Re-evaluating the greek foreign policy system in a transforming world politics

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Re-evaluating the Greek Foreign Policy System in a Transforming World Politics

by

Eleni Georgiadou

Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

11 November 2011

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Abstract

The present thesis evaluates the responses of the contemporary Greek foreign policy structures and processes, conceptualised as the Greek foreign policy system, in the face of the transformation of world politics. This transformation, precipitated by the concurrent complex processes of globalisation and regionalisation, pose empirical and analytical challenges to the national management of foreign policy. Consequently, government departments and agencies assigned with responsibility for the conduct of what has been traditionally termed ‘foreign’ policy, namely the national foreign policy machinery with the foreign ministry and the diplomatic network at its core, find themselves challenged as roles and responsibilities are relocated. Such change underpins the machinery’s institutional responses and the need to rethink its role and structure.

The thesis synthesises several literatures, primarily those identified with international relations, ‘transformational’ foreign policy analysis, and new approaches to diplomatic studies informed by insights from institutionalist approaches. This is combined with extensive fieldwork within the Greek bureaucracy and the diplomatic network, and seeks to cast light on a relatively understudied area: namely the organisation and nature of the Greek foreign policy system in an era of considerable change.

The thesis draws a dual image of the contemporary Greek foreign policy system which displays elements of both continuity and change. According to the first image, the Greek foreign policy machinery embraces contemporary foreign policy developments, and is enmeshed in a process of change and adaptation as a response to its changing operational environment. The second image depicts the foreign policy system as traditionalist conforming to geopolitical approaches, which are linked to compartmentalisation in the organisation of foreign policy. This image is supported by evidence which suggests that the Greek foreign policy machinery is infused with elements of hierarchy, centralisation and verticality in its
organisation, which prevent the adoption of integrated and horizontal models prescribed by globalist approaches to the management of foreign policy.

Keywords: Greek foreign policy system, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greek diplomatic network, public diplomacy, economic diplomacy, international policy coordination, transformational foreign policy analysis, isomorphism, path dependence,
Acknowledgments

This thesis was completed with the financial support of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Loughborough University. I will always be grateful for the opportunity to conduct this project, which has been the most rewarding experience of my life. During the course of the project a number of people have offered their invaluable support and for this I would like to express my deepest gratitude.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Brian Hocking who has been a mentor and a great teacher. Brian has guided me through the course of this thesis with great academic objectivity and expertise. He has been a source of inspiration and has taught me to pursue my thoughts and ideas systematically and with academic accuracy. Brian’s commitment and input to this project have been immense and I will always be grateful. I would also like to thank my director of research Professor Dave Allen whose contribution has been valuable throughout this thesis. I am thankful to my panel reviewers Dr Oliver Daddow, Dr Daniel Conway and Dr Ruth Kinna for their feedback.

I am thankful to my friends and colleagues for their support, in particular my friend Foteini Papadopoulou and my office-mates Dr Martin Mik, Dr Bezen Coskun, Natalie Martin and Mika Obara and my colleagues Dr Matt McCullock and Jarmilla Rajas. I will always be indebted to our departmental administrator and friend Pauline Dainty for her encouragement and friendship. A special thank you goes to my friend Dr Kalliopi Kyriakopoulou for the countless hours of analysis of my work.

This thesis relies mostly on empirical material. Therefore I would like to express my gratitude to every one of the 51 Greek officials and diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the various diplomatic missions overseas who kindly contributed with their experience and knowledge to this project. Without their contribution this project would have been impossible. The majority of these people wished to remain anonymous and I shall respect their anonymity. I also wish to thank Dr Eleni Griva for her input at a crucial stage for the development of the thesis.

Finally, I want to thank my family and in particular my sister Dr Stella Georgiadou for her support and devotion. I will always be grateful to her for encouraging me to pursue this PhD in the first place. Most importantly, I would like to thank my husband Dr George Mavros for his inexhaustible understanding and encouragement, academic input and advice, love and support throughout this project. His involvement has been a catalyst in many different ways. I will never be able to thank him enough.

This thesis is dedicated to my mother Aikaterini Georgiadou. Without her support and decisiveness this journey to the UK, which proved life-changing, would never have started. Αυτό το διδακτορικό είναι αφιερωμένο στην μαμά μου, Αικατερίνη Γεωργιάδου. Χωρίς την την υποστήριξη και την αποφασιστικότητα της αυτό το ταξίδι στην Αγγλία, το οποίο άλλαξε την ζωή μου, δεν θα είχε ξεκινήσει ποτέ.
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<td>COREU</td>
<td>European Correspondents Cipher Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>CSF</td>
<td>Community Support Framework</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>General Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>General Secretariat of International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic and Commercial Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOFIN</td>
<td>Economic and Financial Affairs Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>EKEM</td>
<td>Greek centre for European Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELIAMEP</td>
<td>Hellenic Foundation for European and foreign policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
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<td>FPC</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Council</td>
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<td>FPS</td>
<td>Foreign Policy System</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GCFDM</td>
<td>Governmental Council on Foreign and Defence Matters</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
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<td>GSCI</td>
<td>General Secretariat for Communication and Information</td>
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<td>GSCP</td>
<td>General Secretariat for Civil Protection</td>
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<td>GS-EU</td>
<td>General Secretary for European Affairs</td>
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<td>GS-IER</td>
<td>General Secretary for International Economic Relations</td>
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<td>HI</td>
<td>Historical Institutionalism</td>
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<td>HiPERB</td>
<td>Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMP</td>
<td>Integrated Mediterranean Project</td>
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<td>IPS</td>
<td>International Policy System</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organisation for Standardisation</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUG</td>
<td>Joined-up government</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAS</td>
<td>Centre for the Analysis and Planning of Foreign Policy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>also EKAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>KYSEA</td>
<td>Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence</td>
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<td>KSYM</td>
<td>Governmental Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCo</td>
<td>Ministry of Coordination</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MEPW</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment and Public Works</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIPAD</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMM</td>
<td>Ministry of Mercantile Marine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNE</td>
<td>Ministry of National Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNCEC</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy and Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Diplomatic System</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>National Intelligence Centre</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSPA</td>
<td>National School of Public Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>Press and Communication Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>PeRepGr</td>
<td>Permanent Representation of Greece to the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMO</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDEE</td>
<td>System for the electronic management of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>ΣΗΔΕΕ</td>
<td>Σύστημα Ηλεκτρονικής Διαχείρισης Εγγράφων και Εργασιών</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOG</td>
<td>Whole of Government</td>
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<td>YDAS</td>
<td>DG International Development Cooperation – Hellenic Aid</td>
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Introduction

There is nothing new in the proposition that national structures and processes for the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy have been in a process of profound change, especially after the end of the Cold War. The emergence of global politics weakening traditional distinctions between domestic and international policy environments and highlighting the interconnectedness that transcends states and societies, challenge national foreign policy structures which until quite recently were perceived as embedded in Westphalian conceptions of bounded territories (Held and McGrew, 2003; 2002; Held et al, 1999). With the state having become a fragmented policy-making arena, permeated by transnational networks as well as by domestic agencies and forces (Slaughter, 2004; 1997; Held and McGrew, 2003) foreign policy is being recast in such a way that its global, regional and national facets are intertwined altering its subject matter and organisation, and reflect the changing relationship between domestic and world politics (Smith et al., 2008; Hill, 2003; Webber and Smith, 2002; Moses and Knutsen, 2001; Rozental, 1999; Sundelius, 1984a).

The dominant argument present in the literature regarding the role, structure and functions of contemporary foreign policy institutions is that they are faced with a number of challenges stemming from a transforming world politics (Webber and Smith, 2002). Much of the discourse concerns the acceleration of the processes of change with the overlapping forces of globalisation and regionalisation, which have urged governments to reflect upon and re-organise their foreign policy machineries. It is precisely such developments that have provided the context for this thesis which undertakes the exploration of the Greek foreign policy machinery vis-à-vis the transforming world politics in the 21st century.

Any discussion of foreign policy analysis in the context of this transforming world politics must start with an understanding of the transformation of the fabric of the
international political environment which has occurred through a combination of concurrent complex processes of globalisation and regionalisation (Scholte, 2008: 42-43). Globalisation and its twin force regionalisation -with the latter being understood as referring to the construction of social spaces that span several contiguous countries- have rendered international and domestic policy milieus far more complex and inter-penetrated than ever before and by expanding global social spaces have challenged our theoretical approaches to foreign policy analysis (Scholte, 2002). This is because contemporary foreign policy concerns, with their global and regional dimensions, go far beyond traditional geopolitics, challenging the effectiveness of traditional approaches to foreign policy making and posing, with renewed immediacy, the question of how foreign policy should be managed by national governments and their bureaucracies in the emergent, non-spatially defined policy environment (Hay and Marsh, 2000; Nye and Donahue, 2000; Cooper, 1999: 40; Held at al. 1999: 16-19; Newhouse, 1997: 69).

The transformative forces of globalisation and regionalisation have brought about a significant growth in the spectrum of international policy that foreign policy bureaucracies are handling and create a need for horizontal management of operational issues thus drawing into the foreign and international policy process a large number of domestic entities with a growing international portfolio. This effectively means that agents in several policy milieus, which traditionally belonged to the realm of domestic policy, become active in areas of international policy thus widening foreign policy circles and formulating foreign policy communities (Hocking: 2004; 2003; Cooper, 1999: 41; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 18) with agendas which cut across boundaries.

This development, coupled with a multiplicity of other international, non-diplomatic actors ranging from civil society organisations (CSOs) to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to academics and private enterprises outside traditional governmental channels, alter the environment in which foreign policy and diplomacy are conducted (Melissen, 2005; Rana, 2005: 2; 12; Hocking, 2004;
The weakening of the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy milieus has made analysts re-think and expand the term foreign policy so that it encompasses the international dimension of domestic issue areas expressed in this thesis with the term international policy. At the same time it has made governments re-consider and re-organise their structures and processes for foreign policy making in order to cope with systemic change (Drake and Metzl, 2000: 5; Allen, 1999: 207; Cooper, 1999; Hocking, 1999; Muller, 1999; Neumann, 1999: 152).

As a result, governments which, in their national handling of external relations, are called upon to manage and coordinate classical foreign policy together with the growing international dimension of domestic policies (Moller, 2009; Hocking, 2004; 2004b; Hill, 2003; Rozental, 1999: 136) are faced with the following realisation. Their traditional foreign policy apparatuses, previously perceived as the ‘gatekeeper’ between the domestic and international policy milieus and identified with the foreign ministry may no longer be able to cope with intensified cross-boundary external dealings (Wesley, 2002: 202; Sundelius, 1984b: 94) and added demands for international policy coordination (Spence, 2005; 1999; Batora, 2003; Gyngell and Wesley, 2003; Hill, 2003: 72; Kassim et al., 2000: 83; Allen, 1999; Hocking, 1999; Bulmer and Burch, 1998)

This ‘declinist’ assumption, closely linked to globalist approaches to international relations, suggests that the move from vertical to horizontal models of organisation has questioned the hierarchical structures of traditional foreign policy machineries as well as their monopoly over the management of international policy (Bátora, 2009; Bertram, 2009; Hocking, 2007; 2003; 1999; Hill, 2003: 4; Cooper, 2001; Allen, 1999; 2002; Ahmad, 1999: 117; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Harris, 1999: 27; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 21; Rozental, 1999: 137).

Consequently, foreign ministries - the main constituent of the foreign policy machinery - have embarked upon a process of change and adaptation translated
into extending their functions to embrace new horizontal policy areas such as economic and trade diplomacy, international aid and development, public diplomacy and crisis management as well as international policy coordination. The rationale behind this process of change and adaptation is that foreign ministries, as do other organisations, wish to retain their relevance in the transforming operational environment and maintain their centrality in national foreign policy machineries.

Evaluations of national foreign policy machineries—broadly defined as those parts of the national bureaucracies which are concerned with pursuing foreign and international policy overseas (Robertson and East, 2005: 1)—have yielded different conclusions with regard to their nature, role and significance in the transforming policy environments. On the one hand there are views suggesting that the national foreign policy machinery in its traditional form, in which the foreign ministry is central, retains its significance and key functions as well as its primacy as the government’s ultimate foreign policy actor. On the other hand there are assumptions that the twin forces of globalisation and regionalisation have challenged the significance of the foreign policy machinery in its traditional guise, comprising the foreign ministry and its diplomatic network, and urged governments to look for alternative domestic structures to pursue their policies overseas.

In this light, a broad objective of the thesis concerns the evaluation of the structure and nature of the contemporary Greek foreign policy machinery and its responses vis-à-vis the changing operational environment. A more specific objective is the exploration of the contemporary role and significance of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), traditionally the nucleus of the Greek foreign policy machinery. The exploration of the latter is based on reflection upon the organisational responses of foreign ministries in general to the changing operational environment, in the form of adaptation, as well as questions regarding their structure, role and centrality within contemporary national foreign policy bureaucracies. For purposes of addressing questions on adaptability and change, the thesis employs institutionalist approaches which, as discussed in the following
chapter, reflect upon the adaptability of institutions and organisations to their operational environment.

The study of the structure and role of foreign ministries can be very informative in understanding the national management of foreign policy. With the foreign ministry being the bureaucratic embodiment of the state’s sovereign power in its relationship with the international environment, the patterns of change within its structure, processes and operation should provide significant evidence regarding state responses to external change as well as their fundamental assumptions about world politics (Hocking, 2007b: 4). On a similar note, Jorgensen (1997) suggests that foreign ministries, because they change form and content and are historical-concrete and dynamic organisations are informative indicators of international systemic change. Therefore, in the light of the debate concerning the impact of the transforming world politics on the ways in which governments manage foreign policy, the study of the structure, operation and role of the foreign ministry can provide significant evidence.

Notably, national management of foreign policy in the context of changing international and domestic environments constitutes a research area which is relatively understudied compared with the attention devoted to systemic change (Hill, 2003; Hocking, 1999; Steiner, 1982). In existing literature most of the comparative analysis of nation states has focused on advanced industrialised states which inform research agendas on changing national foreign policy structures and processes (Robertson and East, 2005: 1). In arguments where foreign policy machineries change and adapt in ways that reflect the changing operational environment prescribed by the twin forces of globalisation and regionalisation, it is unclear to what extent this is relevant to smaller nations. In this light, investigation of the extent to which smaller states, such as Greece, relate to themes emerging in contemporary foreign policy discourse can be very indicative of the more general adaptation of their foreign policy processes to the emergent world order. Furthermore, systematic country studies can make a significant
contribution to the understanding of contemporary foreign policy making generally (Hill, 2003).

Focus of the study

Against this background the thesis seeks to investigate the structure and processes of the contemporary Greek foreign policy bureaucracy, namely the MFA, its diplomatic network and other sections of the Greek bureaucracy, which pursue international policy overseas in the context of the changing international and domestic policy milieus. More specifically, the thesis aims to reflect upon the ways in which the Greek foreign policy machinery responds to the pressures exercised by the changing operational environment and how its responses relate to the themes that preoccupy other such machineries presented in the respective literature. The project tests some commonly held assumptions about the adaptability or in some cases decline of foreign ministries and their overseas network of representation as well as assumptions concerning widening foreign policy communities by examining the relevant literature, governmental documentation and by means of a series of 51 interviews conducted during the period 2006-10.

The focal point of this study is centred upon the bureaucratic processes and structures for the management of Greek foreign policy in the 21st century for purposes of contributing to Greek foreign policy literature which has traditionally focused on policy substance. Greek foreign policy literature displays an abundance of writings which focus on the substance of the Greek foreign policy over the last three decades. More specifically Greek foreign policy literature has been particularly concerned with themes such as the dominance of the political leadership and especially of the prime minister and its political office in the foreign policy process - in other words the politicisation of the foreign policy process- as
well as with the europeanisation and securitisation of Greek foreign policy, as the section titled ‘the thesis’s relationship to the literature’ discusses on pages 9-12.

And whilst the substance of Greek foreign policy has generated ample academic interest and extensive research in the Greek academic community, the interlinked problematique of the bureaucratic processes and structures for its conduct in the rapidly changing policy milieus has been under-explored. Therefore, significant questions concerning the architecture for the organisation of Greek foreign policy remained unanswered at a time when research on the changing fabric of the international political system and its impact on national foreign policy bureaucracies is considered to be central to our understanding of the ways in which foreign affairs are managed in the 21st century. As a result, in the interest of informing an under-investigated area in Greek foreign policy literature, the thesis focuses on bureaucratic processes and structures for the conduct of Greek foreign policy and diplomacy.

With regard to the thesis’s understanding of foreign policy, despite its state-centred focus, it employs a broad definition of foreign policy analysis, namely transformational foreign policy analysis (Manners and Whitman, 2001), which adds to the equation the international activities of a wide range of domestic actors besides the traditional foreign policy actor, the foreign ministry. This approach facilitates the exploration of the key themes in the literature on contemporary foreign policy systems, and particularly concepts such as widening foreign policy communities and domestication of foreign policy whereby domestic government departments are involved in its management thus intensifying demands for international policy coordination.

Naturally, with governments facing pressing demands to engage in their entirety in international dealings, functions and competences are relocated between various departments thus challenging the primacy of the foreign ministry as the central foreign policy actor. In the face of such shifting dynamics, states have undertaken different courses of action. Some have undergone significant re-arrangement of their foreign policy machineries while others have persisted with arrangements
shaped by historical and national factors (Robertson and East, 2005). Against such trends, the thesis explores to assess Greece’s strategies with regards to change and adaptation.

Therefore, a specific objective is to re-evaluate the Greek foreign policy machinery and its main constituents, the MFA and the diplomatic network, on the basis of their adaptation as a response to the changing environments. As previously discussed, the response of the Greek foreign policy machinery to the changing global politics has been under-studied for a number of reasons that are examined in detail below. In order to achieve this exploration, the thesis brings together contributions from theorists, analysts and practitioners of foreign policy making and diplomacy who explore the ways in which governments manage foreign policy in the contemporary complex international environment. In doing so, it maps the intellectual and empirical debates about the changing nature of foreign policy and enhances our understanding of the ways in which it is currently managed. Based on the premise that there is a continuing dialogue between the kind of policies governments make and the machinery through which those policies are articulated, the study of the Greek foreign policy machinery will also provide interesting insights with regards to Greek foreign policy.

As previously mentioned the national bureaucratic management of foreign policy in the context of the transforming world politics besides being understudied as a research area it is also focused on advanced industrial states, which determine contemporary foreign policy research agendas. By this is meant that the issues - usually stemming from the twin forces of globalisation and regionalisation- that such advanced foreign policy bureaucracies confront as well as their responses to them, provide the themes that preoccupy foreign policy research. With themes such as the character –based on national politico-administrative traditions- and re-organisation of foreign ministries and their overseas diplomatic networks as well as the involvement of domestic government departments in the management of international policy and the creation of foreign policy communities preoccupying foreign policy research, the thesis sets out to examine how these themes relate to
the contemporary Greek foreign policy system. These themes, presented and discussed in greater detail in chapter one, have provided the backbone of the thesis against which the research questions and interviews were set up.

Research questions

In this light the thesis sets out to explore the following four research questions which have been deemed central to the exploration and evaluation of the Greek foreign policy system. These questions, stemming from the key issues that preoccupy the study of the management of contemporary foreign affairs and having emerged from an extensive literature review which is presented in chapter one constitute the backbone of the thesis and determine its structure. The significance of each question for this evaluation is further discussed in the respective chapters.

- How is the Greek foreign policy system conceptualised based on the particular environment and influences in foreign policy making?

- Since one of the features of transformational foreign policy is the development of foreign policy communities within bureaucracies is there evidence of this in Greece? Do domestic government departments develop an international policy capacity suggesting a `horizontalisation’ of foreign policy?

- How do the MFA’s organisation, operation and role respond to the transformation of world politics? Given the historic centrality of the MFA in the foreign policy process, how does the MFA relate to declinist and gatekeeper images of foreign ministries?

- What are the functions and structure of the Greek overseas diplomatic network? How does the recent experience of the Greek diplomatic network
relate to arguments suggesting the transformation and domestication of diplomatic missions?

The thesis’s relationship to the literature

The thesis builds on the existing literature on Greek foreign policy by employing a fresh approach to its analysis which lies in the utilisation of selected literatures discussed below and by generating a significant amount of empirical data. In doing so it provides a contemporary image of Greek foreign policy structures and processes. Such an approach enables the understanding of the management of Greek foreign policy in the context of changing world politics. By analysing the secondary literature as well as primary sources such as governmental documentation and departmental reports relating to aspects of foreign policy management from selected states, the thesis offers an overview of the key themes that have emerged in the study of foreign policy in the 21st century.

The study of foreign policy in Greece to date has largely relied on geopolitical approaches aimed at explaining the pressing foreign policy issues which dominate the Greek foreign policy agenda. The widespread interest amongst Greek political scientists in the study of Greek foreign policy has focused predominantly on its content with an added emphasis on the triangle of Greek-Cypriot-Turkish relations, and the implications of the regional geopolitics of the Balkans and the regional configuration of the EU for Greek foreign policy (Tsardanidis, 2006; Economides, 2005; 1995; 1995b; Gkikas, 2005; Voskopoulos, 2005; Kazakos, 2004; Tsibiribi, 2004; Kotzias, 2003; Tsakonas et al, 2003; Tziabiris, 2003; Valden, 2003; Zoras and Gkikas, 2002; Kavakas, 2000; Tsoukalis, 1998; 1979; Hatzivasiliou, 1995; Couloumbis, 1994; 1983; Valinakis, 1994; 1988; Yannas, 1994; Kontovounisios, 1988; Tsardanidis and Alifantis, 1988; Wallace, 1979).

There is also a considerable Greek foreign policy literature, which focuses on Greek foreign policy organisation examined from a constitutional point of view
Such literature makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the constitutional basis for foreign policy making and offers valuable information on the legal principles and rules which underpin its organisation. With the majority of the more general Greek foreign policy discussions focusing on constitutional, legalistic, geopolitical and historical approaches (Tsakonas 2005: 312) a gap in the literature was identified concerning the ways in which Greece relates to current global theoretical and empirical discussions on foreign policy.

To this end research was facilitated by a number of studies (Ioakimidis, 2003; 1999; Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997) which focus on the domestic sources of Greek foreign policy making and present the prevalent Greek foreign policy making models. Likewise, there is a significantly comprehensive and detailed study of the history of the MFA from 1833 – the year of Greek independence - to date with an emphasis on those historical variables, national and international, that have influenced its organisational evolution (Griva, 2008; 2002). A historical approach is also assumed by Karabarbounis (2007) who adopts a historical framework to examine the formation of the MFA since 1833. Employing this literature as a basis, the thesis sets out to investigate the Greek foreign policy machinery against contemporary pressures and to evaluate its responses to them.

Underpinning the analysis and evaluation of the course of change and adaptation adopted by the Greek foreign policy machinery is the deployment of the analytical framework. The thesis brings together elements from the general international relations literature, foreign policy analysis (FPA) and more specifically transformational FPA, together with the contemporary diplomatic studies literature. It also utilises the organisational device of the foreign policy system (FPS) and draws on institutionalist approaches. This analytical framework elaborated in the following chapter, constitutes a fresh approach to the analysis of Greek foreign policy and contributes significant value added to existing work.

This is because by adding to the equation assumptions and explanations inherent in each of the aforementioned approaches the analytical framework sheds new
light on the analysis of Greek foreign policy processes and structures and, thereby, aids the understanding of Greek foreign policy itself. Moreover, the analytical framework allows for the examination of a large number of variables that are particular to the Greek domestic and international operational environments and it thus facilitates the understanding of the character of the foreign policy system. As a result, it acknowledges current conceptual foreign policy puzzles which demand that analytical frameworks embrace structures, processes and policy environments which do not belong to foreign policy institutions as traditionally defined. This analytical framework departs from traditional Greek foreign policy literature which focuses on foreign policy defined in terms of military security and adopts a broader approach, which allows for the exploration of developments in international policy making more generally.

With regards to the contribution of the thesis to the realm of empirical research its significance lies in its contribution to Greek foreign policy analysis through the generation and analysis of data on those parts of the Greek bureaucracy, the MFA and the diplomatic network, that have been understudied and considered as closed and elitist. By undertaking a large number of interviews and collecting a large amount of data, the thesis provides a valid contemporary image of the culture, processes, problems, communication patterns and work of a part of the Greek civil service that has remained behind closed doors. The fieldwork managed to penetrate the back-office of the MFA, perhaps the most prestigious and elitist government department, as well as Greek embassies and other diplomatic missions and presents valuable information on the MFA’s general directorates, Greek diplomats’ jobs, routines, perceptions of themselves and of the organisation which they serve.

Altogether, by re-evaluating the Greek foreign policy system in the context of a transforming world politics, the thesis relates it to the literature on national foreign policy systems which has produced different conclusions regarding their nature and role. Additionally, by evaluating the responses of the Greek foreign policy system to the key issues that have emerged in the study of the management of
foreign policy, besides providing an updated image of the administration of Greek foreign policy, it also updates the Greek foreign policy research agenda. More specifically, it initiates what might be a continuous dialogue between contemporary global foreign policy developments and Greek foreign policy and also allows for the contextualisation of its management within prevalent IR conceptual approaches such as globalist and/or geopolitical approaches.

Methodology

The research methods employed in this inquiry fall largely within the qualitative paradigm and involve the review of secondary sources in the form of literature, primary sources such as governmental documents, reports and official websites and the conduct of 51 interviews. The research design involved primarily two interlinked stages. Firstly, the compilation of a taxonomy of issues that preoccupy national foreign policy systems in their management of foreign policy and diplomacy in the context of transforming global politics. Secondly, the generation of data which enable the exploration of the Greek foreign policy system and its response to those issues.

The taxonomy was achieved with the identification of contemporary foreign policy system preoccupations in the respective literature and in primary material such as government documents and reports obtained from official government websites and the synthesis of these issues into a single checklist. The taxonomy, presented and discussed in chapter one, provides the key themes against which the case of Greece is set up and researched. Effectively, it is on the basis of these themes that both the research questions and the interview questions were conceived and formulated. Therefore, the objective of the interviews was to generate relevant information on the Greek foreign policy institutions for purposes of evaluating them vis-à-vis the themes presented in chapter one.
With regards to the second stage, that is the exploration of the Greek case, data were generated primarily through interviews but also through systematic monitoring of the MFA’s website. In addition, special access was granted to the author to review the MFA’s publication on foreign policy issues which is intended only for MFA officials. Although the publication has not been used or quoted directly in this thesis, some of its material was used for purposes of identifying the main issues that concern the Greek MFA and its diplomatic network in their management of foreign policy. The same applies to a number of internal memos and reports that were made available to the author.

**Interviews**

In the course of the thesis, 51 semi-structured interviews using open-ended questions were conducted. Interviewees wished to remain anonymous and for this purpose the interview list presented in the final draft excludes their names and other details. Such information was presented solely to the examiners. The open-ended questions, formulated on the basis of the aforementioned themes, aimed at gathering respondents’ views on certain matters without imposing bias or preconceptions.

The interviewing technique offered significant advantages. Rapport was built with respondents and a number of new themes, particular to the Greek case, emerged during discussion. Another benefit of the chosen interviewing approach was that respondents were able to discuss issues that they believed to be central to the discussion, to provide in-depth detailed accounts of their experience and functions in given sections of the foreign policy bureaucracy and to raise their ‘problematique’ concerning Greek foreign and international policy management in the 21st century thus contributing to the refining of the research agenda. The organisation and conduct of the interviews involved the following four stages: planning, developing a protocol, data collection and lastly transcription and data analysis.
Planning

At this initial stage the two primary tasks involved determining the kind of information required for the exploration of the given themes and identifying the Greek officials who could provide such information. The former involved the drafting of an interview schedule which would ensure the extraction of information that is relevant to thesis’s research questions. The schedule (see ANNEX I), comprised some core questions concerning the role and functions of the unit represented by each interviewee as well as key themes such as international policy coordination, communication patterns, public and economic diplomacy. Schedules were diversified and enriched based on the significance of the unit for the foreign policy process as well as different competences and locations.

Therefore, interviewees were selected on the basis of their competence and hence capacity to generate the respective data but also on the basis of representing the entirety of the spectrum of the bureaucratic sections involved in the foreign policy process. For instance, there is representation of MFA diplomats for issues concerning traditional and newly emergent domains of foreign policy, embassy counsellors and consular officials for issues concerning the overseas network, domestic government department officials dispatched to overseas mission, including the permanent representation of Greece to the EU for issues relating to widening foreign policy communities, and bureaucrats of the national school of public administration concerned with public and economic diplomacy.

The interviewees and their contact details were located through the MFA’s website (www.mfa.gr). Initially, letters were sent out explaining the nature of the research project and asking for an appointment, which proved ineffective. On some occasions, when provided, electronic mail was used to arrange appointments. However, the majority of the interviews were arranged through telephone conversation with the targeted units. The list of interviewees and the research was presented for approval at the Ethical Advisory Committee at Loughborough University.
Developing a protocol

The development of a protocol for the interviews proved to be very helpful in the conduct of the interviews because it provided consistency. The protocol constituted the guide for the conduct of the interview and involved a short presentation of the thesis, its main objectives and a short briefing of the interviewee on current themes and trends in foreign policy management. This short introduction functioned as an ‘ice-breaker’ and benefited the discussion that followed by providing an agenda. In addition, it involved discussion on the matter of anonymity and confidentiality. Interviewees were asked when the appointment was made whether they required a confidentiality agreement but they all declined. Lastly, issues such as audio-recording, taking notes and evaluation of the findings were also discussed in the interview. All interviewees refused audio-recording for purposes of confidentiality and agreed with note-taking by the interviewer.

Data collection

The 51 interviews were carried out over four years from 2007 to 2010 and involved a number of fieldwork trips. Data collection was organised in the course of three week-long trips to Brussels in 2007, 2008 and 2009, two month-long trips to Athens in 2008 and 2009 and a number of short trips to other locations. The breakdown of the fieldwork into blocks served the purpose of testing data and re-informing the research agenda. For instance, some interviews conducted in the first and second blocks in Brussels in 2007 and 2008 were followed up by further meetings in 2009 and 2010 for the purpose of testing findings and clarifying points that had remained vague or unanswered. The same applied to the two consecutive trips to Athens. As mentioned above, the interviews were organised on the basis of addressing and exploring the themes informing the checklist but also of representing all the bureaucratic sections that are concerned with the management of Greek foreign and international policy.

More specifically, interviews were conducted with officials at the Prime Minister’s Diplomatic Cabinet, at the MFA’s headquarters, the ministries of Culture,
Development and Defence, at the Secretariat for Communication and Information, at the MFA’s Diplomatic Academy and at the School of National Public Administration in Athens. In addition, meetings were held with members of the Permanent Parliamentary Committee of Foreign and European Affairs and of the European Parliament in Brussels. Additional interviews were conducted with officials at the Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU in Brussels, at embassies, consulates, and economic and press offices in Canberra, New York, Cologne, Brussels and London. The criteria for the selection in the overseas missions also involved the politico-economic significance of location and the existence of Greek populations.

Transcription and data analysis

Transcription followed immediately after the conduct of the interviews for purposes of imprinting all the information that was recorded through note-keeping in the course of the interview. Transcription proved to be a time consuming technique but when performed instantly after the interview, proved quite effective. Transcribed data were also categorised under themes which enabled the identification of response variation over a given theme. This technique also facilitated the analysis of the data and allowed for the investigation of patterns in the views of respondents based on their seniority, experience, educational background, location and function, which formed part of the discussion in chapters four and five.

Interview data were checked for their credibility to the highest degree possible through data triangulation. Checks were carried out through the use of additional interviews and continuing contact with researchers and officials in the MFA and in overseas missions and material provided by them to the author such as departmental reviews and memos. Additional means for data triangulation have involved the monitoring of the MFA’s website on a regular basis and ongoing search for similar research projects in the libraries of the National School of Public Administration, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.
(ELIAMEP), the Greek Centre for European Studies (EKEM) and the University of Macedonia in Greece.

Chapter Overviews

The thesis is structured on the basis of the key themes identified in the literature review and the chapters that follow explore in greater depth these themes. The thesis is divided into five chapters, with the first two being contextual and the following three being empirical. Chapter one opens with a more detailed discussion on the transformation of world politics and its implications for the conceptualisation and organisation of contemporary foreign policy. In doing so it borrows elements from international relations, globalisation and diplomatic studies literatures. Chapter one provides the agenda for the empirical chapters on Greece that follow. The chapter also focuses on the analytical framework which is based on the employment of different literatures for purposes of facilitating the evaluation of the Greek foreign policy system. More specifically, the chapter reviews institutional approaches to organisational behaviour, a transformational foreign policy analysis and the behavioural model of the foreign policy system.

Chapter two conceptualises a Greek foreign policy system drawing on Clarke and White’s (1981; 1989) theoretical conceptualisation, identifies its constituent elements and discusses the main international and domestic variables that influence Greek foreign policy making structures. This chapter comprises two sections. The first section explores Greece’s international environment and the influence it has over its institutions for foreign policy. The second section focuses on the wider domestic politico-administrative culture and environment of which foreign policy process is just a part. Chapter two portrays certain administrative practices which have dominated Greek politics and have contributed to the moulding of the foreign policy machinery.
The third chapter focuses on developments summarised in the horizontalisation of foreign policy to a number of domestic government departments as well as the development of international policy capacity outside the confines of the MFA. With foreign policy proliferation now embracing a wide cast of government departments and the creation of foreign policy communities constituting key themes in foreign policy discussion, this chapter undertakes the investigation of Greek foreign policy decentralisation and a search for evidence of the emergence of a foreign policy community.

Chapter four narrows down the investigation to the traditionally central actor of the Greek foreign policy machinery namely the MFA. By focusing on the contemporary structure, role and operation of the MFA the chapter seeks to investigate the present position of the ministry within the Greek bureaucracy and to assess its adaptation to the changing operational environment. With adaptation becoming manifested with organisations’ extension of functions and structures, the chapter examines the MFA in the context of the transforming environment and evaluates its adaptability. At the same time, it places the MFA alongside some key assumptions concerning the nature and role of contemporary foreign ministries as well as examines its relevance vis-á-vis declinist theses and contemporary foreign ministry images.

Chapter five focuses on the Greek diplomatic network. Some of the key issues that are addressed concern its functions and role as well as questions regarding its adaptability to current developments. The chapter addresses the key themes which emerge in the wider discussion of the role and operation of overseas diplomatic missions in the context of transforming world politics against which it tests the Greek diplomatic network. The chapter provides a significant amount of data for the understanding of the operation of this part of Greek bureaucracy which has been significantly understudied.

Finally the conclusion revisits the research questions set out above and seeks to contextualise the Greek foreign policy system alongside key assumptions presented in earlier chapters. In other words, by synthesising the employed
analytical framework and findings the last chapter analyses the Greek foreign policy system against the key themes that preoccupy the contemporary management of foreign and international policy.
Chapter 1: Thinking about foreign policy structures and processes in a transforming world

Introduction

The aim of the present chapter is to explore the main challenges, empirical and analytical, that a transforming world politics (Webber and Smith, 2002; Held et al., 1999) pose to the national management of foreign policy. This exploration is necessary for the identification of the main themes that preoccupy national foreign policy systems in their management of foreign affairs in the 21st century. The chapter is organised on the basis of the key developments in foreign policy management in the context of the changing global politics. Such developments constitute the focus of contemporary foreign policy analysis.

More specifically, the chapter besides discussing conceptual developments in foreign policy analysis, addresses the challenges imposed upon foreign policy machineries in their management of foreign policy by the changing global politics. With the latter constituting the independent variable of the study, the chapter discusses its implications for national foreign policy machineries and their foreign ministries world-wide. This approach enables the formulation of a taxonomy of issues that helps to inform and guide the study of the dependent variable of the study, namely the contemporary Greek foreign policy machinery. Given that most of the available foreign policy management discourse derives from western and European states as well as from what have been termed as mega-foreign ministries1 such as those in the US, UK, France, Germany and Japan, it is valuable to explore how Greek foreign policy structures relate to such findings.

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1 Foreign ministries are categorised based on the numbers of employees and the number of overseas missions (Garson, 2007: 238)
In the contemporary environment challenges to national governments’ capacity to conduct foreign and international policy is a familiar theme and reflects the blurring of the boundaries between international and domestic policy milieus. In this environment, agencies assigned with responsibility for the conduct of what has been traditionally termed as ‘foreign’ policy, find themselves challenged as roles and responsibilities are relocated. The contemporary polycentric international environment characterised by a proliferation of actors with international policy agendas -including domestic governmental departments with an international mandate - poses significant challenges to the national foreign policy machinery. This underpins its institutional responses and the need to rethink its role and structure.

With the national foreign policy machinery, defined as the part of the national bureaucracy which pursues governmental policy overseas, it is crucial to explore the implications of the changing operational environment for foreign policy bureaucracies. In this light, a broad objective of the present discussion concerns the implications of the changing operational environment for those national structures and processes involved in the management of foreign policy whilst a more specific objective is to explore the aforementioned implications for the foreign ministry, the nucleus of the national foreign policy machinery in its traditional form. The exploration of the latter involves reflection upon the organisational responses of the foreign ministry to the changing policy environment as well as questions with regards to its role and centrality within contemporary national foreign policy bureaucracies.

The discussion is based on the premise that the patterns of change within the foreign ministry’s structure, processes and operation should provide significant evidence regarding state responses to external change as well as their fundamental assumptions about world politics (Hocking, 2007b: 4). With the transformation in world politics reflecting the forces of globalization, regionalization and, to a smaller extent, localisation creating needs for the management of horizontal issues (Harder, 2004: 3) cutting across customary foreign policy’s
vertical organisational domains, the foreign ministry’s traditional hierarchical organisational structure and models of diplomatic representation are deemed no longer sufficient (Cooper, 2001). Therefore, in the light of the debate concerning the impact of a transforming world politics on the ways in which governments manage foreign policy, the study of the structure, operation and role of the foreign ministry may generate useful insights.

In this light, the present chapter seeks to address the transforming relationships between national and international politics and their implications for the understanding and management of foreign policy. In doing so, it draws on literature from International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and Institutionalism. With this in mind, the chapter starts with a number of key developments which make up the changing international environment and their implications for the national management of foreign policy. Then it narrows the discussion to the foreign ministry and considers its role and mandate within the national foreign policy bureaucracy as well as its institutional responses to the transforming policy environment. Finally, the chapter undertakes the exploration of the analytical and theoretical developments of foreign policy within the context of FPA and employs the organisational device of the Foreign Policy System (FPS) which conceptualises foreign policy processes and structures as an integrated system in specific national contexts.

The transformation of world politics

It is conventional wisdom that the practice and structures of foreign policy and diplomacy are undergoing profound change in response to global transformations, thereby presenting demanding intellectual challenges (Webber and Smith, 2002; Held et al, 1999). In the twentieth century, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have led to the proliferation of new states and the emergence of new patterns of cooperation and conflict between them (Hill, 2003; Webber and Smith, 2002; Allen, 1999). The collapse of the bipolar system, the
absence of fixed relationships and the increased numbers of actors in the international arena have added to the complexity and multiplicity of issues confronting foreign policy and diplomatic machineries. Since then, the transformation of the international environment has been complicated by the overlapping forces of globalisation, regionalisation and localisation commonly referred to in the globalisation literature as forces of change and transformation (Scholte, 2005; 2003; Held and McGrew, 2002; Langhorne, 2000: 43; Held et al., 1999).

Globalisation, regionalisation and localisation as sets of processes subsume a variety of transforming forces. The locomotive of this transformation is information technology (Anderson, 1998: 105; Slaughter, 2004; 1997: 184). Fast and low cost information technology has fuelled ever closer linking of economic, political and social communities by facilitating direct channels of communications with market actors, companies, networks and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which operate transnationally (Bátora, 2009: 1; Woods, 2002: 25; Keohane and Nye, 2000: 116).

The information revolution, lying at the heart of economic and social globalisation, by increasing the number of participating actors and linking societies directly has increased the relevance of ‘complex interdependence’ (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 113; Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 360). More specifically, easy and cheap access to information and technology has increased the capabilities of actors outside the governmental foreign policy machinery while facilitating direct communication of national officials with their opposite numbers (Wallace, 2008; Dunn, 1996: 6-7).

Technological advancements have resulted in change and innovation in the way that international relations and diplomacy are being conducted (Wallace, 2008: 23; Cooper, 2001: 114; Melissen, 1999). Acceleration in communication methods and travel have altered the conduct and conceptualisation of diplomacy in a number of ways as well as facilitating ‘summit’ and ‘personal’ diplomacy (Cooper, 2001: 114).

Langhorne (2000: 41) suggests that a combination of the telephone, microchip and
orbiting satellite has created a global communications network, which has escaped from the control and management of governments.

Against such developments, governmental foreign policy machineries lag behind (Moses and Knutsen, 2001). Not only have governments lost control over communications but also the entire system of inter-state communication, at the centre of which traditionally resided the ministry of foreign affairs is under strain (Batora, 2009: 1). This is because one of the primary functions of the foreign ministry, namely storing and processing information, is seriously challenged by the sheer volume, availability and speed of transfer of foreign policy information (Bátora, 2009: 3; Hocking and Spence, 2005; Melissen, 1999). Therefore, the foreign ministry’s monopoly of information is challenged and together with the increase in direct communication of national officials with their opposite numbers we are witnessing what Metzl (2001) termed the ‘disintermediation’ of the foreign ministry -which refers to its disengagement as the most important intermediary between governments- and a shift towards network diplomacy which involves a wide array of actors operating horizontally across state boundaries.

Such operating forces and actors operating horizontally across the global system, have little or no reference to state boundaries and challenge the role of the state per se as the primary actor in the international system (Scholte, 2005; 2003; Held and McGrew, 2002; Langhorne, 2000: 43; Held et al., 1999). At the same time they force a symbiotic relationship with other non-governmental agencies and advocacy networks which, having defined stakes, seek to influence the agenda and direction of international public policy (Cooper, 2001: 114; Held and McGrew, 2002: 1).

Ranging from multinational corporations and international organisations to civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), foreign audiences and other entities these actors have altered the fabric of the international policy environment and challenged the processes of foreign policy

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2 According to Wallace (2008: 23) and Hocking (2002) such challenge can be observed particularly at the level of the EU where domestic ministries can communicate instantly and informally with their foreign interlocutors, whom they often know personally from multilateral working groups
and diplomacy (Bertram, 2009; Groom, 2007: 203; Foreign Ministry of Denmark, 2006: 6; Rana, 2005: 2; Tsardanidis, 2005: 43; Hocking, 2004; 2004b; Bátora, 2003: 120; Hill, 2003; Rosenau, 2002; Webber and Smith, 2002: 22; Allen, 1999: 207; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Rozental, 1999: 136). At the same time they shift the emphasis to the receiving end of diplomacy, the consumer-citizen and to new modes of diplomacy such as public diplomacy (Melissen, 2005: 7). With NGOs alone having quadrupled from 6,000 to 26,000 only in the 1990s (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 116) the emergent ‘global civil society’, representing local constituencies, principles and values besides commercial interests, is expected to transform foreign policy processes and agendas even further (Woods, 2002: 29-30).

Public diplomacy

In the changing international and domestic environments national governments have become concerned with communicating and gaining approval for their foreign policies from domestic and foreign audiences rather than governments alone and have hence prioritised the national projection of soft power (Nye, 2008; Melissen, 2005). Nye (2008: 94) defines soft power as the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction and not through coercion or payment. Instead a country’s soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies (Nye, 2008; Melissen, 2005). The prioritization of promoting a state’s soft power is directly linked to the elevation of public diplomacy as a key strategic foreign policy priority for many national governments (Melissen, 2005). Public diplomacy, defined as non state and state actors influencing public opinion in foreign societies through the usage of media and other channels of communication (Gilboa, 2008: 58), has become a new governmental instrument to mobilize resources by influencing publics of other countries (Nye, 2008: 95).

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3 For more on the different categories of NGOs based on the interests they represent see Woods (2002: 29-30)

4 For more on Nye’s discussion of smart power, which is the resultant of soft and hard power see Nye (2008)

5 For a distinction between public diplomacy and media diplomacy see Gilboa, (2008: 58)
The elevation of public diplomacy on national foreign policy agendas after the post-Cold War era and intensifying with the 11 September 2001 tragedy posed serious challenges to foreign policy and diplomatic structures previously focused on government to government interaction (Hocking, 2008: 62; Melissen, 2005: 6). The conceptual and practical implications of public diplomacy are that national governments now have to communicate their policies to and engage with a number of new actors and civil society audiences, which reside outside conventional diplomatic governmental channels.

Such developments challenge our understanding of modern diplomacy as a key institution of the Westphalian order (Held et al. 1999: 39). If Westphalian diplomacy has been about relationships between the representatives of states or other international actors then public diplomacy, according to Melissen (2005: 5), targets the general public in foreign societies and more specifically non-official groups, organisations and individuals. Naturally, the shift of emphasis in the target of foreign policy and diplomacy from governments to publics, together with the recent developments in information technologies discussed below, raise significant questions concerning the role and functions of national foreign policy machineries in their contemporary operational environment. Public diplomacy is discussed further in chapter five.

Rosenau (2002: 72) describes the contemporary operational environment of national foreign policy machineries as one of ‘extraordinary complexity’ on the grounds that overlapping forces of change have unleashed challenges, which call for intensified joint movements towards peace and prosperity. At the same time, proliferating complex interdependencies and problems pave the way for the participation in rule systems by entities other than states, such as advocacy groups, NGOs, business associations and other types of collectivities (Keohane and Nye, 2000), with which diplomats have to operate effectively.

Rosenau (2002: 75) depicts the world arena as a ‘bifurcated’ system whereby two worlds coexist. The two worlds are the traditional state-centric system, which coexists with an emergent multi-centric system of diverse types of other
collectivities of actors making up a new, expanding socio-politico-economic arena defined by ‘intermestic affairs’. In this arena, authority is increasingly disaggregated resulting in a polycentric system of global governance comprising centres of authority flowing across state borders (Slaughter, 2004; 1999; Rosenau, 2002: 71; Langhorne, 2000: 42). Such systemic change has dramatically altered the underlying structure of international relations with enormous implications for the ways in which foreign policy and diplomacy are conducted (Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 17-18). Thus, the investigation of how national foreign policy machineries adapt organisationally to such forces of transformation becomes necessary (Neumann, 1999: 152; Allen, 1999: 207).

The advent of networks and the challenges to foreign-domestic divides

The discourse on the forces of transformation in world politics is characterised by differing views. Some suggest that at the heart of the world politics transformation argument is the conviction that at the dawn of the millennium, globalisation constitutes the central transformative force behind rapid social, political and economic changes (Scholte, 2003; Held et al, 1999; Giddens, 2003; 1996). The analysis of the implications of globalisation in any of its conceived forms ranging from internationalisation to liberalisation, to universalisation and westernisation (Scholte, 2005) or as a combination of all those elements (Woods, 2002) for the nation state has been linked to assumptions that the nation state as we know it is

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6 Cooper et al. (2008: 1) describes global governance as a pattern of transparent and inclusive processes to address complex transnational collective-action problems.

7 Scholte (2005) suggests that theorists have portrayed four dominant images of globalisation, which seemingly overlap, but substantially differ in their emphasis. The first image describes globalisation as internationalisation. In this perspective ‘global’ is just another word to describe cross-border relations between countries while globalisation designates a growth of international exchange and interdependence. The second image views globalisation as liberalisation, in the sense that it refers to a process of moving state-imposed restrictions on movements between countries aiming to create an open, borderless world economy. A third conception equates globalisation with universalisation. In this context global means ‘worldwide’ and the globalisation is understood as the process of spreading objects, ideas and experiences to people in all corners of the earth. The fourth image defines globalisation as westernisation or modernisation. According to this image, social structures of the west are spread the world over eliminating prior socio-cultural experiences. Here globalisation is also seen as imperialism.
in a process of transformation (Held et al. 1999). Views which support the transformation of the role of the state suggest that ‘a revolution in diplomatic affairs is inevitable, with IT being a central factor in such transformative dynamics’ (Bátora, 2009: 3).

Focusing on globalisation as a central transformative force with implications for the nation state in the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy confronts us with an analytical puzzle. This puzzle relates to the understanding of regional and local forces in relation to the globalisation discussion. Held et al. (1999) tackle this analytical conundrum by conceiving globalisation as operating in a continuum with regional, local and national dimensions. The authors (Held et al., 1999: 15-16) suggest that by implying a stretching of political and economic activities across frontiers, globalisation embodies trans-regional interconnectedness due to the widening reach of networks of social activity and power. Interaction and flows of people, ideas, trade, and finance across frontiers are not random but rather regularised, transcending constituent societies and states.

The velocity, intensity and extensiveness of interactions may be associated with a deepening enmeshment of the local and global such that the impact of distant events is magnified while even the most local developments may have enormous global consequences. In this context, the authors conceive regionalisation as a clustering of transactions, flows and interactions between functional or geographical groupings of states or societies and localisation as referring to the consolidation of flows within a specific locale. Thus, globalisation describes, for instance, global flows, vertical and horizontal, whereas equivalent flows within them can be perceived in regional or local clusters. In all three conceptions, a reconfiguration of social geography is entailed with increased trans-planetary connections between societies through the emergence and thickening of networks of connections –environmental, social and economic (Held et al, 1999).

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8 The configuration of the European Union constitutes a characteristic example of a regional clustering of transactions between a group of states

9 For different approaches to globalisation and the three schools of thought namely the hyperglobalisers, the sceptics and the transformationalists see Held et all, 1999. Giddens, A. (1996)
The reason why this understanding is essential is because the transformative forces described above pose questions regarding the ways in which trans-boundary problems are dealt with at a national level. More specifically, the issue at hand is whether the institutional density, extreme economisation of politics, expanding jurisdiction and suprastate regulation denote a structural shift in how world affairs are governed. For Rosenau (2002) such developments represent ‘the evolving infrastructure of a fragile system of global governance- a new complex multilateralism’.

Such flows of information be they vertical or horizontal, have contributed both to the diminution of states’ capacities to manage trans-boundary issues (Woods, 2002: 26) and to the shifting balance between hierarchical and networked forms of organisation manifested in foreign policy machineries. In other words, the shifts of dynamics from states to supra-state, sub-state and non state actors with multiple allegiances and global reach can be explained with the changing structure of organisations which move from hierarchies to networks (Slaughter, 2004; 1997: 184; Rosenau, 2002: 77). Such developments are closely linked to data and documentation concerning the changing organisational approaches adopted by a number of foreign ministries which move from hierarchical to horizontal organisational structures.

This shift has been significantly facilitated by the Internet which has enabled the disaggregation of hierarchical models of authority and the spreading of power to extensive horizontal networks (Bátora, 2008; Slaughter, 2004; 1997: 184; Rosenau, 2002: 77). Such networks transcend the traditional divide between high and low politics and span states and cultures. With international organisations having a lacklustre record on global problem solving and NGOs existing largely to compensate for their inadequacies, global spanning transgovernmental networks categorises globalisation approaches under two headings instead, as hyperglobalisers and sceptics.

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10 Whether this is displacing traditional geopolitical modes of regulating world order remains the source of disagreement (Keohane and Nye, 2000; 2003; Rosenau, 2002)

11 Slaughter (1997) suggests that the rationale that transgovernmentalism has more to offer than liberal internationalism and medievalism lies in such realities.
embracing a dense web of transnational actors appear to be more effective in tackling global problems thus promoting global governance (Held and McGrew, 2002: 1; Slaughter, 1997: 195).

Horizontal networks, in conjunction with the increasing intensity of transformative forces, jointly transform the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions (Held et al., 1999: 16). Such conceptions challenge our analytical capacity which is rooted in methodological territorialism and translated into a habit of probing problems in a broad, geographical or spatial context inherent in geopolitical approaches (Scholte, 2005; Anderson, 1998). For much of the twentieth century geopolitics provided the dominant framework for the study of international politics assuming that geographical and geopolitical dynamics constituted the primary variables (Anderson, 1998: 106).

Changes in conceptions of spatial organisation also challenge traditional assumptions of foreign policy analysis (Keohane and Nye, 1989). This is because foreign policy and its structures, traditionally understood to be compartmentalised in vertical organisational domains (Cooper, 2001), must now be comprehended in a networked international policy environment. Here, the methodological constraint of the domestic-foreign divide as well as more general spatial and geographical distinctions need to be questioned (Scholte, 2005; Rosenau, 2002: 74).

Naturally, the above changes pose questions for national foreign policy structures and processes (Cooper, 2001: 114; 1999: 40; Langhorne, 2000: 34; Giddens, 1996: 1). Changes in the style of global governance have triggered tectonic shifts in national foreign policy machineries. This is because questions of supranationality and horizontal organisation imply the need to change traditional configurations for foreign policy (Scholte, 2003; Rosenau, 2002; Held et al., 1999) which have relied on the compartmentalisation of administrative responsibilities within vertically defined national foreign policy domains (Cooper, 2001: 114).

As a result, governments have sought to re-think their foreign policy machineries. Here, the re-organisation of the foreign ministry and its diplomatic network
constitute central themes (Bátora, 2009; Hocking, 2007; 2004; Cooper, 2001; Muller, 1999: 192, 197). Hocking (2007: 9) identifies two trends in contemporary national foreign policy and diplomatic systems as a result of forces of globalisation. These are fragmentation and concentration. Fragmentation relates to the diversification within what he terms the ‘national diplomatic system’ as line ministries come to assume a growing interest in the international dimension of their own portfolios, discussed in the following sections. Concentration relates to the enhancement of foreign policy capacity of prime ministerial and presidential offices and other central agencies. Both developments trigger a series of shifts of dynamics within traditional foreign policy institutions (Langhorne, 2000: 42).

These are further emphasised through parallel processes whereby webs of linkages are created between external and domestic affairs (Komachi, 1999: 105; Rosenau, 1974b: 161). With policy arenas becoming more intertwined both domestically and internationally and with linkages facilitated by informational technologies the same policy areas can be pursued in a range of negotiating environments and bureaucracies, which link themselves directly to global events and economies\(^{12}\) (Newhouse, 1997: 67).

**The transformation of foreign policy agendas and the implications for the foreign policy process**

Trans-border interactions and joint supra-state attempts to address complex transnational collective action have transformed international policy agendas (Wesley, 2002). Contemporary global agendas are occupied by complex inter-linked issues (Rosenau, 2002: 70) and are acutely penetrated by economics (Wesley, 2002; Keohane and Nye, 2000). This has led to the growth in the policy domains that the foreign policy bureaucracy has to monitor and the involvement of a large number of domestic and other entities in the policy process. Economic

\(^{12}\) See Newhouse (1997: 67) for an extensive account of the professionalisation of bureaucracies and for their direct linkages to global economy.
issues seem to dominate international agendas thus contributing to agenda transformation and pulling into foreign policy processes a wide cast of governmental and non-governmental agencies (Hocking, 2004; 2004b; Hill, 2003; Webber and Smith, 2002; Wesley, 2002; Allen, 1999: 207; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Rozental, 1999: 136).

Keohane and Nye (1987) suggest that interdependence, which promoted peace and prosperity, has become complex, binding the economic and hence political interests of states even more tightly together. Interdependence, having now reached yet another height, transcending borders and states and making, what we call, a borderless world has brought into the game of international politics, firms and markets, national and international, which seek to influence agendas. ‘Economic interests become so strong that markets replace politics at home and abroad’ (Waltz, 1999: 694) and develop their own private foreign policies¹³ which crowd international agendas (Groom, 2007). This has affected foreign ministries and their officials, traditionally seen as lacking both knowledge and interest in economics¹⁴. Now, as does the entire bureaucracy, the involvement of the MFA in economic issues has greatly increased (Waltz, 1999: 698).

The proliferation of state and societal actors with a stake in international politics which seek to influence the direction of international policy has brought both quantitative and qualitative changes to the foreign policy and diplomatic agendas which expanded and diversified (Rana, 2005: 2; White et al., 2005: 1; Hocking, 2004: 151; 2004b; Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 356; Harris, 1999: 24). Diplomatic agendas are becoming crowded with a number of new issues often directly linked to citizens, thus reminiscing national domestic agendas. Furthermore, issues of ‘high politics’ or ‘high security’ relating to questions of war and peace are changing in content as they are joined by issues relating to economic and social well being (Cooper, 2001: 114).

¹³ For an overview of private foreign policies see Groom (2007)
¹⁴ There is of course a number of foreign ministries which were set up based on a primarily commercial role such as the Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in Australia
The emphasis placed by the Cold War on military security has in most cases been downgraded by governments (Webber and Smith, 2002: 19) and there has been a qualitative change in the nature of national security which is not confined within borders (Bertram, 2009). There are new types of security challenges, global in nature, which join traditional security issues on the agenda on the grounds that they directly threaten citizens’ wellbeing. Some of the emerging security issue areas can be summarised in natural disasters, fires, tsunamis and earthquakes, transnational spread of epidemics, huge migration waves, asylum seekers, international terrorist groups and competition for resources and energy (Moller, 2009; Wesley, 2002).

A very significant development, simultaneous with the changing notions of security, is that the evolving system of global governance embracing states, international organisations, transnational networks and public as well as private actors has prioritised the significance of humanity and elevates the importance of individual human activities (Held and McGrew, 2002: 1; Langhorne, 2000: 34). As discussed later, such developments have pushed a number of foreign policy machineries to extend their functions towards managing international crises and protecting their nationals overseas as well as towards humanitarian policies such as international development cooperation and aid.

The growing emphasis on cross-cutting policies besides challenging traditional vertical divisions between domestic and international politics inherent in the Westphalian organisational approaches of the state (Allen, 1999: 207; 1999; Cooper, 1999: 40; Muller, 1999: 192; Rozental, 1999: 139; Keohane and Milner, 1996; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Sundelius 1980; 1984b; Katzenstein, 1975) has also created needs for the deployment of the government in its entirety for their management. Such developments have led to the expansion of foreign policy bureaucracies.
**Widening foreign policy communities**

As previously mentioned the proliferation of new policies on national diplomatic agendas has resulted in a proliferation of those parts of government that conduct a state’s international policy (Hill 2003; Wesley, 2002: 210; Cooper, 2001; 1999: 44). Effectively, this is translated into a wide range of government departments of a previously domestic mandate becoming involved in the foreign policy process. Domestic departments, becoming more and more involved in foreign policy making (Muller, 1999: 197) have developed international policy capacity, with the creation of specialised bureaus of international affairs and they now handle their own affairs abroad (Bertram, 2009; Rozental, 1999: 139).

The involvement of such actors in the international policy environment has resulted in diffusion in the management of foreign policy into a wider cast of agents thus creating a ‘foreign policy community’ which embraces actors horizontally outside the confines of the foreign ministry with agendas that cross policy boundaries (Hocking: 2004; 2003; Hill, 2003; Cooper, 1999: 41; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 18). Foreign policy bureaucracies are increasingly growing outside the foreign ministry (Eayrs, 1982: 96) transforming to what has been termed as ‘transnational administration’ (Spence, 2003: 23) further discussed in chapter three.

Bureaucratic elements act in the international arena and create their own linkages, thus developing a web of inter-bureaucratic interaction epitomised in the concept of transgovernmentalism (Slaughter, 2004; 1997; Keohane and Nye, 2000; 1989) facilitated by easy and low cost communications (Bátora, 2009; Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 360; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60). Consequently, the international policy making milieu is becoming more inhabited by domestic departments often bypassing the foreign ministry, once considered the linkage between the domestic and international policy milieus but now confronted with disintermediation (Rozental, 1999: 136). At the European Union level in particular there is a growing interconnectedness of domestic administrative systems of member states where sector-specific policies are coordinated across national borders without directly involving foreign ministries (Bátora, 2003: 117).
The rise of domestic departments to international policy making and the resulted widening of foreign policy communities, albeit strongly encouraged (Neumann, 1999: 153), has at the same time challenged the foreign ministry and the foreign policy machinery in a number of ways. Firstly, the unprecedented number of policy areas preoccupying foreign policy agendas coupled with the fact that it is impossible for the foreign ministry, and any other ministry, to possess expert knowledge in all foreign policy domains, have led to the former’s decreasing monopoly over foreign policy expertise. This limits its foreign policy making capacity due to the direct involvement of other government departments in multilateral diplomatic fora and policy making networks (Wallace, 2008: 22).

Secondly, and relevant to the previous argument, the phenomenon of the widening foreign policy communities has triggered discussion with regards to the centrality and relevance of the foreign ministry in contemporary foreign policy machineries. Those discussions are closely linked to the course of change and adaptation that foreign ministries have embarked upon which is discussed in the sections that follow. Last but not least, widening foreign policy communities, besides challenging the role of the foreign ministry as the sole actor in the identification and pursuit of national interests abroad, also raise questions concerning ways to ensure and improve domestic coherence in national pursuit of external relations (Allen, 1999: 209; Bertram, 2009). This relates to the task of international policy coordination which constitutes a continuing theme in national management of foreign policy. International policy coordination is also central to discussions of foreign ministries adapting their processes and structures and asserting their centrality in the foreign policy machinery.

**International policy coordination**

The central argument in this chapter is that the contemporary polycentric international environment characterised by a proliferation of actors and renewed loci of policy making invites the institutional adaptation of the traditional foreign
policy machinery. In this context the last two sections examined how domestic and other entities join in pursuing international policies thus altering foreign policy agendas and enlarging the foreign policy process. Drawing on the intensified cooperation of domestic entities in pursuing policies with a growing international significance, the theme of international policy coordination emerges with renewed emphasis in the literature.

At a European Union level coordination became very important with the majority of domestic departments acquiring a European dimension\(^\text{15}\) (Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Spence, 1999: 249-250). On the international level, policy coordination emerged as a theme resulting from the proliferation of domestic actors with growing international portfolios and international agendas which extend to the bureaucratic responsibility of a large number of government departments (Harris, 1999: 26-27; 33).

