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The Development of a Brussels-based EU Strategic Culture: A Case Study of the European Security and Defence Policy.

By

Vasilis Margaras

Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

21 January 2009

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Abstract

The Development of a Brussels-based EU Strategic Culture: A Case Study of the European Security and Defence Policy.

The study of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been dominated by various mainstream theories drawn from International Relations and European Studies. These have largely neglected the role of ideas, beliefs, values and practices regarding the use of police and military instruments, in other words, the strategic culture which shapes the security and defence policies of the European Union (EU). This strategic culture of the EU has become manifest in the way ESDP officials think about the deployment of military and police resources as well as in the way they plan ESDP missions.

After introducing the concept in general terms, the thesis claims that the notion of strategic culture can be applied to the EU. Various innovative models of categorisation are provided throughout the thesis in order to describe the state of development of EU strategic culture. An analysis of the development of the strategic culture of the EU is provided since the end of the Cold War up to the year 2007. Important developments such as the institutionalisation of ESDP and the establishment of influential policy networks are considered in detail. The study also takes into account the discourse of ESDP and questions the ideas that stem from it through interviews and questionnaires with ESDP officials. A case study of the police and military missions of the EU in Bosnia Herzegovina is included in order to show how ideas regarding the use of force impact on the implementation of EU missions. In conclusion, the thesis claims that the EU has its own strategic culture which is characterised by a number of behavioural/structural elements as well as by certain ideas, values, beliefs and practices.

Key Words: European Union, European Security and Defence Policy, strategic culture, institutions, networks, ideas, beliefs,
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Chapter One: the Notion of Strategic Culture and its Application to the European Security and Defence Policy

1.1. Research Hypothesis

The impact of ideas, beliefs, values and practices which make up the strategic culture of the EU has been largely neglected by the academic literature with the exception of a few notable case studies. The thesis tries to fill this gap by investigating whether the EU possesses its own strategic culture. The main assumption of the thesis is that the EU has its own strategic culture. Elements of the strategic culture of the EU are manifest in the way ESDP officials think about the deployment of military and police resources as well as in the way they plan ESDP missions (use of force). The EU strategic culture is characterised by a number of behavioural/structural elements as well as by certain ideas, values, beliefs and practices that affect the development of ESDP in a particular way.

The thesis first introduces the concept of strategic culture and claims that it can be applied to the EU. The development of the strategic culture of the EU is studied since the end of the Cold War up to December 2007. The historic point of 2007 has been chosen as an ending point in the study of strategic culture as it allows for considerable time to cover ESDP missions that have taken place in Bosnia Herzegovina. This point also covers the enlargement of the EU up to 27 countries, thus providing an updated view on the strategic culture of the EU. Various methodological issues are raised in Appendix I of the thesis whereas the drafting of the questionnaires and the results stemming from them are included in Appendices II, III and IV.
The thesis addresses the main problems stemming from the currently limited literature on the strategic culture of the EU. It also aims at providing an innovative approach to the study of the strategic culture of the European Union. For this reason, it develops various types of categorisation in order to describe the current state of the strategic culture of the EU. The first type of categorisation deals with the structural and behavioural elements that characterise the strategic culture of the EU. The second type of categorisation focuses on the ideas, beliefs, values and practices of ESDP. Furthermore, the thesis takes into account important developments such as the institutionalisation of ESDP and the establishment of influential policy networks in order to study the influence that these formations exercise on the strategic culture of the EU. The thesis studies also ideas, beliefs and values through the conduct of interviews and questionnaires with ESDP officials. Finally, a case study of the police and military missions of the EU in Bosnia Herzegovina is included in order to show how ideas regarding the use of force impact on the implementation of EU missions.

1.2. Introduction to the Study of Strategic Culture

The study of the foreign and security policies of the European Union (EU) is based on theories derived from International Relations (IR) and European studies. A useful starting point here is Howorth (2002, 2002b, 2003), who has largely focused his study of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on the role of the biggest EU member states (France, Germany and the UK) as well as the development of influential epistemic communities within ESDP institutions. Other scholars such as Lindley-French (2002), and Hyde Price (2005b), have studied the importance of member states in the shaping of EU foreign policy. According to these two researchers, the attachment of the EU member states in their respective foreign and security policies account for the slow development of a cohesive European dimension in this policy field. The works of Kohler-Koch (2002) and Krahmann (2003), meanwhile, have focused on the emergence of various policy networks and their impact on EU policy developments. Scholars such as Burgess (2005) and Williams (2001), by contrast, have claimed that the EU is a security community or a security regime whose functioning has an impact on the global
security system. According to these approaches, the EU has managed to establish its own security mechanism that binds member states together towards commonly accepted actions in foreign policy. Furthermore, studies such as those of Diez (1999), Schimmelfenning (2001, 2003) and Biscop (2002), finally, consider the importance of EU discourse in issues of security. Strategic culture has been the subject of some attention in studies of ESDP. Cornish and Edwards (2001, 2005), Rynning (2003) and Meyer (2005, 2006) have used the notion of strategic culture to explain the role of ideas, beliefs and practices in ESDP institutions and missions. However, these studies require further clarification and enrichment.

The works mentioned above are important contributions to understanding the way the EU deals with foreign and security issues. However, these do not pay considerable attention to the role of ideas, beliefs, values and practices regarding the use of military instruments (strategic culture in other words) and have largely focused on issues of structure and agency. Although the thesis does not ignore the fact that the above mentioned elements are important, it takes the study of ESDP one step further by establishing a link between ESDP structures and agents and the ideas, beliefs and values that motivate policy actors. The thesis claims that the EU possesses its own strategic culture and undertakes a study of its foundational elements. It suggests that the theory of strategic culture has to be applied in a particular way in order to reflect the particular nature of the EU. This is one of the main innovations of the thesis as the majority of case studies on strategic culture have been largely conducted on states and not on intergovernmental entities.

In light of the growing importance of ESDP in the external relations of the EU, it is vital to try to understand what are the motives, ideas and values that make up this policy. This chapter will analyse the notion of strategic culture as it is a useful tool for understanding the development of ESDP. The chapter has two main parts. The first elaborates the concept of strategic culture; its development and its analytical strengths. The second considers how the notion of strategic culture can be fruitfully applied to the EU and specifically ESDP.
Strategic culture has been applied in various ways. It has covered the defence and security policies of a range of countries such as China (Johnston, 1996), Japan (Katzenstein, 1998), India (Kim, 2004) and Germany (Longhurst, 2004). It has also been applied to regions, although less so, be this Latin America (Roland, Taras and Cochran, 1999) or Scandinavia (Neumann and Heikka, 2005), and to security institutions such as NATO (Risse-Kappen, 1996). In applying the notion of strategic culture, scholars have tried to explain continuity and change in security policies. In addition, they have sought to explain why certain policy options prevail over others for, according to Johnston (1995b: 46), strategic culture is:

"an ideational milieu which limits behavioural choices".

As the study of strategic culture can explain the motivations behind policy choices it is important to use it in order to study the development of ESDP.

One can trace the development of strategic culture as an analytical tool back to the 1970s. During this period scholars such as Snyder (1977), studied Soviet deterrence policy and concluded that US analysts had failed to predict Soviet reactions to US nuclear policy. This happened because the Americans took for granted the fact that the Soviets would react the same way the Americans would in cases of nuclear deterrence. However, this kind of 'behavioural prediction' (based on rational-actor paradigms and game theoretical modelling) failed to predict the Soviet way of thinking although it provided a first insight into Soviet strategic thinking (e.g. the work of Snyder 1977). As a result of the failure to understand the motives and perceptions behind policy action, a number of scholars (whose work will be mentioned below) came to the conclusion that each country had its own way to interpret, analyse and react to international events. Due to this assumption, a new wave of literature emerged which focused on the development of a new tool of strategic analysis, notably that of strategic culture. The concept of strategic culture draws inspiration from social constructivism (see Appendix
1). The notion of strategic culture has not been static. Its evolution during the last thirty years has led to the creation of three main 'generations' of strategic thinking.

1.3.1. The First Generation: the Birth of the Concept of Strategic Culture

One of the first generation scholars who came up with the idea of strategic culture was Snyder. Strategic culture according to Snyder (1977: 8) can be best defined as:

"the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community share with regard to nuclear strategy".

Ken Booth in his work *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (1979) continued to explore the ideational foundations of nuclear strategy and superpower relations. Colin S. Gray (1981, 1986, 1999) was another important first generation scholar who attempted to provide an analytical study of the importance of the strategic culture in international relations. According to Gray (1999b: 51) strategic culture consists of:

"the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particularly geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience".

This first generation of scholars suggested that strategic culture can be an important tool in the explanation of policy behaviour. Elkins and Simeon (1979: 127-145), for example, suggested that in making policy, individuals usually consider only a few policy options which are defined by their cultural experiences. One of the common assumptions of the first generation of researchers was that the study of strategic culture could shed light on policy by taking into account mindsets and cultural traditions that neo-realist and other rational models ignored. The first generation also argued that strategic culture evolved slowly under the pressure of new experiences (see the works
of Elkins and Simeon 1979, Snyder 1977, Gray 1981). However, although the first generation set the agenda for the exploration of ideas and values concerning the use of force, much of its work was characterised by a certain amount of national stereotypes, unfounded assumptions and problematic methodology that the thesis will avoid. Some of these weaknesses were mostly addressed by second and notably third generation scholars.

1.3.2. The Second Generation of Strategic Culture Scholarship

Another influential but smaller school of thought concerning the study of strategic culture emerged in the 1980s. The second generation of scholars adopted a critical approach and argued that strategic culture can be used as a policy tool in order to promote the dominant values the establishment. The second generation of strategic culture scholarship includes the works of Klein (1990), Luckham (1982) and Kier (1995, 1996). This generation tried to advance the study of strategic culture by expressing doubts about the elements used by previous researchers in their analysis. In particular, second generation scholars such as Kier (1996: 214-215), expressed a growing scepticism concerning the analysis of official discourse. Indeed, according to second generation scholars, a distinction must be made between the ‘actual’ and the ‘declaratory’ strategies of a particular security collective. The main aim of this reflection was the search for ‘the real language’ behind the official documentation. However, second generations scholars have not managed to come up with a comprehensive methodology on how discourse should be studied.

1.3.3. The Third Generation of Strategic Culture Scholarship

The analysis of strategic culture was enriched by contributions from a third generation of scholars. Third Generation scholarship tends to be more narrowly focused on particular strategic elements and more careful when it comes to issues of methodology (see the works of Johnston, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, Rosen 1996, Lantis 2002, Longhurst 2000, 2005, Longhurst and Zaborowski 2005). Third generation scholars are critical of
the methods of the two previous schools (for instance the Gray - Johnston debate mentioned below). Third generation scholars do not uncritically subscribe to the notion that strategic culture is ‘everywhere’ as Gray does (1999b) and engage with the development of detailed case studies in order to demonstrate that a particular culture characterises a specific country or a collective.

Many of the problems evident in the studies of first generation scholars stem from the wideness of the term ‘culture’ itself. Culture is a loose concept, open to endless interpretation. The first generation of scholars did not provide well-defined cases of what culture really is and how it can be traced. These problems were further explored by third generation scholars who tried to provide inclusive answers to the theoretical weaknesses that characterise the first generation. The differences between first and third generation of scholars are evident in the Gray (1999b)-Johnston (1995b, 1999) debate which evolved around issues of culture. On the one hand, Johnston (1995b: 45) provided a ‘limited’ and thus easier to research version of culture by suggesting that:

“culture consists of shared assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political environment”.

By contrast, the works of Gray (1998, 1999a, 1999b) provide a much wider approach to culture which includes the context that surrounds policy-making and policy-makers. However, the problem with the position of Gray on culture is that, according to Johnston (1995b: 46), it is all-encompassing. It cannot be falsified and tested, thus, its scientific validity may be doubted. Johnston (1995b: 33) believes that strategic culture must be falsifiable or at least distinguishable from non-strategic culture variables so that predictions can be derived regarding policy behaviour. There are lessons from the Gray-Johnston debate that the thesis subscribes to. First of all, a study of strategic culture that attempts to cover all aspects of culture runs the risk of becoming all-encompassing, thus lacking depth of analysis. Second, strategic culture has to be ‘verified’ and its main elements need to be brought into the light.
The focus of first and second generation scholars was the state. However, some third generation scholars have expanded the use of strategic culture by using it in order to study security formations such as NATO (Risse-Kappen 1996: 357-399), and regions of the world such as Scandinavia (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 5-23). These works also include the studies of Mychajlyszyn (2004), who suggests that there is a Euro-Atlantic strategic culture. According to Mychajlyszyn (2004: 191-209), the states of Europe, as well as Canada and the United States, share values and beliefs regarding the use of force. These values can be summarised as the transparency of defence and military policies, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the high levels of cooperation, consultation and consensus in the decision-making process as well as the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, in a study on the ‘Western’ accepted notion of human security Frederic Ramel (2003: 79-104), concludes that, although strategic cultures of the Western northern hemisphere share to a certain degree a common culture, they still diverge on issues of definition and application of human security.

1.4. The European Union and the Concept of Strategic Culture

As the concept of strategic culture has been deployed to explain the policy behaviour of multi-national institutions, a few scholars have also attempted to make a link between strategic culture and the EU. According to Hadfield (2004: 9), this linkage is possible because:

“while it [the EU] is not a political unit in the traditional nation-state sense, the nature and focus of its institutional structures suggests that it too operates as a system of inferred symbols, complex language structures, nodes of collective self-reference that act in the pervasive establishment of preferences both discrete put permanent”.

Furthermore, according to Burgess (2005:1), the EU is a security community which is inextricably linked to values:
“a wide range of principles and practices of the EU make reference, either directly or subjacently to a set of fundamental values, whose origin and homogeneity is seldom put into question”.

Chapter Two will deal further with the idea of the EU being a security community and how different models of the EU security community can affect its strategic culture.

Although in his work, Rynning (2003a, 2003b) is sceptical about the state of the strategic culture of the EU he also recognizes that the EU has the potential to possess a strategic culture. This is because, according to Rynning (2003b: 11):

“the EU represents a collective ambition to create and uphold a liberal order in Europe, and member states are committed to enlarging this zone of peace and cooperation. This conclusion stands even if European countries through late 2002 and 2003 became deeply divided on the issue of Iraq and the question of supporting the US intervention”.

Therefore, a link must be made between strategic culture and the study of ESDP. According to Hadfield (2004: 12-13), using strategic culture as a tool of EU policy analysis is possible because the concept can be used both for states as well as structures with a multi-national dimension.

Why is a study of the strategic culture of the EU important? First of all, the concept of strategic culture itself figures in official documents of the EU, most significantly the European Security Strategy (ESS), in which, the High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana has talked about the necessity of forging: “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (European Council 2003: 13). Without an EU strategic culture it is quite likely that no common vision of the world will emerge amongst the EU members. In this case, as Van Staden (2000: 6) claims, the EU will be carried along by events and incidents without having a clear view of how these should be addressed. This is also the view of Meyer (2006: 3) who claims that:
"if the compass needles of key members point in opposite directions, common action will become substantially more difficult; the lack of strategic coherence may lead the EU to recognise a threat too late, procrastinate a decision or fail at the implementation stage on account of insufficient political and public support. ESDP may become simply unsustainable once a military engagement proves costly or fails in its immediate objective".

1.4.1. Basic ideas of the Strategic Culture of the European Union

Where does the strategic culture of the EU stand so far? The works of scholars such as Martinsen (2003), Matlary (2006), Cornish & Edwards (2001, 2005) and Meyer (2005, 2006) provide an optimistic view of ESDP by reaching the conclusion that an EU strategic culture, albeit with various limitations, is slowly emerging. However, not all researchers are so optimistic. The studies of Lindley-French (2002), Rynning (2003a) and Hyde Price (2005), argue that security policy remains firmly under the powers of the EU nation states as the EU still lacks a common strategic culture.

According to Cornish and Edwards (2001: 587, 2005: 802), the strategic culture of the EU can be defined as:

"the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with general recognition of the EU's legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities".

The expansion of the EU policy sphere in issues of security and defence is also mentioned by Cornish and Edwards (2001: 588) who suggests that:

"there are areas of political-military activity, such as policing actions of various types on the external borders of the EU, and the limited application of military force in the context of post-conflict reconstruction, peace-building and development aid, where perhaps a unique, 'gendarmerie' style EU strategic culture has been germinating".
A few of the elements which constitute the strategic culture of the EU will be described in the works mentioned below. However, these are still very general characteristics that require further elaboration and analysis in the thesis. For instance, Hyde-Price (2005: 154-155), argues that a European strategic culture is characterized by: the primacy of expeditionary operations and the use of coercion but not brute force. Rynning (2003: 485) seems to agree with this statement as he mentions that the less robust nature of the EU:

"is indicative of the same European inhibition that was seen in Kosovo with regard to applying force to win campaigns".

Furthermore, according to Hyde-Price (2005: 155), in the case of the EU:

"military coercion will rarely be employed unless it is seen to have a clear ethical or humanitarian goal".

This is in accordance with the analysis provided by Rynning (2003: 485-6), who claims that the European use of force will likely resemble that of the doctrine of just war: military coercion will take place only when mandated by international law (jus ad bellum). Furthermore, the use of force will be severely constrained (jus in bello).

In addition, Hyde-Price (2005: 154-5) argues that EU states are concerned at ways of securing minimal risk in the exposure of their armies, and that they are sensitive when it comes to causing collateral damage as European public opinion is ill-disposed to the civilian costs of war. Similarly, Cornish and Edwards (2005: 809) claim that:

"the EU has largely regarded the value of military force as limited, preferring a more integrated response that tackles the threat".
Similarly, scholars such as Rynning (2003b: 11), express doubts on whether the EU is ready to engage in direct and often lethal fights against threats such as terrorism. Finally, Meyer (2006: 174) is also very cautious about the EU’s capacity and attitudes towards the resolution of humanitarian crises. As he argues:

“only if humanitarian crises pop up on the EU’s doorstep in a form which is sufficiently in the mass media, can one expect the pressure to act to outweigh concerns over divergent norms on how to fight”.

The above mentioned ideas provide interesting insights to the ideas, beliefs and values that characterise ESDP. However, these descriptions have to be tested in order to be validated as they mostly stem from mere observation of ESDP missions that the EU has so far undertaken. Unfortunately, (with the exception of the more methodologically rigorous work of Meyer, 2006), none of the scholars of EU strategic culture has yet come up with comprehensive methodological guidelines as to how strategic culture should be identified and analysed. The construction of such guidelines is not an easy task as the EU is neither a state nor a simple security organization. Therefore, the study of its strategic culture cannot conform to previous models of strategic culture analysis and so requires an enriched approach. The next section of the thesis deals with the ‘differentiation’ of the EU and the implications that this particular differentiation poses to the study of strategic culture.

1.4.2. Why the European Union is Different? Implications of Differentiation for the Study of the Strategic Culture of the European Union

Matlary (2006: 108-9), notes that the strategic culture of the EU is ‘post-national’. According to Matlary (2006: 114), the EU is a different actor: one that does not look like a Westphalian state and one that is not a simple international organization. Because of this peculiarity the study of strategic culture of the EU cannot be based on the idea of defence because - contrary to what happened in the shaping of the strategic culture of states - the EU does not have a defence policy in the traditional sense.
Scholars of strategic culture mention that there are many factors that affect strategic culture. The study of strategic culture includes analysis of factors as diverse as civic/political culture, tradition, technology, institutional setting, geography, climate, resources, the dominant way of political and social life in the country studied, organizational culture and traditions, historical strategic practices, institutional dynamics, national characteristics, symbols and political psychology (Lantis and Howlett, 2007: 82-99). However, due to the 'different' nature of the EU, not all these factors can be used in a study of its strategic culture.

For instance, in the case of the EU, it would be difficult to talk about a unified political culture that could shape strategic culture of the EU as much of its politics are still dominated by national actors, national political parties and national issues. The same would be valid for other analytical elements such as the study of tradition, the dominant way of life and national characteristics which form part of various studies on national strategic cultures. There are also scholars who mention the importance of the national Constitutions and Parliaments on the strategic culture of the states which they have chosen to examine (Longhurst on Germany, 2004, Katzenstein on Japan, 1998). However, in the case of the EU, ESDP emerged long before the Treaty establishing a European Constitution whereas the competencies in the field of security and defence were left in the hands of the members states. For all these reasons, the above mentioned variables cannot be used in a study of the strategic culture of the EU. The next part of the chapter will justify why particular elements have to be taken into account. These elements will constitute the main independent variables of the study.

1.5. Definition of the Strategic Culture of the European Union

The thesis will now provide a definition of the strategic culture of the EU as well as give an account of how the thesis is going to proceed. After a careful study of the definitions of strategic studies that have been mentioned previously, the strategic culture of the EU is defined as:
the ideas, beliefs, values and practices of Brussels based ESDP officials regarding the current and potential use of force though the deployment of police and military instruments. These ideas, beliefs, values and practices are manifested in the way ESDP Brussels based officials think about the deployment of the military and police resources of the EU as well as in the way they plan missions of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The strategic culture of the EU is also characterised by various structural and behavioural elements of strategic culture which are manifested through the interaction of ESDP officials in institutions and networks. Elements of strategic culture are also developed through the historic evolution of the European security debate.

The strategic culture of the EU is shaped by multiple independent variables, the most important of which are, the historic framework within which ESDP has been promulgated, the development of ESDP ideas through networking and institutionalisation, the emergence of various structural and behavioural rules as well as the development of practices through military/police missions. Building on the definition above, the next section deals with those elements that make up the study of EU strategic culture and will explain how they are to be applied in the thesis.

1.5.1. Locating Strategic Culture through the Study of History

The development of strategic culture (continuity or change in ideas regarding the use of force through police and military resources) can be seen as a product of various historical influences. In one of his very first works Gray (1981: 35-37) defined strategic culture as:

"referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derive from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behaviour in national terms".
Furthermore, the works of Martha Finnemore (2003) and Theo Farrell (2005) have focused on gathering historic evidence which shows that norms of war have changed within the West over time because of external shocks, and other related historical events.

Generally, works on strategic culture clearly argue that strategic culture cannot be separated from historical context. In the case of the EU, an analysis of the historical evolution which has led to the creation of ESDP is therefore important. When it comes to ESDP, it has been suggested that various historic events have been influential in its inception and development. For instance, researchers on security issues (Howorth 2000, 2003, Hyde-Price 2005, Lindley-French 2002), provide an analysis of the political developments in 1998 (notably the Anglo-French St. Malo declaration) which were crucial for the emergence of ESDP. However, it is also argued that the process of change started much earlier (Bailes 1996: 55-64, Howorth 2000: 33-55). In general, the historic coverage of ESDP claims that there were many discussions for a 'Europe of security' since the creation of the European Community back in the 1950s, but it was mostly the pressures emerging after the end of the Cold War which gave new impetus to the idea of assumption of security on behalf of the EU (Meyer 2006: 1-13, Howorth 2000: 33-55, Longhurst and Zaborowski 2005:159-173, van Eekelen 2006: 10-19). New fears stemming from the end of the Cold War led to the birth of new ideas on how to deal with post 1989 security challenges (Hyde Price 2005: 137-155). Consequently, historic changes brought a change of mentalities which were manifested in the creation of new epistemic communities which provided new thinking in issues of security (Howorth 2004: 211-234). This process of change led to basic strategic reconsiderations and to a favourable approach to the idea that the EU could become a security player.

External shocks and policy failures are very much related to the question of when change happens in strategic culture and consequently have to be taken into account in a study of ESDP (Lantis 2005: 8). Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990: 69-70), note that cultures remain important when their core principles continue to generate solutions
that satisfy human needs. When cultures cease to provide such solutions, when they cease to make sense, their constitutive members begin to doubt them, and if plausible alternatives are available, members ultimately defect to them. Change takes place when new issues need to be dealt with and when old solutions are no longer relevant. Problems related to the elements that make up a strategic culture together lead to a discussion about its usefulness and consequently to a change or to a reconsideration of the policies that constitute it.

In this light, one can trace a process of policy learning from traumas and failures. For instance, it is argued that it was the EU’s bad experience in Bosnia and Kosovo that finally pushed it to assume military responsibilities (Cornish and Edwards 2001: 588, Lantis 2005: 9). The evolution of the EU strategic culture was gradual in nature as change of ideas which are related to the use of force happens slowly most of the times (Longhurst 2004). Fundamental change may also be a strategic outcome in times of severe crisis, or in cases where failure stems from wrong strategic choices. For these reasons the thesis will include a chapter on the historic evolution of EU security debate after the Cold War and will take into account influential events as well as the actions of particular member states that contributed to the establishment of ESDP.

**1.5.2. The role of ESDP policy officials in the Development of the Strategic Culture of the European Union**

Many strategic culture researchers (e.g. Kier 1995, Katzenstein 1996, Howorth 2000, Meyer 2006) focus on the question of policy elites and their influence in the development and maintenance of strategic culture. As strategic culture is related to the study of ideas, beliefs and values, policy officials become objects of research because they are the ‘carriers’ of ideas that are the main elements of a strategic culture. Therefore, the beliefs of ESDP officials must be studied in detail. The thesis agrees with this claim and includes an analysis of questionnaires and interviews which stem from two different groups of EU officials (Appendix III and IV). The first group interviewed consists of members of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), one of
the most influential institutions in the ESDP decision-making process (see Chapter Five). The second sample of interviewees includes EU officials which come from many other EU institutions in order to check whether there is a consistency of beliefs regarding the use of force within the EU. Further information regarding the choice of the two interview samples is included in these Appendices as well as in the Appendix I. Furthermore, the relationship between agents and structure is also taken into account in Appendix I as the thesis follows the logic of structuration (Giddens 1984).

The role of EU officials has to be taken into account as officials are often seen as the purveyors of a common historical narrative (Cruz 2000: 278). Furthermore, officials are perceived as 'strategic users' of culture who redefine the 'limits of the possible' in key foreign and security discourses (Lantis 2005: 10). However, they are not always carriers of new ideas and may be cognitively predisposed in certain cases to maintain the status quo, a stance which renders them the main obstacles of change. As Johnston (1995b: 57) suggests:

"elites have their own language of discourse which excludes alternative strategies, undermines challenges to their authority, mobilises support and otherwise upholds their hegemony in the decision process".

Consequently, the boundaries of the strategic agenda of the EU will be set by the language, logic and conceptual categories of the high-echelon ESDP officials and decision-makers.

In addition, officials have their own interests which can be influential when it comes to setting up policy-agendas and taking decisions. According to Hadfield (2004: 6):

"actors are [...] constituted by the range of self-reference and self-interest, generally formed endogenously (if reaffirmed exogenously) and which then promote a cohesive sense of unity, an intra-unit commonality as well as inter-unit differences throughout the wider international structure".
Therefore, elites have the ability to promote new ideas which serve their roles and interests within a particular collective. However, one should also take into account that ideas serve officials only when a set of particular circumstances are fulfilled. According to Keohane and Goldstein (1993: 3):

“ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors’ clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium and when they become embedded in political institutions”.

However, although EU officials are influential, it should be also taken into account that they are constrained by societal framework of ideas and values that surrounds them as well by wider political and institutional forces. Furthermore, ESDP officials can become ‘entrapped’ in their own ideas or in the ideas that are propagated in their environment by other policy-makers and institutions. According to Johnston (1995: 40):

“elites, too, are socialised in the strategic culture they produce, and thus can be constrained by the symbolic myths which their predecessors have created. This raises the possibility that elites cannot escape the symbolic discourses they manipulate”.

The view that ESDP officials are constrained by beliefs and values is also supported in the work of Meyer (2005: 527) who argues that policy officials:

“draw on pre-existing and usually stable schemata, beliefs and ideas about the external world and deeply ingrained norms about appropriate behaviour”.

In addition, as many policy officials are in Brussels in order to represent their respective member state, they also face limitations on their mandate and powers. A study on the EU strategic culture cannot ignore the role of ESDP officials neither the limitations posed on them by their structural environment. The thesis will focus on
whether there is a strategic culture made by EU officials, which are its basic ideas and how far EU officials are constrained by various structural and political issues. The roles and attitudes of ESDP officials will be explored in detail in Chapters Four, Five and Six.

1.5.3. The Development of Strategic Culture through the Influence of Networks

Although EU officials have played an important role in the development of EU strategic culture, they do not act in a vacuum. Elites work in institutions, interact and negotiate with each other in order to reach an EU consensus on issues of security. The examination of the relationships developed amongst different elites through networking can provide interesting findings as far as the planning and execution of policies is concerned. Appendix I justifies the choice of policy networks over other similar terms. The works of Johnston (1995), Katzenstein (1996), Finnemore (2003), Farrell (2005), Howorth (2004) and Meyer (2006) have emphasised the role of elites acting as 'norm entrepreneurs' and the influence of policy networks in the creation of new security trends. In the case of ESDP, Howorth (2004) claims that a particular epistemic community has been important in the shaping of ESDP and that it consists of representatives from the biggest EU states (France, Germany and the UK). Edwards (2006: 21) also mentions the importance of the 'big three' group of officials as a 'directoire' which leads ESDP. Therefore, networks can become a proxy indicator of strategic culture as well as the vehicle through which strategic culture is transmitted. By showing how influential networks are in ESDP, the thesis will, in parallel, show how the strategic culture of the EU has been developed.

However, questions from previous works mentioned can arise on the 'quality' of the cooperation that takes place in ESDP through networking. For instance, the networking of the 'big three' EU countries may happen not necessarily because they have reached a common strategic culture but because their geopolitical interests and priorities happened to converge at a particular time. Therefore, the thesis makes a distinction between strategic culture and strategic consensus. A strategic consensus can be reached
when the strategic interests of particular policy-makers converge and a decision to establish joint missions is possible. However, a strategic consensus does not necessarily imply that the elites have reached permanent common ideas, beliefs and values on wider geopolitical and strategic issues. Therefore, in terms of ideas, strategic culture is ‘deeper’ from a simple strategic consensus as it implies that EU members hold similar views on the deployment of police and military instruments on a permanent basis. Without a strategic culture, the development of ESDP is still possible. Nevertheless, its evolution will be based on coalitions of EU countries that will caucus temporarily for their own interests and not in the development of a cohesive group of EU states which will be bounded together by common understandings on security issues.

Another point that should be also examined is how various policy networks interact with officials from other EU member states which do not form part of their network. For example, although the ‘big three’ group is seen as influential in the shaping of ESDP one must not forget that the EU consists of a wide number of EU states and that agreement is necessary amongst them so that an ESDP mission could be implemented. Therefore, one should take into account the relationship between the big three and the remaining EU member states. In addition, the thesis will also try to locate other influential networks (such as the ‘neutrals’ network and the Greek-Cypriot-Maltese group) that have not been studied so far. All these topics will be included in a consideration of institutionalisation/policy networks in Chapters Four and Five.

1.5.4. Institutionalisation of ESDP and its Impact on Strategic Culture

The thesis claims that structure and agency should be seen as two different entities that mutually influence each other (Giddens 1984). Further details are included in Appendix I of the thesis. In the case of the EU, Andreani (2000: 83) has, in fact, suggested that institutions have always been at the core of the European project:
“the process of European integration is a joint exercise in norm-setting and institution building. Institutions are supposed to provide for fairness and predictability, and inspire EU countries with a sense of purpose and belonging. Institutionalisation raises expectations and plays an important role in maximizing capabilities and giving life to actions”.

Institutions are seen as important strategic culture shapers for various reasons. As will be mentioned in Chapter Three, the development of networks within institutions is a fact that has facilitated the development of ESDP. In addition, as it will be argued later in Chapter Four, ESDP institutions have become the hubs of policy networks. Therefore, institutions and networks have to be studied in parallel.

More specifically, according to Cornish and Edwards (2001: 595), institutions have been important in the shaping of the strategic culture of the EU because:

“institutionalisation matters in that, inter alia, it establishes strong socializing pressures on the part of those participating, both within the formal structures and within the more informal processes and procedures that surround them”.

Therefore, a study on institutions has to focus on how far ESDP institutions have managed to strengthen the development of the strategic culture of the EU.

The study of institutions is also important for another reason. ESDP institutions do not only interact amongst themselves but are also enmeshed in a wider web of relationships. Neighbouring states, big powers such as the US, regional blocs, and security organisations such as NATO and the UN, are connected with the policies of the EU through institutionalized relationships. Here, NATO has a particular significance. Because of a lack of capabilities and experience, the EU has reached a number of agreements with the alliance. An inclusive study of the strategic culture of the EU thus cannot ignore the relationship between these two entities. The thesis will provide a summary of the thoughts that ESDP officials have when it comes to the interaction
between their own institutions with other policy actors and will shed light on the beliefs of ESDP officials regarding the EU-NATO link.

While one would stress the importance of institutions in strategic culture one must also be cautious about the real impact that these have on ESDP. Institutions cannot create a strategic culture ‘on their own’. It may also be the case that institutions form the basis of negotiations where member states see ESDP as a process of pulling resources together in order to serve their own needs and not as spaces of common identity and integration. Therefore, institutionalisation has many different expressions. These will be taken into account in Chapter Two. Some of these forms are described as ‘thin’, and mostly relate to mere intergovernmental interaction that takes place within ESDP institutions for the sake of national interests. Chapter Two will also cover ‘thicker’ versions of institutionalisation which are characterised by common values, ideas and beliefs.

Finally, studies which claim that an EU strategic culture is slowly emerging (Cornish and Edwards 2001, 2005, Martinsen 2003, Edwards 2006, Meyer 2006) mention that it is already developing through a ‘socialization’ process which is considerably accelerated by institutional arrangements. Socialization is used in the thesis to describe the process by which officials within an EU institution come to acquire similar attitudes and values after being engaged in negotiations concerning policy decisions and through intensive social interaction. Parts of the questionnaire that will be analysed in Chapters Four and Six deal with issues of socialisation and the impact that personal interaction has upon ESDP officials.

1.5.5. Case Study: ESDP Missions in Bosnia Herzegovina

In her works on strategic culture, Longhurst (2000b, 2004) argues that collective ideas and values about the use of force are important constitutive factors in the design and execution of states’ security policies. In this respect, strategic culture is important because it either presents decision-makers with a limited range of options or it acts as a
lens that alters the appearance and efficacy of different choices. Analysis of strategic culture can thus be seen as an attempt to locate the impact of deep-seated values and beliefs when it comes to deciding on ways that a particular mission should be implemented (see also Appendix I).

It is worth mentioning that the study of strategic culture of the EU is not merely an issue related to academic theory. It is a pragmatic discussion as the EU implements its own security agenda under the umbrella of ESDP institutions. Therefore, it is vital to apply the strategic culture concept in order to analyse ESDP policies in depth. Various works on the strategic culture of the EU point to the steady EU development of responsibilities in terms of conflict prevention and management as manifested in the growing number of ESDP missions. Furthermore, operations are important because they can lead to a ‘can do’ psychology amongst EU policy makers (Cornish and Edwards 2005: 807) which, in turn, has a long-term impact on shaping a more dynamic strategic culture for the EU. For these reasons, the exploration of the strategic culture of the EU would have been incomplete without the inclusion of a case study on ESDP missions.

Here it should be mentioned that strategic action influences learning and change in strategic culture. On the one hand, if a particular operation fails, it is very likely that major parts of EU strategy will have to be altered. These changes may, in turn, lead to a transformation of EU strategic culture. On the other hand, if an ESDP mission is successful then strategic thinking may be empowered and consolidated leading to a ‘spill-over’ of missions. That said, the thesis favours a cautious approach when it comes to the study of missions. Although various researchers (Martinsen 2003, Cornish and Edwards 2001, 2005) have focused their studies almost exclusively on the development of an EU strategic culture manifested through the deployment of ESDP missions, sceptics can juxtapose the fact that missions do not necessarily reflect common ideas on deploying police and military forces but a temporary convergence of interest that evaporates once the missions are over (strategic consensus). Therefore, a successful link between actions and strategic culture must be made so that it can be demonstrated
that there are common ideas and beliefs which are influential in the planning and implementation of ESDP missions. This will be the task of the case study chapter on the ESDP missions in Bosnia Herzegovina (Chapter Six).

1.6. Constraints on the Development of the Strategic Culture of the EU

A comprehensive study of the strategic culture of the EU must take into account the difficulties that impede its consolidation. First of all, the supposed intergovernmentalist nature of ESDP is commonly cited as a problem. Julian Lindley-French (2002: 809) summarized the situation at the beginning of the 2002 by arguing:

“in 2002, it would appear, there is neither strategy nor policy. Or, put another way, there are too many strategies and policies based upon contending strategic concepts. This has led to a dangerous paradox in European security policies that has become increasingly apparent over the past ten years. In the absence of a functioning transnational security concept west European powers, both big and small, react too late, with too little, to crises that seem increasingly beyond the scope and range of either their diplomatic or military capabilities, built as they are on false strategic assumptions”.

Therefore, although there has been a considerable process of strategic convergence facilitated by ESDP, Matlary (2006: 107) notes that the EU strategic culture is still at an ‘embryonic’ state and requires further consolidation. This condition is due to the fact that the member states continue to possess widely different national strategic cultures:

“from France and the UK, which are used to global military activism, to Germany, which needs a UN mandate and parliamentary approval for any use of force” (Matlary 2006: 113).
Other studies have also focused on the differences between the biggest EU nations states. Hyde-Price (2005: 139-140) provides an analysis of national differences on the use of force amongst France, Germany, Poland and the UK, thus demonstrating the difficulties in the road of a development of a cohesive strategic culture.

In general, it is widely accepted that European attitudes are still characterised by considerable heterogeneity. Furthermore, national variations are not easy to overcome because they have been shaped by different historical lessons (Meyer 2006: 1). According to Edwards (2006: 17), the ‘strength and legitimacy of national discourses’ leaves a limited space for the development of a vibrant supranational strategic culture. The issue of ‘national’ predominance in matters of security and defence limit the inventiveness and dynamism of ESDP as beliefs, ideas and values on the use of military and police instruments remain diverse. Furthermore, according to Meyer (2005: 52-3), national awareness of the ESDP project is still low, thus blocking the development of EU strategic culture.

In addition, pressures stemming from national priorities often lead to a lack of political will to cooperate and act through ESDP (Matlary 2006: 118). For instance, the strategic culture of the EU remains ‘anaemic’ because of the lack of capabilities (Edwards 2006: 17, Cornish and Edwards 2005: 802). This problem may be linked to the unwillingness of the EU member states to invest more resources into ESDP as they remain cautious about its overall aims. The thesis will answer whether different national cultures can be combined in ESDP by reaching a common framework of beliefs and values. Unfortunately, the great number of EU states renders impossible the tasks of examining their security and defence policies in detail. However, the questionnaire drafted to test official opinions also includes sections on the issue of national identities as well as the interaction between the ESDP and the nation states (see analysis in Chapters Six and Seven).
Another challenge to the cohesion of ESDP is the trend of enlargement which is also seen as ‘problematic’ when it comes to the shaping of a unified strategic culture for the EU. For instance, Meyer (2005: 52) mentions that:

“the overloaded agenda and the large number of participants can hamper substantive discussions about longer term strategic choices”.

One of the biggest challenges to ESDP posed by enlargement is the deepening of divisions concerning collaboration with NATO (Cornish and Edwards 2005: 800, Hyde-Price 2005: 137). The EU-NATO partnership has, for decades, had a decisive influence on European thinking on issues of security and strategy (Cornish and Edwards 2005: 815). However, divisions amongst EU members on the perceptions of NATO remain strong and there is no clear indication how far the EU-NATO relationship should go (Meyer 2006: 138-170). The impact of enlargement will be also discussed in the thesis as it emerged during interviews with ESDP officials (Chapters Five and Six).

Furthermore, the question of NATO is inextricably linked to the role of the USA in security affairs. The Iraq crisis of 2003 demonstrated that due to different national perspectives on US foreign policy, EU member states could choose very different strategic directions (Cornish and Edwards 2005: 819). Diverging opinions on the question of NATO/US involvement in ESDP may lead to a slow down of the strategic culture of the EU. For all these reasons, a study of the strategic culture of the EU should take into account these divisions and try to examine whether a unified strategic culture can emerge by bridging the ‘Atlanticist’ and the ‘Europeanist’ perceptions that are evident in the policies of EU member states.

In the case where the ‘bridging’ of national positions through ESDP is not happening, one should not disregard the development of multiple sub-cultures as a possible outcome of ESDP. Strategic culture theory takes into account the fact that different groups of ideas may coexist within a specific culture. Therefore, a study on strategic
culture must also bear in mind that strategic culture may be characterised by fragmentation and in the case of the EU, it may consist of a number of sub-cultures that overlap, thus creating a circle where common points interact by providing a strategic consensus. However, if this is the case, there is also an important space outside the circle of consensus which leaves a wide room of manoeuvre for the national strategic cultures to perform their own initiatives outside the ESDP framework. The development of strategic culture may be empowered as long as ESDP institutions become powerful and can diffuse their own ideas in a 'top-bottom' manner, thus gradually enlarging the above mentioned circle of common action.

