Elite sport development in South Korea: an analysis of policy change in the sports of athletics, archery and baseball

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Elite Sport Development in South Korea: 
An Analysis of Policy Change in the Sports of Athletics, Archery and Baseball 

by 

Jae Woo Park 

A Doctoral Thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
For the award of Doctor of Philosophy of 
Loughborough University 

February 2011 

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Abstract

This thesis explores the process of elite sport policy development in South Korea. The thesis analyses the process of policy change in the sports of athletics, archery and baseball at the elite level. The three objectives of the study are: (i) to trace the emergence, development and current status of elite sport policy in South Korea; (ii) to identify how elite sport policy has changed in response to both exogenous factors and endogenous factors; and (iii) to evaluate the utility of the macro-level and meso-level theories of the process of policy change in relation to Korean elite sport development.

A multiple-case study approach is adopted, focusing on each of the three sports in turn, wherein a qualitative methodology (semi-structured interviews and document analysis) is utilised in order to elicit data regarding elite sport policy change and development. The analysis of the three case studies is organised by following the two principal themes indentified by Green & Houlihan (2005). Firstly, the organisational structure and administration of the national governing body of athletics is explored followed by an analysis of the nature of the body’s relationships with other organisations and an assessment of the influence and significance of business. Secondly, the potential influences on elite sport development in each of the three sports are examined following the three key dimensions of high performance sport policy identified by Green & Houlihan (2005): (i) identification of, and support for, talented athletes; (ii) improvements in sport science, coaching and facilities; and (iii) the provision of more systematic competition opportunities for elite level athletes. It could be argued that Green & Houlihan’s (2005) analytical framework was very useful in investigating elite sport development in the cases of athletics, archery and baseball, but it did not identify all distinctive aspect of Korean elite sport system. A further prominent area of elite sport development has emerged and identified in the cases of the three sports: that is a ‘cash-award system’.

This study reveals the significance of business leaders on the development of the three sports in general, and the sports’ successes in international sporting competitions in particular. The study also identifies that all three sports have been shaped by the actions of a sport policy community involving a small number of groups or actors which share common perceptions and the ultimate goal of each sport’s success in international sporting events. The study concludes that the over-lapping assumptions between elitism and neo-pluralism are the most likely explanation of the Korean elite sport policy process at the macro-level analysis. It is concluded that although three frameworks, ACF, MSF and policy networks, provide partial insights into Korean elite sport policy process in the three sports, none of the three frameworks adopted provides a comprehensive explanation of policy change in the three sports. In particular, the advocacy coalition framework has proved useful in drawing attention to the notion of exogenous factors (e.g. a sport’s failure at an international sporting completion and the change of the presidency of NGBs) and policy learning as a key source of policy change. The concept of policy community which is a type of policy network has provided partial insights in terms of illuminating the characteristics of the Korean elite sport policy process at the macro-level analysis, although it has not been a particularly useful lens for explaining the mechanism of policy change in the three sports investigated.

Key words: elite sport, policy change, athletics, archery, baseball, policy process, South Korea
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<td>AAAA</td>
<td>Asia Amateur Athletics Association</td>
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<td>ACF</td>
<td>Advocacy Coalition Framework</td>
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<td>ADPC</td>
<td>Athletics Development Preparation Committee</td>
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<td>AGF</td>
<td>Asian Games Federation</td>
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<td>BDEC</td>
<td>Baseball Development Executive Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>BFA</td>
<td>Baseball Federation of Asia</td>
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<td>DAPC</td>
<td>Daegu Athletics Promotion Centre</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale de Football Association</td>
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<td>FITA</td>
<td>Federation Internationale De Tir A L’Arc</td>
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<td>FKI</td>
<td>Federation of Korean Industries</td>
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<td>FKTU</td>
<td>Federation of Korean Trade Unions</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>HMD</td>
<td>Head Mount Display</td>
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<td>IAAF</td>
<td>International Association of Athletics Federation</td>
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<td>IBF</td>
<td>International Baseball Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<td>KAA</td>
<td>Korean Archery Association</td>
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<td>KABPA</td>
<td>Korean Professional Baseball Player Association</td>
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<td>KADMC</td>
<td>Korea Athletics Development Measures Committee</td>
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<td>KAF</td>
<td>Korea Athletics Federation</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAFAC</td>
<td>Korea Armed Forces Athletic Corps</td>
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<td>KAHPRD</td>
<td>Korean Alliance for Health, Physical Education, Recreation and Dance</td>
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<td>KASA</td>
<td>Korean Amateur Sports Association</td>
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<td>KBA</td>
<td>Korean Baseball Association</td>
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<td>KBDR</td>
<td>Korea Baseball Development Research-centre</td>
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<td>KBO</td>
<td>Korean Baseball Organisation</td>
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<td>KBOP</td>
<td>Korea Baseball Organisation Properties</td>
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<td>Korean Broadcasting System</td>
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<td>KOCOSA</td>
<td>Korea Council of Sport for All</td>
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<td>KPBL</td>
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<td>MBC</td>
<td>Munhwa Broadcasting Cooperation</td>
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<td>MCST</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism</td>
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<td>MEST</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Multiple Stream</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEST</td>
<td>Korea Foundation for the Next Generation Sports Talent</td>
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<td>NGBs</td>
<td>National Governing Bodies</td>
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<td>NHRC</td>
<td>National Human Rights Commission</td>
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<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSO</td>
<td>National Sporting Organisation</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economics Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAF21C</td>
<td>Participatory Autonomy Forum for 21C</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Personal Digital Assistant</td>
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<td>Samsung Electronic Athletics Club</td>
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<td>SLOOC</td>
<td>Seoul Olympic Organising Committee</td>
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<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force for Fostering Junior/Youth Baseball</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Research aim and objectives

The aim of this research is to explore the process of elite sport policy development in South Korea. The thesis focuses on an analysis of the process of policy change in the sports of athletics, archery and baseball at the elite level. In order to achieve the research aim mentioned above three more concrete objectives can be delineated:

- To trace the emergence, development and current status of elite sport policy in South Korea;
- To identify how elite sport policy has changed in response to both exogenous and endogenous factors;
- To evaluate the utility of selected macro-level and meso-level theories of the process of policy change in relation to Korean elite sport development.

1.2 Justification for investigating elite sport policy change

In contemporary society, many countries have paid a lot of attention to sport due to a wide-range of social purposes such as public welfare, education and health concerns. In addition, sport has been utilised by many countries in order to show their supremacy and raise their national image in the international arena. For instance, Canada, Australia, and most western European nations have invested substantial sums of money to win medals in international sporting events, especially the Olympic Games (Whitson, 1998: 2; Green, 2003: 2). The perceived association between elites sport success and national vitality is one reason why the value of medals at the Olympic Games is thought to be connected with a country’s national power, and why each government takes obtaining medals as a way of expressing their pride within the
international community. Perhaps, it might be said that the attributes of sport have a significant political value beyond sport itself. As Hoberman (1993) noted that the Eastern Bloc’s countries used sport for ideological reasons, the GDR (German Democratic Republic) had a concrete purpose for elite sport development which was outstanding high sports performance that obtained international stature and gave status to the communist regime during the Cold War.

In the case of South Korea, the emergence of sport as a sector of public policy interest was in line with Park’s authoritarian government (1961-1979) where sport was a crucial part of its public policy concern. Following the Korean War (1950-1953), different political ideologies in the North and South of the peninsula created the conditions in which the South Korean government would, at a later date in the 1960s, begin to pay more attention to elite sport development. The authoritarian government in the South began to construct the nation’s elite sport system in order to demonstrate its superiority over North Korea on the international sporting stage. Therefore, the government paved the way for the development of the elite sport system in the 1960s and 1970s. Along with the President Chun’s regime (another military-based government: 1980-1988), we witnessed the continuous use of elite sport as a public policy priority in the 1980s, when the authoritarian government intervention resulted in the creation of the Ministry of Sport with a focus on elite sport triggered by the successful bids for both the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games. The Chun government invested a huge amount of money into elite athletes, coaches, facilities, sports science, as well as sport institutes in order to establish an effective elite athlete development system (Ha & Mangan, 2002). Indeed, the 1980s was considered a ‘golden age’ for elite sport development. The spill-over from competing sporting ideologies due to the social and political conditions of the day made the 1980s a fertile period for the development of elite sport. The domestic salience of elite sport policy was evidenced by the fact that the nation was ranked 4th in the medal standings at the 1988 Olympic Games. The continued development of elite sport has been largely driven by the impact of political and historical factors and the instrumental use of sport to attain government political goals.

In spite of the change of government from the authoritarian regime to the first civilian democratic government in 1993, developing elite sport has remained a high policy
priority for Korean governments. There has been growing recognition within the government of promoting national image and unity not only through medal-winning success at international sporting competitions, but also through the hosting of mega-sporting events. As a consequence, the nation has, over the past 40 years, been committed to the support of a state-led elite sport system. The government’s continuing commitment to elite sport policy has been manifested in the target to maintain athletic performance within the top 10 in the medal standings at the Olympic Games as stated in both ‘5 Year National Sport Promotion Plans’ and ‘Sports White Papers’.

While elite sport as a public policy concern has attracted government attention over the long term, little attention has been given to the analysis of the policy process in the sport sector including elite sport. In recent years, some researchers have become increasingly interested in studying sport policy but little systematic research has been undertaken. As a consequence, at the level of policy analysis, there remains a problem in providing in-depth, detailed analysis of the emergence, development and current status of elite sport policy in South Korea. In this regard, this study is intended not only to provide detailed analysis of elite sport policy change by utilising theories of public policy, but also to offer a catalyst for future research into sport policy analysis.

1.3 Research phases

This study was undertaken in the following five phases (see Figure 1.1): (i) setting out the research aims and objectives and identifying justifications for investigating elite sport policy change; (ii) reviewing theories of the state and the process of policy change in order to provide a theoretical framework; (iii) developing a suitable research design; (iv) reviewing the development of sport in South Korea; and (v) a stage of data collection and thematic analysis of the data.
1.4 Thesis structure

The thesis is organised in nine chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 outlines the study’s analytic framework through reviewing theoretical perspectives on the process of policy change. The first section explores four theories of the state at the macro-level of analysis – Marxism, elitism, pluralism and corporatism. Reviewing the four macro-level theories of the state is undertaken in order to provide insights for an analysis of the role of the state, power structure and the resulting interaction.
between the state and varied agencies. This section considers the utility of the four theories of the state in the context of Korean society. In addition, the second section of the chapter provides a brief discussion of ‘nationalism’ and ‘globalisation’ at the macro-level. The third section of the chapter considers the ways of conceptualising power which are pertinent to the study’s key analytic issue with particular emphasis being given to Lukes’ three faces of power which offer useful theoretical insights for a conceptual analysis of power. Following the review of macro-level theories and theoretical perspective on power, the fourth part of the chapter reviews three meso-level theories of the process of policy change – multiple streams, policy networks and the advocacy coalition framework. The section discusses their respective strengths and weaknesses. The section then considers implications for meso-level analysis of elite sport policy change in South Korea. Furthermore, it is by integrating macro-level analysis and meso-level analysis that it is possible to better understand power relations and the nature of the relationship between government, its agencies and interest groups in the process of policy change for elite sport development. This chapter concludes by suggesting that the overlapping perspectives of neo-pluralism/elitism appear to provide the most useful framework for this study at the macro-level analysis, and the advocacy coalition framework appears to provide the most promising framework at the meso-level of analysis. Moreover, the policy network approach provides a supplementary explanatory lens to illustrate the pattern and characteristics of the policy process for elite sport development. The utility of the various analytic frameworks will be considered in the concluding chapter.

Chapter 3, *Research strategies and methods*, sets out the methodology for the study, including the philosophical assumptions, methodological approach and methods of analysis, given the ‘directional’ relationship between ontology, epistemology, methodology, methods and sources. The first section of the chapter reviews three major ontological and epistemological paradigms (positivism, interpretivism and critical realism) and then specifies the philosophical position adopted for the study. The second section of the chapter explores methodological considerations regarding structure and agency, based on the specified ontological and epistemological assumption. The third section of the chapter outlines the methods adopted for the study: multiple-case study design, semi-structured interviews and document analysis. The chapter discusses fundamental issues (including reliability and validity) involved
in the three core methods. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the study’s research strategy and implications for the substantive analysis of elite sport policy change.

Chapter 4, *Sport policy development in South Korea*, explores the development of Korean sport since 1961, tracing the development in three main sectors of sport – school sport, sport for all and elite sport. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the historical context of Korean elite sport development. The first section of the chapter provides a brief overview of the development of the political, social and cultural contexts in which sport policy emerged. The second section of the chapter is divided into the following periods for tracing Korean sport development; 1961-1979, 1980-1992 and 1993 onwards. The rationale for selecting 1961 as the starting point reflects the emergence of sport as a distinct public policy concern, an example of which particularly included the enactment of ‘the National Sports Promotion Law’ in 1962, along with the establishment of President Park, Chung-Hee’s military-based regime in 1961. Each sub-section provides a brief summary of the implications of school sport and SFA for elite sport development. The chapter concludes by looking at key features of sport development in South Korea.

Chapter 5, *The contemporary sport system in South Korea*, examines the characteristics of the current situation of national sport policy and its organisational context in South Korea. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a discussion of the background of the national sport policy system before proceeding to investigate elite sport policy change in the three cases. The chapter, based on empirical findings, draws attention to the policy priorities, organisational structure, administration and relationship of, and between, the national sporting bodies, and the funding structure in relation to elite sport development. The chapter concludes by summarising the key distinctive features of national sport policy and its organisational context.

Chapter 6, *The case of athletics*. In order to provide some clarity to this investigation of the case of athletics, this chapter utilises two principal themes identified by Green & Houlihan (2005): (i) organisational structure and administration for athletics and the sport’s governing body and the influence of business leaders on the sport at the elite-level; and (ii) the identification of potential dimensions of elite sport policy
development. As for the latter, Green & Houlihan’s (2005) study provides a robust framework for the analysis of elite sport policy development: (i) identification and support for young talented athletes; (ii) improvements in sport science, coaching and facilities; and (iii) the provision of more systematic competition opportunities for elite level athletes. The analysis of athletics follows their analytical framework because of its particular relevance to this study. These key elements have been identified as primary constituent elements in the construction of an elite sport development system in pursuit of medal-winning success at international sporting competitions (cf. Green, 2003; Green & Houlihan, 2005; Digel et al., 2006).

Chapters 7 (The case of archery) and 8 (The case of baseball) follow a similar structure to that of Chapter 6.

Finally, Chapter 9, Discussion and Conclusion, returns to the research questions identified in Chapter 1 and discusses the salience of the theoretical and methodological insights provided in Chapter 2 and 3. The first section of the chapter identifies key similarities and differences between the three cases that emerge from the discussion in Chapter 6, 7, and 8, given that a multiple-case study allows for the potential to draw cross-case conclusions on a particular topic. The second section of the chapter discusses the study’s theoretical insights with particular consideration given to evaluating the usefulness of both the macro and meso-level theories including the aspect of power and configurations and relations in the process of elite sport policy change. It is in the final section of the concluding chapter where the study’s key methodological reflections are considered.
CHAPTER 2

Policy process and policy change: Theoretical perspectives

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this study is to investigate the process of elite sport policy change in three sports and it is therefore crucial to examine theories of public policy-making to provide the theoretical and conceptual context for this study. As many approaches to policy analysis place power structure and relations at the centre of their analysis, this is especially important in reviewing and evaluating the theories of the state at the macro-level. In particular, how power has been conceptualised, how power has been distributed and how power relations have been formed. Furthermore, for this study it is necessary to explore the relationship between the state, its agencies and organisations within civil society at the meso-level (cf. Daughbjerg & Marsh, 1998; Marsh, 1995b, 1998; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992b; Marsh & Stocker, 1995a). Understanding the different theoretical and conceptual perspectives and levels lays the foundations for integrating the macro-level of analysis into the meso-level of analysis to enable a deeper analysis of the process of elite sport policy change.

This chapter will firstly provide the criteria for determining the usefulness of four theories of the state: Marxism, elitism, pluralism and corporatism. We will then attempt to further extend the discussion in order to apply the four state theories to the Korean context. The second part of this chapter will provide a brief discussion of nationalism and globalisation. The concept of nationalism is discussed because elite sport development in South Korea has been, to some degree, bound up with the rise of nationalism. However, an in-depth review of the interconnection between nationalism and sport policy is beyond the scope of this study. There needs to be a discussion of globalisation in order to take account of exogenous factors in understanding and explaining the influence of international conditions on, and the degree of homogeneity
in, elite sport development systems. The third part of this chapter considers the ways of conceptualising power pertinent to the study’s key analytic focus. The fourth part of this chapter provides the criteria for the usefulness of three representative ‘meso-level’ frameworks, and then explores the theoretical and conceptual perspectives of selected meso-level frameworks with their strengths and weaknesses: multiple-streams framework, policy networks and advocacy coalition framework. These theories will then be applied to this study to explain elite sport policy change in South Korea and then will be evaluated with regard to their applicability to the Korean elite sport context in terms of helping to understand policy process and change. The chapter ends with an assessment of the usefulness of the two levels of analysis for studying the policy process and change in the context of South Korea.

2.2 Theories of the state

The starting point for the rationale of this chapter is Parson’s assumption that ‘the development of policy analysis must be placed in the context of this rationalisation of the state and politics as a ‘policy making’ activity’ (1995: 16). It is generally taken for granted that it is essential for a study of the policy process and change to understand the role of the state and to relate it to the power structure of a society as a whole (cf. Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998; Green, 2003; Hill, 1997a, 1997b; Marsh, 1995a, 1995b). In this regard, Hill argues that ‘the role of the state indicates that a discussion of the public policy process needs to be grounded in an extensive consideration of the nature of power in the state’ (1997a: 18). In line with this position, the focus here is to look at traditional theories of the state that can be understood by closely examining the subject of state power, which is an intrinsic attribute and can be understood in political, social and economic contexts (Ryoo G, 2007). Nordlinger (1981) introduced a variety of attributes of state and society as seen through a ‘society-centred’ lens using four theories of the state: Marxism, elitism, pluralism and corporatism. According to Ryoo G (2007), theories of power structure as a central concept in the relationship between state and society are a way of exploring the sources of state authority. The review of the theories of the state here, then, is aimed at providing an overview of how the political system has been theorised at a macro-level before going
on to examine the nature of policy process/change, the relationship between
government and interest groups, and the pattern of interest group activity at the meso-
level of analysis (cf. Green, 2005).

Given Hill’s argument that ‘policy is the product of the exercise of political influence,
determining what the state does and setting limits to what it does’ (1997b: 41), it is
necessary to define and understand exactly what is meant by ‘the state’. Hay et al, for
example, note that ‘the state is not an immediately transparent or self-evident material
object, and this is merely one step in defending a view of politics which places the
state at centre stage’ (2006:9; see also Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987:1). Although the
definition of ‘the state’ varies according to scholars, we can discover a common
concept: ‘the state is a political association that exercises sovereign jurisdiction within
defined territorial borders’ (Heywood, 2002: 101). As mentioned above, we shall
examine four theories of the state. It will then be possible to evaluate the usefulness of
the application of traditional theories of the state in the context of South Korea,
suggesting that this exploration could further help to link this macro-level analysis to
meso-level frameworks of policy change which, in turn, could provide a theoretical
basis for policy analysis. It is here necessary to acknowledge that particular macro-
level theories of the state may be or less useful in specific time periods, and that
different macro-level theories suggest different questions.

Before looking more closely at theories of the state, it is imperative to clarify the term
‘public policy’. Houlihan notes that ‘an important initial problem in policy studies
concerns the ambiguity of the conception of policy’ (1997: 3). Many scientific terms
in the area of the social sciences are abstruse, and the term ‘public policy’ is no
exception. Hill, for example, suggests that ‘the attempts at definition imply that it is
hard to identify particular occasions when policy is made’ and that ‘it is difficult to
treat the definitional problems posed by the concept of policy as a very specific and
concrete phenomenon’ (1997a: 7). According to Heclo, ‘a policy may usefully be
considered as a course of action or inaction rather than specific decisions or actions’
(1972: 85), while Smith refers to policy as ‘bundles of government decisions based on
issues’ (quoted in Houlihan, 1997: 3). Clearly, the definition of public policy varies
more or less depending on scholars. In these circumstances, then, the following
definition of public policy from Jenkins helps us to clarify the abstruse concept of public policy:

A set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve (Jenkins, 1978: 15).

The above definition is fairly easy to understand in comparison with others and provides a clear perspective regarding public policy to use in this study.

2.2.1 Criteria for ‘usefulness’

Before examining the macro-level theories of the state, it is imperative to clarify the criteria for ‘usefulness’ of the theories that will be used. With regard to the key criteria for the macro-level theories of the state, Green set outs two questions: Firstly, ‘Is the macro-level approach one that provides sufficient internal logic and coherence?'; and secondly, ‘Does the macro-level approach account for the particular characteristics of the sport policy sector?’ (2003: 20).

In essence, without an objective and agreed standard, determining state characteristic in terms of the theories of the state is incomplete. The discussion thus needs objectivity when inferring state characteristic in relation to state theories. In this sense, criteria for ‘usefulness’ in applying the theories of the state to Korean society can be based on the following three considerations raised by Shin K (1987): (i) it must not be assumed that the political, economic and social contexts in South Korea can be perfectly analysed by using the theories of the state suited to the contexts of other countries; (ii) it is important when conducting an analysis not to over-emphasise a specific variable; and (iii) it is important to completely rule out the possibility of making an impetuous error by generalisation from another specific point in time and context when making efforts to deduce the state character of South Korea in connection with theories of the state.
2.2.2 Marxism

It should be noted at the outset that there are two major theories of Marxism: classic Marxism and neo-Marxism. Drawing from two Marxist theories, this section provides a brief overview of the position of traditional Marxist approaches to state theory (for a more detailed review see Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987; Hay, Lister & Marsh, 2006; Heywood, 2002). Marxists have indicated that the state cannot be understood without the consideration of the economic structure of society (Heywood, 2002). The central argument of Marxism is based on the complex and dynamic relationship between state, economy and society in capitalist democracies (cf. Hay, 2006: 59). Marx argued that ‘the state is part of a ‘superstructure’ that is determined or conditioned by the economic ‘base’, which can be seen as the real foundation of social life’ (Heywood, 2002: 91). In other words, the economic base determines the superstructure of a society including its political and ideological institutions (Strinati, 1995). Seen from this perspective, there is a class struggle between the ruling class as the owners of the means of production (the bourgeoisie) and the working-class (the proletariat) (cf. Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 203-270).

There are two theories of the state identified in Marx’s writings. Firstly, the state is ‘an instrument in the hands of the ruling class for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class structure itself’ (Sweezy, 1942: 243). Marx argued that ‘the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’ (quoted in Heywood, 2002: 91). Seen from this point of view, the state relies wholly upon its economically predominant class (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987) and the function of the state can be understood as the exercise of power by the ruling class, either directly by manipulating state policies or indirectly by putting pressure on the state (Gold et al., 1975). Another view of the state is premised on the argument that ‘the autonomy of the state is only relative, in that the state appears to mediate between conflicting classes, and so maintains the class system itself in existence’ (Heywood, 2002: 91). Within this position, ‘the state retains a degree of power independent of the dominant class’ (Held, 1996: 131). Form this overall perspective, Marx and Engels maintain that, in order to understand the state structure, a context of unequal class power is an essential factor. The state is a mirror of the
capitalist society by functioning either as an instrument of oppression exercised by the ruling class, or a mechanism which lessens the antagonism between class structures (Heywood, 2002). Within the classic Marxist position, the state as the economic substructure did not have particular significance over the state as an instrument of the dominant class for capitalist exploitation (Shin K, 1987). However, the role of the state has been gradually increasing since the beginning of the 20th century, and neo-Marxists have attempted to develop an argument which keeps pace with the times, by suggesting that the state retains authority as an instrument of the ruling class.

2.2.2.1 Neo-Marxism

Here, it is worth mentioning the neo-Marxist approach to the state. Looking at neo-Marxist perspectives by Lenin, Gramsci, Miliband & Poulantzas who supplement a critique of orthodox Marxist’s principles or aspects, can help us to understand the state in a modern context. The orthodox Marxist approach puts stress on the state as an instrumental apparatus, whereas the perspective of the neo-Marxist state-centred approach stresses ‘the relative autonomy of the state’ and ‘hegemony’. According to Gramsci, ‘the domination of the ruling class is achieved by ideological manipulation, rather than just open coercion’ (Heywood, 2002: 92). From the perspective of the domination of the bourgeoisie, ‘hegemony’ is a key factor. In other words, the ruling class has tried to take advantage of ‘hegemony’ as a useful means in exercising coercion over the ruled class and in acquiring legitimacy for its domination of the proletariat class (Lee K, 1994). Thus, Gramsci insisted that ‘a dominant class, in order to maintain its supremacy, must succeed in presenting its own moral, political and cultural values as societal norms’ (Hay, 2006: 69).

It is worth identifying the debate between two prominent neo-Marxists (Miliband and Poulantzas). Instrumentalism as described by Miliband sees the state as ‘a neutral instrument to be manipulated and steered in the interest of the dominant class or ruling elite’, suggesting that the ‘modern state serves the interest of the bourgeoisie in a capitalist society’ (Hay, 2006: 71). Within this perspective, the personnel of the state hold key influence over the state’s form and function in the determination of state policy. In other words, ‘interpersonal relations’ which have influence in determining
policy outcomes are crucial. In contrast to the instrumentalist view, structuralism, typified by Poulantzas, stresses ‘the causal priority of structures over agents’ (Hay, 2006: 72). From this perspective, political and socio-economic contexts determine the structural system of the capitalist state which would affect the intentions, values and beliefs of political actors or key members of the predominant class (Hay, 2006). Poulantzas’s view asserts that ‘the state enshrines class interests because its form reflects the outcome of past class struggles’ (Marsh, 2002a: 161). However, the distinction between ‘instrumentalism’ [agency-centred] and ‘structuralism’ [structure-centred] was criticised by Jessop (1990). He rejected the dualism of instrumentalism and structuralism, and embraced that the relationship between structure and agency is dialectical. As Jessop argued, ‘structures constrain and facilitate agents whose actions constitute and reconstitute the structures’ (1990:250).

2.2.2.2 Strengths and weaknesses

It is now commonly acknowledged that the power of Marxism as an analytical framework has become weaker. According to Marsh, ‘many would argue that Marxism is in decline, in large part because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the triumph of New Right ideology and contemporary changes in capitalism, and as such, it has nothing to offer to contemporary social science’ (2002b: 163). As there is an obvious relationship between Marxism and the Soviet Union (see, for example, Marsh, 2002a; Robinson, 1999), it would not be an overstatement to say that a series of political events in the process of social change, such as the reunification of Germany in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 have considerably weakened the degree of explanation of Marxism in addressing the influence and power structure of state.

Even though Marxism has reached something of a crisis and is out of date, it still has a great deal to offer the modern political scientist (Marsh, 2002a: 153). Hay (2006) maintains that it is still a useful theory and tool for providing insights into the exciting and complex relations between state, economy and society in capitalist democracies (cf. Cowling & Reynolds, 2002). Marxism provides a useful insight into explaining ‘the operation of contemporary capitalism’ (Marsh, 2002a:167). Particularly, its value
is acknowledged in sensitising analysts to power of economic interests when examining the growth of structured inequality (Marsh, 2002). Thus, Marxism may be useful for answering a question regarding the existence of class conflict within capitalist society. However, it could also be noted that neo-pluralism fulfils much the same function.

2.2.3 Elitism

Originally, the term ‘elite’ has been used to mean the best, the excellent and the noble (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 136). The elite is also defined as these persons who are in the dominant position in public and private bureaucratic organisations such as government, political parties, the military, trade unions and so on (Field & Higley, 1980). Mosca, as a representative classic elite theorist, described the history of politics in society in the following way:

In all societies…two classes of people appear – a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first (1939: 50).

Contrary to the pluralist view in which a policy is decided and implemented by the interaction among a variety of groups constituting society, elite theory holds that specific groups in the society have a powerful influence on policy decisions. In a similar vein, Heywood argued that ‘political power is always exercised by a privileged minority: an elite’ (2002: 79). According to Ryoo G (2007), political elites, as the dominant class, made up of groups having an official political authority and containing the most influential people, proceed to reign over the majority through violent means and the monopoly of economy or resources. Generally speaking, the term ‘elite’ in contemporary social science is used to mean functional or occupational groups who hold a high position, for whatever reason (Bottomore, 1964). Within this view, Evans observes that classical elite theory is premised on the four characteristics of political systems: (i) ‘the rulers of society constitute a socially cohesive group’; (ii) ‘the group is territorially based within a nation state’; (iii) ‘the ruling elite is ‘closed-
off’ from the ruled’; and (iv) ‘its members are selected by virtue of their economic, political or ideological resources’ (2006: 39).

Pareto divided elites into two psychological types, ‘Foxes and Lions’ in order to explore the feature of governing elite systems (cf. Evans, 2006; Heywood, 2002). The former tries to acquire consent to govern and prefer not to rule by using force, whereas the latter achieves domination through coercion and violence (Evans, 2006; Heywood, 2002). In addition, the notion of the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ quoted by Michels provides the essential concept to explain the nature of elite structures. For Michels, ‘elite circulation is maintained by the inability of the masses to mobilise against the leadership view’, stressing ‘the dominance of leadership over the rank and file membership’ (Evans, 2006: 42). From this perspective, elite groups and the rank and file members have a disparity in line with their social background, incomes, interests and capabilities (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987). Elite theorists, considering power as a catholic characteristic of human existence, argue that ‘most social relations are suffused with the exercise of power, even though many social conflicts and exchanges seem to be constructed on a different basis’ (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 149). Thus, elites seek to gain justification for their rule over the masses and also act preferentially in pursuit of their’ own values and interests.

### 2.2.3.1 Modern Elitism

The concept of ‘power elite’ came to set the tone for most of the modern elitist perspectives in the United States and Britain. The literature related to ‘power elite’ has been concerned with identifying how national elite structures are unified or diversified (Evans, 2006). Mills in *The Power Elite* (1956) provides a portrait of the U.S. government dominated by a nexus of elite groups within the executive (cf. Evans, 2006; Heywood, 2002). From this point of view, ‘the power elite comprises a triumvirate of big business (particularly defence-related industries), the US military, and political cliques surrounding the President, and draws on a combination of economic power, bureaucratic control, and access to the highest levels of decisions’ (Heywood, 2002: 79). Mills observes that there is a close nexus between economic elites and governmental elites –the ‘corporate rich’ and the ‘political directorate’
He used the term ‘power elite’ rather than ‘ruling class’, which is the term mainly used in Marxist ideology because he sought ways to differentiate his position from the Marxist view. In the British politics, Scott suggests that ‘there is a small minority, which holds a ruling position in its economy, society, and political system’ (1991: 1). Indeed, Scott classified the two central types of power elite as ‘exclusive’ and ‘inclusive’: ‘The former exists, where the power bloc is drawn from a restricted and highly uniform social background and so is able to achieve a high level of solidarity’; ‘the latter exists where a solidaristic power bloc is not dominated by any particular class’ (1991: 119). In addition, within modern elitism there are two key models to account for the structure of the elite; ‘the power-elite model’ and ‘competitive elite model’. The former views the elite as a cohesive group, whereas the latter emphasises the importance of elite rivalry (Heywood, 2002). In other words, the power-elite group is closely united by ‘common or overlapping interests’ whereas the elite within the competitive elite model, ‘consisting of leading persons from a number of competing groups and interests, is fractured’ (Heywood, 2002: 80).

2.2.3.2 Strengths and weaknesses

Empirical study to reveal the substance of power has been succeeded by lively controversies between pluralists and elite theorists. The controversies show that elitism is not free from criticism, as is case with other state theories. According to Evans (2006), elite theory does not provide sufficient evidence to develop a broader understanding of the relationship between the state and society or elite groups because it tends to be focused on the features and role of dominant elites in the decision-making process. Typically, criticisms began from the pluralist views of Bachrach & Baratz (1962) in that these authors contended that power is not fully explained by an authoritative group and their behaviour (Ryoo G, 2007). More specifically, Michels presented the argument that ‘Western European political parties were characterised by elite domination, but, according to Evans, his fondness for selecting convenient empirical evidence to support his arguments leaves him vulnerable to counter critique’ (Evans, 2006: 43). Moreover, the pluralist critique of elitism is based on the view that elite groups are not cohesive enough to act cooperatively and are distinct (cf. Dahl, 1961a; Polsby, 1963). In other words, elites tend to be fragmented rather than
integrated as they are concerned with relatively private rather than public interests and their field of influence is restricted to narrow issues related to their membership (Evans, 2006).

Nonetheless, elitism still plays a key role in accounting for the substance of power in the world of political science on the ground that ‘both the ownership and control of wealth and the monopoly of political power still reside in the hands of the few’ (Evans, 2006: 57). Take the example in the United States:

In 1976 the wealthiest 1 per cent of Americans owned 19 per cent of all the private material wealth in the United States. By 1995 they owned 40 per cent of the wealth and their share is greater than that owned by the bottom 92 per cent of the population combined (Wolff, 1996: 78-96).

2.2.4 Pluralism

It is acknowledged that there are a number of different views of pluralism. However, this section giving a review of pluralism does not consider all interpretations and perspectives but aims to examine classic/conventional pluralism and neo-pluralism. The pluralist perspective appeared on the international political scene in the mid 20th century in the USA and is defined as ‘the diffusion of power amongst a number of competing bodies or groups, being based on liberal ideas and values (Heywood, 2000: 129). All predominant pluralist notions are focused on ‘diversity’ which is deemed to be a social good preventing the dominance of one particular interest (Smith, 2006). More specifically, the pluralist perspective assumes that firstly, society consists of a variety of groups; secondly, society is not dominated by an individual or a minority elite, but is made up of competitive groups whose political status can change over time; and thirdly, political authority amongst societal members is obtained through an open and competitive political process (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987; Held, 1996; Smith, 2006). As Smith maintains, ‘power should be dispersed and not allowed to accumulate in the state’ (2006: 22). Indeed, the role of the state is as a neutral body which mediates between the competing interests of society (cf. Dunleavy & O’Leary,
1987; Held, 1996; Heywood, 2002). With regard to the policy process, Dahl provides the key elements of its position:

Important government policies would be arrived at through negotiation, bargaining, persuasion and pressure at a considerable number of different sites in the political system – the White House, the bureaucracies …the federal and state courts, the executives, the local governments. No single organised political interest, party, class, region or ethnic groups would control all of these sites (1963: 325).

According to Ryoo G (2007), a policy established in pluralistic societies has the following three characteristics: firstly, the policy is gradually accomplished by compromise, negotiation and agreement between a variety of groups; secondly, the role of a diversity of interest groups, political parties and parliaments (congress) is considered to be crucial in the process of policy decision and execution; and thirdly, a policy is the way in which the government, in a neutral position, disentangles and regulates conflicts caused in the process of the pursuit of interests. Within the classic pluralist view, the key conclusion drawn by Dahl in his 1961 empirical study in New Haven, Connecticut, USA, set up in order to explain the distribution of power, is that while the privileged and economically powerful group exercised stronger power than ordinary citizens, no political party nor the permanent ruling group was able to dominate policy and political processes. In short, power is dispersed across the society.

As Green points out, this view of power distribution can be connected with ‘the meso-level policy networks approach and advocacy coalition framework, which are concerned with exploring interrelationships between groups and society’ (2003: 11). The important point here is that groups hold a centred position in the pluralism (Nicholls, 1975). In this sense, the relationship between the state and government and groups can be linked with the theme of macro- and meso-levels of analysis (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992).
2.2.4.1 Neo-pluralism

The modern pluralists urged that the classic pluralist perspective should be revised or updated, due to a number of political and social crises in the late 1960s. Contrary to the classic pluralistic view, the neo-pluralistic perspective holds that ‘interest groups cannot be treated as necessarily equal, and the state cannot be regarded as a neutral arbiter among all interests: the business corporation wields disproportionate influence over the state’ (Held, 1996: 216). Within this position, the neo-pluralists acknowledge that big businesses hold a ‘privileged position’. More specifically, business interests are far better positioned than other groups to win an advantage over the consumer and the market (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987; Heywood, 2002; Lindblom, 1977). From the neo-pluralist perspective, politicians and state officials, who also constitute a powerful interest group, are not only concerned with satisfying the demands of groups in democratic civil society, but are also seeking to protect and further their own interests (Held, 1996). Modern pluralists acknowledge the existence of elites in civil society, who influence important political decisions. This is elite-pluralism; so called because there is a convergence between neo-pluralism and elitism (cf. Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987; Park Y, 1985, for more information regarding the convergence between theories of the state, in particular the section entitled, ‘Usefulness of application of the theories of the state in South Korea’). Thus, within the perspectives of neo-pluralism and elitism, national policy is considered as a means of maximising the interests of a minority of elite bureaucrats and key groups who exercise power in the policy process (Ryoo G, 2007). In short, as noted by Held, a key aspect of neo-pluralism is that ‘while power is contested by numerous groups within elite pluralist system’ (1996: 218), power remains contested but between far fewer groups such as key government officials, politicians and business elites.

2.2.4.2 Strengths and weaknesses

During the 1960s and 1970s both an empirical and academic critique were applied to pluralism. It was argued that the civil rights movements, like the anti-Vietnam war campaign, indicated that ‘a group with a forceful grievance was excluded from the political protest’ (Smith, 2006: 27). In other words, the experience of the civil rights
movements was seen as indicating the collapse of ‘agreement’ and ‘consensus’ within the political system in the USA prompting criticism regarding the value of pluralism. As a result of this critique, neo-pluralism emerged to explain the limits of classical pluralism and disclosed the hidden process of manipulation, exclusion and elite dominance behind the scenes of a functioning democracy (Smith, 2006). However, despite empirical and theoretical critiques of pluralism, it still remains a dominant perspective for understanding the relationship between the state and society. According to Smith, ‘Pluralism’s strength derives from its normative appeal and the fact that much of it accords with our intuitive sense of liberal democracy: who would oppose diversity, the protection of groups’ rights and the distribution of power?’ (2006: 31).

With regard to the policy process, in terms of utility for this study, neo-pluralism has the following three notable features, as Green (2003: 14) notes in his theorising of the policy process: firstly, an acknowledgement of ‘the active participation of the state in the policy process’; secondly, ‘an emphasis on groups and multiple interests’; and thirdly, a recognition of ‘the significance of business interests’ (cf. Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 271-318; Held, 1996: 216-218). Thus, the neo-pluralist position can provide a useful link to meso-level frameworks when exploring the relationship between government and a number of groups (especially, business groups).

2.2.5 Corporatism

Corporatism emerged as an alternative paradigm to pluralism in the Western Europe and North America during the mid 1970s, to contest the pluralistic political view regarding interest group politics. According to Cawson (1986), in general, corporatist theory has been identified as having three principal approaches: i) a new system of political economy (cf. Winkler, 1976); ii) a novel form of state (cf. Jessop, 1990); and iii) a system of interest intermediation (cf. Schmitter, 1974). Much corporatist literature focuses on the third model in that corporatist theorists highlight the centralised power of organised interest groups (cf. Held, 1996; Smith, 1993). Thus, by reviewing the third model, we attempt to find the universal perspectives of
corporatism, suggesting that it will be able to look at the relationship between interest
groups and government in industrialised societies.

In general, corporatism is viewed as the model to explain the political characteristics
of interest groups in the process of economic development in developing countries,
and is also deemed to be a means of solving the problem of economic stagnation and
improving social unity in advanced capitalist countries (Kim S, 1996), given that it is
a useful model to explain the relationship between the state and interest groups.
Indeed, corporatism perhaps functions as an alternative theory to pluralism and
maintains a complementary relation to pluralism, arguing that pluralism has a limited
ability to explain the situation in third world countries such as those of Africa, Asia,
and East era Europe. In contrast to the aspect of pluralism, Schmitter defined the ideal
type of corporatism as:

a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a
limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and
functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state
and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories, in
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of

Held recognises corporatist arrangements as ‘tripartite’ relations between
organisations of employers, labour and the state (1996: 227). From this corporatist
perspective, tripartite factors such as government, business and trade unions within
the system of interest representation are crucial. In order words, social and political
structure binds government to business and organised labour (Heywood 2002) so that
labour unions and employer associations are intimately connected to the state, with
the result that those associations are considered as governing institutions which share
state power (Middlemas, 1979). In a similar vein, corporatist arrangements are
regarded as political strategies for making sure of the support of trade unions,
business associations and their respective constituencies (Held, 1996). Heywood
meanwhile states that ‘corporatism is social theory that emphasises the privileged
position that certain groups enjoy in relation to government, enabling them to
influence the formation and implementation of public policy’ (2002: 275).
In addition, Schmitter (1974) divided the corporatist system into societal corporatism and state corporatism. Societal corporatism, also known as liberal corporatism or neo-corporatism, ‘refers to the tendency found in mature liberal democracies for organised interests to be granted privilege and institutional access to policy formulation’ (Heywood, 2002: 275). State corporatism (authoritarian corporatism) on the other hand is ‘an ideology or economic form closely associated with Italian Fascism which was characterised by the political intimidation of industry and the destruction of independent trade unions’ (Heywood, 2002: 275). It has been argued that societal corporatism lays weight on cooperative relations between interest groups and the state, enabling them to maintain autonomy (Lee G, 1990). From the perspective of societal corporatism, as the state relies on interest groups, collaborative class relations are shaped by mutual agreement and participation by the interest groups on the basis of a democratic system (Schmitter, 1974). On the other hand, state corporatism is a system of interest representation created by force in order to consolidate the sovereignty of the state (Lee G, 1990). In contrast to societal corporatism, with state corporatism the state keeps more intensive control over mass and labour sectors in order to maintain social stability (Schmitter, 1974). Thus, McNamara insists that state corporatism is more appropriate to the Korean context, because the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime related to state corporatism ‘draws attention to statist controls on labour unrest’ (1999: 19). Thus, it is relevant to the political phenomena in the Newly Industrialising Countries or developing countries unlike those of Western Europe, where state corporatism has arisen from the process of industrialisation (Ryoo G, 2007). From this perspective, a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime is supported by an enforced national consensus and defined by better integrated industrialisation (McNamara, 1999: 12). In this regard, state corporatism theory functions as a linking model between a bureaucratic-authoritarian state and the organised interests of civil society (O’Donnel, 1979). State corporatism could therefore provide a ground assumption to account for the state suppression of opposing interest groups.

2.2.5.1 Strengths and weaknesses

Many pluralists hold that corporatism has its limitation in accounting for the pattern and activity of sub-groups because it focuses too narrowly on the relationship between
‘peak association’ and capital and labour interests as objects of study (Lee G, 1990). It is therefore hard to explore activities of sub-national governments and the relationship between the state and specific interest groups, since the sphere of study sets bounds to the relation between central government, business and labour in the economic policy process (Kim S, 1996). Heywood notes that ‘where attempts have been made to shift economic policy from state intervention and towards the free market (as in the UK since 1979), the impact of corporatism has markedly diminished’ (2002: 81). Also, with regard to the limitations of the macro-level approach, Held observes that broad corporatist arrangements have taken hold in only a few countries, notably Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden. Elsewhere, many of the conditions remain unmet and in some countries like Britain very few have been met and then only for the shortest time (1996: 231).

However, McNamara observes that corporatism may provide a useful framework in delivering ‘organisational patterns and ideas in such a way that a more contextualised causal analysis is possible’ (1999: 14). In addition, McNamara highlights the key strength of this corporatist theory:

The corporatist concept has shed light on ties between both capital and the state, and labour and the state. The studies reveal the potential of a well-defined and adapted concept for penetrating the complexity of interest exchange among groups in various stages of interest consolidation and mobilisation (1999: 18).

In this sense, this corporatist approach might be applied to account for the relationship between central government, business groups and labour unions in the process of economic development during Korea’s rapid industrialisation.

Having reviewed how state power and group power, as products of activity between the state and a number of groups, are formed and exercised by looking at the four traditional theories of the state. It is worth noting that the core of this discussion rests on admitting diverse perspectives regarding state power or the relation between the state and groups rather than discriminating between right and wrong theories of the state. Thus, it is now appropriate to draw together the four key strands of the theories of the state to determine their usefulness in the context of South Korea.
2.2.6 Usefulness of the theories of the state in the context of South Korea

Before looking at the usefulness of the four state theories to analysis of South Korea, it is imperative to identify overlaps between the theories of the state. According to Dunleavy & O’Leary (1987), in explaining the state/civil society relations, none of the state theories is entirely cut off from other perspectives. In other words, with all the four theories of the state there is a degree of overlap and, in some cases, convergence.

For example, both Marxist theory and elite theory argue that ‘state policy is tightly controlled by capital owners so as to foster business profitability’ (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 323). In this sense, in a capitalist society owners of capital exercise their authority over the state policy making process. Furthermore, the convergence between elitism and neo-pluralism highlights the importance of the group (especially business) at a sub-national level in determining public policies (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 324). The value of the corporatist perspective in relation to elitist theory lies in the importance of business - government relations at the meso-level (or sectoral-level) (Smith, 1993). To put it simply, the close relationships between government and peak organisations such as trade unions and big business play a key role in the policy making process. The overlap between corporatism and elitism means that the general public is excluded from the policy making process. It is therefore more appropriate to comprehensively consider the four theories in relation to Korean society rather than to treat them separately.

It is appropriate to explore the application of the four approaches to Korean society since 1960s when the state began to increase its political power over, and intervene in, social, political and economic systems. According to many Korean political scientists, pluralism and elitism, as society-centred perspectives, have been the mainstream theories for defining the state’s character, whereas corporatism and Marxism have been non-mainstream theories. But even so, corporatist and Marxist accounts of societal relations have not been disregarded in Korea. Military regimes established by a military coup held power from the 1960s till the late 1980s suppressing the interests of the popular sector such as labourers, the urban poor and the peasantry, and maintaining close relations with only a few capitalist concerns like the Chaebols or large enterprises, by protecting their business interests (Chung M, 1992). This view
can be related to Dunleavy & O’Leary’s (1987) notion that the state is dependent completely on its economically dominant class. In addition, at that time the state leaned towards the interests of the capitalist class namely the Chaebols or conglomerates, which supports Miliband’s (1977) view that, the state is not a neutral apparatus, but an instrument for a dominant class. In support of Miliband’s view, a good example of the close relationship between business and the state occurred in the 1970s and 1980s when the state colluded with, and relied on, a small minority of Chaebols such as Samsung, Hyundai and Daewoo under monopoly capitalism in order to achieve rapid economic growth (Kang Y, 1995).

In addition, according to Marxist accounts, there is class struggle in all class-divided societies and when these conflicts reach a crisis point, existing dominant groups always fight to maintain the anachronistic form of social organisation. This can be seen in Korean society. For instance, a number of struggles for higher wages and better working conditions were suppressed by the state’s excessive use of physical force carried out by the police in order to guarantee the interests of the capitalist class, with the result that the state had a tendency to become a more repressive apparatus. Accordingly, from the early 1960s till the end of the 1980s, strong authoritarian regimes were formed for the exclusion and oppression of the grass-roots sectors and thus the state acted as a guarantor for the ruling class (Lee J, 1989). As Green has argued ‘Marxist explanations might have better enabled an analysis of societal relations in the earlier part of the 20th century when class relations were deeply embedded and divided’ (2003: 26), however, it is arguable that it is of less value for illuminating class structure since the late 20th century. Indeed, social and political changes in South Korea with the coming of civilian government in the period after 1993, have dramatically re-shaped the old class relations of the 1960s-1980s. As a consequence, the relations between the state and dominant classes, such as capitalist groups, have somewhat weakened, but the autonomy of the state has not been increased in policy making and policy decisions. This view is connected with the neo-pluralist perspective as mentioned above in the review of Marxism. In this regard, the appropriateness of a Marxist view of the present situation in South Korea has declined in favour of other macro-level theories of the state.
With regard to corporatism, the following comments show the possibility of applying corporatist analysis to South Korean society:

Dramatic changes in Korea’s industrial model from the late 1960s fostered bureaucratic-authoritarian forms of organisation, just as recent challenges of industrial adjustment prompt cooperation in policy formation and implementation, often resulting in a corporatist pattern of structured change (quoted in McNamara, 1999: 11).

In the 1960s, the state adopted a growth-oriented economic policy. The role of the state in engineering the alliance between politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats and foreign capital provided a fertile environment for the development of a corporatist system (Im H, 1991) McNamara observes (1998) that South Korea where there is a weak civil society institutions and an economic growth-oriented policy based on the concentration of business interests provides fertile ground for the development of corporatism. The following example is enlightening:

Attention to the segmentary rather than synthetic or unitary nature of corporatist policy appears particularly relevant to the Korean case with such dramatic differences in power between the organised interests of capital in the Chaebol, and the interests of farmers, industrial labour, and other groups (McNamara, 1999: 18).

Lee G (1990) draws attention to the role of the state in authoritatively controlling the interests of the ruled class to minimise its resistance, and on the other hand, to some degree accepted the relative autonomy of institutionalized interest groups such as the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). The former context can be seen as exclusionary corporatism and the latter can be seen as inclusionary corporatism within state corporatist structure (cf. Cawson, 1986; O’Donnell, 1979). Therefore, in relation to both corporatist and Marxist explanations, the political and economic context in South Korea during the 1960s-1980s can be seen as bringing about the following societal character:
Since many of the 386 generation\(^1\) campaigned for the rights of labourers and the socially marginalized, widely ignored during Korea’s rapid industrialization, they are still sympathetic towards labour unions and hostile to business, especially the nation’s powerful family-controlled conglomerates, or Chaebol (The Korea Herald, 11.03.2006).

Thus, as mentioned above, the corporatist perspective can be useful to explain tripartite relations between organisations of employers, labour and the state in the third world countries including Korea. In addition, viewed in the light of the exclusion of the ruled class from the state in policy-making and implementation, Marxism and corporatism reflect an overlapping explanation with which to explore the relationships between the state, the dominant class and the ruled class in capitalist countries.

Until the late 1980s, the oppressive social atmosphere under the military regimes isolated the public from politics and ignited aspirations towards democracy through a number of the anti-military regime demonstrations. However, with the advent of civilian government in 1993, Korean society experienced a variety of radical political reforms. For instance, the Kim Young-Sam administration disbanded Hanahoe\(^2\) to prevent a repetition of the military coup by transferring members to the first reserve (discharging members from military service). Indeed, unlike the authoritarian era controlled by military governments, the emergence of civilian government in 1993 gave rise to new political and social changes which witnessed the birth of a variety of civic groups that have had an effect on the policy-making process. The involvement and influence of civic groups in the policy-making process has been gradually increasing since 1993. In addition, the emergence and boom of the internet in the late 1990s has enabled Korean society to embrace diversity. Indeed, a variety of interest groups based on diversity have been voicing their interests and concerns over a wide range of issues related to public matters. As a result, it could be argued that governments in the last two decades have had a lower degree of autonomy in the policy-making process than during the military regimes. In this sense, it appears that Korean society has been gradually, but increasingly pluralised indicating that power

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\(^1\) The 386 generation refers to those who were in their thirties when the term was coined, attended college in the 1980s and were born in the 1960s (Korea Herald, 14.01.2004).

\(^2\) Hanahoe, which was organised mostly by graduates of the eleventh class of the Korean Military Academy established in 1963, was a group of military officers and the core of the military clique. The group created the Fifth Republic by seizing political power through its coup in 1979 and exercised great influence on political circles throughout the 1980s.
in the decision-making process is contested and distributed across government and interest groups. In relation to the applicability of pluralist theory to South Korea, one supportive example is related to the national sports promotion funds\(^3\) and the government’s attempt to incorporate the national sports promotion funds into public funds in the aftermath of the IMF crisis. In 2001, *The Coalition of Korean Sports Group*, organised by 27 sport-related bodies, handed a strongly worded resolution to the political parties opposing the passing of the bill to incorporate the national sports promotion funds into public funds. The bill from the National Assembly was subsequently withdrawn. A further support for pluralist position comes from the *Resource Centre for Asian NGOs* (2007) which reported that there are around 25,000 NGOs in Korea, and that they play an important part in national policy-making. Powerful bureaucrats and politicians are increasingly conscious of civil society groups supporting the view that power could be distributed between government, pressure groups and interest groups across society, as the pluralist perspective suggests. For these reasons, it is generally taken for granted that the pluralist view might be receiving momentum in South Korea.

However, a possibly strong argument could be made that, in Korean society, power is concentrated in the hands of particular groups. Elites, as a dominant group, have played a key role in the running of Korean society since the 1960s. As is generally known, in the 1970s and 1980s military elites and politicians exclusively dominated power over a wide range of political issues and matters, and in the 1990s and even in recent years politicians, key government officials and business elites have a powerful influence on a wide range of policy issues. Such elite groups in South Korea have taken advantage of networks such as *Hakyun* (same school ties), *Jiyun* (same hometown ties) and *Hyeulyun* (blood ties) which has been regarded as one of the unique social and cultural traits of Korean society and have helped them to hold on to their status and interests. Indeed, societal features of regionalism, kinship and same school ties are still rampant. This peculiar characteristic of Korean society is captured by Rhyu, Si-min, the former Minister of Health and Welfare, in the following interview on Seoul Broadcasting System’s (SBS) special TV program (show: title of the fourth episode – ‘Success in life and hurrah: I am Korean’), who stated that:

\(^3\) The national sports promotion funds were raised by the surplus of ‘88 Seoul Olympics and private funds without the involvement of the national treasury
For instance, those who have high status positions in society have links to prestigious high schools and universities and tend to offer directorship of big businesses or organisations to each other. These posts are as an advisor for major corporations or organisations in name only although they receive much financial benefit (e.g. roughly tens of millions of won a year). As such, the mainstream faction (leaders/groups) has lived and helped with each other (quoted in the program, 24 January 2010)

Joogang Iibo (2005) observed that linking networks between elitists (as mentioned above - Hakyun, Jiyun and Hyeulyun) has reinforced the domination of elite groups in South Korea and been a key factor in understanding Korean society. Even if Korean society is more pluralised in relation to aspects of social, political and cultural life, it still displays typical characteristics of elite dominance. In particular, the Chaebol still exercises it’s a powerful influence over the sphere of politics beneath the surface in order to prevent the rise of unfavourable political issues. In this regard, as the neo-pluralist approach argues that business holds a ‘privileged position’ (cf. Lindblom, 1977), neo-pluralism and elitism can offer overlapping perspectives for exploring the state’s character.

Taken together, even though Marxist and corporatist explanations are becoming weak, both perspectives still need to be considered when reflecting on the relationship between the state and groups. However, elitist and pluralist perspectives, including the convergence between elitism and neo-pluralism mentioned above, need to be placed at the centre of the macro-level analysis in the light of general political history of Korea. Having made these brief points, it is now appropriate to address a brief discussion of nationalism and globalisation as supplementary theoretical notions because the development of Korean elite sport has been directly and indirectly embedded in a nationalist ideology and global influence.

2.2.7 Nationalism

The relationship between sport and nationalism is arguably one of the most intensely studied debates in the modern era (Bairner, 2001). It would not be an overstatement to say that, historically, sport is an arena in which nationalism has been developed and
fostered. Sport has been a useful way of aiding states’ political, social, economical purposes in many countries. In relation to this, Houlihan observes that ‘sport can and has been used to achieve a number of differing political purposes including the manipulation of the international image of the state, as a means of establishing leadership within the international community, or acting as an agent of socialisation within a state’ (1994: 13). As Hoberman (1993) notes, sporting nationalism must be involved in varying national contexts in which it appears. Indeed, social and political confusions/changes such as the First/Second World War, the Cold War era, the colonial/post-colonial era and globalisation throughout the world in the 20th century evoked the rise of nationalism which intermingled with sport for a variety of purposes, including enhancing national identity, securing domestic political legitimacy and pursuing international rivalries by peaceful means (cf. Hargreaves, 1986). In this sense, it is important to consider contemporary discourses on nationalism within which sport and national identities interplay (Bairner, 2001).

Since the early of 20th century ideological conflicts throughout the world have given rise to an incentive mechanism in utilising sport as a political tool. As a consequence, many countries have been paying attention to sport, especially elite sport. Indeed, the emergence and development of the modern Olympics and international sporting competitions have been important in binding sport and nationalism so that many countries invest government money in developing elite sport performance. This raises the following issues: why do governments invest in elite sport?; why do governments seek an Olympic gold medals; and how much is an Olympic gold medal worth? The following example provides a useful evidence of answering these questions:

Perhaps the most dramatic use of sport as a contribution to developing, a sense of national identity occurred in the communist states of Eastern Europe. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet Union, in particular, systematically used to sport to develop a form of socialist nationalism. For the GDR the objective was not only to foster a sense of national identity distinct from West Germany, but also to eradicate lingering association between sport and Nazism (Houlihan, 1994: 19). …the invest in sport in the GDR, Cuba and the Soviet Union was partly justified in terms of demonstrating the superiority of the socialist way of life (Houlihan, 1994: 184).
This characteristic of sport blending with nationalism is distinctly witnessed in the contexts of South Korea. A compelling example of the intermingling of sport with nationalism is that the attitude of government and mass media were obviously mirrored in antagonism in sporting competitions against North Korea and Japan. Indeed, until the mid 1990s football matches between South Korea and Japan were consistent with George Orwell’s description of sport on the ‘war minus the shooting’ due to anti-Japan sentiments (for detail social and political contexts in relation to this, see the chapter 4). As Amara & Henry observe, ‘the newly independent countries have used international sporting events, and particularly the media coverage that such events can attract, as a space to express their regional political and ideological concerns’ (2007: 172). South Korea has not been exempt from growing nationalism and concern with national identity development through sport. As Maguire (1999) notes, particular sports play important roles in embodying all the qualities of national image and character. This can be illustrated by the following example in England:

In the habitus of male upper-class Englishness, cricket embodies the qualities of fair play, valour, graceful conduct on and off the pitch and steadfastness in the face of adversity’….the cricket is seen to represent what ‘England’ is and gives meaning to the identity of being ‘English’ (Maguire, 1999: 178).

As such, sport was seen as a potential contributor to reinforcing national identity and nationalism to demonstrate the superiority of a state’s political and social system. The process of globalisation accelerated since 1990s has influenced all domains of society including sport. Indeed, in 1990s the collapse of the communist bloc and the fading of Cold War ideological tension and the development of a global economic system affected the relationship between South- and North Korea and Japan. In relation to global influence of the sport sector, a prime example of change is well reflected in sports exchanges between South Korea and North Korea. The starting point for sports exchanges was the football events for the reunification of South and North Korea with ‘National Reconciliation’ as the slogan in 1990. Another good instance of the flow of change is displayed in the Korea media coverage which started to avoid more extreme nationalist expressions in reporting matches against Japan. As Maguire notes, ‘attention is paid to the question of whether national cultures and identities are being weakened, strengthened or pluralised by globalisation process (1999: 180).
2.2.8 Globalisation

The concept of globalisation reflects an extending of social, political and economic activities across borders so that the greater part of social life and human activities in one region of the world can have significant consequence for individuals and communities in distant regions of the globe (Held et al., 1999). It is widely acknowledged that contemporary social life is being influenced by global process in which the world is being intermingled into a shared social dimension by political, economic, cultural and technological forces (Held et al., 1999; cf Tan, 2008). In this sense, in contemporary society frontiers between countries are less significant. The following concept of globalisation from Steger helps us to capture the universal notion of globalisation:

Globalisation refers to a multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social interdependence and exchanges while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the local and the distant (Steger, 2003: 8).

A discussion of globalisation might helpful in doing research in the area of policy change or policy decision-making as human affairs can be affected by globalisation. In particular, the national/domestic policy decisions can be directly and/or indirectly be influenced by the force of global governance in the state of international affairs. Thus understanding the notion of globalisation might be useful for taking account of exogenous factors in understanding and explaining the influence of international conditions on, and the degree of homogeneity in, elite sport policy. According to Held et al (1999) and Held & McGrew (2002), there are three distinctive schools of thought in relation to globalisation: the hyperglobalizers, the sceptics, and the transformationalists.

2.2.8.1 Hyperglobalists

Central to the concept of globalisation for the hyperglobalists is that the phenomenon is primarily economic (Amin, 1996; Callinicos, 1994, 1997). For the hyperglobalists,
through the emergence of a single global market, contemporary globalisation defines a new epoch in which human life is highly subject to the discipline of the global market (Ohmae, 1990, 1995). Hyperglobalizers contend that globalisation as an economic phenomenon creating ‘denationalization of economies’ through the foundation of transnational networks of production, trade and finance (Held et al., 1999). In this ‘borderless’ economy, national governments are nothing more than ‘transmission belts for global capital, or simple intermediate institutions sandwiched between increasingly powerful local, regional and global mechanisms of governance’ (Held et al., 1999: 3). The impersonal forces of the world market are therefore regarded to be much more powerful than the authority of the nation-state (Strange, 1996; Reich, 1991). In this regard, hyperglobalizers share a notion that economic globalisation is creating new forms of social organisation that are replacing, or that will eventually replace, traditional nation-states as the principal economic and political units of world society (Held et al., 1999). For the neo-Marxists, the economic globalisation process is understood as the extension of monopoly capitalist imperialism or a new form of globalised capitalism. In this regard, neo-Marxists claim that structural patterns of inequality within and between states are created and strengthened by global capitalism. Furthermore, from the hyperglobalist perspective, the emergence of institutions of worldwide governance, and the global diffusion and hybridization of cultures are regarded as proof of a new global order which indicates the end of the nation-state (Luard, 1990; Ohmae, 1995; Albrow, 1996).

2.2.8.2 Sceptics

The sceptics view globalisation as a perfectly integrated worldwide economy in which predominant national economies interact (Hirst & Thompson, 1998). In other words, what is called ‘globalisation’ today is a phenomenon of internationalisation of economic activity among advanced countries (Hirst & Thompson, 1998; Vogel, 1996; Weiss, 1998) The sceptics argue that the extent of contemporary globalisation is entirely hyperbolised (Hirst, 1997). Sceptics such as Ruigrok and Tulder, and Thompson and Allen, criticised the ‘myth’ of the global corporation, arguing that foreign investment flows have converged into developed capitalist states, particularly three major regional blocks – Europe, Asia-Pacific and North America (Ruigrok &
Tulder, 1995; Thompson & Allen, 1997), with the consequence that most global economic activity is dominated by the three major regional blocs. In this sense, the sceptical position shares a conviction that the world economy forms the profoundly rooted pattern of inequality and hierarchy (Held et al., 1999). So the sceptics have a tendency to consider global governance and economic internationalisation as mainly Western projects, the main goal of which is to maintain the superiority of the West in world affairs (Held et al., 1999). Furthermore, they refuse the fashionable myth that the authority of national government or state sovereignty is being eroded by economic internationalisation or global governance (Krasner, 1993, 1995). On the other hand, Hirst & Thompson argue that the power of national governments is heightened in the global economy because ‘the state as a source of constitutional ordering, limiting its own and others’ powers, and guiding action through rights and rules, is central to the rule of law’ (1998: 192). Although what national governments can do may be constrained by international economic conditions, national governments are by no means restricted (Held et al., 1999). Thus, as Weiss argues, ‘the internationalisation of capital may not merely restrict policy choices, but expand them as well’ (1998: 184).

### 2.2.8.3 Transformationalists

At the core of the transformationalist account is a belief that globalisation is conceived of as a central driving force behind the rapid economic, political and social changes that are transforming modern societies and global order (Giddens, 1990, 1996; Rosenau, 1997). For the transformationalists, contemporary processes of globalisation are regarded as historically unprecedented such that states and societies across the world seek to adapt to a world in which there is a blurred distinction between international and domestic, external and internal affairs (Rosenau, 1990). From the transformationalist’s perspective, globalisation is regarded as a powerful transformative force that enables states and societies across the world to experience changes in many aspects of human life (Giddens, 1996). As Nierop argues, ‘virtually all countries in the world, if not all parts of their territory and all segments of their society, are now functionally part of that larger global system in one or more respects’ (1994: 171). In this regard, contemporary globalisation is a new pattern in which states, societies and communities are becoming increasingly intermingled. In this
pattern of globalisation, as Castells (1996) and Ruggie (1996) argue, national economies are reshaped by processes of economic globalisation. Furthermore, central to the new pattern of globalisation for the transformationists is a conviction that ‘contemporary globalisation is reconstituting or ‘re-engineering’ the power, functions and authority of national governments’ (Held et al., 1999: 8). Although it is not disputed that ‘states still hold the ultimate legitimate claim to effective supremacy over what occurs within their own territories’, the transformationists contend that the jurisdiction of institutions of international governance derived from international law will, to a certain extent, be expanded (Held et al., 1999: 8).

This is evident in the international organisations such as European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In relation to the governance of global sport, this is also evident in the governance of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and international federations such as the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). In relation to sport (as well as other policy areas), nation-states are no longer the single centres or the principal forms of governance or authority in the world (Rosenau, 1997). Accordingly, considering the changing global order, national governments are likely to seek coherent strategies of engaging with a global world (Held et al., 1999). Moreover, governments try to pursue cooperative strategies and to build international regulatory regimes to handle more effectively the growing and emerging array of global issues (Held et al., 1999). Therefore, the authority and power of national governments is not inevitably decreased by globalisation but is being reconstituted and restructured in conformity with the growing complexity of processes of global order and governance in a more interlinked world circumstance (Rosenau, 1997). The three conceptualisations of globalisation are summarised in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Conceptualising globalisation: three tendencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hyperglobalists</th>
<th>Sceptics</th>
<th>Transformationalists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What’s new?</td>
<td>A global age</td>
<td>Trading blocs, weaker geogovernance than in earlier periods</td>
<td>Historically unprecedented levels of global interconnectedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant features</td>
<td>Global capitalism, global governance, global civil society</td>
<td>World less interdependent than in 1980s</td>
<td>‘Thick’ (intensive and extensive globalisation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2.2.8.4 Implications of globalisation for this study

There is considerable debate regarding the driving force of globalisation, and whether there is a single dominant driving force such as capitalism or technological change or whether it is the product of a combination of factors, including technological change, market forces, political decisions and cultural flows (Held et al., 1999). For this study a multi-causal perspective of globalisation rather than monocausal perspective of globalisation will be adopted as a supplementary theory at the macro-level. At the heart of a more comprehensive explanation of globalisation is the compound intersection between a multiplicity of driving forces, encompassing economic, political, cultural and technological changes (Albrow, 1996; Giddens, 1990; Rosenau, 1990, 1997). In this regard, this comprehensive perspective of globalisation might be more closed to the concept of the transformationalists than to those of the hyperglobalists and sceptics which emphasise the mechanism of economic activity. Held et al argue that ‘globalisation can be taken to refer to those spatio-temporal process of change which underpin a transformation in the organisation of human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents’ (1999: 15). Globalisation thus represents transnational interconnectedness, extending reach of networks of social activity and power, and the possibility of action from the transcendence of spatio-temporal boundaries (Held et al., 1999). Accordingly, policy makers’ actions and choices would be constrained or facilitated,
to a greater or lesser degree, by contemporary global conditions (Keohane & Nye, 1977). With regard to the sports realm, a good example of global influence is the significance of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) on domestic Olympic Committees and on governments where the governance of IOC fundamentally affects (or constrain) the preferences and choices of decision-makers. In addition, it is argued that globalisation has increased the degree of homogeneity in elite sport development systems; as indicated by similar pattern of governmental investment in elite sport policy across a range of countries (cf. De Bosscher et al., 2008; Green & Houlihan, 2005, Houlihan & Green, 2008, Oakley & Green, 2001). Hence, as globalisation theory involves a ‘shift in the unit of analysis’ (Beyer, 1994: 14), the perspective of globalisation as a supplementary theory might be useful to some degree in explaining policy process and policy change on elite sport policy at a specific level. Having looked at macro-level theories including a brief discussion of nationalism and globalisation, we discuss the concept of power.

2.2.9 Conceptualising power

We have explored how power has been distributed in the society according to macro-level theories of the state. We shall now proceed to clarify how power is conceptualised. Notwithstanding power has generally been identified as the very kernel of the emerging and developing discipline of political science (Goverde et al., 2000), the concept, or notion, of power is difficult to define (cf. Arendt, 1986; Giddens, 1979, 1984; Habermas, 1986; Layder, 1985; Lukes, 1986, 1997). The reason is that ‘power is not always an observable ‘surface’ phenomenon and may be embedded in the social structure and pattern of social relations’ (Thomas, 2004: 97). Indeed, as Goverde & Tatenhove argues, ‘to understand power relations within and between policy networks, a conception of power is needed that makes it possible to acknowledge both the influence of actors on the development of policies in networks and the impact of the structural context’ (2000: 107). In other words, it implies that power should be explored in the context of relational and structural phenomenon surrounding the capacity of agents (cf. Goverde & Tatenhove, 2000). In order to clarify power relations within policy subsystems or policy networks, we need to look at the logical formulation of power as the capacity of agents within the broader socio-
economic and political context. As such, a salient conception of power relations should be placed at a multilateral dimension in that power is seen as a ‘complex, exacting, arguably subjective task’ (Hay, 2002: 176), and an unobservable phenomenon related to deep structural scope. For a deeper and more satisfactory analysis of power relations at the core of this study, Lukes’ (1974, 2005) conceptualisation of power has been widely adopted in studies of the policy-making process.

Lukes (1974, 2005) proposed a three dimensional conceptualisation of power, often called ‘a radical view’, which is responsive to the restrictive scope of the one dimensional view of Dahl (1961) and the two dimensional view of Bachrach & Baratz (1962, 1970). Based on the ‘pluralist’ view, Dahl’s (1961) the one dimensional concept of power pays attention to observable behaviour in identifying power in the process of decision-making where there is an actual and observable conflict of interest between actors (Lukes, 1974, 2005). Thus, from the one dimensional view, power relations as an actor-centred approach are seen as an ‘interpersonal’ and ‘zero-sum’ phenomenon in the process of competing for power (Hay, 2002: 173) on the ground that ‘power can be envisaged easily in a decision-making situation’ (Polsby, 1963:4). In short, this pluralist concept of power has a narrow scope in identifying power by observing conflicts and preferences ostensibly exposed in actors’ behaviours. In response to this narrow view of power, Bachrach & Baratz (1970) proposed the two dimensional concept of power. That is, they argue that power has two faces. The two-dimensional view is that ‘not only is power exercised, as within the pluralist framework, in the arena of decision-making, but it is also exercised by preventing issues from reaching that arena’ (Bachrach & Baratz in Haugaard, 2002: 26). In order words, the fundamental assumption of the second face of power is that while power is obviously exercised in the decision-making process, power can be perceived in ‘non-decision making’ processes. According to Bachrach & Baratz, a non-decision is ‘a decision that results in the suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker’ (1970: 44). Indeed, with regard to neo-pluralism/elitism, an issue can be excluded from the decision-making process by economic elites or powerful groups, which covertly exercise their power over others for their own benefit by acting in collusion with the government and as a result it is hard for a specific issue to advance into the formal political arena.
The significance of the second-dimensional view is captured in the following argument that ‘to the extent that a person or group – consciously or unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or groups has power’ (Lukes, 2005: 20). In this respect, the crucial point of the two-dimensional concept refers to the ‘mobilization of bias’. Schattschneider explained the mobilization of bias in the following terms:

All forms of political organisations have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because organisations are the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out (Schattschneider, 1960: 71).

In short, the two-dimensional view of power allows for ‘consideration of the way in which decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues over there is an observable conflict of interests, seen as embodied in express policy preferences and sub-political grievances’ (Lukes, 2005: 25). However, although Bachrach & Baratz’s conception of power is valuable in ‘giving consideration to the less visible process by which preferences (or interests) are shaped’ (Hay, 2002: 178), it still has shortcomings. This leads us on to consider the perspective of the ‘third dimension’ of power suggested by Lukes (1974, 2005).

Lukes’ (1974, 2005) radical concept of power pays more attention to the largely invisible nature of power. In outlining the limitation of the two dimensional aspects of power, Hay argues that ‘to restrict the use of the term ‘power’ to situations in which actual and observable conflict is present is arbitrary, unrealistic and myopic’ (2002: 78). Of particular interest is Lukes’ contention that the account of power needs to include ‘latent’ conflict, which ‘consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude’ (Chapter 3. Lukes in Haugaard, 2002: 44), and where power is exercised to shape people’s preferences so that neither overt nor covert conflict exists (Ham & Hill, 1993: 70). Power can distort actor’s perceptions and shape preferences at invisible levels (Hay, 2002), thus there is ‘latent’ conflict. In a similar vein, McLennan insists that ‘conscious policy decisions and expectations are only one aspect of the wider political phenomenon to
be investigated and a more complete picture might be gained through an analysis of unconscious values, overt manipulation and covert preferences’ (1990: 55-56).

As such, from the third dimensional aspect of power, it is a crucial point that ‘the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place’ (Lukes, 1974: 23). In this way, the most insidious and significant form of power can be linked to domination. In order words, the third dimension of power occurs not where there is explicit domination, but where the ruled acquiesce in their ideological domination (Dowding, 1996).

Table 2.2 outlines the core perspectives of, and differences between the three faces of power that have been widely adopted in the political studies on power (for the three dimensional formation of power compared, see also Figure 2.1 below).

Table 2.2 The ‘faces of power’ controversy: political power in three dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>One-dimensional view</th>
<th>Two-dimensional view</th>
<th>Three-dimensional view</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proponents</strong></td>
<td>Dahl, Polsby, classic pluralists</td>
<td>Bachrach and Baratz, neo-elitists</td>
<td>Lukes, Marxists, neo-Marxists and radical elitists/pluralists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conception of power</strong></td>
<td>Power as decision-making</td>
<td>Power as decision-making and agenda-setting</td>
<td>Power as decision-making, agenda-setting and preference-shaping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus of analysis</strong></td>
<td>The formal political arena</td>
<td>The formal political arena and the informal process surrounding it (the corridors of power)</td>
<td>Civil society more generally, especially the public sphere (in which preferences are shaped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodological approach</strong></td>
<td>‘Counting’ of votes and decisions in decision-making forums</td>
<td>Ethnography of the corridors of power to elucidate the informal process through which the agenda is set</td>
<td>Ideology critique – to demonstrate how actors come to misperceive their own material interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature of power</strong></td>
<td>Visible, transparent and easily measured</td>
<td>Both visible and invisible (visible only to agenda-setters), but can be rendered visible through gaining inside information</td>
<td>Largely invisible – power distorts perceptions and shapes preference; it must be demystified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hay (2002: 180)

In the second aspect of three-dimensional power, as Lukes argues, ‘the concept of false consciousness concerns the relationship between power and knowledge on the premise that power distorts knowledge’ (Lukes, 2002: 39). Thus, Lukes views the
relationship between power and knowledge as a negative aspect. Toffler (1990) contends that knowledge is an infinite power by which opposition and resistance are adequately controlled not to be aroused by persuading subjects. Indeed, power can be utilised as a tool of wrapping and obscuring the truth in a direction which benefits the interests of powerful groups (Lukes, 2005).

