“I Want This, I Want That”: a discursive analysis of mental state terms in family interaction

This item was submitted to Loughborough University's Institutional Repository by the/an author.

Additional Information:

- A Doctoral Thesis. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University.

Metadata Record: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/9354

Publisher: © Carrie Childs

Please cite the published version.
This item was submitted to Loughborough's Institutional Repository (https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the following Creative Commons Licence conditions.

For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
“I Want This, I Want That”: A Discursive Analysis of Mental State Terms in Family Interaction.

by

Carrie Childs

A Doctoral Thesis to be
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

September 2011

© by Carrie Childs 2011
Abstract

Using the theoretical approach of discursive psychology, this thesis examines the interactive uses of mental state talk, in particular the term 'want', in everyday family interaction. In mainstream cognitive psychology mental state terms are examined as words which signify internal referents. How individuals come to competently participate in social interaction is formulated as a problem of how individual, isolated minds come to understand the contents of other minds. This thesis challenges these individualistic notions and examines notions of ‘wanting’ as interactionally managed participants’ concerns.

The data are taken from two sources; a set of video recordings taken from a series of ‘fly-on-the-wall’ documentary programmes which each focus on a particular family and videotapes of mealtimes recorded by three families. Recordings were initially transcribed verbatim and sections related to the emerging themes within the thesis were subsequently transcribed using the Jefferson notation system. These transcripts were then analysed, alongside repeated viewings of the video recordings. The thesis considers a range of analytic themes, which are interlinked via one of the primary research questions, which has been to examine how, and to what end, speakers routinely deploy notions of ‘wanting’ in everyday talk-in-interaction. A major theme has been to highlight inherent problems with work in social cognition which uses experimental tasks to examine children's Theory of Mind and understanding of ‘desires’. I argue that the assumptions of this work are a gross simplification of the meaning ‘wanting’ for both children and adults. A further theme has been to examine the sequential organisation of directives and requests in both adults’ and children’s talk. Finally, I examine speakers’ practices for rejecting a proposal regarding their actions and for denying a formulation of their motivations by a co-interactant.

The conclusions of the thesis show that expressions of wanting are practical expressions which work within a flow of interactional and deontic considerations and that making claims regarding one’s own or others’ wants is entirely a social matter. I argue that rather than being examined for what they may reveal about ‘the mind’, mental state terms may be fruitfully examined as interactional matters.

Key words: ‘discursive psychology’ ‘conversation analysis’ ‘family’ ‘interaction’ ‘requests’ ‘mental states’ ‘accounts’
Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor Derek Edwards, for his inspirational guidance. It has been an honour to work closely with him over the last three years and this project would not have been possible without him. My special thanks go to Alexa Hepburn who stepped in as a temporary supervisor during my second year. Alexa, thank you for your encouragement and for believing in me when I was unsure of myself. I am also eternally grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council for funding this project.

It has been an honour to be part of the Discourse and Rhetoric Group at Loughborough University. I would especially like to thank Jonathan Potter for his guidance and helpful discussion. The same goes to my fellow students Laura, Alex and Chloe for your support and help during many hours of data sessions.

I am grateful to the administrative and technical staff in the Social Sciences department who have helped along the way. In particular Peter Beaman who is always a friendly face and is never too busy to lend a hand.

I would like to thank my friends and family for their continuing support. Patricia, my Mother, Peter, my Father and Luke, my brother, thank you for your patience and for putting up with me over the years. I know I haven’t made it easy at times! I’d like to thank my lifelong friends John and Claire, John for providing many hours of escape from it all in The Church and Claire for always being there.

Finally I would like to thank my partner Rhys, not least for moving across the country with me. Without his encouragement and support I wouldn’t be where I am today.
A version of chapter 7 of the thesis has been published in the following article:

## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 1- Introduction</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aims of the research</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of the thesis</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2- Literature review</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 1- Mind and emotion</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Theory of Mind in contemporary cognitive psychology</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 The false belief test</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Language and Theory of Mind</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Mainstream approaches to emotion</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Discursive studies of emotion and cognition</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Conversation and cognition</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 2- Intentions are not ‘hidden’: Participation in interaction</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0 Introduction: Research on the sequential organization of requests</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 The sociology of childhood</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1 Conversation analysis and children’s talk</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2 Children’s repair skills</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3 Children's requests</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.4 Tradition work on requests</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.5 Sequence organisation: Adjacency pairs</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 From intentions to accounts</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 The individual view: Intentions</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2 Motivations and accounts for conduct</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 3- Theories and issues: Discursive Psychology and theoretical debates</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0 Introduction</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Ethnomethodology</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Conversation analysis</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Sociology of scientific knowledge</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Discursive psychology</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Ontological and epistemological constructionism</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 Anti-cognitivism; Against Theory of Mind</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 4- Chapter summary</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3- Method

Part 1- The dataset

1.1 The television documentary data
1.2 The family mealtime data
1.3 Advantages and limitations of the dataset

Part 2- Procedures

2.1 Recording
2.2 Transcription
2.3 Analysis
2.4 Ethics and confidentiality

Chapter 4- ‘Want’ as an interactional resource

1.0 Introduction
1.1 Developing understanding of desires: Experimental testing
1.2 Methodological problems
2.0 Analysis
2.1 ‘Wanting’ in interaction
2.2 Sequential environments
2.2.1 Challenging an interlocutor: ‘What you want X?’
2.2.2 Challenging an interlocutor: ‘I don’t want X’
2.2.3 Accounts
3.0 Chapter summary

Chapter 5- Children’s ‘wants’

1.0 Introduction: ‘I want’ formatted requests
1.1 A developmental view: Desire, language and cognition
1.2 An interactional view- ‘wanting’ in request sequences
2.1 ‘I want’ requests display heightened entitlement
2.2 When it is expectable that a request will not be granted
2.2.1 Requesting precisely that which it is expectable will not be forthcoming
2.2.2 Using ‘I want’ to minimise re-requests
2.3 When there is some basis to suppose that requests will be granted
2.3.1 Requesting something that is available to a sibling
3.0 Chapter summary

Chapter 6- Directing and requesting
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>'I want' formatted directives</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Particular interaction environment</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>'I want' mobilises recipients' obligation to comply</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Reporting a 'want' as a fishing device</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>'You need to X' formatted directives</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>'I need' formatted requests</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>'I need' as a way of building a 'no problem' request</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>'I need' as a prerequisite to compliance</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>'I need' as a strategy for exiting a trouble relevant sequence</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Chapter summary</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 7- “I’m not X, I just want Y” 209