1.7. Innovations of the Study of the Strategic Culture of the European Union

This study of EU strategic culture attempts to fill gaps apparent in similar studies and is characterised by various innovations. First of all, the study has extracted structural and behavioural elements from a number of multi-national entities (Chapter Two). The thesis uses structural/behavioural elements from entities such as security communities, policy networks and institutions in order to see how a 'modus vivendi' is constructed within them. It claims that three particular types of strategic culture can be developed by taking into account structural and behavioural elements in security communities, policy networks and institutions. These three types are called primary, intermediate and consolidated type. Second, the thesis provides a link between the development of the EU security community and the policy networks and institutions that are functioning within such a security community. Third, as noted above, the thesis makes a distinction between strategic consensus which is an ephemeral consensus on a particular security issue and strategic culture which implies that the EU possesses common beliefs regarding a particular strategic question. The study also provides four different types regarding the use of force in order to categorise the way the EU deploys its military and police instruments. These different types have been extracted from a study of the literature on the EU strategic culture and EU actorness (Chapter Two). The
main types that are developed are named as Passive Europe, Cautious Interventionist Europe, Active Europe and Super Active Europe.

Furthermore, the study of history is another step in the extraction of ideas and values that have contributed to the development of the EU strategic culture through the establishment of ESDP (Chapter Three). The study of history is carried out to investigate the way the changing environment has affected their thinking on issues of security, thus contributing to the development of an EU strategic culture. Furthermore, the study of the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts also provide interesting insights on the way the Europeans perceived the use of force. The thesis follows the perceptions of the EU officials regarding the Western Balkans by providing a case study on the ESDP Bosnian missions in order to extract beliefs and practices that are influential in the development of the strategic culture of the EU (Chapter Six). This is not an exercise aimed at describing the problems and challenges of the two ESDP missions in BiH or accessing its effectiveness but rather an effort to locate which beliefs are influential when it comes to the implementation of EU operations.

1.8. Conclusions

Each state and security institution that exercises the use of force through the deployment of police and military instruments may possess a strategic culture. The thesis argues that this is also the case for the EU. It may be argued that the strategic culture of the EU is still an 'embryonic' one or in the process of development. However, if this is the case, then this is a time where its main elements have to be studied as they form the basic constitutive elements that will shape future developments in the field of ESDP. There is already a limited academic debate on the topic of the strategic culture of the EU which requires further clarification, elaboration and deepening. Ideas, beliefs, practices and values regarding the use of force through the planning and deployment of EU military and police instruments form part of the strategic culture of the EU and have to be studied in detail.
After a consideration of the literature of strategic culture, the thesis will develop in relation to four main elements. The influence of ESDP institutions and policy networks will be analysed in Chapters Four and Six of the thesis whereas patterns of measuring the strength of the strategic culture of the EU will form part of Chapter Two. In addition, the post-Cold War trajectory which led to the establishment of ESDP will be analysed in Chapter Three. The analysis of opinions of ESDP officials will be extracted from an extensive questionnaire and interviews (Chapters Four, Five and Six). Finally, a study on the strategic culture of the EU cannot be complete without an inclusion of case studies. Due to their length and size, the two ESDP missions in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUPM and Althea) will be considered in order to discover how the strategic culture of the EU has an impact on the implementation of its missions (Chapter Six). Various ontological and methodological issues which are related to the concept of strategic culture are presented in Appendix 1. The thesis will now focus on the categorisation of the EU strategic culture into different models. Chapter Two deals with the issue of strategic culture categorisation and provides various models of strategic culture. These will be used later in the thesis in order to describe the strategic culture of the EU.
Chapter Two:
Categorising Strategic Culture

2.1. Introduction

The idea of measuring strategic culture is inspired by the Johnston - Gray debate. In this debate, Johnston (1995b) argues that strategic culture needs to be considered scientifically. Therefore, one has to prove that strategic culture exists and that it is susceptible to measurement. This chapter will provide an account of how measurement can be applied to the strategic culture of the EU.

Chapter One argued that strategic culture can be measured by taking into account elements that characterise the functioning of other multinational entities such as security communities, policy networks and institutions. This suggestion is extended here with the claim that each security community, including that of the EU, has its own strategic culture. The decision to conduct a study of institutions, policy networks and security communities was made on the grounds that, as the EU is not a state. Types of strategic culture were devised to study the strategic culture that would fit an entity such as the EU. Therefore, other multinational entities had to be taken into account that would reflect the particular structure of the EU. The analysis of these three concepts (security communities, policy networks and institutions) aims to pinpoint those behavioural and structural elements that permit these entities to be kept together and to consequently possess a strategic culture. These entities are characterised by their own different levels of 'maturity' due to different behavioural and structural characteristics. These different types of strategic culture serve as a basis for measuring the strategic culture of the EU. In addition, as strategic culture is about the role of ideas, beliefs and values regarding the use of force, a framework which categorises ideas in different types of strategic culture also needs to be developed. This framework will be analysed at section 2.5 of the Chapter.
As a point of departure, Chapter Two begins by analysing the importance of the notion of security community as related to the EU. It claims that each security community has its own strategic culture and consequently so does the security community of the EU. However, this is not a merely descriptive exercise. The main novelty of the chapter is to describe the role that institutions and policy networks play within the EU security community and how the strategic culture of the EU is affected by the functions of networks and institutions. Inspired by the theory of security communities, the chapter argues that the strategic culture of the EU can be categorised in three different types. These are the primary, intermediate and consolidated types of strategic culture. Chapter Two also develops the notion of security community by suggesting that policy networks and institutions play a vital link in its maintenance. Without the development of EU policies and the exchange of ideas that is taking place within networks and institutions no strategic culture could have emerged in a security community.

2.2. Security Communities

The existence of a security community is a basic prerequisite for the emergence of an EU strategic culture. Without the emergence of an EU security community (a “no war” community), the development of an EU strategic culture would be impossible as EU states would have never agreed to act together in the field of security and defence. Many scholars claim that the EU is a security community with its own characteristics (Williams 2001: 525, Rumelili 2003: 213, Waever 1998: 69). Being such community, the EU carries its own values which have an impact on the way it uses its military and police instruments, and consequently, on the way it develops its strategic culture.

The notion of security communities was introduced by Karl Deutsch (1957, 1978). Deutsch argued that the North American and Western European states were successful in creating security communities in which the use of force between members was almost unthinkable (Deutsch et al 1957). As elaborated by Nicholas Khoo (2004: 38):
“security communities are characterised by the absence of war as well as the absence of significant organized preparations for war such as military contingency planning amongst its members. Competitive military build-ups or arms races between members of the claimed security community should also not be present”.

A natural corollary is that a security community involves a group of states, which have become “integrated”. According to Deutsch (1957: 5), by such integration:

"we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of security” and of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure [...] dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief [...] that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change”.

Adler and Barnett (1998: 17) suggest that a formation such as the EU is an uncontested security community and is organised around three tiers: (1) precipitating conditions; (2) process variables (transactions, organizations, and social learning) and structural variables (power and knowledge); and (3) mutual trust and collective identity. Geographic proximity and the new technologies on communications are factors that contributed to the creation of the EU security community. However, geographic proximity and technology do not necessarily lead to the creation of a security community. For instance, the conditions for a security community are not present in other areas of the world such as the Asia-Pacific region because the region according to Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama (2002: 69):

“encompasses a diverse mixture of rival great powers, thorny territorial disputes, unresolved historical memories, competing political ideologies, painful economic transitions, shifting military balances and diverging cultures”.

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Therefore, other factors such as common narratives, religion, societal values and beliefs also form an important part in the creation of a security community as they do in the development of strategic culture.

Adler and Barnett also mention the existence of ‘pluralistic security communities’. According to Adler and Barnett (1998: 31), a pluralistic security community is defined:

“as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change”.

Adler and Barnett (1998: 31) suggest that a pluralistic security community has three main characteristics:

“first, members of a community have shared identities, values, and meanings. [...] Secondly, those in a community have many-sided and direct relations: interaction occurs not indirectly and in only specific and isolated domains, but rather through some form of face-to-face encounter and relations in numerous settings. Thirdly, such communities exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest and perhaps even altruism; long term interest derives from knowledge of those with whom one is interacting, and altruism can be understood as a sense of obligation and responsibility”.

The pluralistic version of security community fits the EU. It is a community of states that has developed a considerable level of trust which is manifested in the absence of military clashes. Furthermore, although the states of this community may still have different interests, it is claimed that these can be mutually influenced by group interaction. Furthermore, as claimed by Adler and Barnett (1998: 31), a security community is characterised by ‘shared identities’ which can be seen as the departure point of strategic culture.
The process of constructing a security community is a gradual one and requires a considerable amount of time. According to Deutsch (1978: 246-247), the whole process starts first with the sharing of a number of small modest tasks. If the security community is successful, it then receives more important tasks, and consequently, is upgraded to a community of overall amalgamation. The 'internal behaviour' of security communities is analysed by Deutsch (1978: 230-44). The process of integration includes a process of 'habit breaking'. It is suggested that a new attractive 'way of life' has to emerge. This new 'way of life' based on interstate cooperation will give rise to expectations of a better future which will render common collective expectations credible. New expectations will provide national populations and their political elites with a sense of unity, new interests and new ambitions. Interaction, altruism, reciprocity, the sense of obligation and responsibility need to be also present in the EU security community if some sort of strategic culture is to emerge. Second, the existing sense of unity has to be supported by the emergence of an external challenge which requires some new and joint response.

However, the emergence of a pluralistic security community does not automatically guarantee its existence for the years to come. A security community is likely to have setbacks and failures. According to Deutsch, there are certain conditions which are likely to cause a disintegration of a community (Deutsch 1978: 244). These conditions are presented below and will be also taken into account when the challenges of the strategic culture of the EU will be taken into account in the chapters to come.
Table One

Conditions of Disintegration of a security community (Deutsch 1978: 244)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any steep increase in economic, military, or political burdens on the community or on any participating unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A rapid increase in social mobilization and political participation, faster than the process of civic assimilation to the common political culture of the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A rapid increase in regional, economic, cultural, social, linguistic, or ethnic differentiation, faster and stronger than any compensating integrative process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A serious lag of decline in the political or administrative institutions and capabilities of the government and the political elite, relative to the current tasks and burdens with which they have to cope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A relative closure of the political elite, slowing drastically the entry of new members and ideas, and giving rise to hostile counter-elites of frustrated potential elite members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A failure of the government and the elite to carry out in time needed reforms and adjustments wanted or expected by the population or failure to adjust in time to the imminent decline or loss of some privileged or dominant minority position.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3. The Link between Security Communities, Networks, Institutions and Strategic Culture

Adler and Barnett simply mention that networks exist within a security community but they do not analyse their impact on strategic culture. Furthermore, the literature on security communities spends little time in analysing the impact of institutions on how these communities develop. This gap needs to be filled in order to explain how institutions and networks within the EU security community may influence the strategic culture of the EU. The characteristics of security community as well as the behavioural/structural elements which are evident within networks and institutions can be grouped together in order to reach conclusions regarding the strategic culture of the EU.
Why a study on strategic culture should take into account institutions? Institutions are important for the development of the strategic culture of the EU because they are the spaces where ideas and beliefs regarding the use of force flourish. For instance, March and Olsen (1989: 160) suggest that institutions are:

“collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations”.

These ‘rules’ and ‘routines’ constitute essential elements of the strategic culture of the EU and will be taken into account in Chapter Five of the thesis. In addition, the study of institutions can provide interesting insights to the practices which stem from strategic culture as according to March and Olsen (1998: 948):

“an institution can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations. Such practices and rules are embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules associated with them”.

Within the EU security community policy networks are also influential in the shaping of the EU strategic culture. Policy networks can become influential carriers of ideas that can influence the orientation of the strategic culture of the EU. The idea of policy networks is used to describe national and transnational dealings of actors. Policy networks are formal and informal groups of individuals that emerge within institutions. For the aims of the thesis a policy network is described as a group of officials who meet in order to exchange views on certain issues and policies (based on Marsh and Smith 2000, Richardson and Jordan 1979). Contacts between the network members may fluctuate in frequency. Policy officials who form a network may agree on common actions in order to promote their own policy priorities.
Policy networks can be categorised as either loose and tight. (Marsh and Smith 2000: 6). This is an important distinction as different networks will have a different impact on the strategic culture of the EU. A basic characteristic of a loose policy network is that it has a consultative (sometimes benchmarking) character. Its members may share common interests but do not necessarily share common policy aims. Therefore, the difference between loose and tight policy network lies in the fact that:

“tight policy networks persist in large part, because they are characterised by a large degree of consensus, not necessarily on specific policy but rather on policy agenda” (Marsh and Smith 2000: 6).

When it comes to networking within ESDP, a tight policy network represents a ‘negotiated’ order achieved through a process of pragmatic improvisation and accommodation that must be continually ‘worked at’ (based on Richardson and Jordan 1979: 101). A tight policy network is also characterised by a strong consensus on policy priorities and ideas regarding the use of force. In order to be successful, a policy network must cultivate good relationships with the other actors that surround it. Therefore, a tight policy network must adopt accommodating positions to demands from other non network participating EU officials.

The involvement of policy-makers in tight policy networks does not leave their identities unaffected, for according to Marsh and Smith (2000: 6) networks:

“involve the institutionalisation of beliefs, values, cultures and particular forms of behaviour”.

Therefore, networks can be influential in the shaping of the EU strategic culture as according to Marsh and Smith (2000: 5):

“the relationships within the networks are structural because they: define the roles which actors play within networks, prescribe the issues which are discussed and how
they are dealt with; have distinct sets of rules; and contain organizational imperatives, so that at least, there is a major pressure to maintain the network”.

In addition, an important degree of trust and solidarity characterises a tight network. Usually, tight network participants interact in a harmonised way, cooperate successfully and develop common initiatives. Network members begin to share some common elements of identity. In addition, it is usually the case that tight policy networks are more efficient when it comes to problem solving as during times of high uncertainty they can be influential in shaping the agenda by promoting certain policy options. For these reasons tight policy networks have to be taken into account. Chapters Three, Four and Six will study the impact of the most important tight policy networks regarding the strategic culture of the EU.

2.4. Structural/Behavioural Elements of Strategic Culture

This section analyses the different possible models of strategic culture that the EU security community may possess. Adler and Barnett (1998) claim that that each security community is characterised by three phases of development (nascent, ascendant and mature). The thesis is inspired by this division and claims that, being a security community, the EU has its own strategic culture which can also be categorised in three different types: the primary, intermediate and the consolidated type. The section will deal with these three types in order to extract the structural/behavioural characteristics that follow strategic culture in each of these types. These characteristics will be grouped in tables that will follow each section.

Borawski 1998, Immergut 1998, Jupille and Caporaso 1999, Puchala 1999, Cornish and Edwards 2001, Andreani 2000, Biscop 2002, M.E. Smith 2004, Giovachini 2004, Haine 2004, Youngs 2004, Beach 2005, Meyer 2005, Duke 2006, Flockhart 2006). The main aim of this exercise was to see how structural and behavioural elements that such multinational entities possess can be linked to the development of different types of strategic culture. The thesis concluded that there are common behavioural and structural characteristics in the development of the above mentioned entities that overlap. These characteristics can be grouped together in three different types in order to characterise different phases of development. After a consideration of the literature three main types were devised: the primary, the intermediate and the consolidated type of strategic culture.

2.4.1. The Primary Type of Strategic Culture

The main structural and behavioural elements that follow the primary stage of strategic culture are presented at the table below.

Table Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary strategic culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutual security threat as a reference of cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idea that cooperation can be mutually beneficial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive transactions amongst states leading to cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergence of networks/institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National interests predominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tough bargaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal relationships of partial cooperation but also partial cautiousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy actors as strategic/selfish calculators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National structures generally cautious of EU expansion in security field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally thin consensus on security issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The primary type marks the initial phase in the development of strategic culture and by elements that characterise the nascent phase of the EU security community. Early in the course of the integrative process, a psychological ‘no war’ community often develops that pushes partners of the community to get involved with each other. This is an important stage as strategic culture cannot flourish without the existence of a ‘no war’ community. In this model of strategic culture, EU officials and their colleagues in
national ministries do not explicitly seek to create a security community but they mostly understand that they share similar interests that would be better achieved through common action. As interaction just begins to happen amongst different EU partners there is no particular strategic culture developed yet. However, according the primary type, various common elements regarding ideas and values on the use of force can form the basis for the development of the strategic culture of the EU. Furthermore, the process of building a security community is encouraged by exogenous forces such as changes in technology, demography, economics, the environment, the development of new interpretations of social reality and the emergence of external threats (Adler & Barnett 1998: 50-3).

A mutual security threat may convince policy officials of the EU member states that cooperation can be mutually beneficial. Positive transactions amongst state officials encourage cooperation, which in turns, leads to the establishment of various policy networks and institutions. However, this type of strategic culture is characterised by the predominance of national interests and by tough bargaining amongst different EU officials. The personal relationships that characterise this stage are of initial cooperation but also caution. Policy actors can be primarily perceived as strategic/selfish calculators that decide to collaborate in order to satisfy their national interests. Therefore, the consensus that exists in most security issues is thin. However, the existence of a particular threat may lead to the development of thick consensus on dealing with this particular threat.

The term ‘thin consensus’ is used to describe the fragile and sometimes ephemeral agreement that exists in various security issues which may lead to gradual initiatives amongst EU policy officials in order to deal with problems of security. Policy officials of the EU security community may have reached such a consensus to deal with a particular security issue because their interests overlap at a particular time in history and therefore, a strategic consensus on a particular security problem is feasible. However, the existence of strategic consensus does not imply that EU member states have reached common views on the nature, causes and remedies of a particular crisis.
and on the use of the police and military instruments which are necessary to deal with it. On the other hand, a thick consensus implies that the EU member states have followed a common trajectory which has led to a harmonisation of views regarding a security crisis spot. This thick consensus is based not only on the mere convergence of national interests but also on the convergence of wider values, beliefs and ideas regarding the use of force. It is very rare for such a consensus to be found on a wide gamut of issues at the primary type of strategic culture. On the contrary, it is expected that the primary type will be mostly characterised by thin consensus or no consensus at all in many important security issues. A major crisis may also lead to a thick consensus in one policy area, which in turns, will spiral further cooperation in the field of security.

As far as the primary type of strategic culture is concerned, Rational Choice Institutional (RCI) patterns will be influential in explaining the rules that govern the institutional dimension of the ESDP. RCI views institutions as a space of intergovernmental bargaining where an exchange of favours between national governments takes place (Moravcsik 1995, Hyde Price 2005). This strand of thought contends that it is the national governments of member states which determine how far EU institutions can go and how much power they can exert. If supranational institutions flourish it is because national governments allow them to do so by ‘pooling’ their national sovereignties. According to Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), institutions:

“lower the transaction costs of making deals so as to allow gains from exchange among legislators that make the passage of stable legislation possible” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 943).

The stress of RCI is also on rationality through the appreciation of gains and losses as well as through the pursuit of strategic action by policy officials in order to maximize the latter and minimise the former. In the case of EU institutions, Andrew Moravcsik provides a liberal intergovernmentalist approach which would characterise their
function during the primary typel of strategic culture. Moravcsik (1993: 474) emphasises the role of national sovereignty in the EU by defining the EU as:

“a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-operation”.

According to Moravcsik (1993: 474), the process of EU integration can be explained through the concept of the lowest common denominator. Member states negotiate their interests and they reach a consensus on what action needs to be followed. However, this action is based on what is acceptable to all EU participants. Therefore, the outcome of a negotiation may be modest and will form a compromise between the most ambitious EU members with the most cautious ones (Moravcsik 1991: 25-26). The technique of the lowest common denominator puts strain to the development of strategic culture as the outcomes regarding the use of force are expected to be limited by the most cautious members of the EU.

The primary type of strategic culture is also characterised by the development of new networks which act as a framework of intergovernmental bargaining. However, although many networks may proliferate not all of them will contribute to the development of an EU strategic culture as most of them are loose policy networks lacking deep cohesion. However, a few tight policy networks may also emerge that will be influential in pushing towards the development of strategic culture as they will put the cornerstone on discussions regarding security. The actions of these networks have to be studied in detail in order to understand major developments in the shaping of the EU strategic culture (Chapters Three, Four and Six).

2.4.2. The Intermediate Type of Strategic Culture

The main structural and behavioural elements of the intermediate stage of strategic culture are grouped below.
Table Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediate strategic culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increasingly dense networks of relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New institutions that reflect forms of coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships of cooperation/path dependency of cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The emergence of elements of a collective identity based on the existence of common ideas (although there is still a parallel existence of continuing national/EU identities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffused reciprocity in relationships through continuous cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization: development of new rules of interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of trust, aid, respect, understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of states remain important in stabilizing and encouraging the development of the strategic culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergence of solidarity amongst policy officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Member states supportive of EU activities in security but also cautious especially when it comes to their domaines réservés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thin/thick consensus on security issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This type of the EU strategic culture is characterised by an expansion of cooperation in security affairs but also by a considerable degree of caution as EU member states are not yet ready to accept a radical transfer of power to the EU on issues of security. It may be the case that member states sometimes agree on deploying common missions under the EU flag but there is still a considerable room for national priorities. This type is inspired by the ascendant phase of the EU security community. According to Adler & Barnett (1998: 53), the ascendant phase of security community is characterised by the emergence of:

“new institutions and organizations that reflect either tighter military coordination and cooperation and/or decreased fear that the other represents a threat; cognitive structures that promote “seeing” and acting together and therefore, the deepening of the level of mutual trust, and the emergence of collective identities that begin to encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change”.

It is expected that at this type of strategic culture increasingly dense networks of relationships will also emerge which will encourage common understandings in the
field of security (tight policy networks). Therefore, some ideas and beliefs regarding
the use of force through police and military instruments will be commonly accepted
amongst policy officials. However, there will not be complete uniformity on ideas
regarding the use of force and divergences amongst EU officials will be still evident.
With this particular type, the channels of communication amongst policy officials that
existed previously are extended and intensified as policy-makers share key expectations
and form networks which help to intensify coexisting relations (Adler and Barnett
1998: 53-55). Extensive interaction amongst EU policy officials leads to a gradual
rapprochement on various security issues. Both EU institutions and networks play a
positive role by bridging the differences of officials regarding their views on security
issues. In addition, this type of strategic culture may be characterised by the
proliferation of both loose and tight policy networks which are flourishing within the
newly established institutions. Nevertheless, it is mostly tight policy networks which
are influential in spreading new security ideas. Furthermore, relationships amongst EU
officials who are dealing with issues of security are characterised by extensive
cooperation.

The result of increasing interaction amongst EU officials leads to the development of
new rules of interaction which set the basis for rules of social appropriateness, that is
how it is appropriate to act within an institution as opposed to acting for mere
maximisation of interests (Checkel 1999, Trondal 1999, Wendt 1996) (see also
Appendix I). The development of diffused reciprocity marks the development of help
amongst different EU officials. Trust, aid, respect and mutual understanding are basic
elements of social appropriateness which will be further taken into account in Chapter
Five. The idea of social appropriateness relates to how it is appropriate to act within an
institution as opposed to acting for the mere maximization of interests (Checkel 1999,
Trondal 1999). There are also signs that point to the emergence of a degree of solidarity
amongst policy officials. In addition, one can detect the development of a collective
identity based on the existence of common ideas but such development goes hand in
hand with the maintenance of a national identity which continues to be strong.
Coalitions of states remain important in stabilising and encouraging the development of
the strategic culture through the development of tight policy networks. However, as the intermediate strategic culture can be still seen as a 'strategic culture in the making', it is characterised by fluidity. Therefore, within this model, one can find both thin and thick consensus regarding security issues. In addition, the level of consensus amongst policy officials also depends on the security issue which is on the table.

The intermediate type of strategic culture is a mixed one as elements of intergovernmentalism coexist alongside an increasing willingness to collaborate at the EU level. This type of strategic culture cannot simply be explained by liberal intergovernmentalist/rational choice approaches as these underestimate the role of institutions which contribute significantly to agenda-setting and the setting of future policy objectives (Kaarlejarvi 2003, M.E. Smith 2004). Other problems also emerge from the idea these approaches have of policy agents as selfish calculators. These behavioural assumptions have been disregarded by social psychologists who claim that due to extensive human interaction, human beings behave much more in a spirit of solidarity than RCI suggests (Cottam et al 2004). Finally, basing RCI/LI on rational choice also limits the process of policy making into a mechanistic form of explanation which lacks a deeper analysis as the outcome of a particular negotiation does not always give the full story (Bell 2005, Hay and Wincott 1998). For these reasons, other forms of institutionalism (historical and sociological) are more suitable to explain this type of strategic culture.

For instance, at the intermediate type of strategic culture, institutions and networks can create 'path dependencies' which affect the way actors take decisions and the way policies are orientated towards certain directions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). March and Olsen (1998) provide an explanation of this phenomenon by providing a historical/sociological institutionalist analysis of the consolidation of rules within institutions. According to these two scholars:

"as competence grows with established rules and practices, the disadvantage of new rules and practices increases. As that disadvantage increases, experiments with new
rules are decreased. And as experiments with new rules decrease, the chance of finding a good new alternative or gaining competence on one that might be superior becomes smaller” (March and Olsen 1998: 965).

Path dependencies have been also explored by currents of sociological institutionalism (SI). According to a SI approach:

“many of the forms and procedures should be seen as culturally-specific practices, akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organizations, not necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as a result of the kind of process associated with the transmission of cultural practices more generally” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947).

This is an important statement as it sheds light to the influence that institutions can exert on the development of behavioural and structural elements that are influential for the strategic culture of the EU.

Therefore, the intermediate type of strategic culture requires comprehensive theory in order to study the development of strategic culture and to analyse the transformative impact that both institutions and networks are exercising on it. Historical/sociological institutionalists seem to offer an approach which fits with the intermediate type. They do not fully reject all RCI claims. They accept the fact that politics is dominated by a conflict for resources. However, they suggest that by entering the game of institutions, actors lock themselves into a ‘trap’ of interaction and negotiation (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939). In addition, historical institutionalists do not limit their research to rational gains but also try to provide a mixture of behavioural and rational issues. Consequently, historical institutionalists suggest that institutional organizations constrain behaviour. For this reason, historical institutionalists employ a mixture of calculus/cultural approaches in order to analyse the influence of institutions. According to the calculus approach:
“institutions affect behaviour primarily by providing actors with greater or lesser degrees of certainty about the present and the future behaviour of other actors” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939).

HI also emphasizes cultural factors based on behavioural issues and stresses. Hall and Taylor (1996: 939), thus stress:

“the degree to which behaviour is not fully strategic but bounded by an individual’s worldview”

These worldviews are influential in the development of the strategic culture of the EU. According to this approach, behaviour depends not only on rational gains but also on the interpretation(s) the actor holds of certain situations. For example, the work of Thelen, Steinmo and Longstreth (1992) study the historical evolution of institutions in order to trace the daily interaction of actors by suggesting that informal rules and modes of behaviour create new patterns of interaction. However, the normative transformation of policy actors is also interrelated to exogenous issues (geopolitical, socio-economic pressures of the political environment). Thelen, Steinmo and Longstreth (1992) suggest that changes in ideas can occur because a new socio-political context might render previous institutional choices obsolete. Second, due to changes in the socio-economic environment, the mission and role of institutions might change. In the case of the strategic culture of the EU, various exogenous factors may thus be influential in its development (e.g. new threats, policy failures due to miscalculations, historic traumas such as wars). These factors will be taken into account through an analysis of the historic development of ESDP (Chapter Three) as well as during interviews with ESDP policy officials (Chapter Four).

The upgrading of trust and cooperation amongst EU officials that is taking place at the intermediate type has a direct impact on the strategic culture of the EU security community. One has to take into account the fact that:
"the security community paradigm is therefore a socially based phenomenon, which is premised on shared knowledge, ideational forces, and a dense normative environment" (Ngoma 2003: 19).

Therefore, according to this type of strategic culture it is expected that a new kind of 'Europeanised' knowledge, new transactions amongst players and the frequent participation in EU organizations will lead to social learning which facilitates the emergence of strategic culture. Still, it is worth mentioning that this transformation can take a long time for according to Adler & Barnett (1998: 46):

"identification of friend or foe, the social basis of trust, is a judgement based on years of experiences and encounters that shapes the cultural definition of threat".

Nevertheless, at the intermediate type of strategic culture the actors who are members of the EU security community begin to transform their behavioural and structural environment in which they are acting. This transformation brings changes in attitudes which lead to further cooperation among policy officials.

In addition, tight policy networks will be influential in this type of strategic culture. As mentioned previously tight policy networks are characterised by a stronger link between the members that make them up. It is also the case that in order to achieve a harmonised existence amongst all EU members, policy networks have to diffuse their policy ideas to other EU actors that participate in ESDP. Otherwise, the possibility of internal fragmentation within the security community is possible. The intermediate type of strategic culture is different from the primary type as interaction between participating actors intensifies and different national policy perspectives are narrowed. EU officials who participate within networks and institutions are now bonded together by various personal and professional links. This continuous bonding brings a gradual deepening of interaction and more common understandings in issues of security.
2.4.3. The Consolidated Type of Strategic Culture

The following table groups the behavioural and structural elements that characterise the consolidated type of the strategic culture of the EU.

Table Four

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consolidated strategic culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High levels of trust amongst ESDP officials and national governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear differentiation between those within and outside the ESDP community—EU Common entity vs other external entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important changes in security planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation of new rules of behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common definitions of security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merging of national policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesive common identity through thick consensus on security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level of military integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensive policy coordination against external threats (Harmonization of security laws and policies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The emergence of supranational interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deepening and consolidation of trust, aid, respect, understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong levels of solidarity amongst ESDP members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU member states supportive of increasing EU activity in security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thick Consensus on security issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As cooperation is intensified, a type of commonly owned foreign policy emerges that periodically expands, thus encompassing new issues leading the EU member states to assume a common strategic culture. The role of EU officials who are dealing with ESDP issues is important in this respect as they become influential carriers of ideas from the EU institutions to their national ministries. Further trends towards closer integration lead to the consolidation of the strategic culture of the EU. Mutual aid and intensified cooperation become a matter of habit. This process of intensified cooperation amongst EU policy officials gradually leads to important changes in national military planning. Furthermore, the consolidated type of strategic culture is also characterised by the emergence of a ‘new dimension of identity’ as the idea of ‘Europe’ becomes dominant in the discourse on security. One of the major outcomes that characterises this particular type is the development of a strong ‘we-feeling’ amongst the policy officials of the community as well as a feeling of mutual trust.
This particular type of the EU strategic culture can be explained by taking into account various sociological explanations regarding the functioning of institutions and networks. Various studies that will be mentioned below have focused on how institutions can affect the identity of policy makers and alter it significantly. This implies that the environment within which actors are acting has to be examined in detail in order to understand how 'new' interests emerge or how 'old' interests are refined. According to Michael E. Smith (2004: 33):

"a sociocultural (or socialisation) logic can emerge, in the sense that actors learn to reorient their attitudes and behaviour to an institution's norms as they regularly participate in the system" (italics in the original).

Therefore, it is highly likely that due to interaction process amongst EU policy officials, their interests will be redefined, altered or enriched. Furthermore, actors who participate in institutions are not mere puppets of the nation state: they have their own interests and they can go much further from their fellow national-based elites in order to redefine their own space of action. In this type, a strong bond amongst ESDP officials is expected to emerge which can be explain by SI paradigms. SI perceives institutions in a broad sense by including elements of study such as:

"symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the frames of meaning guiding human action" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947).

It is expected that at the consolidated model of strategic culture, institutions will play an influential role in redefining the ideas and values of policy officials. Thus, in the study of EU institutions, social constructivist scholars look at the role of persuasion and the importance of the communicative discourse (Risse 1994), the location of important 'norm entrepreneurs' (Checkel 2001) or the way European norms influence the political structure of the member states (Börzel 2002). SI emphasises the identity that an individual acquires by participating within an institution. In this respect, SI is close to
social constructivism as institutions are not only seen as an arena for rational calculation but as a space where an actor redefines his/her identity through a process of continuous learning. It is expected that a redefined identity through interaction with other EU colleagues will encourage the development of the strategic culture of the EU and will consolidate the ideas that underpin it.

In this particular type of strategic culture it is expected that networks and institutions are influential in diffusing ideas and beliefs on the use of force, thus transforming the way the EU deals with issues of security. It is the logic of 'social appropriateness' (Checkel 1999, Trondal 1999) which always prevails. This is also the view of Schimmelfennig (2001: 58) who adds that:

"the goals and procedures of international organizations are more strongly determined by the standards of legitimacy and appropriateness of the international community to which they belong than the utilitarian demand for efficient problem solving".

In addition, if tight policy networks persist and if they are influential in diffusing their culture to other EU actors then new 'knowledge' is formed which has a strong impact on ideas regarding the use of force. The consolidated type of strategic culture takes place when the creation of a common identity due to the consolidation of deep trust is happening. At this hypothetical type of strategic culture tight policy networks would have achieved the task of diffusing their ideas to the whole EU group of states successfully. As all members share the same ideas and values on the use of force, one integrated security community will emerge that will have a direct impact on the way EU officials think about issues of security.
2.5. Categorising Ideas of the Strategic Culture of the European Union

As mentioned in Chapter One, the strategic culture of the EU needs also to be categorised by devising types where ideas, beliefs, values and practices fit in. Various scholars have made efforts to categorise the strategic culture of the EU. For instance, Howorth (2002: 89) categorised the strategic cultures of EU member states by reference to various dichotomies of which the most important in terms of ideas are: the allied/neutral nature of cultures, the Atlanticist/Europeanist orientation of strategies and the balance between power projection and territorial defence in the respective foreign policies of the European states. Furthermore, Hyde-Price (2005: 154-5) attempts to build a model of EU strategic culture by grouping various characteristics of EU behaviour such as: limited coercion, the lack of brute force, the imperative of limiting collateral damage, the short length of operations and the legitimate use of force.

Meyer also provides his own model of strategic culture by claiming that the EU fits a Humanitarian Power Europe model. According to Meyer (2006: 30, italics in the original) when it comes to the EU:

"one would see a low to medium level of risk tolerance regarding the proportionate use of force, moderate to high authorization requirements, a growing attachment to the EU as an actor with a general preference for using soft power, and support for goals regarding the use of force, which do not substantially transcend beyond the purposes of humanitarianism. This outcome could be called Humanitarian Power Europe as an expression of using force primarily for altruistic reasons and linked to universal values".

Finally, other EU scholars have focused on providing more theoretical terms for the EU external action by categorising the EU as a civilian power (Duchene, 1973: 19), a 'soft' power (Hill 1990) and a normative power (Manners 2002, 2006). These works require
further enrichment and clarification so that they can be useful to the study of the EU strategic culture.

Although the current literature on ESDP provides some interesting examples on the way the EU decides to act by using police and military instruments, it has not yet offered a fully descriptive gamut of types that can be used to categorise the strategic culture of the EU. Inspired by the works of scholars who were mentioned above, the thesis will create its own types of categorisation based on the ideas, beliefs, practices and values that may characterise the strategic culture of the EU. The framework that has been invented in the thesis distinguishes four main types of ESDP development by taking into account four distinct - but possible ways - of ESDP behaviour. The types elaborated in this section are hypothetical ones which cover a wide gamut of possible ESDP outcomes ranging from complete passivity in security affairs (minimum outcome) to fully fledged assumption of global responsibility in security affairs (maximum outcome).

2.5.1. Passive Europe (PE)

The first hypothetical type is that of ‘passive Europe’ (PE). Although it is an unlikely scenario it still has to be mentioned in order to cover all possible options of strategic culture development. Passive Europe is a negative scenario for the development of the EU strategic culture as it implies that there is a rejection of the use of military and police force at the EU level. This type implies that ESDP will gradually fade away. The field of security and defence will be further nationalised as the EU will have no agenda to implement security missions under an EU flag. This type of strategic culture is characterised by a lack of consensus on the use of force as EU action abroad will be limited to civilian elements such as aid and development. The model is similar to the one offered by Meyer (2006: 29) and describes the possibility of the EU becoming a ‘Helvetian Europe’. However, Meyer also mentions that this model does not fit with the current activity of ESDP and it is unlikely to reflect EU action in the future. According to Meyer (2006: 30), the discussion on the strategic culture of the EU should evolve
around the EU acquisition of willingness to intervene in crisis spots which may gradually lead to robust strategic culture and even to a more ambitious Europe in the future.

2.5.2. Cautious Interventionist Europe (CIE)

The second type is that of a ‘Cautious Interventionist Europe’ (CIE). This type describes the transition from a passive strategic culture to one of continuous and decisive EU action in security issues. This type is characterised by the cautious and qualified acceptance of the fact that the EU has to intervene in certain cases by deploying military and police instruments. According to this type, it is expected that ESDP officials will collaborate in many ways and that common understandings on issues of security will emerge. In addition, it is expected that as the EU has made its first steps in mission implementation, the psychology of ESDP policy-makers will be characterised by a moderate optimism which acts positively in the development of ESDP. However, according to this type, ESDP officials still hold views which still converge on various issues regarding the use of force.

The CIE type of strategic culture is characterised by a ‘cautious’ approach on the use of force because although limited action is accepted by all ESDP policy officials, many of them still maintain a lukewarm attitude when it comes to the development of extensive ESDP missions. In this type, consensus on the use of force amongst EU members is moderate because it can only be achieved for particular and limited missions. However, some limited initiatives may be considerably larger when a commonly recognised threat emerges. Usually the missions that a Cautious Interventionist Europe undertakes are low risk with a limited geographic limit. This type is also characterised by a general unwillingness of EU states to provide personnel to missions considered to be risky. Furthermore, the importance of the UN mandate remains very high because it gives an alibi to states which have to follow cumbersome parliamentary procedures to allow for the participation of national troops and policemen in ESDP missions without facing internal opposition. In this particular model, ESDP still depends on national
sovereignty. Furthermore, within the EU one may still see a considerable degree of fragmentation as different member states try to promote their own initiatives by forming coalitions of the willing.

In terms of mission justification, it is expected that under this model various humanitarian reasons will predominate in ESDP as the emergence of a clear common EU material interests is unlikely to happen. This is due to the fact that nation states still have converging material interests. The type is also characterised by a strong Atlanticist element as well as a strong commitment to multilateralism. These two features derive, in part, from 'pragmatic' necessity as the EU has to co-operate with various international actors in order to gain legitimacy, local knowledge and access to military resources. The CIE type will fit the EU if ESDP institutionalisation is a ‘work in progress’. In this case, ESDP institutions still do not possess all instruments that will allow them to exert too much influence. According to the CIE type, consensus on the use of force is moderate as member states may still differentiate their preferences on issues of security. Finally, if the CIE type characterises the strategic culture of the EU, it is expected that ESDP will be put in practice in order to address security (as opposed to defence issues). Defence will be still under the control of the Member States as it continues to be perceived as a vital national interest.

2.5.3. Active Europe (AE)

The next model is based on ‘reassertion’ of the EU and a considerable increase in the number and scope of ESDP missions. If ESDP conforms to this type it is expected that the EU will posses a high willingness to act in security crises. This is due to the fact that the EU Member States will be convinced of the utility of ESDP. For these reasons, the EU will become more decisive when it comes to intervention and the EU states will gradually become more willing to participate in ESDP missions. These will also become bigger in size and more ambitious in their geographic remit. Due to this fact, the accepted risk of EU missions will become also higher.
In this type, one can also see the development of a cohesive EU security agenda which leads to a loosening of national structures and preferences in favour of the empowerment of ESDP institutions. Although fragmentation may be sometimes unavoidable there is more and more homogeneity of views concerning intervention. Furthermore, the AE model is characterised by less controversy in deploying military and police instruments as the EU countries begin to share converging worldviews and strategic priorities. In addition, a more detailed agenda emerges on the security priorities of the EU which pushes ESDP to assume missions which may even lead to the defence of particular EU material interests.

In this type, there is still room, however, for national prioritisation and abstention from missions. However, the Active Europe type is generally characterised by a more assertive EU stance in international affairs. Assertion may mean that the EU worries less about securing American and international acceptance for its missions either through US/NATO support or through securing a UN mandate. As the EU becomes more confident of its actorness through ESDP and as it possesses clear interests that need to be defended, a gradual adoption of more coercive forms of force may also happen so that its aims can be achieved (e.g. by using heavier ammunition in its ESDP missions). According to this type, ESDP will be strengthened institutionally. The consensus on the use of force amongst EU officials also becomes stronger. Although security is the main focus of ESDP, discussions also start to take place on the question of defence. It is expected that at the AE type ideas on the use of force will be more harmonised thus leading to a more unified strategic culture for the EU.

2.5.4. Super Active Power Europe (SAPE)

The final type is based on further EU self assertion and the consolidation of a strong notion of EU interest. It is a model that is inspired by the literature which describes the actorness of the US superpower (e.g. Kagan 2003) and represents exactly the opposite type to that of Passive Europe. According to SAPE, ESDP becomes fully consolidated and the willingness of the EU to act in international crises increases. Here, SAPE
missions are expected to cover an extensive global and regional geographic remit and can be characterised by a high level of risk. As views on the use of force become more harmonised amongst EU members it is easier to see a further transfer of power from national institutions to ESDP institutions. In addition, as the EU becomes gradually empowered there may be a 'spill-over' of activity from the field of security to the field of defence which may gradually come under EU guidance.