The direct involvement of home ministries and dealings with their opposite numbers in contrast to the past monopoly of the foreign ministry in communication has raised a number of questions concerning both the centrality of the foreign ministry in the foreign policy process but also the ensuring of effective international policy coordination (Allen, 1999: 209; Rozental, 1999: 136). The emerging policy areas with their fluctuating boundaries touching simultaneously on internal and external issues have stressed coordination demands from the foreign ministry (Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 61) while at the same time led to significant intra-bureaucratic friction as international policy coordination has been considered to be highly political and prestigious and has thus given rise to intra-bureaucratic rivalry (Kassim et al., 2000: 83).

According to Allen (1999: 212), governments today encounter two problems in the management of external relations. Firstly, they have to ensure effective internal communication and coordination both within the foreign ministry and between the

\(^{15}\) Especially after Maastricht 1993 this coordinating role has grown in importance (Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 61; Spence: 1999).
foreign ministry and the posts abroad. Secondly, as the agenda expands to involve directly many more home departments in both the shaping and the execution of external policy, the foreign ministry is in charge of ensuring consistency and coherence across the whole of government.

In pursuing this objective, foreign ministries find it imperative to retain as much control over the bureaucracy as possible. These problems coupled with the increase in PM’s role in diplomacy and foreign and international policy coordination (Komachi, 1999: 104) pressure contemporary foreign ministries to pursue an ever stronger position in coordination. Such new modes of interaction and cooperation challenge traditional models of the foreign ministry and the overall management of foreign policy (Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 356).

A response to the increased demands for horizontal coordination across a large number of government agencies and departments is presented by Whole of Government (WoG) approaches. WoG approaches primarily adopted by Anglo-Saxon states, refer to the management of international policy as an integrated approach to policy initiatives that cut across issue areas and negotiating arenas (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007: 1059-1060). WoG or ‘joined up government’ in the UK is defined in the State Government of Victoria Report (2007) as an approach to policy making which recognises that ‘many complex public policy issues are cross cutting in nature and do not fit neatly in departmental boundaries’

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16 Moses and Knutsen (2001) propose new institution, a bureau of foreign affairs (BFA) to replace the old and anachronistic institution of the ministry of foreign affairs. The BFA will be a small coordinating body, directly accountable to the executive office which will be in a position to pursue more flexible responses to a rapidly changing international environment.

17 The Whole of Government approach according to Christensen and Laegreid (2007) seeks to apply new holistic approaches to the old doctrine of coordination. WoG is associated with the term ‘joined up government’ (JUG) introduced by Tony Blair in 1997 main aim was to get a better grip on the “wicked” issues straddling the boundaries of public sector organizations, administrative levels, and policy areas. JUG was presented as the opposite of “departmentalism,” tunnel vision, and “vertical silos.” It denotes the aspiration to achieve horizontal and vertical coordination in order to eliminate situations in which different policies undermine each other, so as to make better use of scarce resources, to create synergies by bringing together different stakeholders in a particular policy area, and to offer citizens seamless rather than fragmented access to services

18 As defined by the State Government of Victoria Services Authority Report (2007) joined up government refers to government organisation along horizontal structures which is translated into more effective collaboration across government which is faced with policy areas requiring cross-portfolio action.
and portfolios’. Hood (2005) describes joined up government as the evolution of what is referred in traditional public administration parlance as coordination.

The 2007 Victoria Report (State Government of Victoria, State Services Authority) suggests that joined up government, also termed as holistic, integrated or horizontal government, denotes public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues. Pollitt (2003: 35), drawing elements from a number of government reports¹⁹ suggests that ‘joined-up government’, besides policy coordination, denotes the aspiration to achieve horizontally and vertically coordinated thinking and action. WoG approaches have been considered as a response to departmentalism²⁰ and competition over the management of international policy that dominated bureaucracies until very recently (Kavanagh and Richards, 2001: 1).

¹⁹ The sources Pollitt uses are listed below:

²⁰ Departmentalism, being the product of older vertical structures and policy processes, has provided the context in which agents –ministers and civil servants- operate.
The foreign ministry in the changing operational environment

Despite the rise of a large number of actors in the foreign policy process and the widening of foreign policy bureaucracies, the foreign ministry and the diplomatic corps of states, what Hocking (2004: 148) terms the national diplomatic system (NDS)\(^{21}\) constitute in most cases\(^{22}\), the core elements\(^{23}\) of the national foreign policy machinery with which governments pursue their policies overseas. In this light, the objective of the present and the following sections is to consider the role and responses of the foreign ministry in the context of its rapidly changing operational environment due to pressures exercised by the transformative forces of globalisation and regionalism\(^{24}\). Research on foreign ministries and the systems of diplomatic representation over which they preside suggests different national responses. The overview of such responses is employed for purposes of guiding through the exploration of the Greek MFA.

The contemporary policy environment raises a number of questions regarding the relevance of the foreign ministry. This, traditionally located at the boundary of two linked systems,\(^{25}\) the national and international (Steiner, 1982), and organised around geographical and functional divisions which reflect the national/international divide is undergoing serious mutation in the majority of states (Hocking, 2002; 1999: viii). The contemporary ‘borderless world’ (Waltz, 1999; Keohane and Nye, 1977) has triggered discussions about the foreign ministry’s

\(^{21}\) The term national diplomatic system refers to nationally based systems of diplomatic representation comprising overseas missions –both bilateral and multilateral- overseen by a central government department, traditionally designated as the ‘foreign ministry’ (Hocking, 2004: 148).

\(^{22}\) For instance, neither in Malaysia (Ahmad, 1999) nor in Israel (Klieman, 1999) is the foreign ministry a major or central agency. It is viewed rather as an auxiliary tool in policy making.

\(^{23}\) Despite traditional and stereotypical views regarding the role of the MFA, research has shown that there is significant variation with regards to their origins and roles or even their political and bureaucratic status. In some occasions, MFAs lie on commerce logic rather than on a political one, despite expectations for the contrary. In other occasions it seems that again despite stereotypes, MFAs do not occupy the tip of domestic bureaucratic architectures.

\(^{24}\) Whereas it is very difficult to distinguish between the implications of one and the other it has to be noted that in two specific areas, coordination of sectoral policies and CFSP, the pressures stemming from the EU context have been distinct. Although some could argue that demands for policy coordination are equally intensive in international policy.

\(^{25}\) On the one hand it is part of a global diplomatic network and on the other it is an element of what Hocking terms the national diplomatic system.
relevance in the emergent globalised policy milieus (Ahmad, 1999: 117). The changing nature of international relations which are moving towards patterns of horizontal organisation, joint responses to transboundary problems in order to protect citizens’ welfare at home and abroad, the reshuffling between foreign and economic policy, handling instant financial transfers and dealing with international crises have challenged the foreign ministry’s capacity to deal with such issues alone (Langhorne, 2000: 43).

Further complexity is added as foreign policy embraces the implications of international activity for national citizens and domestic politics (Wesley, 2002: 209) greater emphasis on humanitarian issues and the elevation of the importance of socio-economic activities (Held and McGrew, 2002: 1; Langhorne, 2000: 34). The growth in the policy domains that foreign policy bureaucracies are handling and the domestic entities drawn into the foreign policy process have questioned the monopoly of the foreign ministry over national management of international policy (Bátora, 2009; Bertram, 2009; Hocking, 2007; 2003; 1999; Hill, 2003: 4; Allen, 2002; 1999; Ahmad, 1999: 117; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Harris, 1999: 27; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 21; Rozental, 1999: 137).

Such developments coupled with the diminishing monopoly of the foreign ministry over communications due its inability to process the available vast amounts of information suggest a decline in the centrality of the foreign ministry within the national foreign policy machinery26 (Bátora, 2009). In a state of affairs whereby foreign ministries are overworked, their resources are diminishing and responsibility of international affairs is diffused across a large number of government departments (Hill, 2003; Langhorne, 2000: 43) we are witnessing what Langhorne (2000: 43) has termed the ‘dismantling of the autonomous foreign ministry’. Such developments have challenged the status of foreign ministries vis-

26 It is true that there are cases where the MFA does not hold a central role in the national foreign policy system. In Malaysia the MFA is not considered as major or central agency rather the locus of foreign policy decision making has shifted towards the PM something which has altered the whole government machinery. Still the involvement of other departments in policy making had been minimal until the late 1990s (Ahmad, 1999: 125)
à-vis other parts of the bureaucracy thus exerting pressures to redefine its position (Hill, 2003: 14; Wesley, 2002).

Despite realisations that in an era of complex interdependence the management of interstate relations no longer constitutes the exclusive domain of ministries of foreign affairs (Keohane and Nye, 1989) –if it ever did- research findings to date suggest that in most cases, the foreign ministry still holds a leading role, and in some countries a strengthening role27 amidst the national foreign policy architecture. A common denominator underlying all national foreign policy institutions is that their foreign ministries and diplomats find themselves operating in an environment characterised by expanded horizontal networks which bends, if not breaks, rules and orders of the past, thus ‘globalising’ their role (Hocking, 2005: 3).

As previously noted while questions of territorial or spatial integrity and borders still matter, the compartmentalisation of administrative responsibilities within vertically defined national foreign policy domains is no longer possible (Cooper, 2001: 114) thus challenging the organisational structure of the traditional foreign ministry which relies on hierarchy and verticality. On an analytical level, breaking up the monopoly of the foreign ministry over foreign policy as well as of old and compartmentalised approaches to foreign policy offers the opportunity for a fresh look at the way we handle international relations in a system of global networks, linkages and eroded foreign/domestic divides (Riordan 2003: 9-10) which may suggest new forms of organisation that correspond to contemporary diplomacy and public diplomacy which are more asymmetrical in nature.

Public diplomacy differentiates from other diplomacy in that its influence is exerted to host governments indirectly, that is via channels other than official government to government channels, notably via the press, mass media communication, the Internet and also through specialised networks such as businesses, trade unions, scholarly associations and religious or other institutions and affiliations (Henrikson, 2003: 124).

27 This is the case in Slovakia, Bátor, 2003: 124
Public diplomacy, which is less a new chapter in foreign policy than an element of foreign policy which has become prominent with the increased role of the public in the affairs of state and the proliferation of mechanisms of communication (Cull, 2008: 17), has significant implications for foreign ministries’ diplomatic networks.

The overseas diplomatic network and the diplomatic profession in the context of public diplomacy

In the wider discussion of rearrangement of national foreign policy machineries, the re-thinking and re-organising of overseas diplomatic missions occupies a significant part. Diplomatic missions, the nerve endings of the foreign policy machinery, are faced with a number of challenges which call for their rethinking and reorganisation (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, 2009; Gyngell and Wesley, 2003: 122). This is because the information revolution and globalisation have placed great demands on diplomatic networks as the spreading of multilateralism and the increasing number of organisations require regular attendance and monitoring (Wesley, 2002: 219). The increased requirements for speed and effectiveness and the large amounts of information have configured the relationship between the foreign ministry and the overseas missions, giving the latter an enhanced role in formulation of foreign policy (Hocking, 2004b: 98, Wesley, 2002: 217, Ikenberry, 1986) whilst posing pressing demands for re-arrangement and re-organisation.

Foreign ministries are now expected to be closer to their nationals (Harris, 1999: 27), to take on an active role within domestic and foreign communities and develop direct channels of communication with civil society and a number of stakeholders (FCO report on Consular Strategy, 2007; Hocking, 2007: 10) as well as to promote their business communities in foreign markets (Foreign Ministry of Denmark, 2006: 9, 11). This, in turn, has altered the agenda and structure of overseas missions. More specifically, such expectations exert pressures for a renewed role for

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embassies and consular missions (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Consular Strategy, 2007; Foreign Ministry of Denmark, 2006: 13), the operation and functions of which are in a process of change towards directions of promoting the entirety of governmental policy overseas. Embassies at the turn of the century have been described as becoming more like governmental offices rather than foreign ministry offices (Cooper, 2001) or else as ‘off shore government hubs’ with the whole of government being represented abroad thus raising questions with regards to the monopoly of the foreign ministry in representation (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, 2009: 37).

And whilst missions focus on a whole new range of activities such as boosting economic and other governmental policies overseas, public diplomacy has gained significant prominence (Bátora, 2003: 117). Public diplomacy, having become a core element of foreign policy (Cull, 2008: 17) and reflecting a government strategy to influence the public, has become a top priority for missions abroad (Srivihok, 2007: 66) and the main axis for their re-organisation (Rana, 2007: 30-31; Melissen, 2005; Paschke, 2000). This is because even though overseas missions were considered to be the most well informed networks in comparison to outside counterparts, they may be less so today as they are challenged by IT and non-governmental networks which seem to be broader, deeper and more comprehensive (Metzl, 2001: 80).

In this spirit of re-organisation of the overseas missions, a new role is also envisaged for the current diplomat. According to the Paschke Report (2000) a new role is awaiting the contemporary ambassador who is now much more than a negotiator and interpreter of a state’s foreign policy interests. The report describes contemporary diplomats as primarily communicators and mediators of national positions vis-à-vis all sections of the politically informed public in their host country. Their main tasks are not limited to confidential dealings with the foreign ministry but rather extend to public diplomacy aimed at explaining and canvassing support for national and international policy among government circles, Parliament, the political parties, the business community, the social partners, the media and
representatives of academic and cultural life. In other words, contemporary diplomats must build up and cultivate a dense and stable network of contacts both world of traditional foreign policy associated with high politics but also with all areas of society thus operating in an environment characterised by expanded horizontal networks (Hocking, 2005: 3).

**Traditionalist versus globalist approaches: the gatekeeper – boundary spanner images of the foreign ministry.**

Despite the much debated erosion of the domestic-foreign policy divide there is still a tendency to equate foreign with international policy which asserts the boundaries between internal and external policy. Such presumptions become manifest in discussions concerning the foreign ministry. There are primarily two different assumptions regarding the contemporary role of the foreign ministry. The first, concomitant to state-centric approaches to international relations, suggests that the foreign ministry remains the key agent in the state’s bureaucratic apparatus for the conduct of its external relations, signifying the perseverance of intergovernmentalism in the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy. The second assumption, associated with globalist approaches to world politics, suggests a diminishing role for the foreign ministry following the erosion of the state’s primacy in world politics.

Hocking (2005) has modelled two images of contemporary foreign ministries as components of the national foreign policy administrations. These he terms as ‘gatekeeper’ and ‘boundary spanner’ images, with the latter corresponding more to the emergent global policy environments. The author (Hocking, 2005: 10) describes the gatekeeper image as resting on a number of inter-linked assumptions such as the centrality of the territorial state, the primacy of control of boundaries and the communication flows that cross them. Associated with this is the equation of foreign policy with high policy and the pursuit of an identifiable national interest. In order to retain exclusivity in the management of international policy and having recognised that there are increasing demands for policy
coordination in the diffuse policy environments, foreign ministries have often pursued the role of the coordinator in order to establish their control. It has been observed that foreign policy systems where there is assertion of the foreign ministry’s exclusivity in international policy management with a simultaneous recognition for increased policy coordination are linked to vertical and hierarchical, top-down conceptualisations of coordination. Moreover, in such systems the foreign ministry acquires the role of the dominant foreign policy agency.

The rationale for the boundary spanner model rests on the capacity of the foreign ministry to span boundaries, which themselves are changing in nature by becoming more porous. This porosity has rendered boundaries more penetrable and at the same time more colonised by new agents such as epistemic communities, specialist groups, think tanks, NGOs and others. In such multi-environments boundary spanners, such as contemporary foreign ministries assume the role of mediators thus gaining renewed significance. The two images of the foreign ministry which present the foreign ministry either perceived through traditional foreign policy assumptions or through globalisation/regionalisation perspectives, have triggered debates concerning its relevance in the contemporary environment.

**The non-decline versus the decline thesis**

The decline thesis is associated with globalisation literature which questions the primacy of the state. It is mostly substantiated in studies of the foreign ministry in the context of the European Union policy milieu. This is because the EU has permanently altered the relationships between member states in that much of what was considered foreign has effectively become domestic resulting in domestic ministries communicating directly with Brussels (Spence, 2005; Langhorne, 2000). In this light, arguments supporting the decline thesis derive from assumptions about the increasing involvement of other government agencies in the foreign policy process and the abrogation of the domestic/foreign divide. More specifically, the foreign ministry is deemed a symbol of the time when national sovereignty was
well defined, international interactions were mostly channelled through official
diplomatic networks and high politics issues dominated the foreign policy agenda

The literature suggests that in terms of shaping and implementing international
policy, the foreign ministry has not always been the primary agency. In several
situations, even in countries with well-developed diplomatic systems, the
management of international policy has involved bureaucratic bargaining in which
ministries of finance, trade and other ministries as well as prime ministerial offices
have competed for pre-eminence (Hocking, 2005: 10). Some countries have also
merged their foreign ministries with ministries of trade\(^{29}\) (Berridge, 2005: 17). The
involvement of other government departments in multilateral diplomacy and the
direct dealings of national administrations officials with their opposite numbers
(Wallace, 2008: 22; Moses and Knutsen, 2001) take this argument even further as
they question the entire conceptual and organisational rationale of the foreign
ministry.

Wallace (2008) argues that for a foreign ministry to be considered in decline, two
phenomena must be present, as in the case of the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) in the UK. Firstly, a state must have a strong international presence
and as a result its foreign policy agenda must be dominated by issues of
international significance involving many areas of international policy. In such
cases the management of international policy would presuppose the involvement
of many government departments in policy making and would need complex and
robust coordination mechanisms which could be supported by the Prime Minister’s
Office (PMO) or other another coordinating department. Secondly, the state’s
foreign policy content would have shifted away from traditional high politics
concerns.

As the agenda of diplomacy changes with the issues of high statecraft being
displaced by issues which have to do less with the structure of peace and the

\(^{29}\) This is the case with Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Korea
balance of power, critics contend that we no longer have to entrust the management of external relations and policies to the bureaucratic elite of the foreign ministry (Eayrs, 1982: 96). On the contrary, international issues have to be dealt by the whole state machinery. Arguments about the indisputable increasing importance of the growing foreign policy bureaucracies outside the foreign ministry led to suggestions that the foreign ministry, as a pillar of the old diplomacy is obsolete (Berridge, 2005).

Eayrs (1982: 96) points out that ‘any government could conduct its foreign affairs without a ministry created expressly for that purpose. Its leaders could rely instead upon their own resources and those of their staffs to supervise and coordinate departments of trade, defence, immigration, agriculture, fisheries and any others doing the country’s business abroad [...] and to attend to any residue that might show up as ‘foreign policy’. As the agenda [...] and level of diplomacy change [...] it is no longer necessary to entrust the management of external relations to an élite sector of the public service’. Similarly others (Bertram, 2009; Cooper, 1999: 41; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 21) suggest that the role of the foreign ministry is challenged to the extent that the rationale for the existence of a department devoted to international issues has been doubted, while radical voices (Moses and Knutsen, 2001) propose a different administrative configuration, such as a small Bureau of Foreign Affairs with a mainly coordinating role.

Similar assumptions about the declining role of the foreign ministry derive from literature on ‘new diplomacy’ the centrepiece of which is multilateralism. ‘New diplomacy’, or else transformational or open diplomacy, is associated with a greater emphasis on publicity, summity and all kinds of direct communication between domestic ministries and thus implies the declining authority of traditional diplomatic machineries and the bypassing of the foreign ministry (Berridge, 2005: Riordan, 2003). The assumptions of new diplomacy, together with associated developments of globalisation and IT, substantiate arguments about the disintermediation of the foreign ministry (Bátora, 2009; Metzl, 2001) as the latter is

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30 For more on this radical proposal see Moses and Knutsen (2001)
viewed as just one element of the government’s foreign policy apparatus (Eayrs, 1982: 96). In this light, the current organisation of foreign ministries and their embassies lose their importance as their structures are deemed anachronistic and obsolete.

Nonetheless, critics of the decline thesis characterise assumptions over obsolescence of the foreign ministry as premature. In the context of the EU member states, Allen (1998: 54) argues that even though ‘Brusselsisation’ may be defined as a gradual transfer of policy making authority away from the national capitals to Brussels, this does not mean that foreign ministries are rendered irrelevant. On the contrary, arrangements for common foreign policy making in Brussels rely on national foreign ministries and diplomats.

Spence (2005: 23) takes this argument further and suggests that despite the changing nature of the policy process at the level of the EU and the dispatching of other government department officials to the permanent representations, the heads of the missions are still diplomats and the foreign ministry has control over the mission. For Berridge (2005) the involvement of other government departments in international policy processes signifies the strengthening of the role of the foreign ministry. This is because with foreign ministries being able to leave so many issues of low politics to the international sections of other departments, they can finally focus on their traditional role and deliver their political functions more effectively. Similarly, it has been argued that at the level of the EU, where aspects of domestic policy affect relations with other member states and therefore fall within those states’ remit, participation in the councils has given prominence to foreign policy questions on national agendas (Hocking and Spence, 2005).

Contrasting globalist arguments regarding the rationale for the existence of a department devoted to international issues (Bertram, 2009; Cooper, Moses and Knutsen, 2001; 1999: 41; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 21; Eayrs, 1982: 96) there are arguments that assess the foreign ministry from an institutional perspective. Institutionalist approaches suggest that the the foreign ministry and its overseas missions, like other institutions, are resilient and experience processes of
change and adaptation (Bátora, 2009; Berridge, 2005; Hocking, 2002; Cooper, 2001; Melissen, 1999).

The British FCO constitutes a characteristic example. This is because even though the FCO has been described as demonstrating elements of the foreign ministry decline thesis with reference to its EU policy making role which is now shared with other government departments, it seems to have strengthened its role as overseer of the network of overseas embassies (Wallace, 2008; Allen, 2002: 258). This argument questions the decline thesis. Berridge (2005) suggests that supporters of the declinist thesis do not take into consideration the trade and political analysis role of missions overseen by an adaptive bureaucratic unit such as the foreign ministry. The exploration of the latter’s institutional adaptability can further illuminate discussions about its relevance in the contemporary environment.

The foreign ministry’s institutional responses to changing operational environments

Questions regarding the institutional adaptability of the foreign ministry to its current operational environment offer interesting insights with reference to the foreign ministry relevance and decline discussion. The literature on the responses of national foreign policy machineries to global developments suggests that there are many dissimilarities and variations between states. At the same time however, Europeanisation theories and institutionalist approaches suggest that policy processes at the national, regional and international environments influence one another on both formal structural and ideational levels (Bulmer, 1994a; 1994b; Ladrech, 1994). A considerable literature which examines the implications of globalisation and regionalisation on domestic politico-administrative structures and processes has evolved from this work.

In the UK context Bulmer and Burch (2001; 1998) have adopted a historical institutionalist approach to trace the responses of the British administrative system to EU membership. In the context of Greece there is a significant amount of
literature which focuses on bureaucratic adaptation to the EC, and later to the EU framework (Spanou 2001; 1998; Georgiou, 1994b; 1994). Dimitrakopoulos (2001) who applied a historical institutionalist approach to investigate the responses of national parliaments in France, the UK and Greece under the pressures of Europeanisation suggested that change has been slow and marginal based on existing institutional practices. Spanou (2001; 2000; 1998; 1996) in her investigation of Greek institutional adaptation to the EU suggests that it is very low and unpredictable.

It is this notion of adaptation to changing policy milieus that provides a central theme in the thesis. Manners and Whitman (2000: 261) suggest that research on EU member states’ foreign policy institutions demonstrated that they are generally notorious for their conservativism and resistance to change whilst the foreign ministry is not considered as a highly adaptive institution. A number of reasons can explain foreign ministry resistance to change. Such reasons could range from their organisational and bureaucratic culture, to membership of the EU, which allows less flexibility or to the persistence of high politics on the national agenda. Other reasons could be a turbulent region, ongoing security threats, deep politicisation of the administration or even a history of dependence which has created a particular national identity and perception of foreign policy. Hocking (2005: 5) disputes such claims on the grounds that such conclusion ignores changes that have occurred in NDSs and foreign ministries over recent decades. Such changes involve the responses of foreign ministries to expanding policy tasks, diminishing resources, a revolution in IT and expectations by civil society and business community.

Both sets of research suggest that the majority of foreign policy machineries have maintained the foreign ministry in charge of foreign policy management and in most occasions its role amidst the foreign policy bureaucracy has either been strengthened or developed within frameworks of interdependence with other government departments. Additional observations also suggest that foreign ministries and their overseas missions have displayed not only extraordinary resilience but a significant degree of adaptability (Berridge, 2005: 8).
Adaptability becomes manifest with foreign ministries taking on new tasks and functions aiming to become more competitive and promote their image abroad in a number of newly added issue areas such as environmental and human rights areas (Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 360). This is closely related to the tendency to re-organise foreign ministries around the organisational principle of functionality which is added to the traditional principle of territoriality thus responding to increased economic interdependence and globalisation (Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Cooper, 1974: 155). As a result, functional re-organisation and adaptability of the foreign ministry have challenged arguments based on its anticipated decline (Cooper, 1974).

Evidence for foreign ministries’ adaptability and mutation is drawn from data found both in literature and foreign ministry reports. Such evidence suggests that contemporary foreign policy structures, including the foreign ministry at home and their overseas diplomatic networks undergo significant changes. More specifically, foreign policy structures are portrayed as being in a process of mutation to match their operational environment and to find a niche within the rising foreign policy communities (Blue Ribbon Report, 2009; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2007; Foreign Ministry of Denmark Report, 2006; Metzl, 2001; Hocking, 1999).

Therefore, despite arguments advocating its obsolescence and conservativism, the foreign ministry seems to be amongst the most adaptive parts of the national bureaucracy (Hocking, 2005; Moses and Knutsen, 2001; Steiner, 1982). With adaptation being due to close collaboration with the overseas missions, the foreign ministry, and generally, the NDS have seemingly assumed a higher profile in adapting to the diffuse and horizontal conditions of the post Cold War era (Hocking, 2004: 148; Cooper, 2001: 111). Discussion of the foreign ministries institutional responses and adaptation can be further explained through the overview of institutionalist approaches.
New Institutionalism’s insights to foreign policy institutions

The general purpose of this section is to introduce the relevant literature on which the main assumptions governing patterns of institutional resilience or else continuity, change and transformation rest. A more specific aim is to provide an explanatory framework in order to facilitate the evaluation of the responses of Greek foreign policy institutions to the changing operational environment. The study of institutions, institutional persistence and change enables the assessment and, in some instances, measurement –if performed in a comparative context- of the responses of states and their institutions to stimuli received from the environments in which they operate.

States and institutions are subjected to several dynamics, internal and external, some of which result in similar responses. Very often, however, individual responses differ. Understanding the different mechanisms or reproduction of patterns sustained by institutions help us understand why common global trends have such different consequences on domestic institutions (Thelen, 1999: 398). State responses are examined in the framework of some of the main assumptions about the nature of political institutions and the ways in which practices, rules and norms that comprise institutions are established and transformed (March and Olsen, 1996: 247).

The hypotheses drawn from the analysis of the impact of globalisation and regionalisation on foreign policy machineries, particularly Europeanisation, have been examined in an extensive literature (Hocking and Spence, 2005; Bulmer and Burch, 2001; 1998; Kassim et al., 2001; Manners and Whitman, 2000; Hocking, 1999; Bulmer, 1994b; 1994a). From these, a variety of patterns with regards to institutional responses emerge. These patterns find, variously, evidence of convergence and divergence to environmental pressures depending on the precise context. In this light, institutionalism can provide useful insights with reference to the responses of national foreign policy institutions to given sets of stimuli and pressures. This is because institutionalism, and more specifically the historical
strand, adds to the discussion parameters such as national historical legacies, organisational traditions and political cultures.

New institutionalism, or neo-institutionalism, is mostly defined by the work of March and Olsen (1998; 1996; 1984). It was boosted in the 1990s by studies employing Europeanist approaches which, as mentioned above, tried to explain the impact of European integration on domestic institutions (Hocking and Spence, 2005; Bulmer and Burch, 2001; 1998; Kassim et al., 2001; Bulmer, 1994b; 1994). New institutionalism views institutions in broader terms than old institutionalism, which saw them as formal rules, procedures and organisations of government such as the legal system of courts (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001:1; Rhodes, 1997; 1995). The explanatory lens of new institutionalism extends beyond formal organisations to encompass formal and informal processes and patterns of structured interaction between groups as institutions themselves (Bache and George, 2006: 24) while at the same time, reinforces aspects of traditional thinking which describe institutional approaches in the study of government and politics as the ‘historic heart’ of the subject and as ‘part of the toolkit of every political scientist’ (Rhodes, 1997: 5, 64).

In this light, institutions, which can be either formal or informal, are understood as a ‘relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations’ (Campbell, 2004:12). Such behaviour is ‘embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimise particular identities and practices and rules associated with them’ (March and Olsen, 1998: 948). Public administration literature introduced the term ‘standard operating procedures’ to describe this widened conceptualisation of institutions (Rothstein, 1996: 145). Other political scientists such as Meyer and Rowan (1991: 41) understand institutions as systems of coordinated and controlled activities that arise when work is embedded in complex

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31 Old institutionalism was undermined in the post the post-war era as theories of a structural, functionalist or economic nature such as Marxism paid little attention to the significance of institutions and explained political processes with social, economic and cultural variables. For more on old institutionalism see Rothstein (1996).
networks of technical relations and boundary spanning exchanges. In modern societies these systems are highly institutionalised.

New institutionalism, having become one of the most popular approaches in modern organisation theory, seems to inform concepts of Europeanization and globalization well and to add complementary explanatory value with reference to their impact on domestic institutions (Peters, 2000: 1). More specifically, in institutionalist approaches states still matter—despite neofunctionalist theorisation that supranationality will prevail—and so do institutions, be they international or domestic. Institutionalism can be seen as complementary to complex interdependence, global governance and networks and can offer explanations concerning the decisive effects that participation in such a range of institutional environments can have on domestic foreign policy arrangements (March and Olsen, 1996:251).

Despite reservations associated with the variations in prediction that institutional theory can offer based on different national experiences and empirical findings (Peters, 2000: 2), its significance lies in some of its main assumptions. One of the key assumptions is that institutions opt for institutional legitimacy and preservation rather than macro-level optimal performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). This effectively means that whilst global, regional or local forces may exert similar pressures on states and their institutions, the latter respond in ways which ensure preservation and continuity.

In other words, institutions function with the aim to survive rather than on the basis of the best macroscopic strategic practice. As March and Olsen (1984: 738) emphasise, in the modern world institutions constitute the cumulative consequence of their very transformation and their aspiration to become larger and better resourced. Therefore, the authors (March and Olsen, 1984: 738) argue, bureaucratic agencies such as national foreign ministries or legislative committees are not only arenas for contending social forces but also a collection of persistent structures and processes fighting for survival.
With the natural state of institutions being survival and continuity, new institutionalism tries to explain persistence of structures and processes. Such persistence is prescribed by the concept of path dependence, which can be summarised in that once a path is taken actors adjust to this path (Thelen, 1999: 385). The concept of path dependence is discussed below. Analysts observe that although institutionalist theory allows for incremental adaptation and institutional transformation, it does not accommodate actors creating path-breaking change of their own volition (Ross, 2007: 93; Bulmer, 1994). They add that doing so would describe a fundamentally different history of institutional development. Such observations have led to significant criticism of the approach for being ‘almost inherently static while the world of politics, which it seeks to explain, is almost inherently dynamic’ (Peters, 2000: 7).

A set of questions that institutional approaches answer concern the ways in which institutions influence actors’ preferences and thus political outcomes. Answers to such questions range from rational, ‘calculus’ approaches on the one end of the spectrum to sociological or else ‘cultural’ approaches on the other (Rothstein, 1996: 147). Rational institutionalist approaches assume that institutions are sets of rules created by actors –who have predetermined and fixed preferences- in a strategic fashion to achieve desired goals (Rothstein, 1996; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). March and Olsen’s (1996: 252) objection to this assumption rests on preferences depending on a logic of appropriateness -that is a logic which predicts specific patterns of normative behaviours on behalf of members of institutions learned through socialisation- than on the logic of consequence that underlies conceptions of rational action. Rather, institutionalised rules, duties, rights, and roles define acts as appropriate or inappropriate. This objection points towards the other end of the spectrum where sociological institutionalism resides.

Sociological institutionalism, taking into consideration both formal and informal structures, suggests that institutions are constitutive of identities and preferences as they help actors to interpret and give meaning to appropriate behaviour (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001:1). At the sociological end of the spectrum,
institutions are viewed as inseparable from human identity and behavioural choice (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 2-3). Another objection to the view that actors have fixed preferences exogenously formulated as argued in the calculus approach is articulated by historical institutionalism (HI). HI cuts across the dichotomy of the two strands and draws on research within both traditions emphasising the importance of historical processes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:9). With reference to preference formation, historical institutionalists argue that ‘actors cannot simply be assumed to have a fixed and immutable preference set, to be blessed with extensive (often perfect) information and foresight and to be self-interested and self-serving utility maximisers’ (Hay and Wincott, 1998:954).

It is very important to note that all strands of new institutionalism, irrespective of how they perceive preference formation and institutional behaviour, are characterised by a number of common assumptions which are central to our understanding of institutions. According to Peters (2000: 5) these assumptions can be summarised in that political institutions, that is processes or structures – however defined- do matter as at their simplest they are structures of government and structures tend to persist whereas individuals come and go. Hall and Taylor (1998: 959) further reinforce the need for structural approaches, which shift the emphasis to structures on the grounds that what we seek to understand is how institutions (structures) shape social life and political outcomes.

**Historical Institutionalism**

HI has been primarily developed by political scientists who have studied how political and economic decision making is affected by the institutional arrangements of states, including the organisation of government agencies, parliaments, constitutions and so on32 (Campbell 2004: 22). In contrast to modern regime theory which views ‘international institutions as deliberate instruments to improve the efficiency of bargaining between states’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 507) HI

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32 For an application of HI to a foreign policy making institution see Bulmer (2001; 1998) who focuses on the evolution of the FCO in the UK
suggests that defined institutions not only shape actors’ strategies but also their goals and preferences and by mediating their relations of cooperation and conflict, institutions structure political situations and leave their own imprint on political outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 9).

HI has been described as synthesising aspects from both rational and sociological strands (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Hay and Wincott (1998) respond to the aforementioned description of HI by portraying it neither as a synthesiser nor as a merger of the two strands. Rather, they depict HI as possessing its own ontology, which is not to be found along the length of the spectrum but above it. HI takes the form of an umbrella, a meta-theory, and transcends the ‘traditional dualism of institution and intention, structure and agency and can be identified as a coherent and consistent approach to institutional analysis’ (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 953) thus prescribing an advancement of the previous two approaches.

Hall and Taylor (1996: 938) suggest that ‘HI defines institutions as both formal and informal procedures, norms and conventions embedded in the polity [...]. They can range from the rules of a constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union behaviour [...]. In general, HI associates institutions with organisations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organisation’. The authors (1996: 938) advocate that HI possesses four distinct features in its analysis.

Firstly, HI tends to conceptualise the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour in relatively broad terms. Secondly, they emphasise the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions. More specifically, HI has been attentive to the way in which institutions distribute power unevenly across social groups. HI assumes a world in which institutions give some groups disproportionate access to the decision making process and stresses how some groups win and others lose. Such analyses can illuminate the issue of disproportionate power held by political leadership in the policy process.
Thirdly, institutions tend to have a view of institutional development that emphasises path dependence and unintended consequences. Historical institutionalists have been strong proponents of a social causation that is path-dependent in that it views operative forces as mediated by the contextual setting often inherited by the past. Fourthly, they are especially concerned with integrating institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes. A significant advantage of HI is that it poses a broad research agenda. While the three ‘neos’ in IR theory (neo-liberalism, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism) claim to be a theory in themselves in which dependent and independent variables are definable and linear causalities are discernible, new institutionalism, sums up instead a set of assumptions about social contexts in which actors behave (Morrise-Schilbach, 2002: 12; March and Olsen, 1984).

HI draws its hypotheses from empirical observations and its explanatory competence lies primarily in the two principles reflected in its own label; namely the historical principle, which acknowledges that political development must be understood as an institutional trajectory that unfolds over time and the institutionalist principle which stresses that many of the contemporary implications of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions – whether these be formal rules, policy structures or norms (Pierson, 1996: 126).

In the study of institutional trajectories, understanding both institutions and the environment in which these institutions operate which is associated with the development of paths, is crucial. Historical institutionalists, unlike rational choice institutionalists, argue that decisions are not made according to abstract rationality, but rather according to perceptions and within environmental constraints that are structured by pre-existing institutional relationships (Bache and George, 2006: 26). For this purpose the organisational device of the foreign policy system, which organises the environment surrounding processes and institutions can add significant explanatory value. The foreign policy system is discussed later in this chapter.
Understanding institutional ‘stickiness’ and change: path dependence, critical junctures and isomorphism

In a broad sense, path dependence refers to the causal relevance of preceding stages in temporal sequence (Pierson, 2000: 252) whilst with reference to institutions, path dependence is the mechanism which causes evolutionary institutional change as described by developmental ‘pathways’ (Thelen, 1999: 387). Evolutionary change suggests that institutions continue to evolve in response to changing environmental conditions. Krasner (1984) was the first analyst to define path dependence and to pose interesting questions regarding the response of institutions to changing environments.

Campbell (2004: 33-35) argues that evolutionary change is perhaps the most frequently discussed pattern of change. This provides for small gradual and incremental change in the context of a pre-determined path. The main rationale in this pattern is that although current institutions have changed and developed they resemble the old institutions as they have either borrowed or maintained several aspects of them. The author (Campbell, 2004) argues that institutions are by nature ‘sticky’ in that they stick to prior practices and forms of organisation as well as prone to inertia and therefore, policymakers can only proceed to minor changes based on past arrangements.

According to Pierson (2000: 251) the concept of path dependence in political science refers to ‘particular courses of action which, once introduced, may be impossible to reverse’. Krasner (1988: 83) justifies the persistence of such courses of action in that their ‘self-reinforcing positive feedback’ renders transition to different courses of action very difficult unless there is a significant disturbance in the path. It has been argued that ‘path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of

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33 In business studies the concept of path dependence defined as certain courses of action which are preferred over others, is known through the QWERTY model. The QWERTY model initially introduced by Paul David, attempted to explain how the standardization of the letters in the typewriters was established (North, 1990: 93). This model points to the direction of path dependency in the sense of a process or practice prevailing over the others.
reversal are very high’ (Pierson, 2000: 252) because once a path is taken then it becomes ‘locked in’ as all relevant actors adjust their strategies to accommodate the prevailing pattern.

As mentioned above, this is manifested through ‘stickiness’ to prior institutional arrangements and commitments (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 12). In other words, actors ‘locked in’ paths adjust their behaviour in ways consistent with past action in order to maximise returns\(^3\) (Campbell, 2004: 67). In this sense, path dependence is helpful in explaining the persistence of patterns or policies over time in individual countries (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 14) and responses of foreign policy institutions.

Path dependence is useful in explaining the responses of institutions and organisations to defined sets of challenges. More specifically, it is useful in explaining the responses of foreign policy institutions as dependent variables to a set of defined challenges and pressures, the independent variables, by taking into consideration all those national circumstances that may render evolution sticky. According to Hall and Taylor (1996: 941) this can be easily explained if one thinks that ‘the effects of operative forces are mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often inherited by the past. These features are institutional in nature. Institutions are seen as relatively persistent features of the historical landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical development along a set of paths’.

In this context, responses and evolution of foreign policy institutions are bound to rely on prior institutional arrangements and commitments which condition further action, limit what is possible, and cause agents to redefine their interests (Bulmer, 1994). Institutional change then becomes path dependent since actors define their

\(^3\) Nonetheless, there are objections to this assumption according to which the concept of path dependence lacks evidence for increasing returns. It has been argued that for institutions to yield in increasing returns they have to become contextually insulated and institutionally strengthened over time (Ross, 2007:92).
preferences endogenously based upon past preferences and experiences. Agents can choose any of the existing paths without any restrictions. In other words, the choices available to the actors/decision-makers are constrained as they are incrementally adjusted and thus become endogenous to the institution formulating the institutional environment (Campbell, 2004: 26). Such perceptions of change, that is incremental and endogenous, have led to observations that path dependence seeks to describe change in a way that resembles a process of adaptation to both external and internal challenges (Ross, 2007: 93).

Inherent in the concept of adaptation -defined in terms of innovations in the policy making structures- are moments of change. More specifically “adaptation refers to transformative change, i.e. the institutional development is punctuated by moments in which the fundamentals of institutions themselves change and in which the quality of the institution itself alters (Morris-Schilbach, 2002: 38). Such moments are termed ‘critical junctures’ (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Thelen, 1999; Hall and Taylor, 1996). Critical junctures constitute the area of research for historical institutionalists who define them as historical moments whereby substantial institutional change took place resulting in a point where historical development moved into a new path. What circumstances are responsible for critical junctures differ for each context and are yet to be decided (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 942). Critical junctures have also been described as crucial founding moments of institutional formation that send countries along broadly different development paths (Thelen, 1999:387).

For purposes of integrating into thinking about institutional evolution both the concepts of stability and incremental change, which are the normal state for institutions, and the concept of abrupt change produced by critical junctures (Pierson, 2000; 1996) historical institutionalists have developed a dual model. This dual model for understanding institutional development and the interchange between stability and change is termed ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Campbell 2004: 26).
According to this model ‘long periods of path dependent institutional stability and reproduction are punctuated occasionally by brief phases of institutional influx – referred to as critical junctures - during which dramatic change is possible [...] and which lead to distinct legacies’ (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 341). The question that is raised in this context is whether an explanation of rapid and revolutionary change squares with the analytic framework of path dependence. In other words how can institutions be so important at one moment so that they persist ensuring continuity and unimportant at another so that they allow for disruption and change? The answer is that what may initially appear as a sudden abrupt change is often the outcome of evolutionary, incremental change (Campbell 2004: 26).

Additional responses to questions of organisational change come from other analysts (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; 1991b; Meyer and Rowan, 1991) who suggest that besides critical junctures there is an additional mechanism with which institutionalism understands and explains change. This mechanism is called ‘institutional isomorphism’. DiMaggio and Powell (1991b: 66) describe isomorphism as a process of homogenisation whereby ‘one unit in a population resembles other units that face the same set of environmental conditions. At the population level, such an approach suggests that organisational characteristics are modified in the direction of increasing compatibility with environmental characteristics.’ In the same context, Meyer and Rowan (1991: 41-47) with isomorphism refer to the tendency of organisations to modify and coordinate their actions based on the complex networks in which they are embedded through boundary spanning exchanges. In other words, institutions tend to match and reflect the environments in which they operate, with which they are in constant exchange.

Application of this assumption to national foreign policy institutions enhances our understanding of their institutional behaviour. Foreign policy institutions appear to transform in an attempt to reflect their operational environment and increase their returns. The way to achieve this is through spanning their traditional boundaries in order to engage in activities prescribed by the environment in which they operate.
An enlightening example for isomorphic processes derives from the context of the EU, which presented national foreign policy institutions and foreign ministries with a given institutional environment. Isomorphic processes are likely to lead to convergence with regards to some aspects of the foreign ministry’s organisation within the EU. At the same time, in institutionalist terms, a certain degree of divergence is also anticipated on the grounds of the different domestic political environments. Endogenous forces relate to the nature and operation of the bureaucratic apparatus in which foreign ministries operate.

New institutionalism, together with the concept of the foreign policy system (FPS), discussed below are very useful for the understanding of foreign ministries, which are part of that system because they allow for the examination of both external and domestic forces. What is distinctive about foreign ministries is that both domestic and international forces shape their organisation, more so than sectoral ministries. And even though arguments about globalisation and regionalisation suggest that national foreign policy institutions respond in certain ways to the changing international environment, reflected in re-organisation and re-structuring, it is important to note that this depends on the political environment in which they operate, thus demonstrating both similar and diverging developments.

**Foreign policy in a transforming world: in a process of conceptual boundary spanning**

So far we have seen some of the main developments prescribing the transformation of world politics which results in a series of implications for national foreign policy machineries. One of the core assumptions in the literature of world politics transformation is that traditional notions of the state as the fundamental unit of international society are challenged. State centric perspectives have come under attack as forces of transformation woven in processes of globalisation and
regionalisation, accelerated by information technology have entangled states in dense networks of interdependencies with a number of state and non-state actors.

At this critical juncture for world politics, it is useful to attempt an overview of where we have reached in the study of foreign policy. In this light, we explore what FPA, traditionally eclectic and the most obvious source of theories for the study of foreign policy has to offer to the understanding of contemporary foreign policy and its organisation. For this purpose the thesis explores the development of FPA from traditional formulations to the contemporary form of what Manners and Whitman (2000) term ‘transformational’ FPA and the behavioural model of the foreign policy system (FPS) (Clarke and White, 1981: 1989) for purposes of facilitating the conceptualisation of a Greek FPS. The central underlying ontological questions concern the changing meaning of the notion of foreign policy and its implications for foreign policy studies.

In seventeenth and eighteenth century European states, foreign policy came within the prerogative of the Crown. For new states, such as the United States of America, writing their constitution to guard against the dominance of monarchical power which they saw in Europe, executive control over foreign policy and defence was considered essential to effective government (Wallace, 1971: 9-10). The view of foreign policy as a separate area of public policy linked to security, territorial integrity and the fundamental values of the state retains much of its force today. However, the emphasis on national security and military strategic considerations was elitist as it presupposed the monopoly of power by a small group of persons. Even the foreign policy budget –largely military- had until the late 1970s been immune to domestic considerations and separate from expenditure on foreign aid for instance (Cooper, 1974: 153). Based on these assumptions, a conventional definition of foreign policy referred to actions taken by governments directed at other governments in the environment external to their state (White, 2004: 11; Webber and Smith, 2002).

Such conceptualisations of foreign policy capture the centrality of states and governments and perceive the foreign policy process as insulated from other areas
of governmental activity. Until recently, this had been translated into conceptual boundaries between foreign and domestic politics based on the state’s territorial frontiers which separate external and domestic politics. According to earlier definitions, ‘foreign policy is the area of politics which bridges the all important boundary between the nation-state and its international environment’ (Wallace, 1971: 7).

White (1981: 4) adds that foreign policy is made within the frontiers of the state but is directed and must be implemented within the environment external to the state. [...] For earlier thinkers ‘foreign’ suggested not only the direction but also a particular type of policy which referred to the area of government concerned with the vital security interests of the state and that foreign policy as security policy should be shielded from the ‘cut and thrust’ that characterised domestic politics (White, 1981; Rosenau, 1967).

Traditional approaches to foreign policy assumed that government is unified\(^{35}\) and that foreign policy is insulated from domestic governmental action due to its inherent connection to diplomacy and defence, high politics and international security. Thus, foreign policy in this sense was distinct from day to day management of the broader domain of contemporary external relations (Wallace, 1974: 2). Rosenau (1967: 34-40), distinguished foreign and domestic policy based on a number of assumed parameters\(^{36}\) such as elitism, limited public involvement and its secretive nature due to its remoteness from the public. Such assumptions arguably find limited applicability in contemporary world politics. The way that politics are conducted globally with patterns of horizontal networks and transboundary action which cut across states and societies renders the rigid differentiation between domestic and foreign policy environments obsolete.

\(^{35}\) As Webber and Smith (2002:35) argue, the idea of a unified government has been under pressure since the 1980s with one source of this pressure being the growth of government itself.\(^{36}\) For the boundaries of foreign policy as an issue area see also Rosenau, (1974), Tracing the Outlines of a Field in Barber, J. and Smith, M., *The Nature of Foreign Policy: A Reader*, (Holmes McDougall in association with the Open University Press, Edinburgh and Milton Keynes)
In this light, a number of questions are raised concerning the conceptualisation of foreign policy based on action beyond the state and targeted at civil societies across borders. Influenced by such developments in the course of the last four decades, different attitudes towards foreign policy have developed moving away from traditional views which held that states were the sole recipient of another state’s foreign policy. Indicative is the definition provided by Manners and Whitman (2000: 2) who view foreign policy as ‘attempts by governments to influence or manage events outside the state’s boundaries’.

In the same context Gustavsson (1999: 75) sees foreign policy as government action which is targeted beyond the territory of the state to the external environment. What is characteristic in these definitions is that they imply the transition from the state to the government and imply wider governmental participation targeted to unspecified external audiences. Such images of foreign policy challenge narrower previous approaches which saw foreign policy as defined only by what foreign ministries do (Groom, 2007: 197).

Morse (1970: 371-372) in his discussion of world politics transformation, summarises the impact of such transformation on our understanding of foreign policy under three general sets of conditions. The first set of conditions concerns the breaking down of the classical distinction between foreign and domestic

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37 This definition is the evolution of Wallace’s definition because the recipient could be an actor other than a government. Rosati’s definition in the same article is even more progressive as he defines the recipient as an environment.

38 More specifically the author (2007:199-200) argues foreign policy could be described differently viewed in realist, pluralist or structuralist terms. In a realist context foreign policy is a prime consideration. Foreign policy is about the management of interstate relations in anarchical society in which each major power has ambitions to establish a system of global governance which reflects its values and interests. Since it does not wish to be subject to a system reflecting the values and interests of another great power it will cooperate with other states in a balance of power to ensure that they will not lose if they cannot win. In pluralist terms foreign policy is understood as encompassing a wider range of actors beyond states, such as public opinion, the civil society, NGOs and international organisations, multinational corporation, churches and others. The pluralist framework in its traditional formulation is like a cobweb rather than a billiard ball model which belongs to the sphere of realism and will be discussed in the following section. It is concerned with the movement of goods, services, ideas and various forms of interactions. [...] Here foreign policy becomes less important than the external relations of a wide range of actors. (See Groom, 2007: 199-200). Likewise, structuralists start with the notion of transactions. The patterns of transactions create structures, which in due course become autonomous and then have an independent influence upon the actors.
affairs. The second relates to the distinction between high policies (those associated with security and the state) and low policies (those pertaining to the wealth and welfare of the citizens) which has become less important as the latter has assumed an increasingly large role in today's societies. The third set of conditions refers to the increasing inability of states to control events in an interdependent environment despite the significantly developed instruments at their disposal.

The eroding distinction between the domestic and foreign policy environments has been repeatedly addressed from a number of viewpoints (Hocking, 2004; 2004b; Hill, 2003; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999; Keohane and Nye, 1989; East, 1984; Sundelius, 1980; 1984a; 1984b; East and Salomonsen, 1981; Katzenstein, 1975; Cooper, 1974; Goodwin, 1974; Morse, 1970; Wallace, 1974; Vital, 1968; Birnbaum, 1965). Whether due to globalisation, regionalisation or localisation, or a combination of all three, the historical divisions between domestic and foreign policies, sectors and issues have been blurred and spanned (Bátora, 2003: 122; Featherstone, 1996; 2005; Allen, 1999: 209; Newhouse, 1997: 73).

Based on the above, the study of contemporary foreign policy must reconceptualise the nature of boundaries (Rosenau, 1974b: 160) and the intermeshing of foreign with domestic policies (Cooper, 1999: 44; Vital, 1968: 71). In a globalised, networked environment, the very differentiation between domestic and foreign policy milieus makes less sense as both have to be seen as part of a seamless and enmeshed web of actors and actions (Hocking, 2007: 10; Rosenau, 1974: 25) where a number of new linkages are created (Rosenau, 1974b). In networked policy milieus, which need no common territory, foreign policy does not need to hold on to territorial definitions (Metzl, 2001: 80). Instead, foreign policy is going through a process of ‘vertical disintegration’ (Underdall, 1987: 169) and a simultaneous horizontal proliferation through which it spans the whole of the

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39 Even though as the author suggests the myths associated with sovereignty and the state have not broken down (Morse, 1970: 371)
40 According to Groom (2007: 199) high politics are concerned with issues of war and peace, disarmament and alliances
governmental apparatus, involving numerous domestic departments (Hill, 2003; Webber and Smith, 2002; Sundelius, 1984b).

From traditional to ‘transformational’ foreign policy analysis

As discussed above, foreign policy in its traditional formulation has been linked to concepts of statehood, national sovereignty and the primacy of the state as a world politics actor. For Kissinger (1969) foreign policy began where domestic policy ended. Such concepts were encapsulated in ‘state-centric’ realism’s main assumptions (White, 2004: 24; 1999: 39; Webber and Smith, 2002: 12; Waltz, 2001; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Banks, 1985: 13). The assumptions of state-centric realism lay on the sharp distinction between domestic and foreign policy making and in the fact that foreign policy is viewed as pursued by governments on behalf of a unitary state. National interest is defined in terms of independence and security and is often pursued at the expense of other nation states. Therefore the international environment in which states were pursuing their interests, their so called ‘national interest’ (Wallace, 1974: 12) is hostile and competitive.

For realists, international society is a system of billiard ball\textsuperscript{41} states in intermittent collision (Groom, 2007: 199; Hudson, 2005: 2; Banks, 1985:12; White, 1981: 6). In this context, foreign policy positions are seen as being primarily determined by the interplay of international forces (White, 1999: 422; Hill and Margot, 1985: 157). As Webber and Smith (2002: 12) argue, given these assumptions it was not difficult to establish a notion of foreign policy which was closely related to ‘national security policy’ in the context of which military security was the main aspect of policy making. This notion is referred to in the thesis as traditional foreign policy. Not surprisingly, this had an enormous impact on both the actors who made foreign policy and on the ways in which foreign policy was made. Even though realism

\textsuperscript{41}With the ‘billiard ball’ model, or as often termed ‘black-boxing’ the state, theory of actors-in-general or actor-general-theory, we refer to a given type of state interaction. More specifically this approach is related to theoretical work in IR which suggests that whatever decision making unit or system is involved can be approximated as a unitary rational actor and therefore be made equivalent to the state. See Hudson, 2005: 2)
was the best known approach in IR with which both practitioners and academics have described international relations\textsuperscript{42} it failed to probe into decision-making processes or other domestic sources of international behaviour (Hill, 2003: 6; Rosenau, 1971).

FPA, albeit viewed by many as fitting best in the realist tradition due to its state-centred focus, has also grown out of reaction to classic realist assumptions that the state is a monolithic actor with clear and rationally calculated national interests (Groom, 2007: 198; White, 2004: 24; 1999: 39; Light, 1994). As a result, work undertaken in the context of FPA challenges many of the ideas inherent in realism such as rationality. As FPA developed, even though it retained the state as an important actor it gradually accommodated a range of other actors. Since the 1950s, FPA has developed and responded by adapting its analysis to the challenges of transforming world politics (White, 2004: 24). Thus, despite its limitations, FPA as a method of enquiry has been dynamic and transformative in itself. In this light, Manners and Whitman (2000: 12) who argue that there is no necessary link anymore between FPA and classical realism, developed the idea of ‘transformational’ FPA thus marking a distinctive line between traditional and current accounts of FPA.

Transformational FPA is understood by Manners and Whitman (2000) as eclectic and enhanced, examining various newly added aspects of foreign policy under its analytical lens. Transformational FPA is concerned with the involvement of a wider range of policy actors, state and non-state, domestic and international, encourages the exploration of linkages between foreign and other areas of governmental policy-making and investigates a much wider set of issues beyond high politics and their inherent military and security connotations. As a result, transformational FPA informs a research agenda which touches upon issues of intra-departmental cooperation thus abrogating the insulation of foreign policy as a distinct

\textsuperscript{42} Some characteristic writings of this school are by Carr, E. H., (2001), \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations}, (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); Morgenthau, H., (2005), \textit{Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace}, (McGraw-Hill Education, Maidenhead)
governmental policy area and extends to issues traditionally falling under domestic policy areas.

Simultaneously, its analytical capacity is further strengthened by provisions for eclectic pre-theoretical approaches such as behavioural models of decision making and foreign policy systems approaches, which are discussed below. Hill (1974: 150-151) reinforces the argument for eclectic approaches under the heading of FPA and argues that it should not be concerned only with decision making in a narrow sense. There are a lot of questions that are raised regarding foreign policy processes which fall outside the usual framework of the different stages of policy making or the impact of the policy makers. These questions seek to address changing diplomatic techniques, foreign policy instruments and institutions, processes and (re-)organisation of the entire foreign policy machinery, which constitute the focus of the present thesis.

A transformational FPA research agenda extends the enquiry to issues such as the influence of leaders over institutions in the foreign policy process, the role of domestic bureaucratic structures and cultures and the impact of external influences on individual member states (White, 1999). In doing so it employs organisational devices, such as the FPS (Clarke and White, 1981: 1989), and analytical models such as the bureaucratic politics models conceptualised by Allison (Allison and Zellikow, 1999; Allison and Halperin, 1972).

The latter model offers significant explanatory insights to cases where bureaucratic bargaining among players positioned hierarchically in the government have determined the actions of governments in given circumstances. At the same time it has received criticism on the grounds that it has been developed from the US experience which involves a certain cast of actors, each pursuing divergent foreign policy goals, with the interplay of their competing influence determining the policy outcome (Gyngell and Wesley, 2003: 39).

Added scepticism regarding the applicability of behaviouralist models in the study of foreign policy process rests on the argument that they isolate individual policy
decisions and examine the influence of certain actors over others thus imposing specific requirements on the process. In this context Gyngell and Wesley (2003: 39) argue that involvement of actors can be gauged only when there are conflicting ‘stakes’ and competition between self-interested sections of bureaucracy and political leadership and even most importantly, a high degree of bureaucratic independence is presupposed. Such assumptions may be justifiable for the foreign policy making system of the US where competing bureaucracies with their own vested interests generate controversy over policies but not necessarily for systems where foreign policy making is heavily concentrated in the executive - as is the case with most European states. For the purposes of this thesis the FPS approach will be further elaborated. The FPS approach investigates systematically foreign policy structures and processes thus adding explanatory value to FPA (Smith et al., 2008: 12).

The foreign policy system approach

The FPS approach is not a theory but rather an organizational device which, under the heading of FPA, enables us to put several aspects of foreign policy processes and structures into context and highlight correlations between a state’s environment - domestic and external - and the ways in which foreign policy is made and managed. It draws on behavioural models of organisation, which define variables based on certain patterns of behaviour and not necessarily based on formal policy boundaries and institutions (Clarke, 1981: 18)\(^{43}\). Despite skepticism

\(^{43}\) As Clarke (1981: 18-19) interestingly suggests, traditional accounts of British foreign policy which only outline the function of decision-makers according to their official constitutional role can at best tell only part of the story. Constitutional functions and official boundaries are always important but actual patterns of behaviour, influence and communication will always cross institutional boundaries. Clarke gives an example from British foreign policy making in order to clarify this argument. More specifically, he argues that even though the House of Commons performs its function of scrutinising the foreign policy of the government through debates and the Question-time, it is widely known and accepted that such channels are highly ineffective and that real scrutiny is a much less formal, interpersonal process that works partly through Select Committees, but mainly through channels of intra-party dialogue.
that it is a ‘study everything approach’, the FPS approach offers value added to research on foreign policy processes and structures because it allows researchers to view foreign policy beyond the traditional or constitutional foreign policy making machinery and understand it both as a function of the government and as part of the changing international and domestic environments.

The FPS approach was born out of a gradual development of the ‘decision-making approach’ which has contributed significantly to FPA. The central pivots of the decision making approach are decision, decision-maker and decision-making processes or systems. Even though this approach reinforces some of the assumptions of traditional realism it also challenges it in several ways. The decision making approach firstly, takes away the centrality of the state and reasserts a focus on the behavior of policy makers (White, 1981: 8). Secondly, it challenges the assumption that foreign policy consists of a series of identifiable decisions and argues that decision making is a behavioral activity which requires explanation.

Instead of trying to explain state behavior only in terms of its environment, Snyder (2002) suggests that the key to the explanation of why a state behaves the way it does lies in the way in which the state’s decision makers define their situation. The emphasis on domestic factors which influence foreign policy signifies a departure from traditional analyses, which viewed foreign policy solely as the product of states’ and governments’ reaction to external stimuli (White, 1981: 9).

A significant contribution of the decision making approach to the study of foreign policy is the understanding of policy processes as a system which comprises a number of interacting variables located in both external and internal environments of foreign policy machineries (Clarke and White, 1989; 1981; Birnbaum, 1965; Hammond, 1965). Through this conceptualization grew awareness that foreign policy is to a greater or lesser extent a product of the way it is made or, in other words, highly dependent on national domestic processes and structures (White, 1981).
According to White (1981:10-11) scholars have concerned themselves with two aspects of the foreign policy process; namely, the identity of the policy making unit and the characteristics of the process. However, current understandings of the policy process need to acknowledge actors outside the constitutional foreign policy configurations. In this context, the FPS approach understands the foreign policy process as being more than a distinct area of government policy and determined by broader domestic political processes, institutions and political cultures (Clarke, 1981: 15).

Clarke (1981: 18) summarises some of the main principles underlying the conceptualisation of the FPS as follows. Firstly, foreign policy systems must be conceived as a whole. Secondly, they must be conceived dynamically since they describe continuous processes through the system reacting to ongoing stimuli. Thirdly, the process must be seen as interacting with the environment. Fourthly, the variables of the system, represented by its three main components, namely the environment, the machinery and the outputs are seen as interdependent and continuously interacting with one another. With reference to foreign policy the ‘environment’ represents both the domestic and external spheres which influence the foreign policy machinery and process in the form of ‘input’. The ‘output’ is perceived as foreign policy actions, decision, reforms and so on which feed back into the environment and thus become part of the new input, indicating significant correlation (Clarke, 1981; 1989).

Essentially, the authors have drawn the foreign policy system in parallel with the variables and function of the basic ‘political system’ provided by Easton (1965) illustrated in figure 1.1 on the next page. Applying this approach to the analysis of national foreign policy process, ensures a broader definition of foreign policy and decision making which comprises various foreign policy activities, actions and actors (Farrands, 1981: 35).
Hence, viewed under the light of the transformation of world politics it adds to the equation agents outside the traditional foreign policy machinery, located in its external environment but at the same time forming an integral part of the system. In doing so, a re-defined and transformed foreign policy system allows for the incorporation of processes that cut across domestic departmental barriers but also foreign and domestic policy milieus. Arguably, despite the space for innovation that the FPS approach allows, it is also characterised by certain weaknesses which
derive from its very behaviouralist nature (Gyngell and Wesley, 2003; Clarke, 1982: 20; 1989: 39). However, whilst recognising these problems the FPS approach offers valuable insights for the present investigation.