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Rejecting a proposal regarding future actions</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Rejecting a directive</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Rejecting a proposal embodied within an account solicitation</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>Following a formulation of actions or motivations</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Chapter summary</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 8- Discussion 233

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Thesis summary</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Contributions of the thesis</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>Future research implications</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References 245

Appendices 282

Appendix A: Participant information sheet 282

Appendix B: Consent forms 285

Appendix C: Transcription notation: 289
Introduction

This thesis is an examination of the interactive uses of the mental state term 'want' in everyday family interaction. It is not my intention to examine the family per se. Neither am I interested in language as a system of words and meanings. I have approached the thesis first and foremost as a discursive psychologist. My concern is with how basic social psychological matters are played out as individuals co-ordinate their activities during the course of everyday interaction (see Potter, 2010a). I consider talk as part of social practices and examine the practical uses of the term 'want' as an intelligible practice of accountability (Edwards & Potter, 2005). My argument is that rather than simply expressing a private, internal experience of desire, any conversational deployment of the notion of 'wanting' is a means of performing some kind of action within a conversational sequence. Hence, one cannot separate what it means to 'want' something from discourse and talk-in-interaction.

Conversation analysis (henceforth CA) is a broadly non-cognitivist approach to discourse while discursive psychology (henceforth DP) is a theoretical approach towards psychology which represents a major alternative to scientific epistemology. As such, the thesis has major implications for work in contemporary cognitive psychology, in particular Theory of Mind. However one characteristic of conversation analytic research is the concept of ‘unmotivated looking’. Rather than approaching analysis with an agenda, such as to develop a ‘critical discursive psychology of desire’ I found in the data that which was of interest. By drawing on conversation analytic work which has examined the structural organisation of talk-in-interaction and general themes highlighted by previous discursive psychological work, I set out to examine the practical uses of the term ‘want’. My interest in Theory of Mind emerged part way through the
project as the analysis evolved. I found in my materials that notions of wanting are interactionally managed participants’ concerns. As a theory which is concerned with children’s uses of mental state terms as a window into the developing mind, it seemed fitting to explore the implications of my analysis for Theory of Mind.

I use two sources of data; television documentary data and videotapes made during mealtimes by three families. The analysis draws heavily on conversation analytic techniques and is based on the analysis of detailed transcripts of the data. The focus of the thesis is how, in which environments, and to what end, speakers routinely deploy notions of ‘wanting’ in everyday talk-in-interaction.

This chapter will introduce the research topic by briefly outlining work in Theory of Mind as I discuss key themes and aims of the thesis. This chapter will provide only a brief overview and introduction as I discuss cognitive psychological work on emotions and mental states in detail in chapter 2. The chapter concludes with an overview of the thesis and the chapters to follow.

Aims of the research

How individuals come to competently participate in social interaction is of perennial interest in psychology. This is reflected in the large body of work in developmental psychology which documents the processes by which children come to understand others. The development of children’s interactional competencies is typically studied under the rubric of Theory of Mind, which is concerned with how individual, isolated minds come to understand the contents of other minds (an ability which is commonly referred to as ‘mind reading’). As Baker, Saxe and Tenenbaum note; “human social interaction depends on our ability to understand and predict other people’s actions in terms of the psychological states that produce behaviour: chiefly, beliefs and desires” (2009, p. 329). It is only within the last decade that language based research,
for example work in contemporary CA, has begun to show that the phenomena which the theory claims to explain is in fact acquired through language. Thus far this body of work has primarily focussed on showing that particular individuals, such as young children and those with diagnoses of autism and schizophrenia, demonstrate abilities that the Theory of Mind model predicts that they should not. While this work is important, it has thus far engaged with Theory of Mind on its own terms. As an oppositional body of work, the objectives and rationale of this research have largely been determined and defined by the main assumptions and theories of Theory of Mind. One of the aims of the thesis is to extend this body of work and to show that what it means to ‘want’ something is part and parcel of interaction. This brings us to a second aspect of research interest, which is to extend work in DP. I examine how notions of ‘wanting’ are deployed in the service of performing specific social actions in specific sequential environments; how these notions are used, where they are deployed, and to what end. This is of relevance to discursive psychologists, academic psychology and ordinary individuals alike as formulating one’s own or others’ ‘wants’ is a common activity in conversation. The thesis offers a technical, empirically grounded account of these practices.

Another interest is to extend work in CA which has examined the structural organisation of talk-in-interaction, in particular the body of work which has examined the sequential design of requests and directives (Craven & Potter, 2010; Curl & Drew, 2008; Heinemann, 2006; Lee, 2011; Lindström, 2005) and the structural organisation of accounts (Bolden & Robinson, 2011; Ford, 2002, Robinson & Bolden, 2010) as I examine the practices of formulating ‘wants’ in the service of performing these particular conversational activities.
Overview of the thesis

Chapter 2: Literature review

This chapter places the thesis in context and surveys the literature on several topics. The chapter is divided into three parts. I begin by introducing two areas of cognitive research which are pertinent to the analysis, which are Theory of Mind and mainstream cognitive approaches to emotion. I then introduce social constructionist, discursive and conversation analytic approaches to cognition and emotion. In part two I discuss work in CA which has examined the structural organisation of talk. This work is important as it informs the analysis in each of the empirical chapters. Finally, in part three I outline the theoretical approach of DP. I discuss key influences, which are ethnomethodology, CA and the sociology of scientific knowledge, and outline their relevance to the thesis.

Chapter 3: Method

Having introduced the theoretical approach of DP in chapter 2, this chapter is a brief look at method which discusses the methodological procedures and practicalities of the thesis. The chapter is divided into two sections; part 1 begins by introducing the dataset. In part 2 I outline the practical steps involved in collecting, transcribing and analysing the materials.