Furthermore, as far as SAPE is concerned, the consensus on the use of force is high and the difficulties of deploying military and police instruments are increasingly overcome. The fragmented nature of ESDP is replaced by a unified vision of security which leads to further institutional empowerment of ESDP. This reassertion may lead to further changes in the behaviour of the EU. For instance, the importance of the UN mandate may become even lower and the strategy of creating an international coalition of third party countries may be pushed aside if the EU judges that an important crisis may require immediate action. The same accounts for the EU-NATO relationship. It may be the case that the EU and the US may continue to cooperate successfully. However, there is also a possibility that the EU may construct a strong identity in security affairs that may lead to the downgrading of the NATO link in ESDP. Furthermore, the EU will be willing to use 'coercive' force, for instance by using heavier ammunition or even a resort to air strikes.

The table below provides the three most important strategic culture types described above. Passive Europe is not included in the table as most elements that are included on the table are not applicable it. Capital letters on the table are used to describe outcomes in the majority of the cases whereas lower case letters refer to outcomes that characterise the minority of policy outcomes in each model discussed.
Table Five. Types of EU Strategic Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Strategic culture</th>
<th>Cautious Interventionist Europe</th>
<th>Active Europe</th>
<th>Super Active Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to act</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small (S)/medium (M)/large (L) missions</td>
<td>S/m</td>
<td>S/M</td>
<td>S/M/L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (L)/high (H) risk</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L/h</td>
<td>L/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic remit: Limited (L), Extended (E)</td>
<td>L/e</td>
<td>L/E</td>
<td>L/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of UN mandate: High (H), Moderate (M)</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>II/M</td>
<td>II/m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeanised (E)/Sovereign (S) nature of ESDP</td>
<td>S/e</td>
<td>S/E</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitary (U)/fragmented (F)</td>
<td>F/u</td>
<td>U/f</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanticist (A)/Europeanist (E)</td>
<td>A/e</td>
<td>A/E</td>
<td>A/E or a/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralist (M)/unilateralist (U)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M/u</td>
<td>M/U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian (II)/material (M)</td>
<td>II/m</td>
<td>II/M</td>
<td>M/II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>H/L</td>
<td>h/L</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty in deploying military/police instruments: High (H), Low (L)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionally strength of ESDP: Weak (W), Strong (S)</td>
<td>W/s</td>
<td>S/w</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Consensus on the use of force: Moderate (M), High (H)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M/h</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security/Defence spill over: (S: security, D: defence)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S/d</td>
<td>S/D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2.6. Conclusions: Networks, Security Communities, Institutions, Ideas and the Measuring of Strategic Culture

The chapter argued that the EU is a security community which is characterised by various structural and behavioural elements. The chapter also studied the role of policy networks and institutions within the EU security community in order to see how these can affect the shaping of EU strategic culture. The study distinguished behavioural/structural types (primary, intermediate and consolidated) of strategic culture that group different structural and behavioural characteristics. Furthermore, four other types of strategic culture have been developed in order to categorise ideas regarding the use of force as elaborated in section 2.5 of the thesis (Passive Europe, Cautious Interventionist Europe, Active Europe, Super Active Power Europe). Chapters Three and Four, Five and Six of the thesis will use the above mentioned typologies in order to categorise the strategic culture of the EU. The thesis now moves with the study of history in order to trace the debates that have led to the development of ESDP. It is expected that the study of this period will provide considerable evidence on attitudes regarding the use of force.
Chapter Three:

The Historic Trajectory towards the Establishment of ESDP (1990-1999)

3.1. Introduction

The chapter claims that the convergence of views regarding the use of force in the Western Balkans was the first step in the development of the strategic culture of the EU. The humanitarian crises that took place in the 1990s in the Balkans had a strong influence on the development of common beliefs in the minds of EU officials who were dealing with issues of security. Primary and secondary sources are used throughout the chapter. In order to trace ideas and beliefs that were influential in bringing the Europeans together in issues of security a number of books, academic articles, memoirs and official declarations of policy leaders will be taken into account. Parliamentary Reports, Parliamentary debates, reports from national ministries are also part of the study. In addition, testimonies from US officials who actively engaged with their European colleagues in the Western Balkan crises also shed light on the beliefs that the Europeans had regarding the Bosnian and Kosovo conflict. These testimonies will form part of the chapter as they provide interesting insights to the use of force. The main aim of the chapter is to provide an overview of the ideas and beliefs on the use of force which brought the Europeans closer together, thus paving the way for the establishment of ESDP. It should be stressed that the thesis uses primary sources from policy officials, ministers and Heads of State who were in charge of their member states and had direct influence over the formulation of the security policies of the states they represented during the 1990s. The study of history focuses on how policy elites and policy officials perceived the crises of the Western Balkans (especially the Bosnian and Kosovo conflict). The study period that was covered starts from the end of Cold War in 1989 up to the establishment of ESDP in 1999. The documents that were used in the chapter were those that had direct quotes to the Kosovo and Bosnian crises and the elements of force need to be used (if any) in order to control these crises.
The chapter also provides an analysis of the complex web of institutions and networks that became involved in resolving the Western Balkan crisis after the end of the Cold War (1989-1999). This description takes place in order to trace how these institutions affected the development of strategic culture of the EU by establishing the first structural and behavioural rules that are influential in the development of strategic culture. The chapter claims that ideas that developed within various institutions and networks had a direct impact on the policies of the EU Member States. As the EU did not have the necessary institutions and competencies to deal with security crises, much of the discussion on security issues took place outside it in structures such as NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and the Contact Group. For this reason, the interaction of European officials within these institutions will be taken into account in order to analyse their impact on the development of an EU strategic culture. It is important to mention that, at this stage of history, the study needs also to cover developments amongst the various EU Member states as the EU was still a weak player in issues of security. One of the aims of the chapter is to demonstrate that there was a gradual convergence of security ideas amongst the biggest EU countries (the UK, France and Germany) which impacted on the strategic culture of the EU. In addition, a ' neutrals' network was also influential in pushing the EU towards the establishment of a new security policy. All these developments led to the establishment of a primary strategic culture.

3.2. The EU as an Imperfect Policy-making Mechanism

Although the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 introduced the possibility of EU involvement in security matters it was not up until the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and the 1998 UK-French St Malo declaration that the path was open for the EU to assume a more influential role. During the 1990s the EU did not have an effective mechanism that would permit strategic action as the weak institutionalisation of CFSP did not allow for any serious decisions to be taken within the EU framework. CFSP emerged in 1993 and was too weak to stand on its feet. Furthermore, the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by Germany was received cautiously by other European states and made them pursue
their own interests rather than searching for an EU consensus (Hazel Smith 2002: 254). A cycle of political introversion and cautiousness characterised the EU during the first half of the 1990s. During this period many countries were trying to overcome the disorientation of the new post-communist era and had to establish new tasks and objectives for their foreign policies. In addition, this period was characterised by a lack of political will. Richard Holbrooke underlines the unwillingness of the Europeans to take decisive action in its early stages of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia by claiming that:

"while both the United States and the European Union initially viewed the Balkan wars as a European problem, the Europeans chose not to take a strong stand, restricting themselves to dispatching UN "peacekeepers" to a country where there was no peace to keep, and withholding from them the means and the authority to stop the fighting" (Holbrooke 1999: xvi).

In institutional terms, the EU lacked a mechanism that would provide effective leadership in the development of an EU strategic culture. In general, CFSP was not supported by a strong structure with a proper dynamism and depended on the capitals of the Member States (Guéhenno 1995: 27). The control of foreign policy was still spread across four different Commissioners and four different Directorate-Generals which undermined the consistency of EU actions (White 2001: 160, Peterson 1998: 5-6). Although some Presidencies such as the Dutch and the German did manage to secure small leaps forward, Edwards (1997: 190-2) claims the problems with the framework of a rotating presidency were evident when it came to providing firm, constant leadership for the Western Balkans. In addition, rivalries between COREPER officials and the Political Directors on issues of political legitimacy and responsibility made the reaching of consensus a very difficult task (Peterson 1998: 7). Because of all these bureaucratic problems, Peterson (1998: 6) claims that EU policy in Bosnia suffered considerably from delays caused by budgetary and related wrangles over, first humanitarian aid and, later, funding for civilian reconstruction.
3.2.1. A First EU Vision for Bosnia Herzegovina: The Carrington-Cutileiro and the Vance-Owen Peace Plans

Although the EU could not provide effective leadership during the Balkan crisis it did propose two plans for the future of Bosnia. Ideas regarding the structure of Bosnia Herzegovina are mentioned below as they have influenced the future development of the strategic culture of the EU in this particular area (see Chapters Five and Six). The first EU plan for the future of Bosnia was the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan of 1991 based on the idea of power sharing and devolution. After its failure, a joint EU-UN plan was devised in 1993 named the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP).

According to the Vance-Owen Plan, Bosnia Herzegovina would become a decentralised, peaceful state, with guaranteed freedom of movement throughout its territory (Owen 1995: 80-90). The VOPP also provided substantial autonomy to the provinces while denying them any international legal character. The Plan provided provisions for democratically elected national and local government and a mechanism for resolving disputes between them (Owen 1995: 80-90). In addition, it stressed strong, internationally monitored human rights provisions (Owen 1995: 89). Overall, the VOPP was to guarantee: “a sovereign, independent, multi-ethnic state” (Owen 1995: 104). The successful implementation of the VOPP implied that:

“the EC would have to be able to mobilize a European defence commitment to implement the plan without the US” (Owen 1995: 170).

However, the countries with the biggest military capacities in the EC -such as France and the UK- had certain fears about putting troops in Bosnia on their own and therefore any EU strategic action was avoided (Owen 1995: 147, 152).

Although the VOPP failed to materialise, it does tell us something of the EU position. According to the EU co-chairman of the Conference for the former Yugoslavia, David Owen), the VOPP had been supported by the then EC12 at every stage over nearly five months of negotiations. EU ministers had not been bystanders but intimately involved
and consulted on detail regarding the VOPP (Owen 1995: 102, 113, 114, 118, 123, 160). However, a more detailed reading of the Owen memoirs suggests that although smaller EC states were committed to the VOPP, the big three EU Member States (France, the UK and Germany) started to have their own bilateral approaches and were discussing the matter with the USA on a one-to-one basis. According to Owen (1995: 123):

“back in London on 21 May (1993) I found in my pile of telegrams from the Foreign Office one from Washington about a new diplomatic initiative involving the US, France, the UK and Russia [...] in this case the British and French governments were embarking on a diplomatic initiative in an attempt to heal the Atlantic rift, knowing this was contrary to EC policy”.

In the end, the Member States decided to sacrifice the VOPP in order to maintain a good relationship with the Clinton administration:

“it was my responsibility to keep the EC together, but I was now attempting to do so on a high-risk policy, with no country in Europe really wanting to damage relations with the new US administration” (Owen 1995: 111).

Therefore, the opportunity to provide firm EU leadership at the beginning of the crisis was lost. However, although disagreements regarding Bosnian security within the EU were plentiful there was a common platform on the future of Bosnia that served as a point of a first consensus. This vision can be seen as the basis for the development of a strategic consensus amongst the Member States. Speaking at a Contact Group meeting, High Representative for Bosnia Herzegovina Carl Bildt noted:

“we want to see Bosnia continue as a single, multiethnic and democratic state in which the human rights of minorities and the rights of refugees to return are fully recognised and respected. We want to see mutual recognition among the states of former Yugoslavia, the development of their economies on market principles and on the basis
of regional cooperation, and the establishment of a process of arms control. We Europeans are ready to contribute to the international effort to reconstruct the areas devastated by war once peace is established and to build stability and prosperity in the longer term throughout the region” (Carl Bildt 01/11/1995).

3.3. The Setting of Loose Collaboration Networks with other Institutions

Although European governments were divided on how to deal with the Balkan crisis there was still a common emphasis on interacting with other institutions such as the UN. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the idea of multilateralism and dialogue is evident in the communicative discourse of the EU. As a result of this interaction, loose collaboration emerged between the EU and the UN which was not institutionalised but relied mostly on the personal contacts and the goodwill of policy makers of the institutions evolved (Interview 12). The various security arrangements that will be analysed in this chapter have been characterised as: “a system of ‘interlocking institutions’ with the OSCE, NATO, the WEU and the EU closely knitted together” (Rühle and Williams 1996 in Sjursen 1998: 102). During the first half of the 1990s, however, the EU took a back seat thus allowing other organisations to take the initiative (Hazel Smith 2002: 234). Four particular institutional relationships will be examined in more detail as they contributed to particular developments which have affected the shaping of the EU strategic culture. These relationships are those involving the EU and the UN, the WEU and EU, the NATO-EU dialogue, and Contact Group interaction.

3.3.1. EU-UN Interaction

EU action in the Balkans has been characterised by increasing collaboration with the UN. In order to deal with the ongoing crisis, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was established in 1992, co-chaired by the former British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, on behalf of the EU, and the former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, representing the UN. The EC also established the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) in 1991. According to Edwards (1997: 184),
there was coordination between the ECMM and UNPROFOR as well the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNCHR). The EU-UN interaction was empowered by the UN’s decision to engage in a dialogue with regional organisations. As a result of the need to communicate with regional fora, the UN established biennial UN-Regional Organisation meetings which began in 1994 (Stewart 2005: 148). Furthermore, the EU was represented at UN-Regional meetings by the Presidency and a representative of the Commission (Stewart 2005: 149). Previously, there had been sporadic interaction between UN officials and the Commission but because of the fragmented nature of the EU policy pillars and the weaknesses of UN bureaucracy, it had a limited input in the policies of the two entities (Interview 29). However, there was a willingness amongst EU officials to collaborate with the UN in issues of security (Interview 12).

The EU-UN relationship was important because it showed that the importance of multilateralism to the emerging EU strategic culture. However, as the UN remained a fragmented organisation with different layers of power shared by different bureaucracies it was difficult to coordinate the EU-UN relationship effectively (Interview 29). The EU-UN relationship continued to rely on the good will of the personnel of the two organisations (Stewart 2005: 160-3).

3.3.2. The EU-WEU link

Limited cooperation between different EU Member States took place under the WEU umbrella long before ESDP. When the OCSE invited both NATO and the WEU to undertake peace-keeping roles this opportunity was further exploited by officials from France and Germany who managed to persuade reluctant WEU member states to sign the Petersberg Declaration (Bonn 19 June 1992) which for first time committed the Europeans to engage in peace-keeping tasks under the WEU umbrella (Interview 30).

The WEU was characterised by loose policy networks which were too weak to influence EU decisions in the spheres of security and defence (Interview 30). Nevertheless, the Petersberg Tasks were included in the Amsterdam Treaty of the EU

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in 1997. Furthermore, the Amsterdam Treaty stipulated that the WEU was an integral part of the development of the EU, thus making a link between the EU and the sphere of security. However, according to the former WEU Political Director Alyson Bailes (16/09/2006):

“although the smaller countries were collaborating within WEU structures the organisation was snubbed by the big three EU countries (meaning France, Germany and the UK)”.

A ‘socialisation’ space for the big three Member States was necessary but the WEU did not provide for this. Furthermore, there was no EU consensus on what to do with the WEU. Britain refused to link the WEU with any EU issues of security whereas France and Germany wished that a link had to be established between the WEU and the Council of the EU (Gnessoto 1996: 114). In addition, the military projects of the WEU were still at an experimental phase (Gautier 1999: 235).

It was clear that due to different priorities amongst Germany, France and the UK no purely European institution such as the WEU could serve for issues of security and defence. However, according to Bailes, it was interesting to notice that a European based forum for discussion on security issues such as the WEU was promoting a different view of security to that of the USA (Interview 30). A European spirit of collaboration was created amongst WEU diplomats who wanted to develop further collaboration with their European colleagues. Not only did the WEU served as a Europeanised body of dialogue between East and West Europe but it also integrated the neutral states into a discussion which was led by European priorities (Interview 30). Finally, according to Bailes, the WEU opened up the agenda of the EU adopting a civilian crisis management agenda (Interview 30).

3.4. NATO Interaction with EU States

A new tight policy network was emerging in the USA that influenced European developments. The Clinton administration wanted to prove its human rights credentials
by adopting a more active stance in former Yugoslavia. According to Allin, American liberals embraced the Bosnian crisis as a ‘cause célèbre’ (Allin 2002: 16). Since 1993 a bipartisan network consisting of both Democrat and Republican Senators had been created by important political figures calling for the use of military force, by using air strikes and the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims (Bono 2003: 74-75). David Owen also claims that these pro-active Clinton Democrats had strong views on how to deal with the crisis and were vehemently opposed to the VOPP as they wanted more land being given to the Muslims (Owen 1995: 100, 108, 121, 161). The group of pro-interventionist Democrats was further empowered by the appointment of Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State who wanted a more interventionist policy both in Bosnia and Kosovo. Michael Mandelbaum (1999: 8) rightly labels the Kosovo bombings the ‘Albright legacy’ as Albright became an active policy entrepreneur of intervention by exerting considerable pressure on the European allies.

Under strong American pressure, sections of NATO became influential in pushing the EU towards a policy of intervention (Bono 2003: 32). However, the new plans proposed by NATO could only be achieved by cultivating the support of a wide policy network of German, British and US national-policy makers (Longhurst 2004: 60-73). As a result of US pressure, NATO became the breeding ground of new security actions concerning the Balkans.

It is important to note that although many EU states were members of NATO there was no official NATO-EU relationship at this time. According to Sloan (2005: 194):

“the relationship between the EU and NATO was informal and lacking much substance with meetings taking place on an informal basis”.

Therefore, although there was a willingness on behalf of EU Member States to interact with NATO, an institutional framework that would bring NATO and the EU together was lacking. Furthermore, the NATO Madrid Summit in 1997 failed to bring equilibrium between the US and Europe through its European partners through the
European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) plan. The degree of European autonomy in ESDI was far from clear and limitations of the transatlantic relationship soon came to the surface (Gnesotto 1996: 23). A solution was necessary so that the EU Europeans could maintain a strong relationship with NATO but also possess room for manoeuvre on security issues.

3.5. Contact Group Interaction

As noted above, although various small developments were taking place that encouraged EU Member States to slowly act together on issues of security, a ‘socialisation space’ for the big three EU countries (France, Germany and the UK) was still necessary to facilitate the construction of a consensus on issues of security. The Contact Group served as this socialisation space. Gradually, as a result of frequent interaction, a tight policy network emerged. This network was characterised by increasingly frequent interaction between the UK, France and Germany. It harmonised approaches toward the Western Balkans through the development of the idea that the EU should play a more active role in security affairs.

The Contact Group was first established by Germany, France, the UK, Russia and the USA in 1994. According to Pauline Neville-Jones (1996: 46), a UK participant, its aim was:

“to establish an informal but strong policy-making core around which the main international players could unite”.

The Contact Group was important because it could exert influence on vast sections of national bureaucracies of the three major EU states for according to Neville-Jones, the Contact Group was meeting at three levels, the foreign ministers level, the political-directors level and the expert/working group level (Neville Jones 1996: 46).
Within the Contact Group a different understanding of the Balkan crisis was emerging between the three EU partners on one side and the US on the other. This mutual understanding amongst the big three EU countries intensified cooperation and made them reach common agreements. Richard Holbrooke, who was in regular communication with the Contact Group claims that there was a rapprochement amongst the Europeans on the Bosnian question:

"dealing with the Europeans was delicate and nettlesome throughout the Bosnia crisis, and put an unprecedented strain on NATO and the Atlantic Alliance just when the Cold War ties that had held us together had also disappeared. Our steadfast allies, who had looked to the United States for leadership during the Cold War, were ambivalent about the American role in post-Cold War Europe, and especially Bosnia. They had long called for greater American involvement but at the same time, they feared that they would be publicly humiliated if the United States took the lead" (Holbrooke 1999: 84).

For their part, the Europeans felt marginalised regarding Bosnia, as the Americans were monopolising the initiative to act and were keeping Europeans out of the Dayton talks:

"... there was a clear undercurrent of resentment among some Contact Group members over American “unilateralism” (Holbrooke 1999: 201).

Furthermore:

“our colleagues in the Contact Group –France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia – were disturbed that we planned to negotiate first and consult them later, reversing the previous procedure, in which the five nations tried to work out a common position before taking it to the parties in the Balkans – a system that was cumbersome and unworkable” (Holbrooke 1999: 84-5).
Relations between the three European states and the USA reached a point of crisis similar to the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 (Owen, 1995, Holbrooke 1999). Much of the trust between USA and its European allies was waning:

"when I noted that the UN seemed reluctant to try to open the roads around Sarajevo, Pauline Neville-Jones exploded, charging that I was trying to "set the UN and the Europeans up" to be blamed for a failure' (Holbrooke 1999: 201).

As a result of this lack of trust, France, Germany and the UK aimed at reaching a compromise amongst themselves and then presented their views to the Americans. For instance, according to Holbrooke, the Contact Group Europeans had agreed on Carl Bildt being the civilian chief in Bosnia and then announced it to the Americans (Holbrooke 1999: 209).

Furthermore, Holbrooke (1999: 223) claims that there was a European interest in Bosnia because most of the resources for the peacekeeping and reconstruction operation would be funded by the Europeans.

It must be stressed that within the Contact Group the EU was not represented. However, decisions of the Contact Group were gradually presented and discussed in the European Councils. In addition, David Owen (1995: 255-92) suggests that the other EU states which were not members of the Contact Group gradually accepted the actions of the Contact Group and were at least relieved with the fact that the three bigger EU states were taking the Bosnia issue seriously. In addition, EU members were briefed about Contact Group actions during the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council (Schwegmann 2000). Furthermore, when Italy joined the Contact Group in 1996 this meant that all the major EU countries were participating in it.

The trilateral initiatives that were elaborated within the Contact Group by the national leaders of France, the UK and Germany become common as time progresses. For instance, after an examination of documentation from state ministries, common
interaction within the Contact Group is mentioned often in post 1997 speeches of Jospin (13 April 1999, 5 May 1999), Védrine (30 April 1999) and Blair (8 March 1999). It is interesting to note that by early 1997 the three EU Contact Group members had seized the initiative to find a solution in Kosovo by monitoring the Kosovo crisis and calling for dialogue between the conflicting parts (see Contact Group Statements of 24 September 1997, 9-10 December 1997, 8 January 1998). In summary, the importance of the Contact Group was that it was slowly aggregating different national perceptions of the big three states into one. The good understanding amongst the three EU states would be further consolidated by the emergence of new pro-interventionist policy networks amongst the three foreign ministries whose actions would throw the seeds of the EU strategic culture.

3.6. Bilateral and Trilateral Policy Networks Involving the Big Three EU States

The development of policy networks at the level of bilateral/trilateral diplomacy amongst the big three EU countries was influential in paving the way towards the establishment of ESDP. These networks were also influential in bringing different strategic perspectives together, thus encouraging the establishment of an EU strategic culture through the development of ESDP. For this reason, the development of policy networks amongst the UK, France and Germany will be studied in detail.

Franco-British cooperation was vital in the establishment of ESDP. Due to UK involvement in the Balkans, two very pragmatic ‘lessons’ were assimilated into the UK strategic thinking which made the UK willing to cooperate with the French (Howorth 2004, Smith 2002, Allin 2002). First of all, it was feared that Americans would not be willing to manage the crises in the borders of the EU for too long. Second, Franco-British cooperation on the ground in the Balkans (through UNPROFOR) had led to a bilateral cooperation between the militaries of both countries. Common Balkan initiatives meant that French and British army personnel were working together in the Balkans. Furthermore, ideas were exchanged and common policies were formulated between the national ministries of defence of the two countries (Howorth 2004: 217).
As policy cooperation between the two countries intensified, the Ministries of Defence of France and the UK were seeing the process of collaboration more positively. As both countries moved from a position of deterrence to a position of Balkan intervention they were forced 'into one another's arms' (Howorth 2004: 217). Patterns of common cooperation also emerged within NATO (Sloan 2005: 187). This feeling of bilateral cooperation was further enhanced by the Anglo-French leadership during the Rambouillet Conference which although brought limited results, still proved that both countries could assume a degree of leadership (Howorth 2004: 224, Gnessoto 1999: 210).

In addition, it was troops from the UK and France which had led the UN military protection forces in Bosnia. The UK and France were also major contributors to IFOR and SFOR operations (Hazel Smith, 2002: 255). The result of this interaction was an increasing amount of cooperation at the level of ground operations. At the outset IFOR/SFOR cooperation between France and the UK was not problem free. Allin (2002: 39-40) mentions the tensions between French and British troops during missions as there was no common language. However, these difficulties were curbed as cooperation was intensifying. Furthermore, Howorth mentions the impact of operations cooperation on the bilateral cooperation as a 'bottom up' approach (Howorth 2004: 211-234). This was also the conclusion of a House of Commons Research Paper (00/80, 2000: 13) which clearly states that:

"the St. Malo initiative built upon earlier cooperation in the field of security and defence undertaken by France and the UK that took place in Bosnia and West Africa and existing agreements between the two countries' navies (1996), armies (1997) and air forces (1998)".

According to Howorth (2004: 231), the French were willing to reach a realistic compromise with the British. The French way of thinking moved closer to the British which is characterised:
"not by Grand projects of massive defence reinforcement but on insisting on vigilance, inventiveness and flexibility" (Bailes 1995: 98).

As the two major representations of Europeanism and Atlanticism were gradually drawn together it was possible for the two countries to reach a consensus that would pave the path towards the ESDP. However, this rapprochement was not so great that national differences on matters of security would be completely erased.

In parallel, Franco-German cooperation was influential in making Germany a more assertive partner in security issues. Close Franco-German cooperation led by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl had led to the Petersberg Tasks (Gautier 1999: 235). Common initiatives and policies in the field of defence demonstrated that a cohesive bilateral network was in place. Thus, plans were adopted by the two countries that supported the view that the WEU would be strengthened and a European intervention force based initially on a combined unit of French and German troops would be established (Fitchett, 1991d). As an initial step, France and Germany declared that they would expand their current bilateral military cooperation and that a second phase of security cooperation would start in 1996. From 1995 the Germans were also working on a European defence plan which would have to be implemented beyond the year 2000 in order to make the EU ready to deal with crises and reinforce trends of defence manufacturing cooperation (Fitchett, 1995b).

Discussions had taken place between the nucleus of French and German decision makers about an EU security dimension but the UK was still opposed. However, ahead of the Amsterdam Treaty France and Germany also called on the EU to appoint a foreign policy chief who would report directly to the European Council (Bremner, 1997). Germany also encouraged Paris to pursue a security dialogue with London and Chancellor Schroeder promoted a triangular Bonn-Paris-London relationship as the way forward in dealing with security issues (Fitchett, 1998j; Lichfield, 1998a ). The German role was influential because Germany was somehow the balancing actor between France and the UK by bringing France closer to US/UK positions (Haftendorn 1996: 79).
Furthermore, the German contribution was vital because the Germans insisted that an EU plan on European security should be a lot more than ESDI and far more than a simple exercise of updating military capacities (Haftedorn 1996: 553).

In addition, the declarations of the French Foreign Ministry demonstrate that there was strong cooperation on the Kosovo issue between the three countries from an early point of the crisis (see Daily Briefings of by the Foreign and Defence Ministries Spokespersons 1999). As a result of this increasing interaction between the three nations, the creation of a Paris-Bonn-London triangle emerged. Intensive cooperation was taking place amongst sections of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the three countries. According to Howorth:

“the Foreign Office had been in a constant exchange of information with the Quai d’Orsay and the Auswärtiges Amt and CFSP/ European Security Units have been established with the aim of co-ordinating policies with the two European capitals” (Howorth 2004: 220).

The socialisation process that took place amongst the three nations begun to bear fruits as:

“the teams of officials working on a new approach to European defence in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) and MODs in Paris, London and Bonn/Berlin were getting to know one another, to generate something of a wavelength, and to speak a language which, while not identical, was at least mutually comprehensible” (Howorth 2004: 221).

This is also confirmed by the declaration of the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (1999f) who claims that:
“the convergence of views of France, the UK and Germany as expressed in Saint-Malo and Toulouse meeting has permitted a forward push to the project of a Europe of defence”.

In the case of the UK and France, the St. Malo declaration bridged the two major positions within the EU (Atlanticist/Europeanist) into a common document that recognised the necessity for the EU to act by using its own structures. It was agreed that EU action would be implemented through NATO but also by using its own autonomous capabilities. The St. Malo declaration was a nice surprise for the Spanish and the Italians (Gautier 1999: 241) but also for many other countries which were not members of the Contact Group but were in favour of a European pillar on security issues (Siani-Davies, 2003: 21). Therefore, a path was found that unblocked the reservations of the big three EU states regarding a Europeanised plan in security and defence and also satisfied other EU Member States. As a result of the St. Malo declaration, ESDP was established which served as a major hub of strategic ideas.

3.7. The Neutrals Policy Network

Increasing cooperation within the Contact Group coincided with the entry of three neutral states into the EU in 1995. As the big three realised that a European approach was necessary due to deadlock between them and the US in the Contact Group, so too did the neutral group of countries add its support for a European-led policy on security and defence (Interview 22). Therefore, the influence of the neutrals in the discussion on EU security is important because it came at a time when the security debate in Europe was still open and when in terms of numbers the neutrals constituted almost a third of EU states.

In order to influence the debate of security a tight Finno-Swedish policy network emerged between sections of the Foreign Ministries of these two countries (Miles 2000: 181-200). The two countries were searching for a solution to the problem of neutrality and had similar views on issues concerning the use of force, the supremacy of the UN
and the importance of European autonomy (Interviews 13, 22). These views had to be somehow incorporated in the plans of the big three so that a common security policy could be developed. Common patterns of interaction and cooperation between the two countries can be traced. For example, the foreign ministers of the two countries gave an end to the speculation on whether they would join NATO by declaring that this was not a solution they would consider. According to the Foreign Ministers of Finland and Sweden, Tarja Halonen and Lena Hjelm-Wallen (15/03/1997):

“if Finland and Sweden were now to reconsider their policy of non participation in military alliances, it would not add to the stability of our countries, nor to the stability of our immediate neighbourhood. That is why there is no need for Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO. The enlargement of NATO is a serious, demanding and continuous process. Parallel to this process, Finland and Sweden will be contributing actively toward security in Europe”.

Furthermore, there was an influential Finno-Swedish memorandum in April 1996 which proposed the incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty (Miles 2000: 196). Swedish-Finnish cooperation was also apparent during discussion of the Amsterdam Treaty. According to Miles:

“the two states worked together on issues of foreign policy by emphasising their non-aligned status and suggesting that they would not obstruct the evolution of a military dimension in CFSP as long as it is done through the WEU” (Miles 2000: 1995).

The influence of the Finno-Swedish bilateral network was enhanced as Ireland and Austria joined their demands (Tonra 2000: 227). In addition, Austria forced the pace of European security interaction by calling the first meeting of EU defence ministers and the first informal meeting between the Presidency of the EU Council and the NATO Secretary-General (Phinnemore 2000: 219). The result of the neutrals output into the EU process was that a new ‘acquis’ had to be constructed which had to take into account their neutral status. As a result, a new policy turn happened that impacted on
the development of the EU strategic culture as the momentum was slightly away from the ESDI/NATO solution. A new EU-centred solution was necessary to address the deadlock (Interview 22).

3.8. Divergences between the Europeans and the Americans: the Shaping of a European Strategic Agenda

The Kosovo crisis further strengthened the opinions of those policy-makers who wanted an EU voice on issues of security. According to Alyson Bailes (1999: 314-5), the St. Malo declaration came from European frustration in the early stages of the Kosovo crisis. Furthermore, according to Allin, Penska and Mason, the headline goal of the EU grew directly out of the Kosovo and Bosnian experiences (Allin 2002: 66, Penska and Mason 2003: 262). Because of their limited capabilities, the Europeans realised that they were too weak to intervene on their own in the Western Balkans and had to collaborate with the Americans on an extensive basis (Interviews 1, 4). However, the Yugoslav crisis became the epicentre of a process of ‘mutual othering’ between the USA and the Europeans that the thesis will now analyse in more detail. Although the issue of capabilities kept Europeans and Americans together, there was a division over how elements of force should be used in Kosovo and Bosnia that acted positively in the establishment ESDP. These divergences are taken into account because they are related to the use of force that the Europeans would like to exercise, thus they are part of their strategic culture.

Divergences in tactics between the Europeans and the Americans can be traced back to the beginning of the Bosnian crisis. The Kosovo crisis further intensified the problems between the Europeans and the Americans (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000). In the case of Bosnia Herzegovina, David Owen claims that there had been frequent tensions between the two sides of the Atlantic (Owen 1995: 116). The Europeans had a growing resentment for the Washington Joint Action Programme on Bosnia with the British, French and German expressing strong concerns about it (Owen 1995: 175-177). Furthermore, the Europeans were unhappy with the American ‘lift and strike’ policy.
that the Americans were eager to practice in Bosnia (Owen 1995: 159). According to Holbrooke (1999: 103):

"I have no doubt the Europeans would have blocked or minimized the bombing were it not for Washington’s new resolve”.

There are testimonies that demonstrate that a European voice was different from that of the USA, especially concerning UN involvement in the area:

“the Americans were aiming for a less UN involvement in the Bosnia talks” (Holbrooke 1999: 202).

Furthermore:

“the United States neither shared the Europeans’ view of what the UN’s peacekeeping mandate in Croatia or humanitarian mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina was designed to do politically, nor accepted the limitation of impartiality on the UN’s military involvement” (Owen 1995: 366).

During the Kosovo crisis the differing approaches between the USA and Europe became even more evident. American geostrategic priorities were different from European ones, a fact that made Europeans worry about the real commitment of the Americans in the region. This was also manifested in the US Military Strategy Review of 1995 which focused on Korea and Iraq with Bosnia not being a US priority (Clark 2002: 46). According to Clark (2002:447-8):

“this meant that NATO was depending for leadership on a nation whose priority securities lay elsewhere”.

These differences were inflated during the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia (Operation Allied Force). According to NATO SACEUR Wesley Clark, NATO came close to
crumbling many times (Wesley Clark 2002: XL). For some European countries, intervening through NATO raised many difficult questions. The incapacity of air strikes to impede ethnic cleansing became a major point of discontent (Heisbourg 1999: 220). In addition, the Operation Allied Force was viewed negatively by the publics of many countries including Greece, Italy, Austria and Spain (Kennedy 2000: 118, Phinnemore 2000: 219) and caused problems for countries such as Austria which refused to allow NATO airplanes to cross its air space (Grant 1999: 9).

The problem of the legality of the Kosovo operation was another important issue. According to Ortega, this fact would also have an impact on the strategic culture of the EU in the future because it:

“implies that military intervention by EU forces without Security Council authorisation will be very unlikely” (Ortega 2001: 115).

The question of legality and whether it is still important for the strategic culture of the EU will be taken into account in Chapter Six of the thesis. Although in public the leaders of NATO nations were defending the Kosovo Operation on the grounds of legitimacy it is evident from primary sources that Europeans wanted a clear UN mandate. For instance, according to Wesley Clark (2002: 125) there was:

“French and German insistence that force could not be used against Milosevic unless specifically authorised by the United Nations. This was an attempt to curb domestic opposition to strikes”.

In the case of the UK, Albright also mentions:

“I called Robin Cook, who said his lawyers had told him a Council mandate would be needed if NATO were to act. I told him he should get himself new lawyers. If a UN resolution passed, we would have set a precedent that NATO required Security Council
authorization before it could act. This would give Russia, not to mention China, a veto over NATO” (Albright 2003: 384).

Indeed, the region of former Yugoslavia constituted a land of paradox for the EU-US relations. On one hand, it empowered the relationship between Europeans and Americans by leading to common actions in Bosnia and Kosovo through NATO. However, it was also the interaction between the two blocs that led to a European differentiation and to the need to move on with ESDP. According to Duke:

“ironically, it was on major transatlantic differences that the Europeans appeared to find most solidarity” (Duke 1997: 42).

This was also the view of Wesley Clark who provides a long list of different approaches between the Europeans and the Americans:

“the United States was increasingly committed to the idea of strategic strikes, going after the heart of Milosevic’s power. The Europeans, or at least the French and a few others, were more interested in limiting the strikes to Kosovo, trying to hit the ground forces, and avoiding actions that might antagonize or damage Serbia further” (Clark 2002: 237).

Furthermore:

“the other Allies began to be increasingly demanding too. It was British law that targets struck by any aircraft based in the United Kingdom had to be approved by their lawyers, the French demanded greater insight into the targeting and strikes, and of course there had to be continuing consultation with NATO headquarters and with other countries, too” (Clark 2002: 224).

In addition, Clark (2002: 449) suggests that there is a different perception on the use of force between the Americans and the Europeans:
“the American view focuses on the outcome of the conflict; it recognizes that consensus for the use of force is difficult to sustain, and that public opinion coalesces behind success. The French view was far more far-sighted; it sought minimal physical and psychological impact on Serbia and the Serbs with the aim of speeding post war reconstruction and reconciliation. The Americans and French positions also reflected their distinctive historical experiences, cultures, and geography”.

Furthermore, when it came to using force it is evident that the Europeans had a different view on air targets. Wesley Clark mentions that the Europeans were usually unwilling to hit civilian targets (Clark 2002: 249), as well as being more sensitive to the issue of collateral damage and civilian casualties (Clark 2002: 314-6), with a barrage of criticism about Serb civilian casualties especially from France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and Germany (Clark 2002: 339, 353-4). In addition, the US was at odds with its Allies on the question of where and how to use air strikes. According to Clark (2002: 430):

“it was always the Americans who pushed for the escalation to new, more sensitive targets, [...] and always some of the Allies who expressed doubts and reservations”.

Furthermore, Americans believed the best way was to strike as much and as quickly as possible whereas the Europeans wanted the operation to focus on where ethnic cleansing was taking place (Clark 2002: 449). In addition, Secretary of Defence William Cohen in a PBS interview suggested that the US would have used a more radical approach if it was alone:

“If we were to carry out and act unilaterally, we would have a much more robust, aggressive, and decapitating type of campaign [...] the difference here, of course, is that we’re acting as an alliance”.

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There was also a different approach between the US and the Europeans on what means should be used to fight the Serbs. The Bosnia campaign had highlighted these different approaches. To the Europeans the ‘lift and strike’ approach in 1993:

“looked like a recipe for the expansion of the fighting, not its termination” (Clark 2002: 37).

The Kosovo Operation highlighted the different perspectives between Americans and Europeans on issues of strategy:

“the Americans favoured a strategic air campaign, the European militaries were more ready to move in on the ground” (Clark 2002: 319).

As early as the autumn of 1998 some European states were willing to place forces on the ground (Clark 2002: 450). According to Clark (2002: 450-5), these troops would be made of a French sponsored extraction force which would station in FYROM and it would consist of 2,000 troops supported by the UK, Germany and Italy. The Americans insisted that there would be no US ground force. American unwillingness to participate put Clark in an awkward position as he was the overall commander but represented a nation that would not participate in such a mission. This was a difficult issue for the Europeans to accept because, within NATO, commands were distributed on the basis of who provided the most troops (Clark 2002: 154).

In addition, although the Kosovo Operation was against the Milosevic regime, the Europeans contrary to the Americans did not want to give the impression that they were favouring the KLA. The issue of remaining ‘relatively’ neutral towards the KLA was still important for the Europeans (Clark 2002: 37). According to Madeleine Albright:

“in my conversation with Europeans, even during the war, I had detected deep scepticism toward Albanians” (Albright 2003: 426). In addition, the US meetings with the KLA “ nettled the Europeans” (Albright 2003: 386).
Furthermore:

“...Hubert Védrine and Robin Cook wanted to be sure a NATO-led peacekeeping force would be authorised to take their (meaning air strikes) place. Otherwise the Europeans feared that power in Kosovo would be seized by the KLA” (Albright 2003: 394).

The issue of leadership and the European willingness to take over were again part of the Kosovo Operation debate:

“while the Americans wanted a clear chain of command under American leadership the Europeans insisted that the European diplomat on the ground have the authority over the force. Both the French and the British agreed on this” (Clark 2002: 64).

Certain technical issues also complicated the transatlantic relationship. For instance, the Americans did not want to use the Apache Helicopter in the Kosovo operation because there was the fear of losing them in the battle. However, the Europeans thought that the Apaches were vital (Clark 2002: 424). Finally, divisions emerged on the issue of policing:

“the Europeans insisted that the international police would only monitor; they couldn’t possibly “enforce” because they didn’t know the laws. The Europeans remained firm on this view.” (Clark 2002: 63).

These incidents led to a lowering of trust between the two sides. For instance, it was felt by the Europeans that Clark’s public declarations exceeded his political guidance (Clark 2002: 104-5). In addition, French-US trust was tarnished when the Americans thought that the French were leaking important NATO info to the Serbs (Clark 2002: 175).
All these differences regarding the use of force that were mentioned above reinforced the idea that Europeans should put their act together in issues of security as reliance on the USA could not be taken always for granted. ESDP was now seen as a pragmatic necessity. According to the then French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin:

"the test of the Balkans has allowed the crystallisation of a European conscience in issues of defence [...] Europe should be equipped with proper tools for the preparation and implementation of decisions which have to do with the strategic planning and the analysis of crisis situations. Europe should dispose military capabilities through the European pillar of NATO or due to the autonomous European means." (Jospin 18/6/1999).

3.9. The Impact of the Balkan Crisis on Attitudes toward the Use of Force

Where does the study of history lead us when it comes to the shaping of the EU strategic culture? The chapter supports the idea that the EU in the western Balkans came to accept responsibility to act through the use of military instruments. It claims that the EU Member States gradually accepted the utility and legitimacy of military instruments as policy tools as a result of the Bosnian and Kosovo crises. Furthermore, the Balkan crisis according to Robert Cooper, Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, has led to a policy of 'Brusselisation' of the Balkan policy which is now largely discussed and decided in Brussels (Interview 31). However, although a process of European socialisation took place due to the Balkans experience it is questionable whether such a process is valid for other parts of the world. The geographic remit of ESDP is an aspect that needs to be studied further in Chapter Five of the thesis.

