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Mega Sports Event Policy in Marseille 1991-2003 the Football World Cup and the Americas Cup: a case study of urban governance

By

Aurélie Cometti

A Doctoral Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of

Ph. D of Loughborough University

2007

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Abstract

Mega Sports Event Policy in Marseille 1991-2003 the Football World Cup and the America’s Cup: a case study of urban governance.

The aim of this thesis is to provide a theoretically informed account of the decision-making process in mega sports events policy in Marseille. This is intended to allow an evaluation of the major theoretical frameworks developed in the Anglo-Saxon literature on urban governance and their applicability to the French local government context, and more specifically to the context of sports policy in Marseille.

Following an analysis of the development of the local political culture of Marseille, the thesis undertakes a review of theoretical frameworks developed in the urban policy literature identifying three major approaches / concepts which have dominated Anglo-Saxon literature, namely the growth coalition (Logan and Molotch 1987), policy network (Rhodes 1981; 1988), and urban regime (Stone 1989) approaches. These theoretical frameworks have been little used in French urban policy literature (Le Galès 1995; 2003) and feature rarely, if at all, in French sports policy literature. In reviewing this literature the thesis identifies a set of indicators, which may be used in empirical contexts to differentiate growth coalitions from policy networks and urban regimes. A major question for the research is thus to what extent Anglo-Saxon theoretical frameworks / concepts can be usefully employed to understand French decision-making and that of Marseille in particular.

Subscribing to critical realism, the thesis aims to give an account of the mega sport event phenomena in Marseille, and of the actors’ understanding and interpretation (in effect their social construction) of the phenomena. The data collected were documents for the period 1991 – 2003 from official sources (minutes and proceedings of local government and event-related bodies, reports, political speeches, and local government publications), local press coverage, and interviewees conducted with the major decision-makers. An ethnographic content analysis was made, partly employing a deductive approach based on the set of common indicators developed from the review of urban policy, and partly inductively from themes, which emerged in the analysis (Altheide 1996).

The thesis concludes that while there is some evidence of the development of policy networks the specificity of the French context, and that of Marseille, with its heavily state-led approach to policy, means that the use of urban regime, and still less of growth coalition approaches, is not warranted by the evidence.

Key words: growth coalition, policy network, urban regime, urban governance, Marseille, Football World Cup 1998, America’s Cup.
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List of Abbreviations and Translations

AC Management: America’s Cup Management.
MJS: Ministère de la Jeunesse et des Sports, Ministry for Youth and Sports.
DRJS: Direction Régionale de la Jeunesse et des Sports, Regional Direction for Youth and Sports.
CFO: Comité Français d’Organisation (for the World Football Cup), French Organisation Committee.
CRO: Comité Régional d’Organisation (for the World Football Cup), Regional Organisation Committee.
FFF: Fédération Française de Football, French Football Federation.
CIQ: Comité d’Intérêts de Quartier, neighbourhood association.
Conseil Général: Départemental (County) Council.
Conseil Régional: Regional Council.
Communauté Urbaine Marseille-Provence-Métropole: Urban Community of Marseille area.
Chapter 1: Introduction

In the second half of the twentieth century the nature of social organisation in the developed economies of the Western world underwent significant structural change. Attempts to conceptualise such changes are reflected in social science literature in the introduction of a series of uses of the prefix “post” (post-industrial, post-modern, post-welfare) as descriptors of society. Such terminology seeks to characterise the nature of fundamental change in politics, social policy, culture, and economy, and such changes invariably impinge on patterns of life in such societies, across a range of domains and the sports domain is no exception.

The growth of urban settlements in the industrial age was premised on the need to have a centrally available, trained and paid workforce, close to raw materials or transport networks. As industrialisation matured, the social reproduction of the workforce increasingly became the responsibility of the state and welfare provision became the norm. Responsibility for providing sport (sport for all) was one of the last of the areas of social provision to be adopted by the public sector. In recent years, however, welfare provision has come under pressure as national, regional and municipal governments have become subject to the pressures of fiscal stringency, neo-liberal ideology, and changing social tastes, all of which have undermined commitment in the public sector to welfare provision (Gratton and Henry 2001).

However, the squeeze on welfare provision and delivery of sport for all has not meant that sports policy in the city has simply disappeared. In many respects sport is even more visible in the public sector as cities vie with each another, using sport for the purposes of city marketing, the promotion of city tourism, and the development of an attractive infrastructure by which the post-modern, post-welfare city can attract
service class professionals (Paddison 1993; Smyth 1994; Waitt 1999; Ward 2000; Chalip and Leyns 2002). Sport in the city has not declined in importance but its role has certainly changed. One should not exaggerate, however: welfare states still exist though their forms may have changed, and sporting services are still provided by state and state-supported bodies at municipal level, but this is by no means as prominent as it was.

Major cities then have begun to seek to develop a programme of events and sporting spectacle, the rationale for which is related to aspects of economic development rather more than to community development (Chalip and Leyns 2002; Gratton and Henry 2001). The concern of the political left with providing services to local people in order to reduce inequality is overshadowed in some instances by this concern with economic development priorities (Boyle and Hugues 1994; Henry and Paramio-Salcines 1999). Sport events have become a focal point for cities that want to achieve a certain development or for cities that are looking for solutions to economic and social crisis. Besides, Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel (2002), in their report on ‘The impact of major events on metropolitan development’, argue that three kinds of objective underpin the organisation of major events:

- objectives in relation to image and to international recognition: all cities expect to position themselves in order to increase their prestige or to strengthen their situation;

- economic and tourist objectives: cities hope to utilise events as a lever to renewal through economic growth and to attract inward investment;

- objectives of urban development: to host a major event, a city must have the necessary infrastructure. New development and renovation of infrastructure are predominantly evident in the transport domain, from the level of local transport to that of international transport facilities. These objectives are described by cities as being as important as the event itself, which is considered
as a "booster for major urban transformation projects" (Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel 2002: 16).

Thus, the real impact of events corresponds to cities' objectives. According to Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel (2002), impact on city image is undeniable, both positive, and in the case of organisation failure, negative; cities benefit also in terms of short, middle and long term impact on the economy and tourism; and city urban development projects are effectively boosted because ancillary works have to be undertaken, the staging of an event can mean a gain of between 10 and 15 years of investment. According to the authors, there is also an impact in terms of working methods. The authors refer to the side-effects of the events on "the mode of governance of the metropolis" (Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel 2002: 27). But the main impact is clearly on urban development (Gratton et al. 2005). As Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel argue:

Some cities like Barcelona even admit that big events are pretexts, the aim is to improve the global attractiveness of the metropolis through the provision of infrastructure, the rehabilitation of urban land, and the creation of a new focal point for development (Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel 2002: 18).

This report clearly underlines the claim that major events are more than the organisation of a competition. They are a powerful means to achieve goals, which have proved difficult to attain through more traditional means.

The city of Marseille is no exception to this process of using sport for regeneration, although it has also developed other aspects of sports policy. On the one hand, the city's football team, Olympique de Marseille, had become a major institution by the end of the 1980s, both as an attraction in its own right, and as a vehicle for Marseille's image. Even though sports events already existed, it was from the 1980s onwards that the events became more media focused, and of increasing size and

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1 Governance is used by these authors principally in the sense of management of human resources.
Chapter 1: Introduction

significance. Marseille, as one of the three most important cities in France (vying with Lyon for the position of France’s second city), regularly hosted a stage of the Tour de France, and other major sporting events, such as the start of the Paris-Dakar Rally in 1989, the tennis Open 13, and a stage of the World Beach Volley Championship. In 1984, the city hosted some of the matches in the European Football Championships. At the same time, numerous lower level, or less well known, competitions, were hosted by the city. On the other hand, policy was also being developed in terms of sport development with increasing municipal subsidies to sports clubs, of greater or lesser significance depending on the political party in power in cities (Callede 1988; Noé 1991; Bayeux and Piau 1996; Augustin 2002).

However the most significant expansion of major sports events in Marseille, as for other major French cities, took place in the 1990s, with the increase of media coverage for mega sports events and the outcomes related. During this decade, Marseille appeared to regard sport in a very different manner from the way in which it had done previously. The decision to take part in the hosting of the World Football Cup 1998 was taken at a time when Olympique de Marseille was achieving impressive results on the field, gaining a genuinely global reputation as capable of taking on the world’s best. The city was also involved in all three Paris bids to host the Olympics Games, offering venues for nautical sports and football. Marseille also made a particular effort to promote its reputation and image as a base for nautical sport, organizing different competitions like the Yachting World Game or ‘the Race’. In 2003, Marseille bid to host the America’s Cup, perhaps the world’s pre-eminent ocean-racing event. During this period, local sporting clubs continued their role in sport development, with less subsidy for operational activity, but an increase in resources available to support the organisation of competitions. This changing emphasis in sports policy began during the period of control of the city by the left wing governments of Deferre and Vigouroux in the
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1980s, but was continued and indeed accelerated following the accession of the right to power in the city in 1995.

The development of this policy approach is one which is not simply limited to the activities of the municipality or the public sector more broadly: it is one which, because of its economic development goals and thus its potential for business opportunities, may also attract private sector support. International sport events had taken on an importance which went far beyond simply the attraction of sport itself. Media investment in this domain grew considerably, providing opportunity not only for capitalising on this increasing visibility in terms of sponsorship, but also for other sources of profit. The building of infrastructure, the development of transport systems, or of tourism provision, meant that this was an area of increasing interest to business, and thus the private sector, as well as the city, had much to gain from the organisation and staging of such events. The competition between Candidate Cities in 2005 for the Olympic Games of 2012 illustrates this point admirably. Each of the bidding cities had the support of many of their country’s major companies, of their government, and of their media. For London, Prime Minister Tony Blair made space in a busy schedule immediately before hosting the G8 summit in Scotland to meet IOC members in Singapore in order to promote the London bid; for Paris, Jacques Chirac himself made part of the presentation speech to the IOC. For both cities, there was a committee of national companies involved in the bids. In France and in the UK national television channels broadcast live the lead up to the decision and its announcement. There were large screens in place in both cities, which allowed people in the street to follow the final process. This hyperactive pursuit of the designation of Olympic host city illustrates the importance of such sport events. The involvement of the private sector was very evident in domains, which had previously been the preserve of the public sector.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Within the context of such changes since the 1970s, the social science literature has developed theories about new forms of city government / governance. The term governance has increasingly been used to reflect the changing, and indeed increasingly overlapping, interests and activities of the public, voluntary and private sectors (Leftwitch 1993; Rhodes 1996). Partnerships between public and private sector bodies have increased, in part because cities are no longer able to realise their missions without the input of private and voluntary sector actors. Thus 'governance' implies partnerships and these partnerships have been characterised in the social science literature by the introduction of a range of conceptual and theoretical frameworks, the most significant of which are represented in the concepts of the 'growth coalition' (Logan and Molotch 1987), the 'policy network' (Rhodes 1981; 1988) and the 'urban regime' (Stone 1989). Authors have sought to use these concepts to identify the nature of the exercise of power in a whole range of policy domains. They identify membership of key groups, their aims and values, their mode of operation and so on. However, those new conceptual frameworks were developed in contexts very different from that of France, where central government has traditionally maintained a strong public sector with a strongly interventionist system and style and with little emphasis on public-private collaboration (Landrieu 2000). Thus, part of the aim of this thesis will be to evaluate whether the concepts of growth coalition, policy network and urban regime are applicable in France and whether they are helpful in explaining the nature of sports policy and its development in the city of Marseille.

The thesis focuses on decisions to bid for and host two sporting events of global significance: the World Football Cup 1998 in which Marseille hosted a number of games including one of the semi-finals, and Marseille’s (ultimately unsuccessful) bid for the America’s Cup 2007. They are several reasons for choice of these sport events for study. First of all, the interest in studying both events lies in the period covered: between the
beginning of the World Football Cup 1998 project and the end of the designation-process for the America’s Cup 2007, 12 years had passed, and it allows an evaluation of the stability of the composition of actors and interests in the medium term. Moreover, both events have important media coverage, with similar outcomes on economic and social life on the host city. In terms of the competitions themselves, both represent the most important competitive events for their respective sports. They are international competitions, bringing national teams together in spectacular competition. The best competitors and athletes take part in the events, offering what sport aficionados consider to be the most beautiful and exciting demonstrations of skill and spectacle in their own sports.

Nevertheless, two main differences exist between the World Football Cup and the America’s Cup. The first arises from the level of government involved in the event: State support is predominantly at national level for the World Football Cup (since it involves a range of areas) but State involvement is predominantly at city level for the yachting competition. Secondly, the project set up diverges in its form because the organisation of the football competition implies a response to specific terms of reference laid down by FIFA, whereas bidding to host the America’s Cup involves a more open-ended approach (essentially involving the response to a questionnaire). The World Football Cup is shaped by a very strong central organisation, FIFA, while the format of the hosting of the America’s Cup is to a large extent the product of the wishes of the previous winning team. Despite these differences, both events have global significance and were organised, or were bid for, by the city of Marseille for this reason.

Within this context, the core research questions for this study relate to the issue of how the sports policy process can be conceptualised in this new context in France, specifically in Marseille. More precisely they consist of the following two sets of related questions:
Chapter 1: Introduction

1) By reference to Marseille can we identify who the major players are in the sports policy process? Where do they come from? (Are they city based? Which sectors do they come from?) How are they recruited into the system? How do they influence policy? What are their interests, goals and strategies?

2) To what extent are the theoretical frameworks developed in the broader urban policy literature helpful in characterising the sports policy system in Marseille? Specifically can the major theoretical approaches of policy networks, growth coalitions, or urban regime theory contribute to the analysis of sports policy event in Marseille?

The importance of these questions is in large part bound up with questions concerning the specificity of the local context (that of Marseille, and of France) within wider globalised systems of world sporting / media events. We seek in effect through the empirical analysis to consider whether theoretical accounts developed in North American (and elsewhere in the Anglophone academic community) provide real purchase on the French context.

To address the research questions, the thesis is developed in the following manner: in Chapter 2, we present and evaluate the literature concerning governance and theoretical frameworks in urban policy. Chapter 3 develops an account of the political, economic and social context of Marseille before and during the period in which both decisions were taken. Chapter 4 provides a defence of the methodology adopted. Chapters 5 and 6 explore both case study policy decisions in depth, synthesising and analysing the empirical material developed in the study. In the concluding chapter we return to the issue of the appropriateness of the different theoretical perspectives of analysis of sports policy in this specific local context. The nature and the significance of the city’s bidding process thus form the focus of our concerns in this thesis.
2.1. Introduction

For the last two decades, in the Anglo-Saxon literature, but more recently in the French literature, the notions of urban government and ways of governing have been debated. In this debate, authors have begun to use the concept of governance in order to explain the inability of the public sector to respond effectively to citizens’ expressions of need. While the concept of governance was initially at the core of the literature about government failures, it has been interpreted more recently as part of the solution to the crisis of ‘governability’.

At the local level, Anglo-Saxon theorists have introduced the concepts of ‘urban growth coalition’, ‘urban regimes’ and also of ‘urban policy networks’ in explanation of the evolution of the policy process at work in cities over the last four decades. However, although much of the work in this field, generally falls under the categories of these three theoretical orientations, there has been relatively little use of such perspectives in comparative analysis of urban policy, and almost none in comparative analysis of urban sports policy (for an exception, see Paramio-Salcines 2000; Denyer 2002). More recently, with the emergence of the language of ‘governance’ a body of work has been developed focused on the various manifestations of governance at the urban level, with a significant proportion of authors employing one or other of the theoretical approaches presented below.

As Jessop (1995) and Le Galès (2003) argue, it is important to clarify the different ways in which governance has been conceptualised. In the context of such a debate, a sociological approach to this question will be
important to any attempt to contribute to the construction of a renewed theoretical framework. With this in mind, work relating to growth coalitions, regimes, and policy networks will be discussed in the following sections, not as theoretical models in their own right but rather in terms of providing a basis to understand what a mode of governance might be. This discussion will be followed by a commentary on research which focuses on urban sports policies. Finally there will be a discussion of how consideration of these literatures can contribute to a refining of the research questions and approach.

2.2. Approaches to governance.

2.2.1. Definitions of governance

The increasing interest in governance is evidenced not only by its increasing presence in the Anglophone social sciences vocabulary but also in the proliferation of research on this topic (Lorrain and Stoker 1995; Jessop 1998; Merrien 1998; and for a literature review about this theme, see amongst others Le Gales 1995; 2003). This 'fad' has its origins partly in the fact that governance constitutes a response to the question of the crisis of economic and social governability in the contemporary context. The term is used in several domains to explain the increasing number and interdependence of actors involved in decision-making processes, because a characteristic feature of governance is the involvement of partners with appropriate resources in networked rather than hierarchical decision-making processes.

In relation to governments, the main characteristic of governance is that of a proliferating collaboration between public, private and voluntary partners. In effect, decision-making power in areas previously the preserve of the public sector, no longer resides solely in that sector. According to Stoker (1998), governance involves work, which is not limited to a single domain or a particular sector. He emphasises collaboration between actors, from different sectors, who wish to achieve objectives,
collectively defined, that government alone cannot achieve (Le Galès 1998). Thus, governance represents a variation from the notion of government which was seen to have been to an extent delegitimated. Elected individuals are thus no longer deemed the sole authority in decision-making, governing in effect becomes an interactive process (Stoker 1998), which will require the bringing together of people with appropriate resources.

a). Scientific usage
Le Galès (2003) claims that the use of governance in the social sciences usually relates to one of three disciplinary fields (29-37). In economics American theorists promote a conception of governance that focuses on development of coordination mechanisms in firms, an approach that seeks to decrease transaction costs and to improve efficiency. In this kind of analysis, which draws on classical economic models, inspired by the neo-liberal right, governance is treated as a set of rules intended principally to optimise the economic efficiency of a social entity.

Economic sociology and political economy go beyond the major consideration of the firms’ efficiency in order to consider more specifically conflicts of power, games amongst social groups and mechanisms of control. In these perspectives, governance refers to regulation mechanisms between the market, social structures (networks, communities, associations), political institutions (the State and its representative parts) and private organizations (firms). Studies from this perspective distinguish regulatory ideal-typical forms in relation to groups and actors present and their interests. Going beyond the simple logic of categorisation, these understandings of governance emphasize two specific points, first the collective, concerted nature of aims reflected in emerging configurations of actors, and secondly the social and political stability that such groups can engender.
In political sociology concern with governance represents a truly separate sphere from social regulation. Starting from this position, the notions of governance and government are integrally bound up. Analysis deals with government failures, and the lack of capacity for auto-regulation in society or with the resistance of certain sectors to authority, and focuses on government action, and the decisions which governments take. The government is always at the centre of debates. The problematic of governance has not replaced that of government but on the contrary represents an alternative approach which governments can take to alleviate governmental failure. This appeared at the beginning of the 1990s reflected in statements that claimed that “the style of government of rich countries has to evolve; these changes have to be implemented” (Gaudin 2002: 20). This problematic focuses on the interaction between the State and society, and the nature of coordination that is necessary for action to take place in the public sphere (Kooiman 1993). It is thus focused not simply on government, but on various alternative mechanisms of negotiation between different groups and actors who are able to make governmental action possible (Kooiman 1993).

The use of ‘governance’, whatever the field, refers to a pragmatic drawing together of power from various sources (Gaudin 2002). For Allemand (2000), governance is synonymous with a change in the government or management mode at different levels, as well as in different sectors, of society. It draws attention to the plurality of actors, who employ different logics in intervening in different processes of collective action. It is also a way to understand that

the environment is uncertain, more and more complex, requiring knowledge, competences, information, which a single actor can no longer pretend to hold on his own (Allemand 2000: 17).

The interest shown in governance notably from a socio-political perspective is a function of the transformation of the role of the State and
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the mode of political regulation, which has resulted from that transformation. This approach of treating the government as one actor among others leads inevitably to the rational restructuring of the State and its implication in terms of State monopoly and power. Governance provides the opportunity of conceptual advances in the social science domain and more particularly in political sociology.

b). Macro governance
Governance introduces a new way of governing society (Stoker 1998), the principal characteristic of which consists of the increasingly strong interrelationship of private and public sectors. In other words, governance represents a move from the redistribution of resources and the development of social programmes by the State to a distribution that is made between partners from the public and private sectors (Murdoch and Abram 1998; Geddes 2006). The boundaries between these two sectors are increasingly blurred in the new mode of government. The division in different sectors, even though it still exists at a formal level, is much less visible in relation to practical action. In effect, by the very nature of the complementarity of the actions of the actors from different sectors, power is no longer seen as being exercised in an independent fashion but is reflected in the interdependent relationship of the sectors, undermining the notion of a single hierarchy in government (Jessop 1998). Government has need of private sector partners that can bring to the table the financial resources for action, while private partners need government to provide a steer for policy action. The same type of relationship exists with the voluntary sector. The notion of governance implies that there exists the possibility of integrating the partners from different sectors, with different interests, into a single governing strategy. Once that strategy is decided, it then has to be defended in the outside world (Le Galès 1998). It is thus a matter of finding a common coherent position, internal to the group in power in order to act effectively in its own policy domain, but which is also
strong enough for this coherence not to be limited solely to its internal functioning.

Whereas studies on governance grew in the US and the UK in the 1990s, there were few such studies conducted by French authors (Landrieu 2000; Reigner 2001; Bayeux 2002). There seemed to be a reluctance to use the term to define French situations even though similar ‘symptoms’ were evident (Gaudin 2002). Gaudin argues that French authors might want to keep some distance from a notion too similar to neo-liberalism and to the market dynamism of the 1990s and so it does not give good account of regulations which, in France, are still, more than anywhere, characterised by the State organised norms of the public sector (2002: 90).

Governance is seen as a result of a ‘society sick of management’ (De Gaulejac 2005), in the sense that the Welfare State has become, like the rest of society, economy driven. The polysemy of the word and the use made of the term by international organisations has further fuelled this reluctance on the part of French commentators (interview with Le Galès cited in Allemand 2000).

Although these criticisms may be more ideology-driven then empirically founded, nevertheless, one cannot deny that the specificity of the French context means that one should be cautious when using the term ‘governance’. Landrieu (2000) for example, argues that the history of French public administrations explains the resistance, which exists to the establishment of a truly governance-oriented approach. The State has always been very strong in France, because it is made up of a powerful network of public services. It is thus difficult today for the government to adopt the role of a mere manager of decision-making groups. The decentralisation laws introduced in the 1980s, enabled functions to be shared by central government with other levels of public administration, but success in the practice of sharing of responsibilities with private sector
bodies has, for many commentators, yet to be demonstrated (Landrieu 2000). Others have constructed their analysis on case studies, illustrating the diffusion of public-private partnerships models both in Europe (Newman and Thornley 1996) and in France (Verpraet 1991). These case studies to date have consisted of large scale projects most notably those relating to the development and restructuring of major port cities. The first French author to use the term ‘governance’ consistently was Le Galès in 1995, who emphasised that the term ‘governance’ was helpful to understand what was happening in France in policy-making, with the emergence of new forms of partnership (Le Galès 1995).

In summary, the classical accepted definitions of governance, illustrated in macro sociological analysis, are based on three theoretical, though not unchallenged, assumptions:

- the existence of a crisis of governability,
- that this crisis reflects the exhaustion of the traditional forms of state intervention,
- the emergence of a tendency or of a convergence of political trends in economically ‘developed’ countries that is giving rise to a new form of governance better adapted to the context (Merrien, 1998: 57)

Even if such claims can be made at the national level, it is necessary, however, to consider the extent to which these assumptions hold at the local level and in a very specific (French) national context.

2.2.2. Urban governance

The first case studies reported in the field of urban governance relate to the Anglo-Saxon context. When one applies the concept of local governance in France, it denotes a change in modes of functioning at the local level, reflecting the claim that the private sector is increasingly involved in the taking of decisions. It is on the level of innovation in relation to the system of city government that reflection on governance is
most developed today (Le Galès 1995; Landrieu 2000). As Reigner (2001: 183) argued “The local level is often where policy innovation and coordination now takes place”. In this respect, the French city represents a laboratory for developing new forms of government.

Because they are directly involved with the problems that citizens experience, city governments must adapt themselves as quickly as possible to changes in local circumstances. The operation of urban government must be effective because its results are directly visible to its citizens. In a whole range of policy domains,

Central government produces rules, the frameworks while the local level is the location for specific negotiations where there are pragmatic government institutions and people meet face to face (Honta, 2001).

The city is the location for practical policy. The first level of government to be contacted is always likely to be under pressure to react swiftly. The need for immediate action by the local authority is sometimes legitimated by reference to the demands of global competition and the place of the city in the global market (Nicholls 2005). This often diminishes considerations by policy actors of local political and social conditions (Southern 2002). In a sense, governance promotes an impetus for privatisation and cooperation between public and private sectors in order to remain competitive and to act quickly and effectively to compete effectively with other European cities.

Approaches to urban governance thus focus their analysis on actors, in the most ‘collective’ sense, and also on the forms and conditions of their interactions. This is perhaps especially true of certain French commentators. Before going further with this argument, the concept of collective actor needs to be clarified. Pichiari (1997) reported five major elements of a ‘collective actor’: a system of collective decisions; interests which are common and seen as such; integration mechanisms; a collective
vision of the internal context and of the external environment and a capacity for innovation. These represent (notably in terms of the first three characteristics) the defining features of a collective actor. It is important to underline the legitimacy which some confer on it. For Bourdin for example:

It is about the definition of common interest, a strategy, an identity, friends and enemies, or at least allies and competitors. If all of this exists and a spokes-person or an authority is clearly enabled to express it, one can effectively talk about an actor (2000; 317).

The whole collection of these indicators contributes to the definition of the city as a collective actor, as, for example, Le Galès (2003) understands it. In this particular case, cities are not simply the interplay of individual actors but equally of social structures and institutions, which shape the expectations of actors, influence their interest and their understanding. These structures and institutions go well beyond the identity of a single commune. Urban governance is based upon this interactive process individualities-entities institutional-social structures. The city as a collective actor does incorporate multiple identities resulting from the grouping together of a plurality of potential intervening parties: local authorities, representatives of different segments of the State, large private enterprises, representatives of private companies, public and semi-public agencies, consultants, research organizations, and associations (Le Galès, 1995: 60). If for certain authors urban governance is characterised above all by the inclusion of private actors, others develop a much more heterogeneous vision of those parties implicated in this process. Much rarer are those who place on emphasis on the dimension of citizen participation, in the way in which Ascher does:

The future of ‘metapoles’ depends more on the possibility of sustaining a true urban governance, that is to say a system of government which articulates and associates with political institutions, social actors and private bodies, in these processes of identifying and putting into operation collective choices, capable of provoking an active commitment on the part of citizens (1995: 269).
Whichever of these is the dominant explanation, the different approaches reveal that urban governance relies more and more on non-governmental actors. In the French case, some authors, like Bayeux (2002), interpret policy-making in the sport domain as being a result of a change from government to governance, by reference to the multiplication of public partnerships. Sport policy is the result of a horizontal collaboration between several mayors, through inter-communal bodies (known as ‘Communauté de Communes’ or ‘Communauté Urbaine’). Bayeux suggests that in the French context, rather than seeking private partners, local authorities seek to build on the networks of local bodies, which central government has made available to them – notably other communes, départements, regions and local arms of state bodies. Newman and Tual (2002), in their study of the development of the Stade de France, demonstrate that although the choice of the stadium location – in the Plaine Saint Denis – was made by the central government, the management of the project was a product of inter-communal cooperation and inter-government department coordination. The central government administration and legislation effectively left decision-making in the hands of the public sector.

Local governments not only incorporate the bringing together of a certain number of actors but this situation also poses a question for their role in the process of decision making (Geddes 2006). In this conceptual framework, it is first and foremost the functions and actions of local government which are fundamentally called into question (Allemand 2000). This new approach allows a glimpse of the transformation of traditional local democracy. Notably in what has been traditionally a most bureaucratic context, innovation in the form of horizontal and vertical coordination of public action implies a necessary flexibility and diversity in the manner in which services are organised (DiGaetano and Storm 2003). Urban governance is characterised as much in the variety of the actors as in strategic capacity or the dynamic of negotiation. However, comparative
studies on governance between British and French cities suggest that though governance exists in both contexts, it differs in its application in some respects, in particular in relation to the political leadership (John and Cole 1999) and public-private partnership (DiGaetano and Storm 2003). The concept of governance embodies the new forms of government in different countries, as cases studies demonstrate it. Beyond the USA and UK, the existence of governance at the local level has been demonstrated in several European countries: in France (Gilly and Wallet 2001; Reignier 2001; Bayeux 2002; Nicholls 2005), in Germany (Gissendanner 2004) and in Portugal (Silva and Syrett 2006).

The increasing number of studies of local governance provides some insights into the question of how the concept applies in such different contexts. Frameworks have thus been developed as a basis for comparative local governance with analysis focusing typically on similar aspects of decision-making (Gissendanner 2003; Sellers 2005; Denters and Mossberger 2006). However, these studies do not necessarily evaluate, rather they propose methodologies to operationalise the concept in comparative urban political researches.

The concept of governance introduces diversity into the processes by which local government operates, and its activities legitimised, and by transforming regulation and control mechanisms in local bureaucracy, it is overturning the classical approach to the organisation of local government (Interview with Le Galès cited in Allemand 2000). One can no longer characterise the way policy actors will operate by reference to whether they are public or private sector actors. Urban governance implies that cross sector operations and behaviours, and inter-organisational cooperation and mutual adjustment constitute elements of a new frame of reference for policy at the urban level.
2.3. Growth coalitions

2.3.1. Origins of the concept and definition

Historically, the first work reporting coalitions dates from the 1940s, directly inspired by game theory. These reflections on negotiation games were emblematic in the field of political theory. Initially focused on the reasons, which motivate the formation of coalitions, analysis rapidly integrated other questions most notably concerning the resources at the disposal of participants (Caplow 1956; 1968) or the ideological affinities among them (Gamson 1961). This type of approach also introduced two other parameters in the founding of a coalition, the benefits sought by coalition members and the level at which decisions would be taken. These four determinants still constitute in the contemporary use of the theory, one of the most useful ways of explaining the formation of coalitions as well as their maintenance, transformation and dissolution.

The definition of a coalition given by Lemieux (1998) effectively integrates these descriptors, but it also introduces an essential temporal dimension, notably by way of differentiating coalitions from other forms of alliances:

Coalitions are generally defined as temporary alliances, which are the result of consultation if not negotiation between those who participate in them. (...) three dimensions of the relation between actors determine the formation and transformation of a coalition. These are first of all transactions which reflect the gains that actors are looking for and the contribution which they bring to achieve this end. There are then affinities between the actors which are sometimes mixed with hostility or neutrality. Then there are the controls which they exercise either among themselves or on their opponents (1998: 13-14).

With a view to summarizing and reinforcing these characteristics, one might propose four defining indicators of a coalition:

- the composition: identification of actors involved,
- the nature of relations between members: understanding, cooperation, or conflict,
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- resources: methods used to achieve power,
- ends: motives and interests of coalition members.

The **raison d’être** of a coalition is expressed in the potential which it represents for its members in relation to the external context, and its potential opponents. It is effectively in the interest of the coalition members in so far as it confers advantages on them, which are greater than if they were outside of the coalition. The question which is of interest to us in the present case relates to the identification of these criteria at the level of the urban system.

### 2.3.2. Coalitions at the micro level

The use of the concept of coalition in the analysis of local configurations began to grow again at the beginning of the 1970s following the ‘first’ urban crisis in the United States. The objective was to understand who exerted the greatest influence in building construction and whose interests these property development activities served (Molotch 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987). Confronted by numerous difficulties such as economic failure, lots of cities developed programmes that were led by coalitions comprising elected officials and members of the business elite (Mollenkopth 1980). Adopting a neo-Marxist perspective, Logan and Molotch (1987) argued that it was those with property capital who exerted the major influence on city policy. These groups played a direct role in the setting-up of development programmes. A coalition is constructed around the idea that local government is no longer capable of responding alone to this crisis and that economic growth led by entrepreneurs is the solution. The authors refer to the ‘urban growth coalition’ or even the ‘urban economic development coalition’ in explaining this phenomenon.

The logic which structures this grouping at the local level is summarised as a ‘coalition of interest’ of which we find the first descriptions in the case study of Thoden Van Velzen (1973). To begin with the aims, which were oriented towards transactions and appropriation of funds as resources,
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were considered by the authors to be the most important elements. Members provided contributions and received benefits which enriched the funds available. The relationship with the wider environment was one of stable boundaries, defined by the leader and the other members among whom transaction took place. In relation to the activities, the authors note that they were multifaceted and largely concerned the ‘structuring’ or ‘reinforcing’ of coalition interests. This was like a form of a star centred around the core with members who were not necessarily linked one with another except through the hub. Following this approach, certain authors favoured the notion of urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1987; Hall and Hubbard 1998; Painter 1998) in the sense that it is the entrepreneurs who legitimate this vision of growth, making of it a collective interest for the locality as a whole. They put forward the idea of growth that benefits everybody: providing employment; resolving problems; and generating resources for the city (Le Gales 1995). Their objective is to get the general population to accept that economic growth is the solution to local problems. They put up projects behind which they hide their personal ambitions emphasizing their contribution to the future of the city. The goal of the members of the coalition, however, is purely individual and not collective, personal wealth is seen as the only motivation (Molotch 1988). In effect, a local group of land rentiers is at the heart of a coalition because these are the people who have the resources necessary for reviving economic growth (Logan and Molotch 1987). They add to financial resources, while the banks, the property developers, and a number of other parties grow their businesses and thus also their economic capital. Alongside this activity, different relationships develop involving both private and public sector actors who benefit directly or indirectly from such associations. A coalition automatically constructs a relatively coherent group, more or less linked to the local authorities, property developers, business owners, managers, bankers, union officials, solicitors, retail interests, lawyers, journalists and members of other liberal professions. To these, one can add secondary actors such as universities,
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private cultural organisations, managers of sports facilities, and other business people.

For Logan and Molotch (1996), land rentiers’ associates may be divided into three categories: businesses that benefit directly from the development project; organisations which increase their sales of products through the project; and local organisations that benefit indirectly from growth. Local governments take part in the growth coalition when it gives them financial resources and also when they can take advantage of it to demonstrate to citizens their ability to govern (Harding 1996a). The principal benefit of a coalition to its members lies in the capacity of actors to make individual interests into a collective interest to legitimate their activities. In most instances, coalition activity centres on the setting-up of large scale building development operations (Harding 1995; Le Galès 1996b; Gissendanner 2003; 2004).

Leisure plays a great role in cities where growth coalition takes place because:

(...) whilst a good opera or ballet company may subtly enhance the growth potential of some cities, other cultural ingredients are crucial for a good business climate (Logan and Molotch 1996: 298).

In that sense, Logan and Molotch argue that sport events are perceived by these cities and their growth coalitions as

... ways of meeting short term goals of generating revenue as well as ways of meeting short term goals of attracting outside businesses (1996: 312).

Thus sports, and more generally leisure, are the tools for fostering growth conditions, and in addition sport may be a useful means to sustain growth ideology (Logan and Molotch 1996).
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At the heart of a coalition, relations are much more those of a market place than of true consensus. Given that its raison d'être is personal profit, relationships are made through negotiation and by compromise because each individual tries to preserve his/her interest to the maximum (Molotch 1988). If one of the actors is not satisfied by the benefits generated, s/he can retire from the coalition. The heart of the coalition is based on indispensable actors belonging to the 'first circle' mentioned in the previous paragraph. However, once the project is achieved, the coalition is likely to dissolve. This concept thus represents a potential tool in the analysis of the institutionalisation of collective action, notably in terms of providing an alternative economic response to political failure. The coalition approach, with its emphasis in certain sources, focuses analysis in particular on the political actors, and this serves to counter the poverty of explanation concerning the motivation of local government for participating in such groups (Harding 1994; 1995). Nevertheless, it is argued that the ethnocentric nature of this type of explanation makes it difficult to apply in countries other than the US because of the specific economic and social conditions and business involvement in different policy domains which are specific to the US context (Harding 1994). However, recent work has sought to extend the application of the theory (Wood 2004) and to use it in European contexts (Kulcsar and Domokos 2005). Nevertheless the coalition does not represent the only form of institutionalisation of collective action in this type of context and we therefore, go on to consider other potential explanatory frameworks in the field of modes of governance, the concept of 'policy network'.

2.4. Networks

2.4.1. Configurations
In the social sciences area, sociology is not the only discipline to be concerned with networks (Parrochia 1993), but it stands to reason that sociology should have as a major focus, social networks (Berkowitz 1982;
Lemieux 1982; Scott 1991; Degenne and Forsé 1994). Conceptual approaches developed in this domain fall traditionally in the area of structural analysis but with a shift in emphasis from a concern with categories to one, which privileges relations. People may be ascribed to certain categories (e.g. to a particular social class) but they also belong to networks, which at a first level of analysis consist of interpersonal structural relations. Categories do not exist ‘a priori’ nor are they permanent. Indeed our ability to identify or construct categories emerges from analysis of the elements, which form a structure. Analysis involves identifying consistencies in behaviour, and identifying those groups in which such patterns are evident. This can be conducted in an inductive, abductive or even retroductive manner (Blaikie 1993). By retroduction we refer here to the process in the sense employed by Bhaskar (1975) in his construction of the critical realist project (see also in Chapter 3 of this thesis). This approach is explained by Lawson in the following terms:

Theoretical explanations entail transforming existing cognitive resources into plausible theories of the mechanisms responsible for identified (typically less than strict) patterns of phenomena. These theories are then empirically assessed and when found to be empirically adequate, themselves explained in turn, in the continuous unfolding of explanatory knowledge (Lawson 1998; 164-165)

Thus in the context of a network approach, one can observe interaction, identify or posit the existence of groups a posteriori, and subsequently go on to suggest how such structures enable or constrain behaviour in emerging interactions.

Given this interdependency, it is clearly critical to develop methods, which will allow the characterisation of a network. Following the framework developed by Lemieux (1982) a number of characteristics of the network approach may be constructed with those of more traditional, hierarchical notions of structure. Thus, a network approach to analysis will emphasize:

- plurality of role (rather than task specialisation);
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- multiplex relations (rather than dyadic 'targeted' relations);
- multiple and informal links (rather than solely functional links in an organisational chart);
- absence of boundaries in interactions (rather than closed domains of action, based on roles, rights, and responsibilities);
- coordination of action on an informal basis (rather than institutionally or constitutionally rule-governed coordination);
- multi-directional interaction (rather than hierarchical, pyramidal, vertical interaction).

The thrust of this type of approach, which focuses on the fluid and informal as much as the 'fixed' and 'formal' has led to a growing emphasis on two foci of analysis, communities (including communities of interest) and groups (including interest groups) (Degenne and Forsé 1994: 37). The kinds of research questions associated with this focus include: how are such groups formed and reproduced?; how do members interact to achieve shared goals?; and whose interests predominate and why?

In the 1950s, analysis of policy focused attention on aspects of the activities of groups in the policy process. Groups were described as being involved in the political process because of their importance as sources of ideas and leadership (see for example Floyd Hunter’s (1953) classic study Community Power Structure). The group context and informal interaction allow us to understand political actors’ behaviour in the formal policy domain. The elite theory approach of Hunter, faced challenge from Dahl (1961) and other pluralists, and from neo-pluralist accounts such as that of Lindbolm (1977). Lindblom’s incrementalist account of policy-making emphasised not only aspects of bounded rationality (the limits to the numbers of options which might be considered by an actor) but also, by implication one might argue, bounded ‘sociability’ (there is a limit to how much social interaction, how many social linkages, might be developed). Every member of a group is unlikely to be able to interact with every other once the group exceeds a certain size. This difficulty is a critical function in
explaining the emergence of corporatist accounts of policy-making. Corporatism represents both a normative or prescriptive set of ideas (this is how policy ought to work through consultation via representative groups/organisations), and an heuristic approach (this is how policy-making actually is managed).

This shifting emphasis in social and policy analysis from a focus on structural antecedents and outcomes of policy to one on process, repetition and interaction, also represents a shift from grand theory to middle range theory in Robert Merton's (1957) sense. The more structuralist versions of elite theory, pluralism, Marxism, feminism etc. tend to relate policy-making and its outcomes to the structural context of society. However, the network approach not only represents a change in the source of explanation (processes of interaction rather than social structure) but also the scope of explanation (explanations may relate only to particular local policy contexts rather than being grand generalisation). Thus commentators explaining the move in policy studies to reject accounts based on the 'iron triangle' concept as too simple to embody the complexity of the policy process (Heclo 1978) began to seek more context-specific accounts.

This is reflected in the growing number of studies in the 1980s and the 1990s adopting an issue network approach (John 1998). In the French literature about the State and public policy, the concept of network has a considerable history. It is in an instrumental sense that it has been mostly used (Jouve 2003). As Jouve (2003) argues "Policy networks were considered as being a regulation mode of the political-administrative French system" (Jouve 2003: 50).

The new approach of networks, proposed by Marsh and Rhodes (1992) appeared particularly useful to understand reconstruction of the French policy system in the context of the introduction of laws of 'décentralisation'.
and ‘déconcentration’\(^2\). The relationship between issue networks, policy networks, and policy communities is addressed in the following section and represents the extension, or teasing out, of the network based analysis in the policy context.

### 2.4.2. Policy networks

In the UK literature on policy networks, the Rhodes model (1981) sees policy-making as involving a significant number of institutions. There is a resource dependency between members of the network, on which relationships are built (Cole and John 1995). According to Rhodes (1988), there are essentially two different types of network: issue networks and policy communities. A policy community is a group characterized by stable and restricted membership, shared responsibilities for delivering services and a high level of integration. In effect, a policy community is a small group of individuals that have sufficient power to enhance policy-making. The concept of policy community corresponds, Rhodes argues, to the practices of European governments. The bureaucracy and the executive have such supremacy that networks are more limited than in the USA. On the other hand, issue networks represent loose, open and shifting constellations of actors (John 1998). Although both networks exist, they do not do so in every policy domain. Policy communities are more formalised, coherent and thus have greater resources and greater influence on policy decisions (Rhodes 1988).

In their book *Policy Networks in British Government* (1992), Marsh and Rhodes argue that policy outcomes and policy change are explained by

\(^2\) The decentralisation laws in 1982 and 1983 introduced new structures into the French State. These laws created the *Conseils Départemental* and *Régional*. These are institutions that have specific powers and missions granted by central government. They are independent from it and there are elections for each Council. The State votes general laws and policy, which are applied by the different Councils. ‘Déconcentration’ expresses the creation of structures which are directly dependent upon the State. For example, the Prefect is the representative of the State at the local level, as the *Direction Régionale de la Jeunesse et des Sports* (DPRS) and the *Direction Départementale de la Jeunesse et des Sports* (DDJS) are representative bodies at the regional and departmental level of the Ministry of Youth and Sports.
the character of the network. The kind of relationships between the members explains the differences between the policy sectors. Rhodes (1988) argues that networks vary across five key dimensions:

- a constellation of interests;
- the membership;
- vertical independence;
- horizontal independence;
- the distribution of resources.

This gives a continuum of networks, from the policy community to the issue network, which enable authors to take into account almost all decision making groups (John 1998). According to Atkinson and Coleman (1992), issue networks and policy communities are different in the kinds of relations that link actors. In the former, they are 'in touch', in the latter, they 'communicate'. One of the criticisms levelled against network theory is that it focuses on the nature of relations, and not on policy content. Policy communities are ideology driven. Members have to follow the rules of the game which are largely imposed by the governmental group. Smith (1993) argues that networks exist because the government wants to create a network in a domain. The governmental body is the dominant group in the network.

Issue networks are involved in areas where decisions do not appear important for the governing body. Government has an interest in developing closed policy communities, which it can then control. These alliances also suit groups or resource holders, because it enables them to gain a certain power. However, the whole group is not systematically integrated into the network: radical elements will tend to be excluded (Smith 1993). Government thus chooses its partners because it generally controls resources. Issue networks tend to be implicated in areas in which decisions do not appear important for the government. They take place where formal governing bodies leave a gap. Since government is invariably one of the main network members (especially in the case of a
policy community), it is anticipated that a network may change following an election. However, networks have to be understood in their environment, and not analysed as institutions (Smith 1993). They are forms of governance which are organised on the negotiation principle focused on the realisation of a common product, which can be, for example, “a specific technical innovation, town planning, a collective action strategy or the solution to a problem in a public policy” (Mayntz 1993: 11). Table 2.1. presents the main features of policy community and issue network illustrating how the continuum between both can be developed.
## Table 2.1: Policy community and issue network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Policy community</th>
<th>Issue network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of participants</td>
<td>Very limited, some conscious exclusion</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of interest</td>
<td>Economic/professional</td>
<td>Wide range of groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of interaction</td>
<td>Frequent, high quality</td>
<td>Contacts fluctuate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity</td>
<td>Membership, values, outcomes persistent</td>
<td>Fluctuating access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>All participants share basic values</td>
<td>A degree of agreement but conflict present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of resources within network</td>
<td>All the participants have resources. Relationship is one of exchange.</td>
<td>Some participants have resources, but limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of resources within participating organisations</td>
<td>Hierarchical leaders can deliver members</td>
<td>Varied and variable distribution and capacity to regulate members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>There is a balance among members. One group may be dominant but power is positive-sum</td>
<td>Unequal power. Power zero-sum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Marsh and Rhodes (1992)

Networks are open configuration, and, as Marsh and Rhodes (1992) suggest, they are affected in public policy by four factors:

- changes in the economy and the market;
- the ideology of the central government;
- changes in knowledge;
- institutional change.
In terms of longevity, Dudley (2003) argues that a policy community survives when it is able to anticipate the future to re-create itself. Local networks are similar to national ones, but there is often a difficulty in defining the territorial scope of analysis in local networks because networks are often not only horizontal but also vertical (Cole and John 1995). Thus, especially in France, a local policy network will involve more than just local actors. Policy-making is a result of relationships between local, departmental, regional and national actors, simply because of the distribution of roles and power implied within the décentralisation and déconcentration legislation. Two features explain the strong relationships between national and sub-national spheres in France: the presence of the central state at the different levels of decision-making, and multiple office-holding (cumul des mandats) which enable politicians to be elected at several levels of government (Cole and John 1995: 93; Le Galès 2001). Thus, in France in particular

The study of local policy networks must encompass the interactions of the various territorial levels appropriate to the study of a particular policy sector (Cole and John 1995: 92).

Amongst the three theoretical concepts presented in this chapter, the concept of policy networks is perhaps the most developed in comparative studies between France and Britain (Le Galès and Thatcher 1995; Cole and John 1995; John 1998; John and Cole 1999; John and Cole 2000; Le Galès 2001). This is largely because the day-to-day reality of policy-making in the French context can be more obviously explained by reference to this concept (Cole and John 1995), more easily than by reference to the other two concepts which require a deeper form of investigation. The Mayor is the main actor at the local level in France, involved in several networks, coordinator of local interest groups, and in competition with other sub-national entities. But if the policy network approach seems to provide an interesting approach to the study of policy in the French case, it will also have limitations because policy networks are
“both everything and nothing, and they occur in all aspects of policy-making” (John 1998: 85).

The metaphor of the network has been criticised as leading to description rather than explanation (Atkinson and Coleman 1992). Moreover, there is often little explanation about why a policy network has come into existence or why it has ceased to exist (Dowding 1995).

Thus although a policy network approach highlights interaction between actors of various types, from loose policy communities to policy networks, and more specific issue networks, it is argued that it fails to explain policy change (or network change) adequately. Thus urban regime theory has sought to provide a more detailed heuristic line of argument, particularly in relation to policy development at the urban level.

2.5. Urban regime theory.

Urban regime theory appeared in the work of Stone (1989) who developed the approach in his study of the development of urban policy over time in Atlanta. He defines a regime as...

an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions (1989: 4).

In its origins, the concept of urban regime was a tool to explain the relationship between the public and private sector. It has been used further to analyse how different interests are taken into account within governing coalitions (Mossberger and Stoker 2001). The complexity of the society and the lack of resources and power from local government imply interdependency between governmental and non-governmental forces. This dependency is based on the resources that each group can bring, resources needed to govern. To that end, collaborative arrangements are built between the different actors. Coordination within the regime is based
on a network of actors; there is no hierarchy or bargaining, but a collective action. There is a shared interest within the coalition that the collaboration will be beneficial for all members. However, a regime is not simply a coalition formed in order to achieve one specific goal, it is a collaboration based on a common project in a long-term perspective. Stone (1989) argues that such a collaboration, if it is to be termed a regime, should operate for more than a decade. According to Deleon (1992: 557):

... if collective goals set for a regime do not change, if its social production performance is adequate, and if alternative institutional means do not exist, the regime can become self-entrenching and impervious to external threats.

There seem to be two characteristics for actors to be effective regime partners: first, possession of strategic knowledge of social transactions and a capacity to act on the basis of that knowledge; and second, control of resources that make one an attractive coalition partner (Stoker 1995). According to Stone, regime analysis is concerned with conceptualising the regime as the ‘organism’ that mediates between causal variables in the environment and policy outcomes, and is also concerned with the way in which local actors mediate external pressures such as economic change. The focus in regime analysis is on the internal dynamics of coalition building, on ‘civic cooperation’ or informal modes of coordination across institutional boundaries (Mossberger and Stoker 2001).

In Stone’s study of Atlanta, the active mobilization of the resources of the business elite and the black middle class through a network of civic cooperation created a regime that was capable of pursuing a development agenda that was beneficial to both types of partners. Regimes are constructed around a common project or a shared vision for the city. This could involve a consensus about the need to act together to achieve this idea. Hence the structuring resources of the partners and the interaction between them should be the basis of the agenda.
A major feature of this theory is its concept of power (see the discussion on power in section 3.3.3). Stone’s approach (1989) emphasises ‘power to’ do things rather than ‘power over’ people. He describes four types of power - systemic power, command power, coalition power, and pre-emptive power – and argues that an urban regime reflects pre-emptive power insofar as an association is building between actors that have power to act. There is interdependency between members, because each of them brings resources needed to a specific agenda, around a shared vision of the city (Dowding 2001). Authors identify three kinds of actor: elected politicians, commercial firms or actors and associations or members of the voluntary sector. It is interesting to note that Stoker and Mossberger (1994) argue for the importance of a fourth group: professionals, i.e. civil servants or municipal employees. In regard to their expertise and their professional involvement in projects, it is undeniable that professionals have a specific role, particularly in European contexts, and specifically in France. In building a case for a particular policy, momentum is often provided by professionals or bureaucrats. Their professional expertise is often recruited by political actors in support of their case. A professional’s actions may be decisive in many instances. For example, in French cities or communes, it would not be uncommon for the person charged with responsibility for promoting events to take a decision not to present the case for a particular event to a town council.

Literature on urban regimes demonstrates the diversity of the concept. Several authors have proposed classifications of the kinds of urban regimes which exist (Stoker and Mossberger 1994; and Dowding 2001, for example list the different classifications). Although this broadening of the application to several types risks loosing the essence of the concept (Sartori 1991), these typologies nevertheless give some insight into the subtlety of regimes in contexts other than North America. Literature shows that regimes are “geographically variable phenomena” (Raco 2003: 40). Stoker and Mossberger’s classification of regime types is particularly
interesting in the context of our study because it was produced with the goal of allowing comparison between urban regimes in different countries and different types of cities. Table 2.2. presents their three-fold typology.

Table 2.2.: Stoker and Mossberger's typology of urban regime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Organic regime</th>
<th>Instrumental regime</th>
<th>Symbolic regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance of status quo</td>
<td>Project realisation</td>
<td>Redirection of ideology or image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main motivation of participants</td>
<td>Local dependency</td>
<td>Tangible results</td>
<td>Expressive politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis for sense of common purpose</td>
<td>Tradition and social cohesion</td>
<td>Selective incentives</td>
<td>Strategic use of symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of coalition</td>
<td>Political communion</td>
<td>Political partnership</td>
<td>Competitive agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with</td>
<td>-Exclusive orientation</td>
<td>-Exclusive orientation</td>
<td>-Inclusive orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-local environment</td>
<td>-Independent</td>
<td>-Dependent</td>
<td>-Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-non-local environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stoker and Mossberger, 1994

Thus they distinguish the organic regime, the goal of which is to sustain existing conditions in the city; the instrumental regime that aims to promote urban development through the realisation of specific development projects; and the symbolic regime, which is focused on developing an ideology or image for the city (1994: 199). Against the background of this typology, Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) sought to demonstrate how a symbolic regime was developed in the city of Sheffield, based around the project of changing the dominant image of the city from that of 'the city of steel', to that of a 'city of sport'. A key vehicle for this regime was the bid to host the 1991 World Student Games.
In order to ensure that extension of the term regime would be linked to the original concept, Dowding (2001) gives eight characteristics of an urban regime. They are

(1) a distinctive policy agenda, which is (2) relatively long-lived and (3) sustained by coalitions of interest or personnel not formally or fully specified in institutional structures, often in the form of a ‘grand coalition’ or large-majority coalition of interests, and often with (4) cross-sectoral or institutional boundaries. The policy agenda should also (5) survive personnel and leadership changes or political successions, reflecting a specific ideology or agreement over fundamental values for members of the coalition, which would allow continued electoral success. It should also (6) primarily involve the formation of public-private partnerships, often transcending partisan divisions, (7) be associated with strong or exceptional leadership, capable of entrepreneurially assembling an unusual coalition and linking it with a distinctive political vision, and (8) tend to bridge institutions and community interests by creating ‘partnership’ forms, especially, in European contexts, spanning the public-private sector (2001: 14).

These characteristics summarize the general meaning of the concept, and furthermore enable us to operationalised the concept.

Urban regime theory is potentially useful in understanding the decision-making process in modern cities since it embodies the different aspects of it: the nature of the partners; how coalitions are formed; and how decisions are taken (Harding 1994). It has often been used in British case studies to explain changes in urban governance (Harding 1990; Digaetano and Klemanski 1993a; Digaetano and Klemanski 1993b; Harding 1994; Henry and Paramio-Salcines 1999; Paramio-Salcines 2000; Denyer 2002; Thornley et al. 2005). In the French case, it is mostly the ‘roots’ of urban regimes which have been demonstrated (Levine 1994) rather than the existence of an urban regime. Where authors have claimed the presence of an urban regime, it is in specific French cities, which play a significant role at the regional, national and/or at the European level (John and Cole 1998).
Chapter 2: Theoretical review

Perhaps the most common criticism levelled against urban regime theory, as with the group approach and policy networks, is that it is limited in its explanation of variation, maintenance or change of an urban regime. It examines how regimes are formed but not how and why they change or disappear (Stoker and Mossberger 1994). An urban regime takes place in a specific context, with governmental and non-governmental partners with more or less resources and influence. The regime is included in a dynamic environment that influences it. For example, DeLeon (1992), in his study of San Francisco argues that shifts in the patterns of funding from Federal Government, and the arrival of a business leadership, led from a pro-growth to a progressive regime.

To address this issue, Orr and Stoker (1994) proposed a model of regime transition. In a first stage, the changes in the environment lead to a questioning of the relevance of the present regime because of the distance between its goals and the present context. The second stage is the redefinition of the scope and purpose of the regime, which involves debate and conflict between the elite groups in the city. A third stage involves the institutionalisation of the new regime. In this stage, a new solution-set would need to be established alongside appropriate institutional arrangements and selective incentives.

A major problem that researchers have to face with urban regime theory (as with growth coalitions) is whether this set of concepts is appropriate to contexts other than that of the North America. In North America, local government is more dependent on cooperation with business to carry out projects. In Europe, cooperation with business is less needed because of the greater importance of public resources, and local policy is thus likely to be public sector-led. In such different conditions, it is questionable whether we can talk about the concept of urban regime as universally applicable. Case studies often do not fully take into account the local and
national context, and thus may confuse general policy groupings with an ‘urban regime’ (Gibbs and Jonas 2000).

Sartori (1991) describes four pitfalls in the misapplication of concepts, which Mossberger and Stoker (2001) relate to the potential misapplication of the term urban regime:

- parochialism: this is a misuse of the concept; for example, refining to a regime where there is simply a public-private partnership.
- misclassification: all cities are assumed to have regimes.
- degreeism: the tendency to talk about the degree to which a regime is present, rather than saying whether there is a regime or not.
- concept stretching: which refers to removing aspects of the original meaning of the concept so that it can accommodate more cases.