Chapter 4: Want as an interactional resource

Chapter 4 is the first analytic chapter. I begin at a basic level and explicate what is meant by examining formulations of wants as an interactional resource. The chapter begins by introducing experimental tasks which are used in the Theory of Mind framework to examine children’s understandings of desires, and discusses the assumptions embodied in this work. As the analysis begins I
highlight some inherent problems and issues with this work as I consider how notions of ‘wanting’ are deployed and oriented to in everyday talk. Specifically, I show how these experimental tests are based on an assumption that individuals ordinarily act in ways which are consistent with the fulfilment of their ‘wants’. I show how ‘wants’ are routinely invoked and deployed in the service of interactions involving obligations and constraints. My argument then, is that the assumptions embedded in tasks are a departure from, and gross simplification of, the meaning of ‘wanting’ for both children and adults. The chapter then moves on to begin examine the kinds of conversational activities in which notions of ‘wanting’ are routinely deployed.

**Chapter 5: Children’s wants**

In the second analytic chapter I build on the analysis in chapter 4 and will examine in further detail the specific sequential environments in which young children build requests using ‘I want’. Rather than understanding children’s uses of the word ‘want’ as simply an expression of a desire, a window into the developing mind, I show how young children select ‘I want’ to build requests in particular environments where the notion of ‘wanting’ is deployed to manage particular considerations.

**Chapter 6: Directing and requesting**

This chapter extends the analysis in chapter 5 by examining adult speakers’ uses of ‘want’ and ‘need’ to build directives and requests. Similarly to the analysis of children’s requests, here we will see that adult speakers use ‘I want’ to deliver directives and ‘I need’ to build requests in specific, recurrent environments to manage a range of contingencies and considerations. Rather than using ‘I want’ to communicate an internal experience of desire or using ‘I need’ to request a particular class of items (those which are necessary for some function) we see that notions of wanting and needing are resources
which have practical uses in their normative sequential environments. ‘Wanting’ and ‘needing’ then, become discursive matters which are constructed and deployed in interaction.

**Chapter 7: “I’m not X, I just want Y”**

The focus here is on speakers’ uses of a two-part structure ‘I don’t want/I’m not X, I just want Y’ which adult speakers use to reject a formulation of their motivations or a proposal regarding their future actions in the first turn construction unit (TCU), and subsequently formulate an alternative sense of agency in the second TCU. The important point here is that speakers may *construct* an intention or motivation in interaction to attend to considerations which are alive in the current interactional sequence.

**Chapter 8: Discussion**

This chapter is the concluding discussion. Here I discuss key themes and arguments of each chapter as I summarise my findings and discuss the contribution of the thesis to developmental psychology, sociology, interaction analysis and systems family therapy.
Literature review

We take it for granted that the problem of other minds does not reflect something timeless and transcultural about the human condition, but is instead a problem which makes sense in specific historical conditions and in its current form is partly of psychologists’ own doing. In psychology, it does not usually arise as a formally stated philosophical problem but is instead inscribed in theories, methods of investigation and in the language of psychology itself—in this respect it is a historical problem and should be treated as such. (Leudar & Costall, 2004, p. 603).

This introductory quote from Leudar and Costall raises important issues concerning whether mental states and emotion are individual, posing the problem of how we come to understand ‘other minds’, or whether, as will be argued throughout the thesis, these are displayed in everyday talk-in-interaction with understandings of others acquired in language. This chapter is organised into three main parts and will discuss the literature on several topics. The first of these, section 1.1, is an examination of the literature on Theory of Mind which is a dominant framework in the field of social cognition for explaining interpersonal interaction. Following this, in section 1.2, I briefly introduce mainstream approaches to emotion. I then discuss social constructionist, discursive and conversation analytic approaches to cognition and emotion in section 1.3. In part 2 I discuss the literature on several topics in order to locate each of the empirical chapters to follow. I begin in section 2.1 by discussing work in the new sociology of childhood, in particular work within CA which examines children’s talk-in-interaction. I then introduce sociolinguistic work on request formats and from this work I discuss conversation analytic work which has examined the sequential design of requests and directives. The chapter then moves on, in section 2.4, to discuss ‘intentions’ in psychological research and from this examines motivations and accounts for conduct in philosophy, sociology and discursive studies. In section 3 I discuss
DP in further detail as I outline the theoretical influences of ethnomethodology, CA and the sociology of scientific knowledge. In section 3.5 I discuss the approach of epistemological constructionism adopted within the thesis. Finally, in section 3.6, I review work that may be described as anti-cognitivist and which has developed a sustained critique of research on Theory of Mind.

Part 1: Mind and emotion

1.1 Theory of Mind in contemporary cognitive psychology

The development of children’s understanding has been a topic of perennial interest in developmental psychology. For over three decades, Theory of Mind, defined as a basic human competence to impute mental states to others, to recognise that others may have desires, beliefs and intentions that differ from one’s own and to use knowledge of others’ mental states to explain and predict their behaviour, has been one of the fastest growing areas in psychology, generating thousands of research articles. The central premise of the theory is that to engage in everyday life one must understand that actions and behaviour are motivated by internal thoughts and feelings and be able to appreciate what these thoughts and feelings are. Individuals must be able to predict and explain the actions of others with reference to their mental states such as desires, beliefs and intentions. This is often referred to as the ability to ‘read minds’ (see Baron-Cohen, 1995) and is proposed to be necessary for normal social functioning.

The term ‘Theory of Mind’ was coined by Premack in his work on in intentionality in chimpanzees as he investigated chimpanzees’ ability to infer intentions and mental states such as the knowledge and beliefs of someone struggling to solve a problem (Premack, 1976; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). In 1986 the movement began to gain momentum as two seminal conferences took place; the International Conference on Developing Theories of Mind at the
University of Toronto, and the Workshop on Children’s Early Concept of Mind at the University of Oxford. The work presented at these two conferences was subsequently published in *Developing Theories of Mind* (Astington, Harris & Olson 1988), which marked the official launch of the movement. The phrase ‘Theory of Mind’ reflects the theoretical position that children construct theories or explanatory systems of others’ behaviour using processes which are similar to scientific theory formation. Premack and Woodruff argue that “a system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behaviour of others” (1978, p. 515).

Research in the area expanded as scholars in developmental psychology introduced the false belief test, which is designed to assess whether individuals understand that others may have beliefs about the world which are false. One of the most important milestones in Theory of Mind development is the ability to attribute false belief to others. This is widely believed to reflect an understanding of the subjective and representational nature of mental states; one recognises that others may have thoughts, feelings and beliefs which are different from one’s own and that others can have beliefs about the world which are false. As such, the false belief test is commonly viewed as the litmus test of Theory of Mind.