Behavioral models have been argued to ‘provide the worst possible answer – study everything’ to theoretical questions. This problem is aggravated by the inability to disaggregate the system without violating the central notion that it represents a *process*. Supporters of the FPS concept argue that the added value of the approach is that it essentially acknowledges that not all variables of the process are the same for all cases. Environments for instance, which is where part of the foreign policy problem is rooted, differ in each case (Allen, 1981: 95; Smith, 1981: 55-56). More specifically, the given domestic social, cultural and economic patterns or perceptions of the international system itself constitute the main tools for the explanation of foreign policy systems’ behavior (Farrands, 1981: 36-50; Smith, 1981: 55-56).

**Conclusion**

The present chapter discussed developments since the end of the Cold War in the management of foreign affairs and their implications for national foreign policy machineries. The aim of this chapter, as stated in the methodology section, was to identify and highlight the major issues that preoccupy contemporary foreign policy systems and synthesise them into a single taxonomy of themes upon which the research questions and the empirical part of the thesis are based. Such themes are directly related to the changing relationship between domestic and international politics which result in the re-conceptualisation of foreign policy and the re-organisation of its processes and structures.

More specifically, the chapter highlighted that the changing international and domestic policy milieus led to specific developments in the realm of the management of foreign policy. The polycentrism of contemporary global politics
enhanced the enlargement of national and international foreign policy and diplomatic agendas and brought into the foreign policy process a number of government departments with a traditionally domestic mandate. The involvement of such actors in the national foreign policy process has resulted in diffusion in the management of foreign policy into a wider cast of agents thus creating foreign policy communities, which embrace actors horizontally outside the confines of the foreign ministry. The phenomenon of the widening foreign policy communities has triggered discussion with regards to the centrality and relevance of the foreign ministry in contemporary foreign policy machineries. Those discussions are closely linked to the course of change and adaptation that foreign ministries have embarked upon which was discussed in the previous sections. Furthermore, this development has raised increased demands for international policy coordination which constitutes a continuing theme in national management of foreign policy.

The direct involvement of home ministries and dealings with their opposite numbers in contrast to the past monopoly of the foreign ministry in communication has raised a number of questions concerning the latter’s centrality in the foreign policy process. Foreign ministries, traditionally the core elements of national foreign policy machineries, located at the boundary of two linked systems, the national and international and organised around geographical and vertical divisions which reflect the national/international divide are faced with challenges stemming from the borderless networked world which calls for horizontal management of issues. In this environment the foreign ministry’s structure, role and relevance are questioned and need exploration.

In the wider discussion of re-organisation of national foreign policy machineries, the re-thinking of overseas diplomatic missions occupies a significant part. Diplomatic missions, the nerve endings of the foreign policy machinery, are faced with a number of challenges which call for their reorganisation. Based on the fact that the content, instruments and target of foreign policy is changing, as previous discussion demonstrated, the agenda and structure of overseas missions as well as the role of diplomats are undergoing profound change. Embassies are expected
to represent the whole of government overseas whilst public diplomacy becomes the top priority of their mission and in many cases the axis for their re-organisation.

The aforementioned issues, as summarised here and analysed in the previous sections, have provided the thematic foundation for the exploration of the Greek foreign policy machinery pursued in the following empirical chapters. These themes are addressed and explored for the case of Greece in order of discussion in chapters three, four and five which focus respectively on the Greek foreign policy community, the MFA and the diplomatic network. The analysis in these three chapters is underlain by institutionalist thinking for purposes of illuminating questions regarding the responses of those elements of the Greek foreign policy machinery to the changing operational environment.

And whilst the aforementioned developments have given implications for a number of advanced foreign policy bureaucracies, the degree to which they relate to smaller states’ machineries requires exploration. In other words, the responses of smaller states’ foreign policy machineries need to be investigated. This is because the responses of national foreign policy machineries to environmental stimuli are determined by their particular bureaucratic culture as well as the historical and political circumstances particular to this country. Arguably, foreign policy machineries are influenced by social and political circumstances such as social modernisation, external penetration and dependence and therefore, they need to be conceptualised as systems which receive input from their surrounding environments as the model of Clarke and White discussed on pages 72-75. For this purpose, it is deemed necessary, before the exploration of the above themes starts, to conceptualise the Greek national foreign policy machinery as a system, which comprises parameters and influences drawn from its particular domestic and international environments. Chapter two embarks upon this conceptualisation and functions as an inventory of factors which, according to the literature, have contributed to the existing images of the Greek foreign policy machinery.
Chapter 2: The Greek foreign policy system: morphology, influences and sources

Introduction

The previous chapter provided an overview of the transforming global and domestic policy environments and the pressures they exert on national foreign policy machineries with regard to the management of foreign policy. The previous chapter also reviewed analytical developments in the study of foreign policy relevant to this thesis and the conceptualisation of the FPS as a set of national foreign policy-making processes and structures. Traditionally, this is defined in terms of the MFA and the overseas missions, the function and role of which are determined by the state's particular domestic and external policy environments. This chapter seeks to investigate those elements that make up the Greek FPS as well as the particular parameters, political, cultural and historical, which according to the existing literature have contributed to its morphology.

Utilising conceptualisations of the FPS as a set of structures which receive input from the surrounding environment, external and domestic (Clarke and White, 1981; 1989), and of the foreign policy process as the product of domestic demands (Webber and Smith, 2002; Smith, Hadfield & Dunne, 2008; Wilkinson, 1969: 116) it is necessary to examine Greek foreign policy structures together with their surrounding environment. Besides, a number of studies have indicated that foreign policy structures and content are influenced by social and political circumstances such as social modernisation, external penetration, dependence (Wilkinson, 1969; Birnbaum, 1965: 8) and historical elements as well as geographical dynamics (Wilkinson, 1969; Bjol, 1965). For this purpose, Wilkinson (1969: 120) argues, a primary task in the investigation of foreign policy structures and processes must
comprise an inventory of the special agents and factors which influence policy-making.

Such inventories comprise individuals, anomic and institutional groups such as legislatures, executives, bureaucracies, churches, political parties, and non-governmental associational groups. In this light, the chapter seeks to provide an inventory of factors which, according to the literature, have contributed to the existing images of Greek foreign policy processes and structures. The chapter starts with foreign policy-making models identified in the literature and then moves on to the specific environment of Greek foreign policy structures, investigating the international and domestic political influences on the Greek foreign policy machinery.

Images of Greek foreign policy making

The literature has portrayed a number of images of Greek foreign policy processes and structures, with the latter largely defined as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and its overseas network of diplomatic representation viewed in the light of different independent variables and sources. All images appear to have a common denominator: namely, that Greek foreign policy structures and processes present a number of characteristics and weaknesses stemming from their operation in their external and domestic environments. The various accounts of the Greek foreign policy-making structures and processes generally suggest centralisation of policy-making at the level of political leadership, process politicisation, lack of macroscopic policy planning and weak institutional structures. The main images of the Greek FPS in the respective literature are presented in more detail below.

1 Anomic groups are mobs, acting through non-organised rioting and demonstration, highly changeable in structure and working and representing spontaneous breakthroughs of social groups into the political system.
Couloumbis (1983) portrays the structures managing Greece’s world entanglements using a number of variables ranging from participation in international organisations to defence equipment imports. Statistical data gathered from this research indicated that Greek foreign policy structures follow neither the typical paradigm of small states, nor the paradigms of Eastern, Western or Balkan states. Rather they generate more fundamental questions relating to the very nature of the Greek foreign policy machinery and, more specifically, questions of whether it is a developed, transitional or developing system. What Couloumbis suggests as an underlying premise is that Greece and its foreign policy structures have suffered, and are still suffering, from a protracted identity crisis (Couloumbis, 1983: 95).

Couloumbis (1983) observed in the early 1980s a significant lack of institutionalised policy planning as well as short-termism in policy-making. At the same time he identified foreign policy formulation as a function conceived by the cabinet and carried out by diplomats and the MFA (Couloumbis, 1983: 111). Similar short-termism was observed in the work of the MFA, whose input has often been replaced by agents outside the diplomatic service. The author observed that the main core of the foreign policy-making machinery at the political level were the Prime Minister (PM), the Foreign Minister (FM), and the Ministry of Defence (MoD), with the former two emerging as the single overwhelmingly influential locus of decision making authority.

The MFA and its overseas diplomatic network held a central position in foreign policy implementation but the latter’s input into policy formulation was minimal. Equally limited was the military input into foreign policy formulation especially post-1974 (Couloumbis, 1983: 113) whereas the need for a widened foreign policy community in Greece was already identified in the early 1980s. A widened foreign policy community was perceived as ‘consisting of opinion makers involved in foreign affairs such as members of parliament, employees of government agencies and personalities drawn from the media’ (Couloumbis, 1983: 111). The issue of a widened foreign policy community outside the traditional components of the foreign
policy machinery, namely the MFA and its diplomatic network, involving other parts of the government has not been addressed in the Greek literature and constitutes the main focus of the following chapter.

Couloumbis’s account also delves into the character of the Greek diplomatic service in the early 1980s and asserts that, despite its centrality in the foreign policy process, its role as a source of policy is very limited and restricted to implementing policy made by the MFA’s political leadership (Ioakimidis, 1999: 145; Couloumbis, 1983: 108). Couloumbis (1983: 107-109) argues and Ioakimidis (1999: 145) confirms in the late 1990s, that not only did Greek diplomatic staff rarely submit alternative strategic policy scenarios to the political leadership of the ministry but they also never questioned the chosen policy courses. More specifically the profile of Greek diplomats at that time is described as

‘Pro-western with a strong sense of loyalty verging on fear to superiors; having a tendency to avoid taking initiative; a tendency to follow instructions and carry out assigned (from above) missions; a self-perception of being realistic, informed and non-political technocratic advisors to the political authorities; a proclivity to bend without much resistance to the political will of those in power; a feeling of comfort with routines; a sense of discretion, if not secretiveness, often without discrimination between sensitive or trivial information; a predisposition to consider the press irresponsible and journalists […]as untrustworthy; a general reticence in giving frequent and systematic briefings to members of parliament and especially members of opposition parties’ (Couloumbis, 1983: 108-109).

The author (Couloumbis, 1983: 110) argues that based on empirical evidence, foreign policy structures until at least the early 1980s were characterised as rigid and hierarchical which in conjunction with heavy disincentives against initiatives and debates between superiors and subordinates, cultivated highly malleable
personalities in the service that subconsciously extended their intra-ministry obedience patterns to their relationships with external centres of authority.

Couloumbis (1983: 116) attributes the aforementioned image to the long tradition of foreign power penetration into Greek domestic politics, a detailed discussion of which is provided in later sections. Foreign power penetration was manifested dramatically by the formation of the first political parties in the newly established Greek state bearing formal names such as the ‘French’, the ‘English’ and the ‘Russian’. For much of the nineteenth century, Greece was treated as a protectorate, with its local elites and party factions seeking external support and in return promoting the protectors’ interests thus creating polarised structures.

In the twentieth century polarisation was even more acute. Civil conflict, foreign intervention and manipulation became the norm. In the interwar and 1950-74 periods, military coups and intervention into domestic politics were seen as both the cause and effect of foreign intervention. Similarly, the monarch appointed by the foreign powers was also considered as a cause and effect of foreign intervention. Couloumbis (1983: 116) depicts the interdependence of domestic and external politics in terms of a set of mutually reinforcing relationships.

![Figure 2.1 Couloumbis's (1983:116) triangular scheme of interdependence between domestic and external politics](image-url)
More than a decade later Makridimitris and Stoforopoulos (1997) provided a snapshot of the Greek FPS, which they define as a set of organisational structures and processes with the MFA at its core. The authors describe the FPS as characterised by limited strategic policy planning and analysis capacity, a low level of strategic planning and orientation, systemic analysis and assessment and a high level of concern with bureaucratic procedure. For these reasons, the Greek FPS is described as lagging behind other similar systems of foreign policy (Makridimitris and Stoforopoulos, 1997: 32-34):

Moreover, the FPS is described as demonstrating all those characteristics that typify the general pathology of Greek bureaucracy namely, fragmentation and politicisation (Makridimitris and Stoforopoulos, 1997: 47). On the basis of this analysis, Makridimitris and Stoforopoulos (1997) suggest that the contemporary pressures exercised by the international environment, necessitate the optimisation of the Greek FPS as well as the redefinition of the role and the re-structuring of the MFA and of the diplomatic service. Chapters four and five explore those issues, namely the role and structure of the Greek MFA and its overseas services in the context of the changing policy environments.

With an added emphasis on the foreign policy process, Kavakas (2000) provides an account which addresses the nature of the process and the kinds of considerations that dominate it. According to the author (2000:150) the main characteristic of the foreign policy area in Greece is that it has been used by governments to claim success and national victories for electoral purposes. An important aspect of the policy process is that it has been separated into two distinct areas. The first has been concerned with all issues that do not affect Greek interests directly, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or Iraq. The second has involved issues of primary national importance such as Turkey, Cyprus and the Balkans. This second area comprises the so-called ‘national issues’ [ethniki themata] which dominate the foreign policy agenda and marginalise other issues of international significance.
The naming and categorisation of foreign policy processes into distinct areas has a considerable impact on the way these issues have been viewed and managed. More specifically, Greece has securitised its foreign policy by putting forward ‘national issues’. ‘Securitisation’ means that the specific issues are removed from any kind of party political debate and the policy process is insulated from other policies as well as from other extra-governmental agents. Instead, such issues become of high national priority, and, therefore, party disagreement is out of the question whilst management on behalf of the government takes place behind closed doors. In this manner foreign policy becomes nationalistic, politicised and ‘securitised’ with the political leadership securing independence in its management and excluding a bureaucratic input.

With the two strands of policy considerations dominating the foreign policy agenda, until very recently ‘low policy’ areas, such as the environment or humanitarian aid were neglected (Sotiropoulos, 2001). According to an official of the MFA’s General Directorate for Development (DG YDAS) (Interview, no 13) it has only been in the past five years that Greek foreign policy makers discovered that issues such as climate change form part of the category of ‘security issues’ and are addressed as a foreign policy consideration in the MFA. Such realisations about the changing nature of foreign policy by Greek foreign policy makers have opened up the policy process to new actors, such as NGOs, which have only recently started to enter policy-making in a more organised fashion. The involvement of such actors under the aegis of the MFA is further discussed in chapter four. The next section presents a model of Greek foreign policy-making conceptualised by Ioakimidis (1999; 2003) the value of which for the understanding of foreign policy structures is very significant.
Ioakimidis’s model of Greek foreign policy-making: personality versus institutions

Ioakimidis’s model of Greek foreign policy-making (2003; 1999) builds upon three central hypotheses developed from observed practices in the Greek foreign policy process. The hypotheses are the dominance of the policy makers’ personalities in the foreign policy process, that the particular Greek societal and political cultures constitute sources for foreign policy and that the interplay between society and politicians is decisive for the Greek foreign policy domain. All these aspects are explored in greater detail in the following sections. Ioakimidis (1999; 142) observes that ‘the role of institutions and bureaucratic structures as factors in defining the policy-making process appears limited or in some cases non-existent’. For this purpose the fundamental principle underlying his analysis is the absence of effective and institutional structures, procedures and processes, what he terms as a ‘systemic institutional framework for public policy-making’.

The author explains that the observed absence of a systemic institutional framework does not mean the absence of constitutional or legal provisions for foreign policy structures. On the contrary, he argues, formal constitutional arrangements provide for a number of special collective inter-ministerial bodies, which are aimed, in theory, at generating foreign policy strategy. Politicians’ narratives however reveal that such bodies have only rarely, if ever contributed to foreign policy-making (Ioakimidis, 2003: 104).

Instead their role is limited to rhetoric in terms of discourse and their function is to legalise policies and decisions formulated centrally, within small executive bureaus\(^2\) which operate behind closed doors at the PM’s and the FM’s offices (Zoras and Gkikas, 2002; Lyrintzis, 1984: 112). Such small bureaus have been created by all Greek governments post-1974 comprising a closed circle of political advisors who together with the PM constitute the ultimate source of power in

\(^2\) For instance the eight-member executive bureau of Papandreou is notorious for its power and secrecy (Lyrintzis, 1984: 112)
foreign policy decision making\(^3\) (Couloumbis, 1988: 62). In other words, there is a significant discrepancy between formal arrangements and practice which constitutes one of the main assumptions of Ioakimidis's model (1999; 2003) which is illustrated on the following page.

The significance of Ioakimidis's model lies in the fact that it links foreign policy structures with policy substance by depicting a circular self-sustaining process which illustrates how the lack of a systemic institutional framework leads, through a number of intermediate stages and components, to irrational foreign policy which feeds back into the process and maintains this order. Ioakimidis (1999: 149-150) identifies a lack of a systemic institutional framework for foreign policy (which he terms an 'institutional deficit' (2003: 104).) as the absence of a set of interlocking policy-shaping instruments both at the governmental and bureaucratic levels interacting cooperatively.

Effectively, this institutional deficit creates the conditions for a shift of policy-making away from the bureaucratic process and towards the levels of political leadership. In other words, the absence of bureaucratic process standardisation - which characterises wider public policy-making (Ioakimidis, 1999; 2003: 99; Sotiropoulos and Bourikos, 2002: 156; Sotiropoulos, 2001; 1996; 1994; 1993) - places individual policy makers at the centre of the process with the PM or the FM being the sole decision maker operating outside the confines of any institutional structure. Thus the foreign policy bureaucracy has no significant input and foreign policy itself does not constitute an 'institutional output' but rather largely depends on the personal preferences of the policy makers (Ioakimidis, 1999: 154).

\(^3\) For an analytical account of this tendency and how it impacted on the foreign policies taken between 1974 and 1980 see Couloumbis, 1988
IOAKIMIDIS’ GREEK FOREIGN POLICY MODEL

(1) Lack of systemic institutional framework → leads to

(2) Dominance of personalities in policy-making → leads to

(3) Maximalist/irrational decisions → leads to

(4) Foreign policy in conflict with
   The European Union
   The international community
   The advanced economic interests
   Members of governing party
   → leads to

(5) Isolation of Greece → leads to

(6) Search for compromise → leads to

(7) Compromise at a lower threshold → leads to

(8) Reinforcing traits making institutionalisation difficult

Figure 2.2 ‘The Greek foreign policy system’ as depicted by Ioakimidis (2003)

Evidently the premise that supports elaborate administrative structures, in order to render individuals’ views less relevant and even stronger bureaucratic processes in order to liberate decision making from the ‘accident’ of personalities (Kissinger, 1966:512) finds little applicability in the case of Greece. In practice, policy-making appears to constitute the PM’s or the FM’s prerogative excluding prior bureaucratic
consultation or collective and strategic formulation\(^4\) thus crystallising a personality-centred policy process (Makridimitris, 2005; Passas, 2005: 372; Ioakimidis, 2003: 109). In addition, the fact that Greek foreign policy has been securitised, in the sense that it is dominated by issues of great national security significance such as the deep-rooted issues concerning Turkey, Cyprus and Skopje has also created a crisis atmosphere which reinforces the non-institutional character of foreign policy-making and the persistence of insulated policy-making in the offices of the PM and the FM. Such observations confirm Hill’s (1978: 12) suggestion that a crisis atmosphere promotes decision making centred on small and ad hoc groups which may reflect the sympathy and trust of the leadership.

Such practices weaken policy coherence and continuity, cause friction between officials and politicians and lead to maximalist –defined as nationalist and emotional- foreign policy often used as a tool to ensure the electorate’s votes\(^5\) (Ioakimidis, 2003: 117-120). Most importantly, maximalist foreign policy has traditionally clashed with economic policies, which are *ipso facto* formulated on rational, collective and minimalistic principles and criteria. As a result, maximalist foreign policy has sabotaged any symbiosis between foreign economic and international policies.

An additional parameter which upsets the foreign policy process and impacts upon coherence, and continuity, is bureaucratic instability caused by regular changes and dismissals of officials managing international and EU affairs for reasons related to the clientelistic relationship of citizens and the state (Ioakimidis, 1993b: 223) elaborated in later sections. For reasons already explained in Couloumbis’s

\(^4\) Ioakimidis offers a list of practitioner writings on the issue (2003: 110) as well as evidence proving this point regarding the evolution of the political crisis between Skopje and Greece and the initiative of Antonios Samaras, the Greek foreign minister (1990-1992) who insisted on the Greek position, without any prior consultation of either the Cabinet or the Greek diplomatic service, both of which at this point disagreed, thus leading the country to international isolation. This case clearly illustrates the lack of institutional processes and mechanisms. Another example is Andreas Papandreou, prime minister of Greece (1981-1989 and 1993-1996) who kept Greek foreign policy his own prerogative leaving only routine ‘managerial’ issues to be dealt by diplomats or officials (Ioakimidis, 1999; 2003: 114; Mitsotakis, 2006)

\(^5\) Populism in Greece is conventional wisdom and foreign policy is criticised as being sacrificed for purposes of gaining political/electoral support
image and others illustrated below, the prevailing image of the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy is that it does not act as a source of policy initiatives but rather as an executive instrument at the service of the political leadership. As a result, proceduralism is a phenomenon which characterises both the bureaucrats of the diplomatic overseas missions and those of the MFA. More importantly, the eagerness of the diplomatic branch to unquestionably support policy initiated by the political leaders of the MFA associates diplomats with individual political personalities. Naturally, in this environment, promotions, transfers and postings come to depend on political affiliations. It is common knowledge that the so called personnel review boards of the MFA serve only to sanction decisions for postings made at the FM’s office (Ioakimidis, 1999: 147).

Whilst it is the best organised government department, the MFA suffers from the pathology which is symptomatic to the entirety of the Greek public administration demonstrated in the following sections. In brief, even though its organisational structure does not differ significantly from that encountered in other foreign ministries in the EU, its operation and internal dynamics are indicate of its traditionally limited input into the foreign policy process (Ioakimidis, 1999: 145). The MFA in its contemporary form, its organisational structure, departmental culture and functions are discussed in chapter four.

Returning to Ioakimidis’s foreign policy-making model (1999; 2003) the author asserts that the detrimental institutional deficit manifest in the Greek foreign policy-making system and the failed attempts in the late 1990s to re-arrange foreign policy processes lie in deep-rooted political and societal features ranging from particular Greek experience of its international environment characterised by foreign power dependence, special regional and geopolitical circumstances such as EU membership, Hellenic history and heritage, the Byzantine influence in the country’s political culture and general administrative tradition. All these factors constitute variables determining the functioning of the Greek FPS and are reviewed below (Ioakimidis, 1999: 162).
Allen (1981; 1989), in his analysis of the FPS’s variables ‘input' to national foreign policy-making, argues that these differ for every state based on its special circumstances, including its international position, administrative organisation or political culture. All these variables together, both external and domestic, make up the FPS environment in which foreign policy-making structures and processes operate and by which they are influenced (Allen, 1981; 1989). It is exactly this analytical approach that makes the FPS such a valuable device. With the FPS understanding the foreign policy process as being more than a traditional distinct area of government policy and closer to broader domestic political processes, institutions and political cultures it achieves a more integrated understanding of a foreign policy machinery and can enhance the explanatory value of institutionalist approaches. This is because it adds to the equation a number of elements regarding the morphology of a given FPS and institutionalist approaches can have a wider scope to test the applicability of their various tools such as path dependence, isomorphism, critical junctures and others.

Couloumbis and Yannas (1996: 160) conceptualise the operational environment for Greek foreign policy processes as a set of three concentric circles (see figure 2.2). In the innermost circle, they place the Greek domestic policy environment, in the intermediate circle the regional setting covering the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean and the outer circle comprises the global setting which covers the international system after the Cold War. Their approach adds significant value in understanding Greek foreign policy structures in the face of pressures stemming from different operational political-economic-diplomatic environments which present Greece with different foreign policy and diplomatic challenges. Featherstone suggests (1996:15-16) that an analysis of how Greece adapts or fails to adapt to its external operational environment is crucial to the understanding of the position of Greece in the EU, the Balkans and the international system in the twenty first century. Based on such assumptions the following sections seek to explore this environment starting from the external layers and progressing to the domestic.
The external environment

Greece in the international environment: ‘high politics’ and dependence

Greece with a population of 11m in 2008\textsuperscript{6}, limited natural resources and ineffective economic structures as the recent crisis has amply demonstrated, as well as with a geopolitical and geostrategic\textsuperscript{7} importance larger than its size would permit, has been at a geographical and identity crossroads for most of the twentieth century. Greece has been involved in a power race between the two superpowers which emerged after the Second World War and sought to control the wider geopolitics of


\textsuperscript{7} The term geopolitical refers to the relationship between the geographical position and the security of a state whereas the term geostrategic refers to the dynamic relationship between geopolitical factors and the acquisition or loss of strategic gravity. For further elaboration see Ifestos and Tsardanidis, 1992: 218.
the Eastern Mediterranean region (Diamandouros, 1983: 48-49). The special geo-
strategic position of Greece has had a catalytic effect on both the substance and
organisational basis of Greek foreign policy which rely heavily on promoting issues
of traditional security linked to Greece’s territorial integrity. This is because, to
date, Greece has had a number of unresolved territorial and security issues on its
foreign policy agenda concerning the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM), Cyprus and Turkey translated into the dominance of ‘high politics’ in
foreign policy management and organisation.

Greece demonstrates a long tradition of foreign power intervention (Verney,
1990b: 205; 1989: 67) which combined with the country’s limited resources
prevented it from obtaining an autonomous and distinct role in the international
arena. Due to its strategic location, Greece had been subjected to competing bids
for Great Power penetration (Couloumbis and Yannas, 1996: 161) at a time when
there was little room in the bipolar world for small states to participate in
international relations. The geostrategic importance of Greece was enhanced in an
international environment of intensified bipolarity as, for the US and NATO, Greece
had an important role to play in the conflict between the East and the West as a
base for deployment of NATO forces\(^8\) (Economides, 2005). The notorious quote by
George Papandreou that in the post world-war era Greece ‘was breathing with a
British and an American lung’ (Couloumbis, 1993: 380) epitomises the extent of
foreign intervention in Greek domestic politics and foreign policy.

At the same time Greece depended on western powers, to which it claimed affinity,
for purposes of securing efficient security and political stabilisation (Economides,
2005: 473; 1995: 107; Kazamias, 1997: 75). For this purpose Greece pursued the
institutionalisation of ties with Western security systems and organisations such as
NATO and the Balkan Cooperation, of which it became member in 1952 and in

\(^8\) For a detailed account of the strategic importance of Greece as perceived by NATO and the US
see Ifestos, P and Tsardanidis (1992), *The European Security System and the Greek Foreign
Policy towards 2000* [in Greek], I. Sideris, Athens, pp:225-227
The need for securing western alliances’ support was intensified as friction came to a head between Greece and Turkey in the second half of the 20th century.

The ‘Turkish issue’ revolving amongst others around the Aegean Sea shelf has constituted the central linchpin for Greek foreign policy, challenging Athens in unprecedented ways (Featherstone, 1996: 14). Ensuring Greece’s preparedness to encounter the Turkish threat urged Greek governments to consistently appeal to western alliances, which infringed the country’s autonomy and imposed their own agendas. A characteristic example comes from the deployment of US bases in Greece as an exchange for ensuring the notorious 7/10 ratio of US aid to Greece and Turkey respectively (Mitsotakis, 2006: 90; Featherstone, 1990: 184; Couloumbis, 1983).

Ensuring military capacity and western support had a significant impact on the way that Greece formulates its foreign policy priorities, agendas and structures, which for at least a decade in the 1980s, focused on the deployment of American bases in Greece (Mitsotakis, 2006). Such priorities, being linked to ‘high politics’, have attributed a significant degree of secrecy and security paranoia to foreign policy and cultivated an image of the MFA, as the country’s fortress against the enemy and the diplomatic service as Greece’s security negotiators (Interview, no 30). Furthermore, they reinforced the insulation of foreign policy-making from other public policies as well as crystallised the monopoly of the PM and the FM in foreign policy making (Griva, 2008; Mitsotakis, 2005).

Effectively, this meant that the acute politicisation of the foreign policy process excluded diplomatic input to the management of foreign affairs as they were linked to important national security issues thus requiring flexible political manoeuvring (Theodoropoulos, 2005). As a result, the functional and institutionalised communication and cooperation between diplomats and political leadership declined and was constrained to the former executing strictly bureaucratic, in the sense of administrative, duties (Griva, 2008: 428). These foreign policy-making
patterns have been perpetuated to date by consecutive governments (Griva, 2008; Makridimitris, 1994).

Besides the quest for guaranteeing security solutions from its international partners, Greece also sought solutions for modernising its domestic political structures and institutions through collaboration with and membership of international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Economides, 2005; 1995; Kazamias, 1997: 76). The search for modernisation in Greece arguably predates the impact of EU membership and in the context of a small country like Greece it can be viewed as yet another impulse for accession rather than only a product of it (Economides, 2005; Ioakimidis, 2002). Greece, having had a longstanding tradition of modernisation through adjustment, believed in the ‘transferability’ of elements from modernised societies and thus became receptive to influences from the outside (Economides, 2005); a tactic which soon proved flawed (Kazamias, 1997: 76).

Retrospectively, it has been concluded that international institutions have offered no significant modernising value to the Greek foreign policy structures. On the contrary, with the aforementioned alliances being predominantly concerned with certain foreign policy outcomes, such as security from communism and trade liberalism, proved that instead of transferring modernist practices to Greece, they caused a preoccupation with security issues often beyond its own and restricted its autonomy and development (Kazamias, 1997: 76).

The Cold War besides offering a stable environment for Greek foreign policy, also presented Greece with new opportunities both in terms of its relations with the US and the Soviet Union as well as with the rest of the world (Economides, 2005: 474; 1995). Most importantly, the East-West divide facilitated Greek membership to NATO⁹ and promoted Greek affinity with the West and it was thus decisive for Greek ‘Westerness’ or else Greek Western orientation (Economides, 2005: 473).

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⁹ It also promoted Turkish membership to NATO
The end of the Cold War marked a new era for Greece. A new agenda opened up for Greek foreign policy, an agenda for international policy, foreign economic policy and diplomacy of a small state (Featherstone, 1996: 15). The expansion of webs of interaction and multiplication of actors in the international environment as well as the increase in global issues such as crime, terrorism and natural catastrophes together with the ensuing need for cooperation between states and bureaucracies altered, to a significant degree, the scope of Greek foreign policy.

This grew to involve and prioritise issues such as humanitarian aid at remote places on the globe, joint supranational management of energy security and illegal immigration and so on. In other words, the contemporary Greek foreign policy agenda has been mutated and inhabited by new themes which pervade Greece’s involvement in international politics and economics thus increasing demands but at the same time creating new opportunities (Kotzias, 2003: 333). Most importantly, however, as mentioned above, the contemporary Greek foreign policy agenda has emphasised the need for the re-structuring of the Greek foreign policy machinery (Ioakimidis, 1996).

**Greece and membership of the EU**

Membership of the EU and European integration with the latter being a gradual and incremental process, have reshaped national politics and policies (Wallace, 1990: 9). Naturally, national responses to the new institutional environment differ according to domestic politico-administrative systems (Spanou, 2001: 47) which constitute a variable of their FPS. For Greece, with its very low levels of institutionalization and legalization of bureaucratic processes (Spanou, 2001: 62), thus being at the ‘receiving end’ of a set of pressures stemming from a changing institutional environment, EU membership has created a number of opportunities and demands. EU membership albeit a lengthy and tortuous process for Greece, it has influenced Greek foreign policy through adaptation to practices, norms and behaviours (Economides, 2005: 472).
Greece’s entry into the EC in 1981 was the single most important event that sealed the course of efforts on behalf of Greece to become incorporated into the Western world. The decision to join the EC was driven by significant political\textsuperscript{10} and foreign policy considerations (Economides, 2005: 473; Ioakimidis, 1996). In the early 1980s, having come out of a seven-year dictatorship, possessing weak, often non-democratic institutions and having been dependent on foreign powers for the past few decades, Greece sought EC membership in order to ensure solutions for issues such as safeguarding national security, modernizing domestic politics, eliminating US influence, ensuring growth and defence and promoting Greek interests and pressing national issues to European partners for purposes of gaining support (Economides, 2005; 1995; Kazamias, 1997; Couloumbis and Yannas, 1996; Featherstone, 1996; Ioakimidis, 1996; 1994).

Since the day of its association agreement in 1961 the EC was perceived by Greece as the institutional framework within which it could develop a regional identity freed from the pervasive superpowers (Economides, 2005). While the US was condemned for having supported the military dictatorship (1967-1974), the EC was projected as the main guarantor of democratic institutions (Verney, 1990b). Greece was in search of collective security in the EC framework (Tsoukalis, 1996: 27) and became the EC’s, and later the EU’s, strongest supporter (Featherstone, 1996). And whilst membership of the EC was viewed as a means of promoting the consolidation of the newly established democratic institutions, economic considerations were of secondary significance (Tsoukalis, 1988: 195). The underlying hope was that EC membership would ‘act as a catalyst for the modernisation of Greece’s outdated socioeconomic system, structures and institutions’ (Economides, 2005; \textsuperscript{11}Ioakimidis, 1993: 406).

Arguably, EC membership consolidated democratic political institutions which have never been stronger (Ioakimidis, 1996; Ioakimidis, 1994: 144; Fatouros, 1993: 35)

\textsuperscript{10} For a list of the political reasons see Ioakimidis, 1994: 141
\textsuperscript{11} For an analytical account of Europeanisation as Modernisation in Greece see Economides (2005; 1995)
and more than anything else, conferred upon Greece the status of a western state which led to a renewed role in the regional and international system, thus allowing the country to pursue a relatively independent, at least from protector powers, foreign policy (Ioakimidis, 1993: 410). The deep-rooted identity puzzle was resolved, Greece belonged to the west and its international orientation and status were clarified (Economides, 2005; 1995; Fatouros, 1993: 24; Lyrintzis, 1984: 108). In terms of foreign policy and diplomacy, EU membership conferred on Greece new diplomatic means with which to promote and defend its interests in European policy fora (Featherstone, 1994: 157) as well as added diplomatic capacity discussed in chapter five.

Most importantly, EC membership paved the way for structural modernisation of the economic and social systems by providing firstly, the necessary financial resources and secondly, the ‘market conditions’ such as large market, economies of scale and competition (Ioakimidis, 1993: 408). In terms of policy-making institutions at home, the EC and later the EU through the process of Europeanisation\(^\text{12}\) had a huge impact, ‘downloading’ from Brussels new procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms (Radaelli, 2003: 28; 2004: 5). Europeanisation for Greece involving both westernisation and modernisation (Economides, 2005; 1999) constituted a force of

\(^{12}\) Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso (2001: 2) define Europeanisation as the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalises interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specialising in the creation of authoritative rules. Others have referred to that as “Europeification” (Andersen and Eliassen 1993) or “Vergemeinschaftung” (communitarisation). In the latter Europeanisation is the independent variable which impacts upon domestic processes, policies and institutions.

For other scholars such as Ladrech (1994: 69), Europeanisation depicts “[an] incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making”. In essence, Europeanisation connotes the processes and the mechanisms by which European institution-building may cause change at the domestic level. Another group of group of scholars such as Bache (2006) and Buller (2003) identify Europeanisation as a process of governance and of changing understandings of governance in Europe. This approach uses Europeanisation as a synonym for institutionalisation; in other words it conceptualises Europeanisation as a process through which formal rules and regulations and informal ways of doing things are firstly materialised at an EU level and they are then crystallised and institutionalised inside the logic of domestic actors. In order for institutionalisation to happen, a level of discrepancy should exist between European and domestic levels; this discrepancy is called “misfit”.

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modernisation for raising standards, for better public financing alongside fiscal discipline and for economic liberalisation\textsuperscript{13}, and at the same time it posed major challenges to the Greek state tradition (Featherstone, 1996: 12) which as demonstrated below is unique.

**The impact of the EU on Greek foreign policy processes: blurring the boundaries and de-externalising foreign policy**

It is common wisdom that European integration in the 1990s penetrated deeply into domestic politics thus blurring the boundaries between foreign and domestic policy milieus, altering policy agendas and reshaping national politics. This was effectively translated into the undermining of the ability of the government and its foreign ministry to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ between the domestic and foreign spheres of policy (Featherstone, 1996: 11) and the broadening scope of the foreign policy processes. In the case of Greece, membership to the EU has challenged several deep-rooted administrative traditions and policy processes. The traditionally secretive, high-politics-centred Greek foreign policy process became less defensive and more open, adaptive and flexible (Interview, no 1; 2; 3; 4; 7).

There is evidence that membership of the EU has prompted a more open style in public policy-making, has contributed to a move away from paternalism and ideological vagueness towards a more neo-liberal stance (Featherstone, 1996: 11) and has harmonised institutions and policy processes with European standards (Ioakimidis, 1994: 144-145). With regards to Greek foreign policy making, Europeanisation marked a shift away from policy formulation behind closed doors (Economides, 1999b: 115) and towards a de-nationalised and multilateralised Greek foreign policy agenda (Economides, 2005; 1999).

More specifically, membership of the EU has significantly broadened the scope of Greek foreign policy, which now extends to a number of issue areas and

\textsuperscript{13} This view contrasts the impression British and Danish voters may have of ‘Brussels’ (Featherstone, 1996: 9)
geographic constituencies that never formed part of Greek foreign policy preoccupations such as humanitarian aid and regional development. The signing of commercial agreements\(^{14}\), the enriched network of trade, business and association relations instilled an unprecedented economic element into Greece’s foreign policy which called for the re-thinking of its institutions (Interview, no 5).

Within the first years of EU membership Greece had to formulate national positions on economic issues such as multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the auspices of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), trade relations with the US, trade or cooperation agreements with third countries, community policies for agriculture such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the environment and monetary issues (Ioakimidis, 1993: 413). The aforementioned areas of involvement meant that Greece, previously used to being mainly preoccupied with its national issues, was confronted with a large number of economic and technical policies as well as other low policy policies which placed issues such as the environment and foreign aid at the top of the national foreign policy agenda (Interview, no 4).

New instruments for decision-making were created and the politico-economic system took on a new form. The adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) which brought with it institutional innovations, the programme for the single internal market and the new Structural Policy (the Delors package) introduced in 1988, were measures with unprecedented impact on the national political system, signifying for the first time in the hitherto Greek experience the economisation of Greek foreign policy and the blurring of the boundary between national and external policy milieus (Ioakimidis, 1999: 163; 1996: 40; Wenturis, 1994: 225). The blurring of the boundaries between foreign and domestic policy brought into foreign policy-making a number of other government departments, with a traditional domestic mandate, local and regional entities which contributed to the de-externalisation of Greek foreign policy (Ioakimidis, 1999: 164-165). The new policy

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\(^{14}\) This applies to both the EU and global contexts
areas and the resulted functions cumulatively marked the shift of Greek foreign policy substance from statist and security related matters to economics and international policy\(^{15}\) (Featherstone, 1994: 160).

Besides the vastly enlarged scope of foreign policy as a result of EU membership, what has also been transformed are the ways in which foreign policy is conducted within the EU. Changes revolve around patterns of communication such as the ones introduced with European Correspondents Cipher Network (COREU), patterns of representation to the outside world, a shift of policy-making at the level of PeRepGr and multilateral diplomacy (Economides, 2005; Ioakimidis, 1999: 162). In short, membership of the EU dictates that foreign policy sheds its parochial national character and is influenced by the globalised policy arena. Consequently, Greece was expected to present and articulate well defined, concrete positions and realised that there was no room for parochialism.

Greece gradually shifted away from its Hellenocentric view of the world and redefined its place in the international system in favor of a more balanced and pragmatic approach (Ioakimidis, 1993: 413). A characteristic example of Greece’s attitudinal change comes from the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC). In the early years of participation in the EPC, Greece misused its right to veto thus blocking the institution’s operation (Ioakimidis, 1993b: 225; Verney, 1990: 215-216).

Despite the overwhelming reshaping of national politics under the pressures of Europeanisation, Greece has been characterised as experiencing change domestically in two ways. More specifically, Ioakimidis (1996: 34) has suggested

\(^{15}\) It has been argued that Greece experiences institutionally the entirety of its international personality through the EU (Interview, no 7). Regionalism, or else ‘peripherialisation’ for Greece is neither limiting nor counter acting to globalisation. On the contrary it is the most effective way for Greece to participate actively in international policy-making and at the same time to ensure and promote its objectives to a world in transformation. In other words, Greece perceives the EU as an organised and constrained facet of globalisation and Europeanisation as the means to this end (Kotzias, 2003: 351).
that Europeanisation in Greece has been ‘asynchronous’ and ‘autarkic’. Asynchronous means that certain components of the state have rapidly Europeanised while other vital elements of government and administration have been left behind. Whilst asynchronous describes the pace and intensity of Europeanisation the nature of the phenomenon can be described as autarkic. This means that the political system and elites seek to internalise European inputs and logic as a means of fostering their continued control in terms of structural stability and practices, ideological attitudes, policy objectives, resources and orientations, rather than as a means of changing or adapting to the new environmental conditions and new dynamics generated by EU membership (Ioakimidis, 1996: 34).

The phenomenon of asynchronous Europeanisation is considered as the underlying cause for the observed duality of the images of the Greek FPS portrayed by fieldwork data. The first image depicts an open and Europeanised set of domestic structures and policy processes whereas the second portrays domestic structures as resistant to change and holding on to Hellenocentric and traditional approaches imbued as they are with hierarchy and verticality. Evidence from interviews conducted in the PeRepGr (2007, 2008 and 2009) confirms the dual image of Greek foreign policy institutions. More specifically, interviewees drew a parallel of Europeanisation and structural change with a ‘change spectrum'. At one end of the spectrum, the most Europeanized organisations: the PeRepGr, the MFA and MNEC are to be found, and at the least Europeanised end, domestic departments are located. This duality in the Greek foreign policy structures was further emphasised by officials in discussions regarding the MFA explored in the fourth chapter.
The Balkan region: Greece at the crossroads

Greece, strategically located at the crossroads of three continents, the European, the African and the Asian, has been faced with several security threats over the years and caught up in regional geopolitics. Not only is it positioned next door to its traditional security enemy, Turkey but it is also in the heart of the Balkans the so-called ‘cockpit of Europe’s wars’ or else the ‘Balkan powder keg’, right next to the nascent states of former Yugoslavia where a bloody war took place just at the borders of the European continent (Economides, 2008: 9). The position of Greece at the crossroads between the Eastern and the Western world has given birth to numerous political and academic debates. In times of global change, European integration and Balkan re-organisation, Greece is expected to be an economic player, a regional catalyst for further integration and democratisation and a local economic and trade leader (Economides, 2005). Such pressures have had a considerable impact on both its foreign policy agenda and the organisation of the MFA as they posed added demands for foreign economic policy and diplomacy (Interview, no 30).

The geographical position of Greece in the Balkans, located in Europe but constituting an ‘un-European part of the continent’ (Economides, 2008) inevitably relates it to local and broader geopolitics. Greece, located in the middle of two worlds, is the only country in the region which is a member of all the main Western institutions such as NATO, UN, WEU, OECD, the EU, and the Council of Europe. Greece is the only EU member state positioned in such a unique geographical position. When Greece deals with external policy it always has to achieve a synergy of aims that derive from two different environments: the European (also representing the international environment) and the Balkan. Given that these two environments experience economic, political and security issues in distinct fashions, Greece is confronted with many demands for representation and negotiation capacity as well as constant reconciliation of European low policy-making and Balkan high politics often linked to territorial claims (Interview, no 18).
Greece, as an EU member state committed to democracy and the protection of human rights, holds the advantage that it can mark significant contribution to international cooperation in the Balkan area (Economides, 2005; Couloumbis and Yannas, 1996: 168) which has traditionally threatened stability in both Greece and the EU. However, Greece failed for a long time to pursue a coherent Balkan policy and instead was often involved in Balkan politics thus becoming part of the problem (Tsoukalis, 1996: 26).

Transformation in the Balkans emerging from the break-up of Yugoslavia had a significant effect on the geopolitics of south-eastern Europe. The stability of the region during the Cold War was violently disrupted and a number of new borders were drawn (Papahadjopoulos, 1998: 9) obliging Greece, a strong supporter of normalising relationships with its northern neighbours (Tsardanidis and Alifantis, 1988: 269) to re-focus its foreign policy and foreign policy capacity to crises and economic diplomacy ‘at home’ i.e. in the Balkan region (Economides, 2005; 1999; Featherstone, 1996: 13) which had implications for the for the organisation of the MFA and the Greek diplomatic network discussed in chapters four and five respectively. Just as an indicator, it is useful to point out that the end of the Cold War presented Greece, as with other states with demands to enhance diplomatic representation in the region but also to re-think the distribution of its diplomatic capital to posts that bore economic and political significance.

Greek foreign policy in the early 1990s has often been termed as ‘Macedonianised’ or else ‘Skopjenised’ (Tziabiris, 2003; Kontonis, 2003; Tsibiribi, 2004) due to the domination of the issue of FYROM on the foreign policy agenda\textsuperscript{16}. Greece in the last three decades has cooperated with the Balkan states on both a multilateral and a bilateral level in policy areas such as finance, trade, energy, technical cooperation, tourism, education, and joint scientific research projects (Tsardanidis and Alifantis, 1988: 275). Most importantly, it is committed to provide financial

assistance through the international development programme of the Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB)\(^\text{17}\) in the framework of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

Having learned from missed opportunities and maximalist\(^\text{18}\) foreign policy in the region -as for instance with regards to the Macedonian issue and prior entanglement in Balkan conflicts- Greece transformed its Balkan policy from 1995 onwards with the underlying target of turning the southern part of Balkans into the core of its diplomatic and business activity. Greece became a major economic and trade partner of FYROM, Albania and Romania (Valden, 2003: 413) and used the expansion of its private sector as a diplomatic tool for political leverage. The signing of the Interim Agreement between Athens and Skopje in September 1995 marked the end of the previous period of policy improvisations and the beginning of a new era for Greek diplomatic and economic strategy\(^\text{19}\) targeted at its northern neighbors (Triantafyllou, 1999: 148; Tsibiribi, 2004: 32-33).

The turn towards the Balkan region is epitomised in the latest 2007 MFA Charter (Law 3566/2007) which raises economic diplomacy to the main pillar of Greek foreign policy with an emphasis on Greek regional economic leadership in the Balkans. Article 6 of the Charter establishes a General Secretariat of International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation\(^\text{20}\) in northern Greece, in Thessaloniki, which constitutes a window on the Balkans. The Secretariat aids the running of the MFA’s AGORA, the online portal to Greek businesses abroad\(^\text{21}\) which is discussed in chapter five. AGORA presents business reports and information gathered from all overseas commercial offices and consulates with


\(^{18}\) Maximalist is used to denote irrational and assertive foreign policy with exaggerated emotionality leading to misunderstandings.

\(^{19}\) Triantafyllou (1999, 148) offers an enlightening account of Greece’s Balkan strategy which aimed to contribute to the stabilisation of the neighbouring states and their transition to democracy, to foster human resources, to invest in value-adding activities, to create a stable macro-economic environment and to integrate the region with the EU.

\(^{20}\) The General Secretariat of International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation was set up in 2002 by the Presidential Decree 159 published in the National Gazette (FEK140) vol. A

\(^{21}\) www.agora.mfa.gr
the aim of strengthening and supporting Greek businesses in the Balkan region but also internationally.

The focus of Greek foreign policy on the Balkan region as a key strategic priority of Greece was presented by the former FM, Dora Bakoyanni to the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign and European Affairs. Bakoyanni (2007) stressed the importance of regional economic diplomacy which constitutes the government’s key strategy and the MFA’s ultimate foreign policy priority. Nonetheless, efforts to rearrange foreign policy organisation seem to hinge on a certain deep-rooted political culture and administrative tradition which are discussed in the next sections focusing on the Greek domestic environment. Before we discuss these domestic elements, which condition the nature and operation of the Greek foreign policy machinery, it is useful to look briefly at the constitutional arrangements for foreign policy making in Greece.

The Domestic Environment

The constitutional basis for foreign policy-making

With regards to the constitutional basis for Greek foreign policy making the following model applies. At the level of the government the main agents for foreign policy formulation and coordination are the Cabinet, KYSEA (Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence) which is presided over by the PM, and EDOS (Committee on International Economic Relations). KYSEA, which is similar to the American National Security Council (NSC) and constitutes an ad hoc branch of the Cabinet is intended to promote effective coordination of the government in foreign and defence policy (Gkikas, 2005: 78-79; Zoras and Gkikas, 22 KYSEA comprises the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, Finance and Economy, Environment, and the deputy Foreign Minister. Depending on the agenda other ministers can participate including the General Secretary of the MFA. For a detailed account of KYSEA’s jurisdiction see Gkikas (2005), Zoras and Gkikas (2002).
Even though KYSEA was conceived in post-dictatorial Greece (after 1974) as a symbol of the democratisation of the foreign policy process (Makris, 2007: 235-240) it raises questions with regards to its legality in decision making since it operates instead of the cabinet in plenum which is what the constitution provides for foreign policy making (Gkikas, 2005: 78). Despite the primacy of KYSEA in decision making in the area of foreign and international policy, this collective body is frequently bypassed by the PM and the FM. Significant efforts have been made to turn KYSEA into the central policy-formulating and decision making body (Ioakimidis, 1999:161) but the above synergy has prevailed (Griva, 2002). In the Greek political system the PM is recognised by the constitution as the primus solus actor (Makridimitris and Stoforopoulos, 1997: 46; Makridimitris, 1992: 28).

The aforementioned constitutional provision together with the long established unquestioned ministerial allegiance to the PM, render him the ultimate foreign policy maker whereas significant input is afforded by the FM (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 268; Griva, 2002: 46; Makridimitris, 1992: 35). The PM is in charge of the state’s representation abroad and determines relations with ‘foreign subjects’. The participation of the PM in international and European summits is a good example. The FM formulates foreign policy based on the special instructions received by the PM and represents the state abroad in other fora. The appropriation/distribution of the roles between the two depends on the political significance of the issues at hand for the national interest (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 268). The FM cannot make decisions independently from the PM on high politics but, rather, follows the PM’s instructions, whether in agreement with the PM or not. Constitutionally, the FM and the rest of the ministers must respect the constitutional dominance of the PM (Constitution, 2008, art. 37, para. 1).

Forming part of the executive and of the governmental mechanism but not a governmental body in itself in the sense that it comprises consultants and experts
outside the governmental machinery, the National Council of Foreign Policy\textsuperscript{23} comprises members of the parliament and external experts (Art. 82 para 4 of the 2008 Greek Constitution) and makes up the constitutional consultative body to the cabinet (Gkikas, 2005: 84-87). Despite the official constitutional role of governmental collective bodies such as the cabinet and KYSEA, foreign policy - especially this part which relates to low policy-is, to a large extent, formulated by the bureaucratic mechanism. In this respect the primary role is held by the PMO and the Ministers’ offices and most precisely the FM’s office, and to a lesser degree the Minister of Defence’s office, together with the MFA’s diplomatic service. The upper bureaucratic levels of the ministries provide continuity and coherence and remain in office irrespective of the government of the day (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 270).

The MFA is considered to be the ultimate bureaucratic actor for foreign policy-making and implementation. However, an increasing number of other government departments are having an input to the foreign policy process, but as the discussion in the next chapter indicates, this input is still limited. The MFA’s role in the policy process has been central and unquestioned. Even when other government agents participate in foreign policy-making, the MFA is the \textit{conditio sine qua non} in policy planning, formulation and implementation (Makridimitris and Stoforopoulous, 1997: 41, 97).

The MFA’s latest Charter (Article 6 Law 3566/2007) provides that for the coherent expression of Greek foreign policy, ministries, other government departments and local authorities cooperate with and report to the MFA for all matters relating to the state’s foreign and international relations thus affirming the primacy of the MFA vis-à-vis other government departments. The article establishes inter-ministerial cooperation but most importantly, it establishes the supremacy of the MFA vis-à-vis the rest of the bureaucracy by vesting the ministry with foreign and international policy coordination (Article 6 paras b and c). In charge of the monitoring and

\textsuperscript{23} For an analytical account of the National Council of Foreign Policy see Gkikas (2005: 84-107)
assessment of foreign policy is the Greek Parliament but, as demonstrated below, its role to date has been characterised as ‘cosmetic' (Couloumbis, 1983).

The Greek Parliament in the foreign policy process

The role of the Parliament in Greek public policy making and especially in foreign policy-making has been significantly limited (Featherstone, 1996: 10; Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 45). There are two reasons for this: firstly, because its role as provided for by the Greek constitution is limited to policy review; and secondly, because the Parliament in the Greek political system is significantly vulnerable against political pressures (Karabarbounis, 2005: 320). The Greek Parliament has been dominated by two major parties, which have managed in the last three decades to secure single party majorities. As a result, the parliament has always been captive to Greek governments\(^\text{24}\) and served as a forum for political debates (Ioakimidis, 1994: 150). Even though it has the right to conduct a referendum if it is decided that crucial national interests are at stake (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 270) it hardly ever performs this task.

A member of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign and European affairs (Interview, no 10) stated that

> ‘It is common practice for foreign policy positions to be presented to the committee a posteriori. Policy is merely presented to the committee for ratification and the whole task of parliamentary control has become somewhat procedural'.

Another official argued that the only incentive for parliamentarians’ involvement is that they receive payment for the questions on policy that they direct to the political leadership (Interview, no 30). Naturally, the involvement of parliamentary committees in foreign policy formulation has been characterised as merely

\(^{24}\) For more on the Greek parliament and its involvement in policy-making see Ioakimidis (1994)
‘decorative’ in the sense that they only validate and legalise decisions rather than substantially contributing to foreign policy-making either through recommendations or through control (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 270; Couloumbis, 1983: 111).

In terms of parliamentary diplomacy, the Greek Parliament follows, to an extent, patterns observed worldwide with slowly increasing involvement in the promotion of Greece’s international relations. Diplomatic action is represented by the development of bilateral parliamentary exchange, participation in parliamentary fora and association in European processes. The main patrons of such processes are the various parliamentary bodies such as the Presidency of the Parliament, the Standing Parliamentary Committees such as the committees for Foreign and European Affairs, for Religion, for Expatriates and others. Equally important are the parliamentary representations to international organisations such as the European Council, NATO, CSCE, WEU, BSEC and others. Such parliamentary action is supported by a series of bodies of officials such as the Diplomatic Cabinet of the Parliament and the MFA’s Secretariat for International Economic Relations (Karabarbounis, 2005: 321).

The inability of the Parliament to contribute to strategy-setting regarding foreign policy, economic policy or even education and defence has added to its limited exercise of parliamentary diplomacy. An underlying problem is that the majority of the parliamentarians who become part of the MFA’s political leadership do not believe in the exercise of diplomacy by the parliament. They have a traditional approach to the conduct of diplomacy which they consider to be the prerogative of traditional diplomats. Once part of the political leadership of the MFA, they do not appear in the parliament to inform fellow parliamentarians about their work. There have been cases of foreign ministers with a long tenure, for instance of seven years, who never appeared before the parliament (Tsouderou, 1992:65). The same delays are manifest in the ratification of international contracts by the parliament, with large numbers of international contracts remaining non-ratified thus posing problems for the governments’ pursuit of Greek interests abroad. With the constitutional basis for foreign policy making presented in the present section,
the following sections will focus on those elements in the domestic environment that form part of the Greek FPS. The next section focuses on Greek political culture.

Greek political culture and foreign policy

Political culture is a crucial determinant of political behaviour and organisation (Papoulias et al, 2005: 87) and at the same time, a very a complex area to handle. It has been argued that not only does political culture influence foreign policy-making but it can also amount to a source of foreign policy-making on its own (Clarke, 1996: 22). Greece appears to be a distinctive case amongst its fellow EU member states because it is the only member-state with a cultural identity with elements of Orthodoxy, Byzantine tradition, classical influences as well as the Ottoman legacy (Ioakimidis, 1994: 143; 1996: 46; 2003: 107). The search for sources of Modern Greek culture should start with the Greek experience, with Ottoman rule, under which it existed for four centuries.

The environment in which Greek society developed its attitude toward politics, law, the state and public policy as well as foreign policy is described by Diamandouros (1983: 44) as agrarian, theocratic and pre-capitalist, which demanded obedience and tax revenues from its subjects thus forcing them to seek protection in families and clientage networks. Such practices seem to be perpetuated today and to

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25 For a more analytical description of the society in which Greece developed its attitude towards politics and the state see Diamandouros (1983). Part of the author’s description is provided as follows: ‘Basically, we are talking about an overwhelmingly agrarian, pre-capitalist society and economy situated at the periphery of a theocratic, Asiatic empire which, true to its military origins and pre-modern essence, sought not assimilation but obedience, military service and tax revenues from its subject peoples. During the heyday of the Empire, enlightened centralised administration afforded the peasant at the bottom of the social pyramid a modicum of security and protection. [...] however, from the seventeenth century onwards, western commercial capitalism, precipitated a number of centrifugal forces which not only destroyed the traditional bases for security and protection in the countryside but, in addition, brought about conditions of lawlessness, arbitrariness, increasing oppression, and profound uncertainty which, over time, became endemic features of Ottoman society. These conditions, which were even more exacerbated at the periphery of the weakening Empire, forced the individual to seek, more than ever before, private means of security and protection. And in a deeply traditional pre-capitalistic social formation, where social
determine relationships between the state, political parties and society. Political socialisation of the individual within such a state of affairs led to the erosion of the state’s legitimacy\textsuperscript{26} which became the cause of discord in the war of independence that broke out (Diamandouros, 1983: 46). The same peculiar attitude applies to more recent history. The Civil War (1944-1949), the Colonels’ dictatorship and the fact that a large number of Greek families were refugees from hostile surrounding countries made Greeks very sensitive to any repetition of such humiliating and painful experiences and also very conservative and defensive (Pettifer, 1996: 19; Wenturis, 1994: 227).

The country’s geographical position aggravated its tendency for introversion manifested in its foreign policy. As a result, the Greek political attitude in the international environment became isolationist and xenophobic (Ioakimidis, 2003: 105), while domestically clientelism underlay all political and social interactions. Makridimitris (1994: 23) suggests that there is more than the well established clientelism and xenophobia in Greek political culture. Greek politico-administrative culture, which is still ‘a culture in transition’ (Featherstone, 1990b: 101) seems to derive from two contradicting normative orientations\textsuperscript{27}. More specifically, it seems to have lain either on a traditionalist, Hellenocentric and populist orientation or on a more meritocratic, rational and modernising orientation both informing Greek foreign policy images. The former dominated Greek political attitudes and interactions for many decades and played a significant role in the formulation of

\textit{differentiation was minimal, the extended family emerged as the foremost defensive institution capable of offering invaluable protection to its members at all levels of society, [...] the extended family and the broader clientage network to which it gave rise as it spread both horizontally and vertically to fill up critical social space, became the central mechanism of social integration and organisation. }\textit{’}

\textsuperscript{26} For an extensive description of individual socialisation in the antagonistic, unfair and elitist environment and particularly for the origins of the Greek attitude toward political power and office holding see Diamandouros, (1983) p. 45. In the same section the author also discusses the legal confusion that was created with the parallel use of three different bodies of laws. The Shari’a applied by the Ottoman authorities, the Byzantine law applied by the Greek Orthodox church and customary law applied by local authorities within the realm of their competence.

\textsuperscript{27} For more on the two models of the traditionalist prism society or Gemeinschaft and the rising civic culture or Gessellchaft see Makridimitris (1994)
the Greek national identity and international interests which focused on safeguarding Greek territorial and ethnic integrity.

In short, the Greek national identity and foreign policy attitude is epitomised in that ‘whatever is Greek is separate from anything foreign’. This strong view is due to the fact that Greece is one of the most homogenous societies in the EU based on its ethnic composition, language and religion and has never been faced with any demands for secession or separatism (Featherstone, 1996: 13). The ‘ethnos’ (nation) in Greece assumed social primacy and supremacy against notions such as individual rights. Greeks see themselves as ancestors of Alexander the Great or Pericles yet they are unable to conduct properly many of the basic functions of a modern democratic state (Pettifer, 1996: 18). They expect that the rest of the world appreciates them for their glorious past which has influenced Greek foreign policy especially with regards to Turkey (Ioakimidis, 2003: 107).

Besides the passionate and empathetic foreign policy and the nominal respect for the state and its institutions, which as explained above, is historically explained, Greeks also always possess a sense of distinctness and a fear of a threat to their territorial integrity (Ioakimidis, 2003: 104; Tsoukalis, 1996: 26) which, whilst not unfounded, has had major implications for the Greek foreign policy agenda as well as foreign policy processes and structures as explained in later chapters.

Their deep-rooted xenophobia makes them trust, even today, only immediate family and friends thus perpetuating the clientage pattern and weakening state institutions (Ioakimidis, 2003: 106). The Greek inability to separate the glorious past from current realities (Wenturis, 1994: 227) has often led to emotional and exaggerated reactions in the field of foreign policy28 in other words maximalist foreign policy, which as mentioned above seems to be characteristic of the Greek foreign policy-making model. Most importantly, it has attached a significant

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28 A complementary reason of emotional foreign policy reactions comes from the rather excessive interaction between foreign policy and domestic politics; and more precisely in the use of foreign policy in order to either satisfy public opinion, to divert attention from domestic politics to (Clogg, 1993; Mitsotakis, 2006) or even to offer solutions to domestic problems (Hammond, 1965: 661).
secretive and introverted attitude to foreign policy-making. As an MFA official stated, Greek foreign policy makers are paranoid about information leakages which would give the enemy an advantage. ‘They, arguably, prefer to be traditionalist than to modernise if this means that they have to share information’ (Interview, no 30).