The second main theme from this chapter points to the fact that NATO is an important organisation for some EU states. During the 1990s, willingness emerged on behalf of the Europeans to provide a Europeanised structure for security provision that could be used especially when priorities between the two blocs would diverge. Europeans did
not wish to be cut off from NATO and neither could they conduct military operations on their own as they lacked the necessary military infrastructure. However, as it was previously explained, the policy stimulus has gradually shifted from NATO domination towards shared EU/NATO initiatives. However, whether there is the political will that will allow ESDP to assume a fully independent stance vis-à-vis the USA in issues of security is a topic that will be further investigated in Chapter Five of the thesis.

In any case, the study of the two Balkan conflicts provides clues that support the argument that the Europeans have their own way of perceiving how force should be used. This European tendency will be further taken into account in Chapter Six of the thesis when the ESDP Bosnian missions will be analysed. The chapter also claimed that during the Bosnia/Kosovo operations the Europeans were not happy with the 'lift and strike' policy the USA was promoting. Furthermore, the Europeans were generally sensitive on the question of air targets. They were unwilling to hit civilian targets and uneasy when it came to collateral damages and civilian casualties. Primary material provide evidence that the Europeans have a particular way of seeing a conflict and reacting to it. However, although the European cautiousness of 'hard' elements of power (such as air strikes) is evident, one must still investigate which elements of force should be avoided. Chapters Five and Six of the thesis will investigate whether these sensitivities are long-term values which form part of the EU strategic culture.

The current chapter also demonstrates that the Europeans were committed to forms of multilateralism. For instance, the Europeans, compared to the Americans, were more willing to collaborate with the UN. It is evident though that the Europeans generally sought to involve other organisations in discussions concerning the Balkan crisis. However, relations were not always as productive. For instance, although networks of cooperation have been established between the UN and the EU they have not served to bring a strong empowerment of the bilateral relationship. The section on the EU-UN network suggests that communication between the two organisations was crippled by bureaucratisation, the fragmented, overlapping power amongst their sections and lack institutionalisation of the bilateral relationship. This institutional weakness had a direct

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impact on the development of an EU strategic culture which was not characterised by a cohesive EU-UN dialogue. Primary sources on Kosovo point to the fact that certain EU countries had problems with the lack of a clear UN mandate during the Serbia bombings which leads to the assumption that an ESDP action without a UN mandate will be difficult in the future. This claim will be further investigated in Chapters Five and Six.

3.10. The Development of a Primary Strategic Culture?

Chapter Two categorised the behavioural and structural elements of strategic culture in three main models: primary, intermediate and consolidated. By studying the period from 1990 up to the establishment of ESDP in 1999, it can be argued that various structural and behavioural elements amongst the EU Europeans point to the emergence of a primary strategic culture at this particular period.

Primary strategic culture stems from a mutual security threat, which in the case of the EU, is the instability of the Western Balkans area. This threat has led to the idea that cooperation amongst EU states can be mutually beneficial. The positive transactions that have taken place amongst various EU policy makers led in the late 1990s to the first steps towards cooperation. As a result of the Western Balkan crisis, new networks emerged that became influential in the shaping of ideas which make up the EU strategic culture. Networks brought new interaction amongst the Europeans and facilitated the development of common understandings in the Western Balkans case. This increasing interaction amongst EU officials facilitated the establishment of ESDP and reinforced the idea that institutionalisation of the EU security should move forward.

However, as it was mentioned in the chapter the process of cooperation has taken a long time to materialise as officials from different states have held different views on issues of western Balkans security. Intensive bargaining is evident as the big three had to negotiate continuously in order to reach an agreement that would allow the EU to become a security player. An agreement that would allow the EU to assume a security
role was finally reached as officials became convinced by the threats stemming from the Balkan wars. Another influential network which consisted of the neutral EU states also acted in favours of an EU dimension in the field of security, thus pointing the way to the establishment of ESDP. However, at this particular decade, relationships amongst officials from EU member states can be seen as of partial cooperation but also strong cautiousness. The process of cooperation was slow and only in the second half of the decade more extensive patterns of cooperation can be traced through networking. Finally, although the Western Balkans became a point of strategic consensus for the Europeans, such a process did not take place regarding other parts of the world.

3.11. Conclusions: the 1990s: A European Strategic Culture in the Making?

The Western Balkans crises of the 1990s provided an opportunity for the strategic culture of the EU to appear. The chapter claims that EU Europeans had their own way in perceiving the conflict in the Western Balkans. The study of history demonstrated that the EU is inextricably linked to a network of multilateral relations with other organisations and states that justifies the idea of multilateralism. Other ideas such as the rejection of air strikes and the fear of collateral damage also emerged in the study and need to be followed up once Chapter Six deals with the EU operations in Bosnia Herzegovina.

The fear of US disengagement from issues of European security is evident in the discourse of policy-makers. The chapter also claimed that for the Europeans the lack of the legal remit of the Kosovo air strikes was problematic. Still, although problems persisted on the question of legality the EU member states supported the NATO-led operation. Are the Europeans afraid that similar legal dilemmas will emerge in the future, thus not been willing to commit themselves to a UNSCR prior to ESDP mission? Chapter Five will deal with the question of UN legality and the influence that such an issue exercises on the strategic culture of the EU.
The decade of the 1990s was a period of adaptability as the Europeans tried to deal with the escalating humanitarian disasters in the Western Balkans. The idea of responsibility of the Balkan security can be justified but Chapter Five will have to investigate whether this feeling of responsibility is valid for other parts of the world. During this period it can be claimed that the EU possessed a primary strategic culture which was the outcome of interaction among policy officials in institutions and networks. The next chapter considers whether networks and institutions that have been developed since the late 1990s within ESDP structures have managed to move the strategic culture of the EU beyond the primary model.
Chapter Four

The Role of ESDP Institutions and Networks in the Shaping of EU Strategic Culture

4.1. Introduction

This chapter considers the behavioural/structural elements of ESDP as manifested in institutions and networks. It uses material extracted from interviews with officials (see Questionnaire, Appendix III) as well as secondary sources. Findings of the questionnaire will be used in this chapter in order to shed light on the impact that ESDP institutions and networks have on the shaping of the strategic culture through the development of internal structural and behavioural rules. The choice of institutions has not been random. Those chosen reflect the political aspect of the strategic culture of the EU (hence attention to the PSC) but also its operational (technical planning and implementation) aspects (hence the analysis of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM).

The focus on the behavioural/structural elements of the strategic culture of the EU was justified in Chapter Two on the grounds that due to the different backgrounds and nationalities of the ESDP officials, a common pattern of behaviour (or rules of engagement) has to be developed in order to facilitate interaction, co-existence and a synthesis of opinions within ESDP structures. As a point of reference, the second chapter of the thesis explored the behavioural and foundational elements of multinational/multi-cultural entities such as security communities, intergovernmental policy networks and institutions in order to delineate the main elements that keep these entities united. It concluded that the strategic culture of the EU can be developed in three main types – the primary, the intermediate and the consolidated. The chapter claims that the type that fits better with the current strategic culture of the EU is that of the intermediate strategic culture.
The chapter provides an account of the importance of institutions and networks in the shaping of the strategic culture of the EU. It begins with an ESDP diagram and an account of the basic inter-institutional relations amongst EU institutions. The following section (4.2) makes some general remarks about the nature of ESDP institutionalisation and its impact on the strategic culture of the EU. Afterwards, the importance of institutions in the strategic culture of the EU will be emphasised by analysing the role that the PSC, the EUMS/EUMC and CIVCOM play in the ESDP policy process. Finally, the chapter ends up with a study of the role of the most important ESDP policy networks in the post-St Malo era as developed within the PSC.

4.2. ESDP in Practice: the Institutional Dimension

Table 1 provides a basic outline of the main institutions that interact in order to shape ESDP. At the top lies the European Council which brings together the heads of governments and states of the EU plus the President of the European Commission. The European Council defines the general priorities of ESDP. The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) consists of the foreign ministers of the Member States who discuss the agenda of the European Council. The ministers of defence of the EU member states can meet either informally or in conjunction with the GAERC (Missiroli 2004: 59). GAERC works in close collaboration with the Secretary-General and High Representative for CFSP (SG/HR) (currently, Javier Solana) as well as with COREPER II.

The PSC also interacts with GAERC and COREPER II as it implements ESDP policy decisions and makes its own policy recommendations regarding the direction of ESDP. The role of the PSC is of vital importance for the ESDP as it is responsible for the planning and functioning of the ESDP missions. The PSC is supported in its work by the EUMC, the EUMS and CIVCOM. Other smaller institutions include: the EU Satellite Centre in Torrejon, Spain, the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and the European Defence Agency (EDA). These institutions will not be part of the thesis as their contribution to ESDP is still limited.
Table Six: ESDP Institutions

(based on Howorth 2007: 69, Meyer 2006: 114)
The role of four ESDP institutions (PSC, EUMC, EUMS and CIVCOM) in the shaping of an EU strategic culture will be analysed in detail in this chapter with principal attention being given to the PSC. The PSC was chosen as the primary body of research for number reasons. First, it has been described as the ‘linchpin’ of the ESDP by the official Council decision of 22 January 2001. In addition, as it will be argued further in this chapter, the PSC managed to increase both its influence and to expand its activities considerably, thus rendering itself into an irreplaceable policy-shaping and gradually a policy-making body in issues of ESDP. As the diagram above shows, the PSC remains at the centre of the decision-making process and has influential relationships with other important EU institutions. The PSC interacts extensively with the GAERC. PSC ambassadors have to represent national views in issues of security during PSC meetings, thus being important policy actors between their nation states and the EU level. Therefore, a study of the PSC can provide important information on the interaction of ESDP officials at both the EU and the national levels. Finally, the PSC is the institution that debates and discusses ESDP issues more frequently than any other EU institution; it formally convenes at least two times per week (plus other unofficial meetings), compared to GAERC (once a month) or the European Council (four times per year).

The thesis does not neglect the fact the ESDP is an intergovernmental policy. The foreign ministers and the heads of the EU states remain responsible for the strategic decisions which affect the direction of the ESDP. Unfortunately, direct access to the ministers and heads of the EU member states is an impossible task. The difficulty in talking to the most important policy-makers sets an important limitation upon the research. However, as mentioned in the first chapter of the thesis, the study of the EU strategic culture requires a direct interaction with ESDP officials so that their ideas and beliefs regarding the use of EU police and military instruments can be taken into account. Therefore, a sample of ESDP officials had to be chosen from an influential ESDP institution that would allow the thesis to reach solid conclusions regarding the state of the strategic culture of the EU. As access to the elected policy makers that make
up the GAERC is problematic, the study had to focus on the PSC. However, before providing an analysis of the role of the PSC in the development of the strategic culture of the EU, some general remarks will be made regarding the institutionalisation process of ESDP.

4.2.1 General Remarks on ESDP Institutions

First of all, it is worth mentioning that the ESDP has had a very short life. In fact, ESDP institutionalisation is still a work in progress as most recent developments such as the establishment of the EDA only took place in 2004. The first ESDP operational institutional activities date from 2003 onwards, thus the experience of ESDP institutions in planning and implementing missions is limited. It should be also mentioned that during their first years of their existence, ESDP institutions such as the PSC, EUMC, EUMS and CIVCOM had to define their agendas, establish working relationships with other relevant bodies and find their role within the complicated institutional system of the EU (Interview 1, 10). To give an example, according to Schuwirth (2004: 242):

"the full establishment of the Military Staff took around one year and included complex internal activities like designing and solving infrastructure and information technology, managing the influx of personnel, their working conditions and their internal training, clarifying their status within the EU and establishing the necessary budgetary conditions".

According to interviewees, a similar time was needed for making operational other ESDP institutions such as the PSC, the EUMC and CIVCOM (Interviews 1, 10). In short, ESDP institutionalisation is a very recent process and this has had an impact on the influence that ESDP institutions exercise on the shaping of an EU strategic culture. Therefore, the first conclusion regarding ESDP institutionalisation is that as these institutions have had to deal first with internal issues and find a 'modus operandi' with other EU institutions a lot of time was consumed on practical issues regarding the
arrangement of their functions. The process of EU strategic culture development was intensified once the institutional tasks were clearly defined and once the institutions acquired a clearly defined policy role. According to interviewees, it should be stressed that this is a very recent period ranging from 2001 onwards (Interviews 1, 10, 18).

In addition, other EU structures involved in issues of security (e.g. the Council and, the Commission) needed time to find ways to integrate new ESDP institutions into their working methods. The acceptance of an ESDP dimension within the EU was not an easy process. As Howorth (2002: 106) claims, a military presence within EU structures sent shock waves through the EU. However, the idea that the EU should acquire such a dimension was gradually accepted (Haine 2004: 46). According to Howorth (2003b: 18):

"the relationship between different ESDP institutions, between new and old members, between national capitals and Brussels, and between political and military functions has proved to be generally smooth".

Indeed, the acceptance of the ESDP institutions is seen as an achievement in its own right by all interviewees.

However, although in general ESDP institutions have managed to consolidate their roles and functions, they are still constrained by intergovernmental decisions that date back to 1999. In fact, ESDP institutions emerged after a politicized process between two blocs of EU states. The first bloc of EU countries (that included, Belgium, Luxembourg and France) argued in favour of institutionalization which would grant extensive powers and freedom of action to ESDP. Another bloc of countries (led by the UK and the Netherlands) was in favour of a more limited version of ESDP. As a result of this division, ESDP institutional structures suffered considerably, as they emerged, with the exception of the PSC, mostly as small entities with limited resources and powers.
The thesis will now move to the study of particular ESDP institutions and their impact on the shaping of EU strategic culture.

4.2.2. The Political and Security Committee (PSC)

The PSC monitors international developments and plays a vital role during the pre-operational phase which precedes an ESDP mission. It exercises political control through the strategic direction of ESDP operations. This includes the power to amend operational plans as well as the chain of command. The PSC reports to the Council of the EU at regular intervals and organises operational contributions of non-EU states. It has a coordination role as well as a consultation role with other ESDP institutions such as the EUMC, the EUMS and CIVCOM. Furthermore, it consults with outside bodies such as NATO. The PSC consists of the Permanent Representatives of the Member States who have an ambassadorial status. The PSC ambassadors are based in Brussels but they also take part in regular meetings in national capitals in order to brief their ‘national’ colleagues as well as be briefed on national issues. In this respect, PSC officials constitute important policy information carriers and policy shapers both at the national and EU levels.

In the first two years of its inception, the PSC had to find its own position within the institutional machinery of the EU. Various, ‘turf wars’ between different institutions on ‘who does what’ had to be resolved so that the PSC could move on with its tasks. For example, a division of labour had to be worked out within the institutional triangle of COREPER, the PSC and the Council of Ministers. The respective roles of COREPER and PSC was partially determined at the Seville European Council in June 2002 when it was decided that the Council would meet monthly in two separate modes, one for ‘general affairs’ business (prepared by COREPER I and II) and the other for ‘external relations’ business (relevant to COREPER II and the PSC) (Howorth 2003b: 19). As COREPER II deals with a wide range of political, commercial, economic and institutional affairs, it has less time to dedicate to ESDP issues which have been delegated to the PSC. At present, the ESDP related work of COREPER II is limited to
checking the legal status of PSC decisions as well as providing advice on financial issues regarding missions. As both PSC and COREPER II ambassadors work for their respective national representations and share the same offices in Brussels (in respective national representation buildings) interaction amongst them is frequent and the relationship is regarded by PSC officials as smooth and mutually supportive.

Questionnaire respondents suggest that the PSC plays a vital role in the policy-making of ESDP and that it is deserves to be called the ‘linchpin’ and the ‘policy director’ of ESDP. According to all PSC interviewees, the PSC has been an influential institution in the shaping of ESDP (Appendix III, section 2, question 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. The institution in which I work has been influential in shaping ESDP.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
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In theory, the political authority of the ESDP is in the hands of GAERC, whereas managerial authority rests with PSC. However, PSC officials mention that the PSC has managed to consolidate its predominance in ESDP affairs and has the responsibility of reaching decisions which the GAERC then accepts. In addition, the PSC is usually chaired by the Permanent Representative of the Member State then holding the EU Presidency. Due to this institutional arrangement, the PSC also manages to influence the work of the Presidency on issues of security and defence. Furthermore, PSC meetings are attended by four representatives of the Council Secretariat as well as by a Commission official in order to ensure policy-continuity and cross-pillar cooperation. Relations amongst the different EU institutions which interact with the PSC have been generally good and the level of EU intra-institutional cooperation has been described as satisfactory by all PSC interviewees.

The PSC is also an important institution because it binds officials together in a pattern of continuous interaction and collaboration, thus contributing to the development of
common ideas in the field of security. According to interviewees, most of the time there is a good degree of cooperation among PSC colleagues which, in turn, contributes to the development of strategic culture (Appendix III, Section 2, question 2).

| 2. Most of the time there is a good degree of cooperation with my ESDP colleagues. |
|---------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Agree                                   | 20   |
| 2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances | 2    |
| 3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances | 0    |
| 4. Disagree                                | 0    |
| 5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer                 | 0    |

Within the PSC, officials have developed what Meyer (2005b: 52) claims is:

“an esprit de corps, a sense of group identity and common thoughts on the idea of developing ESDP as well as high levels of mutual trust and an understanding for each others’ positions”.

Indeed, all PSC interviewees mention that within the PSC there is a good friendly atmosphere which contributes to the development of confidentiality amongst its personnel. The high degree of trust that exists within the PSC is manifested in the frequent exchange of very sensitive and confidential information. Both the behavioural elements of trust and confidentiality are influential in the development of an EU strategic culture.

Friendly interaction and cooperation are common words in the description of the PSC’s work. These two conditions lead to the development of diffused reciprocity as manifested in a non-institutionalised pattern of mutual help amongst officials. Without such frequent interaction, the emergence of an intermediate EU strategic culture would be an unlikely outcome. Thus, some more experienced officials have made a comparison between the predecessor of the PSC, the Political Committee (Po.Co) by claiming that the lack of frequent interaction amongst officials led to no progress in issues of security as Po.Co. Political Directors were based in their national capitals (Interview 18). Furthermore, one can detect a ‘path dependency’ of stable coexistence,
cooperation and interaction that is common amongst the relationships of the PSC officials since the establishment of the PSC. Indeed, the timetables of the PSC officials are characterised by an increasing level of overlapping social agendas as well as private meetings and 'dinner diplomacy' which bind them even closer together. For instance, an official gives a characteristic description which fits with the lifestyle of the average PSC official:

"we spend most of our time amongst ourselves rather than being with our families. The work in the PSC dominates our lives. Relationships amongst the colleagues are constructive. There is a very frequent exchange of opinions, a synthesis of views and also the necessary help when someone needs it" (Interview 12).

In addition, cooperation amongst officials has increased over the years (Appendix III, section 2, question 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. The degree of cooperation amongst employees within ESDP institutions has increased over the years.</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
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<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<td>4. Disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
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For instance, PSC officials mentioned that the frequency of meetings and the number of decisions reached within the PSC have followed an upwards trend since the establishment of the PSC (Interview 12). There has also been an expansion of the issues and policies discussed within the PSC. The expansion of themes tackled by the PSC and the increasing number of decisions reached can be also seen as a positive factor in the establishment of an EU strategic culture as consensus can be reached in other policy areas. However, the PSC has been a victim of its own success as it is characterised by a rising workload. As it stands, the PSC lacks the necessary institutional resources to deal with all its tasks. Certain ambassadors, especially those coming from smaller Member States, have thus complained about the workload and the overwhelming exchange of
papers which is difficult to be incorporated into the national systems (Interviews 6, 7, 8). The problem that such a bureaucratic blockage creates to the development of an EU strategic culture is that the ESDP agenda cannot be transferred to the national capitals in depth. Therefore, the process of harmonisation of national policies is further undermined, thus not allowing the strategic culture of the EU to be consolidated.

The PSC has played a positive role in bringing uniformity to views regarding the use of police/military resources. For instance, PSC officials mentioned that considerable pressures are exercised on members of the group in order to alter positions that do not fit with the ‘mainstream’, that is, with the views of the PSC majority. Pressure and conviction by argument are frequent but are not exercised on issues that are considered to be ‘nationally sensitive’ for a particular country. The result of this group pressure is that it is common for PSC officials to alter their primary positions to ones which are closer to the mainstream views of the group. In addition, PSC officials also witnessed the increasing emergence of ‘third party mediation’ as a way of solving conflicting issues and bridging the differences over different strategic positions. Third party mediation takes place when a discussion between two or more countries involved reaches a deadlock. In this case, it is very common for a third ‘neutral’ official to take the initiative to form a new proposal and present it to both sides which will then accept it most of the times. Conviction by logic as well as third party mediation can be seen as facilitating factors in the development of an EU strategic culture as they encourage the establishment of commonly accepted ideas in the field of security. However, the fact that certain countries are ‘coerced’ into the adoption of particular decision also leads one to believe that the strategic culture of the EU has not reached the smooth process of policy harmonization that would characterise a consolidated strategic culture.

According to PSC interviewees, the natural tendency of allying with other PSC officials is also seen as a positive factor in the creation of an EU strategic culture (interviews 1, 10). The threat of the national veto within the PSC is very rare and usually left as a tool of ‘last resort’. The rejection of the veto as a way of accepted behaviour facilitates the formation of common positions that, in turn, help develop strategic culture. The fact
that a diplomat may stand on one's own is seen as an anathema as it is widely acknowledged that PSC diplomats do not want to be isolated. An insistence on a position that is rejected by the large majority of the PSC is seen as an inappropriate strategy that must be avoided unless the matter discussed is of particular urgency to the national capital.

The work of the PSC is also characterised by a high degree of continuity. Although PSC Ambassadors regularly change (approximately every three years) regular help to newcomers and a tendency to welcome them into the PSC structures contributes to a positive feeling of belonging amongst the new members of the PSC. As a result of this practice, newcomers are very quickly integrated into the spirit of cooperation that is predominant in the PSC. Due to the process of osmosis between old and new PSC members an 'institutional memory' has been developed, thus binding PSC officials into common working methods, agreed agendas and accepted patterns of behaviour. Such institutional memory also facilitates the maintenance of ideas that make up the strategic culture of the EU for when new PSC members join, the work of the PSC does not have to start from scratch.

A positive path dependency in the shaping of the strategic culture of the EU is the continuous engagement of PSC officials in a search for policy consensus. This behavioural element of intense cooperation contributes to the establishment of a consensual strategic culture. One of the main tasks of the PSC officials is to reach consensus, even if this presupposes a frequent 're-writing' of national instructions. PSC officials admit that sometimes national guidelines can be very rigid and can be seen as unacceptable by the other PSC colleagues. In such cases, the role of the PSC officials is to try to minimise the differences between the national positions and the predominant PSC position which contributes highly to the development of the strategic culture of the EU.
When it comes to the appreciation of the work carried out by the PSC, the answers of the participants from interviewees can be grouped into three main categories (Appendix III, section 2, question 5).

| 5. How much does the national capital value the work of the institution for which you are working? |
|---|---|
| 1. Quite a lot. There is frequent interaction between my institution and the national capital | 12 |
| 2. There is a substantial interaction but there is still room for improvement | 6 |
| 3. Not a lot. | 4 |

The first category mostly includes the states from the old EU12. Officials from these states mostly suggest that there is a good degree of interaction between their national capitals and the missions in Brussels and a growing interest in ESDP developments in general. However, even amongst these states there are still differences on how much influence a PSC ambassador can exercise. For example, a British official claims that in the case of the UK there is a very strong interaction between the PSC Representative in ESDP and the high echelons of the FCO, a situation which contrasts with that of the French Representatives (Interview 10). However, although the UK national representation office enjoys a very good relationship with the FCO, this has not necessarily led to a major change of British national priorities. According to one British official, while the UK is taking part in ESDP it is also committed to many other different missions (e.g. Iraq) and therefore attributes less importance to ESDP than France or Germany (Interview 10).

The second category of states includes the post neutral states which joined the EU in 1995. Due to their particular status, it is claimed that it took a couple of years for them to understand how ESDP works and how they can get fully involved in it. For example, a Swedish official adds:

"it took us time to understand the nature of ESDP and what it is for. At the very beginning of its formation the Swedes were very lukewarm about it with no enthusiasm
on the policy and a high degree of scepticism. I can say that interest in ESDP was only raised in 2002/3 so quite recently really” (Interview 13).

For Finland, it is also mentioned that a similar period was necessary so that the national bureaucracy would become more interested in ESDP developments even if the Finnish Presidency was influential in bringing new thinking to Finnish elites (Interview 22). However, both the Swedish and the Finnish Presidencies acted positively in bringing new thinking to Foreign Ministries and preparing the ground for more pro-active stances in ESDP issues for both countries (Interviews 13, 22). In the case of Austria and Ireland, it can be argued that, although the two countries participate in ESDP, the national bureaucracy is still struggling to bring together resources and personnel that will facilitate the assimilation of ESDP at the national level (Interview 8).

The third group of states includes some of the East European EU members which are still struggling to understand the utility of ESDP. In general, as far as these countries are concerned, interest in ESDP is still low in the national ministries with much of the security discussions still dominated by attention to NATO. East European PSC officials also mentioned that they are struggling when it comes to convincing their colleagues in national ministries of how important their tasks are. Although policy ideas may flourish within the PSC, they claimed that it can be difficult to feed them to the national mechanism.

An East European official describes the situation by claiming that:

“sometimes I feel frustrated. There is no reply from the national government on certain policy ideas and the image of ESDP is still comparatively low to my country. This is also the case for most of the Eastern European states. We are still trying to find out a place in ESDP. This also has to do with the fact that for issues of defence the main security provider is NATO and many cannot understand why we need ESDP” (Interview 14).
The fact that a considerable number of EU states lack a strong allegiance to ESDP poses a clear challenge to the establishment of a consolidated EU strategic culture as the danger may be that the EU will be divided into two camps – between the ESDP enthusiasts and ESDP sceptics. Because of the high number of Eastern EU countries in ESDP it is difficult to imagine that a consolidated EU strategic culture will emerge soon as the two blocs have different perceptions of how ESDP should develop (see also Chapter Five).

Although problems of national assimilation of the ESDP agenda are evident, the role of the PSC in establishing an EU strategic culture can still be seen as positive. There are cases when the PSC ambassadors claimed that they have managed to bring closer the national governments to an EU dimension. However, a full EU harmonisation of views regarding security issues is still a distant prospect. It may be the case that gradually further interaction amongst EU officials combined with the successful initiatives that the ESDP undertakes can have a multiplier effect which may lead to a consolidated EU strategic culture in the future. Nevertheless, for the time being all PSC officials mentioned that the tasks that the ESDP undertakes are modest, thereby the impact they have on the individual strategic cultures of the Member States is limited. Although cooperation has taken place, actual coordination of security policies is still a developing process and harmonisation of security attitudes still remains weak. These are signs which point to an intermediate EU strategic culture.

The problematic status of coordination and harmonisation does not facilitate the formation of a consolidated EU strategic. Furthermore, although respect and trust have been common characteristics of the work carried out by the PSC, the same cannot be said when it comes to the levels of solidarity which would have attributed a sense of consolidation in the strategic culture of the EU. For instance, the degree of solidarity is minimum when various national sensitivities dictate an allocation of a big amount of resources to ESDP (e.g. when some EU countries try to put the issue of common defence on the table) or when US policy initiatives put some EU countries in a disadvantaged position. In these particular cases national instincts overshadow
European commonalities. Therefore, there is still a parallel existence of a national identity along with enriched EU elements. This is also another characteristic of the intermediate strategic culture of the EU.

Although the role of PSC officials as strategic culture shapers faces certain limitations it is still of considerable importance to the development of the strategic culture of the EU. The function of PSC officials as ESDP agenda transmitters to the national level is vital to the creation of an EU strategic culture because PSC officials can convince their respective member governments about the utility of ESDP activities. All interviewees mentioned that the role of the PSC official is to provide good briefings from Brussels to the national capital and to spot further opportunities for cooperation between one’s country and other Member States. Evidence from interviews demonstrates that PSC officials have been successful in the transfer of the PSC agenda to national capitals. Even in the most problematic cases, the PSC Ambassadors have been influential in altering national positions (even slightly) towards a more positive approach in ESDP issues. For instance, the majority of PSC officials suggested that due to their ESDP posts they have considerable influence over the formulation of the ESDP policy of their respective member state—with the exception of some East European officials—(Appendix III, section 2, question 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. Due to my ESDP post I have considerable influence over the formulation of the ESDP policy of the state I come from.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<td>4. Disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
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Furthermore, the ‘bridging’ role of PSC ambassadors between the national and EU level was stressed in all the interviews conducted. All PSC officials mentioned that although their main function is to represent their particular government, this does not prohibit them from constructing EU positions which are parallel to national interests (Appendix III, section 2, question 7).
7. My main function is to strike a balance between the national and the EU position but national interest always comes first.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Don’t’ Know/Don’t Answer</td>
<td>0</td>
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Part of the PSC’s success lies in the fact that the work of a PSC official often involves networking at the national level so that his/her ideas can be easily transmitted and implemented in the national policy making process. There is a common tendency amongst PSC officials to build good working relations between the national capitals and the PSC. The professional background of the PSC officials facilitates cooperation between national capitals and Brussels as these officials are usually experienced diplomats who already enjoy a good relationship with and are respected in their national ministries. Usually, information gathered within the PSC is quite valued by the national ministries although the degree of appreciation varies from country to country and depends on the issue discussed as well as the quality of the information itself. PSC officials play an active role in the shaping of national positions as they provide their national capitals with information and advice that they judge as appropriate. The gathering of information is another tool of influence in the hands of the PSC officials as only they can choose and present particular pieces of information which can strengthen their particular arguments when their views are presented to the national governments.

One of the positive functions of the PSC is that it binds the national and EU levels closer together by encouraging the development of common understandings which are influential in the development of the strategic culture of the EU. Although PSC officials have certain ‘no-go’ areas, they also enjoy considerable room for manoeuvre. During the interviews, PSC officials claimed that they have a wide margin of flexibility in deciding upon which ‘national interests’ have to be defended and what the national position should consist of during negotiation (with lower levels of flexibility declared
in the cases of some Eastern European officials). Flexibility is seen as another important facilitating factor in the development of an EU strategic culture for it allows consensus on various issues to be more easily reached. Flexibility has become an unwritten rule of PSC interaction. All interviewees claimed that PSC officials have to demonstrate a level of flexibility themselves, and can expect their colleagues to reciprocate flexibility in every day negotiations. Therefore, a logic of ‘diffused reciprocity’ has become part of the PSC’s working methods.

In addition, PSC officials who come from smaller EU Member States point to the fact that on many issues their countries do not have a clearly defined national interest. Consequently, the shaping of consensus in such cases is easier. This is because officials coming from smaller states usually expect other more experienced officials to take the lead on issues in which they have limited experience (Interviews 1, 5). As a result of such ‘policy gaps’ at the national level, it is up to the PSC officials in Brussels to decide what the national position is. Therefore, PSC officials can also ‘enrich’ national policies by adding new dimensions to them. This phenomenon of enrichment further encourages the development of EU strategic culture as PSC officials can adopt accommodating positions that fit with the mainstream opinion of the PSC.

Nevertheless, the process of ‘national’ incorporation into the works of the PSC has its limits as EU member states will not sacrifice what they consider as core national interests. This is also another sign that points to the fact that the EU possesses an intermediate strategic culture as Member States are supportive of ESDP activities but also cautious when it comes to their own domaines réservés. PSC officials mention that because of national rigidities various opportunities of establishing cooperation amongst EU countries have been lost due to ‘stubbornness’ stemming from the national capitals. One should take into account that as the ‘green light’ to move forward in particular issues is given from the national capitals, Member States can have either a positive or a negative impact on the shaping of the EU strategic culture. This impact depends on the government structures, party/coalition politics, as well as the attitudes of the national
officials appointed to national and EU posts. A PSC official summarises succinctly the limitations of the PSC work by claiming that it can be considered as:

"the art of the possible" (Interview 10).

PSC officials need to have realistic expectations of what an expected outcome may be and always try to reach a consensus. The establishment of the strategic culture of the EU was a process that began with the tackling of security issues that were considered as non-divisive. This is also another sign of the intermediate strategic culture that the EU possesses as not all security issues are covered by the PSC. For instance, during the first two years of its existence, the PSC was short-circuited by national capitals. A very clear example of such tactics was the 2003 Iraq crisis when the PSC:

“was kept at arm’s length from what was a very important policy decision in issues of security” (Howorth 2003b: 18).

However, the PSC interviewees that experienced the crisis of Iraq perceived the exclusion of the topic from the agenda as positive so that the unity of the group would not be called into question (Interview 12). This decision can be also seen as a sign of maturity reached amongst the colleagues who ‘agreed not to disagree’ in order not to jeopardise good working relationships. Yet the exclusion of Iraq from PSC discussions can be also seen as a sign of weakness to address the main security challenges that affected EU foreign policy at this particular time. If the trend of avoiding divisive issues within the PSC continues, then the possibility of establishing a consolidated EU strategic culture that will address important security challenges remains dim. However, PSC officials also point to the fact that the work remit of the PSC has been continuously extended, thus encompassing more policy areas. This policy expansion on behalf of the PSC has a positive influence on the development of an inclusive EU strategic culture.
Finally, national sovereignty is seen as the cornerstone of ESDP by PSC officials even if it sometimes poses difficulties in their work. This is another characteristic of the EU intermediate strategic culture. It is interesting to note that on the question regarding the empowerment of ESDP institutions, PSC officials are reluctant to allocate more powers to ESDP institutions if such moves challenge national sovereignty (Appendix III, section 2, question 8).

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<tr>
<th>8. More powers should be given to ESDP institutions even if this goes against national sovereignty</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
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<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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Interviewees claim that their answers can partly be explained due to the belief that Member States will never make such a move. However, this tendency is also a result of the temporary nature of PSC placements. PSC officials work mostly as expat ‘nationals’ and see the ESDP experience as another stage of their lives but not the only and final stage of their career. Furthermore, many PSC officials serve ESDP at the later stages of their careers where their cultural experiences have already been shaped by work at the national level. Limitations regarding the length of the stay of PSC officials has an impact on their function as influential shapers of the EU strategic culture. Most PSC officials will return to the national ministries and consequently, they have an interest in maintaining the national capitals as the main sources of power. Therefore, PSC officials do not want to be seen as ‘going native’ and want to remain a trustworthy link to their ministries.

4.2.3. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS)

The EUMC is a forum for military consultation amongst EU Member States. It is made up of the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs) and deals with early warning, situation
assessment and strategic planning. It also provides the PSC with advice on military matters. For every crisis management operation, the PSC, together with the EUMC, is charged with evaluating contributions to the mission. The EUMC is chaired by an officer from a Member State whose mandate runs for three years. The EUMC delivers to the European Council, via the PSC, the unanimous opinion of the CHODs on all matters of military relevance. The Chair also attends sessions of the Council of the EU when issues of security and defence are discussed.

The role of the EUMS, meanwhile, has been to establish objectives in relation to capabilities, concepts (doctrines) and internal procedures. It also has responsibility for overseeing the process of capabilities modernisation (as identified in the Helsinki 2003 Headline Goal and the 2010 Headline Goal). Between 1999 and early 2001, the EUMS built upon the 'acquis' gained by the WEU in planning for the Petersberg Tasks (Bono 2004b: 447). By late 2002, the EUMS had drafted military policy and concept papers tackling topics as diverse as command and control, rules of engagement, logistics and communications. It has also contributed to the development of the broader politico-military policies, concepts and procedures, such as an EU exercise policy, information policy, and a handbook of crisis-management procedures (Howorth 2003: 19).

In short, EUMS and the EUMC have been in charge of the development of new technical terms, practices and linguistic codes that have facilitated the shaping of common procedures in the deployment of missions. When it comes to the every day building up of ESDP, EUMC/EUMS interviewees claimed that ESDP has developed in a double manner: through bottom-up and a top-down approaches (Interviews 24, 33). The top down approach occurs when certain initiatives and policy ideas are pushed through either the GAERC or the PSC. The bottom-up approach, meanwhile, happens when the EUMS and the EUMC put forward their views on ESDP missions, thus adding flesh to the bones of ESDP ideas. As a result of the work of the two institutions, the ‘bottom up’ contribution to ESDP has been empowered considerably, thus, contributing positively to the creation of common technical/operational aspects that underpin the strategic culture of the EU.
According to interviews, relationships amongst EUMS/EUMC officials have been characterised by high levels of trust and cooperation (Interviews 43, 54). Within the EUMC/EUMS there are no 'political’ disputes (as may be sometimes the case in the PSC) as both the EUMS/EUMC work on missions that have been already delegated to them. Furthermore, all EUMS/EUMS interviewees supported the view that participants make their best effort to reach agreement on how missions should best be implemented. Here, the question of safeguarding lives of EU personnel is always under consideration and this helps foster consensus (Interviews 24, 33). Therefore, it can be argued that the consensual atmosphere which is evident in the political level (PSC) has also been apparent at the technical/operational level of ESDP (EUMC/EUMS). The high degree of consensual interaction amongst officials thus acts as a positive factor in the establishment of the EU strategic culture.

All officials interviewed noted that within the EUMC/EUMS a frequent interaction of views and ideas occur on policy issues, with a good level of understanding regarding the national difficulties of troop/police deployment and a willingness to cooperate in order to reach agreements (Interviews 24, 33, 55). The development of a path dependency of cooperation and understanding can be traced in the interaction of the EUMS/EUMC officials. Secrecy is a vital part of the EUMS/EUMC internal methods. As a result, EUMS/EUMC officials share many views orally. Due to the predominance of the internal rules of secrecy, a high degree of trust is embedded in the interaction of officials. Secrecy has also fostered a sense of group identity for both institutions, and it has become an influential factor in the establishment of strong personal relationships amongst the EUMS/EUMC personnel.

Furthermore, EUMS/EUMC personnel have noted the importance of solving disagreements at the lowest possible level within their institutions. They argued that issues should not be left to escalate because, if this happens:
"the ownership of a policy’ may be lost and transferred to the national level” (interviews 24, 33, 54).

For this reason, officials try to bring issues to ‘digestible’ proportions, as disagreements can be exploited by national level elites who may wish to limit ESDP. The efforts of the two institutions to maintain policy initiatives at the EU level also facilitates the development of the strategic culture of the EU on technical issues as ESDP as fragmentation through re-nationalisation is avoided due to the consensual functioning of the two institutions. However, the high level of national cautiousness of the EU member states vis-à-vis the work of the two institutions is also a sign of the intermediate strategic culture of the EU.

The high degree of national cautiousness vis-à-vis ESDP has also had an impact on the size and resources attributed to these two institutions. Thus, Brok and Gresch (2004: 183) claim that while there are some 3,000 officers employed at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) there are only 200 personnel who carry out command and planning duties at the EUMS’s Cortenberg building.

Certain interviewees also point to the fact that the two institutions remain at some distance from national operational headquarters with the latter continuing to possess their own differentiated priorities and agendas (Interviews 24, 33). EUMS/EUMC officials will regularly elaborate on phenomena of ‘national consciousness’ as Member States could have made better use of the EUMC/EUMS. In addition, there is a lack of an in-depth knowledge and expertise at the national level about the work carried out at by the EUMS/EUMC. According to EUMC/EUMS officials, an increased interaction between the national and EU levels is seen as an important challenge for these two institutions and is a vital prerequisite for the further development of EU strategic culture (Interviews 24, 55).

Officials also claim that although the work of the EUMC/EUMS managed to create a common vocabulary in technical issues there are still strong national perceptions on
various issues which put limitations to the work carried out by the EUMS/EUMC (Interview 23, 54). All officials interviewed said they would like to acquire more flexibility in dealing with their agendas. However, the reluctance of the member states to give them more freedom sets important limitations on what can be achieved. For instance, one EUMS official claimed that the work carried out by his institution in coordinating the EU member states in cases of natural disasters did not prove successful as member states wanted to maintain their own national mechanisms and deal with physical crises on a one to one basis (Interviews 54, 55). Thus, in certain respects, EUMC/EUMS interviewees supported that the EU possesses a strategic culture in transition which requires further consolidation.

More positively, cultural differences regarding the working methods of EUMC/EUMS have been eroded. It is individual personality rather than national background that has been the dominant factor in one to one interaction amongst officials. According to an official:

"culturally there is not a general trend in how countries will act as reactions mostly depend on individual choices. Due to the work carried out in ESDP there is now a way of thinking and a policy training which mostly works on a similar basis" (Interview 33).

Thus, through the development of certain common practices, training sessions and strategies, new EU methods are invented and new rules have become part of a 'European acquis' at the technical level. The strategic culture of the EU has gradually been reinforced through such developments.

The permanent operation of the EUMC/EUMS also means an on-going process of policy-making has occurred. According to an official:

"we are not starting from zero. There is a collective memory. Committees get mandates and form their own programmes" (Interview 55).
The permanent nature of these agreements may in the long term foster a strategic culture which can consist of clearly defined operational procedures. For the time being, with a few exceptions, ESDP is still characterised by small missions and the tasks performed by the EUMS/EUMC are still minimal. The small scale remit of these tasks poses limitations to the development of an EU strategic culture as major operations are still under national auspices. For instance, interviewees mentioned that important operations such as Iraq and Lebanon are happening outside of the EU framework (Interview 54). However, all EUMS/EUMC officials have also expressed their satisfaction as ESDP is currently expanding and new important missions are planned in the Balkans (Kosovo) and Africa (Chad).