Although infants’ understandings of mental states and the acquisition of a Theory of Mind continues to be vigorously researched the nature of ‘Theory of Mind’ remains contested and unclear (Wellman, 2010). At present there is vigorous debate concerning the processes by which individuals develop the ability to understand others’ mental states. There is consensus that this is an innate ability in humans, however the age at which this develops and whether this is best characterised as a developing theory or a cognitive module (Scholl & Leslie, 1999) is a topic of intense discussion.
According to modular theories “humans have specialized, inherited ‘hardware’ for dealing with the complex social world” (Baron-Cohen, 2006, p. 867) and Theory of Mind is accounted for by a neuro-cognitive module, or a ‘Theory of Mind mechanism’ (Leslie, 1987, 1992) which ‘comes online’ in late infancy as children appear to rapidly develop understandings of other persons (Scholl & Leslie, 1999). This module “allows the brain to attend to invisible mental states” (Leslie, 1992, p. 20) and according to this theory understanding of all mental attitudes, desires, emotions and beliefs, should ‘come online’ together (for an alternative view, see Scholl & Leslie, 1999). It is notable that the metaphor of ‘coming online’ assumes the existence of an innate Theory of Mind module which is simply waiting to be activated. Clearly then, the ability to partake in social interaction is placed firmly within the biology of the individual.

A competing view is the ‘Theory-Theory’, according to which children form a theory based on their own experience. Changes in children’s understanding, which are thought of as theory changes, occur as children modify their theories in light of evidence which is incompatible with their current framework of understanding (Gopnik, 2003; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). A key theory change is the shift from understanding people in terms of a simple desire psychology (Wellman & Woolley, 1989) to understanding them in terms of their thoughts and beliefs. As Wellman (2010) notes, the resolution of the issue of how infants acquire understandings of others, specifically whether this develops in stages or ‘comes online’ at a particular time, has been a central issue in the field as this would clarify some of the theoretical debate.

In a seminal article Wellman and Woolley (1989) suggested that before the age of four, children typically operate with a ‘simple desire psychology’ as they understand others in terms of their desires before developing an understanding of belief. It is proposed that when operating with a fully developed Theory of Mind we explain others’ behaviour by utilising a belief-desire framework. That is, we understand that others act as they desire something and believe that
they can satisfy this desire. “Desires motivate behaviours but beliefs frame them” (Wellman & Woolley, 1989, p. 246). Wellman and Woolley describe the ‘simple desire psychology’ with which young children operate as “one resting essentially on a conception of internal states directed toward obtainment of objects in the world- and in this way quite different from a belief-desire psychology which rests centrally if not wholly on a conception of internal cognitive states representing truths about the world” (p. 250).

In the empirical literature there are two main types of methods used to investigate children’s understandings of mental states. A large body of research has utilised tests of false belief understanding, such as the classic false belief task. Second, researchers have adopted observational methods in order to examine the role of social interaction in children’s developing understandings. I now consider each of these in turn.

1.2 The false belief test

One of the most important milestones in Theory of Mind development is the ability to attribute false belief, which is believed to reflect an understanding that others can have thoughts and beliefs about the world which are wrong and which differ from one’s own. As Hutto (2009) notes, the false belief test provides psychologists with a portable experimental paradigm which can be applied on various different populations with subtle variations and as such “it provides a wealth of data that is generally accepted in the psychological community as providing a robust indication of the presence (or otherwise) of a cognitive competency” (Hutto, 2009, p. 204). Theory of Mind is often equated with false belief understanding as the false belief task quickly became the litmus test for attributing Theory of Mind (Hughes, Leece & Wilson, 2007) and is now a classic method in the study of development.
The original test was developed by Wimmer and Perner (1983) and was modified by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) to be simple enough to administer to children with autism. It involves a child being able to distinguish a puppet’s false belief from their own true belief. A typical finding is that children under the age of four years are much less likely to make this distinction and attribute a false belief to the puppet, and this has prompted scholars to deduce that an important developmental shift, the shift to a representational Theory of Mind, occurs at about four years of age (e.g. Friedman & Leslie, 2004; Gopnik, 1993; Williams & Happe, 2010). Task failure is interpreted as a deficit in the ability to reason about the beliefs and mental lives of others— the child lacks a Theory of Mind, while task success evidences the ability to reason about the behavioural consequences of holding a false belief. During the typical task the child is given information which the puppet (or other story character/person) does not have access to. The child is then asked a series of questions about what the puppet will do or say, which are designed to elicit an understanding of the puppet’s beliefs. During the questioning phase differences in children’s responses are interpreted by experimenters in terms of whether they ‘have’ a representational Theory of Mind or not. A Theory of Mind deficit is implicated in explanations of symptoms typically seen in autism and schizophrenia. Consequently the false belief test has become a major tool for research in clinical settings (e.g. Couture, et al., 2010; Herold et al., 2009).

As noted above, whether children under the age of four understand others in terms of a simple desire psychology is a long standing debate which has generated intense research interest. Consequently researchers have developed a battery of tests which are methodologically comparable to the false belief task that assess children’s understandings of intentions, emotions, knowledge and other states (Wellman & Liu, 2004). A typical ‘desire psychology’ task is designed to assess whether children can use knowledge of others’ desires to predict their behaviour (e.g. Cassidy et al., 2005a). In the typical laboratory set-up participants are presented with vignettes in which they
are either explicitly told the desires of a character, or where they are required to infer the character’s desires based on their experiences detailed in the story. Typically a discrepancy between the desires of the participant and the desires of the character is created. Children are then asked to predict the character’s actions and emotional reactions to a particular situation. Consider a typical vignette;

*Let’s look at these four things to do (eat candy, take nap, clean room, brush your hair). Show me the one that you like to do best, the one that you REALLY, REALLY like to do (Child chooses eat candy). Now point to the one that you hate to do, the one that you don’t like to do (Child chooses clean room). OK. So you REALLY like this one (eat candy) and you REALLY don’t like this one (clean room). Now I am going to read you a story and ask you some questions. This is Brendan. There are lots of things to do at Brendan’s house. Brendan loves to clean his room. Brendan loves to sing the clean-up song and he loves to put everything where it belongs. Brendan hates eating candy. Brandon thinks that candy is too sweet and he does not like to get his hand sticky. Brendan’s mom asks Brendan what he would like to do today.*

Test Question: Will Brendan choose to clean his room or eat candy?

