political institutions which temper, moderate, and redirect that power, so as to render the dominance of one social force compatible with the community of many' (Huntington, 1968: 9).

Important in this connection, regimes suggest another form of interdependence in the international arena. More generally, they are defined as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (Krasner, 1983: 2). Thus, regimes are more than just alliances between states based on some agreements; they 'indicate a pattern of regularised cooperative behaviour' (F.Carr, 1998: 9). They emphasise that states can develop international cooperation by 'focusing on the evolution of expectations during interaction... even after the distribution of power that initially sustained them has gone' (Wendt, 1999: 19).

Both co-binding and regimes have unintended consequences on decision-making. The fact that states are not 'all alike and that preferences arise internally... [indicates that] international
arrangements can alter the power, beliefs, and goals of groups in society in ways that will affect foreign relations' (Jervis, 1991: 61). Institutional arrangements sometimes succeed to create cooperation, thicker than originally anticipated as the EU record seems to indicate. Such spillover can lead to unintended closer cooperation – and in some cases even integration (see E. Haas, 1958). This urges some scholars to ascertain that once established institutions develop a 'life of their own', which ties states closer to each other than initially anticipated (see Martin and Simmons, 1998).

Both the anticipated and unanticipated consequences of neoliberal institutionalism make it an interesting proposition for outlining a framework of analysis for peace-order in the Balkans. However, the post-Cold War years have posed a number of challenges in the Balkans, which suggest certain limitations to the self-interest logic of neoliberal institutionalism. Thus, the attempt to promote institutional development in the Balkan context can entrench division within the region creating new poles of antagonism. In other words, institutional rationalisation alone would not suggest the introduction of an awareness of 'common fate', 'shared identity' and 'we-feeling' (outside of its framework of unintended consequences). It can initiate such a process, but there is also the opportunity that it can generate a regional alliance system marked by divisions and suspicions. As Lionel Curtis (1922: 166) long ago acknowledged 'self-interest may afford a motive for common action at a given moment. But it cannot supply a basis for continuous co-operation, because the interests of individuals are constantly shifting'.

In order to resolve the current impasse in the region only (to borrow from another context) 'changes of the system would do... changes in the system would not' (Waltz, 2000: 5. Emphasis original). Neoliberal institutionalism represents only an (albeit, valuable and insightful) alteration in the neorealist view of order, not of its rationalist underpinnings. This means that recognising that institutions 'constrain state behaviour' is not enough; there is a requirement to investigate 'whether institutions may define/create or redefine/recreate the interests of states' (Acharya, 2001: 22). Alterations in state behaviour within institutionalist limits alone (at least in Southeastern Europe) are not likely to suggest an analytical framework of predictable and peaceful pattern of relations for the Balkans. Achieving this requires a thorough investigation into actors' interests and identities: how do they take shape and how (if at all) can they be influenced (and changed) in the process of inter-state interaction.

14 In an early challenge to the rationalist framework Klaus Knorr (1977: 92) elaborates the 'criteria by which we can distinguish between change of a system and a change in a system'.
2.3.3. Constructivist Perspective on Order:
The end of the Cold War has posed a number of questions for rationalist research (both neorealist and neoliberal) of international relations, the majority of them scrutinising their analytical framework. Reflecting the temper in the rationalist camp, Robert Keohane (1996: 463) has conceded that 'the fact that we lack theories that would enable us to understand the effects of the end of the Cold War on world politics certainly should make us humble'. Developments in the former Eastern Bloc, and especially in the Balkans, during the 1990s emphasised the importance of maintaining peaceful relations through cooperation. However, the policymakers, whose decisions (although not consciously) followed the rationalist paradigm failed to deliver a pattern of peaceful relations in the Balkans (at least up to 1999). At the same time, the initial strategy of deterrence, attempted by a number of Euro-Atlantic actors, further exacerbated the situation in the region. In response to these issues international relations theory proffered a number of sociological approaches to the study and the promotion of order.

While still focusing on the relations between states, they consider the kinds of exchanges occurring in the dynamics of inter-state interactions. The major orthodoxy of sociological approaches has become constructivism (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1999). Rather than distinguishing between the different strands of constructivism, this investigation adopts Ted Hopf's (1998: 172) proposition of 'conventional constructivists', in contrast to their postmodern variants.

Constructivism's main thrust is the proposition that the logic of anarchy is not fixed. Therefore, when actors interact in the international domain they operate in a larger ideational grid of amity and enmity dependent on their perceptions and experiences (Wendt 1994: 384, 389-91). The implication of this proposition is that actors attain identities according to the collective meanings, in which they take part (Wendt, 1992: 398). According to most rationalist analyses, actors' interests are formed prior to the process of interaction (i.e. because of the logic of anarchy), and this process only affects the behaviour of actors, not their identity. Constructivism, on the contrary, proposes that systemic interaction transforms state interests and, in the process, even affects their identity (i.e. the logic of anarchy is not fixed) (Wendt, 1994: 384). This, in fact, constitutes one of the main challenges to Waltzian thinking: the distinction between 'state' and 'anarchy' (the former defined as centralised authority and the latter defined by its absence). Instead, constructivism presents the micro- and macro-levels of analysis as mutually and intersubjectively constitutive, and the fact that the macro-level might be without centralised authority, does not mean that it is 'without rule' (Wendt, 1999: 308).
In this respect, constructivists stress that ‘understanding how interests are constituted’ is the ‘key to explaining a wide range of international phenomena that rationalists have either misunderstood or ignored’ (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 267). Therefore, they underscore the significance of the process of interaction for informing the meanings in which states’ behaviour is organised. The underscoring mechanism in inter-state relations is learning: interaction reinforces some international processes by rewarding actors ‘for holding certain ideas about each other, and, at the same time, discourages them from holding others’ (Wendt, 1992: 405).

Thus, the issue of security in constructivism is dependent upon the ability ‘to identify with the welfare of another’ (Wendt, 1994: 386). According to the constructivist framework (military) conflict is not endemic to the system and deterrence does not provide a viable and long-term solution to crisis (when it occurs). Instead, security comes from the involvement of all (or at least the main) actors in the process of interaction (as the vehicle for positive identification) among states. Collective identity introduces ‘collective definitions of interest’ arrived at through a scale of reciprocity and interdependence, marked by ‘a willingness to bear costs without selective incentives’ (Wendt, 1994: 386).

Thereby, cooperation results from the process of international socialisation: ‘over time and through reciprocal play, each [state] learns to form relatively stable expectations about the other’s behaviour’ (Wendt, 1992: 416). Such cooperation infuses the positive interdependence between states into a sense of community, underlined by shared interests, identities and norms. This inference opens the possibility not only for articulating, but also for establishing collective security arrangements, which unlike realist alliances, are not temporary organisations constituted in response to a particular threat. On the contrary, such collective security frameworks ‘make commitments to multilateral action against nonspecific threats’ (Wendt, 1994: 386). Also, unlike neoliberal institutions and regimes, this form of collective security is based on actors’ shared identity and underlying common interests.\(^{15}\) In other words, constructivist security arrangements challenge the self-help rationale and proffer “cooperative” security systems... [where] the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all’ (Wendt, 1992: 400). The solidarity among actors (a value-added from collective identification) allows them continually to redefine their interests and identities, and at the same time reiterate their commitment to the collective community.

\(^{15}\) Although institutions and regimes may independently achieve such form of integration unexpectedly as a result of a ‘democratic institutional spillover’. See the previous section on this issue.
Some commentators have reflected that constructivism's main contribution is in elaborating 'the content of international politics' (Shannon, 2000: 313). Accordingly, it provides helpful insights into the process of altering the adversarial stance that has been the trademark of policy-making in the Balkans. In particular its analysis of interest- and identity-formation through the dynamic of interaction offers valuable information for the study of the processes of international socialisation: the ways in which actors reproduce the patterns of international relations (the knowledge of the shared experience) in their practices (intersubjective interactions). However, as it will be elaborated in Chapter Three, the explanatory value of constructivist research is primarily relevant to already developed (or optimal) patterns of peace-order. Since this study is focused on the initial stages of order-promotion its idealism (in the sense of emphasising how ideas and culture constitute the content and meaning of materialist power and interests) does not tally with the instrumentalism of suggesting an analytical framework for the extension of security-community-practices to the Balkans. Therefore, this research proffers a combination of neoliberal practices and constructivist ideation, in order to suggest a pattern for initiating a security community in the Balkans.

2.3.4. Neoliberal-Constructivist Perspective on Order:
Neoliberal constructivism (being an eclectic approach) combines in its understanding of international order rationalist (interest-based and power-based) and cognitive (knowledge-based) standpoints. It should be noted from the outset that the suggestion of a neoliberal-constructivist perspective is distinct from similar explanatory frameworks: namely, realist constructivism and sociological institutionalism. As noted by J. Samuel Barkin (2003: 333), the former suggests that no matter how well-intentioned and well-designed institutional patterns reveal that 'power will always be the ultimate arbiter in international politics'. In contrast to this realist-constructivist claim, this thesis concurs with the suggestion that the effects of power can be transcended in international life through the institutionalisation of state-interests (Jackson and Nexon, 2004: 339-40). In other words, it is institutions that can constrain the self-interested exercise of power and influence the diffusion of compliance with externally-promoted standards (Pevehouse, 2005: 8). Power, thereby, is not only constricted, but also exercised through institutions – be it the advancement of a certain norm, agreed-upon rules or arrangements, etc. On the other hand, sociological institutionalism tends to explain order-promotion as an effect of the social identities of the promoters, largely in terms of self-esteem (Schimmelfennig, 2003). This focus on social identities has led some scholars to equate sociological institutionalism with constructivism.
(Jupille et al., 2003: 10). In contrast, the suggested neoliberal-constructivist perspective pays attention to the rationality (i.e. material preferences and strategic interests) concomitant in the process of order-promotion. Perhaps only subtle, such distinction between the framework of neoliberal constructivism and the ones of realist constructivism and sociological institutionalism emphasises this thesis' attempt to provide a balanced account of the interplay of interests and identities in the process of initiating a security community type of order.

Applying the neoliberal-constructivist perspective to the Balkans involves foregrounding the aspects that suggest the establishment of a stable and cooperative pattern of relations. In this respect, the analytical proposition for peace-promotion (i.e. the initiation of a particular pattern of order) contributes to recent studies, which have recognised that theoretical synergies tend to have more convincing explanatory value than traditional approaches premised on paradigmatic inflexibility. Such eclecticism, according to Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein (2002: 577), encourages scholars to embark on a problem-driven rather than method-driven research and, hence, stimulates analysis befitting the complexity of political processes. It has further been defined as 'a process through which a theorist constructs a coherent analytical approach by utilising, synthesising, and reflecting on insights from disparate paradigms' (Makinda, 2000: 398).

The main aspects of the neoliberal-constructivist order prompted here are: (a) institutions – based on mutual agreements, whose normative 'stickiness' and institutional autonomy proffer cooperation; and (b) interaction – the process of interest- and identity-formation, which develops experiential knowledge among actors and introduces positive identification and community-building. Thus, neoliberalism provides the rules and procedures for institutional co-binding, while constructivism points to the learning of new practices and the establishment of trust among actors. As it will be made apparent in Chapters Three and Four, such contention is in agreement with Vaughn Shannon's (2000: 298) analysis of peaceful decision-making as something that neither rationalism nor constructivism can illuminate independently since neither can conjecture 'the logics in the interaction between mental structures instantiated in practical reason on the one hand and in institutional requirements on the other'.

Thereby, the expectation of a predictable pattern of relations within the analytical suggestion of neoliberal-constructivism is derived from the understanding that rule-compliance is prompted not only by a psychological 'feel good' factor from interaction with and inclusion in a 'more highly valued social group' (Flockhart, 2004b: 364), but also that there is a significant strategic rationality behind such conformity (i.e. avoidance of sanctions and ensuring international
assistance). As Chapter Four will indicate, such process of socialisation makes norm-conformity the standard of international behaviour and violating it, then, requires overcoming many obstacles (Shannon, 2000: 301). Hence, the combination of these two theoretical concepts of international relations allows putting the issue of 'practicable and real peace' in the Balkans in its rightful context: as a distinct pattern of international relations based on the interaction between the cooperation and security aspects of order.

The next chapter will focus on the process and practice of security-community-building and will consider its relevance to the Balkans. Its claims are informed by insights from neoliberal-constructivist theorising. On the one hand, the analytical basis for initiating security communities is elicited from the neoliberal notion of 'complex interdependence', which hints that international actors (international/intergovernmental institutions) tend to be the agents that induce states to solve conflicts through non-violent means (Nye, 1993: 169). Robert Keohane (1989: 174) has argued that 'without institutions there will be little cooperation'. In other words, the expectation is that regular interaction between decision-makers routinises the practice of political cooperation. In this respect, one of the hypotheses of this research (developed in Chapter Six) is that the EU's provision of a common forum for debates among Western Balkan elites through the Stabilisation and Association Process introduces a mechanism for regular institutionalised contact among them, which facilitates their cooperation. Thus, institutions are deemed helpful for creating expectations among actors that they would 'behave' in an accepted (or agreed upon) way in particular situations. Institutions, therefore 'are normalising in the sense that they tend to embody shared codes, rules and conventions, thereby imposing upon political subjects value-systems which may serve to constrain behaviour' (Hay, 2002: 105). It is this imposition of normative frameworks, which reflects the asymmetrical distributions of power that yields 'complex interdependence' (inferred through the multiplicity of functional hierarchies) instead of control (Hoffman, 1980: 117-19; Onuf and Klink, 1989: 167).¹⁶

On the other hand, constructivism adds to 'complex interdependence' its suggestion of an underlying dynamic of 'complex learning' (Wendt, 1999: 170). Namely, the process of interaction makes actors learn about each other, which provides them with knowledge what to expect from each other.¹⁷ Thus, within the context of neoliberal institutionalism they agree to work together, which initially affects only their behaviour. However, the continual practice (re-
enaction of the norms, which initiated the process) prompts them to 'internalise' the rules and procedures and, subsequently, impacts their identities (how they perceive themselves and the other actors). Recent scholarship has claimed that cooperation and cooperative/peaceful international orders are the outcomes of 'iterated processes', which reflect ongoing dynamics and call attention to the practice of socialisation (O'Neill et al., 2004: 151). In this way, actors participate in the pattern of international relations according to the expectations that its rules (instituted through 'complex interdependence') are to be followed. International standards, thereby, 'are also normalising in the sense that they may come to define logics of appropriate behaviour in a given institutional setting to which actors conform in anticipation of the sanctions or opprobrium to which non-compliance is likely to give rise' (Hay, 2002: 105).

Within such a framework, neoliberal-constructivism should be understood as a 'common sense' pattern of international relations (Wendt, 1999: 296). Such approach, as Margarita Petrova (2003: 148) has argued, evinces the mechanisms through which material factors create the conditions for ideational change. It recognizes the potential of constructivism to promote 'other-help' as opposed to 'self-help' of neorealism; but it also is aware that this analytical transition could be implemented through the instruments and practices outlined by neoliberal institutionalism. The wedding of both approaches makes explicit an 'assumed but unexplored step [of neoliberal institutionalism] which accounts for the maintenance of cooperation' (Sterling-Folker, 2000: 100. Emphasis original). It is argued, thereby, that constructivism adds consideration to the effects identities have on institutions; while neoliberalism contributes empirical thickness and analytical rigidity to constructivist ideation, which is often (blamed for being) divorced from material and efficiency factors (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002: 577, 583).

In this respect, neoliberal-constructivism recognises the role of ideation (ideas and beliefs) on the policy-making process. In effect, it distinguishes a pattern in which ideas affect policies through institutions. Thereby, in contrast to the neorealist take, neoliberal-constructivism accords ideas both instrumental and constitutive roles, deriving from their consideration as 'problem-solving devices with different utilities on the basis of which the leadership chooses the most beneficial one' (Petrova, 2003: 149-50). Such 'institutional ideation' (Yee, 1996: 86) helps to overcome the limitations of neoliberalism, which 'has always been less an explanation for what policymakers actually do and more a prescription of what they should do' (Sterling-Folker, 2000: 115-16. Emphasis original); and explain constructivists' selectivity, or why they 'pay little attention to norms and ideas that are both revolutionary and evil' (Jervis, 1998: 974).
suggested, such a framework also helps to explain the contradictory dynamics of conflict and cooperation from the same analytical perspective.

Therefore it is expected that the development of such eclectic explanations will provide both relevant insights to the puzzle of peace, per se, and the initiation of its framework of order in the Balkans, in particular. The proposition is that this approach emphasises the path-dependent nature of a neoliberal-constructivist socialisation process, which indicates the ability of institutions to abolish ‘past suspicions’ (Baker and Welsh, 2000: 82). This assumption, however, does not deny the autonomous agency of ‘socialised’ actors; instead, it suggests templates, which they are most likely to follow in particular contexts (even if initially attracted primarily by rational motifs).18 Such contention facilitates the understanding of socialisation as a process of ‘strategic social construction’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 888).

As will be made apparent in Chapter Four, ideas affect decision-making primarily through the socialisation of expert-groups (Yee, 1996: 86-94). An expert-group (or an ‘epistemic community’) is a network of individuals, which has ‘an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge’ (P. Haas, 1992: 3). For the purposes of this research, the expert-group at the heart of its study of security-community-building has been defined as state-elites.19 Being socialised through the interactive practice of their institutionalised behaviour tends to encourage decision-makers ‘to commit to multilateral practices... because the practices are themselves affecting how elites define efficiency’ (Sterling-Folker, 2000: 112).

The required qualification relates to the issue of viability (i.e. hierarchy) of certain ideas over others, which is dependent on the ‘institutional mechanisms that render some ideas more politically influential than others’ (Yee, 1996: 93). Such proposition, however, does not seem to indicate sufficiently the particular process of ideational dominance of certain norms and rules and the practice of their promotion. As it will be elaborated in Chapters Three and Four, the influence of particular normative patterns depends on their shaping power of attraction, which suggests the exploration of consensual hegemony to the study of security-community-building.20 Said otherwise, Euro-Atlantic institutions such as the EU and NATO are constructed as ‘transnational moral entrepreneurs’, whose agency ‘stimulate[s] and assist[s] in the creation of likeminded

18 More on the dynamics of such autonomous agency – i.e. the ‘localisation’ of the process of socialisation – in Acharya (2004).
19 The required caveat is that the notions of ‘elites’ and ‘state’ are perceived as coterminous for the purposes of this research. Likewise, Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990: 284. Emphasis added) acknowledge that ‘the notion of socialisation... elaborates on the mechanisms, through which norms and beliefs become embedded in the elite communities of secondary states’. More on this issue see in Section 3.3.2.A of Chapter Three.
20 Such framework of consensual hegemony is informed by a practice distinct from that of neorealist hegemonic stability theory.
organisations in other countries’ (Nadelmann, 1990: 480). In other words, it is the agency of ideas (through their institutionalised framework) that promotes trust and interdependence.

The implication of such institutional ideation for the Balkans is the suggestion that the idea of cooperation tends to be introduced through the institutionalised dialogue of state-elites for solving de-territorialized issues. In this way, the idea of order-promotion is given a sufficient degree of agency, and, at the same time its cognitive aspects are illuminated. The hypothesis is that the institutionalisation of such practice and the norms that it promotes are likely to set the region on the course of creating a stable order. The suggestion is that once initiated ‘institution-building can also change reality, thereby fostering mutually beneficial cooperation’ (Keohane, 1984: 30), which contributes to ‘the process by which egoists learn to cooperate [which] is at the same time a process of reconstructing their interests in terms of shared commitments to social norms’ (Wendt, 1992: 417).

2.4. Conclusion:
The overview of the concept of order in international relations theory, provided in this chapter, suggests its applicability to the study of peace. In other words, peace has been defined as a particular pattern of order, which tends to be suggested through its aspects of security and cooperation. Moreover, it has been indicated that this framework of international relations can be analytically identified through a theoretical synergy between neoliberalism and constructivism. Conceptually, as already indicated, such an approach recognises that ‘no single paradigm can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics’; and, thus, acknowledges that research in international affairs ‘should remain cognizant of realism’s emphasis on the inescapable role of power, keep liberalism’s awareness of domestic forces in mind, and... reflect on constructivism’s vision of change’ (Walt, 1998: 30, 44).

In this way, the expectation is that the promotion of a framework of peace in the Balkans requires external agencies (i.e. peace-promoters) to induce, regulate and maintain the introduction of such path-dependent pattern of policy-predictability among regional state-elites. In this respect, the pragmatic response to the queries posed by Rengger at the outset of this chapter is that the transmission of ideas to decision-makers and the context of their dissemination in the policy process is contingent upon the choices of Balkan elites, conditioned by the Euro-Atlantic institutions within the context of socialisation (Hay, 2002: 128-30). In this respect, policy-making becomes dependent on the particular perceptions of state-elites in a given context.
Yet, as suggested in Chapter One, the treatment of security communities in International Relations theory does not elaborate sufficiently the power-relationships, which underscore the processes of their initiation. Therefore, the following chapter elaborates the meaning of a security-community-order and suggests an analytical framework for understanding the dynamics of its initiation. Furthermore, it details the concept of power as part of the 'triggering mechanism' of socialisation, which instigates a pattern of cooperative international relations.
CHAPTER THREE

ESTABLISHING SECURITY COMMUNITIES

3.1. Introduction:
As suggested in Chapter Two, the synthesis of the neoliberal-constructivist approach indicates security communities as the framework of a pattern of peace. Therefore, this chapter scrutinises the dominant debates in the literature on security communities, in order to suggest a model for initiating their pattern of order in the Balkans. The pragmatic question for establishing peaceful orders is ‘what makes security communities get off the ground’ (Acharya, 2001: 35)? In the context of the theoretical analysis of neoliberal-constructivism the query can be modified as to how self-interested states develop the practice of establishing regional institutions that can introduce cooperative exchange in the region? And what is the role of Euro-Atlantic organisations in assisting such process?

This chapter starts off with a brief overview of the concept of security community. It is argued that its traditional definition suggests a model for optimal order indicated as a democratic security community. However, owing to the objectives of this research and the context of order promotion in the Balkans, this study proceeds by investigating the initial stages of order-promotion. Thereby, it operationalises the concepts of nascent and embryonic security community. It problematises the latter and proffers the notion of an elite security community as the instrumental pattern for security-community-building. As suggested in Chapter Two, because of the context of the post-Cold War involvement of peace-entrepreneurs (i.e. the Euro-Atlantic agents), this understanding elaborates the concept of power and suggests that the initial stages of security-community-building are dominated by processes of consensual hegemony. Therefore, the understanding of peace-order indicates that security communities are initiated as a result of the socialisation power of external agents to create institutional arrangements that both have the ability to maintain the compliance of state-elites and the capacity to ensure that their decision-making follows peaceful and non-belligerent foreign-policy-choices.

3.2. The Analytical Framework of Security Communities:
As suggested in Chapter Two, the conceptual origins of security community are traced to the work of Richard W. Van Wagenen (1952), who intimates that its self-sustaining continuity is a consequence from the institutional self-enforcing agreement among actors. However,
traditionally, the discussion of this notion draws on the definition given by Karl Deutsch (1957: 5) and his associates (Van Wagenen being one of them), who elaborate that:

A security community is a group of people which become 'integrated'... By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population... By sense of community we mean a belief on the part of the individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'... By peaceful change we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.

Likewise, Alexander Wendt (1995: 73) regards that security communities are 'composed of shared knowledge in which states trust one another to resolve disputes without war'. A security community, thereby, arises from (and is maintained by) the process of interaction in which actors develop their knowledge of shared norms and values. This knowledge (and pattern-predictability) allows them to redefine (continually) order among them as a security community. Consequently, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998b: 30) have identified security community 'as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states, whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change'.

Such definitions have intimated the analytical significance of the security-community-concept for the promotion of peace as order. The two indicators of its pattern of inter-state relations - security and community - signal the aspects of order (cooperation and security) outlined in Chapter Two.

The cooperation aspect is inferred from the suggestion that the underlying 'integration' of security communities, reflects a practice of 'mutual responsiveness', which characterises a 'sense of community'. This is defined as 'much more than simply verbal attachments to any number of similar or identifiable values. Rather this [is] a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we-feeling", trust and consideration' (Deutsch et al., 1957: 129). Such understanding of cooperation through the interactive practices of an integrated community of states, indicates an underlying collective identity (i.e. 'we-feeling'), which is 'a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making'(Deutsch et al., 1957: 36).

The security aspect is reflected in the 'dependable expectation of peaceful change'. Adler and Barnett (1998b: 34) have argued that this aspect can be best defined as 'neither the expectation of
nor the preparation for organised violence' as a means to settle inter-state disputes. In their original rendition, Deutsch and associates prompted a similar understanding of the notion of 'peaceful change' through the perception of 'real assurance that the members of the [security] community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way' (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5).

The suggestion of this research is that such explanation and understanding of the security community framework reflects a pattern of optimal order. Thereby, the literature on peace-promotion has tended to concentrate on the achievement of its mature framework of predictability and reciprocity, which has diverted attention from the initial (more instrumental) stages of its establishment. Adler and Barnet (1998b: 38) have argued that there are three factors, which facilitate the emergence of security communities: (i) precipitating conditions – changes in demography, economics, environment, the new interpretations of social reality and external threats; (ii) factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity – transactions, organisation and social learning; and (iii) necessary conditions for dependable expectations of peaceful change – mutual trust and collective identity.

By applying these three tiers to the study of peace-order, Adler and Barnett operationalise the vocabulary of 'pluralistic' and 'amalgamated' security communities suggested by Deutsch and associates. They have defined amalgamated security community as 'the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit with some type of common government'; whereas the pluralistic one 'retains the legal independence of separate governments' (Deutsch et al., 1957: 6). While still operating within the Deutschian framework, Adler and Barnett (1996: 84-93) problematise the notion of pluralistic security community by developing a three-level hierarchy, according to the degree of 'dependable expectations of peaceful change': 'nascent', 'ascendant' and 'mature'. However, before expanding on the initial phases of security-community-building, the next section details the pattern of policy-making in the optimal (or 'mature') form – the democratic security community – which (although unlikely in the shorter to medium term) is crucial to illuminating the practices of security-community-initiation in the Balkans.

3.2.1. Democratic Security Community:
A preoccupation with the optimal form of security communities could be explained through the rarity of their occurrence. Traditionally, it is the post-World War II relationship that emerged in Western Europe, as well as the North American interactions between the US and Canada, which
are given as examples of ‘successful’ security community projects. Part of the reason for this achievement, according to Emanuel Adler (1992: 293) is ‘not merely because [the members of a security community] share just any kind of values, but because they share liberal democratic values and allow their societies to become interdependent and linked by transnational economic and cultural relations’. Deutsch and his collaborators have also emphasised the importance of domestic practices for the development of a sense of community: ‘there had to be compatibility of the main values held by the relevant strata of all the political units involved... One of these values, clearly, is basic political ideology’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 123-24).

Adler and Barnett (1996: 92) have suggested that in their ‘mature’ form security communities may be ‘loosely coupled’ or ‘tightly coupled’. However, this research concurs with Amitav Acharya’s (1998: 202) suggestion that the ‘distinction between the two cannot be a sharp one’, since there is ‘considerable overlap between [them]’. Therefore, this section adopts John Vasquez’ (1986: 288-89) term of ‘the democratic security community’ as description of the optimal form of such peace-order. Vasquez defined its meaning as ‘an order among states... whose members are at peace and do not anticipate, at any level, the possibility of going to war with each other’.

The main characteristic of a democratic security community is its capacity of responsiveness to the preferences of its citizens (Lucarelli: 2002: 11). Such inference is usually drawn on the assumption that ‘democratic decision-makers expect to resolve conflicts by compromise and non-violence, and will expect other democratic decision-makers to perceive the situation in the same way’ (Rengger, 2000: 115). The logic of this claim derives, first, from the suggestion that due to the transparency and accountability of policy-formulation in democratic states, it is less likely that state-elites would be able to justify domestically the use of force against other democratic states; and, secondly, as a result of the increased economic interdependence among democratic states (Cederman, 2001: 15-19).

Since this research concentrates primarily on the pattern of European order it focuses on the model of the West European democratic security community. Moreover, as Ole Wæver (1998: 69) has exclaimed, most commentators readily agree that ‘Western Europe is a security community’. As Chapters Six and Seven will suggest, it is the particular dynamics of functional

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21 In an insightful analysis, Neta Crawford (1994) claims that it is the League of the Iroquois Nations (ca. 1450-1777) that represents the only ‘excellent example’ of a true Kantian peace kind of order.
22 Lucarelli (2002) distinguishes between liberal-democratic security community and democratic security community. However, for the purposes of this research such distinction is deemed unnecessary, although the thesis follows mostly Lucarelli’s understanding of the former, rather than the latter type.
integration premised on the formation of the EU and NATO (i.e. the main Euro-Atlantic institutions), which circumscribed the development of its framework.

In this respect, the viability of the West European security community has broadly been inferred from its democratic practices. As the case studies of the EU and NATO will exemplify, the credibility of what began as an elite project depended upon the favourable impact of the integration processes upon the conditions of the populations in participating states. It is within this relationship that the feedback-and-output model of the West European security community is construed as a pattern of relations between the publics of the states involved, their decision-making elites and the outcomes from common actions that facilitated the gradual development of a 'sense of community'.

In this way, the integrative processes initiated in Western Europe have fulfilled the tasks of: (1) maintaining peace among the participating members; (2) attaining greater multipurpose capabilities for them; (3) accomplishing the specific issues of integration; and, (4) gaining a new self-image and role-identity for the members (Deutsch, 1978: 239-40).

Figure 1: The foreign-policy decision-making dynamic in the West European democratic security community.

This model is premised on the decision systems that affect foreign policy-making outlined by Deutsch (1978: 117-32). The focus on decisions, according to Deutsch, reflects a better instrumentalisation of the processes of following prescribed rules of behaviour and compliance with agreed-upon standards and procedures. Thus, it is argued that the current representation is a better reflection of the democratic dynamic of decision-making between the different levels of actors (which Deutsch represents as cascading channels of communication); thence, giving an improved illustration of the strategic interactions in foreign policy-formulation.

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governing elites develop inter-subjective understandings and explanations within the societies. The output behaviour resulting from these decisions influences the relationship between the common pool of memories to which both societies and elites refer to in order to justify their actions. The democratic preferences affecting policy-formulation are shaped by the societal and elite cost/benefit analyses as well as by the historical experience (Kozhemiakin, 1998: 21). These preferences are also reflected in the ‘process of interaction that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion’ (Checkel, 2001: 562). Therefore, it is the ‘institutions’, the ‘agreement among political elites on the “rules of the game”’ and the pressure of ‘public needs’ that ‘together provide the mechanisms for resolving conflicts’ (Webb, 1977: 12). As a result, the order established between the West European states has been described through the ‘practice of habits and skills of mutual attention, communication and responsiveness’ (Deutsch, 1978: 251) as a result of the cooperation frameworks between them.

The communicative efficiency between state-elites, the citizens of member states and the positive feedback from the memories of their cooperative behaviour enabled the potential of forging and maintaining a West European community of democratic values premised on the ‘belief that others are of the same community’ (Howe, 1995: 40). The process was further facilitated by the promotion of commensurable political norms embedded in the rules of membership and ‘buttressed by the mythology of a shared destiny’ that helped ‘create a sense of community in populations lacking tangible homogeneity’ (Howe, 1997: 314).

3.3. Initiating Security Communities:
Owing to the objective of this thesis – understanding the initiation of order – this investigation concentrates primarily on the practical stages that initiate a security community. In their reconsideration of the Deutschian approach, Adler and Barnett (1996: 86) identify the ‘nascent security community’ – marked by shared perceptions of threat, expectations of trade benefits and a degree of collective identity – as the earliest phase in security-community-building. Yet, they admit that their classification rather than prompting a ‘compartmentalising teleology’ is primarily an attempt to suggest ‘heuristic devices’ for aiding research (Barnett and Adler, 1998: 431). In this respect, David Jones and Mike L. Smith (2001: 273-78) have taken them to task and have outlined an ‘embryonic’ stage in the process of order-initiation. They have defined an ‘embryonic security community’ through ‘the maintenance of good relations between its member states’, which produces ‘a reasonably stable and healthy economic climate’. The distinction between the notions of ‘embryonic’ and ‘nascent’ security community is the criterion of ‘dependable
expectations of peaceful change': whereas it is ensured in the latter, its maintenance is uncertain in the former.

Jones and Smith, however, do not provide sufficient analysis as to how such an embryonic stage is to be initiated. They only declare that it depends upon the 'dispositions' of decision-makers (Jones and Smith, 2001: 276-77). Although, Adler and Barnett (1996: 86) are more circumspect in their conclusions they do not seem to problematise the process by which states 'begin to consider how they might coordinate their relations in order to increase their mutual security, lower the transaction costs associated with their exchanges, and/or encourage further exchanges and interactions'. In this respect, the current investigation reviews the concept of hegemonic order. As suggested in Chapter Two, the assumption of this research is that the establishment of peaceful order in the Balkans is premised on the external promotion of a security community in the region. The required caveat is that the promotion of a security community in the Balkans is not understood by this research as a separate (or different) phenomenon from the Euro-Atlantic one. Instead, the initiation of peaceful order in the Balkans is interpreted as the enlargement and extension into the region of the Western democratic security community.24 Thereby, external agency and elite-compliance are the main propensities (envisioned by this research) in initiating a security community framework in the Balkans. The following sections outline the nature of the power-relations advanced by such consideration, which subsequently suggests the initial stage of order-promotion as an elite security community.

3.3.1. Hegemonic Power Revisited:
This section prompts a consideration of the role of power in the formation of security communities. A number of commentators have noted that there is a predisposition to explain the stability of (democratic) security communities primarily through the normative scale of attraction and detraction of outcomes, deriving from socialisation, while overlooking its strategic rationale. For instance, Alexander Wendt (1999: 305) has conjectured that the perception of expected policy, maintains and motivates states' participation in such optimal model of order, because its pattern infuses the meaning of policy-making with the practice of 'seeing each other's security not just as instrumentally related to their own, but as literally being their own... All [participating states] refer to a shared, super-ordinate identity that overlays and has legitimate claims on separate body identities'.

24 In this respect, the phrases 'security-community-building', 'security-community-promotion', 'security-community-initiation', etc. are taken as stylistic variations, which reflect the process of enlarging/extending the Euro-Atlantic security community.
However, the argument is that this very same process discloses the notion of power as an ‘interpersonal situation’ (Lasswell, 1948: 10). Adler and Barnett (1998b: 38) even acknowledge that the ‘expectations of peaceful change’ are sometimes ‘dependent’ on the ‘ability to nudge and occasionally coerce others to maintain a collective stance’. This recognises the role played by “third parties”, that is, organisations and institutions that can observe, whether or not the participating states are honouring their contracts and obligations’ (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 86) in the process of promoting a security-community-framework of order in an environment of distrust (such as in the Balkans). Therefore, this section first outlines the socialisation aspect of hegemonic power (Section 3.3.1.A) and then the hegemonic peace relationship, which it underscores (Section 3.3.1.B).

3.3.1.A. Socialisation Power:
The notion of power is one of the central and, yet, most elusive concepts in the study of the relations between states (see Guzzini, 2002). The understanding of its application is seemingly the essence of the distinction between the different strands of International Relations theory. In the context of the security community literature, Karl Deutsch has defined its meaning as ‘control of human behaviour through voluntary habits of compliance in combination with threats to probable enforcement’ (Deutsch, 1978: 17. Emphasis original). Furthermore, he elaborates that power indicates ‘the probability of victory in the event of conflict’ (in Carroll, 1972: 586). The claim of the thesis however, is that such a definition obscures the understanding of the processes of security-community-initiation, mainly due to its entrapment within the realist interpretation of power.25

Such an inference rests on a largely forgotten article on the ‘cult of power’ in peace research by Berenice Carroll (1972). In it she provides a perceptive overview of the etymological development of the concept of power in the study of politics. Carroll’s main finding is that the meaning of power ‘as control and dominance is a development of recent decades; the more traditional meaning centred on the idea of ability’ (Carroll, 1972: 589).26 In a similar fashion, although not so incisively, Stefano Guzzini (2002: 24) has argued that current attempts at ‘power-

25 As it will be suggested soon in this chapter as well as in Section 7.5 of Chapter Seven this thesis retains a notion of power as force. However, the instances of power as force are interpreted in terms of the ability of agents to produce desired effects (i.e. stressing the relational aspect of power) and not only as effects of agents’ control over outcomes (i.e. emphasising material capabilities).
26 Carroll (1972: 589) points out that a mere comparison of the definition of power in the Oxford and Webster’s dictionaries from the 1930s to 1970s illustrates such alteration in the meaning of the concept. Therefore, Carroll (1972: 601-02) argues that in some sense the original meaning of power as ability can be retrieved through negation – i.e. that power indicates a framework of ‘noncontrol’ or a situation of ‘deliberate suspension of control’.
analysis' have become a critique of the realist thinking of 'power politics'; but he fails to discern that such challenges lack an attempt to recover the 'pre-realist' meaning of the notion of power. 27 In this respect Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005: 43-44) rightly emphasise that a mere offer of alternative definition in opposition to the realist one is not sufficient for opening the 'conceptual aperture' of the term – instead, it simply presumes 'that scholars must choose sides'. However, despite their sophisticated analysis, Barnett and Duvall fail to overcome the paradigm of power as an 'exercise of control over', which underwrites their definition of power 'as production of effects'.

In her article, Carroll (1972: 588-89, 611) defines power as the 'ability to act', which prompts her to develop the notion of 'socialising power', underwritten by the practice of elite-socialisation: 'the power of shaping the habits and attitudes of the individuals and small groups of which any society is composed, and upon whose habits and attitudes its governing power depends'. Thence, power as ability indicates the socialisation power of external actors to shape the policy-prefences of state-elites. Such understanding of power is informed by the growing doubt of its definition solely in terms of intended effects. As D. White (1971: 150) argues, the elucidation of power 'in terms of intended effects is misconceived'; hence, it is not intention that matters but the ability to cause change of policy-behaviour. Therefore, Klaus Knorr (1977: 106-08) has suggested that the 'power of influence' does not necessarily rest with traditional resorts to coercive behaviour', but is an effect of what he refers to as 'nonpower influence'. Knorr argues that 'nonpower influence can be generated... when B admires and follows A's example of comportment or of creativity in solving domestic problems'. In this respect (mostly intuitively, rather than consciously), Adler and Barnett (1998b: 39-40) conclude that 'power can be a magnet; a community formed around a group of strong powers creates the expectation that weaker states that join the community will be able to enjoy the security and potentially other benefits that are associated with that community'.

Perhaps, the fullest account of power as ability is provided by Rudolph J. Rummel (1976) in the second volume of his opus on Understanding Conflict and War. Rummel (1976: 163) elaborates the notion of power as the ability and capacity to produce effects. He defines the effects of power through its intended and unintended results. Thus, while the former indicate

27 In a later article, Guzzini (2004: 538) distinguishes between military power, which relates to physical force and, political power, 'which is fundamentally a psychological relation influencing the other's mind'. Yet, again, he fails to emphasise that power refers to the ability to influence, which (as will be explained shortly) depends on the ability to make some policy-choices more attractive than others. A 'good' example of such failure to understand the 'power politics of peace' is Pouliot (2004: 16).
primarily the material capabilities to exert outcomes, the latter reflect the ‘quality of being’ (Rummel, 1976: 166) of those exercising it. Consequently, it is the unintended consequences of power, which facilitate the understanding of its hegemonic practice of socialisation in initiating security communities. Rummel (1976: 167-68), identifies this aspect as a result of the ‘power to draw attention’ – i.e. willingness to identify through association/partnership rather than confrontation – which has the ‘capacities-to-produce-effects’. In international life, such desire to identify through association with other states or membership of particular international organisations can be for various reasons, but it provides the ones aspired to with the ‘capability to alter the perception and opportunities’ of the aspirants. Such ability to socialise implicates the hegemonic practices of power. This understanding suggests the socialisation power of prestige translated into policy-actions. In other words, the suggested (hegemonic) socialisation power of Euro-Atlantic institutions is underwritten by the power of attraction of a ‘larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically, and educationally advanced political unit’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 38).

As will be indicated in Chapter Four, however, power as ability also depends on coercing compliance, in the instances when the appeal of the hegemon fails to attract compliance. It is in this aspect that Rummel’s contribution to the concept-formation of socialisation power is central. Rummel’s conjecture is that regardless of the compulsion implicated with coercion, those socialised in this way retain a choice of action, which underscores ‘the great unpredictability of coercion’ (Rummel, 1976: 177). In this respect, Chapters Five and Seven will explain that despite repetitive coercive measures against the authorities in Belgrade, throughout the 1990s they remained intransigent in their non-compliance with externally promoted rules. To put it crudely, the choice for Serbia/Montenegro was either ‘do as the West tells you’ (and the concomitant...

28 Note that Bruce Russett’s (1985: 207) elaboration of the two aspects of hegemonic power – power-base and power as control of outcomes – largely reflects Rummel’s conjectures. Russett (1985: 228) points out that even when a hegemonic state loses some of its material capabilities, its hegemonic sway does not necessarily diminish. Instead, it is very likely to persist for a long time because of the normative aspects of its power-base – ‘the pervasive cultural influence [of the hegemon]’. This influence is made apparent in the rules and procedures, which constrain the decision-making process in such pattern of order. However, Russett’s failure to conceive power as ability prevents him from elaborating the socialising effects of attraction in the practices of power.

29 In this respect, it is striking that in their analysis of power, Barnett and Duvall (2005: 50) only mention that power can have effects ‘even if unintentionally’. The lack of emphasis on the unintended aspects of power – i.e. its ability to produce effects – is puzzling, bearing in mind their argument that power can be ‘an attribute that an actor possesses... and works through social relations’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 45).

30 Moreover, Rummel treats the meaning of power as a product of inter-subjective interaction centred on a symbolic perception of binding expectations: ‘power like money is itself “worthless”, but is accepted in the expectation that it can later be “cashed in”, this time in the activation of binding obligations’ (Rummel, 1976: 187. Emphasis original). In a similar fashion Barnett and Duvall (2005: 55-57) advance the concept of ‘productive power’ which concerns ‘the social process and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced’. As indicated their shortcoming is their inability to overcome the paradigm of power as control.
potential rewards of inclusion in various programs as a result of such choice) or 'we bomb you if you do not follow' (and the consequent exclusion from various international initiatives). In effect, the US Vice-President Albert Gore has denoted this rationale during the early stages of NATO's Kosovo campaign: 'We are at a fork in the road. This first way lies bombing, continued and accelerated. However, if the Yugoslav president took the other fork, he might maintain some sovereignty over Kosovo and benefit from long-term assistance to the region' (in Norris, 2005: 85). However, the inability of the international community to make Belgrade embrace the choice of compliance throughout the 1990s suggests the failure of the socialisation power of the dominant Euro-Atlantic actors - i.e. their lack of ability to induce compliance. Therefore, Rummel's (1976: 178) definition of coercive power indicates the 'capability to threaten a person into choosing one undesirable behaviour over another'. The importance of this suggestion is that even coercion depends on the socialising ability to make a decision to comply more attractive than the one of non-compliance. 31

In this respect, as Chapters Six and Seven explicate, the post-Cold War involvement of Balkan states in association/accession and/or partnership programs to/with different Euro-Atlantic organisations implicates their socialising power. This process also suggests ability to make Balkan state-elites susceptible to the rules, norms and procedures promoted by external-to-the-region institutions. The EU and NATO 'project a sense of purpose' (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 89) in the region that tends to serve as a core of attraction for Balkan actors. Since features such as 'we-feeling', shared identities and trust are in short supply in the initial stage of a security community, institutions play a 'crucial role in interpreting, deepening and extending the ongoing exchange' (Vucetic, 2001: 113). Therefore, the socialisation power of the Euro-Atlantic actors is inferred from their ability to create and maintain institutional arrangements underwritten by a particular (Western) 'value-system' and a 'peace-reproducing socialisation process' (Levi, 1964: 24).

3.3.1.B. The Security-Community-Order as Hegemonic Peace:
Building on the notion of socialisation power, this section advances an understanding of security-community-building as a process of hegemonic peace. In order to elaborate the hegemonic nature of Euro-Atlantic agency this study takes as a point of reference the suggestions of George Liska (1967: 9-10). His conjecture is that the salience of hegemonic identity 'consists in the fact that no

31 In other words, as the case of Serbia/Montenegro suggests coercive power depends on a notion of negative attraction - threatening the decision-making elites of a state to find a particular policy (which they would not otherwise make) more appealing.
other state can ignore it and that all other states – consciously or half-consciously, gladly or reluctantly – assess their position, role, and prospects in relation to it than to closer neighbours or to local conflicts. The suggestion, therefore, is that in this context, hegemonic orders are legitimised in the framework of interactions and exchanges among states and depend upon their constituent norms and the behavioural expectations, which they establish (Cox, 1983: 171-72; Onuf and Klink, 1989: 166).