It should be also noted that the work of the EUMS/EUMC has been highly valued by the PSC. The relationship amongst the three institutions has been described as constructive and mutually beneficial by all EUMC/EUMS interviewees. This is another sign of the increasingly dense institutional networks that characterises the intermediate strategic culture of the EU. To give an example of such appreciation, a PSC official expresses her admiration for the technical work carried out in the EUMS/EUMC institutions:

“I thought that much of our work would only stay in paper and nothing would come out of it. But when I visited the Potsdam Headquarter I realised that what has been discussed had taken flesh and bones. All the language that we have been using and the technical details that have passed from the EUMS were implemented in practice” (Interview 7).

4.2.4. The Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)

CIVCOM is composed of national representatives as well as officials from the Commission and the Council Secretariat. It discusses proposals for civilian missions, develops strategies for the deployment of police and rule of law missions, formulates
recommendations and gives advice on civilian aspects of crisis management to the PSC. According to CIVCOM officials, the levels of trust, cooperation and aid has been high. In theory, the role of CIVCOM has been upgraded due to the political emphasis of the role of civilian crisis management. However, various weaknesses inhibit the role of CIVCOM as a promoter of a consolidated strategic culture in the field of civilian crisis management (CCM).

In the first place, an initial lack of enthusiasm for the development of CCM in the capitals of most EU member states has had a direct impact on the institutionalisation of CIVCOM. For instance, CIVCOM Committee members have had to improvise in developing their structures (in contrast to the PSC where was used as an institutional basis). According to CIVCOM officials, the lack of an EU tradition in CCM as well as the lack of attention to CIVCOM structures on behalf of Member States has resulted in weak institutional practices within CIVCOM (Interviews 27, 48). Although since 2005 further moves have taken place in order to encourage better coordination between the national and the EU levels, CIVCOM officials complained about the cautious approach of Member States when it comes to initiatives that may lead to an expansion of responsibilities (Interviews 27, 38, 48). However, there is a basic consensus both within CIVCOM (but also gradually developing in the national capitals) on the fact that the EU should develop an effective CCM dimension. This leaves room for optimism as such a consensus may gradually lead to a development of an EU strategic culture in the field of CCM. However, all CIVCOM interviewees mentioned that the strategic culture of the EU is a work in progress and requires consolidation.

Another challenge that CIVCOM faces is the division of the CCM tasks in the different EU pillars, and the division between the Commission and the Council on competencies in this particular field. These institutional battles continue to take place because there are still overlapping but distinctive frameworks - a Commission and an ESDP framework. For instance, military crisis management is characterised by second-pillar intergovernmental procedures, whereas reconstruction, institution building and development assistance are under the first pillar (Gourlay 2004: 407). This lack of
policy coordination between the two pillars still remains an impediment to the cohesion and effectiveness of ESDP as well as for the creation of a CCM strategic culture. As an example, both the Commission and the Council have been involved in drafting separate reports and thus in a wasteful duplication of resources (Dempsey 2004: 196). Rummel (2002: 462-3) provides a fair criticism of this division when he argues that the intersection between all the different institutions involved in ESDP is disadvantageous because:

“goal setting and budget allocation are decided in separate institutions, political decision-making and implementation of intervention policies happen on different levels. If both decision-making processes do not come to a synthesis, the ESDP would hardly be able to fulfil its task, especially in the area of peacekeeping”.

However, there have been also recent moves to combine ESDP/Commission elements in CCM in order to provide a more cohesive approach. According to a highly ranked Commission official, both the Council and the Commission have realised that such division has been counterproductive and needs to be tackled so that a unified EU front could be presented in external relations (Interview 32). An apparent willingness to bring the different pillars together allows for a degree of optimism regarding the development of an EU strategic culture with a solid CCM dimension.

4.3. The Role of Policy Networks in the ESDP Era

Chapter Four examined the role of networks in the establishment of ESDP. This section follows up post-1999 network activity and describes the development of networks within the most influential ESDP institution, the PSC. These networks are studied because their actions have a particular impact on the strategic culture of the EU. According to the intermediate strategic culture model, coalitions of states are important in encouraging further developments which impact upon strategic culture. This section takes into account the views of officials that participate in three networks that will be studied in detail below. The section also considers the opinions of network outsiders in order to test the influence that these networks exercise in ESDP. As mentioned in
Chapter Two, the development of networks can have a positive influence in the development of an EU strategic culture only if the policies that a network promotes can be accepted by a wider circle of non-network members which co-exist within the same institution. If such a process of policy assimilation is not taking place, then networks may bring the fragmentation of ESDP into small groups of countries whose only interest would be to promote national prerogatives by using the EU framework in order to further their national ambitions. In such a case, the development of a consolidated EU strategic culture would be unlikely to happen.

The Questionnaire covered the issue of networking in section 2. It is interesting to mention that the first reaction of the respondents when it comes to the question of networking is that in most cases choosing with whom to network depends on the circumstances, the countries already involved in a particular area as well as the geographic area where a putative ESDP mission might take place. Personal relations are also a very important factor in deciding to whom one should talk first, with high degrees of consultation and interaction taking place amongst friends. When PSC officials were asked whether there is a pattern of collaboration, groups which are linked to issues of culture, history and geography can be traced. For instance, many national representatives tend to work with their neighbours, because certain security issues do not only affect their country but a wider geographic area. However, as this section cannot cover all ESDP personal networks due to their multiple numbers, it will focus on the most influential networks within the PSC.

The section claims that the trilateral network amongst France, Germany and the UK remains active in the post-Malo era. This is a tight policy network that has been influential in shaping the agenda of ESDP. The Neutrals network has been also influential, although various internal developments may partially transform its structures in the future. Finally, a new tight policy network has emerged since the 2004 enlargement involving Greece, Cyprus and Malta. This particular network is influential when it comes to the PSC-NATO relationship and so its actions have had an important
impact on the way the transatlantic relationship evolves, thus influencing decisively the strategic culture of the EU.

4.3.1. The Trilateral UK-French-German Policy Network

Chapter Four argued that cooperation between France, the UK and Germany has been an important factor in sustaining ESDP active. The trilateral network amongst France, Germany and the UK is also evident within the PSC and plays an influential role in harmonising the different views of the three countries on issues of security. According to one official:

"once a discussion within the network begins no matter how problematic it is it will lead somewhere. Although different opinions exist a compromise must be somehow reached" (Interview 1).

It is also claimed that network participants really understand that an ESDP without the participation of their countries is not possible and thus reaching agreements amongst them is seen as a priority (Interview 1, 10).

Both internal network players and external network officials see networking amongst the big three EU Member States as positive in the shaping of common attitudes that facilitate the establishment of an EU strategic culture as the process of networking slowly but steadily bridges different perceptions in security issues (Interviews 1, 10, 19, 22). Network officials also mentioned that although different perceptions exist amongst capitals on certain issues, the trilateral network of the big three has led to certain important ESDP initiatives (Interviews 1, 10, 19). For instance, it is claimed that the Battlegroup concept was elaborated first among these three nations before being presented to the other EU states (Interview 10). This is not the only case where such collaboration has occurred for, according to some PSC officials, the three have worked on various political and technical initiatives in advance, again before presenting them to their colleagues before meetings (Interview 4, 18). The three states have also been
influential in believing that the Balkans and Africa should be priorities for the EU (Interviews 1, 10, 19). Therefore, one of the more positive contributions of this trilateral network has been that it pushes the strategic culture of the EU towards an embrace of more ambitious missions.

However, the big three network has also been characterised by certain limitations which have an impact on the development of the EU strategic culture as its influence is limited by preferences that stem from national capitals. For instance, due to UK sensitivities regarding the sovereign nature of the field of security, as well as the primacy of the transatlantic relationship, UK, French and German network officials claimed that a new policy reorientation on behalf of the UK would be necessary so that the network will be able to contribute more to ESDP (Interviews 1, 10, 19). It is interesting to note that, according to British officials, ESDP has been perceived more as a tool of the UK and less a means of promoting the European project. Mérand (2006: 143) describes the UK position by arguing that the British:

"show no exaggerated enthusiasm for the 'European' or 'defence' aspects of ESDP, but are willing to undertake and influence the course of a policy aimed at solving security crises".

Therefore, the British are interested in the 'policy' dimension of ESDP but are not keen to develop it in an autonomous direction. In this respect the British are cautious of any French plans which attribute to ESDP a vision of traditional French grandeur (Interview 10).

On the issue of network/non-network members' relationship, it can be argued that ideas stemming from the network have been gradually accepted by other PSC colleagues. Although it would have been expected that diplomats from other countries who do not form part of the 'group of three' would see the trilateral cooperation sceptically, interviewees give a different picture. As a non-network PSC officials add:
"we expect that the bigger EU countries would have a bigger say in ESDP. The trilateral cooperation is good as far as we are informed about it and as far as our considerations are taken into account" (Interview 15).

Another official also mentions that:

"it is natural for these three countries to take the initiative because they provide most of the resources and most of the money for operations. If they find a common ground it also helps us reach an easier consensus" (Interview 5).

This is a common view amongst many of the PSC interviewees. In addition, officials from other EU states mentioned the lack of leadership on ESDP which is linked to the lack of coordination between the UK and France and said they would like to see further interaction between the two countries so that problems could be solved. According to one official:

"there is not a particular group of countries which take the lead and this creates problems as policies are delayed. It would be good if the two [meaning the UK and France] could find a solid common consensus but their priorities are different. Sometimes their priorities overlap but sometimes they do not" (Interview 46).

Therefore, a common trilateral leadership necessary for ESDP is still not occurring (Interviews 1, 10, 19, 46).

Although initiatives may begin through tri-lateral discussion, as happened with the Battlegroup initiatives, they still remain open for other countries to join in. Indeed, many officials emphasise the ‘openness’ of the ESDP project as one of its major advantages (Interviews 1, 5, 7, 10, 19). This openness is positive for the development of an EU strategic culture as all Member States can participate in initiatives that stem from a network and get accustomed to a particular way of strategic thinking. Therefore, although initiatives which stem from the trilateral network may have a strong ‘national’
dimension they need to be ‘Europeanised’ in order to survive. It will be increasingly
difficult for the bigger member states to avoid the questioning and the disapproval of
their 26 colleagues if they decide to move on their own ignoring the others. According
to the German Ambassador to the PSC:

"we do not like to form directories. Any idea that ESDP is conducted by the three of us
(France, the UK and Germany) is false. And even if we wanted to do it, it would be
impossible because the other member states would not accept it" (Interview 19).

Therefore, an added value of the PSC as an institution is that, although it allows the
establishment of networks, it maintains network activity in accordance with the
mainstream opinions of the group members, thus reaching a successful synthesis
between network and non-network actors. This synthesis of opinions also forms a basis
of consensus for the strategic culture of the EU.

4.3.2. The PSC Neutrals Policy Network

Another network that continues to be active within the PSC is the network of the
neutrals. As mentioned in Chapter Four, this network was influential in the formative
stages of ESDP. It continues to interact often and has been influential in integrating
gender issues into ESDP (Interview 22). Another case where the neutrals policy
network has acted as an influential group has been through the promotion of human
rights as part of ESDP officials’ training (Interviews 13, 16, 22). Furthermore, the
network has been influential in maintaining the UN as a basic point of reference for
ESDP action because of national political reasons, thus influencing the strategic culture
of the EU towards a UN-friendly direction. Finally, the network has been influential in
lending support to the small scale flexible Battlegroup concept (Interview 13, 22).

However, certain changes have taken place within this particular network which have
altered the balance of the group. Countries such as Finland and Sweden have been
successful in ‘reinventing themselves’, thus moving to an active involvement in ESDP
issues (Interviews 4, 13, 18). These two countries have been joined on certain issues by the Baltic States which prefer to ally with them. Furthermore, Ireland and Austria, which belong to the neutral group, are less flexible in ESDP issues due to the control that their national parliaments exercise on their foreign policies. Furthermore, Ireland and Austria continue to remain anchored to their neutral status (Interviews 8, 16). As a result, Finnish and Swedish officials have become more autonomous policy players and have assumed a new ESDP 'actorness' outside the network. This new stance is also seen as a positive development for ESDP as these countries have moved from a stance of ESDP-cautiousness towards a more committed ESDP involvement. The two countries have also been influential in the promotion of an ESDP African agenda which pushed the EU towards the implementation of the Chad mission.

4.3.3. Greece, Cyprus and Malta in the PSC

A new network comprised of Greece, Cyprus and Malta that has been formed since the 2004 EU enlargement. The network comes together on many aspects of ESDP but is strongly linked together because of the NATO question. As both Cyprus and Malta are not part of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, they are excluded at Turkish insistence from receiving NATO information when ESDP-NATO talks occur. When it comes to Berlin Plus talks and joint EU-NATO missions, Malta and Cyprus have to leave the PSC consultation room and return when NATO-related items have been exhausted. Greece, Malta and Cyprus insist on the fact that they should be equally informed on all ESDP issues and react to NATO exclusion by blocking the development of further cooperation between NATO and the PSC. Therefore, although this network consists of small peripheral countries, it has an influential role in the shaping of ESDP as many officials claim that, unless there is a solution for the Cypriot/Maltese question, the PSC-NATO relationship cannot move forward, thus pushing the EU strategic culture towards a more NATO autonomous path. If the Cyprus-Malta-Turkey blockage will not be solved, it will pose further limitations to the ESDP-NATO partnership.
4.4. Conclusions

The chapter claimed that the EU fits mostly with the type of the intermediate strategic culture. This type of strategic culture is characterised by increasingly dense networks of relations as well as by the existence of personal relations of cooperation and diffused reciprocity. The development of trust, aid, respect and understanding is also taking place within ESDP institutions and networks. However, some of these behavioural elements are not as developed as in the case of the type of consolidated strategic culture. Nevertheless, there has been considerable progress from the primary strategic culture that characterised the EU in the 1990s.

It can be also argued that ESDP institutions have managed to pass a first very crucial test: they have contributed positively to the development of ESDP. Institutions have been characterised by internal cohesion and by a lack of big internal debates. ESDP institutions (and especially the PSC) have managed to consolidate themselves as an important shaper of EU strategic culture. The EUMC/EUMS have also managed to promote their own ‘bottom up’ agenda. However, although, the institutional microcosm of Brussels has proved generally friendly to them, the national capitals have remained cautious and puzzled regarding the real role of ESDP institutions. ESDP institutions need to make a second step of progress and become more involved with national security institutions in order to consolidate their influence.

As the EU possesses an intermediate strategic culture, policy coordination and the harmonization of national policies does take place, but the pace of change is slow due to the predominance of national priorities. Furthermore, as the strategic culture of the EU is still ‘a process in the making’, it is to be expected that some ideas regarding the use of force will be common amongst EU Europeans. However, one cannot yet talk about a total conversion of ideas regarding security issues amongst the EU Member States. In the intermediate strategic culture of the EU, ESDP officials can be seen as ‘owners’ of both a national and an EU identity. This hybrid identity will be further analysed in the following chapters of the thesis.
Chapter Five

Ideas, Beliefs, Values and Practices of EU Strategic Culture

5.1. Introduction

The previous chapter provided an account of behavioural and functional elements that affect the strategic culture of the EU. This chapter focuses on the study of ideas, beliefs, values and practices that make up this strategic culture. The questionnaire and the interviews were conducted with a sample of PSC officials (see Appendix II for more details). Various reasons noted in the previous chapter (sections 4.2 and 4.2.2.) account for the choice of the PSC as the main institution of the study. The first part of the questionnaire asked for some general observation on ESDP and focused on issues such as the geographic remit of ESDP, the importance of the UN and the transatlantic relationship, the question of EU autonomy vis-à-vis NATO, the status of ‘third’ party participation in ESDP missions as well as the challenges that ESDP is facing. In addition, in order to see what kind of strategic culture exists at the EU level, it is important to measure to what degree ESDP has been influential in bringing national security policies closer to each other. Therefore, the second part of the survey dealt with the impact of ESDP on EU member states. The figures that are mentioned in the tables below are numeric figures unless otherwise stated.

The sample of participants has been carefully selected in order to provide a balanced number of officials from different countries (small/big states, South/North states, East, West States). Twenty-two officials participated in the survey. Part of the work carried out in Brussels also included the tracing of biographical data of the interviewees (such as previous career, government positions, party affiliation if possible). The interviews were carried out from the period of January 2007 up to December 2007. The questionnaire was first given to PSC officials during the interview meeting. After officials have filled in the questionnaire they were also interviewed on questions included in it so that more details regarding ESDP could be obtained. All officials who participated in the questionnaire/interview sessions were reassured about the
confidentiality of the survey. As a result of anonymity, ESDP officials could express their opinions freely and elaborate further on issues that they considered as important. Further details about the drafting of the Questionnaire are included in Appendix II.

5.2. Data/Interview analysis

5.2.1. General Assessment of ESDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Do you feel that ESDP has been a success since its launch?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Don't Know/Don't Answer</td>
</tr>
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</table>

A very large majority of respondents indicated that they are happy with the progress of ESDP. However, this does not imply that ESDP is a 'problem free' policy as respondents claim that ESDP is still 'a policy of limitations' 'a policy in flux' or 'a work in progress' with much remaining to be done so that ESDP can develop further. The volatile state of ESDP has an important impact on the strategic culture of the EU because consensus is constructed on an ad hoc basis depending on the mission under discussion. Therefore, the security policies of most EU member states are still characterised by their national 'peculiarities' and preferences that will be examined in the following sections of the chapter. These preferences and peculiarities act as a hindrance to the development of a consolidated EU strategic culture.

However, a degree of optimism is stemming from the success of past and present ESDP missions. This success has strengthened the belief that due to ESDP cooperation different national mentalities can be ‘bridged’ together in the future. As a consequence of increasing activity there is a spill-over effect in security issues that acts as an empowering element of the strategic culture of the EU. As new plans proliferate,
Brussels increasingly becomes a space of strategic interaction. PSC officials mention that new policy initiatives spread from previous initiatives and new discussions are generated due to ongoing ESDP missions. For instance, the planning of the Chad/Kosovo operations is due to the successful operations that were previously deployed in the surrounding areas (Interviews 1, 2, 11). In addition, the success of all ESDP missions has helped to consolidate the idea that the EU can become an effective security player. Such an idea can be seen as a prerequisite for the development of strategic culture. The feeling of self-confidence has led to the strengthening of cooperation which is also a positive factor in the development of EU strategic culture.

Nevertheless, the overall success of the EU operations did not have the transformative effect that would lead to the creation of a consolidated strategic culture based on thick consensus. As will be discussed later in the chapter, the EU Member States share some strategic culture elements but diverge in other respects. Therefore, although ESDP is seen as a success, interviewees also mention that convergence on ideas regarding the use of force happens gradually. The slow pace of convergence did not seem to worry most PSC officials because according to one of them:

“the European approach is based on doing small steps. Progress is slow but it is happening” (Interview 4).

This ongoing progress in ESDP is a positive factor in the development of an EU strategic culture. In addition, all PSC officials claimed that a lot has been already been achieved, particularly if one takes into account that ESDP is a very recent policy and that in the past, such a policy would have been an anathema for many EU countries.
5.2.2. ESDP Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Is ESDP equipped with adequate military and civilian resources?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Agree</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</table>

The picture on the civilian and military capabilities of ESDP is characterised by a mixed assessment with most of the answers being located in the second and third category. However, during the interviews all respondents emphasised the fact that although ESDP has so far been a success, it urgently needs a major programme of investment that will help it to upgrade both its military and civilian resources. PSC officials also mentioned that a lack of resources acts as a hindrance to the development of a consolidated strategic culture because most ESDP operations can only be of small scale. However, PSC officials also admitted that a slow process of capabilities modernisation is underway. This has led to positive results by bridging the capabilities gaps amongst EU countries and by making their forces more inter-operable (Interviews 3, 6, 12). It is also mentioned that setting common targets such as the Headline Goal 2010 promotes further interaction amongst EU officials and leads to common initiatives that the EU states subscribe to.

The explanation that some interviewees offered for the slow modernization of capabilities is that Member State military and civilian instruments are inextricably linked to individual historic experiences and cannot change overnight (Interviews 1, 18). For instance, the priority of defending national territory against a particular enemy is still very strong in certain countries (e.g. Greece, Poland, and Cyprus) and poses a challenge to the development of an EU strategic culture which mostly lies in the field of external security missions (Interviews 3, 6, 12). The volatile geopolitical environment that some EU countries face renders them less willing to spend more on ESDP at the
expense of traditional defence priorities, thus slowing down the development of ESDP. This problem also highlights the division within these EU states which want to assume more out of area missions and others which perceive defence as one of their major policy priorities. This division is negative for the development of a consolidated strategic culture.

5.2.3. ESDP Success as a Factor of Strategic Culture Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Do you feel that so far ESDP missions have been successful in promoting human rights, the rule of law and the protection of civilian populations?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
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</table>

The response to this question was largely positive with most respondents opting for the first answer. All PSC Representatives emphasised the fact that the missions the EU ought to undertake are those whose aim is the protection of human rights, the establishment of the rule of law and the protection of civilian populations. This consensus forms the basis of the strategic culture of the EU. However, as noted below when it comes to deciding upon the implementation of such missions, divisions amongst Member States are apparent (Interviews 7, 18). Unfortunately, conflicting political priorities and a lack of political will hinder the development of a consolidated strategic culture.
5.2.4. The Geographic Remit of ESDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Balkans</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Middle East</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasus</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Newly Independent States (Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mediterranean</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia/Oceania</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Chapter Three described a process of ‘Balkan’ socialisation for the Western European countries that has taken place since the early 1990s and was the direct consequence of the Bosnian and Kosovo crises. Indeed, answers from officials suggest that the trauma of the Western Balkans has had a positive impact on pushing the Europeans to work together on issues of security. Questionnaire results point to the high degree of responsibility regarding ESDP missions in the Balkans. Interviews further reinforce the notion that the region of the Balkans is inextricably linked to the development of ESDP. According to one PSC Representative:

"the first target of having a Headline goal of 60,000 troops was very much planned on the basis of the IFOR mission in Bosnia" (Interview 19).

Interviewees also mentioned that in this particular area the EU has finally managed to get its act together because the nature of the threat to European security has been too important to ignore (Interviews 1, 10, 12, 18). In addition, the humanitarian aspect of the Balkan crisis is cited as a major reason for justifying ESDP intervention (1, 7, 10, 12). Interview and questionnaire data suggest that a thick consensus has been developed
regarding the necessity of ESDP missions in the Western Balkans. In addition, all PSC officials stressed the fact that ESDP missions are important because they provide security in a very fragile geopolitical environment. ESDP is therefore seen as a tool of security provision for the ‘near abroad’ region of the EU.

The relatively large number of operations in the area of the Western Balkans (two missions in BiH, one in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the planning of the Kosovo mission) has had a positive impact on the development of an EU strategic culture as EU officials have met and discussed these operations on a regular basis. For instance, ESDP missions in Bosnia Herzegovina have brought various officials together for a period of over four years. During this time, ESDP officials have had the chance to get to know each other in depth, discuss various issues concerning the future of the area and take common decisions. The traumas of the past also occupied an important place in the minds of EU officials who claimed that a failure to deal with the Balkans in the early 1990s should never be repeated (6, 10, 18, 19). One can even talk about a process of ‘Balkan’ EU maturity which is followed by the belief that, first, decisions need to be reached on time, second, the EU has to assume the ownership of security in the region before a crisis erupts and, finally, that EU action needs to take place in a united and coordinated manner.

The assumption of responsibility for the area of the Balkans has had an impact on the behaviour of the EU officials. When an internal EU disagreement on the future of this region occurs they are cautious of not letting it escalate into a divisive crisis (5, 13, 17). A recent example of successful efforts to harmonise different positions is manifested in the discussions over the implementation of the Kosovo ESDP mission during which Member States, notwithstanding their different national positions on the question of Kosovo autonomy, agreed to contribute to a future ESDP mission in this region (10, 12, 17, 22). Robert Cooper, DG-E Director General, also claims that there has been a ‘Balkanisation’ of the EU agenda. Cooper claims that a process of power transfer has been taking place as most decisions on this region are now reached in the EU capital
(Testimony 31). Therefore, the region of the Western Balkans is the point of departure for the development of an EU strategic culture.

Many PSC officials also suggest that once the Western Balkans is stabilised, the EU will be able to assume missions in different parts of the world (Interviews 10, 19, 20, 21). Questionnaire results suggest that Africa figures very highly as the next region likely to see major ESDP action. However, the case of Africa is very different from that of the Balkans. Because of the large size of the continent and the different historical and colonial experiences of EU Member States, it is still difficult to talk about a common European position on Africa. Furthermore, Africa does not constitute a direct threat to the EU member states as was the case with the Balkans. However, it is interesting to mention that the main justification for African missions is based on humanitarian purposes. Therefore, Africa can act as another consensus building exercise for ESDP. Nevertheless, it is also interesting to note that while some countries have no direct strategic interest in Africa, or strong historic links with it, they are still willing to participate in missions in the continent (e.g. the cases of Nordic States or Ireland as manifested in their interest to participate at the Chad ESDP mission). One of the basic reasons behind these positions lies in the fact that ESDP officials and their Member States do not want to be cut off from ESDP initiatives and want to be perceived as active players within ESDP (Interviews 5, 15). Other reasons for justification are based on a humanitarian belief that ESDP can act positively to stabilise countries in Africa (Interviews 13, 16). In the case of France, it should be also stressed that issues of post-colonial prestige are also part of its African ESDP agenda (Interview 17).

Active participation in Africa also has its limits, as many interviewees mention that their share in such missions will be limited. With the exception of France and the UK, who posses the capabilities to act, there is very little enthusiasm amongst officials for large scale missions in Africa (Interview 7). Indeed, one can see a striking difference when a comparison is made with many EU countries which are lagging behind in technical expertise and capabilities. For instance, French and British officials suggested
that when it comes to the geographic remit of the ESDP there are no limitations as to where ESDP should extend, a fact which reflects the long established position of both France and the UK in global military operations (Interviews 1, 10, 14). This gap in knowledge, expertise and resources amongst EU member states also acts as an obstacle to the development of a thick ESDP consensus on Africa. Therefore, the development of the strategic culture of the EU is further hindered by capabilities gaps as there is a clear dichotomy between the UK and France and the other EU member states.

Furthermore, the high risk factor of African intervention renders a long-term mission prohibitive for most Member States which are very sensitive to the possibility of endangering the human lives of their troops/policemen. The sensitivity over the risks involved in such operations still demonstrates that most EU member states are unwilling to assume a number of missions which are far away from Europe, require large scale assistance, overstretch national capabilities and may put into danger the lives of the personnel. Therefore, the 'high risk' factor that some missions contain puts into question the ambitious discourse of the ESS which mentions that the EU has assumed a global responsibility to act. According to one official:

“although we participated in the Congo mission this does not mean we can take over every problematic African spot. For instance, when it came to Somalia there was not much appetite of Europeans to intervene. The question of having too many bodybags preoccupied the minds of the officials” (Interview 13).

The same argument is also valid in other parts of the world, especially the Middle East. For instance, although the crisis in Lebanon was a possible scenario for ESDP intervention, the EU did not manage to act on this particular area because of the inherent risks involved (Interview 19). According to another official, this 'selective interventionist' approach may have a direct impact on the strategic culture of the EU as it may limit its geographic remit and scope:
"the fact that we take the ‘risk factor’ into account is good in terms of troop/civilian missions security but it may also lead to an artificial crisis management where we do the simplest and the smallest tasks and we avoid the most troublesome ones” (Interview 22).

In addition, when it comes to dealing with geographic areas far from the Balkans many officials claim that reaching consensus is a more delicate and difficult process. According to one ESDP official:

“there is still not a common view of the world. We are at an early stage of development and it takes time for ideas and policies to move forward” (Interview 15).

An East European official likewise complained about the fact that although the EU Member States have reached a consensus on the necessity to act in the Balkans, the EU is less self-confident when it comes to dealing with crises which are located even a few hundred kilometres away (for instance the Moldova-Transdniestra issue). According to another official, in this geographic area Europeans refuse to take full responsibility as:

“they still see it as a far away region” (Interview 14).

In addition, the fact that Russia has vital interests in the South Caucasus and the Black Sea also inhibits enthusiasm for action on the part of some Member States (Interviews 12, 15). Indeed, the South Caucasus region comes third in questionnaire preferences and is mostly chosen by Eastern EU officials (although an ESDP rule of law mission has already taken place in Georgia).

Therefore, although there is a thick consensus on the region of the Balkans, decisions regarding intervention in other geographic areas are characterised by a thin consensus. A consolidated strategic culture requires a harmony of geographic priorities among EU Member states. Questionnaire results regarding the geographic remit of ESDP point to the fact that such a harmonisation of views has not yet taken place. However, all ESDP
officials mentioned that much of ESDP relies on the flexibility of the Member States. This is made clear when officials noted that geography is an entirely political matter (Interview 1, 10, 15, 19). The politicisation of a particular crisis can lead to a deployment of ESDP mission as has been the case with the Western Balkans. On the other hand, if a crisis is not noticed and if political agents in national capitals do not consider it of a high priority then it is unlikely that the EU will intervene (e.g. Western Sahara, Eritrea). Therefore, politicisation of a particular crisis may have a galvanising effect for the strategic culture of the EU and the lack of it may have a debilitating effect leading to ESDP inertia.

5.2.5. The Importance of a United Nations Security Council Mandate for ESDP

| 5. ESDP operations should be carried out with a UN mandate and under the authorization of the UN Security Council |
|---------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Agree                                          | 12                |
| 2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances | 4                |
| 3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances | 4                |
| 4. Disagree                                       | 2                |
| 5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer                        | 0                |

Although it is difficult to name which missions will be implemented without a UN Security Council resolution officials claimed that ESDP missions do not necessity require a UN Security Council mandate in order to be implemented. According to one ESDP official:

"in cases of evacuations of nationals from a particular crisis point no UN Security Council resolution will be sought. Another scenario where a UN Security Council resolution may not be sought is when two conflicting sides within a particular state or area agree to invite the EU to take over" (Interview 22).
Another official also mentioned that a UN mandate is important for military missions but it is not necessary for the civilian missions of ESDP (Interview 9).

It is surprising to see that even amongst the Nordic countries, which are considered the most fervent supporters of the UN, the primacy of the UN in their policies seems to be losing ground. For Finland, acquiring a UN Security Council resolution is no longer a pre-requisite in order to participate in an ESDP mission whereas for Sweden a UN mandate is still important but mostly for internal reasons. According to a Nordic PSC Representative:

“many political parties and the Left in particular would be very sceptical of a mission without a UN mandate. The UN mandate is necessary in order to legitimise a decision” (Interview 13).

On this basis, many actors perceive the acquisition of a UN mandate as a ‘facilitating instrument’ of EU unity. PSC officials claimed that the impact of the Kosovo crisis as well as the more recent split over the legitimacy of the Iraq war are incidents that should be avoided in the future (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 19). A UN mandate is a useful tool because it helps to unite the EU member states and legitimises the decision for military/civilian intervention in the publics of EU member states. However, a few officials also stated that the NATO bombings against Serbia in 1999 which were conducted without a clear mandate acted as a precedents for action outside the UN (Interviews 6, 10, 13). Therefore, as an official claims:

“once it is done it can always happen again” (Interview 9).

East European officials try to justify the limited importance of a UN mandate on grounds of practicality. For instance, it is mentioned by some officials that getting a Security Council resolution can be a difficult, slow and bureaucratic process. An East European official justified in this context the importance of flexibility:
“ESDP has to be more flexible. In this respect de-linking ESDP from the UN makes ESDP even more flexible and independent. This is another way of seeing independence [...] not only by cutting NATO out of ESDP” (Interview 9).

Interview data also demonstrates that the profile of the UN is lower in the minds of East European elites. This is an interesting point of divergence between East and West European Member States. West European representatives who do not think that a UN mandate is a prerequisite to intervene, still believe that getting it is a good development for ESDP because it legitimises its decisions both at the national and global levels. However, when it comes to most East European representatives (with the exception of Hungary) getting a UN Security mandate is perceived as another problem in the effectiveness of ESDP because it creates one more bureaucratic step in an already complicated structure of policy-making.

By contrast, there are still certain countries which have particular parliamentary and political problems in endorsing ESDP action without a Security Council mandate (e.g. Ireland, Austria, Greece, Belgium, Cyprus and Germany). In addition, due to the elections of left-wing governments in Portugal (2005) and Spain (2004, 2008), the importance of the Security Council authorisation has become an influential element in their foreign policies and one of the basic political trademarks of their centre-left governments. However, it can be argued that the importance of a UN Security Council resolution seems to be losing ground amongst many EU countries. Escalating humanitarian crises, the urgency to act at particular crisis points, the push from certain policy-makers and national leaders to assume responsibility quickly are all mentioned as reasons that might lead to a by-passing of the ‘slow’ and ‘bureaucratic’ UNSCR process.

Therefore, the strategic culture of the EU is not based on the wide acceptance of a UN mandate as a prerequisite for ESDP missions in the post 2004 enlarged EU. However, such a mandate is seen as a facilitating factor in deploying an ESDP mission. Data from the interviews suggested that the divergence over the issue of the UN may lead to
cohesion problems in the future as certain countries may want to move to an ESDP mission without a UN Security mandate whereas other states would like to follow strictly UN Security Council resolutions. So far, it is interesting to note that ESDP missions are legitimised by UNSCRs. However, the diverging priorities of the nation states on the importance of the UNSCR may have a debilitating effect in the shaping of a consolidated EU strategic culture in the future as it may lead to conflicts regarding the legitimacy of ESDP operations.

5.2.6. Multilateralism in the Strategic Culture of the EU

| 6. ESDP ought to involve in its operations countries other than EU member states. |
|---------------------------------|----------|
| 1. Agree                        | 17       |
| 2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances | 5        |
| 3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances | 0        |
| 4. Disagree                     | 0        |
| 5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer       | 0        |

In this question positive responses form the great majority of answers. Interviewees mention that ESDP ought to involve countries other than EU Member States. Therefore, the claim of multilateralism in the communicative discourse of the EU is valid and constitutes an important characteristic of the strategic culture of the EU. In addition, it is also claimed that third party participation has been a trend in ESDP since its inception, thus establishing a habit of outside involvement. However, PSC officials mentioned that cooperation differs from country to country. In this respect, it can be argued that there is a form of ‘varied multilateralism’ that characterises the strategic culture of the EU. For instance, interviewees said that there is a very particular relationship with Russia. The Russian use of force (e.g. as manifested in Chechnya) further complicates the strategic relationship amongst the two countries and indicates that the Europeans have a different perception on deployment of police and military resources in the area (Interviews 12, 14, 16).
PSC officials also raised reservations regarding the American use of police and military instruments in common EU-NATO missions (Interviews 1, 5, 13). The US use of force through its police and military instruments is characterised by various PSC officials as counterproductive and excessive (Interviews 1, 4, 5, 7, 12). The difference in EU/US mentalities regarding the use of force instruments in the Balkans (as described in Chapter Four) is still evident today. More details on the EU/US 'othering’ regarding the use of force will be provided in Chapter Six on implementation of the ESDP Bosnian missions. On the other hand, the relationship with Canada in security missions is seen as exemplary (Interviews 1, 6, 7, 10). There is a very good understanding between Canada and the EU consisting of a good interaction and frequent exchange of policy practices. It is also claimed that there is a positive common basis on security issues and a similarity in ‘style and substance’ on the use of force that does not exist with Russia (Interview 6, 22). In addition, the EU-Canada relationship is not characterised by the differentiation regarding the tools of force as it the case with the US. According to one official:

"we have an easy and warm relationship with Canada. We are both democratic and share the same values. This is not the case when we talk with the Russians who seem to have a post-imperial mentality” (Interview 22).

Furthermore, the EU has collaborated with the African Union (AU) in its EUPOL Congo mission. The EU gives emphasis to the fact that the AU should be empowered to deal with regional security issues. However, when it comes to everyday dealings with the AU the reality is very different. Cases of human rights abuse and different practises in policing highlight a different perception on the role of police and military instruments between the EU and the AU (Interviews 1, 18, 19). For instance, in the Congo ESDP mission the two bodies had a different way of perceiving the crisis and dealing with it. According to one PSC official:
"on behalf of the EU we wanted to see a distinction between the tasks of the police and the army. This was something that many leaders of the AU could not really understand" (Interview 7).

Therefore, there are different EU/AU perceptions regarding the use of force as manifested in ESDP missions. These different perceptions have influenced the way Europeans perceive multilateralism as they have become more cautious on this particular bilateral relationship.

The question of Turkish participation in ESDP is also of vital importance as it is inextricably linked to the future of the ESDP-NATO relationship. There is a basic consensus on Turkish participation in ESDP missions. However, EU Member States are divided on how far EU-Turkish cooperation should go, with some of them (Cyprus, Malta and Greece) being openly hostile to the Turkish blockage of the PSC-NATO relationship as well as with the Turkish ambitions over ESDP. The exchange of information in joint NATO-EU operations is a major unresolved issue as Cyprus and Malta want to have access to NATO information and participate in an ESDP of 27 member states (Interviews 5, 11). However, Turkey blocks any EU-NATO initiative that includes these two nations. The problematic dimension of the Turkish cooperation poses two challenges for the strategic culture of ESDP. On one hand, it puts to the test the involvement of third party members in ESDP; on the other, it acts as a hindrance to the development of a strategic partnership between the PSC and NATO. These challenges may in the long-term affect more the thinking of the Europeans regarding ESDP issues, thus having an impact on the strategic culture of the EU.

In the case of the UN it can be argued that the UN is indeed important. However, there are certain difficulties in the relationship of these two organisations. Certain officials clearly stated that the UN is a different organisation from the EU. It has a complex structure which makes it more difficult when it comes to establishing a strong EU-UN relationship and linking the two bureaucracies together (Interview 18). The UN was
described by some officials as ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘slow’ and one official even went so far as to claim that the UN does not suit European needs for intervention because:

“the UN nowadays is about Third World countries which want to participate in missions” (Interview 13).

The issue of third country participation was not disputed in principle by any PSC official. Therefore, when it comes to the discourse of multilateralism it can be argued that in theory, the EU is open to collaboration and welcomes third party contributions. However, in practice, relationships with other third parties are not conducted on the same basis. Therefore, although a consensus exists on the question of multilateralism through third party participation, there are differences of opinion on how far various one-to-one relationships with the above mentioned countries/organisations should be developed. The same is also valid for regional/international institutions such as the AU and the UN. This phenomenon creates a pattern of ‘varied multilateralism’ which characterises the strategic culture of the EU.

5.2.7. The NATO-ESDP Link

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. EU Operations should be carried out using NATO resources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
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The results of the questionnaire and the discussions that followed it show that a very high number of PSC officials wanted to carry out operations using NATO resources. Duplication of resources is seen as unnecessary and has to be avoided although officials also mentioned that it is inevitable (for practical reasons of quick implementation) that the EU is gradually moving to small-scale duplication in certain areas. None of the PSC
officials denied the fact that NATO has an important role to play in security issues. Even when some PSC officials claimed that NATO is very much based on a Cold War framework, they also mentioned that its importance in security and defence issues is indisputable (Interviews 1, 10, 12, 18, 19). One official summarised the issue by claiming that:

“even if we don’t like NATO we have to be in it because it still maintains security. The Turkish-Greek dispute would not have been so quiet if NATO was not there” (Interview 19).

Therefore, there is a basic consensus within the PSC that NATO still has an important role to play in security and defence. However, as the next section will demonstrate, this constitutes only a thin consensus as disagreements amongst PSC officials exist regarding the depth of EU-NATO cooperation as well as the degree of autonomy that the EU should possess.

5.2.8. ESDP Autonomy vis-à-vis NATO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. The EU should develop capabilities that will allow it to deal with crises independently of NATO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the issue of autonomy the EU is quite divided. This division is referred to among the respondents as the most important problem in the development of a consolidated EU strategic culture. Three different strands of thought can be traced regarding the degree to which ESDP missions should be linked to NATO. The first strand includes the countries that are cautious of NATO and would like to see a further Europeanisation
in the field of security and defence, although some of them are NATO members (e.g. France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Austria). A second category includes states which are more flexible on the question of NATO and look toward both the EU and the Alliance for security guidance. This group includes countries such as the Netherlands, Portugal, Hungary and Italy. Although these countries can be characterised as quite pro-Atlanticist they also have strong European credentials and would like to see a gradual empowerment of ESDP. A third group of states is that of the fervent Atlanticist EU member states. This group includes countries such as the UK and the East European Member States. For the East European states the accession to NATO acted as a new security guarantee against the Russians (Interview 6). In addition, NATO accession also had a deeper ideational impact as East European officials claimed that NATO membership forms part of their new Western identity and orientation. According to one official:

“NATO had a twofold significance for us. It is about securing the country from a possible Russian threat but it was also the first important organisation that welcomed us in the West” (Interview 6).

Therefore, it is of no surprise that East European states are quite sceptical when it comes to the question of the EU assuming further autonomy vis-à-vis NATO. However, PSC officials mentioned that gradually countries are becoming more willing to act autonomously since 2006 (Interviews 10, 19). This modest trend of autonomy also affects some of the East European countries (e.g. Hungary). Some practical issues that will be mentioned below may also play in favour of the establishment of a more autonomous EU strategic culture in the future.