**Figure 2.1. Dimensions of power compared**

```
Power of A over B

First dimension
Control of A over B through superior bargaining resources

Second dimension
A constructs a barrier against participation of B (non-DM and mobilisation of bias)

Third dimension
Influencing or shaping of consciousness of B about inequalities (through myths, information control, ideology, etc.)

Defeat of B due lack of resources

Non-participation of B due to barriers and anticipated defeat

Susceptibility to myths, etc., induces sense of powerlessness; uncritical consciousness about issues of B due to influencing or shaping by A and due to maintenance of non-participation by A

Response of A to challenges by B

Open conflict with competing resources over clearly defined issues

Mobilisation on issues; action upon barriers

Formation of issues and strategies

Powerlessness of B to A
```

Source: Gaventa (1980: 21)

However, Foucault’s perspective on the relationship between power and knowledge is placed in opposition to Lukes’ perspective. In this respect, it is worth discussing Foucault’s distinction between power and knowledge. Within Foucault’s theory of power, the relationship between power and knowledge is ‘not oppositional but, rather, mutually constitutive’ (Foucault, 2002: 181). In order words, power can be regarded as knowledge and vice versa. Foucault claims that ‘power produces knowledge … power and knowledge directly imply one another … there is no power relations without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitutes at the same time power relations’ (1977:27). In this perspective, ‘the mechanisms of power produces different types of knowledge aimed at investigating and collecting information on people’s activities and existence’ (O’Farrell 2005: 101). Therefore, the knowledge accumulated in this way further consolidates the exercise of power (O’Farrell, 2005). Notably, within Foucault’s
conceptualisation of power, no less significant is the fact that the integration between power and knowledge has not only been a means for ruling and oppressing the people, has but also contributed to social evolution (development) and their welfare. In addition, of particular interest is Foucault’s contention that ‘power is not owned by the state’, but it may be ‘omnipresent’ (O’Farrell, 2005). In other words, power may exist at every level of the social body. In this respect, power relations could take place from macro-levels and micro-levels, as well as meso-levels. For example, we can not only discover power relations between government and interest groups, but also between interest groups and individuals. In short, Foucault acknowledges power combined with knowledge as productive pathways (O’Farrell, 2005). In modern society media is regarded as the most influential force in relation to the power-knowledge as it can influence public cognition and thinking by defining ‘the truth’. Indeed, in contemporary society, mass media such as newspaper, broadcasting and the internet have played a crucial role in producing knowledge surrounding our life; functioning as an ‘window’ for obtaining knowledge. Thus, people can be easily influenced and unwarily exposed by power-knowledge through the press in ubiquitous circumstances. Therefore, in knowledge-based society, knowledge-power by the press can be conceived as one of the powerful and persuasive sources.

2.3 Meso-level approaches to the policy process

The aim of this section is to review meso-level approaches to the study of the policy process, and to evaluate the general applicability of meso-level frameworks for explaining policy change. The concept of meso-level reflects a middle-range or bridging level of analysis which is placed on the linkage between macro- and micro-levels of analysis (Parsons, 1995: 85). In this regard, by reviewing three major meso-level lenses (cf. Parsons, 1995; multiple-stream, policy networks and advocacy coalition framework), we can better understand policy change with theories of the state outlined earlier. Before reviewing the three frameworks, it is worth mentioning that a review of stages models will be excluded in this section. The reason is that stage model does not offer an integrated perspective of the analysis of the policy process, because it focuses on the policy life cycle [problem, problem definition,
identifying alternative responses/solutions, evaluation of options, selection of policy option, implementation, evaluation] causing the criticism that it is ‘an artificial view of policy-making’ (Parsons, 1995: 77-79). Given that the ‘real world is far more complicated and not composed of tidy, neat steps, phases or cycles’ (Parsons, 1995: 79), these seven sequential stages are not appropriate for explaining a dynamic and complicated policy process.

Before reviewing each of the meso-level frameworks, it is imperative to clarify the criteria for assessing the ‘usefulness’ of each framework. Criteria for ‘usefulness’ include application, coherence, focus on policy change, fitting with macro-level positions and salience for sport policy. With regard to the key criteria for ‘usefulness’, Green sets out five assumptions: (i) ‘the ability to capture the dynamics of policy change’ (both endogenous and exogenous factors); (ii) ‘to enable analysis between macro- and meso-levels of analysis’; (iii) ‘to allow for the role of mediating individuals, for example, policy brokers/entrepreneurs’; (iv) ‘to enable comparison between countries’; and (v) ‘to be applicable to a relatively new and often marginal public policy concern’; (2003: 27). In addition, Houlihan identifies the four criteria for evaluating frameworks for policy analysis: (i) ‘the capacity to explain both policy stability and change’ (John, 1998; Sabatier, 1999); (ii) ‘the capacity to illuminate a range of aspects of the policy process’; (iii) ‘applicability across a range of policy areas’; and (iv) ‘the framework should facilitate a medium term (five to 10 year) historical analysis of policy change’ (2005: 167-168). Furthermore, Sabatier utilised the following criteria in selecting the seven frameworks in his 1999 edition of ‘Theories of the Policy Process’: (i) ‘each framework must do a reasonably good job of meeting the criteria of a scientific theory’; that is, ‘its concepts and propositions must be relatively clear and internally consistent’; (ii) ‘it must be the subject of a fair amount of recent conceptual development and/or empirical testing’; (iii) ‘it must be a positive theory seeking to explain much of the policy process’; and (iv) ‘it must address the broad sets of factors that political scientists looking at difference aspects of public policy-making have traditionally deemed important’: ‘conflicting values and interests, information flows, institutional arrangements, and variation in the socioeconomic environment’ (Sabatier, 2007: 8). In this regard, Sabatier suggests that a good and better lens makes use of a lot of information to explain a number of events (2007). The following criteria are established, in light of the criteria outlined above, to
assess the three meso-level approaches’ value: (i) the ability to illustrate a wide-range of aspects of the policy process and change; (ii) the capacity to cover a broad number of factors such as belief systems within a policy subsystem, external factors, policy-oriented learning, external perturbations and policy brokers/entrepreneurs; (iii) its applicability to a relatively marginal public policy concern and comparatively less pluralised country (beyond the United States).

2.3.1 Multiple-streams

Multiple-streams (MS) is a lens or framework advanced by John Kingdon (1995), who developed the ‘garbage can’ model (for more information see Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; March & Olsen, 1976) to understand policy formation in the United States (cf. John, 1998; Zahariadis & Allen, 1995). In explaining policy formation, the MS approach is divided into three streams which flow through the policy system: problems, policies and politics (cf. John, 1995; Zahariadis, 2007). ‘Each of these streams contains not only various individuals, groups, agencies, and institutions that are involved in the policy-making process’ (Birkland, 2005: 225), each is also ‘conceptualised as largely separate from the others, with its own dynamics and rules’ (Zahariadis, 2007: 65). In describing the policy process within the streams metaphor the possibility of policy change increases when the policy, politics, and problem streams move together. In this regard, ‘at critical points in time, the streams are coupled by policy entrepreneurs’ (Zahariadis, 2007: 65), then a ‘window of opportunity’ is opened; termed a policy window. According to Birkland (2005), the opening of the window shows the probability of policy change, but it does not assure that policy change will happen. As these windows may be open for a short time, participants involved in the policy process must act promptly before the opportunity disappears (John, 1998). However, the combination of all three streams into a single package increases significantly the chances that an issue will receive attention by policy-makers (Zahariadis, 1999: 76). Birkland notes how ‘change’ might be conceived within a MS approach:

That trigger can be a change in our understanding of the problem, a change in the political stream that is favourable to policy change, a change in our understanding of the
tractability of the problem given current solutions, or a focusing event that draws attention
to a problem and helps open a window of opportunity (2005: 225).

Kingdon’s MS framework consists of five structural elements: problems, policies, politics, policy windows and policy entrepreneurs (see Figure 2.2). In a review of Kingdon’s MS framework, Zahariadis (2007) notes that the problem stream is made up of various conditions such as government budget deficits, inflation, environmental disasters, and economic crisis through indicators, focusing events, and feedback. That is to say, government data and reports are good example of indicators which have influence on governmental attitudes and positions. Events focus attention on problems and feedback from previous experience or programmes which is also crucial in that it provides information on current performance and gives knowledge to draw aims or points towards anticipated consequences (Parsons, 1995).

Figure 2.2 Diagram of the Multiple Streams Framework

![Diagram of the Multiple Streams Framework]

Source: Zahariadis (2003: 153)

In this context, ‘successfully implementing a solution in one area may spill over to another, facilitating the adoption of the same solution in a seemingly unrelated area’ (Zahariadis, 2007: 72). Kingdon regards the policy stream as ‘a primeval soup’ in which ideas are important factors striving to gain acceptance in policy networks (cf. Parsons, 1995; Zahariadis, 2007). Ideas are generally originated by experts in policy
networks/communities who share common beliefs, values and thinking within a
specified policy sector (Zahariadis, 2007). Hence, various specialists in public policy-
making, such as bureaucrats, academics, researchers and congressional staff members
seek to put their ideas to the top of the agenda. In this sense, the MS approach tries to
explain how ideas appear by their adoption and rejection by the various decision-
makers involved (John, 1998). Moreover, the politics stream is made up of three
elements: the national mood, organised political forces (parties, pressure groups,
campaigns), and administrative or legislative turnover (cf. Parsons, 1995; Sabatier,
2007). For example, the advent of a new president/prime minister and a variety of
interest groups play a significant role in bringing about potential changes and moving
the agenda towards particular policy.

In a review of Kingdon’s MS approach, John observes that ‘at the same time as the
policies and problems are symbiotically floating in their ‘policy primeval soup’, the
political stream exercises a powerful influence on agendas’ (1998: 175). However,
within the MS approach, policy change is difficult to occur without policy
entrepreneurs (individuals or corporate actors) who seek to couple the three streams.
In other words, policy entrepreneurs must swiftly act to seize the opportunity in order
to initiate action, while policy windows open and so coupling occurs during the open
windows when certain policy makers happen to be in power (Zahariadis, 2007). For
example, in Houlihan & Green’s empirical study of school sport and PE policy in
England and Wales they identified the significance of policy entrepreneur, especially
‘Sue Campbell’s (who acts as a non-political adviser to government on school sport
and PE) influence that she seek to persuade civil servants and ministers of the
potential value of PE and school sport, despite initial departmental scepticism’
(Houlihan & Green, 2006: 87). In this respect, it remains an empirical question to
identify who acts as policy entrepreneur or policy broker in South Korea. It could be
argued that the concept of ‘policy entrepreneur’ is close to that of ‘policy broker’
within the advocacy coalition framework (cf. Green, 2003). However, Green (2003)
argues that the concept of ‘policy broker’ is more suitable to the elite sport policy
developments at the levels of NSOs/NGBs in Canada and the UK. This argument is
supported by the concept of ‘policy entrepreneur’ emphasises on the importance of
employing a lobbying activity to achieve a policy goal (cf. Zahariadis, 2007), on the
other hand, the concept of ‘policy broker’ stresses that ‘a policy broker’s principal
concern is to find some reasonable comprise that will reduce intense conflict’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999).

2.3.1.1 Strengths and weaknesses

Regarding the weaknesses of the MS approach, John (1998) contends that it needs only slight amendments to be applicable to the more centralised policy-making systems in many Western European states. That is, the MS approach is limited in illuminating the early stages of policy formation, as it focuses largely on agenda-setting. According to Zahariadis & Christopher (1995), due to its emphasis on agenda-setting, the MS approach attenuates its value in providing a more general explanation of policy making and the policy process beyond the opening of windows of opportunity. In addition, Zahariadis (2007) points out that the framework does not offer much insight at the sub-national levels, because the MS approach has concentrated almost exclusively on the national level unlike other policy lenses. Nevertheless, the MS lens provides useful insights for accounting for policy-making processes. According to Zahariadis, the MS approach ‘is useful in single case or in comparative applications across time, issues, and policy domains’ (2007: 83). And, Houlihan & Green (2006) argue that the MS lens is a more enlightening analytical tool than the advocacy coalition framework for understanding policy change in school sport and physical education in England and Wales. In addition, Zahariadias observes that the MS framework ‘is particularly useful because it integrates policy communities with broader events … Broad political events are connected to narrow sectoral developments in specific ways’ (1999: 78). In this regard, the MS framework may provide a useful link between macro- and meso-levels of analysis for this study.

2.3.2 Policy networks

The policy networks approach aims to explain the relationships between interest groups and government. In a review of the policy networks approach, Smith notes that ‘policy networks are a means of categorising the relationships that exist between
groups and government’ (1993: 56). In this regard, policy networks is connected with
the meso-level of analysis, the main level of analysis for this study and thus
understanding the perspective of policy networks may be useful for analysing the
relationships between government, quasi-governmental sports organisations and three
NGBs in South Korea. Furthermore, given that some of the literature links policy
networks to the macro-level of analysis (cf. Atkinson & Coleman, 1992; Daugbjerg &
Marsh, 1998), we can better understand the distribution of power and the nature of the
relationship between government and interest groups within civil society by
integrating the meso-level analysis and macro-level analysis. Discussion for
integrating the macro- and meso levels of theorising will be summarised following the
review of meso-level approaches. When it comes to policy networks’ origins, the
policy networks approach’s importance for understanding the relationship between
interest groups and government has its roots in the notion of sub-government in the
United States (cf. Ripley & Franklin, 1980), but the networks approach was also
developed by Jordan and Richardson in the United Kingdom (cf. Jordan &
Richardson 1987).

A key concern of policy networks analysis in the United States was placed on the
metaphor of the ‘iron triangle’ to explain relationships between congressional
committees, executive agencies and producer groups which had influence on the
decision-making process and sustained powerful relations with each other (John 1998).
From this perspective, a few interest groups were involved in the policy-making
process and only a few policy-makers held a dominant position on decision-making.
However, ‘iron triangle’ metaphor challenged the pluralist view of the world. In other
words, ‘policy making is not open’ (Ripley & Franklin, 1980: 8) and the policy-
making process is restricted to a few interest groups (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992). Further
analysis suggested that, while some policy sectors conformed to the ‘iron triangle’
pattern, other exhibited very different patterns of relationship between government
and interests. Thus, in terms of pluralist ideas, the importance ‘of issue networks’,
which is a subordinate concept of policy networks, was suggested to describe the
relationships and nature of a variety of groups as well as government in the policy
process within a pluralistic society. A further concept in the policy networks approach
is that of a policy community. In a review of policy networks, Smith (1993) contends
that Jordan & Richardson (1987) tend to use the term ‘policy communities’ for
describing a range of relations of varying stability, and Marsh & Rhodes (1992a) defines five types of networks in line with integration, membership, resource and power: policy community, professional network, intergovernmental network, producer network and issue network (see Figure 2.3).

**Figure 2.3 Policy networks**

![Image of Figure 2.3 showing the continuum from policy community to issue network](image)

Source: Marsh & Rhodes (1992b: 183)

The following conceptualisation from O’Riordan & Jordan helps us better differentiate between the concept of policy community and that of issue network:

Policy community is a strongly institutionalised form of policy–making arrangement in which there are shared values, world-views, and resources and where members tend to agree upon what specific problems justify a policy response and how, in turn, that response should be structured. And the more weakly institutionalised issue network occupies the other end of the continuum, where there is broader access to the policy process, less permanence and stability, more than one government department involved, and less consensus on the issues at hand and how they should be addressed (1996: 74-5).

Marsh & Rhodes (1992c) delineate a number of dimensions which help to illuminate the policy community-issue network continuum (see Table 2.3).

**Table 2.3 The characteristics of policy networks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Policy community</th>
<th>Issue network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of participants</td>
<td>Very limited, some conscious exclusion</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of interest</td>
<td>Economic/professional</td>
<td>Wide range of groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of interaction</td>
<td>Frequent, high quality</td>
<td>Contacts fluctuate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity</td>
<td>Membership, values, outcomes</td>
<td>Fluctuating access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>persistent</td>
<td>A degree of agreement but conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>All participants share basic values</td>
<td>present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>All participants have resources,</td>
<td>Some participants have resources,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resources within</td>
<td>Relationship is one of exchange</td>
<td>but limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hierarchical leaders can deliver members
Varied and variable distribution and capacity to regulate members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>network Distribution of resources within participating organisations</th>
<th>Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is a balance among members. One group may be dominant but power is positive-sum</td>
<td>Unequal power. Power zero-sum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Marsh & Rhodes (1992a: 251)

One illustration of the collective characteristics of the policy community is provided by Pyeongchang’s bids for the 2010/2014 Winter Olympics, as well as the announcement about the renewed bid for hosting 2018 Winter Olympics in which central government, the Gangwon provincial government, Korean Sports Council (KSC), the Chaebols (conglomerates), and the local leaders formed a policy community where they maintained a privileged position in the policy-making process by exchanging resources and information with each other, without considering various opposition groups’ interests and voices over the past 10 years. Indeed, even though 42 civic groups in Kangwon Province expressed their opposition towards the renewed bid for the 2018 Winter Olympics in July 2007, the province government decided to renew the bid in pursuit of its political objectives and interests. Jung H (2007) cynically contends that local government leaders in South Korea are riding the tide of sport nationalism, and are interested in mega sporting events because they help them to achieve their political ambitions in the following election.

Within issue networks, as opposed to policy networks, groups are likely to be treated inequitably and power is therefore unfairly distributed. Hence, given that these typologies of policy network should be seen as mutually incompatible (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992), disparities in access, resources, and power within a policy network suggest that certain groups occupy a privileged position while weak groups are excluded from the policy-making process. In other words, ‘there is a clear distinction between members with resources and influences and those without’ (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992: 255). In this sense, Bulkeley argues that ‘policy network can have two tiers, a core and a periphery, so that policy analysts should be aware of the different types of network that exist simultaneously rather than look for any one ideal type of policy network in relation to a particular policy issue’ (2000: 729).
2.3.2.1 Strengths and weaknesses

The policy networks approach has also faced criticism. First, policy networks pay less attention to changes in process and outcomes (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992) because it focuses on the relationship between government and groups. Indeed, Atkinson & Coleman argue that ‘policy networks have to explain how policy changes, and then determine the relationship between network change and policy change’ (1992: 172). Second, policy networks disclose a defect in explaining policy change and policy processes in that it does not take into account external factors such as interests, ideas, values, institutions and strategies which affect network interaction (John, 1998; Adam & Kriesi, 2007). Lastly, an important critique is that policy networks at the sectoral and sub-sectoral levels tend to ignore the influence of macro-level systems and structure (Daughbjerg & Marsh, 1998). With regard to power resources, it is thus necessary for this study to take into account how sectoral- and sub-sectoral networks might influence the pattern of policy outcomes at the macro level (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992). In this sense, the justification for integrating macro- and meso level is raised in relation to the state’s influence in the elite sport policy making process (see the section, integrating macro- and meso-level)

Notwithstanding these critiques, a policy networks approach offers helpful insights for understanding how policy is formed by groups of organisations and actors in a policy sector (John, 1998). Furthermore, the policy network approach is particularly useful in describing the policy processes at a specific point in time. More especially, it is a suitable metaphor for a variety of typologies which is to define the new pattern of relationship existing in civil society so that ‘it fits with the technological and sociological changes of modern society’ (Parsons, 1995: 185). In a similar vein, of particular significance is the ways in which policy networks help to illuminate the types of relationships that exist between interest groups and government (Smith, 1993). The final point concerning the strengths of the networks approach is its utility ‘at varying levels of government’ (national or local); ‘in different policy sectors’ (health, industry or sport); or ‘a subsector of policy’ (chemical policy, community care, land drainage) or ‘even around particular issues’ (Smith, 1993: 65). This implies that the policy networks approach can be utilised across a variety of policy concerns or issues which exist within modern society.
2.3.3 Advocacy coalition framework

The advocacy coalition framework (ACF), developed by Sabatier who revised it with Jenkins-Smith, has, since 1993, has been applied to a number of policy cases in the United States, Western Europe, Canada, and OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. The ACF has its origins in the importance of policy subsystems within the overall policy process, emphasising the significance of relationships within policy sectors as the clue for understanding how decision-making operates (John 1998). John also maintains that the ACF is ‘a broader set of processes than that evoked by the network metaphor’ (1998: 169). In other words, the ACF is a broader concept than the policy network approach in describing a more holistic picture of the policy process and has been defined as:

… people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interests groups leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system – that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 25).

The initial version of the ACF was founded on five fundamental premises. First, a time perspective of a decade or more is required for an understanding of policy change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Weiss (1977) contends that a focus on short-term decision-making will minimise the weight of policy analysis because such a study cannot capture the belief systems of policymakers covering a long time period (see also Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). Second, the possession and use of technical information regarding the magnitude and facets of a policy problem is crucial (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Such knowledge and information plays a vital role in determining a number of administrative agency decisions (Sabatier, 1998; Mazur, 1981). Third, the most valuable unit of analysis for explaining policy change is a ‘policy subsystem’, which ‘consists of those actors from a variety of public and private organisations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue….and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 119). A fourth premise is that a subsystem includes a variety of actors at all levels of government beyond traditional notions of ‘iron triangles’ in the policy-making process (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999) including government
officials, politicians, journalists, researchers, and policy analysts (Heclo, 1978; Jordan & Richardson, 1983; Kingdon, 1984; Hall, 1993). A fifth premise is that public policy and programmes incorporate implicit ‘sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realise their objectives’ (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994: 178) and thus ‘can be conceptualised in much the same way as belief systems’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 119).

At this point, it should be mentioned that, with regard to level of analysis, the ACF begins with three ‘foundation stones’: (i) a macro-level assumption that factors in the broader political and socioeconomic system as an influence on actor behaviour within a policy subsystem; (ii) a micro-level ‘model of the individual’ that is entirely derived from social psychology; and (iii) a meso-level conviction that the most useful way to deal with the variety of actors in a subsystem is to aggregate them into an ‘advocacy coalition’ (Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 191-192). In this regard, these three ‘foundation stones’ mean that it is possible for the ACF to consider the multiplicity of factors in policy-making process in which the degree of explanation for policy change may be richer in comparison with other meso-level frameworks. As in the second foundation stone above, if the ACF is integrated with macro-level ‘state theories’, it could be possible for a better understanding policy process. Thus, the value of integrating macro- and meso-level approaches is summarised at the end of this section. In addition, these grounds have an effect on dependent variables, belief and policy change via critical paths: ‘policy-oriented learning’ and ‘external perturbations’ (Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 192). In other words, this argument means that besides political and socio-economic factors and a variety of activities of advocacy coalitions within a subsystem, policy oriented learning and external perturbations (shocks) could affect dependent variables such as policy outcome and policy change. Regarding the structure and logic of the ACF, policy change over time can be explained by three sets of processes (see Figure 2.4).
A key concept of the ACF is the ‘policy subsystem’ and Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1999) argue that the policy process is conceptualised in terms of policy subsystems. As mentioned above, a subsystem is composed of a variety of actors who ‘play a part in the generation, dissemination and evaluation of policy ideas’ (Parsons, 1995: 196). Thus, a subsystem can include researchers, academic analysts, think-tanks, civic groups, and actors in other levels of government, as well as the elements of the iron triangle (cf. Heclo, 1978; Kingdon, 1995; Parsons, 1995; Sabatier, 1999). Its membership and open access can be compared with the characteristics of an issue network, whereas limited access, restricted membership and shared beliefs are associated with a policy community (Bulkeley, 2000). However, within the neopluralist/elitist views actors involved in a policy problem or issue share fundamental beliefs and strive to achieve policy goals over time by translating those beliefs into
policy (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993). The ACF assumes that within the subsystem, researchers with scientific and technical information play an active role in policy change (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). For example, as policy actors can get information and knowledge through an international/national conference or seminar about any policy issue, policy actors are more likely to organise an advisory committee with researchers or academics. Indeed, with regard to the sport sector, the Korean Alliance for Health, Physical Education, Recreation, and Dance (KAHPRD) organised by a number of academics and researchers in sport studies has played an important role in shaping sport policy by presenting policy alternatives through a variety of conferences and seminars. For example, the office of Kangwon provincial government requested the KAHPRD to hold an open forum regarding the renewed bid for hosting the 2018 Winter Olympics in order to acquire non-governmental legitimacy prior to their announcement that they intended to bid again. According to Jung H (2007), the forum was a customized forum for political objectives and interests of Kangwon province.

Different advocacy coalitions are constituted within the subsystem. In other words, ‘policy participants will seek allies with people who hold similar policy beliefs among legislators, agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers, and intellectuals from multiple levels of government’ (Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 196). The policy subsystem is made up of a number of advocacy coalitions which operate within the context of a tripartite hierarchy of beliefs: ‘deep core’, ‘policy core’ and ‘secondary aspects’ (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1999; Parsons, 1995). ‘At the highest and broadest level, the deep core of the shared belief system includes basic ontological and normative beliefs, which operate across virtually all policy domains’ (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1999: 121). A representative example is the relative valuation of individual freedom versus social equality. Sabatier & Weible (2007) describe deep core beliefs as the general product of childhood socialisation, which is difficult to change. Policy core beliefs as the next level, represent ‘a coalition’s basic normative commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy subsystem’ (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1999: 121). With regard to sport policy, good examples are ‘the importance given to Sport for All initiatives relative to programmes for elite level sport’ (Green & Houlihan, 2004: 391), ‘the relative importance of PE within the school curriculum’ (Houlihan & Green, 2006: 79) and the recognition of the value of elite
level performance for national prestige and identity. Finally, ‘the secondary aspects comprise a large set of narrower (typically less than subsystem-wide) beliefs the concerning the seriousness of the problem or the relative importance of various causal factors in specific locales, policy preference regarding budgetary allocations’ (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1999: 122). Thus, beliefs in the secondary aspects are presumed to be more easily adapted in view of new experience, new data, or changing strategic considerations. Deep core beliefs, on the other hand, are resistant to change, for example, religious conversion, and policy core beliefs are to some extent less strictly held (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1999).

From the ACF perspective, there are conflicting strategies amongst a variety of advocacy coalitions competing for influence in the decision-making process. As each coalition, in the light of its hierarchy structure of beliefs, adopts one or more strategies as a way of altering the actions of various governmental authorities in order to realise its policy goals (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1999), a conflict of belief systems from a diversity of coalitions may occur at any particular time. The conflict may be interceded by policy brokers who minimise the degree of conflict between advocacy coalitions. Interestingly, the concept of policy broker is somewhat similar to that of policy entrepreneurs in the multiple streams framework. Parsons describes policy brokers as ‘concerned with finding reasonable or feasible compromises between the positions advocated by coalitions’ (1995: 198). In the sector of sport policy, Patrick Carter (Chair of Sport England) in the UK and Denis Coderre (the former Secretary of State for Amateur Sport) in Canada, who minimised an intense conflict and played a key role in initiating broad policy considerations underpinning the new Canadian Sport Policy, are examples of policy brokers (Green & Houlihan, 2004).

Parsons (1995) also argues that change within the policy subsystem is a consequence of an ‘interplay’ or dialectical relationship between ‘relatively stable parameters’ and ‘external events’ (see Figure 2.4). That is, it is essential that exogenous factors are also taken into account for understanding policy change within the ACF. In this sense, considering both endogenous and exogenous factors in exploring the policy process is required for a more dynamic and dialectical approach to the analysis of policy change (cf. Hay, 2002; Marsh, 1998; Marsh et al., 1999; Marsh & Smith, 2000). The ACF assumes that when change occurs in one of these dynamic factors, it is likely to lead
major policy change. In the area of sport policy, the introduction of National Lottery Funds and the change of Prime Minister from Margaret Thatcher to John Major are good examples of major policy change in the UK. These two factors have been widely recognised as crucial in creating a more supportive political and economic environment for sport in general, and for elite sport in particular (Green & Houlihan, 2004). In terms of exogenous factors in relation to Korea, the advent of the first military government in 1961 in South Korea is a good example of major policy change in affecting the sport sector in general, and elite sport system in particular.

However, on the assumption that coalition behaviour within the subsystem and two sets of exogenous variables do not provide a full explanation for policy change, Sabatier & Weible (2007) confirm two pathways for changes in beliefs and in policy change in the 1997 version of the ACF: external perturbations and policy-oriented learning. External perturbations (or shocks) such as changes in socio-economic conditions, regime change, outputs from other subsystems, or disasters, can alter agendas and attract public attention (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). It is highly possible that previously dominant coalition can be replaced by minority coalitions through the redistribution of resources within a subsystem (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In addition, Sabatier & Weible contend that ‘external shocks might also change components of the policy core beliefs of a dominant advocacy coalition’ (2007: 199). The issue of external shocks is also an important factor in understanding policy change because it induces policy change by affecting deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary aspects of policy actors within a subsystem. External shocks can disturb deep core/policy core beliefs of policy actors or participants. A good example of an external perturbation is the IMF (International Monetary Fund) crisis which hit South Korea in 1997, in that the unexpected political and economic crisis resulted in a withering of government support for general sport, and for elite sport particularly.

Moreover, the ACF defines policy-oriented learning as ‘relatively enduring alterations of thought or behaviour intentions that result from experience and/or new information and that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 123). Policy-oriented leaning is more likely to affect secondary beliefs, which as noted earlier, are less resistant to change than deep core
beliefs and policy core beliefs: example of which would confirm that Korean sport policy-makers learn from experience and/or the policy model in neighbouring countries such as China and Japan (cf. Houlihan, 2009). A successful policy case or a failed one learnt from other counties would give a significant lesson to domestic policy makers. In this sense, a holistic understanding of the process of policy change requires an accounting for the process of policy learning, which might be conceived as the intentional aspect of the process of policy change by policy makers (Houlihan, 2009; see also Yamamoto, 2008). Indeed, government officers and academics are likely to study policy ideas and policy practices of other countries and then seek to adopt those to the domestic policy context. As a consequence of this, other countries could exhibit similar policy models (homogenisation) as policy ideas and/or policy practices could be shared between them.

In this respect, a discussion of policy learning may be linked to the ideas of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), which is to explain isomorphic change involved in an organisational system/structure or a public policy problem. As isomorphism is best conceived as the process of homogenisation, building upon Hawley’s (1968) definition of isomorphism, DiMaggio & Powell refer to the isomorphism as ‘a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions’ (1983: 149). According to DiMaggio & Powell (1983), it is possible to distinguish three distinctive mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change: coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative isomorphism.

Coercive isomorphism originates from political influence and the problem of legitimacy. DiMaggio & Powell argued that ‘coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organisations function’ (1983: 150). In this vein, organisations would display a direct response to such pressures as they may recognise those as force, as persuasion, or as invitations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983): in relation to sports organisations, example of which would includes the national governing bodies of sport in South Korea which exhibit similar aspects of organisational behaviour and structures in response to their parent body’s (KSC) demand and force.
Mimetic isomorphism is conceived of as a standard response to uncertainty. According to DiMaggio & Powell, ‘uncertainty is a powerful force that encourages imitation’ (1983: 151). In exploring the mechanism of policy learning and transfer, Houlihan (2009) extends DiMaggio & Powell’s idea of arguing that if the greater the level of uncertainty involved in a public policy problem the more likely are countries to show a type of mimetic isomorphism in relation to policy selection. One of the most distinctive instances of a form of mimetic isomorphism is the attempt by Korean sport policy makers in conjunction with academics to model the national sporting system (including elite sport and sport for all) on the apparently successful European prototypes (e.g. developing the twin approach to mass participation and international success involving a well-structured club system). Thus, Korean government or governmental bodies sent their officers and researchers to study and benchmark the sport system in some European countries such as the UK, Germany and France.

Normative isomorphism is connected with professionalisation. Following Larson and Collins, we understand professionalisation as ‘the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work, to control the production of producers’ (Larson, 1977: 49-52; Collins, 1979), and to set up a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). According to DiMaggio & Powell (1983), there are two aspects of professionalization that are important sources of isomorphism. One is the location of formal education and its legitimation in a cognitive base produced by university experts; the other is the growth and elaboration of professional networks that bridge organisations and across which new models spread rapidly. Universities and professionals training institutions play an important role in developing organisational norms among professional managers and their staff (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In relation to the concept of normative isomorphism, in South Korea a good example would include the role of university professors in the area of sport/PE as members of the non-permanent advisory committees of the governmental and quasi-governmental bodies such as Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism (MCST), Korea Sports Council (KSC) and Korea Sports Promotion Foundation (KSPO).
2.3.3.1 Strengths and Weaknesses

The ACF is not above criticism. John (1998: 172-173) identifies possible critiques: (i) the ACF does not incorporate all aspects of policy change and variation. For example, the ACF ignores institutions and individual choices by laying emphasis on ideas, socio-economic conditions and networks; (ii) the ACF has a propensity to overstress external factors. In so doing, it is possible that the framework passes over the strategies of coalition formation, the pattern of interest group activities and the role of interests, on the assumption that other factors are also important for explaining policy change; and (iii) the variety of participants such as policy analysts, academics, and journalists is not as applicable outside the USA because, for instance, participation in the policy-making process is likely to be less open in Western European countries. That is, the ACF is less suitable for the more corporatist regimes found in Europe which have restricted participation patterns and consensual decision rules (cf. Parsons, 1995; Greer, 2002; Luloffs & Hoppe, 2003). However, it appears that the potential of application of the ACF to other countries beyond the United States has been identified in a number of works, especially, Green (2003), and Green & Houlihan’s (2004, 2005) works on elite sport in the United Kingdom and Canada.

Overall, the value of the ACF has been well recognised. Parsons suggests that ‘it provides a powerful framework for organising and mapping the wide range of ideas which have emerged in the study of public policy and policy analysis’ (1995: 199). In addition, Sabatier & Weible (2007) insist that the ACF is the most useful framework for integrating the behaviour of the number of organisations and individuals surrounding a policy subsystem over a decade or more. This argument is based on the ACF’s assumption that policy subsystems are regarded as the most useful unit of analysis for understanding and describing policy change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). One final point is worthy of note. Sabatier (2007) contends that the ACF reasonably meets the criteria for a scientific theory largely drawn from Charles & March (1975) and King, Keohane, & Verba (1994), and it might fit Green’s (2003) five criteria mentioned above for the meso-level approaches (see the introduction of Meso-level approaches to the policy process). In this regard, since 1988, the ACF has advanced into one of the most prominent public policy frameworks (Johns, 2003; Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Schlager, 1995). This is supported by over 100 publications.
that have applied the ACF from around the world on a range of different policy sectors such as nuclear policy, domestic violence, drug policy, environmental policy, and sport policy (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). With regard to the sport policy sector, Green (2003), Green & Houlihan (2004, 2005), Houlihan & White (2002), and Parrish (2003) are examples of the representativeness of ACF using qualitative methods. More specifically, Green & Houlihan (2004) confirmed the utility of the ACF for analysing elite sport policy change in Canada and the United Kingdom in explaining the notion of changing values and belief systems as a key factors of policy change, as well as external factors affecting the policy subsystem. Moreover, Green & Houlihan (2005) have verified the overall suitability of the ACF for understanding the rise in political priority given to elite sport in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom.

2.3.4 Implications for meso-level analysis of elite sport policy change

Having reviewed three prominent meso-level frameworks, it is now time to assess their value for analysing the process of elite sport policy change in light of the criteria outlined above. One important criterion was the ability to illustrate a wide-ranging set of aspects of the policy process and change within a broad set of factors (cf. Houlihan, 2005; Green, 2003, 2005; Sabatier, 2007). In this respect, the ACF is regarded as the most useful framework in terms of its broad scope to explain complex policy processes and change. Houlihan argues that the ACF is ‘successful in offering a holistic analysis of the policy process’ (2005: 174). Green likewise argues for the utility of the ACF ‘for analysing the complex, fluid, multilayered and often fragmented sport policy-making process’ through the empirical study in the both Canada and the UK (2004: 39). Furthermore, the ACF satisfies other criteria such as the ability to explain policy change of long term and to include the role of individuals in the policy process.

Given that ‘policy change is the product of a more complex range of influences’ (Houlihan, 2005: 176), a framework capable of embracing a variety of variables to accounting for a complexity of policy change is also an important criterion. In this respect, the ACF has the capacity to cover a number of factors such as coalitions and
belief systems within subsystems, time span of decade or more, policy-oriented learning, as well as exogenous factors. Since 1993 political activities and policy processes in South Korea have been complex, on the grounds that the advent of civilian government enabled Korean society to experience a variety of political reforms and a pluralistic system. Indeed, since the mid-1990s many civic groups have been established, and they have been active in exercising their influence on policy-making processes. For example, ‘the Civil Solidarity for Sport’ established in 2002, the initial civil organisation related to the sport sector, and ‘Culture Action’ established in 1999, a civic group that advocates for freedom of expression in art, culture and sport areas, are good examples with regard to the sport sector. They impinge on sport policy processes by lobbying governmental organisations involved in the sport sector and occasionally form coalitions to advocate specific issues in sport area.

With regard to the fifth criterion drawn from Green (2003) and the third criterion drawn from Houlihan (2005) (the ability to apply the framework to a relatively new and often marginal public policy), Houlihan (2005) argues that the ACF is useful in analysing sport policy, given its applicability across range of policy areas. Although sport policy is conceived of as contributing to policy concerns in the areas of welfare, health, education, and crime, in South Korea sport concerns have been marginalised at government level. More specifically, over the past 10 years, given the scale of government reform and the change of political regimes, sport organisation was one of the sector not deemed a priority electoral commitment (for more detail, see Chapter 4). In this respect, as noted earlier, the capacity of the ACF might thus be expected to be applicable to sport policy in South Korea. While aspects of the ACF are clearly of relevance, there are also aspects of the policy network approach that may be use in the analysis. This argument is based on the weakness of the ACF noted by John (1998). As the ACF emphasises the importance of the beliefs of coalition actors within the subsystem and external factors, it reveals a blind point in explaining coalition behaviour within the subsystem (cf. Schlager, 1995; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). In this regard, the policy network approach appears useful, on the grounds that it discusses how the relationships and patterns of interaction between interest groups and government in a policy sector emerge and develop (cf. John, 1998). That is, even though the policy network lens does not meet all the criteria outlined above, it may
offer fruitful insights for exploring the pattern of interest group activities and relationships with government in conjunction with the ACF. Indeed, John (1995) believes that no one approach provides an inclusive insight into explaining change and variation in policy processes and he suggests a ‘synthetic’ approach. In a similar vein, it is important to note that although the ACF is capable of accounting for comprehensive factors affecting policy change and variation, using more than one theoretical lens might be able to develop a more complete understanding of the process of policy change.

Taken together, we can establish that for this study the ACF appears to be the more salient approach for the analysis of the elite sport policy process in South Korea, along with insights from the policy network approaches. In other words, we can establish that this study is based on the ACF’s wide explanatory structure with the supplementary explanatory lens – policy networks approach for explaining the pattern of interest groups activity and the structure between government and interest groups/agencies in particular. Accordingly, given that this study is based on both deductive and inductive approaches, which derives conclusions from empirical investigation (cf. Lowndes, 2002), it will be important to reflect on the salience of the three meso-level approaches following the completion of the empirical investigation. Having discussed macro- and meso-level approaches respectively, we can now summarise the value of integrating these two levels of analysis.

2.4 Integrating macro- and meso-levels of analysis

Having discussed macro- and meso-level approaches, it is necessary to integrate both levels of analysis, particularly insofar as macro-level analysis focuses on the distribution of power at the societal level, and meso-level analysis illustrates the relationships between government and interest groups and the pattern of interest group activity respectively in specific policy areas. In recent years, many arguments about the analysis of public policy capable of integrating different perspectives and levels of analysis have become ever more vociferous (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992ab; Marsh & Stoker, 1995; Smith, 1993). Indeed, Daugbjerg &
Marsh (1998) argue that macro-level theories need to be integrated with meso-level analysis. Thus, they attempt to explain the membership of networks and the outcomes by integrating policy networks with macro-level theory, on the assumption that ‘policy change is strongly influenced by the economic, political and ideological context within which the network operates’ (1998: 54-55). Similarly, Green (2005) attempted to explain both membership of advocacy coalitions and policy outcomes by integrating macro-level theories into meso-level frameworks. Both policy networks and advocacy coalitions have been used extensively as key explanatory concepts at the meso-level in order to illustrate the relationships, structure and pattern of interaction between government and interest groups within networks/subsystems. However, it is not unreasonable to argue that to fully explain policy change utilising just a meso-level analysis is not sufficient for accounting for holistic policy processes. Houlihan, for example, argues that meso-level perspectives offered by policy networks or advocacy coalitions are ‘only capable of providing a metaphor for policy-making if they are located within a broader theory of power’ (1997: 257). In other words, the degree of explanation of policy change may be enhanced by integrating macro- and meso-levels of analysis.

More specifically, Atkinson & Coleman (1992) argued that the study of policy networks has a tendency to consolidate an image of the state generally found in pluralism. In this model, it has been shown that state authority is traditionally contested by a number of interest groups competing for the attention of policy-making actors and policy style is mainly recognised as fragmented. Moreover, Marsh (1995) found that there is the relationship between policy network analysis and pluralism, considering, for example, that the work of Richardson & Jordan (1979) on policy networks was clearly developed from within the pluralist tradition. In this perspective, the pattern of interaction between government and interest groups strengthens the pluralist position (cf. Atkinson & Coleman, 1992) and can be illustrated with an example from Korea. In February 2008 the Ministry of Culture and Tourism was renamed the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism and there is some evidence that the Civil Solidarity for Sport played a decisive role in renaming the Ministry. In this regard, given the typology of the policy networks proposed by Marsh & Rhodes (1992a), such evidence of the pluralist position can be connected with the concept of issue network.
However, the sing of increasing pluralism should not deflect attention from the strong role played by the state in the policy process. Since the emergence of the first civilian government in 1993, in spite of the increasing influence of interest groups (civic groups and academic groups) in policy sectors including sport, government has continued to exercise its influence over the sport sector by controlling access by interest groups to the policy-making process. Indeed, NGB’s dependence on resource allocations, conditioned by the MCST and distributed by the KSC reveals that government has not only maintained its position as a dominant actor, but it also enjoyed considerable status and autonomy in its relationships with sporting interest groups (cf. Green, 2005). Moreover, the fact that Korean big conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyundai and LG are/have been in a stronger position than others in the policy-making process due to their close relationships with government in general, and their financial contribution to NGBs in particular, reinforces the neo-pluralist position. As a consequence, elite sport development has been dominated by a policy community, primarily involving the government, KSC and business groups, with little concern for an issue shared by a number of interest groups which claim growing policy concern for sport for all over the last 20 years. Such policy community can be closely related to elitism or neo-pluralist theory. In this sense, the concept of policy community within the policy networks might be connected to the universal view of elitist theory. The blending of an elitist view of the state and policy community emphasises that particular interest groups enjoy privileged access to, and close relations with, government (Marsh, 1995). In relation to the policy networks [subsystems] within an elitist position, it is argued that:

Policy networks are a restriction on democracy because the tighter networks reflect a consistent pattern of structured political inequality and are characterised by the exclusion of most interests. Networks will generally be dominated by a narrow range of interests, particularly economic, professional and state interests (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998: 57).

However, if a privileged interest group in a policy community or advocacy coalition were business groups, then the policy community or advocacy coalition reinforces the persuasiveness of neo-pluralist theory (cf. Green, 2005). With regard to this assumption, Daugbjerg & Marsh observed that ‘political parties tend to favour some groups’ interests by giving them access to policy networks and excluding others’
In addition, Green (2005) noted that the concept of a policy subsystem within the ACF is bound up with Dunleavy & O’Leary’s discussion of neo-pluralist theory (at the macro-level of analysis) and policy community (at the meso-level of analysis). In respect of linking neo-pluralism to policy communities [or advocacy coalitions], it is argued that:

Wherever policy-making is split between different agencies or tiers of government, complicated systems of inter-governmental or inter-agency relations evolve. These systems create ‘policy communities’ [or advocacy coalitions] where rational debate and education about issues can take places … They are networks [or subsystems] of personal contacts, or more formalised channels for ideas and communication between diverse agencies (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987:306).

The assumptions of locating meso-level approaches within the different perspectives of macro-level state theories need to be confirmed by empirical investigation.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed four prominent macro-level theories of the state, the ways of conceptualising power, three meso-level approaches to the policy process and ways of integrating macro- and meso-levels of analysis. These theoretical reflections outline different ways of looking at the process of policy change and provide a series of the conceptual frameworks within which the features of policy process associated with elite sport can be evaluated. This section identifies the most useful assumptions to be taken forward to the empirical research.

Firstly, it is argued that the overlapping perspectives of neo-pluralism/elitism appear to offer the greatest potential at the macro-level analysis (cf. Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998). While the assumptions of Marxism and corporatism offered considerable explanatory insight until the early 1990s, neo-pluralism and elitism are considered to have greater potential in explaining South Korea’s state character in terms of political and socio-economic contexts since 1993. The convergence between neo-pluralism and elitism highlights the importance of powerful interest groups and structural
inequalities in state and interest groups (Dunleavy & O’Lear, 1987). For empirical investigation, the overlapping assumptions of neo-pluralism and elitism are helpful in explaining elite sport policy domain in South Korea. Moreover, the concept of globalisation would provide a useful insight into taking account of aspects of policy change at a specific level (e.g. the influence of global conditions on domestic sport policy and the degree of homogeneity in elite sport development systems).

Secondly, the ACF appears to provide the most persuasive insight for analysing elite sport process and change in South Korea at the meso-level of analysis (cf. Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998). Although the ACF is capable of accounting for a wide range of aspects of the policy process and change, as noted above, more than one approach may be necessary for explaining comprehensive policy process and change. Given that ‘policy change is the product of a more complex range of influences’ (Houlihan, 2005: 176), the policy network as the supplementary explanatory lens is employed to illustrate elite sport policy process. In this sense, the policy network approach points to questions about the feature of elite sport development policy networks (subsystems) under empirical investigation. In other words, which concept (policy community and issue network) is more appropriate for defining elite sport policy networks.

The third aspect is the importance of integrating different levels of analysis. The reasonable justification of integrating macro- and meso-level of analysis is provided by Houlihan, who argues that the meso-level perspectives offered by policy networks or advocacy coalitions are ‘only capable of providing a metaphor for policy-making if they are located within a broader theory of power’ (1997: 257). In relation to integrating macro- and meso-level of analysis, neo-pluralist/elitist accounts of policy networks/subsystems can be summarised as follow:

Policy networks are a restriction on democracy because the tighter networks reflect a consistent pattern of structured political inequality and are characterised by the exclusion of most interests. Networks will generally be dominated by a narrow range of interests, particularly economic, professional and state interests (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998: 57). The influence of the privileged position of a selected number of interest groups, the logic of technical rationality, and the complex interdependencies within decentralised governmental structure (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992a: 266).
The integration of macro- and meso-levels of analysis may thus help to account for the process of elite sport policy change within the broader political and sociological contexts. The last aspect is associated with the above observations. That is, the context of a theory of power relations should be located at the heart of the analysis of policy process and change. It is important to clarify how power is conceptualised in this study. More specifically, it is important to explore how power/power relations emerged, and are maintained between interest groups and organisations in the policy-making process, given that power is employed in multi-dimensional ways in which actors and interest groups interplay within policy networks/subsystems.
CHAPTER 3

Research strategy and methods

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to set out the research strategy and specific methods for the study. Given that there is a directional relationship between ontology, epistemology, methodology, methods and sources (cf. Grix, 2002), it is essential to begin with a consideration of ontological and epistemological assumptions. Indeed, Sparkes argues that ‘at a most fundamental level different paradigms provide particular sets of lenses for seeing the world and making sense of it in different ways’ (1992: 12). This chapter therefore begins by reviewing the key ontological and epistemological paradigms and then specifies the philosophical position adopted for the study. The second part of this chapter explores methodological consideration regarding structure and agency, based on these ontological and epistemological stances. The third part of this chapter outlines methods in order to set out the most suitable research design for this study: multiple case study design, semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Furthermore, fundamental considerations involved in the research design and each method are discussed. Based on multiple case study design, the rationale for the selection of the case studies is outlined. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the study’s research strategy and implications for the substantive analysis of policy change.

3.2 Ontological and epistemological assumptions

It should be pointed out at the outset that ontology (that is, what is out there to know about) and epistemology (that is, what and how can we know about it) are core components of the research process, especially in the social sciences (cf. Grix, 2002). Hence, an understanding of ontological and epistemological assumptions
underpinning research design is required in order to: (i) understand the interrelationship between the key components of research (including methodology and methods); (ii) avoid confusion when discussing theoretical debates and approaches to social phenomena; and (iii) be able to recognise others’, and defend our own, positions (Grix, 2002: 176).

According to Sparkes, ‘ontological assumptions revolve around questions regarding the nature of existence: that is, the very nature of the subject matter of the research’ (1992: 12). Thus we can recognise an individual’s ontological stance as ‘their answer to the question; what is the nature of the social and political reality to be investigated?’ (Ha, 2002: 61). In this sense, it is essential that, following ontological questions, epistemological questions can be asked and answered (cf. Grix, 2002: 177). In other words, ontological assumptions underlie and reflect epistemological positions which have an effect on the choice of methodology. Ontological positions are largely divided between two perspectives, ‘foundationalism’ and ‘anti-foundationalism’. In ontological terms, the foundationalist notion is that ‘there is a real world ‘out there’ which is external to agents (Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 19). In order words, it implies that social phenomena have external facts that are in existence beyond our reach or influence (Bryman, 2004: 16). Hence, foundationalists focus upon identifying the causes of social behaviour in order to establish causal relationships between social phenomena (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). In contrast, anti-foundationalists contend that ‘there is not a ‘real’ world, which exists independently of the meaning which actors attach to their action, to discover’ (Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 19). Anti-foundationalists assert that ‘social phenomena and their meaning are continually being accomplished by social actors and produced through social interaction’ (Bryman, 2004: 17). Thus, they lay stress on the meaning of behaviour through understanding rather than explanation (Marsh & Furlong, 2002).

Epistemology as a theory or philosophy of knowledge refers to ‘the claims or assumptions about the possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality, whatever it is understood to be: that is, claims about how what exists may be known’ (Blaikie, 2000: 8). As epistemological positions are linked to methodology and methods (cf. Grix, 2002), it provides ‘a view and justification for what can be regarded as knowledge - that is, what can be known, and what criteria such knowledge must
satisfy in order to be called knowledge rather than beliefs’ (Blaikie, 1993: 7). This argument has significance for social research in that any particular epistemological stance enables the researcher to underpin and support their scientific discovery beyond mere discovery of social phenomena and beliefs. Social research without an epistemological position can be likened to ‘a castle on the sand’. However, this does not mean that one position is superior to another, but it is important to outline and defend the particular epistemological position taken for any particular research design (Marsh, 1999; see also Marsh & Furlong, 2002). In this respect, there are three main stances: positivism, interpretivism and critical realism each of which has different epistemological assumptions. First, positivism ‘advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond’ (Bryman, 2004: 11). Second, interpretivism, in contrast, ‘is predicated upon the view that a strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural science and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action’ (Bryman, 2004: 13). Lastly, critical realism aims to provide ‘scientific principles that are capable of capturing the nature of reality’ (Blaikie, 1993: 59). Table 3.1 outlines the core perspectives of, and differences between these three paradigms that have been widely adopted in the social and political sciences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positivism</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positivism is based upon a foundationalist ontology – so, to the Positivist, like the Realist, but unlike those from the Interpretist position, the world exists independently of our knowledge of it</td>
<td>Interpretivism is based on upon a anti-foundationalist ontology - the world does not exist independently of our knowledge of it – unlike the Positivist and Realist paradigms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular relationships between social phenomena can be established, using theory to generate hypotheses which can be tested, falsified by direct observation</td>
<td>The world is socially, or discursively constructed – at odds with positivism, but like realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within the positivist position, there are no deep structure that cannot be observed – unlike the Realist</td>
<td>Social phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretation of them; it is this interpretation/understanding of them which affects outcomes – and it is the interpretation and meanings of social phenomena</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that are crucial nevertheless that discursive construction affects outcomes

| To the positivist there is no appearance/reality dichotomy and the world is real and not socially constructed | Interpretations/meanings can only be established and understood within discourses or traditions; however, the Interpretivist position acknowledges that ‘objective’ analysis is impossible – knowledge is theoretically or discursively laden | For this reason, structures do not determine outcomes, rather they constrain and facilitate; social science involves the study of reflexive agents who are capable of constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing structures |

Source: Adapted from Marsh et al., (1999: 11-14); Marsh & Furlong (2002: 22-30)

In order to adopt particular ontological and epistemological positions for this study, we need more detailed consideration of the three positions outlined above. Firstly, the positivist would not acknowledge an argument that transformation or consensus could happen at a deeper structural level, or that the relationships between deep structures and political outcomes may not be directly observable (Marsh, 1999). In addition, within the positivist position, many lay stress on agency in its explanation of outcomes as they see agency as more directly observable than structure. A pertinent example is the emphasis on Margaret Thatcher’s role when explaining the rise of ‘Thatcherism’ (Marsh, 1999). This paradigm underpins positivist methodology and the relationship between structure and agency in particular. With regard to methods, the positivists believe that ‘it is possible for social science to be objective and value-free because we can separate empirical and normative questions’ (David & Furlong, 2002: 23). Thus, in order to understand the social and political world positivists rely upon ‘nomothetic’ approaches which focus on systematic procedures and methods (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 6) by utilising ‘hard data’ such as government statistics, election results and questionnaire ‘facts’ rather than ‘soft data’ such as interviews and participant observation (David & Furlong, 2002). As such, the positivist attempts to establish the accurate nature of relationships between social phenomena and produce causal models.

Interpretivists share the view that there is no objective truth in the social and political world; ‘truth’ is understood subjectively (Bryman, 2004; see also Marsh & Furlong, 2002). In this sense, the interpretivist endeavours to explain how to understand social phenomena and how people understand social and political behaviour. This is achieved by utilising qualitative methods such as interviews, focus groups, documentary evidence and participant observation (cf. Marsh & Furlong, 2002).
Accordingly, quantitative methods are not as suitable for this position, but can be used. Moreover, this view’s strength is bound up with ‘the importance of discursive construction, emphasising that ideas affect political outcomes’ (Marsh, 1999: 13). In other words, social phenomena and features could be interpreted by discourse as a set of ideas. By the same token, positivists view the interpretivist paradigm as merely opinions or subjective discussions, accounting for the world (Marsh & Furlong, 2002).

Critical realism shares the positivist’s view which is to discover causal relationships between social phenomena, ‘while accepting the interpretative view that social reality is pre-interpreted, that society is both produced and reproduced by its members and is therefore both a condition and an outcome of their activity’ (Blaikie, 1993: 59). In this regard, critical realism is situated between positivism and interpretivism and eschews extreme and marginal positions. Marsh & Furlong capture the essence of a realist position:

There was a difference between ‘real’ interests, which reflect material reality, and perceived interests, which might be manipulated by the powerful forces in society. Given this view, we cannot just ask people what their interests are, because we would merely be identifying their manipulated interests, not their ‘real’ interests (2002: 31).

The role of theory in realism is therefore to contextualise observable behaviour in that there are deep structures that cannot be directly observed, but by using theory to infer the underlying structures of a particular social and political event and situation (cf. Hollis & Smith, 1991: 207; Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 30). Here, it should be noted that critical realism has been increasingly utilised and applied by many policy analysts. For example, Hay (1995, 2002), Marsh et al., (1999) and Marsh & Smith (2000, 2001) have adopted the key ontological and epistemological assumptions derived from critical realism in analysing policy processes, especially policy networks. Furthermore, it is worth noting that within a ‘critical’ paradigm, ideas inform knowledge which is constructed by pre-existing sets of social relations and structures (Sparkes, 1992: see also Lewis, 2002). Thus, critical methodological approaches explore knowledge which is bound up with prevailing social structures so that critical social research is related to the broad historical, political and social contexts in which phenomena are interrelated (Sparkes, 1992). In this respect, critical social research has ‘critical-
dialectical’ perspectives which try to unearth deep social structures (Sparkes 1992). As such, Scambler argues that we should look ‘beneath-the-surface’ to explain social phenomena ‘on-the-surface’ (2005: 165). As an example of critical methodology in relation to sport, Chalip (1996) used a critical approach to analyse sport policy discourses in New Zealand.

While there has been a limited adoption of research based on critical realism in the sport/PE sector (cf. Spakes, 1992), it is increasing. With regard to the study of sport policy, Green (2003) adopted a critical realist perspective in analysing elite sport policy processes in general, and advocacy coalitions in particular. Lee (2005) adopted critical realism for reviewing the system of governance of professional baseball in Taiwan. In addition, Chatziefstathiou (2005) adopted critical realism in understanding and explaining the expression of values associated with the Olympic ideology across time. Furthermore, drawing on the work of Marsh et al., (1999) based on critical realism, in ‘Postwar British Politics’, Sayer suggests that in analysing and explaining postwar British political development these authors support multidimensional accounts based on integrating significant factors such as social and economic changes, political ideology, international contexts and the agency of the government, while criticising one-sided accounts which attempt to explain the whole in terms of a single part or theme such as the decline of the British economy or Thatcherism in terms of Mrs Thatcher’s personality and style (2000: 25).

As mentioned above, given the argument that there are deep structures surrounding social phenomena, which cannot be directly observed, critical realist approaches assume that many-sided elements such as the internal and external worlds surrounding actors’ behaviours in specific circumstances should be considered in explaining causation between social phenomena. In relation to the theoretical framework, this argument can be linked to the capacity of the ACF to embrace exogenous and endogenous factors. More specifically, in order to analyse the sources of policy change in policy networks or a policy subsystem, social scientists should take account of: (i) fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure; (ii) change in socio-

economic conditions, institutions and actors’ beliefs and values; (iii) the basic attributes of the problem; and (iv) the given circumstances on the ground with which these elements interact. In relation to this, Sayer provides a useful summation of critical realist strategies:

It is the priority given to conceptualisation and abstraction, for how we ‘carve up’ and define our objects of study tends to set the fate of any subsequent research. Critical realists seek substantial connections among phenomena rather than formal associations or regularities. So explanation of the social world also requires an attentiveness to its stratification, to emergent powers arising from certain relationships, and to the ways in which the operation of causal mechanisms depends on the constraining and enabling effects of contexts (2000: 27).

With regard to the position outlined above, critical realists regard the relationship between social structure and human agency as a fundamental consideration (Lewis, 2002). For critical realists, ‘social and political events are generated by a complex causal nexus that involves both the efficient causation of actors and the material causation of social structure’ (Lewis, 2002: 21). Accordingly, social and political events of interest must be understood as the result of the causal interaction over time between structure and agency (Archer, 1995: 15; Hall & Taylor, 1996: 942; Marsh & Smith, 2000; 5-7). Such an assumption sheds light on the perspective that structures do not determine outcomes, rather they constrain or facilitate (Marsh & Furlong, 2002; Sibeon, 1997). From a critical perspective, theory enables us to understand and explain underlying structural relationships and interplay between actors’ behaviours and structure in policy communities, issue networks and advocacy coalitions (cf. Green, 2003). Critical realism’s assumptions are captured in the following passage, which outlines the mutual influence between structure and agency:

Social structure and agency are held to be recursively related. Each is both a condition for and a consequence of the other. Actors constantly draw on social structure in order to act and in acting they either reproduced or transform those structures. Consequently, neither agency nor structure can be reduced to the other (Lewis, 2002: 18-19).

The ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying critical realism provide the philosophical base for this study. To put it more specifically, given the assumption
of critical realism that that ‘there are deep structures which cannot be directly observed’ (Marsh et al., 1994: 14) and all social phenomena (social and political events) are generated by a complex causal nexus within which structure and agency interact but not are directly observable (Lewis, 2002: 21; Marsh & Smith, 2001: 530), this study is premised on a set of ontological and epistemological assumptions related to the critical realist paradigm. The reason is that interpretivism and positivism would not be capable of capturing the deep relations of both structure and agency to the degree that we attempt to investigate social and political phenomena, in respect of sport policy change, whereas the critical realist paradigm could shed light on the mechanisms of complex policy processes and change by which actors interact with in a broader and dynamic political and social-structure context. From the critical realist perspective the role of theory is bound up with how we understand and explain particular complex social and political phenomena which cannot be directly observed. In the same vein, it is essential for critical realists to consider a diversity of ‘unseen’ explanatory elements to identify and explain underlying structures of a particular social and political situation (cf. Hollis & Smith, 1991: 207). For example, from this perspective, we need to consider a wide-range of factors such as social structures, political ideology, socio-economic contexts, institutions, the invisible logic of power behind the policy process, one’s own will, shared beliefs and one’s preference over time behind or surrounding individual or group behaviour in relation to policy analysis. In this sense, as Sayer argues, ‘explanation based on critical realism requires mainly interpretive and qualitative research to discover actors’ reasoning and circumstance in specific contexts’ (2000: 23). As such, for this study the ontological and epistemological assumptions associated with critical realism are justified by the argument that ‘critical realism leaves conceptual room for a range of causally significant factors and as a result is more able to do justice to the complexity of political life’ (Lewis, 2002: 22; see also Lawson, 1997: 60-61).

To sum up, ‘ontology relates to the nature of the social and political world, epistemology to what we can know about it and methodology to how we might go about acquiring that knowledge’ (Hay, 2002: 63). The ‘directional’ relationship between ontology, epistemology, methodology, methods and sources is outlined in Figure 3.1.
The assumption of critical realism adopted for this study ‘endorses or is compatible with a relatively wide range of research methods, but it implies that the particular choices should depend on the nature of the object of study’ (Sayer, 2000: 19). In this sense, critical realism can be linked to an ‘intensive’ approach, which aims at discovering substantial relations on connection between ‘causal groups in which particular individuals are actually involved, that is the groups or networks of specific people, institutions, discourses and things with which they interact’ (Sayer, 2000: 21; see also Sayer, 1992). Thus, for this study the intensive approach would play a pivotal role in accounting for power relations and resource distributions in policy networks, policy communities and advocacy coalitions surrounding the elite sport sector in South Korea because it is principally concerned with what makes things happen in specific circumstances in order to explain deep causal relations between certain objects or events behind or the outside of our sight. Accordingly, the intensive approach would primarily adopt qualitative analysis using semi-structured interviews and document analysis rather than quantitative analysis of large-scale surveys.
Taken together, as different ontological and epistemological positions lead to different research methods and strategies depending on different methodology, Table 3.2 outlines the differences in the three approaches: foundationalist /positivist, anti-foundationalist/interpretivist and foundationalist/critical realist.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontology</th>
<th>Epistemology</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foundationalist</td>
<td>Positivist</td>
<td>Choice of quantitative strategy, using multiple cases</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Survey data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-foundationalist</td>
<td>Interpretivist</td>
<td>Choice of both quantitative and qualitative strategy, usually using small number of in-depth cases</td>
<td>Interviews; Survey</td>
<td>Interview transcripts and survey data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundationalist</td>
<td>Critical realist: positioned between Positivist and Interpretivist</td>
<td>Choice of both quantitative and qualitative strategy, usually using small number of in-depth cases</td>
<td>Interview transcripts and survey data</td>
<td>Interview transcripts and survey data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Grix (2002: 184)

Given that critical realism as a set of ontological and epistemological paradigms underpins and affects methodological choices (in particular, the intensive approach), the next step is to consider methodology in more depth and particularly to explore the relationships between both structure and agency.

### 3.3 Methodological considerations

We have looked at the philosophical assumptions in order to determine this study’s position in terms of the way of looking at the social world. As a different philosophical stance has a different point of view in seeing social events and the world, methodological considerations seeking to look at, and interpret, the social construction of events and meanings have important implications for the choices of methods. Methodology as a bridging mechanism between philosophical paradigms
and methods relates to ‘the choice of analytical and research design which underpins substantive research’ (Hay, 2002: 63). As Blaikie helpfully notes, ‘methodology is the analysis of how research should or does proceed’ (1993: 7). In relation to this, a number of political and social scientists consider that the structure-agency question is one of the most crucial theoretical issues within political science (cf. Giddens, 1984; Archer, 1995). To put it more specifically, the structure-agency concern raises a significant point of how to look at social and political phenomena (here, the process of policy change).

### 3.3.1 Structure and agency

The debate surrounding the relationship between structure and agency is one of the crucial issues in social science. As Archer argues, ‘the reality of social situations can be usefully reflected by consideration of the two fundamental components of social life – structure and agency’ (1995: 17). Indeed, for critical realists, the relationship between structure and agency is an overriding concern at the heart of analysis of the social world (cf. Bates, 2006; Lewis, 2000). In relation to this issue, McAnulla provide the following explanation which helps us to understand the significance and influence of structure and agency:

> The debate concerns the issue of to what extent we as actors have the ability to shape our destiny as against the extent to which our lives are structured in ways out of our control; the degree to which our fate is determined by external forces. Agency refers to individual or group abilities to affect their environment. Structure usually refers to context; to the material conditions which define the range of actions available to actors (2002: 271).

In other words, agency is regarded as ‘the capacity to act upon situations’ and structure is considered as ‘the conditions within which actors operate, encompassing social norms and rules’ (Lewis, 2002: 18). There are different ways of looking at the relationship between structure and agency. Some emphasise structural factors such as social class, religion, gender, ethnicity and custom, which have influence on political effect, outcomes and events exclusively in terms of contextual factors; whereas others emphasise agential factors such as the ability or capacity of an actor, which implies a
sense of free will and autonomy (Hay, 2002). Thus, we identify the former as
structuralism and the latter as intentionalism. To put it concretely, ‘structuralists such
as Althusser believe that individuals act in accordance with structures that they cannot
see, and of which they may have no awareness’ (McAnulla, 2002: 275). In this sense,
the way in which unobservable structures either constrain or determine human action
can reflect political change by looking at the development and interaction of
structures (McAnulla, 2002). On the other hand, for intentionalists, the main focus is
on individual actions which seek to promote their benefit and self-interest (Bunge,
1996). In this regard, political outcomes can be explained by viewing the social and
political world from the pattern, mode and nature of behaviours which the participants
make in the social and political process (Hay, 2002).

However, as mentioned above, in line with critical realism, the emphasis is on the
interplay between structure and agency; that is, a dialectical relationship. Crucially,
our academic curiosity is ‘how structure and agency relate to one another and interact’
(McAnulla, 2002: 278). As Marsh et al. note, ‘Agents are, in a sense, “bearers” of
structural positions, but they interpret those structures. At the same time, structures
are not unchanging; they change in part because of the strategic decisions of the
agents operating within the structure’ (1999: 15). In this respect, ‘social structure both
facilitates and constrains the behaviour of actors, influencing their decisions about
what course of action to pursue and thereby having an impact on the course of social
events’ (Lewis, 2002: 18). In order words, policy outcomes are not responsive to one
factor (structure or agency), but are generated by the interaction between both
structure and agency. Thus, the relationship between structure and agency to explain
social phenomena can be referred as ‘two sides of the same coin’ (cf. Hay, 1996;
McAnulla, 2002; Jessop, 1990; see Hay, 2002 for a detail on this issue). In line with
critical realism, structural and agential factors should be regarded as indivisible.
Therefore, the view adopted here is one that ‘allows for the influence of both
situational [structural] and voluntary [agency] factors in accounting for the activities
of human beings’ (Burrel & Morgan, 1979: 6). Accordingly, policy outcomes should
be explained with reference to both structure and agency (Marsh et al., 1995),
otherwise the explanation of social phenomena would not be complete and the
account of outcomes would be distorted. In explaining this dialectical relationship,
Archer’s model of the relationship between structure and agency is a useful guide:
Structural conditioning (T1): This refers to the context in which action subsequently take place. As a result of past actions particular conditions emerge (for example, climate change, globalisation, the structure of political institutions); Social interaction (T2-T3): Agents are strongly influenced by the structured conditions at T1. However, they also have at least some degree of independent power to affect events; Structural elaboration (or reproduction) (T4): As a result of the actions at T2-T3, the structural conditions are changed, at least to some extent. Some groups may have successfully changed conditions to suit their own interests, others may have lost out (1995: 71).

Through the ‘morphogenetic’ model, Archer underlines the interaction between structure and agency over time in order to explain how structure and agency relate (McAnulla, 2005). However, in considering Archer’s conceptualisation of structure and agency, Hay (2002) is critical of the view that there is an ontological distinction between structure and agency so that the two can be seen to exist independently. Hay argues that ‘structure and agency cannot be ontologically distinguished by virtue of the fact that one cannot exist without the other’, assuming that their existence can be understood as ‘metals in the alloy from which [a] coin is forged’ (McAnulla, 2005: 35). However, even if there is the discrepancy of cognition regarding structure and agency between Archer and Hay, our key concern is the interrelationship between the two which gives impetus to methodological considerations looking at structure and agency. In this sense, Lewis asserts that ‘social structure and human agency presuppose one another, implying that only the combination of the two is sufficient to produce social events’ (2000: 264)

In relation to these standpoints, the issue of agency, for example, refers to the talents and/or weaknesses of George W. Bush in explaining political events of the United States; that is, ‘Bush’s style, psychology and character are mentioned in connection with how effectively he is performing as President’, and the issue of structures refers to the ‘external challenges’ such as globalisation, international institutions and environmental threats which the US Government faces (McAnulla, 2002). In a similar vein, this perspective could provide a significant implication for this study in explaining the process of elite sport policy change in South Korea. In line with this position, we could identify structural and agential factors surrounding sport sectors in South Korea. A pertinent example of structural factors is the structuring of
governmental organisations in line with political ideologies: the creation of the
Ministry of Sport under the former military regime, the Ministry of Culture and
Tourism (from 1998 to 2008), and currently the Ministry of Culture, Sport and
Tourism (for more details see chapter 4). However, as policy analysis would not be
complete without considering agency factors (cf. Green, 2003), it is necessary to
examine agential factors in explaining policy process. Two examples of agential
factors related to sport in the recent history of South Korea help to make the point.
The first is the role of the former President Jeon Doo-Hwan under the military regime
in placing elite sport concerns higher on the political agenda in the 1980s. The second
is the will, political creed and beliefs of the former President Kim Young-Sam who,
as the first civilian president, influenced elite sport policy issues. In order words, elite
sport development was not viewed as politically salient under Kim Young-Sam’s
leadership.

However, as Marsh et al., note that ‘these agents are located within a broader political
and social-structure context’ (1999: 15), and structural factors such as the IMF crisis,
the change of political regime and the advent of civil society, is required in order to
fully account for elite sport development in South Korea. In addition, Marsh et al.,
argue that as a dialectical approach demands a longitudinal analysis, analysis of
policy change requires a long-term perspective; a partial snapshot would not fully
explain policy change (1999: 15). In this sense, our concern to explore policy change
over a long time period can be linked to the capacity of the ACF in illuminating a
time frame of a decade or more to acquire a reasonably accurate account of policy
change. The reason can be justified by the following argument based on critical
realism by Lewis:

Pre-existing social structure, bequeathed to the current generation of actors by actions
undertaken in the past, constitutes the conditions in which current action takes place and
so shape the latter’. In turn, the (reproduced or transformed) set of structures which are the
product of current behaviour form the context for the next round of action (Lewis, 2002:
21).

Therefore, in order to understand and explain contemporary elite sport policy change
in South Korea we need to look at how areas of sport policy have been developed and
changed by undertaking a historical review (for more details see chapter 4.). Accordingly, the understanding of the past sport contexts, and political, social and cultural contexts would help to underpin the analysis of elite sport policy change. For this study the integrated approaches can be reinforced by the assumption of a dialectical relationship between structure and agency on the basis of a critical realist perspective.

3.4. Research design and methods

3.4.1 Introduction

As Sayer notes, ‘the particular choices of research methods should depend on the nature of the subject of study’ (2000: 19). Given this research’s aim and objectives outlined in Chapter 1, this study adopts qualitative research methods using ‘soft data’ because quantitative research methods using ‘hard data’ are less likely to be appropriate for investigating the complexity and dynamics of elite sport policy change which could not be directly observed and which occur as a result of a wide-range of causal relations and interactions within deeper and broader social and political contexts. Moreover, as the previous section outlined, the critical realist position adopted in this study is mainly suitable for interpretive and qualitative research to discover deep relations between groups and individuals within broad contexts (cf. Sayer, 2000). As such, qualitative research methods are aimed at ‘capturing meaning, process and context’ by drawing attention to contextual issues (Bryman, 1988: 62; see also Devine, 2002). Accordingly, out of qualitative research methods such as observation, analysing texts/documents, interviews/focus groups and audio/video recording, two research methods for this study are adopted: semi-structured interview and document analysis. Before embarking on a discussion of the two methods in turn, it is necessary to consider the discussion of multiple-case study design employed in this study.
3.4.2 Multiple-case study design

As Stake (1995) notes, case study research is understood as a research strategy to investigate the complexity and particular nature of the case in question. The use of the term ‘case’ focuses attention on the intensive investigation of particular setting (Bryman, 2004). Yin provides two technical definitions (characteristics) for the case study:

Firstly, a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary within its-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and contexts are not clearly evident. Secondly, the case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to data collection and analysis (1994: 13).

In this sense, case study research design allows for an investigation of the unique features and rich complexities of contemporary events, dealing with a full variety of evidence – documents, interviews, artefacts and observation (Yin, 1994).

There are two approaches in case study research; single- and multiple-case studies. It is generally acknowledged that a single case is appropriate for representing an extreme or unique case (Yin, 1994). However, ‘the single-case study cannot be regarded as a complete study on its own’ (Yin, 1994: 41), whereas the value of the multiple-case study is emphasised as being more robust (Herriott & Firestone, 1983). Evidence from multiple-cases (three sports – archery, athletics and baseball) provides detailed descriptions of a specific topic in a particular setting (Hague et al., 1998) and also allows for the potential to draw cross-case conclusions on a particular topic. Research designs based on multiple-case studies are particularly suitable for subjects that are too complicated and involve too many actors to be addressed by interview survey (Hakim, 2000). In this respect, in order to analyse the complexity and dynamics of elite sport policy change, this study adopts a multiple-case design. A deeper understanding of elite sport policy change in South Korea can be gained through an investigation of how government, quasi-governmental bodies, NGBs and
other organisations relating to sport within and/or surrounding the three sports operate and interact, and what they make for the development of three sports. Hakim suggests that ‘multiple case studies provide an important alternative to the sample survey for certain research questions where there is a need to provide broad generalisation as well as to take account of the complexity of the subject matter’ (2000: 62). Thus, the aim of the multiple-case study is to produce detailed, in-depth and rich findings on a particular subject.

It is also necessary to note that, more often than not, multiple-case design involves ‘focused comparisons’ in that the logic of multiple-case design enables research to provide an ‘intensive comparison of a few instances’ (Hague et al., 1998: 280). In relation to this, although this study does not focus on a comparative research design by adopting multiple-case design, the use of multiple-cases, to some extent, enables this research to draw cross-case conclusions between two or more cases. As Yin suggests, with regard to the logic underlying the use of multiple-case studies, ‘each case must be carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) produces contrasting results but for predictable reason (a theoretical replication)’ (1994: 47). In this sense, for this study findings from the three cases may not only provide similar features regarding elite sport policy processes and changes, but also offer distinctive variations. In relation to theoretical reflections, Yin argues that ‘the use of theory, in doing case studies, not only is an immense aid in defining the appropriate research design and data collection but also becomes the main vehicle for generalising the results of the case study’ (1994: 32). In this sense, the number of cases investigated help to increase the potential to draw wider conclusions across cases. Furthermore, cross-case conclusions underpinning the theoretical basis and framework of the study might be useful for investigating elite sport policy process and policy change in other sports. Therefore, we analyse different perspectives/types of sport to draw a whole picture of elite sport policy change in South Korea.

3.4.2.1 Fundamental considerations involved in case study design

There are three main issues to consider in using a case study design. The first issue is about ‘rigour’ (Yin, 1994). Yin is critical of some case study research, stating that
‘too many times the case study investigator has been sloppy and has allowed equivocal evidence or biased view to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions’ (1994: 9). This second issue is directly related to ‘reliability’ concerns. In order words, for greater objectivity, ‘if a later investigator followed exactly the same case study all over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusions’ (Yin, 1994: 36). In fact, this is more associated with quantitative research than qualitative research in which, although a researcher follows same cases on a certain topic with the same theoretical approach and process, the researcher may or may not draw same conclusions or produce same findings. However, in order to achieve reliable conclusions and findings qualitative researchers have to document their theoretical assumptions and methodological approach. In short, the reliability problem is aimed at minimising the errors and biases in a research (Yin, 1994). The third issue is bound up with a ‘construct validity’ problem which is raised in case study design. This is when ‘a case study investigator fails to develop a sufficiently operational set of measures and ‘subjective’ judgements are used to collect the data’ (Yin, 1994: 34). In this sense, the theoretical assumption is instructive in conducting case study in qualitative research. It is important to recall that for this study the role of theory in realism is to contextualise observable behaviour by using theory to infer the underlying structures of a particular social and political event and situation (cf. Hollis & Smith, 1991: 207). As such, the assumption of theory before conducting empirical study helps qualitative researchers to establish guideline for achieving research objective and to indicate an appropriate strategy for collecting data. For example, as noted in earlier chapter, the ACF emphasises actors’ values, beliefs, and notions in explaining policy change, which these factors cannot be investigated easily through statistical methods, but can be investigated through semi-structured interviews and document analysis.