*Participant Preference Question: Which thing do you like to do best? Which thing do you really hate to do the most?’ (Cassidy et al., 2005a, p. 453)*

In this paradigm a ‘correct’ answer is that Brendan will choose to clean his room. An ‘incorrect’ answer, that Brendan will choose to eat candy, is understood to reflect an inability to appreciate that others can have desires which differ from one’s own. That is, that the child answers egocentrically and predicts that Brendan will act in accordance with the participants’, rather than his own desires.

Although the false belief task is understood as the litmus test for Theory of Mind its efficacy and appropriateness have been questioned, with some critics maintaining that the test should be abandoned altogether (Bloom & German, 2000). It has been argued that tests are inherently difficult and hence require
“abilities other than Theory of Mind” (Bloom & German, 2000, p. B25). To solve the task using the vignette above the child must be able to follow Brendan’s actions, remember that Brendan likes to clean his room and does not like to eat candy and appreciate the meaning of the test question. The typical set-up has also been criticised as it makes assumptions about how children operate. Terwogt and Rieff (2003) argue that when adults fail to make a ‘correct’ prediction this is assumed to be because the adult must have reasonably questioned the validity of the desire statement, as “nobody doubts adults’ theory of mind abilities” (p. 71). However they argue that “even young children might have reasons for accepting or questioning the desire statement” (p. 71). They note that both adults and young children may use generalised beliefs about desirability as a basis for their predictions. That is, a child may question that Brendan truly desires to clean his room, rather than eat candy. Incorrect answers then, may not reflect an inability to appreciate the subjective nature of desires. Clément, Bernard and Kauffman (2011) show that young children who fail the typical false belief task are able to infer rules from social situations and to use this information to predict protagonists’ behaviour. They argue that deontic reasoning, which is less cognitively demanding than ‘mentalising’ may sufficiently explain children’s predictions of others’ behaviour.

It has also been noted that there is variation in the specific age at which individuals are able to succeed at tasks (Jenkins & Astington, 1996). For example Hughes et al. (2005) found marked individual differences in Theory of Mind performance in pairs of twins at age 5. Consequently, while early research focused on milestones in children’s developing Theory of Mind, throughout the 2000s there was increasing interest in individual differences in task performance (Ensor & Hughes, 2008) and the social factors which may contribute to these individual differences. Further, as early as the 1980s researchers documented the uses of terms which reflect internal experiences such as ‘tired’, ‘watch’ and ‘see’ by children as young as 28 months (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Shatz, Wellman & Silber, 1983). This, along with critiques of
the narrow definition of Theory of Mind proposed by the false belief task (Bloom & German, 2000) cast doubt on the efficacy of the test, prompting researchers to adopt observational methods to examine the role of language and social interaction in children’s developing social understanding.

1.3 Language and Theory of Mind

A number of researchers have reported correlations between aspects of socialisation history such as parent-child conversation (e.g. collections in a special issue of Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, Thompson, 2006), relationships with peers (Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Peterson & Siegal, 2002), and sibling status (Barr & Hayne, 2003; Cassidy, Fineberg, Brown & Perkins, 2005b) and false belief performance. Across these studies language has emerged as an important correlate (Milligan, Astington & Dack, 2007) and it has been suggested that conversations about mental states, emotions and the causes of action influence the age at which children develop a representational Theory of Mind (Dunn & Brown, 1993; Ruffman et al., 2002).

Milligan, Astington and Dack (2007) note that language can be operationalised in many different ways and across these studies “is measured from observations of naturalistic conversation, from standardized inventories, and from performance on language-ability tasks” (p. 623). Although there are various ways of measuring language ability, these researchers converge in their understanding of language as a methodological tool for the study of the mind (Budwig, 1999). Semantic development is thought to be a problem of reference as words are understood as signs which signify a referent. The child’s task is to establish word-referent links and to figure out which words map onto which referents (Montgomery, 2002). As Moissinac and Budwig note, “underpinning these studies is the idea that the child’s development of language provides the researcher a means to infer the cognitive development that either undergirds it or is concurrent with it” (2000, p. 1). For example,
According to Gopnik and Meltzoff’s (1986, 1987) cognitive specificity hypothesis there are close relations between particular linguistic and particular cognitive developments with particular words emerging in the vocabulary that are relevant to the acquisition of particular cognitive capabilities.

As noted above, the proposition that children come to understand other people’s desires before they understand the concept of belief (Bartsch and Wellman, 1995; Wellman & Woolley, 1989) has been influential in Theory of Mind research. The centre-piece of this thesis is Bartsch and Wellman’s (1995) seminal study of the conversations of children aged two to five. They propose that children are able to make genuine references to desire from the age of eighteen months and do so frequently from the age of two. In contrast they argue that children are not able to use terms such as ‘think’, ‘know’ and ‘wonder’ to refer to genuine beliefs until shortly after their second birthday. This lag in the use of belief terms is cited as evidence that the child understands the concept of desire before they understand that of belief.

In order to examine talk about desires Bartsch and Wellman developed a coding system which was designed to identify utterances with “a focus on desire rather than on a specific action” (p. 68). Idiomatic expressions such as ‘wish upon a star’, those which are used “purely for social convention (“I don’t care” to make a polite denial)” (p. 67) and “mere repetition of someone else’s utterances (child repeats adult’s statement “I want one”)” (p. 67) were disregarded. Below are two examples of convincing references to genuine desires;

*Father: Mommy’ll read it to you*
*Ross (02;10): I want you read my new books (p. 83)*

*Adam (2;10): More milk.*
*Adult: You don’t need milk.*
*Adam: Why not? Want more milk in it.*
*Adult: You take that in (you put the glass away) (p. 87)*
These examples were coded by Bartsch and Wellman as ‘subject contrastive’ and ‘desire-outcome contrastive’ respectively and are cited as being particularly revealing about children’s understanding of desire states. Contrastive utterances, “those contrasting desire and outcomes, those contrasting desire with actions” (p. 77), Bartsch and Wellman argue, provide evidence of an understanding of the subjective nature of desires.