First of all, geography may be key to the development of an independent EU strategic culture as PSC officials said that transatlantic cooperation depends on the geography and the nature of each mission. According to a national representative:
“for certain cases unless we do a mission under a European flag there is no other way a successful mission can be done” (Interview 16).

Other ambassadors supported this argument by adding that in some parts of the world both the Americans and NATO are not welcome. For instance, in the case of the Aceh mission, the Indonesians would have never accepted American involvement, whereas they were willing to allow intervention under the EU flag (Interview 4). As for certain geographic spots the possibility of acting with NATO is limited, the door opens for more European autonomy. Therefore, the idea of ‘variable geography’ vis-à-vis NATO is developing in the minds of ESDP officials which implies that certain areas should be tackled by the EU only, whereas other crisis spots should be dealt with the help of NATO. This tendency may be also nourished by US unilateralism and an unwillingness to intervene in various troubled spots (e.g. in Africa and Latin America). Furthermore, the Americans, who are the major actors behind NATO are not always willing to talk to their European colleagues on various crisis management issues and sometimes prefer to act unilaterally. This is a fact that irritates even some of the most fervent Atlanticist officials (Interviews 4, 6). In addition, as noted above, the question of ‘third party’ participation also plays an important role in the EU-NATO relationship. The Turkish blockage in EU-NATO cooperation may push ESDP further away from NATO towards a more autonomous direction, because at present there is not even a common dialogue between NATO and the PSC.

However, due to strong pro-NATO forces that act within the EU, it is evident that the strategic culture of the EU will remain for the time being one which possesses a ‘double nature’: part of it will be closely related to NATO but it will also possess some room for independent planning and action. The EU room for autonomy may expand in the future if the EU Member States decide that this is necessary. However, for the time being, it is difficult to reach a clear consensus on the role of NATO in ESDP because there are two opposing blocs (NATO-cautious and NATO-loyal countries) which have different views. This division is seen as the most important obstacle by PSC officials in the development of a consolidated EU strategic culture.
5.2.9. ESDP and the Question of Defence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. In the future the EU should assume responsibility for issues of defence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The idea that the EU may gradually assume defence responsibilities is seen as a distant option. The EU’s strategic culture, in other words, has developed around security not defence issues. In this respect, most respondents stated a clear preference for the EU to prioritise humanitarian/civilian missions as they saw here an opportunity for the EU to establish an active and important role. This is justified on the grounds that there is a need to address sufficiently the civilian tasks of crisis management. Defence is also regarded with skepticism (for example, among the East European States and the UK), because it could lead to a gradual weakening of NATO. For other, non-NATO countries, meanwhile, defence is seen as a vital part of national sovereignty and should remain so (e.g. the cases of Ireland and Austria). Only a few PSC respondents claimed that the EU could eventually assume a role in defence. This group of officials included respondents from the ‘ESDP enthusiastic’ countries such as France and Luxembourg but also countries with a strong ‘security deficit’ such as Greece and Cyprus. The point of departure for strategic culture is the security of external threats and not the tackling of defence issues.
5.2.10. The Importance of Military and Civilian Tools in ESDP

| 10. In the ESDP missions that the EU undertakes military and civilian tools are equally important. |
|--------------------------------------------------|---|
| 1. Agree                                       | 18 |
| 2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances | 4  |
| 3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances | 0  |
| 4. Disagree                                    | 0  |
| 5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer                     | 0  |

EU officials agreed overwhelmingly on this issue: there is a thick consensus regarding the importance of both military and civilian instruments in ESDP missions. In this respect, it can be also argued that ESDP added a new dimension to the policies of the Member States as PSC officials claimed that the civilian aspects of ESDP went against the ‘habits’ of most EU member states (Interviews 12, 14, 19). Therefore, an EU strategic culture with a civilian dimension is emerging as national representatives both in Brussels and in the national capitals of the member states become more involved in developing ESDP civilian capabilities.

However, most of the interviewees also mentioned that there is a gap between the rhetoric of ESDP and the implementation in practice that inhibits the development of a fully developed EU strategic culture in the civilian crisis management field (Interviews, 3, 20, 21). Representatives claimed that the civilian capabilities of the EU need to be developed further but due to limited resources that states invest in the Civilian Headline Goals progress is still slow. This is a demonstration of the cautiousness of EU member states to invest further in ESDP. However, although difficulties exist it is possible to talk about a ‘civilian turn’ in ESDP as there is an ongoing discussion about reinforcing the civilian aspects of crisis management and investing more in them.
5.2.11. The Main Challenges of ESDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. Briefly mention the main challenges ESDP faces (multiple choice)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Empowerment of ESDP institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Investment in military and civilian capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lack of trust of national governments in the ESDP project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Competition with other organizations such as NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other (Please mention in detail): All the above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviewees claimed that ESDP encounters all of the above suggestions to a certain degree. However, a considerable number of officials noted that although challenges exist, ESDP has managed to survive them. This is a fact which demonstrates the strength of the ESDP for, according to one official:

"the dynamics of the ESDP are great and ongoing" (Interview 1).

When interviewees elaborated more on these challenges they first talked about the lack of investment in military and civilian capabilities. Part of the problem is that the Member States do not want to spend more resources on issues of security as their budgets are restrained by EU financial rules as well as by other more important policy commitments at the national level. Although particular EU Headline Goals have been set up to develop military and civilian capabilities, all interviewees claimed that progress, while apparent, is still slow.

The question regarding ESDP institutions was dealt with in the previous chapter. In short, when it comes to the institutions of ESDP most officials argue that institutions are flexible and decisions are easy to take due to the good will of the participants which facilitates the development of an EU strategic culture. Many officials also claim that the way ESDP works is the only possible way. According to one official:
"it is a bureaucratised and slow process but I cannot see a different way it can happen as you have to consult with the other 26 nations" (Interview 10).

Of the other issues mentioned in the list, officials emphasise difficulties that have been already explored in previous sections (e.g. the NATO issue). In addition, some officials - especially from Eastern Europe- subscribed to the view that there is a lack of trust among national governments on ESDP. This is another point of divergence between East and West European governments that will be analysed in the section 6.3.2 of the chapter. This lack of trust further hinders the development of a consolidated strategic culture.

5.2.12. ESDP Priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The EU should (multiple choice):</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervene in case of a disaster in Europe</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee Human Rights</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervene in conflicts at the borders of the EU</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defend the economic interests of the Union:</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take part in humanitarian missions without UN approval</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Please mention in detail) Petersberg tasks</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS: All of the above state reasons</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The great majority of PSC officials chose the first three points as the main justification for intervention. Interviewees are critical or even dismissive when it came to the last two options. It is also interesting to observe that a spontaneous talk of the European Security Strategy was made by two PSC officials only. Other tasks such as dealing with terrorist threats, weapons of mass destruction and organised crime that form part of the ESS were not mentioned by PSC officials during the interviews. On the contrary, when asked this question many respondents suggested unprompted that one should take the Petersberg Tasks as a point of reference which demonstrates that, in this particular case,
the rhetoric of ESDP reflects a reality of ESDP. The Petersberg tasks include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crises management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation (Article I-41 (1) of the Constitutional Treaty). These tasks will define the strategic culture of the EU for some time to come. It is interesting to note that the challenges mentioned in PSC interviews are more modest than the ones mentioned in the ESS.

A large number of PSC members said that both the civilian and military headline goals apparent in the official documentation of the EU are important points of reference but do not fully bind the EU towards a particular model of crisis management as these can be altered (Interviews, 1, 4, 10, 17). According to interviewees, crisis management is an entirely political matter and a lot depends on the willingness of the EU member states to deal with a particular situation (Interviews 1, 8, 10). Although the numbers of the 60,000 troops force and the 5,000 policemen are mentioned in the EU communicative discourse, some PSC officials did not disregard the possibility that in the future these numbers may increase in order to be able to deal with more challenging crises (Interviews 8, 12, 14). However, the limited ambitions of the EU states on ESDP do not, for the time being, encourage a stretching of capabilities.

The possibility that the EU will assume missions in order to defend its vital geostrategic interests comes last in the list of answers but it is also interesting to mention that during interviews some respondents left this option open for the future. According to one interviewee:

“ESDP is a new policy and so far we have not come across any cases where we have to defend vital national interests. What will happen though in a case where there is a problem with a particular pipeline or in cases of piracy? Shall we remain with our hands crossed?” (Interview 22).
Other officials also mentioned that while ESDP does not act in defence of economic interests it still forms part of a wider EU toolbox which is connected to a particular long term geostrategic interest. According to an official:

"ESDP is an instrument. It is part of the wider EU toolbox. ESDP missions are not deployed to defend economic interests but in the long term ESDP also promotes a particular geostrategic order which is inspired by a European vision of personal freedom, democracy and liberal economy" (Interview 4).

Interviewees generally mentioned that in the past there have been very few efforts to associate ESDP with economic interests and so far these ideas have failed miserably to become part of the agenda as they have been opposed by the great majority of the member states. One official claims that:

"France usually has an aspiration to promote an economic agenda and has tried to do that twice in the past but has failed miserably. Another effort where a notion of economic interest tried to penetrate the ESDP agenda took place at the Feira European Council in 2000 and also failed. Bringing an economic dimension within ESDP is not for the time being easy. Even if one country would like to do this, it will have to build a consensus amongst the 27 member states which is not an easy task" (Interview 13).

Therefore, it is still early to talk about an EU strategic culture that will be based on the defence of the economic interests. By contrast, all PSC officials mentioned that ESDP is about the promotion of security and stability. The idea of security maintenance can also be regarded as an EU interest and will be further considered in Chapter Six when Bosnian operations will be taken into account. In this respect, the answers that were given by PSC officials on the importance of security in the Balkans coincide with those given from the second group of officials (see Chapter Six). Maintaining stability in the borders of the EU is an important element in ESDP because Europeans do not want to see the tragic images of the Balkan crises of the 1990s again (1, 13, 18).
5.2.13. The Importance of Dialogue as a Tool of ESDP Conflict Resolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. Dialogue is an important tool for ESDP conflict resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dialogue on security issues forms an important aspect of the strategic culture of the EU. However, PSC officials also suggested that EU procedures must be more swift and that too much dialogue can lead to very little action being taken (as in the case of delay of the Bosnian operations) (Interviews 13, 21). Therefore, dialogue should not be seen as a panacea to the security problems of the EU. It was also acknowledged that at the very beginning of a crisis too much time can be spent on discussions between various EU institutions in order to figure out institutional intentions. From this point of view dialogue can be also seen as a point of weakness in strategic culture, because:

"we (meaning the Europeans) are talking too much without assuming responsibility or doing anything in reality" (Interview 8).

Therefore, interviewees stated clearly that the EU needs a considerable amount of time in order to put its act together. Most interviewees pointed out that long discussions and detailed negotiations take place before the EU assumes an operation. These long discussions manifest that there is an element of cautiousness in the strategic culture of the EU. The high degree of EU cautiousness contradicts the vibrant spirit of preventive action which is mentioned in the ESS.
5.3. ESDP and its impact on EU member states

5.3.1. ESDP as a Tool of National Policy Transformation

1. By participating in ESDP the security and defence policies of my country have been altered.

| 1. Agree                       | 3 |
| 2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances | 14 |
| 3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances | 5 |
| 4. Disagree                     | 0 |
| 5. Don’t’ Know/Don’t Answer     | 0 |

PSC officials suggested that the policies of the Member States which they represent have been altered to a certain degree. However, during the interviews, officials suggested that national policies have not been altered radically due to ESDP. It is mostly the case that ESDP added an extra layer of activity to national policies. Enrichment rather than alteration is the key word that characterises the impact of ESDP on national policies. Furthermore, officials noted that the impact of ESDP is limited when it challenges strongly held beliefs on national security issues (e.g. through the promotion of security missions over defence which is vital for certain EU states).

5.3.2. The Impact of ESDP on EU Member States

2. ESDP had an impact on EU States as a whole.

| 1. Agree                       | 4 |
| 2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances | 14 |
| 3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances | 2 |
| 4. Disagree                     | 2 |
| 5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer     | 0 |
3. If you agree or mostly agree with the following statement, mention any cases of policy change that have taken place because of ESDP:
See section below for more details

A majority of PSC officials agreed with the fact that ESDP has had an impact on EU Member States albeit a limited one. It has been the case for most EU countries that ESDP has not led to a major 'soul searching' on questions of security (Interviews, 1, 10, 12). However, respondents from all states, even from the most cautious ones regarding ESDP assimilation (e.g. East European states), claimed that there have been small changes in the national policies of all EU member states. These changes can be mostly located at the level of micro-developments in technical and operational practices. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the civilian crisis capabilities programme that ESDP promotes has been also seen as an innovative policy for some EU countries that did not invest in this field in the past.

In addition, ESDP has led to a new wave of bureaucratisation by adding new procedures in terms of military-civilian planning. In general, it is the case (but still with varied levels from country to country), that additional resources had to be allocated to new missions, thus overstretching the tight national security and defence budgets. New posts were created and personnel had to be employed both at the national level but also in Brussels in order to cover ESDP issues with each national representation now possessing its own ESDP department. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the trend of bureaucratisation has not been a unified one as some countries allocated more resources to ESDP than others. This asymmetrical pattern of bureaucratisation has had an impact on the assimilation of ESDP in national capitals. The limited institutional resources that some member states have allocated to the EU (e.g. the case of Eastern European states) have had a detrimental impact on the development of an EU strategic culture. This is due to the fact that ESDP decisions and issues that emerge after an ESDP discussion cannot always be fed into the national capitals.
Furthermore, PSC officials said that even within Member States there is some confusion concerning ESDP. For instance, officials mentioned that it is not a paradox to see member states whose defence ministries are socialised within a NATO framework to prefer direct dealings with NATO whereas their foreign ministries act mostly in a more multilateral and pro-ESDP environment (Interviews 4, 18). In addition, the Ministries of Finance and the Interior are also two internal players that in certain countries have different views on how ESDP should develop (Interview 18). The national mosaic of ministries in each country and their conflicting priorities make it even more difficult for ESDP priorities to penetrate the national level. Therefore, the complicated national bureaucracies of each Member State also act as an obstacle to the creation of a cohesive EU strategic culture as the conflicting priorities of different internal actors fragment the influence that ESDP could have exercised in harmonising national policies.

The impact of ESDP varies from country to country. For some East European countries, ESDP has been seen as a duplication of the work carried out by NATO and has not, therefore, been prioritised. However, even for these countries, a process of learning is also under way. For instance due to the ESDP Bosnian experience, the Polish started to work on a deployable force that is similar to the Italian Carabinieri (Interview 6). In the Hungarian case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has begun to develop a new security and defence policy which will revise the outdated two-page concept on ESDP from the year 2000 (Interview 7). Furthermore, due to the implementation of new ESDP missions the neutral EU states have had to cut down on their blue helmet UN missions and redirect their resources to EU missions (Interviews 7, 13). According to one official, ESDP is also used in these countries as an alibi for reconstruction and passing decisions that would otherwise be problematic:

“in the restructuring of the Swedish armed forces the Battlegroup concept was used as the pretext for change because imposing certain changes that affect external deployment have been a very difficult task otherwise” (Interview 7).
Officials also added that another change that has happened due to ESDP is that EU governments collaborate more with each other on issues of security. When it comes to analysing different national perspectives on issues of security and defence it can be said that the creation of ESDP does not imply that national differences have disappeared but they have been partially eroded. Working together has contributed to a wider understanding of geostrategic realities, a slow harmonisation of national perceptions and appropriate small adaptations of national policies. It has also contributed to a high degree of respect for issues that are sensitive for various Member States. However, 'national' mentalities are still strong with many ESDP officials mentioning that there is still a long way to go until 'common understandings' on all major security issues are reached. No quick convergence is likely in the foreseeable future (Interviews 5, 7, 20). In addition, national bureaucracies that deal with ESDP issues have remained 'national' to a great degree. PSC officials generally claimed that there is a need for more intensive interaction between the national and the supranational ESDP level when it comes to formulating policies and deciding on security priorities.

It is also evident that many Member States are usually cautious when it comes to new ambitious ESDP proposals especially when necessary resources for implementation are lacking. In addition, accepting an ESDP decision does not necessarily imply enthusiasm for it or real implementation on the ground. Smaller states find it difficult to digest all the information which comes from ESDP institutions as they have limited resources and expertise to allocate to it. Most of the time, when it comes to policy areas which do not form part of their regional agenda, smaller states accept mostly the issues that the 'big three' EU states put on the table without blocking them. This does not necessarily imply an enthusiasm regarding the initiatives which are suggested but rather a belief in the idea that it is better to 'move along with the rest' rather than abstaining or, even worse, blocking decisions (Interviews 5, 9, 15, 16). Therefore, the acceptance of ESDP decisions is not necessarily due to the fact that there is a common consolidated strategic culture. However, the belief that the ESDP should 'move on' also acts positively in the development of the newly established EU strategic culture as it facilitates the process of convergence.
5.3.3. ESDP as a Motivation Force for Further Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Due to ESDP my country has become more inclined to use military/civilian instruments in its foreign policy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to ESDP, my country has become more inclined to use military/civilian instruments in its foreign policy. All interviewees mentioned that ESDP is still a modest project. However, for some countries, a policy transformation has taken place through participation in ESDP missions. For instance, the various contributions in Africa, Middle East and Aceh are seen as innovative missions for smaller EU countries that otherwise would not have participated in them (Interviews 6, 7, 9, 15). However, participation in ESDP should not be seen as a new jump to interventionism as most countries have been already involved in various missions abroad - before ESDP came along - either through NATO or the UN. Therefore, although ESDP has enriched the national agenda of the Member States, it did not lead to a pro-interventionist breakthrough effect.
5.3.4. Importance of ESDP in National Agendas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. My country perceives participation in ESDP as a vital element of its security policy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the question of the importance that EU countries attribute to ESDP, EU countries can be grouped in three main categories. National divisions regarding the prioritisation of ESDP is also another sign of the weakness of the EU strategic culture. The first group of countries can be seen as pro-ESDP countries who perceive participation in ESDP as a vital element of their security policy. This group consists of the majority of the pre-1995 enlargement EU12 countries (minus the UK). Cyprus and Malta are also included in this group although because of their particular circumstances regarding their non-NATO status they cannot fully participate in various ESDP initiatives. The second group of EU states is generally a pro-ESDP group which still maintains a degree of cautiousness vis-à-vis various ESDP initiatives which may lead to a loss of sovereignty in security and defence issues. This group unites the post-neutral states such as Finland, Sweden, Austria, Ireland, Hungary and the UK. Although Finland and Sweden will be gradually moving towards the first group of pro-ESDP countries, Ireland and Austria continue to maintain a passive stance on many ESDP initiatives and have not yet assumed their full potential regarding ESDP missions. Finally, the last group of EU states groups most of the Eastern EU countries which, for reasons related to the transatlantic relationship and the predominance of NATO, are unwilling to pay more attention to ESDP developments. The varying levels of importance that EU member states attribute to ESDP may lead to a division between EU active ESDP states and the EU ‘observers’ of ESDP. Such a division would be lethal to the development of a consolidated EU strategic culture.
In this respect one can also draw a line between the lagging behind of the Eastern Europe in ESDP matters and the threat to the internal cohesion of the security community that Deutsch described (1978: 244). According to Deutsch (1978: 244), rapid membership expansion may add an increase in regional and cultural differentiation which can cause problems to the integrative process. On the other hand, one can adopt a more optimistic view by claiming that it took approximately five years for the neutral states to get accustomed to the workings of ESDP and so will be the case for the East European states which will gradually become assimilated into the process of consensus and ESDP implementation. However, for the neutral countries ESDP came at time that they were in search of a new identity in issues of security and this ‘soul-searching’ period facilitated their integration into ESDP (Interviews 13, 22). Nevertheless, the challenge to fully ‘acclimatise’ East European countries into the ESDP remains an important priority so that the EU strategic culture can reach a level of consolidation.

5.4. Categorising the Strategic Culture of the EU

By using the findings of the questionnaire and interviews conducted with PSC officials, the possible types of EU strategic culture can be categorised according to the types that were developed in Chapter Two. The elements that characterise the strategic culture of the EU are marked with X on in the following table. Three main types have been developed in Chapter Two: the Cautious Interventionist Europe (CIE), the Active Europe (AE) and the Super Active Power Europe (SAPE) types of strategic culture. These types of strategic culture are characterised by various elements which are grouped in the table below. Capital letters consist of the elements that form the majority of outcomes in each type whereas lower-case letters indicate that a particular outcome is still present in a given type although it is only evident in the minority of the policy outcomes reached.
Table Seven: Accessing the Strategic Culture of the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Strategic culture</th>
<th>CIE: Cautious Interventionist Europe</th>
<th>AE: Active Europe</th>
<th>SAPE: Super Active Power Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to act</td>
<td>Low X</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small (S)/medium (M)/large (L) missions</td>
<td>S/m X</td>
<td>S/M</td>
<td>S/M/L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (L)/high (H) risk</td>
<td>L X</td>
<td>L/h</td>
<td>L/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic remit: Limited (L), Extended (E)</td>
<td>L/e X</td>
<td>L/E</td>
<td>L/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of UN mandate: High (H), Moderate (M), Low (L)</td>
<td>H X</td>
<td>H/M</td>
<td>H/m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeanised (E)/Sovereign (S) nature of ESDP</td>
<td>S/e X</td>
<td>S/E</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitary (U)/fragmented (F)</td>
<td>F/u X</td>
<td>U/f</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanticist (A)/Europeanist (E)</td>
<td>A/e X</td>
<td>A/E</td>
<td>A/E or a/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism (M)/unilateralism (U)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M/u</td>
<td>M/U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian (H)/material (M)</td>
<td>H/m</td>
<td>H/M</td>
<td>M/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty in deploying military/police instruments: High (H), Low (L)</td>
<td>H/l</td>
<td>h/L</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionally strength of ESDP: Weak (W), Strong (S)</td>
<td>W/s</td>
<td>S/w</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Consensus on the use of force: Moderate (M), High (H)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M/h</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security/Defence spill over: (S: security, D: defence)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S/d</td>
<td>S/D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The strategic culture of the EU mostly fits with the Cautious Interventionist Europe type. This particular type of strategic culture is characterised by a low willingness to act, manifested in the deployment of mostly short-term small/medium and low risk missions. This type also displays a limited geographic remit. According to this type of strategic culture, the strategic culture of the EU is still a culture which is characterised by the belief that national sovereignty should be above EU prerogatives. National cautiousness regarding ESDP is also manifested in the difficulty Member States have in deploying troops and police forces in the name of the EU. Defence also remains under national auspices. Furthermore, the strategic culture of the EU has a strong Atlanticist aspect. Cautious interventionist Europe has a strong multilateral nature and the importance of a UN Security Council mandate still remains important as a tool of cohesion amongst its members. However, as mentioned previously there are also divisions on the utility of the UN and the UN Security Council resolutions amongst its members. Furthermore, the strategic culture of a Cautious Interventionist Europe is based on the protection of human rights and the promotion of law. Therefore, a humanitarian agenda is still important in issues of security. Still, there is no consensus on the promotion of economic elements through ESDP amongst EU member states. Finally, the consensus on the use of force is moderate as national opinions amongst EU states vary over geographic and political priorities.

5.5. Conclusions

This section will group all elements that emerged from the study of the questionnaires and interviews in order to shed light on the constituent elements of the strategic culture of the EU.

First of all, replies from officials demonstrate that although there is a willingness to act in the Balkans there is no such willingness when it comes to assuming global responsibilities. For regions other than the Balkans, ESDP looks very much like a ‘pick and mix’ bag whose agenda depends on capabilities, risk assessment and political circumstances. As mentioned in the previous chapter, networks of countries which are willing to intervene are very important in galvanising the EU to move to certain
geographic directions. In this respect ESDP is a policy which is characterised by a certain degree of ‘openness’ as all EU countries can influence its final outcome.

ESDP officials also claim that the EU has accepted the utility and legitimacy of military instruments in dealing with security crises. However, although officials claimed that building, harmonising and modernising capabilities is happening they also pointed to the slow pace of work and to the financial issues that pose limitations to modernisation. Officials mentioned that national governments have been slow and sometimes not willing to cede national resources to ESDP, a fact that poses limitations to the development of the strategic culture of the EU.

'European' values (democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights) are cited as important motivating factors for ESDP intervention and there is a humanitarian element in the strategic culture of the EU. It is also interesting to note that, although ESDP so far is not an economic-interest driven policy, a few officials hinted that the development of ESDP as an economic protection tool whereas other mentioned that ESDP is functioning as part of a wider EU agenda which also includes economic interests. Others also mentioned the primacy of the idea of security/stability provision as an ESDP priority. Securitising can be also seen as an EU security interest. During the interviews officials have been focusing mostly on regional conflicts, human rights and the importance of the Petersberg Tasks which attribute to the ESDP a relatively narrow remit of action than. Therefore, the base for the strategic culture of the EU mostly lies on selected cases of humanitarian intervention, the promotion of law and the protection of human rights.

ESDP officials claim that both the status of the UN and the importance of Security Council Resolutions have been weakened by the EU’s eastern enlargement. The importance of UN Security Council Resolution as an ESDP legitimacy tool is therefore not consolidated, although for the time being it seems that most, if not all, ESDP missions will occur under a UN mandate. Security dialogue is also important. However, although officials did not deny the importance of dialogue they also claimed that
sometimes too much time is wasted in talking. Therefore, dialogue can be seen as an opportunity for policy expansion but also as a hindrance to the development of the EU strategic culture as the opportunity to act is put second to discussions.

Multilateralism in indeed important However, ESDP officials provide a more detailed version of ESDP multilateralism by adding the limitations and the difficulties of multilateralism as cooperating with other countries or organisations is not always an easy task. Furthermore, although all officials accepted that cooperation between the EU and NATO should take place the degree and depth of the cooperation is very much disputed with EU member states being divided between two opposing camps and a ‘flexible’ group of states situated in between. The role of the US and NATO in ESDP is by far the most divisive issue and hinders the development of a consolidated strategic culture. So far deciding whether or not to collaborate with the US and NATO is happening after a careful discussion of missions which are under discussion. However, no thick consensus has been reached on the depth of EU-NATO relationship.

Finally, ESDP policy-making is intergovernmental in nature and will remain so in the future as there is no desire for a supranational governance to take over the sphere of security and defence. ESDP institutions had an important role in bringing more of a European dimension to national policies but they have not always managed to promote their own agenda as national capitals still have the upper hand in the process. Furthermore, ESDP has been important in bringing officials together and adding an extra layer of policy initiatives into the national policies of EU Member States. However, the influence that ESDP exercises on national agendas is limited by a number of factors which were explained in this chapter. As argued previously, the type of strategic culture that best characterises the strategic culture of the EU is the Cautious Interventionist Europe type. The findings of this chapter validate the claim made in Chapter Four which argued that that the strategic culture of the EU is in a stage of transition and is characterised by a number of thin and thick consensuses on various security issues. The thesis will now examine how the ideas and practices of the strategic
culture of the EU are manifested in operations by studying the two ESDP missions that the EU has deployed in Bosnia Herzegovina.
Chapter Six

The Operational Dimension of EU Strategic Culture: ESDP Operations in Bosnia Herzegovina

6.1. Introduction

According to the definition of strategic culture provided in Chapter One, ideas, beliefs, practices and values of strategic culture are also manifested in the way a country or an organisation acts in operations. For this reason, the current chapter will examine the development of EU strategic culture through a case study of the two ESDP operations in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH). The chapter is not intended as a comprehensive case study of the two ESDP operations but rather constitutes a study of the attitudes of Brussels-based ESDP officials who have contributed in these missions. The Bosnian ESDP operations have been chosen because they have occurred in a geographic region (the Western Balkans) in which the EU has been most heavily involved. The area of BiH is one where the EU has deployed many different foreign policy tools since the beginning of the ethnic conflict in the 1990s. Therefore, conclusions on the strategic culture of the EU can be confidently made by drawing upon evidence from these missions. It is also acknowledged that ESDP has been heavily shaped by the Bosnian experience. For instance, the ESDP Headline Goals were drawn on the experiences stemming from the Bosnia crisis as according to one official:

“ESDP is a by product of the Bosnian crisis, the 60,000 troops target was similar to the IFOR experience” (Interview 33).

This chapter is based on a sample of 23 interviews (Appendix IV) of policy-makers drawn from a range of EU bodies (PSC, EUMS, Council of the EU, COWEB, European Parliament), all of whom have dealt with security issues relating to BiH. A questionnaire similar to that used to interview the group of officials listed in Chapter Six has been drafted with a clear focus on ESDP operations in BiH (Appendix IV). The sample has been carefully selected in order to provide a balanced number of officials
from different countries and institutions. The interviews were carried out between January 2007 and December 2007. In much of the questionnaire the Likert scale was used in order to evaluate the answers of the interviewees. Officials involved in designing, implementing and evaluating ESDP operations in BiH largely confirm the main findings of the sample of interviews reported in Chapter Five. The convergence of ideas from the two interview samples reinforces the main arguments developed in the previous chapters and also demonstrates that the beliefs that were taken into account in Chapter Five are also held in wider EU circles. As it was the case with the first sample, the interviews were anonymous and the interviewees were reassured about the anonymity of the research.

In the case of BiH, the EU has implemented two missions using the ESDP framework: the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) and Operation Althea (EUFOR). The chapter will provide some basic facts regarding the two missions. It will focus on the main strategic ideas that emerged from questionnaires and interviews of officials that have been involved in both of these missions. An account of the practices and ideas that have a positive influence on the development of the EU strategic culture will be provided. The last section of the chapter will deal with various limitations to the strategic culture of the EU that stem from the practical implementation of these missions. The thesis will now provide a short introduction of the aims of the two ESDP missions.
6.2. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM)

According to the Council of the EU Website, EUPM started on 1 January 2003. The EUPM builds upon the work carried out by the UN International Police Task Force through monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities.


According to the same source, some 500 police officers from more than thirty countries made up the mission in its initial phase (2003-2005). EUPM consists of international staff members. It includes seconded police officers as well as some 200 BiH nationals. As of mid 2007, the mission was made up of 24 contributing EU countries and six other states.
According to EUPM statistics (Official Website of the EUPM, http://www.eupm.org/Documents/Weekly.pdf (Accessed on 20/06/2007)) on 29 June 2007, the national contributions were as follows:

**Table Eight. EUPM National Contributions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECH REPUBLIC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTONIA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>SLOVENIA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATVIA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITHUANIA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SLOVAKIA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALTA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total EU NATIONS</strong></td>
<td><strong>223</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total Non-EU</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of police in EUPM</strong></td>
<td><strong>(250)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore,

"EUPM is under the guidance and co-ordination of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR), and as part of the broader rule of law approach in BiH and in the region, aims through mentoring, and inspecting to establish a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service in BiH, operating in accordance with the best European and international standards". (bold in original, EUPM website Official Website of the EUPM, http://www.eupm.org/Documents/Weekly.pdf (Accessed on 20/06/2007):

EUPM is deployed so that it can pursue the following objectives:

"a) Under the guidance of the EU Special Representative (EUSR), EUPM actively supports, advises and guides where appropriate, the preparation and implementation of police restructuring in line with the principles for police restructuring.

b) Improve, through proactive mentoring, monitoring and inspecting, police managerial and operational capacities, especially at the State level, including relations with other law-enforcement agencies, in order to enhance BiH's capacity to fight organised crime in accordance with existing international and in particular regional, commitments and obligations.

c) Assist the BiH Police in initiating and conducting counter-organised crime activities and follow up their actions. When inappropriate conduct is observed, refer to the High Representative for BiH for further action, in accordance with the determined procedures.

d) In close coordination with the EUSR, monitor the exercise of political control over the police and address inappropriate political interference in the operational management of the police."
6.3. Operation Althea – EUFOR

The Council of the European Union decided on 12 July 2004 to conduct a military operation in Bosnia Herzegovina. EUFOR-Althea was launched on 2 December 2004 and was carried out with NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus arrangement. Co-operation between the two organisations in this regard had been facilitated by the establishment of a permanent EU Cell at SHAPE and due to the NATO permanent liaison team at the EUMS.

According to the EUFOR website, the key objectives of ALTHEA EUFORBIH are:

“- To provide deterrence and continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the role specified in Annexes 1A and 2 of the Dayton/Paris Agreement (General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH);

- To contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH, in line with its mandate, and to achieve core tasks in the OHR’s Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP).”.

The force started with some 7,000 troops, a number gradually cut down as the security situation in Bosnia Herzegovina improved. According to official figures, as of 30 May 2007 there was a total of 2,502 troops in Bosnia Herzegovina. The participating countries and the number of troops deployed in Bosnia Herzegovina were as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>ALBANIA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ARGENTINA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECH REPUBLIC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CHILE</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTONIA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MACEDONIA</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>MOROCCO</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>NORWAY</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>NEW ZEALAND</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>Sub Total Non-EU</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATVIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITHUANIA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBURG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>203</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOVAKIA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOVENIA</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>262</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>EU Nations</td>
<td>2,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Total Troops</td>
<td>2,502</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.4. Main Ideas Regarding the Strategic Culture of the EU as Manifested in ESDP Operations in Bosnia Herzegovina

This section provides an account of the ideas, beliefs and values that emerged from the questionnaires and interviews with EU officials working on Bosnian issues. As noted above, these ideas largely correspond with the coordinative discourse of the PSC officials as studied in the previous chapter.

6.4.1. The Assumption of Responsibility

One of the basic characteristics of the development the strategic culture of the EU is the fact that that the EU has assumed a responsibility to maintain security in Bosnia Herzegovina. Furthermore, what is seen as the success of the BiH operations (Appendix IV, question 1) has contributed to the belief that the EU can assume important military/police missions.

| 1. Do you feel that ESDP missions in BiH have been a success since their launch? |
|-----------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Agree                    | 20               |
| 2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances | 3               |
| 3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances | 0               |
| 4. Disagree                 | 0                |
| 5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer  | 0                |

All interviewees stressed the fact that the EU has decided to act decisively in the Balkans. In this respect, all interviewees mentioned that Bosnia has been an important point of strategic convergence, for the EU has had to assume its responsibilities in this area of the Balkans and had to deal directly with what has been viewed as a ‘security deficit’ in Bosnia. The previous chapter emphasized the fact that there is a wide consensus in dealing with the Western Balkans, in contrast to the lack of consensus
when it comes to dealing with other parts of the world. Indeed, certain second sample interviewees mentioned that the case of BiH is unique due the severe situation of its population during the time of war, its proximity to Europe and the particular challenges that the Bosnian crisis posed to the safety of the EU (e.g. immigration waves) (Interviews 33, 35, 42). Due to its particular circumstances, BiH can be seen as central to the development of the strategic culture of the EU. It is worth noting in this context that officials seemed confident of the long-term prospects of the strategic culture of the EU because this particular consensus on the importance of the ESDP missions in Bosnia is not threatened by the EU enlargement. This is because many East European countries (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria) are either part of the Balkans themselves or are very close to the region (e.g. Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) and share an interest in maintaining security in BiH (Interviews 36, 39, 43). Geographically, then, the location of Bosnia is a good example of where Western member state priorities meet those of their Eastern counterparts. However, this is an example that is not necessarily happening with other crisis areas of the world as the previous chapter has already noted.

6.4.2. Humanitarianism and Geostrategic fears as Strategic Culture Shapers

It is interesting to note that both humanitarian and geostrategic concerns were necessary in the development of thick consensus regarding Bosnian security. The parallel lack of any of these two factors may provide the answer as to why a common strategic culture has not yet emerged in respect of other parts of the world. Thus, one official has noted that:

“the case of Bosnia is different from Aceh because in Bosnia there was a multiple list of reasons to intervene that affected all EU countries to more or less the same degree. This is not the case with other ESDP missions” (Interview 33).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promote law, order and good governance</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee Human Rights</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solve a conflict in its borders</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defend the economic interests of the Union</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Please mention in detail): promote security/stability</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of the above state reasons</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When interviewees were asked why the EU has become involved in BiH they usually replied by arguing that Bosnia had a ‘humanitarian’ impact on the minds of EU policy makers. The traumas of the early 1990s, the images redolent of Europe’s past (violence, authoritarianism, refugee flows) and the willingness to end once and for ever the barbarity of the Bosnian atrocities are all common themes in EU thinking as expressed by the interviewees (Interviews 33, 35, 38). All officials also agreed on the fact that the ‘remedies’ for the Bosnian conflict are the spread of democracy, the protection of minorities, the respect of human rights, the promotion of a multi-ethnic society and the establishment of the rule of law. Furthermore, interviewees claimed that the Europeans are committed to the maintenance of the Dayton agreement and have faith in the development of a multi-ethnic and multicultural Bosnia (Interviews 35, 38). Therefore, ESDP is the product of a ‘humanitarian’ thinking which was developed in the EU as a result of the atrocities of the Bosnian conflict.

In addition, interviewees also mentioned that there were commonly accepted geostrategic reasons within the EU that contributed to a strategic culture of Bosnian prioritisation as the primary geographic spot for ESDP action. A major challenge to the stability of the EU identified by the interviewees was the immigration waves of Bosnians who had to leave their country (interviews 33, 35, 55). Because of the Bosnian war, Bosnian immigrants had to either relocate to neighboring countries or flee to West European states. Officials interviewed said that both outcomes were problematic because, in the first case, the change of regional demographics would have
led to a new wave of unrest in the fragile area of the Western Balkans. Secondly, the waves of immigration would lead to an increase of racism and xenophobia and would provide a fertile ground for the success of extremist politicians in Western political systems (Interviews 37, 41, 46, 47). In order to stop Bosnian migration, the EU sought to stabilise the country and thus encourage Bosnians to remain in their own locality. Therefore, the provision of security for the region was an important factor that pushed the Europeans towards the assumption of Bosnian responsibility.

Furthermore, the existence of other security challenges (drugs/weapons/human trafficking, the spread of crime) were all considered by EU officials. Bosnia has been viewed as ‘an insecure place in the EU’s backyard’ and consequently, strategic action through police and military instruments has been seen as necessary (Interviews 37, 39, 46, 47, 56). In the Bosnian case, ESDP serves the wider EU security interest. As one official put it:

“first and above all, ESDP is about providing security for the continent and security is an important interest for all Europeans” (Interview 51).

In addition, the fear stemming from US reluctance to maintain a presence in the region was also cited as a commonly accepted reason that galvanised the EU to act in the region. In conclusion, in the case of BiH, a humanitarian concern was combined with an EU security interest and the fear of American withdrawal which led to ESDP intervention.

6.4.3. A Strategic Culture of Mixed Civilian/Military Elements

A basic element of the strategic culture of the EU that emerged in Chapter Five was the importance of a mixed civilian/military strategy. A consensus on the deployment in ESDP of a mixture of military and civilian instruments has also been evident in the case of the BiH EU missions. According to the results of the second questionnaire, all
officials interviewed believed that civilian tools are as important as military ones (Appendix IV, question 6).

6. In the ESDP missions that the EU undertakes military and civilian tools are equally important.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All officials interviewed mentioned that conflicts are multi-faceted and, in order to be addressed successfully, a comprehensive approach is necessary which ought to include a wide array of policy instruments. Interviewees agreed on the necessity of deploying the implementation force within a comprehensive civilian/military framework. They mentioned that both a military and police presence has been necessary in order to maintain peace in BiH but that these two elements should, in turn, be complemented by financial instruments in order to address social and economic challenges. According to one ESDP military official:

"we know that giving financial aid alone will not solve the problems of Bosnia. We also know that the military and police cannot just remedy problems on their own. What is needed in Bosnia and also in every crisis point of the world is a comprehensive package of support" (Interview 35).

Some interviewees also noted that EU strategy was complemented by the drafting of an EU-BiH Stability Association Agreement which may lead to a closer EU-Bosnian relationship in the future (Interview 37, 38, 39).
6.4.4. The Use of Police and Military Instruments as a ‘Mild’ Projection of Force

Some officials noted that although multiple instruments are necessary in order to tackle the Bosnian crises, these should be used in a very careful manner. If a conclusion is to be drawn from the interviews concerning the strategic culture of the EU as manifested in its Bosnian operations it is that such a culture is based on a ‘moderate’ civilian/military projection of force (Interviews 37, 39, 43, 53). This moderate approach is based on the deployment of limited amounts of projected ammunition and a dislike of air strikes and heavy armaments. As one official claims:

“we all understand that heavy tactics will not solve the issues” (Interview 56).

The insistence that military and policing instruments be used in a cautious manner also brings to light a process of ‘EU/US differentiation’ that is reflected in the strategic culture of the EU. This process of ‘EU/US othering’ has been studied in Chapter Three and is also validated in this chapter. In general, interviewees claimed that the EU has very strict rules of engagement and that both EU troops and police are bound by a stricter control of lethal power than is the case on the American side. The different views between the US and the EU on the use of police/military resources are also manifested when officials with direct experience on ESDP missions mentioned that the carrying of heavy ammunition by US soldiers (as well as the air strikes of the 1994-1995 period) is a strategy that the Europeans must not copy (Interviews 33, 38, 55).