In order to establish the reliability and construct validity in a case study design, Yin suggests three useful principles which will be followed in the study: (i) use multiple sources of evidence, aimed at the development of converging lines of inquiry, a process of triangulation. So the use of multiple sources of evidence in a case study research helps an investigator to cover a broad-range of historical, social, attitudinal, and behavioural issues; (ii) create a case database which is a way of organising and documenting the data collected for case studies, including interview transcripts,
observations on document analysis, and rigorous recording of references used; and (iii) maintain a chain of evidence – the principle is to allow an external observer to be able to trace the derivation of any evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions (Yin, 1994: 90-99). Lastly, ‘a common concern about case studies is that they provide little basis for scientific generalisation: the external validity problem’ (Yin, 1994: 10). In this regard, the cross-case conclusions of this study are not to generalise in a statistical sense. On the other hand, the multiple-case study could design the use of replication logic, but ‘case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes’ (Yin, 1994: 10). Thus, the goal of researchers in qualitative empirical study is to enhance and generalise theories with findings gained from multiple-cases; thus analytic providing generalisation.

3.4.2.2 Rationale for the selection of the cases

For this study we need to consider the rationale for selecting the study’s ‘cases’. In selecting the cases, this study is based on purposive sampling that illustrates some features or processes in which researchers are interested (cf. Silverman, 2006). As noted by Bryman (2004), purposive sampling in qualitative research entails an attempt to set up relevant linkages between research questions and sampling. Thus, bearing in mind that we need to consider cases which can reflect features of the elite sport policy process in terms of deep and multi-dimensional perspectives, for a detailed analysis of elite sport policy change, three sports (archery, athletics and baseball) are selected by purposive sampling from the 55 sports affiliated officially to the Korea Sports Council. The three sports meet the two requirements indicated by Green & Houlihan (2005) in the Australia, Canada and UK contexts: first, ‘that they are all prominent Olympic sports and have major World Championships’; and second, their respective national sporting organisations affiliated in the KSC have responsibility for a number of sub-disciplines, all of which compete for resources and attention of influential actors in the policy-making process (for more details, see Green & Houlihan, 2005: 8). A third criterion is that the sports should differ in some ways; they are not only selected in terms of similarity, but also in terms of difference, which would reveal particular homogeneities and differences among them. In other words, as noted above, the three
sports are selected in terms of different perspectives of sport to draw a more complete picture of elite sport policy change in South Korea.

Further rationales for the selection of the respective sports are as follows: firstly, archery as a ‘major’ Olympic sport in South Korea is selected for this research. It is one of the sports highly expected to win gold medals at the summer Olympic Games or other international competition levels. Indeed, Korea’s national archery team has achieved considerable international success over the past two decades (Sung, 2008). Secondly, athletics as a ‘minor’ Olympic sport in South Korea is selected for this study. Athletics is regarded as a foundation sport, part of the national PE curriculum from primary school to high school, but its competitiveness is relatively poor at the international level, in spite of government interest. It is worth noting that the marathon gold medal won in the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games was a significant moment for the national elite athletics policy actors, stimulating future investment in the development of elite performance. More recently, Daegu’s successful bid for the 2011 World Championships in Athletics led the government to invest substantial resources in developing athletics performance and infrastructure. Thirdly, baseball as a representative ‘professional’ sport is selected. Baseball is regarded as the most popular sport for the Korean public among the nation’s professional sports, and the nation’s professional baseball league has been in place since 1982. Moreover, contrary to other professional ball sports, baseball is considered as a good prospect for winning a medal at the Olympic Games or other international competition levels. In sum, the three sports’ different characteristics provide a strong basis upon which to investigate the processes involved in elite sport policy change.

3.4.3 Semi-structured interviews

The interview is one of the most widely used methods in qualitative research (Bryman, 2001). There are three main types of interview: structured, semi-structured and unstructured formats. The structured interview mainly employed in quantitative research provides limited flexibility and reduces ambiguity of response (Bryman, 2001). Thus, structured interviews do not allow the researcher to explore the rich/deep
meaning, contextual detail and phenomena in which responses are made (Mason 1996). On the other hand, in the unstructured interview ‘there may be just a single question that the interviewer asks and the interviewee is then allowed to respond freely’ (Bryman, 2001: 320). It is therefore possible to ‘explore and expand upon the issues that interest them as they are not guided by the predetermined set of ideas or expectations of the researchers’ (Patton, 2002: 342). However, while the unstructured interview can generate rich and deep data, the use of that data can be problematic in that it may be difficult to identify and categorise data within what may be extremely diverse contents (Thomas, 2004). So using semi-structured interviews allows the interviewer to divide the research topics and provide an interview guide which allows similar questions to be asked to each interviewee while still allowing the interviewee to talk at length on an issue and to provide their interpretation of topics. The semi-structured interview is ‘based on an interview guide, open-ended questions and informal probing to facilitate a discussion of issues’ (Devine, 2002: 198). As such, the semi-structured interview is open and flexible so that it can remain conversational yet also allow for interviewees to provide some background context (Patton, 2002). Such intensive interviewing ‘offers richly descriptive reports of individuals’ perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, views, meaning and interpretations given to events and things, as well as their behaviour’ (Hakim, 2000: 34). Indeed, key actors’ perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and experiences involved within a broader political and social-structural context can be considered as one of the important sources in analysing policy change on elite sport because insights provided from key actors involved in elite sport sector help us to understand deep and complex social phenomena which cannot be directly observed. Keat & Urry argue that the in-depth interview is appropriate when seeking to understand actors’ perspectives that attach subjective meaning to their actions and interpret action of their own situation and that of others (1975: 205). Accordingly, semi-structured interviews with key personnel involved in elite sport development can reveal their deep perspectives, perceptions, experiences and beliefs, and then offer useful insights in understanding and accounting for the complexity and dynamics of the process of elite sport policy change.

The rationale for adopting semi-structured interviews is reinforced by the following reasoning: first, the semi-structured interview is aimed at gaining some insight into world-views of a number of different Korean key policy actors in sport, government
officials, and academics involved in sport policy in order to investigate ‘how they see things as they do’ (Fielding, 1993: 157); and it ‘attempts to discern the normative values and belief systems underlying the agent’s perspective as well as an assessment of their perception of the constraining/facilitating structural context within which they operate’ (Green, 2003: 62). However, even though there is an intensive focus on a particular interviewee, it is not about key individuals per se; reports from interview transcript focus rather on the ‘various patterns, or clusters, of attitudes and related behaviour that emerge from the interviews’ (Hakim, 2000: 34).

3.4.3.1 Fundamental considerations involved in semi-structured interviews

Given that the use of qualitative methods is often regarded as unrepresentative, to some extent, some deem qualitative research to be highly subjective and not open to external validation in terms of sampling and the interpretation of findings (Devine, 2002). From this perspective, some fundamental issues in respect of qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews are raised by three key concerns: (i) representativeness and reliability; (ii) interpretation; (iii) generalisability (Devine, 2002: 205-207). With regard to aspects of representativeness and reliability, Lee notes that a key issue concerns sampling techniques, namely ‘the selection of people, places or activities suitable for study’ (1993: 60). However, qualitative research methods do not seek to achieve representativeness. Instead of generating a representative sample for acquiring data and findings, qualitative research methods are likely to be related to particular aspects of the research topic and objective. Thus, qualitative research methods try to seek a diverse and deep range of responses (Devine, 2002). More especially, given that the issues of representativeness and reliability are logically associated with sampling, Green notes that qualitative research identifies a group of potential interviewees according to social characteristics, patterns of behaviour, and close association with particular aspects of the research topic (2003: 63). In this sense, the qualitative researcher should find ways of generating broad sample of interviewees (Devine, 2002). One criterion for the selection of interviewees is that they have been or were involved in senior positions in the area of elite sport policy and key sectors surrounding elite sport development over period of time. Taking account of the requirement of the ACF which requires a time frame a decade or more
to acquire a reasonably accurate account of policy change, we attempt to interview those who offer a longer term perspectives on policy. In identifying prospective interviewees, more especially, this study pays attention to key actors within Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism (MCST), quasi-governmental bodies (e.g. KSC, KSPO and KISS), NGBs and civic groups relating to the sport sector (as well as academics, journalists and former athletes). Furthermore, it would be possible for this research to generate further potential interviewees connected to a network throughout the interviewing process—what Devine (2002: 205) terms, ‘snowball sampling’, or the ‘snowball effect’ (Richards, 1996: 200).

With regard to issues of reliability, Hammersley notes that ‘reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions’ (1992: 67). A further issue in relation to reliability is involved in the process of collecting empirical material. It may be the case that it is necessary for the researcher to the document research procedure and to demonstrate that categories have been used consistently (Silverman, 2005). As a consequence, it is to some extent problematic that qualitative research is seemingly less reliable than quantitative research. Thus, Moisander & Valtonen (2006) suggest two ways to satisfy reliability criteria in qualitative research: (i) ‘by making the research process transparent through describing our research strategy and data analysis methods in a sufficiently detailed manner in the research report’; and (ii) ‘by paying attention to ‘theoretical transparency’ through making explicit the theoretical stance from which the interpretation takes place and showing how this produces particular interpretations and excludes others’ (quoted in Silverman, 2005: 282).

The second consideration for qualitative research is the analysis and interpretation of qualitative data. The analysis and interpretation of interview data is pertinent to validity. That is, how can we achieve a valid conclusion after conducting the interviews? According to Devine, ‘all data are subject to different interpretations and there is no definitive interpretation of the ‘truth’’ (1995: 145). Unlike quantitative analysis utilising determined (definite) statistical methods, the analysis and interpretation of interview material according to researchers in qualitative research could bring about a different conclusion. In other words, there is a possibility that
even though two researchers gather the same interview data through conducting the interviews, their analyses and interpretations might proceed in a different manner. Thus, transcripts are subjected to numerous readings until themes emerge to be analysed (Devine, 2002). In this process, researchers pay attention to particular/key content and selected extracts from the transcripts which underpin a study’s particular points or arguments. Nevertheless, Devine notes that the qualitative researcher seeks to satisfy the plausibility of their interpretation (2002). To enhance the validity of any interpretation and to demonstrate the plausibility of any conclusion by the interpretation, Devine argues that ‘the interpretation of interview material can be discussed with a group of researchers to obtain a consensus on the interpretation’ (2002: 206). In adopting the critical interpretative epistemology’s paradigm, that ‘the world is socially, or discursively constructed’ (Marsh et al., 1999: 11-14), consensus reached through the discussion with a variety of researchers would strengthen the validity of any interpretation. In addition, in relation to this, Sparkes argued that ‘truth … is what we make it to be based upon shared visions and common understanding that are socially constructed’ (1992: 31). Therefore, through discussion with a group of expert and experienced researchers, it is possible to enhance the validity of the interpretation and to reach the plausible of conclusions. In addition, ‘the internal consistency of an account can be assessed to establish whether an analysis is consistent with the themes that have been identified’ (Devine, 2002: 207) and ‘external validity can be considered by checking findings with other studies’ (Fielding, 1993: 166). Thus, most researchers triangulate their findings with other studies and theoretical reflection to enhance external validity.

The third issue for qualitative research is that of generalisability. As Devine notes, ‘it is not possible to generalise the findings from a study that confines itself to a small number of people or a particular setting’ (2002: 207). In order words, it is impossible to make generalisations about attitude and behaviour from in-depth interviews by utilising small cases. Thus, as qualitative researchers must be tentative in making inferences from a small number of cases to a larger population, researchers can design research which could facilitate an understanding of other situations (Rose, 1982). In this sense, researchers can corroborate the findings of one in-depth study with other research in order to establish regularities and differences (Devine, 1995). This comparison would allow for a limited test of confirmation or non-confirmation of any
results (Marsh, 1984). As Devine argues, ‘it is rarely the case that a sample of interviewees is so unrepresentative or the interpretations so misleading that suggestion about the wider incidence of certain phenomena is wholly specious’ (2002: 207). However, although qualitative research findings do not seek to make generalisations about a particular topic, they can interpret the ‘hidden meaning’ of a specific phenomenon. For example, the implication for funding on elite sport development stated by policy documents, reports, statistical data, and quantitative survey related to sport policy provides more direct evidences, but the use of only direct evidence is not enough to understand deep meanings behind the context in which government has allocated a considerable sums of money for elite sport development more than for sport for all and school sport development in South Korea. This is why the semi-structured interview is adopted for this study as a way of uncovering the profound meanings of elite sport policy change which are held by key actors and interest groups which are located in the broader social and political context.

3.4.4 Document analysis

The term ‘documents’ is conceived as a vast range of material found in all sorts of places (MacDonald, 2001: 197). Documents are one of the common sources for comprehending the meaning of social events, activities and phenomena. As Altheide (1996) argues, documents provide a significant clue regarding what people do and how they act, and furthermore, how their actions, practices and behaviours are influenced (but not determined) by circumstances. In this sense, document analysis is regarded as the fundamental technique for social science research. According to Yin, the primary value of document analysis in qualitative research is that document analysis can reinforce evidence from other methods (Yin, 1994). Also, it is generally acknowledged that the documents corroborate and enhance evidence from other sources (Yin, 1994, 2003) such as from semi-structured interviews. Therefore, document analysis enables us to: (i) ‘place symbolic meaning in context’; (ii) ‘track the process of its creation and influence on social definitions’; (iii) ‘let our understanding emerge through detailed investigation’; and (iv) ‘if we desire, use our understanding from the study of documents to change some social activities, including
the production of certain documents’ (Altheide, 1996: 12). From this point of view, documents are a useful resource in understanding the social world, as they can be viewed as the ‘sedimentations of social and political practices’ (May, 1997: 157). For this study, policy-related documents are analysed through what Altheide (1996: 15) has termed ‘qualitative document analysis which concerns understanding how different discourses make up the activities of actors within the broad social contexts and how they ‘are produced, how they function, and how they are changed’ (Howarth, 1995: 115).

There are a wide range of different sources of documents: personal documents (diaries and letters), official documents derived from the government/private organisations, mass media and other non-written sources (film, video and slide) (Bryman, 2004). The most common types of documents, however, are sources such as official documents/reports, newspapers, reports, books and journals. Accordingly, we firstly use public documents such as Sports White Papers, annual reports, statics (indexes) and strategy documents of government and quasi-governmental bodies of sport (KSC, KSPO and KOCOSA) and magazines/annual reports published from the three sports’ governing bodies. In addition, as a huge amount of political and social information is presented via media format (Tan, 2008), media sources including online resources (particularly, newspaper articles), are used in understanding the phenomena of social and political events. In relation to this, Harrison observes that ‘media resources can offer a valuable understanding of the context of political behaviour, when we might not have direct access to the event we wish to analyse’ (2001: 108). In this sense, given that it is quite difficult for us to collect all the documents related this study in general, and sport policy in particular, analysing media sources would be conducted in compensation partly for this limitation. Furthermore, some information is collected not only from websites of (quasi)-governmental bodies and NGBs, but also from documents suggested and offered by some interviewee.

In relation to document analysis, in selecting documents it is important for this study to consider that the analysis and interpretation of documents should be connected with drawing attention to the research themes under investigation (cf. Hindley, 2002). Namely, we have to take a cautious attitude in selecting documents because documents are written for a specific purpose and a particular audience. As a
consequence, documents are, to a certain extent, subjective so it is possible to show a biased view of an individual’s or group’s thoughts on any specific context or situation. Moreover, documents can be interpreted in different ways. It should be mentioned that qualitative document analysis is acknowledged as a systemic and analytic technique, but not rigid in order to understand contexts and ways of representing the social world (Altheide, 1996: 16; May, 2001: 193). In this sense, problems of the selection and interpretation of documents in qualitative document analysis can be bound up with the following issues

### 3.4.4.1 Fundamental considerations involved in document analysis

In assessing the quality of documents, Scott (1990) suggests four key criteria: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. In order to establish basic rules in analysing and appraising documents, these criteria must be considered when using documentary sources (McCulloch, 2004). Firstly, the issue of ‘authenticity’ means ‘is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin?’ (Scott, 1990: 6). To distinguish between authentic- and inauthentic documentary sources, a useful checklist for determining the authenticity of a document are set out by Platt (1981: 34):

- (i) Does the document contain obvious errors and/or inconsistencies?
- (ii) Do different versions of the same document exist?
- (iii) Is there consistency of literary style, content, handwriting or typeface?
- (iv) Has the document been transcribed by more than one copy writer?
- (v) Has the document been circulated by someone with a vested interest in a particular reading of its content?
- (vi) Does the version derive from a reliable source?

Secondly, ‘credibility refers to the extent to which the evidence is undistorted and sincere, free from error and evasion’ (Scott, 1990: 7). The following questions are relevant: ‘who produced the document, why, when, or whom and in what context’ and ‘how accurate are the observations and records being researched?’ (Green, 2002: 68). These questions can be linked to the following suggestion for achieving credibility in the study of document analysis: ‘other sources on the life and political [policy] sympathies of the author should be used in a form of triangulation in order to establish
the social and political context in which the document was produced’ (May, 2001: 1994).

Thirdly, ‘representativeness’ is a fundamental problem in assessing the typicality of evidence. In this respect, whether the documents available can be said to comprise a representative sample of the totality of documents as they originally existed in an important question (MacDonald & Tipton, 1993: 196). It is necessary to acknowledge that we cannot analyse all relevant documents but we need to keep in mind how much and why some may be missing (Scott, 2001).

Lastly, the issue of ‘meaning’ ‘refers to the extent to which the evidence is clear and comprehensible to the researcher’ (Scott, 1990: 8). Implications and meanings of the documents are crucial in interpreting and understanding particular social activity because a set of social activities are recorded in various forms and ways such as literal documents and audio/video recordings. A good example of this is the many drafts of the president's speech which can be utilised in order to understand and interpret the social and political context of the time. Indeed, many historians and policy analysts try to understand and infer the features and meaning of social activities within wider social and political contexts of the days. There are two levels for understanding the issue of a document's meaning: surface meaning and the deeper meaning through some form of interpretive understanding or structural analysis (MacDonald & Tipton, 1993: 197). ‘Interpretative understanding’ seen as a more sophisticated form of documentary analysis (MacDonald & Tipton, 1993: 197) is ‘the end-product of a hermeneutic process in which the researcher relates the literal meanings to the contexts in which they were produced in order to assess the meaning of the text as a whole’ (Scott, 2001: 30). In this sense, the researcher should consider how a document was produced, in what context, so that they are better able to assess whether this interpretation makes sense (MacDonald, 2001: 31).

Taken together, it could be said that only using documentary sources could result in a partial understanding and interoperation of social and political activities because organisations such as government and quasi-governmental bodies are more likely to produce policy reports and documents to reflect their point of view and interests, which may result in a distorted analysis. Implications and meanings that emerge from
documents must be reflected in the view of the wider context to provide better understanding. Therefore, the analysis of documents should not be undertaken in isolation from their social contexts (Altheide, 1996; Scott, 1990). In this sense, as Yin argued, ‘the most important use of documents is to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources’ (1994: 81). For this study, we try to triangulate an approach to data analysis that synthesises data from multiple sources such as theory, interviews and documents. In order to investigate ‘deeper meaning’, this study attempts to integrate data gained from interviews with key actors involved in elite sport policy development and an analysis of policy documents relating to (elite) sport policy change within the broader political and social-structure context. In addition, we can draw conclusions about the features of elite sport policy process in South Korea by reflecting upon the empirical data with the aid of various theories outlined and discussed earlier.

3.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the study’s research strategy and methods based on the ontological and epistemological assumptions. Given that there is a directional relationship between ontology, epistemology, methodology and methods (Grix, 2000), this relationship means that ‘ontology logically precedes epistemology which logically precedes methodology’ (Hay, 2002: 63). In this sense, an ontological and epistemological assumption is connected with methodological implications for the choice of approaches in a given study, which is linked to the selection of particular research methods.

The critical realist position adopted in this study assumes that: (i) not all social phenomena are directly observable, structures exist that cannot be observed and those that can may not present the social and political world as it actually is (Grix, 2002: 183); (ii) while social phenomena exist independently of our interpretation, or discursive construction, of them, nevertheless discursive construction affects outcomes, thus structures do not determine outcomes, rather they constrain and facilitate (Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 31); and (iii) a complete understanding of social
and political phenomena is based upon the emphasis of the interplay between structure and agency. Therefore, the critical realist assumptions require mainly interpretive and qualitative research to investigate the intricacies of complex social and political phenomena, underlining the interrelationship between structural and agential factors within the broad historical, political and social contexts in which phenomena are interrelated. In line with the critical realist assumptions, this study adopts an ‘intensive’ approach aimed at investigating substantial relations of connection between ‘causal groups in which particular individuals are actually involved, that is the groups or networks of specific people, institutions, discourses and things with which they interact’ (Sayer, 2000: 21). To investigate deep meanings and insights, which actors attach to their action within broader social, political, historical, and economic contexts, the case study method is adopted in this study. The case study approach designed in this study is outlined in Figure 3.2 below.

**Figure 3.2. Case study method**

![Case study method diagram](image)

For this study, the three cases involving the sports of athletics, archery and baseball will be considered. The case study approach allows the researcher to employ more than one method of data collection. Thus, this study will employ semi-structured
interviews and qualitative document analysis to acquire a wide range of knowledge and data which cannot be directly observed and have a deep meaning within a broader political and social context. The data collection ranges from semi-structured interviews with key personnel who have been/are involved in elite sport policy development relating to the three NGBs, government, sub-governmental bodies and NGOs, to the analysis of sport policy-related documents over time.
4.1 The political, social and cultural context

Before looking more closely at the development of sport policy, it is important to consider the historical context on the assumption that sport, as a social institution, can be closely linked to the politics, economy and culture of society. This section is framed into five time periods for an overview of the Korean political, social and cultural context: 1910-1945, 1946-1960, 1961-1979, 1980-1992 and 1993 onwards.

4.1.1 The Japanese colonial period: 1910-1945

There were many calamitous events in Korean history which impeded progress and caused confusion and grief to all domains of society.

Geopolitically situated where the convergent interests of states all larger and more powerful than itself are focused, Korea has been a battleground, a route of invasion, a tributary, a colony, a divided nation, a country which has seen violence, bloodshed and physical, cultural and political devastation on an horrendous and rarely equalled scale (Wade & Kim, 1978: 1).

From 1910 to 1945, Korea was under Japanese colonial rule. ‘It is often said by historians that the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 was an incident in a larger pattern of imperialism’ (Ok, 2005: 649). Indeed, the colonial era can be regarded as a nadir in Korean history. Colonial rule was driven by Japan’s expansionism which was a stepping-stone for continental expansion on the Asian mainland (Ok, 2005). According to some historians, who assert the benefits of colonial modernisation, Japan assisted with the modernisation of Korea during this period. However, the dominant opinion in Korean history finds that this modernisation policy was carried
out on the basis of the obliteration of autogenic national capital. According to Lee (1995), it would be an overstatement to say that Japanese imperialist occupation had a positive effect on the growth of Korean capitalism in terms of the exploitation of economic power. But, Yoon argued that ‘although the Japanese introduced modern improvements such as factories, roads, and railroads, it was mostly to serve their own interests’ (2005: 23). Ultimately, Koreans were deprived of their freedom by Japan for thirty five years and did not enjoy organic growth due to Japanese rule. However, with Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War in 1945 Korea gained liberation from its colonial rule.

4.1.2 Trusteeship and the Korean War: 1946-1960

Before developing the political and social contexts after the liberation, it is worth identifying relations between South Korea and the United States. Eventually, ‘liberation from Japan was accompanied by the division of Korea by the United States and the Soviet Union into two political entities’: South Korea and North Korea, (Wade & Kim, 1978: 15). According to a policy report of the U.S. State Department, it was recommended to President Truman that the United States should put South Korea under its trusteeship, given the importance of the Korean peninsula’s geographical position for the peace and security between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union (Lee & Ku, 1986). Thus, the United States established a policy for the stability of South Korea linked directly with the security of the Pacific regions close to the United States (Lee & Ku, 1986). The National Assembly, with the approval of the United States Government, was created and the Korean Constitution was promulgated in 1948. South Korea was therefore faced with a new era in its history as the Republic of Korea. However, the ideological differences between the South and the North turned into military confrontation (Yoon D, 2005). The Korean war broke out following the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of the South Korea in June 1950 due to the a clash of ideology between the two countries, formed by the post-World War II pact between the Soviet Union and United States. The war was brought to an end by the signing of an Armistice Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in July 1953, and the Korean War ended without a peace
treaty. As a result of this, political tensions between the South Korean and North
Korea still remain.

4.1.3 Socio-political reform, nationalism and economic revival: 1961-1979

Following the war, South Korea faced many problems, such as political turmoil,
social unrest, and economic poverty. The Second Republic was established in 1960
with the collapse of the First Republic caused by the demonstration known as the ‘19th
April Revolution’ but the republic which lived for eight short months was overthrown
in May 1961 by the military coup led by Major General Park Chung-Hee, thereby
creating the Third and Fourth Republic (1961-1979). Actually, despite the
authoritarian rule of the new government, the advent of President Park onto the
political stage was an epoch-defining event for the development and change of
Korean society. The authoritarian government sought to manage the crisis of
hegemony through the nation’s economic-centred policy because national per capita
income was just $87 at that time. Accordingly, the people overwhelmingly seemed to
accede to the pattern of authoritarianism (Kim Y, 1990). Following the Korean War,
different political ideologies surrounding the South Korea and North Korea enabled
the authoritarian government to spread anti-communist sentiment throughout the
nation. This situation was one of the important sources for the government to pay
attention to elite sport development. In addition, President Park appealed to pan-
national cooperation by presenting the slogan ‘autonomy, self-dependence, prosperity’
as practical policy tasks. Under this form of absolute power, the regime carried out a
wide range of reforms to the educational system, economic system, and social system.
In particular, the official signal toward increasing the regime intention for economic
development was ‘the First 5 Year Plan for Economic Development (1962-1966)’. The
plan was published by central government every five years and contributed
greatly to economic growth during this period (1962-1979). The military
government’s growth-oriented-economic policy during this period caused a wide gap
between the rich and the poor as a consequence of distorted resource distribution
(Yang M, 2003). Taken together, the political, socio-economic and cultural contexts
in the 1960 and 1970s were shaped by three key factors: (i) the growth-oriented
economic policy to alleviate the image of a ‘poor country’; (ii) the flood tide of anti-communist ideology after the Korean War; and (iii) the social, political and cultural unrest and disorder due to the growth-oriented economic policy and authoritarianism.

4.1.4 Continuity of authoritarianism, but aspirations towards democratisation, and globalisation: 1980-1992

After the ending of the authoritarian Park government (1961-1979), the public desire towards democratisation was huge (cf. Cho Y, 2008). The people strongly expected that the reign of authoritarianism would come to an end, and democracy would be realised in the Korean society. However, contrary to their expectations, these desires were thwarted by another military coup. This occurred on 12th December 1979, and was led by Chun Duh-Hwan, Major General of the Army. Following this, the Fifth Republic (1980-1988) was born in 1980, when another military-based government was also established with the symbols of authoritarianism. In a similar vein, in order to try to reduce opposition to the military government and increase its legitimacy and divert the people’s attention from politics, the government carried out so-called ‘3S policy’ (Screen, Sport, and Sex) throughout the country (Lim Y, 1998). As a result of this government involvement in the culture industry, not only was a series of erotic movies funded, but also professional leagues of baseball and football were launched by the government in the early 1980s. In addition, the government paid much attention to fostering elite sport policy triggered by the successful bids for the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games, an example of which includes the creation of the Ministry of Sport in 1982.

With respect to economic aspects, ‘although the economic sector continued to flourish through the 1980s’ (Cho Y, 2008: 242), the economy of the 1980s was confronted by a number of problems such as inflation, deficiencies in the balance of payments, credit distortion, and unbalanced development across industries caused by a rapid growth during the Third/Fourth Republic (Kim J, 1997). The Fifth Republic carried out a policy which laid emphasis on qualitative growth and stabilisation rather than focusing on a quantitative growth-oriented policy (Lee H, 2003). In summary, ‘the
economic stabilisation strategy during this period became the fundamental policy objective, which was a departure from Korea’s traditional growth-oriented strategy in the 1960s and 1970s (Kim J, 1997: 210).

‘Despite further oppression and censorship, the Korean people’s voice for human rights, freedom and democracy became increasingly loud’ (Yoon D, 2005: 26). Finally, the movement for democracy, particularly the demonstration by many citizens against the military authority on 19th June 1987, succeeded in obtaining agreement for direct elections. Kihl (2005:62) insisted that ‘Korea’s political transition from authoritarianism towards democracy began with its democratic opening in 1987’. However, even though the next president Roh Tae-Woo (1988-1993) was elected through a direct election on 27th October 1987, his regime was no more than democracy in a transitional stage. The reason was that as President Roh was also a retired Army general, who was involved in taking power through the military coup of 1979, he had considerable political power. Along with the successful hosting of the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, Korean society had gone through democratisation and witnessed transformation in a wide range of aspects of the nation’s society from the latter half of the 1980s onwards.

4.1.5 Democracy, economic crisis and the 2002 Football World Cup: 1993 onwards

‘In 1993, President Kim Young-Sam was inaugurated as the first civilian president since the military coup of 1961’ (Yoon D, 2005: 27). The government attempted to get rid of political and social corruption by implementing various policies, especially the ‘Public Servant’s Ethics’ and the ‘Real-Name Financial Transaction System’. In addition, the administration allowed local government to have more autonomy through the decentralisation of government: for example, nation-wide mayoral and gubernatorial elections were held for the first time in Korean history in June 1995. However, the first civilian government was confronted with the continuing deterioration of the economy and an inconsistent policy (Yoon D, 2005), resulting in a foreign currency crisis in November 1997, the so-called ‘IMF (International Monetary
Fund) era’. During the IMF intervention, South Korea witnessed not only the bankruptcy of many small and medium enterprises and the collapse of several major conglomerates (so-called ‘Chaebol’), but also an economic depression stemming from an increase in unemployment. As a consequence, the Korean government tried to restructure and reform the economic system of high level of dependence on the Chaebols such as Samsung, Hyundai and LG. Indeed, there has been a symbiotic relationship between the government and the Chaebols because the former military governments seemed to rely on the Chaebols to bring about rapid economic development. This specific situation is embodied in the following statement:

The special relationship has been expressed more seriously between the government and Chaebols. Through this collusion, the Chaebols could get favoured access to financial resources under the state’s control, while politicians and bureaucrats get access to political slush funds. A closed circuit of corruption has been formed and reproduced (Cho H, 2000: 415).

For the Roh Moo-Hyun administration (2002-2007) much policy attention has been given to reforming politics, especially in relation to the corruption between politics and business. According to the Korea Times (01 January 2003), President Roh stressed in the New Year that ‘his administration would place a top priority on speeding up political reform this year by eradicating regional antagonism and corrupt politics’.

Kim Dae-Jung’s administration (1998-2002) embarked upon a new ‘3 year Development Plan for a Knowledge-Based Economy’ which was to make the Korean economy competitive in the global marketplace, when the Korean economy removed itself from the IMF mandate in August 2001 (Kihl, 2005: 211). As a result, Kihl (2005) suggested that the Korean economy after the IMF era was becoming more competitive and efficient. Besides, during this period of the administration’s rule, President Kim Dae-Jung focused on policy toward North Korea, what is called “the Sunshine Policy”. The policy was aimed at maintaining peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula by supplying much economic assistance under a policy of humanitarian cooperation (Walker & Kang, 2002).
In relation to facets of social and cultural change, it should be noted that the 2002 Football World Cup in Korea was also a landmark in the transformation of political, social, and cultural aspect of society. During the 2002 Football World Cup, the wave of explosive support for the Korean national football team on the streets across the country is remembered as an unprecedented event. According to the Korea Herald (2002), millions of Red Devils fans, mostly college students, who displayed world-class standards of order, manner and sports etiquette to cheer the Korean national team by voluntarily pouring onto the streets of Seoul and other major cities, thrilled the global TV viewers. Following the 2002 Football World Cup, the street cheer atmosphere created a new ‘plaza culture’ in which the public holds a variety of political and cultural meetings. In this regard, it is widely acknowledged that the successful hosting of the 2002 Football World Cup worked as a harbinger of a wide range of social and cultural changes in the last ten years. The past decade has witnessed quite a growth of civil society in a wide range of political, social and economic areas.

### 4.1.6 Summary

Table 4.1 illustrates key political, economic and social characteristics of each regime from the early 1960s onwards.

**Table 4.1 Summary of Korean historical characteristics from 1961 onwards**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name of administration</th>
<th>Type of government</th>
<th>Political features</th>
<th>Economic features</th>
<th>Social features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1961-1979| Park Jung Hee administration, Third/Fourth Republic | Absolute authoritarian | •Modernisation of the fatherland  
•Centralism  
•Anti-communism  
•Expression of nationalism for the security of political legitimacy and the building of a strong political leadership | •Growth-first ideology  
•Self-supporting economy  
•Long-term economic growth  
•High growth of economy  
•Mal-distribution of wealth  
•Increase in urban and labour population | •Reinforcement of social control by central government  
•Weakening of social autonomy  
•Intensification of a labour movement for a fair distribution and participation of wealth |
| 1980-1987| Chun Do Hwan administration, Fifth Republic | Authoritarian | •Gwangju democratic uprising in 1980 against the military junta  
•Constant | •Economic stabilisation strategy  
•Overcoming of debt crisis due to three low prosperous | •Growth of middle, working, and farmer classes as an influence, leading in a pro-democracy |
Even though Korea suffered from huge political and economic difficulties such as Japan’s colonial rule (1910-1945), the Korean War (1950-1953) and the IMF intervention (1997-2001), the country has experienced rapid economic development in the past four decades. The Third Republic as a starting point and a blossoming era had an effect on the national systems, laying the basis of development in the future. The emphasis put upon the highly compressed economic growth beyond 1960s was a
double-edged sword. In other words, even if Korean society has undergone remarkable economic development during this period, the compressive economic growth-oriented policy has created a lot of negative facts in terms of the political, economic and social context, especially, the closed bond between politics and business resulting in political corruption. Along with the direct election of the nation’s President in 1987, the 1988 Olympic Games functioned as a turning-point in alleviating authoritarianism. The 1980s witnessed the enthusiasm of the people for democracy. Taken together, the context during the period 1960s-1980s has three main characteristics: (i) the strong centralising system under military power; (ii) the high economic growth as Korea is called an ‘Asian Dragon’; and (iii) distrust in politics due to the lack of autonomy and democracy.

Along with the birth of the first civilian government in 1993, Korean society witnessed an epoch shift in pushing ahead with the decentralisation of power; that is, the central government’s authority has been gradually distributed to local governments in conjunction with the introduction of a local self-governing system. In addition, it is largely acknowledged that South Korea has been gradually becoming a pluralistic society since the early 1990s. In contrast to the conditions of the previous authoritarian regimes, it is not surprising that such changes have paved the way for the public’s interest and participation in politics from the early 1990s onwards. Furthermore, the high rate of internet use in South Korea has accelerated the advance toward civil society. The context of South Korea since 1993 can be viewed by four characteristics: (i) the transformation from authoritarianism and the stability of democratisation; (ii) the remains of political-and social corruption, particularly the very close relations between politics and business; (iii) the overcoming of economic difficulties; and (iv) the emergence of a variety of civic groups.

4.2 Introduction: historical and socio-political context for sport

This section traces sport policy development in light of the wider historical and socio-political context of South Korea from the 1960s onwards. Although the central concern of this research is to investigate elite level sport, the areas of ‘school sport’
and ‘Sport for All’ (hereafter SFA) should not be overlooked. The assertion is justified on the assumption that the elite sport sector cannot be clearly evaluated without a consideration of the school sport sector and the SFA sector as the area of school sport has played an important role in developing young elite athletes in South Korea. The SFA sector is not directly interrelated with the area of elite sport, but the past decade has witnessed a phase of quite tangible changes in the organisation of and context for elite sport system on the basis of SFA development. This section, therefore, provides an overview of Korean sport development in order to provide a more detailed analysis of elite sport policy process and change in three sports. In order to introduce some clarity into the following discussion, the section is organised as follows. Firstly, this section can generally be framed into three time periods for an overview of Korean sport development: 1961-1979, 1980-1992 and 1993 onwards. The basis for their periodisation is explained below. Secondly, each sub-section is further divided between elite sport, school sport and SFA. Thirdly, each sub-section provides a brief summary of the implications of school sport and SFA for elite sport development.

Along with the birth of President Park Chung-Hee’s military-based regime in 1961, the selection of 1961 as a starting point reflects the emergence of sport as a distinct public policy concern, indicated for example by the enactment of ‘the National Sports Promotion Law’ in 1962. The selection of 1980 as the second time period is based on the replacement of President Park and the commencement of the Fifth Republic, the so-called the Republic of sport (Lee H, 2003). This change signified a blossoming of interest in many areas of sport. Along with the advent of the first civilian government in 1993, the selection of 1993 for the final period reflects the start of a relatively weak level of government involvement in sport (compared to the previous military governments).

There are several further justifications for using the time periods mentioned above. The division into time periods in the historical review is useful for purposes of clarity and analysis. However, this division should be treated with caution. Son (2002) observes that it is meaningless to divide periods without logical grounds and criteria for the related study. Indeed, South Korea could not afford to pay attention to sport and could not include provision for sport in the national budget prior to the 1960s.
‘Political chaos, social instability, and economic poverty continued unabated, all of which made it impossible for Korean sport foundation to grow’ (Ha & Lim, 2001: 63). However, ‘the rise to power of President Park was a sign foretelling great changes in the areas of politics, economics, society, and education, as well as sport’ (Ha & Lim, 2001: 63). Sport emerged as a realm of public policy during the regime of President Park (1961-1979) who seized political power in the military coup of 1961. Moreover, ‘as sport was used overtly as a political tool to promote a communist ideology’ in other authoritarian regimes (Green, 2003: 86), the authoritarian regime of Korea also made a political and ideological tool of sport in order to project national power toward hostile countries and secure the regime’s legitimacy during the 1960s and 1970s. As sport and politics combined, the central government involvement in sport began in earnest in the early 1960s. As a consequence, much attention was paid to the development of elite sport including that of school sport during the period of the 1960s-1980s.

4.2.1 Socio-political reform, nationalism and sport: 1961-1979

During the President Park’s regime (1961-1979) Korean society witnessed the beginnings of dramatic changes in the realms of politics, the economy and culture as well as sport. The authoritarian government strongly promoted the rise of nationalism in order to achieve the primary task of the regime, which was to establish political legitimacy and to establish the foundation for a self-supporting economy. In addition, following the Korean War, the ideological confrontation on the Korean peninsula provided favourable circumstances for the authoritarian government to use sport as part of its public policy strategy. The authoritarian government progressively manifested an interest in sport and defined the central concern of Korean sports policy as the expression of sporting nationalism (Lee H, 2003). The following speech indirectly displays President Park’s sporting ideology:

The main task of our nation is territorial reunification, and one way of achieving this goal consists in strengthening our national power. Considering that national physical strength is a measurement of national power, it is one of the most vital factors in our national progress. The spirit of unity and cooperation, and the virtue of courage and patience
through sports activities, will give an important impetus to the resolution of all problems (quoted in Kim S, 2000: 83).

In relation to sport and physical education, the authoritarian government stressed the value of health, hygiene and physical education for the achievement of its political purposes so that it reformed education policy and encouraged the people to participate in sporting activity in order to improve their physique. One of the aims was ‘to advance national physical standards by way of physical education’ (Ok, 2004: 47). Therefore, the government increased PE/HE class hours in schools (Kim J, 1999). The authoritarian regime’s intention to use sport and physical education was evident in the following slogans, ‘Strong People make a Strong Nation’ and ‘Physical Strength is National Power’. These slogans were indicative of the government’s beliefs not only in relation to solving economic poverty and social turmoil, but also to reinforcing the nation’s ideological influence over North Korea and Japan. As Hoberman (1984) insisted that sport could not be free from ideology, ‘sport was relatively cheap and easily adapted to support President Park’s ruling ideology’ (Kim S, 2000: 82). The ruling ideology at that time can be viewed as comprising three elements: nationalism, developmentalism and centralism (see Figure 4.1 below). In this sense, it seems reasonable to note that sport served as an instrument for Park’s regime to address a range of such political and social problems during this period.

Figure 4.1 Ruling ideology and relationship with sport in the Third and Fourth Republic

![Figure 4.1 Ruling ideology and relationship with sport in the Third and Fourth Republic](image)

Source: Kim S (2000: 81)
Moreover, sport was an important instrument with which to parade the supremacy of the political system and the structure of society through victory in sporting contests with North Korea in the 1960s and 1970s. The following statement by President Park in the Opening Speech of the National Games in 1970 indirectly shows the direction of sport policy during his regime:

We must realise that high physical fitness is very important to build a strong nation. And the high physical fitness of our people is the symbol of a strong nation. We all should accumulate a great store of energy by building physical fitness and sound minds through national games. The balanced improvement in people’s physical fitness will contribute to strengthening the nation’s power as well as enhancing its prestige (quoted in Kim S, 2000: 84).

Given his personal philosophy that sport and physical education would help build a strong country, it should be reiterated that sport emerged as a significant public policy concern following the enactment of the National Sports Promotion Law in 1962. It was the first indication of a planned and co-ordinated approach to sport (see Table 4.2 below).

Table 4.2 The National Sports Promotion Law

| The Ministry of Education promulgated it as Statute No. 1146 on September 17th 1962 |
|---|---|
| This statute consisted of two parts with seventeen articles and an additional clause |

**Part 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act 1. The purpose of the law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The object of this law is to improve people’s lives by revitalising physical &amp; mental harmony through sport &amp; physical education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act 2. The definition of sport</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The definition of sport &amp; physical education in this law is physical activity such as sports competition, games, outdoor activities in order to cultivate sound body &amp; mind</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act 3. A brief outline of government policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The nation &amp; self-governing state should devise a proper policy regarding sports promotion, and should encourage, foster, and protect citizen’s spontaneous physical activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act 4. Recommendations and government plans for implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Minister of Education can lay down the basic policy regarding national sports promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of the self-governing state should establish the sport promotion plan in order to put it into practice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act 5. The establishment of the Sport Evaluation Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education organises a sports deliberation committee in order to respond to the Minister’s inquiries regarding a basic policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Part 2**

| Act 7. The establishment of a national sports day on 15th October each year and a regular sports week the last week of each month |

| Act 8. Support for provincial sport events |

| Act 9. The promotion of physical education and sport at work |

| Act 10. The training of instructors |

| Act 11. The extension and improvement of facilities |

| Act 12. The foundation of national sport complexes |

| Act 13. The utilisation of currently available facilities |

| Act 14. Support for athletes |

| Act 15. The state subsidy for a local autonomous entity (government) |

| Act 16. Financial aid for sport organisations |
- Articles for structure and operation of the committee are decided by cabinet ordinance

**Act 6. Cooperation**

- When the Minister of Education and Chief of self-governing state’s request regarding the policy and establishment of sports promotion plan is approved, all the government agencies should cooperate with the Ministry of Education and the self-governing state.

Source: Adapted from Kim B (2001a: 100); Law & Business; Ok (2004: 47)

### 4.2.1.1 School sport

For the authoritarian government, education became a pillar of the nation’s development (Kim B, 2004) and was considered to be particularly important in breaking the defeatism which was endemic in Korean society at that time. Indeed, ‘the catchphrase in Korean education was ‘education linked to nationality’, and the task of education was to provide for ‘the hard-working and to foster the healthy’ (quoted in Ha & Mangan, 2002: 215). As such, an educational policy was to educate the people to contribute to economic growth through the establishment of the nation’s moral structures/values/norms, national identity, the formation of new schools, and reinforcement of the productivity of education. Such an educational philosophy of the government was evident in the promulgation of the ‘National Education Charter’ in 1968, the ultimate goal of which was ‘to construct a spiritual base for the regeneration of the nation, create a new image for the Korean people and promote the knowledge of national history’ (quoted in Lee H, 2000: 396). With the support of the government, physical education was a prominent part of education policy in the late 1960s. In particular, the government attempted to improve pupils’ fitness levels by highlighting the value of physical education in school (Kim S, 2000), a relevant example of which included the introduction of the ‘Physical Aptitude Test’ in 1969. The test as part of a college entrance examination was adopted in 1973 by the Ministry of Education for the purpose of contributing to school grades used for collegiate entrance examinations from 1973 to 1994.

It should be mentioned that school sport in South Korea is largely divided into two functions: one includes physical education for the general pupil and the other is a

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5 events: 100m sprint, standing long jump, sit-ups, throwing a ball, chin-up/male, and hanging down from the horizontal bar/female
substructure to foster student-athletes. More specifically, school sport in South Korea is, in part, the base for nurturing young talented athletes who may proceed to elite level. Schools have arguably played a vital role in shaping the development of elite sport in South Korea because most young student athletes took up their sports in school-based teams. In terms of elite level sport, of note was the introduction of ‘Athletic Specialist System’ in 1972, which was institutionally designed to develop talented young athletes in the area of school sport. As Kim J (1999) argued, the system was institutionalised as part of an elite sport-centred national policy in pursuit of sporting excellence and success against North Korea and Japan. It thereby offered an unrivalled opportunity for excellent student athletes to develop their talent by going on to high quality schools with sports scholarship regardless of the results of their academic performance. More specifically, it is a unique system, which allocated scholarship on athletes who reached semi-final level in team sports, or 3rd or better for in individual sports at national athletic tournaments. The system is still considered to be a key factor in South Korea’s continuing international sporting success. However, despite the good intent of the system, it caused many problems such as the excessive hours of training (cf. Yamamoto, 2008). As a result of this, while most student athletes have been spending excessive hours on intensive training in pursuit of sporting success, they have displayed low academic achievement.

4.2.1.2 Sport for All

The enactment of the ‘National Sports Promotion Law’ in 1962 marked the beginning of government involvement in SFA (see Table 4.2). However, even if the stated aim of the law was ‘to improve the people’s quality of life by revitalising its physical and mental harmony through sport and physical education’ (Law & Business, 2007), the law did not contribute to the development of SFA to any great degree. Nevertheless, it is meaningful in the sense that the Law laid the groundwork of policy for SFA and its link with social development (Kim J, 1999). Park’s regime began to develop an interest in SFA in earnest in the early 1970s. For example, the National Sports Deliberation Committee, which was created to promote national sport, physical education, sport facilities, and sport funds in 1970, provided direction for SFA policy, but the key contribution remained at the level of publicity (Kim J, 1999). However,
the National Committee for the Promotion of SFA, an affiliate of the KSA established in 1920 (Korean Sports Association which became known as the Korean Amateur Sports Association and was again renamed Korea Sports Council) assumed responsibility for all matters related to the promotion of SFA in general, and sport facilities and events at work in particular (Lee H, 2003). In 1976 this Committee also announced a Five-Year Plan for mass participation designed to popularise sport activity (see Table 4.3 below). One of the significant achievements of the Committee was the creation and spread of a national gymnastics\(^6\) programme in 1977. The introduction of the national gymnastics programme was consistent with the government’s emphasis on increasing awareness of the necessity of sporting activity in order not only to promote the people’s health, but also to improve labour productivity and efficiency.

### Table 4.3 Annual objectives & main projects of the ‘5 Year SFA Promotion Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Main Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>• Promotion plan with utilizing research</td>
<td>• Advertisement &amp; Enlightenment of the People (ex. TV, Radio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enforcement of the National Sports Promotion Law</td>
<td>• Survey of the Actual condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Basic &amp; Exemplary Actives</td>
<td>• Management of sport Programs &amp; class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enforcement of the National Sports Promotion Law</td>
<td>• Holding of workshops for sports instructors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enlightenment of city/province’s sports associations</td>
<td>• Security of ordinance of the National Sports Promotion Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>• Enlightenment people actively</td>
<td>• Enforcement of city/province’s sports associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Expansion &amp; use of sports facilities</td>
<td>• Utilisation of sport facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Education for the sports instructors &amp; coaches</td>
<td>• Advertisement of exemplary Sport for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Development of a variety of sports programmes</td>
<td>• Publication of sports manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>• Reinforcement of the National Sports Promotion Law</td>
<td>• Enactment of the national gymnastics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Guidance of sports organisations &amp; gymnasiemens</td>
<td>• Deliberation of sport policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Development of a variety of sports programmes</td>
<td>• Reinforcement of administration and department related to sports associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>• Establishment of sports facilities</td>
<td>• Development and diffusion of new sport activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cultivation of Sports administrator</td>
<td>• Increase of sports facilities &amp; establishment of Sport for All centre (city/province)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>• Extension of the main projects</td>
<td>• Systematisation of sports instructor qualification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Popularisation of physical activities</td>
<td>• Mobilisation of sports administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Developing physical test system for the citizens</td>
<td>• Disposition of instructor/coach in public sports facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sport for All Council &amp; Sports instructors’ council</td>
<td>• Organisation of the instructor/coach council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lee K (1994); ’70 Years History’ of KASA (1990)

\(^6\) The national gymnastics was a programme created by the committee in 1977 and spread throughout the country in general, and schools and a wide range of institutions in particular.
Nevertheless, ‘a systematic sport policy for mass participation was limited to publicity work throughout the country as it was doubtful that the plan was productive’ (Lee K, 1994: 154). The reason why the plan could not attract interest and achieve a substantial outcome was due in large part to economic and cultural circumstances whereby most people could not afford to pay attention to sport activity because most were concerned to improve their economic status at that time.

4.2.1.3 Elite sport

As noted above, the enactment of the ‘National Sports Promotion Law’ can be viewed as a starting point for the elite sport development strategy. Although the purpose (Act 1) of the Law put the emphasis on national sports promotion in general, according to Part 2, the term ‘National Sport’ includes both SFA and elite sport (See Table 4.2). Indeed, ‘the Law explicitly declared that elite sport was at the centre of sport policy’ (Lee C, 2005: 49). The priority of elite sport was further underlined in Act 14 of the Law (Support for athletes, see Table 4.2). The Law was intended to guarantee a developmental-policy for elite sport in order to give Koreans a sense of national superiority through the success of their elite athletes. Following the Korean War, the extreme tension between South and North Korea drove South Korea to value sports confrontation as a proxy for war in order to express the superiority of its social and political structure.

As Green & Houlihan (2005) revealed, Australia’s poor performance at the 1976 Montreal Olympics served as catalyst for increased national government funding and support. Similarly, for South Korea the 1964 Tokyo Olympics can be viewed as a turning point for elite sport development. Although South Korea dispatched a large team of 59 officials and 165 athletes in 16 events, Korean athletes won just 3 medals (2 silver and 1 bronze) (Lee K, 1994). The poor performance served to re-focus officials and sport administrators’ attention on pursuing and investing in programmes to raise the nation’s elite sporting performance. The milestone of elite sport development was described in a statement by Min, Kwan-Sik, head of the Korean national team at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and President of the Korean Amateur Sports Association, who asserted that ‘sport could not exist without science and
facilities’ (quoted in Lee H, 2000). On the basis of this lesson, Min, Kwan-Sik highlighted the importance of sports science and facilities for elite sport development. Reflecting his intention, the ‘6 Year Plan’ for the revival of sport was published and included among its goals the objectives: (i) to improve the quality of the coach/instructor; (ii) to construct sport facilities; (iii) to conduct effective and rational training; (iv) to make sport provision more scientific and (v) to identify hidden sporting talent (Lee H, 2003). In line with the objectives of elite sport policy, the need for a sharper focus on athlete development was evidenced in the creation of the so-called ‘Taenung Athletes’ Village’ in 1966, which was designed to provide dedicated and holistic training facilities for the national athletes, including boarding and lodging. The village is currently operating as the hub for elite sport success (Lee H, 2003).

Of particular importance was the politically driven merger of three organisations under President Park’s directions: Korean Olympic Committee (KOC), Korea Sport Association (KSA), and Korea Physical Education Association (KPEA). The KOC and KPEA were absorbed in 1968 by the KSA which was later renamed the Korean Amateur Sports Association’ (KASK, currently KSC) (Ok, 2004: 48). After the amalgamation, the KASA had a clear focus on elite sport (Na Y, 2002) and was a reflection of the government’s prioritisation of international sporting success. Table 4.4 indicates that it would not be an overstatement to say that the KASA laid more weight on elite sport than on SFA. Indeed, government subsidies sharply increased in the years of the Olympic Games and Asian Games. Table 4.4 reveals indirect evidence of the tendency to concentrate on elite sport.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government Subsidy</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government Subsidy</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>5,721,872</td>
<td></td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>169,849,838</td>
<td>The Bangkok Asian Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>31,154,511</td>
<td></td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>127,754,311</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>86,732,600</td>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>364,824,831</td>
<td>The Mexico Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>117,240,900</td>
<td>The Tokyo Olympics</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>238,702,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>105,424,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>439,999,300</td>
<td>The Bangkok Asian Games</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lee C (2005); Annual Report of KASA (1972: 367)

In 1974, ‘the KASA announced the ‘Lifelong Pension System’ for medal winners in international sports events, including the Olympic Games, the World Athletic
Championships, the Asian Games and the Asian Athletic Championship’ (quoted in Ok, 2004: 50). The current name of the pension scheme is ‘Performance Enhancing Research Pension’. The system which was designed to encourage high performance by athletes was indicative of the philosophy of the government towards elite sport success (See Table 4.5 and 4.6 below) and reflected the growing concern of the government over elite sport development. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 indicate how the system works.

Table 4.5 Points evaluation for medal winners’ lifelong pension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Gold Medal</th>
<th>Silver Medal</th>
<th>Bronze Medal</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
<th>6th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Olympic Games</td>
<td>90 Points</td>
<td>30 Points</td>
<td>20 Points</td>
<td>8 Points</td>
<td>4 Points</td>
<td>2 Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years cycle</td>
<td>45 Points</td>
<td>12 Points</td>
<td>7 Points</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World Athletic Championships</td>
<td>30 Points</td>
<td>7 Points</td>
<td>5 Points</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 years cycle</td>
<td>20 Points</td>
<td>5 Points</td>
<td>2 Points</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Asian Games &amp; The Universiade</td>
<td>10 Points</td>
<td>2 Points</td>
<td>1 Points</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Sports Promotion Foundation’s (KSPO) homepage (2007) - http://www.kspo.or.kr/

Table 4.6 Monthly payments for medal winners’ lifelong pension in line with the point evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Monthly payment</th>
<th>Criteria (Unit: won/🗺; per person)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20~30</td>
<td>300,000~450,000</td>
<td>From 20 points 150,000 won per 10 points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40~100</td>
<td>525,000~975,000</td>
<td>75,000 won per 10 points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110 or Olympic gold medal</td>
<td>1,000,000 (upper limit)</td>
<td>25,000 won per 10 points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 110</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500,000 won per 10 excess points (5,000,000 won for Olympic gold medal only)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Sports Promotion Foundation’s (KSPO) homepage (2007) - http://www.kspo.or.kr/

As can be seen in Table 4.5, the highest points value is given to the Olympic Games; evidence of the importance attached to the Olympics and their perceived value as a demonstration of high performance. Furthermore, by enacting the ‘Military Service Exemption Law’ in 1973, the government allowed selected elite athletes to carry on
their sports career by completing a short-term reservist service instead of a long term military active duty (Lee K, 1994). The introduction of the law was also indicative of the government considering a strategic incentive for the nation’s elite athletes in pursuit of sport excellence. In addition, there were a variety of measures to develop elite sport, examples of which include the commencement of coach academy (1969), the establishment of the Seoul Physical Education High School (1971) and the Korea National Sport University (1976).

4.2.1.4 Implications of ‘School Sport’ and ‘SFA’ for elite sport development

A summary of the key implications of school sport and SFA for elite sport development is provided in Table 4.7 which shows the landmarks of sport policy from 1961 to 1979.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key political/policy event</th>
<th>Organisational and administrative implications</th>
<th>Implications for school sport and Sport for All</th>
<th>Implications for elite sport development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961: Military coup puts General Park Chung-Hee in power</td>
<td>Park’s entrance heralded a change in the government’s approach to sport</td>
<td>Park’s intervention in sport policy had an impact on every domain of sport</td>
<td>Sport considered as a key tool in order to achieve the government’s political purpose, especially elite sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962: The National Sports Promotion Law promulgated</td>
<td>The law was an official signal for a shift toward increasing central government involvement in sport</td>
<td>The law included school sport, Sport for All, and elite sport as its comprehensive contents</td>
<td>Direct implications for national sports promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964: Tokyo Olympic Games</td>
<td>Korea dispatched a large team of 59 officials and 165 athletes in 16 events and won a total of just 3 Olympic medals (2 silver and 1 bronze). The failure dealt a heavy blow to elite sport.</td>
<td>No direct implication</td>
<td>The Olympics could be viewed as a turning point to improve elite performances. Low medal count led to increased pressure on the situation of elite sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966: Taenung Athletes Village established</td>
<td>The village was set-up as the hub for developing elite sport</td>
<td>No direct implication</td>
<td>Raised status of elite sport at government level. The village still functions as a key facility to foster elite level sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968: Korean Sports Association</td>
<td>Park’s government attempted to unify sports organisations aimed at</td>
<td>Despite an elite level-oriented sport, KASA has a function for Sport</td>
<td>Increasing implications for elite level. After the unification, the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Olympic Committee, and Korea Physical Education Association were integrated into Korean Amateur Association</td>
<td>Improving efficiency for All. The affairs related to school sport was taken mainly by the Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Organisation (KASA) altered into a body emphasising elite sport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970: ‘3 Year Plan for Expansion of Sport Facilities’ (1970-1972)</td>
<td>The government invested government money in an expansion of sports facilities; 238 million won in 1970, 531 million won in 1971, 4.3 billion won in 1972</td>
<td>Funding for sport facility was mainly focused on that of school sport. Increased demand for connection between school sport and Sport for All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971: Physical Aptitude Test established</td>
<td>Government’s powerful intention to promote the nation’s physical fitness through school sport</td>
<td>Increasing level of student’s physical fitness in terms of school sport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 and 1976: Seoul Physical Education High School and Korea National Sport University established</td>
<td>The high school established for sport development based on scientific and professional coaching and the university established in preparation for Moscow Olympic Games in accordance with President Park’s directions</td>
<td>Functioned as a pillar for the cultivation of national athletes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972: Athletic Specialist System</td>
<td>The establishment of a system for athletes talented in school sport in connection with elite sport level</td>
<td>No direct implication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972: White Paper, A Comprehensive content for National Sport</td>
<td>A background of increasing sport interest by KASA. Confirmed links between sport and government policy throughout the country</td>
<td>Government’s intention for national sports promotion could be grasped through the White paper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972: The National Sports Promotion Foundation established</td>
<td>The Foundation collected and administered a fund which aimed to encourage the promotion of national sports and the improvement of elite level performance. There were two main methods of raising funds; i) advertising business on packets of cigarettes; ii) tax on the entrance fee of arenas</td>
<td>Essential impact on sports facilities and the improvement of circumstances for Sport for All in the late 1970s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Until the late 1980s, the national sports promotion funds concentrated on elite sport level. This is the single most important factor in the development of the elite sport model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Implication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Lifelong Pension System announced by the KASA</td>
<td>The system was for medal winners in international sports events</td>
<td>No direct implication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>'5 Year Sport for All Promotion Plan</td>
<td>KASA announced the plan for mass participation</td>
<td>Policy for Sport for All did not gain the nation’s interest and desire due to economic circumstances. The plan functioned as a publicity level and during this time was not productive in terms of Sport for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>National Gymnastics enacted by KASA</td>
<td>Created as a part of the people’s control to increase the country’s productivity</td>
<td>Despite criticism as a uniform military culture, the aim was to popularise physical activity in the difficult economic situation of the time; Gymnastics was a representative strategy to boost the people’s labour productivity by practising it in school, the community and the workplace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from BBC (2007); Ha & Lim (2001); Ha & Mangan (2002); Lee H (2000)

Until the promulgation of the ‘National Sports Promotion Law’ in 1962, the approach to sport in terms of government involvement was, in general, best characterised as being nonexistent. The Law was a clear signal of government involvement in national sport and the acceptance of sport as a public policy concern. In the light of these considerations, the Law reflected the government’s concern with national security and the nation’s economic productivity, with sport becoming one avenue for the achievement of the government’s political objectives.

With the government-led industrialisation, a significant aspect of SFA was to stress the importance of improving the national physique and soundness of mind and body for ‘modernisation of the fatherland’. For this purpose, the government launched policies related to SFA, beginning with the National Sports Promotion Law. Despite the ‘5 Year SFA Promotion Plan’ in the late 1970s, within which the regime’s intention was to encourage mass participation, the revitalisation of SFA was not substantially accomplished. This was due in large part to the social conditions of the
time; the people confronted with poverty could not afford to be concerned with sport activity because higher priorities at that time were food, clothing and shelter.

In addition, the government also attempted to achieve political goals through school sport. As stated above, the function of school sport focused on physical education for all students and as a ‘breeding-ground’ for ‘talented’ children. Schools, during the authoritarian control of the Park regime, were used to develop the physical strength and physique of the nation because the ‘institutionalised’ structure of schools gave greater opportunity for the government to influence policy and programmes. In respect of elite sport, the second role of school sport mentioned earlier is worthy of note. School sport has been the cornerstone of elite sport development in which most talented young athletes are identified and nurtured. Indeed, school-based sport clubs were the key factor in shaping the sub-structure for elite sport because there were few private sport clubs due to the poor social and economic circumstances in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, the area of school sport was invaluable in expediting the government’s policy objectives for elite sport success.

According to Kim (2003), modern Korean sport in the latter half of the 20th century was characterised by: (i) a state-led official sport; (ii) a tendency towards result-oriented sport; and (iii) sport as a demonstration of national identity. In this respect, the Third Republic sought to base the development of the national sports era on physical education in schools (Kim D, 1999). The government aimed to wipe out defeatism and the image of poverty and considered sport’s function as an important means for achieving their political purposes under the slogan ‘Physical Strength is National Power’. Thus, the function of school sport was to increase physical strength and physique by stressing physical education in schools. In relation to elite sport development, political tension between the two Koreas in the 1960s and 1970s underpinned the government’s growing awareness of the necessity of elite sport development combined with nationalism. The rationale for elite sport development as part of its policy concern, in large part, originated from the Cold War ideology as perceived to be evident in other countries (e.g., between the United States and Soviet Union, and West Germany and East Germany).
4.2.2 Continuity of authoritarianism, but towards democratisation and sport: 1980-1992

After the ending of the authoritarian Park regime (1961 to 1979) another military-based regime took over the presidency in 1980. Contrary to the people’s expectation for a democratic government, Korean society again witnessed an oppressive, authoritarian government whose objectives included, according to Lee H (2003), the establishment of a form of managed democracy, the establishment of welfare society, the realisation of a just society, the reform of the educational system and the promotion of culture. However, the continuation of authoritarian government brought about the public anti-government movement in the 1980s, so that the legitimacy of government was seriously threatened. For this reason, ‘the authoritarian government utilised sport or sporting events to make up for its political illegitimacy’ (Cho Y, 2008: 243). Examples of this included the so-called ‘3S policy’ (Sex, Screen and Sport) and the government’s bid for the 1988 Olympic Games. For the authoritarian government, sport was a crucial instrument designed to compensate for the lack of its political legitimacy. Therefore, the launch of Korean Professional Baseball League (KPBL) in 1982 was related to the political strategy of the government to divert the public’s attention from politics, a strategy which, according to Cho Y (2008), played a significant role in diverting public interest from political issues.

The government’s aspiration to host the 1988 Olympic Games was also part of its diversionary strategy. In 1981, Seoul’s successful bid for the 1988 Olympics; the so-called Baden-Baden’s miracle, accelerated the nation’s elite sport development, evidence of which included the creation of the Ministry of Sport in 1982, which was the national body responsible for the implementation and management of a wide range of sport policies in South Korea. Moreover, during President Chun’s regime (1980-1998) the slogan, ‘the prosperity of the nation through sport’, was indicative of President Chun’s consideration of sport as an important policy concern. The increasing government involvement in sport can be inferred from President Chun’s address to the nation in 1983 in which he stressed ‘the establishment of the nation on the basis of sport’ rather than ‘on the basis of industries’ (Lee H, 2000). As Ok indicated, ‘the 1980s was the fruitful autumn of Korean sport’, and the Fifth Republic,
which is often so-called ‘the Republic of Sport’, paved the way for the ‘golden age of sport’ in the 1980s (2004: 51). As such, under President Chun’s regime, the use of sport was considerably correlated with the political strategy to help manage the crisis of hegemony within the regime.

4.2.2.1 School sport

Along with the creation of the Ministry of Sport in 1982 the government introduced an administrative change in the area of school sport. Namely, the nation’s school sport policy under the responsibility and control of the Ministry of Education was transferred to the Ministry of Sport (Lee H, 2000). As a consequence, the school sport sector degenerated into a secondary concern of the government’s policy agenda because the Ministry of Sport paid more attention to the supervision of preparations for the Seoul Asian Games and the Seoul Olympic Games (Lee W, 2002).

It was argued that the impact of these changes on school sport gave greater prominence to elite sport development than to the physical education of general students; thus President Chun’s regime was relatively indifferent to school sport policy (Lee W, 2002). The Korean approach to the development of school sport relied heavily upon schools to support potential elite athletes and teams and thus has been fragmented into a dual structure which has caused the development of school-based sport clubs and the improvement of PE for general students to be uncoordinated. For example, it was difficult for pupils to use sports facilities in schools, as they were exclusively used by student-athletes of athletic clubs (Kim T, 2007). As Kim (2000: 225) notes ‘the status of physical education was almost the same as during the Park era, the Ministry of Education was not particularly concerned with students in general’, but building good infrastructures for the elite sport system via schools. For this reason, PE policy development for general students stagnated in the 1980s.

Alongside the political reform initiatives in the early stage of Roh Tae-Woo regime, the Ministry of Sport was reorganised to form the Ministry of Sport and Youth in 1990 and the Division of School Sport was abolished. This change disrupted the function of central administration for school sport affairs (Lee H, 2003). Such a
change brought about the situation that neither the Ministry of Education nor the Ministry of Sport and Youth had full responsibility for the implementation and management of the nation’s school sport policy. In other words, the responsibility for school sport policy was ambiguous. According to Kim M (1988), the area of school sport had remained frozen in the amber of the government’s ineffectiveness and confusion (Kim M, 1988).

4.2.2.2 Sport for All

During the 1980s, social change began to arouse interest in SFA across the nation. However, the expansion of a base of SFA was subject to restriction because of the degree of emphasis put on elite sport by the central government until the late 1980s (Lee H, 2000). Along with the successful hosting of the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics, increasing national income and leisure time provided the driving force for SFA to the nation, and ‘democratisation fever’ before and after the Olympics functioned as a connecting link to SFA by sparking values of individual freedom and the right to pursue one’s own happiness (Son S, 2002). Indeed, the SFA participation rate of 1989 increased by 7.8 percentage points compared with three years before (according to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2006), SFA participation rate was 19.4% in 1986 and 27.2% in 1989). It was argued that the two mega-sporting events had crucial significance in terms of SFA in: (i) raising the status of SFA throughout the country; (ii) functioning as a catalyst for SFA development; and (iii) raising the emphasis of sport policy where SFA should ‘keep pace’ with elite sport (KSC, 1988: 22-25). Therefore, there was a growing awareness of the necessity of constructing a national support system for improving SFA participation rate. Along with the birth of Sixth Republic (1988 to 1992), whereupon Roh Tae-Woo was sworn in as President elected by the first direct presidential election system, much attention was paid to SFA, compared to the previous authoritarian governments. A policy emphasis on SFA was reflected in the ‘3 Year National Sport for All Promotion Plan of 1990, widely known as Hodori Plan. The ‘Hodori Plan’ was indicative of the government’s consideration of SFA as part of its policy agenda. In line with the plan,

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7 The 1988 Seoul Olympics Mascot
1991 witnessed the creation of the Korea Council of Sport for All (KOCOSA) in 1991, which is the national body responsible for the implementation and management of Korea’s SFA policy. However, in a strict sense, compared to the sport policy of the previous authoritarian government, President Roh’s regime did little for sport, with the exception of the creation of the Hodori Plan for SFA.

It should be reiterated that the development of SFA had remained at a paltry level until 1988. However, during President Chun’s regime (1980 to 1988), if we consider spectator sport as an extension of SFA development, of particular concern was the instrumental use of sport to turn the nation’s attention from politics and to mollify a ‘rage-driven’ public against the military regime. The authoritarian government felt the need to create an epoch-making system for the attraction of the people’s eyes and ears so as to manage its crisis of political hegemony (Lee H, 2000). It was argued that the launch of professional leagues of sport in general, and baseball/football in particular, appeared as one part of its ruling strategy. This is borne out by the following statement:

The specific launching process of the KPBL [Korean Professional Baseball League] was initiated and organised by the government, in part to compensate for its essential authoritarianism and militarism...The government’s role in the beginning of Korea Baseball Organisation, which was aggressive, included the assignment of specific regions to major conglomerates wherein each conglomerate would organise its own franchise team. The government easily intervened in determining which conglomerates would participate and where they would base their teams (Cho Y, 2008: 242).

‘Although many critics commented that the Professional Baseball League was one of the most obvious outcomes of the government’s intervention in order to divert political attention’ (Cho Y, 2005: 1), it quickly turned into a national pastime, becoming the most popular sport in Korean society (Kim B, 2001b: 173). In spite of the governmental involvement based on the authoritarian motivations, baseball became the most popular professional sport with ‘the public’s growing desire for an increase in available leisure activities’ (Cho Y, 2008: 242).
4.2.2.3 Elite sport

Arguably, the defining catalyst for Korean sport in the 1980s was the decision in 1981 by the Asian Games Federation (AGF) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to grant the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games to Seoul. These decisions had a significant influence on the direction of sport policy and administration. Notably, these decisions helped to consolidate elite sport policy as the crucial public policy concern. The government’s commitment to elite sport development was made manifest in the establishment of the Ministry of Sport in 1982. According to Roh Tae-Woo’s inaugural speech as the first Minister of Sport, who symbolically illustrated the objectives for, and direction of, sport policy:

We founded the Ministry of Sport with the establishment of the nation on the basis of sport in order to ensure the intensive preparation for the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics. Accordingly, we will not only do our best to recruit and foster outstanding athletes and coaches, but also make an effort to strengthen the development of sport science, school sport, SFA, military sport and backward sports facilities (quoted in Lee C, 2002:134)

In addition, along with the creation of the Ministry of Sport, the total amendment of the National Sports Promotion Law in 1982 was amended to emphasise sport as a means to an end by adding the following aim to, ‘contribute to the enhancement of national prestige via sport’. Ha & Mangan (2002: 221) note that ‘the inclusion of this amendment showed officially the intention of the government to foster elite sport in the interest of national prestige’. As such, the Ministry of Sport functioned as the heart of central administration organisation for sport during the Fifth Republic (1980 to 1988). It is worth noting that the commitment of the Fifth Republic to sport was indicated by appointing Roh Tae-Woo as the Minister of Sport. He was the second ranked politician during Chun’s regime and later became President of Korea in 1988. As Ok notes, ‘military and political power played an important role in promoting the development of sport’ (2004: 51), and Chun’s regime achieved much in the elite sport sector under strong political leadership despite severe criticism for undemocratic policies (Ha W, 1997).
Along with the inauguration of Roh Tae Woo as the Minister of Sport, of particular policy concern was the revival of the talent identification policy for future national athletes in 1982. The talent identification project began in 1965, but bore no fruit at that time because of budget limitations (Lee Y et al., 2001) and the project was terminated 1971. The Korean Amateur Sports Association instructed the Korean Institute of Sport Science to establish selection criteria for talent identification, and 4,395 students among 100,000 students who achieved the special grade or first grade in Physical aptitude tests, were selected in the first year (Ministry of Sport and Youth, 1992). Table 4.8 illustrates the number of reserve athletes selected through talent identification from 1982 to 1993.

Table 4.8 The number of reserve athletes selected through talent identification from 1982 to 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of participants</th>
<th>No. of drop-out</th>
<th>No. of selected athletes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>6.5 million students (10-19 year old)</td>
<td>The third selection</td>
<td>4,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>4,359</td>
<td>2,610</td>
<td>1,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2,545</td>
<td>1,696</td>
<td>849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,675</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1,487</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1,693</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,529</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Sports Council (2000: 5)

However, Lee H (2003) points out that the project left much to be desired due to insufficient parental enthusiasm and the lack of professional coaching in schools. During the Fifth and Sixth republics (1980 to 1993), the establishment of specialist sports schools such as Gyeongnam Physical Education High School in 1984, Chungbuk Physical Education High School in 1988, Kangwon Physical Education High School in 1991 and Chungnam Physical Education High School in 1992 was disseminated throughout the country. These specialist sports schools were designed to nurture and promote talented athletes in sports such as athletics, judo, shooting,
gymnastics and swimming which many schools were largely unwilling to foster. These specialist schools have played a key role in nurturing future excellent athletes in unpopular sports (Lee H, 2000), the most recent evidence of which included three Winter Olympic gold medals (in speed skating) in Vancouver won by three students of Korea National Sport University.

The Ministry of Sport designated the Korea National Sport University as the Second Class Athlete Coaches Training Institute in 1983 and the Korea Institute of Sport Science as the First Class Athlete Coaches Training Institute in 1988. Furthermore, the Armed Forces Athletic Corps (the so-called ‘Sangmu’) was established in 1984. This Corps emerged as the single most important factor for the development of elite sport in South Korea’s special situation in which every Korean man is under an obligation to undertake military service. In sum, Korea’s elite sport development system during this time was underpinned by the impact of hosting the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and reinforced and revived the policies of the 1960s and 1970s for elite sport development.