To avoid these pitfalls in comparative research, Mossberger and Stoker (2001) proposed core criteria that enable researchers to use the urban regime concept in explaining case studies:

- Partners drawn from government and non-governmental sources, requiring but not limited to business participation;
- Collaboration based on social production – the need to bring together fragmented resources for the power to accomplish tasks;
- Identifiable policy agendas that can be related to the composition of the participants coalition;

This set of criteria provides a useful checklist against which to consider the application of the term ‘urban regime’ to European contexts in general and the French context in particular.
2.6. Operationalising the differences between the three theories.

On the basis of the evaluation of the literature concerning these three concepts, we identify below seven transversal indicators that will facilitate comparison of the three concepts, and which focus on governance characteristics. All three approaches share certain features: they are, for example, network rather than formal hierarchy models. Nevertheless, we can conclude from our preceding discussion, that they vary along several key dimensions.

- the nature of their objectives;
- the means by which they seek to achieve their ends;
- the nature of the actors involved (both primary and secondary);
- the motivations of actors (either explicit or inferred);
- the nature of the resources available to the group;
- the kinds of relations evident between actors;
- the stability of the grouping / network, and its time frame for action.

This set of dimensions provides us with a key means of identifying or operationalising differences between what one might expect to find in contexts conforming to one of the three types (table 2.3. summarises these differences). Each is considered in turn.

a). Objectives

As we have seen, growth coalitions’ objectives can be described at different levels. On the one hand, Logan and Molotch (1987) argue that the objectives of the dominant actors relate to profit from the growth project. However, they also note that the public legitimation of their activities relates to ‘economic growth’ as a public or at least a merit (rather than a private) good.

Objectives in the case of policy networks will reflect what Rhodes and Marsh refer to as a ‘constellation of interests’. Dunleavy (1980) identifies goals among policy actors in the British local government context as
reflecting ‘ideological corporatism’, the dominant value system in any
given policy network (though strictly speaking Dunleavy’s work pre-dates
the policy network literature). This might also be described by reference to
‘epistemic communities’ whereby a policy community may embrace a
pertinent set of values and thus objectives which are promoted within its
ranks (see for example Hume 2005), and may become embedded so as to
form in effect part of the group habitus.

Objectives in the case of an urban regime may vary from that of
defending the status quo (in conservative, ‘organic’ regimes in Stoker and
Mossberger’s (1994) terms), to ‘symbolic’ change, promotion of
development and so on.

b). Means employed
Growth coalitions focus activities on physical development projects which
foster capital accumulation. Policy networks employ approaches more
closely associated with the shaping of the policy agenda. Regimes,
because of their multifaceted membership will seek to advance their case
on a wide range of fronts involving actors and groups from the private,
the public and the third sector, fostering action among like-minded
individuals.

c). Actors (primary and secondary)
Here perhaps the key issue is the place of the private sector. In the case
of growth coalitions, land ownership / property development capital leads
the coalition, with other actors in a secondary position. In the case of
policy networks, though non-governmental actors will play a part in the
promotion of particular goals, local, regional and national governmental
actors will tend to be the critical group. In urban regimes, for different
projects, different actors may come to the fore, and sometimes these will
be public, sometimes private, and sometimes voluntary sector actors. The
Chapter 2: Theoretical review

individuals and indeed the projects may vary but the overall goals of regime are consistently promoted across groups and across projects.

d). Motivations
Logan and Molotch (1987), in their neo-Marxist account, emphasise the economic self interest of the leading members of the coalition as providing the primary motivation. Policy networks are also described as to some degree reflecting self interest on the part of its members, as well as motivations associated with social or professional goals. Motivations in the case of urban regimes will vary from one regime type to another.

e). Resources
Key resources available to growth coalitions are capital investment funds. Thus coalitions are most likely to flourish in circumstances within which the public sector is weak politically and / or economically. Policy networks’ major resource by contrast tends to relate to control over / influence upon the policy machinery – from agenda setting through resource prioritisation, to implementation. Thus it seeks to exert ‘power over’ others in the policy context. An urban regime may recruit its members from a broader range of sectors. Each of these actors may bring with them different resources – capital for investment; political influence; ideological influence in promoting the regime’s values in wider communities and so on.

f). Nature of relations within the group
The growth coalition tends to focus on constant bargaining until its goals are achieved, usually with the realisation of a single, major project. Within policy networks, forms of hierarchy are evident with some actors more able to exert influence on the activities, means and goals of the network than others. Finally, urban regimes require continuous consensus-building to maintain long-term commitment to the regimes’ goals.
g). Stability over time
Coalitions as conceived by Logan and Molotch are relatively short term, project-specific groupings. Once a project is realised, therefore, it is likely that the coalition will dissolve. Policy networks may be rather more long term, but at local level, in particular, may be disrupted by electoral misfortunes. Regimes however are long term interest and action groupings with a broadly shared set of goals (e.g. regeneration, conservation) which are promoted over a range of projects.

Table 2.3. below summarises these features of the three approaches.
| **Table 2.3: The urban governance framework** |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| **Objectives**           | **Growth coalition**     | **Policy network**        | **Urban regime**          |
| Economic growth of the   | Constellation of         | Depends on type of        |
| city and 'personal'      | interests.               | regime (growth,           |
| economic gain.           |                          | symbolic change etc).     |
| **Means**                | Large scale property     | Shaping of policy         | A range of projects       |
| development projects.    | agenda, projects         | and delivery.             | over an extended period.  |
| **Kind of actors:**      | **Local, regional,      | **Local, regional,        |
| - primary                | national governments    | national governments      |
| Land owners, property    |                          | Private firms,            |
| developers               |                          | associations, all with a  |
|                          |                          | shared vision for the     |
|                          |                          | city.                    |
| - secondary              | Banks, government,      | Actors sharing the        |
|                          | universities, associations (actors who indirectly have benefits participating to the project) | same ideology, representatives of governmental and non-governmental associations |
|                          |                          |                          |
| **Motivations**          | To enhance capital values, personal wealth gain. | To maintain / strengthen position in the policy system. | To promote the shared vision for the city through a variety of measures |
| **Resources**            | Financial power and property ownership. | Influence of actors in the policy system; ‘power over’ | ‘Power to’ do things |
| **Kind of relations**    | Constant bargaining,    | Internal hierarchy        | Consensus in the          |
| between actors**         | subordination of politics by economics | within an overall network | orientation and the action |
| **Stability**            | Low: limited to the life of the project | Medium: often linked to elections | Strong: over at least 10 years |

The section following completes the literature review, by focusing on the principal domain of policy concern, urban sports policy.

2.7. Urban sport policy research.

Whereas sport policies were traditionally concerned with a service delivery to citizens, they have now gained an important place in urban policy (Henry 2001). More than the involvement of populations in sport, sport facilities and sport events represent interesting challenges for city
development. Thus, the nature of local sports policy has significantly changed (Dulac and Henry 2001), with a growing role of sport in economic and social regeneration for cities (Gratton and Henry 2001). Research focusing on this new approach to sport at the local level is still, however, relatively underdeveloped.

In terms of urban level theories, urban regime theory has perhaps been the most used in explaining the activities of cities in hosting major sport events (Paramio-Salcines 2000; Denyer 2002; McCarthy 2002; Bennett and Spirou 2006). Sheffield, for example, is described as having been managed by a symbolic regime, which aimed to change the image of the city through the hosting of the 1991 World Students Games (Paramio-Salcines 2000) and the development of a new leisure policy (Denyer 2002) though in the latter study Denyer uses urban regime theory as a prism through which to evaluate city policy, ultimately rejecting it.

Beyond such studies, authors have focused their attention on sport as a means for achieving broader cities objectives, rather than a focus on how urban sport policy has developed, in European countries. Thus, Gratton, Shibli and Coleman (2005) argue that in the British context, sport events have been an opportunity to change cities’ image and to create jobs. The hosting of major events is also aimed at attracting tourists and encouraging inward investment. Such events are now seen by politicians as a means to attract attention to the host city (Westerbeek, Turner and Ingerson 2002). Thus, from earlier concerns about service delivery to the population, sport has became a strategy of economic regeneration (Gratton, Shibli and Coleman 2005; Findlay 2003), with the hosting of major events often accompanied by the building of sport facilities (Santo 2005; Davies 2005).

But even if cities seek economic regeneration, a necessary condition is often to change the image of the host city (Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel
Chapter 2: Theoretical review

2002; Smith 2005), since economic regeneration is seen as a consequence of the renewal of a city’s image. The hosting of a major event enables cities to position themselves in the global world, to take part in the ‘global game’. However, though host cities may attract global attention through sport events, they, nevertheless, may not change the reality of life conditions in impoverished neighbourhoods (Silk 2002; Friedman, Andrews and Silk 2004). Furthermore, the hosting of major events may only be made in rich or emergent countries, able to take part in the global dimensions of bidding process (Swart and Bob 2004). It is thus, perhaps, only an option for cities, which are already economically and infrastructurally developed.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, it is in the US context that most such case studies have been conducted (Nelson 2000; Chanayil 2002; McCarthy 2002; Gibson, Willming and Holdnak 2003; Chapin 2004). Although few studies explicitly link the importance of sport to governance in the US context, we can argue that sport is one ‘solution’ identified by many cities, which are faced with economic, social and government crises. In a period when the ‘market sportivisation of the world is growing’ (Brohm 2006), sport is seen instrumentally as a good stimulus, or vehicle, in the development of cities. Consequences of the hosting of major sport events include economic outcomes following from the increase of spectators / consumers in the host city (Gibson, Willming, Holdnak 2003) and an increase in available employment during and after event with management of infrastructures (Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel 2002).

Nowadays, urban sport policy is part of the global vision of the city, and the hosting of an important sport competition is seen as an opportunity to realise this vision. It is thus urban development policy, economic policy, and tourist policy, which are now at play in sport rather than simply sports policy ‘per se’. Although few comparisons have been made between sport policies in different contexts or periods, such comparative studies may aid
the understanding of our ‘sport world’, and an interesting typology has been proposed by Henry et al. (2005) to develop such approaches.

This thesis makes, in a sense, part of this will to develop comparative studies on sport policy, because it focuses on a comparison between decision-making process in the same city, but in different time periods. Though a single city study, this thesis in effect forms part of this body of comparative analysis since it seeks to evaluate a French policy context employing conceptual and theoretical tools developed in non-French contexts.

2.8. Conclusion

In this chapter we have sought to identify the key features of the three approaches to urban governance. Our aim in doing this was not simply to identify and evaluate the kinds of explanation given by the leading proponents of these three positions. We were also concerned to clarify how these three approaches might be operationalised and differentiated. In essence this provided us with an ‘ideal typical’ description of seven key dimensions along which the nature of the three approaches might be evaluated. The specificity of the French context, and indeed of Marseille as a city, and the specificity of sport policies for cities, will have to be taken into account, but given our research aims as specified in Chapter 1, we wish to consider to what extent the urban sport policy system in Marseille reflects aspects of the three models, or whether sports policy in Marseille requires some other theoretical or conceptual construction to capture the nature of the local policy system in the cases of the two major sporting events on which we focus.

Our outline of this ideal typical set of features is not intended to suggest a simple checklist of characteristics but rather a configuration of factors that will lend themselves more readily to the description of the policy actors as
a growth coalition, a policy network or an urban regime. This discussion brings us on to the discussion of methodological issues in some detail which is the subject matter for the next chapter.
3.1. Introduction

In research, methodological concerns represent the key to understanding how the researcher constructs her/his research and why s/he does so. Doing research not only means describing or explaining a topic but it is an account about how an observer sees the world and thus how s/he analyses things s/he observes. Thus the researcher, as an individual, must explain her/his ontological and epistemological position. To adopt an ontological position means to explain what the researcher’s view is in respect of the nature of the world: does s/he claim there is a real world or not? (Marsh and Furlong 2002). In political science, “One’s ontological position is... one’s answer to the question: what is the nature of the social and political reality to be investigated?” (Hay 2002: 61). The answer to this crucial question affects what is studied and how. In others words it leads to specific epistemological positions (Marsh and Smith 2001).

Section 3.2 presents (a modified version of) the critical realist ontological and epistemological positions, upon which this research is based. From these ontological and epistemological assumptions the methodology adopted is derived. According to Hay (2002), methodology is preceded by epistemology, which is preceded by ontology. Figure 3.1. describes the relationship that exists between them. These basic philosophical concerns cannot be ignored. Implicitly or explicitly ontological and epistemological assumptions are made which are fundamental to knowledge. They are in this sense ‘irreducible’ (Hay 2002).
Figure 3.1: Ontology, epistemology and methodology: a directional dependence (Hay 2002: 64)

Thus, section 3.3 highlights the methodology of this research, which is based upon an adaptation of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of critical realism.

Methodology relates to the choice of analytical strategy and research design which underpins substantive research... Thus, although methodology establishes the principles which might guide the choice of method, it should not be confused with methods and techniques of research themselves (Hay 2002: 63).

Founded principally on critical realist assumptions, the methodology presented here is closely linked to the literature in local political studies. Theories are crucial in critical realist research, because observations are always mediated by concept. Indeed, theories help to raise research questions and to understand the results (Marsh and Furlong 2002). These steps imply the use of specific data and analysis, outlined in section 3.4 and 3.5.

We thus outline below our 'world view', that is what constitutes the world and what we can observe about it, before going on to specify research questions and how they might be answered.
Chapter 3: Methodology

3.2. Ontological and epistemological concerns.

3.2.1. A critical realist position.

The critical realist approach represents a subtle form of realism. Like positivists, realists argue that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it (Marsh and Smith 1999). Whereas interpretivists emphasise the view that the world is socially or discursively constructed (Marsh and Furlong 2002), traditional realists contend that the world ‘out there’ is a reality, and that it exists independently of human activity. Critical realists wish to meld these views arguing that although the external world is socially constructed, nevertheless it exists independently of the individuals / groups who constructed it. Language provides one of the most compelling examples of the critical realist’s ontological claims. Language has (historically) been constructed by language users / speakers who have developed a set of grammatical and semantic structures. Language exists, and its structures exist, independent of individual users, though users may subsequently change rules and structures in and through linguistic interaction. Thus language is both socially constructed, constitutes a set of structures, but can be reflexively changed by individuals’ / groups’ interactivity (e.g. inventing new words, establishing new grammatical conventions etc.). The critical realist thus takes the realist notion of a ‘real external world’ and the interpretivist notion of an interpretive process in the construction of reality.

Some critical realists, following Bhaskar (1975) argue that “social phenomena/structures do have causal powers, so we can make causal statements” (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 30). Here we depart from the critical realist view. To continue with our use of language as an example, grammatical structures do not ‘cause’ people to speak in particular ways, though grammatical rules may enable or constrain certain types of speech. Thus to talk about structures ‘causing’ speech is inappropriate.
Chapter 3: Methodology

In epistemological terms, unlike positivists, critical realists argue that not all phenomena can be observed directly. There are deep structures that are not directly observable. Nevertheless,

positing their [structures] existence gives us the best explanation of social action. To use a phrase familiar to philosophy of science, we are involved in 'inference to the best explanation' (Hollis and Smith 1990: 207, in Marsh and Furlong 2002).

Marsh and Furlong (2002) thus explain that

... to a realist, there is often a dichotomy between reality and appearance... It means that realists do not accept that what appears to be so, or, perhaps more significantly, what actors say is so, is necessarily so’ (2002: 30-31).

Agents have perceptions of reality, and no direct objective observation. Interpretivists criticize realist claims about structures, which cannot be observable, by arguing that all structures are dependent on social action, and thus inferences of deep structures or observation are subjective (Marsh and Furlong 2002). Critical realists now recognise the subjectivity of research: our interpretation of social phenomena affects outcomes, and on the other hand, theories are used for a research oriented knowledge of the world (Marsh and Furlong 2002). In other words, structures and social phenomena exist independently of our knowledge of them, but reflexive agents are able to affect them, to have their own understanding as well as their own uses of such phenomena. The researcher is not totally objective, because any claims have to be made from a pertinent perspective. The ‘objectivity’ of the researcher lies in identifying this perspective, its assumptions, and its position in respect of other perspectives.

Marsh and Smith (1999: 11-14) summarise the main features of critical realism as follows:

- the world exists independently of our knowledge of it;
there is necessity in the world – objects / structures do have causal powers, so we can make causal statements (a point, which we critique above);

there are deep structures, which cannot be directly observed; social phenomena exist independently of our interpretation, or discursive construction of them, nevertheless the latter still affects outcomes;

structures do not determine outcomes; rather they constrain and facilitate; social science involves the study of reflexive agents who are capable of constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing structures.

Thus, growth coalitions, policy networks and urban regimes have to be defined in ontological terms: for example, are they real or simply ideal types (i.e. simply a useful way of conceptualising and grouping phenomena)?

3.2.2. Structure and agency: the position of this research.

In the debate about the relation between structure and agency, social scientists are actually concerned about the freedom that we, as actors, have according to the environment which surrounds us. As argued above, structures do not have causal power, they only constrain or facilitate outcomes (as suggested in the fourth bullet point of Marsh and Smith listed above). This leads to a specific relation between structure and agency: structures are linked to the agency that makes them 'live', just as agencies are dependent upon structures that enable and constrain them. This statement is consistent with the strategic-relational approach developed by Jessop (1990) and subsequently by Hay (1996). According to these authors, the distinction between structure and agency is purely analytical (Hay 2002). Structure and agency are interdependent, one could not be real without the existence of the other. Nevertheless, structures are the starting point for actions to take place (McAnulla 2002: 280). But structures are not fixed, they move in relation to actions. Structure and
agency thus only exist through their relational interaction. This is what Crozier and Friedberg (1977) emphasise when they argue:

The actor does not exist outside the system which defines his freedom and the rationality that he can use in his action. But the system only exists through the actor who is the heart of it, making it alive and who alone can change it (1977: 11).

Crozier and Fridberg (1977), like other authors, go further by arguing that it is the interaction between actors and their environment that is crucial: actors internalise the context they are in and orient their action accordingly. In other words, individuals are strategic actors in a strategic context. Actors and environment – agency and structure – are moving together, because the strategic context is strategically selective (Jessop 1990). A similar strategy adopted in two different contexts would not have the same result, and some contexts facilitate some strategies better than others.

Thus the conceptual dualism (agency and structure) becomes a conceptual duality (agency through structure, and structure through agency). Figure 3.2. shows this path and the relational and dialectical links between structure and agency.

Figure 3.2. From dualism to duality: the strategic-relational approach (Hay 2002: 128).
This approach, developed by Jessop (1990) when he was working on theorising the state (McAnulla 2002) is particularly relevant in the analysis of political interaction.

If we now come back to the concepts of ‘growth coalition’, ‘policy network’ and ‘urban regime’, we can describe them in ontological terms as being real, socially constructed, and as the context within which, or through which, actors are following strategies in response to the strategic selective context. These three concepts (growth coalition, policy network and urban regime) may be described as solutions to the strategic context (in particular the economic and social crises, which traditional government on its own cannot resolve). According to the context of a country (its social, cultural, political and economic history) agents’ options will vary. In a US context, where the private sector has much more power at the local level, it may be easier to have a private-sector led urban regime, than in France where the public sector has traditionally been dominant. In France, an elected politician can hold office at different levels, it may thus be easier to ‘grow’ a policy network. In other words, ‘the strategic selective environment’ can favour a policy network rather than an urban regime as an emergent structure. So, the same types of policy problem can lead to different strategies according to the context and the internalisation of this context by local actors.

It is thus within the context of strategic selectivity that this research aims to interpret the interrelation between structure and agency evident in the sport policy process in Marseille.

3.2.3. The notion of power.
Since this study focuses on decision-making at the urban level, it will be necessary to consider how power is to be defined and operationalised. Relations of power are invariably central in policy study, and the concepts of growth coalition, policy network and urban regime are related to the
wider conceptualisation of power. In this section we focus on the conceptualisation of power and consider how power can be evaluated in 'operational terms' and its relationship to ontological and epistemological considerations, drawing on the work of a range of (some complementary and some competing) traditions (Dahl 1957; Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Crozier and Friedberg 1977; Foucault 1977; 1981; Giddens 1979; Habermas 1968; Luke 1974).

Robert Dahl (1957) in his seminal work argued that power exists when A gets B to do something that B would not do otherwise (Dahl 1957: 201), and where there is a conflict of interests. Thus, the power of A can be 'measured' in the extent to which B lacks power. In this pluralist account, this power is an imbalanced relation between actors (Crozier and Friedberg 1977), with 'winners' and 'losers', where power is understood in relation to its effects, with power lying in agents’ ability to exert it rather than in social structures (Hay 2002). In the decision-making process, the most powerful actor is the one who has the greatest influence over other actors (Dahl 1961). This conception leads to a relative straightforward way of evaluating the power of actors in decision-making processes, by focusing on their success in exerting influence over others to act in particular ways. However, a key difficulty for Dahl’s approach is that he focuses on the decision-making arena, without analysing the external context.

Bachrach and Baratz (1970) added a new way of looking at power, or in Luke’s (1974) terms a new ‘face’ or dimension of power. Bachrach and Baratz argued that there is also a need to analyse non-decision making, since the choice by decision-makers to put forward a decision or not implies a highly significant screening process even before issues reach the decision-making arena. Thus, Bachrach and Baratz state the importance of analysing policy making beyond the official spheres, since "power is exerted in setting the agenda for the decision-making process” (Hay 2002:
174). Decisions have to pass through different barriers in the decision-making process, including the process of selection for consideration of an issue in the policy-making arena. Moreover, all decisions do not have the same importance, some issues are more significant than others, and decision-makers can decide to cede influence to certain groups on issues of lesser importance, while not doing so on issues of greater significance (Hay 2002). Thus, the major contributions of Bachrach and Baratz relate to their consideration of the informal process of agenda-setting, and the need to consider the weight of decision-making to assess the real distribution of power.

However, the major problem of this conception of power and Dahl’s account is that their conceptions are based on the assumption that an overt conflict of preferences between individuals is an essential condition of a situation where power is exerted, and thus, there are differences between interests and ‘formal’ preferences, which both conceptions do not examine.

Making this point, Luke (1974) argues that power is tri-dimensional. One dimension corresponds to Dahl’s account (open conflict in the policy arena), the second dimension corresponds to Bachrach and Baratz’s account of non-decisions, and the third dimension corresponds to Luke’s notion of power as the realisation of interests. According to Luke, to understand power, there is a need to understand the preference-shaping of actors. In this third dimension of power, actors may be aware or unaware (through for example false consciousness) (Rosen 1996) of her / his interests. Power thus corresponds to the manipulation of A over B to make B think that the situation serves her / his interests. That means that power is not only exerted in a conflictual situation but also exists in situations of consensus (Hay 2002). This approach, which draws on structuralist Marxist or Radical feminist epistemologies, is interesting in its contribution concerning the complex dimensions that power can embody,
but the distinction between real and perceived interests seems difficult to sustain and under-estimates actors capacities, as classic critiques of structuralist Marxism and radical feminism illustrate (Hay 2002).

For Crozier and Friedberg (1977), in their strategic analysis approach, actors are able to identify and assess where their interests lie, and act strategically to attain achievable objectives (rather than being able to optimise their position). It is through understanding of the context and other actors' interests that an actor draws up her / his strategy. According to Crozier and Friedberg, “power is a relation between actors, and not an attribute of actors” (1977: 65). It is a relation of exchange between dependant actors which can only exist, in such conditions of dependency, in the accomplishment of common objectives. In this sense relations of power have an instrumental aspect, since an actor uses it in her / his own interests. For Crozier and Friedberg (1977), relations of power are also non transitive, i.e. power is specific to an action, and is not ‘transferable’ to any other action. It is by the actor using her / his room for manoeuvre that s/he is able to increase her / his power. The control of the zone of uncertainty beyond structural relations is the main source of power for actors inside the structure.

These different approaches presented here focus on power in terms of the capacity to influence other actors, in terms of domination of one actor upon another. Stone's (1989) account of power is interesting and to some extent relates to Habermas's notion of communicative rationality. Stone's approach focuses on 'power to' do things rather than 'power over' people (Stone 1989; 227). In other words, he directs attention to an understanding of power expressed through social production rather than power as an issue of social control (Stoker 1995). His concern is about how a discourse is constructed and legitimated, and not how that discourse is used by one group to further its interests over another in a Foucauldian sense. Stone's concern is with how one group gains the
capacity to act.

Stone (1989) describes four forms of power:

- systemic power: available to certain interests because of their position in the socio-economic structure.
- command power: an active mobilization of resources and achievement of domination over other interests.
- coalition power: the power to construct a coalition or a group around a specific project or set of projects rather than around a broad and long term programme.
- pre-emptive power: where leadership is the result of a group of interests which are reflected in the establishment of a long-term network; there is a need to manipulate their strategic position and control over resources into an effective long-term coalition.

Systemic power implies greater access of one or more parties to systemic resources to influence decisions, whereas command power implies imposition of outcomes to achieve the domination of a particular set of interests. The distinction between coalition and pre-emptive power is the distinction between the power to construct a coalition, and the power to construct the conditions under which coalitions of interests emerge in organisational and political forms.

Stone’s work focuses on pre-emptive power. In his account, power is measurable in terms of resources that people are able to exchange. Power is thus not simply a matter of relation between actor, but rather a matter of competencies. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to exclude the notion of power as the result of a relations between actors, since there are always more than one individual / institution in the decision-making sphere with non-identical sets of interests and resources, implying that the relations between them will be significant.

The issue of power at a micro-level adopting a critical realist position implies a focus on relations between actors, their resources, and their
level of influence, in order to address the different dimensions of power. Actors’ discourses will invariably play a great role in understanding how actors construct the reality of the policy context and to what extent that discourse can become a source of power. However, we do not follow a Foucauldian approach in which discursive construction is ‘all that exists’ or ‘all that counts’, but would argue that actors in order to dominate discourse need to access wider structural resources (e.g. channels of communication). Thus, the notion of power which informs the formulation of our research questions, presented in the next section, is one which draws on strategic action, structural resources, coalition building and the development of value consensus as the context of decision-making.

3.3. A critical realist research strategy.

This research project was developed in several stages.

Stage 1: Literature review.

The literature review had two aims: first, to inform the study about what has been found in other similar contexts and how it has been theorized; and second, to help to articulate research questions. This research mostly focuses on two types of literature: the first is that relating to urban policy and politics, governance and specifically to French policy; the second relates to the specificity of the urban context in Marseille. This allows us to characterise structure in a particular national (French), and urban (Marseille), context and the nature of local agency in this context. Thus, the first stage of this work represents a review of critical concepts and applied literature in the field of urban governance to aid the emergence of research questions.

Stage 2: Research questions.

Informed by the literature, we have been able to formulate pertinent and coherent aims for the study, to formalize research questions and also to
choose adequate data, to interpret the interdependency of structure and agency in Marseille. Research aims and questions are introduced in Section 3.5. These represent a refinement of the initial research questions raised in Chapter 1.

Stage 3: Data collection.
For critical realists "we need to identify and understand both the external 'reality' and the social construction of that 'reality'" (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 31). Thus, this research has to take into account both the reflexive agents' discourses about events, and an understanding of how the context within which these events take place has been shaped by its history. This is largely accomplished through the collection of documents and interviews. Details of data collection are presented in section 3.6.

Stage 4: Qualitative content analysis.
The data collected were from interviews and documents. This was subjected to detailed qualitative content analysis in order to identify both manifest content and latent content (Berg 1998). Section 3.7. shows the different steps taken in this qualitative content analysis, which are derived from Altheide’s (1996) ethnographic content analysis approach.

3.4. Reviewing the literature on methodologies adopted in previous studies employing these three approaches (growth coalitions, policy networks, and urban regimes).
To understand the methodology employed in growth coalition theory, policy network and urban regime approaches, we have to consider work that has been undertaken in the urban policy studies field since the middle of 20th century. The first major work to consider is Hunter’s (1953) study on Atlanta. He based his study on a reputational analysis to identify community influentials. Hunter (1953) asked a panel of people to rank the
names of the community elite – which he had previously assembled into categories of business, government, civic associations and society activists – according to their perception of how powerful they were. The top forty people were subsequently interviewed. He then sought to ascertain who were the most powerful, what was the nature of interactions between them, and how did they relate to community projects. In his elitist approach, Hunter concluded that an elite group from business and society ruled Atlanta, and that the structure of Atlanta society was that of a pyramid capped by a ruling elite.

In contrast to the findings of Hunter, Dahl (1961) in his study of New Haven, tried to evaluate whether the local form of governance was an oligarchy or a polyarchy. He focused his research on three policy areas: urban development, public education and political nominations, and sought to identify whether the most influential individuals were the same for all three policy domains (providing evidence of an oligarchy) or whether different domains had differing leading individuals and groups (a polyarchy). He concluded that New Haven was ruled through a polyarchy.

The differences in these methodological approaches arise from the authors’ view of power. According to the view of power that one has, methodology and methods employed to investigate it will differ. Both authors in this case focus on ‘power over’ (power of one group over others), but they do so in different ways. For Hunter (1953), the question of power is directly linked to the influence that actors can have on other actors. It is this influence that explains the power of actors. For Dahl (1961), the power is much more a matter of influence on decisions. Indeed, Dahl’s research questions were ‘who is involved?’ and ‘how are they involved in policy decisions?’, whereas Hunter’s research question was ‘who has the greatest influence?’.
The three perspectives adopted in this thesis promote slightly different methodological approaches, which in effect are based on different conceptions of power. The policy community / policy network approach presupposes, in most instances, a pluralist or neo-pluralist approach. In Lukes’ (1974) seminal text, this constitutes the first and second dimensions of power. Power may be viewed in such contexts in the overt struggles over decision-making or access to resources (pluralism) or in the control over agenda setting (neo-pluralist / managerialist notions of non-decision-making). The growth coalitions literature stresses Lukes’ third dimension of power – where power is manifest in terms of those whose interests are met. Thus growth coalition analysis focuses on the interests of local capitalists and how such interests are met.

Thus in relation to these first two approaches, contrasting methodologies are suggested. The first implies investigation of the overt struggles between interest groups – as evidenced in public debates (recorded in documents and media commentaries) and personal recollections (through documents and interviews). It also (in its neo-pluralist / managerialist form) implies consideration of how agendas are shaped and restricted (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). The second approach relating to growth coalitions suggests that whatever the superficial battles are about, analysis of interests is required, with individual interests of local capitalists being represented as the interests of the wider community. Such an approach implies discursive analysis of documents in order to see how private interests are ‘masked’ in discourse about public welfare.

Regime analysis, in contrast to the other two perspectives, focuses on what Stone (1989) terms ‘power to’ rather than ‘power over’. Such an approach is related to Arendt’s (1970) normative distinction between violence and power, in which she argues that power can only truly be exercised where there is sufficient (democratic) consensus. Analysis of power will thus involve analysis of how such consensus can be built and
sustained, and implies analysing processes through description of meetings and how construction of potential to act is developed.

Because the three perspectives focus on who has power, a reputational analysis is often conducted. This can take different forms. In terms of quantitative methods, it can take the form of a socio-metric analysis for a policy network approach (John 1998) or a ‘wheel of involvement’ as developed by Smith and Beazley (2000) in an urban regime perspective. In terms of qualitative methods, interviews, documentary and media analysis are common, employing qualitative content or discourse analysis. Often quantitative methods provide a basis for the sampling of interviewees, and interviews enable an understanding of interactions between actors.

Perhaps the most interesting methodological approaches are those developed in the urban regime perspective, not only because of the methods employed, but also because of the view of power. The focus on ‘power to’ (power to do things, to mobilise resources and to accomplish change, rather than power over others) seems much more relevant to an understanding of policy-making. ‘Power over’ limits analysis on the influence, or capacity to influence, of actors. This notion does not take into account the capacity of actors to act, which is clearly critical when governments are in crisis and when the pressure of globalisation accentuates claims about the powerlessness of local actors to respond. Governance is a result of the gathering of actors capable of action, and not simply capable of influencing others.

Adopting this view of power, Harding (2000) presents 3 phases of regime analysis:

- to identify the keys players – formal and informal – in urban politics of production,
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- to describe how and to what extent they interact and what motivates them to do so,
- to assess the outcomes and effects of their interaction.

Similarly, Di Gaetano and Klemanski (1993a), in their study on the capacity of urban regimes in Birmingham and Detroit, interviewed 35 people, (city government officials and business elites) as a primary source. Their secondary source was local newspapers. Their aim was to understand the decision-making process in both cities with regard to urban regime theory. The use of both tools allows more valid findings. Interviews highlight formal aspects of the political process, but they also inform us about its informal side. Documentary analysis provides information about formal aspects and the context of the city, as an account of the one side of the ‘reality’ of the policy making process.

Paramio Salcines (2000), in his study of Sheffield and Bilbao, used the following tools: semi-structured interviews, the content of which evolved as the research progressed, with ‘snowball’ sampling; and a documentary analysis of materials produced by local authorities, the local press, policy literature and central government reports.

Ward (1996) listed the methodologies of major studies of urban policy and pointed out that if local press coverage is almost always used, this is often accompanied by analysis of interviews and materials produced by public or private bodies. But when interview material does not exist (for example when access to interviewees is problematic) then documentary sources have tended to be given increased prominence.

The research conducted in this study thus draws upon the following data sources and methods:

(a) reputational analysis – identifying who the key actors are and how they extend their influence;
(b) explanations of behaviour by key members of the policy elite through interviews and documentary accounts;
(c) minutes of policy meetings, analysis of agenda in order to establish what key decisions and non-decisions are made by which sets of actors;
(d) analysis of (particularly local) media;
(e) qualitative content analysis which is critical to the analysis of embedded interests and the evaluation of how the public interest is represented.

3.5. Research questions

The literature review on urban policy focuses on groups in power, and the actions and behaviours of actors in the decision-making process. To understand how groups emerge, a number of questions need to be asked, linked with the table presented in Chapter 2:

- who are the actors involved in the decision-making process, and who are they representing?
- what are the objectives of the group?
- what are the means used to achieve them?
- what are the kinds of resources that actors bring to take part in the decision-making group?
- what are the relationships between them?
- what is the stability of the decision-making group involved in the events?

Answers to those specific questions will involve feedback to theoretical foundations, and raise general questions:

- How might the mode of governance of sports event policy (in relation to the two events identified) be characterised?
- To what extent does such a characterisation reflect aspects of a growth coalition, a policy network or an urban regime, as presented in the literature?
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Behind those questions linking theories and empirical results, there is a further critical issue implied.

- In a French case study, are such local theories (growth coalition, policy network, urban regime) pertinent to an understanding of the decision-making process, or is French urban politics too specific to be ‘captured’ by ‘Anglo-Saxon’ theories?

In this sense, this research is subject to debates about the use of these theories in culturally different contexts. As Harding (1997) says:

> The key to overcoming (... ) reservations is not to reject the literature wholesale, but to take from it what is widely applicable, to use work whose general applicability is questionable as a basis for research hypotheses that are amenable to empirical verification and actually to test whether the underlying conditions that promote subnational coalitions in the United States are also found in Europe (1997: 185).

3.6. Data collection

In a qualitative research project dealing with a relatively lengthy period, understanding the historical context of the city and the constant link between decision-making and context are very important. In this respect, local newspapers can provide the local and contemporary context for policy decisions. Newspapers are sources of interpretation as well as of information because articles are written by journalists. Also, people interviewed have their own memories of the past, which provide a particular perspective on events and their ‘reality’ (Bendikat 1996). Thus “Qualitative data collection methods were chosen to help provide a strong sense of context, which facilitates an understanding of the case” (Cassell and Symon 1994) and “can be used to seek actors’ accounts of the structural context and their response to it” (Denyer 2002: 127).

Such qualitative sources are critical for contextualising purposes. Thus, a preliminary step in the data collection process was a literature review about Marseille, to understand its context and its history. This is presented in Chapter 4. Subsequently, document analysis was employed to get
beneath the surface of the two projects. Three kinds of documents were collected.

**Press articles:**

*Le Provençal*, (which was retitled *La Provence*³ in June 1997) was analysed from January 1991 to December 2003, thus covering the period of bidding for both events. For the America’s Cup project, the Nautical Affairs Editor also provided access to her press book. This incorporated regional and national articles about the America’s Cup bid. The exhaustiveness of this list was checked. Three kinds of articles were collected:

- those directly linked with events,
- those related to the political life of Marseille and the main projects relating to the city,
- those related to the sporting life of the city.

The analysis of press articles had to be undertaken with care since these were potentially politically biased – *Le Provençal* was clearly written by journalists with their own particular interests, and related to, and supportive of, left wing political interests. In other words, newspapers articles were the result of agents’ subjectivity, and of structurally located interests. The analysis of the press sources was thus tempered in this study in two principal ways. The first was to acknowledge and to continuously bear in mind the possibility of left wing bias, that is, to read the sources with care and anticipation of these factors. The second set of precautions adopted was to triangulate the press analysis with analysis of other kinds of data, most notably interviews and proceedings of political meetings including views from different political perspectives.

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³ The newspaper *La Provence* represented the merging of both main regional newspapers: *Le Provençal* and *Le Méridional*. *Le Provençal* has been the main regional newspaper.
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**Municipal documents:**
From 1991 to 2003, Town Hall reports and deliberations linked to both events were collected: the reports because they had informed discussions between elected members during the meetings of the City Council; the deliberations (or minutes) because they note the official decisions taken. The second kind of municipal document was editorial comment provided by mayors in the municipal magazine *Marseille le Magazine*. This provided direct insight into what the mayors wanted to highlight in their actions and their policy.

**Official documents:**
This kind of document was only available for the America’s Cup project. The City of Marseille put at the author’s disposal Marseille’s bid file of July 2003, which was supplied to the Swiss decision-makers. For the World Football Cup 1998, access to official documents was not provided, despite repeated requests.

Having analysed the local structural context, informed by the above sources and having charted the course of decisions, and identified in preliminary fashion the major actors, the second step – interviews - was undertaken. The analysis of documents enabled the researcher to draw up a list of actors to interview. This list was the result of a twofold process. First, with regards to the formal institutions involved, a list of their leading figures was set up: Mayors, Deputy Mayors, the office-holders of association involved – the Regional Organisation Committee for the World Cup, AC Management for the America’s Cup. Second, key actors emerged from the media accounts, reinforcing or / and increasing the first list: the General Secretary for the City Council, the Technical Advisor for the City Council, the Director of Economic Development, Bernard Tapie, the directors of firms involved in ‘Marseille La Découverte’ (for the World Cup) and ‘Entreprises Marseille America’ (for the America’s Cup). The list was then completed and refined with a snowballing approach in that
interviewees were asked to suggest other significant actors for further interviews.

The principal aim of the interviews was to gain an understanding of interviewees' perceptions of the reality of the policy process in these key areas of local sports policy, and of their role in the decision-making process. The list of people interviewed and their function is listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution represented</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>In relation with</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City elected</td>
<td>both Deputy Mayor responsible for sport across the period</td>
<td>World Football Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City elected</td>
<td>Deputy Mayor responsible for maritime and nautical business</td>
<td>America's Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City civil servant</td>
<td>Technical Services Advisor for the City</td>
<td>World Football Cup and America’s Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City civil servant</td>
<td>the former Director of Communication for sports services</td>
<td>World Football Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental Direction of Youth and Sports</td>
<td>The former Director</td>
<td>World Football Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Community “Marseille-Provence-Métropole”</td>
<td>Director of the Economic Development</td>
<td>America’s Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Authority</td>
<td>Director of East Dock</td>
<td>America’s Cup</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This list of interviewees contains only public officials and elected politicians. In addition to these formal interviews, informal discussions were held with a number of sporting and other city officials and journalists, which provided useful background information but which were not recorded and subjected to qualitative content analysis.

Sustained efforts were made to contact individuals from the commercial sector. However, requests for interviews met with either refusal or non-response. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry was contacted over the America’s Cup since it is credited with having promoted the idea, but
this was met with the official response that no action had been taken since the America’s Cup did not go ahead. Officials / members of the public-private partnership Euroméditerranée, claimed to have no knowledge of the involvement of the organisation in the establishment of the bid for the America’s Cup, although the bid document cites the organisation as being involved. This may be because the ‘involvement’ of the organisation simply reflected an agreement between the senior deputy mayor (president of Euroméditerranée) and the Director of Euroméditérranée. In relation to the commercial organisations taking part in the Club Marseille la Découverte, for the World Football Cup, and in the association Entreprises Marseille America, the directors indicated that they were too busy to give an interview. The head of the Regional Organisation Committee of Marseille, did agree to give an interview but failed to arrive on the day, and afterwards failed to respond to the researcher’s requests for an alternative date.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted, according to the research questions. The rationale for choosing semi-structured interviewees – rather than structured interview, free interview, questionnaire or focus group – is directly linked to the research questions. There was a need to introduce certain themes, without constraining interviewees in terms of the range and form of their answers. A questionnaire, for example, would not have been an appropriate tool since the research was concerned to focus on the agents’ interpretation of local sport policy. Similarly other approaches such as a focus group, would have been both inappropriate, and impossible to conduct, especially with politicians who have a very busy agenda. Nevertheless, semi-structured interviews, it should be acknowledged, can result in deflecting some themes that might be important. Triangulation of data (particularly with public documents and media reports) was a response to this issue. Also, the interview guide was not fixed. Versions were modified following the ‘snowballing technique’,

with the position of the interviewee and the direction of the interview, being taken into account.

The interview guide was divided into three main parts (see Appendix). In the first section, items were directly related to the interviewee:

- professional history,
- her or his function.

In the second section, general questions were asked about the event:

- her or his role,
- the context of the decision-making,
- who was involved in originating of the project,
- expectations from the project.

A third section was about the partners and the work procedure:

- who were the institutions involved,
- how did they meet,
- the place of the private sector,
- who had the greatest influence,
- who had responsibility for final decision,
- what deadlock periods and issues were there,
- what problems were encountered,
- interviewees’ ‘regrets’, observations on how things might have been done differently,
- results.

The interview ended by asking if the interviewee wished to add anything and with a request for advice concerning further interviewees. Through those items, key players gradually became visible. The interview data were subsequently interpreted through qualitative content analysis.

3.7. The use of ethnographic content analysis.

With critical realist assumptions, qualitative content analysis seeks to document and understand the communication of meaning, as well as verifying theoretical relationships (Altheide 1996). The researcher has a key role in the process. His / her theoretical knowledge, data reading and
understanding will provide material that probably s/he alone can give, because of the subjectivity of the research process. However, by providing the reader with a clear understanding of how and why a particular interpretation has been reached, the validity (or in Wood and Kroger’s (2000) terms, the ‘warrantability’) of the researcher’s account can be demonstrated.

After the theoretical review, common indicators were developed to compare ‘growth coalition’, ‘policy network’ and ‘urban regime’ concepts. The main questions of this research are: who are the key actors in the decision-making process in sports policy in Marseille?; and to what extent are these three (Anglo-Saxon) concepts useful in characterising this decision-process? With preliminary readings of the data, the seven common indicators retained appear to be appropriate categories to analyse the data. In effect, identification and analysis of objectives, means employed, kinds of actors involved, motivations, resources, kinds of relationships and stability, enable us to identify decision-makers and their strategies, and to make a direct link between the sports policy process in Marseille and the theories, and thus to evaluate their relevance to explanations of this context.

Although this deductive approach employs categories / codes derived from a careful analysis of the literature, it could be argued that such an approach will not ‘capture’ concepts or insights which fall outside this frame of reference. In order to avoid this pitfall, categories derived inductively from the text were also employed. Initially these were coded under the heading ‘other’ and subsequently the ‘other’ category was subjected to detailed inductive analysis. This approach of commencing with deductive and concluding with inductive analysis is thus consistent with Altheide’s characterisation of the Ethnographic Content Analysis approach.

Categories and variables initially guide the study, but others are allowed and expected to emerge throughout the study (Altheide 1996).
Chapter 3: Methodology

The analysis of data was made by hand for all documents and interview transcripts. Each document was coded by line. Then, results for each category were gathered. Initially, results were separated in two categories: for the World Football Cup 1998, and for the America’s Cup, in order to interpret the decision-making process for each separately. Subsequently, results for both events were compared to identify similarities and differences, and to review ‘stability’ across the two policy events.

The following chapters develop in the same manner. After an introduction to the history of Marseille and the local policy context in chapter 4, chapter 5 analyses the 1998 Football World Cup case study, the America’s Cup case study is presented in chapter 6. Chapter 7 provides analysis of the decision-making process in sport policy in Marseille against the backdrop of the three theoretical traditions.
4.1. A city in crisis.

4.1.1. A structural crisis.

Since the beginning of the 1970s Marseille, France’s second city, has been experiencing a major social and economic crisis. This situation has its roots, however, in the immediate post-World War II period (Morel 1999). Although the French state had launched a policy of industrial development based on a Fordist model of production, Marseille remained stubbornly focused on its role as a port. At the centre of Marseille’s economy, was the transport of primary materials, which local industries treated but with production of few finished products for the market. The materials that had been processed left the city via the port: road and rail links were little used, with the city ‘turning its back’ on its hinterland. This system collapsed in the 1950s and 1960s with the on-set of the colonial wars, Marseille having developed as a colonial port (Morel 2001). The crisis of the port was a function of the broader crisis of traditional industries. Marseille was not oriented towards the industrial modernisation, which the state wished to promote, the city simply adapted, rather than modified its system of production. The demographic explosion, which the city experienced between 1959 and 1975, a product of both immigration and an influx from the countryside, allowed it to continue to experience a certain level of growth. The influx of population fostered a dynamism in the area of construction, which offered numerous jobs, and together with the clientelistic city management of Gaston Deferre, this masked the profound economic crisis which the city was experiencing (Morel 2001).

This great port city had lived through the twentieth century without really adapting to the changing industrial context. As a city of trade Marseille had relied for a long time on primary materials as its core business. When
new technologies and new models of production emerged Marseille remained committed to its traditional role, and failed to invest in manufacturing production of finished products, preferring to maintain its identity as a centre of trade. The crisis of Marseille is structural in nature. The industrial port model of production of the 1970s lagged behind the Fordist approach. Marseille did not grasp change when the moment was right and as a result fell well behind its competitors (Pinson 2002). The port, the centre of the economic life of the city, declined bit by bit, becoming simply a platform of maritime transport from which the rest of France might profit but which itself did not retain benefits. Marseille’s large scale enterprises dealing with primary materials were absorbed one by one into large international groups (Zalio 1999), compounding the employment crisis, and the city began to lose population from the end of the 1970s to the hinterland, which was more active than the metropolitan area (Donzel 1998).

Gaston Defferre, Mayor of the city from the end of the Second World War put in place a crisis management plan. This emblematic socialist figure in coalition with centrists and the liberal right sought to deal with the crisis, in order to combat the communist left in the city, principally employing his own policy ideas. Thus, in order to deal with the increasingly impoverished economic base, for thirty years Marseille was the site of a clientelistic system in the domain of public employment and housing overseen by Defferre. Defferre pushed the local bourgeoisie to move investment into the property market (Morel 1999). Morel describes how local capital, since it was losing control of industrial activities, began to invest in property, selling land, which hosted industrial activities. With the arrival of an incoming population during the different waves of immigration, the property market proved an effective investment (Zalio 1999).

However, the Defferre clientelistic system was based on a day-to-day management, rather than strategic thinking in relation to the future of the
Chapter 4: The City of Marseille

city. It was only with the arrival of Vigouroux at the head of the city that there was a recognition of Marseille’s problems, with the beginnings of reflexion about how the city should address them, and in particular what economical orientation the city might adopt.

4.1.2. The image of Marseille: between myth and reality

Marseille is exceptional in terms of its place in the popular imagination. From the outside, Marseille has always had a very distinctive image, a mixture of cliché, reality and exaggeration. First of all, Marseille is a city of sun, pastis and pétanque. In both literature and cinema, these three characteristics are evoked over and over again. Marseille also ‘lives’ in the accent of local people implying a local character ‘bien brave’. This image is a positive aspect, the sympathetic dimension of the image, which strangers hold of this Mediterranean city. But the image also carries with it more than a hint of irony and superiority.

Elements of the image linked to Marseille are also in some respects quite negative. It is a city of the Mafiosi, bogged down in scandals, shady deals and crimes. It was in the 1930s that this aspect of the image of the city took root. During this period, the links between politicians and the criminal milieu became evident, and tarnished the reputation of the city. It became known as the “French Chicago” (Donzel 1998). It was not a city in which one could walk safely at night. These clichés have fed into and continue to nourish stories about Marseille, evident for example in fictional accounts such as the Hollywood film The French Connection. These accounts have tended to foster a misleading impression to the external world.

Marseille also has the image of city set apart from others in the French political landscape. It is often referred to as a rebel, rebelling against the decisions of Paris. It is argued that the Mediterranean city often feels that it is ignored by central government, based in Paris, and the Marseillais harbour a feeling of rejection by Paris (Rochu 1983; Meunier 1985;
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Bertrand 1998; Donzel 1998; Peraldi and Samson 2005). The city also tends to run counter to French national electoral tendencies. When it comes to presidential elections, results in Marseille rarely reflect results at the national level (Bertrand 1998).

From an economic and social point of view, Marseille has the image of a city, which has failed to adapt to the changes of 20th century. It is a city in which there is an incapacity to establish a comprehensive political vision, a port city which seems to know of no other way to make a living except through its port. This perspective is not improved by the difficulties experienced in trying to establish cooperation between various local and regional governmental bodies, and this is a factor, which has also been used as an excuse by politicians to cancel projects (Morel 2001). It has thus proved very difficult to change the city's image. On the social level, Marseille has been able to integrate its immigrant population, thanks to jobs provided by the port. The spatial location of immigrant groups has been dependent upon their place of work and they have tended to settle around the port (Donzel 1998). With the onset of the economic crisis, entire districts in this area found themselves without work and without financial, material or organisational resources. Local government has abandoned the centre of the city to impoverishment and to the eking out of a fragile economic existence based on the port.

However, the different communities have at least emancipated themselves through the port. They have developed local trades, working with their countries of origin, although the government has tended to ignore the significance of this economic activity based on little shops, with such shops being omitted for example in the Euroméditerranée project (Bertoncello and Rodrigues Malta 2001). In relation to building, Marseille continues to be a place of residential segregation with a dilapidated set of properties in the centre of town, and the growing construction of housing in the southern part of the city (Donzel 2001). The rehabilitation of certain
districts has begun, as in the case for example of the Panier quarter, but this is with a view to the attraction of a student population. The problem of rehousing the residential population was quickly put to one side and has not yet been addressed (Pinson 2002).

At the international level, Marseille’s identity and reputation has been promoted via its football team, l’Olympique de Marseille. Known for its excellent results in the 1990s (it won the European Champion’s League in 1993), it is also well known for its fanatical supporters. These are the most committed in France, ecstatic in victory, desperate in defeat. However, it is above all within the city that O.M. has a very special place. The city is said to vibrate to the rhythm of the results of its team (Meunier, 1985). Across the city, all social classes support the team (Bromberger, Hayot and Mariotini, 1995). In the Stade Vélodrome, the full range of the local population is represented. The location within the stadium of spectators reflects the demographic structure of the city. Every stand is populated by a particular (dominantly men) social group, shop keepers, heads of business organisations and politicians from the northern part of the city, the southern quarter, the young, the old etc. Spectators change their place in the stadium as a reflection of their changing social position, to such an extent that a young supporter will be able to do a full circle of the stadium, in terms of the position from which he spectates (Bromberger 1989). Marseille is also a city to which things seem to ‘happen’, rather than one with a proactive polity, or truly participative citizenry (Donzel 1995; Morel 2001).

4.2. A brief urban political history of Marseille.

4.2.1. The Defferre years.

Gaston Defferre was a politician who made his special mark on the history of Marseille. He was Mayor from 1953 until his death in 1986. From the end of the Second World War, he held an important place in the political
life of the city through his active political engagement and through his control of the daily newspaper, *Le Provençal*, which he took over in 1945 (Rochu 1983). In the municipal elections, he presented himself as a bastion against communism. To achieve this, he brought together a socialist-centrist alliance which held until 1977.

Defferre’s management of the city was crisis management, resolving problems one after the other as difficulties arose (Pinson 2002). The reason for the longevity of this alliance lay in his political ability to divide and rule. Municipal responsibilities were divided into two large categories: one for the right, “management of material resources”, and the other for the left, “the management of people” (Morel 1999). The former area of activity consisted of urban development and the local economy, and the latter of the day-to-day management of municipal services. This separation of powers allowed him to maintain a front against communist influence, but it also permitted him to reinforce his influence among the local population. Effectively, local politicians ‘solved’ the daily problems of their fellow citizens by rendering them services. In this way, the clientelistic system of Defferre was developed. Two principal policy domains operated under this principle, those of housing and employment. Socialist politicians responsible for ‘management of people’ controlled the housing service and the allocation of municipal employment, and jobs and housing were thus offered with the goal of generating votes (Roche 1996). The local elected representative acted as the intermediary between the local authority and the citizen and passed on information or solved problems. The *Marseillais* have thus always felt ‘close’ to their mayor. In addition, with the political right in the Deferre coalition retaining responsibility for the “management of material resources”, this enabled the industrial bourgeoisie to develop its interests in property and land.

Defferre organised a local cross-spectrum political coalition and, among other initiatives, he revived a particular type of local organisational entity
to serve this purpose: the Comités d’Interets de Quartiers (CIQ). He asked local activists to found a CIQ in each of their residential districts, and to run this organisation themselves. However, some local groups founded their own CIQ and immediately placed a local elected socialist politician at its head (Rochu 1983). This gave Defferre a high profile with the different local communities, and local Armenian, Israeli and subsequently pied-noirs associations all provided him with strong support. In addition, he gained the support of the Marseille bourgeoisie thanks to the stance he took against communism. His marriage to Edmonde Charles-Roux, who came from an important Marseille business family, also aided acceptance by the industrial bourgeoisie (Roche 1996). Moreover, his newspaper, Le Provencal, became a very important communication tool in the Defferre system because it was the most widely read daily newspaper within the city. This clutch of strategies helped Deferre to appeal across a wide range of opinions to the Marseilles electorate.

Defferre had based his system upon networks. He used these networks to his own political advantage, as evidenced during the second round of the 1983 municipal elections. Defferre, as Minister of Decentralisation at the time (as well as Mayor), proposed specific legislation related to the electoral boundaries within the major cities of Paris, Lyon and Marseille. Marseille was divided into sectors, or political constituencies. Defferre steered the legislation which gave more importance, in terms of numbers of elected representatives, to sectors which he knew would be oriented towards the political left (Rochu 1983). Despite this, he was in second position after the first round of the election. At this point he drew on his local networks, asking his local ‘lieutenants’ to mobilise support. This was highly successful, and a number of local communitarian and corporatist associations delivered citizens’ votes for Defferre, allowing him to retain his seat as mayor (Rochu 1983).
At the national level, Defferre held a number of important posts. He held ministerial office several times under the Fifth Republic and was even a candidate in the presidential elections in 1969 (Rochu 1983). From 1981 to 1984, he was Minister of Internal Affairs and Decentralisation. The most important laws that he realised were those relating to local boundary changes and the 1982 decentralisation laws. He was an influential and proud man who reputedly would bear neither failure nor affront (Bertrand 1998). Before the municipal elections in 1977, he accused the local centrist group of corruption and excluded them from the coalition. In doing so he was actually seeking to distance himself from the supporters of Valérie Giscard D'Estaing, of whom the future mayor, Jean-Claude Gaudin, was one (Rocchu 1983; Morel 2001). In relation to the management of the city, the Defferre system did not halt the city's crisis. Perhaps the most one could claim is that he successfully masked its symptoms.

Defferre's first political defeat was his last. He died in 1986, the night following his defeat in a socialist meeting, during which the local socialist organisation had to elect a new committee. This meeting involved a major struggle between Defferre and his opponents, who had become more numerous. The candidate that he supported to lead the organisation was not chosen, a sign of his decreasing influence. But with his demise, his main opponent, Michel Pezet, was seen by the population and other politicians as being primarily responsible for Defferre's death (Leras 1991), and as a result Pezet never realised what was expected of him in terms of a political career. Thus in a sense, this was also Defferre's last victory.