As set out in Chapter Two the main distinction between the notion of hegemonic peace followed in the thesis and neorealist hegemonic stability theory is that the former is premised on the non-violent resolution of conflicts. Such an outcome is largely unrealisable under hegemonic stability, owing to the flimsiness of inter-state cooperation and the power-asymmetry, in which the ‘subordinate states chafe under the (coercive) leadership [of the hegemon]’ (Snidal, 1985: 582). This raises the question of how hegemonic order is to be maintained after the decline of the hegemon – i.e. the weakening of the coerciveness of its material capabilities. As the neorealist logic indicates, inter-state relations constitute an ‘international pecking order’ (Spiegel, 1972: 3); hence, the expected scramble for power-resources feeds the assumption that ‘international relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy’ (Gilpin, 1981: 7).

By contrast, the hegemonic peace model follows Antonio Gramsci’s (1971: 239) suggestion of the hegemonic aspects of socialisation by marking it out as a process for the diffusion of an entire system of values, attitudes and practices supporting a particular status quo in power relations. Gramsci’s (1971: 350) emphasis that ‘every relationship of “hegemony” is necessarily an educative relationship’ underwrites this thesis’ understanding of the international socialisation of the Balkans that will be developed in Chapter Four.32 It is argued that Gramsci’s consideration of hegemony provides insight into understanding ‘how increased interdependence has reinforced the need and strength of the coinciding interests of different elite groups... Hegemony in a consensual sense requires not only the capacity to lead but also the capacity to be led’ (Abrahamsson, 1994: 428). According to Burnham (1991: 75), Gramscian assumptions of consensually hegemonic power inform ‘the constitution of a stable order [as] the result of a manufactured compatibility between dominant ideas, institutions and material capabilities’.

The best example of a hegemonic peace order is that of post-war relations in Western Europe when conditioned by the socialising power of the US. Here the US was able to diffuse its norms.

32 For a detailed account of Gramscian influences on International Relations theory see Cox (1983); Germain and Kenny (1998).
and values in a way that ‘shaped people’s desires and perceptions of alternatives, so that their preferences in international politics and economics were concordant with those of the Americans’ (Russett, 1985: 229). It needs to be emphasised, however, that the exercise of hegemonic power is not altruistic, yet, it is one that provides the capacity and the expectation of ‘peaceful change’. Duncan Snidal (1985: 580-82) suggests this through the provision of a ‘public good’ — security, economic benefits, etc. — to the other members of a hegemonic peace order. He insists that although the hegemon ‘benefits from this situation (i.e., it turns a net “profit” from providing the good), smaller states gain even more. They bear none [or rather little] of the costs of provision and yet share fully in the benefits’. Randall Germain and Michael Kenny (1998: 17) neatly summarise the logic of consensual hegemony as a ‘rule with and over, rather than against’. Thus, the post-war environment created a situation, which allowed the US to initiate a security-community-pattern in Western Europe. Ruggie (1998: 62-84) has interpreted the emergence of this community as the result of ‘embedded liberalism’ — the willingness of both the US and West European states to lock themselves in international organisations that reflected their shared commitment to democratic practices. It was this exercise of hegemonic power that framed interstate practices of policy-making and ultimately socialised states into a Euro-Atlantic democratic security community.

This process informs our understanding of the post-Cold War order-promoting agency of the Euro-Atlantic institutions in the Balkans. The end of the Cold War meant the assumption of an unrivalled pattern of order centred on the EU and NATO. It will be argued in Chapter Five that developments during the 1990s compelled both the EU and NATO by 1999 to outline a hegemonic but inclusive order-promoting approach to the Balkans. Thus, the suggestion is that the involvement of Euro-Atlantic institutions reinforces the norms of peaceful international

33 Likewise, Khoo (2004: 142) has argued that the West European security community is a ‘direct consequence of American hegemony’.
34 It has to be noted, however, that the development of this hegemonic peace order was underwritten by a particular international contingency — i.e. the Cold War. Harold Lasswell (1948: 182) has claimed that the Cold War compelled states to ‘group themselves in space according to the values they demand, the expectations they entertain about outcome, and their identifications’. Similarly, Werner Levi (1964: 25) has argued that the environment of the Cold War facilitated an extension of peace not only within the ‘Western/Capitalist’ or the ‘Eastern/Communist’ camps, but worldwide. Levi’s conjecture was that ‘it may not be merely pollyannish to expect that as the means of violence become more fierce and widely distributed, hence practically unusable, this trend will enhance the indirect effect of the unavailability of force upon the growth of peaceful methods’. However, as it would be explained in Section 6.2 of Chapter Six, the contingency of the Cold War only accelerated rather than caused the initiation of a security-community-relationship in Western Europe.
35 By contrast, some rationalist analyses have emphasised that a cooperative framework of order reflects a ‘hegemonic state’s interest... implying that capability follows (i.e. preponderant resources) to ensure its emergence’ (Snidal, 1985: 589). Furthermore, Sjursen (2004) and Raik (2004) have advanced a more sophisticated analysis of order-promotion by arguing that such spread of democracy within hegemonic peace orders is largely an unintended consequence. This point is discussed in greater detail in Section. 5.2.1 of Chapter Five.
relations in the Balkans by extending them through their programmes of partnership, accession, etc. (i.e. makes sure that regional governments follow and perpetuate them in their interaction). It is the hegemonic power of attraction of the EU and NATO that 'shapes the practices of states and makes possible the emergence of security communities' (Adler, 1997: 269). This, also suggests an externally-driven process of peace as 'rule through charisma' (Onuf and Klink, 1989: 150) – i.e. the ability of external agents to make certain policy-choices more attractive to states than others.

As Chapter Four will demonstrate this hegemonic process of order-promotion is underlined by a particular practice of socialisation, premised on 'teaching' state-elites what norms to follow (Adler, 1997: 256). Here, the hegemonic socialisation power underlying the practices of order promotion is conducive to introducing a framework of predictability and as a consequence of the positive images surrounding powerful states – reflected in the move by the former Eastern Bloc states to integrate with Euro-Atlantic actors (Bengtsson, 2000: 368). As Adler and Barnett (1996: 83) acknowledge, in the face of the ideational and material discrepancy between the former rivals after the end of the Cold War, 'the former communist states, rather than being invited to form part of the security community [of the West], issued their own invitations'.

The literature on security communities suggests that it is the socialisation of the decision-making practices of states (i.e. of state-elites), which is crucial in the initial stages of security-community-promotion. Thereby, this investigation proposes an elite security community as the embryonic stage of security-community-building.

3.3.2. Elite Security Community:
Since the notion and practice of a security community are (i) imported to the Balkans and (ii) promoted by the Euro-Atlantic imperatives, this research agrees partly with the assertion that 'a security community which depends more on enforcement mechanisms than on acceptance of collectively held norms might not be a security community at all' (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 78-79). However, the necessary qualification is that although this is a far cry from the mature (or optimal) form of security community, it still is an embryonic form of a security community.

Therefore, this thesis suggests the socialisation of elites (understood as the decision-making authorities of Balkan states) as the initial phase of the introduction of a security-community-framework of relations. The following section justifies this focus on elites and then explains the pattern of decision-making in an elite security community.
3.3.2.A. Why Elites:
Vaughn Shannon (2000: 294) has remarked that owing to the fuzzy nature of norms, the multiple situations to which they can be applied, and the imperfect interpretation of their meaning ‘oftentimes norms are what states (meaning, state leaders) make of them’. Therefore, it is the socialisation of state-elites into the norms of peaceful foreign-policy interactions that underwrites the initial stages of security-community-building. Without delving into the classification and subdivisions of ‘elites’, the term is used here to signify state officials, bureaucrats and civil servants engaged in the process of negotiation, and the adoption and implementation of policy. In a nutshell, elites encompass those Balkan actors who have control over the political, administrative and bureaucratic tools of their respective societies. Methodologically, a focus on elite-socialisation allows for the application of normative theory to concrete case-studies. More specifically, it allows one to make judgements on how externally promoted norms and rules affect decision-making and why policy-makers choose to follow these in intra- and inter-state affairs (Alderson, 2000: 5-10).

The question then is: why is elite-socialisation important in the initial stages of security-community-building? The obvious answer is that elite decision-making signifies (or contradicts) compliance with externally-promoted standards. Such an attention to elites also allows one to trace the institutionalisation of promoted norms and rules through the observable behaviour of states (Adler and Haas, 1992: 372). Pragmatically speaking, such a focus corroborates Lasswell's (1948: 20-21) assumption that policy-actions reflect the personality of particular decision-makers. Neta Crawford (1994: 378) emphasises the centrality of convincing state-elites of the ‘necessity for peace’ in the introduction of cooperative orders. It is, therefore, the conditioning of elite decision-making that ‘binds’ the policy-preferences of states (Pevehouse, 2005: 53). As Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002: 596) indicate ‘one set of ideas triumphs over another’, not simply because certain policy concerns occur, but rather because they have been made by state-elites.36

Owing to the patterns of intra-state relations in the Balkans and the lack of developed, policy-influencing regional civil societies, it is the Southeast European elites that have access to power and resources, and can subsequently affect change in the governing practices of states. The former US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrook (1998: 23-24) argues that it was the lack of societal checks on the exercise of power and the initial wavering of external actors that

36 Note that such inference concurs with the suggestion of socialisation power as ability to produce effects. Carroll (1972: 593-94), herself, has suggested that power’s capacity to socialise focuses on ‘elite decision-makers... It is contended, therefore, that the final determinant is, and will continue to be for some time to come, the elite’s conception of national security’.

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allowed the 'political leaders' of the Yugoslav constituent units to 'encourage ethnic confrontation for personal, political and financial gain'. It is, therefore, through the institutionalisation of regular meetings and the provision of forms for periodic discussions among decision-makers that external agents socialise states into peaceful patterns of behaviour (Crawford, 1994: 379). In this respect, external agents tend to condition predictability of policy-formulation, by involving regional decision-makers in programs in which they act as if they trust each other, 37 which gradually affects their attitudes in line with their behaviour. In this context, Van Wagenen (1965: 820) has pointed out that a security-community-framework can initially emerge only 'between certain governments'. It has to be reiterated that the suggestion of this thesis is that the security-community-building process currently under way in the Balkans is not autonomous from the wider Euro-Atlantic security-community-building project. What is meant here is the emphasis on 'certain governments' that formulate their decision-making according to externally-promoted standards. Thus, the security-community-building project in the Balkans involves the extension of the Euro-Atlantic one through the socialisation of state-elites.

This helps explain why the EU and NATO have prioritised them and have sought to persuade regional elites to adhere to international rules and norms. Thus, the process of elite-socialisation in the Balkans can be instrumentally defined as creating 'the ability to make the right decisions' (Baker and Welsh, 2000: 82). As Commission President Romano Prodi has insisted, 'It is the regime in Belgrade and its policies, which are continuing to deny Yugoslavia its place in Europe, a place to which it will be wholeheartedly welcomed once a democratic government is in place' (RFE/RL Newsline, 22 June 2000). In other words, the socialisation of Balkan decision-making practices reflects the exercise of socialisation power associated with the adoption and implementation of Euro-Atlantic norms. It also emphasises that the introduction of a security-community-order depends on the ability to maintain reliable structures of decision-making that reinforce the path-dependence of policy priorities (Penksa and Mason, 2003: 261). The implication is that it is 'national policymakers' that 'absorb new meanings and interpretations of reality' as a result of the agency of external actors, which therefore 'can change their interests and adjust their willingness to consider new courses of action' (Adler and Haas, 1992: 385). Such a view reflects the thesis of neoliberal-constructivism that in the initial stages of security-community-building, norm-diffusion depends primarily on the kind of power exercised by the

37 The concept of 'sceptical trust' is discussed in the following Section 3.3.2.B.
external agents rather than the prescriptive force of a particular type of norm. As Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990: 293) explain,

socialisation occurs only when normative change takes place within an elite community. Although normative claims articulated by the hegemon may take root in the public at large, it is ruling elites that must embrace these claims if they are to have a long-term and consequential impact on the behaviour of secondary states. While public opinion can influence elite restructuring, it is through the dynamics of elite politics and coalition-building that socialisation takes place.

Therefore, this study concentrates on the process of elite-socialisation, because the repeated practice of decision-making according to externally promoted norms and rules tends to routinise policy-behaviour in the Balkans, and, thence, introduce a pattern of an instrumental peace-order defined through the framework of elite security community. Moreover, since the reasons for the conflicts, which plagued the region during the 1990s came from within the states involved, then it requires a change in the practices of those responsible for decision-making to prevent them from relapsing into a similar imbroglio in the future. The socialisation of Balkan elites by Euro-Atlantic organisations aims at mitigating regional conflicts by developing the competences of domestic institutions (and in this way tailoring not only the process of domestic, but also foreign policy formation). Since Euro-Atlantic socialisation implies adherence to externally promoted principles, the compliance of Balkan elites with these offers a potentially more effective operational enforcement mechanism. As the US Congressman Eliot Engel (2003: 7) has acknowledged, ‘it is not the people or the parties that we are concerned with. It is having the institutions take hold... I would like to see democratic institutions take hold in Albania, in Kosova and in the rest of the Balkan region’. Hence, the suggestion is that the focus on state-elites implies that the effects of socialisation are ‘not easily reversible’ once they have been initiated (Adler and Haas, 1992: 372-73).

Thus, anchoring the domestic practices of Southeast European states around the norms and rules promoted by Euro-Atlantic organisations suggests an order-promoting approach around attaining and maintaining transparent forms of governance. Given this, the present study examines the effects that norm-diffusion might have on domestic practices, foreign policy and thence on regional cooperation. This then permits consideration of the possibility that external agency advances the basis of an (initially) elite security community.
3.3.2.B. The Decision-Making Pattern of an Elite Security Community:
The thesis suggests that the current state of affairs in Southeastern Europe can be described as involving the initiation of an elite security community. In a nutshell, the elite security community-framework (Figure 2) establishes the institutions and procedures, which frame the decision-making of state-elites. The suggested focus on decisions allows for the study of observable elite-behaviour. By socialising Balkan elites to prescribed standards, extra-regional structures promote 'political cooperation machinery' (Allen and Wallace, 1982: 29) that facilitate the development of predictable policy-making. Such machinery influences the level of policy by providing an institutional environment, where 'the views of partners (including relatively weaker partners) are not just expressed but reliably have a material impact on the operations of the collaborative arrangement' (S. Smith, 2000: 44).

Figure 2: The decision-making dynamic in an elite security community promoted by the Euro-Atlantic actors.

The elite security community is a type of an embryonic security community that promotes a framework for strategic interaction between the Euro-Atlantic institutions and Balkan state-elites, through which they advance their interests and values, while building regional consensus on the objectives of policy-making. Amitav Acharya (1998: 207-14) has suggested such possibility by acknowledging that the existence of community may be maintained only at the state-elite level, while failing to involve the rest of society. In this 'beginners' stage (and especially in the Balkans) the promotion of a security community relies on 'learning by reinforcement' (Schimmelfennig, 2000: 117. Emphasis original). The inception of such kind of consideration in the region is inferred from the current involvement of Euro-Atlantic institutions in the region. As Chapters Six and Seven explicate, they promote and guarantee certain (at first, minimal) dependable expectations from a practice of Balkan cooperation.

Initially, this order reflects an 'organisational emulation' of the Euro-Atlantic pattern of institutionalised behaviour (Vucetic, 2001: 113). David Jones and Mike L. Smith (2000: 285) refer to it as 'an imitation community', based on the experience of other multilateral structures. G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan (1990: 289) have illuminated the logic of this process by
highlighting the aptitude of external agents 'to generate shared beliefs in the acceptability or legitimacy of a particular international order - that is the ability to forge a consensus among national elites on the normative underpinnings of order - [which] is an important if elusive dimension of hegemonic power'. The assumption, therefore, is that 'political elites attribute need hierarchies to the politically relevant organisations with which they most closely identify' (Friedman and Starr, 1997: 101).

Further, the model of an elite security community benefits from Richard Van Wagenen's (1965: 820) notion of 'sceptical trust': a situation, when 'people are made to keep on behaving in ways that are inconsistent with their actual attitudes of mistrust (e.g., they act as if they really trusted each other) their attitudes tend to shift into line with their behaviours'. Thereby, the hegemonic power of attraction of the EU and NATO maintains a broad agreement on the fundamental rules of international relations. The interaction among Balkan state-elites within this context promotes the transfer of Euro-Atlantic standards to their decision-making. The expectation is that working together for solving de-territorialized issues (such as border control, trafficking, etc.) helps socialise their policy-formulation. In such pattern of relations, Balkan state-elites are bounded by the norms of prescribed behaviour (which includes regional cooperation) or risk punishment. Thus, the experiences from following prescribed patterns of behaviour inform the decision-making process and modify its framework towards expected habits and policy outcomes.

3.4. Conclusion:
This chapter has assessed the concept of security community and the process of its initiation. It has endorsed the understanding that security communities are promoted through the socialising agency of external actors. In a nutshell, in their initial stages security communities have been identified as hegemonic peace orders, which depend on the socialisation power of external actors. It is this explanation that contributes to understanding the introduction of peace-order in the Balkans. The analytical implications of combining institutionalism with interest and identity-interaction suggests a pattern of order based on the exchange between different forms and sources of authority, which regulate actors' resources (their use and distribution) in the environment of a security community.

The suggestion of the socialisation power of the Euro-Atlantic organisations (i.e. the EU and NATO) involved in the Balkans indicates their significance for introducing a framework of predictable behaviour. Thus, the practice of inter-state interactions based on certain rules and
procedures prompts shared expectations about each other. The promotion of institutions, by Euro-
Atlantic structures, through which regional cooperation is maintained, ensures that this process
can promote an environment of complex interdependence in Southeastern Europe. More
importantly, however, it engages regional state-elites in regular interaction both with external
actors – i.e. the EU and NATO and among themselves as well.

The main query is whether it is possible to detect in the theory and praxis of international
socialisation cooperational frameworks that can be initiated without (necessarily) requiring prior
trust or solidarity among the actors; but which (in the process of interaction) can lead to
establishing trust and solidarity among them. Evincing such patterns would help the development
of similar frameworks for Balkan cooperation that can help establish long term trust and
solidarity among actors. This issue is dealt with in the next chapter and, in its essence, it is an
attempt to find a framework of international socialisation that helps initiate a security
community-pattern of relationship in the region.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISATION OF THE BALKANS

4.1. Introduction:
Hitherto, this research has proposed that peace can be conceived within a framework of order outlined through a theoretical synergy between neoliberalism and constructivism. This pattern of international relations has been suggested through the framework of security communities. The discussion on promoting security communities has prompted an understanding that in their initial stages, they are driven by intentional external agency, which induces decision-making elites to conduct policy-action according to the perceptions of the strategic context of their interaction. Such conscious orientation of policy-making is best evinced through the power relations underscoring the processes of order-promotion. Therefore, in their initial stages, security communities have been identified as hegemonic peace orders initiated through the exercise of the socialisation power of external agents.

In this respect, the argument of this chapter is that external agencies (i.e. the EU and NATO) are capable of having socialising effects on target elites. In effect, this is a process of state-socialisation (however, not in the neorealist sense of this term) as these elites are state-elites. The suggestion is that Euro-Atlantic organisations are equipped to address the Balkan sources of conflict and encourage peaceful inter-state interactions. The prospect and conditionality of membership provides them with significant influence in the region. This socialisation occurs in terms of altering policy-making through compliance and learning, and in changing external behaviour. These processes, in turn facilitate regional cooperation and thus, the emergence of an elite security community.

The study of this dynamic entails an examination of the role external actors play in the promotion of security-community-relationships in Southeastern Europe. As the previous chapter has outlined, in their embryonic stage, prospective security communities rely (to a large extent) on a complex process of organisational emulation, initiated and maintained by third parties. For the Balkans, these extra-regional structures are Euro-Atlantic organisations. Their involvement in the region is underlined by the policy of promoting particular inter-state relationship aimed at teaching them certain norms and rules of appropriate behaviour. In this respect, conditionality (adherence to particular requirements of extra-regional actors) has become a pragmatic approach for achieving compliance. In other words, the Euro-Atlantic institutions are involved in a process
of socialising Southeast European states within a pattern of prescribed behaviour; and, hence, they mitigate the instability deriving from the threat of violent conflict. However, prior to detailing this socialisation dynamic some definitional matters of key terms for the understanding and explanation of this process are in order.

4.2. Norms and Rules:
The end of the Cold War opened the post-communist region to the socialising influences of the Euro-Atlantic organisations, and this meant attention was given to the norms and rules of their international relations.\(^{38}\) Moreover, the absence of any normative alternatives or sources of normative resistance\(^{39}\) exposed the region to external influences and, thus, turned the Euro-Atlantic organisations ‘from victor to blueprint’ (Jacoby, 2001: 171). Since the analysis of Balkan socialisation considers the institutionalisation of international norms and rules in the domestic as well as in the inter-state political arena, a brief explanation of these terms is necessary.

Norms embody ‘standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’ (Krasner, 1983: 2), which reflect ‘collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors within a given identity’ (Katzenstein, 1996: 5). For example, sovereignty (Bull, 1977: 8) is understood to be one of the dominant norms in international politics. In other words, norms can justify action (or inaction) and define the terms of discourse – i.e. norms of international society (Chayes and Chayes, 1993: 186). Thus, norms ‘provide an important kind of motivation for action that is irreducible to rationality or indeed to any other form of optimising mechanism’ (Elster, 1989: 15). In other words, norms present decision-makers with persuasive reasons for policy formulation (Wiener, 2004: 199).

However, the means through which norms materially affect the domestic political process (and, thus, the external behaviour of states) is through their institutionalisation in political rules. In this context, rules ‘are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action’ (Krasner, 1983: 5). They offer a practicable context – i.e., ‘instructions’ (Wiener, 2004: 199) – for realising norm prescriptions. As Hedley Bull (1977: 140) mentions ‘the importance of international law does not rest on the willingness of states to abide by its principles to the detriment of their interests, but in the fact that they so often judge it in their interests to conform to it’.

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\(^{38}\) Although this dynamic was not immediately apparent in the Balkans.

\(^{39}\) With the exception of Serbia/Montenegro, whose case will be discussed in Chapter Seven.
While distinctions can be drawn, this study does not put a particular emphasis on the differences between norms and rules. Instead they are taken as similar, a move justified by the research focus of this investigation, which is not rules and norms per se, but 'rather the processes by which both can affect national policy' (Cortell and Davis, 1996: 453). This thesis is interested in how norms and rules influence policy-actions (i.e. decision-making) in the Balkans through the process of its international socialisation. O'Neill et al. (2004: 160) have argued that normative beliefs 'socialise state actors' both by serving as models of expected behaviour and/or by identifying the practices of appropriate behaviour. Both norms and rules are taken in their amalgamated meaning in order to emphasise the pervasiveness of Euro-Atlantic procedures, organisational forms and institutional practices in Southeast European relations. Such an approach recognises that the influence of norms and rules is dependent upon the practice and perception of appropriate international behaviour, which external agents provide (Curtis, 1922: 166; Petrova, 2003: 136).

In this respect, the focus is on the ways norms and rules affect the foreign-policy of Balkan states. One is through the alteration of domestic practice (or what is also called democratic consolidation) and the other refers to direct conditioning (both explicit and implicit) by the EU and NATO (i.e. conditions relating to border disputes, alignment with the EU positions, common participation in regional initiatives, etc.). Essentially, the two processes are linked and common domestic democratic institutions (as the case of the EU illustrates) tend to be replicated in intergovernmental arrangements for international cooperation. A description of the methodology of such cooperation is evident in the words of Romano Prodi (2002: 1), the president of the European Commission, who describes this process as a 'new way of solving conflicts... a method that enables our Member States to avoid open conflict – by sharing aspects of our sovereignty. By pooling strategic assets. By trusting in our freely accepted democratic procedures rather then resorting to power politics. By developing the community method that relies on identifying and giving priority to our common interest'. The extension of this community method to the post-communist region indicates the socialisation power of Euro-Atlantic actors – i.e. their ability to shape the interests and preferences of target states (O'Neill et al., 2004: 161).

As already suggested in Section 3.3.2.A of Chapter Three, it is state-elites that provide the visible and testable target of these dynamics of socialisation. In other words, the argument here is that it is the study of elite-behaviour that can be studied to judge the extent to which extra-regional influences orient intra-regional and domestic practice in the Balkans towards a promoted security-community-order. The understanding of the means through which this transfer of
international rules and norms shapes the domestic and the international relations of Balkan states is the subject of the following sections.

4.3. What is Socialisation?
Lionel Curtis (1922: 168, 176) considered the meaning of socialisation as the 'experience' and 'exercise of political responsibility' that 'operates to keep [decision-makers] in touch with the facts of life, to practice them in reading their meaning, and to make them responsible for giving effect to the lesson'. The international socialisation of Southeastern Europe reflects such an educational experience and is premised on the development of stable institutions of inter- and intra-state relations. In itself, socialisation is a 'process that is directed toward a state's internalisation of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalised in its international environment' (Schimmelfennig, 2000: 111) and 'taught by the socialisation agency' (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 63). In other words, it refers to a process through which institutions, practices, and norms are transmitted between international actors. Being a complex and context-specific process, socialisation (for the purposes of this study) is understood to comprise two complementary aspects: compliance (socialisation by international organisations) and learning to comply (socialisation in international organisations).

These two aspects are crucial for understanding the socialisation power of Euro-Atlantic actors. The required qualification is that this twin dynamic reflects the reality of socialising the Balkans outside/before membership in the Euro-Atlantic organisations. The suggestion, in other words, is that it is the status of outsiders that makes applicants accept the cost of adopting Euro-Atlantic norms (Wiener, 2004: 198). Whereas, 'member states can be assumed to share the constitutive values and norms of their community organisation and to have been exposed for a certain time, to socialisation within the organisation' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 514), such an assumption cannot be made in the context of the international socialisation of the Balkans. In this respect, the logics of socialisation within and outside/before membership in the Euro-Atlantic organisations are distinct.

The process of international socialisation of the Balkan states is geared toward preparing them for potential membership; and involves two methods: one, (potentially) coercive – i.e. direct conditioning or enforcement; and the other, instructive – i.e. by the management of differences (see Downs et al., 1996). Both methods aim at adherence to externally promoted rules. Attention to these two methods (of enforcement and management) aims to overcome the false debates concerning which of the two processes is more likely to introduce a peaceful pattern of relations.
This research claims that the instrumental introduction of security communities is the outcome of both (i) 'a plastic process of interaction among the parties concerned', which induces them to settle their conflict peacefully, and (ii) 'enforcement limitations' that bind state-behaviour (Downs et al., 1996: 379). Put simply, both methods suggest different abilities on the part of the external socialising power. The conjecture of this research (in line with the suggestion of neoliberal-constructivism noted in Chapter Two) is that both methods promote compliant behaviour among state-elites and thus affect the introduction of security communities.

4.3.1. Socialisation by International Organisations:
The socialisation by international organisations reflects their ability to constrain the policy-choices of target state-elites. This dynamic of socialisation, therefore, depends on direct conditioning of decision-making behaviour – i.e. compelling state-elites to follow an externally-promoted set of policy-actions (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 49). In this context, the level of compliance is related (i) to expected rewards, and (ii) to avoiding specific punishments (i.e. threat of sanctions). Socialisation therefore operates primarily on the level of 'material inducements', however, it also suggests a transformation of substantive policy-beliefs. Its implications for generating security-community-behaviour in the Balkans are that enforcement is required to deter states from 'shirking' (Tallberg, 2002: 612). The agency of the Euro-Atlantic actors puts them in a strong bargaining position, which allows them to correct aberrant behaviour by shaping the procedures and monitor the implementation of rules and norms. Moreover, the educational aspect of this type of socialisation reflects the power (i.e. the ability) of external agents to create an environment for following one set of policy choices (those promoted by the EU and NATO) versus another (broadly suggested by the term 'ethnonationalism'). Referring back to the notion of socialisation power suggested in Chapter Three, this type of socialisation reflects the 'capacity of external agents] to persuade a person [i.e. target state-elites] into believing or doing something... by choosing one behaviour over another' (Rummel, 1976: 182-83).

The socialisation by external agents reflects the understanding of hegemonic power proffered in Chapter Three as the ability to affect the attitudes of state-elites. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990: 286, 293) suggest that rule-enforcement is premised on the ability to induce elites to alter their norms and value orientations, because socialisation is 'a component of power... integrally related to [its] material components'. Owing to the pragmatics of order-promotion in the

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40 These dynamics are further elaborated in Chapters Six and Seven. As Barnett and Duvall (2005: 50) indicate, such 'compulsory' socialisation 'is not limited to material resources; it also entails symbolic and normative resources'.

41 More on the concept of 'ethnonationalism' in Connor (1993).
Balkans,\textsuperscript{42} compliance with promoted standards is maintained both through material incentives (rewards/threats) and (more controversially) through actual coercion of the Euro-Atlantic pattern of non-war order. Theoretically, the conjecture is that the latter practice is consistent with the framework of the Western democratic security community, since it is the constraints set up by external agents that limit state-behaviour in the initial stages of order-promotion into expected frameworks (Downs et al., 1996: 379).\textsuperscript{43} Likewise, Lars-Erik Cederman (2001: 15) has insisted that security communities have ‘little choice but to eliminate violence in international relations’. He contends that enforcement is a last resort, yet his analysis evidences that security communities are more effective at fighting wars.\textsuperscript{44} Therefore, conformity (or rule-compliance) is a function of socialisation, which is derived from the example of punishing violators (Shannon, 2000: 312). As elaborated in Section 3.3.1. A of Chapter Three, the coercive socialisation power of external actors depends on the ability to make compliance more attractive. Liliana Botcheva and Lisa Martin (2001: 2) maintain that the institutions, which have managed to affect state-behaviour have constructed various ‘enforcement mechanisms’ in order to avoid divergence from promoted patterns of behaviour. The development of such capacities will be paid closer attention to in Section 7.5 of Chapter Seven. Therefore, to the context of enforcement, the socialisation power is defined as the ‘ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’ (Manners, 2002: 239).

In a (somewhat) similar fashion, Rengger (2000: 115) has acknowledged that due to the pragmatics of outside/before membership socialisation the democratic security community of the West may adopt ‘non-democratic’ measures to ensure acquiescence with its standards. Coercive means are required (i) to diminish the possibility of free-riding, as well as (ii) to indicate commitment by the socialising agency and if necessary make an example of the negative effects of non-compliance (as the case of Serbia/Montenegro illustrates). This conclusion emphasises the unique potential of the Euro-Atlantic institutions to effect compliance.

\textsuperscript{42} Section 5.2.1 of Chapter Five elaborates the particular dynamics of ‘normative securitisation’ developed by Euro-Atlantic actors.
\textsuperscript{43} See Chapter Three.
\textsuperscript{44} Likewise, Crawford (1994: 380) argues that the members of a security community go to war with the same overall frequency as non-democracies. In a detailed analysis, Slantchev (2004: 821, 827) contends that security communities, in general, and democratic states, in particular, are more effective in their war-efforts, because they tend to be better at selecting when to start a war. Usually, the wars initiated by them tend to be short and only 10\% have lasted longer than a year. In this way, Slantchev insists that security communities both respond to domestic pressures from public opinion, which normally does not support long fighting, but also sends a message to other potential violators that they will be dealt with swiftly (if necessary).
For example, the ‘New PHARE Orientations for Pre-Accession Assistance’ adopted in 1997 emphasize that it is the EU (through its Accession Partnerships) and not the beneficiaries that decide how PHARE money is spent (EIS, 27 March 1998). Thus, ‘mandatory adaptation’ (Brusis, 2002: 534) effects adherence to rules by conditioning the actors. Conditionality – ‘the use of incentives to alter a state’s behaviour or policies’ (Checkel, 1999: 84) – emphasises the role of the sanctioning authority, which is responsible for monitoring the degree of adherence to the promoted norms and rules. Adler and Barnett (1998b: 37-38) acknowledge that the initiation of security communities is dependent upon ‘exogenous agency’, which ensures that state-elites ‘begin to orient themselves in each other’s directions and desire to coordinate relations’. In the Balkans, the principal socialising agencies are the EU and NATO, which set up the criteria for accession to their structures.\(^4\) This suggests an instrumental ‘threshold principle’, which indicates ‘the qualitative and subjective judgements about minimum standards’ that applicant states must meet in their bid for membership (Jacoby, 2001: 181). However, as the case of Serbia/Montenegro will suggest, if the attraction of rewards is insufficient, then the socialisation power of external actors can be exercised through compulsion into promoted policy-behaviour for the sake of maintaining non-war order.\(^4\) In other words, the presence and constant monitoring of this process by external agents guarantees that Balkan elites institutionalise and act according to community-compatible practices. Within this context their compliance with the socialising mechanisms is ensured by both the symbolic and instrumental pulling incentives of these extra-regional organisations.

### 4.3.2 Socialisation in International Organisations:

The socialisation in international organisations occurs through the actual interaction by the socialised states with the EU and NATO in partnership and association activities.\(^4\) In particular, this aspect indicates that very often non-compliance occurs not because of a deliberate decision of the target to violate the promoted norms and rules, but because of the lack of capacity-building, rule-interpretation and transparency (Tallberg, 2002: 613).\(^4\) Thus, Euro-Atlantic organisations have developed programs of learning for accession countries by enhancing the accountability of state-bureaucracies and providing technical assistance in which state-elites are

\(^4\) See Section 4.3.3 for elaboration of the issue of the socialisation of entities like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro.

\(^4\) This dynamic is further discussed in Section 7.5 of Chapter Seven.

\(^4\) Or already membership, as indicated by the instances of Bulgaria’s and Romania’s membership in NATO.

\(^4\) One such instance (which can be corroborated with references to other similar assessment papers from the region) is the acknowledgement by the Croatian government that the ‘knowledge about issues relating to European integration is generally at a very low level in the country, including the state administration’ (PAAN, 2004: 33).
in situation of as if members. In this respect, the socialisation power of external actors is implicated with the ability to 'clarify' the interests of target state-elites and 'entice [them] into choosing one behaviour over another... by increasing [their] expectations [in order] to affect their interests' (Rummel, 1976: 179-82).

For instance, the European Commission recognised in 1998 that the 'only alternative to long transitional periods is a major investment effort' to help applicant countries 'adapt to Community norms and standards and to develop their infrastructure' (EIS, 27 March 1998. Emphasis added). This conviction is reflected in subsequent initiatives developed by the EU (mainly PHARE and CARDS) aimed at strengthening the programming and administrative abilities of candidate countries with the purpose of boosting their absorption capacities. Similarly, NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, introduced at the January 1994 Brussels Summit of NATO is a major initiative to enhance stability and security in the applicant countries through capacity building 'by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance' (M-1(94)2).

In this context, the Euro-Atlantic socialisation of the Balkans is perceived as a transitional arrangement to allow time for adapting to behavioural requirements (Tallberg, 2002: 615). The socialising agency provides authoritative interpretation as well as time for the socialised to learn to comply. The power of attraction of extra-regional actors offers the stimuli that lead to learning, i.e. policy change (E. Haas, 1990: 27-28). This power of attraction is not necessarily only ideational as material incentives do matter. As already noted in Section 3.3.1 of Chapter Three, the concept of power advanced in this thesis underwrites the ability of external actors (i.e. the EU and NATO) to cause change in the policy-behaviour of Balkan states (i.e. that they follow external demands for compliance). The socialisation in international organisations, therefore, seeks to build the capacity of the socialised elites to carry out their obligations by providing a framework for their implementation (Chayes and Chayes, 1993: 188). In this respect, it is noteworthy that Günter Verheugen, the EU Enlargement was nicknamed 'the schoolmaster' (RFE/RL Newsline, 14 November 2003), an alias, which reflects the socialisation power of external agency. As Barnett and Duvall (2005: 51) have claimed, in such contexts power works 'through socially extended, institutionally diffuse relations'. In other words, it is because of the particular pattern of relations between the Euro-Atlantic actors and Balkan state-elites that the former exercise 'power over' the latter. This understanding underlines the consensually

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49 Grunberg (1990: 449) explains that the process of learning to comply is an 'effect of persuasion' which helps to overcome different 'epistemological obstacles' to socialisation.
hegemonic nature of the relationship, which gives external actors the ability to use strategic constraints and direct the policy behaviour of decision-makers.

Thus, the power of attraction posed by Euro-Atlantic institutions allows them to become a legitimate authority for evaluating the degree to which their preferred norms and rules have become part of (i.e. constitutive to) the decision-making practices of the Balkan states. As outlined in Chapter Three, the legitimacy of this institutional oversight derives from the consensually hegemonic relationship, in which Balkan state-elites 'regularly refer to the [outside] norm[s] to describe and comment on their own behaviour and that of others, the validity claims of the norm are no longer controversial, even if the actual behaviour continues violating the rules' (Cortell and Davis, 1996: 456-57).

4.3.3. The Socialisation Process:
The double-dynamic of the Euro-Atlantic involvement in the Balkans – compliance and learning to comply – underscores the socialisation process in which both material and ideational resources are utilised to achieve acquiescence with a hegemonic (both in rational and normative terms) set of policy-practices. Moreover, it emphasises the foreign-policy orientation of governments as a factor in the kind of socialisation policies adopted by external actors (Moon, 1985: 301). In this way, the Euro-Atlantic organisations promote rule-conformity both as a rhetorical practice and operational mechanism to justify and facilitate the reproduction of their pattern of order. These mutually reinforcing aspects of socialisation develop a common process, which develops in three phases: interaction, interpretation and internalisation (Koh, 1997: 2645-649).

Interaction occurs in the course of conditioning the target to comply with the external agency by convincing the socialised state-elites to accept the authority of the external actor. Wiener (2004: 202) has indicated that the interactive relations among states in this context are increasingly structured by 'processes of community formation'. This is best evidenced by the influence that Euro-Atlantic institutions have in shaping policies in the region through the conditions for accession (as well as the prospect of membership). For instance, the 1994 concluding document from the inaugural conference of the Pact on Stability in Europe held in Paris, states that the participants' 'aim is to encourage countries which have not yet concluded cooperation and good neighbourliness agreements and arrangements... do so' (Emphasis added).

Interpretation indicates the mechanisms through which the socialising agent projects translates its requirements onto the domestic arena so that it can achieve the necessary levels of understanding and, hence, effect compliance. It will be suggested in Chapter Five that it was as a
result of the Kosovo crisis that the EU and NATO asserted their interpretative agency both in Europe and vis-à-vis the Balkans through the exclusion/inclusion dynamics of association and accession. However, claims to interpretative agency have been advanced prior 1999. For example, the 1995 declaration of the Pact on Stability in Europe indicates that it is the Euro-Atlantic institutions that 'undertake to combine [their] efforts to ensure stability in Europe... [by encouraging] States to cooperate across frontiers' (RFE/RL Newsline, 21 March 1995. Emphasis added). This conviction in the interpretative authority of external actors is also reflected in the words of Commission President Jacques Delors, who asserts that the '[European] Community has a special responsibility not only because of its importance as a pole of stability and prosperity, but also because it has an armoury of instruments to deal with the most pressing problems' (Delors, 1994: 11. Emphasis added).

Internalisation is a matter of practice. It indicates the degree to which the rules and norms introduced in the process of interaction and interpreted according the needs of the internal context of the state are actually domesticated in policy-making (i.e. are accepted by state-elites). In this respect, internalisation 'does not require deviant desires or behavioural preferences to be completely absent, only that internal (rather than external) sanctioning mechanisms are sufficiently effective to prevent deviant preferences from becoming norm-violating actions' (Schimmelfennig, 2000: 112. Emphasis original).

These three phases of the socialisation process suggest a generalised pattern for transferring Euro-Atlantic norms and rules to the Balkans. Owing to its instrumental logic, in the initial stages of security-community building, socialisation is mainly affecting the policy-behaviour of state-elites. Figure 3, represents the logic of the socialisation dynamic that is guiding the subsequent case studies.

Figure 3: The process of international socialisation.

However, a crucial feature of this process, which has not been addressed by the literature on socialisation still remains to be qualified: the context in which the external agency is applied. In

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50 Werner Levi (1964: 32) illustrates the procedural dynamics of internalisation in the practice of international socialisation: 'The way of life [i.e. the policy behaviour induced by external actors] becomes a habit, maintaining itself by the habit-forming qualities of social behaviour and by the social behaviour-forming qualities of habit [i.e. the repeated interaction and decision-making practice according to promoted standards].'

51 A useful theoretical first-cut in this respect is Wade's (2005) inquiry on how the agency of external actors is affected by the context as well as how they shape the context once they get involved.
In this respect, all commentators of the post-Cold War dynamics of socialisation developed by the Euro-Atlantic actors have stressed that it is a *state-centric* process – i.e. it involves the socialisation of states (that is, their state-elites) into externally-promoted patterns of behaviour. However, how does socialisation fare in entities that are not states? In other words, how do international actors socialise entities that do not fulfil the minimum requirements of a state: (i) clearly defined and internationally recognised territory; (ii) a government that has the ability to monitor the implementation and exercise of domestic rules; and which (iii) can represent the state internationally. Such lack of theoretically-grounded hypotheses about the *context* to which socialisation programs are applied is telling. The research agenda of international socialisation argues that international actors have conditioning effects on state-behaviour (Botcheva and Martin, 2001); however, the suggestion here is that such a socialisation process depends on the kind of statehood to which it is deployed, and the fact that international actors adapt their agency according to local conditions. Thus, if the minimal conditions of statehood are not present, the logic of the socialisation process would be significantly altered since it would be analytically impossible to suggest its practice in the absence of ‘state-elites’ (or the presence of too many candidates for such status) that would be able to implement domestically the promoted standards and represent their territories at international fora. Crudely speaking, socialisation in this context is construed as the ‘construction of state institutions from chaos’ (Wantchekon, 2004: 30), or what Florian Bieber (2002: 205) has termed as a process of ‘integrating the state’. It is important to draw attention to this problematic, because the contention prompted here is that all entities in the sub-region of the Western Balkans have gone through (or are still in) a non-integrated-state phase.

Many commentators have mentioned this issue but few have made inferences on its effect on the socialisation dynamic. For instance, Timothy Edmunds (2003: 25-26) has suggested (but only in passing) that one of the main problems for the stabilisation of the Balkans is the ‘uncertainty’ deriving from the proliferation of ‘contested states’. At the same time, the NATO Parliamentary

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52 For a good overview of such ‘Weberian’ typology see Thürer (1999). Such failure to study the context of socialisation is largely a result of the research focus on Central and East European countries, whose statehood remained largely uncontested throughout their transition. In this way, Gryzmal-Busse and Luong (2002: 1) have emphasised that ‘scholars of post-communist transition have focused on the “triple transition” from Soviet rule; the transformation of the polity, economy and civil society... Yet, [such focus] has led to overlooking an important common denominator across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union – the need to reconstruct public authority, or state-building’.

53 Ultimately, such claim relates to the notion of ‘localisation’ advanced by Acharya (2004), but not in his sense of localising international norms by (local) elites, but the localisation of socialisation practices by international actors. Furthermore, such inference borrows from the growing literature on ‘categories of statehood’ (Cooper, 2003; Jackson, 1990; Rotberg, 2002; Talento, 2004; Wantchekon, 2004).
Assembly has indicated that the 'future of the fragile states of the Balkans depends primarily on interethnic relations within the countries themselves'. The symptoms of such fragility are 'organised crime, corruption, poverty and ethnic strife' (NATO PA, 2004b: 1). Likewise, Ivanka Atanasova (2004: 427) refers to the 'state-predicament' in the region as a quandary to Balkan accession in Euro-Atlantic organisations, while Anna Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Luong (2002: 5) indicate the difficulty to peace-building efforts posed by 'fractured states' such as Bosnia and Serbia. Thus, Srdjan Vucetic (2004: 120) has concluded that 'all Balkan states can be seen as weak and some can be safely regarded as failing or even failed', while Tom Gallagher (2005: 173) suggests the existence of certain 'hallmarks... of fissile Balkan state[s]'. The prospect of extending the Euro-Atlantic security community to the region therefore presents a precedent of the international socialisation of entities with 'unfinished processes of nation-state formation' (Letica, 2004: 212). Elaine Sciolino (2003) has managed to capture best the issue of 'stateness' in the Balkans (and therefore her depiction merits a longer quotation):

The odd alliance between 'the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro', which the country is now officially called... poses problems, because the two areas are not economically integrated, a precondition for EU membership. There is no national flag, no national anthem and the name of the country is now so long that some people refer to it as 'Sam'. 'It's a disaster', said Mladjan Dinkic, an economist and former head of the Central Bank. 'Nobody screams for "Serbia and Montenegro" at soccer matches. The name is too long'.

In Bosnia, meanwhile... a bureaucratic structure created by the Dayton Peace Agreement that divides the political power among the three ethnic groups is so redundant that it sometimes functions like a "Saturday Night Live" skit. "Mr. President, Mr. President, Mr. President, it is very moving for me to be back in Sarajevo", is the way [Richard] Holbrooke started the joint news conference after his meeting with the three co-equal presidents of Bosnia.