4.2.2.4 Implications of ‘School Sport’ and ‘SFA’ for elite sport development

Table 4.9 provides a summary of the interconnection between elite sport, SFA, school sport and the impact of the changing political context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key political/policy event</th>
<th>Organisational and administrative implications</th>
<th>Implications for school sport and Sport for All</th>
<th>Implications for elite sport development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981: President Chun indirectly elected to a seven year term</td>
<td>Martial law ends, but government continues to have strong powers in order to prevent dissent</td>
<td>Called Geon’s government as the republic of sport. President Park controlled sport as a strong measure in order to lead political apathy.</td>
<td>Implemented a elite level-oriented sport policy. Elite sport was an effective means to Chun’s administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981: Seoul decided as a venue of ’88 Olympics and ’86 Asian Games</td>
<td>The winning the bid to host the events was the signal for sharply emphasising on high performance sport</td>
<td>Seoul Olympic Organising Committee (SLOOC) established same year maintained close cooperation systems with other organisations</td>
<td>Chun’s government focused on elite sport to improve performances at ’88 Seoul Olympics and ’86 Seoul Asian Games; linked to issues of national identity and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Ministry of Sport inaugurated</td>
<td>Even though the Ministry was established as special measures for ‘88 Olympics and ‘86 Asian Games, the foundation was a watershed in terms of Korean sports history</td>
<td>With the launch of the Ministry, strategy as a salient feature to scout athletes talented was promoted an early stage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 and 1983</td>
<td>Korean Professional Baseball League and Korean Professional Football League launched</td>
<td>Curtain rises on Korean Professional Baseball- and Football league by President Park’s strong will</td>
<td>Although the leagues launched to turn away the people’s eye from political interest, those contributed to popularise sport in terms of Sport for All and leisure life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>More substantial Acts were adopted for the effective enforcement</td>
<td>More substantial Acts were adopted for the effective enforcement</td>
<td>Despite the outset influenced by the administration’s political purpose, those played important role in shaping of sport culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982: Total revision of the National Sports Promotion Law</td>
<td>The foundation was for national sports development in terms of a farsighted policy under the situation which everyman have an liability for military service</td>
<td>With the focusing on elite sport, Park’s government gave an impetus to the promotion of school sport and that of sport at work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Armed Forces Athletic Corps established</td>
<td>The foundation was for national sports development in terms of a farsighted policy under the situation which everyman have an liability for military service</td>
<td>The corps was the motive power for elite sport development Functioned as the nexus to maintain the performance of talented athletes, escaping break of elite performance from liability for military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 and 1988</td>
<td>Seoul Asian Games and Seoul Olympic Games</td>
<td>With the events successfully hold, Korean national athletes won 224 medals in Seoul Asian Games; 33 medals in Seoul Olympics</td>
<td>Especially the Olympics viewed as turning point, signalling the national spread of Sport for All by being convinced of sports importance and value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>The Korea Sports Promotion Foundation inaugurated</td>
<td>The KSPO plays a key role in organising various activities to commemorate the Seoul Olympics. It, expanded from the former National Sports Promotion Foundation, was established on 20, April, 1989. About US$430 million, inherited mostly from existing funds from the National Sports Promotion Foundation and profits from the Olympics, were raised as a basic fund to operate the KSPO</td>
<td>The events played key role in the increasing of elite performance and pave the way for an switchover of elite sport to Sport for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Substantial funds through ‘88 Olympics surplus and fund raising business were directly allocated to school sport and Sport for All objectives</td>
<td>Four key roles in terms of fostering elite sport: (i) supports for Korea Sports Council; (ii) supports for competitions at home and abroad; (iii) supports for sports exchange (contributes to the strengthening of global sports diplomacy); and (iv) supports of other professional sports organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Support and sport policy development for national sports promotion</td>
<td>Substantial support for the improvement of performances of national athletes; a systematic and synthetic research to sport science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989: Korea Institute of Sport Science re-established</td>
<td>Integrated research institute equipped with the sole management system as a foundation was re-established</td>
<td>Support and sport policy development for national sports promotion</td>
<td>Substantial support for the improvement of performances of national athletes; a systematic and synthetic research to sport science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990: ‘3 Year National Sport for All Promotion Plan (1990-1992)</td>
<td>The emphasis on Sport for All was reflected in the ‘3 Year National Sport for All Promotion plan, widely known as Hodori (the ‘1988 Seoul Olympics Mascot) Plan</td>
<td>Confirmation of support for Sport for All with increasing demand toward mass sport</td>
<td>Implications for switchover of elite sport-oriented policy to Sport for All-oriented policy, including the counting support for elite sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990: Ministry of Sport, reorganised Ministry of Sport and Youth</td>
<td>In line with government administrative reform, department of school sport was abolished in Ministry of Sport and Youth renamed</td>
<td>Businesses related to school sport scattered and stagnated</td>
<td>Evidence of indirect shift in government focus away from high performance sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991: The Korea Council of Sport for All established</td>
<td>Three key objectivises: (i) Enhance people’s health and fitness from; (ii) promotion of Sport for All Lead people to most effective sport and recreation system; (iii) Building basis for unification of Korea from developing world Korean’s identities and patriotism</td>
<td>Confirmation of government policy shift toward Sport for All</td>
<td>No direct implications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from A Handbook of Korea (1993); BBC (2007); Ha & Lim (2001); Ha & Mangan (2002); Lee (2000)

The government’s approach to sport during this period was strongly interventionist as was the case with the previous authoritarian government in order to fulfil the objectives of national sport policy. In the 1980s governmental interest in sport was motivated by the need to reduce the tide of unrest affecting domestic politics. The government consequently focused on the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games in a way that maximized their political objectives, with the result that priority was given to the development of elite sport.

Accordingly, the direction of sport policy in the 1980s was not sport for national interests and the public welfare, contributing to the people’s well-being and happiness (Lee C, 2002). Little government consideration was given to SFA policy due to the prioritisation of elite sport. As a consequence, by the end of 1980s there was a wide gap between the elite sport sector and the SFA sector. Song and Kim (1997) pointed
out that Korean sport could be explained by an inverted pyramid structure in which elite sport was not developed on the grass-roots sports base. It is generally taken for granted in Korea that an ideal structure for a sport system is pyramid structure in which elite sport and mass sport are integrated and coordinated (Kim J, 1998). However, the conclusion of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games marked the beginning of a momentous change from elite sport-oriented policy to a greater policy concern with SFA. This change in policy priority was reflected in the ‘3 Year National SFA Promotion Plan of 1990, the ‘Hodori Plan’. It should be reiterated that the creation of the Hodori Plan in 1990 can be conceived as a turning point for the provision of SFA development. In relation to school sport, the priority given to elite sport significantly affected the opportunities for general school pupils. The dominance of elite sport in schools set the tone for elite sport development and obstructed the development of physical education for all students in schools.

To sum up, as Ha and Mangan suggest that ‘if the evolution of modern Korean sport is compared to the four seasons, then the 1960s was the spring when the seeds were sown, the 1970s was the summer when the roots took firm hold and the 1980s and 1990s were the autumn when the fruits ripened’ (2002: 231), the heyday of Korean sport was created through the development of elite sport in the 1980s. It is evidenced by Green’s (2003: 129) suggestion in the UK context that ‘if the outcome of such policy initiatives is to be judged on the criterion of success at the Olympic Games’, then the 33 medals (Fourth place) won at the Seoul 1988 Games and the 224 medals (Second place) won at the Seoul 1986 Games are ample evidence of the policy’s success.

4.2.3 The advent of civilian government, an economic crisis and sport: 1993 to 2010

Along with the establishment of civilian government in 1993, Korean politics witnessed the beginnings of the new democratic age. Kim Young-Sam’s regime (1993-1998) emphasised political reform to differentiate itself from the former military regimes. The pattern of reform affected all government function including sport (Lee H, 2003). The period dating from the 1993 to the mid 2000s (2010) has
been characterised as one of reduction, contraction and confusion for the Korean sport. Indeed, the country’s central administrative organisation of sport was progressively reduced from Kim Young-Sam’s regime (1993-1998) to Kim Dae-Jung’s regime (1998-2003) due to the desire for ‘small government’ (Park Y, 2005). In particular, the revamp of the Ministry of Sport and Youth was the signal for significant structural shifts of sports administration at central government level from 1993 onwards. The Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Sport and Youth were unified to form the Ministry of Culture and Sport in 1993, which consisted of sports policy bureau, sports support bureau and international sports bureau in relation to the machinery of sport.

Moreover, with the departure of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in the early 1998, when the nation was hit hard by the Asian financial crisis, the Ministry of Culture and Sport was again reformed to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and was the evidence of the decline in the status of sport at the central government. The upshot of the sustained reduction in status was that sport administration organisation within central government has been trimmed down to the sports bureau including Sports Policy Team, Sport for All Team, Sports Industry Team, International Sports Team and Disabled Sports Team. The IMF intervention, which created an enormous national crisis, had a negative impact on public expenditure. Lee H (2003) pointed out that sport was one of the most damaged fields by the economic crisis, evidence of which included the shrivelling of sport-related organisations and the dissolution of a variety of business sports teams.

However, it is not that the governments have displayed indifference towards sport policy since 1993. Each government published the 5 Year National Sport Promotion Plans which commonly claimed a consistent support of elite sport with the nation’s ultimate goal of finishing in the top 10 in the Olympic medal tables and an increase of SFA participation rate (Ministry of Culture and Sport, 1993; Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1998; Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003). The country’s aspiration to become one of the world’s major sporting nations has been arguably evidenced in the hosting of a variety of central- and local government-led big sporting events (e.g., the 1997 Winter Universiade Games, the 1997 East Asian Games, the 1999 Winter Asian

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Games, the 2002 Korean-Japan World Cup, the 2002 Summer Asian Games, the 2003 Summer Universiade Games), which advanced the drive to develop an elite sport system.

Unlike in the past, the governmental interest in SFA development has been constantly increasing prompted in part by rapid social changes such as the implementation of the five-day workweek system, the increase of national income, the orientation towards individualism. Accordingly, the direction of governmental sport policy seemed to have swung toward SFA policy development from elite sport-oriented policy (Lee W, 2004). In a similar vein, there has been growing concern over the necessity of constructing a well-balanced and holistic system of elite sport and SFA since the last decade.

4.2.3.1 School Sport

The period dating from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s can be viewed as a nadir in Korean school sport, where government organisation reforms blighted school sport development and caused administrative confusion. Indeed, school sport has been a sector in need of reconstruction since the late 1980s (Kim J, 2002). In line with the repeated administrative reform at the central government level, at present the School Physical Education, Health and School Meals Division in the Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development is in charge of school sport sector. Of greater concern in the indifference the government displayed towards school sport as only one official assumes responsibility for school sport policy (Ko Y, 2000). The organisation and administration of school sport policy has been bedevilled by the continuing fragmentation and disharmony between the various bodies over time. The administrative reform and downsized structure of school sport in South Korea has been seen as hindering school sport development, exemplified in the decrease of PE class hours in middle and high schools, and the abolition of physical aptitude tests in 1994. As such, the neglect on school sport during this period has also exposed the lack of school sports facilities over the past two decades, which the evidence of a disorganised and unmatched approach to school sport. The problems of Korean school
The reality of school sport in which a few classes take PE lesson at the same time at narrow playgrounds has been happening over again over the few decades. Moreover, schoolgirls change their clothes in classroom and schoolboys change their clothes in the toilet because there are no changing rooms in schools. What is worse, only 42 percent of the elementary, middle and high schools in Seoul have a playground where students can possibly run a 100m race (JoongAng Ilbo, 2002).

In addition, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (currently Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism: MCST) has given little attention to the promotion of school sport over the years (Lee H, 2003). However, there has been a progressive shift toward school sport development since the mid-2000s. President Roh Mu-Hyun’s administration (2003-2008) presented a set of rational principles and detailed aims for school sport through a comprehensive policy document, ‘A Renovation Plan for School Sport’ in 2005 (Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development, 2006), in line with the establishment of an exclusive organisation for the affairs of school sport. The following the year, the government published a policy document, ‘A Fundamental Direction of School Sport’, aimed at improving the quality of life through the revitalisation of school sport and SFA sectors by linking the two areas. More recently, President Lee Myung-Bak’s administration (from 2008 onwards) published a comprehensive policy document ‘A Fundamental Direction of School sport’ (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 2008) in 2008, which indicated the more specific provision for the promotion of school sport and focused, inter alia, on (i) the promotion of school sport clubs, (ii) the reinforcement of educational administration for school-based athletic teams, (iii) the managerial faithfulness of the curriculum of PE, (iv) the introduction of a minimum academy ability system for student-athletes, and (v) the expansion of school sports facilities. These measures, taken together, can be summed up as demonstrating that Korea’s school sport has suffered an absence of political attention during the period dating from the 1993 and into the early 21st century, but there has been growing concern over the revitalisation of school sport since the mid-2000s, when school sport has been considered a discrete root and nexus to SFA and elite sport.
4.2.3.2 Sport for All

If the 1980s was the quest stage for SFA, the 1990s was the time operated by concrete plans and tasks for SFA (Kim H, 2007). In 1993, the first civilian government (1993-1998) published a comprehensive national sport policy statement, the 5 Year National Sport Promotion Plan (Ministry of Culture and Sport 1993), which indicated the government’s ultimate goal, which was to raise participation rate above 50 percent by 1997. To achieve this goal, the government focused, inter alia, on: (i) the inspiring eagerness for sport activity; (ii) expanding the space for sport activity and increasing the number of SFA instructors; (iii) systematic support for national sports activity; and (iv) expanding a wide range of opportunities for a sound leisure activity, which would now be successive tasks for promoting SFA at government level (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2005). The keynote of sport policy in the early days of the Kim Dae-Jung’s administration (1998-2003) could be understood by the task of state affairs ‘A healthy society is in SFA’ among the 100 tasks in the national administration (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2005). To achieve these goals, the Kim Dae-Jung government proposed five main directions towards SFA through the 5 Year National Sport Promotion Plan newly established by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 1998: (i) creating a friendly environment for community-centred sports activity; (ii) expanding the sports programme for underprivileged classes such as handicapped people, working classes and low-classes; (iii) upbringing of SFA instructors; (iv) scientific support for the care of national physical fitness; and (v) encouraging private-led SFA initiatives. Interestingly, despite the decrease in the overall sports budget since 1999, President Kim’s government attempted to carry out its goals at grass-root level through budget rises for promoting SFA sector (Lee W, 2004). In line with the government’s steady efforts for SFA, SFA participation of over two or three times a week reached 38.8 percent (see Table 4.10 below), showing a steady growth from 1989. However, participation decreased by 33.4 percent in 2000 due to the financial crisis (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>27.2 %</td>
<td>34.7 %</td>
<td>37.6 %</td>
<td>38.8 %</td>
<td>33.4 %</td>
<td>39.8 %</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2005, 2006)
However, after overcoming the financial crisis, the SFA participation rate in 2003 increased to 39.8 percent perhaps due to growing interest in health and the spreading recognition of sport activity as a way of prevention and treatment for disease among adults (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003). The 5 Year National Sport Promotion Plan announced by the Roh Mu-Hyun administration (2003-2008) in 2003 was perceived as a national sport policy statement aimed at ‘raising the SFA participation above 50 percent’ (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003). The governments (since 1993) have been stepping up efforts to promote mass participation in sport and leisure activity in line with the increasing public interest in sport activity, the popularisation of sports activities and the increase of national income. More recently, ‘Sports 7330 campaign’ (doing exercise for 30 minutes a day and three times a week; as in the case of Germany’s ‘Trimming 130 Campaign’ in the 1980s) announced by the KOCOSA in 2006 represents specific and substantial policy ambition (The Korea Council of Sport for All, 2007).

4.2.3.3 Elite Sport

Korean elite sport circles suffered a double blow when the first civilian government (1993-1998) cut their subsidy and also downgraded relatively on the emphasis on elite sport development. The change in priority was partially evidenced in the central government reform of sport (renamed Ministry of Culture and Tourism from the Ministry of Culture and Sport) in 1998, which was relegated to the status of a Sport Bureau. Given that much attention was focused on elite sport rather than SFA by the previous authoritarian governments, the civilian government’s consideration of elite sport policy as a crucial part of its policy agenda became weaker.

Table 4.11 demonstrates how the civilian government decreasing involvement in sport. As shown in the table, unlike the Chun Du-Hwan government known as the Republic of Sport, with the beginnings of civilian government in 1993 the sport-related budget has begun to reduce. If government policy commitment to sport is to be judged on the criterion of share of government budget, then, on the average, the 0.13 percent from the civilian government onwards is still a low proportion in comparison to that of the past military regimes. As such, the reason why the sports budget was earmarked at
comparatively low levels during the civilian government is that it was a partial sign of the decreasing central government interest in sport, especially elite sport (Lee C, 2005).

### Table 4.11 Government budget vs sports budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>General accounts (A)</th>
<th>Sports budget (B)</th>
<th>Ratio (B/A, %)</th>
<th>Divisions in charge of sport related matters / note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>15,375</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>Sports bureau in the Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>21,425</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>'76 Montreal Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>27,406</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>35,398</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>52,137</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>64,668</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>'80 Moscow Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>80,400</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>93,137</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>•Ministry of Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>104,167</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>111,729</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>'84 Los Angeles Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>125,324</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>138,005</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>'86 Seoul Asian Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>160,596</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>174,640</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>'88 Seoul Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>192,282</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>226,890</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>328,352</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>•Ministry of Sport and Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>362,279</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>'92 Barcelona Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>407,641</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>•Ministry of Culture and Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>•The advent of Civil Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>476,310</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>557,805</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>'96 Atlanta Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>630,376</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>'97 IMF crisis (November 1997-December 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>705,284</td>
<td>1,541</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>•Ministry of Culture and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>•Kim Young-Sam replaced Kim Dae-Jung as President of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>807,629</td>
<td>1,816</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>•Ministry of Culture and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>•Kim Young-Sam replaced Kim Dae-Jung as President of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>884,850</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>946,199</td>
<td>1,799</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>'00 Sydney Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,002,246</td>
<td>1,639</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,060,963</td>
<td>1,589</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>Korean/Japan Football World-cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,114,831</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,183,560</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>'04 Athens Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Unit: In hundred million won)
Moreover, ‘considering the gloomy national atmosphere in South Korea during the IMF intervention’ (1997 to 2000) (Cho Y, 2008: 245), the economic crisis blighted elite sport development. It was not surprising therefore, that for private enterprises thrown into financial turmoil, their business sport teams were a target for liquidation, especially in the unpopular sports such as athletics, handball and gymnastics. According to statistics provided by the Korean Sports Council, over 60 business sports teams were disbanded and 212 male, 143 female athletics, 39 managers and 35 coaches left their teams between 1997 and 1998 (quoted in Bang Y, 1998). It should be noted that, since the financial crisis, much of the burden to nurture and promote elite sport teams has been transferred to municipal governments and local sports councils (KBS News, 10 March 2010). In other words, while the private businesses disbanded their sport teams, the municipal governments and sport councils were committed to creating a lot of small-scale sport teams to nurture their own elite athletes, at least in the pursuit of sporting success in the National Sports Festival (see Figure 4.2 below).

Figure 4.2 Number of Business teams vs number of local sports council teams

Source: KBS News, 10 March 2010
Notwithstanding the above unfavourable conditions for elite sport development, the central government during this period (1993 to 2010) did not display indifference towards elite sport. As mentioned above, it was apparent in the 5 Year National Sport Promotion Plans that the government aimed at holding athletic performance within the top 10 in the medal standings at the Olympic Games. Furthermore, the project for talent identification which was abandoned in 1997 was revived in 2002, when KSC selected the total of 163 young students in three sports: 80 for athletics; 39 for gymnastics; and 44 for swimming (Bang et al., 2003). However, in contrast to the government’s expectation which was to keep the top 10 place sustained since the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games (Lee H, 2000, 2003) the sustained decrease in interest in elite sport at central government was reflected in the medal standings (the 28 medals - twelfth place) at the 2000 Sydney Olympics. Yoon K et al., (2003) noted in the Korea’s sports context that a dark shadow hung over the elite sport sector, such as the disorganisation of sports business teams and the shortage of athletic resources making the prospect of Korean sport development not very hopeful. Reflecting on such a sense of crisis, along with the relative failure of the national team in Sydney, the system of ‘selection and concentration’ has been introduced (for more detail see the following chapter). At least, the increasing consolidation of the system of ‘selection and concentration’ was cemented in 2005 with the publication of ‘Vision 21: A Mid- and Long-term Plan for New Athletic Performance Improvement’ (2005-2014)’, which is a wide-ranging strategy for elite sport success that highlighted the new paradigm for developing elite sport.

4.2.3.4 Implications of ‘School Sport’ and ‘SFA’ for elite sport development

Table 4.12 provides a summary of the interconnection between elite sport, SFA, school sport and the impact of the changing political context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key political/policy event</th>
<th>Organisational and administrative implications</th>
<th>Implication for school sport and Sport for All</th>
<th>Implications for elite sport development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 4.12 Sport policy: 1993 onwards
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event/Action</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993: Kim,</td>
<td>The first civil government signalled the administrative, political and social</td>
<td>In contrast to the former military regimes, implemented policy for Sport for All. The reform was a heavy blow to elite sport sector. The revamp of the Ministry of Sport and Youth was the signal for withering structural shifts of sports administration at central government level from 1993 onwards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young-sam</td>
<td>elected as the first civilian president</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993: Ministry</td>
<td>The Ministry consisted of sports policy bureau, sports support bureau and</td>
<td>Decreased status of elite sport at central government. The revamp of the Ministry of Sport and Youth was the signal for withering structural shifts of sports administration at central government level from 1993 onwards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Culture</td>
<td>international sports bureau in relation to the machinery of sport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Sport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inaugurated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993, 1998</td>
<td>The statement included Sport for All and elite sport as its comprehensive</td>
<td>Plan for school sport was ruled out in the statement as a comprehensive national sport policy statement. With regard to Sport for All, the statement indicated the policy goal in order to raise Sport for All participation above 50 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and 2003:</td>
<td>contents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'5 Year Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aimed at keeping the top 10th in the medal standings at the Olympic on the basis of Sport for All.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the First</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>established</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(first: 1993-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997; second:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2002;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third: 2003-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996: Taebaek</td>
<td>The village was set-up as the second hub for developing elite sport</td>
<td>No direct implication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opened as the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>second athletics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997: IMF</td>
<td>The IMF situation created an enormous national crisis, which affected all</td>
<td>Sport was the biggest damaged field by the IMF situation. For example, Korea had been seen a slight decline in Sport for All participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>domains of society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>faced</td>
<td></td>
<td>Many sports business teams as one of the pillar of elite sport system were disbanded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998: Ministry</td>
<td>The term “sport” was firstly disappeared from the Ministry. The administrative</td>
<td>It was the evidence of the decline in the status of sport at the central government: the absence of divisions in charge of school sport related matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Culture</td>
<td>organisation for sport at central government has been trimmed down to sports</td>
<td>In comparison with status of elite sport in the former regimes, decreased status of elite sport at central government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Sports,</td>
<td>bureau at present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reformed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002: Korea/Japan Football World Cup</td>
<td>The 2002 Football World Cup in Korea and Japan was also a landmark in the</td>
<td>Functioned as an incentive for the promotion of Sport for All participation; especially increased football clubs at grass-root level. Again, further confirmed the importance of elite sport for national prestige; the government gave the benefit of exemption from the mandatory military service to Korea national football team athletes achieved fourth place at the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cup</td>
<td>transformation of political, social, and cultural phases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The period dating from 1993 to 2010 has been characterised by: first, the reduction and contraction in sport-related organisations at central government level, the most prominent example of which is the downgraded status of the sports bureau under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Although the first civilian government has given a lower priority to elite sport unlike the 1970s and 1980s, ‘the government sees sport as part of culture’ (Houlihan & White, 2002: 164). Government involvement in sport has put greater emphasis on SFA policy although, following the perceived failure of the nation in Sydney, the KSC’s concern with elite sport has been reinforced by its ‘Selection and Concentration’ strategy, which concentrates most resources on those sports most likely to win medals in the following Olympics (for more detail see the following chapter).

Moreover, the country’s aspiration to host mega-sporting events has provided an important catalyst for the development of elite sport policy, the most recent example of which includes the government’s commitment to spend 3900 billion won to develop Korean athletics triggered by the successful bid for the 2011 World Athletics Championships. The second characteristic of this period is the increasing criticism of the severance between SFA, school sport and elite sport sectors. According to An M (2005), it seems probable that the sport system in advanced countries reflects a close connection between the three sectors, whereas in the Korean sport system there is disconnection. There has been a growing awareness of the necessity of integrating the elite sport system and the SFA system in the last decade (for more detail see the following chapter). In this regard, for an advanced sport system, critical voices have argued that the KSC and the KOCOSA should be unified into one body (Lee C, 2005),
assuming that a fundamental model for sports globalisation is that elite athletes are developed on the basis of school sport and SFA (Nixon & Frey, 1994). Notwithstanding the above critical point of view, the governments have created good outcomes in the international arena and the revitalisation of SFA to some extent, contrary to a depressed school sport’s status.

4.3 Conclusion to chapter

This chapter has explored the development of sport policy in terms of political, economic and social perspectives from the 1960s onwards. To draw conclusions for the whole chapter, we have to look at the key features of sport development. At first sight, it would seem that the progress of the Korean government towards a greater emphasis on elite sport was accelerated by a deeply-rooted political ideology from the 1960s to the 1980s. It is possible to argue that the willingness of the previous authoritarian governments to enhance national prestige, pride and unity may be traced back as the primary motive for developing elite sport. As each of the Korean government has arrived at a policy emphasis on elite sport success, the nation’s elite sport system has been gradually developed over the past five decades. Therefore, the dependence of sport (including elite sport) on government in South Korea has been common. It should be mentioned that while the Korean governments have placed a high emphasis on elite sport success over the years, there has been a relative neglect of SFA and school sport development, but the role of school-based sport teams within the area of school sport has been remarkably important in developing elite sport in general, and young elite athletes in particular.

The second feature of Korean sport is some recent signs of change. Indeed, along with the growth of civil society institutions, there has been growing demand for SFA since the 1990s. Despite the quite impressive success of Korean elite athletes based on state-led elite sport oriented policy, the imbalance between elite sport and SFA has been frequently criticised by the media, civil groups and academics. Over the past decade there has been a growing awareness of the necessity of constructing a holistic sport system based on a pyramid structure in which elite sport development should be
underpinned on the basis of SFA. Therefore, this context of sport has precipitated
government concern with SFA.

The last significant feature of Korean sport is the enthusiasm of local governments
and the willingness of the central government to host major sporting events which
have been an important motive for developing elite sport in pursuit of national
prestige and unity and community development (cf. Green & Houlihan 2005).
Compared to the previous authoritarian regimes, although a policy emphasis on elite
sport has rather dwindled (at least evident in the reduction of governmental sports
organisation, especially the word ‘sport’ was disappeared from the Ministry of Sport /
Ministry of Culture and Sport), the civilian governments have still considered elite
sport to be part of their policy agenda. With regard to elite sport development, it is
worth noting that the Chaebol such as Samsung, Hyundai and LG have played a
significant role in developing elite sport by providing a considerable amount of
money to the NGBs of sport and managing their sport teams over the past three
decades. Moreover, it seemed inevitable that the Chaebol have maintained a close
relationship with the central government and local governments in the process of
staging major international sports events.
CHAPTER 5

The Contemporary Sport System in South Korea

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the characteristics of the current situation of national sport policy and its organisational contexts in South Korea. It starts with the assumption that an investigation of elite sport development in terms of policy change in three sports cannot be clearly conducted without an understanding of the national sport system. The assertion is further justified on the assumption that an investigation of each case study should be based within the range of contexts and settings provided by central government, quasi-governmental bodies and NGBs as the three sports have been developed by the operation, action and policy of the NGBs, central government and quasi-governmental bodies. This chapter, based on empirical findings, draws attention to the policy priorities, organisational structure/administration/relationship (of, and between the national sporting bodies) and funding structure in relation to elite sport development.

This chapter begins with a broad overview of the sport policy priorities from the late 1990s onwards. In the second and third sections a broad overview of the present situation could be articulated with an insight into the organisational/administrative structure and context of, and relationship between central government and quasi-governmental bodies. The fourth section explores the financing system in which the primary focus is on the central government and quasi-governmental level of funding structure/pathway. The final section summarises the key distinctive features emerging from the pattern of national sport policy change and organisational contexts. These themes could offer a useful insight in analysing elite sport development in terms of policy change in relation to three sports, as well as the policy process within which
the NGBs, central government and quasi-governmental bodies interact (cf. Green, 2003).

5.2 Policy priority

Over the past few decades there has been an increasing power struggle between many countries to win medals in major international sporting competitions (De Bosscher et al., 2008; cf. Green & Houlihan, 2005). For example, under the ideological conflict between the capitalist and the communist, the United States of America (USA) and the former Eastern bloc countries such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) utilised sport as a political tool to express their ideological supremacy through sporting excellence at the Olympic Games and world global sporting events (Houlihan, 1994). Another prominent example of this feature can be also reflected in Korea, where state-led elite sport policy has been initiated by political confrontation between South- and North Korea since 1960s. More lately, ‘international sporting success has been variously valued for the national ‘feel-good’ factor that it generates, for its capacity to deliver economic benefits through the hosting of major events, and for its general diplomatic utility’ (Green & Houlihan, 2005: 1).

The value of elite sporting success in many countries is considered as worthwhile to boost their reputation in the international arena. In the same breath there have been changing values, ideas and beliefs in relation to elite sporting success. The values, ideas and beliefs of elite sport excellence at the international sporting level are being changed from being an effective way of presenting political ideology to an effective way of raising the national image, competitiveness and brand across the world. More specifically, just a couple of decades ago, the competitiveness of international sporting excellence was just a means of expressing the supremacy of a specific political system and ideology, but more recently, it is more a platform for demonstrating technological, scientific and economic standards (Lee B & Kim J, 2008). In this regard, the development of elite sport policy in South Korea is in sympathy with the global tide. This changing international, national and societal
A paradigm toward elite sport was borne out by a senior government official at the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, who argued that:

The former powerful countries in sport, such as USSR and GDR, and senior countries among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members look at elite sport with shifting recognition that if elite sporting success in the Cold War was an extension of ideological competition, it is a core factor capable of promoting national software such as national image/brand in those days. It is recognised that there has been a growing new point of view towards elite sporting success in our society. According to such a new paradigm, government is still investing a large amount of government money in developing elite sport performance in pursuit of promoting national prestige and image. (Interview: 29 October 2008)

As such, the continuing emphasis on elite sport in South Korea is at least evidenced in the ultimate aim of the government and KSC (the nation’s elite sport agency), stating that our national Olympic teams should maintain the position of a top 10 place in the Olympic medal tables since the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. Given the fact that elite (Olympic) sport success could not be achieved without governmental interest and investment (De Bosscher et al., 2008; Green, 2009; Green & Houlihan, 2005; Houlihan & Green, 2008), the government’s concern with, and investment in, elite sport have produced the successful result in the 2008 Beijing Olympics where the national team were ranked 7th place in the medal table with 13 gold medals. In the last decade, in relation to policy change, it should be noted that the relative failure of the national team at the 2000 Sydney Olympics, where the nation won only 8 gold medals, thus retreating to 12th place in the medal table after ranking in the top 10 in the four previous Olympic Games, provided an important impetus for policy change in elite sport system. Following lessons learned from the 2000 Sydney Olympics, there was a growing awareness of the necessity of changing elite support system for elite performers and sports. Therefore, the system of ‘selection and concentration’ has been introduced under the initiative of the KSC. The most likely explanation for the introduction of the system was the Korean failure in the 2000 Sydney Olympics. Against this background, the KSC (2004) published its own strategy for elite sport, ‘VISION 21: A mid- and long-term plan for improving new performance (2005-2014)’, the aim of which was to reinforce the lasting policy interest on the elite level
at governmental- and quasi-governmental level. A noticeable trait in the strategic report is associated with the system of ‘selection and concentration’, which was designed to concentrate many resources on those sports most likely to win medals in the following Olympics. In line with the system, the strategic report divided sports into two groups as follows: first, those sports most likely to win gold medals which include archery, athletics (only marathon), badminton, fencing, gymnastics (only for male), Judo, shooting, table tennis, taekwondo, wrestling and skating (only short-track); and second, those sports likely to win other medals which include swimming, gymnastics, basketball (only for female), boxing, cycling, handball, hockey, modern pentathlon, yachting, weight lifting, and wrestling (for female).

The introduction of the system based on discriminatory support required the national governing bodies of sport’s consent because the national governing bodies of sport included in the system of ‘selection and concentration’, hold a relatively predominant position in developing their sports in terms of competing resources. For the system of ‘selection and concentration’, a senior manager at Korea National Training Centre explained as follows:

After the Sydney Olympics with the nation’s relatively low performance, there was a growing sense of crisis sweeping across the sporting world, and as a result, the KSC embarked on the introduction of the system of ‘selection and concentration’. In fact, the national governing bodies of sport which felt a sense of crisis over Korean elite sport success accepted the system with the KSC’s persuasion. Actually, after carrying out the system, we identified that some countries adopt such similar system which served as a significant force for persuading certain NGBs and sports to be treated in a discriminatory manner within the ‘selection and concentration’ system. (Interview: 07 November 2008).

Although Korea’s elite sport policy did not, in advance, adopt other countries’ policy model in relation to the system, the process of identifying other’s models has helped settle the system down in relation to elite sport policy. From a theoretical perspective, this may be, to some degree, explained by ‘policy learning’/’policy transfer’. This pattern of policy development can involve ‘policy transfer’ for as Dolowitz & Marsh suggest ‘an increasing amount of policy development and particularly policy change, in contemporary politics is affected by policy transfer’ (2000: 21). The theoretical approach is based on the argument that, for elite sport development, policy
mechanisms adopted and used in many countries played an important role in implementing the policy and persuading the national governing bodies of sport. In this regard, it should be argued that elite sports systems in many countries have become gradually homogenous in pursuit of podium success in a globalising world (De Bosscher et al., 2008). As Houlihan (2009) argues, a more homogenised sport policy system in many countries is arguably conceived as the result of globalisation (e.g., the generalisation of using sports science and the need for a more sophisticated system in talent identification).

With regard to the importance given to the development of elite sport, central- and local government’s effort along with the national governing bodies of sport to host a variety of international events in South Korea may be connected with the emphasis on high performance sport. Examples of recent hosting efforts include (i) Daegu’s successful bid for the 2011 World Athletics Championships, (ii) Inchon’s successful bid for the 2014 Asian Games, (iii) the third bid of Kangwon province for hosting the 2018 Winter Olympics, (iv) the hope of Busan City to host the 2020 Summer Olympics; and (v) more recently, the announcement by the Korea Football Association of plans to bid to host the 2022 Football World Cup. Interestingly, such an undeniable trend towards hosting mega-sporting events has been a significant impetus for the development of elite sport in South Korea because ‘the host nation’s athletic performance may be one of the most important factors for the hosting of a successful sporting event’ (Interview: a senior official of the MCST, 29 October 2008), the most likely examples of which included the 1988 Seoul Olympics (the nation marked 4th place in the medal table) and the government’s commitment to spend 3900 billion won to develop Korean athletics following the decision by the International Association of Athletic Federation (IAAF) in 2007 to grant Daegu the right to host the 2011 World Athletics Championships. In this sense, hosting mega-sporting events in South Korea is likely to be an incentive to greater government involvements for elite sport development.

Furthermore, in connection with this trend in relation to hosting or biding for mega-sporting events in South Korea, a politician belonging to Liberty Forward Party argued that, ‘as there is a political aspect behind sports value itself, hosting mega-sporting events is a great administrative achievement which local government
political leaders can exploit for electoral advantage’ (Interview: 16 December 2008). That is why many municipal governments in South Korea have been devoting their efforts in hosting mega-sporting events. On this issue, a professor in sociology of sport in South Korea argues, paradoxically, that the aspirations and efforts of the local governments to host international mega-sporting events expanded since the introduction of a local self-governing system in 1995 may be seen as a ‘Mega-sporting Event Hosting Wave Phenomenon’ (Jung H, 2008).

In recent years, there has been a growing concern about the elite athlete development which has been criticised as being against the human rights of student-athletes (Civil Solidarity for Sport, 2008). The successful elite sport development system in South Korea has been challenged by ‘growing criticism of the excessive hours of training that athletes of junior middle and high school age undertake and the ‘trade-off’ between study and training’ (quoted in Yamamoto, 2008: 69). More specifically, student-athletes are degenerated into training machines by being forced to give up studying and the human rights due to the result-oriented elite sport policy. While the elite sport-oriented policy system in South Korea has achieved remarkable successes in the international arena over the years, human rights issues (especially for student-athletes and female athletes) relating to elite sport development system have been disregarded; namely, scholastic ability and violence/sexual violation. The negative side of the elite sport system and structure in South Korea has been overshadowed by the success of elite sport. Reflecting on such a sense of crisis within the sports field in 2007-2008, ‘Ssam’, an in-depth investigative series of the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) dealt with such social issues regarding an inherent contradiction within elite sport: Titles of the programmes – ‘A sad gold medal’, ‘A report on human rights about sexual violation in sport I and II,’ and ‘I am sorry, I am a student-athlete I and II’. The series of programmes have woken up society and were, arguably, a key moment for the movement of policy change, a relevant example of which includes that the government published its new strategy for school athletic teams – ‘A plan for the revitalisation of school athletic teams’ (MEST, 2008a). Moreover, a resolution for the normalisation of school sport (especially, in relation to student-athletes) was passed in the National Assembly in 2007. The key elements were as follows (Ahn M et al., 2007):
The National Assembly of Korea urges our government that all sporting competitions should not be held on a weekday, but on a weekend or vacation, allowing student-athletes to train in parallel with studying.

- The National Assembly of Korea urges the government to adopt a minimum level of scholastic ability for student-athletes.
- The National Assembly of Korea urges, gradually, to close boarding houses for student-athletes in school.

Furthermore, the internal maladies uncovered by the program caused the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to be interested in the human rights of student-athletes, leading to an investigation into the experiences of violence and sexual violence committed by coaches in school. Even though NGOs and academic groups relating to sport have been expressing their critical views about the scholastic ability and human rights of student-athletes to the government since the early 2000s, there had been no real change from the government over the last 20 years. It could be argued that the series of programmes served to re-focus attention on human rights matters of student-athletes by politicians, officials and sport administrators who have entirely focused on improving athletic performance in pursuit of winning gold medal, rather than reforming unfavourable circumstances to the human right of student-athletes over the years. The reason why we could not perceive a visible policy change was made evident by a former director at Korea Sports Council, who observed that:

Over the last 20 years the excellent elite performance which kept Korea in the top 10 in the medal table at the Olympics has, to some extent, let the government benefit from the social silence in spite of internal problems of the sporting world. If the performance of Korean national athletes team were less than expected, perhaps we could re-evaluate all of elite sport policy systems governed by government. (Interview: 16 December 2008)

This observation draws attention to the concept of ‘path dependency’ as Kay argues that ‘path dependency encapsulates the insight that policy decisions accumulate over time’ (2005: 558). In other words, the relatively successful achievements of elite sport over the last 20 years has allowed key actors involved in elite sport policy development to stick to the previous ways formed by the pre-existing elite sport system. The elite-oriented sport policy system continued under the military
government since the 1960s might be conceived of as ‘path dependency’. However, as noted above, the high-profile series on the negative aspect of the elite sport development fuelled increasing concerns about the Korean elite sport system in general, and the human rights of student-athletes in particular. Reflecting on the theoretical framework, policy change was due arguably to a critical outcry triggered by the media report as external shocks are identified as playing an important role in affecting and changing policy core beliefs of a dominant advocacy coalition (Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 199). A pertinent example of this shift was primarily through the NHRC’s actual intervention in the human right of student-athletes in 2008.

Another significant aspect of increasing central government and quasi-governmental organisation involvement in sport is on the issue of the balance between elite sport and SFA. Indeed, the fact that SFA as a policy agenda of the government was included in the 100 grand schemes of state affairs in the former Kim Dae-Jung’s administration (1998-2003), the Roh Mu-Hyun’s administration (2003-2008) and the current Lee Myung-Bak’s administration (2008--) reflects the value and importance of SFA (cf. Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 2007). The above-mentioned governments’ concern for the development of SFA is clearly related to the construction of a welfare society in that SFA can be connected with promoting people’s health, well-being and quality of life. Furthermore, it could be argued that the increasing consensus on highlighting SFA has been to some degree rooted in the inherent troubles behind the glory of elite sporting success. The concern to emphasise SFA-oriented policy has been justified on the ground that it will help tackle the glaring problems identified in the elite sport development system. This is illustrated by the comment of a member of the National Assembly who argued that elite sporting success should be based on the firm foothold of SFA and school sport in which the Korean sport system can be changed into a pyramid structure as appeared in advanced countries (Ahn M, 2005). He also noted that if the roots and trunk were school sport and SFA respectively then the fruit is elite sport (Ahn M, 2005).
5.3 Organisational structure and administration of the national sporting bodies

It is necessary to explore organisational structures and administrations of the national sport bodies so as to examine the current situation of sport system. Moreover, given that power relations is one of the important aspects of policy analysis, it is important to understand facets of their relationship. Indeed, over the last ten years, a critical issue on the reform (integration and/or separation) of the Korean Sports Council, Korea Olympic Committee and Korea Council of SFA has been associated with the concern to construct a holistic and integrated system between elite sport and SFA as perceived to be evident in other advanced countries that have developed their sport system on the basis of a twin-approach to elite sport and SFA.

5.3.1 Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism

The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST) is the central administrative agency responsible for national sports disciplines. It is important to note that the establishment of the Ministry of Sport in 1982 was a significant symbol of government involvement in sport policy under the military regime. However, since the emergence of civilian government in 1993, the Ministry of Sport was downsized to the status of a Sports Bureau over time. Currently, the Sports Bureau within the MCST (renamed from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 2008) is the lead administrative unit for the promotion and development of sport. The organisational structure of the Sports Bureau is divided into five key divisions: (i) Sports Policy Division; (ii) Sports Promotion Division; (iii) Sports Industry Division; (iv) International Sports Division; and (v) Adapted Culture Physical Activity Division. The Sport Bureau is the primary national policy actor for conceptualising, defining and making national sport policy. Responsibility for elite sport policy is centralised within the Sports Policy Division and the International Sports Division within the Sports Bureau. The distinctive features of the governmental sport administrative unit at the MCST since 2000 are: firstly, the newly-established Sports Promotion Division in 2002, reacting to the increasing demand for SFA; secondly, the establishment of
the Sports Industry Division in 2004, reacting to the growing demand and interest in
the sport and leisure industry; and thirdly, the newly-established Adapted Culture
Physical Activity Division, transferred from the Ministry of Health and Welfare in
2005.

It is important to note that over the last 30 years policy on sport has been dominated
by a concern with high performance sport which reflects the enduring emphasis on the
medal-winning success. However, the area of elite sport has been challenged by the
creation of Sports Industry Division, Sports Promotion Division and Adapted Culture
Physical Activity Division since 2000, which highlights the increasing government
interest in the broader concern with mass participation in sport and leisure activity,
and opportunities for the underprivileged. This means that government policy interest
in, and concern with sport promptly meet the needs of the times, reflecting social and
economical contexts.

Here it is worth noting that the Sport Bureau does not take responsibility for school
sport which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, Science and
Technology (For more information see Chapter 4). Considering that school sport is
considered to play an important role in developing elite sport in South Korea, we need
to spare a moment to look at the organisational structure of the Ministry of Education,
Science and Technology.

5.3.2 Ministry of Education, Science and Technology

Responsibility for school sport policy is administered within the Students Health and
Safety Division of the Educational Welfare Support Bureau within the Ministry of
Education, Science and Technology (MEST, renamed from the Ministry of Education
and Human Resources Development in 2008). This division is the prime national
policy actor for conceptualising, defining and making national school sport policy,
which deals with a wide range of affairs such as the PE curriculum, sports clubs,
school-based athletic clubs, students’ health & safety and so on. Although school
sport has paved the way for the development of elite sport in South Korea, the area of
school sport has often been neglected by government (cf. Lee H, 2003). The marginalisation of school sport as a field of government focus in respect of sport policy has been disclosed over time. Indeed, the downsized school sport organisation reflects the evidence of the decreased status of school sport at central government level over time. Further evidence of the lack of interest in school sport is shown by the resolution for the normalisation of school sport adopted in 2007, which uncovered urgent problems in school sport. In addition, school sport was criticised for having no inter-ministerial cooperation between the MCST and the MEST because they act independently. However, the agreement to enhance bilateral cooperation (MoU: Memorandum of Understanding) between the two Ministries in 2008 was indicative of a recognition of the need to construct a holistic approach to the school sport system. By the mid-2000s the focus of school sport policy was on student-athletes and school-based athletic teams displaying governmental indifference toward physical education for general students. A senior official at the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology explained the emphasis on the student-athletes and school athletic teams in the previous years.

It was true that, in the past, much attention and resources from MEST and the MCST were by and large devoted to fostering student-athletes and school-based athletic teams. Indeed, there was a tacit awareness or agreement that responsibility for the promotion of PE and physical fitness of general students should be the school superintendents’ duty rather than that of the state (Interview: 06 November 2008).

As such, the relative lack of interest in school sport including PE was due to the nonexistence of a lead administrative unit responsible for school sport policy at the central government level from Sep. 1990 to Feb. 2005 (For more information, see chapter 4.). However, along with the creation of School Physical Education, Health and Meals Division within the Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development in March 2005, the changing concern with general student’s sport activity and PE was initiated by government documents, ‘Plan for the Renovation of School Sport’ in 2005 and ‘Fundamental Direction of School Sport’ in 2006, which were aimed at reinforcing student’s fundamental physical fitness and promoting their

9 renamed to the Students Health and Safety Division of the Educational Welfare Support Bureau within the MEST in 2008
health by balancing policy considerations between the general student and student-athletes. More recently, the government document ‘Plan for Revitalisation of School Sport’ published by the Students Health and Safety Division of the Educational Welfare Support Bureau within the MEST in 2008 is indicative of the government’s increasing concern with school sport policy. The plan reflects the growing value given to PE and sport by the government and coincides with the current social concern with the human rights of student-athletes, obesity, health, and physical strength. The strategy is summarised in Table 5.1).

### Table 5.1 ‘SPORT’ Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Core Driving Task</th>
<th>Relevant agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sport Science</td>
<td>• Introduction of Physical Activity Promotion System (PAPS)</td>
<td>• MCST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fostering school sport industry</td>
<td>• KSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fostering school sport industry</td>
<td>• KSPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Activity</td>
<td>• Developing Physical Activity 7560+ Campaign</td>
<td>• MCST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fostering school sport club</td>
<td>• KSPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>• Improvement of a law and system related to the promotion of school sport</td>
<td>• MCST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Extension operation of school sport promotion committee</td>
<td>• KSPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>• Educational management and administration of athletic team</td>
<td>• MCST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• expansion and advancement of school sport facilities</td>
<td>• KSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>• Raising the quality of PE Curriculum</td>
<td>• MCST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support of PE assistant instructor for primary school</td>
<td>• KSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Plan for Revitalisation of School Sport, MEST (2008: 7)

### 5.3.3 Korea Sports Council and Korea Olympic Committee

The Korea Sports Council (KSC) established in 1920 is the governing body for the implementation of elite sport policy and the administration of the national sports programme encompassing the 56 national governing bodies of sport, the 16 municipal- and provincial branches and the 16 overseas branches. The KSC, restructured under the National Sports Promotion Law in 1982, takes responsibility for a range of dimensions of sport such as the pan-national campaign of sport activity, the promotion of school sport and SFA, the enhancement of national prestige through fostering excellent athletes, the support of national governing bodies of sport and the
spread of the Olympic Movement (MCST, 2007b). Nevertheless, there is a firm awareness that elite sport policy has been at the heart of KSC’s remit. In this sense, the KSC is the key delivery agency for the nation’s elite sport policy. On this issue, a senior manager at the KSC stated that, ‘while the KSC, under the military government, focused heavily on elite sport regardless of its remit for SFA, the KSC was deprived of its responsibility for SFA affairs by the creation of the KOCOSA in 1991’ (Interview: 06 November 2008). As a result, the KSC is primarily in charge of executing national elite sport policy.

The Korean Olympic Committee established in 1946 under the IOC Olympic Charter is the National Olympic Committee (NOC). The KOC has been part of the machinery of KSC since 1968. Of particular interest in relation to the KSC & KOC’s structure is the issue of the reform (integration and/or separation) of Korea Sports Council, Korea Olympic Committee and Korea Council of SFA which is dealt within the following section.

Another notable feature of the organisational structure of the KSC is the founding of the Korea National Training Centre (widely called as ‘Taeneung Athletic Village’) in 1966 and the establishment of Taebaek Training Centre (widely well-known as the second athletics village) in 1988, aimed at providing national athletes (especially for mid and long-distance runners) with specialised facilities for cardiovascular and cardiopulmonary trainings. The overriding task and key objectives of the Taeneung Athletic Village are ‘to support current and potential national athletes as well as developing junior athletes and to implement scientific and systematic training and to achieve standards of success in international competitions’ (The centre’s webpage, http://www.sports.or.kr/player_eng/KOC/KOC_fun.jsp, 2009). With regard to its establishment background, a senior director at the centre related that ‘Japan’s success in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics where the host nation ranked fourth in the medal table (with 16 Gold medals, 5 silver medals and 8 bronze medals) functioned as a catalyst for the construction of an intensive elite sport training system’ (Interview: 07 November 2008), and as a consequence of this situation, the centre was launched by political actors in 1966. From a theoretical perspective, this observation can be understood as an example of ‘policy-oriented leaning’ leading to policy change.
(Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 192). Currently, the building of a third national training centre is being planned in Jincheon with an intended completion date of 2011.

5.3.4 Korea Council of Sport for All

The Korea Council of SFA (KOCOSA) inaugurated in 1991 is the governing body for the implementation of SFA policy and the administration of national SFA programme in which the 46 national federations of sport and 16 municipal and provincial branches are currently members. The KOCOSA is the key delivery agency for the government’s SFA policy. The establishment of the KOCOSA was related to the hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. The establishing background of the organisation was explained by a senior director at KOCOSA:;

There was a secret history in the hosting process of the 1988 Seoul Olympics. In fact, many IOC committee members had doubts over the level of Korea SFA, asking ‘How could your country host the 1988 Olympic Games?’… So Korean policy actors promised that we will try to drive forward mass participation in sport through the fever of the 1988 Seoul Olympics which may be a turning point for promoting SFA. After the successful hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics, President Roh’s government published the ‘3 Year National SFA Promotion Plan in 1989, widely known as Hodori Plan. In 1991, KOCOSA was established as a result of the plan which was seen as a stepping stone for SFA development (Interview: 11 November 2008).

‘Reflecting the increasing social importance of sport’ (Petry et al., 2008: 116), KOCOSA, which encompasses a variety of networks, is the quasi-governmental agency responsible for developing the nation’s SFA system and programme. The key objectives of KOCOSA for SFA include the improvement of quality of life through the pan-national campaign of sport activity, the delivery of SFA programmes, the revitalisation of a variety of sporting events; support to a sport-loving society, the hosting and management of the World Korean Race Festival, and the international exchange through SFA. It is worth noting that, from the founding of the KOCOSA in 1991, the relationship between the KSC and the KOCOSA has been beset by the problems arising from the severance of administrative relations between elite sport-
and the SFA system. This led a power struggle over resources between the two organisations.

5.3.5 Korea Sports Promotion Foundation

The Korea Sports Promotion Foundation (KSPO, renamed from Seoul Olympic Sports Promotion Foundation in 2009) launched in 1989 is the public sports corporation with responsibility for the support projects regarding national sports promotion, sports science, and wholesome youth development through raising, operating and managing the national sports promotion funds. Indeed, the KSPO, as the national funding provider, was established by the 1988 Seoul Olympic surplus in order to implement projects commemorating the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. A senior director at the KSPO explained in depth about the background to the establishment of the KSPO that ‘after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games there was a perception that it was undesirable to abandon the infra-structures of sport, assets (properties), manpower, know-how derived from the hosting of the Olympics, therefore the establishment of KSPO was propelled by Park, Se-Jik\(^{10}\) (Interview: 23 October 2008).

The five key objectives of the KSPO are: firstly, ‘provision of financial support to promote national sports, and the raising and distribution of funds’; secondly, ‘installing and supporting sports facilities, and fostering the sports industry’; thirdly, ‘research in sports science; fourthly, projects commemorating the 24th Olympic Games held in Seoul’; and fifthly, ‘supporting projects related to the development of youth’ (The KSPO’s website, http://www.kspo.or.kr/english/sosfo/roles.asp, 2009). In line with these objectives, the KSPO plays a crucial role in financially supporting the KSC, KOCOSA, Korea Sports Association for the Disabled and NGBs, as well as in the construction of sports facilities (infrastructure) such as the national sports centre, artificial turf playgrounds, football centres/parks, sports complex facilities in agricultural and fishing villages through the effective operation and management of funds raised from profit-generating businesses such as Seoul Olympic Parktel, cycle

\(^{10}\) The former Minister of Sport and the president of the 1988 Seoul Olympics Organising Committee.
racing, motorboat racing and Sports ToTo (The KSPO’s website, http://www.kspo.or.kr/english/fund/index.asp, 2009). These methods of revenue sourcing are seen as a necessity for national sport actors to supplement the scarce national treasury fund for national sport expenses (for more detail see Table 4.13 Government budget vs. sports budget of the previous chapter). It is clear from the Sports White Paper’s statement that it is difficult to expect the government to allocate a more substantial budget for sport because the areas of national defence, education, and welfare are overriding government priorities (MCST, 2007b). Hence, a broad range of financial assistance schemes from the KSPO play a significant role in helping the holistic approach to national sports promotion. In short, the KSPO functions as one of the nation’s key funding providers.

With regard to the organisational structure, an important feature is the merger of the Korea Institute of Sport Science (KISS) with the KSPO in 1999. The KSPO was launched as an affiliated organisation in the KSC in 1980 and became an independent body in 1989. The origin of the merger is explained by a senior researcher at the KISS, who stated that:

The former Kim Dae-jung government recognised the necessity for national research institutes/centres to be controlled and administered by government. Therefore, most national research institutes/centres were reorganised under the Prime Minister’s Office. In this regards, that KISS’s affiliation with the KSPO in 1999 was due to the desire of government which there should be a need for a separate arm for managing and administering the role of KISS (Interview: 07 November 2008).

KISS is noted as a specialised research centre designed to meet specific professional research needs for sport. KISS takes responsibility for conducting a wide range of sport research such as sports science, medicine, coaching systems, support of national athletic performers and national sports policy. KISS also monitors a wide range of research themes such as sport policy, sociology of sport, sport pedagogy, sport management and sport science. In the early of KISS, its attention was largely focused on sport science research such as exercise physiology, sports psychology and sports mechanics designed to improve national athletes’ performance. These priorities can be linked to the background against which KISS was established. A senior researcher at the KISS explained that:
In 1978 policy actors’ aspiration to host the 1988 Olympic Games prompted the creation of KISS, the ultimate goal of which was to support the improvement of national athletes’ performance in international sporting competitions in general, and the 1988 Seoul Olympics in particular, because the government deemed the nation’s athletic performance crucial to a successful hosting of the 1988 Olympics (Interview: 07 November 2008).

In recent years, the most probable explanation for KISS’s continuing role was the first swimming gold medal in the 2008 Beijing Olympics where the team led by KISS and coaches of national swimming team won the first ever gold medal in Olympic swimming. This success reinforced the growing awareness of the role of KISS in producing medals at the international sporting competition.

5.3.6 The Korea Armed Forces Athletic Corps

The Korea Armed Forces Athletic Corps (KAFAC, hereafter also called ‘Sangmu’) established in 1984 is a specialised military unit for sport. The purpose of the Sangmu was arguably to prepare for the nation’s success at the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and 1988 Seoul Olympic Games (quoted in Lee H, 2003). At the outset Sangmu was designed to provide a holistic training environment with selected athletes in 21 sports (currently 25 sports) in which they could carry on their sport careers on a full-time basis (see Table 5.2. below). The impact of Sangmu was demonstrated in the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics, where past and present Sangmu-based athletes at that time won ten gold medals in 1986 and three Olympic gold medals in 1988 (quoted in Lee H, 2003). According to Lim T’s (2004) research on the role of the Sangmu, past and present Sangmu-based athletes marked over 10 percent share of the nation’s Olympic gold medals from the 1984 LA Olympics to the 2004 Athens (for more details see Table 1, page 4). Furthermore, considering the Sangmu’s annual budget (5.54 billion won in 2004) which is regarded as a relatively low budget compared to other big sport groups such as Samsung Sports Group and Hyundai Sports Group, the Sangmu has been more successful and effective in producing medals in international sporting events (Lim T, 2004; cf. Hong, 2009).
Table 5.2 Type of sports in the Sangmu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Sports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 1st battalion</td>
<td>Football, Handball, Basketball, Rugby, Boxing, Judo, Wrestling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 2nd battalion</td>
<td>Baseball, Badminton, Volleyball, Tennis, Hockey, Gymnastics, Lifting, Table-tennis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 3rd battalion</td>
<td>Shooting, Modern pentathlon, Swimming, Archery, Fencing, Athletics, Cycling, Biathlon, Taekwondo, Female football</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5.3.7 The Korea Foundation for the Next Generation Sports Talent

Lately, in respect of national sports organisations, one of the important changes is the establishment of the Korean Foundation for the Next Generation Sports Talent (NEST) in 2007, which operates using funds from the profits of the Sports ToTo. The NEST, an affiliate of the MCST, have a vision which is to be ‘a Mecca of fostering global sports talents in order to make Korea the world sports leading country by supporting and providing various programme to talented athletes in all sports fields’ (The NEST’s webpage, http://www.nest.or.kr/en/sub/sub012.asp, 2009). Indeed, when the MCST announced the intention to establish the organisation, the KSC was displeased with their decision (Yonhap News, 2007). This was because the scheme and role of the NEST overlap with those of the KSC. According to Kim Jung-gil’s interview, the former president of KSC, ‘we have a difficulty in wining a budget from the MCST. Nevertheless, if the MCST launches NEST and allocates a significant budget to talent identification and to supporting projects through the foundation, then there may be a sense of incongruity stemming from the MCST and the KSC (quoted in Nocut News, 2007). In addition, the board of directors of the KSC raised concerns that the establishment of the NEST may be in order to recruit retired officials from MCST (Nocut News, 2007; Yonhap News, 2007). This is an example of a source of conflict of interests between the MCST and the KSC (Yonhap News 2009). On this issue, an Assemblyman belonging to the majority-opposition party argue that the MCST caused distrust and conflict in the sports field and nothing may come from NEST which is consuming several hundred million won (Son B, 2008). However, it would be premature to evaluate the controversy over the existence of NEST. Table 5.3 clearly
shows a remit emphasising a wide range of sports talent projects in order to seek ways
to differentiate the NEST from the KSC.

Table 5.3 Key business projects of the NEST in 2008 and 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fostering specialised talents for international sports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fostering athletics talents of the next generation for 2001 IAAF World</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Athletics Championship</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fostering global sports specialists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young talent identification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fostering sports talents in each region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting special sports colleges and student-athletes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispatching sports assistant instructor to schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 key projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports talent identification &amp; training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing programmes for nurturing young talents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fostering distinguished coaches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving sports science equipment &amp; coaching skill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivating global sports specialists in order to revamp diplomatic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fostering international sports professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fostering sports specialists for disabled people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introducing the intern system for sports major students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opening a contest for student-athletes studying and distinguished coaches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 key projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from internal 2008 Annual Plan and 2009 Annual Plan of the NEST

Having explored the organisational structure and administration of national sports organisations in turn, we shall now proceed to examine more closely the relationship between the central government and quasi-governmental bodies of sport.

5.3.8 The relationship between the central government and quasi-governmental bodies of sport

Elite sport in South Korea is characterised by a state-led system. In other words, government has had a strong role in shaping elite sport policy and in distributing resources from the 1960s onwards. Given the centralised, bureaucratic and hierarchical system of sport in South Korea, two key quasi-governmental bodies for sport, Korea Sport Council and Korea Council of SFA, have been subordinated to government in relation to the organisational links. While MCST plays a key role in making and shaping elite sport policy, KSC and KOCOSA seem to be considered as field players for implementing elite sport policy and SFA policy respectively (see
Figure 5.1). In essence, a senior official at MCST identified ‘the organisational relationship between MCST and KSC and KOCOSA as a high ranking policy maker and an implementer/deliverer of sport polices’ (Interview: 29 October 2008). Nevertheless, it is true that KSC has been in the predominant position because it has been deeply rooted in Korea’s elite sport-oriented policy, along with elite sporting success over the last 20 years. While such characteristics of Korean sport system have resulted in success at the international sporting level, they have exposed two significant problems: firstly, there has been asymmetrical development between elite sport and SFA; secondly, there have been conflicts between MCST and KSC and KOCOSA.

It is thus necessary to understand the historical context of the issue of power relations between the national sporting organisations. In order to better understand the phases of power relations, it is important to recall the politically driven merger of three organisations under President Park’s will. In 1968 there were some conflicts and tensions between the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC), the Korea Sport Association (KSA) and the Korea Physical Education Association (KPEA) which led to KOC and KPEA being absorbed by KSA (renamed as KASA and currently KSC) in 1968 in line with the President Park’s special command. On this issue, Lee Tae-Young, head of ‘Sports-Forum 21’, stated that the integration of the three bodies for sport in 1968 was designed to resolve conflicts between executive members of three sport organisations rather than to improve an organisational function and efficiency in relation to the sport system (quoted in Ke ynote speech for the reform of the national sport bodies, 2001). ‘While the three bodies for sport were reorganised into an elite sport-centred organisation, KOC has been so in name only as part of the machinery of KSA (currently KSC) since then’ (Interview: a head of ‘Sports-Forum 21’, 15 October 2008). Furthermore, the creation of KOCOSA in 1991 aroused political controversies, firmly rooted in the older conflicts between the KSC and its organisation. Moreover, while the KSC and KOCOSA have been developed in an inharmonious manner, unbalanced development between elite sport and SFA prompted calls for the reform (integration and/or separation) of the national sport organisations (An M, 2005). In other words, disconnected administration and organisational structures have been a long-standing problem in which elite sport and SFA have continually competed for resources. This situation has been recognised as
an obstacle to comprehensive sport development encompassing elite sport, SFA and school sport.

The last 10 years has been a critical phase within the sport sector in South Korea. While much of the Korean government’s focus has been on elite sport policy, asymmetrical development between elite sport and SFA has been a key issue. The fact that ‘South Korea has became one of the strongest sporting nations, but not one of the advanced sporting nations in terms of participation, was a key source of momentum for reform of the national sport system’ (Interview: a member of the National Assembly, 17 December 2008). The quasi-governmental bodies for sport, in particular, were subjected to sustained controversial discussion regarding the reform of the national sports system (Kang S, 2006). The discussion of the reform of the national sports system in general, and the integration and/or separation between the Korea Sports Council (KSC), Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) and Korea Council of SFA (KOCOSA) in particular was an overriding concern at the heart of the nation’s public sport policy issues. It is certainly the case that discussion of restructuring national sporting organisations and reform of the Korean sport system was raised by an advocacy coalition calling for reform of the national sport bodies in general, and the integration and/or separation between KSC, KOC and KOCOSA in particular. Evidence of this coalition emerged in October 2001 when they organised an open forum to debate the reform of the Korean sport system. The advocacy coalition which involved a limited number of actors (academics and a few journalists) took the lead in the reform of the three sport organisations by advocating, ‘the integration between KSC and KOCOSA’ and ‘KOC’s independence from KSC’. The coalition advocating the separation of KSC and KOC highlighted the requirement of NOC independence in accordance with the Olympic Charter ‘The NOCs must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any kind …’ (for more details, see 28 Mission and Role of the NOCs within the Olympic Charter, July 2007). Extending Sabatier and Weible’s (2007) concept about policy-oriented learning, the pattern, which the advocacy coalition examined closely in relation to how other countries (especially, the United States, Japan, Germany, Australia and France) administer an organisational structure and the relationship between their sports council and NOC, is the intentional aspect of policy-learning process. As Yamamoto (2008) argued, the process may be conceived of as the systematic scanning of the condition for policy ideas and alternatives.
Moreover, following DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) ideas about mimetic isomorphism, it may be argued that the greater the level of uncertainty involved in policy problems in relation to the integration or separation of the KSC and KOC, the more likely the nation’s key actors will adopt mimetic isomorphism as a way of making decision about organisational structure (cf. Houlihan, 2009: 62).

In response to the growing pressure from sports interests, the attempt of Roh Mu-Hyun’s government to integrate KSC and KOCOSA but to separate KOC from KSC met with a backlash from the KSC in 2003. The government’s effort to reform the national sporting organisations supported by the advocacy coalition was obstructed by the KSC. According to Lee Tae-Young, head of 21st Sports-Forum, the failure of reform effort was due to the resistance from both KSC and KOCOSA to attempt to force them to merge (quoted in the debate on evaluation of the new government’s sport policy vision, 01 January 2008). The most likely explanation for the power struggle is that KSC was not only reluctant to be separated from KOC, but that it also preferred to see KOCOSA integrated but at a subordinate level as the KSC did not want to lose its current power and authority. Not surprisingly, KOCOSA also did not want organisational and administrative integration with KSC but, if a merger was forced it would prefer a horizontal (i.e. equal status) relationship with the KSC (Lee C, 2005). This situation is explained by a former assistant deputy minister at the Ministry of Culture & Tourism, who commented that ‘friction or conflict caused between the KSC and KOCOSA was due to the circumstance in which they act on their respective interests in order to take a greater slice of the pie in terms of finance and power’ (Interview: 08 November 2008).

As a consequence of the different points of view between the two bodies, the reform (integration and/or separation) of the three bodies for sport was shelved in line with political interests for several years. However, the matter of restructuring national sporting bodies was concluded in June 2009 when the decision by board members of the KSC to keep both KSC and KOC integrated received political support. In doing so, the two organisations were reborn as an integrated body by renaming it the ‘Korean Olympic Committee’ (KOC), and the KOCOSA kept its existing status as the exclusive body for SFA. On this issue, an academic argued that ‘the primary cause of the failure to reform was the absence in the leadership of sports administration in
Park Jin-Kyung, a professor of sociology of sport, argued that, despite KSC’s presidents’ election pledges for security of KOC’s legal status, they have not fulfilled their commitments. This is because the heads of KSC & KOC have been reluctant to lose their political leadership given that KOC encompasses much of KSC’s businesses and affairs (quoted in debate on evaluation of the new government’s sport policy vision, 01 January 2008). A further explanation of the failure of reform has been the appointment of powerful figures as the heads of KSC & KOC and KOCOSA. As a former assistant deputy minister at the Ministry of Culture & Tourism highlighted, ‘the power struggle between key heads of these quasi-governmental bodies for sport has resulted in organisational and administrative opposition, especially when Kim Un-yong\textsuperscript{11} of KSC, Eum Sam-tak\textsuperscript{12} of KOCOSA and Lee Yun-taek\textsuperscript{13} of KSPO were the heads of their respective organisations’ (Interview: 08 November 2008). KSC and KOCOSA’s resistance to the government’s scenario largely originated from the use of political power of heads of two bodies for sport. In other words, as the former and present presidents of KSC are politicians, KSC has exercised a powerful influence over national sport policy, especially elite sport. Such personalised power within the sport sector has enabled the KSC to struggle with MCST. In this regard, this facet of the use of key individuals’ power and their roles in the decision-making process is consistent with the concept of elitism and elite competition (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987; Evans 2006).

However, in 2008 there was some evidence of progress with the agreement for bilateral cooperation (MoU: Memorandum of Understanding) between MCST and MEST in relation to a holistic approach to school sport development. A likely explanation for this shift is the awareness by government of the consequence of the fragmented system of Korean sport which has resulted in a lack of cohesion on a number of matters such as the human rights of student-athletes and the general student’s isolation from school sport policy. Thus, this administrative change may result in greater collaboration between related agencies: for example, the MoU would provide a pathway that allows MEST to act in concert with MCST for school sport devolvement. In sum, Figure 5.1 illustrates the current organisational structure of

\textsuperscript{11} The former IOC Vice President
\textsuperscript{12} The former Vice President of the KSC and politician
\textsuperscript{13} The former the Minister of Government Administration and the Minister of Labour as well as the former President of the KSC
sport in South Korea, including key organisations at both governmental level and quasi-governmental level. The figure displays the latest administrative structure of Korean sport since 2007 when NEST was established under the supervision of MCST.
Figure 5.1 Map of sport in South Korea 2007 onwards

Organisational structure of sport in South Korea

Governmental Sector

National

- Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism
- Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology
- Korea Institute of Sport Science
- Korea Anti-Doping Agency
- Korea Foundation for the Next Generation Sports
- 56 national governing bodies of sport

Regional

- 16 municipal & provincial sports organisations
- 16 municipal & provincial school boards

Local

- 259 wards & counties’ council
- 252 wards & counties’ council

Quasi-Governmental

- Korea Sports Promotion Foundation
- Korea Sports Council & KOC
- Korea Council of Sport for All
- Korea Sports Association for the Disabled
- 46 national federations of sport

Hierarchy & Funding — Funding — Non-financial support (Interministerial Cooperation)
5.4 The financial system for sport

There are four funding streams for national sports promotion: first, the national sports budget from the national treasury; second, the sports budget of municipal governments; third, the funding from the KSPO; and fourth, self-funding of the quasi-governmental sporting bodies such as the KSC, KOCOSA, the national governing bodies of sport, and the national federations of sport (see Table 5.4 below).

Table 5.4 Sports budget in South Korea\textsuperscript{14}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National treasury</th>
<th>Funding (KSPO)</th>
<th>Municipal government’s budget for sport</th>
<th>National sports organisation’s funding</th>
<th>Total (Unit: hundred million won)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,589</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>9,352</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>12,847</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>16,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>14,443</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>17,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,137</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>16,041</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>19,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>13,835</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>18,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>2,663</td>
<td>20,510</td>
<td>3,429</td>
<td>28,416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Sports White Paper, MCST (2007b: 82)

Table 5.4 shows that in 2007, of the total sports budget (total 28,416 hundred million won), municipal government’s budget for sport accounted for 72 per cent of the total and the central sports budgets (the national treasury + the national sports promotional funding) was no more than 15.7 per cent. With regard to the central sports funding pathway, Figure 5.2 illustrates the contrast between funding from the national treasury and funding from KSPO. Until 2002, funding from the national treasury was greater than that from the KSPO, but as seen in the Figure 5.5, KSPO funding has exceeded that of the national treasury since 2003.

\textsuperscript{14} Note: 1. National Treasury: Sports Bureau’s budget at the MCST; 2. Municipal government’s budget: general account of 16 municipal- and provincial governments including ward and county; and 3. National sports organisation’s funding: (i) KSC including the 56 national governing bodies of sport and 16 municipal- and provincial branches (ii) KOCOSA including 46 national federations of sport and 16 municipal- and provincial branches.
Figure 5.2 National treasury vs National sports promotional funding

At the central government level, while the elite sport annual budget has gradually increased, the annual budget for SFA has since 2003 relatively decreased (see Table 5.5 below). Part of the explanation for the low figures for SFA is that it lacks an annual budget at the central government level and is reliant on funds raise from KSPO’s project such as Cycle Racing, Motorboat Racing, Sports ToTo/Proto and Seoul Olympic Parktel (see Table 5.6 below). The elite sport annual budget in 2007 was sharply increased due to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, which allowed the government to allocate more funds to elite sport (cf. MCST, 2007). When it comes to policy priority at the central government level, the pattern of budgetary allocations is an indicator for judging which aspect of sport is considered more as important. As a member of the National Assembly observed, ‘it is generally taken for granted that central government places a great deal of weight on the elite sport budget’ (Interview: 17 December 2008).

Table 5.5 The sports budget of the national treasury

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>158,874</td>
<td>142,556</td>
<td>109,314</td>
<td>113,684</td>
<td>148,852</td>
<td>233,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite sport</td>
<td>54,059</td>
<td>53,056</td>
<td>68,361</td>
<td>79,518</td>
<td>98,342</td>
<td>179,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>29,654</td>
<td>32,708</td>
<td>31,083</td>
<td>23,452</td>
<td>27,776</td>
<td>27,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International sport</td>
<td>73,720</td>
<td>54,187</td>
<td>7,331</td>
<td>8,025</td>
<td>13,899</td>
<td>11,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports industry</td>
<td>1,441</td>
<td>2,605</td>
<td>2,539</td>
<td>2,689</td>
<td>10,835</td>
<td>6,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport for the adapted</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.6 The record of national sports promotional funding

(Unit: million won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Record</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>'89</th>
<th>'90</th>
<th>'91</th>
<th>'92</th>
<th>'93</th>
<th>'94</th>
<th>'95</th>
<th>'96</th>
<th>'97</th>
<th>'98</th>
<th>'99</th>
<th>'00</th>
<th>'01</th>
<th>'02</th>
<th>'03</th>
<th>'04</th>
<th>'05</th>
<th>'06</th>
<th>'07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National sports promotion</td>
<td>19,586</td>
<td>1,584</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td>1,031</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>2,367</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>18,541</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td>1,031</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>2,367</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Sport</td>
<td>8,760</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>2,324</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>667</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School sport</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>173</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile upbringing</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1988 Seoul Olympic commemoration project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'08</th>
<th>'09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*15 Bodies</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>15 Bodies</td>
<td>8 Bodies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In relation to the policy priority at the elite sport level, a key financial decision is which sports should have the highest priority. The introduction of a financial support scheme for supporting elite athletic performance was introduced in 1993 (called the budget for improving athletic performance) and receives its income from the national sports promotional funding. In other words, KSPO has provided funding for athletic performance-enhancement and covered the organisational expenses of NGBs. More specifically, according to the support criteria, the budget allocated from the national sports promotional funding has been unevenly delivered to the national governing bodies of sport. The criteria for award of financial assistance to the national governing bodies of sport are: first, whether they are Olympic sports or not; second, the importance-factor of the sport; third, the financial resources of the national governing bodies of the sport; fourth, the policy priority of the sport; and fifth, the performance evaluation. This financing support system is also linked to the system of ‘selection and concentration’ noted earlier (See Table 5.7 below).

Table 5.7 Differential financial support for NGBs

(Unit: thousand won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>classification</th>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>'08</th>
<th>'09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sports won gold medal as Olympic sport</td>
<td>Athletics, Handball, weight lifting, Boxing, Ice skating, Judo, Gymnastics, wrestling, Hockey, Shooting, Taekwondo, Archery, Badminton, Fencing, Table tennis (15)</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>15 Bodies</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A large scale of sports as Olympic</td>
<td>Football, Tennis, Basketball, Volleyball, Cycle, Swimming, Baseball, Ski (8)</td>
<td>220,000*</td>
<td>240,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>9 Bodies</td>
<td>220,000*</td>
<td>240,000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

173
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sport</th>
<th>Olympic sports</th>
<th>Subvention</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horse riding, rowing, canoe, yacht,</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>9,740,000</td>
<td>11,460,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modern pentathlon, biathlon, softball,</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,760,000</td>
<td>586,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>triathlon, Ice-hockey, Curling (10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Softball tennis, Rugby, Bowling,</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golf, Bodybuilding, Sepaktakraw,</td>
<td></td>
<td>*10 Bodies</td>
<td>*10 Bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squash tennis, Wushu, Billiards, In-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line skates, Karatedo (11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ssireum, kundo, kungdo, water-ski,</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain climbing, Underwater, Luge,</td>
<td></td>
<td>*10 Bodies</td>
<td>*10 Bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bobsleigh, Taekyon, Dance-sport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>54 Bodies</td>
<td>9,740,000</td>
<td>11,460,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subvention</td>
<td>56 Bodies</td>
<td>1,760,000</td>
<td>586,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,500,000</td>
<td>12,046,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Internal annual budget plan of the Sport Bureau (2009)

5.5 Conclusion

‘Given that international sporting success can be produced by investing strategically in elite sport’ (De Bosscher, 2008: 13; cf. Oakley & Green, 2001), the successful outcomes at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (7th, 13 Gold medals won) reflects how much the Korean government has devoted its policy entirely towards elite sport development. The effectiveness of elite sport-oriented policy is demonstrated by the Olympic medal standings led by the dominant role of the state since the 1984. It is effective here to highlight the Korean national squad’s performances at the Olympic Games (See Table 5.8 below).

Table 5.8 Korean national squad medals: Olympic Games, 1984-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Olympic Games</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Gold</th>
<th>Silver</th>
<th>Bronze</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As leading nations in elite sport arguably operate a single model with only slight variations in developing elite sport (Oakley & Green, 2001; Clumpner, 1994), a similar attitude towards the elite sport system is also observed in South Korea. It is clear that the enduring emphasis of elite sporting success is confirmed by the accelerated elite sports budget from the national treasury over time. However, while the struggle for international sporting success in South
Korea has intensified over the past few decades, some policy issues beyond elite sport development have been raised over the last ten years. Our analysis in this chapter has identified six key salient features for Korean elite sport development in terms of policy change: (i) the enduring emphasis on elite sport policy; (ii) the centralised, closed and bureaucratic organisational sport system; (iii) the concentration of power in hands of business and political elites; (iv) the weakness of civil society organisations in sport; (v) continued controversy regarding SFA- versus elite sport policy priority linking to the reform of the national sport organisations; and (vi) the country’s hosting strategy of mega sporting events.