4.2.2. The Vigouroux Period.
Before becoming a politician, Robert Vigouroux was an internationally recognized surgeon, working at the city hospital, La Timone. From 1971, he was one of Defferre's town councillors, and he also held a second political post as county (département) councillor. A loyal lieutenant of
Defferre, he was not particularly well known by Marseillais voters. When Defferre died, Vigouroux was chosen to succeed him, supported by Defferre’s widow and the body of Defferre supporters within the Town Council (Peraldi and Samson 2005). He was for them the man the most able to manage a smooth transition before the municipal elections of 1989, but it was something of a surprise when he was elected in 1989. He was chosen by the Marseille electorate to carry forward the heritage of Defferre, the city patriarch, whose loss, local people seemed to find difficult to accept, though he had disappeared three years earlier (Bertrand 1998). Though, Vigouroux wanted from very early on to break with clientilistic system of Defferre, his priority was to reinstall economic growth in Marseille. He wanted the city to become the great metropolis of Southern Europe, with international influence (Pinson 2002). Such messages appear frequently in the editorials of the City Council’s own magazine, in which Vigouroux places great emphasis on the necessity of reinforcing the place of Marseille as a / the leading city in the Mediterranean axis and in Southern Europe.

On a practical level, he increased the number of trips and visits undertaken in order to make the city better known and more widely acknowledged. According to Morel (2001), Vigouroux used his electoral program “50 projects for Marseille” to show to the population that it could benefit from his vision. For his colleagues, he was a great visionary (Interview with René Olméta, 3 November 2004). He became known above all as the man who made a transition from the left to the right in political terms. His policy was ‘tainted’ by a right-leaning political vision and he subsequently chose to support Edouard Balladur (RPR), a politician at national level from the right, for the 1995 presidential elections. This support sparked off an important crisis within his own municipal majority, with some of his supporters affirming that he could make such a choice as a personal matter, while others resigned their offices faced with what they saw as a betrayal.
When it came to the municipal elections of the same year, Vigouroux waited until the last moment before announcing that he would not put himself forward. Marseille public opinion never fully warmed to Vigouroux as a candidate with his cold and aloof character. During the months before both elections, Le Provençal averaged almost one article per day relating to Vigouroux’ political life; his support for Balladur and its political consequences; his position within the life of Marseille, and his candidature and / or subsequently his non candidature.

Vigouroux was essentially not a politician, a factor, which led to his political demise. According to observers and his colleagues, he was a man who was a poor communicator, both with the general population and with his peers, practising policy like surgery (Peraldi and Samson 2005): a surgeon does not have to communicate well to obtain what he wants. At this level of surgery, one just believes in oneself. When you have to open a skull, you only make gestures. People who are skilled know what to do to assist the surgeon, but he has nothing to say, he does his job and people do theirs to assist him. And that, we found was the same in politics (Interview with René Olmeta, 3 November 2004).

This description seems to summarize Vigouroux’ political life during his nine years in office: a man with strong ideas, but with poor skills in political relationships.

4.2.3. Jean-Claude Gaudin and the accession to power by the right.

In 1995, the election of Jean-Claude Gaudin (UDF) marked the end of 60 years of socialist government in Marseille. He was not an unknown in terms either of local or of national politics. Born in 1939, he became involved very early in political life. At the age of 16, he joined the Jeunesse Indépendante et Paysanne, going on a little later to join the Centre National des Jeunesses Indépendantes et Paysanne. He was involved with associations from the traditional right from Christian
democracy to liberalism. In 1965, when he was President of the Centre National des Jeunesses Indépendantes et Paysannes, he was nominated as a candidate on the list of the socialist-centrist group of Defferre and Rastoin and became the youngest municipal councillor in Marseille (Leras 1991).

In 1973, he joined the Républicain Indépendants, founded by Giscard D'Estaing, and took part in the electoral campaign of Giscard in the presidential election of 1974. He was a member of the Defferre ruling group in the city until 1977, the point at which the socialist centrist alliance effectively broke up (Leras 1991). From 1975 to 1976, he was involved in “management of material resources” in the city because he was the deputy mayor responsible for urban development.

In 1978, he was elected to the Assemblée Nationale, and three years later, was re-elected, even though the majority of colleagues from the right were swept from power by the resurgent socialists. He was then named as president of the UDF group in the Assemblée Nationale. His political rise in national politics and his victories at the local level made him the focal point of municipal opposition to Gaston Defferre from 1978 to 1983 (Leras 1991). He managed to gather all of the right in Marseille around him at a point at which Defferrism was beginning to run out of steam (Morel 2001). In 1983, he was the natural candidate to lead the list of the right (RPR and UDF) in the municipal elections. He suffered a narrow defeat and it was only by virtue of the redrawing of electoral boundaries in the city that Defferre managed to keep his seat as mayor (Bertrand 1998). In 1989, he lost again to Robert Vigouroux. However in 1986, he was elected president of the region thanks to the support of the Front National. This alliance cost him considerable unpopularity among the population of Marseille and notably during the municipal election of 1986 (Levreau and Baudin 2000).
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Even though during the last few years of Defferre's life, the two regularly opposed one another, Gaudin always had a profound respect for the 'patriarch' of Marseille. He had learned at the side of the master how to manage networks in his own favour. From 1977 and his break with Defferre, he became responsible for CIQs which he had worked on from the moment that he became a municipal councillor (Leras 1991). He took control of the daily newspaper Le Méridional, a publication supporting the right, which would be his major tool for the municipal elections campaign in 1983 (Rochu 1983).

In 1989, he once more lost the municipal elections and he concentrated, therefore, on his role as president of the Conseil Régional, a mandate which was renewed in 1992, when he defeated Bernard Tapie and Jean-Marie Le Pen (Levreau and Baudin 2000). He was able to make use of this victory to finally overcome the negative effects of his alliance in 1988 with the Front National.

In 1995, he last achieved his major objective: he became Mayor of Marseille on a UDF-RPR list, seconded by Renaud Muselier (RPR). This alliance avoided the violent struggles between both of the parties of the right at national level produced by the confrontation between Chirac (RPR) and Balladur (UDF) for elections in the main time. It also permitted him to gain the support from the whole of the right in Marseille (Peraldi and Samson 2005). He subsequently took up the mantle of Gaston Defferre in seeking to re-establish the link with the Marseillais, which had been broken (Morel 2001). This year was to be one of success for the former professor of history and geography. In November, he entered the government of Alain Juppé as Minister for the City and Local Development and Integration, a post that he occupied for two years.

In 2002, he again ran for election on the Gaudin-Muselier list and was re-elected as mayor.
4.2.4. Some concluding comments about city politics in Marseille.

In France, political life at the local level is dominated by the figure of the mayor (Cole and John 1995). Because of proximity to the local electorate, the mayor is probably the most 'representative' of elected roles in France. Municipal elections are those, which gather the highest proportion of votes. Mayors have thus a particular place within national political life (Landrieu 2000). In Marseille, strong personalities have always governed the city, and Defferre is almost a 'mythical' figure among politicians, civil servants as well as the local population. Even if he was single-minded and if his political practices were not always very clear or fair, politicians who worked with him say that they learned a lot from him (Interview with René Olméta, 3 November 2004). Furthermore, both mayors who succeeded him were marked by his stamp. For Vigouroux, seen as his most evident successor by politicians, the heritage was not really positive because he had to work through the Defferre clientelistic system. Gaudin's approach had more to do with Defferre's image in the sense that he would have liked to have the same charisma among the local population.

Nevertheless, both of these Marseille mayors had a strong image and personality. In the view of politicians, they were total opposites in terms of political approach. Interviewees liked to compare their behaviour in explaining their political actions. They refer to a complete contrast of style.

So there was a difference of methods. An approach to problems which reflected this specialisation of the man in charge. One [Gaudin] saw his role more as an historian than a geographer. The other looked at it in the way a dissector of skulls would do... You have to know how to join nerves... there is a need to know the mechanisms of both hemispheres to manage to connect the whole... And now [with Gaudin], it is a bit like a 'sequin and gloss' policy (Interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005).

The same idea emerges from the discourse of René Olméta who compares the reality of policy under Vigouroux to that of the superficiality of policy

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4 And film « Marseille contre Marseille », Comolli and Samson.
under Gaudin. In relation to communication, Vigouroux did not find it easy to deal with this side of the political life, whereas Gaudin seemed to really enjoy this aspect. For example, on the evening of his election, Gaudin declared ‘we are going to set you alight’, which is the slogan of O.M. supporters (La Provence, 19 June 1995: 2). Whereas for Vigouroux

Unfortunately, he didn’t manage to sell himself. He is not a communicator, it is not his thing. For me, he was an great visionary for the city... But as we say in Marseille, he is unbearable (Interview with René Olméta, 3 November 2004).

For me, he was an ‘autistic’. Sometimes, I have spent several minutes alone in his company. Whereas with Gaudin, you do not stop talking, well, that is he does not stop talking. There is a complete contrast here (Interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005)

It is thus clear, they are very different characters: on one side, Vigouroux, the strong but cold individual, and on the other one, Gaudin, a smooth talker but with little broad policy action or vision. In terms of the role of the mayor in France, one might expect opposing tendencies at play in the way these two conducted the negotiations concerning the Football World Cup 1998 project.

4.3. Sport in Marseille.

Sports policy in Marseille reflects the same kind of evolution as has been the case in other French cities. Calléde and Dané (1991) propose a three stage chronology of this development. The first stage relates to what they term a “heroic” period from the 1880s. Clubs and associations began to be initiated at this time under a federal hierarchy, which was not well developed and whose relations with municipalities were limited to administrative issues. The goal in this period at the end of the Franco-Prussian War was the control of young people and their values (Arnaud and Riordan 1997). The second stage, the ‘topique period’, beginning in the 1930s was related to a period in which the first municipal sporting facilities were developed. Most cities began to develop a set of sporting
activities and facilities and financial aid in this period from 1936. The State looked to develop leisure provision and began to engage in the meeting of need and provision of services. Sport was developed with the wish to promote sports for all (Clément et al. 1994). From the 1960s, the State reacted to the lack of sporting facilities by provision through local authorities. The ‘strategic period’ from the 1970s is characterised by the explosion of sporting phenomena with an increasing demand and emergence of a hierarchy in sport participation. The differences between cities in terms of sporting development began to grow and in particular between those cities that experienced strong demographic growth, and those which did not. Sporting institutions and facilities were much more developed in the former and this was at a time when municipalities were gaining more prerogatives from, and promoting more initiatives in comparison with, the State. This local response to demand also reflected those municipal authorities which were dealing with local populations and sports clubs, which were more politically engaged, and which were trying to develop a distinctive image of their locale.

Callède and Dané’s chronological stages fit well with the evolution of sport in Marseille. At the end of the 19 century, the heroic period began in Marseille with the creation of its first clubs. The gymnastics and nautical societies were initiated: La Phocéenne (1879); Le Gymnaste-Club (1892), La Gauloise (1893) (Echinard, 2005) for the former discipline, and Union Nautique Marseillaise (1882); Société Nautique de Marseille (1887) (Lorimier and Sirost 2005) for the latter. The Anglo-Saxon sporting disciplines were established little by little in Marseille as in the rest of France in the beginning of the 20th century (Echinard 2005). The second period is characterised by the construction of an important sporting heritage in terms of facilities. Gabriel Vallerian, municipal councillor responsible for sports from 1929 to 1935, promoted a policy of strong support for provision of sporting facilities. Numerous facilities were constructed during this period in a context, which offered good financial
conditions and in which manual labour was cheap (Raoult and Bonneau 1999). From 1935 to 1947, sport had little place in a municipality which was made subject to central government control. Roger Lebert subsequently relaunched a major programme of facility construction when he was in charge of sport. The numerous facilities built in this period were a response to the need of the population, which had grown with waves of immigration from the pied-noirs and from North Africa more generally. But like most policy action by municipalities in this period, the construction of facilities was carried out on a piecemeal basis with little concern for comprehensive sport policy (Niel and Cometti 2005). The imbalance between neighbourhoods from the north and the south of the city in terms of subsidies for sport facilities, dates back to this period. The strategic period marked in Marseille the recognition of elite sport and the varied needs of different types of participants. René Olmèta who was deputy mayor for sport in 1977, among other things was instrumental in the development of a centre for female gymnastics, the creation of a sports ground for children with disabilities and was the first to promote elite sport in the city of Marseille (Raoult and Bonneau 1999; Brun 2005). It was also the beginning of the intensification of the relationship between the city and its major sporting club 1Olympique de Marseille. This club often dominated sporting debates within the city. Demanding high level of subsidies, and with the firing of coaches and the debts which the club accumulated, O.M. remained the club with the highest sporting and political profile in the city. In 1981, it was the city in large part, which saved the club from bankruptcy. Relations were further strengthened when Bernard Tapie resumed the presidency of the club in 1986, called in by Gaston Defferre shortly before his death (Levreau and Baudin, 2000). Because of the open conflicts between Mayor Vigouroux and O.M. and with Tapie’s own political ambitions, the situation dominated political debate in the city. Overshadowed by the presence of the O.M. debate, the other clubs fought to demonstrate their importance to the general public and to the city. However, this was an uphill struggle, so central is O.M. to
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the cultural and political life of the city. In this respect, Marseille is like no other city in France (Bromberger 1989). One only has to walk in the city streets the day after a match to 'sense' the result. As we have noted, the crowd at the *Stade Vélodrome* provide an accurate reflexion of the social make up of the city. It represents the place where elements from the whole spectrum of Marseille society can meet (Bromberger 1989), and this is a phenomenon, which the mayor cannot ignore. The football team is seen by local elected politicians as a precious tool as well as a burning issue. In regards to the political advantages it can confer, interviews with the two former Deputy Mayors with responsibility for sport provide real insights. Both argued that Marseille has few problems of social disorder in disadvantaged areas compared to other French cities largely because young people have got O.M. The quotation that follows is about Gaston Defferre's arguments to justify O.M. subsidies, according to René Olmeta:

> That was, as he (Defferre) said, because (O.M. and its players) give young people something to think about... They help me to balance a little bit the big problems that cities usually have with youth. And that is true in terms of deprived neighbourhoods. Marseille is completely different from *les Minguettes* (Lyon) and from the banlieue in the Paris region (Interview with René Olmeta, 3 November 2004).

Given the importance of the club, the city's mayors have always made every effort to select the president of the leading club of the city. It is important to have an ally in this job. And René Olméta even says:

> Defferre told me: you are my deputy mayor mister Olmeta, but dealing with O.M., it is my business. Vigouroux did not need tell me, for him it was the same, and Gaudin followed the same line (Interview with René Olméta, 3 November 2004).

Beyond the importance of the institution, one has also to consider team supporters (Peraldi and Samsom 2005). Organised in different groups, they gained, during the Tapie years, a not inconsiderable power, above all in vote terms. O.M. is used to represent the city, to enhance its image, and also to serve political interests. All of the city's politicians, and even those in the *Conseils Général* and *Régional*, are very careful when they
have to deal with the club. When decisions concern O.M., boundaries between the different parties disappear.⁵ These are the reasons why O.M. still remains a 'thorny political issue', to use the title of an article by Michel Samson⁶ (2006), published in *Le Monde*.

In the contemporary context, according to the documents of the Directory of Sport Services, Marseille has around 200,000 registered sports participants in 1,500 clubs with about as many participants again involved in informal sport. The current orientation of sport policy places an emphasis on the renovation of facilities and few new facilities are being built. An ice rink is nevertheless one project underway, but other sporting disciplines such as fencing lack facilities (Niel and Cometti 2005). A significant imbalance in the funding of facilities in the north and the south of the city still exists although the municipality has tried to compensate for this in part by designation of certain open spaces for multi sport uses. The 1998 Football World Cup resulted in a reduction in that element of the budget allocated to the running of facilities while the budget for supporting sport events grew. However, Robert Villani announced a major sports facilities construction project for 2007, notably the building of an ice sports arena, but this was still accompanied by major investment in sports events such as the World Rugby Cup 2007 and the Tour de France (Brun 2005). There is an almost total silence in such documents in relation to amateur sport.

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⁵ The analysis of town hall reports reveals that there is no longer political division when the debate is about O.M. Whereas for other sport decisions, political ideology emerges easily in politicians discourses, the O.M. topic makes disappear it, and leaves the place to very careful discourses.


With the death of Gaston Defferre, the political system, which had lasted for three decades, collapsed. The political elite in Marseille seemed to want to distance themselves from the management of the city and to engage in a fundamental reassessment of its future. The Defferrist management of the city had, as we have noted, only masked the crisis, which was only fully recognised after his death, and this had significant implications in all urban policy domains, including sport.

Different reports were thus produced by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry on the one hand and by the Agence d’Urbanisme de l’Agglomération Marseillaise (AGAM) on the other. In 1986, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry published a report promoting action to develop Marseille into a platform for international commerce, relying on the port (Isoard 1997). It is here that the idea of renewal of the districts around the port was first evident (Pinson 2002). The AGAM focused its reflection on the development of a business centre in the north of the city (Pinson 2002). These reports were to have two major consequences. The first was that they inspired the policy programmes of candidates in the 1989 municipal elections. The Gaudin team proposed a programme entitled Euthymène, promoted by Jean-François Mattei, requiring large scale urban renewal. The project was oriented toward tourism development and a major restructuring of the port. Vigouroux also took into account the findings of the reports, proposing ‘50 projects for Marseille’ although this programme did not promote a global urban development vision (Morel 2001). Pezet, a candidate supported by the Parti Socialiste also proposed a project, which reflected an interest in developing a new vision of the city. “The Pezet project promoted an opening up of the city, the pursuit of economic development” (Morel 2001: 26), which was to be based on high level technologies. The second consequence was the emergence of a
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‘grand projet’: Euroméditerranée, proposing an operation, which would provide a new image for the city and a way out of the crisis.

4.5. A ‘grand projet’: Euroméditerranée.

The 1990s saw the development of a significant programme of urban renewal in the city centre. The two major city events that we are focusing upon are contemporaneous with this development. The project of the Football World Cup 1998 arose at the same time as the emergence of Euroméditerranée and the project of the America’s Cup came at the same time as the implementation of the Euroméditerranée programme. It is thus important to understand what the Euroméditerranée project was in order to appreciate better the context in which decisions concerning the two major sporting events were taken.

The emergence of the Euroméditerranée project thus makes sense in a context marked by the end of the system of Defferist compromises and the emergence of a new style of municipal management most notably characterised by a willingness for the city to address the problems of its environment (Pinson 2002: 184).

Vigouroux embodied the figure of the mayor-entrepreneur, the promoter of his city. He launched numerous projects, always focusing on a long term perspective. Vigouroux, according to his former collaborators, did not engage in politics, so much as in managing the city by anticipating the future (Interview with René Olméta, 3 November 2004).

He [Vigouroux] intended to introduce to Marseille a use of urban management with, at the centre of his preoccupations, the creation of an image of the city which was to be both [socially] integrated internally and externally attractive (Pinson 2002: 180).

Although the city had a negative external image, Vigouroux sensed that for the Marseillais also themselves, there seemed to be a lack of belief in the city. The Euroméditerranée project was developed in this perspective. In creating a business centre in the neighbourhood of La Joliette and in renewing the surrounding area, Marseille would engender a new dynamic
image, oriented towards high level technologies and bringing new life to the city centre with an influx of new inhabitants.

The Euroméditerranée project succeeded in getting the representatives of the various local authorities around the same table. These authorities were involved as decision makers and not just simply as financiers, as had been the case in the past. In the framework of this project, the local authorities sought to shape the future of Marseille. The project also incorporated representatives of the private sector. Thus, there are some signs of what might have been an urban regime. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) collaborated closely with the public sector, to develop a common vision for the city, indeed, this was in effect initiated by the CCI. Moreover, the different local authorities (communes, département and région), which usually hardly collaborated, managed to engage in discussions and to work together in the same way.

However, the more the project went on, the less an urban regime type configuration was evident. This was firstly because this novel approach had been promoted by central government, which had established a Public Department of Development (Etablissement Public d’Aménagement) in 1994, requiring an agreement between the various authorities operating at the local level. The presence of the State guaranteed the long term survival of the Euroméditerranée project, despite political squabbles and electoral deadlines. But the presence of the central State also gave the impression of dispossessing local authorities of ownership of the project, an impression confirmed by the announcement of Euroméditerranée as an operation of national interest (Operation d’Intérêt National) in 1995 (Pinson 2002). By giving it this status, which is rarely attributed,

…it seemed… that it was the State that was playing the role of guarantor of the public interest, having as an objective the positioning of France in Mediterranean Europe through this project (Bertoncello and Rodrigues Malta 2001: 419).
The regional and local role of the project was masked and the local positioning of the project as a high technology district risked becoming decoupled from the interests of the local population in this neighbourhood. The *Euroméditerranée* project was the result of plans, which aimed to halt the crisis in Marseille. According to Gilles Pinson: “a crisis situation leads to a series of policy stances that construct a local agenda around city positioning issues” (2002: 190).

The crux of the project was the development of Marseille’s status as a city, by creating a high technologies quarter and by renewal of districts in the *Euroméditerranée* area. For the project to become real, public partners had to cooperate with the private sector. They needed bankers, and property owners, because they did not have the financial and property resources to get the project done. This kind of association seems to be on the increase, even if slowly, in France, where local actors have to find partners other than central government, which is decreasing its investments because of budget restrictions (Dubois and Olive 2001). It seems, however, to be more by obligation than by choice, that the public sector has developed its contacts with the private sector. Indeed, Gilles Pinson (2002) concludes that something akin to a growth coalition developed around the *Euroméditerranée* project, because the private sector is the dominant presence in this group, particularly in regards to its capacity to invest in the different projects.

Through this major programme, local elites wished to develop the image of Marseille, from a city simply trying to survive, to a dynamic city concerned with its future development, a concern which they shared with non-local, State actors as will be seen in the following chapters.
4.6. Conclusion.

Behind the image of sun and pastis, Marseille has had to deal with an important crisis. Although the situation has improved to some degree since the middle of the 1990s, Marseille is still in a difficult position. Image enhancement was recognised as key to the city finding a way forward to deal with its difficulties, and sports policy relating to image became an increasingly evident feature. The city’s bids to form part of the staging of the Football World Cup 1998 and for staging the America’s Cup have thus to be understood within this context and it is to these two sets of events that attention is now turned.
5.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the development of the city’s bid to become one of the centres for hosting the 1998 Football World Cup, drawing predominantly on documentary sources and the press, before going on to develop an analysis of how the decision-making process related to the Football World Cup project might be interpreted by reference to the three theoretical frameworks. The Football World Cup is an event, which is staged not in a single city but normally in a single country, with matches taking place in cities with stadia of sufficient size and appropriate standard of facilities. The competition to ‘host’ this event, therefore, takes place at two levels. One is the global competition between countries. The second is the national competition between cities. In France, with one notable exception (Auxerre), clubs do not own their own stadia, as they do for example in the UK. As is the case for American football or baseball in the United States, professional soccer clubs play in stadia owned by municipal authorities. The internal national competition between potential locations for World Cup matches is, therefore, essentially a competition between municipalities / local government, in partnership with their local professional clubs, amongst others.

5.2. The history of Marseille’s candidature for the World Cup.

5.2.1. Introduction: the official process.

a). Decision-making

At the beginning of 1991, France declared an interest in organising and hosting the Football World Cup 1998. In an internal process, the French government called for expressions of interest from cities willing to host
matches for the event, and Marseille along with others received this invitation. Robert Vigouroux, Marseille’s mayor, after an informal meeting with some of his colleagues (Interview with René Olmétà, 3 November 2004), decided to present the project to the City Council. On 27 May 1991, the council voted unanimously to promote the participation of Marseille as a venue for the Football World Cup, for which France was, at this stage, still just a candidate (City Council deliberation and report, 27 May 1991). Marseille had to wait for the FIFA decision on the choice of the host country for the 1998 edition of the World Cup. The years 1991 and 1992 were relatively calm in regard to the decision. Since nothing had yet been decided, there was little or nothing to be done.

However, on 2 July 1992 when France was officially chosen (Le Provençal, 3 July 1992: 17), the process began in earnest. A number of meetings took place between leaders of the CFO (French Organising Committee of the World Cup) and local authority representatives, and feasibility studies were undertaken for potential host cities. Following such discussions in Marseille, the City Council voted again unanimously to fund the extension of the Velodrome Stadium, from 40,000 to 60,000 places (City Council deliberation, 22 February 1993). The reason for this expansion was the wish to host a semi-final, since according to the terms of reference of the World Cup, semi-finals could only be played in stadia with at least 60,000 places. This decision was taken even though the State only announced the name of the official host cities on 14 October 1994. The outcome was that which was anticipated unofficially. Ten cities were designated for hosting games: Bordeaux, Lens, Lyon, Marseille, Montpellier, Nantes, Paris, Saint Denis, Saint Etienne and Toulouse. The Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur himself, made the announcement and confirmed that three cities would definitely be accepted when their financial plans had been completely finalised: the three were Lens, Nantes and Marseille (Le Provençal, 15 October 1994: 21).
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The main decisions taken by the City Council were: to vote to support the participation of Marseille; and more specifically to vote to support the staging of a semi-final. This second decision involved the major aspect of the Marseille investment, the expansion of the Vélodrome Stadium.

b). Organisation of the event

Once France had been chosen by FIFA and the different host cities designated, the French Organising Committee (CFO) assumed greater importance in the process. Until the decision to go ahead with the stadium project, which took place during the Vigouroux period, the CFO was the intermediary with FIFA in establishing terms of reference. Like the French State, the CFO put the city authorities in Marseille under pressure when they took too long to reach agreement on the financial plan for the Stadium. The CFO was concerned to ensure that the different host cities would be ready in time for 1998. From October 1994 to January 1995, Fernand Sastre and Michel Platini, co-presidents of the CFO, made a series of public statements encouraging Marseille to reach agreement with local authorities to finance the stadium so that work could start on time. Fernand Sastre, for example, threatened to stage the second semi-final in Lyon rather than Marseille if the matter was not resolved quickly (Le Provençal, 6 October 1994: 3). Once the financing had been finalised, the City had to choose a preferred design from amongst those presented by different architects.

Apart from the stadium project, the City was also responsible for cultural events / animation around the event, and it was free to choose how to go about hosting spectators and programming events. The CFO was solely in charge of the organisation of the competition. During 1996, the CFO organised the work of the different host cities by creating Regional Organisation Committees (CROs). In Marseille, the creation of the CRO was announced in February 1996 (Le Provençal, 10 February 1996: 21), with the announcement that Jean-Claude Gaudin would be one of its co-
presidents. In the following months, the regional newspaper, *Le Provençal*, expressed concern that the CRO had not yet been created. Nevertheless, the leadership of Marseille CRO seemed unofficially to have been given to Jean-Louis Genovesi, an unknown figure in the football world, even though the nomination of the *Comité Départemental Olympique et Sportif* 13 (CDOS 13) had been widely anticipated. However, Genovesi was apparently a friend of Jean Tigana and knew Michel Platini, who spent regular holidays in Cassis (Genovesi’s home town), and Genovesi had also been supported by one of the deputy mayors of Marseille. This nomination would have generated some conflict in the Marseille City Council (*Le Provençal*, 22 May 1996: 17). Moreover, in the presentation of Genovesi’s curriculum vitae, it was indicated that he had worked as general director in a firm, which Edouard Balladur was for a while a director (*Le Provençal*, 20 May 1998: 5). It was only in 1998, with the event imminent, that Genovesi was explicitly introduced as a friend of Platini. In an interview with a *La Provence* journalist, he explained that Platini himself had advised him to put his name forward for the job. He also claimed that he had no link with football, but that his relevant expertise was in how to manage people (*La Provence*, 20 May 1998: 5). Platini, it seems, preferred to have a friend in place where good relationships facilitate working relationships.

Genovesi officially became the director of Marseille’s CRO on 24 July 1996 (*La Provence*, 25 July 1996: 3). The CRO consisted of 2 sections: public consultation (*cellule de concertation*) and operation. Jean-Claude Gaudin and Jean-Claude Nevière, President of the Mediterranean Football league, were co-presidents of the communication section. This section was responsible for bringing together people representing different sectors and institutions. Their mission was to bring ‘efficiency and coherence to the preparation of the most important media event of this end of century’ (*Le Provençal*, 22 May 1996: 17).
The communication section was further divided into 4 thematic committees: ‘business action, promotion and tourism’; ‘animation and relationships with the sport world, communication, and culture’; ‘education, social insertion, and youth’; and ‘traffic, security, and transport’. Different ideas emerged from these sub-groups, which were all led by local elected or local official representatives. These included a charter for accommodation and catering, and the locations for big screens from which to view the matches. But although their proposals were regularly reported in *La Provence* up to May 1997, there was little news after that date. This may be because the most important work of the CRO was conducted by the operations section, which was responsible for the organisation of the main event. This second section brought together technical experts led, like the other section, by Genovesi. For the local authority, “Mister World Cup” was Marc Vincent (*La Provence*, 5 June 1996: 5; and interview with Robert Villani, 8 July 2005). He was responsible for coordinating the municipal activities associated with the organisation of the World Cup, in other words, he was the link between the City and its services and the CRO.

On the 4 May 1998, the CRO officially became the tenant of the Velodrome Stadium and Chanot Park (*La Provence*, 5 May 1998: Sports I). Genovesi was thus in a sense the ‘mayor of the Stadium’ until the 21 July 1998. The City was, during this period, without any legal power in this area. This was a decision accepted by the City, which was preoccupied with the main facility project for the event, the extension of the Velodrome.

**5.2.2. The stadium project**

If, from the outside, the extension of the Velodrome Stadium appeared to be an easy project to realise, this was far from being the case, especially in relation to the establishing of the financial plan. As indicated earlier, the City Council had agreed an extension of the Stadium from 40,000 to
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60,000 places. But a range of opinions were subsequently to be heard in relation to the extension. The first was that of the mayor who wanted to organise the final in Marseille, which required an extension to 80,000 places (Le Provençal, 24 February 1993: 3). With the support of the newspaper Le Provençal, the mayor argued that such a stadium in Marseille would be cost-effective with the size of the potential audience in the region for football or other major events. He added that the ‘City of football’ was the national location for organising the final of the World Cup (Le Provençal, 28 May 1993: 3). However, the sports world would simply not consider starting and closing the competition in any city other than Paris (Le Provençal, 3 May 1993: 14). Vigouroux’s hopes definitively disappeared when FIFA announced that the stadium in Paris would be built and would be the venue for the final. Nevertheless, Marseille would have a specific role to play because it was to be the location for the holding of the draw for the final phase (Le Provençal, 19 March 1994: 5). Thus, a stadium of 60,000 was what the city council of Marseille finally agreed upon (City Council deliberation, 30 May 1994).

Subsequently, Bernard Tapie, General Councillor (i.e. ‘County Councillor’ for the Département) representing the left, declared that it would be more reasonable to build a stadium of 50,000 places for a lesser amount. The existing stadium, with a capacity of 42,000 places was rarely full, he argued, and so a facility with 18 000 additional places would not be cost effective. Despite this, in 1989, he had led a campaign against the City Council’s plan to build a stadium of 60,000 places. He had even threatened to build a private stadium for his team (he was President of OM at that time), outside the City if nothing was done (Peus 1991). However 4 years later, he was arguing that the cost for a 60,000 seater stadium was too high for the inhabitants of Marseille (Le Provençal, 12 October 1994: 17). Lucien Weygand, President of the General (County) Council, followed Tapie’s suggestion and added that he would accept a larger stadium if a number of sport federations would commit to
organising different competitions in Marseilles and if central government would increase its financial contribution (*Le Provençal*, 12 October 1994: 17). This debate provides an illustration of the difficulties experienced in trying to finalise an agreement for the financing of the stadium expansion.

a). The financing plan.

When the City voted for the extension of the Stadium two commitments were made, one from central government to meet 30% of the costs, and the other from the City also to provide 30% (City Council deliberation and report 22 February 1993; *Le Provençal* 23 February 1993: 3). Robert Vigouroux had to find the remaining third and it was natural that he should turn to both the *Région* and the *Département*. The fact that Presidents of both *Région* and *Département* were elected local representatives and, therefore, had taken part in the Town Hall vote, voting for the extension of the Stadium might have been expected to run smoothly. This was not the case however.

In September 1993, the City, the *Conseil Général* and the *Conseil Régional* were unable to reach an agreement on the financing of the stadium. Relationships were most difficult between the City and the Department. It was almost a tradition that on virtually every project, representatives of both bodies would confront each other, and the World Cup was no exception. At the beginning of October, central government agreed to increase its contribution from 30% to 38.72%, following a request from the City one month earlier (*Le Provençal*, 5 October 1993: ). However, this did not break the deadlock between the local authorities. Yet the decision relating to the Stadium was still supported unanimously by the City Council. For example, on 30 May 1994, the Town Hall agreed unanimously on the extension of the stadium to 60,000 places for a 341 million francs budget, even though the involvement of the *Conseil Général* (the *Département*) and the *Conseil Régional* had not yet been agreed (City Council deliberation, 30 September 1994). These other two local levels of
government had voted funds, which would be insufficient for a facility to host a semi final: the Council Général (Département) proposed 28 million francs and the Conseil Régional had agreed 25 million francs. There was thus a shortfall of 50 million francs. A real struggle began in September 1994. During the City Council meeting of 30 September, Vigouroux called the Conseil Général and the Conseil Régional's bluff. He declared that if they were unwilling to face up to their responsibilities, there would not be a stadium and the sole responsibility for this outcome would rest with the parties. If Vigouroux wished to build a big stadium, it was 'to please Marseille's inhabitants who had loved football for many years' (City Council report, 30 September 1994). The mayor was thus able to seize 'the highground' casting the other two local bodies as the villains of this political game.

During a municipal election campaign all sides take advantage of issues, which will mark them out as different in the eyes of the electorate. Nevertheless, in this case there was a time pressure: the official designation of the host cities for the World Cup was anticipated during October 1994 and solution had to be found quickly. Different national figures involved in the project, began to put Marseilles under pressure, including the CFO President and the Minister of Youth and Sport (Le Provençal, 12 October 1994). But the Presidents of both the Conseil Général and the Conseil régional continued to resist: Lucien Weygand declaring a wish for more involvement from the State and from the sport federations; Jean-Claude Gaudin wishing to know whether the objective underpinning the project was to organize a semi-final or to renovate the Stadium by increasing its capacity (Le Provençal, 17 November 1994: 20).

Nevertheless, everyone agreed on one point: the necessity of a meeting (Le Provençal, 14 October 1994: 22). The official nomination of the host City appears to have had no impact on the major actors. A meeting was planned, delayed, and finally held bringing together officials of the
different local authorities, but no elected representatives (*Le Provençal*, 17 November 1994: 20). According to Vigouroux the financial plan had to be agreed by December, a date which was already late in the process (*Le Provençal*, 19 November 1994: 3).

René Olmeta, after a meeting between the different host cities of the World Cup, declared his optimism, convinced that the State would increase its contribution, and so break the deadlock in the situation (*Le Provençal*, 2 December 1994: 19; 3 December 1994: 21). However, even though the State had in effect decided to provide a further 13 million francs which had initially been earmarked for provision by the local authorities, Olmeta was still waiting for news from the *Conseil Général* and the *Conseil Régional*, with the threat hanging over both Councils that Marseille would not be taking part in the organisation of the World Cup, and with attendant problems for O.M. as well, e.g. to play and to train in another stadium (*Le Provençal*, 22 December 1994: 20; and 30 December 1994: 17). However, these claims were false: no deadline had been given by the CFO, and the issue of Marseille’s involvement was not under consideration. The sole consequence of a delay in the financing arrangements would have been a move for O.M. to another stadium (*Le Provençal*, 3 January 1995: 3). The disagreement between the different local authorities stemmed from the budget presented by the Town Hall. The City had announced a cost of 341 million francs, taking into account costs linked to unforeseen risks associated with work to be undertaken. But this cost incorporated work only related to the City of Marseille. According to central government, the element of the project to be subsidised represented 263 million francs. Both the *Conseils Général* and *Régional*, therefore, wanted the City to reduce the budget it had presented (*Le Provençal*, 3 January 1995: 3). By the end of January, the City had agreed to present a new amount, and an agreement between local authorities was reached (*Le Provençal*, 26 January 1995: 16). The
budget was to be 263 million francs with the following division of contribution:

- central government: 101.5 million francs,
- the City: 101.5 million francs,
- the Conseil Régional: 30 million francs,
- the Conseil Général: 30 million francs (City Council deliberation, 27 February 1995).

The City finally agreed to take responsibility for unforeseen costs linked to the project.

Exactly two years had passed between the decision to extend the Vélodrome Stadium and the agreement of a financial plan for the project. The length of time taken to make the decision has to be understood in the context of the municipal election campaign. The leaders of the three local authorities, City, Département and Région, were all expected to be candidates for Mayor. Thus, each sought to take advantage of the situation. A background factor, which allowed the politicians to play this kind of game, was the timing of the procedure for the selection of the preferred Stadium project design.

b). The choice and the realisation of the Vélodrome Stadium extension.

As soon as the Town Hall had decided on the extension of the Vélodrome Stadium, in May 1993, an invitation to tender was published for architects and construction firms. A Technical Commission, headed by René Olméta, the Deputy Mayor for sport, was responsible for selection of the successful tender. This Commission was made up of technicians and professionals from the construction sector, such as architects (interview with René Olméta). The Mayor was to have the final decision, although the leadership of the Commission would change with the results of municipal elections.
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A number of proposals were assessed, though little was reported in the press about this process. It was announced by *Le Provençal* in March that eight projects were still in the running (*Le Provençal*, 7 March 1995: 5) and on the 22 May 1995 the eight companies involved were to present their projects according to FIFA's terms of reference, together with proposals about developments around the Stadium (*Le Provençal*, 16 March 1995: 5). On 3 July, *Le Provençal* published details of the eight projects, some proposing to cover the stadium, others not. The presentations were made at the time when the leadership of the Committee had just changed as a result of the municipal elections. As indicated above, Jean-Claude Gaudin led only one Committee, that which was to make the final decision. The winner, nominated on 24 July, was the team *Chagnaud-Travaux du Midi* led by the architects Averous and Buffi (*Le Provençal*, 25 July 1995: 3). The choice of the mayor was for a proposal with an uncovered stand (although the current stand was covered). The choice was not debated in the City Council (City Council report, 27 July 1995) but it was by journalists who pointed to a possible conflict with fans (*Le Provençal*, 28 July 1995: 15), and this is indeed what happened. Spectators who normally used this stand were furious (*Le Provençal*, 28 July 1995: 15), and began a petition (*Le Provençal*, 30 July 1995: 13). Although the co-president of CFO emphasised that having a covered stand was not a request made by FIFA, particularly in the 'City of sun', Robert Villani, the new Deputy Mayor, declared that he was seriously studying this question (*Le Provençal*, 3 August 1995: 15). In the end, the Mayor denied any possibility of amending the plan because of the cost ramifications (*Le Provençal*, 8 August 1995: 15).

Although this controversy died down during the work on the Vélodrome Stadium, it returned as soon as the Stadium was fully re-opened, for the drawing of lots for the tournament. The regional newspaper, it seems, took every opportunity, through interviews or articles, to promote the controversy (*La Provence*, 4: 23, 8: 3, 30: back page, December 1997; 22:
back page, 27: sport II February 1998). It appeared that the Vélodrome Stadium was considered a main feature of the Mediterranean city, and thus a matter involving every inhabitant. The covering of the stand even provoked a declaration by the president of O.M. who suggested that he was thinking about financing the covering of the stand himself, and was seeking sponsors to assist with this. He even declared that he had not dismissed the idea of buying the facility (La Provence, 12 February 1998: 3). The Deputy Mayor for Sport, and the Mayor himself, reminded the club President that the stadium was not for sale, because it was essentially a municipal facility, part of the heritage of Marseille (La Provence, 15 April 1998: sport II). Thus it is very clear that the Vélodrome stadium was a sensitive topic, for a wide section of Marseille society. In addition to the covered stand controversy, some people complained about the lack of comfort within the new stadium. For example, the ground on which the press stand was built collapsed slightly, with one journalist being hurt (La Provence, 23 January 1998: 3), and people at the top of the stands felt insecure because of the steep gradient (La Provence, 27 February 1998: sport II). These different problems led the City Council to vote an increase of 2.4 million francs to the Stadium budget in order to improve spectator comfort (La Provence, 30: 5 and 31: 3 March 1998). This new increase came in addition to another voted in October 1997, which was required in order to have the Stadium ready for staging the draw for the final on 4 December (City Council report 27 October 1997). The opposition began to argue that the budget was spiralling out of control, even though it voted in favour of both decisions. In total, the global budget for the Stadium project represented 391.9 million francs, compared with the initial estimate of 341 million (for the global budget).

As one can see, the Vélodrome Stadium extension project was not realised without difficulty. It is interesting to note that when a journalist asked Jean-Claude Gaudin if he had any regrets since the beginning of his period in office, he answered: 'My sole real regret is about the Stadium. Its
architecture is not conducive to the atmosphere. But there was a need to make a decision quickly in order for Marseille to be on time for the World Cup appointment’ (La Provence, 6 June 1998: 3). This statement, coming from the man who led the group that made the decision, seems surprising. When one grasps the importance of the municipal facility for the population, one can understand the importance of this statement. An article in La Provence on 5 June 1998 provides reassurance for the Mayor, arguing that the Vélodrome project was the best available, considering the quality-price trade-off.

Rather less controversially, a range of smaller projects were realised for the World Cup – including events and other facilities for visitors. These were intended to illustrate Marseille’s capacity to be as good a host as one would expect from the second city of France.

5.2.3. Around the event.

a). Expectations from the event.

During Vigouroux’s period in office few expectations were clearly formulated. During City Council meetings, where the World Cup was discussed, politicians repeated the mantra that the World Cup represented a major opportunity for the Mediterranean city, without ever explaining why or in what way (Town Hall Council report, 21 May 1991; 30 May 1994). Until Jean-Claude Gaudin came to power, the political discourse was different. In effect, it was Fernand Sastre who, during a visit in Marseille to see the stadium project, outlined what the city could expect: a positive economic impact with 450,000 people expected for matches, and a huge boost to publicity thanks to the media coverage and its world audience. In that, millions people would hear about Marseilles (Le Provençal, 6 September 1995: 2).
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It was in the context of an interview\(^7\) in which he recounted his track record after 100 days in office that Jean-Claude Gaudin talked about his expectations from the World Cup. The event, he argued, would benefit Marseille in terms of image change. Specifically, he wanted this competition to be a vehicle for eradicating or downplaying its 'Pagnol' associations\(^8\) by which Marseille had been caricatured with, in its place, an image of a city opening up to the world. The Mayor in fact was relying on two major events to revive the city's reputation: the Football World Cup 1998 and the celebration of the 26th century of the city's history in 1999. The former in particular would be a way for Marseille inhabitants to regain a certain pride in their city (Le Provençal, 10 October 1995: 5). Without pre-claiming an official policy, both events were presented as crucial to the development of Marseille, but are largely significant in terms of the Mayor's political reputation. This is illustrated in an editorial of the municipal magazine in which Jean-Claude Gaudin talks about the World Cup as an historic event, in which the citizens of Marseille are invited to participate, notably to showcase the wealth of the city. Vigouroux, by contrast, when he was mayor, made no allusion to this event in his contribution to the same magazine.

For journalists, economic outcomes were the most important factor, in particular, provision for visitors to sleep and eat, as well as to have fun were seen as major profits opportunities. Other outcomes such as jobs generated and improvement in the image of the city were acknowledged, but benefits of this type were regarded as difficult to estimate in advance (Le Provençal, 9 February 1996: 2). It was widely recognised that the generating of a new image for the city would depend on local people. The

\(^7\) Jean-Claude Gaudin had spent one hundred days as Mayor of the City. For this symbolic birthday, he outlined his initial track record and presented his policy and ambitions for Marseille.

\(^8\) Marcel Pagnol, 1895 to 1974, was an author, playwright and film-maker whose work is renowned for a poetic and picturesque depiction, often in comic caricature of Marseille and Provence. His plays, books and films are attributed with cementing the association of the Marseillais, with pastis, pétanque and of patois, a tendency for exaggeration and for the conducting of shouted conversation.
local bureaucrats and politicians responsible for this, therefore, had high expectations of the local population for celebrating the World Cup and the 26th centenary of the City. Deputy Mayors responsible for sports, tourism and culture held numerous meetings with local associations to mobilise the population (La Provence, 19 June 1997: 3). The event was seen as a crucial opportunity for image change, and would generate tourist and business challenges (La Provence, 5 November 1997: sport II; 14 March 1997: 21).

If expectations in term of image were largely introduced in articles about the World Cup, they were clearly expressed in entire articles dedicated to the topic when 'D-Day' approached. For example, an article entitled ‘World Cup: one month to seduce’ presents the challenge that a new image of Marseille would represent (La Provence, 28 April 1998: 3). More explicit is the content of ‘4 weeks in balloon’. It is said that ‘the City is relying on the 7 matches that it will host to renew its image’. The most important match is

...the one that the City has to play against itself (...) Marseilles knows that it is playing its reputation (...) Will it be able to satisfy the visitors, to seduce them, to give them the desire to come back. The same questions exist in the other host cities, but the difference is that Marseille has a specific image: as an undisciplined, disorganized, and whimsical city. The World Cup is a huge opportunity to change this. The entire city is mobilized for it (La Provence, 5 June 1998: 5).

One can see that as the event approached discourses and ideas were beginning to be exposed more clearly. The aim was not simply to host a football competition; it was to change the image of the City through the successful organization of the event, with everybody active in the achievement of this aim. In essence, as reported in La Provence, ‘the World Cup is first of all a motive and a showcase’ (La Provence, 6 December 1997: 5).

9 At the time for the draw for the finals, La Provence emphasized this point on 5 November 1997 (p. 5).
In relation to discourses around the themes of the economy and tourism, during the Gaudin period, this is much less evident. In other words, whereas expectations in terms of image grew more and more significant as the event approached, expectations about tourism and the economy diminished. At the beginning of 1996, much was reported about the major implications for tourism and economy (*La Provence*, 9 February 1996: 2). As the staging of the draw grew closer, some commentators began to de-emphasise economic expectations because in terms of accommodation, Marseille would not be able to accommodate all incoming spectators, and this would benefit neighbouring cities (*La Provence*, 5 November 1997: 5). These fears appeared to be confirmed as some fans, such as a group of Brazilians, indicated they were going to make the return trip on the day of the match to Marseille because they would be staying in Paris during the competition (*La Provence*, 11 February 1998: 2). Moreover, it was reported that for the accommodation sector, the usual business clients and congress participants might be put off from coming risk not to come to Marseille, by the prospect of the World Cup (*La Provence*, 29 April 1998: 3). One month before the event an article entitled ‘Will the World Cup disrupt the tourist economy?’ made the point about negative expectations for tourism. According to an officer responsible for tourism services, there would not be a net negative effect during the event because spectators for the World Cup would replace the normal clientele, but this group was coming solely for the football, and not to visit and stay in the city. The tourist office representatives argued, however, that consequences would be visible in the long term because of Marseille’s new image from which tourism would benefit in the future (*La Provence*, 1 June 1998: 3 and 5 June 1997: 5). Shop owners reportedly had similar expectations, some hoped to increase their activity, while some expected nothing (*La Provence*, 8 June 1998: 2).
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To summarize, the most important expectations for the event related to enhancement of the city image, with a hope that Marseille's new image would have positive consequences in the middle and long term for the local economy and tourism. Thus for journalists and political representatives alike the World Cup represented an opportunity to change the image of Marseille, thereby promoting city development, and projects and actions drew on this expectation for legitimation.

b). The different projects associated with hosting the event.

Apart from the stadium extension, the first major project to take effect concerned the laying-out of the area around the stadium. For this Jean-Claude Gaudin announced that 180 million francs would be allocated (Le Provençal, 10 February 1996: 21). The aim was to improve access to the stadium, and to host thousands of people in a small area. Residents living close to the stadium were very much in support of these plans (Le Provençal, 13 June 1996: 3). There would be development of the underground, of the roads and pavements, and protection of houses around the Vélodrome (Le Provençal, 13 November 1996: 3). The moving of the municipal tennis club, next to the stadium, was also planned to allow the stadium to be extended and for car parks to be built. In the same locale, the pedestrian area around the stadium entrance would be a free space (Le Provençal, 17 August 1996: 5), with this was seen as a means of 'giving back' the stadium to the local population. The idea was to leave a space between the gates and the facility itself, to which Marseille inhabitants should be allowed free access.⁽¹⁾

There was one important element, which would cause significant difficulties if nothing was to be done, and this was the city's accommodation capacity. With only 4,500 rooms, Marseille would not be capable of accommodating all the spectators visiting the city. However the

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⁽¹⁾ Since 1998, this space has become the main area in the city for the practice of different urban sports: rollerblading, skates, street-hockey and so on. One can observe families, groups of friends or single people sharing this space peacefully.
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City Council was reluctant to start constructing new hotels. It was regarded as too great a risk to build hotels because of one event, however big, because of fears that, after the event, they would be under-used (Le Provençal, 11 June 1996: 3). The tourist professionals agreed. The solution proposed was that neighbouring cities would provide additional accommodation, while boats could also be transformed into hotels. This solution met with consensus from all parties.

In relation to other aspects of the project, nothing more was publicly discussed. However it was not only the physical aspects of the stadium project but other aspects of the city environment that required actions. The city required a face lift: graffiti were erased (La Provence, 25 October 1997: 3); the centre of the city was renewed (La Provence, 29 May 1998: 2), and the town centre was made safe (La Provence, 5 February 1998: 3). In this manner, Marseille aimed to present the face of a clean, safe and well organised city. In addition, various socio-cultural animations were planned.

c). Cultural events.
If the image of the city was to be overhauled, the organisation of cultural animation programmes would have to be a success, and the communication section of the CR0 did not lack ideas in this respect. The different committees proposed creating a charter in the different sectors: for local people in terms of promoting a welcome for strangers (Le Provençal, 21 November 1996: 7 and 6 May 1997: 3); and for hotels and restaurants in terms of commitment to a high quality of service (Le Provençal, 17 December 1996: 10). For spectators and for young people, the setting up of giant screens in the city was proposed (Le Provençal, 15 February 1997: 5). From July 1997, it was known that three main sites were to be dedicated to animation in the city: the Vieux Port, the Prado beaches and Borrely Park (La Provence, 11 July 1997: sport I). While the first two were eventually used for the event, the last was replaced by the
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site of Mourepiane (La Provence, 30 March 1998: 5 and 31 March 1998: 3; and Town Hall Council report, 30 March 1998). Thus, animations were planned in the North, in the South and in the centre of the city, allowing all inhabitants of the city to be involved. Although other host cities contributed to the financing of animations, Marseille was alone in leaving the private sector to do this. The association ‘OM-Centenaire’ was given responsibility for the organisation of animations (La Provence, 30 March 1998: 5 and 31 March 1998: 3). Private investors included the Club ‘Marseille-La Découverte—an association that consisted of 15 firms from Marseille – as well as international and national firms: Coca-Cola, Budweiser, Adidas, Canal Plus, Lavazza, France Telecom, Danone and Eurest (La Provence, 7 April 1998: sport II). Most of these companies were regular sponsors for FIFA. Although the ‘OM-Centenaire’ was responsible for the financing and organisation of animations, the city contributed to the planning of most of the events. Initially, Jean-Claude Gaudin had wanted the city to finance the animations. However, faced with opposition from his City Council, he agreed that the private sector should finance it (La Provence, 30 September 1997: 5). On 4 June 1998, La Provence published details of the finance plan for the animations: the budget of 21,5 million francs was divided as follows: 19 million francs would be provided by the ISL marketing company – which obtained sponsorship from international and national companies; 1,5 million francs from ‘Marseille La Découverte’; and 1 million francs for the Conseil Général (representing investment by the public sector). The three main sites would host different events. At the Vieux Port, concerts were planned, as well as an exposition of products from regional firms and an art exhibition. The Prado Beaches and Mourepiane would host the two giant screens and sporting events (La Provence, 7 April 1998: sport II).

If the animations planned appeared to delight the local population, this was not the case for shop owners in the Vieux Port. The charm of the Vieux Port, the boats, the port and the sea, meant that animations needed
to be less visible. Shop owners opposed the animation proposal – about which they were not consulted - because they obscured the main attractions of the port (La Provence, 3 June 1998: 3). The regional newspaper also began to echo the negative reactions of individuals as the World Cup approached. Residents near the Vélodrome Stadium expressed some fears (La Provence, 10 June 1998: 3), for example, about poor road signage (La Provence, 11 June 1998), the location of seats within the Stadium (La Provence, 6 June 1998: 3), and the lack of tickets allocated for disadvantaged groups (La Provence, 3 June 1998: 5). By contrast however, the newspaper emphasised two positive topics: security and traffic. La Provence thus struck a balance between periods of hope and enthusiasm, and of doubt and fear, between the positive and (not so) negative consequences.

5.2.4. Results.

a). Economic outcomes.

From the second week of the competition, shop owners in the town centre and the Vieux Port were largely disappointed (La Provence, 19 June 1998: 3), and this impression was confirmed after the event, since not all shops benefited equally from the event. In catering, the only sector that increased its activity was fast-food. Others reported little impact from the World Cup (La Provence, 11 July 1998: 2). Similar results were reported by the accommodation sector: few establishments increased their activity, and the loss of ‘normal’ clientele was not compensated by spectators for the World Cup (La Provence, 18 July 1998: 5). In fact, the only shop owners to increase their activity were those located at strategic points or on the spectators’ ‘routes’. Two other explanations were given for this lack of impact. First, none of the teams were based in the same city for the month, hence supporters travelled from city to city. Second, this World Cup was an event, which gave prominence to VIPs and their guests but VIPs tend to stay in their hotel where they sleep, receive people and eat,

Economic results were thus mixed. In fact, they corresponded with the expectations formulated by the Head of the Tourist Office. However, as he argued, the impact on tourism and on the economy was likely to be over the long term, as a result of image change, and in this respect at least, it seems that the city was successful (*La Provence*, 11 July 1998: 2).

b). Image outcomes.

During the World Cup competition Marseille portrayed itself as a city with a good atmosphere. In the festivities for the opening of the competition, the population demonstrated its warm and friendly character (*La Provence*, 10 June 1998: 3). The site where this atmosphere was most evident was on Prado beach, with its giant screen attracting 106,500 spectators up to the 27th June (*La Provence*, 28 June 1998: 2). It represented freedom and a friendly atmosphere for the World Cup (*La Provence*, 24 June 1998: 2), benefiting from the mixed public coming from different parts of Marseille and its hinterland, as well as foreigners coming to support their team. These people came to 'enjoy a wild time peacefully' (*La Provence*, 24 June 1998: 2). The second site with a giant screen did not enjoy anything like this success. Mourepiane is located in an industrial area, and the giant screen was set up between business premises, and was 'walled in'. Only 5,000 spectators attended the site to watch matches (*La Provence*, 28 June 1998: 2). Obviously, beaches are more attractive than an industrial zone, and the success of Prado beach led to demands for further animation events. Even though the City Council agreed to this proposal, the local authority at neighbourhood level did not, since it objected to the noise and the damage to the grass (*La Provence*, 20 July 1998: 3).
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In general, the City managed to do what Jean-Claude Gaudin had wished, that is it showed a ‘friendly and warm image, to demonstrate once again, the example of fraternity and generosity’ (La Provence, 4 December 1997: 2-3). Yet, the organisation did not get off to a good start. In effect, the match between England and Tunisia was the occasion of violent opposition between supporters of each team as well as of problems with some young inhabitants of Marseille (La Provence, 15 June 1998: 2). Clashes took place the day before the game, as well as on the day of the match. The security system that had regularly been presented as being ready and prepared to deal with just such events, became the subject of debate. The police were criticised for allowing the hooligans to come into the town centre, even though there were reports of trouble near the stadium. In the town centre and the Vieux Port, shop windows were broken, cars were damaged, and some people were injured (La Provence, 15 June 1998: 2). As a consequence of this, shop owners closed their shops the day after, and the town centre was deserted (La Provence, 16 June 1998: 2). However, despite initial fears that the football party would turn into a violent affair, the rest of the competition passed by with little difficulty. These images of violence were not associated with the city for long, thanks to an improved security system and to supporters becoming more peaceful. Moreover, these events were nothing compared with situations in other host cities, such as Lens, where a policeman died during a battle between supporters.

For the inhabitants of Marseille, the event was a success. A survey, commissioned by the City, demonstrated the positive views of people:

- 94% of Marseilles inhabitants interviewed thought that the hosting of the World Cup was a good thing for the City.
- 66% of people interviewed thought that it would make a lasting change to the image of Marseille in a positive sense.
- and 93% of people interviewed thought that Marseilles lived up to the event.
With regard to animation events, 57% of people interviewed declared that they did not enjoy animations as much as they would have liked, whereas 74% thought that animations were ‘for everyone’. About the quality of animation events, more than 75% of people found them to be of good quality, though less than 40% of people interviewed took part in an event. Finally, at least, 95% of people interviewed thought that if it had to be done again, Marseilles should host the World Cup (*La Provence*, 11 July 1998: 3).