Following the proposal of Bartsch and Wellman’s ‘simple desire psychology’ interest in the acquisition of desire terms began to increase (Moissinac & Budwig, 2000) as it is assumed that a desire-based Theory of Mind can be studied through the analysis of children’s uses of desire terms. In this literature the word ‘want’ is often treated as uniquely reflecting an private experience of desire (Montgomery, 2002). For example Ferres (2003) examined uses of the desire term ‘querer’ by speakers of Spanish and claimed that children begin by making references to their own, rather than others’ desires and that they do so from around the age of two. Their explanations of others behaviour “by means of this mental state” (p. 163) peaks around thirty-three months after which there is an apparent decrease. Ferres notes that these findings converge with those of Bartsch and Wellman (1995) who attribute this decline to the increase of the use of belief terms at this age. Moissinac and Budwig's (2000) findings also converge with those of Bartsch and Wellman. They examined the terms ‘moechte’ (would like), ‘wollen’ (want) and ‘brauchen’ (need) in German mother-child dyads. They found that over the course of the three months of the study children’s references to others’ desires increased. They interpret this as evidence of Shatz’s (1994) theory of children’s increasing socio-linguistic intelligence; “as the child participates in more linguistic interactions she increasingly realises that others have desires like her own and consequently makes more reference to them” (Moissinac & Budwig, 2000, p. 17).

While researchers have recognised the role of language in the development of social understanding, there is much debate concerning the specific role of
language in predicting success at false belief tasks. For example some researchers, such as advocates of constructivism, argue that it is “within social interactions an understanding of mental states develops and is constituted” (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004, p. 80, original emphasis). On the other hand, others suggest that the relations between false belief success and language measures simply reflects the fact that most false belief tasks are verbal tasks (Milligan, Astington & Dack, 2007). For example, de Villiers argues that an understanding of syntax, specifically tensed complements, is a prerequisite of successful task performance (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; de Villiers, 2005).

The research discussed in this section is concerned with how an innate ability to understand the minds of others, a prerequisite to successful participation in social interaction, develops. Language is understood as a variable which influences task performance (such as the approach advocated by de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; de Villiers, 2005) or as a medium through which the mind develops and is constituted (such as the approach adopted by Carpendale, 1997; Carpendale & Lewis, 2004, 2006). Language is understood as a methodological tool, as a window into the developing mind. These approaches converge in their understanding of an ability to ‘mentalise’ as essential to be able to manage everyday life and to interact with others. The thesis presents a radically different way of understanding participation in social interaction. As McCabe (2009) notes, theorising about putative mental states is not an accurate reflection of how individuals participate in social interaction, rather talk is designed so that communicative intentions are obvious. Rather than understanding ‘want’ as simple references to internal states I show that invocations of notions of wanting are resources in and for interaction which have practical uses in their normative sequential environments. This takes us away from the need to theorise about individual processes which allow individuals to read the minds of others and to consider instead what it means to ‘want’ something as a human action in interaction.
For proponents of Theory of Mind, emotion understanding is achieved as children develop a Theory of Mind and learn to appreciate the subjective states of others. This view of emotions as individual entities which other people must learn to read and to ‘figure out’ is grounded in emotion research in cognitive psychology. The next section will discuss some of the principles, assumptions and findings of this work before moving on to discuss social constructionist and discursive studies of emotion and cognition.

1.4 Mainstream approaches to emotion

Emotion is a big topic for social scientific inquiry and popular culture alike as it appears to encapsulate the crux of what it means to be an individual. Goleman (1995, 1998, 2006) popularised the concept of ‘emotional intelligence’, which he defines as “the capacity for recognizing our own feelings and those of others, for motivating ourselves, for managing emotions well in ourselves and in our relationships” (1998, p. 317). His 1995 book was on the New York best seller list for a year and a half and has spawned thousands of research articles and popular books, with experts developing seminars and training workshops to help companies and individuals improve their emotional intelligence. While ‘emotional intelligence’ is a relatively new concept which emerged in the early 1990s (Mayer, DiPaolo & Salovey, 1990; Mayer and Salovey, 1993; Salovey & Mayer, 1990), the study of ‘emotions’ by philosophers and social scientists dates back to the time of Aristotle. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a general review of psychological theories of emotion, so here I offer only a brief overview (for an overview of the history of emotion in psychology see Gergen, 2009; Stearns, 2008).

Studies of emotion in the disciplines of psychology, sociology and philosophy can be broadly identified within two approaches; the essentialist and the social-constructionist approaches. ‘Essentialism’ is a term that is not used by those who practice it, rather by those who oppose it, as references to ‘essentialism’ in
the literature tend to be derogatory (DeLamater & Hyde, 1998; Sayer, 1997). The term refers to research and theory which presupposes a biological basis and is exemplified by work in socio-biology, genetic research and evolutionary psychology. The emotions are understood as properties of persons which are natural and biologically determined and proponents argue that there are a set of universal emotions that are part of innate human physiology which are culturally refined (see e.g. collections in Röttger-Rössler & Jürgen, 2009). Similarly to studies of language in Theory of Mind, this view is grounded in a referential view of language which assumes that emotion words develop as names referring to private entities and that “emotional signals are an example of a communicative system that may constitute a psychological universal” (Sauter, Eisner, Ekman & Scott, 2010, p. 1).

Ekman, who was influenced by Darwin's work on the biology of emotions (1872) and Tomkins’ affect theory (1962) is a key figure in the field of emotion research. He carried out cross-cultural research on the Fore Tribesman of Papua New Guinea (1972) and noted that certain facial expressions of emotion appear to be universal. This observation led him to conclude that there are a set of separate, basic emotions that “differ in their appraisal, antecedent events, probable behavioral response, physiology and other characteristics” (Ekman, 1999, p. 45). Each basic emotion is a ‘family’ of related states which share common, physiologically determined characteristics that are part of our evolution. The basic emotions argument was reproduced in the work of Lazarus (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1990), who drew on Arnold’s appraisal construct (1960). Within current academic psychology emotions are typically viewed as a highly organised system which serves important motivational and adaptive functions and appraisal theories developed to explain the elicitation of emotion, particularly individual differences in elicitation (Smith & Kirby, 2011). According to appraisal theories emotions are the result of the evaluation of a situation (appraisal) along with the cognitive reaction to face the situation (coping); “each emotion expresses a person’s appraisal of a
person-environment relationship involving a particular kind of harm or benefit” (Smith & Lazarus, 1991, p. 611). In this framework, “events do not have significance in of themselves, but only by virtue of their interpretation in the context of an individual’s beliefs, desires, intentions and abilities” (Gratch & Marsella, 2004, p. 273). According to appraisal theories then, emotions cannot take place without cognition or an appraisal of a situation, placing emotion firmly within the biology and cognition of the individual. Appraisal theories are now dominant in emotion research where individual experiences of emotion are placed prior to social factors. For example ‘culture’ is typically factored into analyses as an independent variable which affects the expression and interpretation of emotions (see e.g. collections in Röttger-Rössler & Jürgen, 2009).