The top policy priority of sport has been given to high performance sport since the 1960s. Over the last few decades the priority given to elite sport success has not ostensibly changed, but there has been substantial innovation and change in the delivery of elite sport success. A prominent example, as noted earlier, was the introduction of the system of ‘selection and concentration’ in the allocation of funding. In addition, the growing importance of sport science, young talent identification and systematic competition opportunity for elite level athletes is all examples of policy change within the prioritised filed. The recent impetus for these changes was the failure at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games where the Korea national team won only 8 gold medals and retreated to 12th in the medal table after ranking in the top 10 in the four previous Olympics. This point can be explained by the ACF perspective. The consequence of relatively poor performance at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games can be viewed as an example of an exogenous events leading to policy change.

The second key distinctive feature of policy change identified is that the national sporting organisations are still characterised by a centralised, closed and bureaucratic system. In spite of the introduction of a local self-government system in 1995, the MCST still has a strong influence in shaping, governing and managing national sport policy. A vertical bureaucratic hierarchy and structure of the national sport system has brought about conflicts between national sports organisations. This centralised, closed and bureaucratic aspect of Korean sport system is linked to the third and fourth distinctive features of policy change. Indeed, even if Korean society has been to some extent more pluralised since the mid-1990s, power in general still resides in the elites, and the heads of the key national agencies for sport who were high-ranking officials, politician and businessman, in particular. While over the last decade the emergence of many sport-related NGOs in Korean society, mainly academic
groups, have played a partial role in shaping national sport policy it would be easy to exaggerate their importance. According to the Civil Solidarity for Sport,

> It is true that policy-making process is more open to a variety of interest groups and participants than in the past. Indeed, MCST and KSC have constructed more effective and open systems that can be conceived of as a process for collecting opinions from a variety of groups such as the academics’ association of sport and civil groups for sport, when making and deciding a sport policy. However, while these groups have apparently been listened to, most policy decisions have been made by the arbitrary decisions or interest relations between the Minister, the head of the sports policy division and heads of quasi-governmental bodies (Interview: 12 October 2008)

As a consequence, there is little evidence of emerging a coalition calling for elite sport development, but elite sport sector works within elite led community. Considering a theoretical perspective, this may be, to some degree, explained by the concept of policy community which is a type of policy network involving a limited number of actors (Rhodes, 1997). And given that ‘political power is always exercised by a privileged minority: an elite’ (Heywood, 2002: 79), at first glance an elitist macro-level explanation may seem to provide a useful account of the nature of policy-making process in South Korea as a minority of elite bureaucrats and heads in MCST and KSC has exercised their power and authority in shaping and making elite sport policy.

Furthermore, the segmented nature of the Korean sport system in which elite sport and SFA have been separately developed without a mutual-cooperation system has resulted in a heated political debate about the restructuring of national sporting organisations which has been an overriding concern in sports field as discussed earlier. This issue has arguably been concerned with the continued controversy regarding SFA- versus elite sport policy development. Over the last few decades elite sport-oriented policy led by the state has been confronted by the lasting debate concerning the negative impact of elite sport-oriented policy and SFA policy development in the last decade. Along with the continuous need for SFA over time, the heavily skewed sport system and structure derived from the elite sport-centred policy funnelled into the balancing development of elite sport and SFA. As a result, in the last decade Korean sport has been beset with controversy over the reform of national sporting bodies.
The last key feature for policy change is the aspiration of hosting mega sporting events. In South Korea, favourable attitudes of the local- and central governments toward hosting mega-sporting events may be seen as reinforcing the priority given to elite sport development. The reason is that elite performance of the hosting country is considered to be an important criterion for the successful hosting strategy. In this sense, it is no less dubious to surmise that the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games provided a significant catalyst for the host nation to develop elite sport system in general, and to improve the national athletes’ performance in particular. Moreover, in recent years the Daegu’s successful bid for the 2011 World Athletics Championships has provided significant political legitimation for the host nation to spend a considerable sum of public money to develop infrastructures for fostering competitive athletes in the sport of athletics (cf. Houlihan & Green, 2009: 686). In short, these observations identified in this chapter shall be linked to the following chapter. It is now time to turn to a more specific analysis of three sports within which their respective NGBs, the MCST, the KSC and other interest groups act.
CHAPTER 6
The case of Athletics

6.1 Introduction

The focus of this chapter is an analysis of elite sport policy change in athletics as the first of the three case studies. The analysis of three case studies is organised by following the two principal themes indentified by Green & Houlihan (2005). Firstly, the organisational structure and administration of the national governing body of athletics is explored followed by an analysis of the nature of the body’s relationships with other organisations and an assessment of the influence and significance of business. Secondly, the potential influences on elite sport development in athletics are examined following the three key dimensions of high performance sport policy identified by Green & Houlihan (2005): (i) identification of, and support for, young talented athletes; (ii) improvements in sport science, coaching and facilities; and (iii) the provision of more systematic competition opportunities for elite level athletes. The final section of the chapter provides a brief summary of key implications from the case study for the wider analysis of Korean elite sport policy.

6.2 Organisational structure, administration and the influence of business leaders

The introduction of athletics in Korea originated from the sports day (Woon-Dong-Hoe) which was held under the instruction of W. du F. Hutchison, English teacher, in 1896. (Lee H, 2003). In the early days of athletics development, Woon-Dong-Hoe\(^\text{15}\) played an important role in popularising athletics among the public. Athletics was one of the few sports that was easily accessible and as a result, it would not be an overstatement to say that the early years of Woon-Dong-Hoe were almost exclusively athletics meetings (Lee H, 2003). As such,

\(^{15}\) Woon-Dong-Hoe is like a small athletic meeting or sports day mainly held in primary-and middle schools or regional towns.
athletics emerged through Woon-Dong-Hoe and began to establish a base for modern sport, particularly following the inauguration of the Korean (Joseon) Sports Association in 1920 (later renamed the Korea Sports Council), which held a variety of athletics meetings in Korea. In 1945, the establishment of the Korea Athletics Federation (KAF), which is the recognised governing body of athletics at the elite level in South Korea, was as an important step in Korean athletics development. The KAF joined by the International Association of Athletic Federation (IAAF) in 1945. The KAF was affiliated with the Asia Amateur Athletics Association (AAAA) in 1973 and finally, became an official member of the KSC in 1985. At present, the KAF has the 16 affiliated municipal and provincial federations of athletics and the three affiliated central federations for middle-high school-, university- and business teams. The KAF’s remit encompasses the four disciplines of track and field, race walking, cross-country and long-distance relay race.

More specifically, the official purpose of the KAF is to promote sports culture and international brotherhood by spreading amateur athletics across the country and to enhance national glory by fostering excellent athletes. Its key activities and responsibilities are as follows: (i) deliberation and decision-making regarding the policy direction for athletics; (ii) management and oversight of all types of athletics meetings; (iii) research and guidance of athletics coaching skill, including talent identification and athletes support; (iv) administration and superintendence of the affiliated municipal and provincial federations; (v) authorisation of Korean records and application for authorisation of a world record established in South Korea; and (vi) the development, administration and authorisation of athletics facilities; and the publication of a periodical, data collecting and statistical research (The website of KAF - http://www.kaf.go.kr/ver1/01_about/business.asp, assessed on 7th April 2009). Figure 6.1 shows the current organisational structure of the KAF.
As seen in Figure 6.1, while the large number of committees gives an impression of fragmentation, the previous six departments were rationalised to the two departments of Competition and Administrative Support in order to improve the efficiency in 2005. This organisational reform was a way of reflecting the firm intention of KAF’s chairman (Shin, Pill-Ryun) to re-create Korean athletics as ‘the foremost sports domicile’ (organisation) (Track & Field Magazine, 2005 1/2:19). However, organisational and administrative change in the sport of athletics has not been highly visible, but internal changes have been somewhat perceived within the KAF. On a large scale, ‘there has not been an epochal organisational change in respect of the sport of athletics, while there has been slight changes with the KAF over the last two decades’ (Interview: a former executive director of the KAF, 14 November 2008). The reason is concerned with the feature of the sport of athletics that the KAF is the only organisation for taking charge of the wide range of disciplines and remits in respect of athletics at the elite level. Due to their monopoly position in relation to the sport of athletics, the KAF has not had to compete with any other organisation and has retained its exclusive
responsibility of elite athletics. It is worth mentioning that the KAF has only competed with other national governing bodies of sport for resources because it has been controlled by the KSC in accordance with the hierarchical sport system and structure as noted in the previous chapter. The KAF is therefore regarded as the sole body for elite athletics at the national level.

Given this study’s focus on policy change in athletics, a significant aspect of KAF’s organisational and administrative changes concerns the influence of business leaders on the sport. Most notably, their financial contributions have played an important role in developing athletics in a situation where KAF is low in terms of fiscal independence (Koo B, 1997). In 2008, 1.5 billion of the 4.5 billion won, the total annual budget of the KAF, was received from the organisation’s head (Shin Pill-Ryun’s parent company (Samsung) and the rest was provided by the national treasury and national sports promotional funding16. This distinctive feature of the financing system is borne out by the secretary-general at KAF, who stated that:

> It is so hard for KAF to administrate and manage with the national treasury funding without the support of the chairman’s parent company due to the lack of our own financial independence. The organisation head’s contribution is not optional, but unavoidable for athletics development at the elite level in a situation in which the sport of athletics cannot be a commercial sport like football and baseball in South Korea. A fixed [element of] funding is therefore needed in order to maintain a stable administration and management of the organisation (Interview: 13 November 2008)

With regard to this observation, the emergence of the Samsung business leader as head of KAF in 1997 was seen as a major impetus for the development of elite athletics. Indeed, KAF’s chairman Lee Dae-won (1997-2005) who was the president of Samsung Heavy Industries Co., signalled a notable change in Korean athletics development by contributing a considerable amount of money to KAF. The past decade has thus witnessed quite significant changes in developing Korean athletics, while the advent of Samsung has provided KAF with the palpable resources to fulfil such change. KAF has been under the presidency of the Samsung Group17 since 1997 which is remembered as a watershed moment for athletics. Indeed, if money is a fundamental resource in developing the sport of athletics, the emergence of Samsung in 1997 is instructive. More especially, ‘the contribution of business

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16 Funding raised from profit-generating businesses such as Seoul Olympic Parktel, cycle racing, motorboat racing and Sports ToTo.

17 The 21st chairman - Lee Dae-won 1997-2005; the 22nd chairman - Shin Pill-Ryun 2005-2009; and the 23rd chairman - Oh Dong-jin 2009 onwards)
leaders which had continuously decreased until 1996 showed a remarkable threefold increase in 1997 from around 440 million won in 1996 to 1.2 billion won in 1997’ (Koo B, 1997; Interview: a secretary-general of the KAF, 13 November 2008). However, in the late 1990s, ‘the IMF crisis resulted in a reduction in the financial contributions from 1.2 billion won to 700 million won’ (Interview: the secretary-general of the KAF, 13 November 2008). Here, from a theoretical perspective of the ACF, the IMF crisis can be viewed as one of the exogenous factors which affects the behaviour of subsystem actors and brings about policy change (Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 193). In 2008, the Samsung business leader’s funding has been increased to 1.5 billion (KAF, 2008).

Table 6.1 The 2007/2008 income of KAF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Amount of money</th>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National treasury (state-aid)</td>
<td>1,966,564,136</td>
<td>3,350,335,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSPO funding</td>
<td>507,182,850</td>
<td>1,873,420,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEST funding</td>
<td>400,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor money</td>
<td>884,844,700</td>
<td>830,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution (from Samsung Group)</td>
<td>1,500,000,000</td>
<td>1,500,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other incomes</td>
<td>261,098,654</td>
<td>166,140,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance carried forward from the last account</td>
<td>29,569,112</td>
<td>199,463,969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,549,259,452</td>
<td>7,919,358,969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As seen in Table 6.1, of particular note is the funding provided from the Korean Foundation for the Next Generation Sport Talent (NEST) in 2007 and the increased funding from the national treasury and KSPO funding in 2008 due to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. The former is indicative of the government’s willingness to identify and nurture young talent in the sports of athletics, gymnastics and swimming which are regarded as foundation sports in South Korea (NEST, 2008).

Along with the finance from Samsung, in relation to policy change in the sport of athletics, identification projects for talented young athletes are worthy of note. At the inauguration of Chairman Lee, Dae-won in 1997, he announced the revival of the talent identification project that had been suspended since 1988. Furthermore, KAF announced the ‘2000 Master Plan for
Athletics Powerhouse’, aimed at reviving Korean athletics through talent identification/development, the further expansion of the cash-award system and the expansion of pool/base in the sport of athletics (Track & Field Magazine, 1998 11/12, 1999 3/4). The talent identification project is of particular importance in terms of policy change because the revival of the project was due to the involvement of the Samsung business leader in 1997. A sports journalist stated in KAF’s Track & Field Magazine, that it would not be an overstatement to say that with the appointment of Chairman Lee Dae-won in 1997, KAF could recover from a period of administrative and organisational blight (Kim, D - quoted in Track & Field Magazine, 1998:28 11/12). In this sense, the context within which business leaders took over as heads of a number of national governing bodies of sport, including the KAF, was illustrated by the former executive director at the KAF, who stated that:

In 1980s the former Jeon’s regime put pressure on business leaders and provided them with tax incentives (benefits) to induce support for the national governing bodies of sport by taking over as head of NGBs. Many large enterprises have held the presidency of the NGBs. However, there was a growing government concern over the monopoly of the NGBs from a few conglomerates such as Samsung and Hyundai in 1990s. As a result of this, while tax benefits for businesses which took charge of the presidency of the NGBs have dwindled since the late 1990s. Some businesses pulled out of their partnership with NGBs. But these days, there is a situation in which business leaders try to take over as head of the NGBs as they recognises the significance of sport in terms of sport marketing and contribution to society. For example, business leaders who have the presidency of the NGBs may have more benefits in overseas marketing (Interview: 14 November 2008).

As such, if business leaders’ involvement in NGBs had been forced by the previous military government’s intervention from the 1980s to the early 1990s, currently the marriage between sport and marketing has accelerated business leaders’ support of the NGBs for the benefit of their businesses. That Samsung has taken charge of the KAF’s presidency can be understood in terms of the way in which Samsung’s interests match governmental interests. In this regard, while government and Samsung share common interests for KAF, it can be explained in terms of a win-win strategy: namely, elite sport development for government and public relations of business for Samsung.

Furthermore, with regard to sport marketing strategy, KAF reached a corporate sponsorship agreement with ASICS Sport Corporation in 2002, which promised to provide about 360
million won for training and competition equipment for elite athletes. Regarding the background of this sponsorship agreement, the Track & Field Magazine (2002 1/2) stated that in recent years the booming popularity of marathon running and the growing potential of the sport of athletics were significant factors in attracting ASICS Sport Corporation to such a sponsorship contract. Changing values and perceptions of business leaders towards contributions to society and economic interests have facilitated the development of athletics. In other words, the changing nature of business values has shifted from the notion of compulsory involvement (scepticism) to that of spontaneous involvement (willingness) coupled with the contribution to society and commercialism.

With regard to the importance given to the significance of businesses for the development of athletics, the contribution of Kolon Marathon Club to Korean athletics development can be viewed as a key platform for leading the Korea marathon to a world-class level. Indeed, the marathon gold medal in the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games and the silver medal in the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games won by two athletes of the Kolon Marathon Club were significant moments for policy actors involved in elite athletics development, stimulating future investment in the development of elite performance. This important momentum in the development of the sport of athletics was borne out by the previous KAF chairman, who stated that:

Hwang, Young-Jo’s first ever gold medal in the Olympic men’s marathon at the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona had an effect in various ways. For example, it is true that the KAF had some difficulty in winning the funding in those days of the 4th World Junior Athletics Championships in 1992 because the sport of athletics is a kind of unpopular sport in South Korea. However, the Hwang’s gold medal not only encouraged government and quasi-governmental bodies to invest more resources in the sport than the previous one, but also stimulated the people’s interest in athletics in general, and the marathon in particular (Park K, – quoted in the interview of the former head Park, Jung-Ki with Dong-A Ilbo, 1992).

Furthermore, the marathon success in the 1992 Barcelona Olympics has allowed the sport of athletics to be designated as A class within the system of ‘selection and concentration’ as noted earlier, even though other sports within the sport of athletics have a relatively poor performance at the international level. However, the IMF crisis had a harmful effect on the

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18 The Kolon marathon club which won a gold medal in the 1992 Barcelona Olympics and a silver medal in the 1996 Atlanta Olympics left its mark on the history of Korean athletics.
development of athletics that resulted in disbanding some corporate-owned athletics clubs including the Kolon Marathon Club in the late 1999. Instead of the dissolution of the Kolon Marathon Club, the Samsung Electronics Athletic Club (SEAC) was launched in 2000. SEAC was made up of the nine members including the six athletes and coaches transferred from the Kolon Marathon Club which had struggled with financial difficulties and internal conflicts.

Given the significance of administrative/organisational affairs and power relations surrounding the sport of athletics, an important emerging tension was associated with the formation of the ‘Korea Athletics Development Measures Committee’ led by a group of academics and some athletics coaches in 2008. Notwithstanding Samsung’s substantial contributions to the development of athletics since 1997, Samsung faced pressure from the committee as to its control over the organisation and administration of the sport. As a member of the committee argued, the sport of athletics has been backward since the Samsung took over as head of the KAF in 1997, insisting that the company has implemented policies by excluding many athletes’ support staffs (experts) from the decision-making process (Yang J, – quoted in Dong-A Ilbo, 2008a). The reason for the conflict may be linked to the stagnation of athletic performances over the last decade. In other words, a closed-door administration veiled by the substantial sums from Samsung has been criticised by the committee, who stated that the leadership of Samsung has resulted in any medals in the Olympic Games over the last 12 years (Yang J, – quoted in Dong-A Ilbo, 2008bc). The dominance of Samsung within the KAF is evidenced by the fact that a vice-chairman and general executive including the chairman of the KAF are from Samsung. In response, KAF maintained that it was trying to take account of the opinions of athletes’ support staff (experts), although acknowledging that it could not fully satisfy all demands (adapted from Donga, 2008b).

This tension between the KAF and the committee represents an emerging trend towards a critical coalition of actors surrounding the sport of the athletics. The influence of Samsung on the sport of athletics in general, and the KAF in particular, is self-evident. It is generally taken for granted that Samsung’s power in the sport of athletics is strongly based on its substantial funding. In respect of the connection between power and money, a senior researcher of sport policy at the KISS argued that ‘sports leaders have to possess an ability to

19 Athletes’ support staffs are used here to refer to wide-range of groups relating to athletics, but with mainly involving in current and former athletes/coaches.
raise substantial funding’ (Interview: 18 November 2008). In respect of this issue, Green argued that power and authority of an organisation or individual abide in financial wealth (2003:237). Considering state theories in explaining power relations in the process of policy-making, the influence of business leaders and their power in the policy-making process for the development of the sport can be understood by the central idea of elitism and neo-pluralism. In other words, government and Samsung with the financial wealth exercise their power and authority over the sport of athletics by sharing overlapping or common values and interests concerning medal-success.

Most recently, Daegu’s successful bid for the 2011 World Championships in athletics has signalled a momentous sea-change in the sport of athletics. Indeed, following the successful bid, in 2008 the MCST published its new strategy for athletics, ‘Korea Athletics Development Plan: Run Korea 2011’, which announced a commitment to spend 3900 billion won to develop the performance of athletics and the expansion of the athletics base in general, and also to invest in facility development (Choi K, 2008). Nobody ever envisaged such a decision of the government for the sport of athletics. However, as the nation’s hosting strategy seems to drive investment in elite sport performance, the successful bid for the 2011 World Championships in athletics, as an exogenous factor, has accelerated government to invest in developing athletics performance and infrastructure (especially the construction of the nation’s first ever indoor athletics stadium - named as ‘Daegu Athletics Promotion Centre’).

As regard the background to the decision to host the 2011 World Championships the secretary-general of the KAF stated that:

In fact, a discussion of hosting the World Championships in Athletics in our country was begun in 1997, when Samsung took over the leadership of KAF. At the early stage of discussing the hosting strategy, KAF’s position was against the hosting of the Championships because we worried about our poor performance in athletics and the huge cost, assuming that the Championships would be a festival only for other countries thus wasting many millions of won. The decision was therefore left to further discussion for a long time. After the 2003 Daegu Universiade, the discussion was revived in that we can use the infra-structure of sport created from the Universiade. In the long run, the decision was reached between KAF, Daegu Metropolitan and the government. According to our federation, the event would be a great opportunity to step up the sport of athletics towards world-levels. (Interview: 13 November 2008)
For the 2011 World Athletics Championships, the Athletics Development Preparation Committee (ADPC) was launched in 2007, whose vision was to pave the way for athletics promotion. Figure 6.2 shows the organisational structure of the ADPC and its membership.

**Figure 6.2 Organisational structure of the ADPC**

![Organisational structure of the ADPC]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Athletics Development Preparation Committee</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director of Sports Bureau at the MCST</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCST/ MEST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSC / KOCOSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary-general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daegu Metropolitan City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Policy Document, 'Run Korea 2011' (2008)

The committee comprises policy actors from central and local government and quasi-government, as well as additionally a few academics. Extending Marsh and Rhodes’ (1992) ideas about the concept of policy networks, it may be argued that the formation of the committee involving a limited number of elite members such as senior government officials, business leaders, head of Daegue metropolitan city and senior sport administrators, who share common values and beliefs for the development of athletics up to and beyond the 2011 World Athletics Championships is close to the concept of policy community (cf. Rhodes, 1997), even if the characteristics of the committee’s membership seemingly includes a variety of groups and actors.

**6.3 Identification of the key dimensions of elite sport policy development**

**6.3.1 Identification of, and support for, young talented athletes**

‘Given the growing trend towards a homogeneous model of elite sport development’ (Oakley & Green, 2001: 91), talent identification is regarded as one of the key elements for
subsequently achieving high performance success at international level competitions. There has been a growing concern about talent identification amongst many countries over the last few decades. Reflecting on the global trend of elite sport development, South Korea has become increasingly aware of the importance of talent identification system since the mid-1960s. Indeed, the initial septennium from 1965 to 1971 was recognised as the period for starting the talent identification project, in which 350 talented athletes were identified under the KSC initiative (Lee Y et al., 2001). However, the first period of talent identification came to nothing due to the lack of budgetary and institutional support. As noted in Chapter 4, talent identification for reserve athletes was re-embarked upon in 1982, when the Ministry of Sport was launched in order to prepare for the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. The first successful product of the talent identification project was the Lim Chun-Ai’s gold medals in the 800m, 1500m and 3000m events in the 1986 Seoul Asian Games (Track & Field Magazine, 2004 09/10). Despite this example of medal success, the project of identifying and nurturing reserve athletes during the period, by and large, was not productive in winning medals (Lee Y et al., 2001). This evaluation of talent identification project is illustrated by a senior researcher at the KISS, who stated that:

In the early 1980s we recognised that advanced countries in elite sport, such as Germany and Australia were operating a structured talent identification programme. As a consequence, the talent identification project was considered to re-launch. But, it ended in smoke due to the lack of well structured/sophisticated administration and systematic linkage between the KSC and national governing bodies of sport and school clubs. (Interview: 07 November 2008)

From a theoretical perspective, the above statement draws attention to the concept of policy-oriented learning which is a subordinate concept of the ACF (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). That the Korean government re-launched talent identification project in preparation of the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games is linked to the idea of policy learning as the new talent identification project was based on good practice learnt from Germany and Australia.

The project of identifying and nurturing reserve athletes was re-launched as an identification project for talented young athletes in the sports of athletics, swimming, gymnastics, archery, shooting, ice skating, badminton and table-tennis. These sports were selected on the basis of

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20 Reserve athletes are a group of having a potential to become national squad members.
being foundation sports (athletics, swimming, gymnastics) and the sports most likely to produce gold medal (archery, shooting, ice skating, badminton and table-tennis) from 1993 to 1995. In 1993 a total of 85 talented young athletes were identified under the KSC initiative in the sport of athletics, covering a wide range of disciplines from short to long distance races, jumping and throwing, increasing to 125 talented athletes in 1994 (KSC, 2000, 2003, 2007). As this project did not give satisfactory results, owing to the failure of constant supervision, it was therefore integrated into the project of nurturing reserve athletes in 1996. Once more, the identification project for talented young athletes was separated from the project of nurturing reserve athletes in 2002. Every year 200 talented young athletes have been identified and developed in the five sports of athletics, gymnastics, swimming, ice-skating and skiing since 2003 (KSC, 2000, 2003, 2007). As such, the 1990s witnessed quite clear confusion and disorder in the talent identification projects due to the lack of a professional operation.

In considering policy change with regard to talent identification in the sport of athletics, arguably 1997 was a watershed moment for the sport, as KAF, with the emergence of the Samsung business leader as head of the body, began to put a greater emphasis on talent identification as one of the three top projects (Track & Field Magazine, 1998 11/12, 1999 1/2). Indeed, alongside the repeated confusion and the vague central operating body responsible for talent identification project, the KAF’s ‘2000 Master Plan for Athletics Powerhouse’ including identification for talented young athletes in 1997 is instructive. 1997 can therefore be seen as a starting point for KAF to independently manage the talent identification project which had been little more than a name since 1988 (Track & Field Magazine, 2000 5/6). On this issue, the secretary-general of the KAF explained that ‘the talent identification project could be resuscitated due to the emergence of the Samsung business leader because it required investment on a long-term basis’ (Interview: 13 November 2008). KAF has thus identified and nurtured, every year, 80 talented young athletes in conjunction with the National Talented Young Athletes Contest of Athletics, which has been held since 1997 (see Figure 6.3). KAF have provided selected talents with subsidy, accident insurance, training supplies, physical testing and camp training. The talent identification procedure is shown in Figure 6.3 below.
It should be reiterated that the talent identification project has been under the control of KAF since 1997. According to Lee Y (2001), it has entered a stable period and been relatively revitalised, compared with other national governing bodies of sport. The reason why KAF lays emphasis on talent identification is associated with the decline of the number of athletes in the sport of athletics over time (see Table 6.2). In other words, the sport of athletics has been challenged by the decrease in resources for athletics because it is mainly regarded as an unattractive sport by young pupils. Unlike popular or professional sports such as football, baseball, basketball and golf, it is so hard for the KAF to attract potential elite athletes. According to Lee Y (2008), other reasons are the falling birth rate, the decrease in athletics preference and the failure to present a vision for the sport. These challenges confronted in the sport of athletics are borne out by the secretary-general of the KAF, who stated that:

In fact, the reason why Korean athletics performance is poor is related to the lack of talents and the small athletics base because it is difficult for athletes to provide a bright future/success. Therefore, those who are even gifted and interested in the sport of athletics are reluctant to become elite performers. As a result, the number of potential elite athletes in the sport of athletics is insufficient. In this situation, the talent identification project is a clear pathway for developing the sport of athletics (Interview: 13 November 2008)

### Table 6.2 Number of registered athletes and clubs in the sport of athletics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. of Elite players of athletics</strong> (from primary student-athletes)</td>
<td>9,729</td>
<td>9,173</td>
<td>6,112</td>
<td>5,373</td>
<td>Athletes and clubs registered at the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reflecting the challenge and the sense of crisis sweeping across the sport of athletics, the government’s policy document, *Mid- to Long Term Development Plan for Korea Athletics* (Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism: MCST) heralded in 2007 highlighted the talent identification/nurturing, the pool of athletics, the diversification of a nurturing system for athletes and infrastructure building of athletics. The plan is largely concerned with the following two objectives: one is the preparation for hosting the 2011 World Athletics Championships and the other is the growing importance of the sport of athletics as a foundation sport, which is also articulated in China’s *119 Project* and Japan’s *Gold Plan*. Indeed, while the emerging focus on foundation sports which have had relative poor performances at international competitions has precipitated the need for policy learning from the neighbouring countries with the China’s 119 Project and Japan’s Gold Plan being particularly influential in shaping recent government policy documents for elite sport and athletics (MCST, 2007a). The most likely explanation for policy learning from China and Japan is that both are neighbouring rival countries which have relatively similar disadvantaged physical conditions by comparison to the leading Western countries in terms of winning athletics and swimming Olympic medals.

In addition, the *Korean Athletics Development Plan: ‘Run Korea 2011’*, precipitated by the Daegu’s successful bid for the 2011 World Athletics Championships pointed out the shortage of athletes and coaches as one of the top barriers for the development of athletics. In essence, the document published under the initiative of the MCST is concerned with improving the relatively poor performance of Korean athletics to ensure the successful hosting of the 2011 World Athletics Championships. Indeed, ‘the government and KAF became worried about the poor performance of athletics after the decision to award the 2011 World Athletics Championships’ (Interview: the secretary-general of the KAF, 13 November 2008). As the chairman of KAF, Shin Pill-Ryun, stated, the success or failure of the 2011 World Athletics Championships will hinge on how to create an athletics boom in South Korea (Park H, 2007). Interestingly, the sport of athletics has also sought to learn from the successful practice of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Athletics clubs (from primary school club to business club)</th>
<th>2,559</th>
<th>1,264</th>
<th>977</th>
<th>KAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Korea Athletics Development Plan: ‘Run Korea 2011’ (2008: 3)

\(^{21}\) ‘119’ is the sum total of Olympics medals allocated in foundation events such as athletics, swimming and rowing.

\(^{22}\) ‘Gold Plan’ is to focus on elite sport policy, aimed at winning 5% of the total gold medals.
other sports, particularly swimming, which recorded Korea’s first ever Olympic gold medal in swimming at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games resulting in a boom in swimming interest across the country. In this sense, it may be argued that identifying and nurturing prominent athletics stars would be the best way to arouse the national interest in the sport of athletics (Segye Ilbo, 2007).

By the same token, in respect of identification and support for talented athletes, the Korean Athletics Development Plan: ‘Run Korea 2011’ focuses on selecting and supporting the 2011 athletics dream-team as a short-term driving task and expanding the pool of athletics performers as one of the long-term driving tasks (see Figure 6.4). The aim of the short-term element of the plan concerns the expanding the ‘Athletics Dream-team’ comprised of 85 athletes in 2007 and dividing it into two groups (total 100 athletes - A group: 10 athletes and B group: 90 athletes), which is designed to create ‘a set of conditions’ which will eventually allow these dream-team members to train under special conditions with sport science support, special training programmes abroad, special training subsidy and so on (cf. Green, 2003: 273). The aim of the long-term element of the plan is to expand the base of athletes in the sport of athletics through building up an ideal athletes nurturing system which will provide talented young athletes with a clear performance pathway. The talent identification project continued since 1997 will extend the number of talented young athletes by 160 talents in 2011 (MCST, 2008c).
The growing issue of a co-ordinated programme for talent identification and nurturing has become a matter of greater concern than ever before in the sport’s drive to achieve its planned goals at the 2011 World Athletics Championships in particular, and future athletics development in general, taking the opportunity of the successful bid for the event. In this similar vein, it seems reasonable to assume that the Daegu’s successful bid for the 2011 World Athletics Championships has given impetus to such government involvement in talent identification in the sport of athletics in particular (see figure 6.5). It is evidenced by the following comments from the secretary-general at the KAF, who argued that:
In spite of the perception of the importance of talent identification, it has not been easy for KAF to construct a pyramid structure for identifying and nurturing talented athletes due to the lack of annual budget. In fact, as of 2008, we have identified 80 talented young athletes every year, so we are trying to create an ideal environment in which it is supposed to expand the number of talented young athletes by around 200 athletes. Accordingly, we are heavily trying to expand the pool of talented young athletes under the support of the government expedited by the successful bid of the 2011 World Athletics Championships. (Interview: 13 November 2008)

**Figure 6.5 Pyramid system of nurturing athletes in the sport of athletics on a long-term basis**

![Pyramid System Diagram]


### 6.3.2 Improvements in coaching, sports science and facilities

#### 6.3.2.1 Coaching

In a strict sense, coaching development in the sport of athletics has made little progress so far. The main reason for this is that KAF and the government have only tried to improve coaching or coaches in a very piecemeal fashion. In other words, there has been no systematic and
structured approach to coaching development in the sport of athletics, while the national coaching qualification system at the elite level has been developed in 50 of the 55 sports affiliated officially to the KSC under the control and supervision of the MCST since 1974. Reflecting on the situation of the coaching system, the government document, Korea Athletics Development Plan: ‘Run Korea 2011’, pointed out the lack of professional athletics coaches (instructors) and a training manual as urgent matters (MCST, 2008c). The root of the problem lies not only in the absence of a professional coaching qualification course for each sport, but also the low salaries of coaches and employment unrest (MCST, 2008c). As a consequence, ‘there has been a limit to what KAF can independently promote and cultivate in relation to professional coaching in athletics’ (Interview: the former executive director of the KAF, 14 November 2008). Consequently, coaching development remained stagnant up the mid 2000s with most coaches seeming to depend on the training experiences acquired during their athlete years.

Table 6.3 Number of coaches (instructors) in the sport of athletics: as of 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First class</th>
<th>Second class</th>
<th>Third class</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Athletic coach</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>1,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of SFA leader</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Policy Document, ‘Run Korea 2011’ (MCST: 2008: 3)

At the heart of coaching development in South Korea is the introduction of foreign coaches. The import of foreign coaches goes back to the late 1980s. At that time, one of the representative examples was three imported coaches from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), who initiated the Korean national athletics team into their technological know-how of athletics, for two months, in 1989 (Sports Korea, April, 1990:22-25). Since then, the use of foreign coaches has been considered in developing performance of Korean national athletics team from time to time. Recently, a clear example of the reliance on imported coaches arose from the sport’s nadir in the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, with Korea winning no medals in athletics. As a result, KAF declared a road map for improving the Korean athletics system, including recruiting foreign coaches from the United States and Australia. This growing emphasis on the use of foreign coaches as an alternative to domestic coaching development is illustrated by the following comments from Dong-A Ilbo, one of the major newspapers, where it stated that:
Above all, KAF had the objective of bringing more coaches from overseas. That was stimulated by the Susanthikr Jayasinghe’s (Sri Lanka) Athletics Bronze medal (200m for female) in the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, who was under the instruction of Tony Campbell, an American coach. In addition, the Kim Mi-Chung’s case, which she shaved more than ten minutes off her record in 20km race-walking for one year under the supervision of a Chinese coach in 1998 and 1999, was associated with ‘the effect of foreign coach’ which bolstered confidence in improving Korean athletics performance (quoted in Dong-A Ilbo, 2000 – journalist Yang, J. G.).

Furthermore, the disqualification of a Korean athlete in the walking race at the 2003 World Athletics Championships provided KAF with an opportunity to introduce a foreign coach, Bohdan Bulakowski from Poland who worked as walking race exclusive coach in order to prepare for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games from November 2003 to August 2004 (Track & Field Magazine, 2003 9/10). An example of the introduction of a foreign coach for improving the most vulnerable short-distance events in 2004 was Miyakawa Chiaki, the former Japanese national athlete for 100m and currently professor at Tokai University. Of particular concern are the power struggles between KAF and athletes’ support staff in the process of introducing and using foreign coaches. On this issue, Track & Field Magazine (Spring 2007) articulated that KAF, in trying to employ foreign coaches, was likely to heat up a ‘turf war’ between itself and athletes’ support staff (largely coaches) in athletics circle. A prime example of this was the introduction of Miyakawa Chiaki in 2004, which was criticised by a few Korean coaches of short-distance racing, who argued that the introduction by Chiaki of advanced coaching skills conflicted with national self-respect given South Korea’s historical relationship with Japan (Track & Field Magazine, Spring 2007:40). In addition, KAF’s intention to recruit foreign coaches were reinforced by the failure of athletes at the 2006 Doha Asian Games but let to a sharp conflict of interest between KAF and athletes’ Korean support staff. This conflict is made evident by a sports columnist in the Track & Field Magazine, who argued that:

Most domestic coaches were against the employment of foreign coaches because they feared that competition with foreign coaches would drive them out of realm of coach. On the other hand, some, who feel anxious about athletics’ future, supported KAF’s plan by arguing that we should find a means of escape from the standard of Korean athletics performance which has stagnated over the long time because it might be hard to expect the development of athletics with domestic
coaches (quoted in the column of Ki, Young-No’s column in the Track & Field Magazine, 2007:40).

In terms of power relations within athletics, the way in which the executive members of KAF made the decision regarding the introduction of foreign coaches can be seen as an example of Dahl’s (1961) one-dimensional concept of power as conflict of interests and power relations between the KAF and athletes’ support staff (largely coaches) were observed visibly in the decision-making process (cf. Polsby, 1963).

Some workshops for domestic coaches in athletics were held by these foreign coaches employed for national team level training. In particular, the success of Guus Hiddink with Korean football team and his willingness to train Korean coaches has made Korean coaches more receptive to the idea of foreign coaches (Chung K, - Newsis, 2008; Park D, - Newsis, 2009). ‘It is assumed, if a prominent experienced foreign coach takes charge of the Korean national athletics squad, Korean athletics would not only benefit, but it would also be helpful in nurturing domestic coaches’ (Interview: the former executive director at the KAF, 14 November 2008). As a consequence, KAF revealed its provision for the gradual expansion of foreign coaches, the support of training programmes abroad for domestic excellent coaches and overseas training for athletics in the Korea Athletics Development Plan, ‘Run Korea 2011’ in order to learn advanced coaching methods and improve domestic coach’s capability by matching them with coaches adopted from overseas, as well as the construction and utilisation of the e-Running system. Given the significance of policy learning, an important aspect of coaching development is the programme of overseas training for national athletes. The clear aim of overseas training is to tackle the poor performance in the sport by providing Korean national athletes with an opportunity to attain success at the upcoming 2011 World Athletics Championships. In this regard, Jamaica, which produced Usain Bolt who won three gold medals (100m, 200m, 400m relay) in the 2008 Beijing Olympics and China which produced Xiang Liu who won 110m hurdle’s gold medal in the 2004 Athens Olympics are considered role models for Korean athletics development (Rho J - Sports Chosun, 2009). Therefore, KAF sent Korean athletes teams to Jamaica, China and Australia in order to create ideal opportunities so that they could compete against the best athletes and be trained by

23 He who led the Korean national football squad to the semi-finals in the 2002 World Cup is considered to be one of national heroes in South Korea.
24 As of 2009, he is currently world-record holder of 100m and 200m events.
coaches who had trained world-class athletes. The introduction of foreign coaches and the sending abroad of domestic athletes and coaches as a strategy for delivering advanced coaching/technical skills and knowledge from abroad emphasises the importance and extent of ‘policy learning’ and ‘policy transfer’. As Houlihan & Green (2008:289) argue, ‘the use of ‘imported coaches’ in Singapore and China is a significant feature of the ways in which these two countries utilise knowledge transfer from abroad’. In short, it would not be an overstatement to say that coaching development in South Korea has been, in large part, reliant on the use of foreign coaches on the basis of the past training experience of domestic coaches.

6.3.2.2 Sports science

While the application of science to elite sport has been a global trend over the last two decades (cf. De Bosscher et al., 2008; Green & Houlihan, 2005; Oakley & Green, 2001), the development in sports science in the sport of athletics remained at a modest level until the early 2000s in South Korea. Recently, competition in sports science has intensified as countries realise the capacity of science to deliver greater success and to change a medal’s colour. Nevertheless, the application of sports science in South Korea had been accomplished in a fragmented way up until the early 2000s. Namely, there has not been an integrated and systematic application of sports science to athletics. Indeed, although the term sports science has emerged and been used in sport sector since the late 1960s, an actual application of sports science to elite level athletics had not been generalised until the late 1990s. One of the main reasons is borne out by a senior researcher at the KISS, who stated that:

Most coaches thought that they are the best of the best in training field. In other words, they doubted that sports science was needed, so there were conflicts between our researchers and coaches during the 1980s and early 1990s. Perhaps, their thinking was that hard training is the most important factor in improving performance. However, since 1988 or/and the early 1990s, there was a growing acceptance of the importance of sports science amongst coaches (Interview: 17 November 2008).

During the 1990s although there were piecemeal instances of applied sports science in athletics, the instances were largely associated with matters such as diet, physiology and
sports equipments, excepting psychology. One of the representative cases is Hwang Young-Jo’s marathon gold medal in the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games where his success was crowned with scientific training/dietetics schedules, and special running shoes with 100 million won’s worth of manufacture, which was to decrease fatigue during the race. Interestingly, Lee Jin-Il can be viewed as an instance as to the two-sidedness of sports science where, in the mid 1990s (Kim S, - Seoul Economics, 1999), he was disqualified from competition after a positive drug test and, suspended from March 2005 until the end of 2007. However, scientific training from KISS helped him at the nadir of his fortune and he made a successful comeback at the 1998 Bangkok Asian Games where he won a gold medal in the 800m event. As such, even though there were partial approaches to sports science during the 1990s, KAF was not actively concerned with the discipline of sport science. However, as mentioned above, the failure at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games provided an important impetus for the drive for a sports science project from KAF in partnership with KISS’s network (Chung J, - Hankuk Ilbo, 2000). The project of KAF was seen as an important step in beginning to intervene in earnest in the discipline of sports science where the KAF planned to invest annual 100–200 million won over five years (Chung J, - Hankuk Ilbo, 2000). The principal aim of the sports science project was to tackle the poor performance in athletics by providing leading athletes in a range of athletics events with physical, physiological and psychological support. Reflecting the marriage between science and athletics since sports science has been under the control of KAF, Lee Jae-Hoon’s success in winning initial qualification for 800m race of the 2004 Athens Olympics, where he improved on his personal record by 0.27 second, reveals a striking improvement on the performance. Moreover, Park Jae-Myung’s renewal (break) of his own Korean record for the javelin with a throw of 83.99 metres (the previous record 81.46 metres) by changing a throwing angle into 28 degree instructed by the KISS from 26 degree is also instructive in relation to the application of sports science (Park J, - Hankuk Ilbo, 2004).

Since the early 2000s, there has been a growing movement towards greater consideration of the aspect of sports science in the sport of athletics. As illustrated in Chapter 5, amongst athletes’ support staff this changing perspective has been solidified by the successful case of the exclusive team for Park, Tae-Whan who won the first Olympic gold medal in swimming in Beijing partly driven by the investment in sports science (particularly the scientific training

25 He won the first qualification for long and mid distance races of the Olympic Games since the 1988 Seoul Olympics.
team exclusive to him). For the sport of athletics, the successful case of swimming has been frequently mentioned in terms of the benefits of sports science. In this regard, the case has played a significant role in changing coaches’ relative scepticism into a willingness to adopt sports science in recent years (cf. Yamamoto, 2008). On this issue, the secretary-general at KAF related that ‘it was true that the case of Park Tae-Whan in swimming had a positive effect on athletics circle’s thinking about the benefits of sports science when applied to prominent talents’ (Interview: 13 November 2008). Therefore, as in the sport of swimming, KAF set up an exclusive team to foster a star player of athletics, Lee Jung-Jun who has emerged as a remarkable talent in 110m Hurdle by breaking his Korean record four times in 2008 (Song Y, - Daejon Ilbo, 2009). In this regard, this observation can be related to the notion of policy learning and how it affected actors’ (athletes’ support staff and governmental sports policy makers) perceptions, thinkings and beliefs in relation to the value of sports science. Thus, just as policy learning takes place between countries it also takes place between sports within the same country. Reflecting the surging importance of sports science in the sport of athletics, the 2008 strategy document, ‘Run Korea 2011’ reveals the government and KAF’s willingness to deal with the matter regarding sports science in a more professional manner, in which they declared the formation of ‘Sports Science Support Coalition for Athletics’ (see the Figure 6.6). The coalition comprise a few researchers of KISS, outside experts (nutrition, rehabilitation, medical and so on) and coaches of KAF under the aegis of MCST (MCST, 2008c), the ultimate aim of which is to tackle the current poor performance in the sport of athletics in general, and to achieve a good performance at the 2011 World Championships in Athletics in particular.

Figure 6.6 Formation and operation of Sports Science Support Coalition for Athletic

6.3.2.3 Sports facilities

It is generally taken for granted that access to specialist elite level facilities is one of the key pillars of elite sport development throughout the world (cf. De Bosscher et al., 2006; Green, 2003, Green & Houlihan, 2005; Houlihan & Green, 2008). In South Korea the development of elite level facilities for the sport of athletics has been largely determined by the need for staging Olympic, World Championships, World-cup and domestic sporting events (primarily National Sports Festival). Therefore, while the central and provincial governments have invested funding to build their multiple stadiums for mega sporting events (generally for Track & field and football), an integrated and systematic approach to elite level facility developments designed to meet high-performance training needs in the sport of athletics has been seen to be incomplete up to now. Indeed, the strategy document, ‘Run Korea 2011’ points out the lack of suitable facilities and exclusive athletics training centre as one of a cluster of problems facing Korean athletics. More especially, as of 2008, although there are 47 authorised stadiums all over the country, there is no indoor athletics training facility; therefore, in case of national athletics squad just 170 days of 250 training days are allowed for them to train, given the absence of indoor training facility (MCST, 2008c:4). Moreover, a training facility for throwing events has been limited to Korea National Sport University, Seoul Physical Education High School and Jeonnam Physical Education High School on the ground of the dangerousness of the sport and grass protection (MCST, 2008c:4). Thus, during the winter training period, lopsided training drills focusing on weight-training have resulted in limited technical training of athletes in track and field events. This concern regarding infrastructure development for athletics is emphasised by sport researchers in the Mid to Long-term Plans for the Development of Korean Athletics, where they argue that the construction of indoor athletics stadia is the most urgent problem facing Koran athletics, considering the expansion of infra-structure in a situation where athletes have difficulty in training during the winter season (Seoul National University, 2007). As such, it is true that from the perspective of KAF, ‘the relatively neglected area is concerned with the facility development, compared

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26 In 2000, there were 55 authorised athletics stadiums, and the first-class stadiums of these were 40 stadiums, capable of hosting/staging international competitions: but, the number of authorised athletics stadiums has been varied according to the recognition and expiration of authorisation. There were 31 authorised athletics stadiums, and the first-class stadiums of these were 19 stadiums (Track & Field Magazine, 2000, 2003).
to the matters of talent identification, cash-award system, coaching, and sport science’ (Interview: the former executive director at the KAF, 14 November 2008).

Concerning facility development, in a broad sense, the Taebaek Training Centre (also called the Taebaek Athletes’ Village) which opened in 1998 has a significant meaning with respect to the development of athletic facilities. The centre is located at altitude 1300-metres and equipped with a 400-metres track, dormitory and physical training room, physical therapy room and recreation facilities. The aim of the centre is to ‘enhance the athletes' ability through stimulating cardiovascular and cardiopulmonary health’ (http://www.sports.or.kr/player/player.taerung 2009). With regard to the Centre, KAF’s view was reflected by the former head of KAF in the opening ceremony of the centre, when he stated that the hilly area training camp of the centre will be a mecca for improving performance of the national athletics squad and talented athletes (Track & Field Magazine, 1998 7/8). The Centre is playing an important role in training mainly for mid to long–distance athletes. If the centre is a remarkable facility development for mid to long–distance events, the completion of the initial indoor javelin range at the Korea National Training Centre (KNTC) in 2006 was a progressive step towards building sufficient infrastructure for throwing events. The range was established at the special direction of the head of KAF and with the support of KNTC (Track & Field Magazine, 2006 9/10). These fragmented developments in athletics facilities seem to be still far too weak to change stagnated athletics performance.

However, 2011 might be the optimum times to attain the long-cherished desire of Koran athletes’ support staff to break the poor performance of the sport. ‘If Korean athletics go through the take-off stage further through the 2011 World Athletics Championships, then about 20 of the total athletics events will be likely to be able to go into the Olympic Games’ (Interview: the secretary-general at the KAF, 13 November 2008). In this sense, the construction of an indoor athletics stadium (named Daegu Athletics Promotion Centre) was proposed in terms of infra-structure building as part of the mid to long term approaches to improving athletics standards under the strategy document, ‘Run Korea 2011’. At present, the centre is under construction with the Daegu’s local money and the national sports promotional funding from the KSPO allocated by 2011 (see Table 6.4). The centre includes the total indoor athletics stadium, training ranges, athletics academy (including lecture rooms and accommodation), sports science/medicine centre, media room and a variety of offices.
Table 6.4 Allocated budget for the construction of the DAPC

(Unit: hundred won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Athletics Promotion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Funding</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>21,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Money</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>25,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The ultimate aim of the centre is to pave the way for improving Korean athletics performance by establishing an indoor athletics complex capable of providing training, regardless of the climatic condition, and also it will be possible to host international indoor competitions in athletics (MCST, 2008c). These expectations surrounding athletics circles with regard to the centre reflects a similar view by a member27 of the National Assembly in the Dailian News, where he argued that the centre will function as an all-round athletics facility like the Korea National Training Centre (Kim J - Dailian News, 2008).

6.3.3 The provision of more systematic competition opportunities for elite level athletes

On the issue of the provision of more systematic competition opportunities for elite level athletes, it is worth noting that as the former executive director at KAF argued, in relation to key elements leading to the development of Korean athletics, the provision of a systematic competition structure was described as the last of the six obstacles to athletics development and success (Track & Field Magazine, 1997 7/8: 31-32). To put it clearly, the issue of systematic competition opportunities has not been a principal concern for the sport of athletics over the years. That is to say, the issue has been largely neglected by KAF until the mid 2000s, compared to other elements of elite sport development such as coaching, talent identification, sports science, facility and the cash-award system. In a situation where Korean athletics faced poor performance in international competition, the provision of a competition structure has not been at the heart of elite sport development elements because ‘KAF has laid

27 Park Jong-kuen is also the President of International Competition Support Special Committee.
more emphasis on the provision of talent identification, coaching, facilities and sports science as an urgent need to tackle the poor performance than the provision’ (Interview: the former executive director of the KAF, 14 November 2008).

Indeed, on this issue KAF has been largely concerned with the matter of organising domestic competitions for elite level athletes. In the case of the sport of athletics, the National Sports Festival, which is usually held in early- to mid October, is the last competition opportunity for elite level athletes. However, the 1st Grand Prix Athletics Competition held at the end of October 2008, where only the top eight athletes in each event of athletics compete, was indicative of the KAF considering the provision of competition opportunity for elite athletes to be part of its policy concern in recent years. This competition was planned by collecting a range of coaches’ opinions with the aim of providing high level competition with opportunities for top level athletes (Park D, – Newsis, 2008). In a similar vein, KAF’s intention to focus on the matter of competition opportunity is emphasised by a current executive director at the KAF in the Newsis, where he stated that the event would play a significant role in providing a competition opportunity in which top level athletes would be able to compete even at the end of autumn after the National Sports Festival (quoted in the Newsis, 2008).

As of 2008, there were 19 authorized domestic competitions for elite level athletes (KAF, 2008). Compared to ten years ago, the number of competitions held every year remained largely unchanged (see Table 6.5 below). In addition, given the influence of exogenous factors in the process of policy change, in 1999 the number of domestic competitions was influenced by the IMF crisis in which the two competitions scheduled could not be held due to the financial difficulties of the host organisations (cf. Track & Field Magazine, 2000 3/4). In a situation where there has been arguably lack of competition opportunities, the unfavourable condition made the circumstance for the Korean athletics development harder.

Table 6.5 Number of domestic competitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>No. of domestic competitions</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Track & Field Magazine (2000 11/12: 15)
It is worth noting that half the numbers of domestic competitions scheduled every year have been related to marathon and road-races. As a consequence, there has been a criticism of the lack of domestic competitions which has been seen as partly responsible for the lack of improvement in Korean success at the international level (Donga, 2008). In addition, while most competitions have been designed and located at a national level, no competitive opportunities have been designed and located at a regional level. Considering that competition might be the best form of training, Karron Conright’s (Coach of Korean national athletics squad spring from USA) statement is instructive here. He pointed out that there is a lack of competitive opportunities where there is the opportunity to break national records (Yang J, - quoted in Dong-A Ilbo, 2008a). As such, the problem of competition opportunity remained largely undebated throughout the 1990s, but in recent years, there has been a growing concern over the competition structure. A growing issue on competitive structures and opportunities is partly associated with the matter regarding the indoor athletics training facility (stadium) as noted earlier. A point reflected by a senior researcher at KISS, who suggested that, ‘in considering mid- to long term development plans of athletics, the indoor athletics stadium is an urgent requirement became it is difficult to hold competitions and to train between November and March because winter is so long’ (Interview: a senior researcher, 7 November 2008; cf. Lee Y, 2008). The issue has been raised by athletes’ support staff, who argued that the long gap between season and post-season harms athlete development (cf. Track & Field Magazine, 1997 7/8).

It is argued that one weakness in the competition structure is the emphasis placed on competing in the 16 municipalities and provinces at the National Sports Festival and the National Junior Sports Festival. In order words, the fact that the nation’s major competitions such as the National Sports Festival and the National Junior Sports Festival emphasise inter-regional competitive success at the expense of the overall improvement of individual athletes is one of the biggest problems (quoted in Yonhap News, 2007; also MCST, 2008c). This contention is related to the comments raised by athletics experts, who argued that rather than concentrating on the Nation Sports Festival KAF should organise a broad range of competition structures and opportunities for different age groups at the elite level which should contribute to the improvement of performance and also aid talent identification at the same time (Donga Ilbo, 2008). Although KAF recognised the importance of developing a more systematic competition structure as an element of elite sport development, financial priority has been given to the matters such as talent identification, coaching and the cash-
award system. ‘This is in part because such the creation of a more effective competition structure cannot be realised without money, manpower and sponsors’ (Interview: the former executive director, 14 November 2008).

However, the strategy document, ‘Run Korea 2011’, indicated the availability of financial resources to implement policy change towards a more systematic competition structure. Put simply, the successful bid has triggered visible policy changes in the provision of a more supportive competition structure. The policy direction has two elements: (i) the expansion of competitive opportunities for regional specialised events (e.g., Cheonan/Suwon for marathon, Kyungju for walking-race, Kwangju for jumping, Mokpo for javelin throw, Seoul for Hurdle, Daegu for high jump, Ulsan and Busan for pole vault and short-distance races for Kwangju), and the introduction of a competition for psychological training (e.g., hosting an event at night); and, (ii) the introduction of a ranking and grading system in competition structures, the aim of which is to induce ‘athletes’ performance-enhancement’ by introducing a points-system into domestic competitions as in the IAAF’s ranking and grading system (e.g., 1st Grand Prix Athletics Competition held in 2008, MCST, 2008c). In sum, it is reasonable to conclude that recent years have witnessed more visible policy change in competition structure due to the preparation of the 2011 World Athletics Championships in Daegu.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter ends with a brief summary of key implications from the study of the sport of athletics in respect of elite sport policy development. Thus, consideration is given to the significant aspects of policy change identified from the administration of the sport, the influence of business leaders and the four key dimensions of elite sport development within which the KAF, government and quasi-governmental bodies such as the KSC act. The key implications for policy change in the sport of athletics are provided by the following three principal themes: (i) motivation; (ii) method; and (iii) consequence.
In terms of motivation, there are four factors that enable KAF and government sporting agencies such as MCST and KSC to become more interested and involved in athletics. Firstly, the catalyst for policy change and the involvement of the government is largely due to a series of poor performances at international sporting competitions such as the Olympic Games, Asian Games and World Athletics Championships. In spite of the importance and value of the sport, namely, regarded as blue riband sport across the world and considered as a foundation sport in South Korea, Korean athletics has produced the relatively poor performances which have aroused national (public/governmental) concern. Indeed, the recent government strategy documents (Mid-to Long Term Development Plan for Korea Athletics in 2007 and Run Korea 2011 in 2008) could be seen as reflecting the active government involvement in the sport of athletics in response to the poor performance.

Secondly, this concern is also a consequence of the country’s hosting strategy for mega sporting events. Central and local governments believe that the hosting of mega sporting events is not only likely to bring economic development to the host country and community, but will also enhance national prestige. Indeed, along with the poor performance, the successful bid for the 2011 World Athletics Championships has geared unprecedented interest and levels of governmental investment. As a consequence, the country’s hosting strategy has become one of the significant impetuses for governmental and quasi-governmental actors and the executives of KAF for developing the sport.

Thirdly, most of the policy commitments of KAF have been developed since the appointment of the Samsung business leader as the chairman of KAF in 1997. It may be argued that the presidency of NGBs, which the former military governments arm-twisted businesses to undertake, was initially accepted reluctantly due to the financial cost. However, as times have changed, Samsung’s involvement in the sport of athletics can be understood in terms of business Public Relations (PR) and marketing objectives, as well as social contributions. As noted in the earlier interview with the secretary-general at KAF, there appear to be values, notions and beliefs regarding the presidency of KAF, which are considered to bring intangible benefits to the business.

Lastly, in recent years, remarkable developments in athletics in regional rival countries such as China and Japan have played a significant role in stimulating Korean athletics. Especially, policy actors within the elite sport policy subsystem and/or policy community, such as senior
officials at MCST and the executives of KAF, seem to be influenced by the regional rivalry that helps them justify future investment and future policy direction (cf. Haas, 1990; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992ab; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). As such, policy change in the sport of athletics has been motivated by the four key exogenous factors which affect the perceptions and behaviour of actors.

In terms of methods adopted to bring about policy change in athletics, the investigation draws attention to the increasing value of policy-oriented learning which is partially regarded as a significant source of policy change. Indeed, recently the successful practices from other countries such as Jamaica/Kenya and the rival countries such as China/Japan have been introduced to the Korean athletics context. A long time ago, good practice from Germany, Australia and USSR were considered as useful examples for policy change. In addition, the successful cases of swimming and ice-skating within the Korea elite sport context were deemed as exemplary models for the sport of athletics in terms of medal-winning strategy. Given the importance of the policy-oriented learning, the launch of talent identification and the use of foreign coaches are significant features of the ways through which the KAF adopted good experience and knowledge from abroad (cf. Houlihan & Green, 2008: 289). Moreover, reflecting the worldwide trend towards a scientific approach to elite sport, KAF’s and the government’s growing concern for sport science reinforces the evidence for policy learning/transfer. With regard to policy-oriented learning from overseas, representative examples are at least evident in China’s 119 Project focusing on the importance of foundation sports, and the emphasis of elite sport policy illustrated by Japan’s Golden Plan. They are cited as an example of how much the regional rival countries have been involved (highlighted) in the foundation sport and elite sport in the government strategy documents, entitled Mid- to Long Term Development Plan for Korea Athletics in 2007 and Run Korea 2011 in 2008.

Moreover, extending the influence of business leaders on the development of athletics in general, and the sport’s success in international competitions in particular, it is imperative here to note a salient element of elite sport development in the case of athletics. Actually, it could be argued that Green & Houlihan’s (2005) analytical framework was very useful in investigating elite sport development in the case of athletics. However, it did not identify all distinctive aspect of the Korean elite sport system. In other words, while the framework didn’t capture all elements of Korean elite sport system leading to international sporting
success, a further prominent area of elite sport development has emerged and identified in the case of athletics: that is a ‘cash-award system’ and ‘financial incentives’ to encourage high performance.

Indeed, over the last two decades we have seen that a cash-award system for medal winners in the sport of baseball has been regarded as one of the significant sources leading to international sporting success. Although a cash-award system and cash-incentive, including a lifetime Olympic pension for medal-winners at the Olympic Games and international competitions have not been widely adopted or considered as an important factor leading to international sporting success in many countries (cf. De Bosscher et al., 2006; Green & Houlihan, 2005; Green & Oakley, 2001a, 2001b; Houlihan & Green, 2008; UK Sport, 2007), some countries, such as China, Germany, Japan and Russia, have set up such systems to motivate athletes to produce high performance and to bring international sporting glory. At an early stage of elite sport development policy, the former military government (the era of Park Jung-Hee’s regime) introduced ‘the Lifelong Pension System for medal winners at international sports events, including the Olympic Games, the World Athletic Championships, the Asian Games and the Asian Athletic Championship’ (quoted in Ok, 2004: 50; for more information see Chapter 4.). In this section, it is not necessary to discuss the Lifelong Pension System that is operated by the central government (MCST) and quasi-governmental body (KSC), as already illustrated in the Chapter 4. The section’s central concern is to identify the importance of the cash-award system and financial incentives operated by KAF and the central government.

A cash-award system for medal winners, which has been in place since the 1980s, seems to have become a major inducement to reach world standards in athletics in South Korea. A representative case of the system is the marathon in which the Kolon corp.’s president, Lee Dong-Chan, offered one hundred million won in prize money to athletes who succeed in breaking the ten-minute barrier (2°10’) in the marathon, and KAF promised fifty million won reward for gold medal winners in the Olympic Games in the early 1980s. Finally, Hwang Young-Jo was the beneficiary of the system by establishing a new Korean record in the marathon (2°08’47”) at the 41st Beppu-Oita Marathon Competition in 1991. In the following year, as mentioned earlier, he was the beneficiary of fifty million won reward for his gold medal winner by winning the marathon gold medal at the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games. KAF continued to offer a fifty million won reward to gold medal winners until early 1997.
The consolidation of the cash-award system was cemented in 1997 with the announcement of the 2000 Master Plan for Athletics Powerhouse – a concrete strategy for athletics development that reiterated the commitment to new payment regulations which resulted in a remarkable increase and expansion of cash-awards, along with the emergence of the Samsung business leader as head of the KAF in 1997 (see Table 6.6 below).

Table 6.6 Regulations of cash-award for medal winner over time

(Unit: one million won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Athlete</th>
<th>Coach</th>
<th>Athlete</th>
<th>Coach</th>
<th>Athlete</th>
<th>Coach</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Games</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>(100m/marathon)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>90</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(100m/marathon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bronze</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>7-8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian Games</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Championships</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(100m/marathon)</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>(100m/marathon)</td>
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<td>Silver</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>Bronze</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>7-8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Gold</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bronze</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Track & Field Magazine (1997 7/8: 44); The 2000 Master Plan for Athletics Powerhouse (KAF, 1997); Policy Document, ‘Run Korea 2011’ (MCST, 2008c: 15)

An important aspect of the cash-award system for medal winners is the increase and extension of cash-award. Seen from Table 6.6, the value of the cash-awards has been elevated by up to eight positions in the Olympic Games and World Championships. Particularly, worthy of note is three hundred million won award for the 100 metres and marathon events. This observation not only reflects the superior importance and value of 100 metres and marathon compared to other events in Korean athletics, but also demonstrates KAF’s
profound concern over the poor performance in the 100 metres where the Korean record has been frozen since 1979, and the declining performance in marathon running.

Moreover, ‘unbroken national records in some events over the last 10 years were one of the catalysts for the introduction of a new incentive system (prize money system for record-breaker) in 2001’ (Interview: the former executive director, 14 November 2008). More especially, the system is designed to motivate athletes to challenge stagnated Korean records by committing to provide financial incentives for those who succeed in breaking unbroken national records and equalling the records in 45 events - 23 events for males and 22 for females (Track & Field Magazine, 2001 5/6). The background for the introduction of this prize money programme was borne out by a former executive director at the KAF in an interview with Track & Field Magazine, who stated that:

In 2001, there are 16 events [records] unbroken over the last 10 years. This can be seen as the carrot system. In fact, most athletes can afford to barely have any idea to break such records due to too high targets. However, target records which the new executives set out are not outrageous demands at all. We think that if athletes proceed with phased records step by step, they could naturally reach to break the long-standing Korean records. Accordingly, the new executives decided to use all possible methods to improve Korean records. (Track & Field Magazine, 2001 3/4:48)

The incentive programme for breaking Korean records, initially introduced by the national governing bodies of sport in 2001 in attempts to improve the poor performance, has been upgraded along with the successful bid for the 2011 World Athletics Championships (see Table 6.7 below).

**Table 6.7 Regulations of prize money for record-breaker**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Application subjects</th>
<th>Athletes</th>
<th>coaches</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prize money for breaking records (record-breaker)</td>
<td>Male - 100m &amp; marathon</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World record</td>
<td>Other events</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian record</td>
<td>All events</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean record</td>
<td>Male 100m</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male marathon</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female marathon</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Events unbroken over the last 20 years in track &amp; field</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Temporary application by 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Events unbroken over the last 10 years in track &amp; field</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As such, a pump-priming policy in connection with the prize money system for record-breaker announced through the strategy document, ‘Run Korea 2011’ is eye-catching. That is, the central government (MCST) declared that if an athlete breaks the ten-second barrier for the 100 metres and the five-minute barrier (2°05’) in marathon, then the government and KAF will grant five hundred million won to the new record holder. In addition, although there is a recognition that it is highly unlikely that a Korean athletes will break a world record in the sport of athletics, the government’s financial stimulus measure has been already decided that a billion won will be provided for an athlete who breaks a world record in any event of athletics (see Table 6.8). The recent prize money system for record-breakers is designed to deal with an urgent need in identifying star players in order to save the hosting country’s face at the 2011 World Athletics Championships (Kim S, - Kyungyhang Shinmun, 2008).

Table 6.8 Current status of Korean records which have not been renewed over the long period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Record holder</th>
<th>Establishment year</th>
<th>Korea record</th>
<th>World record</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male 100 metres</td>
<td>Suh Mal-Gu</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>10.34</td>
<td>9.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 200 metres</td>
<td>Chang Ja- Keun</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>20.41</td>
<td>19.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 10,000 metres</td>
<td>Kim Jong-Yun</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>28:30.54</td>
<td>26:17.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Male 4×100m Relay  |  Chang Jae-Keun; Shim Duk-Sup; Sung Nak-Kun; Kim Bok-Sup  |  1988  |  39.43  |  37.10  
Female 200 metres  |  Park Mi-Sun  |  1986  |  23.80  |  21.34  
Female 800 metres  |  Choi Se-Bum  |  1987  |  2:05:11  |  1:53.28  
Female 4×100m Relay  |  Lee Young-Sook; Woo Yang-Ja; Park Mi-Sun; Yoon Mi-Kyong  |  1986  |  45.59  |  41.37  


For the KAF, if the cash-award system for medal-winners is broadly related to medal-winning success at international competitions, the prize money for record-breaker is associated with the concerns about the Korean records unbroken over a long period on time and the urgent need to foster star athletes, who will eventually help to keep up the hosting country’s prestige at the 2011 World Athletics Championships in particular.

In respect of the consequences, a significant aspect of Korean athletics development leads to the insight from the notion of policy community as a type of policy network. Following Marsh & Rhodes’ (1992a) and Rhodes’ (1997) typology of policy networks, it may be argued that the Korean athletics policy network is a type of policy community in that Korean elite athletics policy community involving a small number of groups or actors (especially, government, executive members of the KAF, Samsung business leaders, KSC, NEST and the Daegu Metropolitan city authorities), which share common perceptions and the ultimate goal of developing the sport at the elite level. The recent and most obvious example of policy community is the formation of the Athletics Development Preparation Committee (triggered by the successful bid for the 2012 event) involving a limited number of key actors such as senior government officials, Samsung business leaders, head of Daegue Metropolitan city and senior sport administers, which shares common perceptions, beliefs and notions regarding the importance of medal-winning success in the international arena in general, and at the upcoming 2011 World Champions in Athletics in particular. Given the context of Korean elite athletics development that most policy decisions for the sport have been dominated by the government actors, business leaders (Samsung) and the executive of KAF, it is useful to recall Rhodes’s (1996) argument that a policy community is regarded as a network identified by stable relations, restricted memberships, vertical interdependence and exclusion from other institutions and networks. This observation can be related to the perspectives of elitism.
and neo-pluralism that are at the heart of explaining the political dominance of a few elitists such as state officials, businessmen and politicians (cf. Marsh & Rhodes, 1992ab).

Extending Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith’s (1999)/Sabatier & Weible’s (2007)’s concept of the advocacy coalition, there has been little sign of an emerging advocacy coalition surrounding the sport. Interestingly, the formation of the Korean Athletics Development Measures Committee (KADMC) in 2008 led by a group of academics and some athletes’ support staff concerning the exclusive dominance of the Samsung business leaders and executive members of KAF might be an emerging advocacy coalition, but KADMC is more like an interest group pursuing their interests for Korean elite athletics development as they have not been competing for a change of direction of Korean athletics policy (e.g., from the current elite-oriented athletics development policy to mass participation-centred athletics development policy). However, it may be argued that KADMC may become an influential lobbying group in the policy-making process of athletics. Another instance of interest groups was the coalition which emerged occasionally consisting of a small number of athletes’ support staff (especially domestic athletics coaches) who was concerned about KAF’s policy decision to introduce foreign coaches. Taken together, the notion of an advocacy coalition framework provides only a partial insight into the elite sport policy process in Korean athletics in that it offers a sectional explanation of policy change.

CHAPTER 7
The case of Archery

7.1 Introduction

This chapter has a similar structure to the case of athletics in Chapter 6 and is thus organised by the same principle themes and same three key areas of elite sport development. The first part of the chapter is concerned with the organisational structure and administration of the national governing body of archery followed by an analysis of the nature of the body’s relationships with other organisations and an assessment of the influence and significance of business leaders. The second part of the chapter focuses on the investigation of elite sport
development in terms of change in the three key elements of elite sport policy. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of key implications arising from this case for the broader analysis of elite sport development.

7.2 Organisational structure, administration and the influence of business leaders

It would not be an overstatement to say that South Korea has dominated the Olympic podium, as well as other international sporting competitions in archery. Mirroring such sentiment, the IOC referred to Korea as ‘the modern masters of archery’ on its homepage after the women’s team event at the Beijing Olympic Games where ‘the Korean women’s team set a world and Olympic record on the way to winning the Gold medal in the team event thus continuing their domination of women’s archery and making history by winning their sixth consecutive Olympic Gold medal on the Olympic Green Archery field’ (The IOC’s homepage - http://www.olympic.org/uk/news/Olympic_news/full_story_uk.asp?id=2716, assessed on 25th May 2009). Such achievements have often been associated with the history of 5000 years of the Korean race who used a bow and arrow as a tool for hunting and warfare. But, the modern archery development has stemmed from a relatively short history of forty years. Traditional archery in Korea (named as ‘Kuk-Kung’/national archery) was modernised as a sport in the early 1960s. The traditional archery in South Korea faced a turning point in the early 1960s when ‘international archery’ (as practised in the Olympic Games) was introduced by Suck Bong-keun, who was a middle school PE teacher and is regard as the pioneer of international archery development (KAA, 1992). Accordingly, international archery has been developed since then. In 1963, Korean National Archery Association (KNAA), which took responsibility for the organisation of the sport of international archery, joined the Federation Internationale De Tir A L’Arc (FITA / International Archery Federation).

The separation of national (traditional) archery and international archery in March 1983 was seen as a major step forward in developing the international archer (Olympic archery) in South Korea. Since the creation of the Korean Archery Association (KAA) responsible for the nation’s international archery in 1983 the two types of archery have begun to go their respective ways. ‘1983 was thus viewed as an epoch-making point of history in Korean
Olympic archery development’ (Interview: a secretary-general at the KAA, 17 November 2008). Until the independence of international archery from the traditional archery (Kuk-Kung), there were conflicts and struggles for power between the people involved in the traditional archery (Kuk-Kung) and the people involved in international archery (hereafter, archery). The general idea of actors involved in the sport of archery appeared to be that the separation of international archery and traditional archery was inevitable in order to effectively operate and govern the sport of archery given the increasing possibility of winning medals for archery at the L.A. Olympic Games (KAA, 1992). This conflict arose due to KNAA’s struggle to retain its exclusive power and authority over both sorts of archery. Ultimately, in 1983 the tension between the two groups within KNAA was resolved by arbitration from the KSC (a quasi-governmental body) which decided that traditional archery, Kuk-Kung, would be encouraged as an ethnic sport, and the sport of archery would be fostered on the basis of elite level completely (KAA, 1992). Thus, ‘the founding of the KAA in 1983 was viewed as the actual starting point of Korean archery development, although the introduction of the sport was from the early 1960s’ (Interview: the secretary-general at the KAA, 17 November 2008). *The Thirty Years of Korean Archery* (1992) revealed the process of the independence of archery from the KNAA that:

Indeed, the issue of the separation of the traditional archery and archery was raised at the Berlin Outdoor World Championships in 1979, when the Korean national squad won the Championship titles in the team event and individual event for females. However, the discussion blew over due to the opposition of the people involved in traditional archery. Thereafter, the actors involved in the sport of archery made a request to the KSC that the sport should be separated off from the KNAA based on the argument that the rules and equipment used in the two sports were different, and that the KNAA had difficulty in running the two sports simultaneously due to the divided loyalty of key officers. Eventually, in February 1983, the KSC granted the petition for the separation of the two sports, based upon the decision agreed in the general meeting of representatives (KAA, 1992: 203).

Most notable was the role of the KSC’s president, Chung Ju-yung28 in the process of separating archery from the traditional archery. As Chung Kap-pyo, a vice-president at the Archery Association of Seoul Metropolitan, reported in the publication, *Thirty Years of Korean Archery*, the separation of the national archery and archery was deeply rooted in the

28 He is an initial founder & former president of Hyundai Group and also is the father of Chung Mong-gu, who is a former chairman of the KAA.
active cooperation of the KSC’s president, Chung, Ju-yung, who was in support of the separation and argued against those who did not want to split the organisation (KAA, 1992). His belief was that the separation of the organisations was desirable to develop the whole of Korean archery. Following Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1999) and Sabatier & Weible’s (2007) the concept of ‘policy broker’ in the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), the role of the KSC’s president at that time would be compatible with the concept.

In 2009, the KAA has the 16 affiliated municipal- and provincial federations of archery and the three affiliated central federations for middle-high school-, university- and business teams, same as in the sport of athletics. The purpose of the KAA is to contribute to the cultural development by enhancing national glory through nurturing excellent performers and coaches and by delivering the sport of archery to the people in order to improve their physical strengths (The website of KAA - http://www.archery.or.kr/society/introduction/purpose.asp, see Figure 7.1 below).

Figure 7.1 Organisational structure of the KAA
The KAA’s responsibility and business are as follows: (i) the deliberation and decision regarding the policy direction for archery; (ii) the consultation and proposition regarding the sport of archery; (iii) the participation and hosting of international events for archery; (iv) the administration and supervision of the affiliated municipal- and provincial federations; (v) management and oversight of all types of competitions; (vi) the research and guidance in techniques and coaching skills for the sport of archery; (vii) the nurturing of elite archers, coaches and referees; (viii) the research, foundation, and administration of archery facilities and equipments; (ix) the collecting of materials (data) relating to the sport of archery; and (x) the publicity and enlightenment of the sport of archery (The KAA’s homepage - http://www.archery.or.kr/society/introduction/purpose.asp). Figure 7.1 shows the current organisational structure of the KAA. Compared with the organisational structure in the early
days of the KAA (from the late 1980s into the early 1990s), the current organisational formation remained largely unchanged (for more information see p.317 – KAA, 1992).

It is worth noting that the KAA is the only organisation responsible for the wide range of disciplines and remits in the sport of archery at the elite level. As seen in Figure 7.1, the current organisational structure is relatively complex in comparison to the organisational structure of KAF for the sport of athletics. Part of the complexity is due to the range of disciplines for which the KAA has subdivided its organisational functions into several committees in order to ensure a systematic approach to dealing with diverse affairs for the development of Olympic archery. While there has not been a considerable change in the KAA over time, a noticeable feature of the organisational structure is the presence of a Research Director and a Research Committee which was newly formed in the late 1980s to facilitate the sharing of opinion, knowledge and expertise between the KAA and external experts in the sport of archery aimed at, especially, promoting and developing sports science (KAA, 1992).