Furthermore, interviewees also drew attention to the fact that the training of EU troops and policemen is very strict when it comes to dealing with the local population. A lot of emphasis during training has been put on the fact that soldiers simply cannot fire on civilians for minor issues and that clashes with the local population should be avoided. ESDP officials who have dealt with BiH ESDP missions claimed that EU police and military forces are very unwilling to use arms in a crisis. In addition, when there is a crisis when ammunition needs to be used, there is a very gradual response to it and not
an immediate one (Interviews 33, 37, 38). Officials added that compared to the EU forces, the Americans are ‘easier’ when it comes to ‘pulling the trigger’ and carry heavier weapons and much more ammunition than the EU force (38, 42, 50, 51, 55). This has a direct influence on the psychology of the troops and police on the ground with the direct result that ESDP forces are more constrained when it comes to the use of ammunition.

For instance, one official mentioned that there are two different perceptions of using force in Bosnia:

“the Americans were always as heavily armed as ‘ninja-turtles’. We take a different approach because we see this as counterproductive. If you carry too much ammunition with you all the time it is like saying you do not trust the locals. In Bosnia we (meaning the EU forces) were circulating as civilians with our everyday casual clothes. By carrying too much ammunition the psychology of the soldier changes. You feel in a different way when you have ten bullets and different when you have one hundred. The more ammunition one carries, the easier it becomes to use it. On the other hand, if a soldier holds ten bullets, a policy of resources restriction is employed as these bullets will only be used in cases of extreme emergency” (Interview 42).

Another official made a similar claim:

“we do not want to be seen as carrying heavy ammunition as the Americans do. And we, as Europeans, are good in doing this. For my country the best is to have a mission under a UN badge but the second best is the EU badge” (Interview 55).

This demonstrates that the EU has a strategic culture which is related to an unwillingness to use heavy ammunition in its operations. This particular finding is also in accord with the historic trajectory of EU/US ‘othering’ that was analysed in Chapter Three and shows that in this issue there is a degree of historic continuity.
6.4.5. The Importance of the UN Mandate in the Strategic Culture of the EU

On the question of the legitimacy of the operations, all interviewees noted that UN approval was an important step of legitimisation and were keen to point out that both EUPM and EUFOR operations were implemented after UN decisions. ESDP officials said that United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1575 and 1551 legitimised the decision to intervene in Bosnia Herzegovina by employing the Althea mission. (Interviews 36, 48, 49) In addition, the EUPM is based on a Council decision which followed the UNSCR 1396 (37, 40, 42, 54, 55). The previous chapter argued that the lack of legitimisation for EU missions without a UN mandate can be a divisive issue for the EU. Officials of the second group mentioned that a UN mandate has facilitated EU cooperation and it has provided a ‘vale of legitimacy’ to the least intervention-friendly countries. The results of the questionnaire pointed to the fact that a UN mandate and the authorisation of the UN Security Council are desirable (Appendix IV, question 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. ESDP in BiH operations should be carried out with a UN mandate and under the authorization of the UN Security Council</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
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<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<td>4. Disagree</td>
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<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
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Although certain officials said that in the future operations may be deployed without a UN mandate for political reasons, they also claimed that such a scenario would cause various problems to countries that require a legitimacy of military and police operation (36, 42, 44). The reasons that interviewees gave for such a perspective coincided with those given by the interviewees as reported in Chapter 6 (e.g. pressures from urgent and massive humanitarian disasters).
6.4.6. The Importance of Multilateral Institutions in the Strategic Culture of the EU

The second group of interviewees generally agreed on the fact that ESDP is based on a multilateral and inclusive approach and that the ESDP Bosnian missions have welcomed contributions from third parties. One military official claimed that multilateralism is so entrenched in EU thinking that it also forms part of EU training:

"we have a multilateral approach. We are trained like that; we have various liaison officers who work with other institutions. We are dealing with local ministries, local government and NGOs. We exchange information freely with them" (Interview 42).

The results of the questionnaire thus show that as a matter of principle multilateralism is widely accepted amongst second group interviewees (Appendix IV, question three).

### 3. ESDP ought to involve in its operations countries other than EU member states.

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<th>Option</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
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<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
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For instance, interviewees mentioned that, during the implementation of the Bosnian missions, the EU had a genuine wish to collaborate with institutions such as NATO as well as with a number of third countries (Interviews 36, 42, 46, 49). The importance of NATO in the ESDP Bosnian operations will be studied in the following section. On the question of the UN-EU relationship, none of the interviewees disagreed with the fact that one of the aims of the EU is to collaborate with the UN. Furthermore, all officials mentioned that there is a positive dialogue between the EU and the UN and a general willingness on the part of both organisations to collaborate, something manifest in the
frequent exchanges of information. However, difficulties exist at a more practical level as the two institutions are characterised by very distinctive hierarchical structures which sometimes inhibit further cooperation. Various officials also pointed to the fact that a new detailed strategy is needed so that the two organisations can act more closely together (Interviews 34, 38, 43). Therefore, although in terms of ideas multilateralism is highly valued, the practicalities of implementing multilateralism hinder the development of a strategic culture that would be characterised by strong patterns of cooperation between the EU and third parties.

6.4.7. The Importance of the NATO-EU Relationship in BiH

As noted above, Operation Althea has been carried out by putting into practice the Berlin Plus guidelines which set the framework of EU-NATO cooperation. In BiH, both NATO and the EU maintain their own command structures. Their activities must be constantly discussed during meetings. Although ESDP has assumed the heavy burden of Bosnian security, NATO still maintains a small caucus in BiH and is active on issues of intelligence as well as in the ongoing search for war criminals. Because of the mixed competencies of both NATO and the ESDP missions, frequent consultation takes place between the two organizations (Interviews 43, 54). For this reason, both the PSC and the Chairman of the EUMC constantly update NATO on the progress of Althea.

The second sample of interviewees pointed to the fact that there is a basic consensus amongst officials on the idea that the EU should maintain a good relationship with NATO. However, there was disagreement on the ‘depth’ that this bilateral relationship should have. It is interesting to note that in the case of the UN there was no objection to a deepening of the relationship. By contrast, there is no real consensus as to how far the NATO-EU relationship should go. One can see the existence of a basic division between those officials who claimed that interaction with NATO in BiH has been positive and those who had a more cautious assessment of the EU-NATO relationship. For instance, some of the most cautious ESDP officials claimed that the reluctance of

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NATO to exchange confidential information regarding the deployment of future ESDP operations demonstrated a lack of trust and even a feeling of contempt for EU efforts to assume part of the security burden in the European neighbourhood (Interviews 48, 49). Some ESDP officials mentioned that during the first months of the NATO hand-over to the EU, they were puzzled by the ambivalent stance of the NATO American officials as well as by their lack of cooperation (e.g. on the issue of intelligence exchange) (Interviews 54, 55).

The conclusions from NATO behaviour in BiH differ from one group of officials to the next. When it comes to the ‘NATO cautious’ group of officials, NATO rigidities were seen a proof that the EU should embrace further autonomy in strategic issues. By contrast, ‘pro-NATO’ officials claimed that the only way ahead is one of transatlantic cooperation through NATO and that the emerging problems of EU-NATO interaction were the outcome of a lack of a specified cooperation plan. Nevertheless, all officials involved in ESDP planning of the Bosnian missions emphasised the fact that the lack of European capabilities acted as the glue to the transatlantic relationship as Europeans needed to cooperate with NATO in order to address their capabilities deficit. The importance of the capabilities deficit on behalf of the EU is one of the primary reasons that second group officials are in favour of the statement that ESDP operations must be carried out by using NATO resources (Appendix IV, question four).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>4. Operations must be carried out by using NATO resources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
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<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<td>4. Disagree</td>
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<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
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However, when it comes to the question of EU autonomy vis-à-vis NATO, the interviewees were divided between those who would like to see the EU becoming more
independent and those who would like the EU to be in a close relationship with NATO (Appendix IV, question 5).

5. The EU should develop capabilities that will allow it to deal with crises independently of NATO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
<td>0</td>
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The division over the ‘pro-autonomy’ and ‘NATO-first’ attitudes is also manifested at the political level in the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE). Within the Subcommittee, MEPs are also divided over the extent of NATO cooperation and EU autonomy that the EU should develop (Interviews 39, 40, 44). Therefore, there is a strong political division that affects the development of strategic culture as well. Interviewees pointed to the fact that NATO-EU relations constitute a challenge to the development of an EU consolidated strategic culture.

6.5. Structural Reasons for the Consolidation of the Strategic Culture of the EU in Bosnia Herzegovina

This section deals with factors that have facilitated common understandings within the EU, thus making possible the emergence of a common strategic culture in the Bosnian case. Three main reasons were mentioned by officials as being important catalysts in bringing different European attitudes closer together. The first was the influential role of new ESDP institutions in the policy-making process. The second factor was the interaction between France, Germany and the UK (the so-called ‘big three’ group). This is a network which is influential in the prioritisation of BiH as the principal geographic location of ESDP missions. Finally, the third factor concerned the process of interaction amongst ESDP officials which helped to consolidate common understandings regarding
the Bosnian crisis. In order to avoid duplication of arguments that were already studied in other parts of the thesis the chapter will only mention the importance of institutions and networks briefly.

6.5.1. The Contribution of ESDP Institutions to the Making of an EU Strategic Culture

Interviewees generally mentioned that ESDP institutions brought EU officials closer together by making them deal directly with Bosnian issues of security and by creating a genuine space of dialogue. Furthermore, as explained in Chapter Four, one can detect an ‘esprit de corps’ and a feeling of ‘collectivity’ in the answers of officials who have worked in institutions which deal with the more technical aspects of the Bosnian ESDP missions (e.g. the EUMS/EUMC). Furthermore, a scenario of competition amongst the two different missions involved in BiH as well as amongst all the ESDP institutions involved in the missions has not materialised so far. The smooth cooperation between different institutions also reflects the fact that there were common understandings on the nature of the Bosnian crisis as well as on the importance of civilian and military policy tools that had to be used in order to address Bosnian challenges (Interviews 39, 40). Therefore, the strategic culture that was shaped due to the BiH experience has contributed to the fostering of a good level of cooperation amongst different ESDP institutions involved in the planning and administration of ESDP missions.

6.5.2. The Contribution of the 'Big Three' Network

Interview findings also demonstrate that networks are extremely important in promoting ESDP policy initiatives. The role of networks was examined extensively in Chapters Three and Four. This section, therefore, deals with them only briefly. Interviewees mentioned that the network of the three biggest EU states (France, Germany and the UK) has been an important promoter of action in BiH but also in the wider area of the Western Balkans (Interviews 48, 51). Furthermore, interviewees also claimed that the willingness amongst the big three EU states to intervene in Bosnia was

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a catalyst to achieving a wider EU consensus regarding the importance of ESDP action in BiH (Interviews 37, 48, 51)

A process of slow ‘taking over’ of Bosnian security by the ‘Big Three’ EU states is described by various interviewees (Interviews 43, 46, 47, 55). This phenomenon is perceived as a gradual process as interviewees mention that during the early 1990s none of the EU states wanted to assume full responsibility for the future of Bosnia (Interviews 46, 48). However, as mentioned in Chapter Three the ‘big three’ have been gradually reaching a consensus on assuming the security responsibility of BiH within the Contact Group. When ESDP structures were established a trilateral network similar to the one of the Contact Group was formed within the PSC.

According to one official:

“although in the beginning the big three were behaving as a 'directoire' it was evident that such a practice could not have worked in Bosnia as many nations had an interest in having their say” (Interview 46).

Due to the establishment of ESDP institutions, the networking activities of the ‘big three’ EU states also became more transparent as the then other twelve EU states could see the outcomes of the ‘big three’ negotiations and actively participate in shaping them. As a result, these three countries had to integrate policy aspects which were of high concern to the other Member States and also had to communicate their Bosnian priorities in order to gain wider EU acceptance for their policy plans (Interviews 4, 54, 55). Furthermore, due to the intense network of communication with the other EU member states, the big three have been successful in promoting their ideas on the future of Bosnian operations especially on issues of practical implementation. This was due to their great expertise in out-of-area missions (Interviews 34, 38). Therefore, one can claim that in technical and operational issues the big three have been influential in shaping common attitudes that crucially influence the development of an EU strategic culture.
6.5.3. Interaction Amongst ESDP officials

Members of the second group of interviewees mentioned that interaction amongst ESDP officials during the implementation of the two ESDP missions had an impact on the shaping of common views vis-à-vis the Bosnian crisis. This is due to the fact that European troops and soldiers had to face common challenges and collaborate with each other in order to solve them. For instance, ESDP personnel have been required to act in a politically and ethnically fragmented environment. Troops and police from EU states have confronted common problems such as inter-ethnic animosity, the break up of governance structures, the territorial fragmentation of the Dayton Agreement as well as the lack of law and order (Interviews 54, 55). The direct involvement of EU officials on the ground has had a unifying impact on the beliefs of EU officials regarding the implementation of the Bosnian missions because they had to assess the situation in BiH and reach common decisions. For instance, ESDP interviewees noted that it is a common view amongst ESDP officials that the importance of the imposition of law and order still remains an essential task of the EU forces in Bosnia (Interviews 33, 34, 49, 54). Therefore, the practical implementation of the Bosnian missions acted as a positive factor in the strengthening of the strategic culture of the EU.

The longevity of the Bosnian ESDP missions was seen as another important reason for the consolidation of cooperation and the establishment of common understandings. It was acknowledged that ESDP operations in BiH have had an empowering effect on the strategic culture of the EU because they have brought together different policy actors for long periods of time. This contrasts with ESDP missions of shorter duration conducted in other parts of the world (Interviews 54, 55). The lengthy operations in BiH have empowered a pro-interventionist strategic culture in the region for, according to one official, the spirit has changed from:

“let’s think and debate to let’s plan and see it on the ground” (Interview 55).
Another positive aspect in the development of the strategic culture of the EU is the process of learning that has taken place in BiH. For instance, officials noted that a process of learning is under way through benchmarking techniques and an ongoing exchange of views on what is best to do on the ground (Interviews 35, 49, 51, 55). In this respect, the role of ESDP institutions as monitors of ESDP have been very influential as they have become the vehicles for lessons learnt from the BiH missions. Interaction of EU officials on the ground has also led to a number of changes in tactics, thus facilitating the copying of successful models by all participating countries. Therefore, the EU Bosnian experience has had a significant impact on the strategic culture of the EU due to the common learning experiences occurred.

Officials interviewed claimed that monitoring is an important task because it leads to a common EU analysis of shortfalls and failures of implementation in ESDP missions in BiH. Policy amendments stemming from processes of learning have been manifest in decisions such as the creation of mobile inspector teams as well as the establishment of a Criminal Justice Interface Unit which was set up in order to maintain a link between the EUPM and the Bosnian authorities (Interview 38). EU participating countries in BiH have also agreed on a regular basis to employ border experts and fraud advisers in their operations (Interview 39). The creation of Civ/Mil Cell within the Council Secretariat is also perceived as the outcome of a lesson learned, one that stems from a perceived lack of clear communication between the civilian and military elements of ESDP (Interview 33). Finally, all ESDP practitioners interviewed, mentioned that one of the most important priorities of the ESDP Bosnian missions was the reaching of techniques that would ensure the inter-operability of different troop forces, thus paving the way for the emergence of common practices in troops deployment.

6.6. Obstacles to the Development of a Consolidated Strategic Culture

Although the two ESDP missions in BiH have encouraged the creation of common EU understandings in issues of security, all officials interviewed acknowledged the fact that
the strategic culture of the EU is still in transition and that it urgently requires consolidation. The issues that are analysed in this section constitute direct obstacles to the development of a consolidated strategic culture.

6.6.1. Lack of Consensus on the Issue of EU-NATO Relations

The Bosnian ESDP case study validates the point made in Chapter Six, namely, that the transatlantic relationship through NATO remains a thorny issue amongst the EU Europeans and that different Member States hold different priorities as on how far transatlantic security cooperation should develop (Interviews 39, 40, 54, 55). Although there is a general desire to collaborate with NATO, the importance of the NATO-ESDP relationship still varies in the minds of ESDP officials. The study of the Bosnian operations demonstrates the fact that the strategic culture of the EU is characterized by a thin consensus on how far cooperation with NATO should develop in the future.

6.6.2. Lack of a Long-term Civilian Commitment

The fact that the EU has put a police mission on the ground in Bosnia highlights the fact that there has been an emphasis on what some officials have described as ‘civilian and human security’ which confirms the view of the previous chapter that there is a civilian upgrading process within ESDP (Interviews 37, 55). The civilian element of the ESDP was also reinforced by certain EU Member States (e.g. Sweden and Germany) which were cautious of the increasing militarization of the EU. The civilian side of ESDP now constitutes a vital element of ESDP agenda (Interviews 37, 55). Furthermore, officials agreed on the fact that there is a common idea which is widely accepted by most capitals and ESDP officials:

“the security sector cannot be reformed in small pieces but must be approached as a whole” (Interview 55).
The idea that military and civilian means are necessary in order to confront a crisis is the first step of convergence amongst the EU Europeans.

However, the process of constructing a civilian aspect for ESDP is still an ongoing project. The EUPM has brought into the light the differing perceptions when it comes to prioritising civilian aspects of crisis management. Although not a single official disputes the necessity of having a strong civilian ESDP dimension, there is still no particular consensus on what an EU civilian identity within ESDP entails (Interviews with 33, 37, 42). On the question of where a civilian agenda lies for the EU, officials had limited answers. Some interviewees claimed that there has not been a detailed debate on the nature of the civilian crisis management that the EU should carry out (Interviews 38, 39, 48). Consequently, there is certain fuzziness on the issue. The definition of both civilian and military tasks is drafted according to each ESDP mission and by taking into account the particular interests and the limitations that Member States are facing with no clear long-term consensus on civilian issues. According to one official:

"we have not yet developed an understanding on the needs required for effective civilian crisis management. Most of the work is on an experimental level" (Interview 38).

The lack of debate and dialogue on these issues adds another obstacle to the development of the strategic culture of the EU as:

"ideas about security and lose policy concepts are difficult to be translated into practice and mean different things to different people" (Interview 48).

6.6.3. The Impact of Intergovernmentalism

The ongoing strength of intergovernmentalism and national sovereignty in ESDP also came up as important obstacles to the consolidation of an EU strategic culture. It was
commonly mentioned by officials that in regards to the Althea and the EUPM missions, the Member States were very cautious of any ESDP institutional moves that would weaken state control over the two operations (Interviews 33, 35, 37, 54). Many officials stressed that the real problem in the forging of an EU strategic culture stems from the predominance of national priorities as well as from the 'mentalities' and the 'habits' that have been entrenched in the national capitals of the member states. Therefore, different national strategic cultures are still predominant within the EU. According to one official:

"in the field of operations there is no common language and one has to be constructed which is not always an easy task. However, due to the long time spent in Bosnia, both consensual language and practices have been invented for the two missions. But we cannot talk about a common European language in all EU strategic operations yet" (Interview 42).

The Bosnian operations have fostered a considerable degree of cooperation and integration amongst participating nations (Interviews 42, 54, 55, 56). However, according to EU officials, the existence of different national strategic cultures is also related to the fact that some troops and police forces are more flexible than others and have a wider degree of freedom. For instance, the British troops have a lot more flexibility on the ground as Generals can decide upon their own strategic plans and therefore their forces can be integrated more easily with other forces (Interview 37). However, this is not the case with many other countries which are still relying on detailed directions from the central Headquarters and their national capitals.

Finally, two other examples from the Bosnian cases were given in order to demonstrate the point that the Member States are still cautious about ESDP. First, it is widely claimed that there is an unwillingness to share national resources for EU missions. For example, in the case of BiH, forensic experts were difficult to find because EU states were not willing to 'sacrifice' them on EU missions (Interviews 37, 38, 48). Furthermore, as the training and recruitment of EUPM/EUFOR officials is mostly
conducted through nation states’ mechanisms it is difficult to consolidate a unified trend in procedures, guarantee flexible interoperability on the ground and propagate identical norms of operational behaviour. Therefore, the ‘national ownership’ of ESDP is also seen as an inhibition to the development of an EU strategic culture as EU missions cannot flourish without the necessary permanent capabilities and the common training procedures that would provide unified standards of strategic action.

6.6.4. Unfinished Institutionalisation

The main conclusion of Chapter Four was that although institutions act as positive spaces of strategic consensus they are still relatively new and face various limitations. Interviews conducted with EU officials for this chapter confirmed this view. For instance, one of the main institutional problems that officials mentioned was that the lack of a permanent EU HQ is detrimental to the creation of an EU strategic culture as ESDP personnel still spend much of their time trying to negotiate strategies with many different actors which are dispersed in the national headquarters of the EU states, the EU Headquarters in Sarajevo and the EU Cell in SHAPE (Interviews 42, 54, 55). Fragmentation of military institutions leads to a bureaucratisation of ESDP as most of the time officials only reach a lowest common denominator not necessarily because of national differences but because much time is spent talking and negotiating amongst different actors on various issues (Interviews 37, 42, 54, 55). All officials directly involved in the implementation of ESDP Bosnian missions believed that if the EU Headquarters would become operational it would bring more cohesion to European views regarding strategic issues (Interviews 42, 54, 55).

Interviewees also claimed that more interaction is necessary in order to bring together those institutions which deal with civilian agendas and those responsible for military issues. Although there is a commonly accepted wish to combine both civilian and military instruments further improvements are seen as necessary in coordination between EUFOR and the EU Police Mission. If actions between the two missions are not sufficiently combined an emergence of two different sub-cultures (civilian and
military) which will sometimes have conflicting priorities may be a possible scenario (Interviews 36, 38, 48). However, officials also added that this civilian/military coordination gap has been partially addressed in BiH as there has recently been a considerable effort to coordinate both missions formally and informally (Interviews 37, 54). In this sense, the experience in BiH points toward the future direction of ESDP by pushing the Europeans to coordinate their actions in both fields. In addition, the Bosnian learning process has contributed to an institutional alteration: the Civ/Mil caucus, which was established in 2005, was perceived by the interviewees as a positive development which gradually contributed to a deeper understanding and interaction of the civilian and military dimensions of the EU, thus leading to a consolidated strategic culture (Interviews 37, 38, 48, 50, 55).

Finally, a severe problem in the creation of a consolidated strategic culture can also be traced within the wider institutional structures of the EU which not only affects the Bosnian missions but all ESDP missions. This issue has been already dealt in Chapter Four regarding the institutionalisation of ESDP and will be only mentioned briefly here. Officials claimed that the complicated three pillar EU structure fragments policies, divides institutional practices and dilutes the ability to act in a united manner. For instance, it is claimed that as the first pillar deals mostly with economic cooperation, the second with foreign policy and the third with justice and home affairs issues, one can understand how difficult a united civilian approach is as civilian competencies are in between the three pillars (Interviews 35, 36, 37). It would be interesting to see whether the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty will manage to solve the structural issues that affect ESDP, thus contributing to the development of a consolidated strategic culture.

6.7. Conclusions: Accessing the Strategic Culture of the EU through the Study of the Bosnian Operations

The chapter has underlined the importance of the Bosnian ESDP operations in the development of an EU strategic culture. The strategic culture of the EU is premised on
the fact that the EU has agreed to assume responsibility for Bosnian security. It has
done so for a mixture of reasons that are both humanitarian and geostrategic. The
strategic culture of the EU consists of an agreement on the deployment of a mixed
civilian/military instruments, the use of military/police instruments in a cautious way,
and the use of peacekeeping instruments within a framework of multilateralism that
includes relations with third countries and institutions such as NATO and the UN.

The study of the development of the two Bosnian operations validates the findings of
the previous chapters regarding the categorisation of EU strategic culture. In the case of
the BiH operations, the strategic culture of the EU fits mostly with the intermediate
type that was developed in Chapter Two. According to this type, increasingly dense
networks of relationships amongst ESDP officials are influential in the development of
common understandings in the field of security. A positive path dependency of
cooperation has been consolidated through the deployment of military force in BiH
which contributes to a spirit of exchange of views and practices on the issues of
security. Furthermore, due to the development of extensive discussion of practices
some countries have moved to a gradual transformation of their forces that in the long
term may lead to the development of common rules and practices in the deployment of
troops and police forces abroad. The development of trust, aid, respect and
understanding are also evident. However, it is still early to talk about a common
language in operations that is inspired by a common strategic culture.

The findings also point out that the strategic culture of the EU belongs to the Cautious
Interventionist Europe (CIE) type as described in Chapter Two. Officials mentioned
that the Bosnian operations are the exceptions to the rule as the willingness to act and
the resources committed to these missions are usually higher than the other ESDP
missions. BiH missions are considered as medium/slow risk missions as the EU took
over the BiH security burden when the stability of Bosnia was largely established.
Furthermore, the UN mandate was important in legitimising these two missions, thus
making it easier for the Member States to justify intervention. Although a consensus
exists on the necessity of civilian instruments there is no thick consensus on how a
civilian agenda should develop. In addition, the difficulties stemming from an imperfect institutionalisation of ESDP still pose a challenge to the development of a consolidated EU strategic culture.

The strategic culture of the EU is limited by the fact that intergovernmentalism is still very important and that Member States have still the upper hand on what the troops and police forces can do in BiH. Furthermore, coalitions of states such as the big three remain important in encouraging the development of the strategic culture of the EU. When it comes to the question of consensus on ideas regarding the use of police and military instruments, it can be argued that a thick consensus has been developed on the issue of Bosnian prioritisation, the importance of promoting an inclusive civilian/military strategy, the issue of multilateralism and the projection of ‘mild’ forms of force. Consensus is also evident on the geostrategic and humanitarian reasons that have led to Bosnian intervention. Nevertheless, when it comes to the question of NATO-EU relationship as well as to the importance of the UNSC mandate, differences amongst ESDP officials are still evident. Last but not least, the question of NATO-EU relations has been one of the most detrimental factors in the development of a consolidated strategic culture. This is due to the fact that national divisions on the question of the EU-NATO relationship remain unresolved.
Chapter Seven

Conclusion: A Research Agenda for the Strategic Culture of the EU

7.1. Major Findings of the Thesis: The Gradual Development of an EU Strategic Culture

The thesis conducted a survey on ideas, beliefs, values and practices on the deployment of police and military instruments. Chapter One justified the main choices of the thesis and claimed that due to the particular state of the EU a study on the strategic culture of the EU needs to take into account the historic background of ESDP, the role of institutions and networks as well as the views of ESDP officials on the deployment of police and military instruments. This section summarises the main findings of the thesis and reflects on the term of strategic culture. The chapter ends with an update of the major policy developments at the EU level which are included in the Lisbon Treaty as well as with some policy recommendations.

The thesis claimed that the Western Balkan crises of the 1990s provided an opportunity for various elements of strategic culture to appear. However, at this period, the EU only possessed a primary strategic culture. The primary strategic culture of the EU stemmed from a mutual security threat which emerged from the instability of the Western Balkans. This threat led to the idea that security cooperation amongst EU states can be mutually beneficial. The positive transactions that subsequently took place amongst various EU policy makers led to the first steps of security integration. As a result of increasing cooperation, new networks (for instance, within the Contact Group) emerged that have been influential in the shaping of ideas which make up the strategic culture of the EU. However, the thesis claimed that this process of cooperation amongst EU elites has taken a long time to materialise as officials from different states had different views on issues of security. Policy bargaining was part of this period as the big three had to negotiate continuously in order to reach an agreement that would allow the EU to
become a security player. The process of cooperation was slow and only in the second half of the decade of the 1990s did more extensive patterns of cooperation occur.

The chapter also claimed that the EU Member States have gradually accepted the utility and legitimacy of military instruments as policy tools due to the Bosnian/Kosovo crisis. One main theme from this study points to the fact that NATO remained an important organisation for EU Member States who were members of it. However, in the 1990s, willingness emerged on behalf of the Europeans to provide an EU structure for security provision especially when priorities between NATO and the EU diverge. It was also claimed that Europeans do not wish to be cut off from NATO and neither can they conduct all military operations on their own as they lack the necessary military infrastructure. However, the policy stimulus has gradually shifted from NATO domination towards shared EU/NATO initiatives.

The thesis claimed that the strategic culture of the EU today fits with the type the intermediate strategic culture. According to this type, the strategic culture of the EU is characterised by increasingly dense networks of relations as well as the existence of personal relations of cooperation. The development of trust, aid, respect and understanding has also taken place within ESDP institutions and networks. As the EU possesses an intermediate strategic culture, policy coordination and harmonization of national policies does take place but the pace of change is slow due to the predominance of national priorities. However, it should be also mentioned that there has been considerable progress from the primary strategic culture that characterised the EU in the 1990s. Therefore, it can be argued that both ESDP institutions and networks have contributed positively to the development of ESDP. In general, ESDP institutions have been characterised by a lack of big internal debates. They have managed to consolidate themselves as important shapers of the EU strategic culture. Furthermore, the thesis concluded that the French-British-German network is very influential. Other networks that influence the strategic culture of the EU is the network of the neutral countries as well as the network that consists of Greece, Cyprus and Malta.
Special attention in the thesis was paid to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which was officially characterised as the 'linchpin of ESDP'. Indeed, the thesis validated the importance of the PSC on the development of the EU strategic culture. The PSC has been seen as an influential institution because it binds officials together in a pattern of continuous interaction and collaboration, thus contributing to the development of common ideas in the field of security. The high levels of trust and confidentiality within the PSC are influential in the development of an EU strategic culture as they encourage in-depth discussions in the field of security and encourage common understandings. Nevertheless, opportunities of cooperation have been also lost due to national sensitivities stemming from EU capitals.

Chapter Four also considered the work carried out by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) who are influential in the development of an EU strategic culture. These institutions are important because they work on the technical aspects of the ESDP, thus producing a strategic culture in a 'bottom-up' manner. The above mentioned institutions have managed to work on the technical details and rules of deployment of the ESDP police and military forces. Through the development of training sessions and the elaboration of strategies that are developed within these institutions, new rules become part of the EU 'acquis' in the field of security. However, they still face the cautiousness of the national capitals.

The thesis concluded that the strategic culture of the EU is in a process of transition as ESDP remains a policy of limitations. The still early state of ESDP has an important impact on the strategic culture of the EU because consensus within the PSC is many times constructed on an ad hoc basis and depends on the mission under discussion. Thus, more time is necessary for common understandings to emerge amongst the Europeans in the field of security. The success of ESDP so far has helped to consolidate the view amongst PSC officials that the EU is a security player. Policy initiatives spread from previous ESDP missions and new strategic plans are generated due to the ongoing ESDP missions. This has led to the development of a 'can do' attitude amongst
ESDP officials that contributes to a pro-active mentality in issues of security. However, different strands of opinions emerge on national security priorities. One of these differences is manifested in the way EU Member States invest in ESDP. For instance, the priority of investing in defence territory against a particular enemy is still very strong in certain EU countries (e.g. Greece, Poland, and Cyprus) and poses a challenge to the development of an EU strategic culture which mostly develops in the field of external security missions.

The study of the geographic remit of ESDP is also of interest as it points to the existence of different national priorities. As answers from officials suggest, the trauma of the Western Balkans had a positive impact on pushing the Europeans to work together in issues of Balkan security. However, as both Chapters Five and Six claim, it is difficult to trace a similar mixture of pragmatic and humanitarian motivations for other parts of the world. Many officials suggest that Africa is the next most important spot for ESDP action. However, because of the different historic and colonial experiences of the EU member states in this continent, it is still difficult to talk about a common ESDP strategic culture in Africa. European ambitions in Africa are limited by the large scale of the crisis as the fear of bodybags haunts the minds of many EU officials. Another important internal EU division also emerges between the countries that have the capabilities to act globally and have been active in out-of-area affairs and those that do not. Therefore, when it comes to dealing with areas which are far from the Balkans, reaching a consensus is a difficult process.

An issue of complication for the strategic culture of the EU is the question of the UN Security Council mandate which some Member States see as an important prerequisite in order to assume a security mission. East European countries regard it as less significant. There are still also certain countries which have particular parliamentary, legal and political problems when it comes to endorsing a security mission without a Security Council authorisation (e.g. Finland, Cyprus, Sweden, Hungary). However, in general, it can be claimed that the importance of the UN SC resolution is losing ground amongst various EU countries as a point of strategic reference. Escalating humanitarian
crises, the need to act quickly and the pressures stemming from various political leaders to assume responsibility in certain crises are all reasons that may lead to a by-passing of the Security Council in the future. However, it must be also stressed that for the time being all ESDP missions have been justified by UNSCRs and there are strong incentives to continue to do so in order to avoid various political and legal difficulties.

The thesis claimed that the strategic culture of the EU is one which is based on multilateralism. ESDP multilateralism has been manifested in strategic cooperation between the EU and other organisations such as the UN and NATO but also with the inclusion of other non EU countries in ESDP missions. However, PSC officials also mentioned that cooperation with third parties differs from one actor to the other and so does the appreciation of the Europeans when it comes to collaborating with various external actors. Therefore, a form of 'varied multilateralism' characterises the strategic culture of the EU.

A similar complicated image emerges when it comes to the importance of NATO in the strategic culture of the EU. It was claimed that there is a basic consensus amongst ESDP officials that NATO still has an important role to play in issues of security and defence and that a degree of cooperation must be sought with it. Furthermore, the limited resources of ESDP and the unwillingness of EU Member States to invest more in new capabilities also contributes to the maintenance of EU-NATO cooperation in issues where NATO wants to get involved. Disagreements amongst PSC officials exist regarding the depth of EU-NATO cooperation as well as the degree of autonomy that the ESDP ought to possess. However, the idea that in certain cases, an ESDP mission can only happen under an EU flag is slowly consolidating in the minds of PSC officials. The American unilateralism of the Bush administration has also encouraged this particular thinking. However, on the question of defence, the responses point to the fact that it is still too early for the ESDP to assume such responsibility. For most EU Member States the question of defence is related to the primacy of NATO or to the idea of national sovereignty. For these particular reasons it would be difficult for the EU to expand its remit on such a sensitive issue, thus the strategic culture of the EU will
continue to develop in the field of out-of-border missions. Therefore, the Petersberg Tasks will, for the time being, define the strategic remit of ESDP.

The importance of security dialogue also forms part of the strategic culture of the EU. Nevertheless, interviewees also mentioned that sometimes too much time is wasted on talking without assuming action. They also claimed that it is highly unlikely that ESDP action will take place in support of a clearly defined EU material interest as for the time being the interviewees could not identify commonly accepted material interests upon which EU member states could reach unanimity. However, stability can be also seen as an EU interest per se. In addition, some ESDP officials did not reject the possibility that in the future, ESDP may be used for economic purposes whereas they also mentioned the fact that ESDP missions provide geopolitical security and that this can be also seen as an EU interest per se. Therefore, ESDP is a policy of flexibility and relies very much upon the political will of the EU Member States.

The thesis claimed that the impact of ESDP on national policies has been limited. ESDP enriched national policies rather than altered them and reinforced already existing trends of change. National policy changes stemming from ESDP can be mostly located at the level of micro-developments in technical and operational practices. In addition, for some countries, EU contributions in Africa and other parts of the world are seen as innovative items for their national policies. Civilian crisis management is another element that has been added to the agenda of various EU Member States due to pressures stemming from ESDP.

Finally, the thesis provided a case study on the ESDP Bosnian missions in order to see which beliefs and practices are influential in the development of the EU strategic operations. The chapter concluded that there is considerable convergence of views between PSC officials and the second sample of EU officials. Therefore, the coordinative discourse of the two groups coincides in many ways and demonstrates that there is continuity of ideas regarding the EU use of force.
7.2. Current Developments: The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the Strategic Culture of the EU

Will the implementation of the Treaty strengthen the strategic culture of the EU? The Lisbon Treaty does not refer extensively to ESDP. However, it remodels the CFSP framework which may also affect the development of ESDP. For instance, The Lisbon Treaty envisages a new role for the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission who will be appointed by the Council and will replace the Presidency as the main CFSP player. In this way, the High Representative will have an influential role of coordination and implementation of CFSP. The High Representative will chair the new Foreign Affairs Council and will nominate the chair of the PSC as well as tasking the PSC with work. In theory, the relationship between the PSC and the High Representative may be strengthened if cooperation amongst the two actors will be followed. In addition, the High Representative will be assisted by the External Action Service (EEAS) whereas the European Commission delegations in third countries will be placed under his/her authority. All these changes may bring more cohesion to the external action of the EU and consequently may also have a positive spill-over effect in the development of ESDP. The High Representative/Vice President of the Commission will have new powers but will need still to be in close contact with the President of the Council. A similar interaction in the past (The Patten/Solana relationship) demonstrates that such an approach can function. Nevertheless, the personal chemistry of the two persons that will fill the two new posts will be of high importance. Whether a strong personal relationship will reinforce the strategic culture of the EU still remains to be seen.

The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSCoop) will institutionalise what already was happening through networking. It will enable countries which are willing to move further in issues of security to implement joint initiatives in issues of capabilities. However, the details of PSCoop are still unknown and at the current stage, the PSCoop proposal is still vague. Many scenarios follow from this ambivalent position on the functioning of the PSCoop. In Brussels
there are those who fear that the PSCoop may lead to a potential duplication of NATO capabilities as the pro-EU autonomy group of states may start a round of collaboration. This may still contribute to division between pro-NATO and pro-EU states, thus making it difficult for the strategic culture of the EU to reach a consensus on the transatlantic relationship. Furthermore, such a legal initiative may serve to consolidate the trend between ESDP-enthusiasts and ESDP-laggards, as the first will be able to caucus and move on with their projects whereas the others will continue to remain passive. On the other hand, according to the most positive scenario, PSCoop may lead to clearer division of labour within the EU of who does what and can also exercise pressures on those countries which are staying behind so that they should join the PSCoop groups. However, PSCoop is about capabilities, not about operations. If Member States have not managed so far to close the capabilities gap what guarantee is there to demonstrate that PSCoop will be effective?

Other Lisbon Treaty provisions provide room for moderate optimism but will have to be tested in practice. Although unanimity remains the rule, the Council can use QMV in cases when a proposal will be presented by the High Representative. There is also a provision which allows the Council to adopt a unanimous decision for the extension of areas which are now covered by majority voting. Only time will tell if the area of security will be one of them. Furthermore, the Treaty states that Member States can seek a common approach on matters on foreign and security policy which are to be pursued by member states through their representation in third countries and international organisations. Whether these provisions constitute an empowering instrument for the foreign policy of the EU or a simple spin still remains to be seen. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that all these measures will contribute to the development of a more dynamic strategic culture although they may contribute to the amelioration of EU actorness in foreign affairs.

An interesting point when it comes to ESDP is related to the extension of the Petersberg Tasks which, according to the Lisbon Treaty, cover the following:
"joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories."

The addition to the previous concept on the Petersberg Tasks has to do with the issue of combating terrorism. However, the study on the strategic culture of the EU so far claimed that the issue of terrorism has not figured prominently in the minds of ESDP officials. It will be interesting to see whether the idea of combating terrorism through the Petersberg Tasks remains a paper tiger or whether it stems from a real re-evaluation of the security needs of the EU.

Furthermore, constructive abstention remains in the Lisbon Treaty text. However, the blocking majority of one third of member states needs to comprise at least one third of the population of the EU. The text also recognises the existence of the EDA and states that membership of the EDA is optional. The Treaty though does not lead to a major upgrade of the EDA neither does it provide a breakthrough on the issue of capabilities modernisation which is much needed so that the EU can possess an effective ESDP. Instead, it simply mentions the recognition of the ‘fait accompli’ of the EDA establishment. One of the negative aspects of the new institutionalisation is that the Lisbon Treaty has not managed to solve the problem of fragmentation of civilian crisis management. CCM continues to lie in between different policies and pillars, thus continuing the current fragmentation of initiatives and making it difficult for the EU to reach a consolidated strategic culture in issues related to CCM. In this respect, the Lisbon Treaty remains inconclusive and vague. It tries to address the problem of fragmentation through the development of the post of High Representative but does not deal with the wider institutional dimension that poses problems to ESDP.

In conclusion, the Lisbon Treaty can be seen as another example of the ambivalent spirit that characterises the minds of Europeans when it comes to the field of foreign
affairs and security. On the one hand, there is a wish to provide the EU with more instruments in order to become an effective policy player. However, on the other hand, there is considerable caution and even fear of giving too much power to the EU through new institutionalisation. This contradictory situation is detrimental to the establishment of a consolidated strategic culture as it does not allow for the development of clear-cut structures that can facilitate the development of common understandings. Within the Lisbon Treaty there is not a major breakthrough that can lead to major developments in the field of security but rather small and inconclusive measures that fail to address current policy challenges. In addition, the Treaty leaves space for further bureaucratisation and complexity and does very little to bridge the divisions of mentalities amongst different national traditions in foreign affairs.

7.3. Towards a Consolidated Strategic Culture? An EU Agenda for the Future

Although considerable progress has been achieved in the development of an intermediate strategic culture, the EU now has to make brave steps in order to acquire a consolidated strategic culture. For instance, the study demonstrated that structures with a clear mandate and strong structures such as the PSC can have a positive development in the strategic culture of the EU whereas other ‘weaker’ institutions cannot play such a role effectively. Therefore, a major upgrade of the functions and resources of the EUMC, EUMS and CIVCOM is necessary. An EU permanent Operational Headquarter based in Brussels is necessary so that more effective policy-making can be achieved. Furthermore, a stronger relationship between the ESDP institutions and the national capitals will also contribute to the effective implementation of the ‘acquis’ of security.