Greek xenophobia and ‘inwardness’ has been termed as the ‘underdog’ syndrome or ‘the underdog culture’ which has had implications for Greek foreign policy (Diamandouros, 1983). This syndrome translates into the belief that Greece is treated as inferior by the Western world because the West envies it for its ‘glorious historical tradition’ and conspires against it to humiliate it. This stance has led to irrational attitudes both internationally and in the context of European institutions on several occasions, with Greece aligning with whoever appeared to be against the West or rejecting instantaneously any compromising act (Ioakimidis, 1996: 47).

The underdog culture has ascribed a traditionalist view to society and has dominated public foreign policy-making (Makridimitris, 1994: 24). The aforementioned concept of Hellenicity expressed through Hellenocentrism has been traditionally intertwined with orthodoxy in Greece. This dual perception of the Modern Greek state has had serious implications for the value structure of the society (Diamandouros, 1983: 57). While the overall involvement of the church in individual life has been in decline it remains one of the most influential institutions in terms of values, attitudes and beliefs and provides a parallel forum for political socialisation (Lambrias, 1988).

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29 The case of the irrational Greek usage of its veto power in the context of the EPC is characteristic.
30 This impression was further reinforced by the fact that Greece was proclaimed as a ‘delayed nation’ in terms of synchronisation with the rest of Europe (Wenturis, 1994: 228).
31 Until recently the mid 1980s priests were hired to teach at schools without any relevant teaching qualification and the priest together with the teacher constituted the two prominent figures in all rural areas. In the large number of villages of Greece, where illiteracy was 24% for those over ten years of age, the priest was viewed as the ethical leader of the village.
Not only has the Greek Church been a normal segment of national identity and domestic politics, a tendency which goes back to the War of Independence in the early nineteenth century, but it has also been a major determinant in many foreign policy matters (Pettifer, 1996: 18-19). For instance, the identification of Hellenicity with Orthodoxy has been an obstacle to the integration of ethnic and religious minorities\(^{32}\) into the Greek culture (Diamandouros, 1983: 55) and the Greek society, which has been criticised for social intolerance (Pettifer, 1996: 19) and for abuse of the rights of minority groups (Featherstone, 1996: 13). Such intolerance is even further aggravated and encouraged by schools and school texts which are virtually silent on groups such as the Kutzovlachs, the Pomaks, the Sarakatsans, the Albanian and Slav-speaking populations in Greece (Featherstone, 1996: 13).

It seems that such egocentric and xenophobic views are embraced by the entirety of the educational system in Greece. The education system in Greece until very recently, has been characterised by a significant degree of authoritarianism and emphasis on discipline, rote-learning and authority. Critical thought and discussion have been strategically ignored and the transmission of finite knowledge in often obsolete, centrally prescribed textbooks has been repeatedly imposed (Diamandouros, 1983: 56). The worst consequence of this system was the creation of para-school private institutions, which prepared students for the university entry exams. At the university level, extensive reliance on professors’ texts, remoteness and authority of professors as well as pronounced formalism and intellectual rigidity make up a rigid system which encourages populism, intolerance and antagonism (Lambrias, 1993: 321).

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\(^{32}\) Roman Catholics, Jews, Muslims are some of the religious minorities in Greece
Greek society and politics

Greek society has been characterised by small businesses with a salaried population of 42% in 1971 (Mavrogordatos, 1984) which has grown to 64% in 2009 (Greek statistical services\textsuperscript{33}) with this percentage being significantly lower than European average. The low percentages of salaried populations in the Greek society, besides the size of economy and industry which is small, are also rooted in the creation of temporary posts for the purpose of power maintenance. In Greece, there is an absence of strong networks of voluntary associations with a specific interest, capable of acting as agents of secondary political socialisation society (Diamandouros, 1983: 58; Sotiropoulos, 2001: 64). Movements and NGOs or other organisations and unions with sectional interests, lack authority and independence and have often been integrated into the structures of political parties (Featherstone, 1990: 192) which results in the politicisation of their interests.

Even though the consolidation of democracy in the post-1974 Greece allowed for the representation of interests of ecological, cultural, consumer and health substance as well as social provision movements, such movements are still small, fragmented and weak, hiding underlying ideological splits between right and left, which antagonise for their control (Sotiropoulos, 2006: 2). This phenomenon leads to a weak civil society which in turn creates a vacuum allowing political parties to gain control of the political system. As a result, Greece is classified among those states with political party penetrated and dependent political systems (Couloumbis and Yannas, 1996: 161).

Overall, the ‘third sector’ is dramatically underdeveloped in comparison to other European countries and therefore its influence over policy-making has been minimal to non-existent (Interview, no 12). Only recently, have environmental organisations taken advantage of some form of interaction between the third sector and the government merely for the purpose of protesting against already

\textsuperscript{33} Greek statistical services  
implemented policies (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 77) or to polarise public opinion against the government (Interview, no 12). The traditional way of societal integration into the Greek political system is clientelistic in nature, which does not allow the merging of horizontal, party independent, social alliances (Sotiropoulos, 1993:94). This is why in order to understand the input of societal interests and ensuing bureaucratic initiatives into policy-making in Greece we have to firstly understand the relation between the two, which according to Lyrintzis (1983) can be summarised in what he terms ‘bureaucratic clientelism’. Bureaucratic clientelism describes the process whereby society becomes the client of bureaucracy and in the case of Greece, of the political parties.

Bureaucratic clientelism fully describes societal integration in the post-1977 era. In the context of this phenomenon, the political party functions as a collective patron to its supporters, who become clients of the state\(^{34}\). Civil society, being dependent on this vertical clientelistic nature of their political participation remains fragmented and weak. Furthermore, a lot of societal groups, such as business and industrial societal groups, or professional organisations such as those with lawyers and doctors as members have become fora of intensive party antagonism and their members have often been promoted to the parliament. Deriving from the above, it is not surprising that the relations between civil society, parties and the state machinery have led to the dependence of Greek society and bureaucracy to the government of the day (Sotiropoulos, 1993:94). The Greek ‘bureau-pathology’, as it has been termed by Samatas (1994), has established ‘bureaucraticism’ as a means of socio-political control. Greek bureaucracy being thoroughly controlled by the government of the day does not follow the models of the US or the UK where a strong independent civil service works for the state and not for the government and influences government policy\(^{35}\).

\(^{34}\) Before the 1967-1974 dictatorship society members were clients to individual ministers.

\(^{35}\) According to Sotiropoulos (2006: 1) Greece presents a theoretically interesting paradox according to which ‘the relations between the central Greek state and civil society are shaped by state corporatism, which still thrives, although corporatism’s favourable political context - authoritarianism - has ceased to exist since the fall of the colonels’ regime in 1974.’ The author also
It is not surprising that Greek governments demonstrate disproportionate strength to their relatively young organisations while bureaucracy exhibits an inability to resist alternate governments, a fact which is matched by the weakness of Greek civil society. In the realm of foreign policy-making on several occasions bureaucracy has been excluded from the process on the grounds that it would pose an obstacle to the state’s national interests (Griva, 2008; Theodoropoulos, 2005). The extreme dimension of bureaucratic pathology in Greece poses serious questions of intention. By this is meant that the continuity of the politicisation of bureaucracy represents an idiomorphic fashion of public administration organisation based on interests of political parties (Samatas, 1994: 34).

Since the end of the Second World War, Greek civil servants including Greek diplomats have not formulated a set of organised interests, nor have they acquired an *esprit de corps* thus being incapable of attracting external resources and sources of power. And even though they emerge as active in terms of reforms and policies with regards to their own rights and interest, they appear to have nominal input into policies which fall outside their own interests - such as environmental or educational policies (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 68). The Greek state, shaped by a patron-client interaction (Couloumbis and Yannas, 1996: 162; Ioakimidis, 1996: 40), has evolved into an over-sized, over-centralised entity and has become seriously unresponsive to environmental challenges of adjustment due to its tight control by political parties (Ioakimidis, 1996: 40). Naturally, such a *modus operandi* extends into all areas of policy-making, including foreign policy-making which is, by definition, the policy area that might be expected to demonstrate the greatest responsiveness to external challenges.

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suggests that Greece constitutes a characteristic example of state-civil society relations which differ from the Western model in that although West civil societies have been able to limit state action in Greece both bureaucracy and civil society have been permeated by pervasive party factionalism.
Strong political parties versus weak society

The uneven relationship between civil society, bureaucracy and the state has been extensively discussed in Greece with political parties being placed at the top of the administrative ‘truncated pyramid’ (Spanou, 2000). The overwhelming conclusion is that political parties possess the largest share of power vis-à-vis weak Greek civil society and bureaucracy. This is, partially, the product of an uneven distribution of organisational resources in terms of which, political parties dominate the administration without confronting any societal resistance (Sotiropoulos, 1993: 85). Bureaucratic clientelism operated through political parties constitutes a significant impediment to processes of modernisation, Europeanisation and globalisation of Greek political structures as these require the redefinition of the relationship between the state and society in favour of the latter (Ioakimidis, 1996: 44; Lyrintzis, 1983), hence their autarkic nature.

Such resistance to the aforementioned processes becomes more evident in the context of the EU. Greek traditionalist political parties have often opposed the process of Europeanization, using as a pretext the claim that it subverts and undermines Greekness. The real reason behind political parties' resistance to allow the process to take its full course lies in the fact that this would result in their own loss of access to state resources (Ioakimidis, 1996: 45).

Greece had a political tradition of clientelistic political parties even before the 1970s (Couloumbis and Yannas, 1996: 161). Political parties are very strong vis-à-

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36 For analytical accounts of the internal structures of Greek political parties from 1974 onwards see Featherstone (1990b), Lyrintzis (1983), Mavrogordatos (1983), Verney (1990)
37 Spanou (2000) describes administrative organisation and co-ordination in Greece as a truncated pyramid where everything is in place apart from the unifying element at the top
38 For more on organisational resources see Sotiropoulos (1993)
39 As earlier explained Ioakimidis (1996: 34) defines autarkic the process whereby the political system and elites internalise European inputs as a means of fostering their continued control in terms of structural stability and practices, ideological attitudes, policy objectives, resources and orientations, rather than as a means of changing or adapting to the new environmental conditions and new dynamics generated by EU membership
40 Ioakimidis (1996) describes the impact that the EU has had on Greek political parties. Specifically, the author argues that the EU has created a schism in political parties, which have split into two separate camps, namely the traditionalists and the Europeanists.
vis civil society and highly interventionist and in the post-1974 regime the ‘party-state’ is a crucial manifestation of the new political order. Political parties, which played a major role in the process of democracy consolidation (Featherstone, 1990: 193), are an important indicator of change in contemporary Greek society and it has been argued that the domestic dependence on the party in power is reminiscent of the older Greek dependence on foreign powers (Featherstone, 1994: 154). After the 1974 regime, the party system that was established, according to Mavrogordatos (1984: 163), was bipolar and of ‘limited but polarised pluralism’. The Greek electoral system, based on simple proportionality reinforced the two-party system (Sotiropoulos, 1993: 92). Bipolar party competition, based on long-established families rather than on abstract belief systems (Mavrogordatos, 1984: 161) further strengthened political parties and at the same time has weakened the authority and independence of social structures (Featherstone, 1990: 191).

Internally, political parties are characterised by a significant democracy deficiency and autocratic leadership (Featherstone, 1990: 188-189). Power is concentrated on charismatic leaders who have a populist and demagogic leadership style (Featherstone, 1990b: 102; Mavrogordatos, 1983: 80). Leaders have used the state apparatus and its resources for party purposes; in other words, as a means of extending their own hegemony (Featherstone, 1990: 195; Lyrintzis, 1984: 108). Political parties are today still locked into clientelistic patterns of social behaviour, viewing the state as the instrument for satisfying clientelistic demands, a mechanism for allocating favours, and a collective patron for their active supporters who become clients of the state bureaucracy (Featherstone, 1990b: 101; Ioakimidis, 1996: 45). These are regarded as essential conditions to ensure electoral victory.

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41 The Greek electoral system immensely perpetuated tripolarity
42 It is not surprising that a ‘swelling’ of the state apparatus has been repeatedly observed just before elections when recruitment takes place in return of votes
43 After the 2009 European Parliament elections a bonus was given to all the officials who were involved in the elections in one way or the other, which amounted to €140,000,000 and was
Sotiropoulos (1993: 86-88) complements Lyrintzis’s (1984) account of bureaucratic clientelism and gives a very clear projection of the problematic development of the relationship between bureaucracy and political parties. He argues that even though both bureaucracy and political parties have become larger, this has not led to the strengthening of bureaucracy vis-à-vis political parties.

On the contrary, bureaucracy is becoming weaker in containing political parties’ intrusion into its internal structures as each political party in government intervenes and changes the state apparatus at their own discretion. Interestingly, the enormous administrative changes introduced by the two main political parties in Greece, New Democracy and PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement), have not met with any strong resistance from Greek officials. The only leverage on behalf of administrative officials derives from their electoral power and is exercised only when their own emoluments are concerned. Their involvement in all other matters concerning their unions, policy formulation or even administrative organisation is minimal. Since there is no counterbalancing power on behalf of the parliament, the court or the civil society, political parties can perpetuate their monopoly over the state apparatus.

In contrast to the minimal involvement of bureaucracy to political matters, the intervention of political parties to the administration’s organisation and performance is disproportionate. Political parties institutionalise their intrusion and manipulation of the bureaucratic apparatus\textsuperscript{44} unquestioned (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 116) and take control over government departments by establishing ‘camps’ of supporters within them and within other state organisations and businesses and by appointing party affiliated officials at both the middle and top positions of the administrative hierarchy (Sotiropoulos, 1993: 89; 2001: 18).

\textsuperscript{44} For a more analytical account of the administrative changes that PASOK and New Democracy introduced during their tenure in order to ensure political control over the state see Sotiropoulos (1993)

\footnotesize{disproportionately higher than the equivalent bonus in any other EU member state. The specific bonus is said to be highly clientelistic and to buy votes for the upcoming general elections. For more on this matter see Chiotis, 21\textsuperscript{st} June 2009, To Vima newspaper at}
Arguably, despite its large size\(^{45}\), the Greek administrative system is ineffective and weak and also at the mercy of the party in government. Sotiropoulos (1993b; 1993) has described Greek bureaucracy as ‘a colossus with feet of clay’ and identifies the origins of the political parties’ supremacy against bureaucracy at the very early state-building in the 1830s. As a result central state bureaucracy becomes indistinct from the ruling party (Featherstone, 1990: 188). Naturally, this political culture impacts both on foreign policy processes and structures and can explain to an extent the course of change and adaptation undertaken by the MFA and its overseas network.

**Conclusion**

The above discussion has focused on the elements that make up the Greek FPS. The conceptualisation of all those elements inherent in the Greek domestic and external environments together with foreign policy making processes and structures into a FPS offers significant explanatory value to Greek foreign policy making. This is because the FPS model, functions as an inventory of all those national aspects and elements that make up the environment in which Greek foreign policy making takes place and integrates them into a self-feeding system thus making them part of it. For this reason, the FPS model enhances our understanding of the morphology of the Greek foreign policy structures as well as their institutional responses to change.

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\(^{45}\) In the report prepared by the ministry of Interior in early 2009 regarding the number of officials in the Greek public administration the number of 370,517 officials seemed to correspond to the European Union average. Nevertheless, this number reflects only tactical staff omitting staff with a limited contract, which amounts altogether to 550,000. In essence from the 370,517 civil servants 268,832 are permanent and 101,685 are contractual staff but with an open-ended contract, which is practically equivalent to permanent. The ministry of Interior concealed a large number of officials in the report which is said to allow for further recruitment before the next general elections. Such practices reinforce the clientelistic relationship between political parties/state and society. For more on this issue see Nikolakopoulos, 26\(^{th}\) May 2009, to Vima [http://tovima.gr/default.asp?pid=49&ct=1&artid=269867](http://tovima.gr/default.asp?pid=49&ct=1&artid=269867)
In the course of the exploration of the Greek FPS the chapter provided a number of images of Greek foreign policy-making provided by existing Greek literature. These images converge to a significant degree in their portrayal of the Greek foreign policy-making model which they describe as unique and idiosyncratic. The Greek model manifests a number of characteristics such as personality dominance, short-termism and politicisation which stem from the country's particular international and domestic experiences.

Images of the Greek foreign policy structures focus primarily on the traditional foreign policy agents, the MFA and the overseas diplomatic representations which seem to be dominant, while, at the same time, suggest the need for a broader foreign policy community. This need derives from the growth of the Greek foreign policy agenda to accommodate issues and policies of international significance generated from global and regional spanning policy milieus. As a result, the Greek foreign policy machinery faces demands for rearrangement on the basis of this need for a foreign policy community and for re-organisation of its constituents, the MFA and the overseas representations. Even though these images address the need for the MFA’s and its missions' re-organisation in the late 1990s there is a lot to be said about their changing role in the contemporary environment. The following chapter explores the domestic elements in the foreign policy process which claim an international role alongside the MFA and its diplomatic network which constitute the focus of chapters four and five respectively.
Chapter 3: A widening Greek foreign policy community?

Introduction

The previous chapter conceptualised the Greek FPS by employing the FPS concept developed by White and Clarke (1981; 1989). The FPS organisational device facilitates our understanding of those factors which make up the specific environment in which the structures and processes for the management of Greek foreign policy operate. The chapter also reviewed the existing literature on foreign policy making in Greece as well as the literature concerning the wider politico-administrative culture of Greece as well as its geopolitical influences, which help us understand the morphology of Greek foreign policy structures.

Most importantly, chapter two presented existing evaluations and conceptualisations of Greek foreign policy making processes and structures. Those evaluations which identified the Greek MFA and its overseas network of diplomatic representation as the core elements of the Greek foreign policy machinery are rather traditional in their approach. This is because they study the sources of Greek foreign policy making based on a legalistic, geopolitical approach –thus maintaining the distinction between domestic and external policy milieus- or in the context of earlier approaches to FPA decision making through which they examine the role of the Greek foreign policy machinery in policy formulation. With the purpose of adding to such approaches, the present and the following two chapters will employ a thematic approach which reflects the main themes that have arisen in the study of foreign policy management in the early twenty-first century.

In this light, a broad objective of the present chapter is to tackle issues concerning the wider discussion of expanding foreign and international policy agendas and
communities, and their implications for the national foreign policy machinery in its traditional form. A more specific objective is to investigate Greek responses to such developments and provide data that test the hypothesis of the emergence of a foreign policy community. Evidence from the literature suggests that the growth of the Greek international policy agenda as a result of globalisation and regionalisation, has confronted the Greek foreign policy machinery with demands for management of international policy outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

Such demands had already been identified more than a decade ago and were presented in the models of Greek foreign policy making reviewed in the previous chapter. With this in mind, this chapter undertakes an analysis of evidence concerning contemporary management of Greek foreign policy outside the MFA and its diplomatic network which will add to our understanding of the contemporary Greek foreign policy machinery. And while a trend towards a more active role for domestic agencies in managing international external relations has been documented, less systematic evidence has not been available until now for assessing the implications of such developments on Greek foreign policy processes and structures.

**Expanding foreign policy bureaucracies**

As discussed in chapter one, the development of international portfolios in traditionally domestic government departments, their involvement in the foreign policy making process and the expansion of foreign policy bureaucracy horizontally outside the foreign ministry constitute recognised themes in the management of foreign and international policy at the start of the new millennium. This section will pick up on the discussions presented in chapter one and extend the debate to the implications of such developments for the traditional foreign policy machinery and its foreign policy bureaucracy. Max Weber perceived bureaucracies as constituting the memory of processes and institutions meant to ensure continuity, coherence,
objectivity and expertise. They constitute the core elements in the process of public policy making and implementation (Gerth and Wright-Mills, 1991; Weber, 1983). Foreign policy processes, whilst having distinct characteristics, are no exception.

Foreign policy bureaucracies traditionally identified with the foreign ministry and diplomatic service (Smith et al., 2008; Hill, 2003: 76; Webber and Smith, 2002) constitute the nucleus of the foreign policy machinery. A standardised governmental foreign policy making apparatus extends from the overseas missions, through the foreign ministry, up to the Foreign Minister (FM), the Prime Minister (PM) and the cabinet (Hopkins, 1976: 411; Wallace, 1975: 40). The bureaucratic part or else the foreign policy bureaucracy is located within the premises of the ministries concerned with international policy with the majority found in the foreign ministry (Hill, 2003; Wallace, 1975: 40).

However, as the spectrum of states' international preoccupations expands, foreign policy bureaucracies are increasing in size and importance (Jensen, 1982: 121) within, but also outside, the foreign ministry (Eayrs, 1982: 96; Vital, 1968: 75) and extend horizontally across most governmental departments (Carlsnaes, 2008; Hudson, 2005; Hill, 2003; Wallace, 1975: 40). Against this background, our understanding and exploration of the contemporary foreign policy bureaucracy must reflect such change and adopt a broader perspective than the MFA alone. As discussed in chapter one, the proliferation of state and societal actors with a stake in international politics which seek to influence the direction of international policy has significantly challenged international and national foreign policy agendas which become diversified (White et al., 2005: 1; Harris, 1999: 24) more complex and multifaceted (Rana, 2005: 2; Hocking, 2004: 151; 2004b; Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 356).

Diplomatic agendas are becoming more like national domestic agendas as they are crowded with a number of issues directly linked to citizens’ wellbeing and the prioritisation of humanity (Moller, 2009; Held and McGrew, 2002: 1; Wesley, 2002; Langhorne, 2000: 34). As a result, national foreign policy is now concerned with
issues such as human rights, the environment and economic affairs which cut across divisions between domestic and international politics inherent in Westphalian organisational approaches to the state based on distinct geographical and administrative entities (Allen, 1999: 2007; Cooper, 1999: 40; Muller, 1999: 192; Rozental, 1999: 139; Keohane and Milner, 1996; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Sundelius 1980; 1984b Katzenstein, 1975).

The growth of governments’ involvement in new issue areas, both internationally and domestically, has been accompanied by a proliferation of governmental and non-state actors such as NGOs pursuing their interests in foreign policy, and becoming involved in the foreign policy process (Bertram, 2009; Rana, 2005: 2; 12; Hill, 2003; Gyngell and Wesley, 2003; Held and McGrew, 2002; Webber and Smith, 2002: 22; Cooper, 1999: 44; East, 1984: 121; Sundelius, 1984b: 94; Jensen, 1982). With regards to the implications of such developments for the national foreign policy machinery, there is evidently an increased number of government departments which acquire an international interest thus becoming involved in foreign policy making (Hill 2003; Wesley, 2002: 210; Cooper, 2001; 1999: 44).

This is because conventionally domestic departments acquire an increasingly significant role in the international policy process and develop their own international policy making capacity, demonstrating a parallel international function alongside the long-established government agent for foreign and international affairs, the foreign ministry, thereby breaking down the traditional divide between foreign and domestic policy (Hocking, 2004; 2004b; Hill, 2003; Allen, 1999: 207; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 16; Rozental, 1999: 136). The increased involvement of domestic government departments becomes manifest and institutionalised through the development of specialised international policy bureaus (Bertram, 2009; Rozental, 1999: 139). Such developments have resulted in diffusion in the management of foreign policy into an expanded range of agencies which form foreign policy communities that extend horizontally outside the foreign ministry (Hocking: 2004; 2003; Hill, 2003; Cooper,
This phenomenon has been termed as ‘horizontal proliferation’ or ‘decentralisation’ of foreign policy (Hill, 2003)

Foreign policy communities constitute a governmental response for coping with the needs for intensified government external involvement (Sundelius, 1984b: 94) in an era of ‘complex’ (Keohane and Nye, 1989) or ‘cascading’ interdependence (Rosenau, 1984) whereby the management of the external environment no longer constitutes the monopoly of foreign ministries and their diplomatic services. With their monopoly in expertise over policies targeted at the external environment having been challenged, foreign ministries find themselves competing for leadership in the management of international policy with a number of other government departments such as the military, economic and defence ministries, the intelligence services and finally political advisors who reside in the ministers' personal cabinets or in the party machine. Arguably, however, the main competitors are considered to be ministries of finance, economy and trade. (Hill, 2003: 82-85; Jensen, 1982: 122). Consequently, even though the foreign ministry still plays an important role in the national management of foreign and international policy its centrality and role in the national foreign policy machinery is no longer self-evident (East, 1984a: 89).

In addition to the increased involvement of domestic government departments in the foreign policy process and the proliferation of the foreign policy bureaucracy beyond the confines of the foreign ministry, arguably the processes of globalisation and regionalisation have also encouraged direct inter-bureaucratic communication (Underdal, 1987: 169; Blondel, 1985: 77) which further stresses the breakdown of the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic policy areas (Held and McGrew, 2002; Morse, 1970: 374). Domestic bureaucracies and departments have developed their own web of transgovernmental linkages and networks with counterparts in foreign domestic institutions, international organisations, supranational institutions and businesses (Moses and Knutsen, 2001: 360; Komachi, 1999: 105; Wallace, 1978: 34; Keohane and Nye, 1974: 42).
Policy arenas are more intertwined both domestically and internationally and thus policy issues can be pursued in a range of negotiating environments and bureaucracies, which link themselves directly to global events and economies\(^1\) (Newhouse, 1997: 67; Tsardanidis, 2006) often outside centralised channels (Slaughter, 2004; 1997: 183). Consequently, domestic bureaucratic institutions have become part of an enmeshed web of actors and actions (Hocking, 2007: 10; Rosenau, 1974: 25). This phenomenon was first encapsulated by Rosenau (1974b; 1974; 1971) and later described by Slaughter (2004; 1997) and Keohane and Nye (2000; 1989) as ‘transgovernmentalism’. More specifically, Slaughter (2004; 1997: 184) argues that a new world order is emerging in which, contrary to common assumptions,

‘The state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts. These parts –courts, regulatory agencies, executives and even legislatures- are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order. Today’s international problems –terrorism, organised crime, environmental degradation, money laundering, bank failure and securities fraud- created and sustain these relations. Government institutions have created networks of their own, ranging from the Basle Committee of central bankers to informal ties between law enforcement agencies to legal networks that make foreign judicial decisions more and more familiar. [...] Transgovernmentalism today is becoming the most widespread and effective mode of international governance’

Such processes have transformed domestic bureaucracies which pursue international roles into what has been termed ‘transnational administration’ (Spence, 2003: 23). A characteristic example of transnational administration comes from the EU and concerns COREPER II which involves not only traditional

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\(^1\) See Newhouse (1997: 67) for an extensive account of the professionalization of bureaucracies and for their direct linkages to global economy
diplomats, but also officials from various lead ministries (Spence, 2002: 23). These observations falsify earlier predictions which foresaw that the forces of globalisation or regionalism were bound to render foreign policy bureaucracies redundant on the basis of the prevalence of the phenomenon of ‘disintermediation’\(^2\) (Wesley, 2002: 207-208). Disintermediation is understood as a process of disengaging those parts of the bureaucracy, traditionally identified with the foreign ministry, which operate as an intermediary between interested parties due to the availability of In contrast with disintermediation assumptions, it seems that globalisation has profoundly challenged foreign policy bureaucracies by changing the ways in which they perform their traditional activities and has drawn them into new fields of action thus enhancing their role in the current domestic and international policy environments.

For some, not only are we not confronted with a declining foreign policy bureaucracy, but we are also witnessing the bureaucratisation of the international policy processes (Makridimitris and Passas, 1993: 4). The traditional function-related or policy process-related structure of government departments corresponds less and less to the increasing complexity of the international policy environment and to the cross-sectoral character of public policy (Makridimitris and Passas, 1993: 3). In an international policy environment characterised by multi-bureaucratic processes and inter-bureaucratic linkages, states participate less as unified blocks and more as compartmentalised administrative units The EU is the epitome of the creation of direct links between domestic and foreign administrative units such as those between national permanent representations to the EU (Makridimitris and Passas, 1993: 10).

\(^2\) In other words, in an era when communication technology enables direct communication between interested parties, a part of bureaucracy which is traditionally vested with the role of the intermediate between those parties is becoming increasingly irrelevant
Bureaucratic policy coordination as a whole of government approach

Naturally, the overloading of government with large amounts of detailed information, actions and actors constitutes a major problem for the state in dealing with its international environment. And even though governments’ approaches to management of this environment varies, the colonisation of the policy process by new actors constitutes more or less a common denominator raising issues of coordination and coherence (Hocking, 2005; 1999; Spence, 2005; 1999; Batora, 2003; Gyngell and Wesley, 2003; Hill, 2003: 72; Ioakimidis, 2003: 134; Kotzias, 2003: 333; Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000: 83; Allen, 1999; Bulmer and Burch, 1998). In other words, governments face the problem of ‘holding together the threads which tie national policies to international negotiations, and on maintaining an element of steering, of self-direction, amidst the wide and swiftly-flowing current of activity’ (Wallace, 1978: 45).

Reportedly, the lack of coordination and coherence across government departments or programmes constitutes one of the major problems facing contemporary governments which results in reduced efficiency and increased costs in the delivery of services to citizens. For purposes of eliminating redundant and contradictory programmes at a time of shrinking budgets, governments and civil services are seeking ways to increase horizontal cooperation (Peters, 1998: 1). The increasing demands for coordination stem from the growth of government involvement in international activity which, albeit a consequence of international interdependence and globalisation, is also a product of the general growth of government’s domestic responsibilities in a welfare society, which spill over national boundaries into the international domain.

Domestic management of economics, the environment, migration policy and others on behalf of the government is partly in response to international pressures and party in response to domestic objectives (Hill, 2003; Webber and Smith, 2002; Wallace, 1978: 42). As previously discussed irrespective of the reasons that urge
governments to get involved in their entirety in pursuing international policies, the
direct involvement of home bureaucracies with their opposite numbers in contrast
to the past monopoly of the foreign ministry in communication has raised a number
of questions concerning both the centrality of the foreign ministry in the foreign
policy process but also the ensuring of effective international policy coordination
between horizontally located governmental actors (Allen, 1999: 209; Rozental,

The horizontal proliferation or decentralisation of foreign policy (Hill, 2003) coupled
with increasing need for specialisation\(^3\) (Jensen, 1982: 123) and expert
consultation in policy making (Hopkins, 1976: 407) have intensified the need for
such policy coordination which integrates the whole of government (Peters, 1998)
Before we move on to foreign and international policy coordination in Greece the
following sections will firstly review evidence concerning the horizontalisation of
Greek foreign policy and the development of international policy capacity in
domestic government departments.

Some indicators of horizontal proliferation in foreign policy
management in Greece

The previous section discussed some of the major challenges that governments
and their foreign policy bureaucracies are currently confronting in managing
international policy. The present section focuses the discussion on Greece with the
aim of exploring the implications of the aforementioned developments for the
Greek foreign policy machinery. With issues such as widening foreign policy
bureaucracies and decentralisation of foreign policy making as well as the
development of international policy capacity in domestic departments constituting

\(^3\) Contemporary international policy issues are complex and require individuals with specialised
skills together with a simultaneous expansion in the involvement of bureaucracy in foreign policy
making. Naturally, for this to be achieved, pooling experts other than those involved in diplomatic or
political affairs is necessary. For more on this see Jensen (1982: 123)
key preoccupations within national foreign policy machineries, it is interesting to test how such themes relate to the Greek foreign policy machinery.

The overview of Greek foreign policy making processes in chapter two indicated that the political leadership together with external consultants, and more specifically the PM and the PMO together with the FM and the FM’s office and deputies, constitute the key agents for policy formulation. The foreign policy bureaucracy is of secondary importance and commonly restricted to providing information and implementing policy (Griva, 2002: 46; Sotiropoulos, 2001). The same section also indicated a significant degree of introversion and secretiveness on the part of the government and the MFA regarding the management of external issues, which have traditionally revolved around the dominant Greek national security issues (ta ethnika mas themata).

Nonetheless, change in the content of foreign policy and the rise of ‘low policies’ on the foreign policy agenda brought forward by globalisation and membership to the EU have brought into the foreign policy process a large part of the bureaucracy previously confined in areas of domestic policy. As a result, the acutely centralised Greek foreign policy processes opened up to diverse bureaucratic agents and effectively augmented in size both within and outside the MFA (Interview, no 2; 3; 8; 9; 26; 28). A characteristic example concerns the Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU (PeRepGr), which constitutes a clear example of foreign policy making power handed over to a bureaucratic unit. PeRepGr is discussed in the sections that follow.

Greek governments, until fairly recently, had never relied on civil servants either for new ideas, strategic planning or foreign policy formulation (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 85; Theodoropoulos, 2005). Even the short-lived coordinating committees between the MFA and several technical ministries were led by and comprised the political leadership of the ministries rather than bureaucratic departments (Spanou, 2001: 65). This practice has been re-enforced and legalised recently by the identification of Greek foreign policy as coterminous with issues relating to Greece’s territorial integrity and security defined in geopolitical terms. This justifies foreign policy
making being the prerogative of the FM, his deputy ministers and the PM and its insulation from other policy areas. Such an approach to policy making left limited scope for involvement of the foreign policy bureaucracy, let alone of what was traditionally understood as domestic bureaucracy: in other words government departments with a domestic mandate. The nominal involvement of bureaucrats and the focus of foreign policy on issues of national security prevented any significant link developing between foreign policy with the domestic political agenda (Interview, no 6).

Recently, however, the scope of the Greek government’s international preoccupations has grown and its international engagements have intensified, which becomes especially manifest at the level of the EU. Involvement in international and EU policy making has brought into the international policy processes a variety of actors from the political and business world (Ioakimidis, 2003: 134; Makridimitris, 1992: 77) and a number of experts from other departments and ministries (Ioakimidis, 1993: 414). However, as yet there is no hard evidence of significant qualitative shifts or changes in the foreign and international policy process.

There are indicators that some domestic ministries are starting to acquire an international orientation but no hard data that they are formulating their own coherent and integrated international policy. For instance, as interviews indicated, the ministry of education and religious affairs has intensified its international activities in the last decade as well as its international cooperation with a number of NGOs and international cultural centres such as the British council, the German Goethe Institute and the French Foundation Lycée as well as other such institutions. It has also extended its international presence by attaching educational consultants to a number of Greek diplomatic missions.

Similarly, the ministry of health has intensified cooperation with a number of international NGOs and foreign state organisations and involvement in projects of a regional or international reach. For instance the ministry of health together with the MoD have intensified cooperation with their Balkan counterparts in a joint
project for the fight against drugs in the region (Interview, no 16). In addition, in an attempt to fine-tune with international developments and increase international policy capacity, the ministry of health has promoted training and post-graduate studies in state university hospitals on international medical crisis management (Interview, no 16). To further support such internationalisation the PMO and the MFA have opened up consultative channels with technical domestic ministries for purposes of borrowing technical expertise and, as far as the MFA is concerned, for purposes of lending protocol advice and support to ministries engaging in international dealings (Interview, no 30).

The existing literature and past research suggest that in terms of direct communication, at least until the mid 1990s, most of the core ministries in Greece communicated with the rest of the EU or international institutions and policy making fora through the MFA which held the monopoly of expertise on issues concerning the international dimension of any kind of domestic policy (Minakaki, 1992: 44; Sotiropoulos, 2001). This underscored the centrality of the MFA in all areas of external policy, both European and international. The direct linkage between Greek civil servants -outside the MFA- and international organisations has been similarly weak. When it exists it is restricted to Greek civil servants travelling to other countries to meet their counterparts and attend seminars, usually organised by the European Commission aimed to diffuse new administrative ideas and methods. Usually civil servants accompany the minister’s confidant or a politically appointed consultant (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 71).

It is surprising that Greek integration into the EU, which for Greece is the major forum of interaction and socialisation with other foreign policy bureaucracies, did not result in the direct communication of Greek bureaucrats with international organisations. A research project conducted by the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation (MIPAD) indicated that until 1998, 76% of Greek civil servants had never had any kind of contact with civil servants of a foreign national administration or with the European Commission (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 71). Given such practices it is not surprising that officials or the majority of...
ministries have not developed any distinct international identity (Minakaki, 1992: 44).

Interviews with a number of officials indicated that even though domestic departments have always consulted the MFA on technical matters with an international dimension, today the MFA seeks their technical expertise more regularly for the purpose of formulating and generally managing international policy in conjunction with the PM and the cabinet. For some this suggests a horizontal ‘spread’ of the management of international policy to a larger number of domestic ministries (Interview, no 3; 22; 31). This spread, however, is not always explicit or translated into an institutionalised mechanism or structure and is commonly limited to information sharing. Nonetheless, expectations and needs for further involvement of technical ministries into policy formulation are increasing (Interview, no 31). Whether such involvement amounts to the emergence of a foreign or international policy community is explored later in this chapter.

Evidence of the need for foreign policy management by a growing number of government departments beyond the MFA can be drawn from the practice of the weekly inter-ministerial meetings that take place in the MFA. Such inter-ministerial meetings serve the purpose of home departments informing the MFA and seeking guidance from the MFA with regards to international dealings. As it is impossible for the MFA to have expertise in all technical matters, the lead ministries prepare the file under investigation and present it to the MFA for discussion, which then gives directions and instructions (Interview, no 31).

Another source of evidence for some horizontal spread of foreign policy management to domestic ministries comes from the creation of MFA linkages with the Ministries of Defence, Culture, Economy, Health and Development, which are known as ‘fast ministries’. These ministries have been termed fast for a number of reasons ranging from the fast ways in which their bureaucracy operates in comparison to other parts of Greek bureaucracy and their speedy responses concerning domestic and international demands for action. The latter is also related to their continuous direct communication with the PMO (Interview, no 21).
Based on the MFA’s 2007 Charter (Law 3566/2007, art. 7) the role of the MFA’s linkages is the ensuring of ‘systematic, cohesive and effective implementation of foreign policy’. From the above linkage offices, however, it is only the office in the MoD which is institutionalised while the others are dependent on the continuing support of the PM (Interview, no 10).

MFA linkage offices in fast domestic ministries are considered to have been created as a response to increasing needs for information sharing and the carrying out of international tasks in the aforementioned ministries and in practice they serve only this purpose (Interview, no 44). A number of interviewees confirmed that the MFA is still at the centre of both diplomatic interaction and representation overseas, while such offices serve to strengthen the MFA’s centrality within the foreign policy bureaucracy rather than promote decentralisation in foreign and international policy management. Nonetheless, a MFA official (Interview, no 13) argued that such offices are expected to increase as they represent the first signs of the realisation that ‘Greek foreign policy in the 21st century is expanding towards areas traditionally understood as domestic policy but currently acquiring an international dimension’.

The horizontal proliferation of foreign policy to involve other domestic departments with an increasing international dimension is more or less limited to technical ministries preparing their files and portfolios and then submitting them to the MFA for further instructions on policy making (Interview, no 30). As far as direct communication between the overseas diplomatic network and home ministries is concerned, it is possible that a Greek embassy would communicate with the Ministry of the Interior, for example if the issue under discussion is only a strictly technical matter, concerning that Ministry alone. Therefore, in theory, officials directly refer to, and are encouraged to do so, sectoral departments in order to save time and resources. This alternative path, however, outside the MFA’s established channel of communication, has been rarely used (Interview, no 27).

It seems that one of the areas whereby enlargement of the foreign policy agenda and widening of the policy process are more clearly observed is security. Security,
traditionally coming first in the Greek foreign policy agenda, has always kept the MoD in close cooperation with the MFA and the PMO and is now extending to include other government departments as explored in the following sections. With a revised notion of security to encompass asymmetric security threats such as international migration, pandemics, AIDS and drug and human trafficking\footnote{The ‘commodification’ of persons constitutes a serious problem in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean countries p: 442} a number of government departments have been pooled into the international policy process (Nomikos, 2004: 442). The aforementioned security issues which have been added to the Greek foreign policy agenda have intensified collaboration between a number of domestic departments (Interview, no 18).

For instance, the MFA largely shares civil protection responsibility with the General Secretariat for Civil Protection (GSPC)\footnote{www.gscp.gr} which, administratively, falls under the umbrella of the MIPAD, whereas for issues concerning illegal migration it is in constant collaboration and intelligence information sharing with the NIS and the Police (Nomikos, 2004: 443). Another area of increased horizontal collaboration between various domestic ministries, nevertheless under the aegis of the MFA, is the management of domestic and international crises. Crisis management, discussed in chapter four as it constitutes one of the newly added functions of the MFA, is a characteristic example of both interministerial horizontal cooperation and of the creation of international links between the relevant ministries. For instance, in cases of crisis management, domestic or international\footnote{For the Greek response to the crises of Imia and Ocalan see Liaropoulos (2008: 34).}, there are a number of agencies that need to be coordinated such as the Coast Guard under the auspices of the Ministry of Mercantile Marine, the General Secretariat for Civil Protection of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health and the naval and air forces under the military branch of the MoD.

Based on the above a need for a horizontal spread in the management of foreign and international issues today calls for the involvement of a number of home ministries. In Greece there has been a tradition of consultation but it seems that
today further joint ministerial management and policy formulation takes place and is encouraged by the MFA. Two questions are raised in this context. The first concerns the extent to which domestic departments participate in policy formulation beyond policy implementation and management of international issues and the second concerns the development of their own intra-ministerial capacity to generate international policy. Both issues constitute the focus of discussion in the following sections.

Elements of developing international policy capacity in domestic ministries

A well known theme in the literature that tackles the management of foreign policy in the 21st century is that the development of international policy capacity in domestic government departments usually manifests itself through the establishment of international policy departments. Enhancing international policy capacity in home departments is closely linked to the horizontalisation in foreign policy management discussed in the previous sections. With these themes in mind, the present section seeks to explore whether there is evidence of the development of international policy capacity in ministries other than the MFA and whether this provides evidence of a widening foreign policy community in Greece.

The selected government departments examined below constitute those actors that according to the literature arguably challenge the centrality of the MFA in national foreign policy machineries. Even though other departments have been acknowledged to develop an international portfolio, such as the ministry of culture and the general secretariat for information and communication which is vested with the conduct of Greek public diplomacy and is examined in chapter five, they do not claim a central role in foreign and international policy management.

In the course of the fieldwork, when interviewees were asked whether they perceive a change in the scope of their policy area in the last couple of decades,
they all responded positively. More specifically, all interviewed officials, both traditional diplomats and officials from home departments dispatched to overseas missions, including PeRepGr, acknowledged an intensified international dimension in their policy area. They suggested that the scope of their foreign policy interests has widened so much that they are not yet fully conscious of or familiar with the new areas of activity. An official (Interview, no 26) in Brussels argued that

‘There is so much change going on. All we know is that we need to carry out all these new areas of governmental policy abroad. Effectively, we need to carry out governmental policy in its entirety. We moved away from foreign policy in its traditional, security-centred form and we now promote Greek national positions on international environment policy, international development policy and a whole new range of international policies’

Amongst the various government departments, some have translated this acknowledgment into operational or structural re-organisation while others, the majority, have remained immune and trapped in prior practices and retain their purely domestic dimension (Interview, no 23). Not surprisingly, a small number of government departments such as the Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of Maritime Mercantile have always demonstrated an intense international interest due to their field of competence which has inherent elements of international engagement (Interview, no 3; 11). Another such example is the Ministry of Education which has traditionally attached educational consultants to Greek embassies and consulates who, together with attachés from the Ministry of Culture, worked on the promotion of Greek language, history and culture.

At the same time, however, there are still a few departments which are much less ‘internationalised’ than they should be such as the Ministry of the Environment and Public Works (Interview, no 13). Until 2008 the latter ministry was under-represented in the EU, demonstrating serious shortage of expert staff to represent Greece in EU COREPER’s respective working groups or in other international fora thus leaving empty chairs (Interview no, 3). Both PeRepGr and MFA officials
suggested that the reason for the limited international activity of the given ministry lies in the fact that ‘only recently Greece discovered that climate change, as other policy areas, is as much a domestic issue as it is international’ (Interview, no 8; 9; 16; 23).

The problem identified by a number of interviewees (Interview, no 1; 2; 3; 5; 6; 8; 13) is that in home ministries there is no leadership and initiative when it comes to international policy making. As a result, their international policy performance remains domestic in substance and operation while guidance is constantly sought from the MFA, not only with regards to protocol, but also with regards to policy substance. The fact that a large number of domestic ministries have not to date developed specialised units for either international or European policy further stresses their unpreparedness to address the increasing complexity of policy making in a transforming international policy environment.

This is further aggravated by the fact that even the MFA’s linkages with other home ministries are limited to exchange of only the information that is not considered as ‘for internal consumption’ rather than transparent and intensive collaboration in international policy formulation (Interview, no 9). In other words, instead of them being the think tank of the ministry and a generator of ideas for either European or international issues they are reduced to ‘transmission belts’ with no input into the policy process (Minakaki, 1992; Spanou, 2001: 100). In the Greek experience, until very recently, only two ministries beyond the PM and the FM have claimed an intensive international role, those being the MoD and the MNEC (Papakonstantinou, 2004: 269), with the latter being in charge of mostly domestic and technical European issues. As far as the involvement of the Parliament is concerned the previous chapter demonstrated that in terms of its input it can be characterised as merely symbolic (Interview, no 10).
Ministry of Defence

The MoD, Greece’s guardian of territorial integrity has a strong tradition of an introverted perception of Greek security that is to say focusing on security inside Greek territorial borders. The current expansion of the notion of state security to encompass a large number of cross-national and asymmetric threats has gradually altered the role of the MoD, which is becoming more ‘extroverted’ and diversified (Interview, no 18). Today, the MoD retains its traditional competence of being the central axis for the execution of the government’s national defence policy as decided by the Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA) but also claims a newly enhanced international role (Interview, no 41).

The main aims of the Ministry and its Armed Forces (the military branch of the ministry) have been the protection of territorial integrity, of national independence, ensuring Greek citizens’ wellbeing against any external threat (MoD official website, 2009). Until very recently, the MoD’s primary concerns, which revolve around traditional concepts of foreign policy linked to territorial security, have led to a rather limited and obsolete national defence policy and institutional framework which did not correspond to contemporary needs and demands (Dokos, 2003: 269).

The MoD has always been the most secretive and costly ministry of all the Greek government departments due to the importance attached by successive governments to issues of national security in terms of territorial integrity and military capabilities (Couloumbis, 1983), issues which have always dominated Greek foreign policy agenda (Interview, no 8; 18; 30). Military spending, which has characteristically constituted an obstacle to development spending amounted to 4.9% of GNP in 2002 while the European average was 1.8% (Kollias, 2003: 207-210) thus making Greece rank higher in military spending than any other NATO member (Tsakonas, 2003: 61). The high military expenditure of Greece reflects the

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7 Military expenditure was 7% of the GNP in the 1980s. In 1996, Greece spent approximately $5.9 billion, 4.6% of its GDP and Turkey 4.5% of its GDP, much higher percentages of any other NATO member (Tsakonas, 2003: 61).
emphasis that the government attaches to the military dimension of power and to the internal balancing of external threats (Kollias, 2003: 213) thus prescribing a traditional approach to foreign policy (Interview, no 30).

Recently however, in the context of the globalised and interdependent world, the Greek MoD has realised that for its constitutional aims to be achieved, its traditional introversion and traditionalism need to be abandoned and cooperation fostered with other national and foreign government departments as well as global agents (Interview, no 41). The MoD cooperates currently with a wide range of government departments and agencies in order to respond to non-state, asymmetric security threats not only to Greece, but also to its Balkan neighbours and its European partners. Most importantly, a qualitative change has taken place which relates to the understanding that the security of Greece is not limited to its territory but it extends to its nationals, both at home and abroad (Interview, no 17; 18). Greek security is challenged from a number of threats, some of them newly emergent such as physical catastrophes, international crime, illegal migration and others, besides the traditional territorial threats posed by Turkey and Skopje which have dominated the Greek foreign policy agenda.

In the last decade the MoD has successfully launched a number of initiatives in the area of military diplomacy which led to the signing of a number of military cooperation treaties especially in the Balkan region (Dokos, 2003:248). With its strategic planning conducted in cooperation with the MFA and to a lesser extent with the MNEC, the MoD has been transformed from a passive supporter to an active member in peace operations and UN missions. In the course of planning and developing an institutional framework for the management of the totality of environment issues that could potentially threaten Greek security, the MoD has established a directorate of Human Capital and Environment, under the aegis of

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8 MOD special issues section at [http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/MainAnalysisPage3.asp?HyperLinkID=3](http://www.mod.mil/gr/Pages/MainAnalysisPage3.asp?HyperLinkID=3) 07-09-09

9 A large number of Greek soldiers participated in peace operations in Somalia (UNSOM), in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR and SFOR), in Albania (ALBA mission), in Kosovo (KFOR), in Afghanistan (ISAF) while a number of Greek soldiers have observed missions in Kuwait, N. Iraq, in Georgia and in West Sahara, for more see MoD speech to the conference of ambassadors at [http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/el-GR/300707_F1706.htm](http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/el-GR/300707_F1706.htm)
the DG for Economic Planning, and a section for health security and environmental management.

The work of the respective Directorates and the section is conducted in close cooperation with the ministries of Health and Environment and Public Works (MoD, Environment Section, 2009). With such initiatives the MoD aims to claim an active role in international policy making which extends beyond its traditional military scope and to intensify its cooperation with the MFA in international policy making (Interview, no 17).

The MoD aims to improve and promote its international policy capacity and diplomacy and has embarked since 2005 on an intensive plan of regional cooperation involving ministries of defence and foreign affairs as well as other government agencies in south-eastern countries, in policy areas which supersede its traditional military-technical expertise such as crisis management (Meimarakis, 2007). Besides the promotion of an individual international identity through defence-military cooperation that the ministry promotes in the Balkan region or in the context of the EU, one of its main aims is to promote the link between defence, diplomacy and international policy making as demonstrated by participating in a series of multinational rescue exercises such as Dolphin, 2005; 2006; 2008 carried out in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue.

For this purpose the MoD works closely with the MFA both at home and abroad and has re-organised and strengthened its representation overseas even in small missions as well as posts which are of strategic international importance to Greece by dispatching more defence attachés but also military, maritime and air marine attachés who constitute a significant instrument for the promotion not only of Greece’s defence policy but also of its international policies (Meimarakis, 2007b).

One of the most important challenges for the MoD is the management of both domestic and international crises for which it shares responsibility with the General

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10 With participating and strengthening EU initiatives such as tactical Battlegroups
11 For instance in the Greek embassy in Kiev the special office for the defence attaché was established in 1998 [http://greece.kiev.ua/page1738.html](http://greece.kiev.ua/page1738.html) 13-06-09
Secretariat for Civil Protection which falls under the ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation and the MFA (Interview, no 7; 23). With security issues breaking the monopoly of the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs national security and crisis management require coordination between these departments but also with the police and other government and bureaucratic agencies (Dokos, 2003: 274; Meimarakis, 2007; 2007b) which seem to increase in the Greek case. Based on the above, the MoD undertakes significant initiatives in international policy coordination and a significant degree of international policy interaction. Together with the MNEC they constitute the only two other domestic ministries which demonstrate evidence for of developing a certain degree of international policy capacity without however challenging the centrality of the MFA in foreign policy management.

**Ministry of Economy and Finance**

The MNEC remains the key actor in Greece’s international and European economic policy with most of the issues being handled in conjunction with the PM’s department (Featherstone, 1996: 11). The MNEC seems increasingly to be developing linkages with other ministries and actors outside the government whereas it constitutes the key ministry in economic and technical policy coordination. Economic decision making, however, remains tightly controlled by the PM and several important issues such as the Single European Act seem to have never been discussed in the Cabinet (Featherstone, 1996: 11).

In the area of international policy making in Greece, policy planning as a systematic instrument of foreign policy making has only been observed in the context of foreign economic policy in the EU. The first time that the Greek government had to embrace policy planning as an operational instrument was with the absorption of the Integrated Mediterranean Programs (IMPs) in 1985 (Ioakimidis, 1996: 42). The adoption of the new structural policy of the EU contributed radically to the content and style of foreign economic policy making in
Greece and brought the ministry of finance and economy to the core of economic policy coordination and implementation.

Ioakimidis (1996: 42) argues that it was the first time that Greek bureaucracy, both within and outside the MFA and the MNEC was compelled to set up bodies and procedures to deal with ‘external policy’. The seven IMPs of 1985 were formulated exclusively by the Ministry of Finance and Economy, albeit the first Community Support Framework (CSF) drawn between 1989 and 1990 was drafted by a much wider group of policy makers comprising participants from the regions and from the private sector of the economy. The increased participation of non-state actors and agencies as well as the various networks of cooperation with corresponding bodies in other member states were coordinated by the MNEC which claimed a vigorous role in foreign economic policy.

The transformation of the foreign economic policy process with the widening network of actors shaped an unprecedented policy making environment in Greece, raising demands for an institutionalisation of channels of participation in the policy making process. This led to persistent demands from the Confederation of Greek Industries to set up a Social and Economic Council to link the state with other economic and social actors in shaping policy (Ioakimidis, 1996: 43). This heralded a new era of cooperation between governmental and non-governmental actors, domestic and foreign alike, and the MNEC in the context of promoting economic diplomacy and exports and supporting Greek businesses abroad and investments. Cooperation which takes place in the context of the ‘National Export Plan’ issued by the Greek Exports Council, involves the MFA at home, but also all Greek overseas missions which are becoming involved with the Plan (MNEC, Press Report, 2003). (For more on this partnership see chapter five, more specifically the section of economic diplomacy.)

Such demands were further intensified in the last decade and especially from 2007 onwards when foreign economic policy and diplomacy were proclaimed as the core pillar of Greek foreign policy according to the latest MFA Charter. The promotion of foreign economic policy and diplomacy as the central axis of Greek
foreign policy had a number of implications for the Greek foreign policy machinery, the MFA and the MNEC. This is because this change was effectively translated into the transfer of the function of economic diplomacy together with the respective bureaucracy from the MNEC to the MFA, thus centralising the competence of economic diplomacy under the control of the latter. The extent to which the MNEC could develop an active international presence and enhance its overseas representation leading to significant decentralisation of foreign policy was prevented with the aforementioned transfer. On the contrary, such development is indicative of a tendency towards foreign policy centralisation under the organisational structure of the MFA, which is discussed in chapter four.

The diplomatic cabinet of the Prime Minister’s Office

The PMO is the actor in the foreign policy process in which decision making power is concentrated. The PMO in Greece has been very strong especially from 1980 onwards and has often constituted a structure of a mini-cabinet forming something of a meta-government (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 124; 126; 127). The PMO has a long history of recruiting extra-governmental consultants and is considered to be the most politicised unit of the Greek administrative apparatus (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 142). It comprises sections such as the diplomatic, economic, strategic planning, communication and management sections which often bypass the ministry with the respective competence and as a result excludes them from the policy making process. Chapter two discussed the role of the PM as the prime foreign policy actor in the Greek foreign policy process (see pages 101-103).

This section does not aim to reflect yet again upon either the political role of the PM in the foreign policy process or the acute politicisation of the PMO due to the tradition of recruiting extra-bureaucratic consultative elements as those aspects were presented previously (the role of the PMO was discussed in chapter two as analysed by Gkikas, 2005; Griva, 2002; Sotiropoulos, 2001; Ioakimidis, 1999; Makridimitris and Stoforopoulos, 1997; Makridimitris, 1992). Rather, it focuses on
the bureaucratic dimension of the PMO. The PM, besides the political consultants, is also supported by a cabinet which comprises bureaucratic elements. It is these which are central to the discussion of expanding foreign policy bureaucracies which constitutes the theme of this chapter. With the spectrum of state international interests expanding towards new regions and policy areas, foreign policy bureaucracies expand both within and outside the traditional foreign policy bureaucratic actor, the foreign ministry in their attempt to reflect such change. Therefore, the PMO, which is central in foreign policy making, is under investigation with regards to its bureaucratic constitution.

The PMO comprises a diplomatic section, otherwise termed as the PM’s diplomatic cabinet. The cabinet is staffed by a combination of officials dispatched from the MFA (as well as external consultants and academic experts) and was set up to serve as a direct linkage between the PM and the MFA for purposes of overseeing the implementation of Greek foreign policy and the conduct of Greek diplomacy. Nevertheless, the section has often taken the form of a mini foreign ministry (Interview, no 11) bypassing the MFA in foreign policy making, especially when key Greek national issues are involved (Interview, no 30). The cabinet is headed by a diplomat of ambassadorial rank who is directly accountable to the PM and provides significant input in the foreign policy process with regards to protocol amongst other things (Interview, no 11; 44).

The cabinet’s agenda can vary significantly according to circumstances and has enlarged over the last decades. Demands for the cabinet’s expertise in different policies have grown into areas such as economics, development and the environment and therefore more and more experts from other government departments are pooled into its structure. ‘The PMO is expanding bureaucratically to reflect the changing Greek foreign policy agenda’ (Interview, no 11).

With regard to its operation there is always a pre-scheduled agenda with issues that constitute the core Greek foreign policy preoccupations but there is also a parallel, ad hoc agenda. The later is concerned with all aspects of the PM’s foreign and international engagements, policy, interests, contacts and issues (Interview,
The cabinet and its diplomats receive instructions and information from the MFA and after they filter and analyse it they forwards all relevant information to the PM and his advisors. This way the cabinet ensures a valid and comprehensive bureaucratic input into foreign policy making. An official at the PM’s diplomatic cabinet (Interview, no 11) argued ‘We see what the MFA staff sees but we forward it to the PM. We make sure that the MFA has an input in the foreign policy making process’.

**Elements of European policy capacity**

Evidence for a developing international policy capacity seems to originate largely from the level of EU policy. Before accession to the EU, domestic ministries’ resources and areas of policy interest were very limited. Membership of the EU brought forward an expansion of ‘foreign policy’, traditionally belonging solely to the MFA’s competence, to include issues which fell under domestic government departments but which started to gain an external dimension (Tsitouridis, 1986: 861). As a result, certain parts of the Greek domestic administration became part of a large European network of cooperation (Kavakas, 2000: 147). A special provision of Law 445/1976 established EC Affairs Services in Greek domestic ministries, that is offices in charge of EU affairs designed to constitute firstly, the ministries’ core for information and research on EC-related issues and secondly, the linkage between technical ministries and the MFA. The role of these services however, was soon downgraded and limited to linkages with the MNEC on economic issues of (Anastopoulos, 1986: 645).

The first signs of the development of European policy capacity were manifest in the creation of European sections in the ministries of Economy, Agriculture, Industry and Energy, Trade, Employment, Public Works, Transportation, Social Services, Culture and Sciences. Later in the 1990s, similar structures were created in most of the Greek ministries that took the form of European Union affairs offices (Interview, no 28). These offices functioned as repositories of information and
constituted linkages with the Ministry of Coordination\textsuperscript{12} (MCo) which was in charge of coordinating European policy until 1981 when the task was transferred to the MFA (Tsitouridis, 1986: 863).

Despite the initial importance attached to the aforementioned EC and later EU inter-ministerial offices with regards to developing European policy making capacity, in practice they were less effective. It has been documented that the majority of such offices were merely limited to exchanging information with the PeRepGr and their functions and competence were far from that of policy making (Interview, no 28).

In research conducted in the early 1990s (Minakaki, 1992: 38) officials from a number of ministries outside the MFA or the MNEC, suggested that in terms of policy formulation, policy communication and coordination in the area of foreign and European policy, there was amongst other things, a high degree of centralisation in the MFA as well as lack of information sharing on behalf of the two leading ministries, the MFA and the MNEC with the rest of the ministries regarding economic and technical policy\textsuperscript{13}. This model in European policy making crystallised the centrality of the MFA and MNEC as the main channels in European and other international policy processes. Minakaki (1992: 38) describes the following linear process in European policy making and communication.


In terms of communication and consultation of certain European policies there is a linear if not circular pattern which follows this model:

EU – PeRepGr – MFA / MNEC – Ministry X – MFA – PeRepGr – EU

In most cases policy has already been formulated in the second stage by the PeRepGr and is then transmitted to the headquarters (HQ) in Athens and in turn to the concerned technical ministry (Interview, no 2; 6). The tendency to formulate

\textsuperscript{12} Which was later replaced in European policy coordination by the MFA

\textsuperscript{13} For more research data on the matter see Minakaki (1992)
policies at the level of the PeRepGr in direct communication with the technical ministry concerned becomes more and more regular (Interview, no 6).

The limited European policy capacity of domestic government departments, albeit more developed than international policy capacity, has shifted the weight of EU and also of international policy formulation to the PeRepGr, which is discussed in the following section. A number of interviews conducted at the PeRepGr in three consecutive years from 2007 to 2009 stressed a twofold deficiency in terms of domestic ministries’ European policy capacity. Such deficiency lies both in the malfunction of departments for EU affairs in domestic ministries and in the lack of their qualitative representation in the PeRepGr. This deficiency coupled with the majority of domestic ministries’ ‘slow-speed’ performance and administrative pathology poses significant limitations to the development of European as well as international policy capacity (Interview, no 2; 8).

The increasing number of issues with a European or international dimension in technical or else vertical ministries’ preoccupations is not without implications, qualitative and quantitative alike, for the ways in which the structures for their management are organised (Makridimitris and Passas, 1993: 11). Therefore, not surprisingly the cross-cutting dimension of European policy is at odds with existing vertical organisation. The same applies to the MFA and MNEC, which Makridimitris and Passas (1993: 12) characterise as horizontal ministries. As a result the aforementioned implications become manifest in the augmentation of foreign and European policy bureaucracy within and without the MFA, with the PeRepGr constituting a prime example.

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14 Three interviewees referred to the report of Stavros Dimas (European Commissioner for the Environment) on the poor Greek environmental policy and measures. This was an illustrative example of a case whereby the lack of a department for EU affairs was felt as despite the need to cover existing posts with experts in the ME (YPEXWDE) those posts were vacant. It was emphasised that it is a matter of urgency for the Greek government to have the right people, ie policy makers and consultants at the right positions. This report and the Greek reaction is bound to poison the relations between Greece and the Commission.