The non-integrated nature of Western Balkan statehood is also encapsulated poignantly in the quip of a Bosnian politician: 'We don't live in a country, we live in a project' (in Joseph, 2005: 115). The argument prompted by this thesis is that the objective of the Euro-Atlantic socialisation in both the 'awkward' (Field, 2001) and the 'integrated' (Bieber, 2002) states of the region is the same – the promotion of peace (through the extension of their pattern of relations); however, their logic is different. In the instance of 'awkward' states – the logic is 'state-building in the literal sense of word' (Krastev, 2003: 1), which implies a 'process of establishing authority over a given territory' (Grzymala-Busse and Luong, 2002: 2), whereas in 'integrated' states the issue is only

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54 In this respect, Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004: 267) suggests that the essence of the process of international socialisation is to endow states with the ability to engage with other states through the acceptance of mutual
altering the practices of decision-making according to Euro-Atlantic demands. Therefore, it is anticipated that the socialisation dynamics would have different effects. In ‘awkward’ states, the expectation is that the socialisation process involves a longer and more complex manner of integrating (multi-ethnic) states through programmes that overcome the ‘privatisation of decision-making’ (Krastev, 2003: 8) by creating a group of people, which can perform the functions of ‘state-elites’. In ‘integrated’ states, the expectation is that the process is more straightforward, in the sense that it involves a process of importing ‘good practice’, adjusting it to local dynamics and monitoring the implementation of promoted procedures.

This research concentrates primarily on the latter, state-centric type of socialisation, although it makes inferences about the socialisation of ‘awkward’ states. In this respect, the Bulgarian analyst, Ivan Krastev (2003: 4) has hinted that ‘one clear thread is visible in the post-communist puzzle of success and failure: only nation-states have succeeded in the European integration project’. Singling out Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten suggested the logic of external conditioning of awkward states when he noted that ‘we would like to see a self-sustaining state [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] acting like a country not like “two and a bit countries” and this is an imperative’ (in Gallagher, 2005: 183). As will be indicated in Chapter Six, Croatia is a good example of such comparison of the socialisation of ‘awkward’ and ‘integrated’ states: for most of the 1990s it was excluded from the process of external conditioning, not least because of its ‘awkwardness’; but as soon as its statehood was integrated in 1999 it was involved in the dynamics of Euro-Atlantic socialisation for ‘integrated’ states (Batt, 2004: 13). The positive development, however is that since 1999 most of the entities in the Western Balkans have increasingly started to look like integrated states (Bieber, 2002) – i.e. their territories have become less contested and their decision-makers tend to be perceived both domestically and internationally as ‘state-elites’. Mann (2005: 508) notes that this is partly an outcome of the completion of the ‘ethnic cleansing of Yugoslavia’ and the creation of virtually monoethnic ‘statelets’ that are susceptible to external pressures. In this respect Knaus and Cox (2005: 48) ascertain that the various state-building projects in the Balkans ‘have arrived at a plateau of stability’. As Chapter Five will suggest, since the Kosovo crisis there has also been an obligations. Thence (to paraphrase her) the participation (i.e. inclusion) of Balkan states in the Euro-Atlantic socialisation activities confers status that allows them ‘to connect to the rest of the world and the political ability to be an actor within it’.

Such claim reflects Werner Levi’s (1964: 32) conjecture that it is the ‘norms of [a] nation’s normative order [that] are adequate for a peaceful international society’. The conjecture is that owing to the character of international life, it is only the behaviour of nation-states that is considered predictable or can be socialised into a framework of predictability.
alteration in the perceptions of the Balkans by the Euro-Atlantic actors, which has increased the effectiveness of their socialisation power and, thus, has contributed to the practices of international socialisation of the region.

4.4. **Why Are International Organisations Interested in Socialisation?**

One of the main queries in the post-Cold War developments in the Balkans is why are the Euro-Atlantic structures interested in socialising Southeast European elites? Perhaps the most straightforward answer comes from Chris Patten (2002: 5), who stated 'either we [the EU] export stability to the Balkans, or the Balkans exports instability to us. I know which I would prefer'. As suggested, the promotion of peace is not an altruistic, but a (albeit consensually) hegemonic project. To that effect, the extension of security-community-practices to the Balkans is a function of the interests of the socialising Euro-Atlantic actors. In this respect, Patten's statement encapsulates their interest in exporting stability in order to prevent the import of instability. Hence, the extension of the zone of peace translates into an increase of the Euro-Atlantic security (which, however, also indicates increase in Balkan stability).

In particular, the series of violent events in the former Yugoslavia and Albania indicated the potential extent of the security problems that could develop in Europe (Penksa and Mason, 2003: 257). The building and maintaining of domestic institutions as well as conditioning foreign-policy making is beneficial for the socialising agency, in avoiding the dangers from the competitive security environment of realist anarchy (Owen, 2002: 376). The possibility of domestic power struggles in the post-communist states suggested the threat from 'security uncertainty' (Karp, 1993: 4). The dynamic of Euro-Atlantic socialisation aims to overcome the negative implications from such policy-uncertainty by conditioning the decision-making process towards expected outcomes. It is the socialisation power of external actors that generates expectations of predictable policy-behaviour (Adler and Haas, 1992: 371). As Stanley Hoffman (1984: 11) insists: 'If one wants an actor to behave in a certain way on the world stage, what better method is there than to see it that it has the “right” kind of government?'.

The rationale for the instrumental significance of the Balkans for the EU and NATO to a large extent depends on the proximity of the region to the member states of the Euro-Atlantic

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56 More detailed analysis of the particular reasons for the EU's and NATO's socialisation of the Balkans is provided in the empirical part of the research: Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

57 As Stephen Krasner (2004: 118) argues in stringently strategic terms, 'badly governed states have become threats to much more powerful actors'.

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security community. As Chapter Five will illustrate, it is mainly as a consequence of the Kosovo crisis that the perception of the Balkans as part of the European continent – i.e. it is in the immediate environment of Euro-Atlantic responsibility – altered the agency of external actors in the region. Thence, the international socialisation of the Balkans aims to prevent a relapse into regional violence. It has to be noted however, that the proximity of the member states of the dominant Euro-Atlantic actors (i.e. the EU and NATO) to the conflicts in the Western Balkans brought an added sense of urgency, which by 1999 made their socialising agency nearly compulsory. In this respect, the awkwardness of the states emerging from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia impressed the perception that ‘collapsed and badly governed states will not fix themselves because they have limited administrative capacity, not least with regard to maintaining internal security’ (Krasner, 2004: 86). Thus, the dual logic of the international socialisation of the Balkans is suggested as: (i) integrating the awkward states of the region and (ii) preventing the disintegration into awkwardness of those that are integrated.

In this respect, the extension of (i.e. the reproduction of) the Euro-Atlantic security community aims at affecting the foreign policies of target states, in order ‘to minimise combat, casualties, refugees and displaced persons. Doing so... also has the potential to eliminate the authority and power-vacuums in which terror thrives’ (Rotberg, 2002: 95). Hence, the external conditioning of Balkan decision-makers to deal with problematic issues by following promoted rules and procedures, limits the potential for violence (Chayes and Chayes, 1993: 179). This also reflects the regional security-community-building logic of the international socialisation of the region.

4.5. How Can Socialisation Extend Peace?

Of course the question remains, whether the external socialisation of the Balkans by Euro-Atlantic actors is likely to encourage the extension of their security-community-order to the region? This query is to be answered by the following empirical section of this research, which contends that since 1999, the dominant Euro-Atlantic actors have been more convincing in their programs for peace-promotion in the Balkans. Bearing in mind the rationality of the initial stages of security communities, this thesis adopts Snidal’s (1985: 587) conclusion that due to net benefits from following the policy-prescriptions of external agency, regional states cooperate with the Euro-Atlantic actors. In this way, external actors are capable of extracting compliance with their norms and rules. Thus, the construction of congruence (i.e., similarity of policy-perceptions) among Balkan elites is dependent on the Euro-Atlantic actors: they define what is
acceptable international behaviour and what is aberrant (Acharya, 2004: 243). Chapters Six and Seven will indicate that it is through the conditioning of the institutional frameworks of domestic governance that external actors affect foreign-policy-choices of target states. Therefore, the socialisation by and in international organisations reproduces not only the domestic institutions of the socialising agencies, but also the practices of their inter-state relations.

In other words, externally promoted congruence introduces a complex dynamic of two inter-related processes that alter the production of policy-interests and incentives. As it will be elaborated in the case-studies (and suggested in the theoretical framework of Chapter Three), the extension of the Euro-Atlantic security community to the Balkans is not premised on the creation of a shared regional political identity, but instead (owing to the embryonic nature of the pattern of order in the region) it counts on the individual rational action of state-elites. Recent analyses have pointed out that in the initial stages of security-community-initiation a 'heavy reliance on the solidarity-creating function of political community may even have counter-productive effects on the willingness of addressees to comply' (Neyer, 2005b: 150). Hence, the external promotion of coinciding norms and rules of policy-making facilitates the perception of similarity among Balkan state-elites. Thus, the claim of this research is that the introduction of peace-orders is a hegemonic project dependent on external capacities and agents to maintain compliance. It is the constraints on domestic decision-making that affect foreign-policy-behaviour (see Spruyt, 2005: 4-36). The exogenous involvement in the post-Cold War developments of the Balkans assists in adjusting the substantive beliefs of regional elites in line with the principles underscoring the perception of order; that is, the socialisation process emphasises that norms (together with material incentives) help in shaping the 'beliefs about what set of policies will maximise short-term interests, and they therefore serve to guide state-behaviour and shape the agenda from which the elites choose specific policies' (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 285). Such processes of introducing domestic congruence with externally-promoted standards tends to affect the foreign policy of socialised state-elites by expanding the 'interaction opportunities for such ends as trade and cooperation' (Pevehouse, 2005: 18).

Thus, the threat of violent conflicts is mitigated through the development of common practices initiated and maintained by the EU and NATO. Such a socialisation dynamic also manipulates the perceptions that inform the rational calculations of decision-making within the region. The logic of the international socialisation of the Balkans recognises that 'states often fail to cooperate even when their preferences overlap, because policymakers draw incorrect inferences about the motives and intentions of others' (Larson, 1997: 3-4). Participation in the
socialisation programmes, therefore, signals the policy-intentions of target states (Pevehouse, 2005: 26). Talentino (2004: 321-22) has emphasised that the attraction of external institutions establishes 'limitation on aggression' by 'setting the agenda for weak states' and 'serving as a normative bridge between categories of states'.

In this respect, the process of Euro-Atlantic socialisation introduces the essential requirement for security-community-building – 'compatibility of the main values held by the relevant strata of all political units involved' (Van Wagenen, 1965: 818). The socialising ability of periodic meetings among Balkan state-elites in the context of different EU and NATO initiatives, suggests tendencies toward regional policy-coordination. It is the compliance with externally-promoted norms and rules that generate instrumental practices of cooperation (Adler and Haas, 1992: 372). The presence of external agency also encourages the quality of the communication flows between the socialised state-elites, which also increases the predictability (knowledge of others' policy-intentions) among them (Crawford, 1994: 379). Thereby, it also tends to reinforce perceptions of sameness among Balkan elites owing to their participation in joint initiatives (Der Derian, 2003: 47). Such cohesion derives from the pragmatic accountability of decision-makers to external agency: state-elites are confident that others will accept their decision-making, based on the rules that define the parameters of legitimate policy-formulation. It, also, emphasises that the socialising practices are "sticky". The further the process evolves along a particular path, the harder it becomes to shift to alternative paths, which eventually "locks in" one of the possible outcomes' (Arfi, 2000: 565). In this way, the Euro-Atlantic institutions introduce a reinforcing normative base that orients the policy-making choices in the Balkans (towards compliance with externally-promoted conditions).

Thus, the interaction between the Euro-Atlantic organizations and Balkan elites constitutes the basis for the gradual alignment with their norms and rules, and the development of a regional institutional framework in the process of accession 'forging a climate of trust so that regional cooperation becomes as second nature as it is within the EU' (Patten, 2002: 2. Emphasis added). The stimulus for emulation comes from the extra-regional involvement in Southeastern Europe. It institutes a routine practice of following the externally promoted rules and norms 'unconsciously' (like 'shifting gears while driving "without thinking"') that becomes part of the decision-making process, in which such 'unconscious activity is part and parcel of an act or activity that is intended' (Alderson, 2000: 11. Emphasis original).

In a nutshell, the emulation of Euro-Atlantic institutions by Balkan elites, makes them more prone to peaceful international interactions, since the socialising dynamic makes regional
bureaucracies less able to disguise their capabilities and intentions (Keohane, 1984: 258-59). The argument here is that the contractual state-level conditioning of the Balkans by the EU and NATO creates 'transparency' (Lipson, 2005: 106) that reassures regional decision-making about peaceful policy intentions. In other words, the experience of introducing similar democratic domestic institutions (through the socialisation by the same external Euro-Atlantic agents) makes Balkan states inclined to consider each other as 'not-threatening', and, hence, potential partners.

4.6. Conclusion:
The promise and prospect of accession of Balkan states to Euro-Atlantic organisations exhibits a socialising effect, in which regional actors are encouraged to demonstrate a degree of adherence to externally-generated rules of legitimate behaviour (i.e. conditionality). This aims to ensure that regional actors behave in a predictable way and thus encourages instrumental trust between these actors. In this manner, international socialisation can help 'underwrite the capacity of a system to function peacefully and to bond its members in agreements' (Kegley and Raymond, 1990: 248). It is noteworthy that it is the Euro-Atlantic institutions that promote such cohesion, by socialising regional state-elites to their norms and rules of institutionalised behaviour. The suggestion is that such process of socialisation contributes to the initiation of a regional security community (as part of the post-Cold War extension of the Euro-Atlantic one).

The argument, then, is that Balkan state-interaction with Euro-Atlantic organisations (principally the EU and NATO) leads the latter to propagate norms on accepted practices to Southeast European states. These practices relate to domestic politics and also to inter-state relations. The rules and norms are propagated in a number of ways. These processes of socialisation, in turn, promote peaceful inter-state interactions among Balkan states (i.e. because they have adopted similar norms and thus types of practice) and this encourages the extension of security-community-relations.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE CENTRALITY OF THE EU AND NATO IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

... through [their] operations in the Balkans. It is NATO and the EU which have begun to operationalise their imperfect capabilities to reconstruct and develop countries and societies that have suffered through war, ethnic cleansing and a range of injustices.

Doug Bereuter
10 April 2003

5.1. Introduction:
So far this thesis has followed a number of assumptions, regarding the post-Cold War practices of order-promotion in Europe with a particular reference to the region of the Balkans. The analytical points outlined in the previous chapters have suggested that security communities emerge as a result of consensually hegemonic projects and are initiated through the socialisation of state-elites. The expectation, therefore, is that the advancement of security-community-relations in the Balkans develops through the socialisation of regional decision-making by external agents.

This chapter identifies the dominant agents of this socialisation as the EU and NATO. It argues that despite the involvement of other international actors in the region, it is the EU and NATO (together or independently), which have developed and implemented programs that determine their centrality as the main agents for the socialisation of Balkan elites. Circumstantially, the emergent centrality of both the EU and NATO is a result of their reaction to events in the Balkans, in particular in the context of the Kosovo crisis. It is claimed that the conflict in Kosovo evinces the emergence of (what this chapter refers to as) the terms of the post-1999 European order, which are marked by the formal securitisation of norms by both organisations and functional differentiation between the two in terms of their socialising mechanisms.

The chapter also argues that ‘9/11’ (and subsequently the Iraq crisis) did not impact dramatically the import of both the EU and NATO in the Balkans, since the region is an instance of continuing (if not increasing) cooperation between the two organisations. It agrees with Michael Mandelbaum’s (2002: 67) assertion that ‘the attacks on America did not usher in a new world’; instead, they simply confronted policy-makers with the reality of post-Cold War
international affairs. Neta Crawford (2004: 686) has argued that at least since 1990 there can be traced a gradual shift in US foreign policy towards unilateralism. Thus, the conjecture of this research is that the differentiation between Europe and America was already elaborated in the context of the Balkan crises during the 1990s.

This study emphasises a division of labour between the Euro-Atlantic ‘partners’, which emerged in the context of the Kosovo crisis. In spite of the whole host of analyses of the Kosovo conflict, none has actually spelled out the content of the ‘new consciousness’ (Mingiu-Pippidi, 2003: 83) that it ushered in. The suggestion here is that it reflects the Cold War practices of cooperation in matters of European security, but agreement to disagree in out-of-area operations (Lebl, 2004: 722). Thereby, it is also argued that the post-‘9/11’/Iraq crisis developments do not alter the socialising relevance of the EU and NATO in the Balkans. The necessary caveat is that such an inference is premised on tracking the externally-driven processes of order-promotion in the region. Thus, in retrospect, as the eminent Balkan analyst Vladimir Gligorov (2004: 3) has remarked, ‘the year 1999 of the war in Kosovo was for the Balkans the equivalent of 1989 for [Central] Eastern Europe’.

5.2. The Terms of Post-1999 European Order:
There is already an established body of literature on the governance of European security, which focuses on the dispersion of authority between different international actors (Howorth, 2000; Krahman, 2003; Webber et al., 2004). This school identifies ‘security governance’ as the promotion of a European order grounded in the predisposition to pursue national goals through multilateral arrangements (Howorth, 2000: 87-91). As Elke Krahman (2003: 14) has put it, it is the particular enlargement processes of both the EU and NATO, together with their concomitant dynamics of differentiation between ‘new, soon-to-be, would-be and not-to-be members’, which asserts their centrality in European affairs. Since the objective of this chapter is to emphasise the significance of both the EU and NATO as agents of socialisation, it concentrates on the particulars, which led them to assume such roles.

In this respect, it is relevant to revisit the initial post-Cold War debates on whether conditions for collective security architecture in Europe exist, and, if they do, in what guise (Bennett and Lepgold, 1993: 213). As one commentator noted at the time, the majority of debates were underscored by an uncertainty of ‘how much of the old order will disappear and what new structures will emerge’ (Lodgaard, 1992: 57). When the leaders of the CSCE states met at the Paris Summit in November 1990 to mark the end of the Cold War, they hailed ‘a new era of
democracy, peace and unity' on the continent (Letica, 2004: 209-10). Subsequently, this optimism was boosted by the successful UN-led intervention in Kuwait that led many to declare a ‘a new international order through the UN’ (Carlsson, 1992: 7). These developments, in turn, seem to have intensified the debates on reforming the UN system to the new environment. In this context, the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1993: 68) declared that the UN is looking for a ‘new division of labour with regional organisations’. In the context of Europe, such regional security frameworks were sought within the mechanisms of the CSCE/OSCE, EC/EU, NATO and the WEU (Bennett and Lepgold, 1993; Lodgaard, 1992; Weber, 1992). In their suggestions of the advantages and benefits of any of those organisation commentators oscillated between three lines of argument: common security, collective security and strategic calculation (Lodgaard, 1992: 64). However, as Richard Betts (1992: 7) has perceptively remarked, to a large extent these debates were ‘fuelled by confusion about which is the cause and which is the effect in the relation between collective security and peace, and by conflation of present security conditions (absence of threat) with future security functions (coping with threat)’. He suggested, therefore, that it is reasonable to expect inconsistency both in policy and in the theoretical debates on the issue of collective security architecture of the continent ‘if we do not yet know when and against whom we will once again need a functioning security system for Europe... the idea that post-Cold War strategy must define itself against “uncertainty” is becoming a tiresome and suspiciously facile cliché’ (Betts, 1992: 43).

It was the concomitant violence of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the USSR, which dampened the euphoria caused by the end of the Cold War and also suggested what kind of international practices the new security governance of Europe had to prevent. In particular, the continuing failure of the UN to achieve a durable ceasefire in the Balkans illustrated that ‘its practices set early in the Cold War are now outdated’ (Bennett and Lepgold, 1993: 230). The violent break-up of former Yugoslavia, thus seemed to unravel the myths of post-bipolar peace and the UN ability to coordinate conflict management. These developments intensified the debates among various international actors on how and by whom conditions on the ground could be shaped.\footnote{Thus, as will be elaborated in this chapter (as well as Chapters Six and Seven) gradually during the 1990s both NATO and the EU indicated their willingness and capability to offer a long-term vision of stability through the extension of their security-community-pattern of relations.} Thus, it is argued that regardless of the proliferation of institutional arrangements in Europe after the Cold War, all of them, in one way or another have come to derive their authority and to assert their legitimacy during the 1990s through their relations with the EU and/or NATO.
‘as the main diplomatic, political and economic platforms, in the absence of corresponding UN mandates’ (Hertkorn, 2004: 23).

As Chapter Two has outlined, the establishment of order has been a perennial challenge in international life. Therefore, the proposed significance of 1999 is indicated procedurally – via the dynamics prompted by the Kosovo crisis. Such conjecture can be interpreted both as the culmination of institutional adaptation and the indication of ideational change (Kydd, 2001). The claim is that the significance of 1999 is not ‘fortuitous’ as was the case of 1997 when both NATO and the EU took decisions to enlarge. The issue is that the pre-1999 involvement of international actors in the Balkans have been informed by ‘an effort to “read the Balkans out of history” and turn it into a place with no relevance to Europe’s future’ (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1997: 156), while the Kosovo crisis reversed this trend (i.e. a move from quarantine to integration).

In this respect, the proposed significance of the post-1999 period is indicated not only historically – the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall – but also circumstantially. In the wake of the Kosovo conflict, the EU launched its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), appointed its first High Representative of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and delineated the extent of its outreach leavened by its decision to open enlargement negotiations with all candidate-countries, initiate accession procedures with the states of the Western Balkans, recognise Turkey’s prospective status as a candidate country and, thereby, consign the rest of the continent to the outskirts of ‘Wider Europe’. To these series of firsts, NATO added its order-enforcing mission in Kosovo, the adoption of its new Strategic Concept and on its fiftieth anniversary NATO embarked on its first post-communist enlargement. Such an amalgamation of events alludes to the articulation of the terms of the post-1999 European order. This includes the following two characteristics: (i) compliance with the Euro-Atlantic normative standards, securitised through a process of socialisation; and (ii) functional differentiation between the Euro-Atlantic actors as regards their socialising tasks in Europe. Such conjecture is corroborated by the perceptions of regional decision-makers. As an advisor to the Romanian President acknowledged ‘1999 was an important landmark in Romanian foreign policy’ (Maties, 2000: 79). Another Romanian diplomat insisted that ‘the attitude towards Romania significantly

60 It has to be emphasised that these aspects although defining for the post-1999 European order are not new. Both can be traced before 1999. The argument, however, is that the Kosovo crisis confirmed and strengthened these two features by demarcating explicit capacities for punishment and ostracism for those who did not comply (of course, within the geographic confines of projected association and accession activities).
changed in 1999, with Romania’s support of NATO’s action in Yugoslavia over Kosovo. At the same time, a leading Croatian analyst and government advisor has acknowledged that the EU and NATO introduced ‘a new integration paradigm and approach for the Western Balkans in 1999’ (Letica, 2004: 212). Likewise, a Bulgarian diplomat has indicated that 1999 was the year when the EU and NATO developed ‘concrete and pro-active’ approaches to the Balkans.

It has to be reiterated that such securitisation process did not develop overnight, but gradually. It seems that in 1999 a ‘critical mass’ has emerged, which triggered the understanding that the crises in the Balkans constituted a challenge to the institutionalisation of the Euro-Atlantic security-community-kind of order, which could no longer be tolerated. In this context, the altered perception of the Euro-Atlantic actors indicated their ability to frame the context for collective responses to international problems (Adler and Haas, 1992: 376). Prior to 1999, the situation in the Balkans was regarded by external actors as incompatible with the dominant patterns of cooperation and peaceful international affairs in Europe. However, neither the EU nor NATO indicated any order-promoting agency beyond the humanitarian-aid-provision and containment of the conflict within the territory of former Yugoslavia. Kosovo changed all that. The common motif seems to be that as a result of their Balkan experiences both NATO and the EU have clarified the boundaries of their socialisation power through the extent of the prospective inclusion of all Balkan states in their enlargement programmes.

The required qualification relates to the suggestion that the post-1999 European order reflects a perception by both the EU and NATO of the extent of their socialisation power. The scope of their agency (i.e. transformative capacity) can be defined by the geography of their European outreach – that is their different criteria for evaluating permissible behaviour in states that are prospective/would-be candidates for membership and those who are not. Thus, in the states that have been constructed as part of the European framework of order (such as the Balkan countries) different understanding of the standards for closer association are applied than to those that are not considered part of it (i.e. states that are not potential members). For instance, the EU has done this through the clear delineation of its membership project, while NATO has indicated different interpretation of its criteria for inclusion in the PIP – as indicated, for instance, by the differential treatment of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro on the one hand and a number of authoritarian states in Central Asia, on the other. Such a difference in NATO’s perception of

61 Interview 9 February 2005.
63 See Chapters Six and Seven for the particular details of this evolution.
these two sets of states is premised on the understanding that the former are (potentially) prospective members, while the latter are not. Hence, the Balkan region has been the object of a process of securitisation, which has compelled the EU and NATO to develop an understanding of their agency in Europe different from the one in out-of-Europe-areas.

Thus, 1999 provided a watershed, which simplified the institutionalisation of Europe’s security governance such that two bodies – the EU and NATO – became central. It was only then that both the EU and NATO interpreted Yugoslav intransigence as an existential threat to the validity and credibility of the ideational basis of their security identity. Such an assertion rests on the premise that other institutions lost significance as a consequence of the Kosovo experience. In this respect, their centrality in European affairs evinces the two aspects of the order that they embody: legitimacy (or shared purpose) and coercion (or enforcement). Both aspects are ingrained in the terms of the post-1999 European order: compliance with the Euro-Atlantic normative standards suggests the preponderance of their legitimacy, while the practice of order-promotion in effect implies hegemonic capabilities to enforce appropriateness. The result of such developments is that the EU and NATO asserted their own centrality in European affairs.

5.2.1. Securitisation of Western norms:
A dominant aspect of the post-1999 European order is the perception that the Kosovo crisis indicates not only a refusal to adapt to the standards of peaceful international behaviour, but also a normative threat to the legitimacy of the security community patterns of relations in Europe (defined through the geography of the EU and NATO membership). Hence, the ‘self-perpetuating quality’ of the post-Cold War process of norm-diffusion from the Western to the Eastern part of the continent created obligations (in the sense of international expectations that events such as the ones in Kosovo have no place in European affairs and have to be punished), which compelled both NATO and the EU to act in order to maintain their socialising relevance in Europe (Talentino, 2004: 320). In this respect, Madeline Albright (1999: 7) has called Southeastern Europe ‘the critical missing piece in the puzzle of a Europe whole and free... That vision of a united and democratic Europe is crucial to our security. It cannot be fulfilled if this part of the continent remains divided and wracked by conflict’. In his memoirs John Norris (2005: xxiii), aide to the then US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, has acknowledged that ‘Belgrade

64 This contention is reinforced by both the significance that KFOR is a NATO rather than a UN force, and the decreasing importance of OSCE in European security. Section 5.2.1.B elaborates these points further.
65 See Ruggie (1982: 380) for a more detailed elaboration of both aspects.
66 Both the UN and the OSCE are treated in the following section.
seemed to delight in continually moving in the opposite direction’ and repeat ‘transgression [that]
ran directly counter to the vision of a Europe “whole and free” [and] challenged the very values’
of Euro-Atlantic order.

The classic definition of such securitisation discourses provided by Waever (1998: 80)
indicates that an actor ‘dramatis[es] an issue as having absolute priority. Something is presented
as an existential threat: if we do not tackle this, everything else will be irrelevant... [Thus] the
actor has claimed a right to handle it with extraordinary means, to break the normal rules of the
political game.’ In this respect, the notion of normative securitisation emphasises the ‘normative
reconceptualisation of security’, which indicates strategic commitment to the norms of acceptable
(i.e. peaceful) international relations and constrains state-behaviour by providing standards of
 judgement and the possibility for censure and sanction.67 An important point in this context has
been the reconceptualization of acceptable behaviour in terms of the domestic governance of
states, revealed by the Kosovo crisis.

This normative securitisation of the EU’s and NATO’s responses to the Kosovo crisis, which
reinforced their ‘European international identity’ by conflating the mythic narrative of the
European post-war history with obligations from their profile as agents of international order
(Waever, 2000: 279). As a result, normative securitisation developed into a powerful determinant
of legitimacy for NATO and the EU in the application of their agency to the Balkans (Talentino,
2004: 320). Prior to 1999 both NATO and the EU were two among many actors involved in the
region. After Kosovo they became the main agents for the socialisation of Balkan state-elites.
Agency in this context, has involved a ‘conscious choice, the ability to reflect on the situation at
hand, and the capacity to use reflexive knowledge to transform situations and to engage in
learning as a result’ (O’Neill et al., 2004: 158). Thus for the then NATO Secretary General
George Robertson (2003) the situation in Kosovo ‘threatened to set Europe back to a darker era,
an era to which our continent must never return’. In a similar fashion, Javier Solana (2000b: 218)
has revealed that had not NATO acted in Kosovo, ‘the entire logic of turning Europe into a
common political, economic and security space would have been invalidated’. Such normative
justification for the use of force is also evident in the words of the then German ambassador to
the US, Wolfgang Ischinger (2000: 27), who insists that ‘[i]nstead of national interests, the
international community pursued the goal of implementing the basic principles of law and
humanity’. It has also been emphasised by General Wesley Clark in his farewell address to the

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67 This understanding benefits from the suggestions of Talentino (2004: 315).
Alliance, who stressed that through its action in Kosovo, NATO 'demonstrated that there is nothing stronger than the power of ideas... ideas of freedom, law and democracy and that democratic peoples united in a vision of common imperative form an irresistible and magnetic force which is transforming the nature of Europe' (in Moore, 2002: 12).

These statements also effect a further qualification of such normative securitisation. A number of recent studies have challenged the democratic qualities of the norms and rules underwriting the post-1999 European order. In the case of NATO, Helene Sjursen (2004: 702-03) has argued that while its post-Cold War persistence has depended largely on 'the glue provided by a sense of common history or a sense of sharing a common destiny', this should be distinguished from its contribution to strengthening democracy in CEE. Sjursen claims that if this has occurred it is largely an unintended consequence rather then resulting from 'the core identity of NATO'. Kristi Raik (2004: 590-91) has advanced a similar argument to the EU’s case. She has argued that the association and accession activities introduce compliance with a set of standards, but this process also 'constrains' and 'contradicts' the logic of democracy-building. Instead of taking issue with the validity of such claims, this thesis maintains that the EU and NATO socialisation dynamics are about the strategic extension of norms and rules of appropriate international behaviour (see Chapter Four). In this respect, even if considered constraining to certain democratic practices, this does not negate their instrumental logic of promoting peace. As suggested, the Euro-Atlantic socialisation is a hegemonic project, which introduces the minimum requirements of a peace-order (elaborated in the framework of elite security community). Therefore, the argument of this research is that the terms of the post-1999 European order (as implicated with the normative securitisation of the Kosovo crisis) indicate that the socialisation practices of the EU and NATO are about the promotion of standards of predictability (which may not necessarily be democratic). As Mark Wheeler (2003: 54), the Bosnia Project Manager of the International Crisis Group acknowledged during a hearing at the US Congress, the best way to build order ‘in these countries emerging from communism and chaos... is simply to enforce the highest possible standards’ – not democracy, per se.

Such conceptualisation of Euro-Atlantic agency, therefore, suggests the requirement for identification with the normative premise of their institutions. This kind of discourse implies a particular reading of Euro-Atlantic securitisation practices. On the one hand, they are premised upon the desecuritisation of national identity (defined in territorial terms). On the other, they reflect the strong emphasis on the securitisation of the norms of appropriateness (understood as compatibility with the dominant peaceful pattern of international relations in Europe).
In this respect, the threat posed by Yugoslav disintegration was interpreted as an opportunity to extend the Euro-Atlantic integration practices. Thereby, after 1999 both the EU and NATO indicated their willingness to make the legitimacy of decision-making a necessity for the recognition and admittance to their accession programs. In practical terms, such normative securitisation underwrote two policy (and perception) shifts in external actors. First, it directed the inclusion of all Balkan states into the EU and NATO association and accession programmes. Second, this inclusion of the region into the EU and NATO enlargement projects reflected the limitations of other international actors, mainly the UN and the OSCE, to be agents of order in the Balkans. The following two sections detail these dynamics.

5.2.1.A. Inclusion of the Balkans in the Integration Programmes of the EU and NATO:
The theoretical suggestions of Part One of the thesis propose that an instrumental peace-order in the Balkans is expected to emerge through the extension of the Western security community as a result of the congruence between externally promoted standards and the decision-making of regional state-elites. The constraining of foreign-policy behaviour occurs not only from its direct conditioning by the EU and NATO, but also in the context of these organisations’ promotion of the domestic institutions of government. This has been an important feature of the international socialisation of state-elites in the Balkans, whose strategic rationale itself reflects the twin-interests of the Euro-Atlantic agents of socialisation. Namely, the strengthening of statehood and, at the same time, the introduction and maintenance of peaceful foreign-policy practices. The socialising impact of the EU and NATO on the external behaviour of Balkan states is thus, a product in part of the effects these organisations have on domestic governance. In other words, the promotion of regional security (i.e. ‘good-neighbourliness’ among Balkan states) is intertwined with conditioning the domestic practices of decision-making among state-elites.68

This claim is crucial to the empirical elaborations of Chapters Six and Seven. Such securitisation of the Kosovo crisis boosted not only the EU’s and NATO’s enlargement projects, but also, and more specifically, their countenancing of a Balkan enlargement. Whereas the link is much more straightforward for the EU (with its decision to engage in accession talks with all

68 This assumption rests partly on the example of West European integration: the practice of international cooperation was maintained (if not enforced) by the increased penetration of European Community law in the domestic affairs of member states (Downs et al., 1996: 392). As Chapters Six and Seven will explicate such socialisation dynamic maintains that regional decision-makers take as their point of reference the external agents (i.e. the demands of the EU and NATO). In this respect, the case studies indicate that it is as a result of the bilateral contractual relations between Balkan states and external actors that peaceful relations begin to emerge in the region due to the increasing congruence with external standards in domestic-policy-formulation that impacts foreign-policy-making.
countries that fulfil the Copenhagen ‘political criteria’ and the launch of its Stabilisation and Association Process);\(^{69}\) such connection is not immediately discernible in NATO's case and, hence, requires some elaboration.\(^{70}\)

A number of commentators have argued that NATO enlargement, per se, as well as its inclusion of Balkan states was made possible by ‘9/11’ (Gallagher, 2004: 9). The argument here, however, is that the ‘war on terror’ became a facilitative condition for enlargement, owing to developments already set in motion in the wake of the Kosovo conflict.\(^{71}\) Some of these have been occluded by the debates surrounding the 2000 US presidential election as well as the subsequent emphasis on the ‘war on terror’. Yet, it is noteworthy that both Vice-president Al Gore and Governor George W. Bush made it explicit throughout their campaigns that NATO enlargement was one of their top foreign-policy priorities (Gore, 2000; Bush, 2000). However, it is the testimony by General Wesley Clark on 21 February 2001 before the US Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs, which indicates a link between events during 1999 and the subsequent American preference for enlargement of the Alliance. As Clark (2001) insists ‘the Balkans are the most urgent issue confronting the Alliance’, and therefore, ‘the process of bringing peace and stability to Eastern Europe’ has emphasised that

NATO enlargement is thus critical to maintaining NATO's relevance and effectiveness, as well as American leadership in critical transatlantic security issues. NATO has served for over fifty years as the bedrock of stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. It is an institution initiated and led by the United States. It remains for farsighted and courageous American leadership to steer NATO safely through the difficult issues ahead.

In this context, some commentators have long insisted that as regards the issue of NATO enlargement, the George W. Bush Administration ‘largely picked up where Clinton has left off’ (Gordon and Steinberg, 2001: 2). During his first visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels on 13 June 2001, Bush (2001a) insisted that the Alliance’s work ‘in the Balkans shows how much... NATO can achieve’; therefore, in order to

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\(^{69}\) This point is detailed in Chapter Six. As it will be suggested, the EU has clearly indicated the prospect of membership for all the Balkan countries.

\(^{70}\) Chapter Seven elaborates further NATO’s involvement in the Balkans.

\(^{71}\) In effect, John Norris (2005: 315-16) has suggested that a major reason for not proceeding with the enlargement at the 1999 Washington Summit was Western apprehension at a possible backlash in Russia from communists and hard-liners, who were already agitated by NATO’s war in Kosovo and were seeing opportunities for accessing power in Yeltsin’s increasingly waning capacities.
be true to the great vision of our fathers and grandfathers... NATO must prepare for further enlargement of the Alliance. All aspiring members have work to do. Yet, if they continue to make the progress they are making, we will be able to launch the next round of enlargement when we meet in Prague'.

A couple of days later, during his visit to Poland, he expanded further on the issue of NATO enlargement as part of a project to ‘build an open Europe – a Europe without Hitler and Stalin, without Brezhnev and Honecker and Ceausescu and, yes, without Milosevic’. Bush (2001b) suggested that such support is based on a belief in NATO-membership for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings... The question of ‘when’ may still be up for debate within NATO; the question of ‘whether’ should not be. As we plan to enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a pawn in the agendas of others... Next year, NATO’s leaders will meet in Prague. The United States will be prepared to make concrete, historic decisions with its allies to advance NATO enlargement... The expansion of NATO has fulfilled NATO’s promise. And that promise now leads eastward and southward, northward and onward.

In this respect, Ian Brzezinski (2003: 15), US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for European and NATO Affairs, has insisted that the post-‘9/11’ contribution of the PfP countries emphasises the results of their socialisation process. He has maintained that

Our [the US] support for the NATO aspirations of the seven invitees has been matched by their enthusiasm and willingness to contribute to NATO-led operations in the Balkans, to Operation Enduring Freedom, ISAF, and, more recently, to the war against Iraq... They have demonstrated, by risking their own blood, that they not only understand the responsibility of NATO membership; they embrace it... through these contributions, their defence establishments have attained a better understanding of how NATO and NATO allies conduct military operations.

The prospect of inclusion is open to current MAP states of the region (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) and not only to the ‘old’ MAP countries: Bulgaria and Romania. This has been most specifically indicated by the US-Adriatic Charter, whose officially-stated objective is ‘the final realisation of the notion of integral and free Europe and integral membership of NATO’ (Hina, 22 March 2003). 72 At its Istanbul Summit, the Alliance further encouraged the Adriatic Charter...
countries to continue with their reforms necessary to achieve membership (ISN Security Watch, 21 January 2005). As the Director of Balkans and Eurasia Programs to the US Secretary of Defence, Alan van Egmond (2005) has insisted ‘the door to NATO membership remains open, and we welcome the Adriatic Charter members’ aspirations to join NATO’. Such a view was reinforced by President Bush during his visit to Brussels when he assured the Adriatic Charter countries of their membership prospects (Focus, 23 February 2005). Likewise, in his statements the NATO Secretary General regularly maintains that the Alliance remains open to new members from the Balkans. For instance, during the visit to NATO Headquarters, by the Croatian President Mesic, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stressed that because ‘Croatia is a country which has a MAP, and that, of course is part of the road... to Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO membership’ (NATO Update, 1 March 2005). Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer made a similar claim during a meeting with the Macedonian Prime Minister Buckovski, by insisting that ‘I can tell the Prime Minister that the signals and the signs are green as far as the progress that Macedonia is meeting in the framework of the MAP. Nevertheless this Prime Minister and his government do not need any encouragement I think from a NATO Secretary General to go on the way which will lead to the only recipe I see, as I have said many times before, for the region that is Euro-Atlantic integration’ (NATO Update, 14 February 2005).

It is this context that suggests the centrality of the Kosovo crisis to both the EU’s and NATO’s understanding of their agency in European affairs. The fragmentation implied by the Kosovo crisis - i.e., the challenge to the Euro-Atlantic norms and standards - was securitised in terms of its disturbance to the very legitimacy of the West European (integration-based) order. The Balkan challenges, therefore, fostered the order-promoting enforcement of the common expectations of appropriate state-behaviour in Europe. Schimmelfennig (2003: 72) has claimed that through such securitisation, the Euro-Atlantic actors have broken their normal rules of procedure, and have emphasised their position as the ‘community organisation[s]’ for the European continent – i.e. they can ‘regulate [their] community membership and act to realise [their] community values and to uphold [their] community norms’.

Robertson told a press conference that NATO ‘wants Bosnia as a partner and possibly as a member, but only as a member that shares our values’ (NEDB, 28 November 2003). Likewise, Bruce Jackson, the President of the US Committee on NATO has indicated that he is ‘very optimistic’ regarding Serbia/Montenegro’s membership in NATO (Tanjug, 14 July 2003).

33 A further discussion of the prospect of NATO-membership of the Balkans is provided in Chapter Seven. As it would be indicated, NATO’s overall framework of relations in the region (including the entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro) has been suggested as ‘enlargement by stealth’ (Smith and Aldred, 2000).
As the case-study of the EU will demonstrate, its distinct dynamics of accession allow it to affect (through the ‘sticks and carrots’ of the offer of membership) outcomes in the continent. The German analyst Ulrich Beck (NYT, 28 April 1999) has claimed that Kosovo turned out to be Europe’s ‘military euro, creating a political and defence identity for the European Union in the same way as the euro is the expression of economic and financial integration’. In this respect, the enlargement programs are perceived as the foreign policy initiative that maintains peace in Europe and, thus, reinforces the credibility of EU’s security identity. As Frank Schimmelfennig (2003: 70) explicates, the dynamics of accession allow the EU not simply to regulate state behaviour, but also to shape state identities and interests.

A similar claim underwrites the treatment of the case of NATO. Borchert and Hampton (2002: 372) have suggested that in retrospect, NATO’s Kosovo operation was a ‘success for its enlargement policy’. It confirmed the logic of its first post-Cold War enlargement and suggested that it is (the offer of) membership that helps to extend the zone of peace in Europe. In other words, the offer of membership to East European states outlines the area where the Allies expect subscription to the norms and rules of the Euro-Atlantic security community. Hence, NATO has asserted its agency in Europe through the implications of the inclusion/exclusion dynamic of enlargement and partnership programs (Webber et al., 2004).

5.2.1.B. The Limitations of the UN and the OSCE:
As some have argued, the deepening crises in the Balkans reflected the failure of a number of international organizations, and specifically of the UN and the OSCE (Vucetic, 2001: 111). Both fell short of their objectives due to similar shortcomings – the twin deficiencies of a lack of enforcement ability; and a commitment to the territorial integrity of states, which underwrote their inability to impact the policy-behaviour of target-states (Callan, 1999: 10). While the former implicates an inability to ensure compliance, the latter opens these organisations to allegations of partiality. Although, the UN’s role in the Balkans is also suggested in Chapter Seven (in the context of NATO’s enforcing socialisation), the following sections provide a brief overview of the UN’s shortcomings and subsequently detail the failures of the OSCE.

It has to be acknowledged that the UN is still an important actor in the socialisation of the Balkans. In this respect, it remains part of the security governance of the region and as such has

74 From a material-interest perspective, Fotopoulos (1999: 364) has argued that the EU supported the war in Yugoslavia, because of a rational calculation that it would ‘indirectly bring the full integration of the Balkans into the EU’.

75 Moreover, unlike the EU and NATO, both were unable to adapt to altering demands.
been the formal mandating authority for the EU missions in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and is in charge of the administration of Kosovo. Yet, the claim of this research is that the UN has become supplementary (if not subordinate as the Kosovo crisis has indicated) to the socialising agency of NATO and the EU. In this respect, Talentino (2004: 314) maintains that its primary task remains the ‘legitimising of state behaviour’; but, its role in Europe has been somewhat curtailed due to the developments in the Balkans in the 1990s. A notable feature of the post-Cold War ‘flurry of UN peace-keeping’ efforts has been their ‘internal focus... to a domestic political scene’ (James, 1993: 359). Yet, this increase in UN interventions did not necessarily reflect or translate into ability to prevent or stop militarised conflicts. As Diehl et al. (1996: 698-99) have insisted, the conflicts in the Balkans confirmed ‘the historical trend of virtual UN irrelevance in dealing with long-term threats to international peace and security’ due to its ‘lack of long-term vision’ and ‘ineffectiveness in stemming militarised conflicts’. One commentator has suggested at the time, that the UN actions in the Balkans were counterintuitive both to its claims to centrality in conflict resolution and the expectations that they generated as the ‘increased fighting in the region appears to have decreased the feasibility of outside intervention... Instead the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali is reviewing the UN presence [and is] considering withdrawing peacekeeping troops in the Balkans as a result of renewed fighting in Croatia’ (Oberdorfer, 1993). Consequently both regional and various external actors grew increasingly frustrated with the UN’s inability to impact the evolving crises (Stuart, 2004: 37). As the representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the UN, Muhamed Sacirbey (1995: 3-4) poignantly declared at a meeting of the UN Security Council:

Excuse us if we do not seem adequately grateful for the food that we are given, but after three years of sieges that the world powers could have confronted and lifted by now, we believe the members of the [UN Security] Council should be thankful to us for, while our physical existence resembles that of livestock held in pens, fed but none the less surrounded and waiting our fate, we in Sarajevo and elsewhere within our nation have continued to be true believers in and the practitioners of the principles that members here preach from the comfort of their unaffected lifestyles... Hence, I say to the members of the Council that ‘your tolerance, even institutionalisation, of this siege can no longer be justified’... The Serbians have to accomplish their crime by cutting

76 Hence, the suggestion is that the UN has been marginalized rather than made completely irrelevant. See Abshire and Cross (2004: 82) for the counter argument that the UN is no longer a ‘viable and effective option’ for the promotion of order.