Jean-Claude Gaudin was delighted with these results. According to Gaudin, Marseilles succeeded in its goals: there was good media coverage, an increase of business in some sectors and the events were a success, in particular on Prado beach (*La Provence*, 11 July 1998: 2). When, later on, the opposition of the City Council lamented the fact that shop owners were disappointed about the lack of positive impact for them, as well as the poor use made of the Vieux Port and the cost of the project, Gaudin replied:

> without any doubt, in the years to come Marseille will benefit from the huge promotion campaign which was developed around the event and which represents almost 10 years of effort in promotion. (...) We did not host the World Cup for restaurants and pubs to sell more sandwiches or beers (Town Hall report, 20 July 1998).

The redirection of image seems to have been successfully initiated, as were the events organised to support this goal. One such major event was ‘the City of Success’ in November 1997, a Congress, which was usually hosted in Paris. The event brought together scientists, intellectuals and philosophers, to discuss social issues. The fact that famous personalities were drawn to the city enabled Marseille to claim that it was enjoying a better reputation (*La Provence*, 12 November 1997: last page; 14 November 1997: 2 and 17: 3 November 1997). The city then had to build on this success.
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Informed by the above ‘history’ of the event, we turn now to the decision-making process for this project.

5.3. Analysing data.

5.3.1. Objectives.

The way that the decision was made under Robert Vigouroux to host the World Cup matches was as follows. The Mayor gathered some close collaborators to discuss the opportunity to participate, including those Deputy Mayors with responsibilities for related areas. All gave their approval and thus proposed to vote for this proposal in the City Council. This was the way that René Olmetá, Deputy Mayor for Sport at this time, presented the decision-making process and the rationale for participation:

It was an interesting operation including for the city of Marseille because the stadium, the mythic Vélodrome Stadium, was beginning to pose a certain number of problems in terms of its operations and of its facilities. I was well placed because as the Deputy Mayor for Sport, my services were responsible and we had already concluded quite quickly that we would have to do a lot of work quite soon. So it was an argument used by the Mayor to say that work would have to be done in any case, one might as well say that we benefit from this operation to obtain State financing, and while doing something at the same time that Marseille wanted to do (Interview with René Olmetá, 3 November 2004).

The starting objective was thus simple for the Mayor and his Deputy Mayor for Sport: the participation of Marseille in the Football World Cup 1998 was an opportunity to renovate the stadium, which needed to be done anyway. The second objective was to please the citizens of Marseille. This Mediterranean city, which ‘lives and breathes’ its football, would thus become the location of the greatest competition in this sport. The inhabitants of Marseille could only be in favour of this decision (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 18 October 2004; and with René Olmetá, 3 November 2004), and thus politicians would also support it. René Olmetá, talking about the importance of football in Marseille stated that:
For a politician, so for a mayor and for Vigouroux who had lived this as well [the importance of football in Marseille], that leads to say: well, a big event like the World Cup, it is football, we cannot neglect it (Interview with René Olmeta, 3 November 2004).

It would also enable the city to have a major facility with additional spectator capacity and which could be used not only for football. Other sports events, concerts or other large gatherings could take place in the stadium, and this would benefit the whole tourist sector in Marseille. For some people, it was the visionary spirit of Robert Vigouroux, which involved the city in this adventure (Interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005).

When Jean-Claude Gaudin came to power in 1995, the World Cup project was already underway, and there was just one significant decision to make: the type of stadium development to adopt. The new Mayor thus shaped the event in a particular fashion. For him, international competition would be a starting point for the city and its citizens to undertake renewal. As one of the project actors put it:

The policy of Jean-Claude Gaudin was able to be expressed more freely [than was the case of Vigouroux] because the project had already been accepted, because Marseille was officially a host city in Marseille, then one could extend ambition beyond (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 18 October 2004).

But there were no clear objectives stated by Gaudin. Of course he exhibited the World Cup as a major event for his city, but we do not really know with what goals in mind, except to provide an unspecificed boost to the city. It appears that things were clearer for civil servants - the technocrats. One of the civil servants who worked on the project only under Gaudin expressed it this way:

[The role of the city] was to host the event and to ensure the event went well. And also that the good image of the event should be reflected on the city (Interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005).
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To summarize, the objective of Vigouroux was to participate in the competition in order to renew the stadium, which was something that needed to be done. For Gaudin, the objective was to provide a new boost to the image of Marseille through the hosting of World Cup matches. His late involvement in the project had enabled him to orient the project as he wished. One of the interviewees summarizes this element well:

In terms of political ambition, one might say that sometimes the politicians make a decision and the ambition comes later, with all the material support being provided (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 18 October 2004).

Marseille simply applied to take part in this project. Having done so successfully, objectives for the city followed, rather than the other way around. Strategic thinking was thus emergent and not formative.

5.3.2. Means.

For this project, the city depended on two systems. One was the decentralised state system involving central government, the Conseils Général and Régional for the financing of the stadium. The second was the football authorities in charge of the competition, with the CFO and CRO, representing FIFA for the event. The convention signed between the CFO and the City Council required that the latter put its sport facility at the disposal of the former. The City Council was thus not responsible directly for dealing with the event. The operational section, whose President was officially designated by the CFO was formally independent of the City Council. The public consultation Section, made up of local representatives from different sectors was responsible for organising the hosting process and staging the animations linked to the competition. In a sense the CRO took over responsibility once host cities had been chosen.

The city thus became just another location where FIFA organised its activities. With regard to both systems, Marseille helped itself where it needed to. The financial collaboration of other public bodies enabled Marseille to set up a project that it would not have been able to take on.
alone, and the decentralised arm of FIFA, the CRO, took on the operational aspects of the event. In relation to the other local and national government levels, their involvement was even presented as ‘natural’ something which, despite disagreements, was always going to take place. For the city of Marseille, partners were quickly found: the system of decentralisation provided these in the form of the Department and the Region. The idea of recruiting other partners, notably from the private sector, was touched on, but quickly put aside.

In terms of infrastructure for the World Cup, this mostly concerned developing the stadium area and the transport network linked to it in order for the thousands of spectators to be accommodated in good conditions. To host seven matches with 60,000 spectators at each game this work was essential. Thus, works included development of the underground, of roads, of the pavement area, protection of houses around the stadium, the moving of the tennis club, and the construction of car parks near the stadium and at the different underground stations of the city. As Marc Vincent explained

> The Football World Cup has also been a means to change the use of public spaces and thoroughfares, places, in fact to change the nature of a neighbourhood. In a sense, it was also, an opportune, mini-operation of town planning (Interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005).

As we have already noted, the objective was not only to develop the stadium, but also to reorient the space around it in order to make the main city facility more accessible and to give local inhabitants more of a sense of ownership of the space (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 18 October 2004).

5.3.3. Kind of actors.

In a project such as the Football World Cup, a certain number of bodies are almost automatically regarded, in the French system, as likely to be involved in decision-making and financial plans. In other words, central
government, the *Conseils Régional* and *Départemental* are usually partners for such event. For this specific competition, FIFA and committees especially created at the national and local level, were to be added. At the city level, interest groups were consulted to a greater or lesser degree. Figure 5.1. illustrates the role of each of the actors involved.
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Figure 5.1.: Actors involved and their roles

- **STATE**
  - Ministry of Youth and Sports
  - Ministry of Finance

- **LOCAL AUTHORITIES**
  - Regional and Departmental Direction of Youth and Sports
  - Conseil Régional Provence Alpes Côte d'Azur
  - Conseil Général of Bouches du Rhône

- **FOOTBALL BODIES**
  - FIFA
  - French Organisation Committee of the World Cup (CFO)
  - Regional Organisation Committee
  - League and departmental committee of Football

- **Private sector**
- Football Clubs

- **Residents**
- Sport movement

- **Investors**
- Decision-makers
- Investors and decision-makers

- Direct link
- Representative of the higher hierarchical level
- Groups consulted
Under both mayors, the Deputy Mayor with responsibility for sport was in charge of the project. However, the political style and the personality of each of the mayors led to different roles for both Deputy Mayors. Thus, René Olméta was the voice of the project, its official representative notably at the national level, with little intervention from Robert Vigouroux. In contrast, Robert Villani adopted a more common deputy mayor role, as the political go-between at the local level, with Jean-Claude Gaudin as the City representative and its voice when mayoral influence was required (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004). The local authorities had, for their part, played the role of sole financers of the project. Their competences were not requested in other respects. Nevertheless, some of their representatives were part of the CRO, although only in the communication section.

Central government, however, performed significant tasks on this project, through the different ministries involved in the event. The first of these was the Ministry of Finance, because the State brought an important financial contribution to the table. The Ministry of Youth and Sports was the main interlocutor of the CFO, and had to choose the host cities, ensuring that stadiums conformed to FIFA requirements. The local representatives of this Ministry, the Regional and Departmental Direction of Youth and Sport (DRJS), thus had an important role in this process. It provided expertise, liaised in dialogue between partners, and undertook technical assessments, for the central government, the city and the CRO (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004). Central government was also involved through its Ministry of Internal Affairs, which oversaw security during the competition.

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11 There is an example of this division of role: in an article about relationships between the CFO and the host cities, it is described how, when Michel Platini came to Marseille, it was Jean-Claude Gaudin who had lunch with him; but when there was a meeting between the CFO and the different host cities, it was Robert Villani – accompanied by Marc Vincent - who represented the city (La Provence, 17 January 1998: sport I).
The final major set of actor for the project were the football authorities. FIFA designated France as the organising country and produced the terms of reference for the competition. Subsequently, it created the French Organising Committee of the Football World Cup, in charge of the national organisation of the competition. Subsequently, the French Committee named site directors, responsible for the Regional Organisation Committee. This local committee then had to put in place the necessary context for the competition to take place. In Marseille, the different actors had to deal with the site director Jean-Louis Genovesi who was appointed in 1997, and thus did not work with Vigouroux’s team.

As discussed, the CRO had a specific organisation to lead the event. It was divided into two sections: operational and public consultation. The former played the major role, in terms of the logistics and technical organisation. This operational section incorporated experts chosen by Genovesi. The public consultation section had, as its mission, to think about hosting issues and the animation for spectators. Within this section there were elected members: the Mayor, Deputy Mayors for sport, culture, and tourism; a departmental (county) councillor, René Olméta and at least one regional councillor. One also finds numerous public officials, representing different bodies: prefects, chief education officer, the president of the DRJS, but also directors of municipal services, amongst whom was Olivier Latil D’Albertas, the Director of Economic Development, and Marc Vincent, Technical Councillor, ‘Mister World Cup’ for the City. Public institutions were the most important suppliers of members, followed by the sports world (mostly football). For the former, besides league and committee representatives, the director of O.M. participated in this section. The sector, which was least well represented, was the economic world, because there was only one company director and a member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Although the public consultation section wanted to be open to the whole population, and its role was highlighted by the press in the early stages, this did not last. It seems that
the aim of the section was to involve local people in order to gain their support for the project. However, their concern was rather more with ensuring people were represented rather than with taking action. In addition, interviewees who took part in the activities of the public consultation section did not make reference to it during our interviews.

If, during the process, the State and local authorities always had the same role, it was not the case for the City and the CRO. In effect, until the arrival of the CRO in 1997, the City was 'master in its own house'. It was the one that was making decisions concerning the stadium development, even if it had to follow the line imposed by FIFA. As soon as the CRO was in place, it took control of the project. The City thus became simply an executive of the CRO in relation to World Cup issues. The CRO was actually in a position of acting 'extra-territorially' since the stadium area was a territory, which did not belong to it but in which it had power to do as it saw fit. Thus, the main actors of the project were public bodies and an association.

The private sector had little or no involvement in decision-making terms. It performed a largely supporting role. In other words, it was an accompanying partner for the event, upon which the project had to rely because the domains of transport, accommodation and catering were the bedrock of the World Cup for players, spectators and the host communities. The business sector was consulted, notably via the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Marseille. Work for the stadium extension was also undertaken by private firms and designed by private architects, because the municipal services did not have the capacity to carry out these tasks (Interview with René Olméta, 3 November 2004). In this case, the relationship between the city and these private actors was simply one
of employer and employee.\textsuperscript{12}

If the private sector had a role as supporting services under Vigouroux, as well as under Gaudin, this role, nevertheless, took a different turn with the Mayor from the political right. In effect, as indicated earlier, the Mayor called in the private sector to take on the financing of animations, led by the association ‘\textit{OM-Centenaire}'. Thus, although the private sector under Gaudin still had no role in decision-making, it did have a role as an investor. The public-private partnership, which was until December 1997 ‘de facto’ because of the services that the private sector could offer, became official largely in the area of organising animation. The process was not simply a call for sponsors from the City: it was a request for financial help. The City Council decided that the city did not have the finance to support animations, or at least it was not desirable to take on financial commitments given the costs already committed to the project. Private sector bodies were then called in. If we look in detail at the firms involved in the animation projects, there were the usual sponsors of FIFA – international firms on the one hand, and 15 regional firms on the other, organised through the association ‘\textit{Marseille La Découverte}'. For the 15 firms, which were national or international, each had a head office in the Marseille region. The private sector was thus more operator than actors.

In relation to the general population, dialogue was mostly conducted through the normal channels in Marseille. Thus, when interviewees were asked about consultation with the population, this was said to have been done through associations, sport associations, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the CIQs. Even though the role of the CIQs had become less important since the demise of Defferre, they were still key actors for

\textsuperscript{12} Nevertheless, during both interviewees, Raymond Mallet emphasized the influence that the architects had in the project, especially in defending their ideas. But this approach is to be expected in the case of people who were chosen for their ideas, as is always the case when an architectural team is selected.
Chapter 5: Bidding to stage the Football World Cup 1998 in Marseille

Marseille politicians. Consultation took place largely through the networks’ head. According to one technocrat:

There was consultation, of each of the representative bodies in Marseille. Through forms, which criticized by certain networks, by certain channels, for being simply sufficiently visible to showcase that it was done. Dialogue of this kind is questionable. When one talks with networks heads, it is a kind of dialogue. When one communicates with a larger population, this is very different. It is not always satisfactory. So, it was the alternation between a wish to consult to the maximum and also simply to take account of the answers of the network heads, the lead voices’ (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004).

The dialogue was thus regarded by this technocrat, at least, as having been conducted as a cosmetic exercise rather than a real exercise in listening to the people.

From the beginning, the participation of Marseille in the Football World Cup was a decision of the City Council, the State and FIFA, and these three bodies were key to the project. The main actor, in terms of decision-making and power, was not consistent across the period of the project. In the early stages it was the City Council but once the CRO was established, it took the major role with the City Council becoming simply a collaborator.

5.3.4. Motivations.
Motivations, which underpin the main objective, were of different types. At the social level, Vigouroux’s team wanted to please citizens, given the population’s passion for football. However, the Vigouroux team sought predominantly to reach out to the young through this project, by giving them dreams, a topic for passionate debate, a focus, something to do or to talk about. Marseille politicians recognised, whatever their political party, that football engenders a fervour which would allow young people to dream: ‘It has the advantage of being able to preoccupy them’ (Interview with René Olméta, 3 November 2004).
Chapter 5: Bidding to stage the Football World Cup 1998 in Marseille

It was argued that there are fewer problems in the inner city in Marseille than in other French cities because of the existence of O.M., the football club, and the sense of community it engenders. Subsidies given to O.M. represent money, which should not be available for neighbourhood associations (Interview with René Olméta, 3 November 2004). Hosting the World Cup would make young people dream for a month, and 12,000 more places in the Vélodrome would give more of them the opportunity to come to support their team. For politicians, it was a godsend. Even though this factor (i.e. the usefulness of the project as a political tool) was only the fourth most significant argument raised by René Olméta, it is one of the few factors to be cited by all interviewees.

In relation to economics, there were two kinds of motives evident, one in each of the municipal teams. For Vigouroux and his colleagues, a 60,000 seater facility would enable them to respond to expectations, notably from the restaurant and accommodation sectors (Interview with René Olméta, 3 November 2004). For Gaudin’s team, the event would attract new firms (Interview with Robert Villani, 8 July 2005). This illustrates something of the two political visions: the first from the political left, involved responding to the demands of Marseille inhabitants, the second from the more liberal right, emphasised the attraction of new firms, and thus of new forms of capital.

In relation to the event itself, the interviewees did not talk directly about economic outcomes anticipated from the hosting of thousands of spectators. It was only press commentary that emphasised this aspect, and then, only later in the process. Indeed, it was the President of the CFO who reminded Marseille inhabitants what the World Cup could bring to them (Le Provençal, 6 September 1995: 2).

In relation to motives concerning media outcomes, there were also differences corresponding to each municipal team. In both cases, a major
motive was to improve Marseille’s image, but in different ways. For René Olméta, this was the least significant motivation:

‘And the last element was the communication element... There was an impressive press gallery... I mean that, also from that point of view, the communication could widely promote, if there was a need, the city, Marseille, as organiser, as passionate about sport and so on... So, if you like, at different points there was first the political choice for investment by the city, and afterwards there was the economic side, the social, and then ‘pourquoi pas’ the communication’ (Interview with René Olméta, 3 November 2004).

The expression ‘why not’ used by the former Deputy Mayor for sport demonstrates that he did not anticipate this aspect of the event. The view of his successor was somewhat different:

... and with a hope, that is the whole world will see images of Marseille, will see what Marseille is, will discover Marseille and maybe will change the image that people have of it (Interview with Robert Villani, 8 July 2005).

Nevertheless, this aspect of changing the image of the city was most prominent for civil servants. All such interviewees laid greater emphasis on their expectations in this domain than elected politicians:

Expectations were first of all to fill the gap in the image of Marseille (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004).

...[Outcomes] of image because... it means you don’t have to have a press campaign, if you have a team that becomes UEFA champions, or even wins another competition. So there was town planning, providing facilities, but also over the 7 matches there would be an impact on the image of Marseille on the part of the tourists who will come (Interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005).

Nevertheless, even if interviewees did not talk about it, it is hard to divorce this decision from the political context of that time. Bernard Tapie, President of the football club at the beginning of the 1990s, was a political ‘spoiler’. He was attracting more and more supporters and publicity. Yet, at this time – 1990 – a conflict was developing between Vigouroux and
Tapie. The latter threatened to build a private stadium outside the city if the municipality would not start work for the Vélodrome Stadium (Peus 1991). The World Cup ‘arrived’ just in time: work was to be done at less cost to the city and the conflict ended. This decision enabled Robert Vigouroux to regain some esteem in the opinion of the city’s inhabitants, he was thus able to avoid getting into a major argument during the electoral campaign with the man who seemed likely to be a strong future opponent in the 1995 municipal elections.

It seems that the Vigouroux team wished to project the message that it was still master in its own house. It was a way of gathering public support against an opponent, Bernard Tapie, from the private sector, who would readily have called on other private support if it had to come to a fight. The local authority was thus not ready to cede power, and revealed a capacity to maintain control.

5.3.5. Resources.

It was clear that financial resource was the first thing needed for this project. Conflicts relating to this aspect between the local authorities demonstrate their importance. This kind of major project provides the opportunity for each of the local authorities to flex their political muscles, and assume control over respective opponents. In terms of influence, as noted, one cannot deny Bernard Tapie’s role in the first stage of the decision. He got his way virtually without doing anything, and thus managed to demonstrate his political weight. A year after his strong words about the stadium, he again came to the fore expressing his opinion in relation to a 60,000 capacity facility. Nevertheless, he was unable to avoid the complaint against the club management registered by Vigouroux.

On the other hand, the relationship between Edouard Balladur, Prime Minister at that time, and Robert Vigouroux, though officially political opponents, was positive. Because of this relationship, plans were
facilitated for the Mayor, notably a semi-final to be staged in Marseille, as well the staging of the draw. This was significant for a single city, knowing that other cities could have taken its place since state rather than local budgets were allocated for it. Of course, Marseille is the city of football in France, which led logically to the organisation of one of the semi-finals in the city. The decision with regard to the staging of the draw was made by the CFO. But Edouard Balladur named Marseille among the organising cities even though at the time the city’s application file was far from being finalised (Le Provençal, 15 October 1994: 21). Two other events lead one to think that the links between both men played a part in this project: the first is that Edouard Balladur had been the person who had ratified the Vigouroux Euroméditerranée project; second, and even more surprising, was the decision by the Marseille Mayor to support the Prime Minister for the presidential elections, a choice opposed by his own team. Was this a reciprocal courtesy?

Things were, once again, different in the case of Gaudin. The only requirement placed on him was that the event be hosted properly. And this task was largely fulfilled by the CRO and its operations section, and by Marc Vincent, ‘Mister World Cup’ for the city. Everything had been planned, it simply had to be implemented effectively.

There is thus a confusing situation with regard to resources and their application by both mayors. If Vigouroux was dealing with the ‘power over’, Gaudin was more concerned with the ‘power to’, because of his late arrival in the decision-making process, and because by the time he arrived in power the major internecine political battles had already been fought.

5.3.6. Kinds of relationships and links between decision-makers.
What first of all strikes one in this study concerning relationships between bodies and groups, it is that they were dominated by political interests. The local authorities - the Conseil Général, the Conseil Régional and the
City - related to one another in a manner, which can be read as the opposition between right and left. The most significant ‘impasse’ related to the financing of the project. Two years of prevarication had passed before reaching the first official agreement. Even if such difficulties were not unusual between local authorities, these positions have to be understood in the context of that time. Before providing an abstract of an interviewee’s discourse, let us remind ourselves of the situation. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Mayor of Marseille was Vigouroux, a man of the political left but who, following his election, had pursued a policy line more akin to the right, which led to his expulsion from the Socialist Party (PS). Lucien Weygand, also from the left and representing the PS, was the head of the Conseil Général. The Conseil Régional was directed by Jean-Claude Gaudin, from the right. The political inclination of Vigouroux, which placed him between the right and the left, placed him in a difficult situation among the other local authorities. He could not have the support of Jean-Claude Gaudin, who was from the political right, neither could he gain the support of Lucien Weygand because of his position in relation to the PS. So, there was a conflict between these three figures, particularly between Weygand and Vigouroux, where most regions were experiencing conflict between only two such parties. For the World Cup project, Raymond Mallet summarises the situation as follows:

... in the final implementation of the financing arrangements, we had shifted from a situation as the city of Marseille – which had to be noted – led by a mayor who had been elected on a policy platform of the political left, to one of a municipality with a vision of the future reflecting a political declaration from the right. And as a result there should only have been a limited number of discrepancies and dysfunctions [between the political entities of City, Département, and Region]. At the Conseil Régional, the situation was simple since Gaudin was still the President. But from his point of view, there was still a need to make people think or see that he was not using the Region to promote his own interests at the city level in Marseille which ‘owned’ this project. And as a consequence, he had to maintain a certain distance. He responded to the request for finance not before or after the Département, but at the same time, otherwise his decision of
Political manoeuvres dominate the management of the project for the local authorities. The men at the head of each of the authorities had political ambitions at the city level, and thus, by that time, every project was an excuse to demonstrate his will and his power. Beyond these political positions, each actor was defending his own institution. Raymond Mallet went on to discuss this:

I would like to point out here, because it was a problem in almost all regions involved - because of the political orientations of the various levels – the entry into the process of the Conseils Général and Régional since these had implications for management and efficiency. They [the Département and the Region] were actors who knew they would get involved, but they wanted to do so only at the express demand of the city of Marseille, and this political situation broadly overtook us [speaking as a representative of the Ministry of Youth and Sport at Regional level]... We were technocrats who wanted a response from both entities but neither wanted to respond... They did not want to appear to be party to a project about which the city of Marseille had never asked their opinion beforehand... and so with different political agendas there was an attempt to marginalize interest in hosting the World Cup (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004).

The situation was considerably simplified when the CRO was created. From this moment, the aim was not to be against the project or to slow down processes, since it was no longer the public institutions alone that participated but the whole football hierarchy. None of the local authorities thus had a real interest in interfering in decisions, but rather had an interest in facilitating the work of this non-political body, which was perceived as very important at the national level. All the petty squabbling had quickly disappeared. Nevertheless, in 1994 and 1995, years in which there was a municipal political campaign ‘brakes were placed on the project whereas they could have been avoided if there had not been political conflict’ (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 18 October 2004).
The civil servants had thus to juggle with situations that they were not able to change, obliged to wait until each of the politicians felt that his view had had sufficient impact on the direction of the project. The political context thus weighed heavily on the process.

Among the local population, opposition had existed but had not lasted, and had little impact on the progress of the project (Interviews with Raymond Mallet, 18 October 2004; with René Olmêta, 3 November 2004; and with Robert Villani, 8 July 2005). The general sport movement (rather than that of football), the fan clubs of O.M., the stadium residents, and city shop owners, all these groups had made their voices heard at some point in order to ascertain what the event should bring them, or to make sure that their interests would not be disturbed or damaged. Through discussion and meetings organised by the City and the DRJS any fears had been calmed (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004), at least officially. Nevertheless, the trade unions did try to take advantage of the World Cup to organise events. The day of the draw for the finals, employees of the RTM (the main transport company in Marseille for buses) planned an event to obtain certain benefits from their employer. The choice of the day, defended by trade unions as giving their demands more weight, was greatly criticized by different sections of Marseille society (La Provence, 1 December 1997: 30; 2 December 1997: 31 and 3 December 1997: 5). Although this action reduced the influx of spectators on the day, it had little lasting effect. At the beginning of June 1998, a few days before the beginning of the competition, other union events were also planned (La Provence, 5 June 1998: 2), but few employees participated.

Despite these side shows, the decision-making process followed a well respected schema. For the stadium extension project, the final decision was in the hands of the city. There was close collaboration between the City services, the central government through its different local
representatives, and FIFA through its committees, but it was the city that made the final decision. In relation to the competition organisation, authority was vested in the CRO, with the different partners collaborating. However, from this point on the city of Marseille no longer had control over the event even though the competition took place within the city boundaries. It had to accept the organisers’ decisions. Thus two rigid hierarchical systems in turn dominated relationships between event actors.

5.3.7. The consequences of the project.
Throughout the interviews conducted for this study, interviewees highlighted consequences for the city. The Football World Cup 1998 represented an event, which had marked effects on the City for a number of reasons. This demonstrates that actors had not expected so much in terms of consequences from hosting the World Cup across different sectors.

First, all agree that renewing the city’s image renewal is linked to this event. Whereas Marseille had been labelled as an inactive, perhaps incompetent administration, it demonstrated that it was able to host and to organise, to a high standard, a major cultural event. Furthermore, this was demonstrated both to the outside world and to the citizens of Marseille themselves. In other words, for some commentators, from this moment local inhabitants began to recover confidence in their city and to feel positive towards it not simply because of O.M. (Interview with Edel Melin, 17 January 2005; René Olméta, 3 November 2004 and Robert Villani, 8 July 2005). According to interviewees, the city’s performance as host enabled Marseille to gain acknowledgement for its accomplishments. And as we have noted, this image change engendered consequences in other domains where the perception of a city is important, such as local economic development and tourism. The Football World Cup 1998 is now an event which has been used ‘to sell’ the city (Interview with Edel Melin,
17 January 2005). It is like a visiting card which professionals are happy to present.

With regard to sport policy, there are two important consequences. First, the cost of the stadium extension provoked a reduction in the general sport budget for several years. Few sports facilities have been built during the years following the event, the focus being the management of existing provision. Secondly, although the stadium was expensive, it, nevertheless, enabled Marseille to take on a new dimension in the hosting of major events. Thus, the hosting of the World Rugby Cup matches in 2007 was possible only because the stadium could accommodate 60,000 spectators. Numerous concerts with international stars were also organised around the stadium and this too was a long term consequence of the project. In addition, a sports event policy was formally developed since the city was better equipped to host major events. After 1998, Marseille was involved in both bids by Paris to host the Olympic Games (Interview with Edel Melin, 17 January 2005), it will host matches in the World Rugby Cup 2007 and it was able to bid for the hosting of the America’s Cup, all because of this increased competence and capacity in the city. If one just talks simply in terms of yachting activities, the number of competitions staged increased significantly after 1997 and such competitions now dominate the Marseille sporting calendar (Interviews with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005; and with Marc Vincent, 28 June 2005), an aspect reflected in the growing number of articles about yachting events in La Provence since 1997.

These various sporting events, particularly those at an international level, were thus established not simply because of the stadium, but more especially because local politicians had been sensitised to what major sporting events could do for the city (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004). The following quotation aptly summarizes the
impression of many the interviewees, that is, that the Football World Cup marked a turning point for the city:

So the event added value, and... in a sense it helped to tear down the dark curtain, which had hidden the real Marseille... Changes in simple ways in terms of how the city was viewed: from a city which has a multi-ethnic population and is ‘dangerous’ to one of a city which is multi-ethnic but no longer dangerous; from a city which had a long way to go in terms of a work and economic environment and there was a huge gap between political rhetoric and action,... we had proof that this was wrong; the city had an ability to operate effectively in terms of the local economy with a return for those who had invested... and so in a way there has been a total change in the way the city is judged... and in this respect the World Cup played a key role [in change]. The proof? There was a bid for the Americas Cup, the Rugby World Cup has been attracted, and this is because openings had been made (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004).

Thus the claim is that the Football World Cup 1998 demonstrated the potential of Marseille, dispelling the negative clichés traditionally associated with the city. This perennial image had seemed difficult to break but the major actors and the local press refer regularly to the claim that the World Cup provided the trigger or means for shedding such negative connotations. On a more pragmatic level, the Football World Cup 1998 also had consequences in terms of the working methods of the different services in the city. In other words, it enabled the development of a mode of operation. As Marc Vincent maintained:

...before the Football World Cup, technical meetings, about events in general, they were something of a ‘rush job’. Now, we have a real method when we have a major event, we plan sufficiently early and meet with all people concerned with it... So, if I have to characterise the impression that I had after the World Cup, it is that things had been haphazard but that now they are methodologically arranged, and left potential in the organisation, which can be reactivated (Interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005).

During the World Cup, Jean-Louis Genovesi, the site director and Marc Vincent, ‘Mister World Cup’ for the city, had worked according to an approach created especially for the event by the advisor Algoet, for both
the city and the CRO. The legacy of this approach has been the simplification of connections between the services and the organisations involved. As Marc Vincent argues, people having worked closely together can 'reactivate' this system as soon as it is needed. In other words, networks are activated with more speed and actions are more efficient because trust networks have been established. The fragmentation of the sector has given way to a direct interconnection of people where there is a need, and a system for staging events was brought into existence. People from the various bodies involved have met and cooperated effectively, and this is now a latent resource. The formal mode of governance that was adopted is no longer in place but if there were a need to awaken the network, this could be done.

5.4. Conclusion.

This then is the 'storyline' for the hosting of the Football World Cup 1998 and of the emergence of themes, issues, political responses, and the stature and significance actors and networks. In Chapter 7, we go on to consider the extent to which such phenomena can be characterised as evidence of a policy network, growth coalition, or urban regime employing the indicators outlined in Chapter 2. However, before doing so we consider the development of themes, issues, responses, actors and networks in relation to bidding for our second major event, the America's Cup.
Chapter 6: Marseille’s bid to host the America’s Cup.

The second major event to be considered is Marseille’s bid to host the America’s Cup 2007. The whole process in relation to this bid took less than one year, from January to November 2003. After an introduction to the background of the bid, section 6.2. presents an analysis of the decision-making process involved.

6.1. The history of the Marseille candidature.

6.1.1. The main steps of the project.
The America’s Cup is considered to be the oldest international sport competition in the world. Inaugurated 150 years ago on the English coast, it takes place in several stages. First, there are head-to-head heats between boats during the Louis Vuitton Trophy, until just one winner remains. The winner then becomes the challenger for the America’s Cup proper. During the Louis Vuitton Trophy competition, the winner of the previous edition of the America’s Cup, the Defender, does not participate. The defending champion qualifies directly for the Americas’ Cup, which is normally held in the champion’s own country, more or less every four years.

During the 2003 edition, the Louis Vuitton Trophy was won by the Swiss Défi Alinghi, skippered by the multi-millionaire Ernesto Bertarelli. The winner of this competition thus qualified to compete against the previous winners, Team New Zealand, in their vessel Oracle. The Swiss team then were to compete with the New-Zealanders in New Zealand and if they...
won, would earn the right to host the competition next time around. However, the rules of the competition are clear, and the race has to take place on salt water, a problem for a land-locked country such as Switzerland. This realisation provoked a strong current of interest among a number of port-cities.

From 16 November 2002, the newspaper *La Provence* began to consider a Swiss victory because of its results during the first regatta of the Louis Vuitton Trophy. In this article, France Gamerre, Deputy Mayor in charge of maritime and nautical business for Marseille, was interviewed on this topic, and declared: “The interest [to host the Americas’ Cup] is obvious... And it would be a very enthusiastic challenge” (*La Provence*, 16 November 2003). Nevertheless, Sète was the first French city, which declared in the middle of January 2003, that it would bid in the event of a Swiss victory (*Reuters Agency dispatch*, 26 January, 2003). Sète was already the training base for the Swiss Défi. On 27 January, during his New Year speech to the press, Jean-Claude Gaudin declared his interest in the competition, and stated that he would be ready to support efforts to win the right to host the competition (*La Provence, Libération*, 28 January 2003). In Mediterranean ports, there was a remarkable flurry of interest to host the America’s Cup, since the Swiss multimillionaire had overtly expressed a preference for a Mediterranean venue. Although the final stages of the 2003 competition had not yet begun, representatives of the different cities began their lobbying and went directly to where the competition was taking place. For the city of Marseille, France Gamerre, accompanied by several specialists, made the trip to Auckland (*Liberation*, 28 January 2003) between the end of the Louis Vuitton Trophy and the beginning of the America’s Cup.13

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13 During her interview on 31 May 2005, France Gamerre talked about her first trip in the following terms: ‘Thus we went to Auckland with an audio montage, gifts, books about Marseille, indeed all that was needed to charm the Swiss’. The second trip at the end of February was organised in the same vein: ‘It is important to cry on Ernesto’s shoulders when he is about to win. Emotion links people’.
chapter 6: marseille’s bid to host the america’s cup.

During February 2003, the number of press articles about the possible arrival of the oldest world trophy in Europe intensified. One can thus read articles with titles such as ‘Europe is awaiting the return of the old Cup’ (Le Journal du Dimanche, 23 February 2003) or ‘The America’s Cup seeks a port’ (La Croix, 24 February 2003), which described the history of the competition and provided a portrait of Ernesto Bertarelli. The multi-millionaire, it was declared, was thinking of blowing away the cobwebs of the competition, notably by playing the card of professionalization. He wished to attract more participants or challengers, organising several regattas over four years (Le Journal du Dimanche, 23 February 2003; L’Express, 6 March 2003). In local newspapers, it was obviously Marseille’s bid, which journalists emphasized: “Marseille reaches out for the America’s Cup” (La Provence des Sports, 24 February 2003), “America’s Cup: Marseille in the running” (Marseille l’Hebdo, 26 February 2003), “Marseille-metropolis on Swiss time” (La Marseillaise, 2 March 2003). By the time that the Swiss victory was imminent, Jean-Claude Gaudin solemnly announced Marseille’s bid, to host the America’s Cup during the inauguration of the Ciotat’s Yachting Show on 1 March (La Marseillaise, La Provence, 2 March 2003). It was during the following night that Alinghi won, enabling cities’ dreams to become potentially realisable. The battle had begun.

The prestigious image of the competition and the competitors, the media coverage of the event, the number of people that it would bring to the host city, and the economic benefits (La Croix, 24 February 2003; Aujourd’hui en France, 3 March 2003; Le Figaro Magazine, 20 September 2003; Marseille l’Hebdo, 26 February 2003; La Provence, 28 February 2003) led to 60 cities declaring an interest in hosting the competition (Le Figaro Magazine, 20 September 2003). The Swiss, through an intermediary ‘America’s Cup Management’ (ACM) – a company especially created to manage the next Cup and led by a very close colleague of Bertarelli - announced on 27 March that only eight candidate cities were
accepted. This was a first victory for Marseille, which was chosen along with Valencia, Barcelona, Palma de Majorca, Porto Cervo, Naples, Ile d'Elbe/Toscane and Lisbon (La Provence, 28 March 2003). These cities then received a questionnaire in order to be able to identify the four finalists by May. The final result was scheduled for the 15th of December (Liberation, 4 April 2003).

The result of the second phase was delayed because it was only on 12 June that AC Management designated not four but five cities: Lisbon, Naples, Palma de Majorca and Valence (Le Monde, La Provence, 13 June 2003). This decision was taken while Marseille was the location of protest movements, which France was experiencing, against retirement reform. Refuse collectors were about to strike for ten days, leaving Marseille's streets transformed into a rubbish dump. Commentators were pessimistic about the chances of the city in such circumstances. Jean-Claude Gaudin alluded to the harm that the strike could cause to Marseille's bid (La Provence, 7 and 13 June 2003). He argued that it was 'stabbing the city in the back' (La Provence, 7 June 2003). This second phase involved a questionnaire with around 80 points as a basis for comparing the organisational capacities of the candidate cities. The questionnaire had to be returned by 31 July (La Provence, 16 June 2003).

During the same stage, an ultimate test was planned on 20 August: every city was received by the AC Management officials for a major oral evaluation. The main project actors formed the Marseille delegation: France Gamerre; Jean-Claude Gondard, General Secretary of the City; Olivier Latil d'Albertas, Director of Economic Development of the Communauté Urbaine "Marseille-Provence-Métropole" (Metropolitan district), and of course, Jean-Claude Gaudin, the city Mayor. The aim of the exercise was to test the different projects and the people in charge. Following thirty minutes of presentation, one hour of questions was scheduled to discuss the main points. Marseille's team ended its interview
in a confident vein (La Provence, 21 August 2003). Three points were examined closely by the Swiss society officials:

The French central government commitments, the schedule of port development in the Fort Saint-Jean/J4 area, and the conditions, which the threat of social conflicts that would be likely to impede the under progress of the competition, could be eliminated (La Provence, La Marseillaise, 21 August 2003).

During this meeting, Jean-Claude Gaudin stated the limit of the financial commitments, which the city could not exceed. An article in La Provence, on 22 August entitled “The city does not want to slide into ‘the Athens syndrome’”, set out the mayor’s statement. He argued that the city should make reasonable investment, but that in an aggressive competition between finalists the city should not mortgage its future. Press sources commented that ‘As a result Marseille risks appearing less ambitious than its opponents’ (La Provence, 22 August 2003).

Some days later, on 5 September, a rumour began to circulate that the number of candidate cities was to be reduced (Marseille Plus, 5 September 2003). AC Management announced the elimination of Palma de Majorca (La Marseillaise, France Soir, Métro, La Provence, 6 September 2003). This left only four cities in the running, one per country. The major oral evaluation stage had thus been successful for Marseille. Now, all the competitors were ‘back to zero’, according to France Gamerre (Marseille Plus, 8 September 2003). This phase involved the formalization of contracts in order for commitments to be binding. A new set of questions had to be answered. According to the Director of AC Management:

The candidate which is the quickest, with the clearest and most precise plan will inevitably be well placed because our goal is to have the best project possible in place at the moment of the signing of contract, (Reuters Agency, 5 September 2003).

During the last week before the final decision, three major events in the PACA region made the front pages of local newspapers. In effect, on the same day, 26 November, the host city for the next America’s Cup would
be announced; as would the European city that would represent Europe to compete with the Japanese to house the experimental thermo-nuclear fusion reactor (the ITER project);\(^{14}\) and finally to conclude this busy sporting day, a major international football match between O.M. and Real Madrid would take place in the Champions League (La Provence, 24 and 26 November 2003; La Marseillaise, 26 November 2003). Journalists explained the issues for each event, with strong views, especially in La Provence. Both of the ‘hosting competitions’ were presented as real springboards for the renewal of Marseille and the PACA region. One promised growth plus tourism impacts and the creation of thousands of jobs. In effect this was a real dual between France and Spain.

Eventually, as planned, on 26 November just before noon, Valence was designated the host city for the next America’s Cup (AFP dispatch, 26 November 2003). Real Madrid won against O.M. but France, through Cadarache, was chosen to represent Europe for the hosting of the ITER project. With regard to the America’s Cup, the Mayor, after the usual thanks and wishes of good luck to the winner, was quick to declare that certain projects would still be realized, arguing that, ‘we have to take advantage of our bid’s impetus to speed up our development in water sport, the local economy and urban development’ (La Provence, 27 November 2003). His discourse echoed earlier themes. It was indeed a failure, but city projects should not simply disappear with the failed bid. Most of the politicians interviewed promoted the same line: the failure was disappointing, but the city should still take advantage of the human and financial ‘mobilization’ that the project had fostered in order to boost the city. In addition, the newspaper La Provence sought to illustrate the benefits engendered by the bid. Journalists described development projects for the ports and in particular Vieux Port, which should be realised; the city’s ambition and potential were praised, arguing that the bid had given the city a new credibility; and indeed the tourist, economic

\(^{14}\) Two locations were retained: Cadarache, near Aix-en-Provence and Vandelos in Spain.
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and media coverage that the communication campaign generated was seen as worthwhile since it cost just 2 million euros (La Provence, 27 November 2003).

We can thus summarize the history of the designation process in 5 main steps:

- 3 March: victory of Alinghi team in the America’s Cup; the process begins,
- 27 March: 8 cities chosen: Marseille, Valencia, Barcelona, Palma de Majorca, Porto Cervo, Naples, Ile d’Elbe/Toscane and Lisbon,
- 12 June: 5 cities remain in the running: Marseille, Valencia, Palma de Majorca, Naples and Lisbon,
- 5 September: Palma de Majorca was eliminated,
- 26 November: Valencia was chosen.

We will now consider the process across these five stages in Marseille.

6.1.2. Numerous commitments.

Following the decision, the press not only gave information about the Swiss decision-making process, it also provided supportive comments about Marseille’s candidature.

In the city, those responsible for the bid, apart from declarations about the work required to stage the event, had also chosen to mobilize the population: poster campaigns and support postcards proliferated throughout the city. Ernesto Bertarelli declared that he wanted the next America’s Cup to be a truly popular event in order to break its image as an elitist competition (Le Journal du Dimanche, 23 February 2003). Marseille grasped the message well: there is only one city that would give a popular aspect to the America’s Cup: Marseille. The policy of the group responsible was quickly steered towards a charm offensive on the Swiss, seeking to show them that Marseille would be on ‘Swiss time’. Jean-Claude Gondard declared: “It is a business of charm. If we want to win, we will have to
make Bertarelli say "I want Marseille" (Le Journal du Dimanche, 2 March 2003).

In addition to the support of the population, the City put in place a promoting committee, with singers, sportsmen, journalists, company directors, all supporting it. On 28 April, France Soir, Le Figaro, La Marseillaise, La Provence and Aujourd'hui en France published accounts of Jean-Claude Gaudin's press conference called to present the promoting committee. The press was united in emphasising the presence of football hero Zidane. His media significance had not decreased and the City had understood this well. By this time, with giant posters, press articles, conferences and supporting postcards distributed in every street, no Marseille inhabitant could be unaware of the bid for the old trophy. On 30 April, La Provence even titled an article: 'America's Cup: first prize for enthusiasm', because Marseille was the only candidate that had gained the full support of its citizens.

At a political level, Guy Teissier (UMP) was charged with securing the support of members of Parliament (La Provence, 3 June 2003). In the business sector, support was forthcoming just a few weeks before the designation of the winner. Although a group of company directors were already part of the promoting committee, this group intensified its commitment. Under the name of 'Entreprises Marseille America', 30 Marseille company directors launched an advertising campaign to carry out the charm offensive. They announced several actions: a file in the "Times" newspaper, the collection of 1,000 supporting signatures of company directors from the area, and also putting senior personnel at the disposal of the competitors and operational staff for the event in order to help them (La Marseillaise, 31 October 2003).

During the nine months of the competition to win the organisation of the event, the newspaper La Provence was the regional daily, which
supported the bid most openly. Articles were often real pleas for support for the City and a column named “America’s Cup” was regularly fed by interviews with people, known personalities or unknown, who were clearly in favour of the city’s candidature.

In relation to those responsible for the Marseille project, the lobbying that began in January with meetings between France Gamerre and the Swiss team, intensified. The day after the announcement of the five finalists, a delegation from Marseille, including France Gamerre and Jean-Claude Gondard, went to Geneva to collect the new questionnaire. It was the only city to do so (La Provence, 16 June 2003). During this visit, the ‘dynamic duo’ Gamerre-Gondard (La Provence, 16 June 2003) engaged in a rapid round of meetings. They visited the Vice-Mayor of Geneva, had radio, TV and newspaper interviews, and meetings with members of the Geneva watersports society during a regatta in which Bertarelli’s partners participated. The determination to charm was very evident: ‘... Marseille has already started long-term work, aiming to convince the different circles of decision-making and influence, which have links with Bertarelli’ (La Provence, 16 June 2003). In the same article, which dealt with the perception of Marseille by the Swiss and with Marseille’s lobbying, the journalist underlined rules of conduct to which the population would have to submit if it wanted victory for Marseille:

...not to tell off foreign drivers who are lost or... not to dump rubbish at every hours of the day or night. More than ever, foreign visitors have to be treated with consideration, helped, directed and given information without ulterior motive, except that of acting in favour of the improvement of Marseille’s image (La Provence, 16 June 2003).

The journalist, Philipe Galini, clearly harboured some doubts about the behaviour of Marseille’s inhabitants. He continued the article by inviting the municipality to be more strict and authoritarian.
By the beginning of July, the municipality had announced the establishing of commissions within a ‘bid committee’, which had to improve the Marseille project by proposing innovative projects for the competition organisation (*La Provence*, 2 July 2003). Marseille decision-makers tried to ensure that nothing was forgotten in terms of communication or charm.

### 6.1.3. The difficulties of the project.

From the outset, one of the significant weak points of Marseille’s candidature, which the newspapers highlighted, was Marseille’s accommodation capacity (*Le Monde*, 3 March 2003; *Libération*, 4 April 2003; *La Marseillaise*, 4 April 2003; *Les Echos*, 4 and 5 April 2003). The city had a quantitative as well as qualitative deficit. A further difficulty related to the negative image that the Swiss might have of Marseille as ‘a dangerous city’. More implicit than explicit in the Swiss pronouncements, there is evidence of such concerns nevertheless. Explicit reference was made by Loic Peyron in *Le Figaro Magazine* on 8 March: ‘I should clearly prefer Marseille, but it does not only have advantages, and it causes some apprehension for the Swiss who are not very used to things like moped robbery’.

The regional press also reminded people that a French ‘Défi’ – or America’s Cup challenger – wished to use Marseille as a base (*La Provence*, 21 and 27 February, 2003; *La Marseillaise*, 21 February 2003; *Marseille Plus*, 3 March 2003). *La Provence* viewed this as a positive point for the Marseille bid because this might attract other teams to Marseille and would show that the city was acknowledged as a centre for sailing and training. On the other hand, others argued that Marseille had compromised its chances with this announcement because the Swiss multi-millionaire champion would not choose a city that hosted one of his future opponents (*Le Figaro*, 2-3 March 2003).
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The potential for social conflicts such as strikes, seen by foreigners as peculiar to the French context, was also often part of the debate. Could Marseille guarantee calm during the competition? If this question was posed by the Swiss, the trade unions themselves sought to provide an answer. In April, there was anxiety from the Port Authority CGT trade union, which regretted it had not been part of the discussion around the project, and which feared that the competition would be hosted to the detriment of industry (La Provence, 19 April 2003). On the other hand, to reassure the Swiss by the end of the process, some trade unions promised that there would be no strikes in 2007. Thus, Force Ouvrière (F.O.) declared its support for Marseille’s bid, and reminded people that it was the majority trade union for employees of the municipality and the Communauté Urbaine. The privileged dialogue that F.O. had with the municipality enabled its representative to announce: ‘...this mutual attitude enables us to affirm that today, it would be unthinkable that a conflict should disturb this prestigious event’ (La Provence, 2 October 2003). Four years before the competition, one might ask how significant this declaration was. Jean-Claude Gaudin made similar noises, suggesting that during an electoral year, there should be no social movements because ‘trade unions should leave elected representatives to do their talking’ (Le Monde, 3 October 2003).

Exposing concern about the project, members of the opposition warned the municipality not to be tempted to hold ‘Pharaonic’ projects which would prejudice the city’s future financial position (Marseille Autrement, April 2003, published by the socialist and allies group of the City of Marseille). In the same vein, the financial plan had already been discretely but surely criticized in a press article in La Marseillaise (2 March 2003). After the presentation of the bid, the institutions involved and the aspects, which needed to be reinforced, the journalist ended the article, commenting that ‘It remains to be seen how all of this will be financed’.

The newspaper La Provence, though it was a strong supporter of the city,
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finding no weak points in the project (5 March 2003), argued, nevertheless, — in the *La Provence de l’Economie* supplement— that there was a lack of financial contribution and of a long term development plan from the public powers in the sailing area in Marseille. It was very evident that Marseille was one of the last cities to start lobbying, because it did not anticipate a Swiss victory. Nevertheless, criticism soon became muted, leaving a kind of tacit consensus.

It was only in the last months of the decision-making process that conflicts and opposition became evident again. Hostilities were reopened by Jean-Claude Gaudin. Confronted by the Valencia bid in which the King of Spain was fully involved, the Mayor argued that he was disappointed by the lack of support from the higher levels of the French State (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, from 4 to 10 September 2003). According to Gaudin, the involvement of the President of the Republic and also the Prime Minister should have been much more significant and vigorous. A journalist from *La Provence* took up the same argument by comparing the Spanish and French bids. Valencia, thanks to the king and the mobilisation of the government, advanced through the process with significant political and financial backing. As reported in *La Provence*, ‘Jean-Claude Gaudin is not wrong when he regrets the lack of mobilisation on the point of Jacques Chirac to secure Marseille’s bid’ (14 September 2003).

Responsibility for the smooth running of the project was thus placed directly on the shoulders of the major State actor, and the President subsequently became more heavily involved. During a reception of French champions, he underlined his involvement in the Paris bid to host the Olympics Games 2012 and for Marseille’s bid to host the America’s Cup (AFP, 16 September 2003). Nevertheless, Marseille’s project was a subsidiary concern, even though the final decision concerning the city was expected in November 2003, and the one for Paris in June 2004.
Michel Pezet (P.S.) exposed the low level of financial commitment from the central government. The 40 million euros promised by the President were not sufficient with regard to the necessary investments required to host the competition. For him, this low level of support meant that: "...the present government condemns the city faced with the increasing demands of the organising company and with the savage competition between the four remaining candidates" (La Marseillaise, 10 September 2003). Michel Pezet also wrote about his anxiety concerning the risk of escalation in costs for Marseille inhabitants if the city were to win (La Marseillaise, 10 September 2003). In a small insert in La Provence of the 25 September 2003, the words of the Communist local politician Jean Dufour were reported talking about the Cup budget: "120 million euros, it is equivalent to the budget for the building of... ten lycées!". At the same time, those responsible for the bid announced that projects would be implemented even if Marseille was not successful. "Marseille has already won", according to the Mayor (Métro Marseille, 8 September 2003; L'Equipe, 12 September 2003). The promoting group thus expected to take advantage of the impetus that this bid would give to boost the city. On 4 October, an AFP dispatch took stock on the Marseille Bid. There was a return to the problems and fears evident at the beginning of the project: 'the candidature should be weakened by fears of social conflicts, as well as by a limited hotel and residential capacity' (AFP dispatch, 4 October 2003). Was the action taken in these domains insufficient? Such comments led people to think this might be the case.

During the last month of the process, the final project preparations were put in place. The Prime Minister chose this period to allay criticism against his government in relation to the Marseille candidature, declaring that the State would increase its contribution if Marseille were to be successful (La Provence, 12 November 2003). He also announced that a Public Interest Group – Groupement d'Intérêts Publics (GIP)\(^\text{15}\) – would be created to

\(^{15}\) Legal structure to manage funds provided by public institutions in a project.
manage and organise financing from the public institutions, i.e. the central government, the Conseil Régional, the Conseil Général, the Communauté Urbaine Marseille-Provence-Métropole and the City of Marseille.

An extraordinary City Council meeting was convened to ratify the partnership contracts with the Swiss team. This step was important for the project because it was the city’s indication of commitment to finalise. Though decisions and commitments were validated, each of the opposition groups made comments expressing disagreement. Les Verts (the ecologist group) and the Communist Party voted against the proposals, members of the Convention Citoyenne (a party from the left) abstained, whereas UMP, UDF (right wing parties), and MNR and PS (left wing parties) members voted for them. Nevertheless, the socialist group declared to the Mayor that they had voted in favour in order not to be blamed for project sabotage, and stated that the set contracts would leave the Swiss free to do virtually as they pleased (La Provence, 15 November 2003).

La Provence regularly reminded its readers of the consequences, which the America’s Cup would have for the city, while rumours about the duel between Marseille and Valencia were growing. The other finalists no longer appeared to exist so far as journalists were concerned. In addition, a Swiss daily newspaper (according to La Provence, 21 November 2003) announced that victory had already gone to Valencia. Faced with this news, France Gamerre called a press conference to remind correspondents of all the rumours, which had bedevilled the city’s candidature, and took advantage of this occasion to announce the participation of French firms in the project providing finance amounting to 30 million euros (La Provence, 21 November 2003), though details were not given.

The Swiss victory in the America’s Cup had led to a host city designation for the first time in the competition’s history. The schedule for the process
was very tight for the cities involved. During a period of less than a year, each had to draw up an extremely specialised document. There was a necessity to set up construction projects, to guarantee financing, to demonstrate enthusiasm for the event, and to continue trying to charm the Swiss. Competing cities had thus to show adaptability and particularly a strong and efficient mobilization of the groups involved in developing the project.

Marseille showed that it was able to rise to the challenge, demonstrating that its image as an ossified city was disappearing or at least that there was a determination to change it. The city momentum, however, was halted at the final moment when the Swiss had to make their final choice. So, the experience of the project was positive to a certain point.

6.2. Analysis of the decision-making process.

The aim of this section is to explore what emerges from press articles, the candidature document and interviews for each of the operational indicators described in Chapter 2: objectives, means, kinds of actor, motivations, resources and kinds of relationships. The indicator “stability” is not appropriate because the study is limited to one year, which does not allow due consideration of the duration or durability of the group in power. Stability is thus considered in relation to the continuities between the Football World Cup 1998 and America’s Cup.

6.2.1. Objectives.

This is the clearest indicator to emerge from the data. From the announcement of Marseille’s bid, newspapers promoted the event, and the large scale development that it would engender. The same phrase is used several times, by journalists as well as politicians: the America’s Cup would give the city a ten years boost (Marseille L’Hebdo, 26 March 2003;
Olivier Latil D'Albertas emphasises similar sentiments:

... We had a city that was already on the first step of take off, of its image evolution, of maturity in its projects of development, and at this time, a big event is a tremendous boost. (…) It was one of our challenge, there was not only the water sport aspect, there was the boost for the metropolitan projects which was very important. This means that, when you have an event like that, with a quite strong visibility really, in the medium term, since it was a visibility to 2007, this type of time-scale would enable the city to accelerate investment (Interview with Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 27 June 2005).

In the candidature document, the same idea emerges. The term “acceleration” is used in this context talking about for example “the acceleration of infrastructure” in respect of:

Servicing of road works, work on an underground network extension, the creation of a tramway network, development for sailing, the development of reception capacity at train stations and airports in Marseille and its wider region... (Bid File, sheet 47).

It was not the intention to create new projects but largely to improve what already existed, actions necessary both to host the event but also to develop the city. In the same page of the Bid File, economic objectives in relation to the America’s Cup were clearly presented and related to the general policy direction taken by the metropolis. Thus, following objectives relating to development of infrastructure, six other objectives were specified by Marseille decision-makers:

- the strengthening of development strategies in priority areas,
- strengthening of the city reputation as a port destination and of its logistic functions,
- strengthening of the development programme for nautical industries,
- acceleration of the establishing of ‘high tech’ industries,
- reinforcement of the city’s sailing culture,
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- enhancing of the total amount of tourist accommodation (Bid File, sheet 47).

These relate to the broad lines of the city's expectations in the hosting of major events (cf. Chapter 1). The aim is to establish and/or promote anything that can enhance the city based on already existing resources and infrastructures. We should note in particular that the port development represents part of these objectives.