During the 1970s the social constructionist movement gained momentum as several important developments raised problems for the ‘basic emotions’ approach. Social constructionist studies of emotions can be broadly grouped into three strands; historical, anthropological and discursive. Here I sketch out a brief overview of each of these, beginning with anthropological and historical studies which throughout the 1970s and 1980s raised questions regarding the universality and ahistoricality of emotions.

In anthropology the work of three researchers, Michelle Rosaldo, Catherine Lutz and Clifford Geertz was influential in raising doubts concerning the existence of a universal set of basic emotions. In her fieldwork with the Ilgonot people in the Philippines Rosaldo (1982, 1983) observed that rather than thinking of language as tools to ‘express’ or to refer, the Ilgonot people conceive of language in terms of action. Her work showed that emotions terms are cultural rather than universal and that emotions terms which we use to account for our activities “are at the same time “ideological” or “moral” notions” (1983, p. 135). Similarly, in her work with the Ifaluk people in the South Pacific Lutz challenges “the cultural assumptions found in Western thinking about the
emotions” (1988, p. 3) as she argues that uses of emotion terms are bound up with social structure and moral attributions rather than individual feelings. Finally, Geertz has written extensively on the construction of ‘the self’ and argues that;

*The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgement and action, organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against other wholes and against a natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures. (1979, p. 229).*

For Geertz then, emotions are cultural artefacts which are bound up with the concept of the self in Western society. The work of these anthropologists documented the cultural specificity of emotion, challenging the basic emotions argument which theorises emotions as biologically determined, discrete states. It became apparent that the experience of emotion is not universal and that the understanding of emotions as discrete entities is particular to Western culture.

A second problem for the basic emotions argument came from historical studies of emotion etymology which have shown that there are changes in the emotional repertoires of cultures throughout history. As Gergen notes;

“Aristotle identified *placability, confidence, benevolence, churlishness, resentment, emulation, longing,* and *enthusiasm* as emotional states no less transparent than *anger* or *joy*. Yet, in their twentieth-century exegeses, neither Tomkins (1962) nor Izard (1977) recognizes these states as constituents of the emotional domain” (1996, p. 61, original emphasis). Harré (1986) notes that in the psychological literature of the Middle Ages and early Renaissance discussions of *accidie*, an emotion which was related to the religious sin *sloth*, were prominent. The term represented boredom and despondence with fulfilling one’s religious duty. While today we recognise idleness and procrastination, our emotions are now defined against a backdrop of the ethics
of a material production, rather than religious duty. In his historical analysis Wenzel (as cited in Edwards, 1997) shows that the decline and eventual extinction (Harré, 1986) of accidie is linked to social patterns and religious beliefs. “The essential issue is the dependence of the very existence of the emotional state on a moral order (duty to God fulfilled in spiritual exercises)” (Harré, 1986, p. 222). We can note that it is not simply the case that we experience the same emotions but learn to label them using different terms. Rather “emotions and the names we call them are intrinsically linked to social conditions, rights, and responsibilities, which change historically and across cultures” (Edwards, 1997, p. 180).

Social constructionist and discursive approaches to emotion gained momentum throughout the 1980s in the context of cultural and historical analyses which challenged the basic emotions argument (see e.g. collections in Harré, 1986). For these researchers emotions are cultural products which acquire meaning within social structure and far from being discrete, innate entities, can only be experienced in the context of reciprocal social encounters. As Harré argues;

*There has been a tendency amongst both philosophers and psychologists to abstract an entity- call it ‘anger’, ‘love’, ‘grief’ or ‘anxiety’- and try to study it. But what there is are angry people, upsetting scenes, sentimental episodes, grieving families and funerals, anxious parents pacing at midnight, and so on. There is a concrete world of contexts and activities. We reify and abstract from that concreteness at our peril.* (1986; p. 4).

One wide ranging and influential account of social constructionism is Kenneth Gergen and Jonathan Shotter’s relational perspective (Gergen, 1994, 2009; Shotter, 1993,1997). They relocate our ‘inner lives’ and emotions in the relational counters between people and argue that “meaning lies not within the private mind, but in the process of relating” (Gergen, 2009, p. 98). Emotion words are not to be understood as representations of private states but “as
actions within relationships, actions that gain their meaning through social collaboration” (ibid).

Gergen (2009) notes that in contemporary Western society we are comfortable with the view of ourselves as individuals who think for ourselves, making conscious decisions, but that it is only for the last several hundred years that we in the West have had this idea. Gergen traces this notion back to Descartes as he proclaimed “I think, therefore I am” during the 1600s; “it was only in the following century that people began to construct themselves as having ‘feelings’” (2009, p. 82). Gergen argues that mental state discourses are performances and so that “it is useful to replace the image of ‘private feelings’ with public action” (p. 99) as what we describe as the mind or emotion only has meaning within relationships. As Shotter (1997) notes, rather than representing a new method or theory within contemporary psychology, their aim is to “change the subject” (Rorty, 1989, p. 44, as cited in Shotter, 1997). Shotter and Gergen are both strongly influenced by Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as they argue that the mind and self are discursive formulations which emerge in the relational field of ‘joint action’.

Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mind, published in 1953 as *Philosophical Investigations*, made several observations which exclude the possibility of a private language which develops as individuals label discrete, private, inner emotions. He observed that language functions according to shared norms of life and so it would be impossible to create a language which corresponds to one’s inner sensations as there would be no public criteria to determine whether a word had been used correctly. One of his famous thought experiments was the ‘beetle in a box’ which is as follows:

*Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One
might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.- No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (1953, §293).

For Wittgenstein then, words such as 'want', 'think', 'angry', and 'happy' cannot refer to private, discrete states as they require agreed upon, public criteria to determine their proper use. If mental states and emotions were private, the only way individuals can say they know what others mean is by examining their own states. This poses problems of indeterminacy, as there are indeterminate possibilities for what any one word may be referring to (Montgomery, 2005).