77 David Last (1998) has even suggested that the UN’s shortcomings in the 1990s echo its first-ever ‘early-response’ operation, the UN Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCO, 1947-1951) which was forced to wind down its activities due to the ineffective pursuit of its mandate both because local parties refused to abide by the UNSCOB demands and because of lack of support of the UN Security Council. Last’s suggestion corroborates the definition of socialisation power in Chapter Three as the ability to compel decision-making behaviour.
...down snippets of human life not noticeable to an increasingly disengaged international
community until the entire tree of human life in places such as Srebrenica has been
eradicated.

The subsequent fulfilment of Mr. Sacirbey’s ominous portend turned Srebrenica into a glaring
symbol of the UN’s failure as a coordinator for conflict management in the region. The
frustration over its cumbersome structures and their inability to affect policy-making urged
NATO (and then the EU) to develop their own agency in the region, outside of the mandating
authority of the UN. Thus, they became the main agents of international socialisation in Europe
(Hertkorn, 2004: 23). As Chapter Seven will elaborate, during the Kosovo crisis, NATO claimed
legitimacy in lieu of the UN Security Council and then ‘invited’ the UN to establish a mission in
the province. Colleen Duggan (2004: 347; 357) has argued that these developments indicate a
lack of ‘integrated conflict prevention strategies within the UN system’ and reflect the absence of
‘desire’ among the ‘UN actors’ to be ‘protagonists’ of order. As Chris Patten, the EU
Commissioner on External Relations has acknowledged, the experience in the Balkans showed
that the UN ‘should never again take on responsibilities for which it did not have the capacity, the
financial resources or the political will’ (in Weismann, 2003).

It is deemed necessary to mention in this brief discussion of the UN’s tasks in the region, the
role of one of the ‘UN actors’ – the overlooked and understudied six-nation Contact Group
(France, Italy, Germany, the US, the UK and Russia). Formed in April 1994 to coordinate
responses to the Yugoslav conflict, it was quickly established in the region as the ‘Security
Council’s Contact Group’ according to the then Croatian representative to the UN, Mario Nobilo
(1995: 5). The Group’s origins are usually traced to the beginning of 1992 when the then
European Community and the UN initiated joint working teams on devising peace plans for the
conflicts in former Yugoslavia (Carter, 1995). However, a year after its creation the Bosnian
representative to the UN, Mr Sacirbey (1995: 4) declared unequivocally that ‘confronted by a
toothless international Contact Group, unwilling Western Powers and UNPROFOR tactics
promoting the status quo, it is no wonder that the Serbs believe that their reality of conquest,
“ethnic cleansing” and occupation on the ground will prevail over the paper maps, documents and
words of the Contact Group peacemakers’. Since the mid-1990s the Group has become a

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78 For an in-depth discussion of the Contact Group see Johnson (2003). Its initiation reflects early post-Cold War
suggestions that the UN should develop ‘Regional Security Commissions’ that would act as a bridge between the
Security Council and existing regional organisations (Lunn, 1993: 371). Most analysts have suggested the strategic
rationale behind such necessity to create a ‘Security Council on European affairs’ through the need to recognise
‘Germany’s de facto great power status but also the limitations of its role as a non-member of the UN Security
Council’ (Bennett and Lepgold, 1993: 232).
mechanism for coordinating the policies of its members towards the Balkans and it has managed to issue a number of joint 'calls', 'declarations', 'plans' and 'ultimatums', but not so much agreement in terms of actions to be taken. As the Kosovo crisis illustrates, while France and Russia maintained that it is the Kosovo Liberation Army, rather than the Belgrade authorities that is the destabilising factor, the US and the UK held the opposite view (RFE/RL Newsline, 4 January 1999). The terms of the post-1999 European order may suggest that the UN and the Contact Group are still relevant actors in the Balkans; however, owing to their inability to affect policy-behaviour their role is auxiliary to that of NATO and the EU who have become the main agents of socialisation.

Just like in the UN case, the OSCE's role in the Balkans has also gradually developed in the direction of a supplementary organisation to different EU and NATO initiatives. A number of commentators have suggested that a significant part of the international effort during the 1990s had been concentrated on the initiation of a centralised security structure for Europe under the auspices of the OSCE (Aybet, 2000; Hulburt, 1995; Krahman, 2003). Yet, owing to differences of interest and the persistent Balkan crises, such a framework gradually became untenable for the purposes of security-community-building. The OSCE's commitment to the inviolability of national sovereignty was agreed upon at its Lisbon Summit Meeting in December 1996. Subsequently, this position made the organisation open to questions of partiality. For instance, its Kosovo Verification Mission has been interpreted by ethnic Albanians as thwarting their claims to self-determination, while endorsing the Belgrade position (Callan, 1999: 10). At the same time, others in the region perceived the OSCE as a stooge for various member-states of either NATO or the EU (Borogovac, 1996). Hence, the Balkan analyst, Dusan Reljic (in SEF News, 2002: 11) argues that 'the OSCE was never an alternative [for the Balkans] - it had proved its “impotence” early in the 1990s'. Attesting to such proposition, during its 12th Ministerial Summit in Sofia (6-7 December 2004) the title of an editorial in a leading Bulgarian daily read 'It is best if the OSCE dissolves' (Politica, 5 December 2004). The argument was that 'the OSCE does not have the instruments to solve the problems plaguing Europe. Therefore, Ukraine, as well as the countries in the Caucasus region, and those in the Balkans are looking up to real organisations such as NATO and the EU'.

Institutional problems have also plagued the OSCE since its emergence. One commentator points out that the organisation is hampered by its 'cumbersome structure, logistic problems, internal discussions of leadership and the role of various contributing countries' (Eide, 2000: 68). As the Romanian Foreign Minister, Mircea Geoana (2002), the 2001 chair-in-office, referred to
these problems as 'the limitations' that prevent the OSCE from 'proving its value'. At the same
time, Dr. Jutta Stefan-Bastl (in SEF News, 2002: 8), Head of the Department on Security and Cooperation at the Austrian Foreign Ministry, acknowledges that the OSCE has 'a marginal role in the European security debate [limited to] the context of elections'. She insists that there are two reasons for such institutional impasse: first, 'the West has no interests to develop the OSCE into a regional organisation of the UN with an executive council', and, second, 'Russia was forced to recognise that it could not implement its policies via the OSCE and withdrew within the organisation, sometimes even vetoing its work'. Therefore, it is not surprising to read the disparaging analysis of the OSCE issued by its Dutch chair (ACIA Report, 2002: 42):

The OSCE's practical effectiveness is hampered by uncertainty about the organisation's position in the international arena, a lack of clarity about the OSCE's role (as a result of which it is entrusted with a large number of disparate responsibilities and activities), the questionable loyalty of the participating states, the fact that the organisation is still a conference, inadequate decision-making procedures, a lack of operational continuity and a political divide within its own ranks.

These shortcomings were conspicuously reiterated during the 2004 Summit, which coincided with the Ukrainian election crisis, when the OSCE could not reach an agreement on a political declaration on the issue. This led one Bulgarian commentator to proclaim that the OSCE 'has no longer any role to play. It fulfilled its purpose during the days of Gorbachev's perestroika. However, subsequently, it could not prevent Srebrenica, nor Kosovo, and now, naturally, it cannot assist Ukraine, when it is in crisis' (Dremdzhiiev, 2004: 21). Even the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Simeon Saxcoburggotski acknowledged that the biggest advantage from hosting the OSCE Summit is the promotion and revenue that it brings to Bulgarian tourism (Politica, 5 December 2004).

In this respect, the involvement of both the OSCE and the UN in the course of the Balkan crises during the 1990s underwrote their limitations as agents of peace in the region. As already indicated, it is this inability to introduce order in the Balkans which ultimately led the EU and NATO to securitise the region and compelled them to assert their centrality as agents of order in Europe. Nevertheless, despite such similarities in both the EU's and NATO's securitisation of the norms of the Euro-Atlantic security community, significant distinctions remain in regards to their functional differentiation in the process of socialising the Balkans. Since such distinction is important for the understanding of the subsequent case-studies the following section elaborates its implications.
5.2.2. Functional Differentiation Between the EU and NATO:

In light of such comments, therefore, it is not surprising that the terms of the post-1999 European order indicate both EU's and NATO's willingness to formulate their responsibility in European affairs. However, despite 'such endurance of the normative order' (Talentino, 2004: 335) between the EU and NATO, the Kosovo crisis also reflects their distinct histories and objectives. As Baker and Welsh (2000: 79-80) insist the differences (both in identity and methods) between the Western agents has largely remained unnoticed in the 'Euro-Atlantic' model that they characterised.

On the one hand (as the subsequent case-studies will indicate), the post-1999 approaches of both the EU and NATO towards order in Europe have aimed at similar objectives constraining (into predictable patterns) the foreign policy behaviour of Balkan states. However, on the other, this very process reflects the different capabilities of both organisations.

As the Balkan crises of the 1990s demonstrated, the EU seemed handicapped by the intergovernmental framework of the CFSP, and the subsequent situation on the ground demanded the muscle of NATO allies (many of whom are EU members). This tendency is implicated in the terms of the post-1999 European order and suggests the pragmatic division of labour between the two Euro-Atlantic agents. In other words, the crises in former Yugoslavia indicated that when the power of attraction from the historical practice of cooperation did not affect policy-behaviour, it required the agency of the power of enforcement to affect outcomes. Thus, NATO has largely come to be associated with furnishing the latter; yet, once compatibility of decision-making with external standards is enforced, the collaborative practices of the EU begin to take precedence again. General Gustav Hägglund, the Chairman of the EUMC summarised this functional differentiation as corresponding 'to the ability and interests of the two sides [the EU and NATO]'. He insisted that their common work in the Balkans is driven by an 'idealistic leading thought', yet, in practice such 'agreement on the main issues, provides a freedom of action in smaller questions, mutual respect and refraining from petty bargaining' (HS, 5 May 2002).

An emphasis on such cooperation reflects the general pattern of the EU and NATO socialisation activities through association and partnership. Usually, examples of such cooperation concentrate on cases from the Western Balkans, since (as suggested) the sub-region of Bulgaria and Romania is subject to the traditional accession-dynamics, which are largely perceived as complementary. As one analyst has suggested, 'while the logic driving the two organisations' enlargement [programs] might be somewhat different, they are mutually supportive, complementary and essentially inter-related' (Mamaliga, 2004: 23). Carmen
Podgorean, the Political Affairs Minister at the Romanian Embassy in Brussels confirms such assertion by insisting that 'the asset of NATO and EU programs in Romania and Bulgaria derives from their complementary roles, which makes their action more effective'. In their conditioning of the Western Balkans, such cooperation has been instanced through the common conditionality of the sub-region through the insistence that 'closer relations [with the EU and NATO] depend on cooperation with the ICTY' (RFE/RL Newsline, 8 February 2005). At the same time, representatives of both organisations have worked together on finding a solution to the issue of Kosovo (RFE/RL Newsline, 7 February 2005). Furthermore, both the EU and NATO cooperate on a range of issues from border management (Bieber, 2002: 213), the prevention of trafficking in human beings (Lindstrom, 2004), cigarette smuggling (Hozic, 2004), arms smuggling (Segell, 2004), etc. Recently, some commentators have drawn attention to 'the successful example' of the town of Brčko, a formerly divided town in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bieber, 2002: 209) and the larger Sava River Basin Cooperation Initiative (Joseph, 2005: 121). However, the current emphasis of such cooperation has been reinforced through the process of transferring Balkan missions from NATO to the EU, as instanced by the smooth transition from NATO's Operation Allied Harmony in Macedonia to Operation Concordia, the EU's first military operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. In a similar way, the EU's High Representative of CFSP Javier Solana and NATO's Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer have hailed 'the transition from SFOR to EUFOR' as a 'success of the common project of EU and NATO in the Balkans' (IHT, 15 July 2004). Reflecting the details of this transferral, Clifford Bond, the US Ambassador to Bosnia, has emphasised the subsidiarity between the NATO and the EU missions, with NATO remaining involved in operations demanding logistics, intelligence and military capabilities that EUFOR would not have (ICG Europe Briefing, 29 June 2004). The Austrian Chancellor, Wolfgang Schüssel stressed that the 'transatlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans is a real success story' (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 February 2005). Javier Solana has hailed them as a reflection of 'the effective partnership' between Washington and Brussels in the region (RFE/RL Balkan Report, 25 February 2005). On the whole, it is the complementarity of NATO's

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79 Interview on 9 February 2005.
80 Other initiatives and programs are discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.
81 The transference of missions in the Balkans from NATO to the EU, as well as the 'Berlin plus' agreement are treated at length in the following section, since, it is claimed, that they reflect the continuing relevance of EU-NATO cooperation in the Balkans during the 'war on terror'.

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order through intervention and the EU’s long-term roles (in addition to its ESDP tasks) that matter in the socialisation of the Balkans.\textsuperscript{82}

Thus, the Kosovo crisis, as William Wallace (2002: 284) has bluntly indicated, institutionalised a functional division of labour in which NATO ‘don’t do windows’. The Alliance, in other words simply demolishes the snags that hinder the introduction of the Euro-Atlantic order and then leaves it to the EU ‘to pick up the pieces’ and undertake the task of reconstruction. Similar functional differentiation in the post-‘9/11’ environment has been emphasised by Colonel Thomas Lynch (2005: 142), the former Chief of the US CENTCOM Commanding General’s Advisory Group, who has acknowledged that ‘NATO’s track record and its unique capabilities make it the essential partner for hard-power military confrontation against terrorism, while the EU has the best economic, social and foreign policy organs to work with Washington to generate social stability with a soft-power approach’.

Hence, the continuing relevance of NATO in European affairs is due to its ‘vitality’ as a security community organisation, which has indicated a knack for adapting to changed security environments (Penksa and Mason, 2003: 273). The EU’s centrality, meanwhile, derives from its accession and association programs, whose approaches through strategic investments, legal agreements, trade incentives, etc. allow it to utilise its ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002) in the Balkans.

As Chapter Six and Seven will demonstrate functional differentiation between the two organisations is best seen through the application of their practical instruments. NATO’s mechanisms for comprehensive outreach to the Balkans include its Partnership for Peace programme, the Membership Action Plans, as well as varieties of assistance in the field of defence reforms. At the same time, the EU instruments are centred on its mechanisms for accession and its Stabilisation and Association Process (PR/CP(2003)089, 29 July 2003). This study, therefore, claims that the complementarity of such functional differentiation continues to persist in the post-‘9/11’/Iraq crisis reality in Europe. The following section elaborates the main points of this suggestion.\textsuperscript{83}

5.3. The Effects of ‘9/11’:
The purpose of this section is to consider the significance of ‘9/11’ in the Balkans. As already suggested ‘9/11’ has simply reinforced (and, perhaps, accelerated) trends already set in motion in

\textsuperscript{82} In terms of the socialisation process discussed in Chapter Four both organisations indicate different abilities to exercise their socialisation power.

\textsuperscript{83} For a counterview see Joseph (2005: 117).
the wake of the Kosovo crisis. Nonetheless, the shared Euro-Atlantic paradigm built during fifty years of containing the Soviet threat has seemingly begun to unravel under the strain of a 'global war on terror'. This development has burdened the terms of the post-1999 European order outlined above. However, the main argument pursued in this section is that the conflicts between the members of the Euro-Atlantic community rather than negating EU's and NATO's centrality in the socialisation of Balkan states are simply reinforcing their significance as well as the relevance of their security community pattern of relations. As already suggested in Chapter Three, Deutsch (1957: 276) and his associates have emphasised that security communities are not characterised by the absence of conflicts, but by their peaceful resolution - which, in its minimalist definition implies (at least) a consideration for the other side:

even if some of the... partner countries find themselves on the opposite sides in some larger international conflict, they conduct themselves so as to keep actual mutual hostilities and damage to a minimum - or else refuse to fight each other altogether.

The claim is that even after '9/11' both the EU and NATO share a common vision for the Balkans (although not always means for achieving it), which further implicates their socialising consequences for the region. Hence, '9/11' and the subsequent Iraq crisis failed to achieve the significance of the Kosovo crisis as a watershed in the external perception of the Balkans. This study proffers three main reasons for such a development.

The first (and, perhaps, more conspicuous) reason is that such differences of opinion were apparent already during the Kosovo crisis. Borchert and Hampton (2002: 369) have acknowledged that Operation Allied Force while reconfirming half-a-century of US-West European security-community-building, also 'deepened fissures' in the transatlantic relationship that had begun to emerge with the end of the Cold War. In other words, the intervention in Kosovo represented a moment when shared threat-perceptions gave rise to different policy-measures (i.e. multilateralism vs. unilaterallism) among the EU-members and the US-dominated NATO. Thereby, '9/11' simply confronted the West with the reality of this dichotomy. Yet, as already indicated, in the Balkans such distinction of capabilities and perceptions has been dealt with through the functional differentiation between the EU and NATO. The Finnish Chairman of EUMC, General Hägglund, has insisted that in their work in the Balkans the EU and NATO are acting as a 'single crisis management organisation' (HS, 5 May 2002). Although, the suggested post-'9/11' conflicts of means do challenge the perception of a Euro-Atlantic security
community, the peaceful (in the sense of non-military) solution of these conflicts reinforces the conviction of its strategic importance in Europe.

The second reason for the continued relevance of EU and NATO complementarity in the Balkans is the fact that the US initiatives in the region are still channelled through Alliance programs. One of the most conspicuous events in the wake of ‘9/11’ was the first-ever invocation of Article 5 (the mutual defence clause of the Washington Treaty) by the Allies and its almost immediate rebuff by the US. As Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz (2002) insisted, Alliance assistance would not be necessary since ‘the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission’. However, owing to multiplicity of causes, the US found it more beneficial to pursue its mission in Southeastern Europe through NATO. General William Nash (2003: 25) acknowledged during a hearing before the US Congress Subcommittee on Europe that future US policy vis-à-vis the Balkans had to focus on ‘ensuring that NATO and the EU are the primary agents of international influence in the region over the coming decade; and... eliminating independent policymaking by ad hoc structures and transferring these responsibilities to permanent European or responsible local institutions’. As some have cynically remarked George W. Bush’s administration lacks interest in Balkan affairs, apart from preventing the spread of terrorist networks in the region, and, thus, finds it cheaper to work through NATO (Abramowitz and Hurlburt, 2002: 2-7). In this respect, probably, Southeastern Europe can be identified as a region where US policy-making acknowledges that it ‘needs support more than it needs control’ (Gordon, 2003). For not so dissimilar reasons, other commentators have interpreted such a stance through the paradox of ‘inclusive exceptionalism’ (Hirsch, 2002: 31), which recognises the benefits from binding American power in institutional arrangements in regions that are not at the centre of US foreign policy. Still others, as Daniel Serwer (2003a: 183-84), the former US Special Envoy for the Bosnian Federation and one of the architects of the Dayton Peace Accords, maintain that since the Kosovo crisis there has been consensus in Washington that all Balkan states ‘belong in Europe’.

Thirdly, and probably most significantly, the persisting EU-NATO collaboration in the Balkans reflects the US expectation that the Europeans would project their own policies in the region rather than merely provide capabilities in support of American programs. Such conjecture is implicated in one of President Bush’s (2001b) early statements, when he insisted that the US

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84 As it would be suggested shortly, the majority of the US-driven bilateral arrangements (at least rhetorically, if not always in practice) aim to facilitate the NATO-membership/partnership of individual countries.
welcomes a greater role for the EU in European security [and] the incentive for reform that the hope of EU membership creates. [But] the vision of Europe must also include the Balkans... Across the region, nations are yearning to be part of Europe. The burdens – and benefits – of satisfying that yearning will naturally fall most heavily on Europe, itself. That is why [the US] welcomes Europe’s commitment to play a leading role in the stabilisation of Southeast Europe.

Nicole Gnesotto (2003: 36-37) indicates that one of the main reasons for the policy-clashes between Europe and America after ‘9/11’ has been borne out of the US necessity for assets and not initiatives, which underlies the Bush administration’s tendency to marginalise the EU in favour of bilateral relations. Yet, the Balkans seem to be an exception from this pattern. As Daniel Serwer (2003b: 10-11) explained at the US Congress,

I don’t believe we [the US] should lead on economic reform and development. They are better handled by the IMF, the World Bank and the EU, which have vastly greater resources at their disposal. Social welfare is an enormous problem in the Balkans, but it should fall to others to handle it. State building should mostly be a EU responsibility because these countries are going to be European states. And military reform should be handled primarily by NATO.

The pattern of Euro-American collaboration in the Balkans has been further detailed through the ‘EU-NATO framework for permanent relations’, better-known as the ‘Berlin-plus’ agreement (EIS, 18 December 2002; Gnesotto, 2003: 34). One interpretation of the ‘Berlin-plus’ proposes the assurance that (at least) in Europe, the US remains involved within NATO’s multilateral structures (Sjursen, 2004: 702). Another, hints that the Balkans are an area where the EU wants to collaborate with the US (unlike its attempts to constrain American power in out-of-Europe areas) (see Harvey, 2003/04: 16).

The maintenance of such a common approach in the Balkans has been ensured through the optimisation of the existing EU-NATO consultation mechanisms – NAC/PSC, MC/EUMC, PCG/PMG, as well as the series of joint initiatives, statements and visits to the region by NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative of the CFSP. It is this warren of common Euro-Atlantic initiatives that contributes to the post-1999 stability of the Balkans and increases the socialising effectiveness of both the EU and NATO. The NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the EU High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana have referred to this process as a ‘move out of the era of Dayton and into the era of Brussels’, designed to assist regional elites to move ‘from the implementation of stabilisation to European integration’ (IHT, 15 July 2004).
The inference gleaned by such developments is that the discrepancy between the European and Atlanticist perspectives really clash ‘only’ when it comes to impacting developments outside of ‘Europe’ – defined through the framework of EU-membership and accession programs. As Borchert and Hampton (2002: 386-87) have suggested, the real challenges for Washington and its European partners lie in ‘out of area’ places such as the Middle East and Asia, where they have not yet cooperated. Whereas Operation Concordia received American approval, EU’s Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo came as a shock to Washington (Gnesotto, 2003: 34). Daniel Serwer (2003b: 10) has perceptively remarked the significance of the Balkans for transatlantic relations: ‘The fact is that European-American cooperation in the Balkans is today very good. We cannot expect that good cooperation to be the tail that wags the dog and creates good cooperation in Iraq. But I do think it teaches us a lesson’.

For these reasons, and despite the seeming divergence in the socio-economic contexts within which the EU’s and NATO’s policy-initiatives are embedded, the general trend has been towards cooperation between the two organisations in the Balkans. Thus referring to the events of 11 September 2001, NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson (10 October 2001) acknowledges that both the EU and NATO ‘have reinforced the logic of keeping peace in the Balkans, because stable multiethnic states are our best insurance against terrorism emerging in the first place’. Yet, despite the continuing complementarity between American and European initiatives in the Balkans, it has to be recognised that ‘9/11’ has altered (at least) one of the facets underscoring the logic of keeping peace in the region as outlined in the terms of the post-1999 European order. Antje Wiener (2004: 218) has presciently pointed out that as a result of the ‘war on terror’ the prospective accession of Balkan states into the EU is likely to be premised on four ‘strict conditions’. In addition to the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ – democracy, the rule of law, political and economic stability – the condition of ‘solidarity’ with EU-positions in world affairs has also been promulgated. This fourth condition has already been made apparent during the European and American haggling over the International Criminal Court as well as in the context of the Iraq crisis. In relation to the latter, however, Günter Verheugen, the then EU Enlargement Commissioner, has acknowledged that Europe has no ‘common’ foreign policy on Iraq (RFE/RL Feature, 11 September 2003). The suggestion is that the Euro-Atlantic differences over Iraq have not impacted on the EU-NATO cooperation in the Balkans. As already suggested in this chapter, at the height of the Iraq crisis the NATO-EU agreement on permanent relations was established which, in turn, paved the way for Operation Concordia. Therefore, the claim of this thesis is that this post-9/11 development in the Balkans has not undermined the significance of EU and NATO
initiatives in the region, nor has it challenged the logic of their security-community-building potential.

Differences do exist, however. For instance, exactly on the very same day (31 March 2002) that Washington suspended its aid to Serbia/Montenegro over non-cooperation with the ICTY, Brussels offered $100 million in new loans to Belgrade (Abramowitz and Hurlburt, 2002: 4). However, such instances have been the exception rather than the rule of the Euro-Atlantic ‘partnership’ in the Balkans. Carl Bildt (2004: 24-25), the former EU’s Special Representative to Former Yugoslavia and the first High Representative in Bosnia, has remarked that since ‘9/11’ and especially after the Iraq crisis it is clear that ‘Europe and America’ have ‘very different agendas’. Nevertheless, he contends that the continuing experience in the Balkans suggests that ‘these two agendas are complementary and mutually supportive… the 1989 agenda of peace through economic integration, political state-building and extension of the rule of law goes hand in hand with the 2001 agenda of decisively fighting global terrorism and combating the spread of the technologies of mass destruction’. Corroborating Bildt’s assessment the Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn has stressed that ‘regarding the Balkans, the EU is working together with our American friends’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 25 January 2005). Likewise, the former US Ambassador to the EU Richard Morningstar has insisted that looking at the Balkans both Europe and America can draw the conclusion that when we work together much is possible; when we argue, progress stalls’ (RFE/RL Balkan Report, 8 August 2003). As Doug Bereuter (2003: 3), the Chairman of the US Congress Subcommittee on Europe has declared ‘our efforts and activities in the Balkans will help us conceptualise a new collaboration between the US and Europe’.

Moreover, such pattern of EU-NATO cooperation in the Balkans is maintained by the perception that the US is linked (both discursively and in practice) with the Alliance programs in the region (Gligorov, 2003: 7). As a Macedonian defense official summarised the attitude of his colleagues in the region, ‘the US and the EU differences [of opinion] are nothing new to us and we have learned to live and work with them. What is important is that we make sure that they play together on the ground’. Hence, NATO’s partnership programs and the EU accession criteria tend to be portrayed in their complementarity by Balkan decision-makers. The Croatian Minister of European Integration, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, for instance, has insisted that although there are ‘two processes’ – i.e. of the EU and NATO accession – they ‘represent one Euro-Atlantic integration [because] in a global sense, the preconditions for membership in both

\[ Interview on 28 October 2004. \]
are very similar' (Fokus, 27 February 2004). Such statements reflect the mid-1990s stance of the Euro-Atlantic actors that 'the enlargement of NATO will complement the enlargement of the EU, a parallel process, which also, for its part contributes significantly to extending security and stability [in Europe]' (M-NAC-2(94)116).

As indicated, however, this does not imply that Balkan state-elites do not distinguish the (occasional) conflicts of interest between the EU and US/NATO approaches. The point, however, is that despite some of their approaches being at odds with each-other, Balkan decision-makers seem to emphasise that there is no major disagreement as to the objectives of the EU and NATO efforts in the region. As a senior Bulgarian diplomat suggested the current approaches of the two organisations in the region remain complementary. 86 Also, a Romanian official has corroborated the perception that both the Alliance and the EU maintain their 'teamwork' in the Balkans, despite the fact that NATO's role 'has slightly decreased due to the stabilisation of the region'. 87 For instance, the Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Nastase (FT, 13 March 2003) has indicated that the conflict between the 'old' and 'new' Europe over the Iraq crisis should not be perceived as a crisis of the overall unity of the Euro-Atlantic community. He insisted that for the Balkans, it is 'important to decide not whether we are with Europe or America, but what kind of values we are supporting... [Therefore] we should not have false debates. NATO and the EU are complementary organisations for us'. In a similar fashion, Croatia's president Stjepan Mesic (IHT, 21 November 2002) has argued impassionedly that for the countries in Southeastern Europe the partnership between the EU and NATO, which maintains peace in the Balkans is 'the best guarantee for security in Europe'. A senior Croatian government official has maintained that 'overall, the roles of the EU and NATO are complementary, primarily because both insist on the same political criteria. In this sense they both work in the same direction'. 88 The one-time Croatian Foreign Minister Tonino Picula has insisted that 'due to the historical lagging behind of Croatia... now it is not enough to run [to catch up with the other transition countries], we must fly. And to be able to fly, we have to have both wings. By that I mean membership in both the EU and NATO' (Jutarnji List, 1 March 2003). Likewise, the Bulgarian Minister of European Integration has declared that 'the US and the EU have the same system of values and a shared approach to achieving their goals' (Focus, 26 January 2005). To the extent that such statements

86 Interview on 25 January 2005.
87 Interview on 31 January 2005.
88 Interview on 8 April 2005.
reflect policy-making reality, they indicate the relevance of Euro-Atlantic agency in promoting order in the Balkans.

5.4. Conclusion:
The claim of this chapter has been that during 1999 the EU and NATO asserted their centrality both in European affairs and in promoting order to the Balkans. Their agency in projecting stability to the region is inferred from their programs for prospective (if distant) membership for all Southeast European states. In this respect, it is the power of attraction of the dominant Euro-Atlantic agents that facilitates the *export* of their security-community-pattern of relations through the socialisation of decision-making practice. Such conjecture conforms to the suggestions of Chapter Three of the hegemonic nature of the initial stages of security-community-building.

However, despite making the Balkans the object of securitisation practices, different lessons have been drawn by the dominant members of the Euro-Atlantic community. Whereas in Europe, the Kosovo crisis indicated the requirement for further multilateral cooperation in order to avoid the recurrence of violence, in America it was interpreted as a necessity for the introduction of order through military means (Borchert and Hampton, 2002: 373). As discussed, these distinct policy-perceptions seemed to have informed a complementary functional differentiation between the EU and NATO in the Balkans. Moreover, such collaborative division of labour seems to persist even in the context of the current 'war on terror'.

At the same time, the oft-quoted disengagement of US/NATO from the Balkans (as a result of the transferral of missions) seems to have been countered by the Alliance’s swift response to the March 2004 disturbances in Kosovo as well as its pre-emptive deployment of 2000 additional troops during the October elections in the province (*SET*, 14 September 2004).\(^{89}\) In a similar fashion, pre-empting the indictment of the Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj by the ICTY on 8 March 2005, NATO deployed respectively 600 additional troops on 6 March 2005 and further 500 British troops to prevent large-scale street protests (*RFE/RL Newsline*, 8 March 2005). Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NATO Secretary-General, has reiterated this international commitment to the region at the May 2005 EAPC meeting in Åre, Sweden and has acknowledged that ‘one challenge for all of us – one we have been dealing with for more than a decade – is the Balkans. We will, in particular, discuss the way ahead in Kosovo... there remains a lot more to be done towards meeting the standards before talks on the final status can begin. During this critical period KFOR will maintain its operational capability’ (*Focus*, 24 May 2005). Moreover,

\(^{89}\) For a counterview see Serwer (2005: 7).
as Stefan Lehne (2004: 111-24) indicates, the EU’s hands-on approach to the Balkans, both through accession programs and taking over NATO’s peace-enforcing missions, suggests that the ‘hour of Europe’ has come at last – i.e. even in the (unlikely) complete withdrawal of US/NATO from the region, this is not going to leave a leadership vacuum.

Therefore, this chapter puts forth the argument that the EU and NATO are not only the dominant actors of the Euro-Atlantic community, but also that they still remain relevant agents for the socialisation of Balkan states into their security-community-pattern of order. Hence, 1999 constitutes the key watershed in tracing the process of external agency in the Balkans. As a result of the Kosovo crisis both the EU and NATO impressed their centrality in the socialisation of the region. This process has been reinforced, not undermined, by the Iraq war. Such an understanding has also introduced an important qualification to the explanation of their socialisation power: it has emphasised the conditioning of foreign policy through the active involvement in building the institutions of state-governance. The conjecture is that as a result of the increasing congruence between Balkan patterns of policy-making and externally-promoted standards, the EU and NATO are able to introduce their security-community-framework in the region. The following Chapters Six and Seven will explicate this point by detailing the order-promoting agency of the two organisations.
CHAPTER Six

EXPORTING THE EU TO THE BALKANS

I am often asked where Europe's ultimate borders lie. My answer is that the map of Europe is defined in the mind, not just on the ground. Geography sets the frame, but fundamentally it is values that make the borders of Europe. Enlargement is a matter of extending the zone of European values, the most fundamental of which are liberty and solidarity, tolerance and human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

Olli Rehn (2005b: 2)

6.1. Introduction:
So far the theoretical propositions of the thesis have illuminated the significance of hegemonic socialisation in the promotion of security communities. Hence, as outlined in Chapter Four, the dual processes of compliance and learning to comply lead to the institutionalisation of practices of cooperation among decision-makers. This dynamic suggests the development of an elite security community. The socialising power and the guaranteeing presence of external agents provide the enabling setting for this process.

Chapter Five indicated the centrality of the EU and NATO for the extension of their Euro-Atlantic pattern to the Balkans. Hence, this chapter is testing the viability of this claim in relation to the EU. The proposition is that since 1999, the EU has asserted its hegemonic role in order-promotion to the Balkans through the extension of its accession and association activities to the region. As a result, this has allowed the EU to demand compliance from Balkan state-elites through the 'sticks and carrots' of its membership project or the threat of exclusion from its benefits. Therefore, the demands (and conditioning) from Brussels for domestic congruence with its standards give rise to more cooperative regional interactions. The contention is that as a result of such post-1999 practices, the EU has facilitated the initiation of stable and predictable relations among decision-makers in the Balkans.

In order to judge this claim, the chapter traces the process of EU-agency in the socialisation of Balkan state-elites. In this respect, the promotion of order in the region is made out in the extension of the West European security-community-practices to Southeastern Europe. A substantial component of this process is the socialisation by and in EU-initiated activities.
However, prior to expounding on the patterns of the EU’s promotion of order in the region, this chapter looks at the genesis of the (West) European democratic security community. Such an overview provides a background for the explanation and understanding of EU’s involvement in the Balkans.

6.2. From a Union for Europe to the European Union

As outlined in Chapter Three, the main prerequisite for the initiation of security communities is the presence and commitment of external agency, which maintains elite-compliance. The contention is that these conditions characterised the post-World War II international relations in Western Europe. The former featured the persistent American leadership in the form of economic assistance, provision of security and promotion of different forms of cooperation; the latter was furnished by the institutionalisation (of US-sponsored) practices of cooperation among West European decision-makers. Hence, as indicated in Chapter Three, one of these led to the development of the EU.

The origins of the EU are traditionally traced back to the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The pattern of inter-state relations proffered by the ECSC reflected the particular post-war concerns of the Allies (mainly France) in relation to the potential military capacity of Germany. Its function was to achieve reconciliation between the former adversaries by advancing collective interests. Thus, it was the pooling of the economic and material resources for potential confrontation under the supervision of ‘supranational’/European institution that were to create the conditions for ‘peace’ in the continent. According to its initial proposal, the ECSC’s objective was ‘to make a breach in the ramparts of national sovereignty which will be narrow enough to secure consent, but deep enough to open the way towards the unity that is essential to peace’ (Monnet, 1978: 289).

The economic order promoted through the ECSC was to be guaranteed by its institutions, which reflected a long-term political vision. These institutions showed themselves capable of

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90 See Chapter Three for its elaboration.
91 There is a contention that a third propensity in Western Europe was the environment of the Cold War, which created both the willingness to socialise and the willingness to comply. However, in agreement with the argument proffered by Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002), the US involvement in Western Europe after World War II was driven by particular perceptions of shared history, rather than threat-perceptions. Likewise, Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995: 223) argues that it was the sense of community and common values, which informed the US sponsorship of institutional arrangements in Western Europe. Risse-Kappen suggests that the sense of common purpose was undoubtedly strengthened by the perception of Soviet threat, but it was not driven by it. Hence, the contention is that regardless of the Cold War realities, the US would have initiated programs for the post-war socialisation of West European elites, which would have facilitated the emergence of a collective (democratic) security community.
92 For the purposes of clarity (and unless specified otherwise) the predecessors of the European Union are also encompassed by the term ‘EU’, mainly to avoid confusion with the abbreviation ‘EC’ – European Commission.
expressing collective will and taking common action to implement mutual guarantees. Their transformative effect was made apparent through the ability to maintain a pattern of predictable decision-making. The procedural features, which emerged with the ECSC gradually, enhanced their 'capacity to achieve consensus amongst governments... for the initial action [resulted] in forward-looking European policies and a gradual, but cumulative, transformation of the political relationships amongst the participants' (Webb, 1977: 8).

As Monnet makes it clear in his memoirs the consent was achieved after intensive (and discrete) elite-socialisation, predominantly between French and German officials (Monnet, 1978: 300-04). The dynamics and subsequent practice of such socialisation led to the formation of a group of like-minded individuals, whose values and interests derived from the European institutions they helped to promote and to establish. As it has been suggested earlier in this research the emergence of this group was preconditioned by the aim of achieving solutions to specific tasks in the functional integration of Western Europe. However, the experience and practices of working together led to the emergence of (what can only be termed as) an European epistemic community, which shared any 'needs, interests, and values' in regards to the issues at hand and, at the same time, working for the spread of conditions 'favouring integration and preparing the political climate for it' (Deutsch, 1978: 251).

Although it could be contested to what degree such a framework of international relations led to a reduction of the amount of clashing interests between the West European countries, it clearly led to a decrease in their intensity (i.e. the absence of armed conflict). Hence, the institutionalisation of such pattern of relations gradually enabled the development of cooperative relations around specific issues and tasks, which subsequently allowed for the promotion of collective security arrangements among the former Second World War adversaries. Hence, from the perspective of the process tracing approach, the history of the EU indicates the extent to which elite-socialisation can promote 'an international cooperative ethos' that can 'eventually enmesh national governments in a dense network of inter-locking co-operative ventures' (Mitrany, 1975: xxiv).

Arguably, the salience of the EU-framework was tested by the 1989 'dissolution of the East'. It challenged the EU's capacity to adopt a leading role (as an agent of socialisation) in the projection of a coherent vision for peace and security in Europe. The challenge, thereby, was whether the EU could adapt itself to the requirements of the post-communist period and extend its framework of peace to Eastern Europe.
6.3. EU Approaches to the Balkans

As indicated in Chapter Five, the role of the EU in the Balkans altered qualitatively as a result of the Kosovo crisis. As some commentators have suggested, the EU's 'ambition to be an international actor cannot be separated from the European project itself, but achieving that ambition will owe much to the trauma of Kosovo' (Haine et al., 2004: 45). Hence, Brussels' post-1999 involvement reflects the tendency that the enlargement of the European security space establishes particular patterns of relations between the socialising agency and the socialisee, which are then replicated among the group of socialised states. That is, the 'carrot' of membership allows the EU to use the 'sticks' of conditioning within the context of enlargement, which provide the EU with the resources for its order-promoting powers. Therefore, Andrew Moravcsik (2004: 191) has remarked that 'EU-accession is the single most powerful policy instrument for peace and security in the world'. Usually, such conclusion is premised on the post-Kosovo agency of the EU in the space defined by its association and accession programs and their contrast with its pre-1999 instruments in the Balkans (which are largely characterised by the lack of EU-agency).

Hence, for the purposes of clarity the EU involvement is divided in two main periods, from the point of view of the external agency.

- Foreign Policy Approaches to the Balkans (Section 6.3.1): the EU adopts a passive approach of providing humanitarian assistance and demanding peaceful interstate relations without the application of a socialisation project. In this period the EU mainly has encouraged the development of regional cooperation but without (or rather in lieu of) a tangible prospect of membership.

- Enlargement into the Balkans (Section 6.3.2): the EU adopts a proactive approach of offering the prospect of membership on condition of compliance with certain criteria; thus, applying the whole gamut of accession-driven socialisation. In this period, the EU has promoted domestic congruence with its standards through its association/accession activities, which in turn have affected the foreign policy behaviour of Balkan states.

93 Within the context of locking in expected outcomes outlined in Chapter Four.
Such periodisation is merely operational. Its logic does not deny continuity between periods. Its purpose is to emphasise the development/application of distinct EU instruments to the Balkans. As indicated in Chapter Five, the terms of the post-1999 European order acknowledge the EU’s leadership in extending its security-community-practices through its enlargement programs. Consequently, the suggestion is that although the first period is not underlined by particular security community-promoting measures, it, nevertheless, introduced facilitating dynamics and practices (mainly in the context of making the EU aware of its order-promoting role), which the second one builds upon and, thereby, contributed to the extension of its security-community-pattern to the Balkans.

6.3.1. Foreign Policy Approaches to the Balkans:
The purpose of this section is to suggest that up to the Kosovo crisis, the Balkans influenced the reform process within the EU yet, this did not seem to affect its agency in the region. As noted in Chapter Four, the ‘success’ of socialisation into appropriate patterns of decision-making depends (especially in its early stages) on the committed conditioning and monitoring by external agents. Indeed, it became apparent quite early on that the conditions fostering insecurity in the Balkans ‘were not amenable... to control from within the region’, but required ‘outside frameworks and processes’ to promote stability (Nelson, 1993: 174). However, the initial uncertainty of the EU (apparent in its reactive, rather than proactive approaches) to Balkan crises, is well evidenced by its lack of enthusiasm for extending the ‘community method’ implied in the model of West European order to the region.

This period is mostly characterised by (i) the transition of Bulgaria and Romania to post-communist statehood, marked by free elections and market-liberalisation, while (ii) Albania and the dissolving former Yugoslavia were subject to ‘state-building in the literal sense of the word’ (Krastev, 2003: 1). These developments were reflected in the EU’s activities for the region – i.e., it accepted the distinct transition dynamics of the two groups of states. Because of such differentiation, the implications of EU involvement were different for the two tiers of countries: (a) Bulgaria and Romania, which were recognised as potential candidates and could apply for association and pre-accession assistance; and (b) the ‘Western Balkans’ which were generally excluded from such programs and relied mainly on humanitarian aid in response to crisis situations (and thus were dealt within the context of the EU’s foreign policy).

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94 Hence, Albania was bundled up into the subregion of the Western Balkans with the entities that emerged from the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, while Bulgaria and Romania ‘formed’ a subregion of their own, and Slovenia left the Balkans altogether.
As a result there are separate 'Europeanisation' dynamics (understood as patterns for promotion of the EU-model of inter- and intra-state relations) in the Balkans. For instance, despite the largely reactive measures of the EU in the early 1990s, their different domestic effects in Bulgaria and Romania, on the one hand, and in the Western Balkans, on the other, indicate of their different adaptational potential. Thus, Bulgaria and Romania managed to initiate the development of stable institutions of governance (and, thus, at a fairly early stage of their transition, decrease the simmering tensions stemming from the potentially disruptive 'Dobrudja' issue, for instance), while this was not the case in the countries from the Western Balkans (where social, economic and political mismanagement were incorporated into the rhetoric of ethno-nationalism). In contrast, the EU's responses to the Yugoslav dissolution remained essentially a method of diplomatic coordination, explicitly intergovernmental and 'reliant on words' rather than the deployment of the softest common instruments (M. Smith, 2003: 561). The confusion caused by controversies about objectives, purposes and expectations suggests a ‘lack of any clear European security identity’ on behalf of the EU (Duke, 1994: 93).

There are different reasons for the lukewarm (and reactive) approach of the EU during this period. One of the most overlooked was the lack of EU-agency owing to the construction of the Balkans as outside the EU area of responsibility. Some commentators have referred to EU's reluctance to accept responsibility for order-promotion ('at least') in Europe as a reverse-realism paradigm', where instead of competition for power and influence, there is attempt to avoid positions of leadership and responsibility (Duke, 1994: 94). For instance, when the Commission was asked ‘what prospects’ can the EU offer the people of the Balkans ‘with regard to closer and more speedy integration into the Community’, the reply was that ‘the development of future relations... will depend largely on the way the states [in the region] themselves decide to work towards a comprehensive settlement of their differences’ (WQ E-2597/91: C 126/35). At the same time, however, the EU had already signed in December 1991 far-reaching and comprehensive Europe Agreements with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, which (in the words of an MEP) sent a clear ‘signal that [they] belong to Europe’ (Randzio-Platth, 1991. Emphasis added). Consequently, the only response that the EU could muster at the time to the issues of the Western Balkans was to study the problems caused by the flood of refugees with a view to finding an effective arrangement for future sharing of the burden of humanitarian assistance’ (00300/94. Emphasis added).