The intention was to give a new boost to the city, through an event which required projects in several domains: port, accommodation, transport. Several projects that had been on hold were thus brought forward or relaunched, under the Euroméditerranée banner (Le Figaro Magazine, 20 September 2003). According to Jean-Claude Gaudin, this was an "extraordinary opportunity in terms of economic development and European and international influence" (Les Echos de la Ville, 4 April 2003). The benefits were clear: the America's Cup and its 1.3 to 1.5 multi-million euros spin-off, the thousand of jobs created, its investors and its media coverage effects were, it was claimed, going to enable the acceleration of Marseille's development.

6.2.2. Means.

To convince the Swiss to choose Marseille, the city established several projects. First of all, the reception of 17 teams – the number desired by Bertarelli – would require the clearing of several hectares of space. A site was quickly found, with AC Management agreement, the J4 mole on Port Authority land. As the project progressed and Marseille went through the different "qualifying rounds", a partial redevelopment of the entry to the Vieux Port began to take shape. An esplanade for the competition was proposed, and in addition an increase of the ports' reception capacities. It was thus the Port Authority, through Christophe Piloix and his engineers, which took charge of the setting up of the project. Christophe Piloix chose

16 The America's Cup is the 3rd event in terms of media coverage in the world.
an architect to devise the reception space for the boats (Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2003). Local politicians declared that the Vieux Port project would still be implemented in slightly modified form even if Marseille was not chosen, and the increase of places for boats would be effected, whatever the result. On the other hand, this site development delayed the construction of the Musée des Civilisations, which had been planned in the same area (Marseille L’Hebdo, 15 October 2003; and interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005). Priority was thus clearly being given to the America’s Cup.

Marseille also began to grapple with a limitation raised by the press: its stock of hotel accommodation. To resolve this problem, several hotels would be built, notably luxury hotels, by 2005 (La Provence, 2 March 2003). It was even planned to use cruise boats as hotels on the water during the competition (Les Echos, 4 and 5 April 2003; Bid File, sheet 77). In relation to this topic, the candidature document announced the building of 7 hotels by 2007, 4 in the town centre and 3 in the Euroméditerranée area. The total accommodation available in neighbouring cities was also presented, as well as their development projects in this domain. Moreover, the creation of a ‘brand’ label ‘Accueil America Cup’ was proposed, with an inventory of furnished accommodation and bed and breakfast, to facilitate reception in Marseille (Bid File, sheet 77). Marseille had also to make efforts to find luxury housing. In effect, the America’s Cup competitors are people with large incomes whose accommodation requirements might not be available Marseille. Through the development of these different projects, Marseille was able to maintain its bid to organize the America’s Cup until the very end of the designation process.

6.2.3. Kind of actors.

Officially, project actors were spread across several committees:
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- the steering committee: 'The City of Marseille, the Communauté Urbaine Marseille-Provence-Métropole, the Port Authority of Marseille and on the other hand central government' (Bid File, sheet 58),\textsuperscript{17}
- the promoting committee: brought together leading figures who supported the candidature,
- the bid committee: was constituted by 110 members divided into 4 specialized commissions (Bid File, sheet 52).

If the Bid File appeared to describe definitively the roles of each entity, these roles evolved as the candidature developed and often deviated significantly from the 'official' position. In the growth coalition and policy networks literature, authors distinguish two levels of actors, primary and secondary.\textsuperscript{18} In the present case study, three not two levels can be distinguished:

- primary actors,
- secondary actors,
- those providing additional symbolic and active support.

The third level corresponds to people who were not directly involved as decision-makers, but who assisted primary and secondary actors in a number of ways.

a). \textbf{Primary actors: the Steering Committee, from the largest to the narrowest.}

The Bid File presents these members as the main actors without referring to a "Steering Committee". It was in the regional press that this term first appeared (\textit{La Provence}, 2 June 2003). Gathering public institutions, the project is the result of the classical scheme for the organisation of a major event held in France. This Committee was led by the City of Marseille, represented by Jean-Claude Gondard, General Secretary of the City Council, the politician France Gamerre, Deputy Mayor in charge of nautical

\textsuperscript{17} It is important to note that the State is differentiated from other institutions by the expression "on the other hand". Its implication is thus different from the other three.

\textsuperscript{18} In the urban regime literature, both levels are not distinguished, since actors have a balance position within the group.
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and maritime business. The Communauté Urbaine was represented by the Director of Economic Development, Olivier Latil D’Albertas, and the Port Authority of Marseille by Christophe Piloix, Director of the East Docks. Central government was also named, but no specific representative was cited. Central government was the least active member among the main actors. On the Swiss side, the America’s Cup Management was the decision-maker. Delegations from each city were in negotiation with this group which formalised the competition’s terms of reference into questions and eliminated cities as the process went on. Even if Ernesto Bertarelli was not formally part of this organisation, he had a colleague at its Head, and he was to take part in the small committee, which would finally select the host city.

But for the project actors, this Committee was a group of variable-geometry composition. Olivier Latil D’Albertas cites Euroméditerranée, the yachting club and the Office de la Mer (Interview with Olivier Latil D’Albertas, 27 June 2005), France Gamerre also cites the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005), as groups called on at specific times. Members of the Steering Committee could not be clearly recalled by interviewees. The explanation for this is perhaps that the Steering Committee was not an official name, and also is a reflection of the process itself. In effect, at the beginning of the project, the General Secretary had organised a round table with different participants (Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005). During meetings, not all were present, and they were contacted when their contribution was needed. Thus it was in an informal way that they were called to participate for specific topics for which they had expertise. Olivier Latil D’Albertas states that:

That was my approach. I used it a lot to accelerate things when they were going too slow, to ask for additional information, to mobilize, to make up the supply... to arbitrate, to break deadlocks that were not settled, to define approaches or strategies for one thing or another. It was a
permanent iterative system (Interview with Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 27 June 2005).

The real Steering Committee was actually made up of four people: Jean-Claude Gondard, France Gamerre, Olivier Latil D'Albertas and Christophe Piloix. They themselves describe this group as the core team (l'équipe restreinte). In addition, this was the terminology used when we ask interviewees who were the main actors in the project, or when indicating the people to meet who were central to the project. Each of them had responsibility for a specific aspect of the project. Jean-Claude Gondard dealt with partners, France Gamerre represented the political sector, Olivier Latil D'Albertas was in charge of administrative and legal aspects, and Christophe Piloix was responsible for technical and logistical parts of the project. It was, however, Olivier Latil D'Albertas who appears to have been the real project mainspring. This appears to be the case when we look at the Communauté Urbaine's place in the process: the Communauté Urbaine was the project manager whereas the City Council was the contracting authority. Even among these four actors, some were in limited contact with the others. Thus Christophe Piloix talking about France Gamerre:

And even with her [France Gamerre], we discussed very little. Us, we discussed with technicians... With professionals, not politicians. What is very important is not to mix roles. We were not technical-political, we were technical (Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005).

There was little time wasted in discussion with other people. The time pressure did not allow for an increase either in the number of interlocutors or of generation of wider ideas. As Christophe Piloix observed:

It was the strength of Marseille's candidature: ... to have two interlocutors very clearly organised behind Olivier Latil D'Albertas who was doing the whole thing, a legal-

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19 Olivier Latil D'Albertas, Christophe Piloix and France Gamerre cited the name of the other three, and also Jean-Claude Gondard, who I was not able to meet. Marc Vincent, technical councillor of the general secretariat, who was involved in the project until June 2003, also gave those names. Even though he did not name Christophe Piloix, he advised me to meet a representative of the Port Authority.
administrative interlocutor with the city’s lawyers and the whole city system; and a technical interlocutor. And so, the candidature team, it was a formidably efficient organisation, beyond all our hopes. ... It was a team very very narrowly focused... This was the key to success. If we had begun to discuss with everybody in Marseille, the project was dead (Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005).

Moreover, the interest of the Steering Committee lay in the administrative function of actors. Christophe Piloix, Jean-Claude Gondard and Olivier Latil D’Albertas had jobs with high levels of responsibility in their institutions. ‘De facto’, when these institutions have common projects, these are the people who most often represent them. The three of them were used to working together. In the press, the spotlight was primarily on France Gamerre and Jean-Claude Gondard, the individuals who had overall responsibility for the project, issuing media statements and having responsibility for lobbying. Olivier Latil D’Albertas and Christophe Piloix worked in the background, and were the individuals who really got things done on the project, supported by their own teams.

Among these four major actors, it is important to note that three are civil servants and one is an elected politician. Civil servants thus largely controlled the project, and had the greatest influence it, particularly on other partners, because of their expertise. The Committee exerted strong control over the project, and decided who they needed to talk to and when to call on them.

b). Secondary actors.

Beyond the project set up, partners’ involvement in the project takes on forms other than direct decision-making. At a financial level, other public bodies became participants. Central government declared that it would be financially involved, providing 40 million euros at the first stage. Subsequently, it agreed to invest more if Marseille were to be selected, without indicating the size of the additional contribution. Virtually all relevant of ministries were involved in the project providing assurance that
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the Swiss demands would be met. Central government was thus a major decision-maker in respect of the project in terms of its role as a regulator. In addition to central government, the usual spectrum of sub-national public institutions was involved. In France, decentralized power means that the following bodies are relevant: Conseil Régional, Conseil Général, the City, and in recent years, the wider metropolitan community (Communauté Urbaine or Communauté de Communes). For Marseille’s candidature, the Conseil Régional PACA and the Conseil Général des Bouches-du-Rhône joined as financial partners underwriting the project. In essence, this was their only role since they had no operational competence in relation to the project.

In terms of the logistical plan, numerous partners were cited in the candidature document. These were the bodies whose support is necessary for any such event, and include: the Autorité de Régulation des Télécoms, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel, the Agence Nationale des Fréquences Radio, the universities, the SNCF, METEO France, and the Tourist Office (Bid File, sheet 58). Notably in terms of logistical support, no private companies were cited.

c). The symbolic support:
   i) The Promoting Committee: Marseille’s showcase.

From April 2003, Jean-Claude Gaudin personally began to lead this Committee (La Marseillaise, 28 April 2003). It incorporated personalities from the media, the sport domain, the economic world and the arts. The role of this Committee, as evident by its name, was to promote the project. For professional events, in support of operations, it was represented by well known personalities. Included among the 183 public

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20 'Central government (...) competent in the frame of this project, for all matters in relation to: fiscal regulation of companies and private individuals, social regulation, customs regulation, immigration conditions, organisation of school and university education, national police force, assistance and aid plans, fight against pollution and natural disaster, aeronautical regulation, maritime regulation’ (Bid File, sheet 58).
21 Among the 158 personalities, 83 came from national and local economic sectors.
figures were: Charles Aznavour, Johnny Halliday, Edmonde Charles Roux, and Florence Artaud, individuals who were known both nationally and internationally. The representative of the Committee who was mentioned most in press articles and interviews was Zinedine Zidane, the ‘best football player in the world’, who is from Marseille, and who was always present when the Promoting Committee had to be represented.

Through this Committee, project holders aimed to show how much these public figures were behind Marseille. The message to the Swiss was that Marseille’s bid was supported well beyond the Mediterranean City’s boundaries. Some of the most well known people in France believed in Marseille’s capacity to host the America’s Cup and they promoted the candidature in France. The most fleeting appearances of Zidane were invariably reported in the newspapers, and his presence ensured major media coverage. If Bertarelli wanted the America’s Cup to become a popular event then Marseille’s decision-makers were ready to provide the media stimulus to make this happen. The Promotion Committee was a tool for the communication campaign, targeting the Swiss as well as the French public.

ii). The other forms of symbolic support.

On the periphery of this first group, were the trade unions. As noted earlier in this chapter, Force Ouvrière and CGT were the principal trade union voices to make themselves heard. Initially, they intervened in the project itself, by warning that the America’s Cup could interfere with the port activity. Subsequently, after the refuse workers’ strike, their involvement took another turn. This trade union conflict demonstrated how Marseille’s image, which was essential to the success of this project, could become very negative. This situation was taken up by several newspapers and politicians who sought to make trade unions aware of their responsibilities in relation to the project as a whole. Furthermore, the Swiss highlighted this point, during the major meeting with the city in
August 2003. One can conclude that the trade unions had the situation in hand from this time. Their support was important to the project holders, particularly when FO declared that there would not be social conflicts in 2007. It seems clear that their rallying to the cause gave them a higher standing with the politicians, even though the main actors interviewed, and the Bid File entry (sheet 57), tended to minimize their significance during the process (Interviews with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005; and Olivier Latil D’Albertas, 27 June 2005). Trade unions have a long history in their relationship with the City Council. Even though different mayors had tried to reduce it, their significance among civil servants employed in Marseille has always obliged mayors to deal with them. As a result, town hall trade unions had regularly used their support for mayors as a bargaining tool. Their commitment is not party political and they have often acted counter to the position of their unions nationally. The major objective was to get what they wanted. When that was secured, their support was absolute, and this is what happened here. In the same vein, deputies from the Assemblée Nationale, under the leadership of Guy Tessier, signed a motion of support.

At the highest level of the State, further forms of symbolic support also existed, in the form of the President of the Republic, of the Sports Minister, and of the Prime Minister (the last being significant for the financial support he was able to promise). In the sailing domain, support also began to grow, notably from: the Fédération Française des Ports de Plaisance, director of the Tour de France à la Voile, the twinning association of Marseille Sailing Society, with the Yacht Club de France and the Yacht Club de Monaco (La Provence, 4 April 2003).

The City thus had no lack of support. The number and diversity of people and institutions, which actively supported the city showed that this aspect

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22 Peraldi, M. and Samson, M. (2005) wrote a chapter about these relationships in their book “Gouverner Marseille”.
of the project was successful. Nevertheless, the intensity of that support was not always as expected by the project team. Jean-Claude Gaudin admitted to being disappointed by the lack of public involvement of Jacques Chirac whose efforts were overshadowed by those of the King of Spain.

But the most significant mobilisation of support came from the local population. The City established a large scale communication campaign. Two poster campaigns were launched, one after the other. The first, entitled ‘Je soutiens la candidature de Marseille’, was located throughout the whole city. Subsequently, the “Marseille aime les grands défis” campaign was run, with posters widely displayed in Marseille but also in other French cities. Beyond this, support cards to send back to the City were available in Marseille shops and other locations such as the Saint Charles railway station, the international airport and also the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. People were also able to declare their support on the city website or by phone at the call centre “Allô Mairie”. Thus, Marseille was able to boast of the reception of 121,000 post cards, 200 internet messages and ‘hundreds of e-mails’, together with 1,000 telephone calls on average per day (Bid File, sheet 52).

Few in Marseille could be unaware that the city was bidding to host the America's Cup. The advertising campaign was huge, concentrating minds on this and nothing else. Edel Melin explained the aim of this campaign:

That was a bit underhand. It was, at the same time, to make Marseille inhabitants accept that there would be public works and there might be a financial cost... It was a means to make people accept a lot of things... That is communication, people had to be prepared long in advance, people had to be motivated, we had to show them that their city was fighting with other major cities... It was almost brainwashing. Thus it is true that we saw posters everywhere... It is true that we tried to get the whole city behind us. The 800,000 Marseille inhabitants had to be behind Marseille and it is true that we had to show them, we had to tell them, to explain to them... So they would see a poster once, they would not see it, and
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they would see it again. Well... There was an intellectual progression that pushed them to support the America’s Cup. And it is true that the whole of Marseille was disappointed when we did not gain the America’s Cup. It was a communication job, which was done for the America’s Cup using a communication company (Interview with Edel Melin, 17 January 2005).

This demonstrates clearly the approach of the City: Marseille inhabitants had to accept the candidature as a first step, and then had to support it strongly afterwards.

Between the promoting committee and the mobilization of the population, the City of Marseille responded to the Swiss team’s wish to make the America’s Cup into a popular event. All partners and sectors showed their support, demonstrating to the Swiss that if they chose Marseille, they would be well received and the event would stimulate popular enthusiasm. Very few private sector actors appeared significant at this symbolic level, but were rather more evident in forms of active support.

d). Active support.

‘Active support’ is the term used to differentiate material action to progress the project, from symbolic expressions in favour of the City’s bid. Active support was largely undertaken within the ‘Bid Committee’. This was introduced quite late in the process. In effect, the official presentation was made on the 1 July, notably by France Gamerre (La Provence, 2 July 2003). Four specialized commissions were set up by the Town Hall, in order to enhance the Marseille project with propositions for innovative projects (La Provence, 2 July 2003), and to intensify the mobilisation of action around the project (La Provence, 3 July 2003). Their mission was officially presented to the Swiss in the following terms: ‘Beyond the technical work, the aim is to create a consensus by mobilising the whole of Marseille around the America’s Cup’ (Bid File, sheet 55). On the 3 July, an article in La Provence revealed the names of the different co-presidents of commissions:
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- Economy: Francis Lemor, PDG de STE-TFE, and Claude Cardella, president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Marseille Provence and of the Port Authority,
- Tourism-communication: Thierry Baudie, director of la Maison de la France, and Dominique Vlasto, Deputy Mayor of Marseille, responsible for Tourism and Congresses,

The choice of Co-presidents seemed to reflect a wish to call on experts. In addition, the presence of Jean-Louis Genovesi, a co-organizer of the World Football Cup 1998, provided a strong message both for Marseille inhabitants and for the Swiss: that one of the organisers of the largest and most successful events ever organised in Marseille, would be part of the America’s Cup organisation. The representativeness of the Co-presidents also performed another function: to try to communicate with most sections of the population of Marseille inhabitants through the people chosen. What was expected from these Commissions also appeared to show that they would have a decisive role by giving another dimension to the project. However, as soon as the main actors talked in detail about the Committee, a different picture of its activities is evident. The implication of the Committee was much more a supportive vehicle than one which provided practical solutions.

... it is very important to mobilize economic, associations, sports, cultural, university, and scientific local interests. It was not a production system of practical proposals or answers (Interview with Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 27 June 2005).

Members were chosen in regards to their expertise [and], in relation to their representativeness... But members were essentially representative of groups, let's say of networks (Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005).
In addition, this Committee is described in the Bid File (sheet 52), sheet entitled ‘Population support’, which also lists the Promoting Committee. It is likely that the Committee had two functions, of which only one was officially acknowledged. It first demonstrated to the Swiss organizers that the local interest groups or infrastructure had been mobilized and was ready to welcome them; and secondly, these interest groups were involved in the setting up of the project. However, its role in the project and in production of ideas, as officially presented, never fully materialised.

The Steering Committee was thus enabled to mobilize a wide ranging grouping of the population through the commissions’ co-presidents and members. However, it transpired that the Bid Committee was much more a symbolic support than an active one.

The active support was really led by several groups within Marseille society, which were described in the press and in the Bid File. Four categories were specifically introduced in the File: economic actors, universities, local sport clubs and associations (Bid File, sheet 19). Although the first of these (local business) raised more in terms of declarations of intent rather than real active support, universities by contrast proposed to put their facilities, laboratories and competences at the service of the Swiss (La Provence, 18 March; 25 June 2003). Local sport clubs were introduced as facilitators for mobilising the population, and yachting clubs were put at the disposal of the Swiss: materials, volunteers and professional employees and a place to work would be provided. The Associations were to be mobilised ‘to receive and facilitate the daily life of the Défi teams’ (Bid File, sheet 19). The directors of firms did create an Association ‘Entreprises Marseille America’, by the end of the process (La Provence, 5 November 2003). In addition to promotional support throughout Europe, this Association declared that executives would be delegated to help the Swiss in their daily activities, if Marseille
were to win. Twenty two firms took part in the association. The table below presents their characteristics with regard to the project.

**Table 6.1: The firms of "Enterprises Marseille America" and their main features.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Link with Marseille</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Created in</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created in the metropolitan area</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head office in</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settled in</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settled in the metropolitan area</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector of activity</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Services (excluded maritime services)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime products and services</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other products</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of activity</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Regional</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can see that the most important relation to the project is the link the firms have with Marseille: 15 of the firms involved were created in the City. With regard to their activity domain, most of them appear to have a material interest in the project if Marseille was chosen. Services firms were likely to benefit from both Swiss competitor and spectators requests, as were the maritime firms. The banks were also more concerned with Swiss and competitors’ needs. Among the firms, which produced goods, interests were sometimes less clear. There was a pharmaceutical company, for example, which could have some interest in relation to Bertarelli, who had become a multi-millionaire because of his involvement in the most important pharmaceutical firms in the world. One was Eurocopter, producer of helicopters that might interest competitors. The remaining two, Pébéo - colour production - and Ricard - alcohol producer -
were the hardest to understand in terms of their motivational commitment. The participation of Ricard can perhaps be understood as an important symbolic support because it was seen as the most important firm in Marseille in terms of local connections. It produces Pastis, internationally associated with Marseille and the Midi. For Pébéo, however, which is more oriented towards the art market, involvement is harder to explain. In terms of level of activity, there are dynamic firms, many of which are international, indicating to the Swiss, international support for the Marseille project. Such commercial involvement is significant in terms of the Marseille bid. Yet two questions arise from this reading: why do these entities get involved only during the last month of the process, and why do they not participate financially? We can find an answer in the interviewees’ discourses and their view of the private sector (c.f. section 6.2.5.).

As already indicated, the press played an important role, and this is most notably the case for *La Provence*. In addition to its role as a conduit of news, this newspaper was a member of “Entreprises Marseille America” (*La Provence*, 5 November 2003). From the outset, it emphasised the positive features of the Marseille candidature. A regular column was dedicated to interviews with local people – both well known personalities and ordinary citizens - about this project. During the 9 months of the process, only one interviewee strongly opposed to the project (*La Provence*, 23 May 2003). Other than this, support for the project is invariably what emerges from those columns. The newspaper appeared to be virtually a communication tool to persuade Marseille and its region that the project was well-founded. For the project’s principal actors, this was a very valuable resource.

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23 According to their press book, their capital range from 16,5 millions euros to 11,7 multimillion euros, capital which would have enable financial involvement.
Although the project appeared to involve people from a wide cross-section of Marseille, decision-making and influence appeared to be in the hands of just four people, and these are all from the public sector. Although the private sector was evident at different stages of the project, it was never evident in the role of decision-maker. This project was led and controlled solely by public sector figures and bodies, and places left to other partners were much less influential.

6.2.4. Motivations.

Even if the local elections are not a topic that often appears in the press or the commentaries of interviewees, there is some hint of their significance. In effect, 2007, the year chosen by Bertarelli, will see the staging of municipal elections. This first hint came from the municipal opposition in the magazine Marseille Autrement of April 2003, in an article dealing with the America’s Cup and particularly about the danger for the municipal team of things growing too big. The article hints that the municipal team may have political motives, seeing it as: “…probably blinded by the opportunity to host such an event during the year of… the municipal elections.”

René Olméta engaged in a discourse of this type. He evaluated the city’s candidature as he did the rest of Jean-Claude Gaudin’s policy as being more ‘show’ than substance. According to Olméta, from the start of the candidature, the question of financing was evident. The municipality, however, did not want to answer the question, leaving people with their dreams and in effect providing a good advertising campaign. Although Olméta does not refer to the America’s Cup bid as an electoral tool, he considered the arrival of The Race 2001 in the Vieux Port, a short time before the municipal elections, to be part of the electoral campaign (Interview with René Olméta, 3 November 2004).
In October, Jean-Marie Le Pen, in his favourite role of agitator, argued that Marseille would not win because:

Marseille has just always been a port, let's say of 'internal navigation' for the Mediterranean Sea, but has never been a port opening up to the world... [and] for those who wish to use it as an electoral springboard, their tactic will not work (AFP dispatch, 14 October 2003).

Coming from a politician who is seeking a term of office at regional level, this declaration before the end of the process is thought provoking. Le Figaro Magazine, on 20 September, had its front page dedicated to Marseille's bid for The America's Cup and devoted the entire issue to a discussion about related concerns, and it also raised the topic of electoral ambitions by asking Jean-Claude Gaudin 'What do you answer to those that suspect a political manoeuvre [OPA] from your part?' Even though the answer of the mayor denies any political motivation, it demonstrates that the political issue is a matter of debate. Effectively, simply organising an event like the America's Cup during an electoral year might lead one to assume that the Gaudin team may be acting on political motivation. Indeed, the way that the project was presented to citizens and to France makes it appear like part of a political campaign (Peraldi and Samson 2005). But this argument might be made for every city, which seeks to attract major events. The success of any such campaign could be seen as a vehicle for the re-election of the local mayor. Moreover, the year of the competition, 2007, was not decided at the beginning of the process. Bertarelli hesitated between 2006, 2007 and 2008. Thus Gaudin's team could not have been motivated by the year of the competition at the beginning. It may simply have been that the project generally was viewed as likely to have a positive political impact for them regardless of its timing. It is more in these terms that the political ambitions of Gaudin's team can be seen. But again, they are hardly measurable here. There is no real evidence of it in the analysis of interviews and media data. Civil servants might have been motivated by the importance and significance of the project. They may have harboured professional, rather than political
ambitions. Here again there is little evidence to support this explanation of professional motivations.

It seems clear, however, that one of main motivation of actors was the renown engendered by such an event. All the significant actors wanted Marseille to be known and acknowledged as an important metropolis, a city with the resources to organise major events, to conform to strict deadlines, to mobilise key partners and to receive thousands of visitors. This is a point of consensus across the data. The city needed to regain a dynamic image, as it moved towards economic recovery. Hosting the America’s Cup would enable the city to engender the international dimension, which a metropolis of this size should have. For politicians, the key explicit motive finds its origin in this argument. France Gamerre thus insisted that city image, promoted through connections to the city and the event and its ‘international influence’, was the key goal. It was a continuous process of boosting the image of a Mediterranean city, which seemed to be bouncing back after the World Football Cup 1998. Thus Marseille should seek to attract investors, improving its tourist activity and the living conditions of its inhabitants. The issue of image is what most of the principal actors in the project saw as a priority rationale. The city’s regeneration would be based on renewal in the cited domains (Le Figaro Magazine, September, 2003). As Olivier Latil D’Albertas claims, the America’s Cup bid:

... coincided with a will from the Communauté Urbaine and the city to carry on positioning Marseille on the yachting sector. In the same time, it is a tremendous event in terms of image, economic impact, issues of every type (Interview with Olivier Latil D’albertas, 27th July, 2005).

The image was also a major motivation for the Port Authority team. It sought the public image of a Port competently managed at the technical and logistical level which could be generated through the America’s Cup. Such an event required significant resources and capacities to be demonstrated, which would be of interest to new clients. But this is not
the sole motivation of the Port Authority. From a political point of view, one motivation was to give concrete expression to the Port Authority’s new relations with the city, in political as well as urban or sociological terms (Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005). The Port Authority wished to ensure that the port no longer ‘turned its back’ to the city. The America’s Cup was a way to affirm this, notably by working on a common project of this importance with the city authorities. The Port Authority team was motivated to support the project because of the potential impact on the Port Authority’s activity, and because the project fitted with the established policy of the institution. Moreover, the Port Authority would have the sale of the J4 space as a significant source of income. Economic motivations were thus important. We should remember that the Port Authority is managed as a private firm, with obligations in terms of managing assets. It is a public establishment but is not a public service institution.

In essence, the three local authorities, the City, the Communauté Urbaine and the Port Authority of Marseille shared an interest in terms of image issues because of the consequences that a good image would engender for the development for all three, even though they are concerned with different constituencies: the town for the City, Marseille metropolitan area for the Communauté Urbaine, and the port for the Port Authority. However, even if their spatial focus was different, there was a common concern with development of the city.

6.2.5. Resources.

Through the analysis, it is evident that different kinds of resources are required to develop the project. Each of these has a different place in the project. The first is that of the city’s environmental resources. As the Mayor and the press regularly reiterated, the city has a natural stadium: the sea. Marseille harbour is often put forward as being among the most beautiful in the world, offering first class “terraces” with the Corniche
Kennedy and the Digue du Large (Libération, 4 April 2003). When journalists list the strengths and weaknesses of each candidature, these natural resources are always cited as one of Marseille's strengths. These elements might be influential in the Swiss decision because the event was a water sport competition, but they were marginal in terms of the resources that project holders could manipulate.

Another resource used in the project is an intangible, what one might call "the History of Marseille". There is the history of the port, founded 2,600 years ago by Greek sailors, and this is used as an argument to promote the maritime capacities of Marseille and its inhabitants in this domain. A 2,600 years old city would provide a significant backdrop to the America's Cup. In relation to more recent history, the quality of organisation of sport events, and in particular of sailing events, were also used as arguments. In effect, Marseille had already been the location of international sailing events: for example, the port arrival of The Race 2001, organised by Bruno Peyron, one of the Marseille ambassadors for the America's Cup; organisation of the Jeux Mondiaux de la Voile 2002 by the Yachting Club Pointe Rouge (La Marseillaise, 3 March 2003 and Bid File, sheet 36). Other lower level competitions were cited in the arguments. According to France Gamerre, the history of Marseille is an essential resource of the project: the city was the first to organise a regatta in its harbour in the 19th century; l'Union Nautique Marseillaise (Marseille Yachting Union) has existed for more than a century; a sailor created the city; and numerous water based competitions have taken place in Marseille in recent years. As a result, the City was given access to high quality skills and know-how, which enabled it to mount a credible bid to host the most prestigious yachting competition in the world (Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005).

The organisation of the Football World Cup 1998 is used as reference point for the city, as a successful event in terms of the friendly and
popular spirit engendered, and the press and the municipal authority regularly referred to this. In the document file, reference to the successful staging of the World Cup is made on several occasions: in relation to urban transport, security and events organisation (Bid File, sheets 36, 37, 74 and 78). The World Cup is thus a legitimator of claims, a trump card, which actors use as often as possible. They also point out that it is not simply ability to organise a competition which was demonstrated, but also the quality / efficiency of catering and tourism provision. With this argument, the Marseille bid promoters hoped to demonstrate to the Swiss that Marseille was able to meet the requirements of a major event (Bid File, sheet 32). The Tour De France, on 15 July 2003, was also used as an occasion to demonstrate the City’s capabilities.

This first level of resources serves mostly as background, highlighting the city and its competences. In relation to the theoretical framework, these are peripheral elements of the category, playing a role in the communication campaign. They do not represent resources brought by the different actors to fuel the project. They are integral aspects of the City and its history, but actors cannot use, exchange or manipulate them. They are significant but are not resources provided by the actors involved, and hence are not the primary focus.

In this kind of project, invariably the main resource is financial. There was a necessity to establish a financial framework, which would allow development of the various requirements of the project. The financial commitment raised some questions, notably from the opposition in the City Council, but did not dominate debates. There were financial ‘warnings’ at the beginning of the process, and these had transformed into objections by the end. For Marseille, the global budget was estimated at 200 million euros, 120 million in capital, 80 million in terms of revenue. The State committed 40 million euros – and would provide more if Marseille were chosen – the Conseil Général agreed to provide 7.6 million
euros (La Provence, 21 June 2003), the Conseil Régional had yet to decide an amount. Marseille and the Communauté Urbaine were the largest financial investors. The candidature document also cites a capital budget of about 120 million euros (Bid File, sheet 58). Despite a lack of a clear break-down, central government was, nevertheless, officially to provide one third of the capital cost, leaving the remaining two thirds to the other local authorities and the Euroméditerranée establishment. The distribution between local authorities was to be more or less as follows: 1/3 for the City, 1/3 for the Communauté Urbaine, 1/3 for the Conseil Régional (Bid File, sheet 58). The Conseil Général is not mentioned in this division, although it is cited elsewhere as providing 7.6 million euros.

The finance issue appeared to be a potential handicap, and so the government agreed to increase its commitment (La Provence, 12 November 2003), Jean-Claude Gaudin promoted the idea of a potential defeat because of financing issues (La Provence, 22 August 2003), while France Gamerre announced the commitment of the national media (La Provence, 21 November 2003). Given this concern the absence of the private sector may be seen as something of a surprise. The project team thought the former would intervene in terms of sponsoring and providing technical competence in the second stage of the process, i.e. if Marseille had been chosen. According to Olivier Latil D’Albertas, this project could only be set up by public sector interests. The private sector did not have the capacity to do it. It could not allow itself to become involved in a project for which the benefits engendered were uncertain. In the short term process, private sector involvement was not even a question, but if the time-scale had been greater, private-public partnerships might have been conceivable (Interview with Olivier Latil D’Albertas, 22 June 2005). The private sector was thus not involved in the decision-making process on either the financial or the logistical level. The major actors only saw it as a symbolic support or an active support. Indeed, the creation of a GIP
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(Groupement d’Intérêts Publics) was proof of the willingness of the various elements to let the public sector take the lead.

Another resource to emerge from the data is that of the capacity to influence. Newspapers and interviewees report the lobbying exercised by Marseille actors on Swiss decision-makers. For Marseille, it began in February 2003, with two trips to Auckland during the Louis Vuitton Trophy and the America’s Cup. The aim was at that stage to make contact with the Alinghi team, in order to get themselves known and to show interest in the event. During this process, key actors from the City approached people who might be able to influence Ernesto Bertarelli. They sought to influence both the multi-millionaire and the AC Management network. The press reported a variety of meetings and visits by the Marseille delegation during this process. The comments of Jean-Claude Gaudin about the lack of involvement by Jacques Chirac seemed to stem from this period. The President of the Republic was accused of failing to use his various networks or to play the ‘charm’ game. The use of lobbying was not, of course, limited to Marseille. All the city delegations were playing this game. The development of influence as a resource, though important, was not going to be of major significance in winning the bid, but bidding cities had to seek to develop this since all the other parties were doing so.

If these three kinds of resources are evident in the first reading of the data, the most important with regard to the theoretical framework are the least visible. The main resources used by decision-makers relate to Stone’s (1989) notion of ‘power to’. Each member of the Steering Committee brought her or his influence to the group to achieve an effective mobilisation of resources to mount the bid. The political elite of the City of Marseille had the power to initiate the Marseille bid, the Communauté Urbaine had the power to set up the project and the Port Authority had the power to shape technical and logistical aspects of the project. The renovation project of the J4 mole, on Port Authority land was essential to
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the setting up of a credible facility for the boats. In addition, the Port Authority was in charge of technical and logistic aspects of the project. As a Port Authority with marine skills it was able to bring these essential resources to the other partners. Without the Port Authority, it would have been difficult to answer the AC Management demands with any technical credibility. It is thus the 'power to' [mobilise resources and actions or not], which was perhaps the most important feature of power in this project. All partners put together their capacities to enable the project to be established. Without any one of the members, it is doubtful that the project would ever have passed beyond the first stage. Each member of the steering committee was crucial because she or he had the power to provide a critical element.


With regard to relationships between actors, two types or levels of relationship can be identified, according to the actors' place in the decision-making process. The first type was the relationship between main and secondary actors according to the institution that they represented. Relations between the different local authorities were complicated by political conflicts. The Marseille municipality was essentially on the right in political terms, whereas Conseils Régional and Général were on the left. Even though neither Région nor Département were against the project, they did not officially declare their support for some time.24 As noted, their participation was essentially only financial, involving a relatively modest amount for the Département and a vague commitment for the Region. This situation was a direct consequence of the political environment. As soon as they were able, all three local authorities sought to take advantage of the project in order to demonstrate their political significance. The tensions between them were, therefore, taken into account by key actors. They are aware that projects controlled by

24 In the press, there is no real sign of support, even when interviews about the project are reported.
Chapter 6: Marseille's bid to host the America's Cup.

Marseille City Council are rarely supported enthusiastically by other local authorities. Thus, even though both Regional and Departmental councils were asked to give support and an official financial request was made, the main actors of the Marseille bid did not want to waste time in political bargaining with the Région and the Département. Nothing was expected from them (Interview with Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 22 June 2005). One might have assumed that the official contact had simply been a matter of going through the motions.

With central government, the situation was very different. First of all the City and the government were of the same political colour. However, the lack of financial support and personal involvement of the President were heavily criticized. Though the conflict was little reported in the press (Jean-Claude Gaudin could not afford to be too critical of a President for whom he was a Minister), interviewees noted the strong level of private criticism. The project promoters had to press their case with the government to gain the effective participation of the State. The discussion below of reasons for the failure of the Marseille bid considers actors’ observations about this aspect.

Within the Municipal Council, the decision on 24 March 2003 to bid was unanimous. The validation vote for the contracts with AC Management on 14 November 2003 was less consensual, with some parties voting against the acceptance of the contracts. This kind of situation is perhaps not unusual. A town councillor could not decently be seen to vote against a project, which would create jobs, boost urban development and improve city image. However, as the project formalised, gasps appeared. The Communist Party and les Vents were opposed to the project for the Vieux Port such as it was presented. The Socialists were in favour of the project, but only in the context of the America's Cup; they would not accept it if Marseille was not successful in its bid (La Provence, 15 November 2003). Three elements were thus under debate: municipal finances, central
government participation and the Vieux Port project. All parties agreed on
the participation of Marseille in the America’s Cup, but some groups
contested the content of plans and the actions proposed.

Agreements also occurred after the process. All agreed to the need to take
advantage of the impetus provided by the project, but again, not about
the way to do it. For example, the Communists wished to use financial
resources dedicated to this project for other purposes, such as to restore
primary schools and municipal cafeterias, whereas others talked about the
need to invest to enhance Marseille’s image (La Provence, 27 November
2003). Nevertheless, despite all such political conflicts, there was never a
risk that the project would be rejected. There was thus an overall
consensus about the orientation – support for the candidature – but not
on the actions and the project management associated with it.

The second level of relationship concerns the main actors. Between the
four project promoters there was a consensus on both orientation and
action. They trusted each other in terms of capacities and competences,
with each being the lead and the expert in the domain for which she / he
is responsible, and none of them even considered alternative cases or
actions other than that recommended by their partners (Interviews with
The public servants in this group were also accustomed to working
together, which facilitated the work. An internal hierarchy, therefore,
exists, which was dominated by the City Council, but which intervened
only in final decisions, and not during the process. The City had the last
word because it was effectively a City project and it also had democratic
accountability. Otherwise, this hierarchy was simply accepted and had no
need to impose itself. Resources brought by each members of the
Steering Committee lead to this consensus. None of them would have
been able to dominate others. They had different tasks and different
competences which, in essence, obliged them to work in a consensual

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relationship. The view of these actors was that it worked very well and gave a specific dynamic to the group.

6.2.7. The candidature consequences.

a). Marseille reaches the final.

Even though Marseille was not chosen as the site for the America’s Cup, it had yet to reach the end of the process, as it went through the different qualification rounds. The City’s ambition for renewal had been seen by the outside world. It had shown that it was able to mobilise its forces to develop a high quality project. It was able to draw on existing infrastructure, in particular for transport, which was essential to the hosting of this kind of event. With its port, its motorway network, the international airport at Marignane and, from 2001, the TGV, Marseille has excellent external communication links. Its internal transport network, however, is still limited, and the impetus provided by the America’s Cup would have permitted the city to accelerate the building of an infrastructure project which would have greatly enhanced transport in the city.

The America’s Cup project also allowed the City to demonstrate its organisational and human capacities. The City managed to mount a strong project in a limited amount of time, showing that it was capable of creativity. The organisational approach adopted was demonstrably efficient, especially in relation to the work of the public services concerned. Although they did not announce this, France Gamerre and Christophe Piloix were surprised by the efficiency of the Marseille team. It seems that even these leading figures had had doubts about entering so late into the process (Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005; and Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005).

The experience also provided a new dynamism between the teams from the different organisational elements. For these teams, it was an
Chapter 6: Marseille’s bid to host the America’s Cup.

opportunity to gain recognition for the work they carry out behind the scenes. And as some commentators pointed out, it permitted ‘the City of Pastis and siesta’ to show Paris just what it was capable of achieving.

Marseille was able to demonstrate that it had unsuspected skills and finally had the last laugh on Paris, on France, on the government, on every one that had not believed that yes, effectively, and without a lot of central support, we were able to get through things and to be selected for the final (Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005).

The City was able to show its determination to go it alone if its partners let it down. The City Council, the Communauté Urbaine and the Port Authority wanted to demonstrate that they could represent strength of purpose and of action. The local authorities thus managed to achieve some success virtually on their own.

b). Candidature issues.

The first issue to be raised relates to the impact of Marseille’s organisation of the first round of the Louis Vuitton Trophy in 2004, which had few economic and tourist effects (Interview with Marc Vincent, 28 June 2005). In relation to the bidding project itself, the first significant issue is that of media coverage. During the nine month bidding process, Marseille was the subject of numerous press articles and some TV reports. Its coastline, its image, as well as its meteorological and sailing conditions were under the spotlight. External economic operators still talk about the project when they meet their Marseille colleagues (Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005; and Olivier Latil D’Albertas, 27 June 2005).

This candidature was a major asset for city leaders in Marseille in that the efficiency and professionalism of the city had now been demonstrated. As a result, links were created with partners that had begun to realise the city’s potential, notably in the yachting domain. Thus, Marseille was approached by the Chinese to assist in the construction of yachting centres in China (Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005).

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25 He uses data from an internal document of the town hall, which he was not allowed to communicate.
For the Port Authority, even though there were no direct economic consequences, it achieved its goal in strengthening its relationship with the City Council (Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005). Working together on the project demonstrated to Marseille citizens that the City and the Port Authority could operate cohesively to achieve common aims. In effect, the City Council and the Port Authority had often been in direct conflict, unable to agree on a common political orientation. According to Christophe Piloix, following the arrival of Mr. Brassart at the head of the Port Authority in 1999, the Port Authority renewed its dialogue with the City authorities and a number of common projects began to emerge, which were not solely economic in nature. The America’s Cup thus provided an excellent opportunity to officially celebrate this new relationship.

According to the project’s four main actors, these nine months of the bidding process also gave Marseille citizens a new found confidence in their own city. The candidature was in fact a major promotional campaign mobilising the population to create a dynamic behind the candidature, and most importantly, to send out the message that the City Council was active and dynamic. It also provided great advertising for the city, raising its profile all around the world. The positive image had then to be ‘...built up in the long term... [to attract] offices, executives to work in Marseille, more private investments and so on’ (Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005).

At the end of the process, Marseille had the opportunity to take advantage of the positive impetus generated by the America’s Cup project.

c). The reasons for failure.
The common view among the inhabitants of Marseille was that Valencia won the right to host the America’s Cup because the King of Spain had a
Chapter 6: Marseille's bid to host the America's Cup.

passion for sailing and because Spain was willing to sign the biggest cheque. The four principal proponents of the bid, though making reference to the first argument, used the second to explain why they lost. They claimed that they lost because the budget had been insufficient, and for this they blamed central government. For them, the lack of financial commitment from the State was the only reason for the failure. France Gamerre referred briefly to this, but Olivier Latil D'Albertas and Christophe Piloix were more forceful. They both highlighted the lack of support from the State as significant, but for different reasons. For the former, a lack of ambition and of global vision lay at the heart of central government's attitude:

The most difficult point was the relationship with the State when we had to talk about the significant finance needed... There I think the State did not always live up to its responsibilities. They [the Spanish] really pulled out all the stops and did the things the Spanish really do well, that is with the region and a major event, they pulled out all the stops, they took advantage of it, they pushed the whole region to the top. There was a real vision in terms of development for the area, which our unapologetic 'Colbertisme' [protectionism] did not provide... Then if it was something to do with Paris, the Olympic Games for example, then yes... The State would have said –especially since it had already put money into Euroméditerranée and so on – they would have said 'we are going to use this as a lever and we are going to pull out all the stops, we are going to change the nature of things in the PACA region, and in Marseille, in the Marseille urban area'. The Spanish did this for Valencia, though the French government did not manage to do it (Interview with Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 27 June 2005).

However, Spain already had experience in these matters. The Universal Exposition in Seville and the Olympics Games in Barcelona had allowed Catalonia to reposition itself at the international level, to boost its economy and to reverse the process of regional decline. According to Christophe Piloix, the hosting of the America's Cup in Marseille was not given sufficient priority because other projects were judged more important by central government:
I am not really sure that the government of the time gave everything to support Marseille. And that ... It calculated that we should not have the America’s Cup in Marseille if it handicapped the Olympic Games 2012 bid in Paris,... it was a calculation that was made somewhere by some Ministers and so on... I remember that during the inter-ministry meeting, it was the Ministry in charge of the port of Marseille that was the most motivated, the Ministry responsible for maritime facilities, more than the Ministry of Youth and Sports, and of course, than the Ministry of Finance... (Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005).

What emerges from the discourse of these major figures is the familiar feeling of competition with the Capital, the feeling of being sidelined for the sake of Paris.

However, the City Council capitalised on the link with central government finance. Jean-Claude Gaudin was thus able to show to his citizens that despite his major ambitions for the city, he was concerned with the cost to the local population. The Mayor placed the question of finance in the hands of the State when he argued that the City could go no further because it did not have the financial means. Gaudin thus defended himself from criticism, in case of either victory or defeat. Subsequently, one reads, for example in La Provence, that if the Swiss thought that the financial commitment made by the City and its partners was not sufficient, then it was just too bad for them, the City of Marseille, according to the newspaper, had made a good choice (La Provence, 27 November 2003). Gaudin was thus seen as a ‘reasonable’ mayor. His political strategy had worked well. However, it was also evident that his political weight at the national level had declined. Even though he was effective in competing with other French candidates cities at the beginning of the process (La Provence de l’Economie, 4 March 2003), his personal networks were less effective than his political strategy. Furthermore, the declaration by France Gamerre concerning the lack of financial support from commercial

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26 Edel Melin, interviewed 15 January 2005 and France Gamerre, interviewed 31 May 2005 also make reference to the intelligence of the Mayor in this project.
companies (La Provence, 21 November 2003) confirmed that the City had identified this issue as a handicap.

Another argument suggested in local discussions to explain the failure of the bid was the refuse workers' strike in June, during a visit by the Swiss delegation to Marseille. Again, although the four major figures acknowledged that the situation was not improved by the strike, they minimized its consequences in the project documentation (Bid File, sheet 57) because Marseille had reached the final selection after the strike had taken place. Furthermore, if Marseille was under the threat of strikes, Valencia was at risk from a more significant threat from terrorism by ETA. In terms of Marseille's candidature, the threat of strikes was largely nullified and although financing was in effect insufficient, it was, nevertheless, difficult to pinpoint the real reasons for the bid's failure. The effect of the lack of lobbying by the President for example is difficult to assess. The importance of lobbying is acknowledged in similar circumstances with the Paris bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games, newspapers, media, the general public and the leaders of the Paris bid all claimed that it was the lack of lobbying, which led Paris to defeat. For the Marseille project, and for the whole process, things are less clear, and such claims are much less strongly asserted.

The technical aspects of the proposal are never cited as a reason for failure. On the contrary, the principal figures assert that the Marseille project was technically the best. Edel Melin was the sole interviewee to argue that the Valencia project was technically superior to that of Marseille, and that this was why Valencia was chosen.²⁷

The problem of identifying factors, which account for Marseille's failure to be selected is exacerbated by the fact that a group of three individuals

²⁷ Edel Melin had not taken part directly in the project. That might explain why she is the only person to 'objectively' argue that the reason for the failure was primarily technical.
made the final choice, and did so in secrecy. In such circumstances, even if a rigorous project had been submitted, the outcome was outside the realms of public debate. AC Management had simply asked questions of candidate cities throughout the nine months bidding process, and did not say what they expected, and criteria for success could only be guessed at. It was left to the cities to identify the factors they felt led to the best conditions to host the America’s Cup. Of the four cities which were still competing in the last straight, the differences between them were few. AC Management had subjected each city to such costs in this process that it became difficult to eliminate those that appeared to be too weak. After the process, AC Management did not explain its choice nor did it explain the weaknesses in the bids of the cities, which were not selected. It is thus difficult to assert with any conviction what the real reasons for failure and / or success were.

We can also conclude, following Olivier Latil D’Albertas, that:

What is new is that this city should have been candidate in an international event of this calibre, in a competition between cities of this calibre, negotiating an international contract of this calibre and should make it to the final cut... It is a good image, a good symbol of the economic evolution and of the clarity of Marseille. The fact that we did not succeed is an indication of the ground we still have to cover (interview with Olivier Latil D’Albertas, 27 June 2005).

6.3. Conclusion : results with regard to the concepts of growth coalition, policy network and urban regime.

Clearly the nature of the America’s Cup case differs along a range of dimensions from that of the Football World Cup. The process was city based and international rather than a competition between French cities, as was the case with the Football World Cup. The range of actors, sources of finance, and other competitive factors were also very different. The point to consider within the context of theoretical interests is whether these different configurations of actors, resources, and circumstances
mask any continuities between the two bids, and more specifically whether such continuities might constitute evidence of a policy network, growth coalition or urban regime. It is to these issues that we turn our attention in Chapter 7.
Chapter 7: Understanding Mega-sport Event Policy in Marseille

7.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to review the accounts of policy decision-making as seen through the documentary analysis, media accounts and interview transcripts relating to both cases discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. In essence the decision-making process is 'modelled' (see figures 7.1 and 7.2), key actors are identified and their principal objectives, resources, types of interaction and centrality to decision-making outlined (see Tables 7.1 to 7.7), in order to go on to consider the extent to which the decision-making process thus outlined provides evidence of conforming to the three models identified in Chapter 2.

In Chapter 2, the concepts of policy network, growth coalition and urban regime were introduced, as reflecting the leading approaches to explanation of urban policy in the Anglo-Saxon literature. These approaches developed in the context of British and North American local governance systems, have, as noted earlier, begun to be applied to a range of new western (and indeed French) contexts (Levine 1994; Le Galès 1995; 2001; Henry and Nassis 1999; Paramio-Salcines 2000; John and Cole 1999, 2000; Benz and Furst 2002; Di Gaetano and Strom 2003; Thomas 2003; Gissendanner 2004; Kulscar and Domokos 2005; Nicholls 2005; Sellers 2005; Kantor 2006; Silva and Syrett 2006), as well as non-western and even developing economies (Low 1994; Henry and Uchiumi 2001; Silk 2002; Swart and Bob 2004). This growing application of such conceptual and theoretical frameworks to novel contexts has, however, been subject to challenge, resulting in criticisms of 'concept stretching' and ethnocentrism (Sartori 1991).
On the basis of the schematised description produced of the decision-making process, we will go on to consider the extent to which the characterisations of urban policy evident in the three theoretical frameworks are evidenced in the policy process in the cases of the Football World Cup, and the America’s Cup. The extension to new contexts of the characterisations of local urban governance, as described in the policy network, growth coalition, and urban regime literature, is clearly part of the movement to describe such developments as aspects of globalisation. However, the claims that globalisation implies growing homogeneity are increasingly dismissed as simplistic. In relation to sporting phenomena Maguire (1999) drawing on the work of Elias (1982) and extending the chronology of Robertson (1994), refers to the notion of increasing varieties and diminishing contrasts, while Robertson himself coined the term ‘glocalisation’. Both authors in effect are referring to situations in which local actors, while subject to common non-local phenomena, both constraining and enabling, are located in different local structures, and have different access to resources by which to respond to non-local pressure / opportunities.

One aspect of the ‘local’ which is absolutely patent in the French context, and which provides a less evident resource in the US (or even the UK context) is the role and power of the State. The form and nature of the State is a product of historical battles. In the French case we can look to particular points in history – in particular in the era of modernity the establishing of the Napoleonic code in the early 19th century, and in ‘late’ modernity the development of decentralisation legislation steered through, and associated with, the dominant figure of post-war Marseille politics, Gaston Defferre. A strong central State, and ironically, a powerful regional, departmental, metropolitan district and city government, constitute a structural context, which permits the emergence of actors of influence in the local scene from the public sector. Such a context might
also be seen as militating against the emergence of influential figures from the commercial and voluntary sectors.

In the earlier discussions of the three theoretical frameworks employed we sought to identify key indicators which might be employed to differentiate between the three types of explanation / description promoted by the three theoretical frameworks (see table 2.3). After discussing the modelled descriptions of policy in the two cases, we will go on to consider (employing the set of indicators) the extent to which either or both of the two case studies lend themselves to a particular theoretical account, or whether by contrast, locally / culturally specific accounts of the policy process are required.

7.2. The decision-making process for the Football World Cup project

The analysis conducted, through the common indicators developed earlier, provides an interesting reading of the decision-making process for the Football World Cup project in Marseille. As noted, there are two phases in the project, which correspond to two periods under different local political leadership: that of Robert Vigouroux and Jean-Claude Gaudin in their respective periods as Mayor of the City. These periods represent stages one and two (under Vigouroux) and three and four under Gaudin (see Figure 7.1)
Figure 7.1 Decision-making in the Case of the Football World Cup in Marseille

Stage 1: Decide to Bid
- Actors
  - City Council
  - Politicians: Vigouroux
  - Central Govt. (Min. of Finance; Youth & Sport)
  - French Fbl Fedn.
  - Bernard Tapie
  - FIFA

Stage 2: Decide Stadium Extension Plan
- Actors
  - City Council
  - Politicians: Vigouroux
  - Conseil Régional
  - Conseil Général
  - Central Govt. (Min. of Finance; Youth & Sport)

Stage 3: Delivery of Infrastructure Changes
- Actors
  - City Council
  - Politicians: Gaudin
  - Vincent
  - Regional Org. Committee (COR)
  - Central Govt. (Min. of Youth & Sport)
  - Supporters (opposing changes)

Stage 4: Delivery of the Event
- Actors
  - Regional Org. Committee (COR)
  - Football bodies (local, departmental and regional) (football events for young people)
  - Commercial sponsors (animation events)
  - City Council
  - Technicians (animation events)

Matches / Security
Animation
In the first stage of the project (see Table 7.1), the central actors were: the Vigouroux team, predominantly its political members; central government through the involvement of the Ministry of Youth and Sports; the French Football Federation which was evaluating all cities to be incorporated in the French bid; and Bernard Tapie, the President of O.M. As noted earlier, objectives for Vigouroux were two-fold: the hosting of the World Football Cup would give the opportunity to renovate the stadium, which was needed, and would also be an opportunity to please local inhabitants / electors. For both the central government and the FFF, the hosting of the event represented a promotional opportunity, promoting France for the former, promoting French football for the latter. These first principal sets of actors were central at this stage, given their respective resources. Vigouroux shared his political resources in order to progress the project; central government had political resources but was also able to commit itself to participate financially in the building of the project; the French Federation of Football used its legitimacy to contact cities interested in hosting the event, thus contributing to the building of the French bid. Bernard Tapie was also a (marginal) actor at this stage.
since, as noted earlier, he threatened to build his own stadium outside the city and was thus trying to demonstrate that Vigouroux was an unimportant figure in the world of football (and by implication lacking political force). By this time, Tapie was a potential candidate for municipal elections, and was seen by local politicians, particularly by Vigouroux, as a dangerous threat to their political careers. Actors were thus largely co-operating with one another at this point, - except, that is, with Tapie – and there was a general consensus that the City should bid.

Table 7.2: Decision-making in the Case of the Football World Cup in Marseille – Stage 2: Decision on Planned Stadium Extension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Primary Objectives</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Type of Interaction</th>
<th>Centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Council Politicians: Vigouroux, Olméta.</td>
<td>Securing Marseille as a venue, the hosting of a semi-final</td>
<td>Political / financial</td>
<td>Co-operation / political conflict with Conseils Régional and Départemental</td>
<td>High / leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Govt. (Min. of Finance; Youth &amp; Sport)</td>
<td>Promoting France and French sporting culture</td>
<td>Political legitimacy / financial support</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conseil Régional</td>
<td>Demonstrate its influence</td>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Political conflict with the City Council</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conseil Général</td>
<td>Demonstrate its influence</td>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Political conflict with the City Council</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Establishing the best available conditions to host matches</td>
<td>Right holders</td>
<td>Contractors for services</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité d'Intérêts de Quartier (CIQs)</td>
<td>To serve local interests</td>
<td>Democratic legitimacy</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents of the stadium neighbourhood</td>
<td>To maintain their daily lives quality</td>
<td>Political voice (small)</td>
<td>Pressure group activities</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the second stage (see Table 7.2), the decision to bid was made, but the hosting of a semi-final would require the extension of the stadium. This stage thus corresponds to the planning of the stadium extension, notably to the financial plan to support the project. The City Council, under the leadership of Vigouroux, was again the key actor in terms of decision-
making, but with a latent objective: to demonstrate its supremacy over the other local authorities, which were controlled by potential political rivals. The second stage was the moment of the arrival in the decision-making arena of the Conseil Départemental and the Conseil Régional, which were asked to share the financial burden but were not offered the opportunity to contribute to decision-making in any other way. This marked the beginning of conflict between the different local authorities. In relation to the football bodies, FIFA was much more involved in this stage since it provided the terms of reference for host stadia. As with the FFF and the newly established French Organisation Committee, FIFA was the institution, which definitively legitimated the process in sporting terms. In relation to central government, more ministries became involved, since the stadium extension plan needed the intervention of the Ministries of Finance, of Youth and Sports, and of Internal Affairs. Again, resources of the central government were its capacity to provide political legitimacy, and financial support for the project. One group of actors to appear at this stage, though in the margins, was the residents of the stadium neighbourhood. They expressed the view that the project would have negative consequences for their daily lives. Another set of local actors also appearing at the margin, but playing an important legitimating role as support for the main decision-makers, was the Comités d’Intérêts de Quartiers (CIQs), in the sense that they were the means by which citizen consultation was demonstrated.