15 This characterisation is accepted only if it refers to their preoccupations which are horizontal and are becoming more so. As far as their structure and operation is concerned both ministries are hierarchical and vertical.
Despite the nominal European policy making capacity constituting the dominant trend in most home departments some ministries such as the Ministry of Mercantile Marine and the Ministry of Agriculture have functioned quite effectively in policy making and policy-uploading to the EU. The Ministry of Agriculture has always maintained significant direct relationships with the Union’s institutions and participates actively in EU policy formulation. Part of its effectiveness is due to the disproportionately large resources it has received from the central Greek government unlike other ministries, in order to enhance representation in the PeRepGr but also in other key missions abroad (Interview, no 3; 28). The Ministry of Agriculture was one of the first ministries to attach a large number of officials and consultants to overseas missions and to create an office for Agriculture Consultants which secured large amounts of European funds when mostly needed in the early 1980s (Tsitouridis, 1986: 863).

**Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU: expanding the foreign policy community**

As discussed in the previous sections, one of the key developments in the contemporary management of foreign and international policy is the transformation of domestic bureaucracies into what Spence (2003: 23) terms ‘transnational administration’. A characteristic example of such bureaucracies concerns the EU’s COREPER II which comprises not only traditional diplomats, but also officials from various lead ministries. The rationale of national public administrations, in the form of national representations to the EU, participating in European policy making attaches renewed significance to national bureaucracies while at the same time exemplifying arguments for the growth of foreign policy bureaucracies outside the MFA.

National representations to the EU are largely similar in terms of their internal organisational structure which reflects their functions in the EU bodies where they participate and when they differentiate this is due to those elements particular to
their given political culture (Spanou, 2001: 120). Spanou (2001: 121) argues that national permanent representations to the EU constitute a characteristic example of institutional isomorphism as defined by Di Maggio and Powell (2001) while at the same time reaffirm assumptions discussed in chapter one according to which national factors and elements condition isomorphism. Based on this, the form and operation of national representations reflect national responses to the same demands for certain functions and coordination.

The Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU (PeRepGr) termed by its officials as an ultra-ministry [υπερ-υπουργείο] or meta-ministry [μετα-υπουργείο] where the whole of government is represented (Interview, no 2; 5; 8; 9) provides us with the ultimate and perhaps the sole evidence of growth of a foreign policy bureaucracy outside the MFA. The PeRepGr, one of the largest national representations in Brussels\(^{16}\), numbering 130 officials in 2008 (Interview, no 2) was set up initially in 1962 under the responsibility of the MCo\(^{17}\) due to the economic/technical substance of pre-accession negotiations. The responsibility of the PeRepGr was transferred to the MFA in 1981 (when Greece entered the EC) based on the increased role envisaged for the MFA in EC affairs. Responsibility for the PeRepGr lies with the MFA and it is a MFA diplomat of ambassadorial rank\(^{18}\) who heads the mission.

In terms of communication and liaison with the home administration, the MFA constitutes the first and ultimate linkage of PeRepGr. Communication between sectoral officials dispatched to the PeRepGr and their home ministries is not permitted unless in cases of emergency. Communication with national administration in Greece must take place through the PeRepGr hierarchy and through the Permanent Representative or his deputy who monitor information flow to sectoral ministries (Spanou, 2001: 134). In theory, this hierarchical and

\(^{16}\) Spanou (2001: 126) argues that two reasons can explain the large size of the Greek representation. Firstly, the long distance of Athens from policy making centres in Brussels and secondly, the tendency of sectoral ministries to dispatch many of their own officials as representatives to Brussels. This way, they believe, they can ensure direct communication with their counterparts by passing the MFA.

\(^{17}\) Renamed the Ministry of Economy (MNE) in 1982

\(^{18}\) For a detailed account of the structure and functions of the PeRepGr see Spanou (2001)
channelled practice aims to strengthen coordination nonetheless at the same time it reflects a climate of suspicion and resentment against direct communication which would potentially lead to bypassing the MFA. Therefore, in order to safeguard the MFA’s centrality in the European policy process this hierarchical and centralised modus operandi is systematically preserved (Spanou, 2001: 134-135).

PeRepGr has come to constitute one of the main actors in coordinating European and international policy. With coordination of external policies being facilitated at the level of the PeRepGr due to its immediacy to policy making loci and physical proximity of the representatives of various domestic departments, the mission has undertaken a large share not only in policy coordination but also in policy formulation. A PeRepGr official (Interview, no 8) in Brussels argued ‘

‘When you have people from every domestic ministry represented at the PeRepGr located on the same floor and literally next door it is only natural that they both make and coordinate policy in the premises of the PeRepGr and then transmit positions home rather than the other way around.’

The official argued that significant decentralisation takes place in Brussels with the PeRepGr undertaking most of the formulation and coordination of European and international policy. However one factor that impedes effective coordination relates to the HQ’s weakness to transmit timely unified positions to the PeRepGr. More specifically, a PeRepGr official (Interview, no 2) argued that very often national positions arrive after the meetings of the working groups have been held if at all. The official (Interview, no 2) suggested that ‘there is some sort of a rolereversal in the case of Greece’ and explained that for a large number of issues, national positions are formulated in Brussels and are then transmitted to the HQ to be ratified and implemented rather than the other way around.

As mentioned above, in many cases the PeRepGr improvises and formulates national positions on an ad hoc basis, whereas policy coordination becomes something of a rapid negotiation between experts dispatched from each ministry
within the PeRepGr premises. In order to serve purposes of fast and effective coordination the various branches of the PeRepGr which were previously scattered in different buildings moved together in 2008 in a newly hired building at the centre of Brussels\textsuperscript{19}. The realisation that it is time and cost effective to make and coordinate policy with colleagues next door gave a pragmatist approach to organising the mission and transformed coordination into an intra-PeRepGr process involving all sectors of Greek administration away from the MFA (Interview, no 8).

PeRepGr officials emphasise that if a degree of foreign policy decentralisation exists outside the MFA then this has to be in the PeRepGr, which is increasingly inhabited by extra-MFA officials (Interview, no 2; 3; 8; 9). This is both natural and necessary, as a PeRepGr official (Interview, no 8) argued because ‘a policy manager in Brussels knows much more about the current status of policies and is in a position to defend more effectively the national position if not to formulate the national position than officials or political leadership back home’ (Interview, no 8). Such realisations were not without implications for the status and recruitment processes of the Greek representation.

More specifically, the PeRepGr which in the past functioned as a national repository for staff unwanted at home and as a forum available to the political leadership to pay back promised positions before elections (Interview, no 2; 8) has changed its recruitment and functional approach.

\textit{‘It has been over a decade that the PeRepGr has been recruiting taking into consideration candidates’ credentials and qualifications. Unlike previous patterns, today Greek governments do not fool around with the PeRepGr any more’} (Interview, no 8).

Such attitudinal change has gradually given the mission significant autonomy to decide their budget and logistics as well as freedom to manage Greek European and international policy away from home. As a result significant policy making

\textsuperscript{19} Rue Jacques de Lalaing 19-21, 1040 Bruxelles
takes place at the level of the PeRepGr thus reinforcing horizontal trends in Greek foreign policy management (Interview, no 2; 3; 8). Nevertheless, despite significant change, the PeRepGr does not offer incentives to Greek officials to pursue a career in the mission. Evidently, PeRepGr officials’ wages are significantly lower than those of their counterparts whereas it still does not offer an expense account despite Greek governments’ expectations that Greek officials in Brussels socialise, lobby and entertain their counterparts (Interview, no 2; 8).

The system of foreign and international policy bureaucratic coordination in Greece

The growth in the domain of government action brought forward by globalisation and regionalisation with the latter exemplified in Europeanisation, have increased demands for foreign policy coordination. This is because the increased complexity of decision making and the raised national stakes in a whole new range of policy areas have increased the needs for coordinating internal policy making activities in order to ensure coherence abroad (Kassim et al., 2001: 1). With different countries responding differently to increased coordination demands the exploration of individual responses can provide further evidence regarding state management of their international and domestic environments at the start of the new century. For countries like the UK and France coordination has always been an important goal to ensure that the government speaks with a single voice abroad whereas for others coordination constitutes a low priority (Kassim et al., 2001: 2).

Even when coordination constitutes a goal in itself, there are questions regarding how it should be achieved. Those questions enquire whether coordination should be allocated at the level of central government and work its way down to bureaucracy (top-down) or at lower levels of bureaucracy (bottom-up) (Peters, 1998: 20). Such views suggest allocating the function of coordination to the centre, at the core executive, at the cabinet or the PM, or even to a specially designed
organisation or to an existing ministry which may however reinforce existing bureaucratic rivalries and raise questions such as which ministry would be appropriate. The two usual ministries are the ministries of foreign affairs and economy. With the above being said, Peters (1998: 20) suggests that such dilemmas are false because governments need both types of coordination.

Research indicates that policy coordination constitutes one of the key themes in the management of governmental policy and some national bureaucrats, such as the British and Canadians, have been in a continuous search in the duration of their career for means to enhance coordination (Peters, 1998: 2). In Greece, interview respondents pointed to a rather different direction. The theme of coordination received different levels of attention at different external policy domains. More specifically, policy managers and officials who are involved in policy areas concerned with traditional national security issues and who cooperate mostly with the MoD do not acknowledge major coordination problems. An official at the PM’s diplomatic cabinet (Interview, no 11) argued that ‘In all my years of experience I have never felt that coordination is a problem. Foreign policy coordination in Greece is centralised and effective’.

Similarly other officials argued that coordination is adequately performed for their hierarchical structures and operation (Interview, no 11; 17; 41). However, as the enquiry moved towards units involved in more cross-cutting policy areas, such as European or other international policies, respondents acknowledged that the Greek hierarchical coordination scheme or else the Greek ‘top down’ scheme suffers from significant inadequacies (Interview, no 2; 3; 4; 5; 8; 9; 13; 16; 23).

More specifically, officials who are involved in European policy making acknowledge significant coordination inadequacy which is however compensated by the work of PeRepGr whereas officials involved in international policy and more specifically those involved in international cooperation and aid as well as foreign economic policy report that policy coordination constitutes to be one of the major weaknesses in Greek policy making and implementation. The discrepancy in respondents’ images of coordination is due to the fact that in the context of
traditional foreign policy, coordination between the PM, the MFA and the MoD has been institutionalised at all stages of the policy process, involving both formulation and implementation\textsuperscript{20}. Most importantly, however, the discrepancy in respondents’ views is due to the increasingly divergent substance of cross-cutting policies which involve networks and horizontal operation. An official at the MFA’s DG International Development Cooperation (Interview, no 13) stressed that

\begin{quote}
‘Coordination over sectoral policy with an international dimension is a new thing and so is the phenomenon of so many home departments and other foreign entities working together over a single policy’.
\end{quote}

As previously mentioned the inter-ministerial coordinating scheme in Greece is centralised, hierarchical and top-down\textsuperscript{21} with policy making coordination allocated to the level of the cabinet’s KYSYM and coordination of policy implementation allocated to the MFA. This scheme by definition seems problematic especially in an era where governments’ ethos supports decentralisation and their preoccupations towards cross-cutting policy domains. This hierarchical scheme is further reinforced in Greece by the vertical and hierarchical organisation and modus operandi not only of the MFA but also of all other Greek government departments. Even though centralisation as well as the use of hierarchy and authority inherent in hierarchical coordination approaches are meant to minimise bureaucratic conflict, reduce coordination costs and increase coordination returns (Peters, 1998: 22) in Greece they seem to have the opposite effect.

In Greece, government departments have functioned on the basis of ‘competing fortresses’ rather than parts of an integrated system\textsuperscript{22} (Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 47) and are far from whole of government approaches (Interview, no 2; 3; 8; 9; 16). Inter-ministerial coordination in Greece relies on the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{20} More or less the same applies to the context of the EU policy for which the MFA, the MNEC and Ministry of Agriculture cooperated on a regular basis
\textsuperscript{21} For an analysis of the various schemes of coordination such as market and network approaches see Peters (1998)
\textsuperscript{22} A tendency which is expected to be extended with the current waves of governmental reorganisation and reform, including privatisation measures which lead to competition rather than cooperation among public organisations. For more on this see Peters (1998).
\end{footnotesize}
following principles (Passas, 2005: 370): Firstly, it relies on information sharing between other ministries and the MFA and on the provision of technical information by the former to the latter. Secondly, it relies on the MFA’s coordination of action and the provision of guidance and directions to other ministries and the PeRepGR. Thirdly, it relies on MFA’s support of inter-ministerial or governmental committees through the provision of administrative, secretarial and scientific contributions; and lastly, it depends on special collaboration of the MFA and other ministries over certain issues and policy areas. A characteristic example is the close partnership between the MFA and the MoD over the action and policies of the political branch of the latter such as Greek positions on CFSP and ESDP (Interview, no 41).

As previously mentioned, the Greek policy coordination scheme is highly centralised for purposes of ensuring effectiveness. Bureaucratic foreign policy coordination has always constituted the prerogative of the MFA and in recent years the Ministry has been established as the primus inter pares coordinator of all areas of Greek external policies. Article 5 of the 2007 MFA Charter stipulates that the MFA is in charge of monitoring and formulating all aspects of international policy. This is further discussed in chapter three in the context of international policy coordination becoming a new function of the MFA. The positioning of the MFA at the centre of the bureaucratic mechanism for foreign and international policy reaffirms the centrality of the MFA in the contemporary Greek foreign policy machinery.

Naturally, the MFA is far from claiming expertise over sectoral policy and technical matters. Rather it gets involved in consultation when the matter under discussion is of international significance. The MFA’s consultative role is of growing significance and its input into the policy process is now more welcome by domestic departments (Interview, no 30). For instance, notwithstanding that the portfolio for environment and energy policies belongs to the ME and irrespective of the fact that in some instances the MFA and MNEC are involved in policy formulation, it is

the MFA which coordinates, manages and negotiates ME’s policies in European and international fora (Interview, no 30).

Policy coordination on behalf of the MFA takes place through intensive inter-ministerial meetings which are convened on an ad-hoc basis determined by the issue at hand (Interview, no 30). In projects such as the Turkey-Italy-Greece (TGI) gas/oil inter-connector which has enormous political and economic implications for Greece and demands negotiations in international fora, the MFA holds a leading role in the process (Interview, no 32). There are also a number of instances where a home department may deal with a problematic state and ask for the MFA’s guidance (Interview, no 11). As mentioned above, European and international policy coordination is facilitated to a significant degree by the PeRepGr in Brussels. The physical proximity of staff dispatched from various government departments enhances coordination and makes it time-effective (Interview, no 3).

Horizontal coordination has been aided in recent years with the creation of a number of ad hoc inter-ministerial committees that focus on policy coordination and monitoring of implementation (Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 47). The mechanism of inter-ministerial committees seems to be a preferred practice and is supported by the MFA where such committees normally convene. The procedure is that the lead ministry or ministries prepare a folder/portfolio and the MFA provides guidance and consultation regarding the international dimension of the policy under discussion. Naturally, representation on the policy has been provided by the MFA but in the last few years it has been shared with lead ministries (Interview, no 30).

Horizontal coordination has been further facilitated by the creation of linkage offices examined above (Interview, no 30). However, these offices constitute more of an ad hoc response to specific needs and are far from constituting evidence of a move towards more horizontal and integrated approaches to policy coordination. External policy coordination remains largely fragmented in Greece where terms such as ‘whole of government’ or ‘integrated’ approaches to policy coordination do not resonate as familiar themes in the foreign policy management discourse.
Policy coordination at the level of the government

The above section indicated that foreign and international policy in Greece is largely formulated at cabinet level, whereas implementation lies with the MFA. Spanou (2001: 83) in her analysis of domestic coordination of European policy suggests that the problem with policy coordination in Greece is to be found at the policy making stage rather than the policy implementation stage. In other words, it can be identified at the core of the central government, at the Cabinet and KYSEA\textsuperscript{24} where governmental strategy and targets are defined. It has been repeatedly suggested in interviews that in the Greek case such strategies and positions are either absent or inadequately defined. In a policy environment where ‘frequently there is not much to coordinate’ (Interview, no 2) discussion on the effectiveness of a top-down bureaucratic coordination scheme becomes by definition irrelevant. Spanou (2000: 162) has described the policy coordination scheme in Greece as a ‘truncated pyramid where everything is in place apart from the unifying element at the top’

A number of interviewees emphasised the lack of strategic and macroscopic planning from the centre which renders the existing bureaucratic coordinating mechanisms ineffective. This explains to a considerable extent claims – made both in the literature (Ioakimidis, 2003; Spanou, 2001; Storoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997; Couloumbis, 1988) and during interviews (Interview, no 2; 3; 23; 17; 18; 42; 43) that even when institutional mechanisms and processes for coordination are in place, they are either bypassed or unused due to the lack of a central governmental strategy. A PerRepGr high ranking official described the instructions from the centre as late and incomplete if not non-existent (Interview, no 22). Specifically, the official argued: ‘National positions from the centre arrive late, if at all, and there is always something missing’.

\textsuperscript{24} KYSEA, reviewed in chapter two, is a mini-cabinet comprising as tactical members the PM, FM, MoD, the minister of economy, interior, environment and development
To further add to the weakness of external policy coordination from the centre, a research study conducted by the PM’s office in the 1990s indicated that the lack of appropriate structures for coordinating European Community policy led to substantial losses of Community funds and delays in policy implementation. Additionally, it led to Greece’s loss of influence as well as to its exposure in European and international fora due to uncoordinated and incoherent positions (Ioakimidis, 1994: 147-148). The latter was discussed by PeRepGr officials in Brussels, who also attributed their increased workload and problems with regards to European policy making to the lack of instructions and coordination from the centre (Interview, no 2; 6; 8; 9; 28).

As a response to the coordination discourse revolving around arguments about the lack of coordination from the centre and the description of coordination mechanism as a ‘headless monster’ (Interview, no 37) an official in Brussels suggested that:

“In Greece we need to understand that coordination at the top does not constitute the only approach to coordination. Coordination at the level of the Cabinet, even if it is effective, is not a panacea and this is exemplified largely with the coordinating function of the PeRepGr. Coordination can be achieved at different levels and we officials have come to understand this well. Greek understanding of coordination, however, lags behind. Obsession with coordination from the capital demonstrates fear of responsibility (efthinofvia), of information leakages as well as fear of taking the blame. Beyond doubt, coordination from the centre is crucial but arguably, so is coordination at the level of the PeRepGr” (Interview, no 8).

25 Based on the constitution, coordination of policy implementation at the level of the government is materialised at the PM’s office, which amongst others, is in charge for conflict resolution and mediation between conflicting parties/ministries (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 125; Tsinizelis, 1996). The arrangement of an ultra mini structure for policy formulation and coordination in Greece has been dominant since the early 1980s when a series of offices, directly accountable to the PM were created. Such offices were a legal office, a diplomatic office, an economic and a security office and the PM’s private office as well as secretariats and services of the PM’s political office (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 126-127).
The same PeRepGr official suggested that especially in terms of European policy it seems that coordination is easier to achieve at the level of the PeRepGr where every ministry is represented by at least one official. Physical proximity facilitates policy coordination and hence significant coordination decentralisation takes place at the PeRepGr’s premises. The official added that in terms of international policy closer cooperation is required at lower levels, at the level of officials and this is where the emphasis should be placed.

The reported lack of coordination from the centre seems to be compensated to a significant extent by personal initiative and inter-personal collegial relations. MFA and PeRepGr officials, despite acknowledging external policy coordination as problematic, emphasise vigorously that under the circumstances:

‘Officials have created their own linkages both within and outside their DGs and eventually they get the job done. Besides policies and developments move so fast that there is not time for hierarchical operation. Instead every official must develop reflexes and respond instantly’ (Interview, no 13).

An MFA official compared the Greek approach to international policy coordination to that of other EU states at EU working groups. Specifically, he stated:

‘In Greece we do not produce coherent positions to present at the various EU fora. We do not allocate time to international policy planning and coordination as our counterparts do. In Finland for instance, there is a working group for ‘daily coherence and coordination’. It is an institutionalised group of people which does not change every time the government changes as would be the case with Greece. Therefore, when there is an issue which demands cooperation between several ministries they coordinate them and produce a folder for action. In Germany, they put their positions, which are the product of serious policy coordination, in a folder and on its cover they put the initials of the officials who were involved in policy formulation and assessment from
every single ministry. In our case, we do not know who should read what and to which DG official messages should be forwarded’ (Interview, no 13).

Conclusion

The present chapter reviewed some of the current phenomena observed in those parts of national domestic bureaucracies which deal with the management of foreign and international policy and explored the extent to which they relate to the Greek experience. With globalisation and regionalisation having intensified governments’ international dealings they present us with a significant new research agenda, part of which explores developments in bureaucracies outside foreign ministries, traditionally the core elements of national foreign policy machineries. More specifically, the cross-cutting policies brought forward by the aforementioned transformative forces have necessitated governments’ engagement as a whole in foreign policy making and led to foreign policy horizontalisation and the creation of distinct foreign policy communities raising added demands for coordination.

The exploration of the Greek experience has provided us with a variety of evidence and indicators with regards to foreign policy management outside the MFA. There is evidence concerning the realisation that in an era of cross-cutting policy demands there is a need to expand the foreign policy template outside the MFA and to develop international policy capacity within departments with previously a strict domestic mandate. Evidence also indicates a degree of horizontal proliferation in the management of international issues across various government departments, manifested in rigorous collaboration between them and the MFA, information sharing and consultations. At the same time however there is a lack of evidence suggesting the development of international policy making competence to the extent that centrality of the MFA in the Greek national foreign policy
machinery is challenged by the usual suspects, the treasury and ministry of defence.

Despite early acknowledgment in the Greek literature of the need for the creation of a foreign policy community in Greece (Couloumbis, 1983: 111) which would promote decentralisation of foreign policy and active involvement of bureaucracies, interview data suggests a significant degree of foreign and international policy proliferation but not policy making decentralisation to other domestic entities. Arguably, intensified internationalisation of domestic departments does not necessarily lead to decentralisation (Sundelius, 1984b: 95) and, evidently, in Greece foreign policy remains the prerogative of the PM and the MFA. Nevertheless, even though the concept of a growing foreign policy community has little substance in the Greek bureaucracy, it is nonetheless partially supported by evidence which suggests a significant degree of policy horizontalisation and a lesser degree of decentralisation. However, this is only apparent in the microcosm of Greek administration in Brussels, the PeRepGr, thus suggesting a ‘micro-foreign policy community’ under the command of the MFA.

The intensification of the Greek government’s international engagements have raised demands for coordination. Far removed from whole of government approaches to coordination, the Greek system remains hierarchical, reflecting hierarchical approaches to foreign policy and reinforcing the centrality of the MFA as the ultimate coordinating agent in the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy. With the MFA seemingly constituting the unchallenged core element of the contemporary Greek foreign policy machinery it is crucial to explore its role and operation in the transforming international and domestic environments. To this end, the following chapter focuses on the MFA.
Chapter 4: Rethinking the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Introduction

The previous chapter explored the scenario of a widening Greek foreign policy community as the result of the intensification of Greek international engagements resulted from globalisation and regionalisation. The available evidence suggested a significant degree of internationalisation in several government departments as well as horizontalisation of foreign policy. Nevertheless, concepts of expanding foreign policy communities appear to have little substance for the Greek bureaucracy. Rather, there is strong evidence that the MFA remains the dominant actor in the Greek foreign policy system. Based on the premise that foreign ministries are faced with demands for re-organisation and re-definition of their role and mandate in the post-Cold War era, a broad objective of this chapter is to rethink the nature of the Greek MFA in the context of the rapidly changing international and domestic environments and a more specific objective is to explore its institutional responses.

The term ‘rethink’ is used here to reflect the new approach taken in the exploration of the MFA which is thematic and focuses on questions of its responses to the changing operational environment. It is also crucial to note that aspects of the nature of the MFA have been considered before in relation to its operation in the European Union (Makridimitris and Passas, 2001). In this chapter however, the MFA is examined in a wider context than that of the EU. Research presented in the previous chapter and evidence gathered by the author in the course of this thesis, indicates that the MFA poses fundamental questions relating to its role, functions and institutional character in the changing contemporary environment.
The literature on foreign ministries and systems of diplomatic representation over which they preside presents different conclusions regarding their role and significance in the contemporary environment (Hocking and Spence, 2005; Hocking, 1999). On the one hand, there are arguments which view foreign ministries as retaining their critical functions and significance. Such approaches suggest that the foreign ministry remains at the centre of traditional national foreign policy machineries with which governments pursue their international relations. On the other hand there are suggestions that the twin forces of globalization and regionalization, creating demands for integrated approaches to the management of foreign and international policy, have challenged the significance of these traditional foreign policy and diplomatic institutions (Shrivhok, 2007).

In this light, it is important to reflect upon the significance and role of the Greek MFA in the transforming world politics of the 21st century. A more specific objective of this chapter is to explore the responses and adaptation of the MFA to a number of new tasks and issues that have arisen in the management of foreign and international policy suggested by the literature and foreign ministry documentation worldwide. Such new tasks stem from the increased international engagement of governments and involve issues such as foreign and international policy coordination, crisis management and international aid. Reflecting the increased demands on foreign ministries and linked to their institutional adaptation are issues concerning the reorganization of the foreign ministry on the basis of new or extended functions. In order to aid the understanding of the main themes that preoccupy the study of contemporary foreign ministries the following section reviews the current literature before embarking upon the exploration of the Greek MFA.
An overview of the challenges to the 21st century foreign ministry

The foreign ministry, commonly regarded as the central bureaucratic agent of national foreign policy and diplomatic machinery, (Hocking, 2007; 2005; Rana, 2004) and simultaneously a key institution of the global diplomatic network (Steiner, 1982: 11), is actively engaged in a complex process of change and adaptation to transforming international and domestic policy environments (Hocking, 2005). Given that the foreign ministry is the bureaucratic embodiment of the state’s sovereign power in its relationship with the international environment, the patterns of change within its structure, processes and operation should provide significant evidence regarding the state’s responses to external change. Similarly, evaluations of the foreign ministry’s position in its domestic and international settings reflect states’ fundamental assumptions about world politics (Hocking, 2007: 4).

With the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy¹ in the era of complex interdependence becoming less and less the exclusive domain of foreign ministries (Keohane and Nye, 1989) – if it ever was - and with their content becoming more concerned with the implications of international activity for national citizens and domestic politics than ever before, (Wesley, 2002: 209) the foreign ministry is in an ambiguous position. Not only does the foreign ministry not monopolise governments’ actions outside the state’s boundaries (Hill, 2003: 4) but it also finds itself in a relationship of deepening engagement with the public and the media heralding the strengthening nexus between diplomacy and society² (Heijmans and Melissen, 2007: 193).

Therefore, unlike traditional views which held that the foreign ministry was and should be distant from the public (Harris, 1999: 27), it is now expected to take on an active role within domestic communities and develop direct channels of

¹ Diplomacy according to Rana (2004) is the delivery method of foreign policy
² What the Heijmans and Melissen (2007: 193) term as trend towards the ‘societization’ of diplomacy
communication with civil society and a number of stakeholders\(^3\) (Hocking, 2007: 10; FCO report on Consular Strategy, 2007) as well as to promote the national business community in foreign markets. (Foreign Ministry of Denmark, 2006: 9, 11). The implications of this for the embassies and consular missions are discussed in the following chapter.

As a result, governments seek to re-organise their foreign ministries and train their diplomats to work with the shifting dynamics of global affairs and information technology (Bátora, 2009; Hocking, 2007; 2004; Cooper, 2001; Muller, 1999: 192, 197) in carrying out governmental policies overseas (Shrivhok, 2007: 63). Thus the role of the foreign ministry and the diplomatic network are being transformed precisely because the context in which they operate has shifted so profoundly, creating a need for redefinition of their role and responsibilities (Blackwell, 2007: 49).

The role of the foreign ministry is also challenged on the domestic level as discussed in the previous chapter. The growing international policy spectrum brought about by globalisation and regionalization, has diffused international responsibility across a wide range of government departments and expanded foreign policy communities which challenge the monopoly of the foreign ministry in the management of international policy (Bátora, 2009; Bertram, 2009; Wallace, 2008; Hocking, 2007; 2004; 1999; Hill, 2003: 4; Allen, 1999; 2002; Ahmad, 1999: 117; Cooper, 1999: 41; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Harris, 1999: 27; Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 18;21; Rozental, 1999: 137).

Related to arguments concerning foreign and international policy involvement by domestic departments, direct communications between them, and the added importance of public diplomacy, are views which perceive the foreign ministry as losing one of its core roles: that is the monopoly over communications (Berridge, 2005: Riordan, 2003). This is because IT has enabled the availability and speedy transfer of sheer volumes of foreign policy information (Bátora, 2009: 3; Hocking, 2007: 10).

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\(^3\) For a list of stakeholders in the UK see FCO report, Delivering change together: The Consular Strategy 2007-2010: 31.
2002; Melissen, 1999) which facilitates direct communication between agents. Direct communication epitomized in transgovernmentalism⁴ has led to the bypassing of the foreign ministry (Berridge, 2005: Riordan, 2003) or alternatively to the ‘disintermediation’ of the foreign ministry, effectively translating into losing its traditional status as the most important intermediary between governments (Bátora, 2009; Metzl, 2001) and is now becoming just one element of the government’s foreign policy apparatus (Eayrs, 1982: 96). This means that its core role of gathering, analysing and disseminating information is challenged (Hocking, 2007: 8). Such a challenge can be observed particularly at the level of the EU where domestic ministries can communicate instantly and informally with their interlocutors in other member states (Wallace, 2008: 23; Hocking, 2002).

Some of the fundamental issues regarding the understanding of the challenges that confront the foreign ministry in the 21st century are its character as an organisation and the significance of organisational culture in understanding this (Hocking, 2007: 3). Literature on foreign ministries’ pathology and change reflects states’ responses to the transforming global environment. Jorgensen (1997) argues that foreign ministries, because they change form and content and are historical-concrete and dynamic organisations, are indicators of international systemic change.

With globalization and regionalization creating the need for the management of horizontal issues ranging from day to day operational issues to management of crises (Harder, 2004: 3), the foreign ministry’s traditional hierarchical structures and models of diplomatic representation are no longer sufficient (Cooper, 2001). The role of the foreign ministry and its missions is further challenged as it has to coordinate and represent the perspectives and priorities of the whole of government (Blackwell, 2007: 47). Therefore, in the light of the debate concerning the impact of globalisation and regionalisation on the ways in which governments manage foreign policy, the study of the structure, operation and role of the foreign ministry becomes ipso facto necessary.

⁴ See Keohane and Nye (1987) and Slaughter (2001)
Questions regarding the ability of the foreign ministry to adapt to its current operational environment can provide insights regarding the decline and non-decline theses. In the literature there is no uniformity of opinion regarding the responses of the foreign ministry vis-à-vis pressures stemming from the transforming international and domestic policy environments. Thus, as Hocking (2007) suggests, a number of differing conclusions are drawn from similar bodies of evidence. On the one hand, lie arguments which suggest that the foreign ministry is in decline or else irrelevant in the current international setting. Such assumptions associated with globalist approaches which assert the spread of diplomacy amongst a greater cast of bureaucratic agents and the diminishing monopoly of the foreign ministry over communications, suggest a decline in its centrality within the national foreign policy system^5^.

On the other hand, there are arguments which suggest a changed and possibly strengthened foreign ministry in the national system for foreign policy and diplomacy due to its adaptability. Discourse on the adaptability of the foreign ministry can be informed by institutionalist thinking which suggests that institutions, such as the foreign ministry, transform in response to changing environmental conditions (Krasner, 1984) and display the tendency to reflect their environments and with which they are in constant exchange as summarized in the term ‘institutional isomorphism’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1991: 41-47). Institutional isomorphism, or transformation as adaptation to changing operational environments, serves the purpose of survival and preservation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and the aspiration to become larger and more resourceful (March and Olsen, 1984: 738).

In our case, this effectively means that the foreign ministry, by being responsive to stimuli from the environment in which it operates, adapts its structure and functions in order to maintain, re-define and/or re-launch its centrality in the

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^5^ It is true that there are cases where the MFA does not hold a central role in the national foreign policy system. In Malaysia the MFA is not considered as a major or central agency. Rather, the locus of foreign policy decision making has shifted towards the PM, something which has altered the whole government machinery. Still the involvement of other departments in policy making had been minimal until the late 1990s (Ahmad, 1999: 125)
national foreign policy system. Due to its positioning at the interface of the two interlinked policy milieus -the domestic and international- and the close collaboration with its overseas missions, the MFA has seemingly assumed a higher profile in adapting to the diffuse and horizontal conditions of the post Cold War era (Hocking, 2004: 148; Cooper, 2001: 111). In this light, the foreign ministry appears to be the most innovative, responsive and adaptive part of the national bureaucracy (Hocking, 2005; Moses and Knutsen, 2001; Steiner, 1982) despite arguments suggesting its obsolescence and conservativism.

Such arguments however, are not unfounded. On the contrary, they fall within the realm of institutionalist theory and more specifically of path dependence which focuses on resistance to change and perpetuation of prior practices (Thelen, 1999). As indicated in chapter one, the foreign ministry, similarly to other institutions, is not considered as highly adaptive However it is still seen as more adaptive than other parts of national bureaucracies. Some research has argued that EU member states’ foreign policy institutions have been notorious for their conservativism and resistance to change (Manners and Whitman, 2000: 261). The reasons behind foreign ministries’ resistance to change could be due to a number of reasons such as a particular organisational culture, membership of the EU which allows less flexibility or to the persistence of a high politics agenda.

Other reasons explaining foreign ministries’ responses cited by Berridge (2005: 8) and viewed by Clarke and White (1981; 1989) as variables of the foreign policy system itself, could be a turbulent region and specific security threats⁶, deep politicisation of the administration, and a history of dependence which has created a particular national identity and perception of foreign policy. At the same time, what this and other research suggests is that in the majority of cases, the MFA’s centrality in the foreign policy machinery has continued, the institution displaying resilience and a significant degree of adaptability (Berridge, 2005: 8).

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⁶ Based on Clarke and White’s (1981; 1989) foreign policy system such variables would originate from the external dimension of the environment
Adaptability becomes primarily manifest with the foreign ministry taking on new tasks and functions with the aim of becoming more efficient and developing its role overseas in a number of newly added issue areas such as the environment, human rights, provision of humanitarian aid and crises management (Moses and Knutsen, 2001). Such efforts translate into a well-established trend to re-organise foreign ministries around the organisational principle of functionality which is added to the traditional principle of territoriality in order to respond to all those issues that stem from increased economic interdependence and globalisation (Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 60; Cooper, 1974: 155).

Organisation based on a functional or thematic approach provides for horizontal management of issues which do not fall into country or regional boxes but involve cross-cutting interconnections (Rana, 2007: 28-29). Such themes for instance, in the case of the British FCO are public diplomacy and the EU budget. Additionally, single ‘bilateral affairs departments’ are often replaced with territorial units. Thematic approaches render vertical policy processes within the foreign ministry outdated and inadequate. For this reason traditional practices of hierarchical submissions going from the division to the head of the directorate general (DG), to the director general and only then to the general secretary have been abandoned as they are not cost and time effective. Instead, divisions may now submit a rule directly to the Secretary and then see if it is relevant to the Commissioner or political leadership (Rana, 2007: 29-30). Thematic approaches are to be found in countries such as in Sweden, Thailand and the US. All these changes have one purpose: namely the facilitation of the foreign and diplomatic processes by coordinating all departments involved in newer policy areas such as energy diplomacy (Rana, 2007: 29). It is precisely this functional re-organisation, which the majority of foreign ministries appear to have undergone, which are perceived

7 For example: the MFA in Malta. Canadian reports indicate that they went even further merging several territorial departments into two; one which deals with the US and Mexico and one for the rest of the world
8 For instance in Berlin
9 Sweden has appointed a dozen ambassadors at the MFA to deal with similar cross-cutting issues such as the reduction of conventional arms
10 The US has a tradition of naming home-based ambassadors to cover regional or thematic issues.
by some as challenging the arguments anticipating their decline and hence their relevance in the contemporary environment (Cooper, 1974).

Other nations, such as Canada, responded to globalization and the economisation of politics, which require integrated approaches in the management of foreign affairs (Shrivhok, 2007: 62), by reintegrating trade and foreign policy into one department (Blackwell, 2007: 53). Such integration is commonly accompanied by changing recruitment patterns and training curricula in national diplomatic systems (Rana, 2007). In 2002 Thailand introduced a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) scheme\textsuperscript{11} adapting a business model to its bureaucratic system. The emphasis of the scheme was on leadership and teamwork as well as a shared vision, mission and strategy on behalf of the whole government (Shrivhok, 2007: 63). Such integrated approaches are currently common. Around twenty countries have unified their ministries of foreign affairs and foreign trade such as Australia, Mauritius and Sweden whilst others have unified their foreign aid activities into the foreign ministry\textsuperscript{12}.

At the same time, however, despite the new tasks, roles and responsibilities that foreign ministries have taken on this adaptation is conditioned, in most cases, by the persistence of hierarchical structures and vertical operating principles. This is despite the fact that it is widely acknowledged that the prerequisites for organizing the state machinery to conduct foreign policy have changed (Larrson, 2007: 68). Undoubtedly, questions related to territorial or spatial integrity and borders are still relevant but it is the compartmentalisation of administrative responsibilities within traditional vertically drawn foreign domains that is problematic (Cooper, 2001: 114).

Nonetheless, the available evidence indicates that, to a great extent, foreign ministries remain highly compartmentalised by function. They remain imbued with verticality in terms of design and function and inculcated with traditional

\textsuperscript{11} For more details on the scheme see Shrivhok, 2007: 63
\textsuperscript{12} There are of course other cases such as the FCO which has separated aid into a distinct department: the Department for International Development.
perceptions of foreign policy which reinforce a hierarchical structure often related to secrecy at the expense of information sharing networks (Cooper, 2001). Foreign ministries often appear to operate in silos, or else in vertical sections with little dialogue between them\textsuperscript{13} which poses significant obstacles to policy coordination - one of the main tasks they are expected to perform (Blackwell, 2007: 48). In this context the question that is raised is where the foreign ministry is heading as an institution, as reorganisation of the foreign ministry appears to be imperative if it is to perform the functions expected of it (Cooper, 2001).

Moving away from the foreign ministry’s institutional responses to environmental issues, another theme that arises in the evaluation of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century foreign ministry is the closer relationship between the HQ and the overseas missions represented by ‘foreign ministry-embassy integration’ (Rana, 2007). Although the role of embassies constitutes the focus of the following chapter, it is important to view the implications of this changing relationship for the overall foreign policy process. Foreign ministry-embassy integration alters prior symmetrical relationships between HQs and missions which prescribed that the HQ created policy and missions implemented it (Blackwell, 2007: 48). The relationship between the two has been altered with the aid of ICT and intranet and changed the old notions of the embassy being a tool of implementation for the centre, run by the centre. As a result there are fast channels of mutual communication between the DGs located at the HQ and the embassies.

Some countries, such as the UK, Canada and Germany have reorganised the functioning of their embassies on this premise. The 2000 Paschke report suggests that a significant amount of work such as dossier contributions and briefings for the minister previously being carried out by HQ staff must now be prepared by embassies and communicated through the intranet. As a result the German Foreign Office has implemented such changes, which has led to the gradual thinning of territorial units. Accepting that the bilateral embassy is in the best position to advise on relationship management, has drastically reduced staff in

\textsuperscript{13} As in the case of Canada
territorial departments redeploying HQ personnel for thematic tasks (Rana, 2007: 26-27). Austria and Canada also recognised this need and delegated more power to the envoy. Nevertheless, other countries such as China, India and Japan are reluctant to use intranet fearing security leaks (Rana, 2007: 28) thus sticking to prior practices.

Based on the above, institutional responses of foreign ministries to the themes that arise in various discussions, as expected, differentiate significantly. The literature portrays differing accounts of foreign ministry responses to pressures stemming from globalization and regionalization. Such variations depend on the nature of national foreign policy systems which, defined in Clarke and White’s terms (1981; 1989), comprise foreign policy structures and processes together with their surrounding operational environment. In this light, and having considered the nature of the Greek foreign policy system in the previous chapters, the following sections seek to explore various aspects of the MFA relating to its organisation, culture and character and whether these are changing under the pressures of the transformative forces of globalisation and regionalisation.

The Greek MFA in organisational terms: hierarchy, fragmentation and co-responsibility

The MFA was one of the seven ministries created at the time of the founding of the Hellenic State in 1833 and has been one of the leading actors in the Greek governmental machinery ever since. The MFA, which has always played a key role in defending and promoting Greek interests overseas, has undergone significant change following the 1974 restoration of democracy in Greece. Such change reflects the efforts of Greek governments to reform their foreign policy bureaucratic machinery, in which the MFA has been central, and is epitomized in
the MFA charters of 1974\textsuperscript{14}, 1998\textsuperscript{15} and 2007\textsuperscript{16}. As this study focuses on the Greek foreign policy bureaucratic structures in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, the present chapter explores change and adaptation emerging mostly in the last decade.

The MFA comprises the Headquarters (HQ) in Athens, the Peripheral Services in northern Greece and the External Services, with the latter involving the diplomatic and consular missions. The latest MFA Charter which came into effect in 2007 with Law 3566/2007, besides introducing a series of changes as a response by the Greek government to the demands of the contemporary international and domestic policy environments, provides for the current organisation of the MFA. This comprises seven General Directorates\textsuperscript{17} (DGs) below the DG-A Political Affairs which coordinates all DGs beneath it in the structural hierarchy. The seven DGs are as follows:

1. DG-A Political Affairs
2. DG-B Economic Relations
3. DG-C European Affairs
4. DG-YDAS International Development Cooperation and Hellenic Aid
5. DG-D International Organisations, International Security and Cooperation
6. DG-E Cultural, Religious and Consular Affairs
7. DG-ST Personnel, administrative organization and financial management

The organization of the MFA rests on the following three criteria: Firstly, the distinction between bilateral and multilateral issues, secondly the thematic distinction, which to date has effectively meant a division between political and economic matters, and thirdly, the division into geographic desks (Griva, 2002: 24). Besides the aforementioned DGs and secretariats which constitute the skeleton of the MFA there are a number of services, offices and diplomatic cabinets of the foreign minister, deputy and alternate ministers as well as two or

\textsuperscript{14} Law 419/1976
\textsuperscript{15} Law 2594/1998
\textsuperscript{16} Law 3566/2007
\textsuperscript{17} DG YDAS is also referred to as a secretariat
three General Secretariats\textsuperscript{18} namely, the General Secretariat for Political Affairs, the General Secretariat for European Affairs and the General Secretariat for International Economic Relations, with the latter being added with the last MFA Charter in 2007. The secretariats are headed by a general secretary, the General Secretary for Political Affairs (GS), the GS for European affairs (GS-EU) and the GS for International Economic relations (GS-IER) respectively. The GS is always a diplomat of ambassadressial rank and heads the diplomatic service whilst the latter two can either be diplomats of ambassadressial rank or political persons appointed by a joint decision of the PM and the FM (Law 3566/2007 art. 3) thus depending on the political government of the day (Passas, 2005: 366). The variation in the number of the general secretaries has been closely linked to regular government reshufflings and to the complicated organisational and political structure of the MFA.

The GS heads the MFA which comprises both diplomats and administrative staff (Dontas, 1982:269). The GS is regularly aided by the general director of DG-A for Political Affairs. A vertical coordinating scheme applies to all foreign policy issues with sub-sections of all DGs referring to their director, who in turn refers to the general director of DG-A. With regards to issues falling under the heading of European Affairs and International Economic Relations also the GS-EU and the GS-IER get involved in coordination. See figure 4.1 below for the MFA’s organisation chart. The complication in the operation and organisational structure of the MFA lies in the verticality and multiplicity of layers. This involves multilayered political leadership as, for instance, one or two alternate foreign ministers and one or two deputy foreign ministers under the foreign minister (FM). Arguably, this multi-headed scheme leads to fragmentation, co-responsibility and bureaucratic overlaps (Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 101) as a number of policy issues can no longer be neatly categorised along vertical organisational compartments.

\textsuperscript{18} There have been instances when there were four general secretariats with the fourth being a General Secretariat for Greek Expatriates
Figure 4.1 THE GREEK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: ORGANISATION CHART

*This organisation chart was produced by the author based on information available on the MFA's website and interview data.*
The issue of co-responsibility is considered to be one of the main problems of the MFA’s current organisational arrangement and is directly linked to the distinction between ‘technical/economic and political’ issues (Passas, 2005: 366). This tendency is manifest in the compartmentalisation of foreign policy into distinct organisational units. For instance, DG-A reflecting areas of traditional foreign policy, DG-B reflecting foreign economic policy, DG-C managing European policy and DG-YDAS in charge of international policy cooperation. The inability to categorise cross-cutting policy into neat vertical domains results in co-shared responsibility and overlaps. This becomes evident in the management of EU affairs discussed below.

This is because the post-2007 revised structure of the Ministry distinguishes between the three EU pillars. DG-C is responsible for issues under pillars one and three whereas DG-A is responsible for pillar two. DG-C is headed by the GS-EU affairs and is under the supervision of the alternate Minister for EU affairs. Issues of CFSP constitute the subject of DG-A11 which is part of DG-A headed by the GS (Kavakas, 2000: 145). The shared responsibility for European affairs between DG-A and DG-C displays elements of co-responsibility (Kavakas, 2000).

The phenomenon of co-responsibility [synarmodiotita] is elaborated by Kavakas (2000: 146-147) who suggests that DG-A is split into two parts, each one responsible to a different deputy General Director. The first part comprises A1, A5, A6, A7, A8, A9, A10 and A11 which fall under the jurisdiction of the first Director who is responsible for all foreign policy issues except for those that constitute Greek ‘national issues’. Greek national issues are the responsibility of DGs A2 (Cyprus), A3 (the Balkans) and A4 (Turkey) which come under the second deputy General Director under the direct leadership of the deputy foreign minister in charge of Greek national issues. This separation creates problems of coordination when these issues are discussed in the context of CFSP where DG-A11 is involved. Similarly, there are overlaps when issues arise which fall under DG-A3 on South-East Europe (directly linked to the deputy-FM) but which at the same
time touches on the responsibilities of DG-C1 on European External Relations which is directly linked to the alternate-FM for EU Affairs (Kavakas, 2000: 146).

Further confusion is added with DG-A being in charge of coordination of political issues coming under all other DGs but not DG-C for EU affairs. Kavakas (2000:146) gives one example: when DD-C 3 on EU-Turkish relations deals with the fourth financial protocol to Turkey there is a problem in both representation and coordination with DG-A 4 on Turkey and DG-A 11 on the CFSP as this issue is highly politicised and is linked to the Greek position on Turkey in the CFSP. Co-responsibility as a problem in the current organisation of the MFA was widely acknowledged by interviewees. According to them the problem of overlapping responsibility constitutes a major issue for the structure of the MFA but also for the wider administration (Interview, no 12; 16; 23; 30; 31; 32; 33; 37; 38; 39; 42; 43).

‘Co-responsibility effectively means that several DGs simultaneously are in charge of coordinating a large number of agents, who somehow are also in charge of the same thing; this vicious circle makes coordination problematic and causes bureaucratic friction’ (Interview, no 43).

The role of the DGs: a model of hierarchical operation

The DGs constitute the back office of the MFA (Interview, no 13). Their multiple roles involve monitoring political developments, information gathering, archiving and storing, analysis and channelling, preparation of positions and policy recommendations and submissions as well as policy coordination (Interview, no 33; 38; 39; 42; 43). The model of communication is similar in all DGs. They receive, data, information and suggestions from embassies overseas and they analyse, produce memos and recommendations which are then uploaded to the political leadership. Very often they prepare ‘talking points’ so that political leaders are able to present national positions with continuity and consistency (Interview, no 43). They regularly receive ‘verbal notes’ from other states’ embassies in...
Athens for joint organisation of missions and events with the purpose of deepening bilateral relations. Official meetings with foreign embassies take place mostly at the level of ambassadors and the DG at the MFA performs a preparatory role.

DGs are headed by a diplomat of ambassadorial rank and are accountable to DG-A Political Affairs in the MFA’s bureaucratic hierarchy. Their operation has been described as linear and hierarchical with a number of inherent flaws such as insulation from other policy areas, overlaps, delays, grey areas of responsibility, restricted freedom in action at the lower levels, and loss of information (Interview, no 33; 38). The diagram below demonstrates the pattern of communication between the centre – through the DGs - and the overseas missions, which constitutes an integral part of the foreign policy process. The established channel of communication is rather circular in that it is initiated by, and completed at, the embassies. Embassies constitute the DGs’ business partner unless the issue at hand concerns the EU, in which cases communication takes place with PeRepGr (Interview, no 42; 43) as discussed in chapter three. The process starts with a DG receiving input from the embassy, usually in the form of raw data. In theory, information should reach the DG after having been processed and analysed at the embassies and increasing volumes of information prevent this (Interview, no 38).

‘Lack of processing and analysis at the embassies makes our job ineffective. If one considers that understaffing at the HQs is also a big problem, then one can understand that we have to work fast to the detriment of the quality of what we produce’ (Interview, no 39).

The DG in turn analyses the information and prepares memos which are forwarded to the DG’s political director, the DG-A political director, the GS and then to the political leadership. There are cases however, whereby the ambassador contacts directly the FM and/or the PM when matters of high political urgency occur. The memos fall usually within two main categories, unless there are other issues of an ad hoc nature (Interview, no 38).
a) memos which concern the internal political developments in a given state
b) memos which concern bilateral relations between Greece and the given state on political, religious, economic and diaspora issues.

Communication and the flow of information within the MFA is highly hierarchical and non-flexible in that it moves up and down the hierarchy within the organisational silos of the MFA. Figure 4.1 below depicts the standard hierarchy in communication between a Greek embassy and the MFA.

**The standard hierarchy in communication**

![Diagram of the standard hierarchy in communication]

The most challenging part of the job is input synthesis and analysis in order to present the case to the political director. ‘This is a very important part of the foreign policy process in that we filter and channel information as well as influence national positions. In the last two years the latter has been most welcome’ (Interview, no 38). However, shortage of staff to perform the analysis and synthesis tasks very often reduces DGs to mere ‘transmission belts’ to the political
leadership. This is because of limited personnel and administrative back-up, combined with large amounts of input from embassies, (Interview, no 33).

Indicative of the extent of understaffing is the ratio between staff and countries monitored. For instance, there is only one official in the MFA to deal with nearly 10 Middle Eastern countries, and 4 diplomats in total to deal with 22 Eastern states in which Greece has major vested interests. While at the same time, Portugal, of a similar size to Greece, has allocated 6 to 7 diplomats to deal with Syria and Lebanon alone (Interview, no 39).

Emerging from the problem of understaffing, limited ‘socialisation’ was identified by MFA officials as another weakness, which arguably leads to constrained ‘learning’. MFA officials feel that due to personnel shortages they do not have the chance to ‘socialise and circulate’ with counterparts as is common with other foreign ministries’ officials. An MFA official argued that low income in conjunction with minimal administrative back-up and the Greek government’s cuts in professional trips discourage officials from travelling (Interview, no 33). Therefore, due to limited travelling they feel that they are disconnected from new diplomatic practices and techniques and are locked into old ineffective practices which their opposite numbers may have abandoned.

Amongst such practices are traditionalism, strict operational hierarchy and protocol within the service or mission (Interview, no 48; 49) as well as lack of personal initiatives, resources and incentives (Interview, no 33; 38). The issue of hierarchy emerged in the majority of the interviews and was characterised as the major problem of the MFA with high costs in terms of timely operation and efficiency at a time when most of the MFAs move towards flatter organisational structures (Interview, no 2; 32; 33; 38).

‘The case at the moment is that we pass on information to the DG Director, the DG-A Director, the GS and political leadership and this creates a need for intensive coordination. Often the Director does not
respond and automatically there is a lack of coordination and a waste of time and resources’ (Interview, no 33).

Officials argued that they should be given more operational flexibility and autonomy for the purpose of completing the processing of tasks they carry out by bypassing their DG’s political director and/or DG-A political director.

‘Even though the contribution of the DGs as the bureaucratic link between two different parts of the diplomatic network that is the overseas mission and the centre, is becoming more important and we are given more freedom in terms of proposals and submissions, our input to the MFA’s vision and strategy is not encouraged’ (Interview, no 43).

Officials claimed that they do not feel part of an integrated machinery and that a high workload in conjunction with understaffing limits socialisation and renders their offices ‘memo producing industries’ (Interview, no 33). Interviewees emphasised that verticality in their *modus operandi* does not encourage horizontal cooperation either; rather their working model resembles a number of parallel silos headed by DG-A.

‘In many instances the preparatory work of the DGs overlaps and is disconnected from work prepared in the office next door. Thus, the overlap is realised only when our preparatory work reaches the top of the ladder. To add to the frustration DGs memos and talking points are often ignored thus eliminating our contribution to the policy process’ (Interview, no 38).

A MFA official gave the example of a DG submitting a recommendation regarding the freezing of entry visas for one country’s nationals for a specific reason which was ignored by the political leadership and explained that this is how the foreign policy process becomes politicised. He argued that
'If one thinks that bureaucrats have one eye set on Greece (domestic environment) and one eye set on the international environment - whereas the political leadership cares only for ensuring votes for the coming elections - then it is easy to understand why our recommendations are ignored. This is very sad when you think that we are talking about the MFA’ (Interview, no 39).

**Critical junctures: change, adaptation and new functions**

The Greek MFA performs the basic functions of foreign ministries which, according to Hocking (2007: 7), are as follows:

- filtering, analysis and dissemination of information
- a policy advice function providing expertise to other government departments, the political leadership and other agents
- a memory bank where information is stored and archived
- a policy transfer function through which the channels of diplomatic communication are used to exchange information and ideas on a range of issues between countries on diverse issues
- administrative functions relating to the management of the overseas diplomatic network, relationships with the resident *corps diplomatique* and associated diplomatic protocol matters.

In the last three decades, however, a fluctuation has been observed in the importance attached to each function as well as an addition of functions. Interviews revealed that in the past, the operation of the MFA centred mostly upon the first and third functions, namely filtering, analysing and storing information (Interview, no 38), whereas in the last decade there has been a shift of emphasis towards policy advice, policy transfer and administrative functions relating to lending expertise over matters of protocol to other government departments.
(Interview, no 32). The latter is closely linked to the increase of international engagements of other government departments and constitutes one of the main functions of the MFA’s linkage offices in other ministries (Interview, no 44).

The functions of policy advice and consultation, which are increasing in significance, are closely linked to the widening reach of the MFA to a new range of sectoral policies and thus to the transformation of its role which, from being limited to mere policy implementation, is moving towards added input to the foreign policy process. Seen as ‘inevitable’ due to the increasing international activity of other home departments and the inability of the MFA to catch up with sectoral expertise, the function of policy advice revolves around the transfer of the MFA’s expertise over negotiation and representation (Interview, no 30). Altogether, the variation in significance attached to the various functions is due to the changing mandate and character of the MFA epitomised in the turn towards economic diplomacy and international policy discussed later in the chapter.

In post-1974 Greece, the Charter of the MFA has been reformed three times in an attempt to adapt the MFA to international developments. The three reforms took place in 1976 with Law 419/76, in 1998 with Law 2594/98 and in 2007 with Law 3566. The three revised organograms emerging from the reforms introduced significant change by extending the scope and functions of the MFA and adapting its character to the changing operational environment. There is no official organisation chart of the MFA. Figure 4.1 portrays the organisation chart of the current organisational structure of the MFA which was collated with evidence gathered from the interviews and the MFA’s website.

The three reforms, viewed in the light of institutionalism, constitute moments of transformative change which qualify as ‘critical junctures’. These are defined as moments when substantial institutional change takes place (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Thelen, 1999; Hall and Taylor, 1996) or as crucial founding moments of institutional formation that send countries along broadly different development paths (Thelen, 1999:387). Consequently, they are embedded in the concept of institutional adaptation - defined in terms of innovation in the policy
making structures (Morris-Schilbach, 2002:38) occurring within existing institutional frameworks in order to maintain existing structures (Löf, 2010).

Therefore, in order to understand the process of adaptation and transformation of the Greek MFA, the aforementioned moments of change need to be evaluated. In this section, as mentioned above, we are mostly concerned with the latest reforms introduced with the 2007 Charter for the purpose of focusing on the time framework set at the beginning of the project. This, of course, does not exclude some of the MFA reforms initially introduced in the 1998 Charter and finalised in 2007. Prior to these reforms the average interval between MFA charters had been forty years (Griva, 2008). The 2007 reform came into effect only nine years after the 1998 charter and there is another reform which was being drafted 2010 (Droutsas, 2010). This indicates the urgency of addressing the pressures that the contemporary environments, international and domestic, exercise upon the national machinery for foreign policy and diplomacy. Former FM Bakoyianni (2009; 2008; 2007), in a number of addresses to the parliamentary committee for foreign and European affairs, declared that

‘Greek foreign policy and diplomatic institutions need to catch up with contemporary foreign policy and diplomacy, which are expanding towards new fields of economic, social and cultural action.’

Reflecting the changing perception with regards to the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy in conjunction with Greece’s widening spectrum of international policy and strategic priorities for economic and political leadership in the Balkans region, the 2007 Charter aims to turn the MFA into a contemporary and flexible ministry by modernising its structures both at home and overseas (Bakoyianni, 2008). As a MFA official suggested when referring to the 2007 reforms:

‘In the 21st century, if the MFA wishes to retain its relevance and centrality in the Greek foreign policy machinery, it has to find a role and a way to re-establish itself’ (Interview, no 32).
The 2007 reforms aimed at addressing the failures of existing MFA organisational arrangements and sought to enhance its operation and functions in a way similar to other foreign ministries in the EU. The central objectives of the reforms were the promotion of economic diplomacy as the core function of the MFA, the reaffirmation and rearrangement of the functions of crises management and international development and aid, the enhancement of the Ministry’s communication with civil society and technological modernisation, as well as the assertion of the MFA’s leading role amidst the national bureaucratic architecture as the ultimate policy coordinator of Greece’s foreign and international policy. Also evident in the Charter are the changing perception of the MFA’s mandate and role amidst the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy. For this purpose, the Charter introduced a number of institutional additions and innovations which are translated into new areas of action and functions elaborated in the sections that follow.

Another area of innovation of the 2007 Charter concerns the promotion of direct communication with Greek nationals overseas and with civil society. Direct communication with Greek nationals is implemented through a series of new institutions and mechanisms such as the ‘centre for information and support of Greek nationals abroad’, ‘the office for promotion of Greek candidates to international organisations’ and the ‘centre for analysis and planning of Greek foreign policy’ (KAS in Greek or according to the latest charter EKAS). The latter aims to bring together diplomats and scientists for the purpose of analysing information and submitting proposals thus increasing extra-MFA input to the foreign policy process (Karabarbounis, 2007: 200 and 212). KAS\textsuperscript{19} aims to analyse and propose policy after consultations and cooperation with academics, diplomats, and special scientific consultants and research centres such as ELIAMEP, EKEM and others (Griva, 2008: 448-449).

It has to be mentioned, however, that the operation of KAS has been characterised as ineffective and unproductive on the grounds that it does not address the real problems and challenges that the MFA is currently confronting.

\textsuperscript{19} KAS was first established with PD 283/1990
(Interview, no 22). On the contrary, views and opinions of some senior diplomats are recycled and the input from overseas missions is rather limited (Interview, no 22). Such comments were further supported by the review of a significant number of issues of the MFA’s Bulletin which is aimed at informing diplomats about current developments. The issues reviewed were rhetorical and generic in nature, only touching upon global trends and phenomena as interpreted by Greek diplomats and politicians as opposed to in-depth analyses found in the existing literature.

With regards to the MFA reforms, the 2007 Charter reinforced the MFA’s position amidst the bureaucratic architecture whilst maintaining the Ministry’s special legal status within the Greek bureaucracy. More specifically, under the 2007 reforms the insulation of the MFA from state employment law was retained (Griva, 2008: 490).

‘The MFA albeit being part of the rest of bureaucracy is at the same time unique. It has its own system for recruitment, promotions and management which are insulated from any other government department. It is sui generis and has its own legal regime provided for by its charter’ (Interview, no 30).

The 2007 Charter reaffirms the leading role of the MFA vis-à-vis the rest of Greek bureaucracy in terms of the management of international policy by attributing to the MFA the prestigious role of the ultimate policy coordinator (Law 3566/2007 art 6). This function is discussed in the following sections.

Despite its innovative nature, the 2007 Charter was greeted with lukewarm response from the Union of Greek Diplomats. It was severely criticised for being anachronistic, unable to respond to current demands and for encouraging favouritism and party affiliation. In a letter addressed to the FM in 2008 the Diplomats’ Union accused the political leadership of perpetuating a legalistic and constitutional approach to the foreign and diplomatic process by allocating the

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20 As well as from the Union of Commerce and Trade attachés and the Union of Press and Communication attachés
drafting of the charter to lawyers and legislators and for ignoring the country’s diplomatic needs.

For instance, the charter’s increase in the number of Celebrity Diplomats –that is the tendency to employ celebrities for purposes of diplomatic tasks- from 5 to 15 was condemned on the grounds that citizens cannot be trusted with the competence of exercising diplomacy. Other criticisms relate to art. 1 of the Charter on the MFA’s mission which, in conjunction with art. 5 on the MFA’s competence, fails to confirm the necessity of diplomatic input into the foreign policy process, thus limiting the role of the diplomatic service with regard to policy implementation.

**The function of economic diplomacy**

The ultimate innovation of the 2007 Charter is the organisational re-structuring of the MFA on the basis of economic diplomacy as a response to globalisation and the post-Cold War order. The shift of its traditional political profile towards economic diplomacy in its international relations came naturally as the result of the normalisation of relations in the post Cold War era and the development of regional cooperation in sectoral policies (Karabarbounis, 2007: 207). Here a clarification must be made. In Greek foreign policy discourse the term ‘economic diplomacy’ is used to describe the Greek diplomacy which aims at promoting Greek commerce, trade and businesses abroad, in other words, commercial diplomacy.