Linden (2004: 50) expands on the conflict-diffusing impact of EU association initiatives on the relations between Bulgaria and Romania.
Such construction of the Balkans as outside the area of the EU order-promoting agency is reflected in its encouragement of 'intra-regional cooperation between the associated countries themselves and their immediate neighbours' (00300/94. Emphasis added). Later, the European Parliament would implicate the EU in unwittingly furnishing a conflict-promoting behaviour through its 'inadequate foreign policy, reconciled to a situation... defined by ethnic dividing lines' (A4-0127/97). Such absence of EU's socialising role in the region is emphasised by the 1995 Pact on Stability in Europe, which involved 52 West and East European states, but conspicuously excluded the Yugoslav successor states (George and Bache, 2001: 400). Envisioned as 'an exercise in preventive diplomacy' in Europe, it was limited only to a 'structured dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and Slovenia' (A4-0098/95. Emphasis added) — i.e. clearly omitting responsibility for the crisis in Yugoslavia. The following section details the EU's involvement in the two Balkan sub-regions: Bulgaria and Romania, and the Western Balkans (i.e. during the 'Foreign Policy' period noted above).

6.3.1. A: BULGARIA AND ROMANIA:
As already suggested, Bulgaria and Romania were included in that group of Central and East European (CEE) states involved in association and accession activities with the EU. From its very (half-hearted) beginning at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, what was later to become the EU's enlargement strategy, implicated the EU as carrying out a potential role in order-promotion. Such a role is implicit in the accession criteria and the contractual Europe Agreements which aimed at 'intensive cooperation' between the EU and the applicant states. The three 'Copenhagen' criteria consist of:

The stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. (SN180/93).

Iligashino (2003) argues that the Pact establishes (some) acknowledgement of EU-agency, but only in relation to the signatories. For instance, he argues that the Pact succeeded to allay the tensions between Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, thus, indicating EU's adaptational powers through external conditioning (deriving from the prospects of membership).

Romania and Bulgaria signed Europe Agreements on 1 February and on 8 March 1993, respectively, which entered into force in February 1995. In June 1995 Romania and in December 1995 Bulgaria applied for EU membership.
In this respect, the Europe Agreements envisioned a ten-year time-frame for the accession countries (divided into two five-year sub-periods) to adopt the criteria for membership. Although, some analysts have mentioned at the time, that they ‘do not give guarantees’ on achieving the objective of ‘membership’ (Michalski and Wallace, 1992: 58-59), in retrospect, the Europe Agreements provided the facilitating environment for initiating the transplantation of the EU-framework of relations by promoting the principles of required decision-making. However, as the Bulgarian President, Zheliu Zhelev indicated in 1993, countries like Bulgaria and Romania have become ‘hostages in disputes between Community “liberals” and “protectionists”’ (in Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2001: 83).

Yet, despite such frustrations (or, perhaps, to allay them), the adaptational powers of the EU (towards candidate countries) were further reinforced as a result of the Essen European Council in December 1994, which outlined an accession strategy, consisting of the implementation of the Europe Agreements, finance assistance under PHARE and a structured dialogue, according to the White Paper (see 00300/94 and 00211/95). The EU’s conditioning powers were further elaborated in Agenda 2000, unveiled at the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997. At the time, the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Poos (1997), explicated that the larger framework of the enlargement process offered the EU a range of policy-instruments to influence the outcomes in candidate states through the accession negotiations. In practice, this was reflected in the shift from ‘demand-driven’ to ‘accession-driven’ approaches to applicant states (Iankova, 2001: 11). This shift is indicated by the Accession Partnerships (i.e., conclusion of Europe Agreements) put forward by the Commission. Such a shift to specific contractual associations also indicates a more individualised differentiation, premised on the EU’s assessment of a candidate’s compliance (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 27).

The EU’s ability to set the standards of behaviour for the accession countries is further evident from the differentiation between fast-track and slow-track countries. The two Balkan candidates – Bulgaria and Romania – have been put together in the second group. This differentiation process (arguably) reflects the different needs and demands of respective applicants, as well as providing a clearer vision of the steps that both the EU and the candidates have to undertake in order to complete the negotiations for membership. For instance, it was only as a result of this differentiation that Bulgaria adopted a National Strategy for Accession to the EU in March 1998 (Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2001: 84). In order to ‘soften’ the implication of this distinction, the EU launched the (conveniently named) Catch-Up Facility for the countries of the second group with the view of further strengthening their pre-accession strategy; but mostly
to assure that Brussels remains committed ‘to maintain the all-inclusive nature of the enlargement process’ (COM(2000)183: 13). In this way, it becomes apparent that it is (finally) the EU (as one would expect, given that it is the organization that is enlarging) that takes the legitimate control over the process. It has unequivocally emphasised since then that ‘the EU has a duty to try to address the many cross-cutting issues that generate or contribute to conflict’ (COM (2001)211: 5). The implication is that it also recognises its role and responsibility over the accession process, which (as has been suggested by the theoretical framework of Chapter Three) in itself tends to be viewed as a pre-condition to the development of a security community in the Balkans.

In their sum, these developments provide external institutional resources to regional states involved in the accession process (i.e. Bulgaria and Romania), and at the same time also constrain their policy choices (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 63). Thus, the EU began setting the boundaries of appropriate behaviour through the threat of punishment or exclusion (as the cases of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia/Montenegro indicate); and (ii) by providing international recognition of the efforts of Bulgaria and Romania, for instance, through the (albeit distant) prospect and promise of membership.

6.3.1.B: THE WESTERN BALKANS:
As indicated in Chapter Five, prior to the Kosovo crisis, EU initiatives in the sub-region of the Western Balkans were characterised by three overlapping shortcomings: (i) lack of strategy and instruments for socialisation; (ii) an expectation that someone else would do the job of order-promotion; both of which resulted in (iii) ad hoc measures. Consequently, the construction of the Western Balkans as outside-the-EU-area (indicated by its exclusion from the accession process) reflected the contradictory perceptions of Member States’ national interests and accentuated the EU’s lack of joint political instrument to pursue and sustain a common foreign policy (as well as the tools to advocate the necessary political agreements). Rather typically, the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council at Corfu in June 1994 (00150/94), declared that the EU is ‘deeply concerned by the continuation of the conflict in former Yugoslavia’ and that it ‘expects the parties to show the necessary political will in order to reach a solution to the conflict as soon as possible’. However, the EU was reluctant to back this up with concrete actions in support of order-promotion in the region. Daniel Nelson (1993: 172-73) suggested at the time that the ad hoc arrangements reflect the EU’s attention to the ‘northern tier’ of the former Soviet Bloc

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98 See Reply to WQ P-1110/98: C323/115
99 The point of different Member States’ preferences is elaborated by Nelson (1993: 159). See also Zank’s (2005: 3-28) claim that the EU enlargement process has always been a function of Member States’ interests.
countries, the 'perceived strategic interests of the West' and its 'more negative reaction to post-communist wars and policies in the [Western] Balkans'.

A substantial part of the initiatives that the EU embarked upon in the beginning of the 1990s were within the context of 'emergency aid' (2793/92/EEC) through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), established on 6 November 1991. In fact, the EU’s response did not target the Western Balkan issues specifically, but put them in the context of 'administering humanitarian operations to aid people in any non-member country who have been victims of natural disasters or exceptional events in cases calling for a swift response and/or implementation of expedited procedures' (97/C143/01: 0003. Emphasis added). The very ambiguity of the term *exceptional events* and the problematic definition of what exactly qualifies as one, as well as the 'discussions' among Member States as to whether they need to respond or implement an *expedited procedure* meant that by 1993 ECHO's programmatic specification were much more clearly defined (and, also, quite unabashed about their lack of order-promoting agency) – namely, the provision of 'food aid' and 'refugee assistance' (93/142/EEC).

In an attempt to rectify its shortcomings in the Western Balkans, the EU outlined its willingness to develop a coordinated external policy in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The TEU urged Member States to 'support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity' (Art. J. 1 (2). Emphasis added). This suggested an awareness of the necessity of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) mechanism that can assert EU's leadership in situations like those in former Yugoslavia. However, as one commentator concluded at the time, the EU's failure to affirm its socialising agency in the Western Balkans indicated that the CFSP 'simply does not exist' (Duke, 1994: 95). As a subsequent audit exposes, the EU drew a similar conclusion about its 'first major CFSP Joint Action': the EU Administration of Mostar:

> central decision-making and management structure is too diffuse to be effective. The Commission is the only part of the structure with operational expertise and capacity. It has exercised a degree of supervision of the operation, but its powers in implementing a CFSP Joint Action are much narrower, than those it exercised when implementing non-CFSP matters, being essentially limited to tasks of budgetary execution. (96/C287/01: 0013. Emphasis added).

Accordingly, the failure of the CFSP to impact the developments in one town were symptomatic of Brussels' inability to contribute significantly to the resolution of the conflict in the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When settlement was achieved it was only after the active
involvement of Washington. Such developments indicated the long way that the EU had to go in order to be able to implement a strategic vision (at least) in the Western Balkans. In fact, the Madrid European Council went as far as to recognise 'the decisive contribution made by the US at a crucial moment' (00400/95); while the European Parliament interpreted such foreign policy imbalance as a 'lack of ambition in defining an overall policy through a common position on the Balkans, which has meant that... the political impact of the EU has been very limited compared to that of the USA' (A4-0169/98).

Thus, in the wake of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreements, the EU attempted to formulate a stronger regional approach to the Western Balkans. It is instanced by the so-called Royaumont Process focused on 'implementing the civil peace process involving the countries of former Yugoslavia' (A4-0127/97. Emphasis added) through 'the restoration of civil society and cooperation between the Republics of former Yugoslavia' (1628/96/EC). To that end the EU launched the OBNOVA programme and access to its funds was contingent upon 'adherence to the political and economic terms of the peace agreements signed in Paris on 14 December 1995' (1628/96/EC). Nonetheless, such conditionality was not geared towards accession, but to post-war rehabilitation. As the OBNOVA Regulation indicates its scope is 'to start repair work and renovate infrastructure whilst pressing ahead with political and economic reforms' (1628/96/EC), and, thereby, not to facilitate accession to the EU. Hence, the objective of initiating regional cooperation in the Western Balkans on 'the EU model' (A4-0127/97), was (largely) subverted by the lack of 'accession carrots' which assisted the conditioning of the applicant countries. Therefore, the very aim of the Royaumont Process – to achieve 'stability and good neighbourliness' in the region – was within the context of 'equitable burden sharing' (00400/95) between different international actors and the implementation of 'aid measures' (1628/96/EC) rather than suggesting to Balkan states their own prospect of accession.

In this respect, the sub-region of the Western Balkans became symptomatic of the problem of 'consistency' between the different arms of EU operations and the presumption of its order-promoting agency. The Yugoslav conflicts posed some of the more enduring difficulties for the EU in trying to assert its socialising role in the sub-region (mainly due to its construction as outside-the-EU-area of responsibility). Thus, until 1999, the EU's policy towards the intransigent Western Balkans remained (largely) reactive.

Similarly, in February 1996 the Imia islands crisis between Greece and Turkey was solved through the active intervention of the US, rather than the CFSP.
6.3.2. Enlargement into the Balkans:

As indicated in Chapter Five, it is the post-1999 developments in the Balkans, which indicate a more certain and definite prospect for EU-enlargement, per se, and EU reach into the region as well as a more focused and convinced (as well as convincing) approach to Southeastern Europe. Such a change signalled the EU's acknowledgement of its actor-identity, a willingness and capability to promote a framework of order through its power of attraction via the accession process. The unique combination of 'EU values and interests' underlying the enlargement strategy suggests the EU's 'true identity [as] an international actor' (Haine et al., 2004: 25). What came to be perceived as a major shift in EU-policy was initially reactive. The EU developed an explicitly pro-active stance to the Balkans (as well as external relations, generally) in reaction to the Kosovo crisis. As the then Commissioner for External relations, Hans van der Broek (1999: 1) explained:

Over the last ten years, the Union has gone through many changes and is reaching the third phase in its geopolitical re-definition. The first stage was the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall, which led to German re-unification and the start of the enlargement process to the east. The second phase came in 1992 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, thereby fundamentally changing the dynamics within the European continent. We are now entering the third phase, which is the stabilisation of the Balkans and their integration into the process of European Union enlargement.

This view of the EU's order-promoting role emphasised its increasing authority in European affairs, which 'depends crucially on the Union's ability to accept responsibility in and for the continent, prevent aggression and safeguard peace' (cdrl61/99FIN. Emphasis added). Recognising the shortcomings of its previous initiatives, the EU has acknowledged that a peace-framework can be promoted in the region 'provided everybody knows exactly who is in charge. Too many actors is a recipe for failure. Stabilising the Balkans requires a range of political and administrative authority and accountability, and the European Union can offer this' (COM(2000)154: 4. Emphasis added).
Figure 4 offers a generalised picture of the differentiated process of socialisation initiated by the EU. This depiction also emphasises the bilateral character of the post-1999 EU-socialisation of the Balkans. As indicated in Part One, the initial stages of security-community-promotion are dependent on creating and maintaining the compliance of target state-elites. Referring to this logic, Milica Uvalic (2002: 330) concludes that the mechanisms of the EU accession are in fact contrary to regional cooperation. However, Knaus and Cox (2005: 44) have argued that it is the context of creating contractual bilateralism that has allowed the EU to make all major political forces in the Balkan countries ('whatever their roots and political orientations') commit to EU membership, something which has also influenced their foreign policy stance. In sum this creates a regional multilateral dynamic.

The rationale of post-1999 approaches to the Balkans seems to derive from the EU's experience in CEE, where it developed accession-driven socialisation, which has allowed Brussels to condition (through direct and assisting measures) the decision-making in both candidate-states, as well as those preparing for candidacy. As Olli Rehn, the Enlargement

101 Figure 4 attests to the differentiated socialisation of the region by the EU. As suggested in Section 4.3.3 of Chapter Four the dynamic of international socialisation reflects the context in which the external agency is applied – i.e. to both awkward and integrated states. As regards the former the EU has been involved in state-building, while in the latter it has initiated a process of member-state-building (see Knaus and Cox, 2005: 40). At the same time Figure 4 also suggests the socialising dynamic of individual congruence with the EU demands, which is then replicated in the foreign-policy of target elites. In its extreme, this logic is best reflected in the two-track approach for Serbia and Montenegro, in which the two republics are judged according to their own individual compliance (Focus, 22 October 2004).

102 For instance, she points that once some Balkan countries become Member States of the EU they would have to renounce their free trade agreements with non-Member State neighbours.

103 Bechev (2005: 1) confirms such statement by reviewing the commitment to EU-integration of all Balkan radical politicians.
Commissioner has suggested ‘EU membership [for the Balkans] is a realistic and valuable goal... but the countries from the region have to live up to their international obligations and commitments’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 25 January 2005). Summarising the feeling of her colleagues in the region, a Croatian government official has indicated that ‘the prospect of membership for all the countries of the region has increased the EU’s role in Southeastern Europe’. The pressure of EU institutions on Balkan elites, therefore, helps to develop the facilitating conditions for a kind of instrumental peace. By extending its norms and rules, the enlargement of the EU has become the organisation’s ‘most effective security policy... [and] has made instability and conflict in the continent ever less likely’ (Haine et al., 2004: 24). Another commentator has been even more blunt in the explanation of the post-1999 effect of the EU in the region, acknowledging that it is the ‘proximity to the EU [that] separates the Balkans from most of the other post-conflict regions in the world’ (Krastev, 2003: 1).

6.3.2. A: BULGARIA AND ROMANIA:
As already suggested, the 1999 developments in Kosovo gave a tangible perspective to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. Despite their inclusion in the initiatives for CEE states (under the PHARE programme), both countries were not on the agenda for opening accession negotiations according to the conclusions of the Vienna European Council in December 1998 (00300/1/98). This decision was underlined by the perception that Bulgaria and Romania were too slow to conform to the accession criteria. However, the volatility of the Western Balkans underlined the need to recognise their efforts in order to ensure the continued attractiveness of EU membership and support for the sanctions (and military campaign) against Serbia/Montenegro. At first, this recognition came in the form of a very explicit ‘Statement of the EU on Bulgaria and Romania’ on 26 April 1999 (Bulletin of the EU, 1999: point 1.4.14). On the one hand, this Statement noted ‘the contribution of Romania and Bulgaria, two associate States, to stability in the wider region’. On the other, it recognised that this situation imposes heavy burdens on these countries’. Therefore, their ‘governments are to be commended for their positive responses’ by underlying ‘the special relationship [the EU] enjoys with Romania and Bulgaria’.

The initial endorsement which followed was the establishment of an Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) on 21 June 1999. According to the division of ISPA funds, Romania and Bulgaria were earmarked as the second and third largest beneficiaries – 23.98% and

104 Interview on 7 April 2005.
10.43%, respectively (COM(2001)616: 9). Simultaneously, they were also granted access to SAPARD (agricultural aid) funds. The next step, which the EU undertook was to upgrade the special relationship it had with Bulgaria and Romania, by noting their eligibility for negotiations on membership. As the EU declared, ‘this option has the advantage of recognising the widely felt need for momentum in the enlargement process taking account of the dramatic changes in European political landscape, mainly as a consequence of the crisis in the Balkan region’ (EC, 1999: 29. Emphasis added). As Romano Prodi (1999: Emphasis added) suggested at the time, this softening of the Copenhagen criteria towards Bulgaria and Romania was intended to prevent the countries concerned, having already made great efforts and sacrifices [from becoming] disillusioned and turn their backs on us. Their economic policies will begin to diverge and a historic opportunity will have been lost – perhaps forever. In the changed political landscape, especially in the Balkan region, some countries may also let slip the progress they have made towards democracy and human rights, and the EU will have seriously failed the people of those countries.

This stance, in turn, allowed EU institutions to demand compliance from their state-elites and, thus, condition Sofia’s and Bucharest’s policy-making in line with its standards. This process also underwrites the dynamic of introducing congruence in Bulgarian and Romanian decision-making, which subsequently impacts the orientation of their foreign-policy-behaviour.

6.3.2. B: THE WESTERN BALKANS:
The Kosovo issue came at the end of a decade of EU involvement in the Balkans and the EU response was intended to indicate a commitment to finding lasting solutions to the Yugoslav crisis. As Chris Patten (1999: 1) made it clear at the time, the EU had to ‘stand up for the values which have been responsible for the best of European history in this century and whose absence has been responsible for the worst of our history as well’. If prior to 1999, the EU was involved in ad hoc/humanitarian aid-type of measures, in its wake it became apparent that the Western Balkans needed to be given an attainable (if still distant) vision for accession, so that the EU could utilise its socialising power.

Javier Solana (2000a: 4) explained this effort thus: ‘[t]he EU offers a model as well as the instruments for peace through regional integration, for the reconciliation of former enemies and for the effective guarantee of human and minority rights. No other solution could offer such hope for the Western Balkans’. Initially, the EU found itself involved in (depending on the interpretation) two mutually contradictory or complementing programs: the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP) and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). It is noteworthy,
however, that both programmes differ from pre-1999 approaches in that they offered the prospect of EU membership.

The adoption of the SP at the EU Ministerial Summit in Cologne (10 June 1999) and its ‘official’ inauguration at the first SP summit in Sarajevo (July 1999) was hailed as the first genuine attempt to ‘Europeanise’ and ‘de-Balkanise’ the Balkans (Pierre, 1999: 2). Yet, only within two years of its launch it became apparent that it was not the EU’s preferred tool for the accession of the Western Balkans (Vucetic, 2001). From its launch, the SP suffered from a fundamental contradiction between its aspirations and the relatively small resources at its disposal (Greco, 2004: 67). Gallagher (2005: 169-70) held Bodo Hombach, the first Chairman of the SP, personally responsible for his inability to ‘galvanise donors... The approach of Hombach and his team was in the best tradition of remote international bureaucrats. Microlevel assistance that might stimulate local economic and social recovery was rejected because the results were likely to be slow in appearing’. Hence, by 2002, the SAP had been declared ‘the centrepiece of the EU’s policy towards the region’ (EC, 2002a: 4) and its ‘only, rigorous, long term and sustainable policy approach’ (COM(2002)163: 13). In the face of this, the SP was forced ‘to streamline and downsize its activities’ (COM(2003)139: 15).

The SAP, thus became ‘the framework for the European course of the Western Balkan countries, all the way to their future accession’ (COM(2004)275: 5). As such it was a further elaboration of the conditionality principle and the bilateral contractual relations between the EU and individual Balkan states. The SAP built upon the EU’s experience from the enlargement process by attempting ‘to replicate the successful transition by the CEE countries’ (COM(2002)163: 6) through the promotion of ‘democratic, economic and institutional reforms’ (COM(2000)628: 8) in the Western Balkans. For the EU, it was now being perceived as comprising ‘our new neighbours’ (COM(2000)154: 5. Emphasis added) rather than the neighbourhood of the accession countries, the latter phraseology having dominated EU policy-formulation before 1999. In other words, the EU not only indicated a possibility for ‘the fullest possible integration of the countries of the Western Balkans region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe’ (2000/1/00), but also that it was committed to increase the probability of such integration by ‘encouraging, in all the countries of [the] region the promotion of the values and models on which [the EU] is founded’ (2000/717/CFSP). Crucially, the EU insisted that ‘all the Western Balkan countries have a perspective to become candidate countries’ (COM(2004)657: 2). At the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, the SAP was bolstered by the introduction of European Partnerships, which were ‘inspired by the pre-accession process’ and
which identified ‘priorities for action in supporting efforts to move [the Balkan countries] closer to the EU’ (COM(2003)285: 3). At their launch, Romano Prodi (2003a: 2) pointed out that they offered ‘an agenda that aims high in seeking to create the best conditions to prepare the Balkan countries for membership’. Reflecting the perception of her colleagues, Ana Brnčić, the Advisor to the Croatian State Secretary of European Integration has acknowledged the socialising effects of the European Partnerships by suggesting that they ‘have not enhanced the membership prospects [of the Western Balkans] but the prospects of meeting the necessary criteria for membership. Namely, by providing a checklist of priorities [the European Partnership] have helped identify the priorities in the process of the harmonisation of legislation’.105

Consequently, the so-called Thessaloniki Agenda has been perceived as either a ‘de facto start of a pre-accession for the Western Balkan countries’ (Baracani and Dallara, 2005: 19) or the beginning of a ‘proto-enlargement towards the Western Balkans’ (Zank, 2005: 32). Confirming these claims, in his first day in office, Olli Rehn (2004: 3) the Commissioner on Enlargement announced the ‘move’ of the Western Balkan countries from DG External Relations to DG Enlargement, which he emphasised ‘is a strong signal that [they] are part of the process of European integration, and our shared goal is [their] future membership of the EU’.106

To that end, the EU consolidated all its initiatives and funding for the region under the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme (2666/2000/EC). Unlike ECHO and OBNOVA whose aim was humanitarian assistance, CARDS focuses on political and economic development and institution-building (SEC(2003)341: 34). At the same time, the EU also set up the European Agency for Reconstruction (COM(2000)281: 13) with the particular aim of targeting the implementation of the CARDS projects. Emphasising the complementarity of the SAP and the EU-enlargement, Brussels initiated Annual Reports, whose aim (like the Progress Reports) is to ‘monitor, follow... and ensure the implementation of the SAP mechanisms’ (COM(2004)275: 15). In addition, the EU suggested its intention ‘to create a new pre-accession instrument (IPA), building on the present pre-accession instruments: PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD’ (COM(2004)657: 6), which would assist the accession of prospective candidate countries from the region. As Olli Rehn (2005a: 4), the Enlargement Commissioner

104 Interview on 7 April 2005.
106 This decision technically makes Mr. Rehn Commissioner on the Balkans as all prospective candidates and current candidates (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey) are either from the region of the Balkans or the Greater Balkans Area (which includes Turkey).
acknowledged, the 'IPA represent a major... rationalisation and simplification of EU assistance... to the potential candidate countries of the Western Balkans'.

With these measures, the EU (in practical terms) has acknowledged its responsibility for order-promotion (i.e. setting the standards of appropriate behaviour) in the Western Balkans. It extends its security-community-practices by instructing the formation of 'viable functioning states [in the region] by aligning their legal and economic systems with those of the EU' (COM(2002)163: 7).

The operational logic here is that the 'carrot' of membership-prospects provides the incentives for appropriate policy-behaviour, one element of which is that the Western Balkan countries 'establish normal relationships between themselves' (EC, 2002b: 4. Emphasis added). Socialisation, therefore, is based on country-effects rather than regionality. The EU has maintained throughout that the 'speed with which each country moves through the different stages of the SAP, taking ownership of the process, depends on the increasing ability to take on the obligations from an ever closer association with the EU as well as compliance with the conditionality policy' (COM(2003)139: 5). Michael Johns (2003: 682) suggests that it is the bilateral relations of accession that reflect the hegemonic character of the EU and put decision-makers of target states in a position in which they are 'forced to choose' between the advantages of membership and the disadvantages of non-compliance (i.e. exclusion).

Thus, from the point of instrumental rationality, the state-elites of the Western Balkan states comply because of the prospects from maximising their chances for accession. This helps to explain the post-1999 policy-transformation (in the Western Balkans) on a similar platform as in the CEE states. In a nutshell, the EU promotes the institutions and procedures, which frame the decision-making of state-elites.

In this way, the post-1999 EU-programs for the Western Balkans reflect the EU's transformation into an agent of regional socialisation through the extension of its 'community method'. Consequently, Javier Solana (2002: 1) was quick to emphasise during the 2002 Conference on Defeating Organised Crime in Southeastern Europe that this new role of the EU has facilitated the 'enormous amount [of progress] that has been achieved since Kosovo: democracy is now prevailing and the logic of political disintegration has been replaced by the logic of integration'. Moreover, these developments also underline the EU's increasing confidence to deal with crisis situations and prevent them from escalating into outright military

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107 In the current debates on the 2007-13 budget, the proposition for IPA's funds is in the range of €12 billion (Knaus and Cox. 2005: 53).
conflicts, as indicated by the Ohrid Peace Agreement or the Belgrade Agreement on the status of the Serbian-Montenegrin union. At the same time, Brussels has started to ‘directly administer Bosnian affairs’ by taking control of peace-keeping efforts away from Washington (Yordán, 2003: 147). Another example of Brussels assertiveness in the region is the unequivocal warning to Albania by Reinhard Priebe (the EU Director for the Western Balkans) that Tirana should ‘stop wasting time on internal political rivalries and concentrate on implementing reforms deriving from its international obligations’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 10 November 2003). Another instance of EU’s pro-active socialisation of the region is its refusal to meet Serbian officials after the December 2003 parliamentary elections until the elites in Belgrade reached an agreement on the formation of a government (RFE/RL Newsline, 22 January 2004). These examples indicate a shift of perception on behalf of the EU that the Western Balkans no longer represents a ‘distant’ abroad, but rather an immediate neighbourhood, whose instability affects the stability and security of the EU itself. 108

6.3.2. C: REGIONAL (PEACEFUL) COOPERATIVE INTERACTIONS:
The EU’s post-1999 approach has involved the functional differentiation of the Balkans into two tiers: those states part of the accession dynamics – Bulgaria and Romania; and those participating in the SAP – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia/Montenegro/Kosovo. 109 This differentiated approach aims at the export of a zone of peace into the Southeastern corner of Europe by both the EU ‘projecting stability... beyond its own borders’ (COM(2001)211: 5) and by it ‘giving a clear public signal of the special and inclusive nature of the privileged relationship’ with the states of the region (COM(2002)163: 13). Chapter Five has also outlined the visible presence of EU troops in the sub-region of the Western Balkans as a result of the transfer of missions in Macedonia and Bosnia – a development, which further implicates the contrast with the EU’s pre-1999 instruments (RFE/RL Balkan Report, 5 March 2004).

As Stanislav Todorov, the Bulgarian Attache to Brussels, has pointed out, the promise of membership to all states in the Balkans has increased the EU’s role in the region. 110 EU involvement in Southeastern Europe has actively engaged regional state-elites. The EU has

108 See Chapter Eight for a discussion of the 2005 ‘constitutional’ crisis of the EU and its impact on EU-agency in the region.
109 This two-tier differentiation reflects the overall process of the EU-driven dynamics in the Balkans. As already suggested in this chapter Bulgaria and Romania were involved in the CEE association and accession dynamics which developed during the 1990s, while the countries of the Western Balkans were offered an association and accession prospect through the SAP after 1999.
impressed upon regional elites the desirability of certain prescribed foreign-policy initiatives. As the respected Balkan commentator Vladimir Gligorov (2004: 2) has suggested ‘the EU starts to play a modernisation role in the Balkans only when the prospect of EU integration becomes an operational possibility’. Reflecting such suggestions, in an unprecedented act of unanimity the Presidents of Croatia and Macedonia, Stjepan Mesić and Boris Trajkovski together with the Prime Ministers of Serbia and Albania, Zoran Zivković and Fatos Nano issued a joint statement in May 2003 that ‘enlargement will finally lay to rest some of the most intractable conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries... [therefore] our overwhelming priority, shared by governments and citizens alike, is full membership of the EU’ (IHT, 22 May 2003). The importance of these accession dynamics was apparent at the 2 June 2003 summit in Ohrid, Macedonia of Western Balkan leaders which had the purpose of coordinating a joint strategy for the EU’s upcoming Thessaloniki Summit (RFE/RL Newsline, 2 June 2003). Elite-coordination in the Balkans was furthered at the Informal Meeting of Prime Ministers from Southeast Europe (21-31 July 2003) in Salzburg. At that gathering the heads of government of Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia/Montenegro discussed common projects and initiatives in their EU accession (SET, 31 July 2003). Prior to that meeting the presidents of Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia met in the Albanian town of Pogradec (13-14 July 2003) to consider joint efforts for attracting funding for the construction of Transport Corridor VIII linking their countries (Focus, 14 July 2003). Further EU-influence has been instrumental in convincing Serbia/Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina to sign a joint agreement on refugee return (RFE/RL Newsline, 7 October 2003). Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and (UNMIK) Kosovo, similarly, signed a regional agreement on combating organised crime (RFE/RL Newsline, 3 November 2003), and the Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia/Montenegro have initiated a series of regular meetings on discussing common initiatives and ways for solving shared problems (Focus, 18 October 2004). Re-emphasising these dynamics, the presidents of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro have acknowledged in a joint statement that it is the prospect of EU-integration that facilitates ‘the normalisation and improvement of relations’ in the region (RFE/RL Newsline, 28 June 2005).

In this way, the EU has helped initiate cooperative interactions in the region. At a speech in Belgrade, Commissioner Rehn (2005b: 4) has referred to such dynamic as “the solidarity of facts on the ground”. That kind of solidarity – which starts off as physical but becomes mental and intellectual – is what I want the EU to help you build in this region [the Balkans]”. For that purpose the EU has advanced the Zagreb Process, which aims at bringing ‘together the political

However, it has to be re-emphasised that these regional interactions (and, thus, embryonic security-community-building) are an outcome of the EU's socialisation of political processes within the Balkan states, which then influence more cooperative external patterns of behaviour. As the acting EU Director-General for Enlargement, Fabrizio Barbaroso insisted during a two-day summit in Skopie (Macedonia) on regional development and cooperation in Southeastern Europe, 'regional cooperation' depends on 'further structural reforms, judicial reforms and building of more efficient administration capacity' within the states of the region (RFE/RL Newsline, 11 March 2005). At the same meeting, the Bulgarian President Parvanov acknowledged the dynamic of EU-socialisation by noting that 'cooperation in the Balkans occurs only when we [individually] have met the EU demands and have implemented the necessary administrative reforms' (Focus, 10 March 2005). In a similar vein, Olli Rehn has insisted that 'the enlargement of the EU has always been driven by the principle of individual merits and according to the efforts of each candidate state' (Focus, 18 March 2005). Some commentators argue that it was only in the instance of the Baltic States (within the context of its Northern Dimension) that the EU has used regional cooperation as a specific tool for accession-driven-socialisation (Rossi, 2004: 9). Similarly, Milica Uvalic (2002: 321) has insisted that up to 1999 the EU did promote various initiatives for regional cooperation in the Balkans but after that watershed its prime objective was ensuring the compliance of individual states. This reflected a new-found willingness to get involved in state-building initiatives, something the EU was reluctant to do prior to 1999. However, this did not rule out a regional focus (involving for instance, cross-border projects and sectoral integration) even though, crucially, this has been seen as the consequence of the shared interests among individual state-elites with Brussels-promoted standards, something which subsequently orientates their foreign-policy behaviour towards peaceful interactions. Therefore, in line with the neoliberal-constructivist framework suggested in Part One, Balkan state-elites initially follow the EU-set benchmarks owing to perceived

111 It is noteworthy that the document was signed by '11 countries of the region' and treats Montenegro, Serbia and UNMIK-Kosovo as separate entities.
benefits (primarily economic as well as the value-added from status of inclusion in the accession programs). As a result of repeated practice (i.e. increasing congruence between their decision-making and promoted standards) their foreign policy practice tends also to lean towards peaceful regional interactions.

In other words, a normative reorientation occurs, which affects foreign policy. Thus, Ms Pejcinovic-Buric, the Croatian State Secretary of European Integration has acknowledged that the reduced possibility of 'military conflict in the Balkans is mainly due to the EU's pressure on all the countries of the region to stabilise internally. This pressure comes in various forms... All these, however, lead to a realisation that externally, in their relations with neighbouring countries, their [of Balkan states'] involvement in further conflicts would be harmful to their development'. In this way, 'a high degree of trust between the leaders of the region' (COM(2002)163: 11) becomes a functional reality, resulting from the EU's socialising power. As the then-Prime Minister of Kosovo Bajram Rexhepi acknowledged, 'it is good that now all the Balkan countries have one goal – to join the EU' (NEDB, 14 October 2003). Echoing these sentiments, the Macedonian President, Branko Crvenkovski reflected during a visit to Sarajevo: 'We used to live in one country. I hope that in the future we will again live in one community called the European Union' (RFE/RL Balkan Report, 25 February 2005). Furthermore, the Serbian analyst Jelica Minic has indicated that 'most of the Western Balkan countries feel that the road to EU membership will be clearer for them once Bulgaria and Romania join the EU in 2007' (Global Information Network, 10 February 2005). Similarly, commenting on Croatia the President of Serbia/Montenegro, Svetozar Marovic has suggested: 'Croatia's ambitions can't harm anyone, but help the entire region turn towards European standards... The closer Croatia is to Europe, the closer Serbia/Montenegro is and both should also hurry to Europe in order to stop the negative forces from the past' (Hina, 10 March 2005). In a similar fashion the Foreign Minister of Serbia/Montenegro Vuk Draskovic has insisted that 'we [in Serbia/Montenegro] are very happy that Bulgaria will soon accede into the EU... and therefore we are going to follow Bulgaria's example in the hope to accelerate our adaptation of EU standards. In this way we hope to surprise pleasantly our Bulgarian neighbours as well as Europe' (Focus, 18 October 2004).

The contention here is that such statements attest to the security-community logic of EU socialisation. The emergence, in other words, of cooperative interactions as a result of policymaking compliance with EU standards. The rest of this chapter traces recent developments in

112 Interview on 8 April 2005.
Bulgaria and Croatia in this light. Both countries have been selected as examples of the two EU approaches to the region: (i) association and accession; and (ii) the SAP. It is argued that despite their different historical contexts and transition dynamics, both have evidenced similar trends in their post-Cold War developments. Concurring with Kristi Raik (2004: 570-77) this study emphasises that the crucial element for the evaluation of the EU-driven socialisation of prospective members is the speed with which elites comply with the directives from Brussels.\footnote{Knaus and Cox (2005: 47) also ascertain that 'speed [is] the key measure of success' of external socialisation.} Hence, the EU has declared that its own criteria for assessing the ‘progress’ of EU-aspirants are based on evidence of ‘decisions actually taken, legislation actually adopted, international conventions actually ratified and measures actually implemented’ (COM(2004)1199: 5). Consequently, the issue of speed-of-compliance forms a central feature of the evaluation of Bulgaria’s and Croatia’s post-1999 socialisation by the EU. From the EU’s point of view, its elite-socialisation procedures initiated in the region provide the desired outcomes as a result of the swift compliance with the Brussels-set conditions: stable domestic institutions of governance, which affect predictability of foreign-policy-behaviour.

6.4. Bulgaria:
This section focuses on the dynamics of EU-driven elite-socialisation. Although this is not intended to be a historical account of the post-communist period in Bulgaria, a brief overview is nonetheless required in order to provide context for tracing the process of the EU’s post-1999 involvement in the country.

Bulgaria’s transition is usually characterised as involving: (i) managed, constitutional transition, which is marked by (ii) contradictions in institutional development, and (iii) for the better part of the 1990s an uncertainty in the direction of transition (Kavalski, 2004: 102-06). The period up to the beginning of 1997 was dominated by the pro-/anti-EU debates resulting in vacillation in the decision-making in Sofia. This had the effect of portraying the EU in very abstract terms, polarising public opinion on the issue along party lines, and, ultimately introducing the possibility of experimenting with an indigenous ‘Bulgarian way’ of reform. Yet, by the winter of 1996/97 as a result of gross economic mismanagement and criminal privatisation, the ‘Bulgarian way’ had led to hyperinflation and a visible slump in living standards (Dimitrov, 2001: 82). Hence, the emulation of (West) European patterns was perceived as a must, which made Bulgarian elites more open to EU-socialisation. It is within this context
that the EU began to assert its role as an agent of order in the country, in the process of affecting Sofia's foreign-policy-making.

6.4.1. The EU-driven elite-socialisation:
An assessment of post-1999 EU-socialisation of Bulgaria is best evidenced by comparison with the 1997 Opinion on Bulgaria. As the EU concluded, 'Bulgaria has neither transposed nor taken on the essential elements of the acquis... It is therefore uncertain whether Bulgaria will be in a position to assume the obligations of membership in the medium term' (DOC/97/11: 122). From this perspective, Bulgaria's achievement of the status of a 'candidate country' in December 1999, the accelerated completion of its negotiations with the EU on 15 June 2004 and the signing of its Accession Treaty on 25 April 2005 clearly suggested the effectiveness of post-1999 instruments. The Foreign Minister Solomon Passi has insisted this reflects the country's 'transition from a national Bulgaria to a European Bulgaria, whose policy-practice reflects the values of peace and democracy' (Focus, 22 December 2004).

The two-main instruments of the EU-driven elite-socialisation of Bulgaria are the Accession Partnership and the instruments for assistance: PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA (Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2001: 83-84). The purpose of the Accession Partnership, which the EU signed with Bulgaria on 10 December 1999, was to provide Sofia with 'a number of policy instruments which will be used to enhance the speed of [its] preparation for membership' (EC, 1999a: 2). The premise of the EU's involvement was that the Bulgarian government had a 'weak capacity to formulate and coordinate policy... including [in] the area of EU affairs' (EC, 1999b: 57).

In order to correct this, pre-accession assistance was increased. Whereas for the 1990-1999 period PHARE assistance has averaged €93 million per year (Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2001: 83), from 2000 to 2004 Bulgaria's allocation nearly doubled to €178 million annually (SEC(2004)1199: 7).\textsuperscript{114} As one Bulgarian diplomat acknowledged, such assistance has 'encouraged' Sofia to bring its policy-making in line with EU-standards.\textsuperscript{115} Yet, the Minister of European Integration Meglena Kuneva suggested that the challenging part is not transferring the acquis, 'but changing the way we think' (Focus, 29 April 2003). Later, she elaborated that this entails an alteration in the way Bulgarians perceive accession and 'stop calculating the benefits of membership only from the point of view of individual self-interest. Instead we should not forget what the Bulgarian state, per se, gains from this process' (Focus, 13 June 2003). In this respect,

\textsuperscript{114} This figure reflects only the PHARE allocation without the funds under the ISPA and SAPARD.

\textsuperscript{115} Interview on 25 January 2005.
Sofia has maintained throughout that its speed-of-compliance derives from the contractual nature of its relations with the EU. As the Deputy Foreign Minister, Gergana Grancharova has insisted ‘the accelerated completion of the accession negotiations confirms that the assessment is premised on the individual merits of each candidate country and not on the principle of group enlargement’ (Focus, 17 June 2004). The Minister of European Affairs, Meglena Kuneva echoed this perspective by insisting that ‘the readiness to comply with EU-rules should have no exceptions’ (Focus, 12 April 2004). Reflecting on Bulgaria’s transition process, the former Bulgarian President, Zheliu Zhelev has insisted that it is the bilateral relationship between Sofia and Brussels, which has offered a convincing possibility ‘to latch our [the Bulgarian] train-car to the EU’s high-speed train’ (Focus, 2 March 2005). Such perceptions of the requirement of domestic congruence of Bulgarian elites have been confirmed by Olli Rehn, the Commissioner on Enlargement who insisted that ‘it is according to its own merits that Bulgaria will be judged and I am convinced that it will win the qualification match for the premier league of the Member States of the EU’ (Focus, 18 March 2005).

The socialising impact of the EU has been facilitated by the lack of alternative centres of normative attraction for Bulgaria. As Foreign Minister Passi emphatically declared: ‘The European Union is our promised land!’ (Focus, 9 July 2003). The former Head of the Bulgarian Mission to the EU, Antoinette Primatarova reflects that this conviction derives from the fact that ‘the EU has already proven that it can deliver in terms of prosperity through enforcing the principles of democracy, rule of law and a market economy’ (Open Society News, 2002: 7). Hence, the speed of the socialisation process has been ensured by the broad political support for EU accession and as the Bulgarian Minister of European Affairs maintains ‘there is no political formation, which would be opposed to the country’s entry into the EU’ (Focus, 23 January 2004). Such assertions are substantiated, for instance, by the decision of the Bulgarian Parliament to dedicate one extra day a week only on the convergence of Bulgarian laws with the EU legislation to facilitate the implementation of the government’s program for EU-accession (RFE/RL Newsline, 9 March 2004).

116 In terms of management capacities, the significance of Sofia’s relations with Brussels is demonstrated by the establishment in 1999 of the position of a Chief Negotiator with the EU and in 2000 the government created the Council for European Integration to coordinate the accession efforts (Focus, 15 June 2004). In 2002, in order to increase the visibility of Sofia’s compliance the government created the post of a Minister of European Integration. Furthermore, in 2003, it also introduced the position of a Deputy Prime Minister on EU Integration (Focus, 18 July 2003). At the same time the National Assembly increased the visibility of its EU priorities with the creation of a new Directorate for Legislation and European Law to assist the work of its Committee on European Integration (SEC(2002)1400: 20).
6.4.2. Foreign Policy Behaviour:
Evidence of elite-socialisation by the EU can be found by the conditioning of Bulgaria's foreign policy. As the European Commission has acknowledged, Sofia 'continues to position its foreign and security policy in line with that of the EU' (SEC(2004)1159: 129). Furthermore, the EU has regularly indicated that the country is a contributor to Balkan stability not only through its participation in peacekeeping missions, but also through the trilateral dialogues it has pursued with Albania, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey (SEC(2001)1744: 89). EU-officials have also praised Sofia for its ‘contribution to the process of conflict resolution in the Caucasus, the Black Sea and Southeastern Europe’ (SEC(2004)1199: 130). A particular emphasis has been placed on Sofia's ratification of the convention establishing the International Criminal Court, despite strong external pressure to the contrary.117 It is noteworthy that the EU's assessment of Bulgarian foreign policy has been put in the context of domestic change. As Günter Verheugen has suggested:

Bulgaria is not part of the Balkan problems – it is part of their solution! It is in our [EU’s] interest that Bulgaria develops a strong economy and maintains a stable democracy. You should not consider that European taxpayers are so affluent as to afford such large sums for charity to non-member states... Instead you should perceive EU socialisation as an investment in the future of your country. Bulgaria is already starting to pay back for this support by developing the foundations of a strong economy and a strong market, and also, one should not forget, by its political stability, which is a major factor for the stability of the Balkan region. (Focus, 10 July 2003)

Similarly, the Bulgarian President, Georgi Parvanov has insisted that it is ‘the European perspective that brings the states of the region together, but regional cooperation depends on the ability of each of us [Balkan countries] to plant in our national soil the rules of the EU to which we all aspire. This means full implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, the Stability and Growth Pact and the benchmarks for economic policy coordination, and the rules of the Social Agenda. Only when this occurs, can we expect such [cooperative] regional relations’ (Focus, 10 March 2005). Thus, in parallel, Sofia’s foreign-policy elites have also maintained that ‘everything that is of benefit for the [Balkan] region is also of benefit to the Bulgarian state’ (Minister of European Integration, Meglena Kuneva in Focus, 29 April 2003). In this respect, such statements attest to the impact of domestic compliance with EU-norms on foreign policy. For instance, the Foreign Minister, Solomon Passi has declared that Bulgaria ‘has a duty to share its experience with its

Balkan neighbours. We must assist them in their attempts to join the EU in the same way that we [Bulgaria] were and are helped by EU Member States in our accession' (Focus, 16 February 2005). However, Mr. Passi has also emphasised the importance of domestic congruence of candidate states in the context of their bilateral contractual relations with the EU over regional cooperation: 'Bulgaria's assistance should not be perceived as an imposition of our opinion on our neighbours; instead we only want to share with them our experience... since each country decides on its own the speed with which it wants to move toward the EU' (Focus, 22 October 2004).