Interactions between those actors took on different forms: as we noted above, conflict dominated interaction between local authorities, whereas the rest of the actors was co-operating in what can be characterised as a network (rather than in a hierarchical manner).
Chapter 7: Understanding Mega-sport Event Policy in Marseille

Table 7.3: Decision-making in the Case of the Football World Cup in Marseille – Stage 3: Delivery of Infrastructural Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Primary Objectives</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Type of Interaction</th>
<th>Centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Council Politicians: Gaudin, Villani</td>
<td>The development of Marseille</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>High / leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council Technicians: Vincent, Gondard</td>
<td>The development of Marseille</td>
<td>Technical legitimacy</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>High / leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Org. Committee (COR): Genovesi</td>
<td>Organisation of the event</td>
<td>Technical competences</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Govt. bodies (Min. of Youth &amp; Sport, of Finance, DRJS)</td>
<td>Looking at the stadium delivery</td>
<td>Technical legitimacy</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters (opposing changes)</td>
<td>Influence the choice of the stadium design</td>
<td>Legitimacy (stadium users)</td>
<td>Conflict (with all the above)</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the third stage (see Table 7.3), it was Gaudin who led the city, with only one headline concern at that time: the choice of the stadium design and its realisation. As the event drew closer, the City Council ceded its leading role to the Regional Organising Committee of the World Cup. With the arrival of Gaudin, the role of public servants or 'technical experts' grew. They appeared in the press, in particular Marc Vincent, 'Mister World Cup' and Jean-Claude Gondard (General Secretary of the City Council). With these new actors and with the Gaudin style for communicating on policy, the objective of staging the event was more overtly oriented towards the development of Marseille. Nevertheless, Gaudin gave little explanation about how or why the Football World Cup would be an opportunity for city development. Central government was still present as a major actor, but with a much more devolved action with for example the role of the Direction Régionale de la Jeunesse et des Sports (DRJS, the regional branch of the Ministry of Youth and Sports) for both the preparation of the event and the stadium evaluation. As in the previous stage, governmental bodies at sub-national levels were using
their capacity to legitimate the project and the realisations linked to the project. The situation was the same for the football bodies, with the implementation of a sub-national level in the organisation (CRO, the Regional Organisation Committee for the World Cup), which had responsibility for coordinating the organisation of the competition. The objective for these latter actors was to create the best conditions to host the event. Thus, co-operation was the most evident kind of interaction between institutions. The sole overt conflict during this stage was with the O.M. supporters, a body of whom objected to the design of the stadium. This stage thus represented the realisation of the projects (stadium extension etc) and evaluation of the projects by key partners, namely the CRO and DRJS.

The fourth stage (see Table 7.4) involved decisions and actions taken around the delivery of the event. Here the central actor was the Regional Organisation Committee (CRO). In terms of delivery, two distinct elements existed: delivery of the matches ‘per se’, and delivery of animations events. In terms of the former, actors involved were mostly the CRO and governmental bodies. For the latter, the central actors were the City Council, the local football associations and a group, which had been almost invisible until then, the commercial sector. In terms of resources, the voluntary sector shared its legitimacy and competences in the organisation of football animation events, whereas the commercial sector was only called on to provide financial resources. The City Council provided technical competence in the staging of animation events. Although for the delivery of matches, alliances were in a sense an ‘obliged’ form of interaction, and it was more a co-operation network that linked actors for the delivery of animations. As with the two previous stages, conflict appeared with marginal actors, who were not directly linked to the project but who were important in the city, notably commercial traders in the centre of the city, concerned about spectator violence during the event. Both the Conseil Régional and the Conseil Général were also
marginal actors at this stage, supporting the programme of animations, with financial and human resources, but again without being able to participate in decision-making.

**Table 7.4: Decision-making in the Case of the Football World Cup in Marseille – Stage 4: Delivery of the Event**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Primary Objectives</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Type of Interaction</th>
<th>Centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Org. Committee (COR):</td>
<td>i) operational section: Genovesi</td>
<td>i) delivery of the event</td>
<td>i) co-operation / alliance with governmental bodies</td>
<td>i) high / leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ii) public consultation section: Vincent, Latil D'Albertas,</td>
<td>i) delivery of animation, improvement of the hosting of spectators</td>
<td></td>
<td>ii) moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Villani...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football bodies (local, departmental and regional)</td>
<td>Delivery of animations events, football events for young people</td>
<td>Sporting legitimacy</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council technicians (animation events):</td>
<td>Vincent, Gondard</td>
<td>Technical competencies</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial sponsors (animation events)</td>
<td>To promote their image</td>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government bodies (ministries, and their departmental offices)</td>
<td>Delivery of security, matches / contribution to animation events</td>
<td>Technical competencies</td>
<td>Co-operation / alliance with the CRO</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local traders of city centre</td>
<td>To benefit from the event</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Pressure group activity</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the Football World Cup project was a product of public sector leadership, using partners having significant resources to help the project. Even if the orientation of the project was different under the leadership of the two mayors, both sought to use partners only in support of their own aims. Decision-making was clearly led by the City Council, until the final
stage of the project. While in the early stages to maintain control though challenged by the Département and the Région, Vigouroux in particular used a form of political brinkmanship to coerce or embarrass the Région and the Département into funding the project. After this, the City Council sought to develop a ‘cooperative network’ of actors to achieve its shared goals.

The America’s Cup was however the result of a different process, because the City Council sought to guide the project from beginning to the end, in a cooperative process, which reflected shared goals between the various entities.

7.3. The decision-making process for the America’s Cup project

The decision to promote the bid to host the America’s Cup was the result of only one set of institutional actors, the politicians and technicians of the City Council (see Figure 7.2). The initiative to think about bidding came first from Marc Vincent, supported by Jean-Claude Gondard, the General Secretary of the City Council. They convinced politicians about the significance of the opportunity to bid. In relation to their roles in the city, they aimed to use the America’s Cup as a lever to boost city development (see Table 7.5). Informed by the experience of the Football World Cup, politicians also shared this objective. At this first stage of the project, the resources employed were predominantly ideological: political legitimacy on the part of politicians; and technical legitimacy in relation to the expertise of the technicians. In terms of interaction between actors, this first stage of the process can be characterised as ‘in-house’ co-operation between members since the bidding process had not really begun.
Figure 7.2 Decision-making in the Case of the Americas Cup in Marseille

Stage 1: Decision to promote a bid

Actors
City Council
Politicians: Gaudin, Gamerre
Technicians: Marc Vincent (Tech. Adv.); J-C Gondard (City Council Gen Sec.)

Stage 2: Engagement of Key Partners for Bid

Actors
City Council
Politicians: Gaudin, Gamerre
Technicians: Vincent (Tech. Adv.); Gondard (City Council Gen Sec.)
Communauté Urbaine: Latil D'Albertas
Port Authority: Piloix
Central Government (Mins. of Infrastructure, Finance, Youth and Sport): Chirac, Raffarin
Local Commercial Sector Association 9 'Entreprises Marseille America'
Local Sailing Clubs
Americas Cup Management
Central government

Stage 3: Bid Construction / Infrastructure Projects

Bid Failure

Actors
City Council
Politicians: Gaudin, Gamerre
Technicians: Gondard (City Council Gen Sec.)
Communauté Urbaine: Latil D'Albertas
Port Authority: Piloix
Central Government (Mins. of Infrastructure, Finance, Youth and Sport): Chirac, Raffarin
Local Commercial Sector Association 9 'Entreprises Marseille America'
Local Sailing Clubs
Americas Cup Management
Conseil Général
Conseil Régional
Supporting Committees (Bid and Promoting Committees)
Local Trade Unions
Table 7.5: Decision-making in the Case of the Americas Cup in Marseille – Stage 1: Decision to Promote a Bid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Primary Objectives</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Type of Interaction</th>
<th>Centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Council Politicians: Gaudin, Franck Gamerre</td>
<td>The boosting of city development</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council Technicians: Vincent (Technical Advisor); Gondard (City Council General Secretary.)</td>
<td>The boosting of city development</td>
<td>Technical legitimacy</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.6: Decision-making in the Case of the Americas Cup in Marseille – Stage 2: Engagement of Partners for the Bid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Primary Objectives</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Type of Interaction</th>
<th>Centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Council Politicians: Gaudin, Franck Gamerre</td>
<td>The boosting of city development</td>
<td>Political / financial</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council Technicians: Marc Vincent (sport); J-C Gondard (City Council Gen Sec.)</td>
<td>The boosting of city development</td>
<td>Technical competencies</td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communauté Urbaine : Latil D’Albertas</td>
<td>The boosting of development in the greater Marseille area</td>
<td>Financial / territories legitimacy for actions in greater Marseille area</td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Authority : Piloix</td>
<td>The boosting of the Port area</td>
<td>Technical competencies / territorial competencies for actions in the port</td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>Being seen to meet obligations to support booster events</td>
<td>Financial / administrative legitimacy</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas Cup Management</td>
<td>To organise and promote the Americas Cup</td>
<td>Right holder / sporting legitimacy</td>
<td>Contractor of services</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 7.7: Decision-making in the Case of the Americas Cup in Marseille – Stage 3: Decisions on Infrastructure Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Primary Objectives</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Type of Interaction</th>
<th>Centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Council Politicians: Gaudin, Gamerre</td>
<td>To succeed in the bid</td>
<td>Political / financial</td>
<td>Alliance / conflict with Central Government</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council Technicians: Gondard (City Council Gen Sec.)</td>
<td>To succeed in the bid</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communaute Urbaine: Latil D’Albertas</td>
<td>To succeed in the bid</td>
<td>Technical competencies / financial</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Authority: Piloix</td>
<td>To succeed in the bid</td>
<td>Technical competencies</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government (Mins. Of Infrastructure, Finance, Youth and Sport) Chirac, Raffarin</td>
<td>To succeed in the bid without too much investment</td>
<td>Political / legitimacy / financial</td>
<td>Conflict with City Council politicians</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Commercial Sector Association</td>
<td>To promote the bid</td>
<td>Professional image</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Sailing Clubs</td>
<td>To host the oldest sailing event in the world</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas Cup Management</td>
<td>To organise and promote the Americas Cup</td>
<td>Sporting legitimacy</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting committees i) promoting committee (personalities) ii) bid committee : Genovesi...</td>
<td>i) to promote the bid ii) to improve hosting projects</td>
<td>i) image of major personalities / committee members for promotional purposes ii) professional reputation of members</td>
<td>i) co-operation ii) co-operation</td>
<td>i) low ii) low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conseil General</td>
<td>Being seen to meet obligations to support booster events</td>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conseil Regional</td>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local trade unions</td>
<td>To defend local workers</td>
<td>Political voice (moderate)</td>
<td>Opposition, and later co-operation</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second stage (see Table 7.6) thus corresponds to the stage at which the bidding process became a reality, when the Swiss effectively gained the right to be the next America’s Cup organiser. The City Council needed to gather the relevant partners to build its bid. The key actors at this stage were the *Communauté Urbaine*, involved because of its legitimacy to lead this type of project, which went beyond the bounds of the City into Greater Marseille; the Port Authority, since it was the institution with the competences, physical resources and legitimacy related to such a large scale maritime event; and AC Management, the company set up to negotiate the bid from the Swiss side. Objectives for the City Council and the *Communauté Urbaine* related to the development of the city and Greater Marseille; and the development and consolidation of the city image. For the Port Authority, objectives related to port development in a time of changing maritime business, which was also linked to city image and infrastructure change. There was a strong alliance between those three entities (more significant than mere cooperation) committed to succeeding with the bid. AC Management was a main actor and interlocutor rather than a decision-maker in the Marseille project. Effectively AC Management had to be convinced of the efficiency and attractiveness of the project. Thus, interactions between central actors and AC Management involved negotiation and consultation.

The third stage in the America’s Cup process (see Table 7.7) was the bid construction. We can argue that primary objectives had changed at this stage for the three core institutions, with the focus on the success of the bid, as the means to achieve other broader goals. The central actors were seeking adequate partners to construct the bid. Central government was one of the peripheral actors, sought because of its political and financial resources. However, relations between the central actors and central government were evidently conflictual, visible, and more or less officially acknowledged. The commercial sector appeared in a cooperative role only at this stage. The objectives of the commercial sector actors were to
promote their association with the event, and to be seen to promote Marseille and its bid. As noted in Chapter 6, the commercial sector was seen rather more as being in an active support role rather than as a decision-making partner. Its involvement in the bid relied on its capacity to influence the economic world, and also to some extent on its financial resources (in particular media firms). Both the Conseil Régional and the Conseil Général were also requested to take part in the process because of their financial resources, but with no further significant contribution. At this stage, both Councils did not really declare objectives for bidding, but politically appeared to have little choice but to get involved in the project. They could not afford to be seen to damage the project by a lack of enthusiasm for support. In terms of peripheral actors, there were also the yachting clubs, bringing their competences and a degree of sporting legitimacy to the project. Except for the Maritime Affairs Service of the City Council, the local sailing group was the sole representative of the sports domain, and this group’s primary objective was simply to host the oldest yachting competition in the world. When we look at interactions, the City Council, the Communauté Urbaine and the Port Authority were effectively a tight alliance; conflict dominated relations with central government; and network co-operation was the main interaction with the peripheral partners. There was little opposition to the project at local level, except for the usual political opposition (left / right) among the City Council, and local trade unions. As noted in Chapter 6, the trade unions finally supported the project after a demonstration of their potential to impact upon the project (through strike action).

In these two examples, we therefore, see some important continuities, or learning processes taking place between events. However, there are in addition significant elements of difference. Perhaps the first point to make is that the political context at the outset for the development of the two projects was very different. Political competition between the local government entities in the case of the World Cup, simply was not a factor
for the America’s Cup. A tight alliance was evident from stage two of the America’s Cup project. That alliance was partly made possible by the links within the City Council across departments, developed during the Football World Cup project. Key senior figures knew each other and could work together.

The second point to emphasise is that with the success of the World Cup project it was much easier for key figures to make the argument that investment in major sporting events could make a difference to the city. The conviction that sporting profile could contribute to a change in the city’s reputation had gone beyond sports professionals to individuals such as J-C Gondard, General Secretary of the City Council who were making the case for the second project. In Patrick Dunleavy’s (1980) terms, ideological corporatism was evident in the conviction across professional and sectoral boundaries, that sports events image strategies can achieve shared goals for city promotion.

The two events were very different in nature. The first was effectively a national competition focused around a relatively simple but high profile stadium project, to secure a role in an international event which had already been won for France. The second was a high profile international competition with a more complex set of infrastructural plans and requirements, and with potentially more far reaching impacts on the physical (as well as economic and social) context of the city. In organisational terms this project was more clearly led by those with the technical expertise to plan and deliver the infrastructural requirements.

Finally, what is perhaps remarkable is the lack of strong conflict characterising each of the projects. Sport seems to be an area which can engage cross-party political support (few politicians are willing to be seen as ‘kill-joys’ at least at the outset). Large-scale investment attracted little overt objection – though the local Communists did raise objections to the
spending proposals for the Vélodrome, nevertheless, they could not bring themselves to vote against it. Local residents in the neighbourhood of the stadium, supporters objecting to the stadium design, and commercial interests objecting to the animation projects, give rare glimpses of relatively ineffectual and short-lived opposition.

A point raised earlier and emphasised here is that the research approach adopted focuses attention on decisions taken, as in the classic pluralist, growth coalition, and urban regime studies, rather than on non-decisions as illustrated in Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) approach. Evidence of non-decisions or suppressed conflict was sought in interviews, but is notoriously difficult to identify. Thus it should be recognised that there may be unacknowledged sources of conflict in terms of either what was done or proposed (the impact of infrastructural projects or proposals) or in terms of what was not done because of expenditure of resource on these projects (the opportunity costs of developing these proposals).

Having developed a characterisation of the two projects we now turn to the issue of the extent to which this can lend support to one or other of the key theoretical positions identified earlier in the thesis.

7.4. Analysing Marseille decision-making processes in mega-sport event policy using common indicators

Table 7.8 below provides a summary of the dimensions against which urban policy approaches might be evaluated to determine the extent to which they constitute examples of policy communities, growth coalitions or urban regimes. This table reproduces Table 2.3 but is included again here for ease of access for the reader. In the methodological discussions (Chapter 3) a (modified) critical realist position was outlined, and in essence the discussion, which follows, seeks to ‘uncover’ whether the real underlying structures of urban sports event policy in Marseille, conform
with, or depart from, these descriptions of policy from Anglo-Saxon contexts, which might be regarded as ideal-typical in this context. Thus below we deal with each dimension / indicator for each theory in relation to both projects before going on to form a set of general conclusions about the adequacy of such accounts to the Marseille context.

### Table 7.8: Urban governance framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Growth coalition</th>
<th>Policy network</th>
<th>Urban regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives</strong></td>
<td>Economic growth of the city and ‘personal’ economic gain.</td>
<td>Constellation of interests.</td>
<td>Depends on type of regime (growth, symbolic change etc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means</strong></td>
<td>Large scale property development projects.</td>
<td>Shaping of policy agenda, projects and delivery.</td>
<td>A range of projects over an extended period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kind of actors:</strong></td>
<td>Land owners, property developers</td>
<td>Local, regional, national governments</td>
<td>Local, regional, national governments Private firms, associations, all with a shared vision for the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- primary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- secondary</td>
<td>Banks, government, universities, associations (actors who indirectly have benefits participating to the project)</td>
<td>Actors sharing the same ideology, representatives of governmental and non-governmental associations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motivations</strong></td>
<td>To enhance capital values, personal wealth gain.</td>
<td>To maintain / strengthen position in the policy system.</td>
<td>To promote the shared vision for the city through a variety of measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resources</strong></td>
<td>Financial power and property ownership.</td>
<td>Influence of actors in the policy system; ‘power over’</td>
<td>‘Power to’ do things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kinds of relations between actors</strong></td>
<td>Constant bargaining, subordination of politics by economics</td>
<td>Internal hierarchy within an overall network</td>
<td>Consensus in the orientation and the action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stability</strong></td>
<td>Low: limited to the life of the project</td>
<td>Medium: often linked to elections</td>
<td>Strong: over at least 10 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 7.4.1. Objectives of sports event policy

The distinction between the three types of theoretical framework in terms of goals is not necessarily clear. For a growth coalition, one anticipates
emphasis on economic growth with opportunities for private profit. Urban regimes may be focused on growth, on social regeneration, or on symbolic change. Policy networks imply a constellation of interests, which may or may not be around issues of sport as a vehicle for example of economic development, sport as a means of reimagining the city, or both. In the case of the two projects described, there is little evidence of concern for private commercial gain. Competitive politics characterises the early stages of the Football World Cup but this grows into a common concern to use sport for image promotion, which might be seen as either promoting the existence of shared values in a policy community or of a nascent symbolic regime.

7.4.2. Means employed to achieve objectives
Under this heading also, a distinction can be made between short-lived support for a large scale property development (growth coalition), the development of a range of projects over time (urban regime) and the shaping of policy agenda to reflect the values / world views of the dominant policy actors (policy network). The two projects considered here were the most significant in a programme of events (such as Beach Volley Ball event, Wind Surfing tournaments etc), which were developed over time in Marseille, and there was also evidence of policy agenda-shaping by significant actors. Although significant infrastructural developments were evident, the role of property development was minimal.

7.4.3. Actors involved in the process.
Here again public rather than private or third sector actors predominated. This lack of evident voluntary or commercial sector activity undermines any claim to characterise this as either a growth coalition or an urban regime. CIQs were consulted although how seriously is open to question. Similarly yachting clubs and the commercial interests were involved in the latter stages of the America’s Cup and the World Cup respectively, but this involvement was peripheral. Within local government circles, actors from
political and technical roles did share an ideological commitment to the policy of city promotion through sport.

**7.4.4. Motivations of actors.**
The absence of commercial self interest here is very marked, while the growing momentum for the shared vision of the (post) modern Mediterranean city is also clear. The concerns of actors to strengthen their position and that of those who share similar views is only implied. Thus motivations lend some support to the explanations of policy consistent with the ‘policy network’ and ‘urban regime’ literature.

**7.4.5. Resources employed**
The financial resources employed in the realisation of the projects were almost wholly sourced from the public sector. Thus, the growth coalition and urban regime accounts are undermined. The nature of power evident in the promotion of policy was a mixture of power to mobilise the public, and to some extent the voluntary sector, to sign up to the goals of the projects and the means by which to achieve those goals. This kind of ideological corporatism is consistent with a growing policy network, in which policy actors’ influence is evidenced by the spread of their particular ‘world view’.

**7.4.6. Types of relations between actors**
The consensual nature of much of the interaction in both cases might well ‘fit’ the notion of a strong consensus. Conflict is limited and relatively ineffective in achieving change. A cooperative network developed during the first event, is more fully extended with new actors in the second. Certainly there is little, which might be described as the subordination of political to economic end. Whether the consensus on goals incorporates the commercial sector is less evident, since its involvement was only late in the first project and it limited overall.
7.4.7. Stability over time
What is evident in reviewing these two events is that the policy of using sports events to promote positive (re)imaging of the city has remained intact across the period, and if anything is more readily accepted in the second case because of the positive evaluation of the experience of hosting the World Cup. This is more than a one-off, short term experience, and seems indeed to be part of a wider programme of promotional events. Again this lends evidence to both medium to long-term ideological corporatism, and to the consensual approach of regime building (though the commercial sector may be absent from this consensual group). The value position shared over time by public servants thus suggests something of a policy community.

7.5. Drawing conclusions about applicability of each of the theoretical frameworks
Having reviewed the two cases and indicators employed to operationalise the three theoretical frameworks, what conclusions may be drawn about how useful each of the frameworks is in terms of characterising the two policy cases? Each of the perspectives is considered below in turn.

7.5.1. The absence of a growth coalition.
The weakest of the three perspectives reviewed in explaining the case studies of sports events policy in Marseille is that of the growth coalition. The limitations of a growth coalition account were clear. Neither of the two projects was oriented towards private capital growth or personal economic gain. The absence of key actors (e.g. property developers, banks, etc) and of private finance as a resource, reinforces this point. There is no evidence of political goals being subordinated to (private) economic gain, and the policy goals show some continuity and stability across time. Thus on virtually all indicators the growth coalition is inappropriate.
7.5.2. A modified urban regime?
The two projects taken together illustrate certain features of an urban regime. As noted in Chapter 2, Stone defines an urban regime as
an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions (Stone 1989: 4).

The links between the individuals involved in promoting the projects were informal, there was stability in goals / values / beliefs from one event to the second even though the membership of the groups involved varied. In addition the identification by Stoker and Mossberger (1994) of a symbolic regime captures some of the world view of the groups promoting both events. Consensus over the actions to be taken and the power to mobilise support (rather than to defeat opposition) are also generally evident features (with the exception of the politically charged climate of stages one and two of the Football World Cup project).

However, the key feature of the urban regime as a concept is its incorporation of transversal links across commercial, voluntary and public sector groups and this is clearly lacking. The étatiste / dirigiste tradition of French politics and policy systems is such that it is unsurprising to conclude that the policy consensus, which develops is public sector-led. The use of the term urban regime to describe a mode of urban governance, which is networked across sectors means that attempts to apply this to public sector dominated networks would leave us open to criticism.

7.5.3. Aspects of the development of a policy network?
As already noted, both projects were led by a core group of public sector actors and institutions, which incorporated others as and when they were needed to contribute to the achievement of projects. The way that the projects were promoted was for an officer to identify an opportunity and to contact others who might lend technical and / or political support. Thus
the City’s Technical Advisor spotted the opportunity to participate in certain major events, and recruited the support of other actors. This was the approach taken when the city bid for the America’s Cup and the Rugby World Cup 2007 (Interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005). In the case of the America’s Cup, the Director of Economic Development was one of the first to be contacted, followed by the politician with responsibility for the maritime domain. Each of the actors could thus bring a set of relevant competences, knowledge, or financial, political or technical skills.

The limited and ‘ad hoc’ nature of the interaction of these actors between projects might be suggestive of an issue network (Marsh and Rhodes 1992 – see Table 2.1 in this thesis). However, the small number of actors, the strong sense of shared values, the evidently relatively even spread of resources, and the notion of power as a positive sum game where all would benefit from the success of the project, lends support to characterising this as a developing policy community, though the policy domain for such a network might be urban economic development rather than sports policy ‘per se’.

7.6. Conclusion
In this chapter we have sought to develop our account of mega-event sports policy in Marseille in ways which would allow us to address the extent to which the above theoretical frameworks might prove adequate for conceptualising such an account. Our conclusion is that while these ‘ideal typical’ accounts of policy theory capture some aspects (in the case of urban regimes, and policy communities) there are some significant limitations to such accounts. Having outlined these limitations we are faced with the question of how such an analysis can inform our thinking in relation to sport and local governance in the French context, and this issue is addressed in the concluding chapter.
Chapter 8: Conclusions to be drawn and their theoretical and methodological implications

8.1. Introduction

In this final chapter, we will evaluate the contribution of the thesis in the light of the empirical findings, theoretical conclusions, and implications for future work. The aim of a thesis is to contribute to knowledge through original work and/or analysis. The work presented here has aimed to enhance understanding of the decision-making processes in sport events policy in Marseille, from the organisation of the Football World Cup 1998 to the bid to host the America’s Cup 2007. Our addressing of the three major perspectives in the Anglo-Saxon literature leads us on the broader issue of urban governance, identified in the opening chapter of this thesis namely:

- How might our findings in relation to the two events identified inform the way in which we characterise urban governance in the Marseille context?

We discuss this more general concern in the sections which follow.

8.2. Theoretical contributions

The principal contribution of this thesis might be said to be two-fold: theoretical and methodological. The theoretical implications of analysis relate to the fact that the ‘ideal typical’ accounts of policy derived from Anglo-Saxon (North American) policy contexts do not provide a convincing ‘fit’ in the French context. In effect, we concluded that Anglo-Saxon theories at the urban level are too specific to embrace this French urban case study. Nevertheless, the decision-making as described in this thesis is a mode of governance (rather than simply local government activity), in the sense that local government, though it led the projects for the most part, was not able to stage projects by itself and requested the support of
partners from the wider public sector and to some extent from the voluntary and private sector. The dispersal of power, especially for the America’s Cup project, demonstrates that the traditional forms of power (top down) are no longer dominant (Merrien 1998).

This leads to consideration of the kinds of governance implemented in the context of sports events policy in Marseille for which Janet Newman’s (2001) work on forms of governance provides a useful framework to adopt for the discussion. Newman outlines four modes of governance, namely ‘hierarchy’, ‘rational goal’, ‘open systems’ and ‘self-governance’. The principal characteristics of each of these forms are provided in Figure 8.1. Newman makes the claim that although she is able to detect in the British context (through her analysis of public discourse on such matters) tendencies towards different types of governance and tensions between such competing tendencies, it is not a matter of a new regime of governance replacing an older one but rather a mixture of continuities and breaks, the result of tensions between several modes of governance. As Newman argues:

Institutional change tends not to occur through some organic and evolutionary process by which one regime is steadily displaced by another. More typically, old and emergent regimes interact, with different elements of the new and old being packaged and repackaged, producing tensions and disjuncture as different sets of norms and assumptions are overlaid on each other (2001: 26).

In the French context, the traditional adhesion to the hierarchical model is still evident, and this has been considerably greater for France than that for the UK and especially for a federal system of government such as the US (Schmidt 1990). In the French context, even in a policy area such as sport, which to the Anglo-Saxon tradition is in many respects a clear candidate for subsidiarity, it is hard to imagine Central Government completely relinquishing its role. Thus, the hierarchy model as being the expression of “bureaucratic power and vertical patterns of relationships flowing up and down hierarchies” (Newman 2001: 33) captures the
étatiste tradition of the French State and its historical adherence to the tradition of the Napoleonic code. However, the governability crisis can be seen in Marseille to lead to moves away from this strong model. For the America’s Cup project, for example, the dispersal of power between the City Council, the Communauté Urbaine and the Port Authority, and their strong alliance might be said to reflect a feature of the ‘rational goal model’ governance, since this collaboration represented a pragmatic and efficient (though not always participative and accountable) means to compete (Newman 2001: 35) with other bidding cities.

Because core decision-makers and their organisations adapted themselves during the course of each event to changing circumstances, governance also exhibited aspects of the open systems model. The challenges posed by each project required an attitude of adaptability from decision-makers, notably in regards to their capacity to identify and recruit appropriate partners at specific moments. The development and expansion of the policy community were a result of this type of governance tendency.

Finally, the urban regime-like elements of the decision-making process in this case study relate to what Newman calls the self-governance model. In effect, the wish to demonstrate that civil society was involved in the process and was supporting the projects reflect this trend.
Figure 8.1: Newman's models of governance.

**SELF-GOVERNANCE MODEL**

1. **Service delivery**
   - commitment
   - persuasion, influence
   - culture change
   - capacity-building
   - long-term investment

2. **Partnership dilemmas:**
   - Focus on building network through participation and empowerment

3. **Democratic innovation and public participation**
   - self-governance
   - delegation of powers to self-managing associations
   - "counter-publics' recognized as legitimate political actors

**OPEN SYSTEMS MODEL**

1. **Service delivery**
   - expansion, adaptation
   - innovation, flexibility
   - monitoring of outcomes

2. **Partnership dilemmas:**
   - strengthening the role of voluntary and community organizations

3. **Democratic innovation and public participation**
   - democratic innovation
   - flexible, responsive forms
   - fluidity of interests and identities acknowledged

**HIERARCHY MODEL**

1. **Service delivery**
   - consolidation, continuity
   - regulation processes through Government
   - monitoring of standards and systems

2. **Partnership dilemmas:**
   - Demonstrating the effectiveness of organisational procedures to receive contracts

3. **Democratic innovation and public participation**
   - legitimacy of process
   - dominance of representative democracy
   - formal equality based on free and equal citizens

**RATIONAL GOAL MODEL**

1. **Service delivery**
   - maximisation of output
   - regulation of outputs
   - monitoring / auditing of outputs, short-term delivery

2. **Partnership dilemmas:**
   - compromising political goals to participate to decision-making or tactical withdrawal

3. **Democratic innovation and public participation**
   - compliance with government / funder requirements
   - managerial framing of participation, limited delegation of power
   - diversity of consumer preferences acknowledged
Hence what is seen in the unfolding of the case study is evidence of the tensions between different governance tendencies as identified by Newman (2001). These tensions are between:

- In terms of service delivery: innovation, flexibility (Open Systems Model) and cultural change, capacity building (Self Governance Model) on the one hand, and government regulation and accountability (Hierarchy Model) and maximisation, monitoring and regulation of outputs (Rational Model);
- In terms of partnership development: between strengthening the role of commercial and voluntary sectors (Open Systems), network building (Self Governance) and compromising of political goals (Rational Goal) and demonstrating effectiveness through organisational procedures (Hierarchy Model);
- And in terms of democratic innovation and public participation: between delegation of powers to self-managing groups (Self Governance), democratic innovation and flexible forms of interest representation (open Systems) and traditional representative democracy (Hierarchy) and managerialist framing of participation (Rational Goal).

It is not that in the French case we do not see such tensions but rather that while there is evidence of these, the 'mix' in the French context differs from that implied for the UK. As Jessop (2000) has argued in the context of his strategic relations approach to explaining the state, state forms are the outcomes of historical struggles, as well as providing the strategic context for contemporary policy. Thus, the particular mix of tensions and structures in the French context generally and in the specific case of Marseille are a product of the national and local context (as outlined in Chapter 4).
Thus, the decision-making process in Marseille for sports event policy is the product of a complex system of interaction. Global pressures exerted on the city prompted a local or ‘glocal’ (Robertson 1994) response.

In terms of issues of power, the case studies provide a useful means for considering the exercise of power in changing contexts. The focus on decisions (as opposed to non-decisions) provides evidence of the overt use of ‘power over’. Vigouroux for example is able to call the bluff of the Département and the Région when they delay committing additional financial resources. The local residents, the OM supporters and the commercial traders in the area of the Vieux Port, all at one stage or another lose out in power struggles.

Given that non-decisions are not dealt with directly in the analysis, and analysis of whose interests are promoted by the policy changes reviewed are also not directly addressed (largely because of the problematic notion of non-expressed interests: Giddens 1979), the case studies might be said to exhibit two other elements of power. The first is Stone’s (1989) notion of power as social production. The ability of key actors to mobilise support around the notion of sport as a vehicle for re-imaging the city is very evident, and relates to the concept of ideological corporatism. The vehicle for achieving this social production is in large part discourse, the promotion of a shared ideological programme communicated discursively in newspaper articles and official reports. Such a discourse legitimises the roles of public servants in promoting these events. Power is thus a producer of, and a product of, social interaction. The thesis thus draws on and reflects a range of concepts of power, which are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
8.3. Methodological contributions

As noted in Chapter 3, this work was based on critical realist assumptions. Following a literature review based on urban policy, the data analysis drew on two types of data: documentary analysis (policy, technical documents, reports, political speeches and press coverage) and interview data, in order to understand the context of decision-making and to analyse how actors interpret it. The ethnographic content analysis conducted was clearly informed by the literature review, which preceded it as well as drawing on actors’ own accounts and explanations.

This methodological approach might be said to make a number of contributions, with perhaps the most obvious relating to the development and application of the set of common indicators against which to review the application of the theoretical frameworks of the growth coalition, policy network and the urban regime. These provide a theory-informed, operational basis for research on urban policy, and point to aspects of decision-making to which researchers may usefully address themselves, representing a starting point for research questions and analysis. This methodological frame is one which may be adapted for other such case studies of urban policy.

Secondly, the focus on two major sport events in the same city is unusual for a case study approach to major sport events. Usually, researchers focus on decision-making related to a sole major sport event. This situation in Marseille allows an analysis of policy-making over a longer period of time, a highly salient point in claiming with, for example, urban regime theory, which focuses on policy in the longer term. The thesis, therefore permits longitudinal work on one aspect of a policy domain over a period of more than ten years (1991-2003).

The qualitative research approach permits the emergence of the actors’ understanding of the context. The analysis of the actors’ discourses gives
account of the interviewees’ social construction of phenomena. In critical realist ontological terms, from the Football World Cup 1998 to the bid to host the America’s Cup 2007, the study of reflexive agents’ discourses enabled understanding of how they construct the reality of their policy world. Public servants constructed the sport policy events as a lever to develop the city. This social construction of the *raison d'être* of major sport events became dominant with the passing of time from one event to the next.

In term of methodological approach adopted, Henry et al. (2005) have proposed a typology for comparative sports policy studies. According to these authors, there are four types of approaches that have been developed in comparative policy studies: ‘seeking similarities’, a positivist approach seeking generalization; ‘describing differences’, an idealist approach seeking specificity; ‘theorizing the transnational’, a critical realist approach seeking local and global levels of explanation; and ‘defining discourse’, a relativist approach analysing policy discourses as constructing the reality of policy. The approach adopted in this thesis cannot be wholly encompassed by one of the four types, but rather it reflects aspects of the three latter types. It reflects the second type, ‘describing differences’, since it is based on theoretical accounts of urban level policy, and because it seeks to develop critical description of a French case study in sport policy. The third type, ‘theorizing the transnational’, reflects the methodological approach of this thesis since we compare Anglo-Saxon concepts to the decision-making process in Marseille for sport events policy, and despite the differences existing between the national contexts, we find strong similarities in the issues addressed through sport events used for urban regeneration (Gratton et al. 2005) and on the development of the symbolic urban regime that Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) describe in Sheffield in the 1990s. In other words, this thesis seeks “to accommodate the global and local structural context (...) and the local nature of agency within this structural context (...)” (Henry et al. 2005).
The fourth type of approach to comparative analysis, ‘defining discourse’, can also to some extent characterise the methodological approach adopted in this thesis. Even though the thesis did not adopt a post-structuralist ontology, the interviewees’ discourse was analysed to understand how actors construct their policy world.

Thus, the typology proposed by Henry et al. (2005) while useful as it describes ideal-types of methodological approaches adopted in comparative sport policy studies, nevertheless is itself an ideal-type construction and thus limited in its generalisability.

8.4. Methodological limitations

As with any thesis, there are particular limitations resulting from the choice of method or from the practical operationalisation of that method. There were in particular two such limitations, which need to be acknowledged here. The first is by virtue of the approach adopted, which focuses on decision and by implication, therefore, limits the opportunity to identify and to analyse non-decision making processes. The voices of marginal groups may thus be underplayed in an account such as this which focuses on overt action and discussion / interaction. We have sought where possible to identify absences in interactions and indeed incorporated in interviews’ questions about groups whose concerns do not reach the public agenda but the responses to such lines of enquiry is invariably weak.

While this first limitation is a product of the approach adopted, the second relates to operational difficulties in implementing method in the case study. Access to interviewees from the commercial sector was ultimately very difficult to achieve. As indicated in Chapter 3, initial agreement on the part of some representatives of the commercial sector was not translated into reality with interviewees failing to arrive for appointments, and subsequently failing to respond to communications, or simply
Chapter 8: Conclusions to be drawn

subsequently declining to be interviewed. In addition access to one set of files (the World Cup Bid File) was refused by the City Council. Thus in both cases, the commercial sector activity and the nature of City official commitments as indicated in the Bid File, these had to be viewed through the accounts of those who were involved with these parties, and through media accounts.

8.5. Future Research

The approach adopted in this thesis opens up the possibility for further work on related aspects on at least three levels. The first is local. No studies to date in the French or indeed the Anglo-Saxon literature have been identified as having adopted a long-term longitudinal approach to the study of urban sport policy. Marseille in addition to the two events on which this thesis focuses, is part of a successful bid to stage the 2007 Rugby World Cup, and has staged a range of lesser yet internationally high profile sorting events. While we have identified key features of the local sports policy system, it is clear that the system continues to evolve.

The second level for further work is the national. The analysis of Marseille invites the question of the extent to which some of the specificities of the policy system identified are specific to Marseille rather than to the French policy system.

The third level at which research might be conducted is cross-national, for example comparing decision-making processes in other cities bidding for the same events. It would be potentially informative for example to consider the nature of the policy system in Valencia and how that shaped and was shaped by, the successful bid to stage the America’s Cup.

At all three levels, there is potential to employ the framework of comparators developed in this thesis. Furthermore, any such research could also usefully focus on further analysis of discourse in sports events
policy as a legitimating resource for the promotion of particular policy approaches. Finally one might consider widening the theoretical domain from that of urban political economy (broadly the field addressed in this thesis) to incorporate theoretical frameworks from, for example, policy analysis.

In the context of late modernity / and post-modern uncertainties, where definitive answers to research problematics are increasingly discounted, if this thesis can contribute to stimulate, or promote such research developments then it might be said to have contributed to the furtherance of this field of research.
1. Interview with Raymond Mallet, 18 October 2004, Director of the Départemental Direction for the Youth and Sports

Parcours professionnel dans le domaine du sport
Alors dans le milieu du sport, bon. Ma vie professionnelle a été partagée en deux : un premier temps au bénéfice de l’éducation nationale essentiellement avec un parcours... J’ai commencé ma carrière comme instit, j’ai été donc prof et j’ai terminé inspecteur de l’éducation nationale. Et je me suis pris d’amour, j’étais, j’étais amoureux depuis longtemps du domaine du domaine de l’éducation physique, et j’ai, et du sport et donc ça m’a conduit à mi-parcours de ma carrière à passer le concours pour être inspecteur de la jeunesse et des sports... Qui m’a permis de devenir inspecteur principal en terme de grade, poste de directeur, directeur régional, directeur départemental. J’ai le bonheur, parce que ça fait partie des bonheurs, mais on n’est pas plus intelligent en en sortant, d’avoir été conseiller technique d’un ministre (rire) , mais, ça c’est, on en sort pas plus intelligent. On en sort peut-être. D’abord on a quelques stigmates, pour des raisons diverses et variées et puis on sort un peu plus prudent par rapport à certaines choses. Pour finir ici, donc, j’ai été sollicité pour travailler au conseil général pour réfléchir à une politique sportive dans la direction régionale jusque là et ensuite je suis allé au conseil gé, régional où le président m’a demandé de mettre avec lui en place des idées à propos d’une politique sportive les premières années où il a été élu, Vauzelles, donc au cabinet, pour terminer d’avec un grade dans le cadre de la mise en place d’une politique de contrôle des services et d’évaluation de l’ensemble des systèmes des politiques publiques. Donc un poste d’instructeur général à la direction... pas à la direction, dans le cadre des services du Conseil régional. Et puis je me commets aujourd’hui à accompagner tout cela de, participer pour partie donc à la vie universitaire, ici, et puis aussi sur l’institut de management public d’Aix. Voilà.

D’accord. Donc, pour attaquer sur le sujet on va dire, quels sont selon vous, les grands événements sportifs qui ont marqué Marseille sur, on va dire les deux dernières décennies ?

Alors, pour remonter aux deux dernières décennies, je crois que, sans être un véritable événement, mais parce que c’est retenu par beaucoup encore aujourd’hui comme étant cette partie de la mémoire collective qui rend les peaux sensibles et les cœurs encore plus sensibles, c’est cette époque forte à Marseille où on a constitué une équipe marseillaise en football avec uniquement ceux que l’on a appelé et qu’on appelle les minots. C’est-à-dire ces hommes venus du terroir, formé par le terroir et qui ont abouti à la dimension sportive que l’on connaît à savoir jusqu’au professionnalisme
avec des personnels d’encadrement qui tous étaient de la maison, la maison terroir marseillais. Ça, ça me paraît être un, un des événements importants sur le territoire marseillais, le football étant omniprésent pour ne pas dire omnipotent. On aura pour deuxième élément de ce parcours probablement, même si ça peut être entaché de certaines choses aujourd’hui, cette immensité qu’a représenté le titre de, de champion d’Europe. Quand, la Coupe d’Europe avec l’ère... donc un petit peu brillante je dirais, beaucoup de brillant. Après il faut regarder... d’un président qui s’appelait Tapie, Bernard en l’occurrence et puis toute sa cohorte de plaisir, de grands plaisirs, de sublimation et puis derrière, les difficultés que l’on connaît. Ben le troisième grand événement, parce que ça je crois que les marseillais s’en souviendront, je crois que ce sera à mettre, mais pas avec les mêmes, les mêmes racines, c’est la Coupe du Monde de football, bien entendu, qui représente pour les marseillais la reconnaissance de ce qu’ils sont dans le football, la reconnaissance de leur savoir-faire, en tant que homme aussi de la cité si je puis dire puisqu’il y avait tout le problème de l’accueil, tout le problème de refaire les installations. Donc ça c’est 3 événements qui me paraissent être importants. Ils ne sont pas de même nature tous les 3, mais ils sont quelque part ceux qui à mon avis sont au plus profond de la mémoire des marseillais. Il est beaucoup d’autres événements, mais j’aurai la faiblesse et en même temps l’honnêteté de dire, parce que je crois qu’il faut être honnête, que le football étant tellement présent, il me paraît presque indécent de dire à l’instant qu’il est d’autres événements qui couvrent les 3 que je viens de citer. L’un d’eux est très, le premier est à la fois anecdotique et peut-être même interne à chacune des pensées du marseillais à l’égard du football. Si, à un moment donné, il y avait une, un gros événement négatif dans le cœur des marseillais à propos du football, l’opération refuge, c’est pas la coupe du monde, l’opération refuge c’est pas la coupe d’Europe, l’opération refuge c’est cette période des minots. Quand, dans l’ère Tapie, les grosses difficultés se sont, se sont présentées, tout le monde a parler, quand Marseille est retombée en deuxième division, de c’est bien on va enfin peut-être revivre l’ère des minots. Ça veut dire des choses. C’est donc la mémoire collective, probablement plus fortement et plus naturellement dans la culture du marseillais que d’autres, d’autres, d’autres, événements. Voilà. D’accord. Et moi en fait je vais vous parler surtout justement de la Coupe du Monde. Donc en fait la décision de proposer Marseille comme ville candidate, ça s’est fait en mai 1991. Est-ce que vous savez qui est à l’origine du dossier ?

Alors. Il est plusieurs villes qui ont candidaté à l’époque, sur la base d’intentions d’abord politiques, nul ne peut candidater si la mairie n’est pas quelque part partie prenante, c’est-à-dire le champ politique. Mais en amont de tout cela, c’est qu’une Coupe Du Monde ayant lieu en France, tout un chacun savait quatre ans à l’avance qu’elle aurait lieu et tout un chacun savait les conditions dans lesquelles les procédures allaient se mettre en place. C’est donc une volonté commune des acteurs du sport, des acteurs économiques, de, j’ai envie de dire des organisateurs de
l'aménagement, des aménageurs en quelque sorte de la ville, avec les politiques pour tendre vers cet événement. Cet événement a fait donc l'objet du dépôt d'un dossier, lequel dossier parmi d'autres était, était un bon dossier. Un, un, un bon dossier en tant que tel, avec des engagements d'ordre politique projetant des engagements financiers, et donc quelque part, organisationnel, technique, administrative etc. Mais il était surtout un bon dossier par le fait que Marseille est quand même la deuxième ville de France, et que, il eut été inconvenant à l'égard des marseillais pour la raison simple, d'abord 2ème ville de France ensuite ville du football s'il en est une, qu'il n'y est pas dans ce, sur ce territoire, non seulement une partie de la Coupe du Monde mais la meilleure partie en dehors de Paris. Il y a donc eu un privilège, à priori, pour le dossier, mais un privilège qui était simplement bordé, soutenu et verrouillé par la culture marseillaise, la préparation qui avait eu lieu, il faut le dire, la volonté politique bien arrêtée des autorités, des autorités de l'époque de le mener à bien. Et un œil, en même temps qu'une oreille très attentive, un œil très comment dirai-je, un œil très attentif une oreille très attentive à, au dépôt de dossier. Et le dossier contenait quelque chose de spécifique, c'est en gros c'était presque conditionnel sans être une, l'expression est peut-être un petit peu trop forte, nous voulons la coupe du monde, nous y participerons, mais nous voulons une partie des matches importants, c'est-à-dire que nous voulons une demi-finale. Plus etc. etc. Ça voulait dire : deuxième lieu avec Paris où vraiment le football sera roi pendant un certain nombre de jours avec un nombre de matches importants, avec tout ce que cela entraînait. Donc ce, ce dossier est le résultat de la convergence d'un certain nombre d'acteur et quelque part d'une, d'une énorme impatience des marseillais à pouvoir recevoir en quelque sorte en retour le message de reconnaissance à propos du football. Je crois que l'on peut l'analyser comme tel. Et puis, une deuxième dimension : la culture marseillaise est une culture d'exception mais d'exces aussi. Et donc quelque part c'est aussi pour le marseillais qui aime le football, mais qui regarde aussi son territoire autrement que par le football, de dire cette ville reçoit un message qui la valorise en ayant la coupe du monde, par-delà l'événement lui-même. Quelque part, qu'un ensemble aussi disparate que le football et que la dimension politique et administrative qui a conduit donc à ce que la coupe du monde soit ici, puisse dire on choisit Marseille comme ça, ça veut dire que quelque part on reconnaît les marseillais comme étant des gens censés, pas simplement sur le plan du football. Donc je pense que c'est ça qui effectivement est à retenir comme dimension de la, du positionnement de ce dossier.

D'accord. Et quel était le but en fait, on va dire politique pour la municipalité de cette candidature ?

Je crois qu'il faut être très, très, très clair là dessus. Y a pas, y a pas hors les difficultés budgétaires que cela peut poser, mais dans l'ambition politique on a envie de dire de temps en temps que l'élu décide et l'ambition suit et l'intendance aussi. Bon c'est un petit problème tout simple, aussi simple que ça. Donc en fait, derrière l'ambition footbalistique etc., il y a l'ambition politique, c'est une certitude. L'ambition politique qui
n’élimine pas, n’ignore pas toute la partie culturelle qui est derrière, n’est-ce pas ? Donc en fait c’est une ambition politique naturelle, c’était, en 91, Vigouroux qui était maire de Marseille, son successeur, Jean-Claude Gaudin, a poursuivi une œuvre qui était déjà largement entamée, et a construit un dossier et un projet à une dimension plus, alors j’ai envie de dire que Jean-Claude Gaudin y a ajouté le, la valeur locale. C’est-à-dire quelque part une dimension, j’existe, j’apporte mon, mon accord politique mais ça va me permettre de redimensionner ça ça et ça. C’est-à-dire que le projet est devenu un projet un peu plus important que celui du départ, donc il y a avait le stade, mais le stade demeurait quelque chose de co-financer par la fédération, l’État etc., la région et le département et au-delà il y avait tout l’environnement. L’environnement c’est tout ce qui entourait le stade, c’était l’idée de couvrir ou pas couvrir une ou deux tribunes, c’était l’idée de, de réaménager autour etc. etc. Donc c’est bien une ambition politique qui a porté le dossier dans sa dernière, dans la dernière partie du parcours. Une ambition politique forte exprimée comme telle par Jean-Claude Gaudin, probablement avec des différences très fortes sur la même expression politique portée par Vigouroux. Alors je fais pas de différence de la, de la, d’ordre politique, l’une ayant du sens et l’autre pas, je dis simplement que les temporalités dans lesquelles ils se sont inscrits n’étaient pas les mêmes : je pose le dossier, et puis toi tu as déjà le dossier, il est déjà accepté, tu poursuis maintenant la construction du projet mais en termes, en termes concrets et ce n’est pas du tout la même dimension donc la politique de, pour Jean-Claude Gaudin a pu s’exprimer plus facilement parce que le dossier était accepté, parce que c’était bien à Marseille, alors on pouvait étendre l’ambition au-delà. Voilà. Je crois que c’est ça.
D’accord.
Donc ambition politique oui.
D’accord.
Franchement, dans tous les cas d’espèces. Tous les cas d’espèces. On peut pas dire, on ne peut pas non plus dire, je vais faire une comparaison, la volonté politique de Paris d’avoir les Jeux Olympiques en 2012 est une volonté politique de la France, c’est une union sacrée autour de l’idée des Jeux Olympiques de 2012, Marseille s’associe à Paris, il y a deux dimensions politiques différentes mais on sait dépasser ce cadre-là, donc il y a bien une ambition politique nationale et derrière si Marseille s’associe à Paris c’est parce que Marseille espère ainsi, ce qui est tout à fait naturel, compréhensible et qui ne peut qu’être soutenu d’avoir une part du marché Olympique si 2012 est en France, s’imposait à Marseille.
Et quelles étaient en fait les attentes de ce projet, de ce dossier ?
Au niveau des marseillais ?
Oui, ou on va dire de la municipalité.
Alors les attentes, les attentes c’était d’abord de refaire le terrain perdu à propos de l’image de Marseille. L’image de Marseille ville de football, ville d’excès mais ville qu’on disait orgueilleuse, comment dirai-je, très peu pondérée dans certains domaines, quelque part une ville sans projet d’avenir, confinée sur son passé, dont elle était quelque part,
profondément jalouse. C’était refaire donc quelque part le chemin pour aller jusqu’à montrer que Marseille était une ville qui avait autant de potentiel que d’autres, simplement le potentiel n’avait pas été peut-être comment dirai-je, regardé avec le regard qui devait exister et que finalement c’était une autre ville que celle que l’on percevait. C’était aussi, et je crois que c’est pas dépassé le cadre de mon propos de l’instant ou de ma compétence, je crois que c’était aussi dans l’idée des politiques de l’époque, pour avoir partagé quelques instants avec eux alors que j’étais dans des responsabilités administratives, au titre de l’État, l’idée que ce dossier était le meilleur dossier possible pour promouvoir Marseille au-delà des frontières. Et ainsi démontrer que Marseille pouvait se promouvoir par elle-même sur des projets extérieurs comme la coupe du monde qui vient mais sur des projets consignés sur l’aire marseillaise mais construit par les marseillais eux-mêmes, telles par exemple les dimensions à propos la volonté d’avoir, d’avoir la compétition de voile, n’est-ce pas hein, la Coupe de l’America, ou d’autres aspects de ce type, par exemple le, on peut estimer que l’une des retombées de ce bon parcours sur la Coupe du Monde de football à la fois par la première municipalité et la suivante, conduit à ce qu’en 2007 il y aura la Coupe du Monde de Rugby, ce qui conduit qu’une partie de la Coupe de l’America sous des formes adaptées certes puisque la Coupe en tant que telle n’aura pas lieu ici, ont eu lieu ces derniers temps, d’autres auront lieu encore, que l’idée de re, de réhabiliter quelque part le littoral au bénéfice de pratiques de voile de très haut niveau suit son cours, et que tout ceci se sont les effets induits et directs de cette volonté politique d’être dans la Coupe Du Monde. Remontons au-delà, au-delà de 91 et regardons les événements internationaux qui, de ce niveau là ou d’un niveau moindre, ont eu lieu à Marseille : aucun. Donc on est bien dans quelque chose qui est là, le point de départ d’une nouvelle volonté politique, peut-être incertaine au départ, participer était une nécessité quasiment au départ à Marseille, participer à la compétition pour que le dossier soit accepté, et au-delà, je crois que c’est devenu quelque chose qui a convaincu que c’était un excellent levier pour démontrer aux marseillais qu’on pouvait aller plus loin, que Marseille était digne de ça, que Marseille était capable de ça, et qu’ensemble on pouvait faire beaucoup de choses. Je crois que c’est ça. En tout cas c’est ce qui, dans les effets induits d’aujourd’hui, très concrets que j’ai citais en amont, l’on constate.

Et donc, vous justement en tant que personne d’une part et en tant que représentant d’une institution d’autre part, est-ce que vous avez été concerté, on va dire sur le dossier de la Coupe du Monde ?