Due to their monopoly position in the sport of archery, the KAA had not had to compete with any other organisation and has retained its exclusive responsibility for elite archery. As noted earlier, the traditional archery had been under the umbrella of the KNAA as part of the scheme of the KSC that aimed at promoting the sport as an element of folk culture. The KAA had seldom struggled to balance resource distribution between the elite level and the grass roots level, as there was the Federation of Korea Kungdo (the traditional archery) which worked at the SFA level. Korea Kungdo is an autonomous body under the umbrella of the Korea Council of SFA. ‘The lack of involvement by the KAA at the grass-roots level led to growing concern regarding the spread of archery at the grass-roots sport in a situation where the sport of archery is often difficult to access due to the facility and safety requirements’ (Interview: an executive director at the KAA, 19 November 2008). Although the ultimate goal of the KAA’s affairs has consistently been medal-winning success over the years, the KAA has, to some degree, turned its attention to the sport’s development on SFA basis particularly since the late 1990s. This changing aspect of the KAA’s policy was borne out by the executive director, who stated that:

Considering the long-term development of the sport of archery, the sole nurturing programme of elite archers is not enough … so we are planning to develop experience programmes/events for the
sport of archery at the community level in which the public can easily access the sport, and which then could be the pathway of talent identification. I think this scheme could promote the dual development of elite archers and grass-roots archers (Interview: 19 November 2008).

It could be argued that as the KAA’s responsibility for the Olympic archery has started extend to include archery development at the grass-root level, this might be seen as potential source of friction between the Olympic archery and traditional archery but there is no evidence that Olympic archery has threatened recruitment to traditional archery in recent years. At this point, it is pertinent to point out that the emergence of the Hyundai business leader as head of the KAA has provided the same major impetus for the development of elite archery as witnessed in the sport of athletics following the involvement of Samsung. As a secretary general at the KAA looked back on the situation in those days, he commented that ‘we thought that nobody would invest in the sport of archery because it is an unpopular sport so we were lucky that the Hyundai Group took charge of Korean archery…since then Korean archery has started to spark for medal-winning success’ (Interview: 17 November 2008). The Thirty Years of Korea Archery also picks up on the context of taking the responsibility for the KAA, stating that:

In March 1983, 17 representatives in the general meeting agreed unanimously to support the KSC’s president, Chung Ju-yung29, as the first chairman of the KAA who was entitled to full powers such as the appointment of the executives, compilation of the budget and a plan of operation (business plans). However, he recommended Chung, Mong-joon as the first head of the organisation, who was the President of Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Thus, the KAA could be launched with emergence of the Hyundai Group (KAA, 1992: 315).

Indeed, the current honorary chairman of the KAA, Chung Mong-goo (the KAA’s chairman/1985-1997), who was the President of Hyundai Automotive Group signalled a notable change in Korean archery development by contributing a considerable amount of money to the KAA. Since then, the KAA has been under the presidency of business leaders of Hyundai Group. At present, the KAA is under the presidency of his son (since 2005), Chung Eui-sun, who is currently the President of Hyundai • Kia Motor, following the presidency of two businesses leaders of affiliates companies with Hyundai Group since 1997. Therefore, it is generally recognised that Chung Mong-goo’s contribution as well as that of

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29 He is a former chairman of the KSC and also previous president of Hyundai Group.
the Hyundai group were crucial in making archery one of Korea’s most successful sports at major international sporting competitions (Kwon B, - Kyungyhang Shinmun, 2000). In other words, it is generally taken for granted that Korea’s archery success can be intimately linked with his support both materially and morally (Lee J, - Munhwa Ilbo, 2004). As reflected in media coverage, he is widely labelled the eternal father (godfather) of Korean archery (Kwon B, - Kyungyhang Shinmun, 2000). And, as seen in Table 7.1, the KAA receives the bulk of its core funding from the Hyundai Group rather than the National Treasury. The business money (initially 250 million won) contributed by the Hyundai Group since 1983 has increased to around a billion won in recent years. Although the KAA’s funds have been subsidised from the national treasury, much of the KAA’s income has come from the Hyundai Group. This income has allowed the KAA to implement policy change in a variety of projects such as sport science, cash-award system and nurturing talent/developing current archers. Therefore, the substantial funds from the Hyundai Group can arguably be seen as the single most important factor for Korean archery development at the elite sport level in a context where government funding for the NGBs has been considered to be absolutely insufficient. On this issue, the secretary general of the KAA stated that ‘the commitment of the business leader of Hyundai to the sport was well reflected during the period of economic crisis (IMF intervention in the late 1990s), where the contribution of Hyundai’s business leader had not decreased quite as much as observed in the sport of athletics’ (Interview: 17 November 2008).

Table 7.1 Funding of the KAA, 1983-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / Amount of money</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribution (from Hyundai Group)</td>
<td>250,000,000</td>
<td>538,924,940</td>
<td>1,513,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National treasury (state-aid)</td>
<td>51,781,827</td>
<td>148,636,720</td>
<td>279,607,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other incomes</td>
<td>5,890,317</td>
<td>9,503,951</td>
<td>80,332,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>307,672,144</td>
<td>697,065,611</td>
<td>2,360,470,000</td>
<td>* Funding for improving athletic performance ** Funding for administrative financial assistance of the national governing bodies of sport</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to the Hyundai Group’s financial contribution, it is worth noting that the changing attitude towards the presidency of the KAA was similar to that observed in the sport of athletics. As noted in the sport of athletics, business leaders took charge of NGBs (especially unpopular sports) due largely to government pressure (arm-twisting) in the 1980s but, over time they came to see their investment as a marketing opportunity and also an opportunity to express their sense of social responsibility (Park J & Boo H - Donga Ilbo 2008). As the executive director at the KAA related, ‘Hyundai business’s involvement in the sport of archery can be viewed as the return of part of the business profits to the country and community which would be ideal for the KAA and Hyundai Group’ (Interview: 19 November 2008). Indeed, Korea archery’s success and impressive performance at international sporting events has resulted in a good image for the CEO that has arguably affected the marketing strategy of Hyundai Group, referred to as ‘President Identity’ (PI) through sport (Boo H, - Doanga Ilbo, 2009). In a broad sense, the relationship between Hyundai and the KAA can be conceptualised in terms of ‘win-win’ strategy.

In the late 1990s the KAA made an important organisational change through the founding of a task force with the objective of winning all events in the sport of archery at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games. The strategy was launched by hiring a wide range of experts such as sport scientists, medical experts, physiotherapist, coaches, equipment mechanics and publicists (Archery Monthly, 1999 1/2:5). This observation can be understood in terms of the attempt to format a collaborative coalition in which the KAA sought medal-winning success by bringing external experts into its elite sport policy development boundary. This action can be related to Marsh & Rhodes’ (1992a) notion of a policy community, as government, the KSC and KAA seek to form an elite sport policy community following the independence of the KAA from the KNAA. It could be argued that the formation of an elite sport policy community committed to ‘podium success’ at major international sporting events has benefited from the support of the Hyundai business elites as well as government.

Moreover, the inauguration of the 9th chairman, Chung Eui-sun (head of the KAA), signalled the hosting ambition for the 45th Outdoor World Championships which was consistent with the country’s hosting strategy for mega-sporting event, and which complemented the
aspiration for medal-winning success in the sport of archery. It was argued that the successful bid for the 2009 World Championships in Archery decided in August 2006 would be the second leap forward for the development of archery. The background of the event was explained in the chairman’s speech in *Archery Monthly* where he reported that:

It is true that Korean archery is facing the challenge of the people’s indifference towards unpopular sports (e.g. archery and athletics), which is an unfavourable condition for the development of the sport of archery. Consequently, I think that the hosting of the 45th World Championships is needed for the expansion of archery’s base, raising interest in the sport and the diplomatic capability within the international archery circle. Thus, we are making every effort to host the event in cooperation with archery athletes’ support staffs and Ulsan city … Moreover, this policy is being intensified through multilateral channels by a partnership of overseas branches of Hyundai·Kia Moto (Archery Monthly, 2006/8: 3).

The declaration of the Korea’s participation in the race in 2005 had a significant meaning in that the introduction of the sport of archery marks the 40th anniversary in which Korean archers have dominated the world’s top position in archery over its short history. Interestingly, the 45th World Championships in Archery was the second event being held in Korea after the 33rd World Championships which were held under the presidency of current head’s father, Chung Mong-Gu. As such, the exogenous factors such as the change of the presidency of the organisation provided a driving force for such policy change in hosting the sporting event through which the KAA sought to achieve the development of archery. Taken together, the exogenous factors and ultimate objective of medal-winning success reinforced in beliefs, values and principles of the actors involved directly and indirectly in the sport of archery around pursuit of ‘sports excellence’ by maintaining Korea’s world leadership in the sport. The common beliefs, values and principles of actors within policy subsystem underpinning the sport has resulted in the recent Korean archers’ constant success, which has been used by Hyundai as a basis for drawing lesson for its own business (e.g., ‘Korean women archery’s success and business management strategy’ published by Hyundai Research Institute, 2004).

### 7.3 Identification of the key dimensions of elite sport policy development
7.3.1 Identification of, and support for, young talented athletes

Overall, the Korean archery’s approach to talent identification depends heavily on school-based sport teams to support and develop potential elite archers. As discussed in Chapter 4, most elite athletes have been identified and nurtured within school-based sport clubs which are an indispensable part for the development of elite sport in South Korea. ‘The KAA has not directly run a structured talent identification programme, but has been mainly involved in supporting talented young archers with a financial aid and archery equipment, who are selected by the 16 affiliated municipal- and provincial federations of archery and/or schools’ (Interview: the secretary-general at the KAA, 17 November 2008). More specifically, in 2000 the KAA provided all primary- and middle school student-archers with per capita 17 arrows, total 18,105 arrows (Archery Monthly, 2000/12). Currently, the scheme of the KAA is still ongoing important issue. Given this fact, unlike the KAF’s approach to talent identification for the sport of athletics in which every year 80 young talents have been identified and nurtured under the independent programme of the KAF since 1997, ‘talent identification and nurturing for the sport of archery have been rooted in coach’s efforts for pupils to take up sport in schools’ (Interview: the executive director at the KAA, 19 November 2008).

The development of talent identification for the sport remained ‘unsystematic largely relying on school sport clubs and coaches’ as in the Japanese approach to talent identification system (Yamamoto, 2008: 73). As such, the reason why the KAA has not been deeply concerned with a structured approach to talent identification project might be associated with the government involvement and Korean archers’ unparalleled success in major international sporting competitions. Government involvement in the sport of archery dates back to the 1980s when the former military government promoted the sport of archery as part of policy measures to identify and nurture talented young athletes in a wide range of unpopular sports in preparation for the international sporting events by instructing schools’ principals to create school sport teams across the nation (Archery Monthly, 1987/6). The current Korean archers’ unparalleled success clearly began from the Kim Jin-ho’s initial victories at the 1978 Bangkok Asian Games and the 30th Outdoor World Championships in 1979 in Berlin, which provided the momentum for the growth in the number of elite level archers (KAA, 1992).
addition, as a journalist of the Joong-Ang Ilbo, Moon Il-Hyun, commented in an editorial of *Archery Monthly*, ‘Seo Hyang-Soon’s unpredicted gold medal in the female event at the 1984 LA Olympic Games had an effect on the recruitment of potential talented students into the sport of archery on the basis of elite level’ (Archery Monthly, 1988/10:7).

Table 7.2 Number of registered archers and clubs in the sport of archery, 1988-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of elite archers (from primary school student-athletes)</td>
<td>1497</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>1589</td>
<td>Archers and clubs registered at the KAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of archery clubs (from primary school club to business club)</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>311</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Archery Monthly (1988/5; 1997/4; 2002/3; 2008/3)

Table 7.2 shows the relatively stable rate of the number of archers and clubs at the elite level over the years, in contrast to the sport of athletics which experienced a sharp decline in the number of athletes and clubs over the same period. In fact, in spite of barriers, such as the falling birth rate and the failure of presenting a vision after sport as observed in athletics, elite recruitment and success in archery has stood up relatively well to these challenges. One of the main reasons is explained by the secretary general at the KAA, who stated that:

Fortunately, contrary to the decline in the number of athletes in unpopular sports, the number of archers has not dwindled. Perhaps, the KAA has a quite strong attraction for young pupils to take up archery because there is a perception that the Korean national squad is highly regarded as the most powerful at major international events. Nevertheless, we are concerned about the expansion of the archery base, as it is not rare that there is just one child in Korean homes today (Interview: 17 November 2008).

In this regard, since the early 2000s, there has been a growing concern with the revitalisation and expansion of the archery base through a wide range of experience programme/events at the grass roots level as mentioned earlier. That the KAA’s concern to make the sport more popular is revealed in minutes of the fifth board meeting of the KAA in 2000, which highlighted the necessity of a study for the revitalisation and development of archery through events which make use of medallists to get closer to the public (Archery Monthly, 2000/1). Representative examples of these are ‘A Field Experience Event for Shooting an Arrow’ in
August 2000 organised by ‘Myung Goong Howe’, which is a meeting (network) of Korean female archery medallists, and ‘An Archery Experience Day of Bukgajwa Primary School’ in July 2005. Such initiatives reflect the sport’s drive to reconcile elite level archery development and grass roots level development with the consequences of social change. This aspect reflects that the KAA’s attention is being gradually extended to the grass roots level from its primary interest and remits centring on medal-winning strategy at major international competitions by only supporting and promoting elite archers (Archery Monthly 2000/1). Centring around the KAA, key actors and groups forming an elite sport policy community of archery share a similar belief and perception that the sport’s development at the elite level is needed in concert with the expansion of archery base and the public’s interest in order to further develop the sport seeking for medal-winning performance.

In considering policy change in archery in relation to talent identification, the decision regarding the formation and operation of the ‘Korean Junior Squad’ scheme in 1998 can be viewed as the KAA’s first significant action in relation to talent identification. Although different from the system adopted in athletics the Korean Junior Squad represented a significant shift in identifying and fostering talented young archers. The aim of the system was to create a clear performance pathway for the superior young archers who will eventually become the next generation of national team member (Archery Monthly, 2001/12). Indeed, in 1998 a total of eight archers (four males and four females) from among middle-high school student-archers were initially selected on the basis of a physical fitness test, athletic ability and a personality test, as well as their previous performance records (Archery Monthly, 1999/1·2:10). This measure reinforced the elite-oriented strategy and paved the way for a relatively more structured approach to talent identification and support by shaping the ideal three steps of identifying and nurturing talented archers: National Junior Squad – Reserve Squad – National Squad of Archer.

In terms of the identification and support for talented archers, a significant aspect of Korean archery development concerns the KAA’s systematic and flexible approach to national archer selection for major international competitions. In relation to the national archer selection system, it is said that behind the Korean archers’ unprecedented successes, namely, to be a member of the national archery squad is harder than to win a medal at the Olympic Games (Choi J, - Kookmin Ilbo, 2000). As a former national coach of the archery squad and current executive director of the KAA, Suh Goh-Won, mentioned in his book ‘Winning Secret’
(2008), the national archer selection system is arduous and is based on an underlying ability and a principle-oriented system. The arduous nature of the selection system is illustrated by two examples. The first concerns Lee Eun-Kyung who, in 2000, despite being ranked the first in the world, was not selected as part of the national archery team for the 2000 Olympic Games. The other illustration is that there has been no occasion in which a Korean archer has won consecutive Olympic championships, even though Korean female archers have achieved six consecutive Olympic titles since 1984 Games in Los Angeles. It would not be an overstatement to say that the development of the sport at the elite level has not been depended on a few star players, but has been consolidated by the steady flow of newly emerged archers. According to the secretary general of the KAA, ‘the gap in performance between the 1st ranked performer and the 100th ranker in Korean archery is small’ (Interview: 17 November 2008). Seen from this point of view, it is necessary to look at the selection system in depth.

There are two exogenous factors that help us to understand the motive force behind policy change in the selection system of the national archers. The first catalyst for policy change originated from the examples of USA and USSR failure. In the 1960s and 1970s the United States and the Soviet Union were the most powerful countries in the sport of archery for male and female events respectively. However, they fell back to being second/third-rate countries behind South Korea. According to Suh Goh-Won in his book, ‘Winning Secret’ (2008):

The cause of the failure of the United States and the Soviet Union was based on their selection systems which relied on a few superior archers when selecting their national archers. Namely, if an archer obtains excellent performance winning medal at major international sporting events, they considered his or her previous career and reputation as the most important factor in deciding selection for the national team. Here, we acquired a valuable lesson from the two countries failures. So the KAA has considered a useful way of selecting national archers based on an underlying principle in a fair and systematic manner (2008: 217).

Although the above observation has not been addressed to the similar manner as that witnessed in the sport of athletics, the lesson acquired from the failure of the two countries is compatible with the concept of policy learning for policy change. Even if the KAA did not adopt good practices and knowledge from abroad, the understanding of the failure of the two countries provided a significant impetus in deliberating future policy direction with regard to the selection system.
Second, the KAA paid serious attention to the selection system in order to deal with the continuous rule changes made by FITA. According to the secretary general at the KAA, ‘the aim of the rule changes was arguably not only to tackle Korean archers’ persistent winning, but also to arouse the interest in the sport among spectators and the media’ (Interview: 17 November 2008). In this sense, the KAA has been very successful in changing and adopting the system’s methods to select the best archers who were best suited to cope with FITA’s changes to the rules of the sport. Indeed, the best six archers (male and female) who were selected through seven rounds over ten months took part in the 2008 Beijing Olympics whereas in the 1990s the national archers were selected after only three to five rounds. More specifically, the KAA designed the current selection system for a particular purpose at each round: the first round is designed to put emphasis on physical fitness, including the fundamental performance of shooting an arrow; the second round is designed to test mental power; the third round is designed to assess courage; the fourth round is for concentration; the fifth round for determination for winning; the sixth round is for the ability to adapt to a variety of circumstances; and the last round is designed to provide archers with psychological pressure (Suh G, 2008: 218).

As such, the thorough selection method is highly regarded as one of the key elements for the Korean archery’s success. In this regard, Kyunghyang Shinmun, one of the major newspapers, commented that the national archer selection system was liken ‘the law of the jungle’ based only on unerring precision (Kim K - 11 April 2008), as the sport is clearly one that is not affected by external factors such as political influence, the umpire’s biased decision and factional strife on the selection system, as well as Korean particularities such as Hakyun (a network based on same school connections), Jiyun (a network based on same hometown connections) and Hyeulyun (a network based on blood ties/kinship) as mentioned in Chapter 2. In this sense, it could be argued that the KAA can be seen as a good example of transparency, by comparison to other national governing bodies such as Judo, Taekwondo and table tennis, in the process of selecting national athletes (Kookmin Ilbo, 2000; Suh G, 2008). It is an open secret that there is considerable factional strife between rival groups in relation to the selection process for national athletes in other sports. According to SBS TV’s report (2009) on ‘Absurd Chains of Sports Circle’, selection in some sports has favoured athletes from certain university and has not been based on performance (ability) (e.g. Judo,
Taekwondo, Table Tennis and so on). Thus, the policy deliberation underlying the selection system helps the KAA administer and govern its organisation and sport in a transparent manner and enhances the fairness of the organisational system.

7.3.2 Improvements in coaching, sports science and facilities

7.3.2.1 Coaching

Archery has not witnessed considerable change in coaching development. While the KAA’s coaching scheme has been somewhat concerned with annual coaching workshop, it seems not to give much consideration to its coaching scheme. Indeed, on the issue of elite level coaching development, a gold medallist at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games stated that:

In the light of KAA’s policy interests, the coaching programme was not a mainstream policy concern, compared to other realms. At the heart of its policy concerns is the national archer selection system. However, according to the KAA’s statement in the last coaching workshop, the current free coaching workshops and seminars funded by the KAA would be changed into a charged special coaching programme with a coaching qualification (Interview: 04 January 2009).

As such, coaching development has been commonly limited to workshops and seminars organised by the KAA, the Association of Korean Archery Coaches\(^{30}\) (called as ‘Goong Woo Howe’\(^{30}\)), and ‘Myung Goong Howe’\(^{31}\). The aim of these workshops and seminars for archery coaches are to improve archery coaching techniques and to upgrade the quality of archery coaches (Archery Monthly, 2005/6). In recent years, the coaching workshops and seminars’ themes has covered a wide range of coaching skills and training methodologies for different aged levels of archers to knowledge transfer on sport science/medicine (Archery Monthly, 2005/12). ‘These workshops and seminars have played a key role as a pathway for discussing coaching experiences and for sharing coaching knowledge amongst coaches, for example concerning a variety of problems identified at primary and middle schools’ (Interview: the gold medallist at the 2006 Atlanta Olympics, 04 January 2009). It is worth noting that

\(^{30}\) The organisation was made up of former elite archers in 1983.
\(^{31}\) The meeting is a network of Korean female archery medallists.
although the KAA has not paid much attention to building a well structured system of coaching development, the non-governmental organisations (the Association of Korean Archery Coaches and Myung Goong Howe) have functioned as a subsidiary player by holding such workshops and seminars on coaching which have helped develop coaching knowledge and facilitate the exchange of coaching experiences, ideas and opinions.

With regard to coaching, it is important to note that many Korean coaches have played a significant role in developing elite archery in other countries. Unlike athletics, the overseas movement of Korean coaches is not only a significant feature of the way in which South Korea spreads knowledge, technique and status over the world, but also a threat to the maintenance of Korean archers’ success at major international sporting competitions. Indeed, Korean archery’s six consecutive Olympic titles in women individual event ended at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games due to the Chinese archer, Zhang Juan-Juan, who won the Olympic title by beating the previous Korean gold medallist, Park Sung-Hyun, in the final match. On the issue of challenging Korean archery medal-winning strategy, a Chinese newspaper reported that Zhang Juan-Juan rocketed to stardom as a ‘Korean archery Killer’ and her victory was due, in large part, to the instruction of Korean coach, Yang Chang-Hoon (quoted in Maeil Business Newspaper, 2008). Moreover, a further example of this problem is the first archery gold medal for Australia at the 2000 Sydney Olympics which was won under the supervision of Korean coach, Lee Gi-Sik. As such, thirteen of the forty-nine countries that competed at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games had Korean coaches and, as of 2008, Korean coaches are playing an active part in twenty-eight countries including India, UK, Australia and Colombia (Maeil Business Newspaper, 2008; Suh G, 2008: 237). The movement of Korean coaches abroad dates from the early 1980s (the first case is Lee Gi-Boong’s dispatch to Saudi Arabia in 1982) and the movement has grown in line with Korean archers’ success (KAA, 1993). The ambiguous attitude to the movement of Korean coaches abroad is borne out by a former national coach and current executive director at the KAA, who stated that:

It is ‘two sides of the same coin’. In terms of globalisation of Korean archery, it is an encouraging trend for both Korea archery development and world archery development. But, the performance gap between rival countries is getting narrowed due to the overseas movements of Korean coaches in which they have transferred coaching skill, know-how and knowledge across the world. Perhaps, in accordance with the equalisation of performance and techniques across the world, it is supposed to signal a close contest (competition) between rival countries. So reflecting the sense of crisis
sweeping the sport, the trend gave us a valuable stimulant for Korean archery development (His book ‘Winning Secret’, 2009:238-239).

It is argued that the international movement of Korean coaches is one of biggest obstacles to Korean archery success: namely, it is explained as the ‘boomerang effect’ (Cho H, - Maeil Business Newspaper, 2008). On the aspect of the boomerang effect, the gold medallist stated that ‘the KAA cannot prevent the move of Korean coaches abroad because they can receive relatively higher pay and better treatment than in Korea’ (Interview: 04 January 2009). At an agency level, the role of Korean coaches is of particular concern here. From a theoretical perspective, Korean coaches’ role might be conceived of as ‘policy (knowledge) transfer’ (Houlihan & Green, 2008; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Contrary to the ways in which Korean athletics utilise knowledge and practices transferred by coaches imported from abroad (cf. Houlihan & Green, 2008:289), the forms and concept of practice observed in archery might be understood in terms of ‘knowledge transfer’ in that Korean coaches transfer abroad a wide range of knowledge. As many countries utilise knowledge transferred from South Korea, coaches exported from South Korea act as the main means of knowledge transfer. If the use of imported coaches in Korean athletics provides a significant insight into the development of domestic coaching, the phase of exporting Korean coaches in archery have two meaningful perspectives: one is that Korea’s contribution to the development of the sport all over the world; and the other is that the movement of Korean coaches abroad is not only a threat to the continued Olympic glory of Korea, but also is a factor in stimulating Korean archery development at the same time.

7.3.2.2 Sports science

With regard to the importance given to applying scientific factors to sport, it appears that the sport of archery can be viewed as the first sport to systematically utilise science in South Korea. Most notably, the sport in the early 1980s was in a situation where its principal concern was the application of sport psychology. Suh Goh-Won (2008) stated in his book ‘Winning Secret’ that the background to Korean dominance in archery is deeply rooted in the construction of a scientific training system and the change in the concepts, ideas and ways in which archery coaches look at the traditional training methods. Given the growth in sports science in the early 1980s, Suh Goh-Won (former national coach/current executive director at
the KAA) and Dr. Kim Byung-Hyun (senior researcher at the KISS)’s efforts to promote a scientific approach to the sport are instructive. In a situation where there was a sense of estrangement between theory and practice (theory and the sports field) their efforts to marry the sport of archery with psychology is viewed as the starting point for the extensive adoption of sport science. Looking back on the initial introduction of sports science to the sport, the executive director of the KAA argued that ‘it was not easy to try to use and promote sports science at that time because most coaches held a biased view on the use of sports science and believed that the best way to improve performance was by training’ (Interview: 19 November 2008). However, the first attempt to apply scientific methods to the sport was accelerated by the Hyundai business leader. Given the importance of the influence of business leaders in Korean sport, the emergence of Chung Mong-Goo as the second head of the KAA in 1985 was seen as a major impetus for the development of the use of sports science for the sport. The KAA’s concern with the discipline of sports science is directly captured in the following extract in *The Thirty Years of Korea Archery*:

Chung Mong-Goo, who was the second elected head of the KAA in April 1985, announced that the scientific approach to the sport, as an overriding task, would advance the first country of archery in the world by adopting the slogan ‘the Propulsion of Sports Science for archery’ in the first year of the inauguration (1993:385).

Indeed, the ‘Archery Training Shooting Machine’, which was invented in 1986 as the first computerised training machine in South Korea, was highly regarded in laying a cornerstone of scientific training for the sport (KAA, 1993). Moreover, the KAA not only imported a variety of scientific training machines such as ‘Reaction Timers’ and ‘Bausch & Lomb Vision Tester’ for an effective training in the mid-1980s, but also utilised ‘High Speed Video System’, ‘Force Platform’ –T.K.K., E.M.G. and ‘Heart Checker System’ (KAA, 1993). The use of these scientific machines under the above slogan reveals that one of the key concerns of Korean archery was sports science. ‘The KAA’s rapid adoption of sports science has been acknowledged as the key to Olympic success’ (Interview: the secretary-general of the KAA, 17 November 2008).

More specifically, the primary focus in early period of the application of sports science in archery concerned the analysis of the archer’s biorhythm, mental condition and shooting movement. The initial evidence of the successful use of sports science came at the 1988...
Seoul Olympic Games, where the Korean national squad of archery won three gold medals, two silver medals and one bronze medal. All the archers had benefited from the ‘SL Scoring System’ (biorhythm graph) used to optimise archers’ physical condition and performance (Archery Monthly, 1998/10; Hankyoreh, 1992). According to an in-house evaluation by the KAA, such scientific training proved effective (Archery Monthly, 1998/10) and is captured in Archery Monthly:

It was announced that the KAA would make an effort to realise the application of sports science by laying emphasis on psychological preparation (e.g., mind control and image training) through closer cooperation between Dr. Kim Byung-Hyun (researcher for archery affairs at the KISS) and coaches (1991/1:5).

However, it should be noted that the failure of Korean archery at the 1987 World Championship Tournament in Australia (only two silver medals in women’s individual event and the women’s team event) provided an important impetus for the change of training methods linked to sports science. Indeed, Suh Goh-Won, a former national coach of archery squad and current executive director of the KAA, provides evidence in his book ‘Winning Secret’ (2008) that help to understand such a change in training methods, stating that:

The shameful result enabled coaches to feel an impending sense of crisis. As a consequence of this, Korean archery coaches were inclined to the view that an epoch-making change of training was needed to reach world standards and achieve further development. Since then, the KAA mobilised a wide range of training methods…Perhaps, extraordinary training methods such as the so-called ‘Hell Training’ and psychological adaptation training, which have been introduced since then, and paved the way for changing the history of Korean archery (Suh G, 2008:55-57).

These ongoing scientific applications for the sport have been developed by the programmes provided by the Korea Institute of Sport Science (KISS). Currently, archery, which is one of the priority sports in terms of national elite sport policy, benefits from a sports science programme supported by three researchers of KISS. More especially, the sport of archery, which was in the vanguard of using sports science in the 1980s and 1990s, witnessed, in 1992, the initial ‘Performance Management Programme for Archers’ that was a newly computerised tool established by joint research between the KISS and the national coaches of the sport in order to effectively administer and analyse prominent factors affecting
performance (Archery Monthly, 1992/1). The emphasis placed on science was evidenced by the Chairman’s directions in November 1994, which stressed that an integrated and co-ordinated approach to scientific coach education should be accomplished with the invitation of experts in psychology, mechanics and physiology (Archery Monthly, 1994/11).

The 1990s and early 2000s provided a further incentive for the development of sports science and was directly related to the external challenges to Korean archer’s consistent success at major international sporting competitions, especially the frequent rules’ changes by the FITA and other countries’ technical threats (growth) to the development of Korean archery (cf. Kim B, 1993). Indeed, a ‘high-attitude’ shooting (a shooting platform and target face established at a height of 3 metres) and single-handed shooting were designed to improve archers’ mental ability capable of controlling unease and tension. In addition, in 2000, the KAA arranged for the national archers to compete surrounded by great crowds of spectators in the Jamsil baseball stadium ahead of the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games. The aim of this arrangement was to build up their nerve in a situation where there are loud noises and shouts similar conditions to the Olympic Games (Archery Monthly, 2000/8). With regard to this, the KAA’s intention is emphasised by a member of the committee at the KAA who stated that as archery is a sport that requires both technical and mental elements, the baseball stadium event was designed to cultivate archers’ courage (Kim K, - quoted in the Kook Min Ilbo, 2000). Since the late 1990s, given the importance of psychological factors in the sport of archery, the KAA have conducted a variety of training methods such as the baseball stadium event, the Misa-ri Water Stadium event, and a specialised training in army training camp aimed at enhancing mental power. If ‘the outcome of such policy initiatives in relation to sports science is to be judged on the criterion of success at the Olympic Games’ (Green, 2003: 129), then 5 medals for the sport (3 gold medals, one silver and one bronze medal) won at the Sydney Olympic Games was a great improvement on the 4 medals (2 gold medals, one silver and one bronze medal) won at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games. Indeed, the fruits of the scientific training above are evidenced by the following article from the Archery Monthly, which identified the effect of specialised training programme, taking into account the psychological aspects:

All sorts of unique and specialised training programmes have received intense media attention, especially when the national archers competed in the Jamsil baseball stadium. This special training, which was conducted in a situation where archers faced a variety of unfavourable barriers such as a large sized scoreboard, a great noise and so on as in the Olympic arena’s similar circumstance
and condition, contributed much to delivering Olympic Gold medals. Perhaps, it was expected that the training program would play key role in winning Gold medal at the 2003 World Championships (2003/06:4).

Moreover, since the 2000s the catalyst for the development of sports science in the sport of archery is largely related to the change of the chairman of the KAA. Firstly, Lee Chung-Woo, who was elected head of the KAA in February 2004, stated that the level of Korean archery is at the world’s top position, but the performance record of the sport is not being improved any more so a drastic action (measure) is needed to take a step forward, so I will focus on sports science; namely combining the ‘Information Technology’ (IT) with the sport (Kim S, quoted in the Dong–A Ilbo, 2004). As a result, the introduction of a special pair of glasses (Head Mount Display: HMD) applied three-dimensional training techniques for the sport’s scientific training ahead of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games can be viewed as the epochal progress of applying sports science to the sport, which enables archers conduct a simulation training as on the Olympic stage. The new technology helped the national archers to experience virtual reality (VR) with audio and visual data acquired from the Pre-Olympics before the 2004 Athens Olympics (Suh G, 2008). In addition, in 2004 the Development of ‘Archery Training Management System’ for Archer's Performance based on personal digital assistant (PDA) was considered as an ‘ace in the hole’ on winning all four Olympic Gold medals, the function of which is to manage and administer a wide range of elements consisting of archer’s performance, such as an amount of training, record and performance, as well as archers’ physical condition such as bio- rhythm, a monthly period and mental condition. This system made remarkable advance and was developed into the integrated service management system of archery in 2006 (see Figure 7.2 below).
The purpose of the system is to search for an optimum training program which will eventually allow coaches to regulate and control the training programme and performance of their archers on a scientific basis (Jang Y & Hong K 2008). Such systems were developed as part of the KAA’s scientific projects. That the KAA’s concerns centred primarily on the issue of sports science for the national archers is also evidenced from the New Year message of the current chairman, Chung Eui-Sun, which emphasised the importance of the development and application of the scientific programme for improving the national archers’ and top level archers’ performance (Archery Monthly, 2006/1).

As noted earlier, Suh Goh-Won’s book ‘Winning Secret’ (2008) revealed that the national archers of the 2004 Athens Olympics acknowledged that their performances benefited from sports science in general and, in particular, the ‘Head Mount Display’ (HMD), which helped the national archers to feel more familiar and comfortable at the Athens arena. If it is accepted that the outcomes at the Olympic Games provide evidence of the fruit of sports science, then it could be argued that ‘the great achievements of Korean archers are due considerably to the KAA’s involvement in sports science with the substantial financial contribution from the Hyundai Group’ (Interview: the executive director at the KAA, 19 November 2008).
7.3.2.3 Sport facilities (equipment)

With regard to the development of the sport, the issue of sport facilities seems not to have been a key concern for the sport of archery over the years with the major concern being the issue of equipment. Although the focus in the investigation of athletics was on the development of facilities for elite level training and competition, this section focuses on the development of equipment for elite level competition in archery. The reason is that the two pieces of equipment, the bow and arrow, have become increasingly significant elements for elite archery performance over recent years. Moreover, ‘the issue of facility development at the broad range of the KAA’s disciplines is not a matter of primary concern’(Interview: the secretary general at the KAA, 17 November 2008), as sports facilities, in particular sports stadium and arena for elite level training and competition in South Korea context are largely owned by provincial governments. A clear example of this is three archery arenas named after female gold medallists both of which are capable of staging international sporting competition and national sports festivals, and which were established by local government expenditure and the KSPO funding to commemorate victories at Olympic Games and World Championships archery: ‘Jinho International Archery Filed’ in Yecheon, ‘Kim Sunyeong Archery Field’ in Cheongju and ‘Seo Hyangsoon Archery Field’ in Gwangju. It appears that, ‘because the local governments in South Korea have been willing to build sports facilities such for the purpose of staging national sports festival and international sporting events’ (Interview: a professor of sociology of sport, 22 October 2008), the KAA has not need to consider facilities for archery training and competition as an area of concern.

As a former national coach of the archery squad and current executive director of the KAA, Suh Goh-won, related in his book ‘Winning Secret’ (2008), archery is only sport to achieve the localisation of equipment manufacturing among the national governing bodies affiliated to the KSC. Moreover, in light of the fact that many world top-class international archers compete with Korean equipment, it would not be an overstatement to say that Korea is one of the leading exporting countries of archery equipments. Behind the current enormous development of archery equipments, there is the KAA’s support. By mid-1990s, it could not be envisaged that the world top class archers would use Korean bows and arrows (Suh G, 2008). However, an instructive aspect of policy change in relation to sport equipment in the mid-1990s concerns the KAA’ action on equipment use. The specific contents of the regulation are made clear by Archery Monthly:

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The KAA announced the measure on the use of foreign-made archery equipment which required student-archers under the middle school to use domestically produced equipments in an attempt to prevent a sense of unfairness between young archers/teams in poor surroundings and wealthy young archers/teams, the ultimate aim of which was to expand the pool of archery (1996/01:2).

Given the relatively expensive equipment requirements of the sport, the KAA’s action was a key foothold in developing domestic equipment. Moreover, the results at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games (two gold medals, one silver medal and one bronze medal) brought about media criticism which arguably functioned as one of the catalysts for the increased emphasis on equipment. The context at that time is provided by a former national coach and current executive director of the KAA, Suh Goh-Won (2008), who argued that, as Korean national archers already enjoyed world leadership in the sport, it was no surprise that media scorn ensued from the relatively unsatisfactory performance. ‘The nation’s performance at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games made headlines, such as ‘an anticipated failure’, ‘Korea archery fall’ and ‘warning-bells on Korean archery’, which fuelled increasing concerns about the equipment problems expressed by the national coaches’ (Interview: the gold medallist at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, 04 January 2009). In a situation where male archers and female archers had used American products and Japanese products respectively up to the mid-1990s, the equipment problem was identified as one of the biggest difficulties facing Korean archers. By the mid-1990s the reason why homemade archery equipment could not be developed was that small scale domestic equipment makers could not afford to invest in developing their business and concentrated on producing archery equipment for beginners and also for export (Archery Monthly, 1998/11). Under such circumstances, the Korean male team failed to win a gold at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games where Korean male archers were defeated by the United States men’s team who were using the latest equipment in the final. Consequently, the failure of Korean male team to win the gold medal gave an impetus to Korean archery circles to consider the necessity of developing homemade archery equipment for elite level use (Suh G, 2008). In the early days of developing domestic equipment for high performance competitions, there were a few critical voices from parents of student-athletes and some coaches opposed to the KAA’s regulatory measures limiting the use of foreign-made equipment. However, there was a shift in attitude in favour of domestic equipment during the mid to late 1990s as some archers using domestic equipment started to produce quite good performances in national archery competitions. In addition, the 1997 currency crisis arguably gave an unexpected opportunity to expand the use of domestic
equipment across the country. Indeed, while the IMF crisis led to a contraction of elite sport development around the country (for more information see Chapter 4.), it appeared that the economic crisis helped to fuel the growth of the domestic equipment industry and its increased use in competition. Suh Goh-Won encapsulates the context of the sport under the IMF intervention in relation to archery equipment development:

The worst financial crisis faced by all the people had a negative impact on elite athletes. Indeed, not only did many elite athletes have difficulty in getting foreign-made sports equipment due to the high exchange rates, but also some sport clubs were disbanded in all sorts of sports. However, for the sport of archery only one club was dissolved. Perhaps, it appeared that there was a growing hope and budding confidence between archery athletes’ support staff that it was entirely possible for national archers to compete in the sport of archery with homemade, instead of foreign-made, equipment (at least in terms of competitiveness power for performance). If we did not invest in equipment development at that time, Korean archery would have fallen down (2008:22-23)

As Green commented, ‘it is self-evident [that] if medal counts at Olympic Games and World Championships is the criterion on which a sport is deemed successful’ (2003:150) then the Korean archers’ excellent performance at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games (total five medals, three of which was Gold), where all Korean archers used homemade equipments, was a clear vindication of the KAA’s measure to develop domestic equipment for the sport. Currently, Korean-made archery equipment has been widely acknowledged as being of sophisticated quality and has set the standard for equipment in the last ten years.

An instructive aspect of the development of archery equipment is also reinforced by the more recent policy pronouncement on the sport industry from the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism, the aim of which is to promote and support the domestic sport manufacturing industry as one of the five key strategies for the development of sport industry (MCST, 2008a). More specifically, that homemade archery equipment is included in the list of ten strategic sport equipment proves that the domestic archery industry is equipped with high technology and growth potential to achieve its goal of becoming the world’s top brand in the ten strategic sport equipments as referred to in the ‘Mid- to Long Term Plan for Sport Industry: 2009-2013’ published in December 2008.
7.3.3 The provision of more systematic competition opportunities for elite level athletes

Although there has been some evidence that the KAA made an effort to offer competition opportunities for elite level archers, the issue of the provision of more systematic competition opportunities for elite level archers has not arguably been a key concern for the sport. It appears that the KAA’s policy concern in respect of the development of competition opportunities for elite level archers has been heavily focused on the selection system. More specifically, the KAA has identified and selected the national archers best able to deal effectively with external threats such as the ‘boomerang effect’ caused by the movement of Korean coaches abroad, the frequent change of competition rule, the generalisation of superior archery equipments and the imitation of training methods (Maeil Business Newspaper, 2008).

Nevertheless, a report in ‘Korean Archery’s Success and Business Management Strategy’ published by Hyundai Research Institute (2004) attributed Korean female archers’ success to the use of Michael Porter’s ‘diamond model’, arguing that one of the key areas leading to international medal-winning success was the large number of competitions for archery which provided many opportunities to identify, verify and evaluate excellent archers. In 2008, there were 24 authorized domestic competitions for elite level athletes, including the selection competitions for national archers (KAA, 2008). More specifically, 16 of the total 24 competitions are held under auspices of the KAA (see Table 7.3 below), the rest are under the sponsorship of the three affiliated central federations for middle-high school-, university- and business teams

Table 7.3 Number of domestic competitions, 1992-2008

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Of particular note are the following two key concerns: the first of which concerns the subdivision of competition for each age groups (for primary school student-archers, for middle-high school student-archers and for university student-archers). For example, currently, ‘there are five official national archery competitions for primary school student-archers including
the National Junior Sports Festival, which have played an important role in identifying young talents at an early stage’ (Interview: the executive director of the KAA, 19 November 2008). More recently, an instructive aspect of the development of competition opportunities is directly related to the Sports ToTo funding which allowed the KAA to host a new archery competition for primary school student-archers (named as the Sports ToTo Primary School Archery Tournament) created in 2008. Hong Jin-Ho, a team leader/spokesman of public relations at Sport ToTo Ltd., said that the introduction of this meeting will give a useful opportunity for domestic young archers to compete and develop their talent (quoted in Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2008). It should be also noted that the KAA expected not only that ‘such competitive opportunities for young archers at primary school level would allow them to develop their talent in archery, but it would also help to expand the pool of elite archers, thus we are providing financial support to pay the expense of participants’ (Interview: the executive director of the KAA, 19 November 2008). The second of which is related to the Seoul International Archery Tournament biennially held in an odd year since 1994 which has been held to commemorate Korean archers’ victory at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and has become one of the major international sporting competitions for archery. Moreover, the Archery Monthly (1997/12:07) argued for the event’s value in offering competitive opportunity, stating that two young Korean archers (Hong Sung-Chill & Kim Du-Ri) made their successful debuts at the 2nd Seoul International Archery Tournament in 1997 in particular, and since then the event has witnessed many new young talents in South Korea.

In 2006 Ulsan’s successful bid for the 2009 World Archery Championships gave an impetus for the KAA to expand the pool of talented archers and to invest further in domestic archery. The KAA’s intention behind the successful bid for the event was to promote the sustainable development of the sport. According to a report in Archery Monthly:

It is commonly accepted that the stagnation of school sport and the public’s indifference toward unpopular sports including archery have been serious obstacles for the development of domestic archery. Hence, the newly inaugurated chairman, Chung Eui-Sun, concluded that the hosting of the World Archery Championships is needed to promote the expansion of the archery base and to strengthen diplomatic influence in international archery circles. As a consequence, the KAA together with the hosting venue, Ulsan metropolitan city has poured their efforts into hosting the World Archery Championships (Archery Monthly, 2006/8:03).
‘In a situation where Korean archery is regarded as the best in the world in terms of high performance, the hosting strategy of the 2009 World Archery Championships in Korea can be viewed as one of the key vehicles for making progress towards the ultimate goal of sustainable medal winning success at international competitions based on the expansion of archery base’ (Interview: the gold medallist at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, 04 January 2009). Moreover, the above observation reflects tentative signs of the formation of a elite archery policy community involving a limited number of actors or groups such as senior officials at Ulsan metropolitan city and within central government, executive member of the KAA and elite businessmen of Hyundai-Kia Motor Group which shared common goals towards the sport’s international success on the basis of the successful hosting of the event. Such a policy community might be symptomatic of a strengthening elite influence on the policy process focusing on elite level of archery development but paying relatively little attention to its policy of supporting and developing the sport’s grass roots level.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter ends with the identification of key implications for the sport of archery in respect of elite sport policy development. Consideration is given to the significant aspects of policy change and this section is thus organised in the same manner as for the chapter on athletics. The key implications for policy change in the sport of archery are provided by the following three principal themes: (i) motivation, (ii) method; and (iii) consequences.

In terms of motivation, three key strands of change were identified. Firstly, the role of the Hyundai Group in general, and that of Hyundai business leaders in particular has been a crucial catalyst for policy change in the sport of archery. Along with the separation of international archery from the traditional archery (Kuk-Kung) in 1983, the emergence of the Hyundai business leader as the head of the KAA can be seen as an epochal impetus for the development of elite archery (international archery). ‘The tremendous financial contribution of Hyundai Group has thus allowed the KAA to develop its policy in a systematic way, relevant examples of which the more structured and integrated approach to the provision of sports science, national archer selection system and financial support for young elite archers’ (Interview: the secretary general at the KAA, 17 November 2008). Indeed, the general consensus in the media is that the considerable sums invested by the Hyundai Group have
been the main drive behind the country’s unprecedented success over the past two decades. Here, it is worth noting that, as in the sport of athletics, the intervention of the Hyundai Group for the sport of international archery was due entirely to the former military governments’ arm twisting although reimbursed with the incentive of tax benefits for NGBs (in particular the KAA). However, there has been a changing trend for NGBs to reconsider their presidencies since the early 1990s. Namely, ‘as business elites have valued their presidencies in terms of business PR and a sense of social responsibility, the Hyundai business leaders have recognised changing values and beliefs, taking into account the business benefits’ (Interview: the executive director at the KAA, 19 November 2008).

Secondly, government intervention has occasionally emerged as a decisive factor in engineering change in elite archery. Government involvement has been carried out through the KSC which was instrumental in bringing about the separation of traditional archery and international archery. Indeed, the KSC as a quasi-governmental body played an important role in intervening in some conflicts or/and power struggles which emerged in the process of establishing the independence of the KAA (international archery) from the KNAA (traditional archery) in 1983. As discussed earlier, the role of the KSC’s former head, Chung Ju-Yung, helped both coalitions of traditional archery and international archery competing for their respective interests to reach the final agreement in pursuit of the development of both types of Korean archery (KAA, 1992). But the KAA’s position was more in support of international archery than traditional archery, putting more emphasis on international success than on grass-root level sport (the evidence of which was, in line with the new formation of the KAA for the sport of international archery, the emergence of Hyundai business leader taking charge of international archery development in 1983). This observation raises the notion of ‘policy broker’ within the ACF because conflicts or/and power struggle over the control of international archery and traditional archery could be interceded by the former head of the KSC (Chung, Ju-Yung) who persuaded dominant actors surrounding the traditional archery to accept the separation of the international archery from traditional archery thus minimising the degree of conflict/power struggle between competing coalitions (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1999).

Another significant point is that the government’s attitude towards traditional archery and Olympic archery exhibited marked differences. While the government has not been centrally involved in the development of Olympic archery and traditional archery, its decision to
allocate the control and supervision of Olympic archery to the KSC and traditional archery to the Korea Council of SFA indicates clearly the different role of these two sports in Korean sport policy. There has clearly been a dualistic development of elite sport and SFA (here Olympic archery and traditional archery) which is far from the ‘twin track’ approach to mass participation and medal-winning success reflected in the policy of a number of the governments such as the UK (e.g., Game Plan 2002: 83). Such an approach by the Korean government to the development of high performance sport and mass sport sheds light on the future direction of elite sport development in South Korea. The government evidently pays more attention to Olympic archery which is regarded as one of the most important sports in terms of medal-winning strategy and national prestige. Evidence of the government’s consideration of Olympic archery to be more crucial to its policy agenda than traditional archery is the discrepancy in the amount of national treasury funding for traditional archery and Olympic archery (158,922,000 won for the KNAA in 2008 & 279,607,000 won for the KAA in 2005) provided through the Korea Council of SFA and KSC (KOCOSA, 2008). Moreover, as noted in Chapter 5, the government treats Olympic archery as one of the priority sports in the system of ‘selection and concentration (focus)’ by providing more (financial) resources than other sports.

Thirdly, a significant aspect of policy changes in the sport of archery and the KAA is the role of media which has occasionally given an impetus to the development of elite archery. Given the importance of archery in terms of medal winning success, intense media interest in the performance of Korean archers in major international sporting competitions can be viewed as inevitable. Indeed, the relative failure of the sport at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games (two Gold medals, one silver medal and one bronze medal) drew sharp media attention which affected the behaviour of actors within elite archery policy subsystem (Suh G, 2008). This example draws attention to the notion of exogenous factors for policy change within the ACF. As ‘the dynamic events affect the behaviour of subsystem actors’ (Sabatier & Weible, 2007:193), the media criticisms triggered by the relative failure of the sport in 1996 had a significant effect on values and actions of coaches and key actors surrounding the sport at the elite level, which fuelled them to take action, especially in relation to equipment. It should be reiterated that the elite archery subsystem might be a closed decision-making process in which most policies have been made by a few board members of the KAA centring around Hyundai business leaders. As the gold medallist at the 2006 Atlanta Olympics relates, the characteristic closed decision-making process can be illustrated by the example of the cash-
award system, where she stated that ‘perhaps most young archers do not even know how much the KAA sets aside for cash-awards and I did not know it before the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games’ (Interview: 04 January 2009). Such a secretive climate relating to the decision-making process in the sport at the elite level is characteristic of the conservation which is indicative of the domination of elites (here Hyundai business leaders and a few executive members of the KAA) in the policy-making process (cf. Smith, 1993).

In terms of explaining policy change in archery, three key tactics are important: policy learning, policy transfer and exogenous factors. Forms of policy learning and policy transfer are identified as significant to the development of elite archery. However, the ways in which the KAA undertook policy learning and policy transfer, are in contrast to the experience of KAF for the sport of athletics. As mentioned earlier, in the past the unsuccessful American model of national archer selection which resulted in their archers falling from the summit of international success played a critical role for the KAA in deciding the general future direction of the sport, and the reinforcement of the national archer selection system in particular. More specifically, lessons learned from the examples of both the USA and the USSR have been influential in that executive members of the KAA has paid more attention to the national archer selection system in a more sophisticated and fair manner (Suh G, 2008).

The second factor in explaining change is primarily related to policy transfer. Contrary to the use of foreign coaches observed in athletics, the overseas movement of Korean archery coaches have been very potent in transferring experiences, techniques, skills and ideas relating to coaching from South Korea to abroad. In this sense, from a theoretical perspective, this observation is conceived of as the concept of policy (knowledge) transfer ‘as it takes account of ideas of diffusion and coercion’ (Green, 2007:429). This argument can be compatible with the discussion of Green and Houlihan, noting that ‘the appointment to pivotal coaching posts of Australians and other international appointments bring ideas, methods and experiences form Australia and other leading countries have been very influential in shaping elite sport in the UK’ (2005: 188). Another important point of this is that ideas, experiences and technical know-how transferred from Korean coaches have been viewed as a serious threat (e.g., Zhang Juan-Juan’s Gold medal in Beijing under the instruction of Korean coach, Yang Chang-Hoon) to the continuing success of Korean archers in major sporting events. Nevertheless, external threats to the Korean archery, including the international movement of Korean archery coaches, have ultimately gave an impetus to the
continuing strengthening of a variety of policy provisions such as sports science, innovation in training methods and national archer selection system (Suh G, 2008).

Third factor in explaining change points to the effect of exogenous factors on the elite archery subsystem. As Sabatier & Weible (2007) argue, external events have influence on the behaviour of policy actors/makers within the subsystem. The failure of Korean men’s team to win a gold medal at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, and the IMF crisis in the following year encouraged the KAA to take measures concerning equipment provision. Ultimately, the KAA’s regulatory action on the restriction of foreign made equipment helped to develop the domestic archery equipment industry. Moreover, according to Suh G (2008), although an ulterior motive for the frequent change of the rules of the sport by FITA has been designed to weaken Korean archers’ dominance, the continuous change of the rules by the FITA has encouraged the KAA to lay stress on the national archer selection system and training methods. As such, while Korean archers have had continued international success since their Olympic debut in 1984, exogenous events such as the occasional failure of Korean archers and IMF intervention, have given a substantial impetus to the domestic development of elite archery.

Furthermore, it is important to emphasise the significance and influence of business leaders on the development of archery in general, and the sport’s success in international competitions in particular. It could be argued that Green and Houlihan’s (2005) analytical framework was useful in investigating elite sport development in the case of archery, but it did not identify all distinctive aspect of Korean elite sport system. In other words, as in the sport of athletics, a cash-award system has been identified as a relatively significant element in encouraging the improvement of the sport’s performance in international sporting events, but the extent of the use of cash-award system in the sport of archery varies a little from that of athletics.

A cash-award system for medal winners in the sport of archery was introduced in 1983 when Hyundai Group took over the presidency of the KAA, but it has not been managed in the same manner as identified in the sport of athletics. In other words, although the KAA has granted a cash-award for medal winners at international sporting events over the years, it has not established specific regulations for the cash-award system for medal winners as is the case in athletics, where the KAF operates detailed regulations for the distribution of cash-
awards and prize money for medal winners and record-breakers. The differences between the KAA and the KAF might be indicative of a considerable disparity in medal success between archery and athletics. While the KAF puts weight on the cash-award scheme, the KAA appears to have little regard for a cash-award system as a policy element for achieving international sporting success. One plausible argument for such little attention, in comparison with other policy elements such as the national archer selection system and the use of sports science, to the cash-award system is the level of success of Korean archers. Perhaps, it is understood by the gold medallist that ‘a cash-award for medal winners has been awarded in compensation for their labours and achievements’ (Interview: 04 January 2009). In fact, as the KAA has not organised the cash-award system in the clear and detailed manner as in the sport of athletics, it is difficult to identify the cash-award system as a deliberate policy to achieve medal-winning success. On this issue, the secretary general of the KAA stated that ‘the organisation has provided a cash-award with medal winners over the years, although it has not constructed detailed regulations of cash-award for medal winner’ (Interview: 17 November 2009).

More specifically, at the time of the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, it was announced that the KAA would provide a cash-award of forty million won and an extra prize of the Hyundai Motor’s Santa Fe sport utility vehicle for a gold medal winner (Yoo H, - Segye Ilbo 2000). In the 2002 Busan Asian Games a cash-award of ten million won was allocated to a gold medal winner for an individual match of archery (Chun C, - Dong-A Ilbo, 2002). The KAA provided up to 600 million won of cash-awards (400 million one in cash & the total tens of Hyundai Motor’s Tucson sport utility vehicles the Sportage sport utility vehicles) for the Korean archery squad including coaches and the executive members of the KAA at the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, where Korean archers won three gold medals and one silver (Lee K, - Kookmin Ilbo, 2004). Also, the KAA allocated cash-awards of around 200 million won to the Korean archery squad at the 44th World Archery Championships, where Korean archers achieved the same result as at the 2004 Athens Olympic Games (Lee D, - Munhwa Ilbo, 2007). It is here worth mentioning that the disparity in the amount of cash-award paid between the Olympic Games and World Archery Championships/Asian Games can be indicative of the fact that the KAA puts greater weight on Olympic medals than on the World Championship medals.
However, it should be also noted that more recent evidence discloses that the KAA has not used the cash-award system for medal winners in the prescribed manner. Namely, although the KAA regards the Olympic Games as the most important event amongst all levels of sporting event, the fact that total 500 million won of a cash-award was granted to archers and coaches at the 2006 Doha Asian Game, where Korean archers won all four gold medals reveals an inconsistent use of the cash-award system. Generally, the amount of a cash-award varies each time (e.g., the Olympic Gold medal’s value is higher than the World Championships’ Gold medal which is higher than the Asian Games’ Gold medal) with ‘the decision being largely made by the head and vice-head of the KAA with the board of directors before each event’ (Interview: the gold medallist at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, 04 January 2008). Of particular note here is the reason why the KAA provided a considerable cash-award for the national squad at the 2006 Doha Asian Game. The gold medallist at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games (currently archery coach) provides comment that helps to understand such a massive welcoming ceremony with an exceptional amount of cash-award (500 million won) for archers and coaches at the 2006 Doha Asian Game. She reveals that ‘the big boost and incentives for the 2006 Doha Asian Game’s squad were due to the first year of the inauguration of current head of the KAA, along with the success of the squad in winning all events at the competition’ (Interview: 04 January 2008). In this sense, from a theoretical perspective, this observation can be conceptualised in terms of the exogenous factors as referred to in the ACF. As the dynamic events such as the change of political regime might lead to policy change (Sabatier & Weible, 2007), the change of head of the KAA in 2006 affected the increase in amount of the cash-award.

As such, that the KAA was able to provide such a huge cash-award to Korean archers and coaches due to the financial contribution of the Hyundai Group. It is generally accepted that Korean archery’s unprecedented dominance over the past two decades has been due in large part to the Hyundai Group’s wholehearted support. Such Hyundai’s influence on Korean archery’s development is summarised in a newspaper, which states that:

There was Hyundai Group (family) behind Korean archers’ success at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games and the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, where Korean archers swept three of the four total gold medals assigned to archery. Since 1985, when Chairman Chung, Mong-Koo of Hyundai Motor Group took the presidency of the KAA, the Hyundai Group has been supportive of the sport of archery both materially and morally over the last 23 years. In 2005 his only son, Chung, Eui-
Sun, who is currently the president of Hyundai-Kia Motor, was elected head of the KAA. According to one of the executive members of the KAA, no matter how busy he may be, he takes care of his business relating to archery at least once a week. Probably his affection for the sport of archery might be bigger than his father’s devotion (Ryu H, – quoted in Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2008).

In terms of consequences, a significant aspect of Korean archery (policy) development draws attention to forming of an elite archery policy coalition in the early days of Olympic archery development. Some people attribute Korean archers’ unprecedented dominance to ‘their intrinsic delicacy and mental strength for archery based on a long tradition with the bow and arrow’ (Korea Herald, 2004:17). However, the considerable success of Korean archers can be largely explained in relation to policy provisions of the KAA centring around the support of Hyundai business leaders. As evidenced in athletics in respect of the influence of Samsung Group, ‘the substantial sums of Hyundai Group to support the KAA have made possible a variety of policy commitments for the development of elite archery, such as sports science provision, cash-award system and the financial support of young archers, that have enabled Korean archers to achieve international success’ (Interview: the secretary general at the KAA, 17 November 2008). From a theoretical perspective, given Evans’s observation (2006) that the political power and authority of the elite abides in the ownership and control of financial wealth (cf. Green, 2003), Hyundai business leaders, alongside their business funds have been very influential in the realm of elite archery. An important point of this analysis is that the financial wealth of Hyundai Group has allowed Hyundai business leaders to dominate elite archery policy community along with the government. The sizable contribution from the Hyundai Group has been primarily conceived of as a major strand in the current unprecedented achievements of Korean archers, and provided further evidence of the extent to which business support lies at the heart of decision-making process in a range of public policies in the capitalist system (Dunleavy & O’Leary 1987). This observation indicates the usefulness of elitism and neo-pluralism as sensitising macro-level theories in explaining policy-making process within the elite archery policy community.
CHAPTER 8

The case of Baseball

8.1 Introduction

This chapter has a similar structure to the case of archery of Chapter 7 and is thus organised by the same principle themes and same three key areas of elite sport development. The first section of the chapter is concerned with the organisational structure and administration of the national governing body of archery is followed by an analysis of the nature of the body’s relationships with other organisations and an assessment of the influence and significance of business leaders. The second section of the chapter focuses on the investigation of elite sport development in terms of policy change in the three key elements of elite sport policy. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of key implications in arising from this case for the analysis of elite sport development.

8.2 Organisational structure, administration and the influence of business leaders/politicians

Korean baseball has a history of over a century, having been introduced in 1905 by Phillip L Gillett, the Secretary for Korea of the U.S. Young Men’s Christian Association, who initially taught baseball’s basic skills and rules to members of the Hwang-sung Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) (Yoo H et al., 1999). Baseball has been arguably the most popular sport in South Korea (Lee Y, 2006). It is remarkable that, along with a century history of glory and development, the national baseball team made Korean history by winning the first ever Olympic gold medal at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The Korean team also enjoyed victory in the semi-finals at the 2nd World Baseball Classic (WBC) in March 2009. Behind these recent successes, there have been two leading organisations for the sport of baseball: the Korean Baseball Association (KBA) and the Korean Baseball Organisation (KBO). The KBA which was established in March 1946 and joined the KSC as an associate
member in the same year is the recognised governing body of baseball at the amateur level. The KBA affiliated to the Baseball Federation of Asia (BFA) in 1954 and the International Baseball Federation (IBF) in 1972. The KBO is the governing body for the Korean Professional Baseball League (KPBL) which was originally launched with six clubs (currently eight clubs) in 1982.

While we have witnessed some cooperation and also some conflicts between the KBA and KBO, both organisations have been inseparably involved in the development of Korean baseball at the elite level. In this sense, we look at the organisational structures of both organisations respectively. Figure 8.1 shows the current organisational structure of the KBA. In respect of the change of organisational structure and administration for the sport of baseball, of particular note is the formation of Amateur-Professional Baseball Cooperative Committee (later renamed as the Amateur-Professional Baseball Development Committee).
It is arguable that since the founding of Korean Professional Baseball League (hereafter KPBL) in 1982, the development of amateur baseball has declined. In the 1970s, the country’s high school baseball leagues enjoyed their golden era with tremendous popularity and strong support on a regional and hometown basis, and this situation served as the driving force for the foundation of the KPBL in 1982 (Jung H, 2009). While the KPBL has been gradually developed by gaining popularity among the public, the popularity of amateur baseball, especially national high school baseball leagues, (e.g., Goldlion Flag, Bonghwang Flag, Blue-Dragon Flag, President's championship cup and so on) has declined. Kim Jong-rak on his reappointment to the presidency of the KBA in 1989 took the opportunity to discuss
developmental exchange and to resolve the problem of imbalance between amateur- and professional baseball, which was a bone of contention at that time after the KPBL’s founding (Yoo H et al., 1999). *The hundred Years of Korean Baseball* provides evidence that helps to understand the context of those days regarding the relationship between the amateur baseball and professional baseball, stating that:

The KBA’s head, Kim Jong-Rak, made an appeasement measure to seek a solution to some conflicts between amateur- and professional baseball by placing the KBO’s commissioner, Lee Woong-Hee (the 3rd & the 4th: March 1988-May 1992) in the advisory seat at the KBA on 11 July 1989. However, despite the head’s appeasement action, the conflicts between the amateur baseball and professional baseball were not easily removed (1999: 1019-1020).

In this respect, the founding of the amateur-professional cooperative committee in March 1993 could be seen as the initial constructive step in improving relations between the amateur- and professional levels of the sport. ‘The fact that the Korean baseball team was disqualified from the preliminaries of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic resulted in changing perceptions among key leaders towards the win-win relationship between amateur-and professional baseball’ (Interview: a former executive director of the KBA, 21 November 2008). More specifically, a coalition of actors within amateur baseball considered that they needed to learn advanced skills from professional baseball, whereas a coalition of actors within professional baseball recognised that the permanent development of professional baseball would not be complete without the development of amateur baseball (Yoo H et al., 1999). From the theoretical perspective of the ACF, as external shocks might play an important role in affecting and changing actors’ beliefs, values and notions of a dominant advocacy coalition (Sabatier & Weible 2007: 199), the Korean baseball team’s early defeat in 1992 helped key leaders at both levels of the sport to change their beliefs and perceptions which resulted in the forming of the amateur-professional cooperative committee (see Figure 8.1 above). However, the changing perceptions of actors towards the win-win development of amateur- and professional baseball were negatively affected by the Kang Hyuk’s affair which related to the KBO’s decision to expel Kang Hyuk from the KBO because he had signed with both Hanyang University baseball team and OB Bears (renamed as Doosan Bears in 1999, one of the professional baseball club affiliated with the KBO) in 1993 (Kim J, – DongA.com, 2000).
The committee was disestablished due to the affair (Yoo H et al., 1999). Therefore, Korean baseball sectors witnessed a turf war and power struggle between the KBA and KBO in the mid 1990s (in relation to coaching openings and financial backing). The context in which the KBA and KBO competed for their interests at that time is borne out by the current secretary-general at the KBA (previously team leader of Management Dept. at the KBO), who stated that:

After the creation of the professional baseball league … while both sectors of the sport have gone their own and independent ways since then, there has been a lack of complementary cooperation. On the one hand, from a perspective of amateur baseball sector, it was argued that the current development and origin of professional baseball has been due to its basis in amateur baseball. On the other hand, from the position of professional baseball sector, it was rather true that the KBO has paid no attention, to some extent, to the KBA and amateur baseball development because the organisation has struggled in dealing with its major concerns and problems (Interview: 28 November 2008).

In such a long standing confrontational relationship between the KBA and KBO, the debut of Hyundai business leader (Lee Hyun-tae, chairman of Hyundai Petrochemical Co.,) as head of the KBA in March 1994 was viewed as a significant step forward in resolving the struggle for leadership of the sport, the ultimate aim of which was to advance Hyundai group into the professional league of the sport. In other words, that the Hyundai Petrochemical Co., took charge of the presidency of the organisation was intended to prepare for its participation in the professional baseball league (Yoo H et al., 1999). The Following year, the Hyundai group took over the Pacific Dolphins which was one of the professional baseball teams founded in 1988 and owned by Amorepacific Corporation, and debuted in the 1996 KPBL season (renamed as Hyundai Unicorns). As a consequence of this situation, 1996 witnessed a shift in the connection between amateur- and professional baseball. At that time, Lee Hyun-tae as head of the KBA, was in support of the unification of the KBA and KBO. Part of the reason is evidenced by The hundred Years of Korean Baseball, which states that

It might be better if professional baseball absorbs amateur baseball side because the Hyundai group already succeeded in the debut (entry) of the professional baseball league. In addition, a trend that the division between amateur and professional is likely to disappear around the world boiled over into the issue. As FIBA (Fédération Internationale de Basketball) made a decision to permit all professional player of basketball to compete at the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, following
the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, IBF (International Baseball Federation) voted to permit the participation of all professionals of the sport from 1997 in international sporting competitions (from the 2000 Sydney Olympics in the case of the Olympic Games). Therefore, the Hyundai group’s recognition was that the body responsible for only amateur baseball might lose its influence and a sense of existence (1999: 1104-1105)

The possibility of balancing the interests of amateur baseball and professional baseball seemed to be very remote until the late 1990s. More specifically, the discussion regarding the administrative integration of the KAB and KBO was faced with the obstacle of the opposition of most people involved in amateur baseball who were determined to protect their interests. Indeed, ‘a coalition of coaches and others involved in amateur baseball was against the KBA’s suggestion, centring on the head of the organisation (President of Hyundai Petrochemical Co.,) because they were concerned about the deprivation of their positions and influences’ (Interview: a former executive director of the KBA, 21 November 2008). During that time, one of the central sources of conflict was the matter of coach transfer between amateur baseball and professional baseball. More specifically, there was a growing issue that amateur baseball needed to open up their coaching sector to ex-professional baseball players. However, while the professional baseball circle expressed satisfaction with the KBA’s decision that amateur baseball should open up coaching jobs to the professional baseball circle in order to develop amateur baseball, there was understandable concern among KBA coaches who felt their jobs to be under threat (Yoo H et al., 1999). Significantly, the disastrous performance of the Korean baseball team at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, when they won only one match (Lim J, – Views & News, 2007), contributed to the creation of circumstances favourable for coach interchange between amateur- and professional baseball. In spite of the strong backlash of a coalition of amateur baseball, high school- and university coaches, the KBA decided to declare an open-door policy towards amateur baseball development in its general meeting of representatives in 1996 (Yoo H et al., 1999). Finally, the debate on the integration of the KBA and KBO was concluded in the rebirth of the amateur-professional cooperative committee in November 1996. Nevertheless, the ongoing issue of integrating the KBA and the KBO that remained unsolved has caused a turf war and power struggle from time to time.

With regard to the organisational structure and administration of the KBA, a further important trend in the early 2000s was the financial problem of the organisation. After the
resignation of the KBA’s head in 2001 (Jung Mong-youn, President of the Hyundai Capital co., January 1997 – 2000), the KBA faced financial troubles which influenced the placing of Lee Nae-heun, President of Hyundai Telecommunication Co., in the presidency of the body in expectation of financial aid. At the same time, the organisation’s financial incompetence led to the re-discussion of the proposal for the administrative consolidation between the KBA and KBO in 2003 (Shin H, - Joong-Ang Ilbo, 2009). As the current secretary-general of the KBA related, ‘2003 can be seen a watershed moment for the KBA in that the KBO has began to provide annually more than one billion won for the amateur baseball body: 1.3 billion in the first year and one billion won in 2004’ (Interview: 26 November 2008). It is worth noting that the KBO asked for their officials to take key posts in the KBA, including an executive director and secretary-general in return for the financial support. This was a scheme intended to take over the leadership of the sport and the organisation (Chun B, – The Internet Hankyoreh, 2003). Such an unequal relation between the KBA and KBO draws attention to a theoretical aspect of power relations. As Evans argues that ‘both the ownership and control of wealth and the monopoly of political power still reside in the hands of the few’ (2006:57), the professional baseball circle’s domination and the powerful influence over the KBA and amateur baseball was clearly based significantly on the financial wealth of the KBO.

More recently, the appointment of Kang Seung-Kyu (currently a lawmaker of the ruling party) as head of the KBA in January 2009 was a significant occasion for the recurrence of the confrontational relationships between the KBA and KBO. It should be noted that the initial emergence of a politician as head of the KBA may be indicative of a trend among NGBs of sport based on an innate respect for authority. While most NGBs prefer a business leader as head rather than a politician, a few of the NGBs tend to be political authority-oriented. According to Lee Sang-Hyun, a secretary-general of the KBA, the fact that the KBA accepted a ruling party lawmaker as head of the organisation was due to the expectation that his political influence would help the revitalisation of amateur baseball (Chung R, – Sisapress, 2009). In other words, ‘the NGBs preference to appoint a member of the National Assembly of the ruling party as head of the NGBs is due to the fact that the NGB believes that a politician of the ruling party would be an umbrella for the NGBs’ (Interview: a professor of sociology of sport, 22 October 2008). Even if the NGBs including the KBA and KBO have largely rejected ‘parachuting personnel appointment’, they have inwardly hoped to seat ruling party’s heavyweight in the presidency of the NGBs. Interestingly, his announcement on the personnel appointment of the KBA to excluded key directors and officials affiliated with the
KBO triggered a conflict between the KBA and KBO, the aim of which was the administrative independence of the KBA from the KBO. Following the KBA’s decision, the KBO declared its intention to suspend the financial aid that the KBO had provided since 2003 to develop Korean amateur baseball (Jung J. - Sportsseoul.com, 2009). Moreover, this conflict led to the issue of Baseball ToTo (controlled by the quasi-governmental body, KSPO), 10 percent of whose profits per annum (dividends) have been donated to the KBO. The introduction of Baseball ToTo in 2006 has been a significant factor in signalling a marked change for the development of the sport. More specifically, ‘the KBO has benefited from the ToTo since 2007: 6.7 billion won in 2008 and 5.2 billion won in 2007’ (Interview: a team leader of task force for fostering youth baseball at the KBO, 28 November 2008). The matter of the distribution of the Baseball ToTo’s profits is borne out by the current chairman at the KBA in an interview with Sportsseoul, who state that:

The financial aid of the KBO for the KBA is arguably originated from the Baseball ToTo’s profits (10% of that). The earning from the baseball lottery is to promote and support amateur baseball. Nevertheless, the KBO has handed it to us as if the KBO has wanted to be given a lot of credits. As part (point of use) of the Baseball ToTo’s profits is, of course, for the promotion of amateur-professional baseball and the support of youth baseball, the KBA should receive more than at present (quoted in Jung J., - February 2009).

However, on this issue of the profits from the baseball lottery, ‘the KBO’s position was firm as part of the proceeds had been given directly to support every school baseball team (excepting university teams) through the KBO which helps their young players to buy expensive equipment for baseball’ (Interview: a team leader of task force for fostering youth baseball at the KBO, 28 November 2008). According to the KSPO as Sports ToTo’s watchdog, it is not a legal flaw that the KBO has authority over the distribution of the Baseball ToTo’s proceeds (quoted in Dong-A Ilbo, 2008). Not surprisingly, the KBA’s demand for administrative and financial independence which was made without an alternative resulted in withdrawing its decision on the removal of KBO from the KBA board. This retreat by the KBA was due, arguably, to its poor financial power and its lack of independent finances. The financial weakness of the KBA is due to the lack of amateur baseball’s capability to attract the levels of media interest that bring sponsorship and advertising revenues to the sport, unlike in the professional baseball (cf. Green & Houlihan, 2005). It is important to note the government’s position on the conflict between the KBA and
KBO. Since the Korean Professional Baseball League’s (hereafter KPBL) founding in 1982, the relationship between the KBA and KBO has been beset by the conflicts and turf wars. Nevertheless, the government has not been very actively involved in the disputes between the KBA and KBO. The government’s role and position on this issue are explained by a former assistant deputy minister at the Ministry of Culture & Tourism, who explained that:

Actually, because the government is reluctant to directly intervene in a conflict between the KBA and KBO, the government expects that two organisations to settle the conflict autonomously. If in the case of a critical matter, the Sports Promotion Division of the MCST might informally express the government’s stance on an important matter. Namely, the government takes steps to urge two organisations to solve the conflict quickly via an official document and/or telephone call (Interview: 08 November 2008).

As such, ‘although the government does not seek to actively intervene in the disputes between the KBA and KBO, the government holds a critical position of authority as a mediator in the Korean hierarchical social structure’ (Interview: a senior researcher of the KISS, 5 October 2009). It seems reasonable to assume that ‘even though the government expresses only informally, its view on the dispute between two organisations, the KBA and KBO could not ignore the government’s opinion’ (Interview: a professor in sociology of sport in South Korea, 12 October 2009). This observation demonstrates a characteristic of the vertical bureaucratic and hierarchical Korean sport system.

Let us turn to the organisational structure and administration of the KBO. In relation to a shift of the organisational structure and administration of the body for Korean baseball development including professional baseball, three significant aspects of change are as follows: (i) the founding of the Korea Baseball Organisation Properties (KBOP) in 2002; (ii) the formation of the technical committee in 2006; and (iii) the establishment of the Baseball Development Executive Committee in 2009 (see Figure 8.2 below).
Firstly, the KBOP, which is a subsidiary company of the KBO, has played a catalytic role in improving the efficiency of marketing for the development of Korean professional baseball. Its founding aim is to advise businesses about sponsorship rights, to run trademark rights relating to the professional baseball and Korean KPBL players’ portrait rights and to handle a variety of events such as all star matches and post-season matches (The KBO’s homepage - http://www.koreabaseball.com/).

Secondly, the formation of the technical committee under the operating committee of the speciality committee in 2006 was seen as a major shift in the development of elite baseball (see Figure 8.2 above). Indeed, the miserable defeat at the 2006 Doha Asian Games, where the Korean baseball team (who won a bronze medal) consisting of the country’s professional players was beaten by Taiwan’s baseball team and even by the Japan baseball team which comprised of amateur players, provided an important impetus for a more systematic and
structured approach to the development of elite level performance. This situation was captured by the vice secretary-general of the KBO in the following article, who stated that:

The KBO planned to establish a technical committee to be responsible for dealing with some matters regarding national player selection and performance analysis. In fact, the KBO faced media criticism due to the perfect failure of the sport in Doha. The technical committee was established in response to the failure (Kim K, - Kyungyhang Shinmun, December 2006).