In the case of Greece, economic diplomacy is defined by Law 2297/1995 art. 1 para.5 as the monitoring of foreign countries’ economies, the systematic research of the market at the locus of the mission, the pursuit of foreign investment in Greece and the promotion of Greek investments abroad, the monitoring of trends

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22 See Bayne and Woolcock, 2003: 4-5 for the distinction between economic and commercial diplomacy
in bilateral trade and the ensuring of trade and economic agreements, mediation of trade disputes and the monitoring of agricultural policy, sea and air transfer policy. Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 139). In this sense, what has been conventionally termed as Greek economic diplomacy would be more appropriately defined as commercial diplomacy. Nonetheless, the former term is used throughout the thesis for purposes of consistency with existing Greek literature.

Economic diplomacy prior to 2007 was the ‘Cinderella’ of Greek foreign policy with its management allocated to economic and commercial offices (Interview, no 13). The 2007 Charter heralds an attitudinal change involving a major organisational change in the MFA reflecting a strategic reorientation towards economic diplomacy. More specifically, the charter aims at setting up the appropriate political and institutional environment with the MFA as its primary vehicle in order to facilitate the building of business networks in order to support the Greek economy and business interests overseas (Bakoyianni, 2008; 2007). In this light, it mobilises and centralises under its institutional umbrella the entire the foreign policy bureaucracy, including the sector of commercial and trade attachés, who previously belonged to the MNEC.

In other words, the MFA, under the current reforms, absorbs the competence of what has traditionally been the section of ‘Economic and Commercial Affairs’ executed by economic and commercial attachés (Interview, no 23). Organisationally, the MFA responded by creating new positions such as the General Secretariat for International Economic Relations in the MFA, the peripheral General Secretariat for International Economic Relations which resides in Thessaloniki, special overseas offices for Greek national interests, and the DG for International Development Cooperation YDAS (2007 Charter). Arguably, the Charter has marked a shift in the MFA’s mandate from political to economic work (Interview, no 32; Karabarbounis, 2007: 200).

The turn towards economic diplomacy was further substantiated with changes in the diplomatic academy’s curriculum and the diplomatic career path which are reviewed in the following chapter. The Charter declares that from 2007 onwards all
diplomats who graduate from the Diplomatic Academy must serve as economic and commercial attachés, thus gradually taking over the posts which previously belonged to the graduates of the School of National Public Administration. The compulsory three to five-year posting to an economic and commercial office is to be supported by the extension of studies in the Diplomatic Academy which increases the six-monthly training on economic and commercial issues to a one-year compulsory module. This reflects the transition of economic diplomacy from a marginal activity to the MFA’s core function and as the underlying principle for the re-organisation of the MFA’s overseas network (Karabarbounis, 2007: 200) which is also discussed in the following chapter.

This transition aims to create a new generation of diplomats freed from the traditional political-economic divide between diplomats and trade/commercial attachés, causing friction and a lack of coordination. This change aims to ensure the preparedness of the Diplomatic Academy’s graduates to manage issues of economic nature and to vest them with the appropriate diplomatic elements (Diplomatic Academy of Greece, 2008; Karabarbounis, 2007: 200; Interview, no 44). The turn towards economic diplomacy has major implications for the overseas network and more specifically for the economic and commercial offices as well as the role of Greek diplomats.

**International development cooperation and aid**

Another function consolidated and strengthened with the latest reform is international development cooperation under the heading of YDAS Secretariat. YDAS or Hellenic Aid\(^\text{23}\) comprises six directorates: namely humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and development, strategic planning, NGO development education and technical and administrative services. Hellenic Aid is the national coordinator for Greek international cooperation policy and constitutes one of the three main pillars of contemporary Greek foreign policy. Hellenic Aid reflects the gradual

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\(^{23}\) YDAS was set up under Law 2731/1999 (Governmental Gazette 138 A’)
change in the substance of Greek foreign policy which aims to strengthen bridges with civil society and enhance communication between different civilizations (Hellenic Aid Yearly Report, 2006).

Greek international cooperation policy has coordinated its action with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and promotes its renewed and alternative approach to diplomacy while enhancing its soft power overseas (Hellenic Aid Yearly Report, 2006: 8). Greek international cooperation policy could be portrayed in three concentric circles with one circle representing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as set by DAC, another circle representing EU international development priorities and another corresponding to Greek foreign policy priorities.

The shared space between the three circles defines the area of Greek action (Hellenic Aid Yearly Report, 2006: 26). Greek strategy for development cooperation has a five year horizon and is organised with geographic and thematic criteria. Until recently the Balkans constituted YDAS’s ultimate geographical focus through the Hellenic Plan for Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB) which simultaneously forms one of the main pillars of Greek economic diplomacy. Recently, YDAS’s agenda has expanded to issues of wider economic development, to the fight against people trafficking and international health (Hellenic Aid Yearly Report, 2006: 26).

Greece became a donor country for the first time in 1997 by participating in a five year development program and officially joined the international coalition against poverty in 2000. It was then that the portfolio for development cooperation and aid was transferred to the MFA together with the respective bureaucracy from the MNEC. However, arguably, only as recently as 2004 did YDAS start to work ‘quite effectively’ (Interview, no 13). For Greece this new function heralds a new era for

24 For 2008-2011 the geographical focus of Greece or else Greek strategic development partners are Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Egypt, Ethiopia, Syria and Jordan
25 For more on HiPERB see Greek MFA website at www.mfa.gr
its diplomacy as it can promote an image of good will abroad removed from the traditional focus on Greek antiquity and thus strengthen its political and economic relationships.

Hellenic Aid Greece aims to promote a modern and alternative approach to diplomacy and encourage the involvement of NGOs and civil society. Most importantly, by embracing development diplomacy, Hellenic Aid aims to promote a renewed wave of philhellenism in the societies of the aid-receivers and strengthen its influence in the international community on the basis of its provision of development and humanitarian aid (The Bridge Magazine, 2010). An YDAS official characterized the creation of the secretariat as:

‘The concrete proof of the Greek governments’ realization that the changing international environment increases demands for allocation of funds in international policy and enhancing your soft power. We have moved away from our traditional national concerns. Only international stability, cooperation and sympathy\(^\text{26}\) can guarantee our national existence’ (Interview, no 16).

The interviewee suggested that the fact that the MFA now works closely with NGOs is a big step for Greece. It constitutes the realisation that ‘there is life outside the PMO, the MFA and MNEC (Interview, no 16).

‘Most importantly however, it constitutes a shift in Greek understanding of the international environment and of the appropriate foreign policy levers in the 21st century which relate to one’s overseas likeability and improved image’ (Interview, no 13).

Greek diplomatic missions are now adapting to this new role of becoming missions of ‘compassion’ and promoting alternative diplomacy (The Bridge Magazine, 2010). This adaptation reveals the realization that offering aid improves a state’s public/foreign image in a much more effective way than would a speech by a politician/diplomat (Interview, no 18). Greece was named by UN General

\(^{26}\) The term sympathy was used in its Greek original meaning which refers to likeability
Secretary Kofi Annan as ‘an international power in humanitarian aid’ and it now wishes to uphold this role (Platis date not available).

Hellenic Aid, headed by a diplomat of ambassadorial rank, is a very small unit in comparison to similar units in other countries. Aid is provided as a response to official requests through international organisations, by another country or people within that country. The MFA at the turn of the 21st century is in a state of increased vigilance and alertness about crises away from home (Interview, no 26) and its major aid contribution focuses mostly on the Mediterranean area (Interview, no 16). Traditional good relations with the Middle East, deriving from Greece being considered as ‘less Westernised than the rest of the West’ have enabled it to provide help in situations where aid from other countries was declined. For instance in 2006 Greece was the first donor country to provide help to Lebanon with the UNHCR mission using Greek vessels. Amongst western aid, only vessels with the Greek flag were allowed to anchor in Lebanon (Interview, no 16).

‘In the case of Gaza, Greece was again the first to send C130 military transport aircrafts to deliver humanitarian aid. Belgium had the brilliant idea to transfer wounded kids and Greece aligned straight away and offered humanitarian aid. It was a reflexive response which shows growing diplomatic substance’ (Interview, no 26).

Hellenic Aid works very closely with a) Greek and other embassies and consular offices b) NGOs c) international organisations d) other domestic ministries such as the Ministry of Health and MoD and e) domestic municipalities. ‘Such multilayered cooperation is a new thing for Greece despite our long tradition in offering humanitarian aid on an ad hoc basis’ (Interview, no 16). YDAS on a European level communicates with the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) via situation reports and on an international level with the UN through the Relief Web.
Greece has a growing international presence through Greek NGOs which systematically fund Niger, Sudan and Ethiopia and provide military aid for transportation (non-armed personnel) and trade shipping (Interview, no 16). The only international NGO that the Greek government formally sponsors is the Red Cross. An YDAS official drew the attention to the fact that there is difference between offering help and having one’s help accepted. For instance in Myanmar (Burma) Greek help was accepted and Greece got to the field straight after the International Organisations. French aid for instance was declined despite the fact that they were carrying 200.000 tonnes of food (Interview, no 16).

The operation of the secretariat largely depends on the issue at hand. As a Hellenic Aid official (Interview, no 16) explained, normally, with a request being received, a coordinating committee is set up with officials of the DG backed by political leadership to coordinate action amongst various domestic departments and municipalities if necessary. Usually the first departments to work together are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Defence and Health and then, depending on the matter, the police or mayors may be involved.

If for instance extra workers are needed in the port of Athens to load a ship with aid usually aiming to embark within the following 12 hours, that is an expense covered by the Greek public sector and needs to be organised by the mayor of Athens in conjunction with the Minister of Transportation or/and Maritime. If, for example, there is need for medicines, the committee instantaneously communicates with the Ministry of Health and coordinates action with the Red Cross. This committee will meet several times if needed with NGOs, as was the case with the Asian Tsunami in 2004, and draw a plan of action and allocate responsibilities. If for instance an airplane has to be sent within twelve hours – which, in practice, means that it has to be ready in eight hours - then Hellenic Aid will oversee preparations.

Despite the renewed significance attached to development aid and assistance, the allocated budget is very small. Development assistance since early 2010 comprises 0.50% of Greek GDP in compliance with OECD’s Development
Assistance Committee’s guidelines (Platis, date not available). YDAS officials (Interviews, no 13; 16) stated that budget limitations do not allow Greece to participate in all aid missions. For instance, in places considered as not cost-effective such as Africa, Hellenic Aid would not be directly involved, offering only funds but without committing people, aircraft or ships.

Greece is a small donor in comparison to many other countries which allocate large funds to humanitarian aid, proportionate to their population or economy, and for this reason, Greek influence in international developments and policies is limited.

‘We cannot intervene to the extent that Sweden does in terms of formulating international development policy. When Sweden allocates 60 billion Euros for development and we allocate 60 million Euros and we are the last on the list of funding then, naturally, we would be followers and observers most of the time. At least what we have learned, which took a long time, is not to cause a problem! Our attitude has changed dramatically. Until relatively recently our ‘old school’ diplomats would not hesitate to oppose common international positions as a result of their unrealistic understanding of our objective means and international position’ (Interview no, 13).

‘We are improving and we aim in the near future to participate more in programmes of human safety and good governance’ (Interview, no 16).

At the moment YDAS appears to suffer from the same problems as the rest of the Greek administration. Under-staffing, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, keeps staff busy with their basic tasks (Interview, no 13; 16).

An official compared the organisational arrangement of the Greek secretariat for development and assistance with that of other countries and argued that the Greek case lags behind. Other countries even have development consultants in their permanent overseas missions, and it is these, in cooperation with the
embassy, that decide upon the mission’s budget. The embassy submits a proposal to the HQ for assessment and government funding.

“In Greece we do not even have a budget! We only have extreme centralisation. The magnitude of aid and organisational funds are determined at the core of the political leadership and this is why they do not correspond to contemporary demands” (Interview, no 13).

Centralisation was characterised as a significant weakness in the organisation of international development cooperation in Greece leading to overlapping responsibility. YDAS officials, in a power point presentation on the ‘Hellenic Aid’s Priorities and Objectives’ presented to the author, submitted a proposal to decentralise the process by setting up ad hoc development offices in overseas missions based on given needs and which would be removed with the ending of the program. A development office was set up in Sri Lanka with significant success. However, the proposal until now remains largely on paper despite its significance in terms of resource and personnel management (Interview, no 13). Arguably, as noted in the presentation, the only step towards decentralisation involved diplomats performing project monitoring in developing countries beyond monitoring procedures undertaken at the HQ.

**Crisis management**

Closely linked to the function of development aid and assistance is the function of crisis management, which constitutes a relatively new competence for the MFA. The function formed part of the MFA’s central organisational structure in the 1998 reforms and was reaffirmed in the 2007 charter. The competence of crisis management was allocated to the GS of the MFA and the unit responsible for it resides in the GS office at the central building of the MFA. This function reinforces the overarching position of the MFA in the bureaucratic coordination scheme elaborated below and reasserts the MFA’s role in civilian protection both at home and abroad. At the same time, it heralds a new era for extensive cooperation
between the HQ and the overseas missions but also between the HQ and other government departments (Interview, no 18).

A Crisis Unit official (Interview, no 18) explained that the activation of the crisis management mechanism resembles somewhat the operation of YDAS. The Unit receives information with regard to crises from Greek and other embassies, NGOs and other agencies such as international organisations. Crisis situations that reach the unit in the form of ‘requests’ are assessed at the GS office and are then forwarded to the PMO where action is jointly decided. The Crisis Unit makes a case for the appropriate level of response and draws up the ‘action plan’. This translates into the setting up of a committee which comprises lead ministries and other government departments under the supervision of the Crisis Unit and the GS. The Unit puts in place a channel of communication between those making a request, international organisations, NGOs and other government departments. The Unit works closely with the EU Civil Protection Agency and Situation Centre (2007 Charter art. 14) and has seconded civil protection representatives to PeRepGr as a response to the increasing demands for managing international crises (Interview, no 18).

The core role of the MFA in crisis management and civil protection has two aspects: firstly, macroscopic policy planning; and secondly representation and support of nationals overseas. Macroscopic policy and planning reach beyond countering crises to rehabilitation. As a Crisis Unit official (Interview, no 18) suggested, there is little point in offering aid and assistance without any further planning with regard to rehabilitation in the area. For a small national economy such as Greece, involvement in managing international crises and provision of the required level of support for rehabilitation is challenging.

This is because, in the case of evacuation for instance, Greece cannot offer evacuees jobs at home. For this reason Greece puts added emphasis on the resetting of local balances. This approach has resulted in substantial change in the relationship between HQ and overseas missions as well as in the operation of the missions per se.
‘Ever since crisis management climbed higher up on the Greek agenda, missions’ job routine has changed to include intense involvement in local communities and reporting back home. This is because in places where crises have emerged, previously ‘easy posts’ where seconded representatives attended a couple of business activities in the area and threw a couple of cocktail parties in order to boost the exports of Greek olive oil and feta, have become intensive information hubs’ (Interview, no 18).

Similar intensification in the activities of overseas missions is related to an increased need for representation and support for nationals overseas who are there either through maritime activities, studies, travelling or for health reasons. Greece has intensified consular representation and assistance for issues that fall outside the sphere of politics or diplomacy.

‘Greek governments have realised that such issues are becoming more important as they are directly linked to our nationals. The proof is the increase in funds allocated for consular purposes since 2000’ (Interview, no 18).

Nevertheless, this has to be put in the right context. The function of crisis management for Greece, and for any country of the size and economy of Greece, should not be magnified. Greece is not directly involved in a large number of international crises. For this reason Greece does not prioritise a holistic strategic approach to international crisis management in the sense of strategically reorganising its overseas missions to support this function. Rather, the function remains operative at the centre where action is coordinated at the Crisis Unit. Notably, change observed in certain post-crisis posts is symptomatic rather than strategic in that it appears only as a result of already emergent crises (Interview, no 30).
International policy coordination

International policy coordination in Greece, as elsewhere, has been seriously challenged both by globalisation and membership of the EU (Interview, no 2; 3; 18; 32). Persistence of traditional vertical organisation and operational modes in the MFA, as well as of other ministries, has had serious implications for policy coordination in an era when a number of agencies involved in foreign and international policy management cut across several government departments. Foreign and international policy coordination, a prestigious bureaucratic task, has often caused friction and antagonism amongst Greek bureaucratic agents who have competed over it (Interview, no 1). The centrality of the MFA in foreign policy coordination has been very well established. The MFA has always been the main coordinator of Greek foreign policy associated with high politics and issues of national and territorial significance.

However, in the current domestic political environment, the MFA is reaffirming its primacy in coordination in all areas of Greek external policy, thus extending its function to the broader agendas of international policy becoming the primus inter pares coordinator (Interview, no 1; 14). Article 5 of the standing 2007 charter stipulates the role of the MFA, which inter alia involves the monitoring of bilateral and international policies, economic, cultural and other matters as well as matters of international security and the formulation of recommendations to the government (para. 2). Paragraph 7 of the same article provides for the coordination of ministries and departments with regards to formulation, implementation and assessment of both European and foreign policy.

Based on the 2007 Charter, the MFA takes charge of monitoring and coordinating all external policies, both economic and political. The MFA holds a monopoly over coordinating and consulting all ministries and state departments with regard to actions with an external dimension (Law 3566/2007 art. 6 para b) whilst overseas representation is shared with other ministries (Law 3566/2007 art. 6 para

27 The coordinating role of the MFA was provided for in the Presidential Decree 230/1998 (FEK 177/1998) art. 1 para z
2a). The allocation of international policy coordination to the MFA aims to strengthen and reaffirm its centrality and significance vis-à-vis other departments in the management of all Greek external policies (Interview, no 3). Most importantly, it seeks to centralise all external competence political and economic/sectoral under a single organisational structure, that of the MFA, with the aim to merge political and technical aspects of external policy as a response to globalisation and the economisation of foreign policy (Interview, no 32).

During the pre-accession negotiations for Greek entry to the EC, the leading role in European policy coordination was allocated to the MCo - renamed the MNEC in 1982 - on the grounds that EC policy would concern issues of an economic and technical nature (Passas, 2005: 365; Passas and Makridimitris, 1993; Spanou; Tsinizelis, 1996: 218). After Greek accession to the EC, in 1981, the role of the MNEC was limited to coordination of the technical/economic ministries as well as the adjustment of the Greek economy to the EC while policy coordination for political matters of the EC was transferred to the MFA.

Since 1981, there has been antagonism and friction between the two ministries as well as confusion due to the increasingly overlapping nature of foreign policy. Even though this scheme was initially intended to enhance centralisation, in practice it proved to be decentralised and it was only in the early 1990s that a government committee for the co-ordination of the relations between Greece and the EU was set up. This committee is presided over by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and is composed of the economic and main technical ministers. Its success depended, however, not only on the adoption of a more coherent policy but also on the acceptance of a more collective approach to decision-making (Spanou C. 1998: 475) which was the result of membership to the EU.

The increasingly unclear and dual - political and economic - content of foreign policy has often caused confusion with regard to the two ministries’ jurisdiction and responsibility for coordination (Interview, no 9; 12). Obscurity concerning each department’s involvement in the coordination of given policies has resulted in

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28 Art. 14 Law 1266/1982
friction that has reached levels requiring the intervention of the PM (termed as negative coordination) whose office is in constant communication with the MFA (Passas, 2005: 365; Tsinizelis, 1996: 220).

It has been argued that the task of international policy coordination has been both underestimated and overestimated by the two ministries (Interview, no 8). Underestimated because its significance in policy management is not adequately appreciated and thus never effectively performed. Despite the fact that coordination has been the cause of discord between the MFA and the MNEC, neither of the two departments has ever had a strategic approach aiming at maximising it (Interview, no 8). At the same time it has been overestimated because it is seen only as a political rather than a bureaucratic problem (Interview, no 8).

In practice, the distribution of coordination responsibility is determined on a pragmatic basis based on the agenda of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) at the European level and, more generally, to the agenda of the specific international forum in which Greece is involved. ‘Even though coordination of any external policy is the MFA’s job in strictly financial matters the MNEC steps in’ (Interview, no 2). For instance it is the MNEC which is in charge of coordinating policy related to the EU Budget as well as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the economic aspects of CFSP, even though for the last two, responsibility is shared with the Ministry of Agriculture and the MFA respectively (Interview, no 2).

A coordinating committee under the MFA’s GS or the Deputy FM for dual economic-political issues was set up in the 1990s but was short-lived because ‘in the Greek bureaucracy such committees are doomed to fail due to the nature of the very bureaucratic architecture and the politicisation of the foreign policy process’ (Interview, no 2). Over the years, coordination of international economic issues has passed to the MFA as set out in the 2007 Charter. It has been argued that the gradual rise of the MFA to the top of the coordination pyramid can be attributed to the fact that the economic ministry in Greece has been so drawn into
domestic economic problems, such as unemployment, deficits and debts, that the foreign and international dimension of its economic policies are left to the MFA (Interview, no 30).

As indicated in the first section, compartmentalisation in the organisational structure of the MFA results in co-responsibility as a response to cross-cutting policies. This produces overlaps leading to lack of clarity in bureaucratic responsibility and in definitions of functions of posts and sections both at the political and bureaucratic level (Interview no, 32). Co-responsibility, effectively translating into two, three or even four DGs sharing responsibility over the same policy area, has significant implications for policy coordination (Interview, no 22; 32; 37; 42; 43). Even at the level of political leadership, there is vagueness in relation to the distribution of responsibility and function between the Foreign Minister and the deputy Foreign Minister due to the blurred distinction between technical/economic or political matters (Anastasopoulos, 1986: 640).

Passas (2005: 370) suggests that the grouping of services under three main headings, with the first being coordinated by the MFA’s GS, the second by the GS-EU and the third by the GS-IER, further stresses the distinction between political, technical or economic issues. International policy has been seen until recently as comprising technical issues with an international dimension - in other words as low policy and of secondary importance to traditional foreign policy associated with high politics. However, things are now changing and as an MFA official stated:

‘2000-2010 has been a decade of merging of foreign and international policy in the sense that you cannot tell them apart. International policy is becoming equally important alongside our traditional foreign policy concerns. The older approach of distinguishing between political and economic/technical issues has caused major coordination problem but this is now expected to change with the Lisbon Treaty. Besides, this realisation has been the main linchpin of the re-organisation of the MFA’ (Interview, no 32).
Changing perceptions of the MFA’s role and culture: towards a business approach?

Evidence from the 2007 reforms demonstrates significant change in the institutional adaptation of the MFA to contemporary developments through the addition of functions and areas of action. At the same time, evidence from MFA reports, governmental documentation and a large number of interviews in the Ministry in Athens and in overseas missions, indicate ongoing discussions with regards to the MFA’s changing culture. Such discussions, however, produce an unclear image of the MFA bureaucratic culture. This is because, on the one hand, significant data portray the MFA culture as changing in a way that reflects the changes introduced by the 2007 reforms, whereas, on the other hand, some argue that it continues to reflect general characteristics of Greek administration such as politicization, hierarchy, centralisation and resistance to change.

Analysis of the evidence points to the direction of a discrepancy in cultural perception, which is directly linked to the experience of the officials interviewed. More specifically, the argument for a ‘new MFA culture’ seems to be supported by the political leadership which aims to instil a degree of newness and innovation, and by bureaucrats who socialize into EU policy making fora. At the same time, the experience of a number of officials located in Athens differs significantly. They describe the departmental culture as stagnating and stuck in its nepotistic and politicized tradition. Without necessarily constituting contradictory accounts, a number of conflicting elements make up the MFA’s contemporary departmental culture which could be described as of delayed ‘maturity’ elaborated below.

The protracted dilemma discussed in chapter two, as to whether Greece belongs to the West or the Balkans, has been imprinted on the MFA’s departmental culture. The Greek foreign policy system, with the MFA at its centre, has been seeking an identity. Prolonged preoccupation with high politics relating to Greek national interests defined in terms of its ‘national issues’ of Skopje, Cyprus and Turkey, demonized Greek foreign policy and thus strengthened the MFA’s political
character and identification of its role as a gatekeeper (Interview, no 14; 17). Accession to the EC and later to the EU added a more technical dimension in the form of low policies while global demands and economisation of foreign policy pushed the MFA towards a quest for an identity or, according to some, for a new identity (Interview, no 32). Such a quest was reinforced by the changing perception of Greek strategic national interests. The MFA, together with the Greek government, in early 2000 redefined the ‘Greek national interest’ both in qualitative and geographical terms. Effectively, Greek national interests have hitherto been defined in terms of regional economic and business leadership, strengthening bilateral economic and commercial ties and promoting Greek exports in South East Europe, the Black Sea region, the Arab and the Gulf states, Russia, China and India (Doukas, 2007; Platis, date not available).

The newly defined perception of Greek interests and agendas has been central to the attitude of the MFA and its officials. The MFA’s political leadership has proclaimed a new attitudinal approach of the MFA which is characterized by ‘openness’ and ‘outwardness’ in terms of business activity and socialisation (Interview, no 28; Bakoyianni, 2008). This turn reflected the ‘metamorphosis’ of the MFA from a gatekeeper to a Greek businesses promoter. The MFA, which previously perceived itself as the gatekeeper safeguarding Greek territorial integrity in a turbulent region, wishes to portray itself in the 21st century as a ministry engaged in promoting business activity with a regional - if not international - range of vested interests (Interview, no 28). According to officials in charge of Greece’s economic diplomacy in overseas posts

‘This metamorphosis is reflected also through the models of organisation that we adopt. Our foreign policy system, with the MFA at its core, was initially set up based on the French École Nationale d’Administration (ENA). In the 21st century we are moving towards the British model. How do we understand this? We have always worked to an extent with line ministries but now these ministries, as we call them -

29 The same statement was made by interviewee no 26
the productive ministries - are our main linkage and the promotion of their international portfolio is our number one priority. The MFA’s aim, which reflects the government’s strategy, is to produce salespeople who sell Greek interests overseas. We need to sell overseas and this is a new thing for Greece. This is a new culture that the political leadership is trying to instil […]. The Greek foreign policy system is becoming a neural system, a network of salesmen with the aim of developing existing underdeveloped business activity. It is no longer enough to play ambassadors in cocktail parties. We are sales representatives and the heads of overseas missions must perceive themselves as CEOs and not as cardinals as used to be the case. We are a culture in change’ (Interview, no 28).

This changing perception heralds the emergence of a new identity for the MFA. An MFA official stated when analysing the changing nature of the Greek MFA, that ‘an evolutionary process has started here which signifies a change of character’ (Interview, no 42). Similarly, the Deputy FM Valinakis in 2007 (Valinakis, 2007) stressed in his address to the parliamentary committee of foreign affairs in 2007, that the MFA is moving away from its traditional character of an ‘exotic’ ministry dominated by high politics preoccupations and working behind closed doors towards a ‘new identity’.

According to this new identity, a ‘new MFA’ is at the front line of the Greek government’s development efforts overseas and is heading an expanding overseas network which is in close partnership with Greek businessmen and nationals all around the globe. To aid this objective the MFA is reorganising itself, including the HQ and the overseas missions, with a new embassy and consular policy and with new Information Technology (IT) tools which are elaborated in the next chapter.

The nascent perception of the MFA as the locomotive of an overseas network is reflected, amongst other things, in the changing attitude towards internal personnel movement. The Greek foreign policy machinery was traditionally divided
into three insulated blocks: the headquarters, the embassies and the consulates, each of which were governed by their own legislation, rules and practices. This effectively meant that the movement from one block to the other was not encouraged\(^\text{30}\) (Karabarbounis, 2007: 222). At the dawn of the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century this practice seems to have radically altered. Circulation between the three blocks is now common and encouraged and is targeted at the better understanding of the foreign policy and diplomatic system in its entirety (Karabarbounis, 2007: 222; Interview, no 28).

The changing culture in the MFA also becomes evident in officials’ jargon and the communication of MFA strategies. More specifically, the deputy FM for International Economic Relations (Interview with D-FM Loverdos, 2003) is paralleled to a ‘yuppie amongst diplomats’. The Deputy suggests a whole new ‘business’ approach to Greek diplomacy which is based on personal networking and making overseas missions more fine-tuned with businesses both in terms of function and results.

More specifically, the deputy FM suggests that the MFA and the foreign policy bureaucracy are entering a new era, demonstrating a shift from the old obsession with the dominant Greek national issues. Even the role of the deputy FM has been transformed to focus on the promotion of economic affairs, and, for this reason deputies focus on accompanying business missions abroad rather than promoting dialogue with Turkey or FYROM in international fora. The new approach has been termed as a ‘business-like’ approach and aims at increasing trade and commercial agreements within given parts of the world as discussed in the next chapter.

The renewed identity based on openness and outwardness within the MFA is also manifest in the changing substance of its relationship vis-à-vis other government departments and civil society. Traditionally, the MFA used to be the ‘crème de la crème’ (Interview, no 32), or for others, the ‘outsider’ (Interview, no 23) in relation to the rest of the Greek bureaucracy. This is now changing with the MFA creating

\(^{30}\) For more on the different chronological phases of movement between the three blocks see Karabarbouni (2003)
linkages in other government departments and supporting their international activity as discussed in chapter three. The MFA has abandoned its previous ‘air of superiority’ vis-à-vis other ministries and is now aspiring to be considered as a more technocratic and productive ministry (Interview, no 31). Most importantly, the promotion of other ministries’ international portfolios is becoming the number one priority of the MFA (Interview, no 28) whilst the role of consultation is now seen as one of the Ministry’s main functions (Interview, no 32).

On a similar note, the MFA promotes a relationship of openness and directness with civil society through the intensification of collaboration with NGOs and with Greek nationals overseas by making the embassies and consulates more accessible to the public. A service for public diplomacy and information for Greek journalists has been established and in 1999 a citizens’ support and information centre was set up (MFA website at www.mfa.gr). The MFA’s prioritization of deepening its relations with Greek citizens at home and abroad also becomes evident with the newly established twenty-four hour hotline, the setting up of a telephone centre for Greek nationals (Interview, no 12) and the availability of the MFA on social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook, thus opening up channels for digital and public diplomacy.

A systematic study of the MFA’s website by the author from 2007 to 2010 demonstrates a significant increase in publicised information ranging from information on signing of international agreements, to the announcement of cultural events around the world, Greek embassies’ news and international news channelled back to the HQ from the diplomatic network. The significance attached by the political leadership to promoting direct communication and deepening the relationship between Greek and other nationals and the MFA was reflected in the creation of the office for ‘citizens information’ established in 1999 (Griva, 2008: 509-510) as well as in the creation of the post of press attaché overseas (Griva, 2008: 449).

Arguably, in Greece, some of the major MFA cultural and ideational changes, alongside structural changes, of the last three decades can be attributed to EU
membership. This is because the MFA became responsible for the functions of forming, coordinating and presenting Greek policy in the EU institutions (Kavakas, 2000: 145). Membership of the EU has meant that Greece, especially through the CFSP, has received vast amounts of information from the diplomatic services of fellow member states, which provided a fertile ground for Greece extending its network of external relations both in political and economic terms (Kavakas, 2000: 155).

The increasing importance of sectoral policies (Interview, no 13) and exposure to a large number of policy fora have been translated into a faster work rhythm and, most importantly, have instilled a new ‘work ethic’ in the foreign policy bureaucracy (Interview, no 2; 6). Familiarisation with new ways of doing things, socialization in EU policy making fora and the widening spectrum of Greek international policy interests has brought about an ‘increased sense of responsibility (Interview, no 2; 3; 6) and ‘a whole new consciousness’ into the MFA’s bureaucratic culture (Interview, no 2; 3; 8; 16; 18; 43).

However, this new consciousness is present mostly in young officials and diplomats. A young diplomat stated that

‘Both our job and attitude are changing. We are becoming more flexible and less concerned with protocol. What we need is a couple of mobile phones and a laptop and we can work anywhere and anytime. We are ‘laptop diplomats’. The old school diplomats, of whom we have many in Greece, are very resistant and demanding. They do not allow changes to take effect. They are the ones who make the MFA slow and rigid. We do not perceive ourselves as needing a big office with velvet drapes to accommodate our counterparts. We can negotiate over coffee and we do not need cocktail parties; rather we need expertise which seems to threaten senior diplomats who now run the HQ’ (Interview, no 32).

Similar statements indicating resistance to change and adaptation to contemporary demands were proclaimed passionately by a number of officials in
Athens. According to them, neither the identity change nor the attempted merging of economics with foreign policy in the name of economic diplomacy seemed to be widely shared. On the contrary, officials’ experience seems to lag behind. The re-organisation of the MFA around the function of economic diplomacy and the resultant departmental cultural change sound like mere rhetoric for a number of MFA Greek policy managers who view themselves as defending Greek territorial integrity such as the Aegean continental shelf in international fora backed by limited resources and departmental rigidity and politicisation of the diplomatic hierarchy (Interview, no 22). For others, the turn towards economic diplomacy is already part of their daily routine. Nevertheless, a generally renewed understanding of their world perception seemingly lags behind, demonstrating elements of delayed maturity. As an MFA official stated:

‘It is only in the last couple of years that this turn is starting to be digested by Greek diplomats and it was about time Greek governments realized the importance of economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy is proving to be the strongest, wisest lever of our external policy. Nevertheless, its significance is only now starting to be accepted by older hard core diplomats who are still stuck in the old ways of exercising diplomacy and are still obsessed with our traditional foreign policy concerns, namely Turkey, Cyprus and Skopje! The nightmare of Turkey is slowly fading away but is still haunting the foreign policy machinery. Only a few years ago we were negotiating exports of Greek cheese to South Africa. Negotiations were not fruitful because Greek diplomats did not support the business case well. When the mission returned home, its feedback report was overwhelmed with assumptions about the possibility of Turkey undermining the cheese trade agreement! Such thinking has delayed maturity in our understanding of the world. Evidence shows that this is gradually changing and it will only be a matter of a few years before it is radically changed. Young, bright and well educated and travelled diplomats have a new and different perception of Greece in the world’ (Interview, no 13).
The difficult symbiosis of politics and economics

Despite the latest reforms which promoted economic diplomacy as the core function of the MFA - and thus triggered a process of change in the character of the institution - the division between politics and economics seems to persist both in terms of organisation and operation. This is manifested in their organisation in distinct vertical organisational units which leads to co-responsibility and overlaps. For instance, as illustrated in the section which discusses the organisational arrangement of the MFA, that management of European policy with a political content is dealt with by DG-A political affairs whereas issues with a technical content are dealt with by DG-C European affairs (Passas and Makridimitris, 1993: 31).

The traditional division between high and low politics, with the former classified as being of primary importance, is still acutely present in the structure and operation of the MFA, as in most EU member states (Passas, 2005: 366; Passas and Makridimitris, 1993: 10). The division of foreign policy into three general domains, namely political or else traditional, European or technical and international economic under the heading of the GS, GS-EU and GS-IER respectively reinforces a multi-pillared structure within the MFA. The resulted fragmentation is also evident in the overseas missions in which there is a distinction between different sections of representatives such as traditional MFA diplomats and technocrats for purposes of delivering the different MFA functions discussed in the following chapter. Problems occur with regards to management and representation when issues of a dual nature - of added political and economic substance – are at hand. In such instances management of dual (if not more complex) issues is ineffective as it falls within a grey area of unclear responsibility and shared competence which results in lack of action and overlaps (Interview, no 30; 32; 37).

The problem of the grey area between economic and political diplomacy and diplomats was first identified in the late 1990s (Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 139) and has been aggravated with pressures of globalisation which has
added an economic dimension to foreign policy (Interview, no 30). The MFA, traditionally uni-dimensional in character and mission which focused on high politics and with a vertical and compartmentalised organisation has been unable to address contemporary cross-cutting policies.

With its organisation relying on a model of vertical organisational silos corresponding to distinct foreign policy domains that operate hierarchically and with an emphasis on geographical desks it resists horizontal models of foreign policy organisation prescribed by globalist approaches to foreign policy (Interview, no 32). This explains why for a number of interviewees the merging between economics and politics attempted in by the 2007 Charter was considered as awkward and spasmodic because it attempted to address globalization and the economization of foreign policy by simply transferring a new competence to the MFA and adding another vertical organisational unit without any horizontal organisational rearrangement (Interview, no 30).

Therefore, organisational verticality and the insulation of the distinct hierarchical organisational domains still remains strong (Passas, 2005: 371). It is hoped that such fragmentation in the organisation of different branches of foreign policy and specifically the division between economic and traditional foreign policy will be eradicated with the changing curriculum of the diplomatic academy which aims at gradually creating a multi-diplomat for the 21st century (Interview no 44) which shows evidence of more holistic approaches to foreign policy discussed in the next chapter. The new multi-diplomat will engage in economic, technical and politic dealings (Interview no 44). Nevertheless, at the moment: ‘The intended fusion between economics and politics is on the way but not there yet (Interview, no 28).

Organisational fragmentation and verticality constitute persistent traits of the Greek foreign policy system and render it resistant to integrated approaches to foreign policy organisation. The system is far from horizontal globalist approaches and different competences such as those of public and economic diplomacy fall in distinct organisational units and are managed by distinct bureaucratic sections both at home and overseas as the following chapter demonstrates.
The character of the Greek MFA: between institutional isomorphism and path dependence

The previous sections demonstrated a range of changes that the MFA has undergone in the last decade in its attempt to retain its relevance and re-establish its centrality in the Greek foreign policy and diplomatic system in the 21st century. Such change ranges from competence expansion and operational change reflected through the addition of new functions such as economic diplomacy and crisis management to change in the MFA’s culture and mission. Seen in the light of its institutional responses to environmental stimuli, The MFA presents a case of institutional isomorphism being engaged in a process of adaptation. Nevertheless, a closer look at the course of its adaptation demonstrates that certain prior practices and patterns of organisation persist thus conditioning its adaptation and displaying elements of path dependence.

More specifically, the MFA demonstrates evidence of transformation through the adaptation of its structural, operational and cultural arrangements to the changing environmental conditions in which it operates. The latest reforms, besides indicating the MFA’s attempts to reflect the changing operational environment, also constitute proof of the MFA’s intention to preserve its role and significance and become larger and stronger by extending its scope and resources. Such elements can be understood with the help of institutionalist thinking which describes ‘institutional isomorphism’ or else ‘transformation’ as adaptation to operational environments which serves the purpose of survival and preservation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).

Nevertheless, even though the case of transformation is adequately supported in the previous sections there is additional evidence, originating from the literature and interviews, which draw a rather different image of the MFA. According to this image old policy making practices and organisational traditions persist and demonstrate resistance to change. This latter image, which should not be seen as conflicting but, rather, as complementary as elaborated below, accords with
institutional accounts which explain the character and evolution of institutions on the basis of persistence of prior courses of action.

Chapter one demonstrated that such institutionalist approaches can be summarised in the phenomenon of path dependence, which refers to ‘particular courses of action which, once introduced, may be impossible to reverse’ (2000: 251). Path dependence is very useful in explaining the persistence of policy making patterns and styles over time in individual countries (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 14) and as Aspinwall and Schneider (2001: 12) suggest, it can elucidate ‘stickiness’ to prior institutional arrangements.

Interview data concerning the Greek foreign policy system suggested the persistence of a number of prior institutional practices in the management of foreign policy. Such practices broadly involve the politicisation of the foreign policy process, lack of macroscopic policy planning and centralisation of policy making at the level of political leadership. More specifically, with regards to the MFA’s operational and organisational culture the following practices re-occur: hierarchy, verticality, fragmentation and centralisation of external competences in the MFA’s organisational culture as well as resistance to change.

Despite being viewed as ‘the agent of change’ for Greece (Interview, no 3; 5; 8) and the ‘most innovative government department’ (Interview, no 30) the MFA is resistant to change. Such resistance is expressed with the persistence of the given fragmentation in its organisational arrangement and hierarchical modus operandi favoured by a number of ‘old school’ senior diplomats who have a ‘traditionalist’ approach to foreign policy and its organisation. Such diplomats wish to reinforce their control over the MFA and propagate a hierarchical, introverted and secretive image of the Ministry whilst supporting its administrative insulation from other government departments (Interview, no 22; 30). It is for such purposes that the MFA has raised an organisational shield against any law or legislation which could threaten its internal control by diplomats. This organisational shield ensures the MFA’s administration by diplomats/bureaucrats who have often used the MFA for clientelistic purposes (Interview, no 30).
An MFA senior official characterised the MFA as part of the Greek bureaucracy but at the same time distinct from it. This is because it has maintained its own system for recruitment which is insulated from other departments. It organises its own entry competitions and recruitment panels comprise diplomats. This is something that differentiates the MFA from other ministries. The system of recruitment and entry to the diplomatic academy is often controlled by diplomats, ‘family dominated [oikogeneiokratiko] and nepotistic’ (Interview, no 30). Nevertheless, arguably, even though it is only the middle of the recruitment spectrum which is influenced by such bureaucratic intervention in the sense that very good candidates move forward and very bad candidates are rejected, still intervention affects the competition process (Interview, no 30). This is also evident in the career paths of staff dispatched in the overseas representation (Kavakas, 2000: 150). As a diplomat in Brussels argued,

‘The system works in such a way that there is no standardised professional ladder for civil servants. You do not know where you are going to be next year. When the government changes everything changes and you can find yourself dispatched to a place you have not heard of before’ (Interview, no 28).

In the last few years, however, career paths have been standardised after a long court case initiated through an appeal made by diplomats to the Greek Supreme Court (Interview, no 30). Nevertheless, even today promotions, transfers and overseas postings seem to depend on political criteria (Ioakimidis, 1999: 147; Interview no 22) perpetuating ‘human resources mismanagement’ (Interview, no 27; 28) despite arguments that the phenomenon of acute politicization tends to decline with globalisation raising demands for specialisation and expertise (Interview, no 5; 8; 44). The majority of interviewees suggested that the MFA suffers from an explicit personnel deficit, in both quantitative and qualitative terms or else from ‘the problem of under-staffing’ (Interview, no 2; 6; 8; 13; 22; 23; 28; 30; 32; 38; 39; 42; 43; 48; 50). The problem of qualitative under-staffing has been exacerbated with another persistent tendency of the MFA, namely centralisation.
Centralisation becomes manifest in the pooling of all external competence under its existing structure without organisational rearrangements (Passas, 2005; Griva, 2002).

Centralisation of all external competence under the MFA’s existing structures is exemplified by the transfer of the PeRepGr and the competence of European policy from the MNEC in the 1980s and of the competences for international economy and economic diplomacy and development cooperation together with their respective bureaucratic sections31 also from the MNEC. In addition, the Secretariat for Greek expatriates was transferred from the Ministry of Culture to the MFA in 1993 (Griva, 2008: 448) further emphasising the wider tendency to centralize policies with a growing international significance under the organisational structure of the MFA (Interview, no 30).

The MFA’s organisational model is another area which can be explained with path dependence. The MFA’s persistence over organisation on the basis of compartmentalisation of foreign policy into distinct domains is reflected in the contemporary structure of the Ministry. Despite arguments that its bureaucratic culture is changing towards business approaches which largely correspond to horizontal organisation, the MFA presents a fragmented, vertical and hierarchical model of organisation which by holding on to geographical desks and territorial divisions, corresponds to state-centric Westphalian models.

Conclusion

The first sections of this chapter demonstrated that there is ongoing discussion regarding the role and significance of contemporary foreign ministries within national foreign policy machineries. Such discussion suggests that foreign ministries are faced with a need to redefine their status vis-à-vis other parts of the

31 Another transfer expected to take place in the next MFA charter concerns the section of press and communication attachés which is discussed in the next chapter
bureaucracy and to reassert their role in the national foreign policy system. In the process of re-inventing themselves, foreign ministries tend to change form and content as a response to international systemic change brought about by the transformative forces of globalisation and regionalisation. With these forces creating the need for integrated and horizontal approaches to the conduct of foreign policy a number of foreign ministries abandon their traditional hierarchical structures and models of diplomatic representation and reorganise their structure and mode of operation as well as reconsider their culture.

The exploration of the Greek MFA against the aforementioned themes gives ample evidence in support of both change and continuity displayed by the Ministry in terms of its responses to the changing operational environment. Change and adaptation as a response to the transformed operational environment becomes evident through organisational reform and functional expansion as well as through the changing culture and self-perception of the institution in the last decade. Organisational reform is materialised with expansion of its organisational structure through the addition of new organisational units which correspond to distinct areas of foreign policy. Such units reflect the MFA’s extended functions and competence into new areas of action such as crisis management, economic diplomacy, international development cooperation and international policy coordination which are closely linked to the changing perception of the MFA’s mandate. The enlarging and changing competence of the MFA signifies a course of adaptability for the purpose of maintaining its relevance and centrality within the foreign policy machinery and of re-enforcing its supremacy vis-a-vis other government departments in the management of international policy.

However, as with other institutions, the course of the MFA’s adaptation is conditioned by the persistence of the existing hierarchical *modus operandi* and organisational practices which involve patterns of verticality, centralisation and fragmentation. More specifically, the organisation of the MFA conforms to compartmentalised models of foreign policy organisation closely related to geopolitical approaches to foreign policy.
Given that patterns of change within the MFA’s structure and operation provide significant evidence regarding the state’s responses to external stimuli and reflect its fundamental assumptions about world politics, one could suggest that in Greece foreign policy management follows a different course from that suggested by integrationist globalist approaches. Foreign policy management displays instead a model of parallel vertical silos which represent distinct areas and bureaucratic sections of foreign policy.

The responses of the Greek MFA to changing international and domestic environments can be understood with institutionalism’s explanatory tools of isomorphism and path dependence. Isomorphism can elucidate modernisation efforts and adaptation to operational environments whereas path dependence helps explain the persistence of certain organisational and operational ‘stickiness’ to prior practices. The above explanatory tools help towards reconciling the two arguably conflicting images of the MFA drawn by interview data. Far from invalidating one another, the two apparently contradictory sets of data combined reflect the contemporary institutional character of the Greek MFA, the course of adaptation of which is conditioned by certain organisational practices.

Overall, the Greek MFA does not accord with declinist images and irrelevance assumptions and has assumed a relatively active profile in adapting to the complex conditions of the post-Cold War world. The preferred courses of action and organisation however, have been conditioned by well established organisational pathologies which render its adaptation slow in the face of the dense and diffuse policy making environments which require integrationist approaches to policy management. Similar challenges confront the Greek diplomatic network, which is discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 5: The contemporary Greek diplomatic network: ‘sticky’ or transforming?

**Introduction**

The previous chapter explored the MFA in the light of a number of assumptions regarding foreign ministries’ responses to transformative forces of globalisation and regionalisation. Such assumptions are linked on the one hand with views which consider the foreign ministry as transformative and adaptive and thus retaining its critical functions and significance and on the other hand with views which regard the foreign ministry as diminishing in significance in foreign and international policy management due to pressures emanating from the dense international policy environment and growing interdependence. In this environment, governments seek to enhance and redefine the role of their foreign ministry through a process of organisational restructuring and operational rearrangement. Evidence presented in the previous chapter demonstrated significant adaptation and resilience on behalf of the Greek MFA. Such evidence relates to the extension of MFA functions and changes in its role and mandate as well as its redefinition as the key actor of the Greek foreign policy machinery.

Reorganising and rethinking the role of overseas diplomatic missions occupies a significant part of the broader discussion of governmental revamping of the national foreign policy machinery. Rice’s (2006) ‘*transformational diplomacy*’, a most innovative approach in contemporary diplomacy, relies on the re-arrangement of diplomatic networks. Diplomatic missions, the ‘nerve endings’ of the foreign policy machinery, are naturally faced with similar challenges to the rest of the foreign policy machinery and the foreign ministry. In the light of the profound changes taking place in the international setting such as climate change, natural catastrophes and global financial crises, governments and states have no other means to promote their interests and manage the
constraints imposed on them than foreign policy and diplomacy exercised by their overseas diplomatic missions (Sanders, 2010).

The world economic crisis, the widening notion of security to encompass the concept of human security and the placement of ‘soft power’ at the core of states’ foreign policy reflecting the evolving architecture of power manifest in the expansion of information technology (Cooper, 2001: 116) has urged governments to rethink their overseas missions (CSIS Report, 1998). Under the strain of governments’ financial cuts and with IT challenging if not ‘disintermediating’ diplomatic missions (Bátora, 2009; Metzl, 2001; CSIS Report, 1998) and more specifically embassies which until recently were considered as the most important intermediaries between one government and another (Bátora, 2009: 5) but currently their very raison d’être requires rethinking.

This is because even though overseas missions were considered to be the most well informed networks in comparison to outside counterparts they may be less so today as they are challenged by IT and non-governmental networks which seem to be broader, deeper and more crosscutting (Metzl, 2001: 80). And whilst there are arguments which view the future and role of embassies and other missions as uncertain and declining, other voices suggest that embassies, similarly with other structures for the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy, are resilient and adaptive (Bátora, 2009; Berridge, 2005; Hocking and Spence, 2005; Melissen, 2005; Hocking, 1999).

This is because governments are in a process of re-arranging their diplomatic missions, reallocating resources while at the same time prioritising public diplomacy as their key function which appears to be one of the main themes in the study of foreign and international policy management in the contemporary transforming world. Evidence suggests that alongside governmental re-arrangement of overseas diplomatic representation significant modernisation and reform of the diplomatic profession and its infrastructure is also taking place (CSIS report, 2007).

However, even though there is ongoing discussion with regards to the future and re-arrangement of diplomatic overseas missions, there is a considerable
lack of qualitative empirical data on the missions’ routines, working procedures and communication patterns. For this purpose Hocking and Bátor (2009: 166) suggest that the change and adaptation of diplomatic overseas missions have to be seen through the prism of their evolving function and role. Based on this premise, the study of the Greek diplomatic network in the contemporary, transforming world must be one that concerns its nature, role and function. 

Respective evidence will provide inferences with regard to its evolution and future and at the same time in relation to assumptions supporting theses of adaptation through transformation or decline. Institutionalist thinking can inform well courses of change and adaptation. Some of the key questions that need to be addressed concern the functions and role of the Greek diplomatic network and their course of adaptation. More specifically, questions concerning whether the Greek diplomatic network adapts to current developments or presents instead elements of ‘stickiness’ to prior institutional arrangements and commitments (Campbell, 2004: 33-35; Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 12).

Similarly with the previous chapters, this chapter will start with a section that addresses the key themes which emerge in the wider discussion of the role and operation of overseas diplomatic missions in the context of transforming world politics and will then proceed to the exploration of the Greek case.

**The functions and role of overseas diplomatic missions: elements of change**

Diplomatic missions, the nerve endings of the foreign policy machinery, are faced with a number of challenges which require rethinking and reorganisation (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, 2009; Gyngell and Wesley, 2003: 122). Missions appear to have largely retained their traditional core competence, epitomised in the political, economic and consular functions which involve information gathering and analysis, reporting, policy advocacy and alliance building, consular services and the overview of the whole spectrum of bilateral relations (Paschke, 2007; 2000; Rana, 2004). The latter applies mostly in the context of the EU where, even though heads of government and officials know each other
well and communicate directly with their communication facilitated by information technology, embassies retain their bilateral significance with the majority of their functions remaining unchallenged (Paschke, 2007; 2000; Rana, 2004).

Analyses which consider the embassies as retaining their traditional functions and remaining central in the conduct of foreign and international policy also suggest that they are growing in significance and scope with new functions being added in their structure and operation for purposes of adapting to contemporary demands (Rana, 2007). Rana (2007: 30-31) suggests that we are witnessing the *metamorphosis* of diplomatic networks whereby the aforementioned traditional functions constitute only a fraction of what overseas missions are expected to do today. Such suggestions are embraced by others who also view the embassies as growing in importance and extending their scope to new functions, stemming from public diplomacy and extensive business activity which have become the milestones of the missions’ operation (Paschke, 2007; Rana, 2004; US Department of State, 1999: 24; 26).

Notably, the commercial function has become more prominent than ever before given the present state of the international political economy. Commercial advocacy has always been central to the missions’ function but in the era of commerce without borders in a global market, on which national prosperity depends, it has been raised, for most missions, to their most important and urgent function (US Department of State, 1999: 28). With the overseas diplomatic network traditionally having been the ultimate governmental driver to boosting national economies and commerce, governments\(^1\) have prioritised the expansion of markets and attraction of investments on the missions’ agenda in order to contribute to the earnings of national treasuries (Sanders, 2010).

Metamorphosis assumptions, in which the concept of transformation is inherent, can be explained through institutionalist approaches. Institutionalist ‘*transformation as adaptation to operational environments*’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) helps us to understand the course of adaptation of overseas missions.

\(^1\) Such as the British government following the election of the coalition govt in May 2010 (newspaper references in FT)
diplomatic missions to their changing operational environment through reorganisation and change. Metamorphosis theses which herald a departure from the embassy in its traditional form are substantiated by evidence which describes embassies as transforming into ‘offshore government hubs’ or else a microcosm of government with the whole of government being represented abroad thus terminating the monopoly of the MFA in representation (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, 2009: 37). In this sense, the traditional embassy staffed by a core of foreign affairs officers augmented by attached specialists is being replaced in many cases by the diplomatic mission as an ‘offshore whole-of-government hub’ (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, March 2009: 37).

At the same time however, there are assumptions -relating to globalist approaches-according to which embassies are declining in significance due to the enhanced availability of instant electronic communications which have enabled a two-way exchange of information between governments, non-state actors and domestic and international publics (Garson, 2007: 212; Melissen, 2005) and thus ‘permanently altered the balance of power between foreign services and their political masters’ (Langhorne and Wallace, 1999: 17). Such observations also presented by Bátora (2008) are linked to arguments supporting processes of ‘disintermediation’ between one government and the other with the aid of IT and thus imply the decline of the embassy as the intermediary between governments.

And while it is widely acknowledged that embassies worldwide are confronted with challenges stemming from the pace at which technology and business processes evolve (CSIS Report, 2007: 12) public diplomacy, often linked to networking and lobbying, is viewed as becoming their number one priority as well as the main axis for their re-organisation (Paschke, 2000) which for Rana (2004) further substantiates the metamorphosis thesis. Public diplomacy, translated into promoting, explaining and putting across to the wider public the achievements and attractions of the state they represent has not only been added to the core political functions of embassies but has also transformed the understanding, promotion and conduct of other functions such as the promotion of businesses activity overseas, which, as mentioned above, has gained significant prominence (Paschke, 2000).
Public diplomacy, having become a core element of foreign policy (Cull, 2008: 17) and reflecting government strategy to influence the public over certain images, has become a top priority for missions abroad² (Srivihok, 2007: 66) and the main axis for their re-arrangement (Rana, 2007: 30-31; Melissen, 2005). However, even though public diplomacy has gained ground in a number of national foreign policy systems, governments seem to be at different stages in the evolution of their thinking on public diplomacy (Hemery, 2005: 196).

A number of states such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, the UK and the US have acknowledged its importance by initiating strategic and organisational reforms to their public diplomacy structures and processes. Such reforms involve, primarily, the reorganisation of their diplomatic network, the centralisation of the public diplomacy function either within the foreign ministry often under the Secretary General as in France and the UK (Rana, 2007: 30-31) or in a semi-autonomous authority, tightening public diplomacy strategy and messages, coordinating public diplomacy across stakeholder groups, providing additional resources and using the Internet and new media techniques such as Youtube, Flickr and Twitter (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, 2009: 31).

The usage of IT and media techniques have been also considered to transform the relationship between the missions and the foreign ministry. The foreign ministry, the foreign policy system’s core and the embassies, its nervous endings, are moving into a new relationship described by Rana (2007: 24) as ‘foreign ministry-embassy integration’. Germany is the epitome of promoting integration by creating a ‘single diplomatic network’ in place of the earlier conceptual division between the HQ and the field units. The innovative Paschke Report (2000) is one illustration of such evolution. The foreign ministry in Thailand has become the back office which supports the ‘Team Thailand’ overseas. Arguably, holistic approaches to foreign policy management and international policy coordination and integration abroad as well as between home and abroad cannot be achieved unless there is unity and integration at the HQ (Srivihok, 2007: 64).

² For instance for Thailand, promoting Thai-ness abroad was a core target around which missions were organised (Srivihok, 2007: 66).
Changes in the functions of the embassies with the addition of the function of public diplomacy which focuses on image promotion at the host country and in the relationship with the HQ has altered old notions of the embassy being merely a tool of policy implementation transmitted from the centre and attached renewed significance to the missions which are now more policy productive. Some countries, such as Canada, Germany and the UK have reorganised the functioning of their embassies on this premise. The 2000 Paschke report suggests that a significant amount of work such as dossier contributions and briefings for the minister, previously carried out by HQ staff, must be prepared by embassies. As a result the German Foreign Office has implemented such change which led to a gradual thinning of territorial units. Accepting that the bilateral embassy is in the best position to advise on relationship management, has drastically reduced staff in territorial departments redeploying HQ personnel for thematic tasks (Rana, 2007: 26-27). Austria and Canada also recognised this need and delegated more power to the envoy whereas others such as China, India and Japan are reluctant to use intranet fearing security leaks (Rana: 2007: 28).

Resources

Pressures for reorganising overseas missions have become more acute due to financial constraints inflicted on foreign offices (Paschke, 2000). Sensible employment of resources is at the heart of reorganisation efforts such as the case of Rice’s (2006) ‘transformational diplomacy’ which centres upon the rearrangement of the diplomatic network and reallocation of resources. Naturally however, although technological means make re-organisation of missions easier (Gyngell and Wesley, 2003: 124) no government is prepared to replace face-to-face diplomacy with technology despite the acute pressures stemming from world’s diminishing resources (US Department of State, 1999: 29).

Nonetheless, as human and financial resources remain scarce, governments have to find cheaper ways to maintain a network overseas and to think outside
of the box in making ‘maximum coverage with minimum resources’ (Srivihok, 2007: 64). In their revamping of the overseas mission for the purpose of managing diminishing resources while at the same time addressing contemporary demands governments have experimented with different organisational approaches.

Some states such as Australia, established micro-posts with only one diplomat located within existing Canadian missions. Canada was chosen because it runs a similar network as that of Australia (Gyngell and Wesley, 2003). Other models and experiments carried out in embassies involve *inter alia* non-resident ambassadors, concurrent accreditation method with a senior ambassador responsible for a number of countries, ‘joint ambassadors’, and thinning out embassies by cutting staff and offering positions to Locally Engaged Staff (LES) (Rana, 2007: 30-31). Missions nowadays rely on LES who provide valuable local knowledge, contacts, language capabilities and continuity of service within missions (CSIS Report, 2007: 12; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2007: 16; Gyngell and Wesley, 2003: 121).

Other experimental schemes for addressing contemporary demands focus on business promotion and management, such as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) scheme initiated by the Thai Government. The CEO scheme is based on the application of a business model to the Thai bureaucratic system for the purpose of pushing forward Thai competitiveness and strategies in an integrated approach by shifting the emphasis towards leadership and teamwork, shared vision, mission and strategy. The CEO scheme has reshaped the operation of numerous embassies which now work under the leadership of the CEO ambassador (Shrivihok, 2007: 62-65). Other governments - such as the British and Chinese - integrate business and politics by appointing businessmen to key ambassadorial posts (Sanders, 2010).

3 Where the ambassador is based at home like in Singapore and Malta
4 Used by the nine Eastern Caribbean state groups OECS or co-location as performed by some EU states as well as Nordic states
5 For instance Australia has handed over the jobs of trade commissioners in its consulates to qualified local personnel on the premise that they know best how to promote exports to the US market.
6 For more on the CEO scheme see Srivihok (2007: 62-65)
7 The Chinese government in 2009 appointed a businessman as an ambassador in Athens
Evaluation and training

And whilst it is widely recognised that the overseas network constitutes the main driver for the promotion of national interests abroad, diplomatic missions face scrutiny over their performance and value (Rana, 2004: 22). Systems for evaluating performance have been introduced with one of the most common devices, popular in 1990s, being annual action plans produced by the missions. A few foreign policy systems have adopted ISO\textsuperscript{8} 9000 certification for the services they provide while others, such as Singapore, adopted ‘fast-track’ policies with an appraisal model borrowed from Shell\textsuperscript{9}. Linked to performance evaluation are selection procedures and diplomatic training. Changing curricula in diplomatic academies also appear to form a trend. With regards to selection procedures, most Western countries including Peru and Brazil, apply in-service exams and rigorous interviews in order to identify the best talent. Some require officials to apply for senior positions and failure to achieve this over the years can mean an exit, under ‘up-or-out’ formulas. At the other end of the scale however, some countries like India and Japan stick to seniority with unsatisfactory results (Rana, 2007: 35).

With regards to diplomatic training, as the world political system is in transition moving from hierarchical modes of operation and organisation towards networks between people and institutions similarly diplomatic training regimes appear to be in transition by adapting to such changes with increasing attention paid to public diplomacy (Kummer, 2007: 184-185; Hemery, 2005: 196). In their attempt to modernise overseas missions a number of foreign policy systems, such as the American and the British, have incorporated public diplomacy training in their curriculum (Hemery, 2005: 203). Other foreign policy systems have a tradition of continuous training and skills enhancing workshops, such as in Canada and the US which are also leading in e-learning (Rana, 2007: 36).

Other countries, such as France, Germany, Japan, Russia and the UK rely on additional means such as annual conferences of all ambassadors, convened in the capital, usually coinciding with annual leave so as to economise on travel

\textsuperscript{8} International Standardisation Organisation

\textsuperscript{9} For a detailed account on evaluation techniques see Rana (2004)
cost (Rana, 2004: 167). Diplomatic training is indicative of the ways in which foreign policy machineries perceive world politics as it reflects the skills that the machinery deems necessary for its diplomats in order to represent the government overseas. And even though diplomatic training regimes vary for instance, according to governments’ evolution of their thinking on public diplomacy (Hemery, 2005: 196), there are certain challenges posed to contemporary diplomats which appear to be applicable universally.