Oh combien ! Parce que dans la, dans la structure actuelle et la structure de l’époque de, de, administrative et politique de la France, une direction régionale et départementale est le lieu approprié où viennent se poser les intentions politiques qu’elles soient nationales ou qu’elles soient locales à propos de la construction de l’ensemble des démarches puisque le mandat a été donné très rapidement par le ministre de la jeunesse et des sports et donc par le comité national d’organisation de la Coupe du Monde aux directions départementales et régionales du chef-lieu concerné, donc
Marseille, d’avoir à remplir un certains nombre de mission, qui étaient des missions d’expertise, des missions d’accompagnement, des missions de concertation, des missions d’évaluation à propos de la Coupe du Monde. Aussi bien sur le dossier technique en liaison avec les différents ingénieurs qui étaient partie prenante du dossier, que la municipalité sur une série de, d’élément concernant le futur projet d’organisation, que le mouvement sportif sur une question récurrente chaque fois qu’il y a une grande manifestation : oui le football mais nous à côté qu’est-ce que, qu’est-ce qui se passe pour nous pendant la coupe de football, en quoi cette coupe de football va-t-elle être un bénéfice général pour le sport ou exclusif pour le football. Enfin, par delà tout ça, c’est d’avoir participé à qualité, à ce vaste mouvement pour valoriser l’image de Marseille auprès de l’ensemble des partenaires qui dans ce territoire, ce territoire français l’Europe et au delà, étaient partie prenante de la Coupe du Monde. Et donc à un moment ou à un autre étaient des gens qui se retrouvaient en tant qu’acteurs de la Coupe du Monde, les pays qui participaient à la Coupe du Monde comme sur un plan beaucoup plus économique qui s’appelle le tourisme, comment allait se traiter l’énorme problème de la billetterie, qui est un problème organisationnel essentiel donc ça implique tout de suite un regard au delà du stade et au delà du seul, de la seule ligue de football ou le comité départemental, pour regarder le tourisme, pour regarder l’hôtellerie, pour regarder les différentes infrastructures d’accueil, se projeter sur des dimensions aussi, comment dirai-je, éloignées du sport mais qui en font partie qui est la sécurité, les problèmes de sécurité pendant la Coupe du Monde, les problèmes que j’appellerai d’ordre diplomatique puisque les visites de consuls, les visites d’ambassadeurs, les visites de ministres de, représentants des pays amis participant à la Coupe du Monde ont fait l’objet de tout un tas de moment précis sur Marseille. Donc c’est un vaste programme sur lequel en tant que directeur, j’ai été sollicité et je dirai qu’on ne peut pas échapper à la sollicitation en tant qu’homme. Si on vit une ville, on peut la vivre professionnellement et ensuite penser que tout ce qui se passe autour ne concerne pas, ne nous concerne pas, ne, on ne peut pas quand on est face à un événement comme la Coupe du Monde, ne pas être aussi présent sur ce qui est la partie rencontre conviviale, sur ce qui est la partie dialogue, comment dirai-je, d’intérêt commun en quelque sorte, que l’on a pu avoir avec les uns et les autres. Ca a été un moment d’intense activité professionnelle, avec beaucoup de, comment dirai-je beaucoup de, de nécessité d’appels à la rigueur, d’appel à la mesure, mais, aussi une extrême richesse dans la rencontre des hommes et des femmes inconnus hier et devenant quelque part des partenaires. Et puis ensuite sur le plan purement convivial, quelque part la rencontre de groupes de gens, marseillais, hors Marseille, sur cette, sur ce pôle qui était un pôle du futur, qui était l’organisation de la Coupe du Monde. Donc là, a été une période très exigeante du point de vue professionnel mais très faste du point de vue du rapport aux hommes et quelque part d’une sorte d’humanisme dont le sport peut être porteur.
Et justement quels étaient les différents partenaires impliqués dans le dossier ?
Alors, étaient impliquées en tant qu'institutions politiques, la mairie, le conseil général, le conseil régional, l'État. Bon, c'est donc déjà d'une manière conséquente les 4, les 4 dimensions de l'organisation politique de notre pays. Étaient impliqués ensuite sur le plan purement technique, les services de la ville, à la fois qui soient service de l'équipement, tout le pôle des ingénieurs, des architectes, tous les services appelés quelque part à avoir, à donner leur avis sur tel et tel partie d'abord de la construction du stade, la reconstruction du stade, l'aménagement du stade. Puis ensuite sur les parties extérieures, les problèmes de comment diraï-je, d'accès au stade, en terme, en terme de voirie, les problèmes de sécurité. Donc si je disais ce qu'a été mon quotidien, c'est d'abord en priorité pendant la période, la première période en dehors des visites extérieures pour voir le site et je vais employer un terme, ficeler le dossier technique avant les décisions finales de financement, ça a été ensuite de cohabiter, presque au quotidien avec les architectes qui avaient été désignés, plus les techniciens de la ville et les techniciens donc de nos services, à nous, donc un ensemble d'opérateurs représentants les services de l'État et représentant la ville, quelquefois, aussi, même s'il n'y avait que le financement pour eux, le conseil général et le conseil régional. Et puis ensuite, ça a été d'entretenir dans un cadre purement hiérarchique, un rapport quotidien très étroit avec Paris : 1 le ministère de la jeunesse et des sports, 2 le comité national d'organisation qui avait la main mise sur une bonne partie du décisionnel. Et que donc nous étions en prise directe, j'ai envie de dire en comment dirai-je, en communication directe au quotidien avec l'ensemble de ces acteurs au niveau national. Et que tout ce qui se faisait au lendemain ou à l'heure suivante découle de ce rapport qu'on établissait avec Paris. Donc, ici, successivement les autorités politiques, les autorités très techniques, ensuite les dimensions un petit peu plus économique, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, et enfin, toute la partie très très importante qui porte un petit peu la parole du public qui est le mouvement associatif dans lequel le mouvement sportif avait une grande importance. Après ce sont posés des problèmes tels que des rapports étroits avec le monde du travail, avec le monde économique, à la fois pour des questions de support de communication, de sponsoring, etc. etc. Mais aussi quelque chose qui a été très important pendant cette période, c'est, vu le nombre de poste qu'il fallait satisfaire, quelle était effectivement la nature de la démarche que l'on devait accomplir et la forme à propos du recrutement des gens. Qui en avait la main mise, qui initiait la publicité là-dessus, qui sélectionnait, comment les gens allaient être pris en compte, défraîs, alors que sur attendait la coupe du monde, ils n'étaient pas dans l'action. Donc de ce point de vue le comité d'organisation de la coupe du monde à Marseille puisqu'il y a eu désignation d'un comité avec, avec la désignation d'un président du comité de la part du comité national qui a désigné donc quelqu'un ici, qui a lui-même fait les recrutements des vrais techniciens dont il avait besoins, sans se cacher que là dedans il y avait une partie des regards de la ville de Marseille qui entrait avec le, certains techniciens, c'est une certitude. Mais je ne vois pas comment on pourrait faire autrement. Ensuite il y a eu donc le développement des recrutements.
multiples et variés, et puis petit à petit, on est arrivé à faire, à relier les liens entre toutes les situations. Mais ça veut dire qu’on a travaillé tout au long de cette période de deux, de deux bonnes années, deux bonnes années, oui, de manière très intense avec toute cette hiérarchie, et que nous avions nous, en tant que direction régionale et départementale, la charge première de valider de manière délégée, en étant délégué du pouvoir du ministre, de valider un certain nombre de, un certain nombre de situation à propos autant des installations sportives qu’à propos d’un tas de dossiers annexes. Donc c’était quand même très très exigeant du point de vue professionnel.

D’accord. Donc le secteur privé était aussi présent dans le dossier...

Le secteur privé était présent dans le dossier, il était présent, j’ai envie de dire en deuxième rideau, comme on dirait en matière sportive, mais il était très très présent. Parce que c’était un des acteurs sur lequel reposait pour beaucoup la partie, si je puis dire non sportive de la Coupe du Monde. La partie sportive elle est ce qu’elle est, ce sont des équipes qui se rencontrent, mais il y avait une partie économique, j’ai envie de dire un pari économique, qui se jouait derrière. Et il y avait donc, effectivement, besoin de le réussir, et de le gagner. Donc il y avait le monde économique qui était très présent, le monde économique, c’était les entreprises du secteur, c’était certains opérateurs nationaux qui avaient pignons sur rue à Marseille, c’était dans certains cas même tout le problème, tout le problème des différents marchés qui ont été passés à propos par exemple sur le plan des télécommunications comment ça allait se passer etc. Donc il y avait aussi des opérateurs étrangers qui étaient candidats. Donc tous ces dossiers-là ont fait que, ont fait que les relations ont dépassé le cadre strict de Marseille à certains moments, pour verser au niveau de l’Europe et même au delà.

D’accord. Et donc on va dire, en tant que, en terme de personnes, qui étaient les personnes on va dire source du dossier, ou qui portaient le dossier, qui étaient...

Alors, sur le, sur le plan de l’installation elle-même, c’était Paris, le comité national d’organisation et le ministère de la jeunesse et des sports, qui étaient parties prenantes des choix définitifs en matière d’installation. Pourquoi ? Parce que, il y avait une implication forte de l’État, suivie de l’implication tout aussi importante de la ville, plus importante même, mais sur le plan réglementaire et sur le plan du droit c’était à Paris que se décider en fait la réponse à propos du, d’un problème comme par exemple on couvre ou on couvre pas une tribune de plus. La réponse fut négative parce que c’était pas dans la vision qu’en avait à l’époque le ministère et les agents qui travaillaient avec lui et chez lui, sur ce plan là. Donc, ça a été les techniciens du ministère, le dossier a été validé mais, par Paris, mais au fur et à mesure où les grands axes des, de la construction prenaient forme, c’était de plus en plus la ville de Marseille qui jouait la carte de l’affinement du dossier en terme, en terme de construction. Autrement dit, toute une série de chose, ont été traduites à Paris parce que les, les ingénieurs, les techniciens, les architectes du bâtiment et autre que l’on a pu avoir ici parce que je pense par exemple à la pelouse,
qui est un point important pour une Coupe du Monde, tout ceci a fait
l'objet d'un travail intense avec ces personnages, les architectes. Donc,
l'affinement définitif du dossier, juste avant l'habilitation définitive et
l'agrément des différents opérateurs, donc le marché lui-même, c'est Paris
et le corps des ingénieurs d'ici et des architectes, avec toujours la double
dimension politique de la ville et du, et du, et de Paris. Bien que, à
certains moments, pour des raisons tout simplement de participation au
financement, le Conseil Général et le Conseil Général, Le Conseil Régional
et le Conseil Général aient été informés, ont été informés, de l'état
d'avancement du dossier. Alors à l'évidence, là on est, on croise toute la
difficulté de la gestion, aujourd'hui, des rapports avec les opérateurs
quand il y a des crédits croisés. C'est-à-dire quand on a, on fait appel à 4
entités comme l'Etat, la ville, le département et la région. On est face à
ça, que le mouvement sportif, rencontre en permanence. Donc c'est cette,
cette, gestion là qui a dû être mise en place et pour laquelle on a eu
beaucoup de, beaucoup de moment de difficulté mais aussi beaucoup de
moment de satisfaction parce que, parce qu'il y a eu véritablement, je
voudrais dire, là, à l'instant, toute la... pugnacité, vraiment,
professionnelle des architectes qui avaient charge de gérer le dossier en
tant qu'architectes commis par la ville de Marseille, au nom de cette ville
de Marseille sur ce dossier-là. Parce qu'ils ont fait un travail de technicien
d'un niveau très très élevé pour convaincre quelque part, sur certaines
parties du dossier, que ça pouvait pas être autrement. Que
techniquement... Donc quelque part, il y a une pugnacité, ils auraient très
bien pu dire, bon, que Paris n'a qu'à décider, non c'était quelque chose, ça
pouvait pas être autrement techniquement ça pouvait pas être autrement
donc ils le disaient et ils défendaient la thèse.
D'accord. Et est-ce que on va dire, officieusement, certaines personnes
avaient de l'influence sur le dossier, sur les décisions qui étaient prises ?
Soyons objectif. Il y avait, il y a eu en permanence une influence politique.
Elle a été faite heureusement dans cette période-là, beaucoup plus de la
convergence des politiques locaux que de la divergence, et il y avait une
influence très très forte, j'ai envie de dire que le stade au bout d'un
moment, sur le dossier lui-même, l'installation, c'était presque à l'identique
de ce que avec le respect des normes, de ce que peut être une maison
d'architectes. Donc quelque part, il y avait la touche, il y avait la patte,
quelque part, donc il y avait l'influence de l'architecte. Parce que
l'architecte voyait les choses, le paysage, la culture ici qui, peut-être
pouvoir être incluse, bon etc. Donc il y a la touche des politiques et il y a
la touche des techniciens. Très franchement, en matière d'influence, mise
à part les politiques et les techniciens qui ont portés d'une certaine façon
l'installation et au delà les annexes de l'installation, tout le reste n'est que
de l'influence de seconde zone et de seconde valeur. Ce n'est pas le
mouvement sportif qui a pu influencer de manière significante
l'organisation de la Coupe du Monde, pas plus que les services de l'Etat
n'ont pu le faire. Les services de l'Etat ont été l'œil qui rapportait à Paris
celui qui posait problème et l'idée de la façon dont il fallait le résoudre mais
un directeur comme moi ne peut pas dire d'avoir une opinion technique
sur un élément d’architecture sans s’inspirer de ce que l’architecte vient de lui dire. Donc l’influence, c’est pas la mienne, l’influence c’est celle de l’architecte avec peut-être quelques comment dirai-je, quelques observations parce qu’on a un petit peu l’habitude de voir ces dossiers-là et de savoir comment il faut les présenter à Paris. Mais pas plus. D’accord. Et est-ce que le, enfin, vous avez déjà un peu répondu à ma question mais dans quelle mesure le mouvement sportif a-t-il été concerté et pris en compte dans ce dossier ?

Il y a eu d’abord dans la partie antérieure, au moment où il y a eu l’organisation ici, le comité a été mis en place, le comité d’organisation local. Dans cette partie qui a précédée, les relations avec le mouvement sportif ont été entretenues avec le comité olympique départemental, ont été entretenues avec le comité olympique régional, ont entretenues avec bien sûr le comité départemental de football et la ligue de football au plan régional mais aussi avec le vaste mouvement des autres disciplines à propos de la place de ce mouvement pour tirer profit de cet événement. Donc le mouvement sportif a été informé, concerté, comment dirai-je, co-acteur de la réflexion pendant toute la période qui est allée en gros de 80... allez soyons objectif de 93, 14, 94 jusque 98 on dépasse donc, la dernière année est une année de mise en place, d’aménagement, donc de 94 jusqu’à 97. Pendant 3 années, il y a eu des va et vient de concertation, de coopération, de, mettant en place une co-participation en quelque sorte, entre le mouvement sportif en général, le football en particulier et puis toutes les autorités qui avaient peu ou prou la responsabilité. A partir du moment où en 97, s’installe le comité local, quasiment tous les tiroirs ont été visités tous les, tous les volets de la, de la manifestation ont été comment dirai-je validé et on est dans quelque chose qui est maintenant on verse à T-12 mois, T-1 mois, on verse sur la manifestation. Et là, plus de discussion. Là, là c’est simplement, j’ai envie de dire, la chaîne qui se met en place et il y a un rétro planning qui fait qu’elle doit être respectée. Et pour revenir au politique, quelle a été on va dire, l’implication et le rôle de René Olmeta dans ce dossier ?

Alors à l’époque René Olmeta dans sa première, dans la première partie du dossier, il était responsable aux sports, adjoint aux sports. Il a donc, le plus naturellement du monde était celui qui a en tant qu’acteur de la ville de Marseille, reçu le message parisien de l’intention, donc quelque part d’être candidat à la coupe du monde. Puis ensuite simplement la ville de Marseille est questionnée : est-elle partie prenante dans la coupe du monde ? Donc, au titre de ce mandat il a effectivement eu lui, la responsabilité de porter le message politique de la ville, le message politique au sens de on est d’accord et au sens de quelque part voilà les grands choix que l’on souhaiterait qu’il soit fait pour la ville de Marseille. Donc René Olmeta a joué un rôle, un rôle important dans ce moment-là, à la comment dirai-je, au diapason de sa responsabilité politique. Avec quelque chose, j’ai envie de dire de lui qu’il a dû jouer, plus qu’un adjoint aux sports joue naturellement parce que, tout en étant partisan de cette manifestation, le président, le maire de Marseille, Vigouroux à l’époque, n’était absolument pas celui qui au quotidien transparaissait comme
porteur du dossier politiquement. Donc quelque part René a eu et a su porté à l’avant le message de la ville de Marseille. Bon, en homme averti qu’il est du sport, et en homme averti qu’il était aussi du fonctionnement politique sur la ville de Marseille. Donc il a joué un rôle important. Son rôle s’est terminé en 95, on était encore à deux ans, on était dans la partie la plus, dans la partie montante des choses. Et donc disons, son rôle a été un rôle important pour en gros faire en sorte que le dossier marseillais prenne forme en deuxième dossier de l’accueil de la coupe du monde, c’est-à-dire après Paris. Ca c’est certain parce que toute une série d’ambitions qui préfiguraient le dossier définitif ne peuvent venir que de la période Vigouroux, donc de sa période là, hein. Après, la période Gaudin a, le dossier a pris une telle forme que ça aura lieu à Marseille, on a, on a déjà le sentiment que ce qui sera validé ce sera une présence forte de la coupe du monde à Marseille. Et puis ensuite il y a toutes les annexes du dossier marseillais que Gaudin a mis en avant à savoir la façon, pousser au plus la demande de financement d’aide de l’État, provoquant quelque part des réactions, provoquant quelque part la mise à l’étude par les architectes de certaines novations, de certains aspects, par exemple les parvis, dont on a, qui sont d’un côté comme de l’autre, sont quand même des choses qui avaient été dimensionnées pour le roller. Donc il y avait quand même des ambitions très précises. Ca c’est Gaudin qui le porte. Ca c’est Gaudin qui le porte parce que c’est la 2ème partie, c’est la partie je vais avoir la coupe du monde, qu’est-ce que je mets en plus de la coupe du monde. Voilà. Donc René Olmeta a joué ce rôle-là premier, probablement de jouer le rôle à la fois de l’élu, aux sports, et puis quelque part de celui qui peut porter la parole du maire.

Donc l’implication de Vigouroux a été relativement faible, on va dire, sur le dossier...

Disons qu’elle a été à l’image de la présence politique de Vigouroux à l’époque qui était une présence forte mais dont les échos étaient peut-être si vous voulez bon, insuffisants pour penser qu’il était entendu de partout. Donc quelque part, ne mettons pas en cause son rôle de maire, il l’a rempli, à sa façon, avec sa dimension politique et il a eu sur ce dossier-là le relais, le vrai relais de force ça a été René Olmeta. Jusqu’à, jusqu’en gros disons 94, début 95, après c’était la campagne électorale. N’oublions pas tout de même que, dans la période qui suit comment dirai-je, qui précède l’événement de 95, qui est l’élection ici de la municipalité il est des ruptures profondes qui se font à propos justement, dans l’équipe Vigouroux en direction du futur. Et que donc la dernière année 94-95 est une année blanche, de ce point de vue. Si ce n’est dans certain cas, une année où des freins ont été posés qui auraient pu être évités s’il n’y avait pas eu de conflit politique. Donc on est obligé de tempérer un petit peu, la perception que l’on peut avoir du message politique, oui il existait mais il était surtout relayé.

Et quelles étaient les personnes ressources on va dire de René Olmeta par rapport à ce dossier ? Est-ce qu’il y avait des personnes sur lesquelles il s’appuyait ?
Le directeur des sports de l'époque, le directeur des sports de l'époque, les services. J'ai envie de dire que René Olmeta s'appuyait sur toutes les potentialités qui lui paraissaient être bonne pour que le dossier avance. La direction départementale et régionale de la jeunesse et des sports, étaient celles vers lesquelles il s'est souvent tourné, il se tournait vers les autorités de la préfecture car il avait droit de cité si je puis dire à ce niveau-là, il s’est appuyé sur toutes les autorités qui pouvaient compenser le manque en gros de, de charisme du discours politique quelque part, qui faisait que il avait, il a su utiliser les potentialités locales pour pouvoir démarcher correctement un dossier qui était un dossier difficile, donc c'est comme ça qu'il s'en est sorti. Donc, tous les services, parce qu'il a su les mettre en avant. Le directeur des sports, certes, qui a été, qui a été quelqu'un de très positif sur ce dossier-là, parce que lui-même avait une vision précise des choses, mais... Vous savez, la ville elle était pas, elle était pas équipée en technicien au niveau du sport pour dire qu'elle était que c'est les techniciens du sport qui ont ménagé tous les espaces pour que la coupe du monde arrive, se mette en place, et soit un succès. C'est parce que quelque part, il y a eu une conviction profonde de tous les services d'aller dans le même sens. Et quand je dis tous les services, oui, tous les services, parce qu'il y a les problèmes d'environnement, il y a des problèmes de voirie, il y a des problèmes, il y a des problèmes de sécurité, il y a des problèmes de sport proprement dit, il y a des problèmes comment dirai-je de communication etc. Tout ça fait que tous les services ont contribué à ça.

Et au niveau de la population, est-ce que la population a été concerté sur le dossier ?

Bien entendu. En premier, la population qui a été concertée c'est celle qui était dans les abords du stade, pour des raisons des raisons de, j'ai envie de dire de parasitages obligatoires de la vie des habitants par un événement de ce type. Au premier chef le fait que la voirie a été a été modifiée et que tout un tas de dispositif qui existait ont été aménagés voire profondément modifiés. Donc la population a été concertée. Ensuite il y avait toute la problématique de voir avec cette population de proximité, comment elle pouvait être un élément important en disant un certain nombre de choses à l'organisateur à propos de la façon dont elle, elle percevait cette organisation, surtout qu'elle avait l'expérience de l'ensemble des matches de l'O.M., et l'on sait qu'ils sont quand même exemplaires du point de vue à la fois des aspects positifs comme des aspects négatifs. Donc, la proximité. Ensuite, les marseillais ont été consultés par différentes, différents réseaux et par différentes opérations de questionnement sur la vision qu'ils avaient de la coupe du monde. Donc quand l'autorité politique, qu'elle soit nationale ou qu'elle soit locale, ont eu quelque part à dire leur choix, elles l'ont elles l'ont fait avec, il faut le dire avec force, une opinion des habitants, suffisamment exprimées pour que quelque part ça réponde vraiment à ce qu'ils souhaitaient. Donc, consultation des habitants, au premier chef les plus proches et ensuite bon, par comment dirai-je, par cercles successifs au plus loin au plus loin. Car il faut quand même savoir qu'il y avait plusieurs zones de sécurité.
pour la coupe du monde et que donc de Castellane à l'Obélisque et en allant sur les autres bords, c’est quand même, allez je vais dire, en gros, une bonne moitié, entre 40 et 50% de la population marseillaise qui était concernée par tout simplement la présence de la coupe du monde. En terme, au quotidien, 24 heures sur 24. Donc il y a quand même eu la concertation. Au delà, il y avait des problèmes par les réseaux habituels, il y avait des problèmes d’image portées par Marseille, il y avait des problèmes de, de, comment dirai-je, il y avait des problèmes de circulation, à poser, il y avait des problèmes d’emploi, il y avait des problèmes de timing précis, par rapport à l’hôtellerie, par rapport aux commerces. Bon. Donc il y a eu consultation. De chacun, j’ai envie de dire, de chacune des entités représentatives de la vie marseillaise. Oui. Sous des formes, critiques par certains réseaux, par certaines filières mais sous des formes suffisamment apparentes pour que tout un chacun sache que ça a eu lieu et que ça a bien eu lieu. Alors, la concertation, elle est sujette à caution. Quand on se concerte avec les têtes de réseaux, c’est un type de concertation. Quand on se concerte avec une population plus large il faut que celle-ci vienne participer. C’est une autre, c’est une autre, comment dirai-je une autre ambition. Elle est pas toujours satisfaite autant. Donc ça a été l’alternance entre la volonté de concerter le maximum et puis quelque part de s’en tenir aux réponses des têtes de réseaux porteurs de parole.

Et les têtes de réseaux justement, c’était, c’était, c’était qui ? D’abord les CIQ ont été consultés en premier lieu puisque c’est un outil de dialogue bon, à l’intérieur de Marseille, le les représentations associatives ont été consultées, pas simplement sportives, donc quelque part les, au niveau des usagers, au niveau des utilisateurs de ça, au niveau de ... Donc le monde associatif, porteur de la parole du citoyen a été consulté, ensuite les structures purement représentatives du monde économique ont été consultées, les structures qui étaient là et qui pouvaient porter la communication de Marseille. Donc c’est à la fois la mairie mais ce sont des prestataires extérieurs. Donc très largement tous les volets de la vie sociale, économique, culturelle sportive et politique de Marseille ont été consultés sur ce plan-là, peu ou prou, dans des conditions qui peuvent être critiquées, mais il y avait une question de rétro planning qui faisait qu’à tel moment il fallait que la réponse soit donnée. Et donc à un moment donné, la concertation large qui attend que chacun est donné son opinion, elle est loin elle est loin d’être atteinte hein, donc on fait quand même. Mais les CIQ ont été un relais important. Ils le sont au naturel.

Et en ce qui concerne le conseil général et le conseil régional, donc hormis leur implication financière, économique, quelle a été leur implication ? En dehors de cela, ils ont été sollicités sur les éléments techniques du dossier, parce qu’il y a des territoires partagés, sur le plan des équipements et des compétences partagées aux équipements, sur les problèmes d’accueil touristique, sur les problèmes de sécurité, même, sur les problèmes d’aménagement du territoire par le fait que des réseaux ... Donc ils ont été concertés, sur tout, pratiquement, en tant qu’opérateurs qui quelque part étaient sollicités pas simplement pour le financement de
la structure mais au-delà sur les soutiens financiers à d'autres choses. Là où ils n’ont pas été sollicités est qualifié car c’est pas de leur ressort, c’est sur la structure elle-même d’accueil. C’est-à-dire sur le stade, sur les dimensions de, sur tout ce qui relève de l’équipement. C’était la ville de Marseille qui avait donc, son potentiel, son pôle de technicien sur ce plan-là, la consultation de la région et du département c’était pour comment dirai-je, permettre le succès des opérations, fussent-elles des opérations initiées uniquement par Marseille. Donc voilà. Alors c’est vrai que, c’est de la convergence des opinions qu’est née effectivement la possibilité de mettre un certain nombre de chose en place. Je dis des opinions. Cela ne veut pas dire que ce sont des accords complets, pour certaines choses c’est beaucoup plus le consensus, manifestement un excellent outil à l’époque, dans ce genre de manifestations qui a gagné la partie, plus qu’autre chose. Donc, les collectivités territoriales de par leur pouvoir réel sur le territoire de la ville n’ont été que des opérateurs financiers d’abord, sollicités disons de manière très superficielle sur les éléments techniques, par contre sollicitées aussi sur la participation d’un certain nombre d’opérateurs économiques, d’opérateurs notamment sur le tourisme et autre, à la valorisation de l’opération et à la participation justement à la bonne organisation de l’opération. Et pas plus.

Mai, enfin, d’après ce que j’ai lu dans la presse et dans les documents, ils ont quand même mis, que ce soit le conseil général et le conseil régional environ un an et demi à deux ans à donner leur accord pour le, pour le finan, le financement du stade.

J’ai envie de dire que moi qui était au cœur du dispositif, c’était quasiment prévu dans le, dans l’enchaînement du système, de manière naturelle et de manière particulière à Paris, euh à Marseille. Au motif premier que quand on est uniquement un opérateur financier sur une opération initiée nationalement dont la retombée est sur une ville laquelle à l’autonomie de sujet, on est toujours comment dirai-je, on a un comportement attentiste à propos de la première, de la réponse financière. Le deuxième élément qu’il ne faut pas oublier c’est que dans la mise en œuvre définitive des financements, on était passé d’une situation d’une ville de Marseille, et il faut le noter, dirigée par un maire qui avait eu une élection sur la base d’une politique posée à gauche, et qu’on avait une municipalité avec une vision d’avenir de la ville posée sur une déclaration politique de droite. Que l’on avait, que l’on avait au conseil général une politique de gauche. Et que, par voie de conséquence, il ne pouvait y avoir que un certain nombre de hiatus et un certain nombre de dysfonctionnements. Au conseil régional, le sujet était simple puisque c’était encore Gaudin, qui était président de région. Mais pour lui il y avait un besoin de faire penser et de faire voir, c’est tout naturel, que qu’il ne se servait pas de la région pour réussir sa, son, son opération au niveau de la ville de Marseille qui était porteuse du projet. D’autant plus que Gaudin savait très bien, intelligence politique et puis des systèmes, que la coupe du monde avait lieu la même année où était posé le renouvellement du conseil général, régional, et du conseil général. Et que par conséquent il fallait qu’il ait une distance suffisamment grande et qu’il réponde, non pas avant, non pas après non
plus mais en même temps que le conseil général à un financement, parce que sinon sa démarche de retard ou d'avance aurait été qualifiée de, d'électoraliste ou au contraire de frein parce que l'autre avait donné son accord. Donc là on est, excusez-moi de le dire mais dans quelque chose qui s'appelle la cuisine politique. C'est tout. Voilà.

D'accord. Donc en 1995, donc changement de municipalité, donc donc Villani et Gaudin récupèrent le dossier : quelles ont été les principaux changements ? Vous m'avez dit tout ce qui concerne le pourtour du stade, quels ont été les changements au niveau des orientations aussi ?

Faire du stade un point central du développement d'un certain nombre de pratiques sportives populaires. C'est-à-dire, une immense, une immense, un immense espace, valorisé par le fait que si le stade était fermé alors qu'il était pas fermé avant, donc il y avait une retenue pour demain, tous ces espaces là étaient à disposition de l'ensemble des marseillais pour des pratiques adaptées sur ce lieu, sur ces endroits-là. La perspective avait été un moment évoquée, d'y installer ce qu'on appelait à l'époque des J-Sports, c'est-à-dire des lieux de pratiques type basket, c'est-à-dire fait évoqué, j'ai bien connu puisque j'étais au ministère à l'époque, ça n'a pas abouti parce que, parce que ça nécessitait une organisation très structurée pour éviter que, en faisant bien, on ait plus de difficultés que en laissant les gens de côté parce que le problème c'est que quand on met des centaines de jeunes à un endroit, il faut qu'il y est une organisation qui impose la sécurité et l'éducation etc. etc. Et que donc on a préféré cette immense espace libéré de façon à ce que ce soit le lieu de rencontre de ceux qui pouvaient effectivement faire du sport là. On peut... des familles et des gens en individuels. Donc c'est cela, c'est aussi de l'autre côté le lien étroit avec le palais des sports dans cet espace libre qui va être réhabilité maintenant d'une autre façon. Donc quelque part c'est cette intention de faire que le stade éclaire une volonté de dire Marseille est une ville ouverte à ses habitants et que toute installation sportive n'est pas l'exclusive et l'exclusivité de la discipline mais que la ville pense qu'elle a des pratiquants autres que le football, et que c'est aussi un lieu populaire. Donc cette dimension a été longtemps discutée, très très très longtemps discutée puisque la ville voulait qu'il y est vraiment des installations populaires là, donc il y a eu après des problèmes de niveau de financement et le déterminant ça a été effectivement que le dossier était trop cher par rapport à ce que la ville devait investir sur le stade lui-même, et que donc on est resté à un niveau quand même de concept très intéressant. C'est quand même intéressant d'avoir un stade ouvert dans la partie qui est fermée régulièrement où les gens peuvent aller faire du roller etc. etc. C'était surtout sur les sports je dirai de glisse, que les choses se posaient, ensuite faire les J-Sports là, ça posait beaucoup trop de problème pour l'avenir. Donc c'est cela, c'est aussi c'est aussi puisque c'était une nécessité, valoriser et rénover un certain nombre d'autres stades puisqu'il était évident que les participants à la coupe du monde avaient besoin de lieu d'entraînement. C'est donc quelque part, non seulement sur Marseille mais de Marseille en liaison avec d'autres villes comme Aubagne et puis et puis et puis La Penne sur Huveaune, et puis
voyons Martigues que, ont été mis en place des lieux d’accueil des équipes participant à la coupe du monde pour qu’ils aient des lieux bon, complètement sécurisés, à eux pour l’entraînement de leurs joueurs. Donc ça c’est la dimension extérieure, avec le fait que, dans le même temps où la coupe du monde développait sa démarche au niveau des constructions et donc de ces espaces-là, la ville a investi fortement cette année-là sur l’aide au mouvement sportif pour que il y ait sentiment que effectivement il y avait un lien de cause à effet entre, entre la ville et puis, entre l’événement, la ville et puis le mouvement sportif de manière générale. Mais l’intention politique ça a été de faire de ce lieu-là, un lieu d’environnement ouvert sur la ville, je pense que c’est dans une certaine mesure, une réussite. Puisque, c’est un lieu de, de, c’est un lieu de vie. Il suffit d’y aller aujourd’hui et de voir que c’est un lieu de vie, c’est un lieu symbolique et c’est aussi un lieu de vie. Y a pas que, c’est le lieu de l’OM à certain moment et c’est le lieu de tout le monde à d’autres moments.

L’utilisation du stade : ça a été de dire que le stade était footballistique mais était aussi ouvert à d’autres compétitions qui peuvent avoir. C’est l’idée, cette idée-là qui a reçu concrétisation dès lors que l’on a vu un certain nombre de matchs de la, soit du tournoi des cinq nations soit des pré-lap du tournoi des 5 nations avoir lieu soit des tests matches avoir lieu, de rugby avoir lieu sur Marseille. C’est quand même évènementiel, tellement évènementiel que l’un des effets induits que je citais dans mon premier propos, c’est que la coupe du monde de foot, de rugby aura lieu en 2007 ici.

Et quel a été, enfin, quelles ont été l’implication d’un côté de Jean-Claude Gaudin et de l’autre de Robert Villani, sur ce dossier ?

Alors, Jean-Claude Gaudin en tant que maire de Marseille et dans sa conception du rôle a été l’homme clé des moments officiels où se, où se formalisent et se concluent les grands dossiers. Sur tous les moments où il fallait qu’il y est la parole du maire, la parole de la ville, politique, Gaudin était là, Jean-Claude Gaudin était là. Ca a donc été un accompagnement politiquement vrai, je juge donc pas là du contenu, je juge essentiellement de l’existant. Deuxièmement ça a été un accompagnement humain par la personnalité du maire, qui a eu, qui a marqué le terrain, c’est une certitude, et à côté de lui, et au plus large tout au long des mois qui ont précédé l’événement, ça a été une participation vraie de Robert Villani, avec les moyens de ses services, c’est-à-dire quelque part des moyens très inférieurs, en puissance, à ceux que représentaient par exemple les services techniques autres que celui des sports. Mais le, la parole sportive de la ville de Marseille a été relayé et sportivement et politiquement par Robert Villani en en suivi de Jean-Claude Gaudin qui était le porteur de la vraie parole politique avec les conditions un peu comment dirai-je, un peu culturelle qui sont les siennes lorsqu’il s’adresse au public. Donc il y a eu, là, un duo, effectivement, un duo, ni à minima, ni à maxima, un duo naturel qui s’est créé avec, on peut le dire, probablement, une certaine difficulté du côté de Robert Villani parce que ses services sont, étaient des services qui ont grandit depuis mais qui n’étaient pas à l’époque des services énormes.
APPENDIX

Est-ce que les services des sports étaient différents sous Olmeta et sous Villani ?

Ben c’est-à-dire que, c’est-à-dire que le nombre, le nombre, le nombre de personnes qui depuis ont été partie prenante du service des sports, rattaché au service des sports, a grandi pour raisons tenant à des politiques plus expansives en matière d’équipement, en matière de soutien et développement de manifestation, en matière de soutien et développement des pratiques sportives de manière générale. Le service des sports de la ville de Marseille est numériquement plus important en 2004 qu’il n’était en 98. C’est une certitude. Donc René Olmeta était, avec un service respectable mais qui n’était pas celui qui est aujourd’hui en place, et qui était en place en 98.

D’accord. Donc en terme de résultats on va dire, entre guillemets, est-ce que vous pensez que les objectifs ont été, ont été atteints ?

Alors, si j’étais purement administratif et technicien, je dirai voilà : vous prenez les comptes de la coupe du monde, et dans la répartition, au niveau national, il y a eu un bénéfice. Un bénéfice, si je ne me trompe qui est de l’ordre de 1 milliard de francs. Donc il y a quelque part une retombée, importante, quand je dis un milliard de francs c’est parce que, à l’époque, le fond national du développement du sport qui est donc une dimension de l’aide au sport à partir du national par le pré-compte sur le PMU et sur le loto, était de l’ordre d’1 milliard 2, annuellement. Ce qui montre bien là, là, l’importance des retombées sur le mouvement sportif.

Donc succès si je m’en tenais à ça. Ca c’est pas essentiel. C’est, je vais pas dire que c’est pas non plus accessoire et anecdotique, bien au contraire. Ce qui est important c’est la façon dont a été appréhendé la coupe du monde, je vous en ai parlé globalement, et la façon dont elle a été conduite en terme d’ac, en tant qu’accompagnement de la dimension sportive et comment elle a été terminée. Parce qu’il est toujours difficile, de mon point de vue, pour une collectivité territoriale ou une entité politique de bien terminer quelque chose qui est dans son emprise au quotidien. Et la ville de Marseille a su le faire car elle a décanté de la coupe du monde, sans oublier un certain nombre d’engagement qu’elle avait pu prendre à propos de la coupe du monde. Globalement, et parce qu’il y avait un comité d’organisation mais aussi que la ville a été attentive, on peut estimer que, sur le plan de la communication de la ville de Marseille, sur le plan de l’organisation proprement dite et de ses capacités à organiser une manifestation de niveau national et international, sur sa capacité de bonne gestion des rapports avec sa population à propos de cet événement, donc c’est important. C’est à la fois capté la parole en amont et être capable de faire ce que la parole populaire souhaite et rendre compte que ça a été fait dans de bonnes conditions et qu’il y est pas de débat autour de la coupe du monde. Ensuite, sur le plan purement de l’image du sport dans Marseille, succès aussi, et sur le plan de l’image de Marseille, on peut estimer que le succès réel, parce qu’il y a eu des événements dramatiques, souvenons-nous de ce qui passer pendant la coupe du monde dans la région lilloise, il n’y a eu aucun incident majeur, mis à part un événement le premier ou le
deuxième jour sur le Vieux Port avec des supporters hollandais, avec lesquels il y a eu effectivement des gros déboires. C’est vrai que les commerçants proches du Vieux Port ont été soumis à contrainte très très fortes et que ils ont plus souvent eu à fermer leurs leurs échoppes et puis leurs établissements qu’à les ouvrir, mais comparativement à ce qu’il a pu se passer à d’autres endroits, c’est pas un événement exceptionnel dans la coupe du monde, malheureusement hein, je dis malheureusement, mais c’est pas non plus le, l’événement de Marseille n’est pas le premier des événements négatifs de la coupe du monde, sur ce plan-là. Donc globalement, la coupe du monde a été, peut être inscrite comme ayant été un vrai succès pour la ville de Marseille, au travers de ce qu’elle avait entrepris et son ambition lui a servi. Voilà ce que je veux dire. Quels sont, là je vais vous parler un peu plus de la politique sportive on va dire municipale en général, quelles sont les principales différences que vous pouvez faire entre la politique de René Olmeta et la politique de Robert Villani en terme de dossier prioritaire, on va dire en terme d’axe politique, quelles sont les principales différences, ce qu’ils ont en commun aussi ?

Alors je crois que ce que l’on doit mettre au bénéfice de René Olmeta, c’est une excellente capacité à bien, à rentrer dans les dossiers, à les connaître et à la maîtriser, à la fois sur le plan conceptuel, sur le plan politique et sur le plan technique. Et j’ai envie de dire quelque part sur la projection sportive qui peut en être faite. Je crois que ce n’est pas faire insulte que de dire que Robert Villani, du moins dans ses premiers pas, n’avait pas la, les qualifications dont je viens de parler que René Olmeta possédait. À la différence de René Olmeta, Robert Villani peut s’appuyer sur du propos politique porté et démultiplié quant aux intentions de politique sportive de la ville de Marseille quand celle-ci a l’intention de mettre en place une politique sportive. Car je veux noter que, dans la période qui a précédé la coupe du monde pour des raisons budgétaires et qui a suivi la coupe du monde pour des raisons budgétaires, le nombre, l’ambition de la ville de Marseille en matière de sport, sportive, locale, pris au sens local du terme a été quand même particulièrement limitée. Ce qui n’a pas été le cas, qui n’était pas encore le cas pour René Olmeta qui avait les mains beaucoup plus libre parce qu’il y avait pas ces coupes sombres nécessaires ou ces limites budgétaires. Nonobstant ce moment-là qui est un moment de dimension politique avec des décisions qui ont été prises, il y a eu ensuite là, le discours politique à propos d’un certain nombre d’action qui devait être menées et d’opération dans le domaine sportif hors coupe du monde portées politiquement donc connues du public et concrétisées par des projets portés par Robert Villani. Il est certes vrai que la critique peut être portée sur une période relativement noire où l’absence de crédit conduit à l’absence de propositions dans le, de propositions majeures, si je puis m’exprimer ainsi, rénover, entretenir des gymnases ou des stades, ça n’est pas avoir une politique sportive, c’est la politique naturelle d’une d’une collectivité à l’égard de ces, de ces ressortissants. Donc on est aujourd’hui dans la phase ascendante qui est celle de (coupure entretien téléphonique). Oui je voulais poursuivre en
disant que on va aujourd'hui vers une amplification des déclarations politiques consignées par des actes précis. On arrive, aujourd'hui, à avoir une lisibilité du schéma politique choisi par la ville de Marseille à propos du sport pour demain. Mais on est dans une période qui suit une période de 3 ou 4 ans pendant laquelle on était dans la notion des vaches maigres. Alors, ces 4 ans ont vraisemblablement conduit Robert Villani à avoir une plus grande maitrise de l'ensemble des dossiers hormis le champ politique et d'avoir donc une proximité avec la décision un petit peu plus tout à fait différente du passé, et certainement quelque chose de plus concret. Nous sommes dans, véritablement, je pense pour Marseille, tous les effets de la coupe du monde ayant été tout à l'heure évoqués, un certain nombre des principaux, nous sommes probablement dans une période où si je puis dire, le labourer va devoir labourer sur son champ, sans que personne d'autre que lui-même ne décide de des objectifs du labour et des conditions dans lesquelles il va labourer. Donc on est vraiment, là, dans l'acte un d'une politique sportive sur Marseille plus que dans l'acte deux. Mais pour des raisons que je voudrais expliquer. Elles sont, je veux demeurer objectif et il faut l'être en pareil cas, c'est parce qu'il y a eu cette coupe du monde qui a eu des effets favorables mais qui a aussi quelque peu malmené la, la dimension budgétaire de la politique sportive.

Et alors quelle différence faites-vous, toujours entre ces deux municipalités on va dire, sur la prise en compte du mouvement sportif ? Alors, sur, sur la dimension relationnelle, celle de recevoir, celle d'écouter, celle d'aller à la proximité du mouvement sportif, peu de différence. Parlant des hommes qui ont charge, en tant qu'adjoint, de conduire la politique sportive, les personnalités se sont affirmées de manière différentes mais chacun d'eux étant d'abord marseillais, ce sont à peu près à à l'équivalent, les discours les discours étant différents, bien sûr. La la relation que René Olmeta entretienait avec le sport était une relation qui méritait le qualificatif de de de, de transparence. C'est-à-dire que quelque part, je crois pas qu'on puisse le taxer de grandes annonces intempestives qui. Bien. En revanche, en tant que technicien avéré de la politique, il apparaît comme étant tout en étant très compétent, comme celui qui sait, parce qu'il se le doit en tant que politique ne révéler que ce qui lui portera j'ai envie de dire, le bien plus que le mal. Donc par conséquent, il y a dans la partie discours, quelque chose de très sélectif. Il y a quelque chose d'opportun, il y a quelque chose de de lier à ce qu'il sait du point de vue de ses capacités et de ce qu'il sait aussi d'être les prétentions du monde sportif. Donc c'est le grand équilibre. Je voudrais dire que si je prends Robert Villani, il est moins dans ces subtilités. Et il est davantage dans un un, un comportement qui est celui de demeurer silencieux et politiquement et techniquement quand il sait qu'il n'a pas les moyens de, du discours, et d'être par contre très percutant quand il sait qu'il va avoir les, les, les éléments. C'est-à-dire que lui, à la différence de René Olmeta, pourrait être qualifié de personne qui prend des risques sur son futur parce qu'il se tait ou il ne dit rien dont quelque part il peut être supposé devoir cacher mais en contrepartie on pourrait aussi considérer, deuxième,
deuxième phase de la médaille, qu’il soit quelqu’un de plus, comment dirai-je, honnête, au sens de discours, que René Olmeta qui lui ficelle un discours en permanence mais le conjugué à tout un tas d’alternatives dont il sait qu’elles seront devant lui et qu’elles sont devant lui. Donc quelque part, il y a deux personnages politiques tout à fait différents l’un de l’autre sur deux périodes complètement différentes. Sur deux ambitions de Marseille complètement différentes et j’ai envie de dire deux positionnements de Marseille différents. Marseille de 2004 n’est pas Marseille de 92-95 ou de 90-95. C’est complètement différent du point de vue du positionnement international, national, de l’image, du développement, du développement urbain, de la requalification de certains quartiers, etc. etc. On est sur un autre espace avec un support économique puissant. C’était pas le cas à l’époque de René Olmeta, c’était pas le cas parce que, au niveau de, national, l’image de Marseille n’était pas l’image que Marseille a su gagner depuis les années, dans les années 90. Donc on est ailleurs. Et parce qu’on est ailleurs, je vais à tâtons sur le jugement de 2 hommes ayant vécus deux périodes complètement différentes. Même si, quelque part, je me risque à les qualifier d’hommes complètement différents du point de vue de leur comportement politique non pas au nom de la politique qu’ils portent mais au nom de ce qu’ils veulent faire pour le sport. Donc là on est vraiment dans quelque chose d’un petit peu subtil mais il faut connaître les hommes pour, pour, et les systèmes pour pouvoi r bon, moi, même s’ils étaient là je le dirai avec autant de facilité, autant de de, de rigueur que je veux avoir dans le, dans l’analyse, c’est simple, même si moi je peux avoir mes opinions un petit peu plus personnelles sur ces choses-là. Je pariais là un regard de quelqu’un qui se sent en phase avec la dimension sportive et qui par le métier qui a été le mien, et par le savoir qu’on m’a donné, se dit un petit peu qualifié pour juger. Voilà.

Et quelle était la place et l’importance donc justement on va dire, de l’OMS, l’office municipal des sports et du service des sports, sous ces deux municipalités ? Quel était leur rôle et leur importance ?

Alors sous le, sous le règne, si je puis m’exprimer ainsi, de René Olmeta, la dimension de l’OMS était une une une dimension relativement, comment dire, réduite. Pourquoi ? Parce que la sollicitation de l’OMS avait été remise en cause par toute une série d’événements antérieurs à propos de la place que l’OMS pouvait tenir etc. l’office des sports, parce qu’il y avait eu des événements un petit peu troubles autour de la dimension de l’OMS sur les connexions politiques ou politico-administratif-financières, ça avait été très trouble dans une période antérieure d’ailleurs à, comment s’appelle-t-il, à Vigouroux, donc l’OMS était une entité finalement qui n’avait pas d’importance pour rapport à, par rapport à la dimension du sport. En revanche, si l’entité en tant que telle ne l’avait pas, les hommes et les femmes qui pouvaient porter le message d’une OMS bis, étaient très présents autour de René Olmeta et très sollicités. C’est-à-dire que les hommes et les femmes qualifiés pour parler du sport, René Olmeta savait qui ils étaient, qui elles étaient, et allait vers. Donc on était dans quelque chose qui était pas comment dirai-je, institutionnalisé, mais qui était
quelque chose de tout aussi important. Depuis que, depuis que Villani est devenu, il y a eu la période première où aujourd’hui, comment s’appelait-il, qui a été président de l’OMS, j’ai oublié le nom, qui est un chercheur de l’Université de Marseille sur le plan des maladies tropicales, Raoux ! Monsieur Raoux a donné une impulsion très très forte à l’OMS, avec une dimension qui se voulait être très politique. Ce qui a posé une série de problème au mouvement sportif participant à l’OMS, et quelque part un certain nombre de dissensions, qui ont fait que la, la sollicitation de l’OMS par Robert Villani a été tempérée à mon avis au simple motif que cette institution par la personnalité de Raoux et ses engagements politiques apparaissait comme étant probablement davantage en puissance, d’être la puissance politique sportive de Marseille que ne pouvait être ne pouvait l’être l’adjoint. Donc quelque part, dans les deux cas, pour deux raisons différentes, la place de l’OMS n’a pas été ce qu’on peut penser, qu’on aurait pu penser qu’elle puisse être, et qu’elle aurait dû être, aussi bien sous l’autorité de René Olmeta que de euh Robert Villani. On peut penser, que dans sa dimension actuelle, même si le, le propos de l’OMS est aujourd’hui certainement couvert par tout un tas de choses car on en entend peu parler, sur la ville de Marseille, on peut penser que dans une étape aussi importante que celle qui semble s’ouvrir sur la ville de Marseille en matière d’installations sportives, en matière de manifestation sportive, et en matière de développement du sport, l’OMS redevienne un partenaire important. Mais à cela, et pour conclure sur ce sujet, je dirai que dans tous les cas d’espèces, le problème des OMS se pose en France de la même façon. Est-ce que, quelle est la limite à partir de laquelle une OMS devient un vecteur de la politique du, de la mairie, au sens politique j’entends, c’est-à-dire partisane et donc quelque part un outil soumis à, et à quel moment, à l’inverse, par sa présence politique au sens de déclarer des choses qui ont un sens politique, cette OMS devient le deuxième facteur de dissension parce que c’est l’opposition non, quelque fois dans un accord total. La personnalité de Raoux a amené à ce qu’il y est des, une ombre sur Villani alors que Villani était premier adjoint, était l’adjoint. Donc quelque part c’est de, c’est en quelque sorte sans le vouloir le calife qui veut être calife à la place du vrai. Donc on est là vraiment dans quelque chose de très classique. Donc aujourd’hui, on peut penser qu’il y aura toujours cette dualité puisque c’est le propre des OMS. La fédération nationale des OMS n’est rien d’autre que le poil à gratter de toutes les, de toutes les villes de France et de Navarre à propos du sport. Et que c’est, quelque part, dans son organisation fédérée, c’est une puissance politique… vraie. J’ai envie de dire même, excusez-moi, mais un syndicat politique du sport. Parce que c’est comme tel, parce que les OMS sont aussi des personnels, ce sont aussi quelque part des entités administratives qui sont derrière. Donc il est très clair que là on est devant quelque chose de redoutable et la conversation, à plus forte raison la coopération et la conjugaison des efforts c’est toujours quelque chose de très, ou superficiel, ou alors très difficile si on veut conjuguer l’ensemble.
Donc la première chose que je voulais savoir c'était comment est née en fait l'idée de proposer Marseille comme ville euh Oui et bien euh Candidate
En tant qu'adjointe aux affaires maritimes si vous voulez je suivais la la Coupe de l'America en tant que euh euh au mois de novembre décembre 2003 euh j'ai vu que les le les la coupe Louis Vuitton était pas encore terminée mais les suisses ont montré des qualités euh assez impressionnantes ainsi que leur bateau. Donc euh euh j'ai pensé qu'ils pouvaient gagner et la Louis Vuitton et l'America's Cup. Donc euh j'ai à la rentrée de janvier j'ai fait la la Louis Vuitton était pas finie d'ailleurs j'ai fait un une note euh une lettre au maire en lui disant voilà je pense que euh les suisses ont des on est les capacités de gagner le et la Louis Vuitton et l'America's Cup et euh ils n'ont pas la mer chez eux, la charte de l'America's Cup dit qu'il faut de l'eau salée, donc pourquoi pas Marseille, avec tous les avantages qu'après on a découlé. Donc euh euh j'ai fait 2 notes au maire et puis euh j'ai proposé de partir euh ils ont gagné la Louis Vuitton et j'ai proposé de partir euh voir les voir euh leur présenter Marseille donc euh je suis partie avec un coureur et je suis avec un skipper et je suis partie avec un marin donc et un ingénieur parce qu'il y a des installations c'est très technique et et moi-même. Donc on est parti à (rire) à Auckland avec un montage euh euh audio etc etc des cadeaux, des livres sur Marseille, enfin tout ce qu'il fallait pour séduire les suisses, et en fait la stratégie j'ai voulu y aller si vous voulez entre la la Louis Vuitton et l'America's Cup euh parce qu'ils étaient plus euh plus abordables. Après une fois qu'ils étaient dans l'America's Cup c'était bon je pensais qu'ils devaient être très très tendus. Donc euh on a passé euh huit jours là bas et euh tout bêtement ! J'ai appelé les suisses (rire) j'ai appelé j'ai dit voilà je suis euh adjointe au maire j'appelais d'ici de Marseille je souhaiter venir voir etc ça c'est passé vraiment très très très détendu, hein. Et donc on est parti là bas, on est resté huit jours, on a rencontré des gens, on a rencontré des responsables, on a rencontré des sportifs enfin... On a rencontré les autres équipes aussi. On a on a beaucoup observé dans la ville comment les choses se passaient j'ai rencontré des des gens de Auckland euh là j'ai vu les conséquences, les retombées à la fois euh sociales économiques sportives qu'il y avait sur Auckland qui étaient euh qui étaient très importantes puisqu'ils avaient eu la Coupe en 2000 déjà.
Oui
Voilà. Donc euh ils avaient récolté plus de plus de 1 milliard euh de dollars euh entre les deux euh à la première, et là autant pour la deuxième donc euh plus toutes les constructions qui avaient été faites et les aménagements donc euh je suis revenue. Euh j'ai euh j'ai vu le maire, je lui ai expliqué ce que j'avais vu, je lui ai euh et je lui ai dit de repars (rire)
alors il me dit ah bon. J'ai dit oui parce que euh c'est important de pleurer sur l'épaule de d'Ernesto quand il va gagner (rire). L'émotion ça lie les êtres. Donc euh je en fait je voulais voir une coupe. En fait j'ai été très déçue parce que je suis repartie donc je suis restée dix jours ici je suis repartie euh Ernesto est le seul homme pour qui j'ai fait le tour du monde deux fois en un mois hein

D'accord

(rire) Ah oui oui oui (rires) Deux fois le tour du monde (rire) pas une fois deux fois. Et donc euh euh je en fait j'ai donc pas j'ai j'étais sur le bateau de d'Ernesto j'étais invitée, j'ai suivie une régate et la dernière régate avait été retardée parce qu'il n'y avait pas de vent, et euh la nuit où j'étais dans l'avion pour Los Angeles, ils ont gagné. (...) J'étais pas sur place mais bon. On avait quand même pas mal parlé, j'ai connu tous les marins, les skippers, les équipes techniques, parce que c'est très c'est impressionnant les les salles de les salles de météo ou les salles de enfin c'est la NASA une base hein. Vous avez la le que les gens voient puis après vous avez l'arrière boutique qui est fermée. C'est... c'est la NASA, tout marche avec des computers, des calculs, des enfin etc Et puis après y a y a tout le sportif euh et toute la maintenance enfin c'est c'est des ingénieurs qui sont là euh. A la fois sur le plan technologie, euh à la fois sur le plan météo sur le plan des vents enfin voilà. C'est très très complexe comme euh une équipe c'est quelque chose de très complexe un team. Voilà. Donc après ben ben après ils ont fait un appel euh donc on est revenu on a fait voter le principe de de participer, puisqu'on est une municipalité qu'on doit des comptes à (...) nos concitoyens, donc on a fait voter, on a fait un un comité de un comité de pilotage si vous voulez, avec les clubs enfin assez large et euh on a posé notre première candidature. Euh qui était alors y avait pas de euh si vous voulez c'était très vaste c'était un une candidature spontanée. Donc on a fait un premier document, comme on le comme on comme moi je le sentais après ce que j'avais vu, bon alors après ils en ont sélectionné là dessus je crois qu'on était plus de 70. Bon après on a eu donc des questions

Oui

Donc là on a répondu, encore, il y avait un nombre de pages limité, vous savez très très anglo-saxon : tant de pages pour telle question, tant de lignes pour ça etc. Alors on a travaillé avec les les clubs nautiques, avec le port autonome, euh avec les les avec le la communauté urbaine enfin vraiment ça a été quelque chose de qui a créé une dynamique je dirais aussi euh entre les différents partenaires, entre les différents acteurs de la ville ca c'est très important. Et donc on a été sélectionné après dans les euh euh je me rappelle plus combien ils en avaient sélectionné 7 je crois

Huit il me semble

Huit voilà. Euh et puis après y en avait plus que quatre, alors on a remis encore un dossier plus que quatre et là on a signé alors là c'était un dossier je l'ai chez moi je le garderai en souvenir il est épais comme ça y en a un par là. Et là donc on répondait en fait on a toutes les quatre nous avons signé le contrat, comme si nous l'avions.

Oui.
Puisque euh si quand ils ont dit c'est c'est l'Espagne, bon le contrat était signé déjà. S'ils avaient dit c'est la France, bon le contrat était signé. Donc on a on a signé un contrat. On a travaillé avec des cabinets d'avocats, avec des ingénieurs, météo France enfin je voudrais oublier personne je sais pas si vous avez vu tout ça mais on a travaillé vraiment euh d'une façon très très large, et on a répondu à toute leurs demandes, et on avait des réunions euh avec le secrétaire général de la ville, euh moi-même euh le secrétaire général pilotait l'aspect euh je dirais administratif, technique bon moi-même sur le plan euh global et donc on avait des réunions plusieurs fois par semaine euh avec après y a eu tout le contrat alors y avait les suisses d'un côté nous de l'autre avec nos avocats respectifs, et on a négocié le contrat point par point hein ! Euh parce que c'était beaucoup d'argent. Et puis et puis et puis ben on a rendu le contrat dans les temps on l'a porté on l'a mené on l'a porté à Genève (rire)le contrat. On a porté le contrat à Genève et euh... et puis je suis allée moi accompagnée d'une euh d'un directeur général euh je suis allée (coupure) bon donc et et nous avons euh euh je suis allée donc on était que deux bon alors j'avais deux discours : un on a la coupe, un on I'a pas (rire). Voilà en fait on n'a pas on n'a pas on n'a on n'a on n'a pas eu donc euh et bon ben on a dit euh c'était on était un peu triste quand même.