Such statements suggest that as a result of EU socialisation, Bulgarian elites perceive they have a role in stabilising the region. For instance, the Bulgarian Ambassador to Skopie has acknowledged that the willingness of Western Balkan states such as Macedonia to cooperate with Sofia derives from 'the attraction of good neighbourly relations with a country that is soon to be a member of the EU... Bulgaria is already perceived as the locomotive of Southeastern Europe. Therefore, it is important that we live up to these expectations and work harder for Bulgaria's accession to the EU' (Focus, 9 March 2005). In his statement at the Bulgarian Parliament, Olli Rehn acknowledged this new role of the country by emphasising 'the concrete role of Bulgaria as a model and incentive for the development of democracy and stability in the Western Balkans... in particular through its decisive implementations of administrative and economic reforms' (Focus, 18 March 2005). In this context, the President, Parvanov declared at a regional meeting of heads-of-state that 'for many years, we [in the Balkans] have quarrelled about history and culture, but now is the time to indicate that the things that bring us together are more than those that divide us. Now is the time for the statesmen of the region to show this culture to Europe' (Focus, 10 March 2005).

The EU assessments at the beginning of this section indicate that such assertions are not only mere rhetoric. Reflecting the high degree of elite-internalisation of promoted policy-values (as well as Bulgaria's regional prominence due to its advanced status in the EU accession process) the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Passi has impressed upon his Serb/Montenegrin counterpart Draskovic and the Serbian President Boris Tadic that Belgrade has to demonstrate its willingness to comply with international standards. This has been cited as instrumental in convincing President Tadic to make a visit to Kosovo in an attempt to influence local Serb politicians to

118 To that effect Bulgaria has signed with Serbia a memorandum for assistance in the EU integration process (Focus, 5 April 2005).
119 The regional significance of the country has been reflected in (and supported by) the fact that since 2003 over 40% of all FDI in the Balkans has been in Bulgaria (Focus, 2 April 2005).
cooperate with the international administration of the province (Focus, 16 February 2005). Reflecting the security-community-dynamics between Sofia and Bucharest, the two countries signed a treaty on adopting the EU-standards in their bilateral relations (RFE/RL Newsline, 1 April 2005). Furthermore, in a highly symbolic gesture, the foreign ministers of Bulgaria and Romania met at the only bridge spanning the Danube-border between the two countries to indicate their cooperation in the EU accession process (RFE/RL Newsline, 7 February 2005). The European Integration Minister, Kuneva has also insisted that Bulgaria ‘has to assist Romania because for us it is integration that matters, not membership’ (Focus, 31 March 2005). In this context, the Bulgarian President has emphasised that ‘today we are witnessing intensive dialogue rather than fighting in the region. It is undisputable that the political dialogue and the general spirit of understanding that characterises all our [of Balkan decision-makers] meetings are condition sine qua non for stability and cooperation’ (Focus, 10 March 2005).

Thus, the socialisation of Bulgarian elites seems to have produced the intended results – capacities, institutions and policies in line with EU-norms. Such policy practice reflects the promotion of an elite security community in the Balkans within the context of EU enlargement. As already indicated in this chapter, such inference is corroborated by Bulgaria’s accelerated completion of its accession negotiations. In short, elite-socialisation has introduced processes and institutions that lock in decision-making into predictable (non-belligerent) patterns.

6.5. Croatia:
Tracing the process of elite-socialisation in Croatia, involves an understanding of the Western Balkan context during the 1990s. The country was in a virtual state of war up to 1995, something which exposed it to external and internal threats. However, despite this environment the general pattern of Croatia’s transition has not been that different from the one in Bulgaria: the elites in Zagreb opted for constitutional reform, the promotion of which introduced certain contradictions in institutional development and the direction of transition (Kavalski, 2004: 106-11).

The ‘homeland’ war with Yugoslavia, the ‘liberation’ of Krajina and the military involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina led to an extreme polarisation of political discourse in Croatia. This involved the regular recourse to ‘we-are-at-war’-rhetoric by state-elites, which allowed for an authoritarian one-man/one-party rule under President Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian

120 Despite the apparent benefits and achievements of this approach, however, there are a number of shortcomings: mainly the sidelining (if not exclusion) of public opinion from this socialisation. Such practice has significantly prevented the socialisation of Bulgarian society along Euro-Atlantic norms. Nevertheless, this study contends that such normative discrepancy is not inconsistent (in the short- to medium-term) with the objective of order promotion in the region. This issue will be discussed at length in Chapter 8.

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Democratic Union (HDZ). The controversial practices of the Zagreb regime during the 1990s excluded the country from the enlargement programs of the EU. Brussels did not perceive Croatia as observing a 'code of democratic conduct' in its policy behaviour, which forced the European Commission to suspend the PHARE assistance negotiations with Zagreb on 7 August 1995 (COM(2000)311: 4). Such ostracism led the Tudjman-regime to experiment with a 'go-it-alone Croatia'-policy (Bartlett, 2003: 65). As in the case of Bulgaria, this attempt was marked by economic mismanagement, which led to social unrest in the second-half of the 1990s. An alteration of relations between the EU and Zagreb was made possible only as a result of the EU's response to the Kosovo crisis and Tudjman's death at the end of 1999. As a consequence, the EU indicated a willingness to utilise its experience with candidate countries and focussed on the promotion of appropriate administrative capacity in Croatia. This, in turn, had an influence on Zagreb's foreign-policy-behaviour.

6.5.1. The EU-driven elite-socialisation:
The EU has acknowledged that Croatia 'suffered increasing international isolation as a result of the nationalist regime of President Tudjman' (EC, 2003: 4) and, consequently, his death lifted the formal obstacles to the involvement of the EU in the country. Moreover, as Judy Batt (2004: 13) has suggested, it was the completion of the integration of Croatian statehood (which also occurred at the same time) that allowed the EU policy-entry points into Zagreb's decision-making. The EU was thus able to focus on state-elites and here its rationale was the avoidance of a relapse into nationalistic regime politics. According to the Commission the objective has been to accelerate Zagreb's 'adjustment... to the post-socialist, post-nationalist situation' and the 'building up [of] a modern state according to European democratic standards, rule of law, economic development and social justice'. This, it was hoped, would help achieve the 'stabilisation' of Croatia's course towards 'integration and association into the international institutions of Western Europe' (EC, 2002b: 18-20).

The main instruments of the EU-driven elite-socialisation of Croatia are (a) the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) and (b) the CARDS programme. The process of EU-promoted elite-socialisation can be inferred from Croatia's swift advance along the SAP. On 29 October 2000, Croatia became only the second SAP country to have signed a SAA. On 20

121 More on this issue see Vejvoda (2000: 222). As suggested in Section 4.3.3 of Chapter Four, a further complicating factor was the awkwardness of Croatian statehood, which was underwritten by these developments.
122 The SAA marked the beginning of the first contractual relations between the EU and Croatia since the dissolution of former Yugoslavia (EC, 2002b: 6).
April 2004 it upgraded its SAA to a European Partnership and on 14 June 2004 it became the first Western Balkan country to have been granted the status of a ‘candidate state’ with its accession negotiations initially set for 17 March 2005, although these were subsequently put on hold. Olli Rehn explained the postponement in terms of socialising Zagreb’s elites: ‘Croatia is getting more time to fulfil the conditions for EU entry’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 14 March 2005). Despite this setback, Croatian decision-makers have further emphasised their willingness to pursue EU-set objectives. Prime Minister Sanader suggested the establishment of a monitoring mechanism for verifying Zagreb’s compliance with the ICTY (Hina, 17 March 2005). He emphasised also that ‘although one cannot be satisfied that the negotiations will not begin, I am expressing my satisfaction with the fact that a framework for the negotiations was adopted’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 16 March 2005). In a similar vein, the Croatian Parliament Speaker, Vladimir Seks said that ‘it is a fact that we wanted to start negotiations, but that did not happen and it is nothing tragic or dramatic for Croatia. I am confident that the adoption of the negotiating framework means progress on Croatia’s path towards integration in the EU’ (Hina, 17 March 2005). Likewise, Foreign and European Affairs Minister Kolinda Grabar-Kitanovic stressed that the postponement is ‘neither a triumph nor a failure, but a normal process, even though I regret the fact that the negotiations did not start today. However, this does not mean that the process would be significantly slowed down. Its momentum is going to be maintained by the agreement on the negotiating framework’ (Hina, 17 March 2005). In this respect, explaining Zagreb’s speed-of-compliance, the then Foreign Minister Tonino Picula (2003a: 2) stressed the instrumental benefits from EU-socialisation:

The membership application became more a question of physics than a question of politics: the reform process has a certain velocity, and in order to move forward that acceleration needs more space. After twelve years of hard history and tough transitions, citizens of Croatia do not perceive membership in the EU either as an abstract ideal or an outside pressure – it is simply our strategic reality... In order to achieve compatibility we have to reform and the candidate status offers the most comprehensive of instruments for the process.

123 This postponement was officially due to Zagreb’s inability to deliver (or provide information of the whereabouts of) General Gotovina to the ICTY, but has also to do with disagreements between the Member States of the EU about the future of the EU-enlargement. As Erhard Busek, the Coordinator of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe indicated that ‘among the former Yugoslav countries, Croatia has handed over the most indictees to the Tribunal and also nobody mentions that Croatian courts have convicted war criminals’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 17 March 2005). As it will be suggested in Chapter Eight, this incident underwrites a shortcoming of the post-1999 approaches of both the EU and NATO in the region as a result of which they ‘fetishise’ particular individuals instead of initiating a ‘truth-telling’ process about the events of the 1990s.
On the one hand, the velocity of this process has been the outcome of a broad elite-consensus on the objectives of EU-membership. This is evidenced by the policy-continuity despite the change of government in November 2003. The continuity of Zagreb’s policy-direction has been ensured by the resolution adopted on 18 December 2002 by all parties represented in the Croatian Parliament, which defined EU-accession as a ‘strategic national interest’ (Hina, 19 December 2002). This consensus has also been reinforced by an agreement between ‘the government and the opposition that the Chief Negotiator with the EU should be a professional not influenced by political parties or election results’ (Hina, 4 January 2005). In effect, the EU’s ability to promote elite-compliance has been apparent after the HDZ’s election victory in 2003, when its leadership found itself in an institutional environment, which made a relapse into nationalistic politics untenable (if not impossible). The significance of this outcome corroborates the argument that institutional constraints condition elite-behaviour (Malenica, 2004: 73). In effect, the HDZ’s campaigning emphasised its ability to accelerate the speed of Croatia’s accession to the EU. As one commentator has suggested the first post-Tudjman government was ‘punished for its hesitancy’ (NYT, 24 November 2003). Emphasising the importance of speed-of-compliance, HDZ’s leader Ivo Sanader declared that his government ‘would work to see Croatia and all its neighbours joining the EU as soon as possible’ (FT, 25 November 2003). Jacques Rupnik (2005: 5) has thus dubbed Croatia ‘the perfect illustration of [Brussels’] strategy: nationalist authoritarians have been tamed and made Euro-compatible through a plausible prospect of EU accession’. In order to encourage compliance, the EU has provided incentives that ‘demonstrate [its] support to Croatia not only in political, but also in financial terms, in order to encourage and concretely help the new leadership’ (COM(2000)289: 3).

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124 The parliamentary (January 2000) and presidential (February 2000) elections which ousted the HDZ from power were interpreted both domestically and internationally as introducing of a new political climate in Croatia. As the External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten (2000: 1) proclaimed at the time ‘the people of Croatia delivered a clear message... democratic change is possible in a region where many had doubted it.’

125 Such development corroborates the argument that it takes a moderate nationalistic leader to initiate a peaceful framework of foreign relations (Schultz, 2005). Likewise, Letica (2004: 220) describes PM Sanader as a ‘moderate hawk... who distanced HDZ from its origins and described his party as conservative European’.
Figure 5, indicates the increase in EU assistance to Zagreb. Whereas for the period 1991-2000 Brussels spent on average less than €30 million on humanitarian assistance, its post-1999 policy towards Croatia has been supported by over €60 million annually. In the light of its previous experience in Croatia (and the Western Balkans), the emphasis on bilateral relations provides an incentive for conditioning the country’s decision-making. The State Secretary for European Integration has acknowledged that such a focus on the part of the EU ‘has helped the [Croatian] Government to think about its priorities and identify strategic goals’. This claim is supported by the financial allocation for CARDS assistance to Croatia, which for the period 2002-2004 is €168 million under the national programme and (only) €23 million under the regional programme (EC, 2002b: 6). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tonino Picula (2003a: 3) has suggested that ‘the bilateral nature of the SAA is of crucial importance, because it brings strict common standards, and enables individual capacity building to fit those standards’. Another government official has insisted that in this way the EU is able to provide ‘a framework for the design and implementation of internal reforms through which its role in shaping internal politics has been much more active’. Neven Mimica (2003: 1-2), the then Minister for European Integration, indicated that it is the contractual relationship between the EU and Croatia that suggests that ‘we are not meeting the membership conditions for their own sake, but rather because in doing so we will also give impetus to a comprehensive process of reforms that will, with some unavoidable sacrifice, lead to the advancement of our entire society’. Echoing such perception, the current European Affairs Minister, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović has stressed that Zagreb’s accession

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126 Interview on 8 April 2005.
127 Interview on 7 April 2005.
progress is ‘the result of Croatia’s assessment on its own merits and by no means as part of the “Balkan package”’ (Fokus, 27 February 2004). Responding to such commitment as well as furthering its own socialising role, Brussels has included Croatia in the pre-accession instruments (i.e. PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD) and is currently developing a ‘new pre-accession instrument (IPA)’ (COM(2004)657: 5). The availability of such ‘carrots’ has ensured the speed and direction of Zagreb’s adoption of and adaptation to EU-rules. One Croatian commentator emphasises that ‘the fast accession of Croatia towards the EU follows the proclaimed principle of individual evaluation’ (Letica, 2004: 211). Attesting to the socialising logic of such initiatives, Ana Brncic, the Advisor to the State Secretary on European Integration insists that bilateral conditioning by the EU has been ‘useful in making clear to the state bodies what are the priorities of [its] programmes, how the programmes should be managed, etc. [and this] contributed to the development of trust between the Croatian Government and Brussels’. It is within this context that Croatia has become a ‘poster child’ for the EU’s post-1999 approaches to the Western Balkans; or as an unnamed European official has called it the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the EU strategy for the subregion (quoted in Field, 2001: 135).

6.5.2. Foreign Policy Behaviour:
The speed-of-compliance of Zagreb’s decision-making is reflected in the fulfilment of Croatia’s obligations according to its SAA. Three formal requirements set up in the SAA relate to foreign policy. These are: (i) cooperation with other countries having signed SAA; (ii) cooperation with other countries concerned by the SAP; and (iii) cooperation with countries candidate to EU accession (COM(2001)371: 19-20). As EU officials have acknowledged, Zagreb has embarked upon the negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Macedonia, Serbia/Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey; the establishment of a transparent policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina by recognising its territorial integrity and independence; and a rapprochement with Republika Srpska and Serbia/Montenegro by means of the recognition and return of refugees (COM(2000)311: 10). Zagreb’s alignment with EU-recommendations is also reflected in its refusal (unlike the other countries in the Western Balkans) to sign an agreement granting US troops immunity from ICC prosecution (COM(2004)257: 114).

On 20 February 2003, Croatia filed its official application for consideration for EU membership. On this occasion the Foreign Minister Picula (2003a: 5) declared that ‘it is in

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128 Interview on 7 April 2005.
Croatia’s vital national interest that its neighbours are flourishing democratic societies. We have every reason to be fully engaged in assisting our eastern neighbourhood to move closer to the same standards that Croatia wants to be in compliance with... Standards create predictability, predictability generates trust and trust enables cooperation’. A high-ranking government official has acknowledged that the EU’s insistence on ‘internal reform’ through the SAP has ‘affected Croatia’s foreign policy... in the sense that it has established links and bridges of cooperation that in other cases would have taken a much longer time to develop’. Prime Minister Ivo Sanader has acknowledged that ‘good neighbourly relations [in the Balkans] depend on the establishment of functioning democracy and free market, the tolerance of diversity, the culture of dialogue, the rule of law and respect for human rights and minority rights’ (Hina, 14 March 2005). And similarly the then Foreign Minister Žužul has claimed that there is ‘no other way to stability but [through] European integration, even if some Balkan countries do not accede to the EU in the next 10-15 years, Croatia is going to maintain its interest in regional cooperation’ (Focus, 30 April 2004).

In the wake of its accelerated progress along the SAP, the Croatian government has maintained its commitment to adopting the EU standards in its foreign-policy-behaviour. The Prime Minister Ivo Sanader (2004b) has insisted that ‘Croatia’s progress [towards] achieving candidate status for membership in the EU, represents an incentive rather than a barrier to others in the region’. The then Foreign Minister, Picula similarly has asserted that it is ‘the probability of integration with the EU that allows [regional] cooperation – exceptional, bilateral or through particular mechanisms with our neighbours... [Thus] as soon as Croatia stopped being perceived as part of the package of the Western Balkans, it adopted the role of a bridge between Western and Southeastern Europe’ (Jutarnji List, 1 March 2003). Mr. Picula’s successor in the Foreign Ministry, Miomir Žužul, has emphasised that ‘stability and cooperation in the Balkans depend on the individual process of integrating [regional] states in the EU’ (CEI, 17 March 2004). Likewise, Prime Minister Ivo Sanader (2004a) has stressed that ‘accession to the EU is not merely good for Croatia and its people; it will also serve to galvanise the [Western Balkan] region as a whole.’ In this context, Sanader has suggested that by ‘declaring Croatia as a candidate country, the EU opens a new era of opportunity for the entire Western Balkans. Since we are the first from this region [to achieve this status] we have a duty to assist those who would follow in our footsteps.

129 Interview on 8 April 2005.
towards the EU'. Confirming this assessment, the State Secretary for European Integration has insisted that 'after the conflicts in the mid-1990s all the countries of the region were more or less in the same position. The fact that Croatia "has made it" is an encouragement for the other countries that they can make it, too. And by now they know [that] they can make it only if they continue with their internal reforms, because there are "no shortcuts to membership"'.

In order to indicate its own compliance with EU standards, in June 2003, the Croatian Cabinet adopted a series of measures aimed at facilitating the return of refugees to the country. On this occasion the then Prime Minister Račan called 'on all Croatian citizens to return to their homeland and make use of the opportunities provided' (RFE/RL Newsline, 12 June 2003). Furthermore, the current government has begun surrendering war crimes suspects to the ICTY, as well as permitting ethnic Serbs to return to their homes and property (IHT, 19 June 2004). At the same time, in order to reinforce its commitment to regional cooperation, the Croatian cabinet indicated its desire to ratify the treaty with Bosnia and Herzegovina on the joint use of the Croatian port of Ploče; as well as its 'interest in the realization in the shortest time possible under any conditions of Transport Corridor 5' between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Focus, 15 July 2003). The extent of normative transformation due to elite-socialisation can also be inferred from the improved relations between Zagreb and Belgrade, which seem to reflect foreign minister Picula's (2003b: 3) conviction that Croatia 'can be a positive influence on its neighbours through regional and cross-border cooperation'. On 12 June 2003 both Croatia and Serbia took steps to begin the demilitarisation of their common border. As already indicated, the president of Serbia/Montenegro indicated his country's support for Croatia's membership. In this context, Croatia's Prime Minister Ivo Sanader has stressed his gratitude for the regional support of Croatia's efforts to join the EU: 'The neighbouring countries logically are better acquainted with the situation in Croatia or the neighbouring region than others. Therefore, their assessments are particularly valuable both for us and for Europe' (Hina, 14 March 2005).

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130 The claim that Zagreb's candidacy has encouraged other regional states to comply is evidenced by Macedonia's application for candidate state status on 22 March 2004 (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 March 2004). Bechev (2005: 3) contends that 'Croatia's success in graduating to full EU candidacy has certainly inspired Macedonia to submit its membership application'.

131 Interview on 8 April 2005.

132 Croatia has handed over to The Hague eight indicted individuals, however, despite its claims to cooperation it still has not managed to provide information on the whereabouts of General Ante Gotovina (RFE/RL Newsline, 6 April 2004).
6.6. Conclusion:
As the instances of Bulgaria and Croatia suggest, the post-1999 approach of the EU to the region has facilitated the development of peaceful interactions in the Balkans. The socialisation of these two countries is evidence of the impact of (the prospect of) enlargement on the region. The instruments of enlargement, which the EU currently employs, create a dynamic, in which exclusion from the process is perceived by regional elites as dangerous. The threat of exclusion comes not only from the possible negative effects of international condemnation, but also from the censure of domestic public opinion. Thus, the EU has embarked upon the conditioning of regional elites into desired patterns of relations, in order to prevent the perpetuation of unpalatable (i.e. war-like) policy-behaviour in the Balkans. This process, thereby, intimates the EU's ability 'to build a structure of peace' in Europe (Penksa and Mason, 2003: 258).

This process of extending the (Western) security community to the region thus involves a twin dynamic: socialisation within the Balkan states (i.e. their state-elites) and, consequently, more cooperative external patterns of behaviour. This chapter has demonstrated how the socialisation of the Balkan elites in terms of domestic conduct of politics and normative reorientation influences their foreign policy. In this context the EU has managed to initiate the development of an embryonic security community among regional decision-makers. Therefore, at least as regards the Balkans, the EU has become a more coherent and effective external actor; yet, its socialising agency in the region is intertwined with the viability of the prospect of EU-membership for Balkan states.

Current EU measures, underpinned by a commitment to the accession of the Balkans seem to reflect the initial hypothesis of this research: that the steadfastness of the external agency indicated by its ability to maintain the attractiveness of the required transformations is crucial for the promotion of security community-arrangements. The EU's post-1999 enlargement-driven socialisation engages Balkan decision-makers in a framework, which ensures elite compliance as well as decision-makers' willingness to subject themselves to learning for compliance. As it has been already emphasised, at the initial stage such behaviour is driven by rational cost-benefit analysis. However, as the examples of both Bulgaria and Croatia attest, as soon as the socialising agency indicates that it is willing to fulfil its promises and reward appropriate policy-behaviour, decision-making gradually starts to internalise the required standards into its policy attitudes. Such development is also maintained by the institutional culture introduced through the socialisation process, which ensures the belief of elites in the appropriateness of the promoted norms.
CHAPTER SEVEN

NATO’S PROJECTION OF ORDER TO THE BALKANS

NATO has been good for the Balkans, but the Balkans have been good for NATO, as well!

Jamie P. Shea
28 June 2003

7.1. Introduction:

As well as the EU, NATO is the other dominant Euro-Atlantic actor involved in the socialisation of the Balkans into a security-community-pattern of relations. The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to elicit the socialising effect of NATO in the Balkans in the context of initiating a framework for a security-community-type of order. During the 1990s, the Alliance gradually began to indicate that it was not merely a mechanism of collective defence, but also an organisation indispensable for projecting (and maintaining) order (Webber, 2002: 49). This led the Alliance to recognise the imperatives of (i) association (i.e. partnership, and enlargement) and (ii) enforcement of its (western) standards of appropriate relations (i.e. a non-war order) in the instances in which its instrumental leverage (coming from the prospect of accession) was not sufficient. Both instruments of Alliance socialisation are characterised by explicit conditionality of compliance (i.e. inclusion) and punishment (i.e. exclusion), and also both indicate the underlying objective of introducing a pattern of peaceful state behaviour.

The argument of this chapter is that NATO’s association and enforcement dynamics suggest actual socialisation processes (i.e. there are two processes at work here – compliance through association and compliance through enforcement) aimed at the introduction of the minimum requirements of a peace-order (i.e. embryonic security community). NATO’s socialisation of state-elites is both about the promotion of norms as well as strategy (e.g. enforcing peace in Bosnia and securing Serb withdrawal from Kosovo). As it was noted in Chapter Five, it is the strategic interests of the Allies (i.e. concern not to import regional tensions) that are exerting pressure for compliance. It will be shown that NATO’s socialisation processes of association and enforcement suggest that prospective members need to adhere to externally-promoted standards. In this respect, these socialisation processes have initiated the introduction of a security-community order. The association dynamic indicates the Alliance’s generosity – i.e. it is willing to tolerate certain normative differences as long as the partners are willing to gradually adopt its
rules (Möller, 2003). Enforcement, on the other hand, indicates the requirement of a coercive agency to promote a ‘code of peace’ (Adler, 1998: 183).

Prior to examining these dynamics this chapter considers NATO’s own history and the patterns of relations that emerged among its members, in order to illuminate its post-Cold War involvement and role in the Balkans. This historical overview is necessary for tracing the dynamic of NATO’s socialisation as a process within and outside the organisation. The chapter then traces the dynamics of security-community-socialisation through association and enforcement. It contextualises these processes through the cases of Romania – an example of association; and Serbia/Montenegro – an example of enforcement. The chapter concludes with an assessment of NATO’s socialising effects in the region.

7.2. NATO Background:
Owing to the Cold War context of its emergence, NATO’s character has mainly been seen as a military defence alliance. NATO’s appearance on 4 April 1949 is traditionally interpreted as an indication of the US commitment to provide a defence mechanism for Western Europe in the face of Soviet belligerence. In this respect, NATO’s Cold War practices suggest a hegemonic character – the US prompted a kind of order supported by the confidence of the participating states that Washington would operate according to the rules and institutions of the Alliance (Flockhart, 2004a: 18). This, in turn, helped overcome the negative implications of asymmetries of power and aided the initial stages of security-community-building.

NATO’s creation was driven by the need to minimise the cost of defence through a collective security mechanism, which would allow for burden-sharing and mutual aid obligations. In other words, in the hackneyed expression of NATO’s first Secretary-General Lord Ismay, the Alliance’s purpose was ‘to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down’ (in Dowd, 1999). However, another objective for NATO was the creation of a security environment in Western Europe, which would facilitate economic and political reconstruction in the wake of the devastation of World War II. Thus, the institutional arrangements of the Alliance provided ‘the skeletal framework, which held the western security community together, but the various webs which linked the community together often rose above a tangible inter-institutional dimension, to the sphere of cultural and social norms’ (Aybet, 2000: 1).

This process of normative alignment in NATO was the result of intense elite negotiations. As Wichard Woyke (1993: 257-58) reveals, NATO’s formation was the result of two intensive rounds of negotiations between ‘ambassadors’, ‘government officials’ and ‘ministers’: the first
'phase' from 6 July 1948 to 15 March 1949 dealt with 'exploratory talks on security' between the US, Canada and the Brussels Treaty states; and the second one from 15 March to 4 April 1949 focused on opening negotiations with other potential member-states. Experiential knowledge thus facilitated the development of reciprocity and responsiveness among the negotiators. As one of the architects of NATO, Theodore C. Achilles (1992: 13) has acknowledged, the Alliance was not merely an 'instrument of détente', but a framework for 'understanding' among its members:

The 'NATO spirit' was born in the Working Group. Derick Hoyer-Miller started it. One day he made a proposal, which was obviously nonsense. Several of us told him so in no uncertain terms, and a much better formulation emerged from the discussion. Derick said: 'Those were my instructions. All right. I'll tell the Foreign Office I made my pitch and was shot down, and try to get them changed'. He did. From then on we all followed the same system. If our instructions were sound and agreement could be reached, fine. If not, we'd work out something that we all, or most of us, considered sound, and whoever had the instructions undertook to get them changed. It always worked, though sometimes it took time.

Thus, the multilateralism on which the Alliance was forged, developed its own socialising environment among the members and facilitated the development of a practice of trust. The argument here is that the military function of NATO advanced its political effects: it urged the allies to resolve their differences through the institutionalisation of the habit of consultation. This practice was institutionalised through the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Consequently, it was advanced through the informal lunches of the ambassadors of NATO countries prior to the NAC meeting (Jordan, 1979: 127). In 1956 such elite-socialisation was further routinised through the creation of a Committee on Non-Military Cooperation, whose main objective (according to its founding report) was 'the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions became fixed. At best, this [was to] result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it [would] ensure that no action [was] taken by one member without knowledge of the view of the others' (quoted in Kay, 1998: 37). This, more 'social dimension' was furthered through the establishment in 1969 of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (Moore, 2002: 5).

These developments suggest not only the military, but also the political function of the organization. The institutional interaction of NATO made it possible to affect the preferences of participating elites by acquainting them with the 'preferences or beliefs, or environmental constraints' of the others (Wallander et al., 1999: 12). Despite the primacy of its military function, NATO's secondary function was to offer a framework for political consultation, which
according to a 1953 communique ‘developed naturally from the sense of unity in the Alliance’ (quoted in Honig, 1991: 27). While the political function of NATO never developed to the same extent as its military one, the opportunity which joint consultations offered ‘for airing grievances, compromise and consensus-building played a key role in the development of the institutional form of a mutual defense pact’ (Kay, 1998: 24).

Regardless of the secretive nature of its creation and its intense elite-socialisation, NATO’s founders also strived to involve the public opinion of its member-states; and, thus, create a broader momentum in favour of the Atlantic Alliance. These attempts were made apparent in the immediate run-up to the signing of the treaty. In January 1948, Dean Acheson (NYT, 27 January 1949), the newly appointed US Secretary of State declared:

We North Atlantic peoples share a common faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty... We believe that these principles and this common heritage can best be fortified and preserved and the general welfare of the people of the North Atlantic advanced by an arrangement for cooperation in matters affecting their peace and security and common interest.

In spite of their rhetorical quality, such statements introduced in the public domain notions of normative appropriateness – i.e. what the allies have in common is not only a common enemy, but also shared values and principles of social and political organization. To that effect, Domke (1987: 382-407) and his collaborators have ascertained that despite the frequent controversies that had beleaguered the Alliance during the Cold War and the suggestions that domestic audiences were not supportive of its strategic functions, their data evidences that there has been a very strong elite-public consensus on NATO’s role.133

It is this achievement of the Alliance to impact both public and elite perception not only of security, but also of the interactions among its members on both societal and decision-making level, that Bradley Klein (1990: 319) calls the ‘genius of NATO’:

By effectively wedding itself to the defense of distinctly modern, Western, Atlantico-centric cultural project, strategic discourse deflected criticism of the Alliance’s otherwise obvious contradictions... NATO’s strategy was thus the only feasible means of securing that precarious historical construct called ‘the Western way of life’.

More practically, the mechanisms for monitoring the compliance of allies reduced mutual uncertainty and increased the predictability of policy-making. This promoted a ‘certain

133 Of course, this issue is open to debate, yet Domke et al. (1987: 404) note that the only division in the elite-public opinion was the nuclear issue, which, however, did not indicate a decline in public support for NATO.
"denationalisation" of defence planning, providing a forum for the coordination of Western security policies, supplying economic benefits to all the Allies, and encouraging and legitimising democratic forms of government' (Yost, 1998: 51). The end of the Cold War challenged but did not remove the shared common political-military culture in the Alliance or its institutional provision of collective security. The following section details the ways in which NATO came to assume an order-facilitating role (by setting the policy-behaviour of decision-making) in the post-Cold War world.

7.3. NATO after the Cold War:
The objective of this section is to provide background for first, understanding the particular dynamics of Alliance socialisation; and, second, evincing the character of Allied pattern of relations. Commentators on NATO have tended to note that the end of the Cold War challenged the Alliance with the questions of its 'new' role(s) as well as bringing up the larger issue of the new 'security architecture' for Europe. However, rather than revisiting the debates between the different schools of international relations on whether the Alliance is bound to disappear in the absence of its 'founding' enemy or the possible implications for its institutional structure from the adoption of a 'flexible' (if not diluting) longevity, this study takes a more incremental approach tracing the process of NATO's evolution, particularly in relation to its involvement in the Balkans.

As suggested in Chapter Five, NATO's development in response to the Yugoslav disintegration asserted its centrality in European affairs. In 1990, Manfred Wörner (LAT, 1 May 1990), the NATO Secretary General suggested that (procedurally) NATO is a model of western standards: 'NATO is not simply an alliance of threat or intimidation. It is a model of partnership, success and a vision of a Europe of peace and freedom'. Over the next decade the promotion of such a (West) European model of order was to undergo several stages, indicating the strengthening of the political function of the Alliance; as well as suggesting its readiness to compel adherence in order to maintain 'peace' in Europe. Both developments were already apparent in the 1990 London and 1991 Rome Declarations, as well as the 1991 Strategic Concept, all of which indicated a willingness to adjust NATO's strategy to the new international environment. According to the last document, the risks 'to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political
difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe' (NATO Press Release (99)65).

In retrospect, this conceptualisation of security threats led to the initiation of the socialisation of the former Warsaw Pact countries. It was formalised through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). According to the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation (Nov. 1991), the NACC was defined as a new ‘institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues’. In spite of its dismissive description as ‘essentially a holding operation that provides only meagre psychological reassurance’ (Asmus et al., 1993: 32), the NACC fulfilled the specific purpose of preventing a security vacuum in Europe (Ulrich, 1999: 3). Regardless of the nuances of the arguments for and against the benefits of the NACC arrangement (which are not the purpose of this research), it was felt that there was a need for upgrading the relationship between NATO and non-members. Therefore, during its Brussels Summit in January 1994, the Alliance launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

PfP is more often than not discussed in the context of NATO’s subsequent decision to enlarge; thereby, it is traditionally described as a halfway house to membership. This tends to overlook its broader framework of relations. Although enlargement was presupposed by the PfP, its rationale was (is) serving purposes larger than enlargement. It has been described as NATO’s ‘most important adaptation to the security challenges of post-Cold War Europe’ (Ulrich, 1999: 1). Currently, PfP includes 30 partners ranging from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to Ireland and Sweden. A number of the partners are soon-to-be-members and aspirants (hence the reading of the PfP as a stepping stone to membership), but a substantial number of them are non-aspirants and neutrals.

In this context, the PfP seems to fulfil the strategic purpose of ‘enhancing [the] long-term security for all NATO countries’ and the instrumental aim of ‘strengthen[ing] relations with partner countries’ (Study on NATO Enlargement, 1995: Ch. 1, par. 18; Ch. 3, par. 32). Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (2004: 15) maintains that the PfP ‘will ensure that the unique strategic value of [the Alliance] remains high. Today’s global challenges require global answers. PfP [is] an important part of the response’. The rationale for the partners depends on their relations with the Alliance. For NATO-membership-aspirants, it is the prospect of accession; for the rest it is either an interest in the promotion of stability deriving from their compatibility/concurrence with NATO security interests as defined in the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, an instrumental benefit from the import of know-how and expertise from NATO and the value-added of legitimacy from inclusion. PfP helps to institutionalise partnership.
into a ‘permanent fixture’ of ‘associated membership’ (Ulrich, 1999: 2-3). One of the reports of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly insists that ‘PfP has become an important and permanent feature of the European security architecture and is helping to expand and intensify political and military cooperation in Europe’ (NATO PA, 2004a: 1). PfP’s strategic role of order-promotion is thus an effect of its policy of ‘inclusion’ of partners. Participation (or inclusion) advances a perception of a common purpose among the partners, which tends to facilitate their cooperation both with NATO and among themselves. Exclusion (non-participation in the PfP and other partnership initiatives), by contrast, hinders the socialisation of non-partners and instead subjects them to the possibility of a punishment/disciplining-like process.

This presupposes some caveats on the character of NATO’s socialisation processes. As indicated in Chapter Four, international socialisation is a complex process of transferring values, norms and standards of policy-formulation. In this respect, NATO’s socialisation dynamic is distinguished (circumstantially) as an adaptational process within and outside of the organisation. During the Cold War, Alliance socialisation was targeting (primarily) its members, while after the Cold War the socialisation involves non-members. Hence, NATO’s security-community-building pattern suggests both an ‘inclusive strategy’ — community-building from within; and ‘exclusive strategy’ — community building from the outside (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 74). The inference is that Alliance socialisation is a continual process, which does not end with membership, but carries on inside the organisation as well. This study, however concentrates on the pre-accession socialisation owing to the current circumstances in the Balkans.

This understanding facilitates the conjecture that the processes of partnership and enlargement are indicative of a dynamic of association of non-members with the instrumental and ideational core of the Alliance (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 75); whereas the tools of enforcement mark its socialising instruments outside the framework of these association activities. As a result there is a distinction as to what kind of socialising power is being utilised to induce compliance: in the former instance the Alliance employs its powers of persuasion, while in the latter it makes use of its powers of coercion. As will be indicated below, the socialising instruments of association are the NACC/EAPC, PfP and the MAP, while its enforcement mechanisms include immediate activities for the restoration/maintenance of peace. Although both reflect an ability to affect the policies of states (Pevehouse, 2005: 25), the suggestion here is that the association activities have longer-term effects — owing to their educating dynamic, while enforcement has

134 NATO has initiated Mediterranean Dialogue Programme, and has established a NATO-Russia Council, and NATO-Ukraine Commission to name only a few.
short-term implications – as a result of its patterns of compulsion (Serry, 2003: 10). The proposition of this research is that although both involve socialising practices it is the mechanisms of association that discern the community-building potential of the Alliance. The point of departure here is Vaughn Shannon’s (2000: 295) argument that international standards create obligations only when they are introduced within acceptable parameters. In this context, the association activities (i.e. partnership and enlargement) introduce a more acceptable prescriptive environment for the socialisation of non-members, by providing them with an as-if-members framework for interaction both with the Alliance and among themselves.

NATO’s partnership activities in the Balkans as a socialisation mechanism can be depicted on a continuum of instrumental adjustment both on part of the Alliance as well as the partners. Thus, it is the strategic interests of NATO (i.e. concern not to import regional tensions) that are exerting pressure for compliance and, hence, socialise into promoted practices.

Figure 6 offers a generalised picture of the differentiating socialisation initiated within and outside of NATO’s partnership activities. These strategic adaptations suggest a ‘deeper structure of values’ maintaining the legitimacy and upholding NATO’s power of attraction (Webber, 2002: 44). The Alliance’s adaptational effects are apparent by means of association (Section 7.4) and enforcement (Section 7.5) dynamics. The former is broadly defined by the introduction of transparency mechanisms (information exchange, monitoring measures, consultative

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As suggested in Section 4.3.3 of Chapter Four the dynamic of international socialisation reflects the context in which the external agency is applied. The suggestion has been that the logic of socialisation has been different: (i) in integrated states external actors mainly instruct and manage the imitation of their policy-practice, and (ii) in awkward states, external agency tends to be more coercive and conditions compliance directly (sometimes through enforcement). Thereby, Figure 6 attests to this logic by indicating the different socialisation dynamics of the Balkans reflecting the various degrees of integration (or awkwardness) of regional statehood.
mechanisms, etc.). Specifically, NATO’s security-community-building potentiality is made out in its instrumental export of know-how and ideational export of values, which frame its process of socialisation. The latter process is characterised by the introduction of constraints – (i) limitations on military manoeuvres, concentrations, deployments, etc., and (ii) ‘punishment’ and sometimes ‘exclusion’ – in an environment where the normative attraction of western standards is weak (or lacking) (see Platias, 1996: 22).

7.4. Association:
In CEE and in the Balkans, the Alliance’s association activities have been intimately connected with the issue of enlargement. It has to be reiterated however that this study looks at partnership both as a condition of post-Cold War international relations, as well as a preparatory process for eventual membership. The suggestion is that what had been conceived by the Alliance during the Cold War as a rhetorical practice of upholding a distinctly ‘Western way of life’, premised on a ‘belief in freedom’, ‘the practice of democracy’, and the ‘functioning of a market economy’ has been extended after the Cold War through the processes of association and enlargement (Thies, 2003: 545).

Considering PfP first, this initiative has been construed as an educational programme, which facilitates the transmission of NATO practices to its partners, by upholding the prospect of membership (since in the Balkans it is generally perceived as a preparatory mechanism for membership), while also allowing the Allies time to work out the actual mechanism and scope of the possible enlargement. Its socialising nature was emphasised by the then US Secretary of Defence, Les Aspin (1993), who described the program as an opportunity for the partners to ‘pick up NATO’s standard operating procedures, habits of cooperation and routines of consultation’. This potential for picking up NATO habits is suggested in the invitation issued to possible partners requiring adherence and commitment to the ‘protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace through democracy [which] are shared values fundamental to the Partnership’ (Annex to M-1(94)2). The PfP Framework Document suggests the socialising potential of the programme by emphasising its implicit conditionality – i.e. required compliance with its standards (it has to be reiterated, however, that this dynamic is strongest where the PfP is linked to the prospect of membership):

1. The facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and budgetary process.
2. Ensuring democratic control of defense forces.
3. Maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute to peacekeeping operations.
4. The development of cooperative military relations with NATO.
5. Developing over time of inter-operability of forces.

Table I further suggests the phases in PfP’s socialisation through association. The key words in the understanding of the PfP socialisation dynamic are interoperability and self-differentiation. The interoperability concept advances not only the required defence adaptations of the partners, but also harmonisation of their operational and political planning. Self-differentiation, on the other hand, allows the partners to define their own place in the program – aspirants and non-aspirants – as well as the intensity of their partnership with the Alliance. Table I indicates the three stages in the development of the PfP. They represent the chronological development of the PfP (rather than the socialisation of the partners) and indicate two distinct phases of such association in the Balkans: partnership (Albania, Croatia, Macedonia) and membership (Bulgaria and Romania).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage I</th>
<th>PfP (1994)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* NACC</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Intensified Individual Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Interoperability Objectives (IOs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Partnership Work Program (PWP)</td>
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<td>- Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Planning and Review Process (PARP[1995])</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>* IFOR/SFOR (1995)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)</td>
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<td>* Study on Enlargement (1995)</td>
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<th>Stage II</th>
<th>PfP Enhanced (1997)</th>
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<tr>
<td>* Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>* PARP Expanded</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Partner Staff Elements (PSEs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Partnership Action Plan (PAP)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- PARP Ministerial Guidance Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Partnership Objectives (POs)</td>
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<th>Stage III</th>
<th>Strategic Concept of the Alliance (1999)</th>
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<tr>
<td>* Training and Education Enhancement Program (TEEP)</td>
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<td>* Membership Action Plan (MAP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC)</td>
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As Table I indicates, the strategic ‘political reassurance’ of the PfP initiatives advances an instrumental expectation of predictability that partners would formulate policy according to the same principles, deriving from a ‘practice of “doing” security together’ (Shea, 1995: 88). Such practice of ‘doing’ security together with the PfP participants was advanced through what became known as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). This was instanced by the IFOR/SFOR arrangement, made possible as a result of NATO’s intervention in Bosnia. Its development indicates a conceptual transformation in NATO’s character of going beyond punishment of non-compliance into enforcement of prescribed non-war behaviour.\(^{136}\) The Alliance acknowledged the significance of Operation Joint Endeavour by describing it as ‘NATO’s first ever ground force operation, its first-ever deployment “out of area”, and its first-ever joint operation with NATO’s PfP partners and other non-NATO countries’ (M-1(97)82).

More significantly, however, the CJTF became an important practical tool for socialising partners into NATO standards. On the one hand the partners contributed personnel, while, on the other, their liaison officers at the PCC switched from observing and simulating decision-taking during training exercises to the implementation and planning of operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ulrich, 1995: 5). Thereby, the IFOR/SFOR became a major socialising instrument for learning-through-practice. This aspect prompts its conceptualisation as a ‘direct learning experience’ allowing NATO to project its own experience of security cooperation and thereby advance both the military and political transformations in the participating non-members (Aybet, 2000: 219).

The CJTF concept was a major institutional adaptation of the Alliance, indicating its flexibility in providing security in Europe. At its launch it was defined as the ‘most radical piece of thinking in [NATO’s] history’ (The Economist, 25 February 1995). The CJTF concept indicated that NATO ‘has always been a hybrid organisation, performing a number of political and military functions’ (Hafendorf, 1997: 2); and, furthermore, reflected the Alliance’s transformation from something other than an organisation ‘arrayed against a foe’ to a ‘collective entity “for” certain norms, values and behaviours’ (Nelson and Szayana, 1997: 3). The CJTF experience emphasised (i) NATO’s centrality in European security, (ii) the significant contribution of the partners to Allied missions, and (iii) the need for upgrading the PfP mechanisms to better reflect the capabilities of joint (partners-and-allies) operations. Moreover,

\(^{136}\) Discussed in the following Section 7.5. In institutional terms, the CJTF concept was hailed as a major innovation of the Alliance reflecting its post-Cold War vitality by allowing the possibility (1) for NATO to engage in military action with other international entities, and (2) for the non-participation of NATO members in alliance-approved military activities (McCalla, 1996: 449).
such practice of acting-like-the-Allies brought forth the discussion on the formal recognition of (some) partners as Allies (as indicated by the 1995 *Study on Enlargement*).