The changing role of diplomats: towards holistic approaches

A central aspect of the public diplomacy debate, which as previously mentioned, constitutes a continuing theme regarding embassy transformation arguments, relates to the impact that it is having on national diplomatic systems as well as to the broader discussion on the role and future of professional diplomats (Hocking, 2005: 40). One of the most significant functions of contemporary diplomats is ‘outreach’ which Hocking (2005: 40) views as central to any self-respecting diplomat’s duties. This function however as the author stresses takes the diplomatic profession to a new direction which places new demands on diplomats but at the same time affirms their significance.

Traditionally, diplomacy has been conducted by career diplomats who tended to operate ‘as members of an elite global club with its own rules and protocols\textsuperscript{10} […] mostly concerned with government to government relationships’ (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, 2009: 38). The role of the ambassador conventionally identified with presenting and explaining national foreign policy interests to overseas counterparts, is now being transformed to a communicator of all national policy sections to publics of the host country.

In order to achieve this, the ambassador ‘must build up and cultivate a dense and stable network of contacts in all areas of society [...] a great deal of which depends on his personal communication skills which he should have the

\textsuperscript{10} For a historical account of the role of the ambassador see Rana, K, (2004), The 21st century ambassador: plenipotentiary to chief executive
opportunity to train and refine’ (Paschke, 2000, Recommendation no. 1). Srivihok (2007: 63) describes the diplomat as ‘a door-knocker or pathfinder who utilizes his professionalism in establishing a close relationship with foreign countries’. It becomes obvious that in the increasingly complex international public policy environment traditional diplomats staffed only with traditional diplomatic skills are no longer sufficient (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, March 2009: 37).

The new diplomat is perceived as an active force in advancing national interests rather than merely gathering and transmitting information. For this purpose they must be comfortable with the latest technologies and with interacting with non-governmental actors and people from a variety of backgrounds and prepared for new types of assignments outside the confines of the embassy (CSIS Report, 2007: 8; 11; Kummer, 2007: 182). Diplomats, inter alia, have to become familiar with serving direct intergovernmental contacts with foreign publics which are translated into collaboration with local expertise inside and outside the embassy (Melissen, 2005: 22). Kummer (2007: 182) suggests that ‘interaction with new stakeholders requires an adaptation to a different professional culture’ whereby the necessary skills are political diplomacy, economic diplomacy and media-image-public diplomacy11 (Rana, 2004: 170).

Diplomats, representing a wider spectrum of policy than ever before, need to have a holistic approach to foreign policy and diplomacy, the so called ‘broad-band’ approach, which is necessary to cope with the blurred internal-external boundaries in policy making (Rana, 2004: 171) so as to reflect systemic change (Srivihok, 2007: 63). This becomes necessary with ambassadors being viewed as assisting the PM in carrying out overseas governmental policy in its entirety (Srivihok, 2007: 63). The Blue Ribbon Report (2009: 38) describes the 21st century diplomat as a skilled and expert individual who is able to work across traditional policy divides and levels of government.

The ambassador has grown in vocation as the ‘relationship manager’ in the country of assignment. Ambassadors are the country’s best resource in terms

11 For an analysis of the required diplomatic skills see Rana (2004)
of bilateral relationships. As Rana (2004: 33) explains, no territorial division or bureau in the MFA is able to keep track of sectoral activity of the actions of technical ministries and other actors in the target country. With embassies becoming a microcosm of the government the ambassador becomes the leader and manager of a diverse group of employees who work together in a host country (US Department of State, 1999: 31). Thus ambassadors and generally diplomats are required to perform strategic and managerial roles in addition to their traditional competencies of representation and negotiation (Srivihok, 2007: 63). In other words, ‘the ambassador’s plenipotentiary powers heading the envoy have long withered away. [...] today an appropriate analogy for the ambassador is the chief executive of a country unit of a transnational enterprise’ (Rana, 2004: 36).

Rana (2004: 24, 36) argues that the chief executive analogy brings value added as it sheds the baggage of pomp manifest in ceremonial and ritual which are globally decreasing and concentrates on the promotion, outreach, negotiation, feedback, management, and servicing functions; described as the six principal functions of contemporary diplomacy. The ambassador as a CEO argument is closely linked to the aforementioned assumptions of the transformation of the embassies (Paschke, 2007). Nevertheless, the evolution in the understanding of the new diplomat’s role as well as state responses to systemic change varies significantly.

**The rise of consular affairs**

In the wider discussion concerning the diplomatic missions’ transformation, the rise of consular affairs constitutes a key theme. Consular affairs, once considered as a second-class activity for ministries and diplomats and having received lukewarm responses on behalf of officials who considered consular affairs outside the realm of diplomacy, have climbed up the governmental agenda (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2007: 4). Globalisation processes and changing patterns of tourism, business transactions, cross-border crime, international terrorism and natural disasters account for a rise in consular
services demands in nearly every country in the world (US Department of State, 1999: 24).

Citizens’ wellbeing and distress abroad are firmly on the diplomatic agenda and foreign ministries acknowledge that part of their overseas network’s mission is to deliver services to their citizens with such services having a direct impact on the foreign ministry’s reputation at home. This is because consular matters are seen as ‘diplomacy for people’ and they tend to get more news coverage than other foreign affairs issues. As a result, the reputation of the foreign ministry at home depends on assisting citizens because people evaluate the work of the foreign ministry, if not of the whole government, based on their experience with consular offices (Rikmunas, 2007: 186).

This new reality has not escaped senior management in foreign ministries which has moved consular affairs higher up on the foreign affairs agenda. Even though consulates and consular affairs are not directly involved in government to government interaction (Gyngell and Wesley, 2003: 122) they receive attention to the highest level (Heijmans and Melissen, 2007: 192-193; US Department of State, 1999: 24) thus heralding the strengthening nexus between diplomacy and society, or else a trend towards the ‘societization’ of diplomacy (Heijmans and Melissen, 2007: 193). Foreign ministries often request reviews of consular services and have tried to boost their performance in various ways including the involvement of more diplomatic staff (Heijmans and Melissen, 2007: 198). In several countries consular experience has become a prerequisite for diplomats and in Japan, Canada, Peru and the UK special career paths have been developed for diplomats to gain experience in the consular field.

Globalisation, in all its aspects and with all its consequences is considered as the overall cause for the growing emphasis on consular affairs and dictates new roles for consulates which are increasingly seen as an integral part of the diplomatic network (Heijmans and Melissen, 2007: 199; 201-202). Speaking in institutionalist terms, the new emphasis on consular affairs constitutes an institutional response to the increasing demands of government assistance to citizens abroad and at the same time the recognition that consular affairs are
part of a wider phenomenon affecting foreign ministries (Heijmans and Melissen, 2007:197).

In the UK, consular services to British nationals abroad, in normal times and in times of crises become part of the FCO’s overall purpose and one of the ten strategic priorities across the whole of government (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2007: 6). In Lithuania, part of the governmental strategy is to re-organise consular services by re-allocating human and other resources (Rikmunas, 2007: 188). Consular cooperation between countries is also increasing as well as with organisations and stakeholders in the field. Outside the government cooperation with NGOs and private companies is essential in delivering the high standard of consular services demanded by the public (Heijmans and Melissen, 2007: 201-202). Delivering high standard services to nationals and promoting governmental policies overseas have become the top priority of national diplomatic networks.

The previous sections briefly presented some of the main themes that occur in the exploration of governmental revamping of overseas diplomatic networks. Such themes involve the re-organisation of embassies and other diplomatic missions around the functions of economic and public diplomacy, the rise of consular affairs and the changing role of contemporary diplomats. Evidence suggests that the embassy, as the key agent of the diplomatic network undergoes significant change and re-organisation in the course of a process of adaptation in order to maintain its relevance in the transforming of world politics. Given that the change and adaptation of diplomatic overseas missions have to be seen through the prism of their evolving function and role (Hocking and Bátora, 2009: 166) and with institutionalist thinking explaining the course of adaptation of institutions on the basis of their nature the following sections will shed some light on the character, functions and roles of the Greek diplomatic network.

12 The Lithuanian consular services re-organisation model was characterised by a qualitative and quantitative stream of change and reform which was based on training and quality improvement and redistribution of resources respectively. For more on this model see Rikmunas (2007).
The Greek diplomatic network

The Greek diplomatic network as estimated in 2007 (Karabarbounis, 2007: 223) comprises 86 embassies, 63 consulates and 9 main permanent representations such as the PeRepGr, the Greek Permanent Representation to the Western Union, NATO and others while there are also a small number of small ad hoc and revocable missions which vary according to specific demands. And whilst the embassies and consulates were considered to be the key overseas actors, the 32 press and communications offices (PCO) and the 52 economic and commercial offices (ECO or OEY in Greek), have come to constitute equally crucial components of this network (Interview, no 50). The Greek diplomatic network, classified as medium in size and capability has expanded significantly in the last three decades as a response to the changing international conditions (Interview, no 3; 25; 26; 49).

The post-Cold War world led to the proliferation of states that Greece cooperates with politically and economically, and together with the increased needs for diplomatic representation within the EU triggered an explosion in the number of Greek overseas missions. Greece has extended its network of embassies to newly emergent states such as Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia (Interview, no 13). In addition, Greece strengthened its existing diplomatic network with new offices and personnel in Kuwait, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Israel (Karabarbounis, 2007: 200) with an emphasis on economic and commercial offices especially towards the Middle East and Asia (Interview, no 28). Similar expansion is documented in the consular network, despite views which support their diminishing significance Karabarbounis, 2007: 203). Table 5.1 demonstrates the opening of embassies and consulates in the last three and a half decades.

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13 There are 13 additional embassies which have suspended operation without being abolished
15 See MFA’s AGORA portal to International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation http://www.agora.mfa.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnod=64&clang=1
The number of commercial offices has been reduced from 42 to 32 due to Greek government’s cuts
16 For a more detailed account of the locations of new embassies see Karabarbounis (2007: 203)
Figure 5.1 EXPANSION OF THE GREEK DIPLOMATIC NETWORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Institution opening</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Johannesburg (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Dortmund (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Korce (Albania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Luxembourg, United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Los Angeles (California), Houston (Texas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Vatican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Peru, Chile, South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Gjirokastra (Albania), Brussels (Belgium), Vienna (Austria), Durban (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Odessa (Ukraine), Leipzig (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Slovenia and Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Podgorica (Montenegro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Slovakia, Bosnia/Herzegovina and Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Sofia (Bulgaria), Konstanz (Germany), Petersburg (Russia), Novorossiysk (Russia), Marioupoli (Ukraine), Hong Kong (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Belgrade (Serbia), Nis (Serbia), Moscow (Russia), Shanghai (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Taba (Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consulate</td>
<td>Guangzhou (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expansion of the Greek consular network has been mostly oriented, for political purposes, towards the Balkans and the countries that emerged after the break-up of the Soviet Union (Karabarbourinis, 2007: 203) whereas significant expansion also took place in Western Europe for purposes of serving large Greek populations (Interview, no 45). Naturally, the significance of location infuses a certain character to the missions, which is manifest in their organisational arrangement. For instance, a Greek embassy in Brazil differs in complexity and concentration of diplomatic staff to the Greek to Greek embassy in Washington DC or Turkey. The latter two have a highly political character as well as representation from a number of domestic departments. Greek diplomatic staff have emphatically argued that the given ongoing Greek national security issues are embedded in the contemporary image of the Greek
diplomatic network thus determining its fabric (Interview no, 5; 13; 26; 30; 39; 41; 42; 43; 44; 48; 49). More specifically, an official in London (Interview, no 48) argued

‘The fact that Greece has such major national security issues at stake determines its overseas representation. Political representation is dense at key posts such as Ankara, Skopje and Washington whereas secondments from home ministries are of secondary importance’.

More specifically, the structure of Greek overseas representation has been the outgrowth of Greek traditional and persistent foreign policy concerns such as negotiations of the continental shelf and security issues with Turkey. Naturally, such preoccupations have led to increased demands for secrecy and control which contribute to centralised and hierarchical practices and organisation as well as diplomatic staff engrained with high levels of confidentiality and political responsibility (Interview, no 30).

The persistence of military preparedness and geopolitical balances of power in Greek foreign policy, as discussed in chapter two, infused a number of Greek embassies and other missions with what is considered as an excessive political substance. This characterises their character and composition in locations such as in Washington, Ankara, London, Paris and Berlin where Greek embassies are programmed to exercise political leverage for purposes of promoting key strategic stakes concerning Greek security issues (Interview, no 30; 48). For these and other reasons elaborated below, Greek missions have been described as traditional and conventional (Interview, no 30) and as corresponding to a ‘Westphalian state model’ in terms of organisational arrangement, instead of being tuned to globalisation (Papkonstantinou, date not available: 24).

Recently however, the re-shuffling and re-deployment of available Greek diplomatic capital became a top priority of Greek governments for purposes of promoting Greek foreign policy with a proclaimed emphasis on Greek economic diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Extracts from FM, 2006; Interview, no 23; 28; 45).
‘Economic diplomacy has become the main priority of the government and huge importance has been attached to it which becomes evident with the institutional changes introduced such as the transfer of the competence of economic diplomacy to the MFA together with the respective bureaucracy including overseas missions’ (Interview, no 37).

This shift was materialised with the 2007 Charter which added economic substance to Greece’s international relations by integrating economic and commercial offices into Greek embassies, altered the diplomatic academy’s curriculum in this direction and heralded a change in the role of the Greek diplomat towards more integrated approaches discussed below. These changes were proclaimed by the Greek political leadership (MFA Report, Bakoyianni Address, 2009) with the aim to reform the Greek diplomatic service and turn it into a strong, flexible and effective tool for the strengthening of Greece’s international position. The diplomatic service from a tool of foreign policy implementation is now envisaged as a ‘force multiplier’, a deterrent and at the same time a ‘producer of wealth’ for the national economy (MFA Report, Bakoyianni Address, 2009). Such attitudinal change is reflected in recent demands for enhanced diplomatic representation and the performance of certain functions overseas whilst at the same time constituted evidence that the significance of the overseas diplomatic network is in a process of being re-affirmed (Interview, no 30).

Greek diplomats acknowledge that demands faced by Greek diplomatic missions are closely linked to globalisation and regionalisation which have not only expanded the geographic scope and reach of Greek international engagement but have also brought forward an unprecedented growth in Greek social, political and economic interests in areas such as the Middle East and Asia as well as within the EU and the southern Balkans.

This growth has also contributed to the increase of Greek business and politico-economic transactions abroad and cooperation with a number of new stakeholders (Interview, no 31). This is translated into Greek nationals and businesses operating overseas thus creating needs for representation and
support. And even though the new extended economic reach of Greece creates much needed financial opportunities it also means that the government needs to realign its diplomatic resources with Greek commercial interests. As a result, the aforementioned process of change, network expansion and relocation of resources has been triggered (Interview, no 13).

A compartmentalised model of representation

Greek diplomatic missions overseas are headed by the ambassador and postings constitute career appointments within the MFA’s diplomatic service. Press, commerce, defence and other specialists and their offices are accountable to the embassy or where there is no embassy to the general consulate. According to Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris (1997: 119) the traditional role of Greek missions is centred upon the following:

- Representation and promotion of Greek interests overseas
- Information gathering, analysis and channelling to the HQ
- Transfer, promotion and explanation of Greek national positions to overseas leaders

The functions of overseas diplomatic missions involve military, economic, commercial and cultural affairs (Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 119) with commercial issues recently rising to the top of the governmental foreign policy agenda following the incorporation of economic diplomacy in the MFA’s structure (Interview, no 13; 23; 28; 30). A very characteristic element in the structure of overseas missions is that there has traditionally existed an insulation of the various competences which becomes manifest in their organisation. More specifically, the various competences such as economic diplomacy, public diplomacy, traditional political diplomacy and cultural affairs have been distinct in that they correspond to different organisational structural units and are performed by different bureaucratic sections.

For instance, embassies are largely in charge of political affairs and staffed with diplomats who graduate from the MFA’s diplomatic academy, whereas
economic diplomacy is performed by economic and commercial attachés who are graduates of the National School of Public Administration (NSPA)\textsuperscript{17} and staff separate economic and commercial offices (usually but not always attached to Greek embassies) which were previously responsible to the MNEC but transferred with the 2007 Charter to the MFA.

In turn, public diplomacy is allocated to the section of information and press attachés, also graduates of the NSPA but accountable to the General Secretariat of Information and Communication under the Ministry of Interior and finally, cultural affairs, which either fall within consulates’ remit or constitute the subject of cultural experts who are either attached to the embassies or other overseas missions and are usually independent consultants. This fragmentation in structure and operation provides evidence for a compartmentalised approach to the management of foreign policy which contrasts with contemporary trends focusing on integrated approaches.

Compartmentalisation in diplomatic representation follows the organisational model of foreign policy at home. Chapter four presented the current structure of the MFA which is the product of centralisation of a number of competences translating to number of vertical and hierarchical pillars which correspond to distinct divisions of foreign policy, namely political, technical/sectoral and economic. This ‘pillarisation’ becomes also manifest and characteristic in the model of overseas diplomatic representation which is based on the compartmentalisation of the management of foreign policy effectively mirrored in the allocation of certain functions - political, economic and recently public diplomacy into respective sections of foreign policy bureaucracy (Interview, no 30).

Not only does this organisational model perpetuate the distinction between political and economic/sectoral affairs but it also prevents integrated approaches to foreign policy management (Interview, no 30). This has major implications for the role of Greek diplomats but also for the operation of Greek foreign policy bureaucracy in its entirety. With globalisation and regionalisation bringing to the foreign policy machinery issues that cut across policy domains

\textsuperscript{17} http://www.ekdd.gr/esdd/index.php
and are impossible to order neatly along vertical organisational units there have emerged a number of grey areas at their interface which cannot be addressed by the insulated fractions of Greek foreign policy bureaucracy. Naturally, this leads to bureaucratic overlaps and waste of resources (Interview, no 30).

Organisational compartmentalisation promotes equal rigidity and unilateralism in recruitment with only given sections of bureaucracy being able to staff some overseas posts and to carry out certain overseas functions. Effectively, this phenomenon results in the insulation of parts of the foreign policy bureaucracy which is translated into different career paths and employment law. Traditionally, the diplomatic network in its entirety had been ‘trichotomised’, effectively being split into three main parts: the HQ, the embassies and the consulates whilst an additional distinction applies to the press, economic and cultural offices overseas.

All aforementioned branches operated separately with their own rules of recruitment, promotions, transfers and career paths. Recently, the division of the three former parts of the diplomatic network has been abolished and movement of staff between different sections is allowed and lately encouraged, with the only exception being the entry qualifications of staff to the various sectors (Karabarbounis, 2007: 221-222). It is not surprising that such insulation has prevented to a large extent missions – HQ integration.

The role of Greek embassies: ‘sticky’ or transforming?

Greek embassies are headed and managed by MFA civil servants of ambassadorial rank or when necessary by the next diplomat in rank or the consul-general in locations where there is a consulate-general. Greek presence overseas however is materialised through a range of officials who carry out specialist roles such as military, cultural, agricultural, educational attachés and others, all accountable to the ambassador head of mission. A typical embassy
comprises the head of mission who is a diplomat of ambassadorial rank\textsuperscript{18}, their assistant who is also a diplomat and in charge of the running of the embassy and one or two diplomats (a counsellor and a secretary) who are in charge of the political office of the embassy which assesses and evaluates the local political situation (Interview, no 49).

In addition there is usually a press office attached to the embassy as well as an economic and commercial office, the significance of which has grown over the last few years. This is because the competence of economic offices from bilateral has become multilateral and thus their scope has widened significantly (Varvarousis, 1983: 119-120). There is also always a defence attaché and at least one representative from the Greek police (Interview, no 47).

Embassies such as those in Washington, London, Paris and Ankara constitute the epitome of multi-representation by Greek standards and their extended structure involves attachés for cultural, tourist, educational, commercial and maritime affairs, as well as Hellenic Air Force and Hellenic Army attachés. This however constitutes an exceptional structure which cannot be applied to many locations due to financial constraints (Interview, no 47; 48; 49). In the last year or two there has been a tendency for a number of embassy staff to be recalled back to the centre in Athens due to the Greek financial crisis but this is believed to be an ad hoc measure rather than indicative of significant structural change (Interview, no 47).

Greek embassies largely do not present evidence for a case of diverse representation from the whole of government and are far from being described as off-shore governmental hubs. The extension in functions and scope emanating from processes of globalisation and regionalisation are not accompanied by respective secondment of experts from home departments but rather involve the changing job description of existing embassy diplomatic staff. As a result, Greek embassies do not resemble models of embassy organisation whereby patterns of ‘whole of government’ representation are observed, prescribing what Bátora and Hocking (2009) have termed as ‘domestication of

\textsuperscript{18} The MFA Charter provides for the assumption of the post of the head of mission from junior diplomats or even from people outside the service for purposes of facilitating movement within the service and carrying out governmental policies more effectively
embassies’ (Interview, no 47; 48; 49). In this light, arguments suggesting the ‘metamorphosis’ of embassies on the grounds of their transformation into hubs of intensified domestic representation do not seem to apply to the Greek case.

Rather, adaptation to contemporary demands is demonstrated within existing organisational arrangements and through the expansion of involvement of existing diplomatic staff in various new areas of international policy. More specifically, younger diplomats are placed in charge of an extended spectrum of issues ranging from migration, to environment, business and consular affairs thus creating a new generation of Greek diplomats\(^\text{19}\) discussed in the following section (Interview, no 49). Evidently, despite the unprecedented widening of the policy areas that Greek embassies are confronted with (Interview, no 25; 26; 47; 48) their organisational structure remains fundamentally unaltered in contrast to their expanding functions (Interview no 47; 48; 49).

In institutionalist terms this could mean that a certain degree of isomorphism or else adaptation to operational environments for the purpose of ensuring survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) takes place but with given constraints prescribed by national organisational traditions which form part of the national foreign policy system (Clarke and White, 1981; 1989). With the chosen course of action, embassies manage to experiment with their extended competence and as Meyer and Rowan (1991: 41) suggest for organisations in general, they are ‘increasing their legitimacy [...] independent of the immediate efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures.’

In the wider discussion of whether the role of embassies is transformative or residual (Bátora and Hocking, 2009) an interesting point emerged with regards to the functions of Greek embassies which concerns economic diplomacy, the newly added function of the MFA. In seeking to explore the implications of this extended MFA function for the Greek embassies, interviews (no 11; 43; 47; 48) revealed that the absorption of the competence of economic diplomacy from the MFA so far has had less impact upon the organisation of Greek embassies and more upon the role and future of Greek diplomats. This is because economic diplomacy albeit having been promoted to the central pillar of Greek foreign

\(^{19}\) This is also due to understaffing
policy, not only remains under the control of the economic and commercial offices but is also threatened as a partial embassy function from alternative sources of information provided by IT. A diplomat in London (Interview, no 48) argued

‘Economic diplomacy may have been recently proclaimed by the government to have become the main pillar of Greek foreign policy but its implications for the organisation of Greek embassies and other missions has been largely overestimated. This is because, economic diplomacy in the Greek context really refers to commercial diplomacy which has been there forever and constituted the main function of the economic and commercial offices. Not only does this function not constitute a new addition to the Greek diplomatic network but if there is one function which is under threat from IT then this is it. This is because the embassy has no time or capability to monitor global business trends. Business transactions are beyond the capacity of the Greek embassy the way it currently stands.’

Arguably, in the era of direct communication, Greek officials anticipate that stakeholders and businesses will rely less and less on embassies for economic information, if they ever did. Instead, stakeholders have direct online access to governmental figures and statistics and maintain connections with networks as well as recruiting their own economic experts and advisors thus outnumbering the handful of diplomats in embassies who struggle to catch up with developments in global economic affairs (Interview, no 48).

The interviewee (no 48) stressed that it is common practice for Greek business missions to visit certain countries without notifying Greek embassies, which are informed about the visit after the mission has returned home. This is because such business missions, which may often support the PM’s business trips, rely on expert economic consultants which are to be found outside the Greek diplomatic network. As a result, Greek diplomats feel that if there are elements indicating the disintermediation of Greek embassies then those elements have so far belonged to the realm of economic diplomacy and are far from affecting
the embassies’ political functions which are very crucial for Greece (Interview, no 48).

In terms of communication between the overseas diplomatic missions and Athens the MFA constitutes the ultimate linkage. Communication is channelled through the MFA and only if and when the issue at hand concerns strictly another governmental department will direct communication with respective departments take place. Direct communication is encouraged for the purposes of saving time and resources however, it rarely happens (Interview, no 26).

In the last decade, a closer relationship has been fostered between embassies and the HQ summarised in mutual understanding and shared ways of operating under pressure, facilitated by a continuous, safe and circular communication loop between the two (Interview, no 26). However, this does not necessarily imply the increase in the missions’ input in the foreign policy process.

The role of Greek embassies has been largely defined in political terms. This is because they identified as negotiators and promoters of Greek national security stakes, due to the ongoing Greek security problems. Recently, however, embassies have acknowledged that they are confronted with an expanding spectrum of policies which has implications for their mandate. This shift gradually makes them shed their traditional profile relating to the management of issues linked to Greek territorial integrity and urges them instead to develop skills and knowledge that are necessary for managing international policy in more multilateral fora. This expansion stems from the intertwined processes of globalisation and regionalisation which brought to the Greek embassies’ agenda issues such as migration, climate change, international cooperation, finance and others (Interview, no 3; 8; 12; 13; 26; 27; 30; 31; 42; 43; 47; 48; 49). A diplomat in Brussels (Interview, no 26) argued that:

‘The scope and reach of our [embassies’] functions have widened so much that we are not yet fully aware of what new areas have been brought to us. Until less than two decades ago, Greek diplomats could not even imagine the extent of the complications and policy areas that globalisation and membership to the EU would bring about. Change has been and is exponential. If one thinks that the
diplomatic service has to reflect the constantly changing anatomy of the international environment then one can understand that in embassies we are in a constant struggle to comprehend and respond to issues of supranational, multilateral and bilateral significance about which we have no prior experience’.

Embassies within the EU and especially the embassy in Brussels are today significantly aided by the PeRepGr which undertakes a large part of their multilateral competence (Interview, no 26). With regards to assumptions which view the role of the embassies as diminishing, evidence suggests that Greek embassies’ bilateral significance has been receding. However, it is increasing in political significance especially within the EU framework. This is because bilateral issues are shrinking as they now become of supranational significance and are dealt with in multilateral fora or are transferred to EU institutions. Therefore, Greek embassies in the EU are largely stripped from multilateral issues and limited to bilateral issues thus becoming in a way more ‘traditional’ as those issues revolve around Greek territorial concerns and security issues (Interview, no 26). A diplomat in the Greek embassy in Brussels argued (Interview, no 26)

‘The role of the embassies is being mutated in a way analogous to the deepening and integration of European relations. The greater the deepening the more we go back to what we were before joining the Union. This mutation and change is ongoing and shows no sign of ending. We have to think seriously about the overall future of Greek bilateral and other missions.’

The issue of traditionalism occurred several times in the discussion, not only with regard to the nature of the foreign policy priorities for Greek embassies but also with regards to their organisational culture and operation. Varvarousis (1983: 145) argued that the operation and culture of Greek embassies is closely related to their very ‘raison d’être’. If one considers that in many cases the

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20 Which is small as far as both the number of diplomats and the officials seconded by other government departments are concerned in comparison to its significance of location. Its small size can be explained with the proximity of the PeRepGr which undertakes representation and management of multilateral international issues.
rationale for the set-up of Greek missions has been highly political revolving around the international projection of Greek ongoing security problems or highly commercial, then the traditional and hierarchical character of Greek embassies may be more easily explained (Interview, no 30).

**Persistence of hierarchy in embassy organisation and operation**

The maintenance of hierarchy in the operation of Greek embassies constitutes an end in itself for purposes of maintaining order (Interview, no 47; 48; 49) and is manifest in a number of ways ranging from the processing of issues within the embassy to maintaining the protocol and communication. For instance, junior diplomats are often discouraged from expressing their views or suggesting recommendations to their seniors and ambassadors or heads of missions and thus ‘corrective feedback’ which could possibly change ineffective practices is normally out of the equation (Interview, no 30; 48; 49). In turn, senior diplomats are often in a position whereby expressing their views to the political leadership and having an input to the foreign policy process is discouraged. As an embassy counsellor (Interview, no 46) argued: ‘Greek diplomats are castrated; junior and senior alike’.

Such hierarchical practices have elevated the head of mission, the ambassador, to the position of the government’s confidant and relegated the rest of the mission to policy execution which is commonly detached from government policy (Interview, no 30). Such arguments reaffirmed Greek literature which describe the Greek head of mission as a ‘junior prime minister’ (Stoforopoulos and Makridimitris, 1997: 137) and the rest of envoy as policy implementation bodies (Griva, 2008: 428).

Evidently, Greek embassies remain very hierarchical and traditional in their operation and the widening spectrum of policy preoccupations, as previously mentioned, appears to have altered the job of Greek diplomats rather than their very organisation. By applying institutionalist approaches in explaining such evidence, one could presume that the course of change and adaptation demonstrated by Greek embassies discussed in the previous sections is
significantly conditioned by certain prior organisational and operational practices such as hierarchy and traditionalism. Naturally, such practices present an adaptation course on behalf of Greek embassies which conforms to ‘stickiness’ to prior *modi operandi* and organisational arrangements.

Traditionally concerned with government to government relations, Greek embassies have recently started to realise that intensive involvement with local publics is essential for the promotion of Greek interests abroad (Interview, no 17; 48; 45). Greek embassies generally have a good record of maintaining excellent relations with host countries and are in a process of enhancing cooperation with NGOs and national civil societies. Part of the Greek embassies’ current strategy, which has become urgent in the face of the Greek economic crisis, is to develop a horizontal network of partners and to extend their reach and influence to foreign audiences (Interview, no 28; 45; 48).

However, despite the added emphasis on increased cooperation with civil society and the widening spectrum of policies that constitute embassies’ contemporary preoccupations, public diplomacy is still far from constituting a central function of Greek embassies never mind a central axis for their re-organisation. Public diplomacy is assigned instead to the press and communication offices discussed in the following section (Interview, no 26; 28; 30; 32; 47; 48; 49; 50).

Public Diplomacy: at the interface of the MFA and the Press and Communication Offices

Public diplomacy was described in the introductory sections as becoming a strategic priority for a number of Western European states overarching the whole spectrum of their embassies’ functions, political, cultural and economic alike (Srivihok, 2007: 66; Paschke, 2000). More specifically, public diplomacy constitutes the gist of the ‘embassy transformation’ argument with its prominence as a core element of foreign policy having been enhanced (Cull, 21 Further thinking and exploration must take place with regards to global civil society
2008: 17) and with IT having altered the channels of communication between
governments, non-state actors and foreign and domestic audiences (Garson,
2007: 212; Melissen, 2005).

Despite bewilderment in distinguishing cultural from public diplomacy
and discrepancy in the stages of evolution in their thinking on public diplomacy
(Hemery, 2005: 196) governments have taken various steps to rearrange their
public diplomacy structures and processes. Such steps revolve involve
reorganising their diplomatic network, centralising public diplomacy function
either within the foreign ministry, frequently under the Secretary General or in a
semi-autonomous authority, tightening public diplomacy strategy and
messages, coordinating public diplomacy across stakeholder groups, providing
additional resources and using the internet and new media techniques such as
Youtube, Flickr and Twitter (Blue Ribbon Panel Report, 2009: 31). With the
aforementioned taken into consideration this section will focus on the ways in
which the function of PD is organised in Greece.

Public diplomacy in Greece has become an issue of a certain priority only after
2005 (Interview, no 17; 36) and hitherto public diplomacy initiatives and
attempts have been ad hoc and sporadic (Interview, no 35). Unlike in other
states, in Greece there has been neither a dedicated consultant attached to the
PM nor an independent agent for public diplomacy (Interview, no 34; 35; 36;
50). The competence has been allocated to the existing section of press and
communication attachés and their Press and Communication Offices (PCOs)
which are accountable to the General Secretariat for Communication and
Information which belongs to the Ministry of Interior. When discussing the
Greek model for public diplomacy a press officer stated ironically (Interview, no
50):

\[\text{Public diplomacy must be misunderstood as being different from cultural diplomacy which is}
\text{often mistaken for. Culture diplomacy, also central to the missions’ functions is regaining}
\text{importance as a prime example of soft power or the ability to persuade through culture, values}
\text{and ideas. For more see Schneider, 2005: 147. Cultural diplomacy involves a wide range of}
\text{concepts and priorities such as the promotion of human rights, the spread of democratic values,}
\text{a nation’s research, thinking and national debate one could argue that public diplomacy can}
\text{be seen as closer to cultural diplomacy than national branding or propaganda, that is usually}
\text{associated with (Melissen 2005: 22).}
\]

\[\text{For instance for Thailand, promoting Thai-ness abroad was a core target around which}
\text{missions were organised (Shrivhok, 2007: 66).}\]
‘We managed to introduce an innovation with regards to organisational arrangements for public diplomacy. Greece is the only country in the world where public diplomacy is so uncoordinated and removed from the MFA and allocated to a section other than the MFA’s diplomats i.e. the press and communication attachés.’

Arguably, the competence of public diplomacy was awkwardly assigned to PCOs, which albeit an integral part of the Greek diplomatic network, are accountable to the General Secretariat for Communication and Information (GSCI)\(^23\) (Interview, no 50). Even though in theory the competence of public diplomacy is co-shared between the MFA’s Service for Information and Public Diplomacy\(^24\) and the GSCI\(^25\) effectively, the former is restricted to presenting foreign policy and other national positions to Greek journalists mainly for domestic consumption whilst performance of public diplomacy overseas is managed by the latter through a network of 36 Press PCOs\(^26\) which as part of the Greek diplomatic network usually cohabitate with Greek embassies.

This bipolarity confuses responsibility and creates overlaps between the MFA and GSCI with the former having maintained a passive role in the competence and the latter, which operates without central strategy from the MFA or the political leadership, leaving all public diplomacy responsibility in the hands of the limited number of press officers overseas who operate without instructions. The lack of instructions, strategic planning and central organisation and coordination, with the latter constituting a persistent but at the same time unsatisfied demand of the press attachés union (Press Attachés Union, 2008) instil a significant degree of pathology to the operation of Greek public diplomacy and render the Greek public diplomacy model weak and ineffective (Interview, no 28; 30; 36).

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\(^24\) The 1998 MFA charter introduced the DG under the title: ‘Information service’ and which was renamed to DG or Service for Information and Public diplomacy based on the 2007 MFA Charter. Art. 5 para 3 of the 2007 Charter provides that the MFA must inform foreign states, international organisations and international public opinion on Greek national positions
\(^26\) Until early 2010 there were 41 Press and Communication Offices and there are plans for further cuts due to the Greek financial crisis. For a detailed list of PCOs see the official website of the GSCI http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/en/index/ministry/ministry-abroad-list.htm
As a result public diplomacy becomes dependent on personal willingness and initiative and its performance is fragmented comprising random activities (Interview, no 28). Most importantly, however, with the task of strategy setting remaining adrift and unclear, there is no public diplomacy consciousness either in the diplomatic academy or in career diplomats, who view public diplomacy as alien to their job and as part of the work of press officers who having graduated from the NSPA, have specialised in media and communication (Interview, no 30).

Notably, responsibility over the function of public diplomacy has divided the section of press officers and their union. Although the majority of press attachés fear that their section is endangered due to the widespread availability of IT and the shrinking dependability of governments on press offices’ input, they are divided against the prospect of the competence and their section being absorbed in its entirety by the MFA, with many officials demonstrating strong resistance (Interview, no 50).

Objective voices foresee that the absorption of the section—which is currently being seen as having no identity—by the MFA is the only option for the conduct of effective public diplomacy (Interview, no 30; 50). Public diplomacy in Greece needs to be embedded on a firm institutional basis and this is a lesson that should have been learned by the recent financial crisis. An interviewee argued that it is somewhat surprising that Greece did not improve its public diplomacy mechanisms especially after the lukewarm and in some cases negative responses received by the EU and other states with regards to the economic crisis (Interview, no 50).

Until today, as previously mentioned, public diplomacy efforts have been poorly integrated and untargeted, and far from constituting an axis for the re-organisation of the embassies. Greek public diplomacy has tended to be rather marginal comprising random and uncoordinated efforts by press attachés in various embassies (Interview, no 35). Examples of personal initiatives are the usage of social network tools for instance by the Press Office in London which
set up the ‘Greek Network’\textsuperscript{27} and ‘A Pint of Greece’\textsuperscript{28} on Facebook, and newsletters attached on the Greek embassy’s website\textsuperscript{29}.

Nonetheless, such efforts are very sporadic and very recent. Characteristically, until one year ago the press office and embassy in London did not have a website, and were thus bound to have a rather low impact factor. As a press officer in London argued (Interview, no 50) the amounts of information received every day and the ever present pathology of the Greek administration system summarised in ‘qualitative under-staffing’ reduces press offices to information transmission belts translating and passing on information to the MFA’s GS (Interview, no 50).

The MFA GS has a two way contact established with PCOs so that it can receive input to be used in policy making and formulation of national positions and send back to the missions respective information to be presented and publicised locally. According to an official of the GSCI (Interview, no 36) the contribution of the GS office to the public diplomacy process could be summarised as follows:

1. Dissemination of information and presentation of Greek positions to foreign press through press attachés

2. Formulation and influence of public opinion through the press offices in the host country

3. Information of domestic publics via the MFA DG for Information and Public Diplomacy

Evidently, characterisations of the public diplomacy model in Greece as weak, casual and fragmented have a solid foundation (Interview, no 48; 49; 50). Despite increasing awareness that public diplomacy constitutes a valuable tool for governments, its institutional incorporation under the organisational umbrella of the MFA is pending thus delaying its effective undertaking (Interview, no 34;...

\textsuperscript{27} \url{http://www.facebook.com/pages/Greek-Network/110946355616226}
\textsuperscript{28} \url{http://www.facebook.com/pages/Greek-Network/110946355616226#!/pages/A-Pint-of-Greece/138645546150308}
\textsuperscript{29} \url{http://www.greekembassy.org.uk/language/en-US/PressOffice.aspx}
It is anticipated by the author that the organisational re-arrangement of public diplomacy will constitute a major innovation in the next MFA Charter which is currently being drafted. Besides, the fragmentation of the competence of public diplomacy and its partial management by the section of press attachés defies its very purpose in that public diplomacy must be seen as uniting and integrating rather than separating diplomacy from media and communication (Interview, no 50).

Besides its weak institutional arrangement, Greece seems to lag behind other western states also in public diplomacy thinking. Such an assumption stems from a number of evidence gathered in the interviews with Greek officials. More specifically, even though all interviewees agreed that public diplomacy is gaining importance in the Greek foreign policy agenda, in-depth discussions with officials indicated significant discrepancy with regards to their understanding of public diplomacy.

More specifically, public diplomacy is understood by some as being coterminous with cultural diplomacy (Interview, no 12; 20; 21; 51) and therefore its exercise and implementation is perceived as involving actors other than diplomats such as educational and cultural experts, architects, historians and authors. Public diplomacy is still perceived by some officials as propaganda and even as an oxymoron in that diplomacy exercised by diplomats cannot be communicated openly. Thus they are relatively suspicious of its methods and objectives (Interview, no 14; 17; 18; 42; 47). A GSCI official (Interview, no 35) suggested:

‘Public diplomacy is about thinking outside the box and in Greece we do not even think about the box. Public diplomacy is a frame of mind which we are yet far from achieving’.

Such perceptions are indicative of a more traditional understanding of diplomacy altogether and a delayed maturity in understanding that public diplomacy signifies a new framework of thinking in the conduct of diplomacy in the 21st century. This explains why a number of key MFA officials believe that the establishment of an office in the MFA in charge of information of Greek journalists serves the purposes of public diplomacy in an adequate fashion and
do not see the need for coordinating and organising public diplomacy centrally (Interview, no 14). Public diplomacy understanding appears to have matured more if not only, in the consciousness of press officers who perform the task of information gathering and dissemination inherent in the practice of public diplomacy. Press officers are more attuned to the necessity of communication with foreign audiences (Interview, no 50) but lack any strategic setting or action plan to this end. Another GSCI official (Interview no 36) who served several years abroad in PCOs argued that:

‘Essentially we do what we always did. We promote a certain image of Greece abroad usually related to our glorious culture. The only difference is that now we do it more intensively, but not necessarily more coherently or strategically. In other words there is no coherent governmental strategy.’

The function of economic diplomacy: the awkward symbiosis of politics and economics

As illustrated in the previous chapter, the function of economic, commercial and trade diplomacy, traditionally performed by economic and commercial attachés, an important constituent of the Greek diplomatic network, was transferred from MNEC\(^{30}\) to the MFA in 2002. In the MFA, the section was assimilated under the General Secretariat of International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation\(^{31}\) (GSIERDC or DOS in Greek) comprising DG B and YDAS-Hellenic Aid and presided over by the MFA’s GS for International Economic Relations\(^{32}\). Economic and commercial attachés, graduates of the NSPA, staff the network of Economic and Commercial Affairs offices (ECA) attached to Greek embassies.

\(^{30}\) The competence of economic diplomacy together with the section of economic and commercial attachés previously belonged to the Ministry of Trade

\(^{31}\) PD 159/2002

\(^{32}\) Alongside the transfer of economic diplomacy to the MFA another significant institutional development was the centralisation of the Development Cooperation pillar under the aegis of the MFA in the DG YDAS-Hellenic Aid
Despite enthusiasm over change and adaptation of the mechanisms that deal with external policy to the transforming international and domestic settings there is evident scepticism over the chosen course of action. The majority of Greek officials both at home and abroad agree that the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy is undergoing a process of ‘large scale fermentation’ merging economic and political foreign policy. They also agree that this fermentation, necessary and overdue, indicates the harmonisation of the Greek foreign policy machinery and its adaptation to contemporary world politics demands (Interview, no 9; 28; 30; 32; 37).

The assimilation of this segment of foreign policy bureaucracy in the MFA but in a distinct organisational MFA unit caused organisational conflict between traditional diplomats and the economic and commercial attachés while at the same time produced a grey area of competence and jurisdiction at the interface between political and economic diplomacy\(^{33}\) (Sitaras, 2005). Therefore, it raised concerns and scepticism over the implications of the chosen course of adaptation for the future and efficacy of the very function of economic diplomacy and the role of the Greek diplomat who is confronted with major challenges.

The transfer of the economic diplomacy bureaucracy served the strategic purpose of rendering the MFA a productive ministry, in the sense of enhancing its economic policy-making capacity as well as intensifying economic activity overseas through the employment of economic missions in cooperation with the MNEC but under the MFA’s political leadership\(^{34}\) (Bakoyianni, 2009). According to an official of DG B (Interview, no 37):

\[\text{‘The rationale of this move was to achieve an osmosis of the political and economic elements in policy making which represent the two dimensions of foreign policy making capability of Greece. The merging of the two dimensions into a single pillar of representation}\]

\(^{33}\) See Sitaras (2005) for the application of theories on organisational conflict on the case of the transfer of the competence of economic diplomacy to the MFA.

\(^{34}\) The articulation of the strategic target of this assimilation exemplifies again that the substance of the so called foreign economic policy is rather limited to commercial policy.
serves the strategic purpose of enhancing Greek foreign policy capacity’.

This was also perceived as the way to improve services offered by the Greek diplomatic network to Greek citizens and businessmen engaging in enterprises abroad. The international and domestic financial crises, with the latter posing more acute pressures to Greek governments and publics, necessitated more than ever before the boosting of Greek exports and enterprise outside the country. This urgency was further intensified due to demands created by globalisation processes which gave rise to new regional and world powers at the other side of the Atlantic thus increasing the need for commercial advocacy (Bakoyianni, 2009).

In 2009, the then FM Bakoyianni (Bakoyianni, 2009) stated that ‘the absorption of economic diplomacy and the ECA section from the MFA and its embassies reflects an unprecedented intersection in Greek diplomacy which requires change of mentality and close partnership with private businesses with purpose of providing better goods and services overseas’. This shift has had major implications for economic and commercial attachés whose section as specialist graduates from the NSPA was abolished with the 2007 Charter, with the abolition coming into effect in 2012 (Interview, no 13).

The section of economic and commercial attachés, in spite of its imminent extinction, currently constitutes a key element of the Greek diplomatic capital and is considered to be the most ‘globalised’ and ‘changed’ fraction of the Greek diplomatic network in terms of ‘outwardness’, modernisation, usage of IT and socialization with an ever widening cast of non-governmental agents and networks (Interview, no 37). This explains expectations that the transfer of the section into the MFA’s more traditional bureaucracy will bring significant change and modernization to the role of the Greek traditional diplomat on the basis of a ‘spill over’ (Interview, no 22; 23; 37).

One of the acute problems of the current organisation of economic diplomacy and the operation of the section of economic and commercial officers, similarly to other parts of the Greek bureaucracy is that it suffers from overlaps due to
co-responsibility with the MNEC \(^{35}\) but also due to the acute lack of policy planning (Interview, no 28; 30; 37). None of the adjectives; strategic, macroscopic or long-term, apply to foreign economic policy planning (Interview, no 37).

‘There is an Exports Council which convenes once a year with domestic sectoral and economic ministries, sectoral businesses and business associations. This council, in theory, constitutes a very appropriate forum to bring together Greek businesses and associations with the political leadership and to draft guidelines and policy, in other words the blue print for foreign economic policy and for the organisation of our economic diplomatic representation abroad. Unfortunately, the council is limited to problem solving in terms of suggestions and proposals and it merely registers existing problems for future reference. Instead, it should constitute a very important sectoral tool in charge of coordination and policy formulation’ (Interview, no 37).

This sectoral tool is presided over by the Minister of Economy and is now registered as an institutional body for the recording and monitoring of the problems encountered by businesses. In essence its biggest achievement is that it merges political leadership i.e. ministries with businesses. It was established two decades ago but it still cannot comprehend the new directions of business activity, the necessity for the government to act as a business and the need for collective commercial and business policy planning (Interview, no 37). An MFA official for DG-B Business development (Interview, no 37) argued that the lack of economic policy planning has had a major cost for Greece. The

\(^{35}\) There is no consolidation and integration of responsibility and tasks. For instance foreign investment in Greece is controlled and managed by the MNEC whereas ECA offices come under the control and instructions of the MFA. Another example is the Organisation for Greek Commerce which operates under the aegis of MNEC however it is the MFA which is in charge of representation in all international fora. Or the World Trade Organisation comes under the management of the MNEC however it is again the MFA which represents Greece in international fora.
official gave the example of the Greek business enterprise in the Balkans post 1990:

‘We, state owned businesses and private alike, ‘stampeded’ to invest in the Balkans without any central economic or commercial policy and without an investment strategy. Whoever got there first won. There was no framework or research with regard to the local sectoral needs and the Greek state sectors or businesses which could engage in commerce and offer support’ (Interview, no 37).

Another official in Brussels (Interview, no 28) similarly emphasised the acute lack of policy planning in foreign economic policy and diplomacy by referring to the same example.

‘In the early 1990s our target was a mass ‘outwardness, a regional opening up. We managed a massive exodus in the Balkan region with banks, industry and technical firms. Our presence in the Balkans was getting larger and larger. However, without central planning, strategy and regulation there was a clash in the register and an escalating conflict’ (Interview, no 28).

**Economic and Commercial Affairs Offices: the trajectory and role of the section**

The economic and commercial section was first established in 1969 in the Ministry of Trade, based on the Treaty of Vienna, with the ultimate objective to promote the ‘outwardness’ and intensification of Greek business enterprise and foreign economic policy overseas (Interview, no 28). According to the official website\(^{36}\) of the union of economic and commercial attachés the first commercial consultant was attached to the Greek embassy in Berlin in 1937 whereas the post of commercial attachés to Greek embassies was institutionalised in 1947\(^{37}\). The section, often referred to as a ‘nomad section’

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\(^{36}\)[www.oey.gr](http://www.oey.gr)

due to its transfer from one ministry to another (Interview, no 23) was transferred in 1981 from the Ministry of Trade to the MNEC only to be transferred two decades later to the MFA.

In 2003, Law 3196/2003 transferred the competence of economic diplomacy and the commercial attachés section to the MFA where they operated until 2007. In 2007, the latest MFA Charter (Law 3566/2007) centralised foreign economic diplomacy under the organisational structure of the MFA and abolished the section of economic and commercial attachés. The abolition, which as mentioned earlier aimed at making economic diplomacy a central pillar of the MFA, was accompanied by significant changes in the MFA’s diplomatic academy curriculum, which introduced compulsory six-monthly economic diplomacy training. The curriculum of the diplomatic academy is discussed later in this chapter.

The network of the 61\textsuperscript{38} in 2011 ECA offices\textsuperscript{39} attached to the Greek embassies and staffed by members of the economic and commercial section has been a major player in the Greek diplomatic network in countries with a particular economic and commercial interest for Greece. With their role focusing on the systematic monitoring and analysis of economic developments in the host countries and on the consultation and support of those parts of the Greek government and Greek businesses engaging in businesses overseas, ECA offices have undertaken a very active consultative function and an inter-ministerial coordinating role (Interview, no 37). The section’s main role as described by its staff (Interview, no 37) is to:

- monitor the international and local markets in the host country and provide information and guidance to Greek governments and businesses on issues of sectoral significance
- draw a yearly course of action and yearly reports and consult the MFA and the government on issues of foreign economic and commercial policy

\textsuperscript{38} http://agora.mfa.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnode=64&clang=1 accessed 17.01.11
\textsuperscript{39} Their number has varied from 52 in 2009 to 60 in 2010 and to 61 in 2011 (Interview no 30)
• offer guidance, support and coordination to other government departments overseas
• maintain a channel of communication between the HQ and Greek and foreign businesses and to co-decide over business activity and action plan
• to organise exploratory and other business missions to accompany the PM, FM and deputy FM or the minister of economy

ECA offices constitute this part of the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy, which arguably altered the dynamics between the overseas missions and the HQ in that they have undertaken an active role both in policy consultation and formulation. They see themselves as ‘the nerve endings of the machinery which sends stimuli back to the centre’ which changes previous images of the diplomatic network as being merely an executive tool (Interview, no 28).

Obviously, it was not only the relationship with the HQ that ECA offices changed but also the relationship with the rest of the Greek administration. This is because their very function and role relies on cooperation and promotion of close partnership with the Greek Chambers of Commerce, the Greek Exports Council, the MNEC, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Transport and other productive ministries with which they organise joint business missions40 (Interview, no 23; 28; 38).

ECA officers are in constant communication with different government departments, non-governmental agents and Greek business and have learned to play the game of ‘building business networks’ outside the confines of Greece (Interview, no 28). Part of their job is to organise business events, conferences and business open days as well as engaging in ‘sectoral marketing’ (Interview, no 28). The section of the ECA was also the first section of Greek foreign policy bureaucracy41 to introduce process standardisation devices in the form of ISO 9001:2000 (Interview, no 28; 37).

40 This is why the abolition of the section of economic and commercial attachés met with strong resistance and disapproval from Greek sectoral parts of the state and Greek businesses
41 ISO 9001 was later adopted by Consulates with regards to Schengen processes
ISO 9001, introduced in 2009, aimed at the standardisation of the Greek foreign economic policy for purposes of ensuring its functional efficiency through yearly scheduled plans on economic and sectoral issues and the standardisation of internal processes for policy planning and implementation. In other words, ISO 9001 was meant to standardise the foreign economic policy process and to assess the quality of performance of ECA offices evaluating their output in the form of yearly performance reports and targets set by the government or Greek businesses (or the two together) (Interview, no 37). However, a more managerial approach to foreign affairs administration and its application to the entirety of foreign policy bureaucracy met with resistance from some traditional bureaucrats (Interview, no 28).

The course of development with regard to performance assessment and foreign economic policy process standardisation was completed with the launch of the business portal AGORA. AGORA offers a wide range of information concerning Greek and other economies in the form of research and market reports carried out and uploaded by ECA offices worldwide and in collaboration with the Greek Commercial Chambers, Greek Export Organisations and other bilateral chambers such as the Greek-Arab and the Sino-Greek Chambers of Commerce. The information managed on the AGORA portal is accessible to Greek and foreign public audiences, a step which heralded the start of a new era for the relationship of Greek foreign policy bureaucracy with the public and IT (Interview, no 23) discussed below.

It is for all the aforementioned reasons that the economic and commercial section is considered to be the most ‘outward’ and ‘up to date’ -with regards to economic globalisation and IT- part of the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy. This is because, by definition, their tasks involve socialisation with local and international business communities outside the confines of the ministry or of their offices and interaction with a wide spectrum of governmental and non-governmental actors and usage of IT (Interview, no 28; 38). Developments in the ways of communication and the types of actors ECA officers interact with

42 www.agora.mfa.gr
have had major implications for their profession over the last two decades. Characteristically, an ECA officer (Interview, no 28) stated that:

‘When I started my career in the early 1980s, things were very amateurish. We had to support Greek businesses abroad and build business relations locally and we were given money in black bin bags. There was no logistical system and the movement of money did not appear anywhere. Our only instrument to start building business coalitions locally was the telephone but often without a phone book inherited from the previous post holder. In the mid 1980s I was sent to Beirut with an order to improve olive and olive oil exports. I did not know where to start, who to see, how to contact them. It took me months to start finding my way around and getting an idea of how the market there worked. Today things are more standardised and with the aid of IT there is ample information. We are now dispatched to a new post and from day one we have significant information about the local markets in the form of yearly local business reports on the MFA’s business portal AGORA and catalogued lists with our main stakeholders. We know their revenues, recruiting patterns, trends and numbers. We send a couple of emails and business starts!’

However, despite the significance of the role of ECA offices and the ‘added value’ they bring to the Greek diplomatic capital, their operation and performance is sometimes compromised by a general lack of business culture which is the by-product of the ongoing ‘Greek security issues’ which in practice downgrade the effective performance economic diplomacy and prioritise traditional diplomacy. For Greek ECA officers but mostly for Greek diplomats it is often considered a luxury to focus on international economic policy as their counterparts do for instance in New Zealand or the UK (Sitaras, 2005: 15; Interview, no 28; 30).

Instead they often have to be preoccupied with national security issues; a fact which has determined their training, orientation and culture (Interview, no 30). Living in the turbulent region of the Balkans and being the only EU country with
ongoing and unresolved traditional security issues, Greek economic diplomacy is not concerned with international economic welfare but rather with strengthening commercial ties in order to ensure security (security first) (Sitaras, 2005: 15). As a result, even the job of ECA officers is instilled with strong political elements.

Another factor which poses constraints to the organisation of an integral economic diplomacy is limited resources. An ECA official in New York (Interview, no 30) argued that the budget allocated to economic diplomacy is extremely low for a country which has rendered economic diplomacy the main pillar of its foreign policy. More specifically, the official argued that

‘The Greek yearly budget for economic diplomacy was in 2009, €900,000 for the totality of the 61 ECA offices worldwide when for instance Cyprus allocates €700,000 to their American office alone’.

This combined with the ever persistent problem of under-staffing –qualitative or quantitative- pose serious hindrances to the effective organisation and operation of Greek economic diplomacy and foreign policy bureaucracy.

‘We are faced with increasing demands for more economic diplomacy and more ECA offices but their number is bound to decrease due to scarce resources ‘ (Interview, no 30).

Information technology: underestimated and unevenly applied

It becomes evident from the above that the role of the Greek foreign policy bureaucrat has been significantly affected by the extensive usage of IT and especially the section of economic attachés. Interestingly however, the responses provided by 51 interviewees on the question of whether and how the usage of IT has changed the job of the Greek diplomat, varied significantly. It appears that IT has not had the same impact on all sections of the Greek foreign policy bureaucracy and that the usage of the Internet is not as widespread as expected.
Seemingly, ECA officers as well as Press and Communications officers (all graduates from the NSPA\textsuperscript{43}) lead the way, for Greek standards, in the use of IT and the internet with initiatives including examples of social network fora mentioned above. At the same time a significant amount of diplomats of the political branch of the MFA lag behind. It is not certain whether this discrepancy relates to the fact that the majority of the graduates of the Diplomatic Academy are graduates of law schools with a specific study culture whereas graduates of the NSPA are graduates from a wide range of faculties usually with postgraduate studies in foreign universities and with a demanding training curriculum.

As far as the impact of IT on the conduct of Greek diplomacy is concerned, Greece has naturally gained significant diplomatic capital through membership to the EU and usage of the COREU\textsuperscript{44} system. This is because it gained access to information concerning foreign policy and diplomatic issues that were new to its agenda and added to its negotiating skills, especially towards third countries. The COREU network constituted a revolution in Greek access to foreign policy information thus empowering Greek diplomats (Interview, no 2) who previously viewed themselves as ‘followers’ with regards to international developments (Interview, no 28).

Several younger diplomats view themselves as the generation of ‘laptop diplomats’ and can rely on the internet for their preparatory work. Supporters of this approach argue that the Internet gives them independence and freedom of movement and tackles effectively issues of scarcity of diplomatic information which constituted a prior weakness (Interview, no 33; 39).

At the same time however, there is a significant part of Greek foreign policy bureaucracy which arguably, adapts very slowly to current developments due to their rejection of electronic communication. In the course of the interviews it was argued that a number of officials in the MFA prefer the old ways of communication and operation such as face to face interaction or the telephone on the grounds that they ensure safety. A large number of Greek MFA officials

\textsuperscript{43} The reason why this is important is explained below
\textsuperscript{44} the telex system used by member states for the transmission of CFSP matters
do not use emailing systems and other electronic social network fora and prefer to have emails printed out for them by administrative staff.

Responses to electronic mail are managed by administrative support staff or even younger diplomats (Interview, no 38). The acutely hierarchical structure and operation of the MFA seems to encourage such practices on the grounds that memos and notes are effective for movement upwards whilst the telephone is deemed adequate for more ‘horizontal’ operation (Interview, no 38).

In 2001, the MFA introduced a system of electronic document management and emailing called SIDEE\textsuperscript{45} which has rarely been used to its full potential and has been replaced by post-it notes circulating in the building (Interview, no 42). A number of Greek officials were hesitant to embrace the new technology and preferred the old ways of communicating and filing which results in increased needs for support staff, unanswered phone calls and large messy folders as well as being time consuming.

A number of diplomats, both at home and abroad, reportedly do not use personal computers or any kind of electronic communication whatsoever. This causes serious delays and loss of information which relies for circulation on hand written notes (Interview, no 43). An MFA diplomat argued that such traditionalist practices are not cost-effective and occupy personnel who, freed from this kind of procedural tasks, could focus on the analysis of available information and on input to the foreign policy process (Interview, no 38; 42; 43).

Despite the limited usage of IT from certain segments of foreign policy bureaucracy, mostly comprising senior diplomats, a number of interviewees argued that their job has been altered with the vast amounts and speed of transfer of available information. For some parts of the bureaucracy such as the press and communication section, their job has become so reliant on the internet that it is impossible to deliver without it and social network fora and the internet have become their main instrument (Interview, no 50). Similarly, for the economic and commercial section, the internet and online communications

\textsuperscript{45} The MFA has also been seeking since 2005 to digitalise its archives and for this reason it has been pursuing funding from the \textit{4th} Community Support Framework (Greek Embassy in Washington 2006 Report).

\textsuperscript{46} ΣΗΔΕΕ -Σύστημα Ηλεκτρονικής Διαχείρισης Εγγράφων και Εργασιών
have become inherent in their section’s culture and officials rely on electronic documentation and uploaded reports and information. These use the internet for commercial information that no embassy or permanent diplomatic mission could ever provide (Interview, no 48).

The Greek diplomatic profession: towards a new integrationist paradigm?

The previous section demonstrated a discrepancy in the impact of IT to the job of contemporary Greek foreign policy bureaucrats. This impact seems to be more significant for the sections of economic and commercial attachés as well as for the section of press and communication attachés and less significant for traditional political diplomats of the MFA. Irrespective of the extent to which their profession has been affected by the IT, Greek diplomats generally agree that their profession has changed as a result of globalisation and membership to the EU as well as to other regional configurations such as Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation or the Organisation for the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Interview, no 40).

Drastic change is also occurring in the domain of traditional diplomats, which is bound to become more manifest in the near future due to the addition of economic diplomacy as a central function of the MFA. This is because their curriculum has been enriched with compulsory economic modules. Most importantly, however, because when the abolition of the section of economic and commercial attachés comes into effect political diplomats are expected to take over the function of economic diplomacy which goes hand in hand with IT usage.

The addition of the economic diplomacy competence in the job description of the MFA’s political diplomat provides evidence that the profession of the Greek diplomat is in a process of dramatic change (Interview, no 22; 23; 26; 37) and according to an MFA official, on the way to a new paradigm for Greek standards which will comprise a single expertise area (Interview, no 28). And even though this merging is deemed necessary to address policies and issues
which require integrated approaches, an official in Brussels (Interview, no 28) expressed his concerns with regards to the fusion of economic and traditional diplomacy in the name of the creation of the so-called ‘holistic diplomat’. The official argued,

‘I am not sure the path we have taken is the right one. The abolition of the ECA section and the transfer of economic diplomacy under the umbrella of political diplomacy means that instead of having experts on either economic or political matters we will have all encompassing new diplomats. In essence, fusion is taking place which indicates how the economic aspects have infiltrated the political aspects as a result of globalisation. However, my concern is that ECA officers have acquired a specific economic and commercial culture that traditional diplomats do not, naturally possess. The question is whether these new holistic diplomats are able to reach the same levels of expertise in both and other areas and in the case they do not, if it matters.

Such fears are considered to be valid if one takes into consideration that the expected success of the new paradigm as the result of the aforementioned fusion, relies on a spill over effect rather than on in-depth planning and re-organisation. In other words, the hasty abolition of a very productive section of foreign policy bureaucracy with a given ethos and tradition and its assimilation in the MFA is expected to modernise a traditional and often outdated section of Greek bureaucracy and to accomplish the lifting of the barriers overseas between two different, and until recently, rigidly separate compartments of Greek foreign policy.