Oui j'imagine

Mais ça a créé une très grande dynamique pour le nautisme et surtout si vous voulez que ce soit tant le maire que moi-même que que tous tous, tous nos partenaires, on a, à travers toutes les études qu'on a fait le travail de recherche qu'on a fait de mesures, de de, de et puis on s'est projeté, je vous donnerai un exemple tout à l'heure qu'est-ce qu'on peut faire, qu'est-ce qu'on peut proposé de nouveau etc, on a été très créatif. Et par exemple l'idée de créer un pôle nautique à l'Estaque euh c'est sorti de mes bureaux On a dit mais y a une digue qui a euh qui est perméable euh et qui sert à rien, si on la repousse de... 100 mètres ou 150 mètres, on peut créer un magnifique pôle nautique euh qui fait un équilibre au pôle sud de euh et avec le euh le losange le Frioul le euh le pôle sud avec le centre du Vieux Port et on cr on développe un pôle nautique qui existe déjà mais qui est... limité, à l'Estaque. Donc voyez on a on a il a germé tout plein de de on avait prévu toutes sortes de choses euh d'équipements donc nouveaux, d'idées nouvelles de développement qui qui sont sortis de ce dossier.

D'accord.

Parce que on a vraiment, on voulait être les plus originaux, les plus affûtés, les les les, les moins chers (rire) on a fait et puis c'était très important sur le plan retombées euh économiques et sociales pour la ville. Parce que c'était des créations d'emplois, euh de des des activités d'entreprises euh enfin Et puis c'était avoir la la la plus grande euh la plus grande euh compétition régates euh qui existe euh au monde hein. Avec tout ce que ça amène derrière. Voilà.
Et justement alors donc en fait les attentes au départ vous, que vous avez par rapport à ce dossier, donc ce sont des attentes euh économiques sociales Sportives !
Sportives.

L'image de Marseille, de communication, euh euh si vous voulez et puis de rayonnement de la ville. Et surtout de de réaménagement de la ville. Parce que euh faire des réaménages des aménagements et des réaménagements, vous savez que c'est très long parce que les procédures d'appel d'études, d'appel d'offre sont très longues bon. Euh là on avait comme pour les jeux olympiques la possibilité de passer dans des procédures les mêmes mais accélérées. Donc ça veut dire ce que nous allons faire euh dans dix ans sur dix ans à Marseille, on le faisait en quatre ans.

Ouais, ouais ouais.

Hein euh. Donc on avait des procédures accélérées euh qui sont les mêmes, qui prennent les mêmes garanties mais qui au lieu de s'étendre euh sur de de longues périodes euh sont plus condensées. Voilà.
Oui, d'accord. Et euh...

Pour notre ville c'était aussi comment dire, sur le plan sportif, je veux dire c'est vraiment d'ailleurs on l'a vu pour les pré-régates euh on le voit pour le match racing que j'organise euh chaque année je veux dire on cette année il y avait 5 équipages America's Cup. Y avait euh Million Bird, Chris Dickson, les meilleurs étaient là. D'ailleurs il dit on comprend pas qu'on soit pas Marseille. Ils adorent Marseille maintenant. Ah oui, les américains, les les les néo-zélandais tout ça sont ils sont tous venus pour le pour le match racing. Euh y avait 5 équipages qui étaient là. D'ailleurs c'est Ed Bird qui a gagné (rire).

D'accord. Et euh donc euh dans je sais si la question va être très claire mais dans quel contexte vous avez pris euh la décision de euh de proposer Marseille comme ville candidate. Est-ce que c'était euh y avait euh une dynamique déjà qui était en place et qui vous a dit tiens pourquoi pas euh.

Vous savez c'est pas, c'est pas venu voilà c'était c'est pas venu il y a plusieurs facteurs. D'abord c'est pas venu tout seul. Bon. Euh d'abord Marseille a une histoire maritime très importante. Vous savez que Marseille est une des premières villes à avoir organisé des régates en dix huit cent quarante sиз je crois, donc 5 ans avant euh la régate des Two Guinnies euh qui a qui a précédé la vous connaissez l'histoire de oui oui oui de l'America's Cup. Bon euh Marseille a organisé les premières régates en 1846, régates régates hein voilà. Donc c'était pratiquement, un des premiers... pays en Europe à organiser des régates formelles comme elle l'a fait. Donc y a y a a un savoir faire euh maritime, un savoir naviguer, et Marseille a aussi si vous voulez outre son histoire, sa culture, son savoir faire, on a aussi quand même des clubs nautiques qui sont euh très très ancrés très développés euh l'union nautique marseillaise, l'UNM était là je crois en 1882 quelque chose comme ça, euh, euh la nautique en 1886 ou
87. Bon y a toute une tradition si vous voulez de, de régates euh de de de grands euh d’a d’architecture aussi de de de, de la mer euh. Marseille a a vécu alors y a des périodes c’est très curieux y a des périodes où Marseille vit de la mer, et puis des pé des périodes où Marseille tourne le dos à la mer. Etlà on sortait d’une période où Marseille avait tourné le dos à la mer avec les problèmes de port, les problèmes euh, on vivotait disons hein bon. Et là avec l’arrivée de The Race, euh avec les Jeux Mondiaux de la Voile que j’ai organisé euh qu’on accueillit accueillit en quatre vingt en 2002. En 2001 on a eu l’arrivée de, je suis arrivée en même temps que The Race moi ici (rire). Donc si vous voulez, tout ça, euh moi je me suis dit mais attends, là dedans y a quand même une dynamique euh quand vous réunissez 150 mille ba 150 mille personnes à, à 1 heure du matin pour accueillir un bateau, c’est qu’il se passe quelque chose. Bon, si vous voulez, quand on a eu les Jeux Mondiaux, on a monté les jeux mondiaux en 6 mois. Alors que parce que y avait une ville qui s’était désistée et nous alors qu’il faut ils avaient travailler pendant euh je crois 2 ans, 2 ans ou 3 ans pour les monter, bon. Je veux dire, tout ça si vous voulez fait que euh ce savoir-faire, et ce savoir-être aussi qu’on a c’est un savoir-être euh y a y a y avait un terrain propice hein et Marseille avait a renoué à la mer avec la mer avec toutes ces grandes compétitions et euh la candidature de l’America’s Cup d’ailleurs y a pensé en écoutant les résultats, euh de la Louis Vuitton hein ça ça m’est venu euh j’ai dit mais si les suisses gagnent ils ont pas d’eau salée bon. Nous on a des des, on a des des endroits où on peut les installer, que ce soit sur le Vieux Port, que ce soit à L’Estaque, euh on a quand même des références, on a de grands on a de grands cou on a un pôle France, on a un pôle d’entraînement euh avec des des des on a été champions de planche à voile, on a des gens qui sont aux Jeux Olympiques, on a on a moi j’embarque quand même euh mes centres déjà plus de 60 000 gosses par an, euh le le l’éducation nationale en fait autant, euh les clubs en font autant bon je veux dire y a y a... Y avait vraiment et puis surtout euh quand je quand j’ai vu si vous voulez sur place euh avec des études qui ont faites par euh les néo-zélandais sur les retombées, euh point de vue image, point de vue euh aménagement euh, point de vue euh emploi, au point de vue euh social, parce que tout le monde vous créez une, une dynamique et le le dossier je l’ai mené en gouvernance. C’est-à-dire que toujours si vous voulez, on a sollicité les euh, jusqu’à un certain point puisqu’après y avait les études techniques qu’on a délégué à des cabinets d’études parce qu’on n’avait pas les moyens nous de les faire. Mais on a toujours euh tous les clubs, tous les, toute le Port Autonome enfin les affaires maritimes, euh la marine nationale, tout le monde a contribué ! Et donc si vousz tout ça c’est... et tous ces gens travaillaient déjà plus ou moins ensemble. Et les clubs ont pris vraiment conscience euh de la force qu’ils représentaient dans le nautisme, de ce qu’ils pouvaient faire euh. Les maintenant les clubs travaillent ensemble euh, on organise de des je sais pas presque 200 régates chaque année, plus septembre en mer je veux dire, on refuse des régates parce que euh le plan d’eau on peut mettre deux deux régates, une dans le plan nord une ans le plan sud (rire) deux, mais y a
des week-ends on a trois régates. On... on est obligé de dire bon
attendez... Voilà. Et on ça va des régates je dirai les plus les plus simples,
aux régates les plus euh les plus prestigieuses hein euh. Là on va avoir les
voiles du Vieux Port. Tenez, on a créé ça par exemple les Voiles du Vieux
Port. Savez pourquoi je l'ai créé ? Parce que sans arrêt on me disait euh
oui mais en Espagne y a les régate d'El Rey etc. J'ai dit attendez, très
bien, on va en faire une ici. Donc c'est la troisième année qu'on l'a fait et
ça et on a de plus en plus de bateaux de tradition qui viennent etc. Bon
euh voyez. Mais mais parce que les clubs aussi ont joué le jeu en disant
mais nous parce que tout toutes les manifestations sont supportées par
les clubs...
oui
Hein voilà. Donc euh par des associations nautiques donc euh les clubs
ont dit ah ben oui. Là là on fait la route de l'Equateur, c'est une nouvelle
course, les euh les personnes c'est les euh c'est quel pays c'est le... pas le
Gabon le le... Pointe Noire c'est euh Josiane ! C'est quel pays la route de
l'Equateur ?
Le Congo.
Le Congo ! Ils sont venus nous trouvés en disant on veut faire une grande
course, etc au départ de Marseille. J'étais un peu sceptique. Y a quand
même 7 bateaux, des 50 pieds, des 60 pieds.
D'accord.
C'est pas mal !
Ben oui.
C'est un début. Ils veulent la faire tous les deux ans. Alors on a tous les
ministres qui viennent etc mais voyez, c'est intéressant. Là on fait du
développement durable.
Oui.
Ils ont envie de de de et donc Marseille apporte un savoir-faire euh,
savoir-être. Là j'arrive voyez j'étais au salon nautique de Shangái euh
jusque du 8 au 11 avril, euh bon on a eu beaucoup de monde, les chinois
sont venus me trouver d'abord on est en train de négocier avec la
Fédération Française de la Voile euh un accord avec euh la Fédération de
Voile Chinoise euh pour peut-être entraîner quand ils viennent en Europe,
euh les les les voileux euh pour les Jeux Olympiques, sur le pôle. Alors on
les entraînent sur place. La France a envoyé des entraîneurs déjà. Mais ils
vont venir aussi en Europe. Et c'est le rayonnement de Marseille ça. Ca
veut dire qu'on est reconnu au niveau international. Bon euh là on était là-
bas, ils vont avoir l'exposition universelle en 2010. Ben ils sont venus me
trouver : Madame Gamerre, vous savez vous vous créez des pôles
nautiques, parce que moi je parle pas de port, je parle de pôle nautique.
Voyez, si vous faites votre thèse je peux vous donner ce concept. Un pôle
nautique c'est pas un port, hein. C'est pas un port de plaisance. C'est le
port plus autre chose. C'est ce qu'on ce qu'on essaie de développer à
Marseille. Hein euh c'est à la fois l'aménagement euh c'est le port, mais
cest aussi euh ce qui fait vivre un port. C'est ce qu'on essaie et ça c'est un
pôle, sur le plan sportif, économique, de loisirs de. Bon voilà. Y a les
pêcheurs avec les plongeurs, avec les voileux avec les kayaks avec. Ca
c'est des pôles nautiques. La différence pour moi elle est là. Un port c'est un parking. Un pôle c'est autre chose. Donc euh les chinois me disent mais euh vous avez de vous être en train de vous avez des pôles nautiques très actifs, ils savez tout : vous voulez en créer un dans la zone nord, enfin au port de l'Estaque, j'ai dit oui. Il dit mais nous on a le on a l'exposition universelle en 2010, on les fait sur les deux rives du grand Pour, on voudrait faire un pôle nautique et on voudrait faire de l'animation entre les deux, les deux rives. Est-ce que vous pourriez nous conseiller, votre maire va venir, le maire y est en ce moment, est-ce qu'il pourra parler au maire de Shangai etc. J'ai fait en rentrant j'ai fait comme les Jeux Olympiques j'ai fait comme les, j'ai fait une note au maire et puis je sais pas il est là-bas il est en train de discuter. Voyez euh le rayonnement international alors pourquoi parce que le rayonnement international de Marseille c'est c'est important. Euh et puis c'est c'est conforté aussi euh en Méditerranée mais au niveau international une une force parce que derrière une force nautique, il y a une force économique, y a une force technique, y a un savoir-faire, y a des universités, y a des laboratoires, y a beaucoup de choses je veux dire hein. Y a euh Eurocopter qui euh derrière peut traiter tout ce qui est carbone, tout ce qui est euh. Il il fallait tout ça pour la Coupe de L'America. Voilà. Donc je pense que vous avez du étudier le dossier euh
Oui un petit peu oui.
Vous avez pris le gros, le petit, lequel vous avez eu de dossier ?
J'ai eu... j'ai eu les dossiers de presse en fait. Que vous aviez
Ah oui, vous n'avez pas eu le accès au dossier
J'ai eu le petit euh dossier de presse
Ah le petite oui c'est le numéro un. Vous n'avez pas eu le gros.
Non.
Non non (rire). Oh mais ça ça ça ne vous et puis il est anglais en plus. Ca aussi par exemple. Regardez euh y a pour les pré-régates on a eu les pré-régates, alors je voulais les premières, je voulais ouvrir le euh première et dernière. Dernière les skippers ont refusé, euh les suisses auraient accepté, mais les skippers ont refusé parce que ils avaient ils auront leur nouveau bateau et ils veulent pas transporter les bateaux euh, ils veulent les faire à Valence enfin ils veulent les laisser sur place. Et euh euh qu'est-ce que je vous disais, je vous parlais de quoi là attendez les pré-régates. Oui ! Il fallait trouver des volontaires (...) et il fallait trouver des volontaires qui parlaient anglais ou espagnol et l'espagnol si possible mais au moins anglais. On a quand même trouvé euh près de 400 personnes qui volontaires qui connaissaient la mer donc. Et c'est nous qui avons assumé la sécurité et les suisses sont restés bluf bluffés. Y a pas eu un problème avec les bateaux tout ça euh et c'est c'est c'est nous qui avons euh le shiff (???) était de chez nous je veux dire. Et tout ça ça parlait anglais, ça c'était donc ça veut dire qu'y a un potentiel à la fois technique mais aussi un potentiel en ressources humaines sur Marseille, concernant la mer, important. Et vous savez ce qu'on nous demande en ce moment ? On a reçu une annonce de la part de de d'Alinghi il voudrait que nos volontaires, il recrute des volontaires pour suivre les pré-régates à Valence
euh en sué en Norvège je crois qu'ils vont, et Italie. Ils voudraient que les marseillais y aillent. (Rire) Je bois du petit lait (rire)
Et bien oui (rire)
Voilà. Est-ce que j'ai répondu à votre question ?
Oui. Oui oui. Euh (...) donc alors euh sur euh le dossier en lui-même, donc votre rôle vous c'était quoi ? C'était la parole politique du dossier ?
Oui c'était porter le politique dans le dossier enfin de le faire avancer, d'impulser les choses et et puis de de coordonner euh sur le plan je dirais politique l'ensemble des l'ensemble l'ensemble du dossier. Après y avait le secrétaire général qui portait sur le plan euh avec les avec les directeurs généraux. En fait on a travaillé avec directement le secrétaire général et les directeurs généraux hein euh
D'accord.
Et puis je vous dis, le port, les affaires maritimes, la marine euh. On a travaillé avec le les chues de Marseille parce que derrière il faut tout un un un y a beaucoup de choses derrière hein. Point de vue euh sécurité, la police nationale, enfin le... les douanes enfin je je voudrais pas en oublier mais tout ça était impliqué dans le dossier.
D'accord.
On n'avait pas tout le monde en même temps mais si vous voulez moi j'ai pratiquement suivi toutes les réunions. De temps en temps y avait des petits problèmes, il fallait les résoudre, l'élue est là pour ça. Et puis attentive euh aux échéances, attentive à la mise en forme, attentive parce que finalement à la fin c'est le maire hein euh ou moi enfin là en l'occurrence c'est le maire qui signait mais bon euh on a une responsabilité quand on engage la signature du maire (rire).
Oui oui. Et euh qui faisait parti alors du comité de pilotage parce que justement dans la presse il parle du comité de pilotage assez euh restreint.
Non. Il y avait un comité de pilotage qui était euh constitué qui était assez large mais qui à la fin c'est vrai qu'on était moins nombreux parce que après c'était des des dossiers d'ingénieurs hein. Mais le comité de pilotage était euh y a eu plusieurs y avait y avait le comité si vous voulez y avait le comité de pilotage dans lequel y avait les ce que je vous ai énuméré là hein euh bon on l'a réuni quelque fois mais c'est vrai qu'après on pouvait pas quand on travaillait avec les douanes on travaillait pas forcément y avait pas la police nationale y avait pas ou peut-être elle y était elle parce qu'elle était concernée. Mais je veux dire y avait peut-être pas le port autonome, y avait peut-être pas les clubs, y avait peut-être pas bon. On on a après on a un petit peu réduit parce que plus le dossier avancé plus il était pointu, mais y avait un comité donc un comité de pilotage où y avait tout ces tout ces membres, y avait un comité euh de soutien où y avait des des personnalités des etc, et puis y avait euh un comité je crois euh je dirais euh comment on l'avait appelé... Y avait le comité de soutien, y avait le comité de pilotage et puis le comité de euh je dirais un comité plus large. Y a eu les les entreprises marseillaises se sont regroupées en association. Voyez enfin c'était un comité je j'appellerai ça c'était Marseille qui qui portait ça. Voilà. Et y avait y vait la chambre de commerce qui était

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impliquée dedans, qui était dans le comité de pilotage. On était vraiment très très large hein. Mais après on a fait des comités si vous voulez on a fait un comité de personnalités euh y avait Zidane y avait enfiiiin tout un tas de personnalités puis y avait puis après y a eu le comité euh je dirais plus local euh mais qui en fait engageait pratiquement tout le monde hein. Et puis le comité de pilotage en fait ça a été surtout dans les deux premières phases du dossier euh il a fallu que les gens se connaissent. Après les gens travaillaient même entre eux, le Port Autonome travaillait avec les douanes, directement, ça revenait à la mairie voyez bon euh. Mais au début il a fallu vraiment qu’on que les gens, les gens ne travaillaient pas entre eux. Ça a été, ce mode de gouvernance a été une expérience pour beaucoup hein. Parce que vous savez combien les administrations sont cloisonnées et là il a fallu échanger, il a fallu tirer dans le même sens, il a fallu beaucoup de choses.
D’accord.
Voilà.
Et est-ce que aujourd’hui vous continuez justement à travailler de cette manière-là ou...
Alors on travaille voilà tout à fait. On travaille plus du tout de la même façon, on se euh la même façon qu’avant. La cou la coupe de l’amérique a tout changé en ce sens que, par exemple, les clubs nautiques euh la rive la rive nord euh l’estaque était très, très fermée... c’était fermée, la rive sud était fermée aussi, mais donc les les présidents par secteur géographique se on fait une sorte de de poule et se réunissent régulièrement, la commission des présidents ou l’association des présidents je sais pas comment ils appellent ça, des grands clubs, par secteur nautique euh... Y enfin YCPR pointe rouge euh... Vieux Port euh Estaque bon les grands ils se réunissent régulièrement. Donc on a une bien meilleure coordination des choses, ils se répartissent les les régates, les supports bon. Ça ça marche. Ça oui ça c’est quelque chose qu’on a... Bon et puis par exemple le Port Autonome. Euh moi je ne savais pas par exemple au Port Autonome, le Port de Marseille euh était euh dans l’association des Eco-ports, et qu’ils faisaient beaucoup de choses pour l’environnement.(... ) Moi qui suis présidente d’un mouvement euh d’écologie, je l’ignorais ! C’est en discutant avec le directeur général avec le président etc que j’ai appris y a eu une conférence dernièrement là-dessus, une conférence européenne, ou internationale à laquelle j’ai été invitée. Donc si vous voulez, en fait euh alors chaque, chaque administration a certes ses problèmes et c’est pas c’est pas de l’angélisme que je fais, mais je veux dire, les gens se sont connus et à partir de du moment où les personnes les personnes se parlent, où les personnes échangent, on facilite beaucoup de choses, hein. Donc euh quand il y a un problème aux douanes, quand il y a un problème aux affaires maritimes, bon je veux dire on prend le téléphone, on s’appelle, on se parle, euh euh si j’ai un problème sur les plages euh euh je vais appeler la préfecture, la préfecture quand même était impliquée également. Voyez, ça a permis de je dirais de euh ça a permis euh de mieux communiquer mais je crois que aussi, euh on a le fait de défendre c’est un challenge que Marseille s’est
imposée avec l'America's Cup, d'avoir un challenge commun, parce que finalement c'était aussi bien le challenge des affaires maritimes que le challenge de la mairie, bon la mairie portait le dossier, mais c'était aussi le challenge de la police nationale, c'était aussi le challenge du le challenge de la marine, chaque chacun voyait quelque chose qui le valorisait là-dedans. Donc c'était devenu le challenge de tous. Et quand on a un challenge commun, bon bien sûr qu'il y a eu des tensions, il y a eu des moments difficiles etc, y avait ce que demandait les suisses que nous mairie on voulait et ce que les autres pouvaient donner. Mais tout ça a fait que euh il y a eu une dynamique que la mayonnaise a prise hein, y a eu une dynamique qui s'est créée et je crois que la en tout cas en matière de nautisme, en matière maritime, les choses sont ne sont plus comme elles étaient avant. Et on a cette plate-forme qui est l'office de la mer, où tout le monde continue à échanger à travers les commissions et pour moi c'est très précieux parce que je reçois des propositions, des conseils, des (coup de téléphone) et et et donc si vous voulez, tout ça est, est très positif. Voilà.

D'accord. Est-ce que vous continuez justement euh à travailler un petit peu ensemble en terme de nouveaux projets ?

Ah de ah on en a de de nouveaux projets. Oui oui; Bon d'abord on travaille ensemble pour toutes les nouvelles les régates et les nouvelles régates je veux dire bon. Puis les aménagements. Aussi bon euh l'aménagement euh du Frioull par exemple, moi je suis chargée de la terre et la communauté urbaine de la mer bon le la mer a communiqué, moi je vais commencer à communiquer sur le sur les, j'ai déjà communiquer pas mal j'ai fait plus de 34 réunions sur Natura 2000 bon mais. Mais c'est bien parce que ce que, ce qui avant n'aurait pas été je dirais euh accepté, maintenant est écouté, est intégré, discuté etc. Bien sûr qu'on continue. Et puis on on a on a des projets euh euh là on a une nouvelle course euh euh, on a des projets de euh mes bases nautiques... Je vais faire une conférence de presse le le 23 juin. Si vous voulez venir d'ailleurs. Elle est prévue, j'espère que ça va pas changer, elle est prévue à 14h30. Y aura le trophée Orma à ce moment-là, je la ferai sur le village d'Orma. Le 23 juin.

D'accord.

Euh il faudra téléphoner à mon secrétariat pour vérifier. C'est la date qui est fixée actuellement voilà.

D'accord.

Bon si vous voulez donc on a continué par exemple mes toutes toutes les les là là je suis en train de construire euh des le pôle le pôle nautique, le pôle France va être tout euh tout reconstruit, bon là on est pratiquement on est on est en train de rédiger les appels d'offre. Je je pense le 23 annoncer 3 ou 4 appels d'offre. Euh je construis une base nautique à l'Estaque, hein au quai de la Lave, de quillards, d'habitables euh et on y mettra le kayak de mer. Bon. Si euh bon. Ça les appels d'offre euh là les architectes sont choisis, maintenant on est en train de travailler euh sur le cahier des charges donc ça c'est des choses qui d'ici 2007 seront toutes faites finies. La fin de mon mandat euh le nautisme aura changé d'aspect à Marseille. Voilà. Et et on travaille, et on travaille donc avec tous ces
partenaires que nous avons. Et puis chacun amène son... son idée hein euh. Donc on essaie de créer de de grande de continuer à créer de grands événements mais un événement est un événement. En fait il faut aussi dev, continuer à développer euh un à mettre les marseillais j'ai une politique du nautisme, c'est de mettre plus de marseillais sur l'eau, de mutualiser un certain nombre de moyen et tout ça est en marche. Avec les clubs déjà ça fonctionne hein oui oui. Euh on est y a vraiment une politique de développement euh qui est de bien sûr les événements sont l'aboutissement mais y a des événements parce que le reste fonctionne, je dirais qui est de de de pousser euh les clubs euh et et et nous euh dans les centres nautiques à à je dirais à attirer plus de personne euh parce que vous savez plus la base de la pyramide est grande, plus on aura des médailles en haut. Donc moi j'essaie d'agrandir cette base, sur les plages on peut s'initier à la plongée, on peut s'initier au voilier etc tout ça pour un euro cinquante la journée je veux dire. Bon voyez. Alors ça c'est la base. Après, quand ils ont fini cette base, bon ben y a des fois qui font faire des stages euh ou dans un club ou dans nos, dans nos centres nautiques bon euh et là on est on trace encore. Et puis après ça leur plaît bon ben soit ils rentrent dans le club, soit ils font des ils viennent régulièrement s'entraîner sur euh sur une catégorie etc. Et donc on monte la pyramide au fur à mesure. Et donc pour ça on on mutualise nos moyens avec les clubs moi je leur dis je suis une boîte à outils hein voilà. Euh on prête des bateaux toutes les manifestations la ville euh j'avais un journaliste qui m'appelait pour la la route de l'Equateur, il me dit oh mais la ville s'est pas assez investie. J'ai dit qu'est-ce que vous en savez euh la ville je mets à chaque à chaque régate je mets des bateaux pour les la sécurité euh à disposition avec du personnel, on donne des subventions euh on est on est à 400 à 400 presque 500 milles euros de subventions aux clubs, sans compter les grands événements. Avec les grands événements on est presque au million. Sans compter les plages. Rien que les plages c'est 1 million 200 mille euh etc. Je veux dire y a un budget mais y a pas que l'argent. Y a aussi la présence, moi je suis beaucoup sur le terrain j'ai je j'apprends hein parce que je suis pas une spécialiste, j'ai beaucoup appris. Ca a été très difficile au début d'arriver j'étais universitaire donc euh d'arriver de se plonger dans ce milieu du nautisme euh où pour la première fois y a une femme (rire). Et oui et puis je veux dire euh j'ai vaguement un permis bateau quelque part mais enfin bon je suis pas une spécialiste hein bon. Donc tout ça euh euh a pris du temps mais le le dossier America's Cup si vous voulez a permis d'accélérer le phénomène. On a on a pu le faire parce qu'on avait déjà des des des équipes, on avait déjà un savoir faire, je dis toujours un savoir faire et un savoir être mais, le dossier Coupe America a a fait plus, a resserré les liens, a permis de mieux se connaître et puis surtout on a on a analysé euh chaque paramètre si vous voulez, à travers ce dossier et donc on sait exactement ce qu'on veut et ce qu'on veut pas. Et on sait ce qu'on peut faire et ce qu'on peut pas faire. Hein parce qu'y a des limites euh aussi euh géographiques, y a des limites je suis très très soucieuse de préserver l'environnement euh donc j'ai par ailleurs j'ai des programmes de récifs art
d'immersion de récif artificiel, j'ai fait un parc maritime au Frioul etc. Voyez, il faut garder comme je dis toujours il faut garder un équilibre euh il faut que je garde un équilibre entre tous les partenaires, quand on a des partenaires comme euh euh Bruno Peyron, qui se montre pas toujours aimable vis-à-vis de Marseille, euh mais moi les clubs me disent vous donnez 1 million 2 à Bruno Peyron euh et il vient faire trois petits tours dans le Vieux Port. Bien sûr il porte nos couleurs, bon euh mais nous on est là toute l'année, on a de grands on a de grands skippers, euh. Bon alors je dis mon souci c'est Bruno Peyron à comme je dis Bruno Peyron euh Marseille doit beaucoup à Bruno Peyron mais Marseille a beaucoup donné à aussi à Bruno Peyron. Euh donc si vous voulez, y a des équilibres à garder. Il faut de grands événements avec de de euh des gens géniaux c'est un génie Peyron euh de de de du de la mer, mais il faut aussi euh avoir le souci de de développer la ville avec équilibre et de transmettre et de former euh. Et puis parallèlement derrière de la la la mer amène toute une économie derrière. Donc il faut se soucier de cette économie mais il faut pas oublier euh d'investir les marseillais euh les frioulais quand il s'agit du Frioul etc hein euh voilà. Bon et puis de préserver notre euh notre notre petite qui est la la qui est la rade hein euh. C'est c'est ce dis toujours c'est notre pépite d'or la rade hein euh. Et donc ça il faut la préserver, il faut la soigner, il faut la là je vais intervenir y a un congrès pour le parc maritime des calanques je vais intervenir. Comment articuler la politique du de la mer enfin maritime avec un parc national etc. C'est c'est intéressant tout ça. Puis derrière y a des problèmes de sécurité, y a des problèmes d'éducation, y a euh ça s'appelle le développement durable (rire).
Oui oui. Euh donc euh au niveau des euh des instances publiques, on va dire, étaient impliquées donc la mairie, la communauté urbaine,
Oui.
Euh
Le port autonome
Le port autonome
Euh la marine nationale, la police nationale, tout ce qui est état la préfecture, les affaires maritimes, je dois inoublier, les douanes, euh y en avait peut-être d'autres hein. Euh la préfecture bien sûr hein euh euh
Il y avait aussi le en terme de collectivités locales le Conseil Général, le Conseil Régional
Alors le Conseil Général, ils n'ont pas traité directement euh ils avaient vaguement dit qu'ils a qu'ils a qu'ils donneraient euh quelques dizaines de milliers d'euros si on l'avait. (...) Ca ça nous a peut-être un peu porter préjudice, hein euh. Ils ont pas été très enthousiastes. Ça ça, quelque part ça les... d'ailleurs c'est amusant, au conseil municipal c'était moi le rapporteur du dossier, euh quand j'ai fait voter le le principe parce qu'on a voté le principe de d'être candidat, à l'unanimité. Quand on a commencé après, à voter euh pour des subsides euh après vous aviez l'opposition qui s'est dit mais ça ça va leur donner des voies donc ils votaient contre chaque fois (rires). C'était ridicule.
Et euh justement quels ont été les euh est-ce qu’il y a eu des blocages du dossier à un moment donné ? Blocage politique, financier ?
Oh le problème on a a on a a été on a eu enfin si vous voulez, euh au niveau de l’Etat, bon l’Etat nous avez euh d’abord euh c’était c’était quand même un truc euh un gros dossier de plus de 300 millions, et on avait demandé donc à l’Etat, un soutien. Parce que évidemment quand je dis ça apportait à Marseille, il faut compléter en disant que ça apportait à toute la France aussi. Euh parce que ça rayonnait euh sur la côte, ça rayonnait dans le langue dans le Languedoc-Roussillon, ç rayonnait jusqu’à Lyon, ça rayonnait jusqu’à Paris. Enfin tout l’axe euh Rhône et tout ce qui est d’ailleurs j’avais vu les maires euh euh de des autres villes en disant bien entendu on essaiera de de de que tout le monde profite du du de l’événement, hein d’une façon ou d’une autre donc. Et euh l’Etat nous avait donc euh euh on a beaucoup sollicité le premier ministre et le président de la république enfin le maire a... et euh il s’était engagé à hauteur de 40 mille d’euros, ce qui était peanuts et euh puis 60 mille euros mais euh manifestement euh on n’a pas eu le le soutien qu’on attendait hein euh. Manifestement je pense que c’est je pense quelque part que ça a joué. Mais enfin c’est clair d’ailleurs. Le euh le roi a soutenu le dossier avec tellement de de de moyens, de moyens parce que finalement euh moi je suis allée voir la deuxième pré-régate à à Valence, où j’ai été reçue très gentiment par Alcade qui est adorable on est devenue copines toutes les deux de temps en temps on s’appelle, bon.
Mais euh euh le site est mille fois moins euh (...) cent mille fois moins, le site nautique hein j’entends, est cent mille fois moins adapté à l’America’s Cup. D’ailleurs, y a qu’à parler avec les skippers hein euh je veux dire vous allez voir les les skippers, les marins, ils vous diront euh ils vous diront bon moi je les ai j’ai navigué donc pour les pré-régates, euh j’ai pu en voir qu’une parce que pendant trois jours je suis restée y avait pas de vent et puis le quatrième jour y avait trop de vent. Bon j’ai pas pu euh j’ai pas pu naviguer, j’en ai vu une, et en fait vous sortez vous êtes en haute mer y a rien et le le euh alors là le port sera certainement aménagé mais euh quand euh quand je sortais c’était entre des containers et du charbon enfin bon. Ça après y a des aménagements, ils peuvent pas tout faire, mais le roi a énormément euh je dirais soutenu puisque il a donné plus de on dit on dit qu’il a donné euh on dit qu’il a donné un milliard d’euros. Mais l’engagement dans le contrat était de 500 millions d’euros, quand même. Bon ben y a eu, y a eu un soutien. Euh euh on nous aurait dit vous avez 500 millions, on aurait eu la coupe hein. Parce qu’on a vraiment euh tirer toujours sur euh sur on était limité sur le plan euh monnaie hein euh. Donc ça je pense que le le manque d’enthousiasme disons, euh (...) ça ça ça a dû jouer, ça a dû jouer hein. Par contre à Marseille y a euh vraiment euh y avait y avait un engouement pour pour euh pour l’America’s Cup hein euh. Ah ben c’était important, pour la ville hein euh. Les choses auraient été tellement plus rapide euh
Y avait toute
Et puis y aurait eu les moyens pour les faire aussi plus vite. Parce que euh euh faire le tramway ça prend du temps parce qu’on fait sur 2 mandats.
Euh si on avait eu l'argent, dans deux ans en 2007 c'était terminé je veux dire. Y avait deux lignes de deux lignes pas deux mais trois et c'était fini. Je veux dire euh les aménagements de la Joliette étaient fait. Je veux dire c'est voilà hein euh. Je pense qu'il y a pas eu suffisamment, alors c'est une des raisons bon et puis peut-être euh euh sur d'autres points ils ont été certainement euh meilleurs que nous, même si très gentiment les suisses nous disent que c'était vraiment euh euh on était très serré mais bon. Euh mais on euh moi je considère que déjà en ayant travaillé euh approfondi, euh vraiment euh euh fait des propositions euh originales comme comme on a fait dans le dossier, euh et en ayant eu les pré-régates, je je considère qu'on a déjà vraiment on a une reconnaissance internationale, on est dans le top 4, voilà, disons hein. On a une reconnaissance internationale, sportive et puis d'organisateurs. Je veux dire quand on nous dit mais euh mais bon vous pouvez accueillir euh euh euh les Jeux Mondiaux, vous pouvez accueillir euh les chinois. Bon ça veut dire qu'y a une reconnaissance si vous voulez de notre savoir-faire, de notre capacité de, humaine derrière d'organisation euh, de compétence de donc. Je pense que tout ça déjà on est très bénéf on a on a retiré un grand bénéfice. Et sur le plan économique, par exemple, les pré-régates ont coûté de l'ordre de 850 mille euros à peu près, dont 400 mille de d'équipements pérennes hein mais on a on a fait suivre derrière le le les retombées, c'est multiplié par 6.

D'accord.

En une semaine. (...) Y a eu 50 500 euh 50 euh 500 euh 50 millions je sais plus combien j'ai pas l'étude sous les yeux de bénéfiques, par le par les par les commerçants par les entreprises, bon par parce qu'ils ont acheté des cordages, parce qu'ils ont acheté bon parce qu'ils ont fait réparer des trucs euh et puis tous les hôtels étaient pleins euh les restaurants étaient pleins, euh les taxis ont fonctionné, les marchés ont fonctionné, les marchands de fleurs ont fonctionné, tout ça... tout ça on a quand même en une semaine on a multiplié par 6 l'investissement. Donc c'est je considère qu'on a été euh certes peut-être pas autant qu'on aurait, qu'on l'aurait été parce que c'était de l'ordre du milliard les retombées hein euh économiques, en plus de tout le reste, en plus de l'accélération. Mais je considère que euh ça a été un bienfait pour Marseille que d'être candidate, d'être dans le top 4, euh en finale, euh d'avoir euh euh travailler avec toutes toutes tous les je dirais toutes toutes les... tous les tous les corps sociaux euh euh toutes les toutes les instances de de avec le monde de de de la voile et puis ça et puis ça a amené aussi des jeunes sur l'eau. Parce que ça leur a plu, ça leur a donné envie bon donc on a eu une recrudescence de stage, les les les clubs ont grandi, les gens se sont euh euh fédérés et on est passé sous une autre gouvernance de des affaires maritimes. Ca c'est bien.

D'accord. Et au niveau des partenaires, quelle a été le le la place et le rôle du secteur privé ?

Alors le secteur privé a été très actif, euh en ce sens si vous voulez que euh les d'abord les les euh les grandes entreprises de la région s'étaient fédérées et étaient prêts euh ont appelé euh bien sûr les suisses enfin y a
eu des tas de réseaux qui ont joué bien sûr. Et ils étaient prêts à bon pas à mettre 300 millions hein mais ils étaient prêts à s'investir euh à nous à aider la ville bien sûr. Ben en échange ils avaient une retombée bien sûr mais ils étaient ils étaient vraiment investis hein euh. Et même au niveau financier donc ils étaient prêts à
Ah ce ce ils étaient prêts à investir bien sûr
D'accord.
D'ailleurs ils s'investissent toujours dans nos régates hein euh. Vous avez la la Banque Populaire qui investit toujours beaucoup dans la voile hein, vous avez des des des assurances, vous allez avoir le trophée Orma, euh je veux dire y a des gens de de chez nous qui investissent hein euh euh. Y a des entreprises qui s'investissent euh qui qui qui investissent qu'enfin je dirais tous les dimanches dans les régates des clubs hein euh voilà. On a quand même des équipages de valeurs, des gens comme Marc Eymi, comme euh comment s'appelle-t-il euh Dimitri Deruel et d'autres je veux dire bon. (...) Tout ça c'est des gens qui ont des sponsors. Là on a fait j'ai fait une équipe féminine, vous êtes au courant.
Non.
Ah vous savez pas. Pour le Tour de France Voile, on a notre équipe pro avec Dimitri Deruel euh Défi Défi Marseille, et euh cette année euh euh je en partie, je sponsorise avec Eminence. La ville de Marseille et Eminence sponsorisent une équipe femme (rires). On a lancé nos filles là. Ah ben elles ont pinailé un an ou deux elles se sentaient pas prêtes et tout. Là cette année on leur a dit allez. Et elles marchent bien. Elles sont en Bretagne là elles font des régates, je devais aller les voir à Dunkerque au départ, je devais aller voir mes deux, mes deux, mes deux équipages là. Non mais c'est bien parce que ça motive des gens, ça amène vous comprenez. Après c'est c'est ça ça fait monter l'intérêt pour le nautisme hein, ça met des gens sur l'eau, et puis ça ça la mer éduque. Derrière tout ça y a y a y a beaucoup de choses, la mer je veux dire euh, être dans un équipage ça veut dire beaucoup de choses pour un jeune. On apprend beaucoup de choses à travers un équipage hein euh. C'est la vie. On apprend la vie finalement hein. Chacun est unique, chacun est irremplaçable mais... si on fait pas le bon geste au bon moment euh la on en paie les conséquences. Euh vous vous savez que je suis passée par dessus le bord y a pas longtemps ? Ah non, ça a été trop rigolo. Pour le pour le match racing, euh y avait des des des bon on était en finale, et euh j'étais sur mon bateau qui est un ma cuve, j'appelle ça ma cuve euh avec mes secrétaires enfin etc et passe des amis sur un des bateaux sur le Plus 39, l'italien et qui qui qui à toute pompe sur l'eau et qui me disent viens c'est un bateau de compétition euh un J-80, viens viens alors j'appelle euh un zodiac, je saute sur le zodiac, du zodiac je vais je rejoins le voilier et puis je vais faire euh c'était Dimitri qui qui Dimitri Deruel je vais faire un un virement de bord au large. On était 5 sur le bateau. Y avait on était 3 débutants, et et 2 chevronnés. Y avait Deruel et Jean-Bernard Constant. Donc on revient, je dis j'aimerai bien quand même voir un petit peu la
course. Bon donc on revient, et Dimitri je barrais et Dimitri enfin je barrais, il avait la barre entre les jambes mais enfin hein et euh on dit attention virement de bord et à ce moment-là, les deux autres débutants, au lieu de renvoyer le génois euh changent de bord bon moi je je barre complètement j’envoie la barre et je change mais ils renvoient pas la voile. L’arrière du bateau, y a pas y avait pas de filet c’était un bateau de compétition du match racing, l’arrière du bateau a dérapé, j’ai fait un saut périsèllique, je suis tombée à l’eau, toute habillée, et le bateau, et l’eau était à 10 degrés. Dimitri a plongé, est venu me (...) me soutenir, mais je pouvais pas alors heureusement qu’il y avait un chevronné dessus sinon on mourrait tous les deux, et euh ils sont allés faire un alors y a des gamins dans des petits bateaux qui gênaient enfin, ils sont revenus, et ils nous ont reçu Dimitri est monté, mais on avait les jambes paralysées déjà par le froid. 4 minutes, 5 minutes, ouais ouais. Mais voilà, voyez quand on fait C’est risqué hein.
Quand on fait un mauvais et oui non moins.
Et oui oui
C’est c’est je veux dire on apprend beaucoup. Vous préparez le professorat de de de sport de
Euh non, enfin
Qu’est-ce que vous faites vous ?
Moi je suis en thèse,
Oui mais en quoi ?
En sociologie du sport.
Ah sociologie du sport je je j’ai des gens qui viennent à l’office de la mer qui ont travailler là dedans oui oui.
Voilà et donc moi je euh donc une fois que j’aurais passé ma thèse j’aimerai bien être maître de conférence à l’université. Voilà. Et je j’ai fait un peu de voile
Oui vous connaissez un peu.
Un petit peu oui. Un tout petit peu pas beaucoup mais un petit peu.
Oui ben moi moi je connaissais enfin je connaissais pas la voile n’y rien, j’ai pas le temps, tout tout le temps on me dit madame Gamerre venez je dis oui (...) Je dis moi je suis skipper à terre.
Oui.
Voyez je je passe beaucoup de temps ici et puis c’est c’est c’est très comment dire, y a beaucoup de de dossier euh même si j’ai des ingénieurs des services mais euh je j’ai un défaut d’universitaire, de de vouloir comprendre. C’est embêtant ça. Ca embête beaucoup de gens. Bon euh (rire). Mais voyez bon en fait toutes les retombées de l’America’s Cup c’est quand même donc euh par exemple la la la fédération des industries nautiques qui a organisé le salon à Shangai nous a invité. C’était marrant y avait la Rochelle et nous. On était côte à côte. On s’est tiré la bouffe pendant tout le salon. Quand on quand ils voyaient arrivée les responsables de de de de des J.O., ils nous regardaient, moi quand je voyais arriver je regardais aussi (rires) c’était excellent (rire) Bon mais je veux dire c’est bien, c’est bien. Je suis allée voir ce qu’il faisait à La
Rochelle, à... je suis allée à la Rochelle, à la Trinité, à Brest. J’ai pris plein d’idée au début de mon mandat. Mes mes directeurs étaient jamais sortis de leur bureau, de leur bateau, je leur ai dit allez hop, je vous emmène huit jours en voyage. On est parti avec le chauffeur et pendant huit jours je leur ai fait voir des trucs. Alors ça les a un peu surpris parce que ça leur était jamais arrivé, et, moi j’ai appris mais eux aussi. Et on a trouvé plein de choses intéressantes à... à mettre en œuvre. Ils savent, ils font mieux que nous ils faisaient mieux que nous. Maintenant ils viennent voir ce qu’on fait ici (rire). Non mais si vous voulez c’est c’est c’est dynamiser les choses, c’est aussi les faire muter au 21ème siècle. On n’est plus dans le même mode de gouvernance, on en tout cas moi j’y suis plus, euh euh euh on n’est plus dans le y a des y a des problèmes de de d’environnement euh en mer aussi qui faut très sérieux que que que, que je gère, que j’essaie de de, de mener euh euh si vous voulez de façon croisée je dirai entre l’économique, le social, l’environnement, le sportif, tout ça il faut le il faut le croiser il faut il faut il faut garder euh une équité, une balance euh, et en même temps euh c’est aussi un combat. Parce qu’y a d’autres villes qui sont, parce qu’il faut rester modeste, qui ont (...) qui font aussi bien que nous sinon mieux. Donc euh il faut essayer de il faut rester lucide quand même. Mais, mais ça a été très bénéfique à tous points de vue hein, cette euh America’s Cup. Ça a ça a, ça a fini de ré, ça a fini, parce que Marseille s’était réveillée avec The Race, avec les Jeux Mondiaux, et là ça a fini de (rire) de nous réveiller.

Et pour revenir au secteur privé, est-ce que ils faisaient partie du comité de pilotage ou ça a été juste euh

Y avait la Chambre de Commerce, qui était là

D’accord

Puis après puis après y avait ce fam ce ce fameux groupement, je me rappelle plus comment on l’avait appelé, euh où y avait alors euh ben toutes les entreprises qui le voulaient hein, voilà oui oui. Mais y a eu du monde hein qui était là, on a on a fait de belles, de belles réunions. On avait fait des groupes de travail aussi, euh avec ce, après dans ce grand comité donc qu’on a élargi disons, on avait fait y avait un groupe euh logistique, y avait un groupe sportif enfin je me je me rappelle, un groupe économie, et un groupe euh je je je l’ai plus dans la tête.

Oui y avait tourisme
Tourisme, éco euh économie,

Nautisme
Euh logistique et nautisme. Donc si vous voulez ce groupe donc a là là était complètement euh euh Alors le premier groupe ne l’appelons pas comité di euh comité appelons-le comité directeur. C’est le premier groupe qu’on a créé, c’est un groupe de je sais pas 20 ou 30, 30 personnes à peu près. Et... et après on est passé à ce groupe donc qui lui travaillait en com a travaillé en commission, hein, et...et puis après y avait le le, je dirais le soutien, le comité de soutien, où y avait les... les personnalités. Voilà.

Et quels étaient les missions justement de ces commissions ?

Ben ces commissions elles ont défini un petit peu si vous voulez à à on leur a donné les quest parce qu’on avait des questionnaires de la part des
suisses, on leur a donné le les pages qui les concernaient, les questionnaire, pas tout parce qu'y avait un machin euh les les, les points qui pouvaient les intéresser, on leur a demandé une réflexion, là dessus. D'accord.
Voilà. Mais, c'était quand même très limité, il faut dire parce que c'était parfois tellement technique, que ces commissions ne pouvaient que dire il faudrait faire une étude sur la capacité de la Région à traiter euh les fibres carbone etc. C'est pas la commission qui allait les traiter sivou voulez hein. Mais ça a fait prendre conscience aussi à énormément de gens de la de la, de la complexité du dossier, hein euh. Et puis y a eu des propositions euh aussi dans ces groupes de travail, des propositions très intéressantes.
D'accord.
Euh que nous on a utilisé, qu'on a développé après. OUI oui.
Et euh comment, comment ont été choisis les membres de ces commissions, justement ? C'était par rapport à leur expertise, par rapport à ?
Par rapport à leur expertise, par rapport à leur représentativité, leur expertise, puis y a des gens qui sont venus euh spontanément, mais on pouvait pas euh mettre euh c'était enfin je veux dire on pouvait pas avoir 300 personnes dans une commission hein. Mais c'était essentiellement des des, chaque euh je dirai les membres étaient représentatifs de de de groupes disons, hein de réseaux voilà hein. Oui oui, oui oui.
D'accord.
Mais y a eu quelques quelques individuels qui sont venus aussi hein, mais euh on pouvait pas non plus avoir euh 500 000 mille personnes hein (rire)
c'était pas possible voilà. Mais euh les clubs étaient représentaient dans chaque commission, les enfin tout ce que je vous ai énuméré et puis d'autres, je dois peut-être en oublier hein euh. Euh les gens étaient vraiment euh je crois que c'était vraiment représentatif de, de notre ville hein. Et et aussi de ce que nous voulions faire. Oui oui, oui oui.
(…)
Ce que je vous propose peut-être, c'est que vous dépotiez un peu tout ce que je vous ai dit, et puis, si vous le souhaitez, euh on peut on peut en reparler. Vous me téléphonez ou
Ah bien c'est gentil
Mais vous m'aveztissez hein.
Oui oui.
Vous en êtes où là, vous en êtes où là de votre thèse ?
Dan sma these je suis, je devrais la soutenir normalement en décembre.
Ah ! Oui ! (interruption). Oui euh donc euh si vous souhaitez, parce que peut-être c'est un peu en vrac tout ça,
J'ai juste une dernière question, à laquelle j'avais pensé, c'est euh qu'est-ce que qu'est-ce que vous retravailleriez maintenant au jour d'aujourd'hui, sur le dossier ?
Ce que je retravaillerais aujourd'hui sur le dossier…
Oui. Quels regrets vous pouvez avoir sur le sur le dossier ?
(...) Je pourrais pas vous répondre comme ça, parce que ça demande une réflexion quand même de (...) Ce que je retravaillerais ce que j’aurai pu plus développer peut-être ?
Oui. Selon selon vous, ce qui vous vient à l’esprit si on vous dit euh euh ben pour la prochaine Coupe de l’America (rire) je je j’ai gardé un petit machin quelque part (rires) vous savez (rires)
J’imagine, j’imagine. Sur quels points est-ce que vous essaieriez d’améliorer les choses ?
Je crois que euh ce que peut-être euh ce qui me vient à l’esprit, euh et qui a été contesté par certains marseillais, je pense qu’ils avaient pas tout à fait tort, euh on a on n’avait pas suffisamment travailler euh si vous voulez la... il fallait agrandir la plate-forme du 34, et je pense que sur le plan technique, euh alors c’est c’est le port autonome qui avait traité ça, euh ils étaient sur le l’enracinement d’une digue avec un un avant-port etc. Voilà.
Et je, je pense qu’on aurait dû travailler non pas sur de l’enracinement parce que ça rétrécissait le l’entrée du port etc, mais qu’on aurait dû travailler sur du sur des digues flottantes, et que peut-être techniquement, on n’avait pas assez euh si vous voulez, parce qu’on était pris par le temps aussi, mais on aurait peut-être, on aurait peut-être pu travailler d’avantage, je euh l’implantation euh je dirais l’extension euh euh du 34 euh, la rendre peut-être plus provisoire qu’elle n’était avec des enracinements, euh euh euh lourds je dirais, et qui ont un impact sur l’environnement et sur le cadre, et là je pense qu’il y avait un travail peut-être à qu’on a pas suffisamment approfondi, euh parce qu’on a été pris euh dans le par le temps je dirais hein. Parce que tout nécessite des études assez complexes hein de de courants, de vents, de, c’était vraiment très très. Et on a peut-être pas eu le temps de (…) d’approfondir suffisamment euh l’implantation je dirais euh des bases, enfin la lo le support d’implantation des bases voilà. Euh peut-être il aurait fallu euh tre d’avantage travailler ça. C’est ce qui m’est venu euh quand vous euh j’étais en train de réfléchir je crois que ça c’est un point qui a qui a été euh important, qu’on n’a pas peut-être pas suffisamment par faute de temps, euh parce qu’aujourd’hui le port a une tradition euh d’ancrage plus lourd, c’est eux qui ont fait les études, euh et peut-être aussi techniquement ce que je dis est une bêtise hein euh faut aussi euh mais pour moi enfin mon (…) mon analyse pas vraiment un sentiment, mon analyse c’est qu’on aurait dû aussi mener parallèlement une analyse euh d’un d’un avant-port euh flottant euh une une digue flottante et non pas et non pas avec un enracinement. Mais bon finalement on l’a pas fait et on est passé sur autre chose mais je pense que là y avait y avait une y avait quelque chose qu’on aurait dû peut-être apporter.
Oui.
Y a peut-être d’autres choses, en réfléchissant peut-être ça me reviendrait mais cette une chose qui m’a quand même (…) qui a été un peu lourde. Sinon on a fait on a on a vraiment euh les collaborateurs, les directeurs généraux, le secrétaire général, tout ça on a vraiment je crois ils ont mené le dossier bien, bien, bien bien. Mais ça c’est quelque chose peut-être
qu'on aurait dû d'avantage approfondir. Mais (...) je veux dire c'est la faute à personne. Euh c'est parce que bon euh il fallait euh toujours y avait des dead line et c'était euh y avait des études, y avait des dead line, il fallait, enfin il fallait avancer etc et euh on pouvait pas toujours euh. Mais ça je pense que c'est quelque chose qu'il faudrait revoir. Ouais tout à fait.

D'accord. Euh et bien écoutez je crois que pour l'instant...
C'est pas l'implantation des bases hein, c'est la structure hein de d'implantation. C'est-à-dire euh l'avant-port
Oui oui. J'ai vu le les photos sur
Qui avait été
Dans le presse
Voilà, qui avait été contesté et euh en fait il fallait faire une avancée mais je pense qu'il aurait fallu travailler sur du sur du provi enfin sur sur du provisoire. En plus une digue flottante après on peut l'amener ailleurs. On aurait pu l'amener par exemple agrandir celle des il fallait aussi agrandir celle des Catalans. On aurait pû l'agrandir encore plus, voyez enfin on pouvait euh avoir quelque chose mais de plus complet. Et utiliser ce qu'on faisait le réutiliser ailleurs. Mais bon, je pense qu'on a eu un manque de temps euh flagrant hein parce que c'était vraiment très le questionnaire était long dur hein.
Et oui et puis la candidature s'est finalement étalée sur 9 mois ou quelque chose ça.
AH oui oui, à peine
C'est rien du tout pour des
Ah oui j'ai pas pris de vacances on a travaillé tout l'été. Oui oui. On est parti peut-être 8 jours les uns enfin du 1er au 15 août les uns les autres mais on a cravaché hein, je peux vous le dire hein euh. Non mais c'est bien hein c'est une belle chose et puis ça continue hein y a plein de choses ici.
Et donc vous avez vous avez une idée de si la coupe de l'américa est gagné par les suisses
Non il faut voir bon par les suisses, on verra hein parce que le contrat stipulait pour les 4 que pas forcément on ils retourneraient au même endroit. D'abord ça, et puis la deuxième chose ça ça peut être l'accueil de la coupe America mais ça peut être aussi un équipage, un jour. Euh moi j'ai j'ai dans ma tête j'ai un peu ça mail il faut trouver beaucoup d'argent, les hommes ont les auraient je pense, mais je serai très fière de laisser en 2000 en 2008 quand je W'en vais un bateau euh Marseille pour 2010. Mais il faut trouver des sponsors, il faut trouver on n'a pas trouvé pour Loïc Peyron et pour euh Bertrand Pasè hein euh. C'est les français ne sont pas euh c'est c'est difficile parce que financer euh quelque chose à 8-10 millions c'est une chose mais financer euh euh un bateau une équipe c'est si on veut être si on veut bien se placer il faut au moins 40 millions d'euros au bas mot hein euh. On peut faire avec moins mais bon euh vous me direz le tout c'est de participer (rire) mais on enverra pas la barquette marseillaise (rire)
(Rire) D'accord. Euh (...) et bien écoutez pour moi c'est bon. Est-ce que euh vous auriez euh des personnes euh A vous conseiller ?
Oui, à contacter par rapport au dossier coupe de l'America.
Ben je pense que vous pourriez contacter le secrétaire général de la ville Monsieur Gondard ?
Monsieur Gondard. Euh je pense que celui qui a mené le dossier euh avec beaucoup de maestria de bout en bout euh c'est euh Latil d'Albertas. Vous en avez entendu parler ?
Oui, oui oui.
Voilà. Euh si vous voulez on a été les trois à piloter le dossier, enfin à coordonner le dossier. Euh (...) pfff, après c'est, après on descend à c'est moins global après si vous voulez. Euh après ben vous avez euh différentes euh euh les affaires maritimes ont joué un rôle important parce que c'est quand même monsieur Dujardin et son équipe qui était qui était présent qui donnait qui transmettait enfin y avait tout un tas d'autorisation à avoir en permanence voilà. Y a eu des engagements écrits de tous hein, dans le dossier tout était y avait les affaires maritimes qu'est-ce qui avait encore (...) la communication. Parce que y a eu énormément de communication là-dessus, le directeur général c'est Guy Philippe, il est pas là il est à Shangai là en ce moment.
D'accord.
bon ben c'est déjà pas mal hein
Oui oui.
Vous avez quelques points de (rire) de chute. Voilà.
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