It was within this context that Madeleine Albright (1998) referred to the role of Alliance association activities in promoting ‘the area of Europe where wars do not happen’.\(^{137}\) As Chapter Five indicated the further development of this process was facilitated by the Alliance’s Kosovo campaign. The KFOR mission emphasised the requirement for strengthening not so much the allure of NATO’s partnership programmes but their effectiveness. Such an understanding is apparent in the New Strategic Concept articulated at the April 1999 Washington Summit. Here the Alliance bolstered the PfP process by introducing two mutually reinforcing initiatives: the PIP Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP) and the Membership Action Plans (MAP). TEEP’s principal aim was to increase the training and education value of the PfP by promoting ‘greater cooperation and dialogue among the wider defence and security communities in NATO and Partner nations’ (*NATO PfP*). This suggests a role in the ‘adjustment of [partners’] mindset’ and the existence of a ‘trickle-down effect’ on the general ‘culture’ of their policy-making (Fluri, 2003: 15-18). MAP, on the other hand, provides an accession-driven monitoring of compliance with the adaptation process required for entry into NATO. Owing to its breadth, MAP screening has been compared to the EU *Progress Reports* (Bjola, 2001: 24). Since TEEP and MAP are clearly tailored to facilitate the potential membership of partners, for the states of the Balkans inclusion in the PfP became even more coveted owing to the concreteness of accession into the Alliance. In this context, NATO has achieved an additional socialising leverage by demanding greater compliance from prospective PfP participants (as the instances of Bosnia/Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro indicate). This development largely reflects the theoretical proposition in Chapter Four that it is the lodestone of membership (i.e. fulfilment of the ‘need of identification and legitimation’) that ensures the socialising effect of external agents (Schimmelfennig, 1999: 213).

Alongside, the improvements in its main association programs, described above, at the Washington Summit, the Alliance also launched the South East Europe Initiative (SEEI). In practical terms SEEI’s aim of ‘promoting regional cooperation and long term security and stability’ (*NATO Handbook*, 2001: Ch. 3) is suggestive of involving the Balkan states in a

\(^{137}\) In May 1998 the practice of working together between the Allies and the partners was further institutionalised by the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Centre (EADRCC), which almost immediately had to get involved in the coordination of humanitarian assistance for Kosovo refugees in Albania and Macedonia. Thus, the socialisation dynamic of the EAPC activities signalled a further degree of inclusion for the partners by recognizing their status of potential members.
program for socialisation through association. SEEI, in contrast to the PfP, provides a forum for both NATO and states of the region (including Serbia/Montenegro from May 2001) to discuss, develop and implement projects together (on an *as-if-members* basis). Yet, the SEEI has not been a substitute for PfP in the Balkans. Indeed, in spite of developing a number of regional initiatives, SEEI has largely been sidelined by the PfP.**138** Furthermore, the launch of the US-Adriatic Partnership Charter in May 2003 seems to offer the NATO-hopefuls Albania, Croatia and Macedonia a more convincing forum for furthering their membership prospects. In spite of being an American initiative, its relevance to a discussion of NATO-socialisation derives from its regional interpretation as a boost to the membership prospects of Western Balkan states (**RFE/RL Balkan Report, 28 May 2004**). Malinka Jordanova (**Perihelion, 23 September 2003**), then Chief of Cabinet for the Deputy Prime Minister of Macedonia, has noted that ‘the US-Adriatic Charter is a way, through cooperation and through partnership, to secure membership in NATO, and, indeed to accelerate this process’. Similarly, a Romanian diplomat, closely involved in the NATO programs in the Balkans, has explained, the ‘Adriatic Charter offers a more convincing path, because it is constructed on [the example of] the successful “Baltic Charter” model and also because its format stresses [regional] cooperation, while maintaining the distinguishing features of the participants – three PfP members and two prospective partners (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro)’.**139** Another diplomat indicated that ‘the Adriatic Charter is more adequate as a path for Western Balkan countries to join NATO, which is community oriented and offers a more comprehensive way to security, while the SEEI is a “tool-provider” for the construction of a secure climate in the region’.**140**

The caveat regarding these claims is that the security-community-building logic of such partnership activities derives from the sense of common purpose which they have managed to initiate in the Balkans, per se, and not because the PfP has created any sort of wider normative community among all its participants – states as diverse as Ireland, Uzbekistan and Albania. The socialising effect of PfP initiatives is indicated by the increase of regional meetings both between civilian and military authorities after 1999, which have contributed to promoting peaceable frameworks in the region (**RFE/RL Balkan Report, 28 May 2004**). One Romanian diplomat has intimated the security-community-building logic of the partnership initiatives: ‘the Balkan PfP countries, as well as those in the region seeking full integration in this type of relationship, see

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**138** Working Table III of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe currently administers SEEI. More information about SEEI can be found at [http://www.nato.int/seei/home.htm](http://www.nato.int/seei/home.htm)

**139** Interview on 31 January 2005.

**140** Interview with Carmen Podgorean on 9 February 2005.
[it] as a strong “confidence building” mechanism and an incentive for sharing common values and common standards’. This implicitly reflects the socialisation power of the Alliance – its ‘continual ability to adjust to the dynamics of the political and security context in the area’. Such developments have led Martin Smith and Ken Aldred (2000: 25) to argue that association activities reflect a form of ‘enlargement by stealth’:

a situation whereby specific countries and territories in Southeast Europe develop a set of enduring political, operational and institutional links with NATO and its leading member states to the extent that their practical relations with the Alliance are, to all intents and purposes, virtually as full and as well-developed as its actual members.

The only qualification, which this research introduces to Smith’s and Aldred’s suggestion, is that NATO’s initiatives are indicative of an association rather than ‘enlargement by stealth’. What is meant here is that association has become quite an open and explicit project (through the MAP/PfP process) of the Alliance in the region. This suggests that partnership and the prospect of membership become the two main instruments for the socialisation of Balkan elites. In order to provide a better understanding of the process of NATO’s association activities in the Balkans, the following section traces the process of Romania’s socialisation experience.

7.4.1. Romania:

7.4.1.A: CONTEXT OF NATO INVOLVEMENT:
As already suggested, Romania’s case is taken as an example of a Balkan country, which moved from partnership- to membership-socialisation. When analysing Romania’s relations with NATO it is usually mentioned that Romania was the first CEE country to initiate its participation in the PfP programme and the second to submit an IPP and then enter bilateral dialogue with NATO (Phinnemore, 2001: 247). These acts are taken to indicate not only its eagerness for NATO membership, but (retrospectively) also tend to be interpreted as a result of the country’s idiosyncrasies during the Cold War. Although a member of the Warsaw Pact, Romania achieved a remarkable degree of policy-independence, often attributed to its successful bid to withdraw Soviet troops from its territory in the late 1950s (Moreton, 1984: 141-51). Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country to purchase equipment from the West – helicopters from France (Yost, 1998: 115). More significantly, it enjoyed an unusually warm relationship with the US, triggered by Romania’s condemnation of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. This was further

141 Interview on 9 February 2005.
emphasised by the momentous visit of US President Richard Nixon to Romania in August 1969, which also marked the first ever visit of a US President to a communist country since the 1945 Yalta conference.

This brief historical summary, however, does not aim to suggest an explanation for Romania’s post-Cold War policy-formulation (especially having in mind the controversy surrounding the toppling of the Ceausescu’s regime). Some commentators have described much of the period prior the elections in 1996 as a period of ‘international quasi-quarantine’ (Bjola, 2001: 27). There have been a number of reasons for such interpretation. With particular reference to Romania, Schimmelfennig (1999: 9) explains such isolation as a result of the unwillingness of its ‘authoritarian government’ to comply with NATO’s values, beyond its material-interests. From the Alliance’s point of view there had been a large amount of suspicion about the ‘ideological baggage’ as well as ‘the questionable political behaviour of the Iliescu regime’ (Linden, 1992: 22). As David Phinnemore (2001: 534) has suggested, an early indication of the country’s wavering international policy was the support given to the Milosevic’s regime in the early 1990s. In fact, President Ion Iliescu’s first foreign visit was to Yugoslavia and subsequently the then foreign minister (and until 2004 Prime Minister) Adrian Năstase proved reluctant to condemn human rights violations in Yugoslavia.

Regardless of such policy-attitudes, Romania made a very clear attempt to be included in the first round of NATO enlargement (Yost, 1998: 127). In parallel, Romania initiated some restructuring both in its foreign and domestic policy, as well as in its military sector. In June 1996, it launched a new ‘Strategy for Accession to NATO’ and issued a position on the ‘Basic Elements of Romania’s Accession to NATO’. Both documents reflected the Alliance’s principles and discourse, and included measures on: the transparency and credibility of Romania’s security structures; the modernisation of its defence industry; the continuation of the country’s good neighbourly relations; and the democratisation of the policy-process (Sur, 2004: 4).

However, the Alliance as a whole was not convinced by Romania’s (belated) case for membership, and Bucharest was excluded from the first round of enlargement. Some commentators have interpreted this decision as a ‘symbol for all the deficiencies of the

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142 Romania’s international behaviour is the subject of the following section.

143 Mihalka (1999: 498) has argued that a major reason why NATO invited only three countries was the domestic public opinion of member states. The Clinton Administration, in particular was concerned about ‘minimising the public debate over enlargement and securing two-thirds vote in the Senate for approving the necessary changes in the Washington Treaty. Romania would have been a very difficult sell. Images Americans have of Romania focus on Caucescu and the bloody revolution (some would call it coup d’état) of 1989, as well as the miners’ marches on Bucharest’.
enlargement process' (Eyal, 1997: 708-09). But, as a senior Romanian diplomat to NATO admitted at the time each of the ‘top three choices had met the criteria for membership better’ (in Ulrich, 1999: 9). As the then Romanian Foreign Minister, Andrei Plesu acknowledged after the Madrid Summit, the state-elites should not blame ‘external forces’ for the failure of the membership bid. Instead, he argued, the ‘causes are more internal than external... a lack of rules, rules that are violated, or rules that change several times a year... [therefore] to place responsibility for the difficulties in which we are currently struggling on the outside world would be unreasonable and in the long run it is bound to fail’ (in Mihalka, 1999: 501). In this respect, some have noted that the ‘positive effect’ of the Madrid rejection in assisting the country ‘to come to terms with the integration process’ (Phinnemore, 2001: 246). Namely, the immediate outcome was a replacement of the unduly raised expectations with a realistic assessment of the accession process itself and the country’s capabilities and compliance with NATO standards.

The subsequent behaviour of Romania and its continued commitment and participation in partnership activities indicates that the Madrid drawback did not negatively affect the socialising effectiveness of the Alliance. If anything, it reinforced its leverage by proffering ‘a clear perspective’ for membership, according to the then Presidential advisor, Marian (1997: 22; see Kydd, 2001: 803). This perspective was outlined not only through the mention of Romania in the Madrid Declaration for its ‘positive developments toward the rule of law and democracy’; but mainly through the launch of the enhanced PfP. The latter, according to the statement of another Romanian representative cited at the time (i) offered the countries not included in the first enlargement round of the Alliance greater access to NATO bodies and (ii) assisted them ‘to build an allied mentality’ (in Ulrich, 1999: 6).

Romania re-emphasised its *allied mentality* in its new accession programme ‘Romania: The Come Back Country’, which articulated Bucharest’s strategic significance to peacekeeping, in the context of its furthered defence restructuring. The expectation was that an emphasis on its contribution to collective security would enhance Romania’s chances of obtaining an invitation at the 1999 Washington Summit. When on 25 April 1999, NATO nominated the potential candidates by urging them to participate in the MAP, Romania’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Andrei Pleșu welcomed the fact that from all candidates, Romania was mentioned in ‘the first position’ (in Sur, 2004: 12). The then Prime Minister Radu Vasile (1998) noted that it was ‘unlikely’ that Romania will be invited to join at Washington and that the country needs to prepare itself for a ‘more realistic’ invitation around 2002. The then Head of the Romanian Mission to NATO, Prof. Lazar Comanescu (1999: 141) ascertained, however, that the launch of
MAP was a clear indication that Romania’s application is moving in the right direction. As a senior Romanian diplomat involved in the membership negotiations later acknowledged the ‘MAP offered a clearer path in terms of fulfilling objectives and meeting deadlines before the actual accession. It has helped familiarise Romania with NATO in a much closer manner, which has created discipline [in Bucharest] vis-à-vis NATO-related issues. I think that Romania was more prepared to join NATO because of MAP’. Consequently, such statements came to reinforce the MAP’s role as an imperative for convincing partners that their efforts will pay off eventually and less its function as an instrument of Allied caution over the acceptance of new members (Ulrich, 2003: 31).

By the time of the Prague Summit, Romania had managed to improve its compliance with the pre-accession conditions, which facilitated its invitation to join the Alliance. The international environment also affected Romania’s bid and in particular the US-led ‘war on terror’. However, as explained in Chapter Five, this study does not perceive NATO’s decision to enlarge in the context of the acquisition of resources for the US ‘war on terror’, but as a strategic extension of its ‘zone of peace’ stemming from the logic of its association activities. In this respect, enlargement is operationalised as a process of maintaining and reinforcing predictable decision-making patterns, rather than a mere instrument for transferring material capabilities. The former US Ambassador to Bucharest, Jim Rosapepe (2002: 168) insisted that by accepting NATO’s invitation, Romania makes a ‘commitment to a set of values, institutions and relationships that lock in its democratic progress’.

In this respect, within Romania, the decisions of the Prague Summit were interpreted as reflecting Bucharest’s ‘readiness to assume an active and efficient role in promoting the values and objectives of the Alliance’ (RMFA, 2004a: 2). At the Summit itself, President Iliescu (2002a: 1. Emphasis added) noted:

For Romanians, Prague has a special meaning. It is a place where, in 1968, Romania, alongside other Warsaw Pact countries, was commanded to come with tanks in order to end the ‘Prague Spring’. Romania not only refused but also condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1991 member countries decided, in Prague, to dissolve the Warsaw Treaty. Among the other heads of state, President Havel and myself signed that historical document. Today, the NATO Allies have issued a different kind of invitation, that of joining NATO in order to defend and promote democratic values and to build a Europe whole and free. We are delighted and honoured to accept it.

144 Interview on 31 January 2005.
Such statements of Romanian officials reflect the nature of Bucharest’s accession process – it is about the recognition of the country’s status in Europe and less about the security guarantees of Alliance membership. Bogdan Mazuru (2004: 1), Romania’s representative to NATO has corroborated this interpretation by declaring that joining the Alliance ‘is about joining the group we belong to [and] with whom we share the same values of freedom and peace’. This position, in turn, reflects the legitimating nature of the Euro-Atlantic socialisation process. As Prime Minister Năstase (2004a: 14-21) acknowledged during the debates on the law for Romania’s accession into NATO, Alliance membership brings the country a ‘new status’ – meaning ‘international legitimacy and credibility’ – something which corresponds to ‘Romania’s identity and perception in the world’.

7.4.1.B: INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR:

NATO’s socialising potential is best illustrated in its conditioning of inter-state affairs (especially in the sense of inter-partner relations) towards a non-war framework. Romania is a good case of such power of suasion. In the beginning of the 1990s, one commentator referred to Romania (together with Bulgaria) as the most volatile country in Eastern Europe, where ‘fragmentation can be anticipated as a result of secessionist trends’ (Kliot, 1991: 12). The rationale for this prognosis derived from: revisionist feelings towards parts of Bulgaria and the whole of Moldova; and problems stemming from the rights of the Hungarian minority in the country. The latter has been of particular significance to Romania’s bid for NATO-membership, since it has been used both by supporters and detractors of Romania’s accession to justify their respective positions. As the US Defence Secretary, William Perry admitted later, the tensions between Romania and Hungary, had led him to consider the possibility of ‘military conflict’ (in Szabo, 1996: 47).

However, as Corneliu Bjola (2001) convincingly argues the joint PfP experience of both Romania and Hungary, as well as the effective pressure of the Alliance through the prospect of membership has managed to convince the two sides of the undesirability of their confrontational stance.145 Similarly, Ronald Linden (2000: 122) ascertains that the ‘puzzle of peace’ between Romania and Hungary is an outcome mainly of the logic of NATO’s socialising programs. As the then-President, Ion Iliescu declared at the time, the desire to join NATO was ‘the most important

145 Similar argument can be made for the ‘peaceful’ relations between Bulgaria and Romania (see Leonard, 2000). The argument has also been advanced that NATO socialisation has been ‘instrumental... in ending the linguistic war between Bulgaria and Macedonia’ (HT, 12 March 1999). Ryan Hendrickson (1999: 111), meanwhile, has argued that NATO has been instrumental in settling the minority issues between Albania and Greece and in signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation between them in March 1996. Hendrickson also implicates NATO as being solely responsible for dissuading Albania from getting involved on behalf of ethnic Albanians in former Yugoslavia (both in Kosovo and Macedonia) during the crises of the 1990s. These cases indicate the regional security-community-building logic of the Alliance activities in the Balkans.
reason’ for signing the 1996 Hungarian-Romanian Treaty (in Mihalka, 1999: 500). The relations between the two countries in the military sphere were initiated as early as 1990 when they negotiated a military treaty to strengthen ‘confidence between the two armies’ and to ensure that ‘political tension would not expand to the military sphere’ (Barany, 1999: 83). As a Romanian official acknowledged it is ‘the very presence of NATO [through PfP] that excludes the prospect of military solution to regional or bilateral tensions’.146 Likewise, Larry Watts (2003: 158) argues that NATO’s socialising presence has propelled ‘normalisation’ and has significantly contributed to President Iliescu’s offer for a ‘historic reconciliation’ in 1995 between the two states premised on the post-World War II Franco-German model.

As a presidential advisor explained, Bucharest’s compliance reflected its ‘quest to join a society that holds the values of democracy and freedom as its highest principles’ (Marian, 1997: 21). Bucharest’s representative to NATO, Comanescu (1999: 139) was even more pragmatic in his explanation, suggesting that Romania’s adaptation of its minority policy, reflects an understanding that ‘what really matters [in the PfP process] is the degree of a country’s predictability and not so much what [its] situation is in a given moment’.

As suggested, Romania’s high degree of policy-compliance is indicated both by its active participation in CJTF and peacekeeping operations, and the development of peaceful international relations with its neighbours. Emphasising the socialising effects of participating in peace-enforcing operations, the then President Emil Constantinescu (1998) has argued that ‘NATO offers to our [Balkan] countries a model, a common goal, a code of conduct in domestic and foreign policy’. Bucharest’s experience of participation in various partnership initiatives reflects such statements. Romania has been one of the main contributors to CJTF missions and peacekeeping operations (Nelson and Szayana, 1997: 11). Such capability was re-emphasised after ‘9/11’ when Romania nearly tripled its contribution to SFOR and KFOR in order to relieve Alliance assets for other missions. It has also contributed over 500 soldiers to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and over 750 to the US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom. The latter two, in particular, emphasised the increasing capabilities of the country to participate in order-promotion. For instance, in the autumn of 2001 it not only offered a special combat unit to Operation Enduring Freedom, but also flew them on a Romanian Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft (Gallagher, 2004: 10). As suggested in Chapter Five, it is such

146 Interview on 31 January 2005.
independent ability to contribute to peace-missions, which facilitated Bucharest’s invitation at Prague.147

Outside of the CJTF pattern, Romania has been actively involved in regional cooperation initiatives. As Mihai Maties (2000: 81), then advisor to the Romanian President, has insisted the unsuccessful bid for membership at the Madrid Summit, urged Bucharest to develop a number of initiatives for tri-lateral cooperation (Romania-Bulgaria-Greece, Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey, Romania-Hungary-Austria, Romania-Poland-Ukraine and Romania-Moldova-Ukraine) in order to ‘increase its visibility as a security provider’. Also as chair of Southeast Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group (SEEGROUP) during 2002, Bucharest initiated a Compendium of Anti-Terrorism Measures in Southeastern Europe and launched a regional Centre for Combating Trans-border Crime (Affirmation, 2002). Carmen Podgorean, the Political Affairs Minister of the Romanian Embassy in Brussels acknowledged the regional security-community-building logic of these initiatives by insisting that ‘when asked if Romania could really afford (in terms of human and financial resources) to be actively involved in so many different regional initiatives I always respond that when one calculates what the war in former Yugoslavia cost Romania (mainly embargo effects but also many side-effects of an insecure environment), you would give anything to secure stability in the region’.148

In this respect, the Prime Minister Nästase (2004c) has reflected that Romania’s accession signals its role as a ‘provider of regional security’ not only through its participation in ‘peace-enforcing missions’, but also through its capabilities for ‘transferring democratic values to adjacent countries’. Likewise, at the Prague Summit, President Iliescu (2002b: 1) has suggested that being a ‘NATO partner for nearly ten years, Romania is familiar with the high importance of the values underlying the very existence of the Alliance and, therefore, is ready to use [its] influence... to turn the Balkans into a region of peace and stability’. In this respect, the stabilising role of Alliance socialisation can also be inferred from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004b), which has declared that

Romania’s membership in the North-Atlantic Alliance strengthens security in Southeastern Europe... Romania will further play a stabilising role in the region by promoting security and cooperation... [and] by sharing its experience of NATO and EU accession with interested countries in this region and will support further NATO enlargement in the Western Balkans and the PfP accession of Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

147 This point has been elaborated in Chapter Five, Section 5.2.1.
Prime Minister Nästase (2004b) has reiterated the socialising role of external actors by indicating that peace in the region can occur only if all Balkan states ‘become engaged – one way or another – in Euro-Atlantic institutions, as soon as possible’. In this respect, the accession of Romania into NATO on 29 March 2004 seems to reflect the effectiveness of NATO’s socialisation through association.

7.5. Enforcement:

Enforcement is the other socialising dynamic which NATO gradually developed during the 1990s parallel with its association one. Whereas, the association process underlines NATO’s reinforcing capabilities to promote its standards of international behaviour, the enforcement process elicits the willingness of the Alliance to set the norms of expected state-behaviour. Understandably, the latter (more instrumental dynamic) has less gradual and more immediate (and, thereby, short-term) coercive socialising effects. Its socialisation ability depends on the capacity of the external agent to enforce certain courses of action upon awkward states.

Underlying the enforcement dynamic is the socialisation of the partners in the association process both by allowing them the opportunity to participate in the maintenance of the very norms and rules they have to internalise; as well as indicating the negative potentialities from non-compliance with promoted standards. In this respect, President Clinton indicated during the crisis in Bosnia: ‘We have an interest in showing that NATO... remains a credible force for peace in post-Cold War Europe’ (NYT, 10 February 1994). Consequently, according to Norris (2005: 293), the Kosovo campaign reinforced the inference that in ‘a world where the UN has repeatedly proven incapable of ineffectively supervising military operations or addressing civil conflict, regional security organisations must develop the capacity to keep order in their own backyards. NATO demonstrated that while the task is not easy, it is also not impossible’.

The argument (already developed in Chapter Five) is that by the time of the Kosovo conflict, NATO has already asserted a responsibility and ability to act on behalf of ‘the international community’ in order to enforce the norms of peaceful policy-making, when contravened by ‘genocide and ethnic cleansing’ (Albright, 1999). Brian Frederking (2003: 371) argues that NATO’s enforcement is not merely an intervention (in the realist sense of the term); instead, it needs to be perceived as an act of fulfilling the Alliance’s prescriptive responsibility to uphold the rules of a peace-order, because ‘human rights violations are not domestic matters, but legitimate concerns of the international community [thereby] NATO has the right to defend the
stability of Europe. State sovereignty in the post-Cold War world is limited because “legitimate” states ensure basic human rights. States that perpetrate ethnic cleansing, thus, forfeit their right to territorial integrity’. In contrast, the perceptions of the Belgrade political elite reflected ‘practically unfeasible goals (having in mind the international norms and the attitudes of the major actors in the international community). These goals were intended to be achieved in a manner and with means that the contemporary international community does not accept’ (Vekarić, 1999: 1). The following sections, therefore, focus on Serbia/Montenegro as the main case in point for illustrating the development of NATO’s enforcing capabilities and tracing the process of its socialisation dynamic. Although, both Serbia and Montenegro were implicated in the pattern of Yugoslav disintegration, this research follows the example of most studies that single out the Serbian leadership as the main culprit for the country’s non-compliance with Western-promoted standards. 149

7.5.1. Serbia/Montenegro:
Enforcement (like enlargement) developed gradually and circumstantially. During the first half of the 1990s NATO was involved in former Yugoslavia with other international actors (mainly the UN). After 1995 it began implementing independently coercive measures. Throughout the 1990s the point of departure for NATO has been an assumption that Serbia has been involved in an ‘unacceptable international conduct’ (Tanter, 1998: 40). However, as Julie Mertus (2001: 489-95) has argued there have been at least three different stages in the development of this starting premise. Initially, NATO (as well as other international actors) perceived the Balkan conflicts as instances of ‘atavistic behaviour’, which were ‘irrationally motivated by primordial hatred’. Therefore, the conclusion was drawn that external agency could do little beyond humanitarian assistance and preventing the spread of violence outside the borders of former Yugoslavia. Because of the ever-deteriorating situation in Bosnia, NATO was led to denounce Milošević’s ‘brand of lawlessness’ as motivated by a rational ‘drive for power’. In order to halt the escalation of the conflict, NATO’s enforcement had to provide rational incentives for convincing Milošević to agree to a settlement. As a result of the Kosovo crisis, the Alliance than concluded that rather than being part of the solution, Milošević was part of the problem and he was portrayed as an

149 In his authoritative analysis of the process of ‘ethnic cleansing’, Michael Mann (2005: 390) traces the decision-making that made ‘the government of Serbia the main perpetrator’. Although, he elaborates a complex model of the dynamic that leads to murderous ethnic cleansing which involves state-elites, armed militants and core constituencies of radical nationalists, Mann (2005: 20-30, 178, 356, 371-72, 424) argues that it is a ‘predominantly top-down’ process ‘being less of a mass popular movement from below than the product of a small nationalist elite’. Mann’s corollary substantiates my argument on the importance of conditioning elite-compliance in the initial stages of order-promotion.
'outlaw leader'. He 'was rational, and yet persisted in acting as though he were beyond the reach of law'. In short he had to be removed.

This suggests that NATO's enforcement role has developed incrementally and in different ways. Consequently, the sections which follow distinguish three different (yet related) enforcement roles, which the Alliance has performed and developed in the Balkans: (i) supportive enforcement during NATO's involvement in providing security of and support to humanitarian agencies (Section 7.5.1.A); (ii) peace-enforcement – developed in Bosnia (and subsequently utilised in Kosovo) as a result of the problems of 'interlocking' arrangements with the UN and other agencies to ensure Serbian compliance with appropriate standards of behaviour (Section 7.5.1.B); (iii) preventive enforcement – as evident during the 2001 crisis in Southern Serbia (Section 7.5.1.C). In analysing these roles, the sections below also consider the 'socialising effectiveness' of these kinds of enforcement.

7.5.1.A. SUPPORTIVE ENFORCEMENT:
Narratively speaking, NATO was reluctantly 'dragged' in the wars of Yugoslav dissolution during the summer of 1992 when it began assisting the UN in monitoring the arms embargo on Yugoslavia as well as the sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro. These were, in effect supporting missions in assistance of the humanitarian efforts on the ground. The objectives of this initial involvement can hardly be suggestive of a community-building rationale. Instead, Allied participation had to merely bolster the international presence in former Yugoslavia and accentuate the credibility of external agency.

As Susan Woodward (1995: 106) has claimed, due to a multiplicity of reasons in the early 1990s, none of the Allies discerned the Balkans as a real priority and, thereby, none was willing to advocate decisive NATO action. This inability of external actors to agree on a common policy, allowed the Belgrade authorities to carry on their policies of non-compliance. During this period, NATO's role was carried out in support of the UN. In October 1992 the Alliance began the implementation of the no-fly-zone over Bosnia, specified under UN Security Council Resolution 781. The UN-NATO association was further institutionalised with Operation Deny Flight (which began on 12 April 1993) for enforcing the no-fly-zone and a NATO supportive role alongside the UN in relation to the 'safe areas' of Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde and Bihać designated in May 1993. NATO also began training flights for Close Air Support (CAS) missions for

150 For an insider's perspective of this development see Drnovšek (1996: 187).
151 Together with the WEU, but relying predominantly on NATO capabilities.
protection of UNPROFOR forces stationed in and around the safe areas (*The Times*, 11 June 1993).

The lack of impact of these measures on Serb behaviour was confirmed, however, through the (Belgrade-backed) Bosnian Serb ongoing non-compliance. This was made apparent in early 1994, when on 5 February a mortar shell fell on the market-square in Sarajevo killing 68 civilians. The complicated UN-NATO command structure, however, meant responsive action was not immediate. It was only on 9 February that the Alliance issued an ultimatum that heavy weaponry around Sarajevo need to be withdrawn beyond a radius of 20 km (*Guardian*, 15 February 1994). This threat to use force, together with the shooting down of four Serb fighter aircraft, in violation of the no-fly-zone, by NATO jets on 28 February seemed to have improved the credibility of the ‘international community’.\(^{152}\) It also indicates Allied potential to coerce compliance when necessary. The NATO Secretary General, Willy Claes (1994) acknowledged however that the ‘air-strikes... came at the request of the UN and were intended solely to support the UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in former Yugoslavia’.

The limitations of enforcement on the ground was clear.\(^{153}\) The Bosnian Representative at the UN Mohamed Sacirbey (1995: 3-4) confirmed that

> UNPROFOR has become a substitute for real peacemaking... and [its] mission is actually being brought into contradiction with the overall efforts to bring about peace within our country... Unfortunately, UNPROFOR’s vulnerability — perceived or real — is manipulated by the Serbs to undermine the peace effort. More disconcerting, the tactics of UNPROFOR commanders are too frequently not consistent with the dynamics that are necessary to bring about a forward momentum in pressing the Serbs to accept the peace plan.

Part of the reason for the *vulnerability* of the UNPROFOR was the tension between the UN (in particular the Secretary General) and NATO.\(^{154}\) Already, in January 1995, Secretary General Claes indicated his irritation with the constraining nature of the UN-NATO framework, snapping that the Alliance had ‘made itself ridiculous as a military organisation’, suggesting that ‘if we [NATO] cannot set the rules of our military operations, they [the UN] will have to find other idiots to support peacekeeping’ (in Smith and Aldred, 2000: 43). Tihomir Loza (1996: 4) has

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152 More significantly, the latter incident marked the first instance of NATO’s involvement in military action since its creation (Aybet. 2000: 207).

153 The ‘helplessness’ of joint UN-NATO arrangements was also made evident in May 1995 when Bosnian Serb forces took UNPROFOR troops as hostages (*The Economist*, 25 November 1995).

154 In 1999, the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (*NYT*, 24 May 1999) vented his frustrations over what he perceived as ‘betrayal’ by the Allies, especially the US, whom he blamed for preventing the UN to play its ‘grandiose’ role in Bosnia.
argued this suggested a major clash over the vision and the means through which non-war settlement could be achieved. On the one hand was Allied insistence that the Serbs needed to be challenged ‘every time they did something that was punishable’. On the other, the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was adamant that it was dialogue that could convince all sides of the fallacy of further hostilities.  

Serb behaviour (in particular the taking of UNPROFOR troops hostage by Bosnian Serbs) began to undermine the normative authority of Western agents (and, therefore, of NATO) to set the standards of acceptable behaviour in Europe. William Perry (Reuters, 20 November 1996), the US Secretary of Defense was quite forthcoming in his assessment of the joint UN-NATO restraining measures: ‘Paralysed into inaction, NATO seemed to be irrelevant’. This was made blatantly apparent as a result of the tragic events surrounding the fall of the UN ‘safe areas’ of Srebrenica and Žepa in July of 1995. These incidents dealt not only a severe blow to the credibility of NATO; but also indicated the ‘interblocking’ nature of the complex UN-NATO ‘interlocking’ command structure (Yost, 1998: 194). Such environment ultimately impelled the Alliance to utilise its enforcing capabilities.

7.5.1. B. PEACE-ENFORCEMENT:
As suggested, intervention occurred because Milosevic and his government in Belgrade were acting in a fashion that challenged the dominant norms of European democracy, human rights and peaceful international relations. Unlike, the subsequent reaction to the Kosovo crisis, NATO’s intervention in Bosnia was not underwritten by a process of securitisation of the Balkan region. Although it has been argued that Operation Deliberate Force was informed by an attempt to avoid a ‘return to Europe’s past’ (Wæver, 1996: 103), its imperative was primarily strategic – the avoidance of further regional destabilisation and a spillover of the conflict into neighbouring countries. NATO’s action was driven by a strategic interest to impose a peace settlement. As William Perry and Warren Christopher acknowledged at the time, Bosnia-

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155 Connie Peck (2004: 230), the coordinator of the UN Institute for Training and Research Programs in Peacekeeping and Preventive Diplomacy, has acknowledged that problem for the UN during the Bosnian crisis was one of institutional culture. She has suggested that ‘at the time, very few of those in the UN system were aware of interest-based, problem-solving methods of conflict prevention and resolution, being steeped, instead, in traditional power-based methods of bargaining, negotiation and mediation’.

156 At least not to the extent that it happened in 1999 as suggested in Chapter Five.

157 On the possibility of a regional conflagration involving Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey see Dimitras (1997). Such logic is also confirmed by the US lobbying for the establishment on 31 March 1995 of a UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia. For a detailed analysis see Vankovska-Cvetkoska (1999).

158 Although it could also be argued that NATO’s actions were driven by a normative imperative to uphold the viability and credibility of the Western security community, if such normative securitisation had indeed occurred there would have not been a Kosovo crisis.
Herzegovina indicated that 'shifting NATO's emphasis in an evolutionary manner from defence of member territory to defence of common interests beyond NATO territory is the strategic imperative for NATO in the post-Cold War era' (in Dabelko and VanDeveer, 1998: 179).

The fall of Srebrenica and Žepa, confronted NATO with the limitations of its action up to that point and implied a requirement to take action in order to restore peace and ensure the credibility of its own claim to relevance. On 30 August 1995, the Alliance began its first order-enforcing mission - Operation Deliberate Force. As one analyst deftly argued, the 'news from Srebrenica finally forced the West to come down off the fence and act decisively' (Loza, 1996: 1). Three days earlier, Richard Holbrooke (1998: 90) warned that 'if the peace initiative does not get moving, dramatically moving in the next week or two, the consequences will be very adverse to the Serbian goals. One way or another NATO will be heavily involved, and the Serbs don't want that'. The US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher affirmed the coercive purpose of the operation by suggesting that it will not be 'a pin-prick [mission]... not just a bomb or two, not just a day or two, but as much as it [takes]' (in Silber and Little, 1996: 365).

At the beginning of 1995, NATO Secretary General Willy Claes (1995b) had noted that the Alliance is prepared to do 'whatever it takes' in order to maintain the 'credibility' of its 'policy of extending security and stability eastwards'. As a result of Operation Deliberate Force, by 14 September it seemed that NATO had driven its message home, and not only the Bosnian Serbs, but also (and more significantly) the Belgrade regime had been convinced of the necessity of compliance with NATO demands. As a result of Operation Deliberate Force by 14 December, NATO had managed to impose upon the warring factions a settlement through the US-brokered General Framework Agreement (the Dayton Accords). Furthermore, NATO's independent enforcement capabilities were recognised by the 'invitation' offered to the UN to establish an Implementation Force (IFOR)159 constituted from NATO and non-NATO countries (but under Alliance command). In retrospect, NATO's role in Bosnia can be interpreted as the first indication of its preparedness to act as the legitimate global agency for order-enforcement.

These developments emphasised the centrality of NATO in the post-Cold War security of Europe through a role of enforcement. Moreover, they also hinted that the UN's legitimacy (at least in Europe) premised on the decades-old habit of 'mediation' of the East-West confrontation, could not be considered superior to that of regional organisations such as NATO. Without attempting to adjudicate on the pros and cons of such claims, which go beyond the scope of the

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159 After December 1996 renamed Stabilisation Force (SFOR).
current research, this study insists that as a result of Operation Deliberate Force (and the experience prior to it), the Alliance began interpreting its centrality in European security as a source of legitimacy deriving from ‘its shared common values and its common vision for the future (Perle, 1999). Philip Gordon (1999), the Director for European Affairs of the US National Security Council, suggested at the time that what made UN authorisation redundant was not only the instrumental understanding of NATO’s newly found international legitimacy. Instead, he argued that the Allies’ authoritative recourse to enforcement is grounded on their post-Cold War praxis: ‘NATO, which in the past was doing collective defense, today finds itself not just doing collective defense, but doing all other things - peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention, partnership and so on – that were done by the UN’.

Among the number of qualifications required by the arguments outlined thus far, the most salient to this research is that enforcement socialisation depends on the continued credibility of the threat to use force. Regardless of the nuances of NATO’s involvement in Bosnia, most commentators concur that Allied bombing convinced the opposing sides to agree to a settlement. Thus, the subsequent presence of IFOR/SFOR was a reminder of the negative consequences which would follow from non-compliance with the peace settlement. In other words, the NATO presence had to facilitate the stabilisation of the situation in Bosnia, deter a renewal of hostilities and consolidate the peace. In a further elaboration of its mission, NATO declared that the desired ‘end-state’ for the SFOR presence is ‘an environment adequately secure for the continued consolidation of the peace’ (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-216: 45). The NATO peace-enforcing presence, however, did not manage to initiate a transformation of perceptions in Belgrade. By the end of 1997, NATO initiated a troop-to-task analysis for a smaller force with a restricted mission. The result of this analytical exercise was the so-called ‘SFOR Phase III’ concept, or the ‘Deterrence Force’ (DFOR) (Ducasse-Rogier, 2000). Consequently, the Allies began a drawback of their troop presence and task commitments from the beginning of 1998 (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-19: 17-24). These reductions persisted even though there were already indications of deterioration in the situation in Kosovo by mid-1998. Operation Deliberate Force and the subsequent SFOR presence did not have a socialising effect on the Belgrade leadership. In this context, it could be argued that the drawback in the Bosnian CJTF mission emboldened the Yugoslav decision-making to pursue a strategy of non-compliance in Kosovo (owing to the lessened visibility and credibility of NATO’s sticks).

The lack of influence of Allied measures on Serbia is further evidenced in their inability to involve the Belgrade authorities in any meaningful process of economic, political and military
transition. Instead the isolation of the country was a boon to Milošević providing him with ‘potent sources of material and ideological strength’ in domestic politics (Thomas, 1999: 422). This state of affairs required a new round of demands. By October 1998 Milošević was forced to agree to an international presence in Kosovo under a four-point deal: (i) withdrawal of Serbian special troops from Kosovo; (ii) agreement on airborne reconnaissance over Kosovo; (iii) promise of talks on a ‘framework agreement’ with ethnic Albanians in the province; and most importantly (iv) allowing 2000 OSCE monitors in Kosovo (Norton-Taylor, 1998). As Richard Holbrook made it explicit at the time, the members of the ‘verification mission... are not monitors, nor observers. They are compliance verifiers’ (Michigan Daily, 1998. Emphasis added).

However, as a result of the increasing inability of the monitors to verify the compliance of the Belgrade authorities with the standards stipulated in the October 1998 agreement and the Račak massacre in January 1999, the Alliance once again found itself forced to coerce a settlement (this time without a specific UN resolution endorsing its actions). Willy Claes (1995b), the NATO Secretary General had predicted that ‘NATO is more than a sub-contractor of the UN; it will keep its full independence of decision and action. There may even be circumstances, which oblige NATO to act on its own initiative in the absence of a UN mandate’. As indicated in Chapter Five, the practices of Serbian authorities in Kosovo were perceived as challenging (if not undermining) the normative premise of the Alliance, and, thence, presenting an ideational threat to NATO. The NAC’s ‘Statement on Kosovo’ (23 April 1999) unequivocally states that the ‘crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law’ (par. 1). Thus, Operation Allied Force represented an act of collective defence not against an existential threat but against a normative challenge.\footnote{Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002: 602) suggest that debates over why NATO chose to intervene in Kosovo and not in Rwanda intimately involves questions of its identity.}

The recourse to enforcement was made necessary as a result of the inability of a series of earlier measures to change the behaviour of Serbia. These were initiated with Exercise Determined Falcon, which had ‘to demonstrate NATO’s capability to project power rapidly into the region’ (NATO Press Release (98)80) and ended with the Rambouillet talks in February 1999. By that point it had become apparent that, first, the Serbian authorities were unwilling to comply with international norms and, second, that there was no other international actor capable of enforcing compliance. The former was indicated by the increasing intensity of Serb military operations against Albanians in Kosovo and obstruction of the work of the OSCE Kosovo
Verification Mission. As one Serbian analyst suggested at the time, the impression given by Belgrade was that its political elites did not perceive partnership and political cooperation as a desirable form of interaction among states (Vekarić, 1999: 10). Consequently, on 23 March 1999 NATO took upon itself the role of coercing an end to hostilities in Kosovo.\(^{161}\) As NATO Secretary-General, Solana (1999) emphasised at the time:

> We have a moral responsibility to act to defend our values once the efforts of diplomacy have failed. And we are doing so with the determination that has become our characteristic since 1949. This has not changed. Our action in the Balkans is the latest chapter in a long history of standing up for these principles. Principles that will ensure that Europe enters the next millennium a peaceful and stable place.

The impact of the Kosovo campaign was enhanced by Alliance unity. As Leslie Lebl (2004: 725) emphasises, NATO’s conditioning potential depends on its ability to ‘mask profound and growing differences [under] outward appearances of harmony’. Lebl insists that the Kosovo campaign offers ‘a perfect example’ of this dynamic: it ‘was remarkable for its unexpected display of Alliance unity. No one had expected the bombing to take so long, and there were serious differences of views... Nevertheless, the Alliance did not break ranks’. Analysing documents of Serbian decision-making during the Kosovo campaign, Gallagher (2005: 55) suggests that Milosevic was working under the assumption that ‘severe disunity [in the Alliance] would ensure short-term or even token air-strikes’. Arguably, therefore, it was the ‘unity of enduring common interests’ (according to the US Undersecretary of Defence, Dov Zakaria (2004: 5)) that ultimately drove home the message to Belgrade.\(^{162}\) The recognition of NATO’s enforcement role was re-emphasised through the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) ending Operation Allied Force and signed between the Alliance and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The agreement allowed for the deployment of a Kosovo security force (KFOR) under Operation Joint Guardian. This development reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to the imposition of peace-orders in Europe, which, in turn, (arguably) facilitates the introduction of an environment in which more comprehensive approaches can be developed.

### 7.5. I.C. PREVENTIVE ENFORCEMENT:

The Alliance’s enforcement role in Kosovo signalled in practical terms the underlying rationale of the New Strategic Concept adopted at the 1999 Washington Summit. The Strategic Concept

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\(^{161}\) Philip Gordon (1999), justifying the legitimacy of this decision posed the rhetorical question: ‘Now, who is to say that the legitimacy of 5 [the UN Security Council] is stronger than that which derives from these 19 democracies [NATO members].’

\(^{162}\) Mowle and Sacko (2004: 40) have argued that ‘initial movement of the Allies toward a land invasion may have helped Slobodan Milosevic decide to surrender’.
signalled Allied readiness to maintain a framework of expected behaviour among states. ‘Peace in Europe is preserved’, it suggested through NATO’s provision of ‘military forces to complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security’. Ultimately, the Strategic Concept continued, ‘the Alliance’s military forces... have to provide the essential insurance against potential risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind’ (par. 41-43).

Such assertions reflected a perception that NATO’s role would not be limited to ending conflicts in Europe, but would also embrace preventive measures. Such a reading of the 1999 Strategic Concept is affirmed by the Alliance’s subsequent action in Southern Serbia, where it helped prevent an escalation of hostilities. During 2000, an Albanian formation calling itself the Political Council of Preševo, Medveda and Bujanovac (PCPMB) began infiltrating southern Serbia and setting up bases in the buffer Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) established by the MTA. For NATO, the requirement for preventive enforcement was suggested by first, the apparent Kosovar links of the PCPMB (thus, challenging the purpose and effectiveness of NATO’s Operation Joint Guardian); and, second, the need to prevent possible spillover of any conflict into neighbouring countries. The effectiveness of the measures undertaken by the Allies can be deduced from the message which they sent to both parties. To the Albanians, NATO asserted that activities of the sorts undertaken by the PCPMB would not be tolerated and that the Alliance was prepared to ‘take all necessary actions to ensure that Kosovo is not used as a staging base for exporting violence to the Preševo valley’ (KFOR Press Release (2000)000310). To the Belgrade government, that KFOR’s purpose was to ‘maintain [a] secure environment’ for the development of ‘mutual acceptance of ethnic groups’, and if required ‘enforce compliance with MTA’ as a precondition ‘for [the] better future of the region’ (KFOR Press Release (2000)000310).