In theory, it is hoped that this arrangement will merge two previously distinct dimensions of Greek foreign policy on a structural level with the aim of facilitating the maturity of the new Greek diplomat and the creation of a single space of expertise. Such an approach would have been more plausible had the barriers between the various organisational compartments in the MFA’s organisational structure at home been lifted as well. For, even if the ultimate aim is to produce integrated diplomats of a wider reach for the future, reality
shows that this centralisation of competences under the heading of the ‘MFA diplomat’ without respective training and corresponding organisational arrangements at the HQ has limited possibilities to succeed.

Interviewed Greek diplomats argued that the changes they have experienced in their profession in the last three decades have been immense. According to an official located in Brussels (Interview, no 28):

‘One parameter of change concerns the fact that we now work on a supra-national level. Even if it is regulated and effective for policy environments such as this of the EU and more anarchic outside the EU it is still a new way of work’.

Another Greek diplomat in Brussels (Interview, no 26) added that the scope of the job of the Greek diplomat has seen an unprecedented widening in the last two decades, to policy areas that were previously unknown or formed part of the mandate of domestic departments. And even though such policy areas reflect the constantly changing anatomy of the international environment, for a country like Greece and its diplomats such areas form a new reality. Greek diplomats feel more intensely than ever before that:

‘Our service has to try to comprehend the changing external and domestic environments and procure for tools and mechanisms that will enable the government to pursue the state’s and its citizens’ interests. Until two decades ago we could not even imagine the extent of the complications that globalisation and similarly the EU would bring forward’ (Interview no, 26).

Another official explained that their profession has changed in both substance and methods in that ‘we are not abroad anymore to merely execute orders from the centre. We are there to investigate and consult, promote and sell, blend in the market and make the best out of IT’ (Interview, no 28). Greek officials emphasise that the implications of globalisation and the EU\(^47\) for their profession are such that it currently takes much longer for younger diplomats to

\(^{47}\) which they all view as the vehicle with which Greece experiences globalisation in terms of policy making
learn how to be effective. This is because they have to perform on a much wider spectrum of sectoral issues and policies such as those concerning the environment, development and cooperation, culture, international humanitarian crises, asymmetrical threats and others and at the same time they are confronted with large scale available expertise and limited resources (Interview, no 26; 47).

And even though the widening of the policy spectrum which preoccupies Greek diplomatic missions has not resulted in any change of embassy structure or patterns of posting officials from home ministries –also due to financial constraints- it has intensified cooperation and contact between diplomats and technical ministries as well as a wider cast of non-governmental collaborators, with cooperation normally channelled through the MFA (Interview, no 47; 48; 49). Without having physical representation from home departments abroad, Greek diplomats represent and are accountable to the entirety of the Greek public sector. And whilst their embassies remain traditional in structure the content of their job has changed with a number of sectoral issues forming part of their agenda (Interview, no 47).

Such developments are believed to have diversified the profession of Greek diplomats who view themselves as on the way to becoming ‘all in one’ or ‘holistic diplomats’ (Interview, no 33; 49). The ‘all in one’ trend is also applied at a more practical level due to the acute lack of resources and shortage of staff in overseas missions, especially in the last few years, and the simultaneous increase in demands.

Effectively, the scarcity of resources and personnel as well as the recruiting trends which do not generally support engagement of locals but sometimes rely on appointments based on family criteria to low clerical positions resulting in extra burden to the mission has major implications for the profession of Greek diplomats, keeping them hostage to limited input to the foreign policy process (Interview, no 49). As a result, diplomats find themselves running the mission

48 On a number of occasions family appointments have applied instead of appointing locals for the post of the driver, telephone operator or embassy receptionist. The implications were that posted staff did not speak the local language and did not help by providing linkages with own local networks but instead needed support from embassy diplomats in translation and carrying out clerical tasks.
from the smallest clerical detail such as queuing in Pakistani public administration branches in order to pay electricity bills to issues of ultimate diplomatic and political significance (Interview, no 49).

It is believed that changes in the profession of the Greek diplomat would have been more emphatically pronounced had they not been so consumed in the execution of purely administrative tasks and in traditional modes of operation. Such modes, indicating elements of path dependence, attribute a more administrative dimension to their job at the expense of input to policy making, analysis and research (Interview, no 49).

‘Needs are increasing for the growth of the Greek diplomatic capital and we are confronted with demands to become more productive and more active. Especially with regards to economic diplomacy and our image abroad we need to sell and we are assessed every day by the media, by businesses, by foreign publics and our citizens. Every minister and head of mission has to think of themselves as a chief executive officer and focus on sales and productivity at a time when resources are diminishing but demands for diplomatic representation and action are increasing. To some extent and some of our colleagues have abandoned and need to abandon the attitude of a cardinal. We are not here to play ambassadors in cocktail parties and drink Martinis. We are here to work with targets and to develop the currently limited business activity. Some of us try to abandon hierarchy and protocol and do our job as we think right. Unfortunately, however, more of us still stick to hierarchical practices’ (Interview, no 28).

Even though change in their profession has been significant, especially in the last two decades, with a large quantity of information being flown in and IT changing the pace of work dramatically, there are still some factors which, arguably, differentiate Greek diplomats from other western counterparts (Interview, no 30). Greece still has major national security issues at stake which determine the composition of diplomatic representation overseas. It is not only

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49 Greek diplomats until the late 1990s were using electric typewriters
security issues that require dense political representation at key posts such as Ankara, Skopje and Washington rendering secondments from home ministries of secondary importance but they also determine the orientation of Greek diplomats with national security issues taking precedence over international issues (Interview, no 28; 30; 39; 45; 47; 48; 49). In addition, they determine recruitment patterns which do not support schemes of appointing LES. Most Greek missions have high political stakes to recruit locals. They need to keep confidentiality at high levels and ambassadors fear that engaging locals will compromise confidentiality (Interview, no 48; 49).

These elements are closely related to the persistence of the acutely hierarchical and traditional character and operation of overseas missions where allegiance and respect to the head of mission is required by younger and other senior diplomats (Interview, no 48; 49). The head of mission, currently also considered as the line manager for the mission’s staff, in an attempt to sound more like western models, is in charge of the unofficial assessment procedures which take place three-yearly (sometimes every four years) usually in the form of a few paragraphs which can be either appraising or indifferent. Overall, the head of mission is in charge of the general running of the mission and constitutes the link with the political leadership (Interview, no 48; 49).

Such observations suggest that hypotheses that the Greek diplomat may be moving towards a new integrated paradigm are exaggerated. This is because traditional political diplomats may be unable to carry out the technical issues inherent in international economic relations, despite their advantage in comparison to ECA officials in such areas as treaty and agreement drafting. Besides, this is the reason why their role in economic matters has so far remained largely limited to coordinating rather than making foreign economic policy. It is important to point out that it was the weakness of Greek diplomats in managing economic relations that led the MFA in 1975, during the pre-accession negotiations for Greek entry to the EEC, to seek extra-MFA economic experts. Evidently, Greek traditional diplomacy failed then to manage the institutional dimension of negotiations with an economic substance (Sitaras, 2005:15).
Greek diplomats operate in hierarchical ways for purposes of maintaining the status quo and traditionalism, both deeply ingrained in their organisational culture (Interview, no 47). Sticking to hierarchy and seniority are considered to be vital in ensuring order in the missions. An embassy official (Interview, no 47) suggested, ‘if you leave too much scope for individual action then you have lost the game. Hierarchy ensures order and we like order’. In this context it is not unusual for younger diplomats to be expected to stand up when the head of mission appears and to refer to them only after permission is granted. Closely linked to aspirations of maintaining the traditional character of diplomatic representations are traditional approaches to promoting diplomacy involving cocktail parties, impressive houses and dress codes. Such traditional approaches are also considered as the means by which Greek diplomats seek to impress and gain acceptance from their American, British or French counterparts who enjoy acceptance, by definition, without effort (Interview, no 47).

Unlike traditional approaches to diplomacy preferred mostly by senior officials, younger diplomats seem to disagree with the very hierarchical operational model of embassies as it causes delays and most importantly wastes resources (Interview, no 48; 49). With a fresh mentality young diplomats would like to utilise a wider range of their capabilities and to push towards more modern approaches to diplomacy and more casual ways of work but the status quo seems unchangeable. A young diplomat in the Greek embassy in London (Interview, no 48) suggested that, ‘even simple things such as the British dress down Friday is miles away from our culture. We would not even dare suggest it to the head of mission’.

**The Diplomatic Academy: a first step towards merging economic and political diplomacy**

The Diplomatic Academy was established in 1999 and operates as an independent organisational unit of the MFA accountable directly to the FM. The main objective of the Academy is to deliver training and education for its
students who are diplomatic candidates who succeeded in the MFA’s entry examinations. Besides educating students, the Diplomatic Academy is also in charge of delivering professional training by organising seminars and training courses for all branches of the MFA but also for professionals of other home departments on issues which fall under the competence of the MFA.

Furthermore, in the context of promoting good relations with third countries the Academy has concluded a number of bilateral and multilateral memoranda with a number of similar foreign institutions for the purpose of promoting cooperation over diplomatic education such as the program for joint training with Azerbaijan in 2009 (Diplomatic Academy Charter).

The Diplomatic Academy is headed by a diplomat of ambassadorial rank appointed through a presidential decree by the FM and is aided by academic consultants. The entrance exams to the Diplomatic Academy have always been very difficult and the system appeared closed and elitist favouring law graduates (Interview, no 44). The main modules that candidates are examined on and their worth in the overall entry mark are as follows (Interview, no 44)

- Oral competence and essay writing worth 15%
- French language test worth 15%
- English language test worth 15%
- Diplomatic history worth 15%
- International Law worth 15%
- International Finance worth 15%
- Secondary tests worth 10%

The curriculum of the diplomatic academy changed in 2007 with the MFA Charter and added six monthly compulsory studies in foreign economic affairs in an attempt to start bridging the gap between political and economic substance of foreign policy. Currently, Diplomatic Academy studies are yearly with the first semester involving the following core modules

a. Public administration and human resource management
b. Diplomatic practice and issues of etiquette, protocol and diplomatic correspondence
c. Administrative documentation and diplomatic terminology

d. Consular practice

e. Negotiating skills – crisis management

f. Foreign policy (political, economic, cultural and other dimensions)

g. Communication

h. IT

During the second semester the taught modules are as follows:

a. International and European economic relations – International and Greek Economic Diplomacy
   i. International Political Economy and Greek Economic Diplomacy
   ii. European Union: Internal Market – Sectoral Policies and Common Trade Policy
   iii. Issues of Development Cooperation

b. International Trade System
   i. International Trade and Fiscal System
   ii. Law of international commerce and trade
   iii. Attracting and evaluating business plans

c. Organisation and Operation of ECA offices – Principles of International Marketing, Marketing of Greek Exports

d. Special IT applications
   i. Advanced Communication Services on the Internet
   ii. E-commerce

**Diplomatic training**

According to the 2007 MFA Charter, the Diplomatic Academy is in charge of ongoing diplomatic training for the MFA’s officials. In this context it organises every year a series of seminars on

- Economic Management
- Consular Affairs
- Computing
• Foreign Languages

The Academy’s revised curriculum and professional training indicate that an international and European orientation has become part of the process and is now formulating the profile of the candidates and attachés (Passas, 2005: 368). The 2007 MFA Charter ensures that the Diplomatic Academy promotes close partnership and cooperation with the National School for Public Administration (NSPA) for the communal training of embassy attachés as well as the conduct of research programmes between the two, and national universities and research centres (Griva, 2008: 534). The revision of the Diplomatic Academy’s curriculum is aimed at educating more open minded diplomats and merging the study and training of different areas of foreign policy into a single forum (Interview, no 44).

Nevertheless, despite the seemingly satisfactory curriculum, diplomatic training effectively remains rather traditional and legalistic in its approach. A diplomat in London (Interview, no 48) suggested that

‘The majority of continuing education training and seminars that the MFA organises focuses mostly on improving IT skills. Existing training does not bring in to the service food for thought and discussion of issues that concerns 21st century diplomacy. Training and education do not connect employees with the rest of the world’.

Similarly, an official at the HQ (Interview, no 22) argued that

‘Greek diplomatic training is basic and far from reflective of the transformation that the world is undergoing. It revolves around the same technical issues and is delivered by senior or retired diplomats who have lost touch with the changing world already two decades ago but with ongoing political connections, hence our lagging behind in comparison to our European counterparts’.

Besides the basic and sometimes obsolete character of the training another problem which further limits its impact on Greek diplomats is that it is always organised at the HQ in Athens and effectively diplomats seconded in overseas missions can hardly attend. This is due to the cuts in travelling but also due to
the missions’ understaffing which does not encourage diplomats to travel for training and educational purposes (Interview, no 48; 49).

Greek consular missions

The explosion in Greek overseas missions was accompanied by an expansion of the Greek consular network, especially in the region of the ex-Soviet Union and the Balkan region after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Karabarbounis (2007: 203) suggests that an interesting expansion of the consular network took place towards Western Europe and especially in Germany, Belgium and Austria where there are significant working Greek communities and increased commercial interests. Greek consulates are generally programmed to serve Greek interests abroad and are vested with the promotion of Greek culture and cultural diplomacy often in collaboration with the Hellenic Culture Centre\textsuperscript{50}. They are at the service of the well-being and support of Greek nationals, travellers and businessmen abroad and are in place to serve their economic, cultural, maritime and commercial interests (Interview, no 29; 46).

A very important function performed by contemporary Greek consulates is serving as embassies’ ‘satellites’. This effectively means that they constitute embassies’ partners who are close to local publics and are thus able to gather field information and then transmit it to the embassy (Interview, no 45). The more specific roles of consulates largely depend on the location and the local demands. For instance the consulate-general in Cologne is a special consulate because it serves a large proportion of ‘Greek society’ which amounts to 100,000 residing outside the Greek borders\textsuperscript{51}.

The location of consulates largely depends on the size of Greek populations locally. However, an equally significant criterion for their location is the maintaining or strengthening of political bilateral relations. For instance the consulate in Leipzig was established on strictly political grounds because the

\textsuperscript{50} http://www.hcc.edu.gr/

\textsuperscript{51} The north-Rhine Westphalia is the most populous, most powerful economically part of Germany with a population of 17 million.
Greek government wished to have ‘an eye focused on this part of the east’ (Interview, no 45).

In terms of communication, contact with the HQ in Athens is usually channelled through the embassy. It is normal for all tasks and functions performed by the consulate to also be communicated to the embassy for purposes of avoiding duplication (Interview, no 46). Greek consulates operate on the basis of ‘unofficial targets’ aiming at processing as many administrative requests as possible by citizens and businesses so that the embassies are freed from bureaucratic tasks and focused on performing their political functions. For this purpose, Greek consulates have been given a certain degree of autonomy and independence to process requests by citizens, companies, groups of people or businesses which they communicate to the embassy. This autonomy and freedom of action is restricted if funding is required in which case the requests are channelled to the embassy and permission is granted by the centre (Interview, no 45).

Greek consulates have an impressive record of peaceful and productive cooperation with local authorities with which they co-organise events, student exchanges, cultural, educational and commercial projects, exhibitions, commercial fairs and ‘twinning’ of cities. Most importantly, one of the highest priorities of Greek consulates has been to integrate Greek nationals abroad into local societies through programmes with a particular emphasis on education, employment and social integration.

With the issues of nationals’ integration being very high on the Greek consular agenda along with the promotion of ‘Greekness’ abroad, Greek consulates have an inherently dual role to perform (Interview, no 45). This duality rests on the simultaneous promotion of Hellenism and ‘Greekness’ by nurturing the Greek identity of nationals abroad and their systematic efforts to avoid the creation of Greek ‘ghettos’ by integrating its nationals in local communities. This

52 For instance Cologne, where the interview took place is twined with Thessaloniki
53 In the Greek General Consulate in Cologne there is a special German-Greek linkage which works as a channel of communication between Greek and German businesses, sponsored by the German Government, which organises special training for Greek nationals.
54 A long project was completed in Germany at the end of 2009 which aimed at integrating Greek nationals.
is achieved by the consulates through exposing Greeks to local businesses and cultures and vice versa in a series of events and socials (Interview, no 45).

Greece is a very small country but with a massive history. Because its soft power abroad can rely neither on its national business community engaging in enterprise overseas nor on the size of the aid it offers\textsuperscript{55} the ultimate means embraced by Greek consulates in an effort to sharpen Greek international reflexes is the ‘\textit{strengthening through unity}’ [\textit{iσχύς εν τη ενώσει}] of Greek human capital abroad (Interview, no 45). This is why Greek governments have relied so heavily on consulates to keep together and support Greek human capital and lobbying. Greek consulates systematically try to be in touch and strengthen the position of the numerous Greek individuals, who work in the City in the UK, in foreign universities\textsuperscript{56} or for the US government. For instance, in London, the consulate-general together with the embassy and the press office have initiated a project which aims to foster continuous cooperation between Greek academics in the UK and elsewhere as well as support their integration in the local educational system. This project, titled ‘Pytheas’ will be launched mid-2011. In Germany, the consulate-general in Cologne supported a Greek national who ran with the German MEPs and got elected.

For such purposes, promoting solidarity and support constitutes a priority for Greek consulates especially amongst the Greek diaspora the dynamics and potential of which are deemed to be immense.

‘\textit{What we have learned to do effectively abroad is to create a culture of integrated Greek communities all around the world and this constitutes our ultimate consular policy and aim. We gradually build a network of Greek nationals, who are educated, socially active and well respected}’ (Interview, no 45).

With regard to their diplomatic functions, as previously mentioned, Greek consulates consider themselves to be the ‘eye of the embassy’ in multiple loci by monitoring not only civil and political activity locally but also international and regional organisations. Despite arguments in existing literature (Karabarbounis,\textsuperscript{55} For instance in Haiti it was only €200,000\textsuperscript{56}}
that Greek consulates’ significance is receding in spite of their increasing number, opinions in the field differ. More specifically, interviewees (Interview, no 27; 29; 45; 46) suggested that the role, significance and future of a consulate depends amongst other things on the location, the local political situation and the proximity of the embassy. ‘A consulate in Istanbul is not of lesser importance than the embassy in Ankara’ (Interview no 45).

Naturally, the consulate-general in Cologne will have a more significant political and diplomatic role to play than those in big capitals such as London or Brussels where the consulates are attached to the embassy. This applies to issues ranging from representation and physical presence of the consul-general in various business oriented or political fora, to carrying out cultural events and maintaining bilateral relations, which in the case of capitals are carried out by embassies and their cultural and commercial offices (Interview, no 45).

The Consul-General in Cologne gave an example to demonstrate the differentiation in the role of consulates according to location which concerned the 11th anniversary of Ocalan’s arrest on 15th February 2010. The MFA’s Action Plan which involved securing extra vigilance with the local police and authorities was undertaken by the embassy in places where there was one but by the consulate where there was no embassy. Naturally, the management of consular affairs also differs outside the EU where consulates are faced with increased consular demands and functions but have at the same time acquired a higher political and commercial importance (Interview, no 45). The argument for the increase in their diplomatic significance, even if it applies in given locations, is further supported by the function of crisis management they have recently undertaken.

Crisis management in a more collective form constitutes one area whereby Greek consulates feel that their competence has expanded. Even though they have always been in place to protect Greek nationals overseas, being involved in international crises and in post-crisis rehabilitation projects constitutes a recent development for which they cooperate intensively with the Greek public sector and the MFA’s General Secretary. A characteristic example is the involvement of the Greek Consulate in Georgia, Tbilisi in the crisis in Ossetia as
well as the involvement of Greek Consulates in the Balkan region in the delivery of HiPERB (Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans) (Interview, no 18).

The large amounts of Greek travellers, students and businessmen in foreign countries have increased demands for support and have prioritised ‘closeness’ with Greek citizens overseas (Interview, no 29; 46). Most importantly, consuls and consulate officials observe that the relationship between Greek citizens abroad and consular authorities has changed in substance. ‘It is closer, more casual and much more supportive (Interview, no 29)

‘If a student needs to go home or needs help and support day or night the consulate is the first point of contact. All a Greek national has to do is contact us and ask for our help. We take it from there’ (Interview, no 46).

Besides the integration in the relationship between consulates and Greek citizens abroad, consulates are also undergoing change with regard to their relations with Greek embassies. IT has contributed significantly to this change with consulates today having access to unprecedented volumes of diplomatic information which they share with embassies and being able to take initiatives and underpin embassies’ political, economic and cultural functions.

‘Today, consulates are informed about events and developments at the same time as the embassies and this facilitates their diplomatic action. In the past, messages were transferred with the diplomatic folder to the embassy first and they would travel to the consulate only if they immediately concerned it. IT has facilitated a more homogenous consular policy but most importantly it has facilitated homogeneity in all our overseas missions’ (Interview, no 45).
Conclusion

This chapter explored the nature and responses of the Greek diplomatic network in the context of transforming world politics. The present exploration formed part of the wider discussion concerning governmental revamping of overseas diplomatic missions which constitute an integral part of national foreign policy machineries. The transforming international and domestic policy environments have urged governments to rethink their overseas missions, which albeit previously the most well informed networks in comparison to outside counterparts, they may be less today as they are challenged by IT and non-governmental networks which seem to be broader, deeper and more crosscutting.

As previously noted, the general lack of empirical data originating from overseas missions has necessitated the study of their processes and structure as well as their adaptation on the basis of their evolving functions and role. In this light, the above sections were organised on the basis of the main functions and competences of the Greek diplomatic network and addressed questions regarding their evolving role.

The chapter has identified a number of critical issues such as traditionalism and hierarchy in the organisation and operation of the Greek diplomatic network which emerged from evidence gathered in a large number of interviews both at the HQ and in overseas diplomatic missions. Such issues determine the contemporary character and organisation of the Greek model of diplomatic representation. At the same time the model of the Greek diplomatic network portrays the ways in which Greek governments perceive and organise foreign policy but also their fundamental assumptions about the ways in which world politics are developing and managed. Evidence presented in this chapter appear to be in agreement with evidence presented in the previous chapter which focused on the organisation of the MFA as far as the Greek understanding and organisation of foreign policy is concerned in the context of the transforming world politics.
Specifically, the Greek diplomatic network, similarly with the MFA appears to conform to the compartmentalisation of foreign policy to distinct organisational domains. Compartmentalisation in the management of foreign policy becomes manifest in the arrangement and allocation of different functions and policy areas such as political, economic and, recently, public diplomacy into distinct sections of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Such models perpetuate the distinction between political and economic or sectoral affairs and prevent integrated approaches to foreign policy management prescribed by increased interdependence and globalisation. In addition, this compartmentalised model indicates a long-routed unilateral and traditional understanding of foreign policy whereby economic, political and other competences are distinct.

Despite sporadic elements of change and adaptation manifest in various parts of the Greek diplomatic network and a relative extension in its functions and scope, a more in-depth exploration of Greek embassies and other missions do not show evidence supporting a case of ‘transformation’ in the form of adaptation and re-organisation on the basis of economic diplomacy or public diplomacy which constitutes the main pivot for re-organisation of other states’ embassies. On the contrary, the Greek diplomatic network in its entirety presents a case of stickiness to prior organisational and operational modes summarised in hierarchy, traditionalism and a compartmentalised approach to the management of foreign policy and diplomacy.
Conclusion

Introduction

This thesis has focused on a set of issues concerning the management of Greek foreign policy in the context of transforming world politics. These issues were encapsulated in the four research questions set out in the introduction on pages 7 and 8. With a research agenda informed by literature on the management of foreign policy and diplomacy in contemporary world politics and documentation on national responses of a number of foreign policy machineries, the thesis sought to evaluate the contemporary Greek FPS and locate its place within global trends. In doing so, the thesis explored the responses of the Greek foreign policy machinery to the transforming international and domestic policy environments through the study of its contemporary organisation, role culture and functions. This exploration was pursued through extensive research in the available primary and secondary sources relating to the management of Greek foreign policy together with fieldwork involving a total of 51 interviews.

National responses to the management of foreign policy in an era of considerable change are manifested in change and adaptation in the role and structure of the national foreign policy machinery and its core constituent, the foreign ministry. Given that the foreign ministry is the part of the national bureaucracy which traditionally reflects the relationship of a state with its international environment, the patterns of change within its structure, processes and operation reflect states’ responses to external change as well as their fundamental assumptions about world politics (Hocking, 2007: 4). Taking this into consideration, the thesis investigated the structure and role of the Greek foreign policy machinery and its main constituents, the MFA and the diplomatic network. The preceding chapters
have revealed a number of significant features of what we have referred to as the Greek ‘foreign policy system’ and these cannot be restated here. Rather, the aim of this conclusion is to indicate the significance of some of the broader issues -as framed in the research questions- in understanding how Greece has managed its foreign and international policy, and the challenges that it faces in this respect.

**Rethinking Greek foreign policy: at crossroads between geopolitical and globalist approaches**

Current developments embodied in processes of globalisation and regionalisation in conjunction with the emergence of horizontal networks and IT, have transformed the spatial organisation of world affairs. As a result they have challenged our analytical capacity which is rooted in methodological territorialism and in geopolitical approaches to interpreting global issues (Scholte, 2005; Held et al., 1999). Geopolitical approaches provided the dominant framework for the study of international politics and foreign policy for much of the twentieth century assuming that geographical and geopolitical dynamics constituted the primary variables (Anderson, 1998: 106). Such approaches closely linked to compartmentalisation in the understanding and organisation of foreign policy along vertical organisational domains (Cooper, 2001) and traditional assumptions of FPA (Webber and Smith, 2002; Keohane and Nye, 1989) have been considerably challenged.

For purposes of utilizing a flexible analytical framework that addresses contemporary developments in the analysis of foreign policy such as its domestication, the thesis employed the concept of ‘transformational FPA’ developed by Manners and Whitman and others (Manners and Whitman, 2000) which accommodates a wider range of policy actors, state and non-state, domestic or international, that may function horizontally. At the same time, transformational FPA encourages the exploration of linkages between foreign and other areas of
governmental policy-making as well as the investigation of a much wider set of foreign policy issues beyond high politics. As a result, the research agenda of transformational FPA allowed us to embrace actors -beyond the MFA- with a traditionally domestic competence such as the Ministry of Economy or the Parliament as well as issues that require horizontal -inter-departmental cooperation. Such an approach challenging the insulation of foreign policy as a distinct governmental public policy area extends to issues traditionally falling under domestic policy areas.

This offers a fresh approach because it breaks up the monopoly of the foreign ministry over foreign policy and offers the opportunity for a fresh look at the way we handle international relations in a system of global networks and eroded foreign/domestic divides. Therefore, it allowed for the re-evaluation of the Greek foreign policy system through a new lens. In the course of the re-evaluation limitations of the foreign policy bureaucracy in the MFA and its diplomatic network were not taken for granted. Rather the search for foreign policy bureaucracy was extended to other departments such as the Ministry of Interior and the Secretariat for Communication and Information which proved to constitute an integral part of Greek overseas representation. This approach allowed the exploration of a possible widening in the management of contemporary Greek foreign policy to other parts of domestic bureaucracies and provided significant conclusions which have been discussed in the previous chapters.

The re-evaluation of the Greek foreign policy system and the study of its organisation presented some interesting conclusions with regards to contemporary understanding not only of Greek foreign policy processes but also of Greek foreign policy substance. It appears that up to date Greek understanding of foreign policy has relied on the perception that it is divided into distinct domains such as traditional foreign policy associated with military issues, European policy and international economic and development policy. Such understanding explains the compartmentalised organisational structure of the MFA discussed below, which essentially indicates the employment, not integration, of different branches of the
bureaucracy for the execution of different foreign policy functions under the leadership of the MFA. The course of the interviews provided ample evidence to support this distinction.

More specifically, Greek foreign policy bureaucrats understand external policy as comprising three different branches, namely foreign, European and international policy. Foreign policy [εξωτερική πολιτική] is associated with traditional military security issues and high politics and is often coterminous with the ongoing issues of FYROM, Turkey and Cyprus. European policy [Ευρωπαϊκή πολιτική] is associated with sectoral/technical and economic policies whereas international policy [διεθνής πολιτική] is associated with international economic and development matters. The interviews also emphasised the primacy of Greek foreign policy in its traditional high politics form vis-à-vis the other branches of external policy. It is not surprising for a country like Greece, with its historic dependence on foreign powers and ongoing security threats to its territorial integrity, to present a foreign policy agenda which is dominated by high politics. The nature of such preoccupations implying imminent security threats render the model of Greek foreign policy organisation traditionalistic and associated with realist, state-centric accounts of international relations and diplomacy.

In this context, it is natural for the MFA to have been perceived as the country’s fortress against the enemy and the diplomatic service as Greece’s security negotiator towards other governments. Such a tendency is further reinforced with the particular politico-administrative culture discussed in chapter two, which has ascribed a traditionalist view to society, political systems and public policy-making generally and which extends to foreign policy-making. Based on this understanding, it is natural for the foreign policy process to be highly politicised and to constitute to a great extent the prerogative of the PM and the FM, especially when issues involve Greek national security concerns.

Entry to the EU and the intensification of globalisation processes with the aid of IT which dictates the addition of a large number of economic and technical or
otherwise low policy areas has had major implications for the Greek foreign policy system. A number of issues have been added to the foreign policy agenda alongside traditional security concerns that urged Greece to shed its strictly parochial national character and become more actively involved in the globalised policy arena. The growth in Greece’s preoccupations toward a large-or at least larger than before-number of international policy domains has added a new dimension to its understanding of foreign policy. Nevertheless, it has not removed those traditional elements which have shaped its understanding to date based on the existing and pressing traditional security concerns.

Therefore, with regards to questions concerning the impact of globalisation and regionalisation on the contemporary Greek understanding and organisation of foreign policy, one could argue that the Greek foreign policy system, albeit in a process of deepening symbiosis between the different branches of foreign policy, for obvious reasons, has not yet managed to achieve an integrated approach. Despite the fact that the post Cold War era marked the end of geopolitical arrangements and thinking, such approaches are still present in the Greek foreign policy system. Geopolitics still provides the dominant framework for the understanding and organisation of Greek foreign policy resisting the penetration of globalist and more networked approaches to organisation. As a result, one could argue that Greece, which until two decades ago had been at crossroads between the East and the West, is currently found at a crossroads between geopolitical and globalist approaches.

Globalist approaches, being associated with deterritorialisation, cross-cutting policy issues and horizontal and thematic arrangements of foreign policy, cannot explain contemporary Greek foreign policy structures which are organised on vertical geographical and thematic divisions, with the latter distinguishing only between political and technical or economic issues. It is a valid claim that the acute centralisation, hierarchy and verticality present in the entirety of the Greek FPS reflect a hierarchical understanding of foreign policy and diplomacy, which conforms more to state-centric approaches to international relations and
understandings of diplomacy based on the Westphalian state-model. In this light, it is not surprising that there is no significant evidence to substantiate the existence of an extensively widened foreign policy community in Greece as well as a decentralisation of foreign policy.

**A micro-foreign policy community and limited horizontalisation**

The rise of low policies as a result of globalisation and EU membership has challenged the Greek foreign policy machinery which is gradually and slowly opening up to a number of bureaucratic agents and expanding both within and outside the MFA. The most characteristic example of expansion outside the MFA to date is the Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU (PeRepGr) which constitutes perhaps the only instance whereby foreign and international policy making is explicitly handed over to a section of bureaucracy outside the MFA. With regards to expansion within the MFA, this is manifested in centralisation and the addition of organisational units for the competences of European, international and foreign economic policy and diplomacy.

The PeRepGr, comprising domestic officials, is the only part of the Greek bureaucracy that provides some evidence of a limited horizontal spread towards other domestic bureaucratic agents, and supports claims for a case of a limited widening foreign policy community in Greece. This, together with evidence supporting limited development of international policy capacity in domestic departments thus not amounting to significant foreign policy decentralisation, has produced what was termed in chapter three a micro-foreign policy community. Therefore, with regards to the question of whether there is a foreign policy community emerging in Greece, the answer is that it is in an embryonic stage of development but it is anticipated that its evolution is being precipitated by pressing demands for the intensification of international policy making in various government departments.
Bureaucratic policy coordination: far from WOG approaches

Coordination has become a dominant theme in the discussion of governmental management of international policy. Its prominence is closely linked to the growth of government, the meshing of the domestic and international policy environments and the respective involvement of a wide cast of domestic government departments and the creation of foreign policy communities. Given that coordination schemes reflect national political and administrative cultures (Hocking and Spence, 2005) evidence gathered from the exploration of coordination practices in Greece, not surprisingly, do not differ from the general Greek politico-administrative tradition. With coordination practices operating on both vertical and horizontal levels, different conclusions can be drawn from its operation on each level.

Interview evidence suggested that Greece does not fall into the category of states that view policy coordination as an end in itself or, in other words, as a bureaucratic strategy. Rather, the function of coordination in Greece, imbued as it is with political significance, besides serving purposes of pulling together the threads of governmental policy, constitutes an indicator of added monitoring power vested in a given government department and is linked to its primacy vis-à-vis other government departments. In the Greek coordinating scheme the MFA has always been central both in coordinating foreign policy in its traditional form but also European and other international policies. The MFA’s centrality has been reaffirmed in the latest MFA Charter in 2007. The Greek FPS accords with observations which suggest that the foreign ministry’s exclusivity in international policy management is linked to vertical and hierarchical, top-down conceptualisations of coordination. In such systems as in Greece, the foreign ministry acquires the role of the dominant foreign policy agency

Interestingly, interviews did not raise questions regarding coordination of those branches of foreign policy linked to traditional foreign policy. More specifically, with a centralised scheme which involves the PMO, the MFA and the MoD, crystallising
the holy triangle of Greek foreign policy, coordination appears to be effective and unproblematic by being hierarchical and centralised. The Achilles heel for Greek policy coordination occurs when coordinating on a horizontal level, between both the vertical organisational units within the MFA and on an inter-ministerial level between ministries which engage in international dealings. The Greek coordination model is highly hierarchical and centralised for purposes of ensuring high levels of coordination. However it presents significant weaknesses and delays when confronted with the management of more horizontal and cross-cutting policies prescribed by globalisation and regionalisation. The weakness seems to be in proportion to the extent of internationalisation: the more the foreign policy system moves away from traditional foreign policy towards European or international policy, the more problematic the coordination process.

Altogether, the existing coordinating mechanisms demonstrate that Greece is far from claims for integrated approaches to international policy coordination defined as ‘whole of government’ approaches commonly emphasised in other countries. Hierarchy, verticality and co-responsibility which characterise the coordination system result in responsibility confusion, waste of resources –human and others- as well as overlaps in policies and programmes. In addition, there is significant bureaucratic antagonism which is closely linked to turf wars between governmental departments based on the premise of competing fortresses rather than parts of an integrated system. In this competitive domestic environment the primacy of the MFA over policy coordination amongst Greek bureaucratic agents has been reinforced in new international policy areas thus strengthening its role and centrality in the management of international policy.
The MFA: continuity and change

Based on the premise that environmental change is manifested with change and adaptation at the bureaucratic level, organisational and operational change in the MFA and its diplomatic network offer significant evidence with regards to the adaptation of Greek foreign policy management. Organisational re-arrangement of the MFA in Greece has been primarily the product of the need to adapt to the transforming external policy milieu. With the MFA perceived as the main Greek bureaucratic agent focused on the external environment, change and adaptation in its organisation reflect the need to respond to international developments. Effectively, the MFA has been in search of a new identity and functions with which to extend its reach towards new international policy areas as well as an expanded and refined organisational structure to reflect the complexity of its international tasks.

As with other EU foreign ministries, the Greek MFA has been resistant to change due to its organisational culture, which allows less flexibility and adheres to a high politics agenda not allowing for low politics to come into play. Simultaneously, as in the majority of EU member states as well as a number of small states, the foreign policy system in Greece has maintained the MFA as its central foreign policy actor. Thus, the MFA has manifested resilience and a significant degree of adaptability which is manifest in the extension of its functions and organisational change.

Organisational change, developed through a series of organisational expansions and centralisation of competences under the MFA, has been small, incremental and based on existing practices. Based on this, the tool of path dependence has proved very useful in analysing it. Such change prescribes a case of change and adaptation as response to external stimuli rather than transformation in the sense of radical reform. With adaptability understood as occurring within existing institutional frameworks in order to maintain existing structures and transformation understood as establishing fundamentally new structures (Löf, 2010) it is easy to locate the Greek case as fitting well in the former. Interviews revealed that the
adaptation of the Greek foreign policy system does not constitute a strategy in itself but rather a reflexive response to given stimuli. Based on the premise that adaptability is manifested by the foreign ministry taking on new tasks and functions with the aim of becoming more competitive in a number of newly added issue areas (Moses and Knutsen, 2001) it can be concluded that the MFA has been engaged in a process of change and adaptation.

The MFA is characterised by a hierarchical model of organisation based more on a geographical than a thematic approach. When a thematic approach applies it is limited in distinguishing between political and economic affairs. Recent reforms introduced in the last ten to fifteen years have rendered the organisational structure of the MFA more complex and multilayered. This process has been the product of attempts to adapt the organisation of the MFA based on the principle of functionality which was added to the traditional principle of territoriality for purposes of responding to those issues that stem from increased economic interdependence and globalisation. Nevertheless, despite elements of functional expansion and increased complexity the MFA is far from adopting a horizontal and integrated approach to the organisation of foreign policy.

More specifically, the MFA reflects a traditional approach to foreign policy organisation which divides foreign policy into vertical organisational compartments which remain insulated from one another due to a persistent hierarchical modus operandi. Effectively, the MFA appears to conform to images of foreign ministries which remain compartmentalised by function and imbued with verticality in terms of design and inculcated with traditional perceptions of foreign policy. Such models reinforce and perpetuate hierarchical structures which often relate to elements of secrecy and introversion at the expense of information sharing networks. Such images seem to explain well the relation between structure and operation of the MFA which by retaining the model of vertical silos prevents the development of networked policy environments and poses obstacles to policy coordination. From this follows questions concerning the position of the MFA in terms of debates
about decline versus non-decline and gate-keeping versus boundary spanning images.

**Whither the MFA?**

Based on the premise that the position and role of the foreign ministry in the context of transforming world politics reflect the ways in which states respond to changes taking place in the international and domestic policy milieus, the study of the MFA presents some very interesting conclusions. Overall, the MFA seems to have benefited from the processes of globalisation and regionalisation in that it has been strengthened due to the centralisation of European and international policy processes. As a matter of fact, the MFA has ensured pre-eminence within the national foreign policy machinery in shaping and implementing Greek foreign policy in both the context of globalisation and supranationality in the EU. In the wider discussion of strong and weak foreign ministries (Hocking and Spence, 2005) the Greek MFA can be classified as a strong foreign ministry in that it occupies the most significant position in the national foreign policy bureaucracy. Beyond doubt, forces of change and transformation have challenged its role and significance but the MFA still remains at the epicentre of the national foreign policy system.

With assumptions in the literature over the foreign ministry’s declining role focusing either on the position of the foreign ministry within the national bureaucratic architecture or on the domestication and horizontalisation of foreign policy, the image of the contemporary Greek MFA demonstrates that it does not accord with such assumptions. It is the evidence of adaptability discussed in chapter four that challenges the conventional arguments regarding the MFA’s decline.

The course of adaptation that the MFA has embarked upon provides substantial evidence that not only is the MFA not declining as the ultimate Greek foreign policy actor but is being strengthened by becoming more complex in structure and
operation to reflect the changing policy milieus in which it operates. For instance, the centralisation of the economic diplomacy function within the MFA follows examples of other strengthening foreign ministries which have re-integrated trade and foreign policy into a single department as a way of responding to the growing significance of economics in foreign policy. The same applies to the function of international policy coordination and crisis management which when allocated to the foreign ministry are indicative of its strengthening position.

With regard to the added European and international dimensions of foreign policy, both in the MFA but also in other home departments, it seems that these have not occurred at the expense of the MFA but have instead contributed to the MFA’s growth as a stronger political actor. At the same time the aforementioned dimensions helped to develop an added sectoral dimension to the MFA due to the extension of its reach to technical/sectoral and economic policies as well as a significant newly added consultative role over issues of protocol and administration.

Whilst some might argue that the role of the MFA is in decline or bypassed by the PMO in policy making in the context of multilateralism and supranationalism, empirical evidence suggests that the MFA is becoming established as the most valued bureaucratic actor with an increasing input in the foreign policy process. With its skills expanding into policy consultation the MFA remains at the centre of Greek international policy engagements at all levels and is transforming into a modern foreign policy actor with increasing sectoral competence. Strong evidence of this is provided by interviews which suggest that the MFA is engaged in a process of change and adaptation aimed at finding its place in a renewed and Modern Greek foreign policy system.
More of a gatekeeper and less of a boundary-spanner

In the framework of the two different models of contemporary foreign ministries summarised by the gate-keeper and boundary spanner images (Hocking, 2005) the MFA appears to relate more to the former whilst recently displaying elements of the latter. This is because the MFA’s image rests on a number of inter-linked assumptions presented by the two images. Concomitant with gate-keeping understandings of the foreign ministry associated with the centrality of the territorial state, the primacy over control of boundaries and the communication flows that cross them, the MFA retains its exclusivity in the management of international policy and pursues the role of the dominant policy coordinator through which it establishes its primacy vis-á-vis the rest of Greek bureaucracy in the management of foreign policy.

In accordance with the gatekeeper image, Greek foreign policy is equated with high politics and the pursuit of certain identifiable national interests mostly concerning national security issues defined in terms of military security. Most importantly, as prescribed by gate-keeping images and observed in the present investigation of the MFA, its exclusivity in international policy management and its perseverance as the dominant foreign policy actor within the governmental apparatus are linked to compartmentalised and hierarchical organisations.

The MFA relates less to images of the foreign ministry as boundary spanner which corresponds more to the emergent global and regional policy environments. The rationale for this model rests on the capacity of the foreign ministry to ‘span’ boundaries, which themselves are changing by becoming penetrable and at the same time colonised by new agents such as epistemic communities, specialist groups, think tanks, and NGOs. The Greek MFA only recently started to display some of these elements and this is manifested in its deepening cooperation with civil society and business communities due to the expansion of its functions.
The fact that the MFA falls somewhere in the middle of the two images of contemporary foreign ministries –even if the balance tilts in favour of the gatekeeper image - further emphasises the views expressed above that the MFA together with the foreign policy machinery in its entirety are at a crossroads between traditional -in the form of state-centric and geopolitical- and globalised approaches to foreign policy. In a more optimistic explanation, the MFA is in a process of change from a traditional approach to foreign policy which in the Greek case was closely related to past emotional, maximalist -in the sense of a radical political and nationalist approaches- and security-charged foreign policy towards a new, more globalised and networked approach which is more harmonious with international and economic policies based on minimalist criteria advocating minimal and technical reforms.

The Greek overseas diplomatic network: sticky and hierarchical

Diplomatic networks, the nerve-endings of national foreign policy machineries, similarly with foreign ministries, are in a process of profound change and adaptation as a response to their transforming operational environment. And whilst globalist approaches assume the disintermediation and decline of the network’s central constituent, the embassy, more moderate approaches suggest that diplomatic networks, similarly with other structures for the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy, are resilient and adaptive. Analyses which consider the embassies as retaining their traditional functions and remaining central in the conduct of foreign and international policy and diplomacy also suggest that they are growing in significance and scope with new functions being added to their structure and operation for purposes of adapting to contemporary demands. In this light, the thesis sought to explore how the Greek diplomatic network and its central elements, the Greek embassies, relate to such assumptions.

Despite ongoing discussion concerning the role and future of national diplomatic representation, there is a considerable lack of qualitative empirical data on
missions’ routines, working procedures and communication patterns. For this purpose, change and adaptation of diplomatic overseas missions have to be seen through the prism of their evolving function and role. It was due to the lack of empirical data that part of this study focused on the exploration of the Greek diplomatic network. Besides contributing empirical data to general literature on overseas diplomatic representation the thesis sought to contribute to Greek foreign policy literature by exploring this dimension of the foreign policy machinery which has been significantly understudied. In doing so, the thesis investigated the structure and character of the Greek overseas diplomatic network in its entirety, that is including permanent missions other than those administered by the MFA, as well as the processes and functions it undertakes in the context of contemporary world politics.

The exploration of the Greek contemporary diplomatic network provided significant information concerning its role, functions, organisation and operation as well as evidence regarding the nature of its adaptation to contemporary demands. The study also identified a number of critical issues concerning the organisation and operation of the Greek diplomatic network such as persistent traditionalism and hierarchy. These issues have shaped the character and organisational culture of the Greek overseas missions while at the same time determined the course of the network’s responses to changing operational conditions, which have been slow and resistant thus drawing the contemporary image of the network as sticky.

Evidently, the character of the Greek overseas diplomatic missions emerged as more conservative than that of the MFA as a whole and more resistant to change. Persisting fragmentation based on the division of foreign policy processes and functions, such as economic and public diplomacy, consular work and crisis management between different organisational units further supports claims about the network’s stickiness.

With the character and organisation of the overseas missions indicating governments’ perceptions of foreign policy in the context of the transforming world
as well as their fundamental assumptions about how world politics are developing and managed, conclusions can be drawn for the Greek case. Fragmentation, traditionalism and hierarchy in the organisational model of Greek overseas missions, as with the MFA, can be argued to reflect an understanding of foreign policy which conforms to its compartmentalisation into distinct organisational domains. Such models largely perpetuate divisions between political and economic or sectoral affairs and prevent integrated approaches to foreign policy management necessitated by increased interdependence and globalisation. In other words, such models reflect a deep-rooted unilateral and traditional understanding of foreign policy whereby economic, political and other competences are distinct and diplomacy targets foreign governments rather than foreign audiences.

The elements of change manifested through the addition of functions, such as economic and public diplomacy, to Greek missions do not amount to claims supporting transformation. These additions did not result in the reorganisation of missions but rather added functions to existing sections. On the contrary, elements such as potent traditionalism and hierarchy indicate a course of adaptation which is characterised by incrementalism, that is to say slow adaptation, within a pre-determined path. In institutionalist terms a certain degree of isomorphism or adaptation to operational environments has occurred expressed through changes in the commerce and press sections but with the respective constraints prescribed by national organisational traditions which form part of national foreign policy systems (Clarke and White, 1981; 1989). In other words, the Greek diplomatic network in its entirety presents elements of path dependence by sticking to prior organisational and operational modes summarised in hierarchy, traditionalism and compartmentalisation in the organisation of diplomacy.
The dual image of the Greek FPS: between isomorphism and path dependence

Altogether, the evidence gathered in the course of the fieldwork initially produced an ambiguous picture of the Greek foreign policy machinery. This is because at times it appeared to oscillate between two contrasting images. The first image, largely implying that the foreign policy machinery embraces contemporary foreign policy developments, is one of change and adaptation in response to the changing operational environment. The second image closely related to the wider Greek politico-administrative culture, depicts the foreign policy machinery as being traditionalist and infused with elements of politicization, hierarchy and centralisation and influenced by geopolitical approaches. Both images providing elements of both change and continuity constitute valid accounts and are considered as complementary in their depiction of the current state of the Greek foreign policy machinery.

The differing views emerging from the interviews generated a number of questions with regards to their validity. For purposes of clarification further interviews were conducted which effectively enabled the elaboration and reconciliation of the two different images. The employment of institutionalist thinking functioned as a catalyst in this process. This is because new institutionalist isomorphism proved very helpful in understanding the course of change and adaptation undertaken by the Greek foreign policy machinery in order to adapt to the complex interdependent environments in which it operates. In this context, isomorphism informed the first image of the foreign policy machinery which supports a case of adaptation through the undertaking of new functions and roles.

At the same time, however, there existed the second set of evidence which depicted the Greek foreign policy machinery as traditionalist and resistant to change. To aid the understanding of this interpretation, the thesis employed an additional analytical framework which suggests that national adaptation of foreign policy structures and processes varies depending on the nature of the national
FPS in its entirety. The FPS defined by Clarke and White (1981; 1989) as comprising foreign policy structures and processes together with their surrounding operational environment involving elements such as politico-administrative culture, particular national circumstances, interests and identities proved very informative.

The conceptualisation of the Greek FPS as the aggregate of foreign policy structures, processes and environmental variables that are particular for Greece added significant explanatory value to the understanding of the character of the Greek foreign policy machinery and its preferred course of adaptation to the changing operational environment. The elaboration of the Greek politico-administrative variables analysed in chapter two, helped explain why, in the face of the challenges and changes posed by globalisation and regionalisation, the Greek foreign policy system demonstrates a significant degree of path dependence expressed through stickiness to prior practices associated with persistence over traditionalism and hierarchy in foreign policy organisation.

Finally, in relation to discussions concerning the two main trends, fragmentation or concentration identified in contemporary national foreign policy and diplomatic systems (Hocking, 2007: 9) the Greek FPS could fit well into the latter. With fragmentation relating to the diversification within the national diplomatic system as line ministries come to assume a growing interest in the international dimension of their own portfolios and concentration relating to the enhancement of foreign policy capacity of prime ministerial and presidential offices and other central agencies, it is easy to position the Greek FPS amongst centralised systems where the foreign policy making power rests with the PM and the MFA. Given that both developments trigger a series of shifts of dynamics within traditional foreign policy institutions (Langhorne, 2000: 42), the present investigation demonstrated that the entirety of the Greek foreign policy machinery has been affected - as for instance with the centralisation of economic diplomacy and the transfer of the economic section to the MFA.
Future scenarios

With regards to likely future developments, it is inevitable that as European and international agendas continue to impact on Greece as elsewhere, domestic and foreign policies will become increasingly intertwined. In this context, international policy capacity at domestic ministries is bound to develop and decentralisation of foreign policy to take place thus promoting the widening of the Greek foreign policy community in the domestic environment, which will require further investigation.

It is not impossible for the Greek foreign policy machinery as it is today to become overloaded and the MFA incapable of coordinating all those aspects of foreign policy - especially foreign economic policy given contemporary financial constraints. One problem which is bound to be aggravated concerns the coordination of international policy which is very weak and ineffective vis-á-vis growing international demands. A possible scenario is the transformation of the Ministry of National Economy to the central Greek foreign policy actor in the face of its intensified international engagements with international actors such as the IMF and the European Central Bank resulting from the Greek economic crisis. These areas need to be studied in greater depth given the change in substance of Greek international dealings.

The vertical organisation of the MFA is bound to be rendered outdated very soon and incapable of managing the increasing load of horizontal cross-cutting policies. With the foreign policy system constituting a living organism, responses to its operational environment must be studied on a continuous basis. One moment for such study will be after the new MFA Charter, which is currently being drafted, comes into effect. Related to this is the function of public diplomacy which it is anticipated will constitute the linchpin of the new Charter. Given the negative responses and criticism Greece received from its European partners after the outbreak of the domestic financial crisis, it will be interesting to investigate whether the organisation of public diplomacy is strengthened for purposes of influencing foreign audiences.
Drawing these points together, the thesis has, by means of a synthesis of several literatures, primarily those identified with ‘transformational’ FPA, new approaches to diplomatic studies informed by insights from institutionalist approaches and combined with extensive fieldwork within the Greek bureaucracy and the diplomatic network, sought to cast light on a relatively understudied area: namely the character and organisation of the Greek foreign policy system in an era of considerable domestic, regional and international change. Given the growing pressures emanating from an increasingly complex environment and in the light of major economic and geopolitical events, understanding the international policy capacity of states - as reflected in their foreign policy machinery - provides significant evidence of their varied responses to the impact of globalisation, regionalisation and localisation in the 21st century.
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List of interviews

In the interest of anonymity, the interview numbers in this table have been deliberately shuffled so that they do not correspond to the numbers of the interviews quoted in the text. Interviews took place over the period from 20th December 2006 until 9th December 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>INSTITUTION/LOCATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Director, General Secretariat for EU affairs</td>
<td>General Secretariat for EU Affairs, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Embassy Counsellor, Consultant to the Prime Minister’s Diplomatic Cabinet</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Diplomatic Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Advisor to the Diplomatic Cabinet of Deputy Foreign Minister for Consular Affairs</td>
<td>Deputy FM Diplomatic Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Director, Geographic Policy and Strategic Planning, YDAS - DG International Development Cooperation</td>
<td>YDAS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Head of Humanitarian Aid, YDAS- DG International Development Cooperation</td>
<td>YDAS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Head of General Secretary Office</td>
<td>General Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Head of Crisis Management Unit, General Secretary Office</td>
<td>General Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Head of Scientific Centre for Analysis and Planning</td>
<td>EKAS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Advisor to Scientific Centre for Analysis and Planning</td>
<td>EKAS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Advisor, DG A General Political Affairs</td>
<td>DG-A Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Embassy Counsellor B, DG-A 1 European Affairs</td>
<td>DG-A Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Embassy Counsellor B, DG-A 1 European Affairs</td>
<td>DG-A Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Embassy Counsellor, DG-A5 Russia, Belarus and Black Sea states</td>
<td>DG-A Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Embassy Counsellor, DG-A6 Arabic states and the Middle East</td>
<td>DG-A Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Embassy Counsellor, DG-A6 Arabic states and the Middle East</td>
<td>DG-A Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Director, DG-B1 Strategic Planning/Economic Diplomacy</td>
<td>DG-B Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Head of DG-B7 International Energy Security</td>
<td>DG-B Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Director, DG-B8 Business Development</td>
<td>DG-B Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Director, Peripheral DG International Economic Relations</td>
<td>Peripheral DG International Economic Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thessaloniki, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Coordinator of Euro-Mediterranean Commission</td>
<td>EURO-MED, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Position and Experience</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Diplomatic Advisor, Linkage of the MFA to the Ministry of Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Advisor, MFA Linkage Office to the Ministry of Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Brigadier Director of International Relations Unit, Ministry of Defence Former Greek Representative to the CFSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Director, MFA linkage to the Ministry of Development, former President of MFA Diplomatic Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>General Secretary, Press Offices section, General Secretariat of Information and Communication (GCIG)</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Vice-President of Press Attachés Union, General Secretariat of Information and Communication (GCIG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Communication Advisor, former General Secretary of General Secretariat of Information and Communication (GCIG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Member of Greek Parliament, Permanent Parliamentary Committee on European and Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Librarian- ELIAMEP- Greek Foreign policy research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Greek members of the European Parliament – Roundtable on Greek foreign affairs and induction to Greek stagiaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Advisor of cultural affairs of the European Parliament and Liaison for Greek MEPs to the EP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Second Secretary, Antici, General Coordination-COREPER II- Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>First Counsellor –Head of Unit External Relations, Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>On behalf of Second Secretary, COREPER I, Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>First Secretary- Department of External Relations and Enlargement, Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Economic and Commercial Affairs Advisor- Economic and Financial Policy Unit, Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Greek Ambassador to Belgium, Greek Embassy</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Position</td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>First Embassy Counsellor, Political division of Greek Embassy in Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Embassy Counsellor, Political Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Embassy 1st Secretary, Political Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Embassy 2nd Secretary, Political Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Minister Counsellor, Cultural Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Officer, Visa Section, General Consulate in Brussels</td>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>General Consul to London</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>General Consul to Cologne</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>Honorary Consul to Birmingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Head of Economic and Commercial Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Economic and Commercial attaché (telephone interview)</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Economic and Commercial attaché (telephone interview)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Head of Press Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX I: INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

SCHEDULE 1: Interview with diplomats at various MFA General Directorates in Athens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure-Functions-Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Could you please describe the structure of your DG?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the main functions and role of the DG/ your office?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What would you consider to be its input to the foreign policy process?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication-Linkages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Could you please identify who gives instructions to your DG? Is this an institutionalised process or ad hoc?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the main linkages of your DG?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ For instance, do you communicate with overseas missions directly? Is there an open communication loop?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Do you communicate/cooperate with other government departments and for what purposes? Any examples?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Do you communicate/cooperate with extra-MFA and extra-governmental elements such as NGOs/businesses? Any examples?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do you consider the level of communication/cooperation satisfactory?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do you identify any problems in communication?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Do you and/or your colleagues perceive any change in the functions and processes of your DG?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do you anticipate more change? If yes, what makes you believe this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is the Greek foreign policy agenda changing in accordance to international policy agendas with issues being added such as international development, the environment and so on?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Are there any other international issues that are particular to Greece? Why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do you think that the nature of Greek foreign policy is changing?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• As a result, has your job changed over the last few years?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ If yes, in what ways?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Coordination</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Are there any particular government departments in charge of different branches of foreign policy? For instance, is there one department in charge of what we call traditional matters of foreign policy linked to security and another one or more of more contemporary issues of foreign policy such as economic and international policy matters (e.g. humanitarian aid, development and so on)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How does international policy coordination take place? What are the main mechanisms?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What is the role of the MFA in foreign and international policy coordination?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Has its role in policy coordination increased/declined over the last few years? Would this have to do with the nature of Greek foreign policy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does foreign or/and international policy coordination constitute an issue for Greek governments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Could you please identify at what level does policy coordination is and is not satisfactory? For instance how would you describe policy coordination within the MFA and between the MFA and overseas missions/other government departments?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intra-bureaucratic collaboration – widening of foreign policy community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• With regards to international policy, does the MFA work closely together with other government departments? What is the form of this collaboration? Is it for instance in the form of consultations/recommendations or anything like this? Is it official and institutionalised?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are there any particular policy areas that the MFA collaborates with other departments? What are those?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It is common for some foreign ministries to create linkage offices in other government departments, is this the case with the MFA?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Could it be argued that the MFA co-manages certain areas of international policy with other government departments?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Is this collaboration more intensified with given departments? What are these departments?

**Crisis management**
- Which actor is in charge of coordination in crisis management?
- Are there any mechanisms in place to manage crises? How are they activated?
- Has this become an institutionalised function for the MFA? How is it organised?
  - Is it well developed? Effectively performed?
- What are the implications of managing crises for the structure of the MFA?
- Does communication/cooperation take place with the overseas missions?
- What are the main home/local partners of the MFA in the management of crises?

**Public and economic diplomacy**
- Public/economic diplomacy has come to constitute one of the major axes of re-organisation for a number of foreign ministries worldwide. Is public/economic diplomacy rising on the Greek foreign policy agenda? Could it be argued that it constitutes the pivot for the re-organisation of the MFA and/or the Greek diplomatic network?
- How is public/economic diplomacy organised? What are the main mechanisms and actors involved?
- Is there a special unit for public/economic diplomacy at the PMO?
- Does the MFA take leadership in this field?
  - Is public/economic diplomacy a cross-departmental activity?
- Is public/economic diplomacy becoming part of the Greek foreign policy consciousness?
- Do you think it receives due attention? Is it adequately performed?
- Commonly, with issues areas such as public and economic diplomacy there is a growing synergy between the HQ and the overseas missions. Is this the case in Greece?

**The MFA**
- What is the structure of the MFA? Is it reflective of Greek foreign policy demands in the 21st century?
- Are there any weaknesses in the current structure of the MFA?
- What are the functions of the MFA?
  - Have the functions changed/increased to new areas? Could you please elaborate?
- What is the role of the MFA? For instance, is its role political/economic?
  - Has its role changed over the last few decades? If yes, why and into what?
- How does the MFA perceive itself? Is it a modern ministry?
- Is there a specific bureaucratic/departmental culture in the MFA? What are the main characteristics?
- Are there any official documents/reports/Organogram available?

**Career-path and professional development**
- Is professional development and training offered to MFA officials? What kind?
- Do you believe that diplomatic training is adequately delivered? Do Greek diplomats/officials perceive themselves as adequately equipped to perform their role?

Could you please refer me to any of your colleagues who has expertise in any of the themes we discussed?

**SCHEDULE 2: interview with diplomats in overseas missions**

**Structure- Functions-Role**
- Could you please describe the structure of your mission?
  - Is this a typical structure for all such missions?
- What are the main functions of the mission?
  - Do smaller/larger missions have different functions/role to deliver?
- Are the different functions viewed/performe as different parts of the same job? The diplomat’s job? Are they performed by officials of different qualifications?
- Does the mission have a coordinating function? Any examples? Who does it coordinate? Is this
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Significance of location</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is an embassy/consulate in London different to other locations? Why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does location have an impact on the character of the mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does its mission based on location have a different agenda?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Linkages</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the main partners of the mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the mission work with local NGOs/Businesses/other national actors/foreign missions locally/local government?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Communication</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who is the main communication partner of the mission back home?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the mission communicate directly with home departments? Under what circumstances?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the embassy communicate with the Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU? Under what circumstances?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Staffing and recruitment</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In a many countries it is common for a number of government departments to dispatch their officials to embassies overseas? Is there such wide governmental representation in Greek embassies?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would this be something to expect in the future? Why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Greek embassies employ local people?</td>
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</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Change</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have the missions’ functions changed over the last few years? If yes, why, when and how?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of the mission’s role? Is it political/commercial? Has this changed over the years?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the role and agenda of the mission bilateral/multilateral or both? Is this changing?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you and/or your colleagues perceive any change in your role and responsibilities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the role of the Greek diplomat changing? In what ways?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Greek diplomats have to perform more/less tasks?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Consular affairs?</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is there an increase/decrease in consular matters?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What kind of consular matters have increased/decreased? Why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are consular matters perceived as equally important to the other functions of the mission or considered as second class?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Crisis management</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In case of a crisis, how and when is the mechanism activated from your mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who are the linkages at home?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which actor is in charge of coordination in crisis management?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has this become an institutionalised function of your embassy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it well developed? Effectively performed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the local partners of the mission in the management of crises?</td>
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</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Public diplomacy?</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is public diplomacy organised in Greece? What are the main mechanisms and actors involved?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does it constitute a priority for Greek governments with regard to the function of overseas missions? Do you receive any instructions from the centre?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has PDcy had any implications for your job? The mission’s structure/functions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think public diplomacy will become a central function in the future?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Economic diplomacy?</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How does this mission support Greek business activities overseas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does this function alter the character of a mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think that the model for the conduct of Greek economic diplomacy is effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How would you describe the model of Greek overseas representation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Is this model effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Does it move towards more holistic/integrated approaches? Is it becoming more integrated itself?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Could you please refer me to any of your colleagues who has expertise in any of the themes we discussed?