Thirdly, the establishment of the Baseball Development Executive Committee (hereafter BDEC) in 2009 was designed to receive the help of a group of experts divided into four committees (infra-structure, marketing, media and system & management), whose membership was made up of politicians, academics, businessmen, journalists and lawyers - twenty five persons in total (The KBO’s homepage -http://www.koreabaseball.com/). It is being referred to as the most critical factor for changing the landscape for the development of elite baseball in South Korea. In a situation where a characteristic of the decision-making process for the development of elite baseball including the professional baseball is closed, the line-up of the BDEC has enabled the Korean baseball circles to be more open and transparent than ever before in the decision-making process. As the new KBO commissioner’s appointment (Yoo Young-Koo, chairman of Myong-Ji Foundation) heralded an administrative change in the organisation’s approach to professional baseball (Lim J, – CBS, 2009), the creation of the BDEC might be conceived of as the influence of human agency for policy change in the administrative development of the sport.

Moreover, with regard to the KBO’s approach to the professional baseball, of particular note is the foundation of the Korean Professional Baseball Player Association (hereafter KPBPA) in January 2000, the ultimate aim of which was to establish a sound partnership between the KBO/professional clubs and professional baseball players of the KPBL. According to Ahn M (2002), there was a growing voice among the professionals of the KPBL that required a new relationship between the KBO/professional clubs and players. ‘The late 1990s into the early 2000s was a transitional phase for the development of professional baseball’ (Interview: a former executive director of the KBA, 21 November 2008). Indeed, the much criticised KBO’s regulations (articles – even expressed as ‘slavery’ at that time) was exemplified by the trade of Yang Jun-hyuk, player of Samsung Lions Club and triggered latent conflicts between the professional players and the KBO (Ma H, 2009: 94-96). The KBO regulation
relating to the draft system, contracts and trade (transfer) of baseball professionals were all considered unreasonable. Given the unequal relation between the KBO/clubs and the professionals of the KPBL, at the heart of the establishment of the KPBPA as an umbrella body for the Korean professional baseball players was growing concern with unequal power relations. While twenty-five leading players of the KBPL were launching the KPBPA in 1999 in an attempt to transform power relations, the KBO and eight professional baseball clubs were trying to undermine the new organisation by controlling players behind the scene (Ma H, 2009; Kim S, – Don-A Ilbo, 2000). As Ahn M (2002) related, the dispute over the founding of the KPBPA was caused by conflicts of interests between the professionals’ concern to protect their rights/interests and the KBO’s veto that was in opposition to its foundation. As such, the founding of the KPBPA was threatened by the eight professional baseball teams’ unity centring on the KBO. At the early stage of establishing the KPBPA, the eight professional baseball teams with the financial wealth exercised their power and authority over their own players. However, the KBO and the professional baseball clubs’ power to prevent the creation of the KPBPA were faced with external pressures exerted on the KBO by media influence, strong public opinion and by NGOs. A good example of this power relation between the professional baseball teams and players is evidenced by the following comments from Dong-A Ilbo, one of the major newspapers, which stated that:

It is widely recognised that the declaration by players of both Samsung Lions and Hyundai Unicorns to boycott the founding of the KPBPA was due, in large part, to the clubs’ invisible power and authority over their players. That the two clubs was strongly against the foundation of the KPBPA is because if the two clubs recognise the KPBPA as an umbrella group for their players’ rights and interests, it is very likely that affiliated companies within the Samsung and Hyundai Groups, including other sports clubs would be affected by the case (Kim S 2006).

On this issue of the founding of the KPBPA, the nature of the relations between the KBO/the professional baseball clubs and their players has resonance with the use and exercise of power embodied in the concept of the Lukes’ three dimensional view of power where it is exercised by shaping participant’s consciousness and preference at invisible level (Lukes, 2005; Hay, 2002). In other words, for many years the professional baseball clubs’ power and authority over their players was exercised in preventing an emerging consensus on the issue of a player organisation by shaping players’ perceptions, preferences and interests where there were latent conflicts. However, since the creation of the KPBPA the power
relationships between the KBO/clubs and the KPBPA have been embodied in the Lukes’ first dimensional view of power, where ‘power is largely exercised to prevail over the contrary preferences of others’ (Lukes, 2005: 9), that is a much more overt use of power.

Clearly, in the last ten years, the interests of professional players have emerged at a public level, which has led to open conflict over a number of issues, most notably the issue of a cash-award after the 2\(^{nd}\) WBC in 2006. Moreover, while the KPBPA has been trying to form a legitimate labour union with more authoritative rights in order to better represent the interests of their members, there have been attempts by the KBO and club owners to prevent the union being formed in the last decade. More specifically, the use of the first and second faces of power, for Lukes (1974, 2005), is embodied in a way where the eight club owners leaned on the KBO to release some of the players from their team who had signed a document advocating the founding of the KPBPA. This action functioned as a barrier to the formation of labour union because of the imbalance of power between players and teams stems with the wealthy club owners controlling key resources. Indeed, in the process of the passage of a vote on whether or not to form a labour union for professional baseball players in December 2009, the refusal of Samsung Lions- and LG Twins players to provide support is an important instance of the first and second dimensions of power. Once the KPBPA succeed in forming a labour union for the Korean professional players, it is likely to open conflicts between the KBO and the union as they have different interests; making the exercise of Lukes’ first view of power more likely.

Concerning power relations between the KBO/club owners and players, Ahn M (2002) related that the power exercised by the professional baseball teams and the KBO over the sport and players is rooted from the birth of the KPBL under the leadership of the military government, the Fifth Republic (1980-1988): when the conglomerates were pressured by the military government to take responsibility for team. As a consequence of this origin, substantial authority was given to the KBO and the eight professional teams in order to compensate for the businesses’ discontents. In this regard, this might be conceived of as the instrumental use of sport to achieve the regime’s political purpose (cf. Green, 2003; Green & Houlihan, 2005). A pertinent instance of such a power and authority of the KBO and the eight professional baseball teams can be understood through the fact that the KBO has not expanded the number of the professional teams since 1990 (Ma H, 2009). The reason was due, in part, to the unwillingness of existing professional baseball teams to accept a new
professional team. Moreover, the fact that a new club have to offer baseball development fund for its entry into the current professional baseball league has made it to found a new professional club (Ahn M, 2002). In other words, the KBO maintain a high ‘entry barrier’ to the league (cf. Arthur & Sheffrin, 2003).

The instrumental use of sport in South Korea leads on to the presidency of the leading sports organisations including NGBs (here the KBO and KBA). It is generally acknowledged that Korean elite sport development has benefited from substantial sums from business and from politicians’ influence as noted in previous chapters (athletics and archery). As mentioned earlier, the position of businesses leaders as head of the KBA has been due largely to the lack of other sources of finance since its establishment, which is addressed in a similar manner as observed in the sport of athletics and archery. Interestingly, when the politician Kang Seung-Kyu took over the presidency of the KBA for amateur baseball in 2009, a critical debate on the practice of such a personnel appointment was rekindled within baseball circles. The issue has been a major concern for the Korean elite baseball over the years. More specifically, providing jobs for incumbent or retired politicians and officials of a government agency is defined as ‘parachuting personnel appointment’ which has been borrowed to describe this practice (The Korea Herald, 2003). Even the publication, *The hundred Years of Korean Baseball* (1999), points out that the habitual parachuting personnel appointment undermines baseball’s aspiration for a commissioner of the KBO who is experienced in baseball. Since the creation of the KBO in the early 1980s, the relationship between the body and government has been beset with the matter of parachuting personnel appointments. The fact that nine commissioners of a total eleven KBO commissioners were politicians or/and senior government officials reflects the facet that the KBO and the sport have not been free from political interference and government influence (Kim S et al., 2005). This situation originated from a bureaucratic system of hierarchy in the Korean elite sport system that is recognised as a legacy of the past authoritarian era (Ahn M, 2002). For example, after the resignation of Park Young-ho, commissioner of the KBO in 2005, the body failed to take action to prevent a political appointment. This is because the KBO has to seek approval from government (MCST). Indeed, Lee Yong-II, the first secretary-general of the KBO, provides evidence that helps to understand the government’s attitude towards the selection of the commissioner stating that ‘a senior official at the MCST expressed a sense of disappointment and concern to the KBO, through the media, that the KBO had appointed a new commissioner without
prior consultation’ (Lee Y, – Joins, 2008). The following figure shows the KBO’s low autonomy in the appointment of the commissioner.

**Figure 8.3 The procedure of appointing a commissioner of the KBO**

![Diagram showing the procedure of appointing a commissioner of the KBO]

Source: Adapted from The Sports Chosun (27 November 2005)

The KBO seems to have been blighted by the low degree of autonomy. At the heart of such concerns is the lack of expertise of the commissioners to deal with the major problems such as the chronic deficits of the professional baseball clubs and outdated infrastructures (especially old-fashioned local baseball stadiums).

**8.3 Identification of the key dimensions of elite sport policy development**

**8.3.1 Identification of, and support for, young talented athletes**

Overall, the Korean baseball’s approach to youth talent identification depends heavily on school baseball teams and little baseball clubs (organised out-of-school baseball teams for children between the ages of eight and thirteen). In other words, many young talented athletes in baseball have been identified and nurtured by school teams and coaches as in the sports of athletics and archery. Neither the KBA nor the KBO were involved in a systematic and structured talent identification programme until the mid 2000s. Therefore, the area of identification and support for talented athletes has remained weak and unsystematic until the mid 2000s. As the current secretary-general of the KBA related, ‘the organisation could not afford to invest a substantial amount of money in a structured talent identification programme.
and in the provision of financial aid for young talented athletes due to the financial difficulties of the KBA’ (Interview: 26 November 2008). Indeed, most school baseball teams and athletes have been nurtured and developed by financial aid from parents of student-athletes, and some school teams of high reputation have been partially subsidised by their alumni associations (Kim H, – Sisapress, 2009). Thus, it would not be an overstatement to say that the KBA’s approach to youth talent identification and talent nurturing has leaned entirely on school teams and private sector, especially little baseball clubs.

The mid-2000s witnessed a significant institutional change in the area of youth baseball. The creation of the Task Force for Fostering Junior/Youth Baseball (hereafter TF) under the leadership of the KBO in 2006 can be seen a starting point for the development of junior/youth baseball. Along with a growing awareness within the sport of the importance of the development of junior/youth baseball, the influence of the Korean baseball team’s head coach Kim In-Sik at the 2006 World Baseball Classic (WBC) was significant in the initiative of the TF. The founding background of the TF is explained by a team leader of the TF at the KBO, who stated that:

Kim In-Sik, who has always been interested in the development of junior/youth baseball, suggested that we should create an exclusive unit responsible for junior/youth baseball development when he had been nominated for a head coach of the Korean baseball team at the 2nd WBC in 2006. At that time, he argued that now we have to invest in and support junior/youth baseball players on the basis of a long-term plan, otherwise it will be too late … The TF was initially founded under the leadership of the KBA. However, the TF was handed over to the KBO because the KBA was in financial difficulty (Interview: 28 November 2008).

The KBA could not afford to make a commitment to invest in and support the development of junior/youth baseball due to its weak financial position. ‘Although the KBA is responsible for amateur baseball development including the area of junior/youth baseball, it depends heavily on the KBO’s intervention in the development of junior/youth baseball and its financial support’ (Interview: the executive director of the KBA, 26 November 2008). As mentioned in the previous section, it appears that the baseball ToTo, introduced in 2006, has helped the KBO to implement the structural change for junior/youth baseball development. This commitment of the KBO to the development of junior/youth baseball is rooted in its financial power, as there is the wide disparity in financial resources between the KBA and
KBO. As the power and authority of an organisation and group often resides in the financial wealth (quoted in Green, 2003:237), the KBO with the Korean Professional baseball League (KPBL) and the profits (ten per cent) from Baseball ToTo enabled the organisation to exercise power and authority over the KBA. From the perspective of theories of the state, as the KBO, which owns the professional baseball league comprised of eight professional baseball clubs under the ownership of eight big business companies, exercises more leverage over the KBA in the elite baseball sector, this observation has resonance with neo-pluralism which highlights business groups’ power in the policy-making process in a capital society.

The formation of the TF in 2006 enabled the KBO to pave the way for detailed and more substantial supporting programmes for the development of junior/youth baseball than ever before. In the first year of implementation, key achievements of the *Task Force for Fostering Junior/Youth Baseball* were: firstly, providing each with up to 5 million won worth of baseball equipments to 105 primary school teams and 24 little baseball clubs, and providing 7 million won worth of baseball equipments to 7 start-up team; secondly, the formation of a consultative group of parents of student-athletes in primary and middle schools of Seoul; thirdly, 20 series of interviews with local government heads; fourthly, the distribution of tee-ball and hold of 11 tee-ball workshops; and finally, the holding of the *National Junior/Youth Baseball Tournament for KBO Commissioner’s Championship Cup* (KBO, 2006). Here it should be noted that the TF is designed to financially support baseball teams focusing entirely on the junior level (primary school teams and little baseball clubs), and to encourage the development of junior/youth baseball rather than to identify young talents in the sport. Given that the maintenance of junior/youth school baseball teams are becoming difficult due to long-term structural problems such as the falling number of students, limited playgrounds for the sport and budget shortage (KBO, 2006), the TF has made a significant contribution to primary school baseball teams (including little baseball clubs) and young athletes. The TF’s financial aid and efforts for the development of youth baseball are of deep import in a situation where the sport of baseball has been classified as popular sport since the early 1980s so that it has been excluded from the financial support of the 16 municipal and provincial offices of education (KBO, 2006). Moreover, it should be noted that the reason why the number of little baseball clubs and players has sharply increased in 2007 is not disconnected from the role of the TF (see below Table 8.1).

Table 8.1 The Number of registered athletes and clubs in the sport of athletics, 1989-
### 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Little baseball</th>
<th>Primary school</th>
<th>Middle school</th>
<th>High school</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of teams</td>
<td>No. of players</td>
<td>No. of teams</td>
<td>No. of players</td>
<td>No. of teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1325</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1764</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1745</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from 2007 Business Plan (KBA 2007: 135-136)

Given the importance of amateur baseball encompassing junior and youth levels of baseball as the root of international sporting success and professional baseball development (Lee S, - Hankook Ilbo, 2007), the increasing emphasis on the junior and youth levels of baseball was a powerful motivating factor for the KBO. Indeed, even though the Korean baseball team achieved the fantasy of reaching the semi-finals in the 2006 World Baseball Classic, the decline of amateur baseball, encompassing junior and youth levels, had been pinpointed as the biggest problem in the Korean baseball. As the Korean baseball team’s head coach Kim, In-Sik at the 2006 World Baseball Classic (WBC) related, it is needed to develop a sound framework in which many children can easily take up baseball in support of the Korean baseball team’s continued success (quoted in Yang S, - Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2006). In addition, although the Korean baseball team achieved very successful results in Beijing (Gold medal) and the 2nd World Baseball Classic (victory in the semi-finals), the base of junior and youth levels of Korean baseball has been often compared with that of Japan baseball: namely, as of 2008, there were 55 Korean high school baseball teams vs. 4100 Japanese high school baseball teams. In this respect, it is articulated that the recent great successes in Beijing and WBC have been often likened to a near miracle. On the performance of the Korean baseball team at the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2nd World Baseball Classic, a team leader of the TF at the KBO said that ‘it was a wonderful achievement to win a gold medal in Beijing and to reach the final in the WBC, nevertheless it should be acknowledged that Korean baseball is...
still inferior to the strong countries of the sport, such as Japan and the United States’ (Interview: 28 November 2008).

However, here it might be persuasive to link the great achievements above to the formation of the technical committee under the operating committee of the speciality committee in 2006. As mentioned in the previous section, the failure of the Korean baseball team at the 2006 Doha Asian Games fuelled the founding of the technical committee that is designed to construct a more systematic and structured approach to the national athlete selection. Indeed, the technical committee has been regarded as a key factor in the recent great achievements. In this context of Korean baseball success, Korean baseball team’s coach Kim, Sung-Han at the 2nd World Baseball Classic (WBC) highlighted the importance of the formation of the technical committee on MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Cooperation) Network’s 100-minute Show ‘Debate and Analysis’:

To a great extent, what the KBO did well was the construction of a systematic framework for selecting the national players via the technical committee after the miserable defeat in the 2006 Doha Asian Games. One of the most important tasks of the technical committee is dealing with the selection of national players in a fair and systematic manner. In the past, there was a tendency for Korean baseball coaches to select national players who stood in their favour. But, I think that a more transparent selection process of national players might be a significant element in maximising the performance of the Korean baseball team and in achieving the great results in Beijing and the 2nd WBC, (quoted in the program, 26 March 2009).

This observation highlights the KBO’s emphasis on the national player selection system which was seen to be so important in the sport of archery. Actually, given the unique Korean features of social networks such as Hakyun (same school ties), Jiyun (same hometown ties) and Hyeulyun (blood ties), it cannot rule out the potential that a head coach of Korean baseball team would select the national players of the sport in a biased manner. Thus, the KBO’s policy decision had a significant impact in preventing such a partial selection process. In this respect, power and authority which are entirely entitled to a head coach of Korean baseball team might be distributed to some degree via the technical committee in the process of the national player selection at least.
The last point leads us to the lack of provision of a talent identification program. On this issue, a team leader of the TF at the KBO stated that ‘we are planning to launch a talent identification programme in the near future, but rather need time in order to finance the introduction of a talent identification programme beyond the TF’s activities’ (Interview: 28 November 2008). It could be argued that the KBA and KBO have not constructed a systematic and structured approach to talent identification. As such, talent identification is still an underdeveloped area. Perhaps, it is due partially to the relative popularity (i.e. there is a large youth participation base) of the sport among the public unlike the sport of athletics because there is the nation’s relatively well structured professional baseball league.

8.3.2 Improvements in coaching, sports science and facilities

8.3.2.1 Coaching

The government intention to nurture coaches at the elite level in a systematic and structured manner is linked to the national coaching qualification system as noted in the sport of athletics. Even though the government has developed the national coaching qualification system at the elite level of the 50 sports affiliated to the KSC since 1974, coaching development in the sport of baseball has made little progress over the years. Apart from the national coaching qualification system, there has been no specialised coaching course provided by the KBA and KBO. Indeed, a lack of high-quality coaches was pointed out in the report on the current status of, and promotion plan for, Korean junior-youth baseball published by the KBO (2006). While the KBA and KBO have largely relied on the national coaching qualification system as the way to enhance coaching eligibility and development in the sport of baseball (see Table 8.2 below), the area of coach development for the KBA has not been a principal concern for the general development of baseball over the years. The KBA states that in order for a candidate to register as a coach, he should hold an athletic coaching licence of the 1st or the 2nd class (Yoo H et al., 1999). According to a former coach of a high school baseball team, ‘we need to hold the 2nd athletic coaching certificate to be qualified to coach and instruct players in the dugout of a baseball stadium/field, but I have not seen any other system by which the KBA seeks to enhance and develop the quality of
coaches during nine years of my coaching experience’ (Interview: 27 October 2009). Coaching development in baseball, then, seems to depend on the training experiences that coaches acquired during their years. This observation can be connected with the situation of Singapore’s coaching development as Lim stated that ‘a significant proportion of the coaching community in Singapore still use traditional methods gleaned from experience in their respective sports’ (quoted in Teo, 2008: 100). As such, for the KBA and KBO coaching development has not been considered a key element in achieving elite sporting success, even though the national coaching qualification system has been developed in a comprehensive and integrated manner in 50 sports at the elite level.

Table 8.2 Number of coaches (instructors) in the sport of baseball: 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First class</th>
<th>Second class</th>
<th>Third class</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Athletic coach</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,602</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>1,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of SFA leader</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>308</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, there are two key examples of policy change in respect to coaching development. Firstly, following the failure of the Korean baseball team at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, the decision by the KBA to allow coach/instructor interchange between amateur and professional baseball in 1996 was a watershed for the development of coaching sector as it enabled coaches of professional teams to work in the amateur baseball sector (Yoo H et al., 1999). Even though the decision of the KBA was designed to enhance technical skill/knowledge and develop the quality of coaches at the amateur level of the sport with the help of the professional baseball sector, the decision led strong opposition from the amateur sector, especially coaches of high school and collegiate baseball teams. As discussed earlier, this decision was one of the key sources of conflict between a coalition of amateur baseball coaches and a coalition of (ex-)professional baseball athletes and coaches (for more information see the previous section).

Secondly, along with a growing need for a sharper focus on junior-youth coach development at the elite level, the holding of the initial junior-youth coach academy in 2007 under the supervision of the Task Force for Fostering Youth Baseball can be seen as the first
intervention of the KBO and KBA in implementing coaching education and developing the professionalism of coaches in the sport of baseball. ‘The launch of an annual junior-youth coach academy is the first indications of the steps taken by the KBO to construct a holistic junior-youth baseball development strategy and to respond to the urgent need to develop junior-youth baseball’ (Interview: a team leader of the TF at the KBO, 28 November 2008). The program contents of the academy held in 2007 were aimed at helping coaches at the junior/youth levels of the sport to acquire effective training methods and how to prevent injury to young players (KBA 2007 & KBA/KBO, 2008). In comparison with other areas of elite sport policy development in baseball, it could be argued therefore that the area of coaching development in the sport of baseball remained marginal to overall development strategy until very recently.

8.3.2.2 Sports science

Given the importance given to the application of science by both athletics and archery, it would be surprising if the sport of baseball did not have a similar interest in scientific methods. Indeed, it would not be an overstatement to say that the sport of baseball has a complicated and varied engagement with science in which the three elements of pitch, hit and run are reconciled to make better performance. Reflecting the trend of taking advantage of science and technology to improve sports team’s performance and athletes’ technique (Coakley, 1998), the use and application of sports science in the sport of baseball in South Korea has been universalised. In particular, as Ricky argues, ‘baseball is a science’ (quoted in Puerzer, 2003:72), each of the eight professional baseball clubs of Korea has a technical coordinating team composed of a couple of specialists who take full charge of analysing technical performances (e.g., using statistical data) based on a scientific methodology which is regarded as a highly important factor for increasing the teams’ performance and technique. As there is a continuously increasing awareness of the importance of sports science in the sport of baseball, Korean professional baseball clubs’ scientific approach to the sport reflects the critical value of sports science. According to the team leader of the TF at the KBO, the use of scientific technology and knowledge in the sport of baseball (especially, in Korean professional baseball clubs) might be the key to the recent great success and development of the sport (e.g., Gold medals won in Beijing, the Korean baseball team’s victory in the semi-finals in the 2nd WBC and semi-finals advance in the 1st WBC). In this context of the Korean
From other countries’ viewpoint, the key to Korean baseball success has been equivocal. Despite the Korean baseball team’s complete victory in Beijing, it was commonly said (largely by Japanese journalists) that Korean baseball has been lucky. However, when the Korean baseball team beat the Republic of Venezuela at the 2nd WBC in the United States, it was argued that the level of Korean baseball had been raised to that of the Major League Baseball (MLB). The reason that Korean baseball has been developed to such an extent is not only due to the KBO’s efforts, but also, in my view, to the introduction of new skills, scientific knowledge and technology by riding (going with) the trend of world baseball (American baseball and Japanese baseball in particular) since the mid 1990s (quoted in the program, 26 March 2009).

However, it should be mentioned that the recent great successes of Korean baseball have been largely rooted in the efforts and investments of the professional baseball clubs rather than in those of government, the KBA and KBO. In other words, ‘this lack of drive within the sport’s governing body in regard to the development of sports science is perhaps associated with the fact that the sport’s governing body has relied entirely on the self-regulating drive of the professional baseball clubs’ (Interview: the former coach of a high school baseball team, 27 October 2009). In the context that all professionals of the sport have been allowed to participate in major international sporting events since 1997, top-level professionals, selected from the eight professional baseball teams including Korean players who had migrated abroad and benefited from the use of sports science of their teams, have played a key role in contributing to the recent excellent outcomes. Indeed, ‘every professional team in South Korea has invested a lot of money in hiring specialists in analysing technical performances based on scientific methods, physical/fitness/health trainers, coaches and scouts rather than in hiring potential staff in the area of sports marketing’ (Ma H, 2009: 158). This observation is perhaps indicative of the greater emphasis placed by professional teams on the result (victory) than on profit. In contrast to the investment by the professional clubs, there has never been a policy of investment in sports science from the sport’s governing bodies or government. The indifference of the sport’s governing body and government towards a systematic and structured approach to sports science for the sport’s international success can be partially evidenced by the level of sports science support services provided by the Korea Institute of Sport Science (KISS) in which only one researcher responsible for supporting the sport’s
national team in comparison with archery which receive help from three researcher-led exclusive sports science support team.

7.3.2.3 Sport facilities

This sub-section deals with an issue that is primarily concerned with the development of infrastructure in the sport of baseball on a nationwide basis. At the heart of the recent debates over the development of the sport’s infrastructure is the construction or refurbishment of stadiums at the professional level of the sport. As a journalist Ahn S (2009) pointed out, the current priority given to infrastructure improvement is regarded as a legacy of the recent Korean baseball team’s victory in the semi-finals at the 2nd WBC. According to the above article (2009), a plan for the sport’s infrastructure announced by the commissioner of the KBO Yoo Young-Koo, appears to be gaining traction due to the recent international success. More specifically, alongside the Korean baseball team’s gold medal won in Beijing, the consecutive success of the sport at the 2nd WBC has been a crucial catalyst for policy change in the provision of sport facilities in general, the building of a domed-baseball stadium and the refurbishment of provincial baseball stadiums in particular. The building of a domed-baseball stadium capable of staging the sport’s major events (especially, the World Baseball Classic) is noteworthy as it is a controversial proposal often opposed by local civic originations. The increasing prominence of the issue of a domed-baseball stadium is highlighted by the actions of the KBO and three local governments in 2009 (e.g. the recent Ansan city’s announcement, Daegu Metropolitan’s aspiration, and a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between Gwangju Metropolitan and POSCO Engineering & Consulting Co, to construct a domed-baseball stadium). The KBO and the local governments both support the building of a domed-baseball stadium but for different reasons. For the KBO the construction of a domed-baseball stadium is regarded as a vehicle for the development of the sport while for the municipal governments it is likely to be considered as a prestigious landmark for regional development.

The debate over the construction of a domed-baseball stadium which has been considered by the KBO in order to catch up with leading countries in baseball, such as the United States and Japan (Chang J, Kookmin Ilbo, 2009), has remained a long-cherished desire. The original plan to construct a domed-baseball stadium in South Korea goes back to 1995 when LG
Group declared an intention to build one in Seoul, following the LG Twins’ Korean Series Title won in 1994. However, progress in transforming the LG Group’s intention into domed-stadium was hindered by the controversy over the Seoul Metropolitan Government’s close links to LG Group in deciding the site (Ttukseom\textsuperscript{32}) and, also by the 1997 financial crisis (Hankook Ilbo, 1997). Therefore, the LG Group’s scheme failed to make progress. Since then, although there has been some apparent progress towards a domed-baseball stadium across the country (e.g., Seoul Metropolitan Government’s announcement to build it in 2003 and a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between the KBO and Ansan city and POSCO Engineering & Consulting Co), no building had begun (Kim K, – Hankyoreh, 2009). The main reasons for the failure to make a state on construction are economic (i.e. the cost of building the stadium and maintaining it). According to the Ansan city’s feasibility study, the cost of construction was estimated to be around 420 billion won (quoted in Lee S, - DongA Ilbo, 2009) As Kang Seung-Kyu, head of the KBA and a lawmaker of the ruling party, commented on \textit{MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Cooperation) Network’s 100-minute Show ‘Debate and Analysis’}:

There have been two attempts to construct a domed-baseball stadium in Seoul. One was a project to construct it in Ttukseom in 1990s and the other was an effort to construct it in Jamsil. That no progress made is due entirely to the fact that there were higher levels of risk and uncertainty raised. First of all, is there sufficient demand for using a domed-baseball stadium? Also, is there a really reasonable site for the building of a domed-baseball stadium? (In consideration of road access/traffic matter) (26 March 2009).

In a similar vein, even though some local governments have had an intention to construct a domed-baseball stadium over the last decade, their projects have come to nothing due to doubts about economic viability. It is here worth noting that the recent good results of the Korean baseball teams in international sporting events have created a favourable atmosphere for the building of a domed-baseball stadium, and therefore allowed the KBO and some local governments to revive the issue. 2009 witnessed some actual progress in constructing such a stadium: the start of the building of Gocheok-dong’s domed stadium which signalled a marked change in Korean baseball facility development. The Gocheok-dong’s domed stadium which will be the first domed-baseball stadium in South Korea is under construction.

\textsuperscript{32} Ttukseom is one of the ecological parks, which is called Seoul Forest located in northeastern Seoul. It was opened by the latest project in the Seoul Metropolitan Government’s ambitious plan to make the city eco-friendly.
It is should mentioned that the Seoul Metropolitan Government’s scheme of building the Gocheok-dong’s domed stadium which was initially designed to construct a half-domed shaped baseball stadium was changed into a domed-baseball stadium at the instance of baseball community centring on the KBO’s commissioner Yoo Young-Koo and the KBA’s head Kang Seung-Kyu (Roh W, - Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2009). Moreover, the success of the Korean baseball team at the 2nd WBC added to the momentum of the building of a domed-baseball stadium which has caused political issues in a couple of the provinces, especially in Ansan city and Gwangju metropolitan where there are fierce political battles between interest groups. For example, a coalition of key actors comprising of mayor of Ansan city and the ruling party lawmakers, with the support of the KBO, played an active role in the decision-making process of approving the bill for the building of a domed-baseball stadium in the city council. ‘Ansan Domed-Baseball Stadium Construction Countermeasure Committee’ as an opposition coalition, comprising of civil society solidarity networks such as ‘Ansan YMCA’ and ‘Ansan Citizen Coalition for Economic Justice’, is against the Ansan authorities’ project. The conflict of interests between the two coalitions was disclosed by the arguments of the Ansan Domed-Baseball Stadium Construction Countermeasure Committee in a media article, which stated that:

That Ansan authorities with less than one year to go before the mayor’s tenure ends are pushing ahead with the project of the building of a domed-baseball stadium at a cost of construction which is higher than the annual budget of Ansan city is irresponsible administration. Moreover, not only does Ansan city, with a population of 740,000, have a slim chance of bringing in a professional baseball club, but also it is not likely to be considered as a venue for staging World Baseball Classic. In this context, the scheme to build a domed-baseball stadium has to be withdrawn (quoted in Choi C - Yonhap News, 2009).

In addition, there was also opposition to the building of a domed-baseball stadium in Gwangju metropolitan. Participatory Autonomy Forum for 21C (PAF21C), a civic group, encapsulates the context of the decision-making process in relation to the building of a domed-baseball stadium:

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33 Gocheok-dong’s baseball stadium is designed to construct as one of the alternative baseball stadium in return for the Seoul authorities’ removal of Dongdaemun Baseball Stadium for the purpose of redeveloping Dongdaemun district.

34 Total working expense of the building of a domed-baseball stadium including the construction of multi-purpose apartment complexes is around 1.3 trillion won (Choi C, - quoted in Yonhap News, 2009/July). And Ansan city’s annual budget is no more than 1 trillion won: as of 2009, 888,681,984,000 won (Ansan city’s homepage - http://fin.iansan.net/04_sub/body02.jsp).
That unilateral decision made between only the Gwangju mayor and POSCO Engineering & Consulting Co, to the exclusion of Gwangju citizens in such a big project in which more than 4 trillion won might be invested in constructing a domed-baseball stadium is an example of a closed municipal administration system (Kim K. W, – Donga Ilbo, 2009).

Despite the constant controversy over the economic feasibility of the building of a domed-baseball stadium, a coalition of actors (the KBO’s executive members, local mayors, the ruling party lawmakers and Korea Baseball Development Research-centre\textsuperscript{35}) in favour of the building project share similar values and beliefs which consider the domed stadium crucial to the sport’s development. In a sense, in order to legitimise the construction of a domed-baseball stadium they quote some successful cases from the United States\textsuperscript{36} (the Astrodome initially constructed in 1965 in Houston of Texas) and Japan; in particular the Tokyo Dome which is seen as a model of best practice. From a perspective of policy learning, a good example of this is the more recent field trip (July 2009) comprised of the KBA’s secretary general (Lee Sang-Hyun), a high-ranking Seoul metropolitan’s official, and Hyundai Development Co., to the Tokyo Dome. Shared beliefs and values of the coalition supporting the building of a domed-baseball stadium are partially reflected by the KBO’s secretary general Lee Sang-II’s argument that it is possible to create an effective business model to make a profit from a Korean professional baseball club playing in a domed-baseball stadium despite the fact that every Korean professional baseball clubs has been running a deficit over recent years (quoted in Shin B, – Sportschosun, 2009). However, in opposition to the building of project, a coalition of civic groups also quotes the examples of the financial failure municipal World Cup stadiums which have become a burden on local governments since the 2002 Football World Cup. Their perceptions and beliefs are borne out by the Ansan Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice’s secretary general Kim Kyung-min in an interview with ‘Ssam’, an in-depth investigative documentary programme of the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), on the political issue of the building of this type of stadium, who related that:

I think that with less than one year left until the next election for the local government head (administrative chiefs) the intention of the local government head to finalise the matter of the building scheme seems to be seen as a typical political-action because the construction of a

\textsuperscript{35} Korea Baseball Development Research-centre as a private body corporate was founded in 2005.

\textsuperscript{36} The total number of domed baseball stadiums in the United States and Japan is 8 and 6 respectively.
domed-baseball stadium could be conceived as a good project for his great administrative achievement, alongside the Korean baseball team’s recent brilliant achievements (in Beijing and in the 2nd WBC) that helped to heat the rise of baseball boom across the country (quoted in the program, 16 June 2009).

As such, it is suggested that the policy process surrounding the construction of this sporting facility is framed by two coalitions advocating divergent belief systems. Although Korean society is becoming pluralistic, it could be argued that it might be symptomatic of strengthening elite influence on the elite sport policy process. The nature of the closed policy-making process between the KBO and local government heads and a few business groups resonates with the concept of an advocacy coalition or a local elite but it was highly politicised. In addition, in terms of theories of the policy change at the meso-level, in particular the ACF, the recent successful results of Korean baseball team in Beijing and 2nd WBC might be conceived of as an exogenous factor for policy change in that the results prompted key actors involved in elite baseball policy process and politicians to a sense of necessity and value of the building of a domed-baseball stadium. In other words the international victory provided the window of opportunity for advocacy groups.

In addition to the new stadiums, the results of Korean baseball team in Beijing and in the 2nd WBC have functioned as a catalyst for the refurbishment of old-fashioned municipal baseball stadiums. Although there has been a growing awareness of the necessity of improving decrepit municipal baseball stadiums37, the problem has been neglected over the years. According to a Sports White Paper, as of 2009, there were officially 52 baseball stadiums on a public facility at the all levels of the sport (MCST, 2009). As the Korean baseball team’s coach Kim Sung-han at the 2nd World Baseball Classic (WBC) related on MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Cooperation) Network’s 100-minute Show ‘Debate and Analysis’, the Korean baseball team’s members consider the building of a domed-baseball stadium to be important but the modernisation of decrepit municipal baseball stadiums is just as important. One explanation for the lack of action by the KBO and KBA over the years is due, partially, to the Common Property Administration Law (Act). On this issue, Kang Seung-kyu, a lawmaker of the ruling party and head of the KBA, argues that:

37 For example, Daegu Baseball stadium was constructed in 1948, Daejeon Baseball stadium was built in 1964 and Gwangju Baseball stadium was constructed in 1965. Especially, Daejeon baseball stadium has been considerably improved because of the deep interest of Daejeon Metropolitan’s mayor (Huh K, – 2008:18)
Most baseball stadiums, including Jamsil Baseball Stadium of Seoul, Daejeon Baseball Stadium, Daegu Baseball Stadium and Gwangju Baseball Stadium, which are owned by their respective local self-governing bodies are common property. According to the Common Property Administration Law (Act), an authorisation for the use of common property is limited to three years. This is designed to block a potential controversy on business favour which might result in a situation where a certain group or business takes possession of the common property over the long term. Thus, professional baseball clubs have been unwilling to invest in renovating their respective baseball stadiums because it is not attractive to the clubs due to these regulations. Therefore, the provincial baseball stadiums are getting out of date (quoted in MBC Network’s 100-minute Show ‘Debate and Analysis’, 26 March 2009).

As such, while there has been an urgent need for the improvement of the obsolete municipal baseball stadiums over the years, there has been a barrier to action. Nevertheless, ‘little attention has been given to the improvement of the decrepit baseball stadiums, but the issue of the building of a domed-baseball stadium has been given much attention by politicians and key actors involved in baseball, as well as the public’ (Interview: the former coach of a high school baseball team, 27 October 2009). With regard the deterioration of baseball stadiums, Huh Koo-yeon argued that the facilities at Korean baseball stadiums were generally poor for players and fans with the exception of Seoul’s Jamsil Baseball Stadium and Busan’s Sajik Baseball Stadium: American baseball facilities, in particular baseball parks/stadiums aroused a sense of envy (quoted in Huh K, 2008). Huh Koo-Yeon has been especially interested in the area of facilities for the sport by raising the importance of, and calling for the improvement of infrastructure for the sport in general, and the remodelling of the out-of-date baseball stadiums in particular, while he has worked as a baseball commentator over the past 30 years. He was appointed as chairperson of the Baseball Development Executive Committee (BDEC) in June 2009 and was nicknamed ‘Huh-rastructure’ (the so-called ‘Huhfra’ named after his surname (cf. Huh K 2008). In this regard, his active role in capturing policy makers’ attention (cf. Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2007) and promoting the improvement of facilities for the sport can be conceived as the role of ‘policy entrepreneur’ as referred to in the multiple stream framework (MS). Accordingly, the influence of human agency and external factors such as the successes of Korean baseball teams in recent years has played a critical role in policy change. More specifically, the three reformed laws, the ‘National Sports Promotion Law’, ‘Sports Industry Promotion Law’ and ‘Regulation on Installation Standards, and Decision Structure of Urban Planning Facility’, surrounding the infrastructure of the sport were submitted to the National Assembly for approval in April 2009. The three revised bills
submitted and proposed by head of the KBA Kang, Seoung-Kyu (a lawmaker of the ruling party) were directly aimed at improving the out-of-date municipal baseball stadiums, and had a high potential to be approved by the National Assembly (Lee S, - Edaily SPN, 2009). According to the revised Sports Industry Promotion Law, the local governments have to allow professional club use for a period of 25 years: previously 3 years (Kang S et al., 2009). Eventually, the revised bills (‘National Sports Promotion Law’ and ‘Sports Industry Promotion Law’) passed the National Assembly in December 2009. Therefore, it is expected that the professional baseball clubs will invest in refurbishing the municipal outdated stadiums by renting their hometown stadiums for longer periods.

It should be pointed out here that an active lobby of the Baseball Development Executive Committee centring on Huh Koo-Yeon has contributed to the establishment of an exclusive training centre for use by the national baseball team in Goyang city. Indeed, in the Goyang city’s planning process, the BDEC’s influence was a significant in the signing of a bilateral agreement for the building of Goyang National Baseball Centre (Goyang NBC – aims to open in October 2011) between the KBO, KBA and Goyang city authorities in September 2009 (Kang P, - OSEN, 2009). The centre is especially designed for the national athletes to focus on training in a situation where no other exclusive training ground exists for the national baseball team despite the country having a world-class Korean baseball team. Such activity by the BEDC can be not only seen an instructive point in explaining key actors’ influence on the policy-decision process, but can also be conceived as an entrepreneurial skill for policy change.

8.3.3 The provision of more systematic competition opportunities for elite level athletes

Before investigating the development of systematic competition opportunities for elite level athletes, it should be noted that the competition structure at the elite level in South Korea fragments into the professional baseball league and amateur baseball league. As mentioned earlier, the Korean Professional Baseball League (KPBL) founded in 1982 is made up of eight professional clubs and controlled by the KBO. It could be argued that the relatively stable KPBL has contributed to producing top-level players whose role has been, in part,
documented by the international successes in a situation where every professional baseball player has been allowed to participate in major sporting events since 1997. The KPBL has played a critical role in creating a clear pathway for excellent young players of the sport to retain their sport career. On this issue, the team leader of the TF at the KBO related that ‘in a strict sense Korean baseball still lags behind Japanese baseball, but the calibre of top level professional players supplied from the KPBL is little different from that in Japan’ (Interview: 28 November 2008). On the other hand, the amateur baseball league which encompasses the primary school to collegiate levels of the sport is governed by the KBA. According to the former coach of a high school baseball team, ‘the relatively well developed competition structure at the youth level of the sport is perhaps the source of the recent achievements of Korean baseball team, in spite of poor overall infrastructure in the sport’ (Interview: 27 October 2009). Here, it is more relevant to look at the competition structures and opportunities at the amateur level of the sport which encompasses school baseball leagues which have arguably paved the way for the development of Korean elite baseball.

On the issue of competition structures and opportunities for elite level student-athletes it is worth noting that at the heart of the development of amateur baseball leagues were the high-school leagues of the sport. Arguably, baseball in South Korea became popular among the public at the time when high-school baseball enjoyed a golden age during the mid 1960s and 1970s. The social and cultural background of the heyday of the high-school baseball leagues is revealed by Chung Hee-Jun, a professor in the sociology of sport, stating that ‘high-school baseball was an important remedy for homesickness and the hard life of labourers who came to big cities from their homes in the early years of industrialisation… they supported their hometown’s high-school teams of the sport’ (2009: 177). Indeed, major newspaper companies such as JoongAng Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo, Donga Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, as well as a few local newspaper companies in partnership with the KBA served as host to the national high-school baseball leagues (Yoo H et al., 1999). As noted earlier, there are four major competitions for elite level high school players of the sport at the national level: ‘the National High-school Baseball for Blue-Dragon Championship Flag’ founded under the sponsorship of Chosun Ilbo in 1946, the National High-school Baseball for Goldlion Championship Flag’ founded under the sponsorship of Donga Ilbo in 1947, ‘the National High-school Baseball for President's Championship Cup’ founded under the sponsorship of Joongang Ilbo in 1967 and the National High-school Baseball for Bonghwang Championship Flag founded under the sponsorship of Hankuk Ilbo in 1971.
In addition, there are four major meetings for them held in the provinces sponsored by local newspapers. These meetings have been regarded as prestigious competitions which have played an important role in nurturing superior young players of the sport. In fact, in association with the KBA, ‘these newspaper companies have contributed to creating and developing co-ordinated competition structures and opportunities for high-school players of the sport’ (Interview: the former coach of a high school baseball team, 27 October 2009). As noted above, even though the high-school baseball leagues sponsored by the major newspaper companies in partnership with the KBA have lost their popularity since the launch of KPBL in 1982, the leagues have paved the way for the sport’s success at international sporting events. Namely, it is argued that such baseball leagues at high school level have been the critical pathway of identifying and developing future professional baseball players. As of 2009, there were the 24 official national meetings for the sport at the amateur level encompassing the area from primary school to university including the National Junior Sports Festival and the National Sports Festival (see below Table 8.3). The number of competitions has remained largely unchanged over the years.

Table 8.3 Number of domestic competitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of domestic competitions</th>
<th>For primary/little baseball players</th>
<th>For middle school players</th>
<th>For high school players</th>
<th>For university school players</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from 2007 & 2009 Business Plans of the KBA

Of particular note, in relation to policy change, is the intervention by the KBO in the provision of competition opportunities for the amateur level of the sport, junior level and collegiate level in particular. As discussed earlier, the TF founded in 2006 allowed the KBO to hold a new junior baseball tournament as part of its extensive project to promote junior/youth baseball development in 2007. The ‘National Junior/Youth Baseball Tournament for KBO Commissioner’ Cup’ was initially held and staged for the 101 primary school teams and 34 little baseball clubs under the joint sponsorship of the KBO, KBA and Pohang city government in 2007. The KBO and the Pohang city government invested 400 million won and two hundred and fifty million won respectively for the tournament (Pohangnews, 2007). Moreover, in order to offer more competition opportunities to collegiate players of the sport
the KBA held the National University Baseball Tournament for KBO Commissioner’ Cup in 2008 under the sponsorship of the KBO. As the secretary general of the KBA highlighted, ‘although the KBA are willing to provide many more competition opportunities than previously to student-players of the sport, it is not easy to open many competitive meetings due to the lack of the governing body’s finance: annual budget’ (Interview: 26 November 2008).

Another important point leads to the recent context of the Korean sport system. As discussed in the previous chapter, some problems such as the issue of the human rights of student-athletes within the elite sport system have emerged as social issues. Given the importance of the problems surrounding the elite sport development process, a significant aspect of school sport (not PE) is linked to the issue of competition structures/opportunities for student-athletes. In recent years there has been growing concern over a decline in the scholastic ability of student-athletes due to their non-attendance in class. As an example of policy change in respect of the provision of competition structures for student-athletes, the first Korean Football Association (KFA)’s declaration regarding the introduction of regional weekend leagues for student-athletes of the sport in November 2008 is highly regarded as an alternative policy approach to the matter of class room absence of student-athletes (MEST, 2008b). Reflecting the policy shift of the sport of football, the policy community surrounding the sport of baseball is considering the introduction of regional leagues for student-athletes of the sport on weekends instead of holding national meetings and leagues for them on weekdays. On this issue, the secretary general at the KBA related that ‘we fully sympathise with the introduction of such a policy and are willing to make a decision like that of the KFA but we need to wait and see what would happen in the sport of football for the time being’ (Interview: 26 November 2008). In addition, as there are changing perceptions and beliefs of actors, the Korea Baseball Development Research-centre (KBDR) pointed out the necessity of improvement to the competition structures for student-athletes in the sport of baseball at an open forum on a development strategy for the improvement of baseball infrastructure held in April 2009, the aim of which was to tackle the problems of striking a balance between study and training (KBDR, 2009). Policy change for the introduction of regional leagues at weekends is highly regarded as imperative to balancing between study and training/competition attendance and to achieving the sport’s enduring success at major international sporting events. Thus, aware of the problem, a coalition of actors centred on the KBDR has recently been calling for change to the current competition structure.
Lastly, it should be noted that the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) decision to drop baseball from the 2012 London Olympics in 2005 was, arguably, a significant loss of status for the sport at the international level and has also affected the status of the sport at the national level. The secretary general at the KBA related that ‘its exclusion from the Olympics was a shock to amateur baseball association’ (Interview: 26 November 2008). Even though the Korean baseball team won gold in Beijing, it has very little chance of elevating the sport to ‘A’ class with the highest priority (currently positioned in ‘B’ class, for more information see the previous chapter) due to the IOC decision. This means that ‘the status of baseball at the national level would be, to some degree, lost by the KSC, particularly at least in relation to funding/resources distribution’ (Interview: the secretary general at the KBA, 26 November 2008). In a similar vein, Houlihan (2009) argues, in relation to international influence on domestic elite sport policy, that domestic government decisions on the level of elite sport funding are perceptibly influenced by the exclusion or inclusion of a sport from the Olympics. As such, this is one of the most explicit instances of exogenous factors having an impact on policy. However, according to the team leader of the TF at the KBO, there would be no substantial impact on the sport and the KBO, arguing that ‘although the sport was dropped from the Olympics, there are still the relatively well structured professional leagues of the sport and another big international sporting event such as the World Baseball Classic, which has been regarded as a prestigious event since 2006’ (Interview: 28 November 2008). In this sense, it could be argued that the government (here MCST) has not been particularly concerned about elite sport development of baseball, but much more concerned with keeping good professional teams in the sport and improving local facilities with regard to the development of the sports industry in South Korea: at least as evidenced in the key policy documents (e.g. ‘Sport Industry Vision 2010’ published in 2005 by the MCST). Although there have been plenty of discussions on the development of Korean professional baseball in general and the revitalisation of the KPBL and infrastructure improvement at the professional level of the sport in particular, there has not been a significant policy document published by governmental bodies (MCST and KSC) or the sport’s governing bodies such as the KBA and KBO. Clearly, the Korean baseball approach to elite sport development has largely relied on the growth of KPBL which has led to the sport’s recent successes in international level. It could be therefore said that there is a perceived lack of government concern over elite sporting success of the sport at the international level, but a keen interest in promoting the
level of professional baseball (particularly the development of KPBL, spectator consideration and facilities), unlike as observed in athletics and archery.

8.4 Conclusion

This chapter ends with a brief summary of key implications from this analysis of the sport of baseball for the study of elite sport policy development. Consideration is given to the significant aspects of policy change and this section is thus organised in the same manner as in that of athletics and archery. The key implications for policy change in the sport of baseball are provided by the following three principal themes: (i) motivation, (ii) method; and (iii) consequence.

In terms of motivation, there are five key strands of change were. Firstly, the Korean baseball team’s failure to qualify for the 1992 Barcelona Olympics provided an important impetus for changing key actors’ perception towards the win-win relationship between amateur baseball and professional baseball that resulted in forming the amateur-professional cooperative committee in 1993. The formation of the amateur-professional cooperative committee can be seen as the initial official attempt for the sport’s two leading organisation to get cooperate on elite sport development. Indeed, Korean elite baseball sector has been beset by the imbalance and conflicts between amateur baseball and professional baseball which stemmed from the founding of the KPBL in 1982. Following the notion of Sabatier & Weible’s (2007) external shocks, the Korean baseball team’s early defeat in 1992 might be conceived of as a shocking factor for policy change in that it affected the change of beliefs and perceptions of key leaders involved in amateur baseball.

Here, in relation to the discussion on the relationship between amateur baseball (and KBA) and professional baseball (and KBO), the second strand of change can be linked to the debut of Hyundai business leader (Lee Hyun-tae, President of Hyundai Petrochemical Co.,) as head of the KBA in 1994. The Hyundai’s takeover of the presidency of the KBA was different from the involvement of Hyundai and Samsung in the sports of archery and athletics. Indeed, although the Hyundai business leader served as head of the KBA and contributed financially to the organisation, its intention was to prepare the outpost for its participation in the KPBL
(Yoo H et al., 1999). Following Hyundai’s takeover of the professional team Pacific Dolphins, the KBA’s head Lee Hyun-tae brought up the issue of integrating the KBA and KBO which opened visible confrontations between amateur baseball and professional baseball due to the different interest, most notably in relation to the matter of coach opening. The issue of integrating the KBA and KBO was eventually concluded in the rebirth of the amateur-professional cooperative committee in 1996. Moreover, with the IBAF’s decision on the inclusion of professional players in the Olympics, the KBO has enjoyed a dominant position in governing the elite baseball sector based on the relatively well structured professional baseball league. Along with the international shift of the sport, the KBO has been very influential in controlling the domain of elite baseball. The KBO’s power and authority over the leadership of the sport and the KBA stems from the fact that the KBO has offered the financial aid to the KBA since 2003, when it was faced with financial difficulty, and made a commitment to the provide a cash-award. As a professor of sport policy/sociology argued, ‘as it might be difficult for the KBA to run and operate its organisation without the KBO’s financial aid, the KBA is likely to seek to strengthen collaborative and close relations with the KBO’ (Interview: 12 October 2009). A distinctive characteristic of the changing relationship between the KBA and KBO is that the KBA has been becoming more and more dependent on the KBO for financial resources. Thus, such a relationship between the sport’s two leading organisations discloses a pattern of financial resource dependency. As in the case of UK athletics evidenced from the study of Green (2003), much of the KBO’s power and authority inheres in the financial wealth of the organisation, at least evidenced in the fact that some key administrative officials of the KBO have taken over a couple of administrative positions of the KBA in return for the financial aid (Chun B, – Internet Hankyoreh, 2003).

Thirdly, the introduction of Baseball ToTo in 2006 provided a significant impetus for the development of junior/youth levels of the sport. In particular, the policy decision on the creation of the Task Force for Fostering Junior/Youth Baseball (hereafter TF) under the KBO in 2006 has been motivated by and built upon the Baseball ToTo’s profits (10 per cent). As the team leader of the TF at the KBO explained, along with the concern over shared problems surrounding the sport of baseball, such as a decreasing number of young players and a falling birth-rate resulting in the need for a more sophisticated approach to identification and supporting of young players of the sport (cf. Houlihan, 2009), ‘the TF’s projects for the promotion of junior/youth levels of the sport have been based on the large amount of Baseball ToTo’s profits’ (Interview: 28 November 2008). Here, of particular concern, in
relation to Baseball ToTo’s profits, is a conflict of opinion between the sport’s two leading bodies, which was at the heart of power struggle over the leadership of the sport. Indeed, the KBO has taken the leadership and full authority in using the ToTo given to the organisation. Arguably, the power struggle between two organisations has stemmed from the different point of views amongst two bodies. Namely, from the point of view of the KBO, it is natural for the organisation to receive and use the ToTo profits, but the KBA’s position is that as part of the proceeds is to promote the development of junior/youth levels of the sport, the KBA should get control over the ToTo’s profits (Jang J, – Sportseoul, 2009). As such, contradictory interests between two organisations have led to power struggles over the years. Here it could be noted that the relative lack of visible intervention by the government and quasi-governmental bodies over the years on the conflicts between the sport’s leading organisations is due, in part, to a relatively high level of dependence on the autonomy of sport’s leading organisation, the KBO, to solve the conflict. As the Sports Promotion Division of the MCST is in charge of supporting the national governing bodies of sport, governing professional sport bodies (baseball, football, basketball, volleyball, etc.) and approving the business plan for the distribution of Sport ToTo’s proceeds, the government can exercise its influence over critical issues. Nevertheless, as the former assistant deputy minister at the MCST explained, ‘the government is unwilling to intervene in conflicts, but rather asks both sides to try and seek harmonious relationships with each other by expressing government’s viewpoint on a critical issue via an official document or telephone call’ (Interview: 08 November 2008). In relation to the power struggles between the sport’s two leading organisations, the government generally relied on the overall leadership by the KBO and the organisation’s commissioners who have largely been appointed by the government’s approval.

Fourthly, the foundation of the KPBPA as an umbrella group for professional players in 2000 can be seen as an illustration of a form of tentative pluralisation in the policy-making process of elite sport. Given the influence of the policy elite (most notably politicians, senior governmental officials and business leaders) surrounding elite sport policy process in South Korea, the founding of the KPBL reflects the likelihood that power could be distributed between competing interest groups (cf. Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987; Heywood, 2002). It should be recognised that the KBO and eight professional club owners of the sport appear to have had a powerful authority over the interests of professional baseball players over the years. Yet, along with the creation of the KPBPA, professional players, at least, seem to have
had an opportunity to defend and promote their interests with the KBO and club owners (Ahn M, 2002). In other words, their interests were mediated and interpreted by the KBO and club owners before the founding of the KPBPA, but their interests and rights could be represented and advocated by the organisation.

The processes of founding the KPBPA over the last decade draws attention to the mechanism by which Lukes’ (1974; 2005) three faces of power are revealed. Namely, it is useful to understand how the power relations underlying the professional baseball development process have been conceptualised by using Lukes’ power theory. For instance, it could be argued that power relations between the KBO/club owners and players had a resonance with the use and exercise of power embodied in the nature of the Lukes’ second dimensional view of power in which issues regarding the professional players’ interests and rights were prevented from reaching that arena by their clubs’ power with the KBO (cf. Bachrach & Baratz in Haugaard, 2002: 26). Extending Lukes’ (2005) third dimensional view of power, it was likely that the players’ interests and preferences were distorted by the KBO and club owners with the financial wealth before the creation of the KPBL. But, after the founding of the KPBL, it seems to be much more closed to the mechanism of Lukes’ first dimension of power in which there has been more visible competing conflicts between them because of different interests. Furthermore, in the process of transforming the KPBPA into a labour union, power relations between them might be compatible with Lukes’ second view of power in which a powerful group creates a barrier against participation of an interest group (Gaventa, 1980). Indeed, as noted earlier, the absence (refusal) of Samsung Lions- and LG Twins teams’ players to support the formation of a labour union discloses the explicit exercise of the Lukes’ second dimension of power in which power has been exercised covertly by the two clubs, that appears to have put internal and silent pressure on their players to oppose the formation of KPBPA (Kwon C - http://www.yagootimes.com/657). It should be noted that the KPBPA would become more influential if they succeed in transforming the organisation into a labour union.

Fifthly, the IOC decision to drop baseball from the Olympics has had a clearly negative impact on the domestic elite baseball domain. This is evident by the fact that even if the sport of baseball has an obviously good opportunity for promoting its status in the arena of elite sport policy as a consequence of having won the unexpected gold medal in Beijing, promoting the sport’s domestic status seems to be remote (at least reflected in the differential
financial support system for NGBs – for see more detail in the previous chapter). On this issue, the team leader of the TF at the KBO related that ‘the status of baseball at the central government level is not immune from the sport’s exclusion from the Olympics because the sport has a relatively robust domestic professional league and other prestigious international events’ (especially WBC) (Interview: 28 November 2008). However, as the KBA secretary general noted, ‘the exclusion of baseball from the Olympics has had an unfavourable impact on the development of the sport’ (Interview: 26 November 2008). It seems reasonable to assume that little consideration and attention is currently being given to the sport of baseball for the country’s elite sporting success at international sporting events by the government (MCST) and the KSC, as indicated by the fact that the sport does not have a top priority in terms of NGB financial support and receive a low level of sport science support from KISS (see more detail in the previous chapter and earlier section).

In terms of the process of policy change elite baseball has witnessed the founding of a variety of key committees for the development of sport at the policy elite level over the years, such as Amateur-Professional Baseball Development Committee in 1993, Technical Committee in 2006, Task Force for Fostering Junior/Youth Baseball in 2006 and Baseball Development Executive Committee in 2009. It appears that for the sport’s two leading organisations these committees have been considered as means of developing the sport of baseball, with the ultimate aim of increasing the sport’s international success. Especially, when reflecting on the motives for establishing these committees, it is useful to understand the mechanism by which the sport’s two leading organisations have responded to external factors which affected key actors’ values and beliefs. Indeed, exogenous factors, such as the sport’s failures at the 1992 Barcelona Olympics and the 2006 Doha Asian Games, brought about the media criticism that arguably affected beliefs and values of key actors involved in elite baseball, whose altered perceptions and beliefs played an important role in founding the Amateur-Professional Baseball Development Committee in 1993 and the Technical Committee in 2006. In addition, the unparalleled results of the Korean baseball teams at the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2nd WBC have awakened an interest in and awareness of the need for infrastructural modernisations for the continuing development of the sport, most notably in relation to the building of a domed-baseball stadium and the refurbishment of municipal baseball stadiums. It should be noted that if the past failures above functioned as one of the catalyst for the increased emphasis on medal-winning success at international sport events, the recent great successes have played a significant role in attracting public and political support for the
development of professional baseball. Namely, in recent years much policy development has been illustrated by a set of values and principles which prioritise the development of professional baseball and which have resulted in an emphasis on facility development at national- and sub-national levels for elite teams.

Such policy actions and initiatives concern two important aspects of the theory of policy change, most notably in respect of the notion of the ACF’s policy learning and multiple stream framework’s policy entrepreneur. Firstly, a significant mechanism of the policy decision-making in relation to the building of a domed-baseball stadium has focused on policy learning. Indeed, as in the case of the UK in 1994 when the government learned from Australia’s experience by visiting the country’s institute of sport (Houlihan 2009) the KBA’s secretary general (Lee Sang-hyun), a high-ranking official of Seoul metropolitan and an executive of Hyundai Development Co., visit to the Tokyo Dome provides an example of policy learning and transfer which resulted in providing a significant impetus for the building of the first-ever domed-baseball stadium in Seoul. Secondly, alongside the recent international success two key actors played significant roles in policy deliberation and policy change involved in infrastructures of the sport. Kang Seoung-Kyu, head of the KBA (a lawmaker of the ruling party) played an active role in pushing for law revisions to enable the refurbishment of outdated municipal baseball stadiums. Moreover, Huh Koo-Yeon, a baseball commentator and chairperson of the Baseball Development Executive Committee (BDEC), has been active not only in the origin of the Goyang National Baseball Centre (Goyang NBC), but also in calling for improvement in the out-of-date local baseball stadiums and for the construction of a domed-baseball stadium. Indeed, even if Huh Koo-yeon is outside the traditional elites (e.g. political and business elites), he has been putting emphasis on the need for the improvement of out-of-date municipal stadiums over a long period of time. While he has taken advantage of sympathy, context and climate for the refurbishment of outdated baseball stadiums and the building of a domed-baseball stadium, he has been successful in opening doors, to some extent, for the recent policy change in facility development by persuading political elites (e.g., heads of local governments) and brokering deals between other organisations. Arguably, the recent policy changes in relation to facility development could have taken place on the basis of the supportive political mood triggered by the recent international performances. In this sense, policy entrepreneurs recognised and exploited the favourable public opinion and were thus active in seizing opportunities in order to initiate policy action (Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2007).
Here, it is necessary to note the nature of the elite involvement in the decision-making. As mentioned earlier, the emergence of the Hyundai business leader as head of the KBA in 1994 had an influence on the relationship between amateur baseball/KBA and professional baseball/KBO. While there have been some conflicts and tensions between the two organisations over the years, the Hyundai business leader as head of the KBA tried to establish a cooperative partnership with the KBO, at least as evidenced by the formation of the Amateur-Professional Baseball Development Committee. In addition, the Hyundai business leader enjoyed a dominant position in developing the sport at the amateur level by offering a considerable sum of money to the KBA in the similar manner as perceived to be evident in the sport of athletics and archery. The financial aid from the Hyundai business group allowed the business elite to have a strong influence on policy-making within the sport. As such, the influence of big business companies on the NGBs is identified in the sport of baseball as the Hyundai business leaders held the presidency of the KBA until the early 2008.

It should be noted that even though baseball is no longer an Olympic sport, it is one of the biggest commercial sports. Therefore, the business elite has been interested in the professional level of the sport and indeed seven big business groups (Samsung, LG, KIA, Lotte, etc.) own the professional baseball clubs primarily as public relations vehicles for their businesses. Indeed, professional club owners along with the KBO’s considerable influence in the decision-making process of the sport which partly explains the contradictory interests between the KBO/club owners and the KPBPA/players. Moreover, there has been a close link between the political elite and business elite. For example, the government seems to expect that the business elite will look after baseball at the amateur and professional levels of the sport in a way that is consistent with government preferences. In recent years, alongside the growing need for the development of baseball infrastructure at the national level and sub-national level, politicians and business elites have joined together with the aim to develop baseball facilities by sharing their respective interests (e.g., commercial advantage for business and political purpose for politicians). This observation in the Korean baseball policy process has resonance with the concept of the power elite identified in Mill’s (1956) study as for the sport there has been a very close relationship between government, politicians and big businesses (see also Evans, 2006; Heywood, 2002). In fact, while the military elite’s power and influence on the sport policy process has been considerably weakened since the
emergence of civilian government in 1993, it has been replaced by the business and political elites.

Extending the influence of business leaders on the development of baseball in general, and the sport’s success in international competitions in particular, it is imperative here to note a cash-award system for medal winners in the sport of baseball, which has been one of the areas of elite sport policy development in South Korea. Over the last two decades we have seen that the cash-award system for medal winners in the sport of baseball has been regarded as one of the significant factors in leading to international sporting success and has been managed in a similar manner as identified in the sport of archery. However, the KBA has not dealt the cash-award system for medal winners in the same systematic manner as in athletics. Although the KBA has granted a cash-award for medal winners in international sporting events, the sport’s governing body has not established specific regulations for the system of a cash-award. It could be argued that even if a cash-award system has been considered as an inducement to international sporting success over the years, the issue of a cash-award system for medal winners does not seem to have been a major policy concern for the sport over time. At least as demonstrated in the key documents and media coverage involved in the sport, at the heart of policy concern for the sport has been the issue of facilities, competition structures/opportunities and talent-nurturing rather than cash incentives. According to the KBA secretary general, ‘a cash-award system has been considered as a financial incentive to achieve international success and/or to reward members of the Korean baseball team for their achievements/labours in the international arena but there has been relatively little concern for the holistic development of Korean baseball’ (Interview: 26 November 2008).

However, the past decade has witnessed slight changes in the operation and regulation of the cash-award system with three key distinctive features: firstly, 2002 can be seen a turning point in the provision of a cash-award system. Indeed, as noted earlier, the KBA faced financial difficulty in 2001 and 2002, when Jung Mong-youn, chairman of the Hyundai Capital co., resigned as head of the organisation in 2001, the sport’s governing body could not afford to offer a cash-award to the Korean baseball team which won the gold medal at the 2002 Busan Asian Games. Therefore, the KBO intervened on behalf of the KBA and the KBO’s commissioner Park Youngho and the eight heads of the professional baseball clubs agreed, in advance of the Busan Asian Games, to provide a cash-award of 100 million won in case of a gold medal (Sports Seoul, 2002). Since then, the moral obligation to provide a cash-
award system has been handed over by the KBA to the KBO. It can be argued that the KBA’s approach to a cash-award system relied too heavily on the head of the organisation (especially on private funds). The decision by the KBO, triggered by the financial troubles of the KBA, was a significant moment for undertaking responsibility for the provision of a cash–award system and reflected in a change in the balance of power between the two originations. For example, a cash-award of 300 hundred won per person was given to the Korean baseball team who won the 1982 World Baseball Championship by the KBA under the presidency of Hankook Cosmetics Co., (Kim E, - Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2008). Moreover, apart from the incentive money provided by the KBO and the sport’s professional baseball clubs, the KBA’s head Jung Mong-Youn offered a cash-award of ten million won per head to the Korea baseball team who won a bronze medal at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games (Roh W, - Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2006). On this issue of a cash-award, a sports journalist argued that ‘a sense of obligation to reward the national baseball members for their achievements should be given to the KBO rather than to the KBA because the national baseball teams have been made up of mostly professional players of the sport since the 1998 Bangkok Asian Games’ (Interview: 3 December 2008).

Secondly, alongside the relative failure of the sport at the 2006 Doha Asian Games, with a bronze medal, as well as the national team’s disqualification from the preliminaries of the 2004 Athens Olympic, the KBO made a decision to set up payment regulation on a cash-award for the national baseball team at the board meeting of the body in March 2008 in pursuit of winning a medal in Beijing (Roh J, - Yonhap News, 2008). The fact that the KBO has established the payment regulation on a cash-award can be understood in terms of the body’s first action to manage the system in a more coherent and transparent manner. According to the payment regulation (KBO, 2008), it was promulgated that the KBO shall provide a cash-award of a billion won if the national baseball team wins Olympic gold medal as it did in Beijing (500 million won for Olympic silver medal and 200 million won for Olympic bronze medal). The payment regulations made before the Olympics might, arguably, be conceived as a successful inducement to raise the morale of the national team for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.

Thirdly, the Korean baseball team’s victory in the semi-finals at the 2nd WBC has caused a conflict between the KBO and players/KPBPA. The conflict surrounding the regulation of prize money and the cash-award system can be understood in terms of the different interests
of the KBO and the players. The KBO decided to give a cash prize of 32 million won per person and asserted that this amount was in line with the cash prize of 2 million dollars for the winner of the semi-finals and a dividend of 1 million dollar received from the WBC organising committee. The KPBPA took a different view. They claimed that the total of 3 million dollars (a cash prize of 2 million dollars for the winners of the semi-finals plus the dividend of 1 million dollars), the 1.5 million dollars (fifty percent) offered by the KBO should be given to the players and that an extra cash-award of more than a billion won should be offered to them (Sung J, – Chosun Ilbo, 2009). Indeed, the 2009 Baseball Rules and Regulations - Article 1 of the operating regulation for the national baseball team - states that a cash-award of a billion won shall be given in case of an advance to the semi-finals at the WBC and a separate cash-award shall be made for a victory in the semi-finals and final-match (KBO, 2009). On this provision of a cash-award, the KBO insists that the provision is designed in case of a cash prize of below 1 million dollars (Choi K, - Hankook Ilbo, 2009). With regard to this conflict between the KBO and KPBPA, Lee Yong-Suk, a baseball analyst, argued in a media article that:

First of all, the conflict is largely rooted in the KBO’s inconsistent administration. The most likely explanation of the problem is the KBO’s decisions on an amount of cash-award that have been largely carried along by the atmosphere whenever the national team achieved unexpected results in international sporting events. Namely, running a cash-award system without underlying principles seems to be the source of the conflict (quoted in Lee Y, – Mediaus, September 2009)

The conflict has eventually spilled over into court but the outcome is currently unknown. It is worth noting the impact of KPBPA in advocating for professional players’ interests and rights and the extent to which it has re-balanced the lopsided power relations between the KBO and professional players.

In terms of consequences, a significant aspect of Korean baseball development draws attention to the concept of policy network. When considering Rhodes’ (1997) typology of policy networks, Korean baseball policy network might be a type of policy community. Following Marsh & Rhodes’ (1992a) notion of a policy community, there appears to be evidence of the formation of a policy community involving a small number of groups or actors (especially executive members of the sport’s two leading bodies, Hyundai business leaders, professional club owners and government agencies of sport), which shares common
perceptions and the ultimate goal of the sport’s success in international sporting events. However, following Jenkins-Smith’s (1999) development of the advocacy coalition framework, the KPBPA might be evidence of an emerging advocacy coalition, though one with a narrow focus like a trade union or interest group protecting interests of professional baseball players. Even if the actors constituting Korean elite baseball policy community exhibit some tensions between them (e.g., amateur baseball vs. professional baseball & KBO/club owners vs professional players/KPBPA), they have a shared objective in the development of baseball at the amateur level and professional level in order to produce a successful national team. In this regard, it could be argued that it might be a fragile policy community because they would have quite different interests in a particular setting/period.

While the Korean elite policy community for baseball includes interest groups seeking their respective interests they do not constitute advocacy coalitions with sharply divergent interests, for example medal success vs. mass participation. More specifically, the strength of values and beliefs which favour international sporting success based on the development of professional baseball has taken clear precedence over concerns with mass participation. The congruence of the policy values and principles of different actors and interest groups can be demonstrated by the fact that there has been much more debate over the development of baseball at the elite level and professional level than at the grass-root levels of the sport. Indeed, while there has been a lack of visible intervention at the grass-roots level of the sport by government, the evidence suggests that the government has been more concerned with the number of disputes over the development of baseball at the elite level and professional level, particularly in relation to coaching provision, national player selection, junior/youth levels of the sport, facility development and increasing spectator number attending KPBL matches. These concerns have therefore led to policy changes such as coach transfer, the formation of technical committees and the founding of TF for fostering junior/youth baseball. Given the recognition that the legitimated consensus on the criterion of success in relation to elite sport development is judged by gold medals at the Olympic Games (Green, 2003, Green & Houlihan, 2005, Houlihan & Green, 2008, see also De Bosscher et al., 2008), the recent achievements can be seen as the attainment of the country’s ultimate objectives. More latterly, alongside the recent brilliant performances, there have been overriding concerns with the development of professional baseball (KPBL), most notably focusing on the construction of a domed-baseball stadium and the refurbishment of municipal stadiums for the use of professional baseball teams.
Another important aspect of the sport was the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) decision to drop baseball from the 2012 London Olympics in 2005. As noted earlier, despite the fact that baseball is no longer an Olympic sport, it is still seen by the political elite as being an important sport for Korean national prestige. The most likely explanation of this is that there are other prestigious baseball events such as the World Baseball Classic and the Asian Games as well as the nation’s professional baseball league.
CHAPTER 9
Discussion and Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This chapter has three principal sections. The first section draws cross-case conclusions between the empirical findings of the three case studies as the logic of multiple-case design enables researchers to provide an ‘intensive comparison of a few instances’ (Hague et al., 1998: 280; see also Yin, 1994). Similarities and differences in the key findings from the two key themes (first, organisational structure, administration and influence of business/political leaders; and second, the four elements of elite sport development) are specifically considered in order to draw cross-case conclusions for the first section. The second section is concerned with a discussion of the theoretical insights set out in Chapter 2, with particular consideration given to evaluating the usefulness of the macro and meso-level theories including the aspect of power relations in the Korean elite sport policy context. The last section of the chapter concludes with brief methodological reflections on the study.

It is worth recalling the aim and three objectives of this study prior to addressing the chapter in depth. The study’s aim was to explore the development of elite sport policy in South Korea, focusing on an analysis of the process of policy change in the sports of athletics, archery and baseball. The three objectives were as follows:

- To trace the emergence, development and current status of elite sport policy in South Korea;
- To identify how elite sport policy has changed in response to both exogenous factors and endogenous factors;
- To evaluate the utility of the macro-level and meso-level theories of the process of policy change in relation to Korean elite sport development.

The first objective is substantively addressed in both chapters 4 and 5. The second objective is clearly addressed by investigating elite sport policy change in three sports in Chapters 6, 7
and 8. Nevertheless, the first section of this concluding chapter, with a focus on similarities and differences across the three sports, contributes to the discussion of the first and second objectives. The last objective will be clearly addressed in the second section of this chapter.

9.2 Comparison of policy frameworks for elite sport development: An identification of similarities and differences between the three case studies

The aim of this section is to draw together any cross-case conclusions from the analysis of the three case studies. Thus this section focuses on the key features and implications identified from the discussion of the two principal themes in terms of similarities and differences. The first sub-section is concerned with the comparison of the organisational structure, administration and influence of business/political leaders across the three sports. The second sub-section provides a comparative discussion of the four areas of elite sport development based on the findings from the three case studies.

9.2.1 Organisational structure, administration and influence of business and political leaders

A principal common feature that emerged in all three sports was the involvement of the conglomerate (Chaebol) in supporting NGBs. As revealed in the three case studies, each national governing body of sport was dependent upon the financial contribution of business leaders to develop its sport. In a situation where substantial government subsidy has not been sufficient for the NGBs, each national governing body of sport has been very eager to make long-term sponsorship deals with big business in order to secure additional financial aid. That the three sports’ governing bodies have been under the presidency of business leaders indicates their financial dependence on big businesses. The sponsorship relationship between the NGBs and businesses was an initiative spurred by the authoritarian government’s arm-twisting in the 1980s but rapidly gained recognition by the businesses involved as a form of corporate social responsibility and public relations (Park J & Boo H, 2008; Interview: the executive director at the KAA, 19 November 2008). For example, the Samsung and Hyundai’s use of sport with the presidency of the NGBs can be conceived as part of public
relations and corporate social responsibility. As such, the dependence of the NGBs on business’ financial contribution over the years has been largely due to the lack of its organisational capability in self-financing. The development of the governing bodies of all three sports is due to their lack of financial independence because their sports have a relatively low public and do not stimulate much media interest which would allow them to generate sponsorship and advertising revenues (cf. Green & Houlihan, 2005). As a result of this, the three sports have relied on the willingness of government and big businesses to provide some financial support for elite sport development over the years. The Chaebols (here, Samsung and Hyundai) have had an impact on both finance and organisational structure and administration over the years. Their influence on organisational structure and administration might be as a result of their ability to offer a considerable amount of finance into the sports. In a similar vein, as Green related that the power and authority of an organisation or individual abides in the financial wealth (2003:237), the KBO’s dominant power and leadership over baseball at the elite level might have originated from its financial wealth. A large part of the explanation for the lopsided power balance between the KBO and KBA is due to difference in wealth. Indeed, the KBO’s relatively high competence for self-financing based on its well-established professional league and eight professional clubs is revealed through the ways in which the organisation has provided some financial support with the KBA when it faced considerable financial difficulty after the resignation of the KBA’s head in 2001 (Jung, Mong-Youn, President of the Hyundai Capital co., January 1997 – 2000).

Furthermore, in contrast to both athletics and archery, a distinctive organisational structure and administration is observed in baseball. It is important to recall that the sport’s exclusive leadership was under the KBA for many years. However, in 1982 the creation of the KBO, which is the governing body for the KPBL, brought about organisational tensions and conflicts between the sports’ two leading bodies. Although the KBA was keen to cooperate with the KBO for the last 20 years (as evident in the formation of the Amateur-Professional Baseball Development Committee), the balance of power between the two organisations has been lost. Indeed, ‘along with the International Baseball Federation’s (IBAF) decision to permit all professional players of the sport to compete in international sporting competitions from 1997, the authority of the KBA responsible for amateur level of the sport, has been to some extent lost’ (interview: the current secretary-general of the KBA, 26 November 2008).
This is at least evident in the provision of national baseball players in which the KBO takes the leadership in selecting the nation’s best players for the national squad.