Nevertheless, structures alone will not solve the problems of the gap of ideas amongst the different EU Member States. More discussion, interaction and common initiatives are necessary so that the EU can assume a consolidated strategic culture. Longer and bigger ESDP missions that resemble the Bosnian ones are more likely to bring common understandings in the field of security. However, political will is necessary in order for
such a development to take place. Whether such political will exists is the big question. In this respect, a new generation of ambitious policy-makers that will render security a truly EU priority may contribute to the development of a consolidated strategic culture through the implementation of a more active ESDP agenda.

A comprehensive discussion on the utility of ESDP must take place at the national level. This will contribute to sorting out the paradoxical situation where various Member States have ministries (e.g. Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior) which hold different views of how ESDP should be developed. This should take place along a pan-European dialogue in order to provide clear guidelines on the priorities of ESDP. Finally, the EU can only reach a consolidated strategic culture if EU member will agree to address divisive political issues. EU Member States will have to gradually harmonise their geographic priorities, find a consensus on the importance of the UNSC mandate and reach an agreement on the ESDP-NATO dimension. They will also have to address the issue of underinvestment in civilian and military capabilities and find new ways of synergy and cooperation amongst themselves.

7.4. Weaknesses of the concept of strategic culture. A research agenda for the future

The thesis concerned itself with the beliefs, ideas and values held by Brussels-based ESDP officials when it comes to the deployment of the police and military elements of the EU. This exercise was undertaken in order to define what the main elements of the strategic culture of the EU are. In Chapter One of the thesis it was claimed that various limitations have been encountered during the conduct of research. This Chapter underlined the main challenges of the concept of strategic culture. These challenges constitute a research agenda for scholars who would be interested in elaborating the concept of strategic culture of the EU even further.

As the introduction of the thesis claimed, the research focused on the ideas, beliefs, values and practices which are manifested amongst Brussels-based policy officials in Brussels based institutions. However, it did not deny the fact that ESDP is an
intergovernmental policy in which member states have the upper hand. It stated that
due to research limitations, the views stemming from all the member states cannot be
covered in detail as it is impossible to include the views of 27 national ministries into a
PhD. However, such experiment can be a future task for researchers of strategic culture.
In particular, more work needs to be conducted on the national ministries and on how
EU states perceive ESDP. For instance, a future study on strategic culture will have to
research to what degree national ministries in all EU member states harmonise ideas,
beliefs, values and practices which are related to the use of force. In addition,
interesting case studies can be provided on the extent to which the ‘acquis securitaire’
of the EU Brussels-based officials is adopted by nationally based elites of the twenty-
seven member states. In this respect, the thesis has already made a first contribution as
it underlined the main problems stemming from the relationship between supranational
and national institutions. However, the task of covering the strategic cultures of the
twenty seven member states is beyond the capabilities of one researcher and requires
contributions from groups of researchers in order to cover successfully the impact of
ESDP developments on the security and defence policies of all the EU member states.
Furthermore, such study would require a cross fertilization between the concept of
strategic culture and the various theories of Europeanisation that have so far been
adopted in the field of European studies.

In addition, further work needs to be conducted on the notion of strategic culture and its
methodology. As mentioned in Chapter One strategic culture scholars have
considerable freedom in choosing the methods that underpin their studies of strategic
culture. Although this methodological freedom has contributed to considerable
creativity it may also encourage various skeptical researchers to accuse strategic culture
scholars of lax methodology and a lack of theoretical focus. Work needs to be
conducted on the methods that underpin the concept of strategic culture in order to
achieve methodological consistency and accuracy. Such methodological elaboration
would consolidate the notion of strategic culture and would consequently facilitate the
successful conduct of further studies on the strategic culture of the EU. A discussion on
methods and theory that underpinned the thesis is included in Appendix One. Some examples of possible theoretical and methodological elaboration are mentioned below.

First of all, discussion needs to take place amongst scholars on where strategic culture stands vis-à-vis theories of IR. In their work both Howorth (2007) and Meyer (2006) have included the notion of strategic culture amongst the family of social constructivism. However, further elaboration and clarification is required in order to clarify the common grounds that strategic culture shares with social constructivism. This would facilitate the study of strategic culture and would consolidate its contribution in the field of IR. Appendix I is one attempt to provide such a link. However, the focus of the thesis is not upon the theoretical dimension of strategic culture and therefore more work needs to be conducted by scholars who are dealing with IR theories.

Another possible exploration for future research may include elements of discourse. This was also out of the remit of the thesis which did not deal with discourse analysis. So far the studies of strategic culture have not provided a comprehensive link between strategic culture and discourse. However, various strategic culture studies use elements of discourse without engaging in a deep exploration of what discourse is, its meanings, implication and influence. Some questions for further elaboration may include the following: is discourse a tool of empowerment for policy officials who deal with issues of security? Can discourse lead to the development of strategic culture? Is there a public discourse aimed at propagating values and promoting policies alongside a more ‘private’ discourse amongst ESDP officials? To what degree ESDP declarations reflect the real values of ESDP?

In order to grasp the subtle elements of the strategic culture of the EU, extensive ethnographic work needs to be conducted within the major ESDP institutions that the thesis named previously. Furthermore, such an exercise needs to cover a wide period of time in order to reach safe conclusions. This can be done through continuous direct observation of the meetings of ESDP officials in the ESDP institutions that the thesis
already mentioned. An observation of ESDP institutions will contribute to the drafting of the security consensus that is achieved amongst ESDP officials. It will provide valuable information on the language of policy elites and the quality of consensus that is achieved amongst them. Once more, this task cannot be conducted by a single scholar and requires extensive work from a group of researchers as more than one ESDP institutions need to be covered. Indeed, groups of researchers are required in order to deal with most of the challenges to the study of strategic culture. However, the issue of access to the meetings of various ESDP institutions is a problem that renders the study of the strategic culture of the EU even more difficult. Furthermore, it would be interesting to study the influence of norms propagated by various influential institutions such as NATO on the EU. Furthermore, the pool of case studies on the EU member states requires enrichment. It is surprising that there are already a number of studies on particular countries (e.g. Germany, the UK, France) while other European countries have not been covered extensively or have been fully ignored (e.g. most Mediterranean and Eastern European countries).

Additional links need to be made between strategic thought and action. In this respect the concept of strategic culture will benefit from an input from studies on political psychology (such as the work by Cottam 2004, Jost and Sidanius 2004). By using political psychology methods strategic culture scholar can demonstrate more efficiently how thinking affects action. The thesis tried to address this challenge through the inclusion of a case study on Bosnia Herzegovina. Unfortunately, due to time and resources restrictions it was difficult to cover the views of BiH based EU officials who were currently working in ESDP missions. Future case studies on the strategic culture of the EU need to cover the views of practitioners who are residents in the field of EU operations. This exercise needs to be undertaken in order to see how experiences on the ground affect the beliefs of the Brussels based EU officials and whether there is a ‘learning’ experience that affects the strategic culture of the EU. A comprehensive study on strategic culture may include more than one case study which would provide details on how Europeans perceive the use of force in various parts of the world and how they react to challenges that stem from the ground deployment of troops and police
Officials. Once more, it was difficult for the thesis to address this challenge due to time and resource limits.

Finally, further contributions are needed in order to cover a more detail thematology regarding the use of force. Specialists with particular knowledge on armaments and procurement need to be brought together in order to discuss how different EU countries use different armaments and how they deal with new technological updates. Furthermore, as Howorth (2008) claims, strategic culture scholars need to broaden their research by including other elements which are not related directly to issues of police and military deployment but are directly linked to the notion of security. Such issues are: the response to terrorism, the question of nuclear deterrence and the management of weapon systems (Howorth 2008: 192-199).
Appendices

Appendix I. Methodological/theoretical Statement

INTRODUCTION

The study of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been dominated by IR/European Studies theories that have largely neglected the role of ideas, beliefs, values and practices regarding the use of police and military instruments. The thesis addresses this gap by studying those ideas, beliefs, values and practices which form the strategic culture of the EU. It builds upon studies of the strategic culture of states (Snyder 1977, Klein 1990, Longhurst 2000) and international organizations (Risse-Kappen 1996) including the limited number of studies on the strategic culture of the EU (Cornish and Edwards 2001, Rynning 2003, Hadfield 2004). These works are relevant to the present study insofar as they deal with ideas, beliefs and values regarding the use of force through the deployment of military and police instruments.

Strategic culture is a concept as according to Berg (2007: 20) a concept: “may communicate ideas or introduce particular perspectives, it may be a means for casting a broad generalization. In terms of ideas, concepts are important because they are the foundation of communication and thought”. Chapter One provided a definition of the concept of strategic culture and outlined the variables that the thesis takes into account. As various international organizations are considered to possess their own strategic culture, the thesis claimed that there is a possibility that the EU also possesses its own. This Appendix explains why the notion of strategic culture can be categorized as a concept that is related to social constructivism according to which: “the world is socially constructed” (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 19). The Appendix also justifies the methods that have been used in the thesis.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

According to McQueen and Knussen (2002: 5): “theory is simply a general set of beliefs about the way the universe, or a part of it, operates – often, in fact, those very intuitions, rule of thumb heuristics and general beliefs [...]”. According to Fierke (2007: 168) social constructivists have sought to explain change at the international level by emphasizing the social dimensions of international relations such as rules, norms and ideas. Although the system of security and defence may consist of weapons and armed forces according to a social constructivist view (Jackson 2007: 165): “it is secondary to the intellectual element which infuses it with meaning, plans it, organizes it and guides it”. Strategic culture is a concept that is directly linked to social constructivism as it studies the importance of ideas, beliefs and practices on the use of force though the deployment of police and military instruments.

In the case of the strategic culture of the EU, the thesis put the emphasis on the social construction of reality: it subscribes to the view that: “the social world is a world of human consciousness: of thoughts and beliefs, of ideas and concepts, of languages and discourses, of signs, signals and understandings among human beings, especially groups of human beings, such as states and nations” (Jackson 2007: 165). The world does not exist independently of the thoughts and ideas that are held by ESDP Brussels based officials. Therefore, the thesis agreed with the major social constructivist claim that: “social structures are defined, in part, by shared understandings, expectation, or knowledge” (Wendt 1992: 73). The most important focus is the ‘social’ one. For this reason the study covered the role of beliefs and ideas that constitute such social reality in ESDP. This orientation is in accordance with the lines of social constructivism as according to Jackson (2007: 162): “the study of international relations must focus on the ideas and beliefs that inform the actors on the international scene as well as the shared understandings between them”.

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The thesis did not neglect the fact that material interests exist. However, these are mediated by ideational forces. According to Tannenwald (2005: 19): “ideas are mental constructs held by individuals, sets of distinctive beliefs, principles and attitudes that provide broad orientations for behaviour and policy” and consequently, are vital for defining interests. Therefore, the thesis aligned with the claim that: “social realities are as influential as material realities in determining behaviour. Indeed, they are what endow material realities with meaning and purpose” (Finnemore 1996: 128). Material interests do not emerge in a social vacuum. They are influenced by a set of collective ideas that influence the individual. Social interaction influences interest formation and subsequently behaviour. Furthermore, another social constructivist scholar, Wendt (1992: 394), prioritized the study of interaction amongst policy makers as it creates identities and interests. For this reason the focus of the thesis was on the exploration of social rules (which in the thesis are categorized as behavioural and structural elements of behaviour). These structural and behavioural elements were covered in Chapters Two and Four of the thesis.

In Chapter One the strategic culture of the EU was defined as:

the ideas, beliefs, values and practices of Brussels based ESDP officials regarding the current and potential use of force though the deployment of police and military instruments. These ideas, beliefs, values and practices are manifested in the way ESDP Brussels-based officials think about the deployment of the military and police resources of the EU as well as in the way they plan missions of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The strategic culture of the EU is also characterised by various structural and behavioural elements which are manifested through the interaction of ESDP officials in institutions and networks. Elements of strategic culture are also developed through the historic evolution of the European security debate.

The primary goal of the thesis has been to contribute to a better understanding of the ideas, beliefs, practices and values of Brussels based ESDP officials that underpin ESDP. For this reason, the thesis has included the views of ESDP Brussels based
officials as a case study in order to outline the strategic culture of the EU. It traced the development of the security debate within the EU since 1989 and has shown how institutions (and networks therein) brought to life a primary EU strategic culture which culminated in the development of ESDP. As ESDP is directly linked to the deployment of police and military instruments, the thesis focused on the development of this particular EU policy through its deployed missions and its extensive institutionalisation. It traced the debate on intervention in the Western Balkans in order to identify specific ideas related to the use of military/police force. The thesis followed a deductive approach (Bryman 2008). Inspired by the concept of strategic culture, provided a hypothesis by stating that it is possible for the EU to possess its own strategic culture. It then moved on with the data collection and analysed the findings. The findings led to the fact that the EU possesses an EU strategic culture.

Chapter One claimed that the concept of strategic culture is influenced by the way historic incidents have shaped institutional approaches to the use of force. This claim was further developed in Chapter Four. The thesis covered the European debate on the use of force since the end of Cold War (1989) up to December 2007. The thesis concluded that the Bosnian and Kosovan crises have acted as critical junctures influencing European views on the use of force and thus shaping the strategic culture in a particular way. As BiH has been at the centre of security discussions amongst the Europeans since the early 1990s, the thesis dedicated the last chapter of the thesis to the study of ESDP operations in that country. Chapter One justified the independent variables that are taken into account in the study of the EU through an extensive analysis of the secondary literature on the concept of strategic culture.

Furthermore, one should take into account that strategic culture is not a theoretical concept as such; rather it is a conceptual framework for analyzing the position a particular group of actors hold toward utilizing instruments of force. Consequently, it is important to examine how a strategic culture is manifest in practice; in the EU case through the deployment of ESDP missions. The chapter on the longest running ESDP police and military missions in BiH thus formed an important part of the thesis. As it
was claimed in Chapter Six, this chapter was not intended as a comprehensive case study of the two ESDP missions deployed in BiH but rather as an examination of how the attitudes of Brussels-based officials have impacted upon the implementation of ESDP activities in this country.

Another important aspect of the thesis was the study of ESDP institutions and networks. According to March and Olsen (1989: 17), institutions influence the behaviour of actors by shaping their: “values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs”. The thesis explores the degree to which ESDP institutions determine ‘appropriate behaviour’ within a given institutional setting (March and Olsen 1989: 17). It focused on the influence of Brussels-based ESDP institutions (through the establishment of various structural and behavioural elements) in the development of the strategic culture of the EU. The thesis explored these structural and behavioural elements in Chapter Two with an attempt to find the rules that keep the security community of the EU together. Many scholars claim that the EU is a security community with its own characteristics (Williams 2001: 525, Rumelili 2003: 213, Waever 1998: 69). Being such community, the EU carries its own values which have an impact on the way it uses its military and police instruments, and consequently, on the way it develops its strategic culture. It claimed that the principal institution of note in this regard is the Political and Security Committee (PSC) but also of note are the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the Committee on the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM).

Due to a lack of formal institutionalization in the 1990s, EU strategic culture developed within policy networks rather than EU structures as such. In this respect it is argued that the certain networks that were developed during the 1990s continued their functioning within ESDP institutions (Chapters Three and Four). The thesis adopted the term ‘policy networks’ in order to define a group of ESDP officials who work together and share common ideas on issues of security. The thesis has avoided other terms such as discourse coalitions (Hajer 1993). This was because propagating a ‘public’ discourse in order to convince the public about the utility of a particular policy was not the aim of
the thesis. Furthermore, the thesis used the term ‘policy network’ as the emphasis is on networking practices which the thesis claimed that they constitute a working reality amongst ESDP officials. However, the thesis did not aim to study the process of network negotiation and bargaining itself. Rather, it has sought to explain the impact of policy networks on the strategic culture of the EU. Furthermore, the thesis adopted the term ‘policy networks’ as it claimed that the agents that are influential are policy officials rather than a group of individuals which may even include scientists or journalists as it is the case of discourse coalitions and epistemic communities (Haas 1992).

The thesis makes use of historical/sociological institutionalist approaches (see Chapter Four) which are useful in assessing the current level of development of EU strategic culture. However, it does not deny the fact that Rational Choice Institutionalist patterns were evident at a previous stage where the EU possessed a primary strategic culture. The thesis claimed that currently the EU possesses an intermediate strategic culture which can best be explored through historical and sociological institutionalism. For this reason, the thesis does not fully agree with hard core Rational Choice Institutionalists who according to Lowndes (2002: 95) deny that: “institutional factors ‘produce behaviour’ or shape individuals preferences, which they see as endogenously determined and relatively stable (favouring utility maximization)”. The thesis also agrees with McAnnula’s (2002: 277) criticism of Rational Choice theory whose “narrow view of motivation ignores the ways in which people may act according to habit, imitation, external compulsion and impulse”. Indeed, part of the thesis traced the development of particular habits, path dependencies and impulses which form the structural and behavioural elements that underpin the strategic culture of the EU.

According to Risse (2004: 5): “the target of constructivist attack is likely to be the methodological individualism emphasized by rational choice and its overly agency-centered approach. The reason for this can be found in the way in which social constructivists conceptualise how social structures impact on agents and their behaviour”. On a rationalist account, social institutions are seen as tools of behavioural
constraint (March and Olsen 1989) which make individuals use strategic behaviour in order to pursue their own aims. The main issue is how individuals maximize benefits. Social constructivism by contrast places emphasis on a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998: 951). This leads actors to adopt a behaviour that fits a given social situation and such behaviour may even contradict their narrowly defined interests.

A central question of the thesis is the extent to which ESDP institutions have established a particular behaviour (amongst ESDP Brussels-based officials) that, in turn, has influenced the development of EU strategic culture (Chapter Four). The thesis claims that institutions are important as they affect values, ideas, beliefs and practices (based on Checkel 2003: 352-54). The influence of ESDP institutions and networks lies in the fact that they promote certain structural/behavioural rules which are vital for the strategic culture of the EU (see Chapter Two). The thesis also suggested that some institutions (notably the PSC) ‘matter’ more than others when it comes to the development of the strategic culture of the EU.

Where does the thesis stand in the question of agency and structure? Do structures determine actions? Or do they mostly constraint and facilitate? Can ESDP elites who are based in Brussels change structures? In sociology, Giddens proposed the concept of structuration (1984) according to which structures constrain actors but actors can also transform structures by acting within them. According to Jackson: “IR constructivists use this as a starting point for suggesting a less rigid view of anarchy” (2007: 163). The thesis adopts the idea that structure and agent can be seen as two different entities that mutually influence one another (Giddens 1984). Social structures, in other words, do not exist independently of agents. The thesis concluded that institutions have been influential in promoting structures, rules and patterns of behaviour that bind individuals to certain modes of interaction. In this respect, institutions do influence the behaviour of agents as agents have to follow certain informal rules that are the product of institutional interaction. Sociological and historical institutionalism that the thesis subscribes to see individual widely interrelated with their environment. For instance,
according to Blyth's (2002: 309) view of historical institutionalism: “once institutions are established they ‘embody and give continuing content to agents wants. Consequently, just as institutions could be ontologically prior to individuals, so could ideas”. However, this does not imply that individuals are powerless. Indeed, agents have an influential role to play as, especially within the PSC, individuals are important carriers of Brussels based ideas to the national capitals. This role provides them with considerable influence when it comes to convincing their particular states about the utility of ESDP policies.

The thesis does not neglect the fact that the development of the strategic culture of the EU has been a ‘paradoxical’ process with various limitations. For this reason, it sheds light on a number of limitations that ESDP institutions and agents have faced in Brussels. For instance, various nationally based institutions in charge of foreign and security issues have their own interests and priorities thus slowing down the process of integration in the field of security and defence. However, due to time and resource constraints it has not been possible to conduct research at the level of the EU member states. Nevertheless, the thesis did take into account the influence that EU member states exercise on EU strategic culture of the EU by questioning Brussels based ESDP officials about such influence. Furthermore, as all EU member states have their own representatives in the PSC, they are perforce directly embedded in the study.

METHODS

Methods according to Crotty (2004: 3) are “the techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data related to some research methods or hypothesis”. The Appendix will now address the issue of methods as they have been used in the thesis. The strategic culture of the EU formed the ‘dependent variable’ of the thesis. Independent variables that have been taken into account are rules of behaviour stemming from interaction in institutions and networks (named in the thesis as structural/behavioural elements), ideas on the use of police and military instruments as well as beliefs and practices stemming from critical historic junctures such as the Bosnian and Kosovan conflicts. The thesis
used several types of primary and secondary sources. EU documents were mostly used in order to find the main ideas that stem from ESDP in order to construct a questionnaire that would be then given to ESDP officials (Appendix II). The period covered ranged from 1999 up to 2007. In order to draft the questionnaire the thesis checked the consistency of these ideas in EU documents so that the questions that were asked would rely on ideas that were persistent across time. In order to see which ideas are related to the use of force the thesis studied the Presidency Conclusions of each Presidency since the establishment of ESDP in 1999 and up to December 2007 (18 Conclusions in total). The Treaty establishing a European Constitution and the European Security Strategy were also taken into account as they constituted two very important documents that held extensive summaries on ESDP and on the use of police and military instruments. Finally, the two Council declarations for launch of the two police and military missions in BiH were also taken into consideration as the Bosnian missions formed part of the thesis. By studying these documents the thesis aimed for a wide coverage of EU documents as ideas had to be extracted from a wide sample of official documentation. Secondary sources included scholarly journals and academic books as well as newspaper articles. The use of secondary sources were important in developing various typologies that were deployed throughout the thesis.

In Chapter Four, it should be stressed that the thesis uses primary sources from policy officials, ministers and Heads of State who were in charge of their member states and had direct influence over the formulation of the security policies of the states they represented during the 1990s. The study of history focused on how policy elites and policy officials perceived the crises of the Western Balkans (especially the Bosnian and Kosovo conflict). The study period that was covered starts from the end of Cold War in 1989 up to the establishment of ESDP in 1999. The documents that were used in the chapter were those that had direct quotes to the Kosovo and Bosnian crises and the elements of force need to be used (if any) in order to control these crises. Memoirs from US officials were also used in a complementary way in order to highlight the security dilemmas that the Europeans had when they were dealing with these crises.
Typologies play a valuable role in defining cases that can be compared and contrasted by providing different types of EU strategic culture. According to Berg (2007: 207), a typology is: “a systematic method for classifying similar events, actions, objects, people, or places, into discrete groupings”. The first typology of the strategic culture of the EU deals with ideas, beliefs, values and practices regarding the use of force whereas the second set distinguishes between different types of structural/behavioural elements. These sources are complemented by the use of a questionnaire as well as the conduct of semi-structured interviews with ESDP practitioners who are based in Brussels. By using different methods such as questionnaires, interviews as well as primary and secondary material it was possible not only to cross-check the information gathered but also to shed light on the subtle elements of the strategic culture of the EU.

Writing about qualitative and quantitative methods Berg (2007: 3) mentions: “quantity is elementally an amount of something. Quality refers to the what, how, when, and where of a thing – its essence and ambience. Qualitative research thus refers to the meaning, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of things. In contrast, quantitative research refers to counts and measures of things” (italics in the original). Ideas, beliefs values and practices which make up the strategic culture of the EU cannot be directly measured by precise criteria as it could have been the case with other positivist studies. Thus, quantitative studies such as those focused on electoral participation, voting behaviour, and party membership (Read and Marsh 2002) are not comparable to the research framework that the thesis follows. Further types of quantitative data which would contribute such as government statistics are inappropriate for the purposes of this study. Although the thesis used questionnaires it does not fully bind itself to quantitative measurements. According to Berg (2007: 4); “qualitative research tends to assess the quality of things using words, images, and descriptions whereas most of quantitative research relies chiefly on numbers” However, questionnaire data on its own is not sufficient on its own to explain the deeper implications of the ideas, beliefs, practices and values that ESDP Brussels based officials subscribe to. For this reason, the study also used qualitative material as
extracted from in-depth interviews with ESDP Brussels based officials in order to
analyse the more subtle meanings behind these beliefs.

As mentioned in the theory section above, the thesis claimed that agents do not exist
independently from their social environments and the shared systems of values that
these environments reflect. Methods should take into account that agents are interrelated
with their social environment. Inter-institutional relationships amongst ESDP officials
lead to various rules and patterns of behaviour that need to be considered in detail (as
these constitute the structural/behavioural elements of the strategic culture of the EU).
Therefore, although the thesis used both qualitative and quantitative tools, it puts
additional emphasis on the analysis of the qualitative material gathered through
interviewing. This choice is deliberate for according to Read and Marsh (2002: 232):
‘researchers who utilize qualitative analysis use their inductive empirical analysis to
generate interpretations or understandings of the social world’. Furthermore, as Berg
claims (2007: 8): “qualitative researchers, then are most interested in how humans
arrange themselves and their settings and how inhabitants of these settings make sense
of their surroundings through symbols, rituals, social structures, social roles and so
forth.” The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way. Although the
conversation followed the answers of the questionnaire the interviewer was free to
move the conversation in a direction of interest that may come up.

Furthermore, according to Devine (2002: 201): “intensive interviews are appropriate
when seeking to understand people’s motives and interpretations”. The main idea
behind this method is to listen to policy actors who are willing to talk about their beliefs
and experiences in order to gain some insight into their world views. In-depth
interviews allowed ESDP Brussels based officials to express their views on particular
topics and to elaborate on issues that they thought were influential for the strategic
culture of the EU. As discussions on security issues dealt with ‘sensitive’ issues that
require secrecy, tape recording or the use of any other type of audiovisual means was
avoided in order to allow interviewees to express their opinions freely. In order to cover
the gap of audiovisual data, extensive notes were taken by the author during the
interviews in order to make detailed inferences concerning the beliefs of ESDP policy-makers. Other qualitative methods such as direct observation of the PSC meetings were attempted. Unfortunately due to the highly secretive nature of the PSC meetings it was impossible to observe them.

Two samples of interviews were conducted after careful purposive sampling. This strategy was used in order to get an image of the beliefs of two groups of ESDP Brussels based officials. Heterogeneity of the sampling was one of the basic elements of the task in order to achieve diversity. The first sample included participants from the PSC. Answers from this particular sample provided a general overview regarding the state of the strategic culture of the EU. Twenty two participants took part in this first sample. The aim of the interviews was to talk to PSC officials who had an influential position in ESDP structures. For this reason, the first interview invitation was addressed to the PSC ambassadors. In cases where PSC ambassadors were not available for interviews, a ‘second best’ possible contact person was sought who was usually chosen by the Ambassador as a replacement. The questionnaire was first given to PSC officials during the interview meeting. After officials have filled in the questionnaire they were also interviewed on questions stemming from their answers so that more details regarding their strategic ideas would be obtained.

The same process also took place with the second group of interviewees. A second questionnaire was drafted for officials who worked in ESDP related missions in BiH. It included many of the questions asked in the first sample of officials but also tested how the strategic culture of the EU affected the implementation of ESDP missions in BiH. This second group of interviewees included participants from the PSC, the EUMS, the Council of the EU, the European Commission and the European Parliament. The main idea behind the conduct of a second sample interviews was to test whether ideas and practices described by the PSC participants were followed by policy makers in other EU institutions. By undertaking this exercise the thesis aimed to investigate whether these ideas, values, beliefs and practices that were mentioned by PSC officials are ideas that characterise EU officials as a whole.
In both cases, the sample of participants was carefully selected in order to provide a balanced number of officials from different countries (small/big states, south/north EU states, east/west EU states). During the conduct of interviews the interviewer drew lessons from Devine (2002: 199) who claims that: “qualitative methods draw particular attention to contextual issues, placing an interviewee’s attitudes and behaviour in the context of their individual biography and the wider social setting”. Indeed, part of the work carried out in Brussels included the tracing of biographical data of the interviewees (such as previous career, government positions or party affiliation if possible). This ‘personal tracking’ was of particular value as the interviewees could then be asked to elaborate more on particular issues in which they had considerable experience. The interviews were carried out during the period of January 2007 up to December 2007.

In much of the questionnaire the Likert Scale was used with a set of statements and propositions mentioned in order to evaluate the feelings of the interviewees (Arksey and Knight 1999: 92). One of the most common versions of the Likert scale categorises answers of the interviewees according to: ‘1. Agree/ 2. Neither Agree and 3. Disagree/ Disagree’ groups. Although this is an interesting categorization, the field of answers in the ‘Neither Agree of Disagree’ category adds a big ‘grey area’ which is difficult to interpret. In order to address this issue, the questionnaire used a five-layered pattern which was based on the following choices: 1. Agree, 2. Disagree, 3. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances, 4. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances. 5. Don’t Know/ Don’t Answer. Finally, the study included various ‘open’ questions which allowed participants to express their own concerns and raise issues that they considered important. At the end of the questionnaire officials were asked to elaborate further on issues of their own interest and to add anything else that may consider as important. All officials who participated in the questionnaire/interview sessions were reassured about the confidentiality of the survey.
The questions that were included in the questionnaire can be categorized into three main themes. The first part of the questions is closely related to ideas and beliefs on ESDP. The results of this section provided a link between ideas on ESDP and how they are related to the strategic culture of the EU. The second part of the questionnaire is related to the behaviour of elites within ESDP institutions. Finally, the impact of ESDP on nation states forms the third part of the questionnaire. When interviews were conducted respondents were asked to articulate national positions when issues were related to national issues. Interviewees were also asked to express their personal views when their role on ESDP institutions was discussed as well as when their influence on ESDP was taken into account.
Appendix II. The drafting of the Questionnaire

The questions can be categorized into three main themes. The first part of the questions is closely related to ideas and beliefs on ESDP. The results of this section provide a link between ideas on ESDP and how they are related to the strategic culture of the EU. The questions that were included in the questionnaire emerged after a study of ESDP documents. In order to see which ideas are related to the use of force the thesis studied the Presidency Conclusions of each Presidency since the establishment of ESDP in 1999 and up to December 2007 (18 Conclusions in total). The Treaty establishing a European Constitution and the European Security Strategy were also taken into account. Finally, the two Council declarations for launch of the two police and military missions in BiH were also taken into consideration. The thesis undertook this exercise in order to cover a wide range of EU documentation. It tested ideas that were persistent in these pieces of documentation in order to establish a map of ideas in the form of questions that would addressed to ESDP officials.

The second part of the questionnaire is related to the behaviour of elites in order to find out whether they have an important role to play in the process of ESDP and to what extent they can be influential carriers of strategic culture both within ESDP structures but also in relation to their home institutions. Finally, the impact of ESDP on nation states forms the third part of the questionnaire. The main aim behind this particular section is to find whether ESDP has influenced the strategic cultures of EU member states and, if so, then to what extent. When interviews were conducted respondents were asked to articulate national positions when issues were related to national issues. Interviewees were also asked to express their own views when their role on ESDP was discussed as well as when their influence on ESDP was taken into account.

The sample of participants has been carefully selected in order to provide a balanced number of officials from different countries (small/big states, South/North states, East, West States). Part of the work carried out in Brussels also included the tracing of biographical data of the interviewees (such as previous career, government positions,
party affiliation if possible). This was of value because the interviewees could then be asked to elaborate more on particular issues in different interviews (e.g. the Bosnia-Herzegovina missions). The interviews were carried out from the period of January 2007 up to December 2007. The first part of the material presented in this chapter deals with interview data from the Ambassadors and officials who are working in the PSC. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the PSC was chosen as the primary institution for research as it is the most important ESDP institution. The aim of the questionnaire was to talk to PSC officials who were high in the ESDP scale. For this reason a first invitation was addressed to the PSC ambassadors. In cases where PSC ambassadors were not available for interviews, the ‘second best’ possible contact person was sought who was usually chosen by the Ambassador as a replacement. The questionnaire was first given to PSC officials during the interview meeting. After they have filled in the questionnaire they were also interviewed on questions included in it so that more details regarding ESDP could be obtained.

In much of the questionnaire the Likert Scale was used with a set of statements and propositions mentioned in order to evaluate the feelings of the interviewees (Arksey and Knight 1999: 92). One of the most common versions of the Likert scale categorises answers of the interviewees in the following according to: ‘1. Agree/2. Neither Agree or Disagree/3. Disagree’ groups. Although this is an interesting categorization, the field of answers in the ‘Neither Agree of Disagree’ category adds a big ‘grey area’ which is difficult to interpret. In order to limit this, the questionnaire used a five-layered pattern which was based on the following choices: 1. Agree, 2. Disagree, 3. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances, 4. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances. 5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer. Finally, the study included various ‘open’ questions which allowed participants to express their own concerns and raise issues that they considered important. At the end of the questionnaire officials were asked to elaborate further on issues of their interest. All officials who participated in the questionnaire/interview sessions were interviewed were reassured about the confidentiality of the survey.
Questionnaire Sample

The questionnaire is divided into three short sections. The first set of questions is general and covers ideas and values in ESDP. The second section concerns ESDP institutions and policy formulation. Finally, the third section is about the impact of ESDP on the foreign policy of your country.

The information of this questionnaire is confidential and anonymous. No quotes and personal data will be used in public and after the end of the survey all questionnaire samples will be destroyed.

Personal Data

Gender

Male
Female

Age Group:

25-34
35-44
44-56
57 and over

Country of origin:

Institution:

General questions on ESDP

1. Do you feel that ESDP has been a success since its launch?

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

2. Is ESDP equipped with adequate military and civilian resources?

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

3. Do you feel that so far ESDP missions have been successful in promoting human rights, the rule of law and the protection of civilian populations?

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

4. ESDP should focus on operations in the following regions (multiple answers):

1. The Balkans
2. The Middle East
3. Caucasus
4. Western Newly Independent States (Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia)
5. Or Africa
6. The Mediterranean
7. South East Asia/Oceania
8. Latin America

5. ESDP operations should be carried out with a UN mandate and under the authorization of the UN Security Council.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

6. ESDP ought to involve in its operations countries other than EU member states.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

7. Operations should be carried out using NATO resources.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer
8. The EU should develop capabilities that will allow it to deal with crises independently of NATO.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

9. In the future the EU should assume responsibility for issues of defence.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

10. In the ESDP missions military and civilian tools are equally important.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

11. Briefly mention the main challenges ESDP faces (multiple answers).

1. Empowerment of ESDP institutions
2. Investment in military and civilian capabilities
3. Lack of trust of national governments in the ESDP project
4. Competition with other organizations such as NATO
5. Other (Please mention in detail)

12. The EU should (multiple answers):

Intervene in the case of a disaster in Europe
Guarantee human rights
Intervene in conflicts on the borders of the EU
Defend the economic interests of the Union
Take part in humanitarian missions without UN approval
Other (Please mention in detail)

13. Dialogue is an important tool for ESDP conflict resolution

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

Institutions and your role in formulating ESDP

1. The institution in which I work has been influential in shaping ESDP.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

2. The degree of cooperation amongst employees within ESDP institutions has increased over the years.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

3. Most of the time there is a good degree of cooperation with my ESDP colleagues.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

4. To which EU Member States do you talk first when it comes to a policy initiative? Mention the five countries with which you collaborate mostly.

5. How much does the national capital value the work of the institution for which you are working?

   Quite a lot. There is frequent interaction between my institution and the national capital
   There is a substantial interaction but there is still room for improvement
Not a lot

6. Due to my ESDP post I have considerable influence over the formulation of the ESDP policy of the state I come from.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

7. My main function is to strike a balance between the national and the EU position but national interest always comes first.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

8. More powers should be given to ESDP institutions even if this goes against national sovereignty

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

ESDP and your country

1. By participating in ESDP the security and defence policies of my country have been altered.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

2. ESDP has had an impact on EU States as a whole.

1. Agree
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
4. Disagree
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

3. If you agree or mostly agree with the following statement, mention any cases of policy change that have taken place because of ESDP:

4. Due to ESDP my country has become more inclined to use military/civilian instruments in its foreign policy.
   1. Agree
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
   4. Disagree
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

5. My country perceives participation in ESDP as a vital element of its security policy.
   1. Agree
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
   4. Disagree
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

6. More powers should be given to ESDP institutions even if this goes against national sovereignty
   1. Agree
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances
   4. Disagree
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer

Do you have any comments on the questionnaire? Is there anything else that you think is important on ESDP and has not been covered so far?

Thank you for your responses!
Appendix III. Questionnaire Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Data</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>Male</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>Age Group:</td>
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<td>25-34:</td>
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<td>35-44:</td>
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<td>44-56:</td>
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<tr>
<td>57+:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country of origin: 22 EU Member States (France, Germany, UK, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Austria, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Spain, Italy, Malta, Czech Republic)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Institution: PSC

General questions on ESDP

1. Do you feel that ESDP has been a success since its launch?
   1. Agree       20
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 2
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0
   4. Disagree    0
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0

2. Is ESDP equipped with adequate military and civilian resources?
   1. Agree       2
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 12
   4. Disagree    0
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0

3. Do you feel that so far ESDP missions have been successful in promoting human rights, the rule of law and the protection of civilian populations?
   1. Agree       18
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0
   4. Disagree    0
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0
4. ESDP should mostly focus on operations which should be implemented in the following regions (multiple answers):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Balkans</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Middle East</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasus</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Newly Independent States (Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mediterranean</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia/Oceania</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Latin America</td>
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5. ESDP operations should be carried out with a UN mandate and under the authorization of the UN Security Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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6. ESDP ought to involve in its operations countries other than EU member states.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Count</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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</tr>
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7. Operations must be carried out by using NATO resources

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Agreement Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

8. The EU should develop capabilities that will allow it to deal with crises independently of NATO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<tr>
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9. In the future the EU should assume responsibility for issues of defence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement Type</th>
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### 10. In the ESDP missions that the EU undertakes military and civilian tools are equally important.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>4. Disagree</td>
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### 11. Briefly mention the main challenges ESDP faces (multiple answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment of ESDP institutions</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in military and civilian capabilities</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of trust of national governments in the ESDP project</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition with other organizations such as NATO</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Please mention in detail)</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 12. The EU should (multiple answers):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervene in case of a disaster in Europe</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee Human Rights</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervene in conflicts at the borders of the EU</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defend the economic interests of the Union:</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take part in humanitarian missions without UN approval</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Please mention in detail) Petersberg tasks</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of the above state reasons</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 13. Dialogue is an important tool for ESDP conflict resolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ESDP institutions and your role in formulating ESDP

1. The institution in which I work has been influential in shaping ESDP.
   1. Agree 18
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0
   4. Disagree 0
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0

2. Most of the time there is a good degree of cooperation with my ESDP colleagues.
   1. Agree 20
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 2
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0
   4. Disagree 0
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0

3. The degree of cooperation amongst employees within ESDP institutions has increased over the years.
   1. Agree 14
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 3
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0
   4. Disagree 1
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 4

4. Networking: To which EU Member States do you talk first when it comes to a policy initiative? Mention the five countries with which you collaborate mostly. For further details regarding the results of this question please see chapter five.

5. How much does the national capital value the work of the institution for which you are working?
   1. Quite a lot. There is frequent interaction between my institution and the national capital 12
   4. There is a substantial interaction but there is still room for improvement 6
   5. Not a lot. 4

6. Due to my ESDP post I have considerable influence over the formulation of the security policy of the state I come from.
   1. Agree 14
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 3
   4. Disagree 0
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 1
7. My main function is to strike a balance between the national and the EU position but the national interest always comes first.
1. Agree 14
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0
4. Disagree 0
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0

8. More powers should be given to ESDP institutions even if this goes against national sovereignty
1. Agree 4
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 9
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 9
4. Disagree 0
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0

ESDP and your country

1. By participating in ESDP the security and defence policies of my country have been altered.
1. Agree 3
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 14
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 5
4. Disagree 0
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0

2. ESDP had an impact on EU States as a whole.
1. Agree 4
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 14
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 2
4. Disagree 2
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0

3. If you agree or mostly agree with the following statement, mention any cases of policy change that have taken place because of ESDP:
See analysis in chapter 6 for more details

4. Due to ESDP my country has become more inclined to use military/civilian instruments in its foreign policy.
1. Agree 4
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 3
4. Disagree 7
5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0
5. My country perceives participation in ESDP as a vital element of its security policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix IV: Questionnaire Results on Bosnia

Institutions covered: PSC, EUMS, Council of the EU, COWEB, Commission, European Parliament

Questionnaire Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Data</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age Group:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34:</td>
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<td>35-44:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44-56:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57+:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General questions on ESDP

1. Do you feel that the ESDP missions in BiH have been a success since their launch?
   1. Agree   20
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 3
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0
   4. Disagree 0
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0

2. ESDP in BiH operations should be carried out with a UN mandate and under the authorization of the UN Security Council
   1. Agree   15
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 6
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 2
   4. Disagree 0
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0

3. ESDP ought to involve in its operations countries other than EU member states.
   1. Agree   20
   2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 3
   3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0
   4. Disagree 0
   5. Don’t Know/Don’t Answer 0

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4. Operations must be carried out by using NATO resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The EU should develop capabilities that will allow it to deal with crises independently of NATO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know/Don’t Answer</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. In the ESDP missions that the EU undertakes military and civilian tools are equally important.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
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7. From your Bill experience briefly mention the main challenges ESDP faces (multiple answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment of ESDP institutions</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment in military and civilian capabilities</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>Lack of trust of national governments in the ESDP project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competition with other organizations such as NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other (Please mention in detail)</td>
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8. The EU intervened in Bill in order to (multiple answers):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promote law, order and good governance</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee Human Rights</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solve a conflict in its borders</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defend the economic interests of the Union</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Please mention in detail): promote security/stability</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>All of the above state reasons</td>
<td>3</td>
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Missing pages are unavailable
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