Such statements coming from the headquarters of the Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR) were soon followed by concrete actions. On the one hand, KFOR soldiers arrested on 25 January 2001 Saquir Saquiri, the spokesperson for the PSCPMB as he attempted to cross illegally the border between Serbia and Kosovo. His detention had to indicate Allied commitment to regional stability, as Saquiri’s actions and statements had ‘demonstrated [to KFOR] his refusal to play a meaningful part in finding a peaceful solution to the [Preševo] crisis’ (KFOR Press Release (2001)010125a). On the other, KFOR initiated discussions with the security forces of Serbia/Montenegro to allow them ‘an increased access into the GSZ’ (KFOR Press Release (2001)010310).
These developments in the field of preventive enforcement have been described by the Alliance as a ‘double-tracked approach to [crisis] situations’ (NATO Update, 26 March 2001). In themselves, these measures initiated by KFOR had to indicate an ‘even-handedness’ in enforcing the provisions of the MTA (KFOR Press Release (2000) 000310). In this respect the Alliance found itself in a position, whereby it had to follow through on its promises. The Yugoslav General Vladimir Lazarević, the commanding officer of the Third Army attests to NATO’s predicament by acknowledging that ‘there [was] an understanding [with NATO] that if the [Albanian] terrorists persist in their activities, we [the Yugoslav Army] would be allowed into the [GS] Zone’ (Glas Javnosti, 28 February 2001).

Indeed, the continuing non-compliance of the Albanian side (as well as the deteriorating situation in neighbouring Macedonia) led to the partial return of Yugoslav forces in the GSZ on 14 April 2001 (KFOR Press Release (2001)010414a). The immediate response on the part of the Albanians was the release by the PCPMB of Serb detainees only four hours later (KFOR Press Release (2001) 010414c). The longer-term (and ‘community-building’) one, however, was the beginning of confidence- (trust-) building measures between NATO and Yugoslav troops as a result of the joint patrolling of the GSZ. The establishment of military-to-military relations between the former adversaries reflects the theoretical proposition developed in Section 3.3.2.13 of Chapter Three on the consensual nature of external agency. Its suggestion implies that ‘changing the overall climate and atmosphere of relations [depends] on a network of confidence-building measures [and not merely] on peace treaties and arms control’ (Steinberg, 2004: 280). In particular, it reflects the significance of ‘sceptical trust’ – i.e. instrumental behaviour of acting as if trusting the other party – which through repeated practice starts to alter the attitudes of participants (Van Wagenen, 1965: 820). An indication of this was the establishment of a ‘direct hotline’ between COMKFOR and the Commander of the Joint Security Forces of FRY (KFOR Press Release (2001)010412b). Also members of the Serb armed forces began attending the Marshall Centre for Security Studies in Germany, while Yugoslav special forces participated in a NATO-led PfP exercise in Austria in 2002 (Sunter, 2004: 5). Dušan Lazić (2003: 8) the then Secretary General of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that the ‘position of hostility was therefore abandoned’. Jovan Teokarević (2003: 122), from the Institute for European Studies, Belgrade, has acknowledged the procedural significance from the re-introduction of Yugoslav forces into the GSZ, which ‘helped to build mutual trust... For the first time, and after many years of bitter experiences, NATO was transformed in the eyes of the Serbian public from an enemy to an ally, in the politically sensitive area of the struggle against...
Albanian terrorism’. Opinion polls from March 2001 bolster such claims. They indicate that public support for integration in PfP has risen to 74.9% (Timotić, 2003: 27-28).

Such situation was a result of NATO’s (and other international organisations) ability to involve the post-Milosevic authorities in Belgrade, rather than ostracise them. As the COMKFOR acknowledged the ‘full relaxation’ of the GSZ reflects ‘the different situation in Belgrade. There is a new government. That government is committed to normalisation and dialogue between Serbs and ethnic Albanians’ (KFOR Press Release (2001)010516). At the same time, NATO’s preventive enforcement is implicated by the Alliance’s swift response to the March 2004 disturbances in Kosovo as well as its pre-emptive deployment of 2000 additional troops during the October elections in the province (SEET, 14 September 2004). Also before the extradition of Kosovar Prime Minister Haradinaj to The Hague on 9 March 2005, NATO deployed 600 German troops on 6 March 2005 and a further 500 British troops on 8 March 2005 to prevent any possible tensions in the province (RFE/RL Newsline, 10 March 2005).

In this context, it can be argued that NATO’s socialisation of Serbia has indicated a tendency to move away from enforcement (that is the deployment of short-term measures for enforcing and maintaining non-war frameworks) towards prevention and, eventually, partnership (that is the initiation of long-term, contractual relations). The development of partnership can be seen from the participation of FM Svilanović in EAPC forum in May 2001 and Serbia/Montenegro’s inclusion in SEEI initiatives. Also, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has invited the Foreign Minister of Serbia/Montenegro to participate in the NATO Council Meeting on 24 January 2005 (Tanjug, 21 January 2005). The new relationship has also been emphasised by the series of seminars organised by NATO countries for the MoD of Serbia/Montenegro – for 2004-2005 the plan includes over 40 such activities (Sunter, 2004: 4). At the same time, the British Major-General John Moore-Bick has been appointed from November 2003 advisor to the then Defence Minister Boris Tadic (Tanjug, 1 July 2003). It is these developments that indicate NATO’s ability to act not only as a security-building, but also as a community-building organisation.

Timothy Edmunds (2003: 66) has outlined that the Alliance has five non-negotiable conditions for the inclusion of Serbia/Montenegro in the PfP:

1. Ending its military and financial support for Republika Srpska.

163 See also the statement of NATO ministers that they ‘pledge to continue to maintain a robust NATO presence in Kosovo, recognizing that the security environment remains fragile’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 10 December 2004).
2. Ratification of the Dayton agreements.
3. Removal of military personnel closely associated with the Milosevic regime.
4. Withdrawal of the government lawsuit against NATO with the International Court of Justice.
5. Full cooperation with ICTY.

Belgrade has indicated compliance with majority of these conditions. The Deputy Director of NATO’s Defence Planning and Operations Division, George Katsirdakis (2003: 2) has indicated that Serbia/Montenegro has made significant progress in meeting key Allied concerns:

- voting a law on cooperation with the ICTY;
- ratification of the Dayton Peace Agreement by the Parliament of Serbia/Montenegro in December 2002;
- ending assistance to Republika Srpska;
- measures to strengthen the state-level relationship between Serbia/Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- removing key figures from Milosevic’s military staff.164

The commitment of Belgrade to rapprochement with NATO has been indicated by the establishment of an expert team by the Yugoslav MoD to analyse the country’s conditions and capacities for inclusion in the PfP. Colonel Mile Stojković (2003: 111), one of the experts on the team has argued that the PfP prospect reflects the ‘strategic goals’ of Serbia/Montenegro: ‘from a military point of view, the accession to the PfP is necessary for an efficient national defence system’ and ‘politically, [Serbia/Montenegro] would gain greater support from the international community and would significantly contribute to strengthening the confidence between the government and the international community, while enhancing cooperation in the region’. During his visit to Belgrade, NATO Secretary General, George Robertson (2003) insisted that ‘Serbia/Montenegro, along with Bosnia-Herzegovina, will have to be part of this unique coalition [PfP]’. At the same time, George Robertson also emphasised the regional security-community-

164 There have been three major rounds of personnel restructuring: (i) in July 2002 the Chief of Staff, General Pavkovic has been removed; (ii) in March and August 2003 there was further removal of 16 high-ranking officers and also the controversial General Aco Tomic, heading the Army Intelligence Service (Edmunds, 2003: 28); (iii) in December 2004 the Chief of Staff, General Branko Krga and 10 other officers were dismissed (Focus, 24 December 2004).
building that has occurred as a result of the closer relationship between the Alliance and Serbia/Montenegro: ‘Serbia/Montenegro has signed trade agreements with all former Yugoslav neighbours. And the apologies for past crimes, which President Marovic delivered in recent weeks to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, will certainly help to set your relationship with these countries on a new footing. Another step in leaving behind the past to move towards the future’. A further indication of the willingness of the Belgrade authorities to engage in cooperative relations in the region has been the return of the bodies of Albanians who were killed during the Kosovo crisis (RFE/RL Newsline, 27 May 2004; Focus, 31 March 2005).

In an attempt to accelerate his country’s relationship with NATO, the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic indicated in August 2003 that Serbia could offer 1000 troops for ‘peace-efforts in Iraq’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 6 August 2003). Like in the case of Romania, such willingness to participate in peace-enforcing missions has been taken as a benchmark of readiness for closer relations with the Alliance. To that effect (and with NATO assistance), Belgrade established the Centre for Peacekeeping Missions at the Pancevo Military Base (Sunter, 2004: 4). Furthermore, the Parliament of Serbia/Montenegro on 20 January 2005 adopted a law clearing the way for the country’s troops to participate in peacekeeping mission abroad (SEET, 20 January 2005).

However, although significant in terms of their content as well as in comparison to pre-1999 relations, such steps have failed to meet the main condition for inclusion of Serbia/Montenegro in the PfP – compliance with the ICTY. In June 2003, the British Ambassador to Belgrade, Charles Crawford and the NATO representative George Katsirdakis reportedly stated that entry into the PfP could be expected within two weeks of meeting this requirement (SEET, 5 June 2003). The inability to hand over war crimes suspects has been cited as the main reason for not inviting Serbia/Montenegro to join the PfP at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004. This study, however, argues that although such non-compliance is indicative of some flaws in NATO’s enforcement socialisation, this is not necessarily a failure of its overall logic of promoting peace.

As Timothy Edmunds (2003: 70) points out, Allied demands are a lever for the civilian authorities, which for their part have largely complied with external requirements. For instance, the Foreign Minister of Serbia/Montenegro has indicated the imperative of cooperation with the ICTY: ‘If anyone thinks he is a hero, he should act like one and go to The Hague. There he can heroically defend Serbia and stop hurting the country and its people’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 19 April 2004). Likewise, President Tadic has called on all people indicted by the ICTY to ‘remove the burden on Serbia and surrender’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 8 December 2004). Yet, as the murder of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic has revealed, the civilian authorities do not exercise full control
over the security sector, whose compliance is crucial to the apprehension of war crimes suspects. In this respect, the Foreign Minister of Serbia/Montenegro Vuk Draskovic has declared that ‘it is only logical that the security services know where Mladic is. They know if he is in Serbia, and they know if he is not’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 5 April 2005). The complicity of some security personnel in Djindjic’s murder has led James Gow (2004) to conclude that part of the problem is that the Yugoslav disintegration is not yet over. Gow’s suggestion partly refers to the ‘awkward’ nature of statehood in Serbia/Montenegro. This, in turn, alludes to another complication for the effectiveness of NATO’s socialisation. A large part of the post-1999 period has been spent on convincing the two entities of Serbia and Montenegro to stay in a ‘state union’ as stipulated by the Belgrade Agreement (4 February 2003). However, the tensions within this ‘state union’ as well as the uncertainty surrounding the status of Kosovo have complicated the socialisation of state-elites by NATO and other international actors (Zverihanovski, 2004: 5). However, NATO’s enforcing agency has been material in promoting regional non-war frameworks.

The case of Serbia/Montenegro reflects the theoretical assumptions of the socialisation process outlined in Section 4.3.3 of Chapter Four. As suggested, the introduction of security-community frameworks has different dynamics in awkward and in integrated sates. The expectation has been that the initial stages of order-promotion in awkward states involves a complex manner of the integration of their statehood – i.e. ensuring their territorial integrity and promoting the institutions of domestic governance. This then encourages the establishment of states-elites which, in turn, would be willing to indicate compliance with external socialisation. The politico-military reform process initiated by the Alliance in Serbia/Montenegro after 1999 reflects these assumptions. In order to better illustrate this dynamic, the following paragraph briefly discusses NATO’s socialisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The contention is that it replicates a security-community-building logic similar to that of Serbia/Montenegro.

NATO’s integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been most conspicuous in the defence sector. The Secretary General, George Robertson insisted on correcting the system whereby Bosnia had two armies – one for the Serbs and one for the Muslim-Croat Federation – which were ‘politically divided, economically exhausting and militarily useless. No country is able to maintain this kind of defence schizophrenia’ (NEDB, 28 November 2003). Robertson also argued

165 Recent reports suggest that army officers were directly involved in the plot (Focus, 1 February 2005). Iavor Rangelov (2004: 333) argues that Djindjic was specifically targeted because he promised to deliver General Ratko Mladic to the ICTY shortly before his assassination.
that bringing the two militaries under a unified command was a requirement for joining the PfP. Reflecting the Alliance's socialisation ability, in the run-up to NATO's Istanbul Summit, the elites of the three ethnic groups agreed on the appointment of Nikola Radovanovic, an ethnic Serb, as the Defence Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina (RFE/RL Newsline, 10 March 2004). At the same time, the ethnically divided armies managed to downsize their combined strength to 12,000 (4,000 for the Serb, Bosnian and Croat components) and units from each ethnic group held their 'first-ever' exercises under joint command in May 2004 (ISN Security Watch, 8 June 2004). The NATO Parliamentary Assembly declared these developments towards integration of the state in Bosnia-Herzegovina a 'major breakthrough' (NATO PA, 2004b: 7). Another 'first-ever' event in the run-up to the Istanbul Summit was the recognition by the President of Republika Srpska, Dragan Covic that the 1995 Srebrenica massacre was a 'black page' in Serbian history (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 June 2004). As a result, the Bosnian Serb authorities have initiated an investigation of 892 state-employees for links to war crimes that occurred during the 1990s (RFE/RL Newsline, 1 April 2005). Such developments indicate NATO's ability to integrate statehood in Bosnia-Herzegovina, something which has subsequently tended to make the country's state elites more compliant to socialisation by external actors.

In this manner NATO's post-1999 activities have initiated security-community-building dynamics for the Western Balkans. Yet, as in the case of Serbia/Montenegro, despite the significant progress made by Bosnia-Herzegovina, (what is perceived as) its 'failure to comply with the ICTY' (i.e. the surrender of war-criminals) has remained the main obstacle to joining the PfP. Robert Bradtke (2004: 31), the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of European Affairs at the US Department of State has given the Alliance's rationale for the significance of the Western Balkan countries cooperation with the ICTY:

NATO [is] committed to seeing the Balkans join a Europe whole, free and at peace. Nothing impedes progress towards that goal more than the continued freedom of individuals indicted for war-crimes by the ICTY in The Hague. Individuals such as Ratko Mladic, Radovan Karadzic and Ante Gotovina are responsible for some of the worst crimes of the wars of the 1990s, and their link to criminal and nationalist groups retard progress in the region... Further progress on the cases of Mladic, Karadzic and Gotovina is needed before Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro can join the PfP and before Croatia can join NATO.

166 Such acknowledgement, which was interpreted as a Bosnian Serb indication of willingness to cooperate with the ICTY, came as a result of a report published by Bosnian Serb judges, international experts and victims' representatives, which had to 'reveal the truth' about Srebrenica (ISN Security Watch, 15 June 2004).

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This statement further confirms the post-1999 perception of the Balkans as an integral part of Europe. Regardless of their exclusion from the PIP, it has to be re-emphasised that Serbia/Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina have moved away from the enforcement/exclusion conditioning and closer to the partnership one along the socialisation continuum represented in Figure 6. This dynamic has reflected the general trend in the Balkans since 1999. As indicated in Chapter Five, in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis the Alliance developed a more pro-active and differential socialisation of the region.

The regional security-community-building logic of this process has been reflected in the general pattern of peaceful intra-regional relations (and the absence of large-scale violence of the pre-1999 type). As already indicated these patterns have been positively influenced by Bulgaria’s and Romania’s membership of the Alliance. In this context the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia have presented a common strategy (‘the first time that countries aspiring to NATO membership have formally agreed to work together’) in which they have declared their intention to support each other’s candidacy in the Alliance and to work together to develop joint capabilities for contributing to Alliance missions (NATO Update, 17 June 2004). In this respect, the Adriatic Charter countries have agreed on 25 January 2005 to send a joint medical team to NATO’s ISAF mission and they have also re-emphasised their readiness to cooperate and assist Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro in their rapprochement with the Alliance (RFE/RL Newsline, 26 January 2005). The embryonic security community effects of NATO’s socialisation activities have been displayed at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia/Montenegro which discussed various regional initiatives in support of Euro-Atlantic integration, ways of increasing cooperation with the ICTY and possible solutions to the status of Kosovo (RFE/RL Newsline, 6 April 2005). At the same time, Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia have signed an agreement to establish a joint system of air-defence (Focus, 25 September 2004). In this respect, NATO’s post-1999 socialisation of the Balkans has tended to reflect the theoretical suggestions of introducing security-communities.

However, as the case of Serbia/Montenegro indicates (as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina for that matter), the Alliance is likely to play a more convincing security-community-building role in the Balkans mainly through its partnership (and partnership-like) instruments. Socialisation does not work if the elites are reluctant to comply – even if subject to enforcement conditioning; however,
NATO’s inclusive socialisation tends to create such willingness (depending on the type of association and the context of the relationship).\(^{167}\)

7.6. Conclusion:
The aim of this chapter was to analyse NATO’s post-Cold War agency in the Balkans and evaluate its potential as a security-community-building institution. For this purpose, it traced the process of the socialising effectiveness of Allied programs in the region. Procedurally, NATO’s dynamics of socialisation have been described as relations of inclusion and exclusion from these programmes. This chapter distinguished between the dynamics of association and enforcement, deployed by the Alliance. As the argument goes, both indicate different degrees of compliance with external agency.

However, as the circumstantial evidence implies, it is the process of association (i.e. the partnership and enlargement activities) that is more likely to involve state-elites in a security-community-type of socialisation. As the case-study of Romania indicates, it is the environment and practices of inclusion (i.e. the behaviour of as-if-member) that makes possible the process of normative transference from the Alliance to state-elites. In this context, what (most likely) began as a process of rational reduction of the costs of uncertainty by (most post-communist states), with time tends to bring about a cognitive change among state-elites, where they perceive compliance as an appropriate thing to do.

On the other hand, enforcement has the benefit of coercing immediate compliance. As a report by the EU Institute for Security Studies concludes, it was because of such ‘decisive intervention of NATO that [the Yugoslav] wars ended and lasting peace was achieved’ (Haine et al., 2004: 15). In this respect, enforcement sets the agenda of decision-making (in the sense of non-war frameworks), where there is no (or little) attraction to Western standards. As the Serbian Minister of the Interior, Dragan Jočić indicated, state-elites subject to NATO-enforcement require a ‘change of mentality’,\(^{168}\) which tends to be the result of the dynamics of association. In this respect, reflecting the theoretical expectations of this research, despite (if not because of) their flexibility, partnership and partnership-like arrangements in the Balkans set in train a process whereby military conflicts among the states in the region tend to be ‘as unlikely as among the old allies’ (Krahman, 2003: 7).

\(^{167}\) However as the case of Serbia/Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina indicate the first issue for the socialisation of awkward states is their integration and the creation of state-elites. In this respect, enforcement plays an important, if controversial, role in the introduction of compliance with externally-promoted standards of policy-behaviour.

\(^{168}\) Personal communication, Belgrade, 23 April 2004.
However, the case of Serbia/Montenegro (and Bosnia and Herzegovina, for that matter) indicates the Catch 22 paradox of NATO’s socialising dynamic of inclusion and exclusion. As explained, it is the former, which tends to create long-term predictability of decision-making through the dynamics of association. However, in an environment where state-elites are not attracted to comply because of the prospect of membership (or closer cooperation), it is the process of NATO’s enforcement, which ensures the maintenance of non-war order. Yet, the socialising effects of such conditioning tend to be short-term (and require continuous re-enforcement) unless the Alliance begins to involve the elites of states subject to enforcement procedures in confidence-building measures, which facilitate their co-optation into a partnership-like conditioning. In this respect, it is the prospect of closer integration with NATO that has greater influence over its socialisation of elites into predictable patterns of decision-making. The case of Romania indicates that it is inclusion in the PfP programme, which offers the Alliance the opportunity to deepen its influence over a country’s defence reform process (Edmunds, 2003: 67). In this respect, the empirical findings on NATO’s socialisation seem to corroborate the theoretical assumptions of Part One that enforcement through ‘interacting measures of assistance and persuasion is less costly and intrusive and is certainly less dramatic than coercive sanctions, the easy and usual policy elixir for non-compliance’ (Chayes and Chayes, 1993: 205).

In summary, NATO has been an ambiguous security-community-builder in the Balkans. It has managed to transfer a degree of compliance with its standards in some instances, but it has also been limited in its success in others. To return to Jamie Shea’s words noted at the outset of the chapter, both NATO and the Balkans have been good for each other; but this relationship, however, is likely to be made more beneficial for both sides by the inclusion of all states in the region in the Alliance’s association activities.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

For while the transmutation of lead into gold would be no nearer if everyone in the world passionately desired it, it is undeniable that if everyone really desired... 'collective security' (and meant the same thing by those terms), it would be easily attained; and the student of international politics may be forgiven if he begins by supposing that his task is to make everyone desire it. It takes him some time to understand... the fact that few people do desire... 'collective security', and that those who think they desire it mean different and incompatible things by it.

E. H. Carr (1981[1939]: 9-10)

8.1. Research Summary: The Hegemonic Peace Project – A Contradiction in Terms?

E. H. Carr’s doubts concerning the construction of a viable, peaceful international order might have been justified in 1939 when he published The Twenty Years Crisis, however nearly seven decades later the notion of collective security underwriting the pattern of security communities seems more like a standard policy practice, rather than a myth at least in the European continent. By way of summary, this research has argued that the development of a security community order in Europe has been a function of the institutionalisation of cooperative practices, which have facilitated the development of common knowledge about expected behaviour (Niou and Ordeshook, 1990: 1231). In this respect, the initiation of a security community in the Balkans has occurred through international socialisation by the EU and NATO. Their centrality in the governance of European security has developed procedurally in response to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.

In this respect, the Kosovo crisis marked a watershed which compelled the EU and NATO to extend the Western Euro-Atlantic security community. This has involved demands for elite compliance with NATO and EU standards. It has been conformity with these standards rather than demands for regional cooperation that has underwritten the embryonic stages of security-community-building in the Balkans. Thus we have witnessed the extension of an already existing (Western/Euro-Atlantic) security community into the region, rather than the promotion of a specifically regional Balkan security community. The empirical findings in Part Two corroborate the theoretical suggestions of Part One on the dynamics of initiating security communities through a process of international socialisation. In particular, the hypothesis that external
agencies (i.e. the EU and NATO) can and do have socialising effects on target elites. This study has also confirmed the suggestion that security-community-building is (and has always been) a hegemonic project. In other words, the security of international relations depends on the introduction of institutional arrangements, supported by peace-reproducing processes of socialisation. In their embryonic stages security communities require an external agent to mediate and supervise its initiation. The hegemonic peace model advances an understanding of power, which is informed by the proposition that security communities are encouraged through the socialisation of state-elites, something which conditions decision-making into a predictable pattern of foreign policy behaviour.

In this context it would be appropriate to compare the socialising effects of the EU and NATO in their promotion of a security-community-order to the Balkans. This research has focused on the embryonic phase in the promotion of security communities in the period from 1999 to 2005. In this timeframe, both the EU and NATO have demonstrated an ability to socialise regional states into a security-community pattern as a result of their common efforts in the Balkans. Chapter Five attests that this does not always mean correspondence between their programmes; however, it has been (and continues to be) their shared vision for the integration of the region that provides the driving force behind the introduction of security-community practices in the Balkans. Perhaps, in the further institutionalisation of such a peace-order, it is the EU rather than NATO that will play the dominant role as there is less need for the instrumental enforcement of non-war frameworks, and even if there is, the EU’s police/military missions have attempted to show themselves capable of taking on such tasks as well. 169

In this respect, a final issue that deserves mention in this section is not so much the external socialisation of the Balkans, but the logic of Euro-Atlantic agency underwriting its socialisation into a security-community-pattern. As suggested, both the EU’s and NATO’s socialisation dynamics are dependent on the willingness of target elites to comply. Both organisations have been able to promote compliance through the prospect of membership. The prospect of membership has been identified as crucial in the extension of the Euro-Atlantic framework of peace to the Balkans. Hence, one issue is whether it would be possible for the EU and NATO to replicate their model of order in regions where membership is not on offer. In other words, the issue for the external agency of both the EU and NATO is to what extent they would be able to wield their socialisation power without the promise of accession. As discussed in Chapter Seven,

169 Although that Chapter Seven seems to indicate that NATO still has a particular socialisation role to play in the Balkans through its partnership activities.
it seems that the Alliance has already institutionalised *partnership* as its preferred tool in both prospective member countries as well as those, which do not aspire to membership. In this respect, NATO has arguably managed to extend its socialising activities beyond the geographic scope of its accession process. However, it seems that in the context of the *post-1999 European order*, the EU has delineated the 'ultimate' outreach of its *socialisation power*: defined by the geographic scope of the 2004 enlargement and the potential for accession of the entire Balkan region.

Thus, the tentative ramifications of a Euro-polity seem to have been laid down. However, the strategic rationale behind such policy-shift – the desire to prevent the importation of instability from 'excluded' (*awkward*) states by 'including' them into programmes for eventual membership – is still not satisfactorily dealt with. Even when the Balkans 'join in', there is still another set of awkward states, which are currently consigned to the concept of 'Wider Europe'. Thereby, the real issue is to what extent the EU can afford to deal with strategic threats through the 'sticks and carrots' of its membership programs; and is it capable of advancing some intermediate degrees of 'closer cooperation' and 'partnerships' for the purposes of order-promotion. Such consideration draws attention to the dilemma of EU's *outreach* for the projection of stability and the potentiality of dilution due to *overreach*. These are issues yet to be confronted by the EU, which are implicit in its order-promoting practices in the Balkans.

Another qualification to the suggestion of EU-agency in the Balkans is demanded by the rejection in 2005 of the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch voters. This seemed to indicate that the EU might be destined for a long period of internal reflection and change before proceeding with its association and accession activities. One analyst has suggested that the astounding feature in the current debates on the character and scope of the EU is that 'enlargement – the most impressive success of the Union – has been turned into its most vulnerable spot' (Krastev, 2005: 3). Probably, taken aback by the extent of anti-enlargement sentiments, EU officials and leaders have been reluctant to re-emphasise the urgency of extending the zone of peace and security to the Balkans. The current absence of clear prospects for admission deprives the EU of 'its most important “carrot” in influencing the region, namely the prospect of EU integration' (*RFE/RL Balkan Report*, 20 June 2005). However, the continuing

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170 On the chronology and instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy see Rossi (2004: 10). The issue however is whether the EU would be able to demand compliance from 'Neighbourhood' states without the leverage of the prospect of membership. In a counter argument, Zank (2005: 42) argues that the European Neighbourhood Policy does not exclude enlargement into (some of) the countries involved in this initiative (i.e. Moldova and Ukraine).
urgency of the situation in the Balkans will compel continued EU attention. Ivan Krastev (2005: 1) insists that a potential 'crisis' would be 'both dangerous and timely. What makes it dangerous is the fact that the European public is totally unaware of it. What makes it timely is the fact that this is the crisis that the EU badly needs... The EU can survive the premature death of its constitution, but the EU cannot survive a new Srebrenica'. Krastev's suggestion is that the EU would be forced either to demonstrate that its transformative powers can have effect in the Balkans or 'it will sink into irrelevance'.

As far as the Balkan region is concerned, this thesis has argued that the agency of the dominant Euro-Atlantic actors is underwritten by the accession programs of the EU and NATO. In this respect the promotion and institutionalisation of security-community-practices has been closely connected to the (viable, if distant) prospect of membership. Yet, despite the seeming ability of Euro-Atlantic actors to initiate embryonic security-community-relations in the Balkans, their framework of security-community-socialisation of state-elites is not without its shortcomings. The following section details some of them.

8.2. The Elite Security Community of the Balkans: Problems
Throughout this study a number of issues have been raised concerning the process of external agency in the Balkans. For the purposes of brevity these are grouped in three main areas: (i) the still unsettled problem of awkward statehood in the region; (ii) the 'fetishisation' of war crimes indictees in lieu of a genuine 'truth-telling' about the events of the 1990s; and (iii) the persisting elite-society cleavage of the Balkans. While the first two relate primarily to the sub-region of the Western Balkans, the third one pertains to the region as a whole.

The issue of awkward statehood has been pointed out as the dominant conditioning variable in the security-community-socialisation of the Balkans. As already indicated, since 1999 the entities of the Western Balkans have begun to look and act more and more like integrated states (owing, in part, to the re-invigorated agency of the dominant Euro-Atlantic actors). Yet, the status of Kosovo (as well as the larger uncertain arrangement of Serbia/Montenegro/Kosovo) continues to plague the stability of the region. This is instanced not merely by the sporadic incidents of inter-communal violence but mainly through the stalling of regional integration prospects into the EU and NATO. Norris (2005: 222) acknowledges that the 'Balkans offer all too many examples of problems left for a later day that have only amplified in their intensity, consequence and violence'.

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For instance, the inability of Macedonia to reach an agreement on defining its border with Serbia (a large section of which is in fact with Kosovo) due to Pristina’s unwillingness to accept any agreement signed between Skopje and Belgrade is often quoted as one of the reasons for the country’s slow accession towards the EU and NATO (Focus, 1 April 2005). Furthermore, the ‘protectorate’ status of Kosovo hampers the province’s chances for development and makes it impossible for Pristina to participate in (and, thence, be meaningfully socialised by) any association/partnership program by either the EU or NATO (ICG Europe Report, 26 January 2005). While EU officials have acknowledged that only a ‘coherent, functioning state can successfully negotiate an agreement’ with the EU (Focus, 21 November 2003), Kosovo is in the paradoxical situation where it has to achieve compliance with external standards but without clarity on its political and juridical status. The issue is that there is no specifically articulated state-building or status-building dynamic; but an attempt to create compliance with externally promoted standards. As suggested in this research, such a framework is not expected to create compliance (i.e. condition policy-making). In order for compliance to emerge, there is the prior requirement of existing state-elites (or at least decision-makers who know what is their own status and the status of the entity they represent) who are willing to comply (or can be socialised into compliance). At the same time the potential unravelling of the ‘state union’ of Serbia and Montenegro has led some analysts to predict a return to the levels of violence of the 1990s. Although this study disagrees with such an apocalyptic scenario (due to the altered role in the region of the dominant Euro-Atlantic actors as well as the different – post-1999 – environment in the Balkans), it concurs that the persistence of awkward statehood in the Balkans poses a degree of uncertainty for the stabilisation of the region. In this context, the recent increase in discussions on finding a beyond-trusteeship solution to the status of Kosovo have been encouraging, but so far there is still no significant progress on this problem (RFE/RL Balkans Report, 26 March 2005). A further complication of the issue of awkward statehood in the Western Balkans is the dependency on external actors, which it has created in the region. In this respect, a frustrated EU official has said that regional entities ‘must do more to create states standing on their own feet’ rather than wait on the international community (Reuters, 26 November 2003). A crucial feature of such dependency situation is not only the oft-quoted issue of donor-dependency (Mallaband and West, 2004: 7), but also (due to their responsiveness to external demands) many state-elites depend on external actors for their political survival (Sidhu, 2000).171

171 Bosnia-Herzegovina is the hackneyed example of this, where the High Representative has regularly sacked popularly elected officials as a result of their non-compliance with external demands (see RFE/RL Balkans Report.
The second issue concerning external agency relates to the demand for ‘cooperation’ with the ICTY in The Hague. As suggested, this condition has beset the EU-accession process of Croatia as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina’s and Serbia/Montenegro’s rapprochement with NATO. The contention here is that the EU’s and NATO’s insistence on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia/Montenegro, Kosovo and most recently Macedonia to surrender persons indicted by the ICTY has centred only on the individuals under injunction instead of initiating a region-wide (and society-wide) process of critical reflection and evaluation of the deeds of the indictees and the entire period of the 1990s. In a prescient analysis, Iavor Rangelov (2004: 337) argues that instead of pushing exclusively for the transfer of war criminals like Karadzic, Mladic and Gotovina, international actors could have (but still have not) recognised ‘the potential of a genuine truth-telling exercise. “Truth” and “justice” should not be conceived as alternatives when it comes to dealing with the past’. Rangelov (2004: 333) insists that it is ‘naïve to expect that judicialised “truth” produced by international proceedings, both spatially and ideologically detached from local audiences, will be immediately recognised as convincing and valid in post-conflict societies. What is striking however is how little genuine debate about the past and its atrocities the trials have provoked in the [region] itself’. Thus, for instance, it is not surprising that in the week preceding Croatia’s unsuccessful attempt to start its EU-accession negotiations on 17 March 2005, on the central squares of the country’s towns and villages appeared large posters with the smiling face of General Ante Gotovina, whose absence at the ICTY dock stalled Zagreb’s accelerated integration into the EU (Focus, 31 March 2005). Or that whenever Belgrade surrenders another indictee to the ICTY, newspaper headlines in the country often read ‘Serbia on Trial’ (Rangelov, 2004: 332). Gallagher (2005: 123) has concluded that ‘from Djindjic down, politicians [in Serbia] shied away from trying to alter public perceptions about controversial events in the recent and more distant past’. In a similar vein, other commentators have argued that ‘the war-torn Balkans is the final piece of the European continent that needs to build peace and economic stability... Serbia could be an important part of this project, but until the Serbs experience a change of attitude about their past and their present, they will cut themselves off from their future’ (RFE/RL Balkan Report, 8 August 2003).

26 March 2005).

179 Indeed, one commentator has termed the treatment of the war-crimes issue by Euro-Atlantic actors as the ‘politics of constructive ambiguity’ (Krastev, 2005: 3). Bolstering this interpretation, Carla Del Ponte, the ICTY’s Chief Prosecutor, has noted that ‘Serbia/Montenegro, Croatia and Republika Srpska within Bosnia-Herzegovina are not yet cooperating fully with the ICTY. However, all of them have shown considerable progress in their cooperation’ (RFE/RL Balkan Report, 20 June 2005).
At least in Serbia, the confrontation with the deeds of the 1990s has been instigated with the release of a videotape showing Serbian police killing Muslim men from Srebrenica. Commentators have noted the profound effect it had on the people of Serbia who have been reluctant to acknowledge the responsibility of their troops and this videotape has become ‘the most significant piece of evidence to shape Serbian public opinion since the end of the Balkan wars of the 1990s’ (NYT, 12 June 2005). In this context, Borislav Paravac, at the time holding the rotating chair of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Presidency stressed that ‘we must openly and truthfully communicate to the younger generations the truth about past events’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 28 June 2005). Therefore, it is worth mentioning the altered socialisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina since the transition from SFOR to EUFOR Althea. Instead of targeting only state-elites the current Multi-National Task Force (MNTF) has also developed what can be described as a societal form of socialisation. The MNTFs consist of small Liaison Observation Teams that reside in ‘normal houses [rather than in barracks] in residential communities and stay in close contact with local authorities and police’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 27 May 2004). In this respect, the MNTF can be interpreted as an effort to socialise (in the sense of change the perceptions about external actors) the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina in an attempt to bridge the gap between elites and societies. The conjecture here is that after ten years (since the Dayton Framework Agreement) of socialising policy-elites, external agents have (arguably) managed to integrate the state, and, therefore, currently they are targeting the state-society by increasing the visibility of their presence (i.e. by taking residence among ‘ordinary’ people) in the expectation that this will alter the attitudes toward those who abet war criminals or know of their whereabouts. It is still too early to prognosticate the effects of such a seeming shift in the socialisation logic (at least in Bosnia-Herzegovina), but it appears to reflect that external actors are aware of the need to involve regional societies.

This point is important as it underscores a phenomenon, which affects the entire Balkan region — a normative elite-society cleavage. Its existence stems from the very logic of the post-1999 international socialisation of the region. As previously indicated, external agents target state-elites with the aim of institutionalising a framework of policy-making around certain standards of behaviour. The objective of such elite-socialisation is to promote congruence between Balkan decision-makers and the Euro-Atlantic actors, which subsequently orients their foreign policy towards peaceful interactions and thus facilitates the initiation/extension of

173 At the same time, the MNTF maintains its strategic credibility through reinforcement of NATO Over The Horizon Forces (OTHF).
security-community relations to the region. At the same time, the expectation on behalf of external agents is that such elite-socialisation around promoted practices will trickle down to the publics as well. Such a dynamic is premised on the history of Euro-Atlantic integration, itself. However, this study contends that the prevailing emphasis on elite-socialisation leads to the institutionalisation of a normative elite-society cleavage. Although in the short- to medium-term such a phenomenon is not likely to have any negative effects on the Euro-Atlantic socialisation as all societies in the region favour integration (see Bechev, 2005: 1), its persistence in the long-term can (potentially) have detrimental effects on the extension of the Western security community to the Balkans. As one commentator has indicated (but for a different case) 'neither elaborate enforcement mechanisms nor a high degree of legalisation is able to guarantee compliance... in situations where rules enjoy only limited social acceptance' (Neyer, 2005a: 119).

The essence of this normative divergence is that Balkan political elites are moving in the direction of justifying their decision-making according to a rationale out of step with that of society at large. Gallagher (2005: 188) reasons that the ‘conditioning of communist times and the fact that the democratic era has resulted in failing living standards for most citizens of the region has instilled a powerful distrust of politics’. Therefore, decision-makers increasingly perceive their policy-making reality from the context of the Euro-Atlantic demands, while the substantial part of regional societies perceives their environment from the framework of their surrounding circumstances characterised by insecurity and dissatisfaction with their conditions of existence.¹⁷⁴ A recent analysis indicates that ‘Balkan politicians want to join the [Euro-Atlantic] organisations... but besides the usual procedures, there are other obstacles they must surmount, and growing public scepticism is one of them’ (Global Information Network, 10 February 2005). Such normative discrepancy between elites and societies is usually reflected in the erratic voting patterns of Balkan electorates.¹⁷⁵ In Bulgaria, for instance, the government of Prime Minister Ivan Kostov lost the June 2001 elections because of its emphasis on compliance with the EU and NATO conditions rather than domestic pressures. Thus, despite ‘sav[ing] Bulgaria from economic disaster’, Kostov’s government fell victim to its inability to involve the society at large in the transformation process (Barany, 2002: 149). Similarly, Mihalka (1999: 501) has explained

¹⁷⁴ In this context, the suggested increase of meetings among Balkan elites might reflect a situation in which they have much more to say to each other than to their electorates.
¹⁷⁵ The societal aspect of the socialisation process is hinted at by Schultz (2005: 3) when he discusses the notion of ‘electoral competition’, in which political formations compete for the electorate’s choice on which of the parties is going to run a state’s foreign policy.
the return of Ion Iliescu to mainstream politics in Romania due to the fall of popularity of the pro-Western government of Emil Constantinescu ‘by its having an agenda out of step with an electorate more interested in the fight against inflation, speeding up privatisation and improving social services than in joining the EU and NATO’. Such dynamics are even more conspicuous in the states of the Western Balkans. For instance, in the December 2003 elections in Serbia, the ultra-nationalist Radical Party took the greatest number of votes – ‘over one million, 700,000 more than in the elections held after Milosevic fell... [largely] due to the electorate’s fatigue and disappointment’ with the pro-Euro-Atlantic reforms of the previous government (Rangelov, 2004: 333). Reflecting a similar phenomenon in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yordán (2003: 157) concludes that since 1998 the nationalist parties have consistently won national elections ‘despite the increased logistical and financial aid to civic parties from the international community’. Likewise, the Croatian analyst, Darko Bekic argues that ‘scepticism [towards the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country] is hidden under the surface... and comes from the isolationist and xenophobic political circles on the political right’ (Global Information Network, 10 February 2005). In this respect Marija Pejcinovic-Buric, the Croatian State Secretary on European Integration has insisted that the EU has ‘been very good in communicating with the government, but not active enough in its communication towards Croatian citizens’. Consequently, the postponement of Zagreb’s accession negotiations has led to 38% of the population to oppose membership of the EU (a rise only of 5%, but support has dropped to only 43%), while 55.4% of Croats fear that EU-membership will lead to a loss of ‘national identity’ (Vecerni List, 17 March 2005).

Yet, Croatia is also an example that in the short- to medium-term, the external socialisation of elites pays off in terms of creating institutional environments constraining their policy-choices. As suggested in Chapter Six, the return of HDZ to power did not mean a return to the nationalistic policies of the 1990s. However, the persistent elite-society cleavage throughout the Balkans poses some issues for the stability of the region. As Karl Deutsch (1953: 171-72) maintains, populations which perceive that they ‘lack direct participation’ in the decision-making process, often fall prey to ‘mobilisation’ by opportune leaders or rabble-rousers. In this respect, the arrival of the former king on the Bulgarian political horizon in 2001, the emergence at the

176 Earlier the same year ‘over a thousand angry workers’ protested in front of the Serbian parliament demanding an end to political reforms, which the workers blamed for job losses (RFE/RL Newsline, 31 October 2003).

177 Interview on 8 April 2005. In effect such statement also relates to the issue of dependency discussed earlier in this section, as this government official (like others in the region) expected that it would be the EU that could initiate such a strategy, rather than regional governments.
2005 parliamentary elections of the freshly-formed neo-fascist front ‘Attack’ as the fourth largest political formation (out of seven) to be represented in the National Assembly (*Focus*, 27 June 2005) and the significant sway over the Romanian electorate of the populist politician Corneliu Vadim Tudor are instances of Deutsch’s suggestions. Therefore it is important that both external actors as well as regional state-elites devise ways for involving Balkan societies in the socialisation dynamics. Tackling the issue the normative elite-society cleavage would also positively impact the solutions for the problem of awkward statehood in the region and initiating genuine evaluation of the events and personalities that shaped the course of Balkan history during the 1990s. As already suggested such normative discrepancy between societies and elites is not expected to impede the development of an elite security community in the region in the short- to medium-term. However, its persistence in the long-term can pose problems for the institutionalisation of order in the Balkans.

8.3. Peace in the Balkans: Prospects
In a nutshell, the prospects for peace in the Balkans depend on finding viable solutions to the problems outlined above. As suggested, security communities are underwritten by a pattern of interactions rather than a static state of affairs. In this respect, in their embryonic stage, security communities depend on the committed (yet flexible) conditioning by external agents. This research has indicated that as far as the Balkans is concerned the Kosovo crisis seems to have informed a collaborative division of labour between the dominant Euro-Atlantic partners. The contention is that at least in the Balkans such a pattern of cooperation persists even in the context of the current ‘war on terror’. Although the rationale for a possible pessimistic scenario has been outlined in the previous section, this research argues that the probability of a relapse into another bout of ‘Balkanisation’ is not very likely. Based on the investigation of this research, it is expected that the terms of the post-1999 European order would persist in maintaining their operational rationality in the Balkans.

Although there is still a lining of uncertainty as regards some issues, it seems unlikely that parts of the Balkans would relapse into the 1990s levels of violence. An important reason for this is the stabilisation of the region as a result of elite-socialisation. In particular, the prospect of EU and NATO membership has allowed external actors policy entry-points into Balkan decision-making and, thence, an ability to condition compliance. In this context, the prospects for peace in the region (i.e. the extension, institutionalisation and, then, internalisation of the Euro-Atlantic security community) depend on maintaining the attraction of membership and the credibility of
its achievement (both to Balkan state-elites and societies). In this respect, the postponement of the start of Croatia’s accession negotiations on 17 March 2005 sent mixed signals to the region. On the one hand, it supposedly encourages other Western Balkan countries (in particular those with outstanding issues with the ICTY) to pursue their compliance with EU-rules, since membership is about fulfilling all the conditions and in this sense Brussels indicates that there are no double standards in its treatment of (prospective) candidacies from the region. On the other, most analysts noted that in the region such postponement was interpreted as an indication of Brussels unwillingness to enlarge into the Western Balkans. For instance, Erhard Busek, the head of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe has insisted that ‘I cannot... prove it, but I have the feeling that there are certain efforts to slow down the enlargement process’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 17 March 2005). Others have doubted the authenticity of the EU’s offer of membership for the Western Balkans and have instead dubbed it a ‘holding action’ (Knaus and Cox, 2005: 51).

Therefore, the way Zagreb’s case is treated by the EU as well as how the issue of enlargement into the Balkans is approached by both the EU and NATO would have important implications for the security-community-relations in the region. It bodes well that the prospect of accession has at least rhetorically been re-affirmed by the EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn who stressed that ‘the door of the EU is still open to those countries that meet the criteria of accession and association, depending on which stage they are in this process’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 14 June 2005). Another promising factor in this regard has been the apparent socialisation of Balkan elites (in the sense of compliance with external standards and peaceful international relations) into predictable policy-making behaviour. In this respect, the increased frequency in regional meetings as well as the various topics discussed by regional decision-makers has introduced a kind of instrumental (if still sceptical) trust in the region. In particular, the responsibility (and willingness to assist) which states like Bulgaria and Romania (as well as Croatia) have indicated for the integration of their lagging neighbours into the dominant Euro-Atlantic organisations bodes well for the further institutionalisation of security-community-behaviour in the Balkans. Thereby, it is expected that the terms of the post-1999 European order will persist in the Balkans, as long as the socialising actors (i.e. the EU and NATO) maintain the commitment and credibility of their agency. In this way, returning to E. H. Carr’s statement, the collective security arrangements underwriting the practice of security communities do not depend only on a shared desire, but rather on the ability to maintain their viability and reinforce their attractiveness.
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