A common theme of the organisational structure and administration concerns the formation of the elite sport policy community which is a type of policy network. All three sports have been shaped by the actions of a sport policy community. For example, the elite policy community underlying athletics has been constituted by government, the executive members of the KAF, Samsung business leaders and other interest groups (e.g., Korea Athletics Development Measures Committee) which share commonly fundamental perceptions to achieve policy goals towards developing the sport at the elite level rather than at the grassroots level. On the back of government policy towards international sporting success, the KAF alongside the Samsung business funding has been a key factor shaping athletics development at the elite level. It is argued that there has not been an emergent advocacy coalition seeking a divergent policy direction at national level (e.g., mass participation) in athletics. This picture is similarly identified in archery insofar as the development of archery has been still dependent on both government subsidy and Hyundai business funding. As a consequence of this, while there have been some highly visible tensions and conflicts between the KBO and KBA over time, there has been a lack of highly visible internal tensions in both athletics and archery. Despite some minor internal tensions surrounding the two sports (e.g. in relation to the provision of coaching development in athletics), the sole organisation structure of both athletics and archery at the elite level with the support of government-led elite sport-centred policy has made both sports unlikely to experience any highly visible tension over the years. In other words, each sport’s leadership by the sole governing body of both athletics and archery has helped the internal unity of both sports in the pursuit of elite sporting success.

However, in contrast to both athletics and archery, there were highly visible tensions surrounding baseball. Indeed, in 2000 the formation of the KPBPA as an umbrella group for professional players brought about some tensions between the KPBPA and the KBO/club owners. The professional baseball policy network centring on the KBO and the eight club owners which has had a powerful authority over the interests of professional baseball players over the years has been challenged with the founding of the KPBPA (Ahn M, 2002). Namely, even if the KBO, club owners and the KPBPA have had common and shared perceptions and goals for the sport’s development at the professional and elite level, they have been
occasionally opposed to each other in pursuit of their respective interests in a particular time and setting. Following Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993) notion of advocacy coalitions, it could be argued that the formation of KPBPBA was a sign of an emerging trade union or interest group rather than an emerging advocacy coalition as the organisation has been narrowly concerned with protecting incomes, working conditions and the welfare of professional baseball players. In addition, this can be indicative of a form of tentative pluralisation in the policy-making process of the sport insofar as power may be distributed among the KBO/club owners and the KPBPBA (cf. Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987; Heywood, 2002). Moreover, as 2009 witnessed the creation of the Baseball Development Executive Committee (BDEC) comprised of 25 members, including politicians, academics, businessmen, journalists and lawyers, it is likely that the policy-making process of the sport at the professional and elite level is becoming more open and pluralised than ever before.

9.2.2 Identification of, and support for, young talented athletes

The active concern to identify young talented athletes was first evident in athletics in 1997, when the talent identification project was introduced under the auspices of KAF in association with KISS. Although there was the early engagement with the provision of talent identification in a number of sports under the KSC initiative in the past, it was in a name only (Track & Field Magazine, 2000 5/6). However, the fact that KAF has identified and nurtured 80 talented young athletes every year since 1997 is associated with the appointment of the Samsung business leader as head of KAF which led to significant changes to policies for the sport’s revival and development. Indeed, much attention was devoted to the talent identification project as one of the three top projects to achieve its elite aspiration. Following the concept of exogenous factors within the ACF, it could be argued that, as it is likely to lead to major policy change when a dynamic exogenous factor occurs (Sabatier & Weible, 2007), the emergence of Samsung business leader can be conceived as a critical exogenous factor which led to KAF’s policy change in the provision of talent identification. Currently, the talent identification programme of KAF has also been incorporated to a large extent into the ‘Development Programs for Youth Sports Talent’ of the Korea Foundation for the Next Generation Sport Talent (NEST). The NEST’s programme offers systematic identification of and programming for physically and mentally promising young students at about 8-13 years of age in three sports (athletics: 340 talents, gymnastics: 130 talents and swimming: 130
talents - for more information, see NEST’s homepage - http://www.nest.or.kr/en/sub/sub075.asp). The most likely explanations for athletics involvement in the programme are the sport’s fundamental value (all three sports are perceived as fundamental sports in South Korea) and the successful bid for the 2011 World Championships in Athletics.

In contrast to athletics, very little attention was given to the area of talent identification in both archery and baseball. Unlike the KAF’s structured approach to the programme of talent identification in athletics, the other two sports’ governing bodies were not concerned with a systematic and structured approach to talent identification. As Yamamoto (2008) identified in the Japanese approach to the talent identification system, the two sports’ approach to talented identification has been heavily dependent on school-based sport teams and coaches to identify, support and develop potential elite archers and baseball players. Part of the explanation for the indifference of the KAA and KBA to the programme of talent identification is the sports’ profiles; that is, ‘the KAA is aware of the popularity of archery among young pupils due to the sport’s success in the Olympic games’ (Interview: the secretary general at the KAA, 17 November 2008) and ‘the KBA is aware of the high potential that youth will take up baseball owing to the nation’s well-established professional league’ (Interview: the team leader of the TF at the KBO, 28 November 2008). Thus, the two sports’ governing bodies have focused more on financial support, including equipment for young athletes, than on programmes of talent identification. For archery, the KAA has provided financial aid and archery equipment for all primary- and middle school student-archers under the auspices of the Hyundai business. For baseball, the KBO has paved the way for detailed and more substantial support programmes for the development of junior/youth baseball since 2006, when the Task Force for Fostering Junior/Youth Baseball (TF) prompted by the introduction of Baseball ToTo. This aspect of policy change draws attention to the notion of exogenous factors for policy change as the introduction of Baseball ToTo gave a critical impetus to the founding of the TF by influencing key actors to perceive the necessity of constructing a concrete support programme for junior and youth talents.

In a broad sense, it is worth noting that, for archery, a more pressing concern for the KAA has been the national archery selection system and the concern to make it more sophisticated and fair. Suh Goh-won, in his book ‘Winning Secret’ (2008), credited the Korean archers’ unprecedented successes to the thorough national archer selection system. The fact that the
KAA has paid much attention to the system over the last 20 years originated from two key sources, the first of which was the unsuccessful examples of the USA and USSR with regard to the national archery selection system in the 1960s and 1970s. From a theoretical perspective, this observation can be conceived as an example of policy learning, as change occurred in the secondary aspect of the coalition’s belief system by policy-oriented learning (Sabatier, 1998). Indeed, as noted in a statement by Suh Goh-Won, the current executive director, ‘we sought for more systematic, scientific, fair and principle ways in which the best national archers could be selected because we learned a lesson from the two countries’ failure to select the best when analysing the cause of failure of the two countries’ (2008: 221). The second source is the frequent changes of the rules by FITA which has been arguably aimed at tackling the Korean archers’ dominance and has been perceived as an external challenge to the maintenance of Korean archery success by the KAA’s executive members and athletes’ support staff. This external factor affected perceptions of the KAA’s executive members which led them to strengthen the national archer selection system with their early and flexible adaptation (accommodation) to suit and deal with the FITA’s frequent rule changes. As such, considering the concept of the ACF, the two strands which played a critical role for the KAA in deliberating and deciding the future direction of action in general, and the reinforcement of national archer selection system in particular, can be conceived as both an endogenous and exogenous source of policy change.

9.2.3 Improvement in coaching, sports science and facilities

9.2.3.1 Coaching

Coaching development in the three sports covered in this study seems to have relied largely upon the experiences and practices of domestic coaches gleaned from their athletic careers. This situation is quite similar to that of Singapore as Lim observed (quoted in Teo, 2008). The provision of broader coaching development in the three sports has not been a key concern in achieving the goals of the three sports’ governing bodies. Part of the explanation for the relative indifference of the three governing bodies of sport to construct a holistic coaching development system is their reliance on the national qualification system and the
priority they have to give to other policy elements such as financial support for young talented athletes, sports science and a cash-award system. Indeed, while most governing bodies of sport have allowed those who obtain a certificate of qualification from the national athletic coaching qualification course (which is supervised by the MCST in cooperation with the KISS) to instruct their own sport over the years, no NGB has constructed a holistic coaching development programme specific to their sport. As a result, it appears that high performance coaches were left to develop their own coaching skills and knowledge.

However, there has been coaching development in the three sports but it has been piecemeal and displays their distinctive features in relation to coaching development. In contrast to both archery and baseball, coaching development in athletics has been as a result of the introduction of foreign coaches, the initial use of which was three imported coaches from the USSR in 1989. The 2000 Sydney Olympics where Korean athletes won no medal at all, including the marathon, was the prompt for KAF to accept the use of imported coaches in order to tackle the sport’s poor performance by learning and adapting advanced coaching skills, know-how, programmes and methods developed abroad. Moreover, following the successful bid for the 2011 World Championships in Athletics, KAF’s recent attempt to use imported coaches has been accelerated by their long-term poor performance. In other words, while KAF has not developed an elite coaching system and structure in a sophisticated manner over the last 20 years, the organisation has been occasionally dependent on the introduction of foreign coaches. This situation is similarly observed in that of the rival country Japan identified by Yamamoto, who noted that ‘Japanese elite coaching remains considerably undeveloped and there is consequently a dependency on importing foreign coaches, especially for ball games’ (2008: 72). As such, for Korean elite coaching development the principal part of KAF’s policies to tackle the long-time continued poor performance of its elite athletes remains the import of foreign coaches. The acceleration of the use of foreign coaches is clearly evident in the government strategic document, ‘Run Korea 2011’, which declared the government’s mid-term objective of bringing more foreign coaches (ten coaches), on the recommendation of the IAAF, into Korean athletics in preparation for the 2011 World Championships in Athletics by 2010 (MCST, 2008c).

In contrast to athletics, Korean elite archery has witnessed a quite different pattern of coaching development. Korean elite archery has been a principal source of supply for international elite coaching. That is to say, there have been many Korean elite coaches who
have been exported over the last 20 years. The reason why archery is different from athletics in relation to coaching development is that Korea is a leading country in the world of archery. However, it should be reiterated that, although exported Korean coaches have contributed to the world’s elite archery development in general, and coaching techniques, skills, etc in particular, the overseas movement of Korean coaches has boomeranged on Korean archery success in international sporting competitions. As revealed in Chapter 7, the most recent example of this was Chinese female archer Zhang Juan-Juan’s gold medal in the women’s individual final match in Beijing, when she was coached by Korean coach Yang Chang-hoon. In this regard, the movement of Korean coaches abroad can not only be conceived as an external threat to Korean archers’ constant success in the international arena (cf. Suh G, 2008), but also perceived as a form of policy (knowledge) transfer. As a result of this, the KAA has placed an emphasis on the following policy elements such as the use of sports science, the development of unusual training methods and the reinforcement of national archer selection system to cope with the external threats.

For baseball, a particular focus on elite coach development has emerged in the provision of coaching opportunities or access to coaching prompted by the failure of the Korean baseball team at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, when the national team, consisting of the nation’s amateur players won only one game. In other words, the Korean baseball team’s disastrous defeat in Atlanta provided a substantial impetus to discuss the issue of coaching transfer (jobs) between amateur baseball and professional baseball. The issue of coaching jobs (especially, opening up to ex-professional players) was specified in the KBA’s declaration in 1996 of the coaching open-door policy for its amateur baseball development. There was a sign of an emerging interest group surrounding the issue of coaching transfer. Indeed, the KBA’s measure faced strong opposition from a coalition of ex-amateur baseball players, which took a position contrary to that of KBA and caused visible tension between the KBA and a coalition of amateur coaches. However, it could be argued that the interest group of ex-amateur players was relatively weak in advocating its interests, given the KBA’s relatively strong position backed by Hyundai business. By drawing attention to power relations, this can be conceptualised in Lukes’ first dimensional view of power in that power was exercised to prevail over the coalition’s preference and interests in the KBA’s policy decision process (Lukes, 2005).

9.2.3.2 Sports science
As regards the exploitation and development of sports science, all three sports have exhibited very divergent attitudes to the application of sports science into their own sports. Compared to both athletics and baseball, archery has been the most strongly committed to the use of sports science. Indeed, the KAA engaged with sports science in order to develop its elite archers’ performance from the early 1980s. The early engagement with sports science in archery has been centred around a psychological approach to training and competition. The most likely explanation for the early application of sports science is that, at a common sense level, archery performance is to a certain degree influenced by mental factors (especially, an aspect of sport psychology) of the sport (Suh G, 2008). The KAA’s use and development of sports science at an early time (compared to other sports in South Korea) originated with the emergence of Chung Mong-goo (Hyundai business leader) as the second head of the KAA in 1985. Along with the financial support of Hyundai business, the KAA’s early attempt to build up a scientific training system is one of the key explanations for Korean archery success. Suh Goh-won (2008) stated in his book ‘Winning Secret’ that over the last 20 years the Korean elite archery’s success is deeply rooted in the construction of a scientific training system. Also, he cites the sport of archery as the earliest sport to embrace the use and application of sports science in South Korea. Indeed, there have been many examples of the KAA’s efforts to develop sports science in the last two decades, as mentioned in Chapter 7.

For athletics, the engagement with sports science has been focused on the development of equipment and apparel (including running shoes), dietetics and physiology rather than on the construction of a scientific training system as observed in the sport of archery. This observation is in line with the case of sailing in the United Kingdom identified by Green & Houlihan (2005). Part of the explanation of this was a somewhat sceptical attitude of Korean athletics coaches, who valued traditional training methods (which emphasised the quantity of training) above sports science. As a senior researcher at the KISS explained, ‘there were unfavourable perceptions and beliefs of Korean coaches regarding the potential of sports science because their view was that hard training was highly regarded as the best practice for improving elite sporting performance in the past’ (Interview: 17 November 2008). But this does not mean that there was no sign of the use and development of sports science in the 1990s. There were piecemeal instances of the application of sports sciences into athletics in the 1990s and into the early 2000s. Indeed, the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games was a substantial impetus for KAF to develop a sports science project in partnership with KISS’s
network. KAF’s genuine concern with sports science has been demonstrated by the allocation of substantial funds to sports science projects which were to tackle the sport’s poor performance. Moreover, in 2007, the IAAF awarded the 2011 World Championships in Athletics to Daegue, which has provided a substantial catalyst for the development of sports science in athletics. The government subsequently published the strategy document, ‘Run Korea 2011’ in 2008, which is indicative of the government considering elite athletics development to be a significant part of its aims towards the successful hosting of the event (MCST, 2008c). Indeed, the strategy document, ‘Run Korea 2011’ highlights the importance of sports science in breaking the current inactive Korean records of the sport, the relevant example of which was the government’s declaration to constitute ‘Sports Science Support Coalition for Athletics’ prompted by its concern about the host’s nation. An academic made it clear that ‘the government’s ambition to successfully stage the 2011 World Championships in Athletics led to the wholehearted support for, and attention to, elite athletics development because the government considers the national athletes’ performance in the event as one of the significant factors for its ambition’ (Interview: 17 December 2008). Consequently, the utilisation of sports science in athletics is being regarded as a principal factor in developing elite athletics.

In contrast to both athletics and archery, the development of sports science in baseball has not been led by either of the sports’ two leading governing bodies’ (KBA and KBO), but rather has been the result of each professional sport team’s investment. That is to say, the KBA and KBO have relied entirely on the self-regulating drive of the professional baseball clubs in relation to sports science, and have not been very eager to invest in sports science themselves. Indeed, the engagement with sports science has been with the professional baseball teams’ scientific approaches to the sport focused largely on analysing performance data. Even if it is argued that the recent great successes of Korean baseball teams at the Olympics and WBC were largely rooted in the efforts and investments of the professional baseball clubs in relation to sports science, there has not been a policy initiative from the KBA or KBO to improve the sport’s performance through sports science research. Part of the explanation of this is that, while the KBA and KBO have not embraced sports science as a primary policy concern, they have focused on the provision of coaching, the national baseball player selection system, financial support for young talented athletes and the cash-award system.

9.2.3.3 Sport facilities (equipment)
As regards the provision of sport facility development in all sports covered in this study, it appears that the provision of sport facility development for all three governing bodies considered here has not been an important policy concern. Part of the explanation for this is that each governing body has been largely dependent on central and local government funding which has been provided to meet the needs of staging mega-sporting events (including National Sports Festival) as they have not enough funding to develop their own sport facilities. Therefore, it has been pointed out that all three sports have been faced with inadequate facilities for training and competition of their elite athletes for some time. However, all three sports have their respective distinctive features of policy in relation to the provision of sport facility development.

For athletics, it should be reiterated that the strategy document, ‘*Run Korea 2011*’, prompted by the successful bid for the 2011 World Championships in Athletics, stated that one of the big problems which Korean athletics has faced is a lack of facilities in general, and particularly the lack of an exclusive athletics training centre and an indoor athletics training facility designed to meet specific training needs (the most likely to be used in all seasons) (MCST, 2008c). Reflecting the urgent needs for facility development in athletics, the award of the 2011 World Championships in Athletics has consequently provided a substantial catalyst for developing high-performance facilities. Following the award of the event, the MCST’s policy document, ‘*Run Korea 2011*’, stated that the Daegu Metropolitan City and KSPO will provide funding to construct the nation’s first ever indoor athletics stadium (named Daegu Athletics Promotion Centre) designed to meet specific training needs for elite athletes and to stage international indoor-athletics championships/competitions (MCST, 2008c). This is planned as part of the mid-to long term approach to Korean athletics development. The centre is currently under construction.

For archery, the KAA has focused on the issue of equipment development rather than that of facility development. The most likely explanation for this is that the sport’s performance may be as much influenced by equipment as facilities. The relatively modest failure of the Korean archery team at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, when the nation’s archers won two gold medals, one silver medal and one bronze medal, generated media criticism. As a result of this unsatisfactory performance, the issue of equipment development was debated (Suh G, 2008). There was a growing awareness of the necessity of developing domestic equipments for the
use by elite archers among some coaches at that time. Crucially, the fact that the KAA undertook an assessment of the limitations of foreign-made equipment (as used by student-archers below middle school level) helped to develop domestically-made equipment for high-performance use. Moreover, although the economic blow faced at the end of 1997 had a negative effect on domestic sport circles, it helped to fuel the growth of the domestic equipment industry and its increased use in competition (Suh G, 2008). Many elite archers across the world are currently using Korean-made archery equipments.

Turning to baseball, as with athletics, the inadequacy of facilities for high performance training and competition, including the nation’s professional baseball league, has been one of the recurring themes over the last two decades. It appeared that, when discussing Korean baseball development, an overriding concern encompassing all levels of the sport was the issue of improvement in facilities. Indeed, with regard to facility development, the improvement of old-fashioned municipal baseball stadiums for the use by professional baseball league has been much debated over the last 20 years. Although the KBO had an intention to improve outdated local baseball stadiums, the organisation faced considerable difficulty in driving its facility strategy to suit the particular levels at which the professional baseball teams are competing. The reason is evidenced by Kang Seung-kyu, a lawmaker of the ruling party and head of the KBA in the MBC Network’s 100-minute Show ‘Debate and Analysis’ who stated that:

A major constraint on facility development is that the eight professional baseball teams are unwilling to invest funding in improving their hometown stadiums because all baseball stadiums which the nation’s professional teams and amateur teams use are in the ownership and control of local governments (quoted in the programme, 26 March 2009).

However, the recent Korean baseball team’s gold medal in Beijing and its victory in the semifinals at the 2nd WBC provided a substantial catalyst for policy change in the provision of facilities. Crucially, following the recent unprecedented performances of the Korean baseball team, Kang Seung-Kyu, promoted and introduced three revised bills to formulate the legal grounds for the improvement of facilities. Of the three revised bills the ‘National Sports Promotion Law’ and ‘Sports Industry Promotion Law’ were passed in December 2009. Consequently, it is expected that the professional baseball clubs will invest in refurbishing the outdated municipal stadiums of baseball by renting their hometown stadiums for longer
periods. From a theoretical perspective of the multiple stream framework (MS), Kang Seung-Kyu’s role in proposing and passing the bills related to the provision of facilities can be conceived as an example of the role of ‘policy entrepreneur’ as he played a key role in capturing lawmakers’ attention and in acquiring their agreement on the back of public consensus on the refurbishment of old-fashioned local stadiums created by the recent baseball successes (cf. Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2007). Perhaps, part of the explanation for his success in achieving policy change is that he is currently a member of the ruling party.

In addition, the recent successes of the Korean baseball team aroused much debate concerning the construction of a domed-baseball stadium which had been debated intermittently over the previous 15 years. In the past, ‘although there was an emerging awareness of the necessity of constructing a domed-baseball stadium, often reinforced whenever the Korean baseball team produced a good international performance, little concrete action followed, partly due to the problem of economic efficiency, and partly due to the short-lived nature of that enthusiasm’ (quoted in Choi Dong-Ho’s Issue Diagnosis’, April 2009). However, due to recent successes, the Korean baseball community had a perhaps unique opportunity to attain its long-cherished desire to construct a domed-baseball stadium. Indeed, the nation’s first ever domed baseball stadium is currently under construction supported by Seoul Metropolitan Government’s funding. Moreover, the KBO has been zealous to maximise a peak opportunity to sign a memorandum of understanding for the construction of a domed-baseball stadium with local authorities; an example of which included a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between the KBO and Ansan city and POSCO Engineering & Consulting Co. In this regard, given the issues of facility development in general, the refurbishment of outdated local stadiums and the construction of a domed-baseball stadium in particular, the recent unprecedented performances of the Korean baseball team are instructive in explaining policy change. Not only can they be explained in relation to the concept of exogenous factors within the ACF, but they also highlight the importance of recognising windows of opportunity and having the skill to take advantage of them through the actions of a policy entrepreneur.

9.2.4 The provision of more systematic competition opportunities for elite level athletes

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The scheduling of domestic competitions for elite level athletes/teams encompassing the range from primary school-based teams to business athletic clubs is seen as a main responsibility for each of the three governing bodies. However, it could be argued that the calendar of domestic competitions seems to have been scheduled in terms of an annual pattern (cycle) of competition rather than as a construction to the policy objective of medal success. This lack of concern with the schedule of domestic competition is evident when, for example, a negative exogenous event (especially their respective national team’s failure in international sporting competitions) occurred. In these circumstances the three governing bodies adopted different policy responses; focusing on other policy areas such as coaching, talent identification, national athlete selection systems, sports science and a cash-award system. In general, ‘the three governing bodies of sport have not considered the provision of competition opportunities as an important element in their medal winning strategy’ (Interview: a senior manager at the KSC, 06 November 2008). Consequently, there has been no major policy change in relation to the provision of competition opportunities for elite level athletes in all three sports. However, all three sports exhibit differences with regard to competition opportunities.

For athletics, the issue of competition opportunities was largely neglected by the KAF until the mid 2000s. As Track & Field Magazine (1997 7/8) mentioned, the area of competition opportunities was the last of the six obstacles to athletics development and success, and the issue of competition opportunities was marginalised until the mid 2000s. However, the government strategy document, ‘Run Korea 2011’, acknowledged the lack of competition opportunities for elite level athletes as one of the biggest problems facing Korean athletics; specifically, the absence of officially regional competitions, as well as the fact that major events the National Sports Festival and the National Junior Sports Festival emphasise inter-regional competitive success at the expense of the overall improvement of individual athletes (quoted in Yonhap News, 2007; also MCST, 2008c). In this competition system with the National Sports Festival and the National Junior Sports Festival, most cities and provinces have been likely to urge their athletes to produce better performances than other cities and other provinces’ athletes (i.e. the aim is to out-rank other cities rather than aim for national records). In this regard, it could be argued that KAF has not been successful in constructing a coherent competition structure which meets the needs of elite athletes. As a result of this perception, the strategy document declared the improvement of domestic competition
opportunities, key priorities of which included the expansion of competitive opportunities for regional specialised events and the introduction of a grading system (such as IAAF’s point system) (MCST 2008). For the government’s first policy attempt with regard to new competition opportunities, 2008 witnessed the 1st Grand Prix Athletics Competition designed to provide only top eight athletes in each event of athletics with a more competitive competition opportunity.

In contrast to athletics, KAA’s policy priority seems to have been the national archer selection system rather than competition opportunities. From a perspective of policy change, there was no sign that the KAA led a major policy change in the provision of competition opportunities, whereas there have been some signs that the KAA has focused its attention on the national archer selection system. Indeed, the organisation has sought the reinforcement of the national archer selection system in order to effectively cope with external threats to Korean archers’ constant success, such as the movement abroad of Korean coaches and the frequent changing of the game rules. Relatively little policy attention was therefore paid to competition opportunities for elite level archers.

With regard to baseball, as a team leader of the TF at the KBO argued, ‘the recent unprecedented performances of Korean baseball teams is due to its well-established professional baseball league through which most national baseball players are produced’ (Interview: 28 November 2008). Since 1997, when every professional baseball player was allowed to participate in major sporting events such as the Olympic Games, the nation’s professional baseball players have successfully delivered medals. Moreover, it is would not be an overstatement to say that the KPBL has played a significant role in creating a clear pathway for amateur level players of the sport to develop their sport career. However, the creation of KPBL in 1982 was a double-edged sword in that it arguably caused the decline in the nation’s high-school baseball leagues which had enjoyed a golden era during the mid 1960s and 1970s. A notable feature of the high-school baseball leagues concerns the sponsorship of the nation’s major newspapers in creating the nation’s key high-school baseball leagues in association with the KBA. Given the fact that financial resources are an essential prerequisite for the establishment of an appropriate competition calendar for elite level athletes, their corporate sponsorship is instructive. ‘Even if the 8 high-school baseball leagues at the national level have lost their popularity since the creation of KPBL, they played a critical role in identifying and developing future national baseball players’
(interview: the secretary general at the KBA, 26 November 2008). However, as with athletics, one of the important problems with regard to competition opportunities for baseball is the absence of regional competition. As most competitions are staged at the national level, there are some limitations to offering much more competitive circumstance to all school baseball teams (KBDR 2009). In recent years, of particular concern is the KBO’s engagement with competition opportunities for junior level athletes (primary school baseball teams and little baseball clubs). Part of the explanation is that Baseball ToTo’s profit enabled the KBO to create the *Task Force for Fostering Junior/Youth Baseball*, one of whose projects included the establishment of the ‘National Junior/Youth Baseball Tournament for the KBO Commissioner’s Cup’ initially hosted in 2007. Furthermore, the National University Baseball Tournament for KBO Commissioner’ Cup was initially hosted by the KBA in 2008 with sponsorship from the KBO. This observation indicates that the KBO, responsible for the operation and government of KPBL, has begun to pay attention to the potential contribution of amateur baseball to the development of elite baseball players.

### 9.2.5 A cash-award system to encourage high performance

Although a cash-award system and cash-incentive system for medal winners have not been widely perceived as one of the important policy areas leading to international sporting success (De Bosscher et al., 2008; Green & Houlihan, 2005; Green & Oakley 2001a, 2001b; Houlihan & Green, 2008; UK Sport, 2007), the cash award has been identified as one of the significant policy elements in all three sports. As noted earlier chapters, Green and Houlihan’s (2005) analytical framework provided useful insights for an explanation of elite sport development policy in the three case studies, but it did not identify the aspect of the cash-award system for encouraging elite sporting performance. Given that the elite sport system, which has become increasingly homogenous among many countries, is based around a single model of elite sport development with only slight variations (De Bosscher et al., 2006, see also Clumpner, 1994, Green & Oakley 2001a, 2001b), the identification of a cash-award system in the three sports can be perceived as a slight variation. The research studies listed above focused on ‘athletic and post-career support’ (De Bosscher et al., 2006) and ‘lifestyle support and preparation for life after sport’ (Green & Oakley, 2001a, 2001b). However, that is not to say of course that all leading nations in elite sport do not see a cash-
award system or cash incentive system as one of their policy elements for producing more medals. For example, the following article in the Daily Telegraph UK made this clear:

UK track and field stars will also get cash awards of £5,000, £4,000 or £3,000 for gold, silver and bronze medals respectively in a deal with Norwich Union … The British incentive schemes follow ones introduced by other countries and Russian competitors are believed to have been promised £50,000 for winning a gold medal … Britain is aiming to finish eighth in the medal league table in Beijing, two spots higher than it achieved in Athens in 2004, and prizes are seen as a fitting reward for the training put in by Olympic athletes (03 August 2008).

Also, it was declared that some countries such as Canada, the U.S, Russia and China will be awarding cash prizes for anyone winning a medal at the Beijing Olympics. As such, some countries have had their own cash award schemes to produce more medals.

Not surprisingly, as most NGBs in South Korea have been keen to use tangible cash incentives to motivate and reward their elite athletes over the years, all three sports’ governing bodies are no exception to these measures. The three sports’ governing bodies have offered cash awards for medal winners in specified international sporting competitions which include the Olympics, World Championships and the Asian Games. The fact that the three sports’ governing bodies have been able to provide cash awards is due to corporate sponsorships. Indeed, Samsung’s financial aid for KAF has been the main source of its cash rewards and Hyundai’s financial contributions to the KAA and KBA have been a key source of their cash awards. It should be reiterated that although the three sports’ governing bodies have had a different regulation of the cash award system, they have considered the cash award system as one of the important measures in pursuit of elite sporting success.

With regard to the regulation of the cash award system among the three sports, athletics has relatively more detailed regulation of the cash award system than either archery or baseball. The KAF has twin track approach to cash incentives for improving its elite sporting performance: one is cash awards for medal winners and the other is prize money for record-breakers, which was introduced in 2001 to try to overcome the relatively poor performance of Korean athletics (as illustrated by the long-standing nature of Korean records). In contrast to both archery and baseball, KAF has specified its cash incentives in a concrete manner. Of particular importance was that KAF upped its cash awards twice in 1997 and 2008 due to the
emergence of a Samsung business leader in 1997 as head of KAF and, in 2008, due to the successful bid for the 2011 World Championships in Athletics. As a result, KAF has been able to operate a detailed regulation of the cash incentives for improving its athletics performance along with its corporate sponsorship awards and government concern with the sport’s performance. Unlike athletics, both archery and baseball have largely avoided introducing detailed regulation of cash awards. They have instead rewarded medal winners on an event by event basis for their achievements. As a gold medallist (archery) at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games stated, ‘I did not know how much it was before the Olympics, but the existence of cash awards allowed me to have considerable motivation to win the gold medal at the Olympics’ (Interview: 04 January 2008). As noted in the sport of athletics, that the KAA could offer cash awards for its medal-winning archers is due to corporate sponsorship awards from Hyundai, facilitated by the Hyundai business leader holding the presidency of the KAA. Of particular concern with regard to the cash award in baseball was the transfer of commitment to offering cash awards at the 2002 Busan Asian Games, when the KBA was actually committed to offer cash awards for the nation’s success in winning a gold medal at the Games, but could not afford to provide cash awards due to its financial difficulty. Since then, the commitment to offer cash awards has been the responsibility of the KBO which has considerable financial wealth. For baseball, there was consensus over the obligation to offer cash awards: that is to say, the KBO should have an obligation to provide cash awards because the national baseball team generally consisted of mostly professional baseball players. As such, the three sports’ governing bodies have dealt with the provision of cash awards with slight variations in pursuit of elite sporting success.

In sum, with regard to the logic of multiple-case design, evidence from the three case studies has disclosed the clearest similarities and differences between athletics, archery and baseball. It is worth recalling, in terms of similarity, all three sports’ governing bodies have relied heavily on financial support from the parent company of their organisation’s head in order to develop their respective elite athletes (with the exception of the KBA for the Korean amateur baseball which is currently under the presidency of a politician). It is generally taken for granted that big businesses’ (here Samsung and Hyundai) financial aid for the NGBs has always made an important contribution to the Korean elite sport development, no matter what their intention may be. For many years, most NGBs in South Korea have been very eager to allow business leaders to take over their presidency in expectation of financial support due to
their difficulty in self-financing. The relationship between the NGBs and big business was made clear in the previous empirical chapters.

As regards the policy frameworks of elite sport development, the three sports’ governing bodies have paid attention to their respective distinctive policy elements. More specifically, all three sports’ governing bodies have their respective different policy emphasis. For example, the KAA has put emphasis on the use of sports science and the provision of a national archer selection system over the many years, whereas the KAF has laid emphasis on the use of foreign coaches. It is worth noting that it does not mean that there is a strong association between such divergent policy emphasis (on elite sport policy elements) of the three sports’ governing bodies and different policy outputs (as argued by De Bosscher et al., (2008: 23) ‘outputs in elite sport can be clearly defined in terms of actual performance’—like Olympic medal). Rather, it could be argued that the different policy changes in, or emphasises on elite sport policy factors evident across the three sports are influenced either by certain exogenous factor or enogenous factors (or both exogenous/endogenous factors). In other words, if a NGB is affected by any exogenous factor or endogenous factor the NGB would take action to change policy in consideration of its resources (e.g., finance) and specific context (e.g., the status of the sport’s performance). Having discussed the key elements of elite sport development across the three sports, we now turn to theoretical insights. The following discussion on theoretical insights is congruent with addressing the third objective of this research set out in chapter 1.

9.3 Theoretical insights

In Chapter 2, four prominent macro-level theories of the state were discussed and assessed for their usefulness for this study. Moreover, four meso-level theories of policy change were reviewed and considered for their usefulness in acting as a lens for this study. Thus, the purpose of this concluding section is to assess the utility of the macro-level and meso-level theories in explaining elite sport policy change in three sports in South Korea. It is also important to consider the value of these theories in illuminating the distribution of power in relation to elite sport and the way in which power configurations in the policy process shape the dynamics of policy change.
9.3.1 Macro-level theoretical insights

Previous studies of elite sport development tend to be located within elitist explanation or/and pluralist explanations at the macro-level of analysis. However, there remain some doubts over whether these theories are appropriate in the Korean context. Green (2003), in his analysis of elite sport policy change in three sports in Canada and the United Kingdom, argued that the overlapping assumptions underlying neo-pluralism and elitism are the most instructive in terms of exploring different power configurations surrounding the elite sport policy sector. Collins (2008) also argued that the overlapping perspectives of neo-pluralism and elitism offered the most persuasive insight for her analysis of public policy toward adult life-long participation in sport in Australia, Finland and New Zealand. With regard to the context of Korean sport policy development, Hong (2009), in her analysis of the sport policy process in elite sport development and SFA in South Korea, concluded that elitism is the most useful theoretical lens to understand not only elite sport process but also the SFA policy process in South Korea. As in the above studies, it is concluded that a potentially more valuable lens for this study at the macro-level of analysis might be elitism. However, the neo-pluralist perspective was acknowledged to offer potential insights for the process of elite sport policy change in three sports in South Korea, although not as significant as those of elitism.

Given the central idea of Marxism, looking at the complex and dynamic relationship between state, economy and society in capitalist economies, the Marxist approach might be convincing in terms of accounting for the relationship between the authoritarian regime and Chaebol in the 1980s. More specifically, considering the Marxist position that the state relies wholly upon its economically predominant class (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987), President Chun’s authoritarian regime (1980-1988) depended greatly on Chaebol to achieve its political and economic objectives. The successful bid for the 1988 Olympic Games in 1981, the so-called ‘Baden-Baden’s miracle’, was arguably a clear embodiment of such Marxist explanations in relation to the elite sport policy sector. This was evident in the socio-economic circumstances of Korea at that time where it was explained that:

President Chun’s strong willingness to host the 1988 Olympic Games was bonded with Chaebols’ interests. The Baden-Baden’s miracle was great news for Chaebols, which were expanded by the
construction industry, in a situation where Korean construction companies faced a severe slump due to the decreased construction demand in the Middle East. The preparation of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was only recognised as ‘construction’ and ‘development’ for them. Domestic Chaebols enjoyed the increased demands in the process of preparing the 1988 Olympic Games and consequently, could get bigger (quoted in Chung H, 2009:152-153, see also Son K’s (2002) Inner Circle of Korea).

In addition, the hosting of the successful 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympic Games and winning of medals in both events emerged as crucial political agenda for obtaining the authoritarian regime’s weak political hegemony. The authoritarian regime’s aspiration towards the hosting of the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympic Games provided significant political legitimation for strengthening elite sport-centred policy direction so that school sport (especially for physical education) and SFA was sidelined by its preferences. Particularly, given the importance of the host nation’s medal count (see Yamamoto, 2008:64), the authoritarian government relied on conglomerates to achieve its aspiration, a principal indication of which was that, as discussed in Chapter 6, 7 and 8, the authoritarian government twisted Chaebols’ arms to take over the presidency of NGBs, and also provided them with tax incentives. By the 1980s 25 of the 33 NGBs were under the presidency of big business heads in the 1980s. As argued by Chung H (2009), capitalist economic power and political power were combined by the medium of the Olympic Games. As a consequence of this, the authoritarian government could acquire political legitimacy for its coercion and domination over the ruled class in collusion with domestic Chaebols by using sport (e.g., the 1988 Olympic Games), whereas domestic Chaebols could hold their predominant position on the back of state policies to prioritise the Chaebol-centred economic growth. When recalling the Marxist argument that state policies promote the interests of the capitalist class (bourgeoisie) which uses the state as an instrument to rule the rest of society (Barrow, 1993), it could be concluded that Marxism is instructive in accounting for the distribution of power and the relationship between the authoritarian government and Chaebol (especially Chaebol involvement in sport) in the 1980s.

However, as Korean society witnessed a new social, political and economic era with the emergence of civilian government after the demise of the military regimes, the Marxist explanation became weak and less convincing. According to Hong (2009), Marxist approaches to the sport policy sector are not persuasive in explaining the pattern of decision making and the distribution of power in relation to SFA and elite sport in South Korea.
Moreover, when considering Green’s question in relation to state theory, ‘Why are certain actors in a privileged position in the policy-making process?’, Marxism does not provide an instructive insight to the question at the level of elite sport policy-making in three sports in South Korea. This is because Marxist analysis is only useful in exploring a particular question about the relationship between the state and the capitalist class. Indeed, the reason why Marxist analysis of the process of elite sport policy in South Korea is not a potentially useful perspective through which to analyse elite sport policy development can be addressed in the following two explanations. One explanation is that, given that the dynamic of Marxism is class conflicts, there is the absence of class conflicts observed in this study. Indeed, there is little evidence of significant class conflicts over elite sport (policy) development in South Korea. The other explanation is that traditional Marxist analysis emphasises the dominance of business class/elite. The Marxist explanation relation to the process of elite sport policy-making is not consistent not only due to the clear dominance of military authoritarian regimes in the 1970s and 1980s, but also with the influence of civil servants, bureaucrats and politicians in more recent period. In other words, this study discloses the Marxist analyses’ weak points in terms of accounting for the clear dominance of other elites such as civil servants, bureaucrats and politicians in the process of elite sport policy-making in South Korea rather than only business. The Marxist analysis is not quite capable of explaining the influence of other elites beyond the impact of business elites on the elite policy-making process in South Korea. This is not to overlook the influence of the business elites on the process of elite sport policy-making. What we want to emphasise is the influence of other elites on the policy process, as well as the influence of business elites as mentioned above, as the Marxist analysis considers the interests of the capitalist class and the influence of business elites as a key explanatory variable for accounting for state policies. However, it should be noted that there are overlaps between the elitist model and the Marxist model.

Thus, our attention turns to elitism, which was considered a credible lens through which to take account of the influence and role of the elite on the elite sport policy-making process. Three case studies confirm that the process of policy-making with regard to elite sport in South Korea is still dominated by the elite. Following Mills’ (1956) concept of the power elite, in which the state is ruled by power elites consisting of a triumvirate of economic elites, politicians and military who make public policy to meet their own interests (Evans, 2006), it may be argued that the elite sport policy-making process in South Korea has been dominated
by a triumvirate of corporate elites, politicians and high-ranking bureaucrats. These elites have dominated Korean society and public policy-making process (including sport). It should be noted that if the military elites as one of the triumvirate had a powerful role in the decision-making process in the 1970s and 1980s, economic elites (Chaebol’ heads) have replaced them in the last two decades. The policy-making process with regard to elite sport in South Korea is still characterised as closed and dominated by the elites. This is clearly illustrated by the policy decision surrounding the need for reform of the national sports system in general, and the integration and/or separation between the KSC, KOC and KOCOSA in particular. As discussed in Chapter 5, there was a growing awareness of the necessity of reforming the national sports system in the last ten years. There were the mainstream voices and discourse calling for the integration of the KSC and KOCOSA as well as the independence of the KOC from the KSC surrounding the Korean sport policy sector in order to construct a holistic and coherent system in which elite sport, SFA and school sport could be harmoniously developed. Nevertheless, civic groups and academia involved in sport, as well as a few politicians (particularly Ahn Min-Suck, currently law-maker of the leading opposition party) failed to achieve their aspired outcome after a long-lasting controversy. This situation draws attention to the influence of the power elite and power relations between the MCST, KSC and KOCOSA. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the Sports Bureau at the MCST is a central policy-making agency at the national level and the KSC and KOCOSA are the key delivery agencies for the nation’s elite and SFA sport policies respectively. Therefore, it would not be an overstatement to say that public power regarding sport policy has been concentrated in the hands of the Sports Bureau. However, the power of heads (the previous and current) of the KSC within the sport figuration has enabled the organisation to compete with the MCST. The most likely explanation for this is the fact that they were and still are relatively powerful figures with political- or economic elite backgrounds. They have had their superior position in the elite sport policy process with the MCST’s leadership in shaping the nation’s sport policy.

In addition, the relationship between elite sport development and Chaebols is instructive in explaining and understanding the influence of economic elites on the elite sport policy-making process in South Korea. The Korean governments have been dependent upon the financial support of big businesses in order to retain their elite sport policy objectives while they have laid emphasis on medal-winning success, which has created a dominant ideology of elite sport oriented policy. As demonstrated in three case studies, Samsung’s and Hyundai’s
business leaders have been playing a key role in the elite sport policy-making process by taking over the presidency of the NGBs. They have offered considerable financial aid to the NGBs which have made up the economic base for the nation’s elite sport development in general and the development of their respective sports and NGBs in particular. Therefore, this has created a situation of mutual dependency between government and Chaebol as evidenced in Mills’ (1956) research on the power elite in the United States, where the close relationship between governmental elites and economic elites was highlighted. Thus, paraphrasing Lewis (2000) and Evans (2006), corporate business elites (here, primarily, business elites from Samsung and Hyundai) who own and control wealth have retained superior positions of authority within social and political worlds rather than individual policy actors (particularly, civil actors and academics) who are in a subordinate position (cf. Green, 2003). As observed in three sports and three NGBs, ‘the control of financial wealth by their heads has enabled them to retain their power and authority in their respective sport policy decision processes’ (Interview: a senior researcher of the KISS, 18 November 2008). Moreover, it should be recalled that, as evidenced in the case of baseball, the KBO’s superior power and authority to that of the KBA resides in the financial wealth of the KBO with the support of eight professional baseball clubs in the KPBL. Therefore, this pre-existing structural condition created the imbalance of power between the KBA and KBO (cf. Green, 2003). As such, the corporate business elites have a conspicuous role in the context of Korean elite sport policy-making. Following Mills’ (1956) concept of a triumvirate forming the power elite, the economic elites could be conceived as one of the triumvirate with politicians and high-ranking government officials in the Korean elite sport policy-making process. Therefore, the domination of elites is still the best description of the elite sport policy process in South Korea.

Regarding the analysis of power in the policy process, the work of Lukes (1974, 2005) was especially useful. As argued by Swartz (2007), Lukes’ intuitive three-dimension model of power was useful in understanding and mapping broad, common and insidious power configurations in the complex, dynamic and multi-faceted policy process and change. In this regard, for the purpose of this study it was considered that it is a more compelling lens than other power models of analysis such as Foucault’s concept of power. Indeed, Lukes (2005) argued that, although Foucault’s notion of power provided insights into a deep and close relationship between power and knowledge, it might be less useful in understanding varied and actual power configurations which exist in the concrete policy-making process in which
actual actors seek to fulfil their needs, preferences and interests. Therefore, the concept of Lukes’ three faces of power sheds light on the analysis of power spectra in this study. More specifically, the authority of the KAF and KBA on the back of the wealth of Samsung and Hyundai draws attention to Lukes’ first face of power, where ‘power is largely exercised to prevail over the contrary preferences of others’ (2005: 9). In other words, the power of the KAF and KBA was exercised to block the pursuit of the preferences and the interests of domestic coaches and athletes (e.g. providing coaching openings in amateur baseball for professional baseball players). In addition, the context surrounding the founding of the KPBPA resonates with Lukes’ second/third face of power, where ‘power is not only exercised by preventing issues from reaching that arena’ (quoted in Haugaard, 2002: 26), ‘it may but also operate to shape and modify desires and beliefs in a manner contrary to people’s interests’ (Lukes, 2005: 10). That is to say, the authority and power of the KBO and eight professional clubs were exercised not only to shape or distort professional players’ preference and interests, but also to prevent the collective actions of professional players to create the KPBPA. However, the collective action of professional players led to the formation of the KPBPA in 2000, despite consistent opposition from the KBO and professional clubs. As a consequence of this, a context has been created in which professional baseball players’ rights and interests come to the surface in a highly visible way.

Furthermore, it should be mentioned that Korean society is slowly breaking down elite domination in the policy-making process. As Hong (2009) argued, Korean society seems to be more pluralistic than before, whereby power is likely to be competed for, shared by and distributed amongst many participants such as civic groups/actors, academics and journalists. Indeed, there are some signs of growing civic groups in Korean society. As mentioned in Chapter 2, we witnessed the emergence and growth of a variety of civic groups relating to the area of sport in the last ten years, such as the ‘Civil Solidarity for Sport’, ‘Culture Action’, ‘Sports-Forum 21’ and academic groups (primarily, KAHPERD) which have been directly or indirectly participating in the sport policy process since the late 1990s. Their emergence and growth as well as the emergence of occasional interest groups (as evident in three case studies) have enabled, to some degree, the Korean sport policy sector to be more pluralistic. It might be an example of civic groups’ (including academic groups) influence on the sport policy process that they have published statements on certain issues, urging the government to reconsider its sport policies (e.g., notably, in relation to the human rights of student-athletes - scholastic ability and violence/sexual violation in recent years). Moreover, as
evident in both athletics and baseball, some interest groups (the KADMC for athletics, and the KPBPA and a coalition of ex-amateur baseball athletes and coaches for baseball) emerged in order to promote and protect their interests against their respective governing bodies of sport (the KAF, KBA and KBO) which hold positions of authority and power in the policy-making process. Following the central idea of pluralism that power is distributed between competing interest groups (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987; Heywood, 2002), this situation could be referred to as an indication of nascent pluralism. However, it should be recognised that such interest groups’ power and authority seemed to be relatively weak in attaining their interests. In this regard, this draws attention to the notion of neo-pluralism. As neo-pluralists hold, ‘interest groups cannot be treated as necessarily equal’ and particularly big business corporations wield disproportionate power over particular policy areas (Held, 1996: 216). Given the fact that the nation’s big business conglomerates have held a privileged position in the elite sport policy sector while the NGBs and government have relied on them to develop elite sport, it could be argued that the notion of neo-pluralism might be applied to the Korean elite sport policy process. As modern pluralists acknowledge the existence of elites and the influence of certain groups (primarily, big business corporations) on the policy-making process, there is a convergence between neo-pluralism and elitism; so called elite-pluralism (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987). Taken together, the over-lapping assumptions between elitism and neo-pluralism are the most likely explanation of the Korean elite sport policy process at the macro-level analysis.

9.3.2 Meso-level theoretical insights

Three prominent meso-level frameworks were set out in Chapter 2 for analysing the policy process in elite sport. As discussed in Chapter 2, the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) was considered as the most potentially useful lens for explaining the dynamics of policy change. Policy networks were also considered to hold some potential explanatory value as perspectives for providing the potential insights into elite sport policy process. It should be reiterated that, as John (1998) contended, no one approach provides an inclusive insight into explaining change and variation in policy processes. The intention of this section is to reflect on the utility of these three analytic frameworks in helping us to understand and explain policy change in three sports in South Korea, with a focus on the reflections on the usefulness
of the two approaches (ACF and policy networks). That is not to ignore the multiple streams framework (MSF) as an analytic lens, which offers useful insights into elite sport policy change, but rather compared to that of both ACF and policy networks, its value is highly limited. It is concluded that, although three frameworks, ACF, MSF and policy networks, provide partial insights into Korean elite sport policy process in three sports, none of the three frameworks adopted provides a comprehensive explanation of policy change in three sports. Therefore, no single framework adequately captures a complete picture of policy change in three sports. We can now turn to insights gained from these meso-level frameworks.

With regard to the MSF, although it offers only a partial insight into recent policy change in baseball, it is not useful in accounting for complex, fragmented, multi-layered aspects of policy change in three sports. Given the fact that the MSF was developed to analyse policy agenda formation within the US federal government, where the political system has multiple points of entry for policy change (cf. John, 1995; Zahariadis, 2007), its value is limited in the analysis of elite sport policy change in the relatively closed policy/political system in South Korea. However, there might be some example of utilising the concept of ‘policy entrepreneur’ from the MSF in the analysis of Korean elite baseball policy, but it is certainly weak in capturing other aspects of the policy process such as service delivery, implementation and impact. Following Kingdon’s concept of ‘policy entrepreneur’ which is used to describe advocates ‘who are willing to invest their resources (time, energy, reputation and money) to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits’ (1984: 188), Huh Koo-Yeon (currently chairman of the Baseball Development Executive Committee within the KBO) and Kang Seoung-Kyu (currently head of the KBA and a lawmaker of the ruling party) could be seen as examples of the presence of policy entrepreneurs in baseball. Their role is instructive in capturing the notion of ‘policy entrepreneur’ in the policy process of baseball as they succeeded in not only seizing the opportunity to change policy, but also employing lobbying activities to initiate constitutional amendments related to the improvement of public sport facilities by utilising their social/political status and position when the public mood on the need for the improvement of out-of-date municipal stadiums was triggered and created by the recent successes of Korean national baseball team (Beijing and 2nd WBC).

Turning to the reflection on the ACF, it is suggested that, although the framework provides partial insights into policy change in three sports in South Korea, it does not provide a
comprehensive explanation. In contrast, Green’s (2003) study of the elite sport policy change in three sports in Canada and the United Kingdom provided strong evidence that the ACF is a valuable lens for analysing the complex dynamics involved in the sport development policy subsystem. Also, the ACF offered a useful framework through which to investigate the sport policy subsystems of Australia and New Zealand in Collins’ (2008) study of the public policy toward adult life-long participation in sport in Australia, Finland and New Zealand. However, the ACF does not seem to be very useful in analysing the sport policy subsystem in this study. Given the ACF’s principal assumption that a public subsystem is made up of a number of competing coalitions, this study has revealed that there is not strong evidence for actively competing coalitions within the sport development policy subsystem. Following Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier’s (1999) notion of advocacy coalitions within a subsystem where they are concerned with changing high level policy in a different way, it is most likely that there are not advocacy coalitions competing for high level direction of sport policy rather than small issues/agendas. For example, as in both studies of Green and Collins, a high performance sport advocacy coalition competes with an emerging SFA/grassroots coalition for their respective policy goal (elite sport development vs. SFA development) within the sport policy sub-system. This fits into the analytic logic of the ACF. As identified in three case studies, there is difficulty in confirming the complex dynamics of advocacy coalitions in South Korea. The most likely explanation of such unclear coalition in the Korean sport sector is that, while elite sport-oriented policy has dominated Korean sport policy for the past 40 years despite the change of government, the areas of elite sport, school sport and SFA policy have been developed quite separately but with a clear priority given to elite sport. As explained by a former assistant deputy minister at the Ministry of Culture & Tourism, ‘we have sought elite sporting success policy on a preferential basis but, at the same time, SFA development for the last 20 years’ (Interview: 08 November 2008). As a consequence of this, it is unlikely that the direction (sector) of elite sport policy has been challenging with, or felt challenged by, the direction (sector) of SFA policy. In this regard, we could not identify emerging coalitions in three sports underlying the Korean elite sport policy network (or community- as will be discussed below). It should be reiterated that both coalitions of traditional archery and Olympic archery could be interpreted as evidence of established coalitions advocating their respective models of sport development, but they reached agreement on mutual interests. Drawing on the analysis of both athletics and archery, it is argued that there is evidence of emerging interest groups promoting their respective interests or an emerging lobby group claiming another direction for elite sport development rather than emerging advocacy
coalitions competing for high-level policy. In other words, interest groups (or a lobby group) which are based upon shared policy perceptions/aims of elite sporting success have largely emerged in order to promote or defend their interests regarding relatively narrow issues (e.g., the formation of the KADMC in the athletics policy process and the founding of the KPBPA in the baseball policy process). Therefore, there have been no major shifts in overall direction of Korean sport policy (e.g. from the direction of elite sport-dominated policy to one of SFA-dominated policy). Furthermore, when recalling the assumption of the ACF that a subsystem is made up of competing coalitions which are based upon a tripartite hierarchy structure of beliefs: ‘deep core’, ‘policy core’ and ‘secondary aspects’ (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1999), it is reasonable to admit that there is difficulty in defining distinctive and coherent belief systems at these three levels.

With regard to the concept of competing advocacy coalitions, an important point concerns the notion of a ‘policy broker’. It is hypothesised that conflicts between advocacy coalitions may be interceded by a policy broker who minimises the degree of conflict by finding some reasonable comprise (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). However, at a visible level, there is no evidence of emerging policy brokers in the Korean elite sport policy process given the findings from three case studies. As discussed above, part of the explanation for this is the domination of elite sport policy by the government over the past 40 years. On this issue, the head of ‘Sports-Forum 21’ stated that:

In fact, there is no any substantial governmental committee or group or actor which could mediate conflict or tension between interest groups. For example, even if we know that there were conflicts of interests between the KSC and KOCOSA, no group or actor arbitrated in the conflict. Actually, academics (professors) and academic societies (here, primarily, the KAHPERD) most likely to be free from government policy, interests relations and power relationship between the quasi-governmental bodies (KSC, KOCOSA and KSPO) should have a sizeable part to play in intervening in conflicts between the bodies but are not willing to do so. The reason is that heads of academic societies and many senior professors are affiliated to a board of directors or committee within such quasi-governmental bodies. In addition, most academic societies receive financial support from the quasi-governmental bodies (Interview: 15 October 2008).

As such, it could be hypothesised that the Korean elite sport policy sector would be unlikely to create a policy circumstance that allows the role of policy brokers in the policy-making
process. In this regard, the notion of advocacy coalition and policy broker may not fit into the Korean elite sport policy process based on the evidence from the current study.

However, in presenting two sets of exogenous factors for major policy change, the concept of dynamic external factors has provided a useful explanatory variable in understanding policy change in the three sports. More specifically, given that the dynamic exogenous factors which ‘include changes in socio-economic conditions, public opinion, and policy decisions/impacts from other subsystems’ affect the behaviour of actors and consequently bring about policy change’ (Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 193), it might be argued that the economic crisis (IMF intervention) in late 1997, along with the failure of the Korean men’s team to win a gold medal at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, affected the KAA’s perceptions and behaviour causing it to shift away from its existing policy. Indeed, there was the KAA’s regulatory action on the restriction of foreign-made equipment due to the change in the economic conditions. Moreover, drawing on the notion of stable exogenous factors including basic attributes of the problem area, fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure and basic distribution of natural resources, it could be argued that there has been a shared problem awareness that athletics is a foundation sport in South Korea, but has recorded poor performance over the past 20 years. Following the logic of the ACF, on the basis of this stable external factor, the 2007 decision by the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) to award the 2011 World Championships in Athletics to Daegu, South Korea draws attention the notion of the dynamic exogenous event which is ‘a necessary condition for major policy change’ (Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 193). This decision had a profound effect not only on central government’s unprecedented interest and involvement in elite athletics development, but also on the direction of policy of the KAF. Indeed, in 2008 the MCST published its new strategy for athletics, ‘Korea Athletics Development Plan: Run Korea 2011’, which announced a commitment to spend 3900 billion won for elite athletics development, taking into account the sport’s high global profile, but current poor standard of performance in Korea.

Moreover, examining two more paths of policy change suggested by the original version of the ACF, the notions of external perturbations/shocks and policy-oriented learning are significant concepts in explaining policy change. This study was concerned with the likelihood of the ACF’s notion of external perturbations/shocks to be applicable to explaining elite sport policy change in three sports. The ACF argues that significant perturbations or
shocks external to a policy subsystem are a necessary but not sufficient condition for major policy change within the subsystem:

Significant perturbations include changes in socio-economic conditions, regime change, outputs from other subsystems, or disaster. These external shocks can shift agendas, focus public attention, and attract the attention of key decision-making sovereigns (Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 198-199).

Following the logic of the ACF, it might be argued that the early exit of the Korean baseball team from the 1992 Barcelona Olympics had a profound effect on the direction of elite baseball development, an indication of which was the KBA’s willingness not only to embrace knowledge, information and skills from professional baseball sector, but also to develop a cooperative relationship between amateur baseball and professional baseball. As a consequence of this, we witnessed the rebirth of the amateur-professional cooperative committee in 1996. In addition, the miserable defeat of the Korean baseball team at the 2006 Doha Asian Games, where the national team made up of professional players was beaten by Taiwan’s baseball team and even by the Japan baseball team which comprised amateur players, provided a substantial impetus for the formation of the technical committee under the operating committee of the speciality committee of the KBO in 2006. The failure of the national team drew criticism from media which affected key actors’ perceptions and behaviours that brought about the creation of the committee. The Korean baseball team’s coach Kim, Sung-Han at the 2nd World Baseball Classic (WBC) emphasised that ‘what the KBO did well was the formation of the technical committee prompted by the miserable defeat in the 2006 Doha Asian Games’ (quoted in the MBC Network’s 100-minute Show ‘Debate and Analysis’, 26 March 2009).

This study also draws attention to the utility of the ACF’s concept of policy-oriented learning. Houlihan argued that ‘while the process of policy learning can be largely domestic and insulated from experience in other countries, or even other policy areas in the same country, it is increasingly the cases that policy learning can and increasingly does involve analyses of similar policy areas and issues in other countries’ (2009: 61-62). The potential of policy learning to bring about policy change or to change perceptions of key policy-makers has been evidenced in this study’s findings. As Houlihan and Green (2008: 288) argued ‘the need for learning from abroad is precipitated in times of crisis’ (e.g., poor performance at an Olympic Games or failure to win a major international championship), it is evident that the relative
failure of the national team at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games is instructive in addressing the mechanism of policy learning. The failure prompted a sense of crisis surrounding elite sport policy development where the KSC looked at the policy frameworks for elite sporting success that has been developed in other countries abroad. As a result of this, the KSC embarked on the introduction of the system of ‘selection and concentration’. Moreover, in baseball, the visit of the KBA’s secretary general, a high-ranking official of Seoul metropolitan and an executive of Hyundai Development Co., to Japan (particularly, the Tokyo Dome) is a significant example of the ways in which the Korean baseball sector wished to gain knowledge relating to the construction and operation of a domed-baseball stadium from abroad. As in baseball, a similar mechanism of policy learning is evident in archery. As explained by Suh G (2008), the KAA’s learning from the failure of both the USA and USSR had a profound effect on the national archer selection system and the concern to make it more sophisticated and fair. Extending the mechanism of policy learning, it is the case that the successful foreign practices (e.g., Jamaica's domination of international sprinting and China’s Olympic gold medal in 110m hurdles in Athens) have been the subject of learning and have become benchmarks for Korean athletics development. As Houlihan and Green argued (2008), many countries are willing to embrace forms of policy learning. The three case studies draw attention to the salience of policy learning for the Korean sport policy-makers. In South Korea, the conduct of policy learning is an ongoing practice through which the government and the NGBs develop the elite sport system.

As the central ideas of the ACF (the formation and influence of coalitions within a subsystem) do not comfortably fit the sport policy process with regard to the complex and dynamic policy change found in Korea, the last point concerns insights from the policy networks. As discussed in Chapter 6, 7, and 8, the policy network framework has proved useful in helping us to explain the Korean elite sport policy sector in general and the pattern, structure and relationship between government, quasi-governmental bodies, NGBs and interest groups in the process of elite sport policy in particular. Indeed, the apparent consensus (or tacit agreement) on the prioritisation of elite sport as an area of public sport policy sheds light on the use of the network approach to explain the high level of policy stability that has existed over the past 40 years (cf. Collins, 2008). Consequently, there is no evidence of competing coalitions concerning the high level policy direction of sport (e.g., elite spot vs. SFA). The development of Korean elite sport has been dominated by the formation of a policy network involving a relatively limited number of participants. Using Marsh and Rhodes’ (1992) five
types of networks in line with integration, membership, resource and power, it would appear that the Korean elite sport sector reflects a feature that is broadly consistent with a policy community. Given the characteristic of a type of policy community that exhibits stable and restricted membership (Parsons 1995), ‘sharing either an interest in a policy area or a common policy focus’ (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992: 158), a type of policy community would appear to fit the Korean elite sport policy process. This policy community is consonant with the utility of elitism in this study as the elite sport policy process has been largely dominated by members of the policy elite. As argued by Hong (2009), the concept of a policy community appears to be harmonised with the Korean sport policy process which is based upon limited membership, the sharing of basic values among participants and a hierarchical structure of relationships. The elite sport policy community has comprised senior government officials (from the MCST and the KSC), politicians, business elites, and executive members of NGBs as well as a few academics/researchers sharing common perceptions of government policy objectives maintaining a position within the top 10 places in the Olympic medal tables. This common objective has disregarded or excluded any emerging voices and also certain issues (e.g., human rights of student-athletes and the need for the reform of the national sport system), thereby justifying continued government support for elite sport. It should be noted that the elite sport policy community which has been dominated by the traditional elites such as politicians, government officials and business elites has included some academic groups in the last 10 years. Indeed, some senior professors have been serving as members of a government (and/or quasi-governmental bodies) advisory committee. However, as explained by a member of the National Assembly, ‘they have merely strengthened the legitimacy of elite sport policy by providing advice to government’ (Interview: 17 December 2008; see also Hong, 2009). Collins argued that, in the Finnish sport policy system, ‘the act of consultation may reinforce the already dominant ideology of SFA while potentially excluding alternative policy options’ (2008: 318). Therefore, it would appear that the role of such academics as advisory members may contribute to reinforcing shared common objectives and values with regard to the prioritisation of elite sport in South Korea. This feature sheds light on the policy community approach to explaining the Korean elite sport policy process. However, in criticism of the policy networks, it is argued that the policy networks approach does not take into account external factors such as interests, ideas, values, institutions and strategies which affect network interaction (Adam & Kriesi, 2007; John, 1998) while focusing on the way in which policy is made within the context of a network of actors and organisations (Parsons, 1995). Therefore, the policy networks approach is not a particularly useful lens for explaining
the mechanism of policy change in the three sports investigated, although it has provided partial insights in terms of illuminating the characteristics of the Korean elite sport policy sector and the pattern of relationships between government and interest groups.

In summary, the ACF has provided only partial insights to explaining policy change in three sports despite its wide-range of analytic factors. The most likely explanation for this is that, as the ACF was developed in the pluralistic political system of the United States, it does not comfortably fit into the closed, elite-centred and hierarchical political (policy) system of South Korea. Indeed, there are no clear competing coalitions for the direction of high level policy within the Korean elite sport policy process. However, the emphasis on exogenous factors and two path factors of the ACF provided useful insights into explaining the complex and dynamic policy changes identified in the three sports. The MS has offered a very piecemeal explanatory framework through which to consider the emergence of policy entrepreneurs within the Korean baseball policy process. The policy networks have been a helpful lens through which to illuminate the Korean elite sport policy sector. It appears that as there is evidence to support the existence and formation of a policy community, the policy networks may offer some explanation regarding the high level of policy continuity with regard to elite sport in South Korea (cf. Collins, 2008). However, it does not address the wide-range of policy factors capable of affecting policy change in any meaningful way. In this regard, if useful insights gained from these three frameworks would be combined, such a new framework might be useful in explaining policy change in the closed and elite-centred Korean political (policy) system. Reflecting on the discussion of three case studies, it is suggested that the introduction of any new policy framework of analysis could be based upon the concept of policy networks (instead of that of a sub-system) with the exogenous factors (relatively stable parameters and dynamic events) and the two path factors (policy-oriented learning and perturbation/shocking variables) of the ACF and the notion of policy entrepreneur (instead of that of policy broker).

9.4 Methodological reflection

In this section, we present four key methodological issues and problems which we encountered in this study, and reflect on how they were addressed. These four issues relate to:
(i) the researcher’s position as a critical realist; (ii) the author’s position as a Korean researcher; (iii) a multiple case study design; and (iv) data collection and analysis.

Firstly, as for the researcher’s position as a critical realist, we found that it was useful for the researcher to adopt the perspectives of critical realism in conducting this research. Indeed, the implications of critical realism generally helped the researcher sensitise the relationship between structure and agency. However, there are some social scientists who argue that critical realism is so broad; that it does not make a difference in terms of how we understand social and political phenomena. In rejecting this view it could be said that the perspective of critical realism made the researcher more conscious of the complex relationship between structure and agency. Here, we can raise the question: in what ways was critical realism useful? As regards this question, it should be recalled that ‘pre-existing social structure makes a difference to the course of events in the social world by influencing the actions that people choose to undertake’ (Lewis, 2000: 258). In a similar vein, not only structures affect the strategic decisions of actors, but also actor’s decisions have a potential effect on structures (Marsh et al., 1999). In this sense, we attempted to understand and explain the process of elite sport policy change by bearing in mind the interplay between structure and agency. In other words, we presumed that it is not that only structure (or agency) forces policy change, but that policy change occurs through the interaction between them. Therefore, we sought to explain the complexity and dynamics of policy change in three sports by looking at the interrelationship between structural (pre-existing sport system, global circumstances and political/economic conditions) and agential factors (government, quasi-governmental bodies, NGBs, business elite, interest groups and civic groups as well as key policy-makers). The perspective of critical realism, therefore, helped the researcher to take account of the interplay between structure and agency in explaining the process of elite sport policy change.

Secondly, the researcher’s background in conducting this study was helpful. The fact that the researcher had both a bachelor’s and master’s degrees in the area of sport and was a full-time lecturer in the department of physical education at the Korea Military Academy may have had a positive effect on carrying out this study in general, and understanding Korean culture and making sense of knowledge and information related to this study in particular. In addition, the fact that the researcher has not only got a wide-range of knowledge and information related to sport issues, but also could have built personal connections with ‘sportspersons’ (che-yuk-in) such as athletes, coaches, sports staffs/officials, researchers and professors in the area of sport since 1995, when the researcher went into the department of physical education
at Hanyang University for his first degree, is considered to be a great help to data collection (largely, conducting interviews and acquiring document materials). Indeed, the research used such personal connections and his status as a PhD student studying in the United Kingdom to contact potential interviewees. In fact, before travelling to South Korea for the field work, the researcher initially planned to conduct interviews with the 25 interviewees who were considered to be most valuable interviewees. 24 of the 25 interviewees willingly gave consent to be interviewed. Most of them were willing not only to provide their thoughts, experiences, opinions and information with the researcher, but also to offer document materials related to this study. Moreover, a couple of the interviewees introduced further potential interviewees (an example of ‘snowball sampling’ or the ‘snowball effect’ see Devine, 2002; Richards, 1996) so the researcher conducted a series of 28 interviews with senior policy actors, academics, journalists, former elite athlete/coach and members of non-governmental bodies involved in the policy-making process in elite sport. It seems that they considered the researcher a ‘sportsperson’ (che-yuk-in) or ‘an insider’ within the Korean sport circles. Therefore, it could be said that the field work (especially, acquiring satisfactory interview data) was judged to be successful in that the researcher conducted the interviews as planned.

In addition, it is worth noting that the researcher’s position as both an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’ could be considered as a positive factor. On the one hand, as the researcher’s status as an ‘insider’, being a Korean researcher studying Korean cases may be better for understanding Korean society and culture in more depth. On the other hand, studying abroad was a good combination of not only understanding of the policy context but also retaining a degree of ‘distance’ in order to look at the Korean sport policy process from a more disinterested (neutral) perspective. In order words, the researcher’s status having been away from his homeland for 4 years, may have been a better position to stand back from his own society and culture in order to look more reflectively at the Korean sport policy process.

Thirdly, as for the use of multiple-case studies, it should be recalled that ‘each case must be carefully selected’ (Yin, 1994: 46). Hence, the researcher was scrupulous in selecting three cases by using the purposive sampling technique, with the intention of producing detailed, in-depth and rich findings in a particular subject (here, elite sport development in South Korea). Given that evidence from multiple-cases allows the researcher not only to provide a detailed description of a particular topic, but also to draw cross-case conclusions on it, the three sports were selected so as to make an intensive, detailed and in-depth analysis of elite sport policy
change in South Korea. In selecting multiple-cases, the researcher considered a different aspect of each case, taking account of the aim and value of multiple-case studies. In other words, the three cases (athletics, archery and baseball) were selected in terms of different types of sport to draw a whole picture of elite sport policy change in South Korea. Here, it should be mentioned that, in fact, four cases were initially selected, but one case (gymnastics) of them was excluded due to insufficient materials. Indeed, the researcher had great difficulty in collecting data relevant to gymnastics because little attention has been given to elite gymnastics policy development by the sport’s governing body, government and researchers as well as media. It was, therefore, considered that we (the researcher and his supervisor) had better exclude it as there was not enough data to analyse elite sport policy change in gymnastics. However, the three cases were considered to be sufficient to explore the dynamics and complexity of elite sport policy change in South Korea. Of particular concern in relation to selecting suitable cases for this study was the issue of validity. As Yin argued (1994), it is likely that a researcher in a case study fails to set out a sufficiently operational set of measures. In this regard, we adopted the two requirements indicated by Green and Houlihan (2005) to establish guidelines for selecting suitable multiple-cases. The two requirements threw light on selecting three cases studied in this study as the three sports meet them.

Lastly, as for the data collection, two issues which the researcher encountered were raised by both interview data collection and document material collection. Although all interviewees were willing to have an interview with the researcher, a couple of interviewees were reluctant to talk about a critical (specific) issue (especially, power relations). In fact, most of the interviewees were open-mined in answering the researcher’s questions but academics, journalists and civic actors were more open-minded than sport officials. For example, the current secretary-general at the KBA avoided telling the researcher more in-depth details about power relations between the KBA and the KBO due to his current position and the situation he faced. Thus, by supplementing and triangulating insufficient accounts provided by sport officials with media materials (largely, newspapers), it was possible to grasp power relations in-depth. In addition, interviews with former senior sport officials allowed the researcher to know critical/political issues because former senior officials were likely to feel more free and at ease to share what they had known and experienced and to express their opinions and thoughts than present sport officials. In this sense, given that qualitative research methods do not seek to achieve representativeness (Devine, 2002), the researcher
sought to conduct interviews with particular interviewees related to this research’s topic and objectives instead of generating a representative sample for acquiring data and findings.

With regard to using document material, a key challenge which the researcher encountered was the job of collecting related document materials. In particular, it was not easy for the researcher to acquire document materials from the three sports’ governing bodies because they had not produced a wide-range of policy documents over time; only their respective annual business plans. However, it was possible to grasp what they had done and how they had changed policies over time by acquiring and reviewing periodicals published by them. Moreover, *The Thirty Years of Korean Archery* (1992) published by the KAA and *The Hundred Years of Korean Baseball* (1999) published by both the KBA and the KBO were important documents for the researcher to gain an understanding of the contexts and meanings of policy change in the past in both archery and baseball. In addition, as Harrison argues, ‘media resources can offer a valuable understanding of the context of political behaviour, when we might not have direct access to the event we wish to analyse’ (2001: 108). The researcher could compensate partly for the lack of data on particular issues by using journalist sources. According to Mannheim and Rich, ‘newspapers are an excellent source of current and historical information including the texts of important speeches’ (1995: 53). Indeed, the researcher could collect valuable data related to important policies in relation to elite sport including athletics, archery and baseball through newspapers including online newspapers. It should be mentioned that the issue of credibility is raised in using documentary analysis. According to Scott (1990: 7), ‘credibility refers to the extent to which the evidence is undistorted and sincere, free from error and evasion’. The research used the nation’s major newspapers including major online newspapers, which might offer reliable (authentic) information about sport policies and might not be biased, towards a political trend and in favour of a certain group (e.g., government, quasi-governmental bodies and NGBs) in the sphere of sport. As Yin (1994) argued, using documentary sources can reinforce evidence from other methods. Thus, the researcher attempted to couple documentary sources with data collected from the interviews so as to corroborate evidence and findings of this study. By triangulating multiple sources collected from the interviews and documents with theories set out in Chapter 2, the researcher sought to enhance the validity of his research findings.

This final section concludes by reflecting on the usefulness of the analytical framework set out by Green & Houlihan (2005), which offered a useful insight into analysing elite sport
policy development in the three case studies. Indeed, the analytical framework helped the researcher to consistently interpret and analyse the data collected from the interviews and documents. In other words, the researcher could be consistent in analysing the three cases by using the analytical framework identified by Green and Houlihan in order that this study may be considered as valid.

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Appendix 1. List of interviewees
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position / Job title</th>
<th>Note</th>
<th>Interview date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of Sports Policy Division, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism</td>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>29/Oct/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former assistant Deputy Minister, Ministry of Culture &amp; Tourism</td>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>08/Nov/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former director of general management, Korea Sports Council</td>
<td>Quasi-governmental sporting body</td>
<td>16/Dec/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Sport Management Team, Korea Sports Council</td>
<td>Quasi-governmental sporting body</td>
<td>06/Nov/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Sports Promotion Team, Korea Sports Promotion Foundation</td>
<td>state-run enterprises</td>
<td>23/Oct/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Strategic planning of National Council of Sport for All</td>
<td>Quasi-governmental sporting body</td>
<td>05/Nov/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Service Manager of Training Support Team, Korea National Training Centre</td>
<td>Under the control of Korea Sports Council</td>
<td>07/Nov/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary-general of Korea Archery Association</td>
<td>Archery</td>
<td>17/Nov/2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive director of Korea Archery Association</td>
<td>Archery</td>
<td>19/Nov/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold medalist at the 2006 Atlanta Olympics</td>
<td>Archery</td>
<td>04/Jan/2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary-general of Korea Athletic Federation</td>
<td>Athletics</td>
<td>13/Nov/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former executive director of Korea Athletic Federation</td>
<td>Athletics</td>
<td>14/Nov/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary-general of Korea Baseball Association</td>
<td>Baseball</td>
<td>26/Nov/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team leader of the task force for fostering youth baseball at Korea Baseball Organisation</td>
<td>Baseball</td>
<td>28/Nov/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former executive director of Korea Baseball Association</td>
<td>Baseball</td>
<td>25/Oct/2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Former coach of a high school baseball team</td>
<td>Baseball</td>
<td>27/Oct/2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Currently National Assembly Member / Former Professor at Joogang University</td>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>17/Dec/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>Publicity committee president of Liberty Forward Party</td>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>16/Dec/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman of Sport &amp; Culture Committee in Cultural Action / Assistant Professor at Donga University</td>
<td>Civic group</td>
<td>22/Oct/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of Civil Solidarity for Sport / Professor at Dankuk University</td>
<td>Civic group</td>
<td>12/Oct/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of Sports Forum 21 / Former journalist</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>15/Oct/2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior researcher of Korea Institute of Sport Science</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>27/Oct/2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior researcher of Korea Institute of Sport Science</td>
<td>Academic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Researcher of Korea Institute of Sport Science</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>07/Nov/2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professor at Seoul Women University</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>27/Oct/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of department of sport at the Hankyoreh</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>03/Dec/2008</td>
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