1.5 Discursive studies of emotion and cognition

The chapter moves on to give a brief overview of discursive and conversation analytic studies of emotion and cognition which are influenced by social constructionist thinking. The discipline of psychology has developed around the notion that studying what people do and how they communicate means studying the mental machinery by which individuals perceive, code and explain the world around them. The traditional research question is formulated as 'what is the effect of X on Y?'. Emotions are understood as independent variables which influence behaviour, as reflected in the large body of literature which correlates emotional intelligence with success in the workplace and academic settings (e.g. Brackett, Rivers & Salovey, 2011; Cliffe, 2011). Discursive psychologists question this view, and have developed an alternative route to the understanding of human action that addresses 'mind' in a very different way to traditional psychological perspectives. 'Emotions' and 'cognition' are not approached from an analysts' perspective, as dependent or independent variables used to explain human actions. Rather, the notion that mental state
and emotion expressions can be studied as concepts used and as matters oriented to in talk-in-interaction is a basic premise (Edwards, 2005).

Discursive studies of ‘mind’ have examined various different aspects. Research has reworked a range of standard psychological topics such as memory (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Lynch & Bogen, 1996; Shaw & Kitzinger, 2007), attitudes and attributions (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wiggins & Potter, 2003) and ‘script’ knowledge (Edwards, 1994, 1995). A second strand of work has focussed on the ‘psychological thesaurus’ and how ‘psychological’ terminology (such as emotion and mental state terms) is described, invoked and put to use by people themselves in situ as part of the social actions performed in and through everyday talk. What psychologists have traditionally seen as personal, individualised notions, such as ‘emotions’ are now seen in terms of their location in broader social and interactional practices. For example, Locke (2001, 2003, 2004) examined the use of mental concepts such as ‘emotion’ in athletes’ accounts for sports performance. She shows how experiencing particular types of emotion, such as ‘nervousness’ is treated as normal and expectable in competitive sport. Emotion discourse can be related to notions of rationality or irrationality (Edwards, 1997, 1999). Locke shows that in their accounts, athletes were not only accountable for their emotions themselves but for their ability to control and cope with them. To soften this accountability, emotions such as ‘anxiety’ and ‘nervousness’ were constructed as ‘positive’ and as facilitative to performance. Rather than understanding emotions as pre-existing, measurable variables which influence sport performance (e.g. Lazarus, 2000; Vast, Young & Thomas, 2010) Locke shows how emotion discourse “is part of a larger accounting structure” (2001, p. 87).

Further work has examined the use of emotion and mental state terms in institutional settings such as relationship counselling (Edwards 1994, 1995) and legal discourse (Locke & Edwards, 2003; Edwards, 2006, 2008). Edwards (1994, 1995) shows how in the context of relationship counselling speakers
routinely construct events with regard to how routine or exceptional they are. For example describing someone as a ‘jealous person’ may be used to invoke and ascribe dispositional jealousy. In the institutional setting of relationship counselling one effect of this is to construct a partners’ behaviour as non-normative, ascribing blame for marital difficulties. This may also undermine the jealous person’s account and protect the speaker from blame as it makes available the inference that “jealousy underlies not only his own unreasonable behaviour, but also his false accounts of her actions” (1995, p. 331, original emphasis). Locke and Edwards (2003) examine emotions and constructions of normativity in Bill Clinton’s discussions of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky under Grand Jury cross examination. They show how Clinton managed blame and accountability by depicting himself as rational and sensible in contrast to Lewinsky who was portrayed as irrational and emotional. Clinton describes Lewinsky, for example, as getting ‘upset from time to time’. Locke and Edwards note that “it is implied that Lewinsky was perhaps prone to getting upset, such that any pursuit of the reasons for her getting upset, on any particular occasion, might look to reasons within her, and not only to local causes such as what (in this case) Clinton might have done or said to provoke her” (p. 20, original emphasis).

A third strand of work examines how psychological themes are handled and managed without necessarily being overtly labelled and how descriptions of events and actions are organised in ways which invoke and manage traditionally ‘cognitive’ topics such as doubt, caring, belief and prejudice (Edwards, 2005; Patterson & Potter 2009; Potter & Hepburn, 2003). In this body of work “psychological concepts such as prejudice, identity, memory or trust become something people do rather than something people have” (Willig, 2001, p. 91). Edwards (2008) approaches intentionality as a practical feature of how events are reported. He examines speakers’ invocations of intentionality in mundane talk and the institutional setting of police interrogation. He shows how, in everyday talk, speakers ordinarily invoke an ‘intent’ to do something
(such as ‘I would like to X’) in circumstances when “the intended actions are in some way balked, unfulfilled, or a departure from expectation” (p. 117). In contrast to everyday talk, establishing the intentionality of an act (in legal terms mens rea) is an integral aspect of police interrogation. Edwards shows how officers may use resources such as beginning with generalised normative scenarios which retain crucial aspects of the crime in question before asking the suspect to consider the specific case in question. Suspects’ responses to questions regarding hypothesised scenarios provide the basis for officers to return to the specifics of what the suspect actually knew or understood at the time when they committed the crime. Edwards (2005) shows how, when making complaints, speakers manage their subjective investment in the compliant, their motivation for making the compliant and their disposition (or otherwise) to complain. For example, ‘whinging’ reflects a major indexical danger of complaining as this is an action that reflects the complainer themselves and is something which can be used to counter a complaint. Meanwhile, Patterson and Potter (2009) argue that ‘caring’ is a practical, conversationally unfolding accomplishment with a range of systematic elements rather than a psychological disposition held by an individual. They examine closing sections of telephone calls between a young adult with a learning disability staying in a residential placement and members of her family and show how speakers attend to the potentially interactionally troubling matter of closing the call in ways which construct a ‘caring’ stance to one another.

In sum, discursive work has shown that the uses of ‘psychological’ categories, emotion and mental state terms “are clearly not simply a matter of referring to private mental states but, rather, are part of how actions and actors are made publicly accountable” (Locke & Edwards, 2003, p. 24). While DP’s disciplinary roots are within psychology and has developed as an alternative to cognitivism, conversation analysts have traditionally shown little concern with ‘psychological' topics such as the status of cognition and emotion. In recent years however there has been debate concerning the extent to which cognitive
concerns may enter into analysis. In the following section I provide an overview of work within CA which has begun to consider the potential for integration between conversational and cognitive approaches.

### 1.6 Conversation and cognition

*There is no reason to look under the skull since nothing of interest is to be found there but brains.* (Garfinkel, 1963, p. 190)

DP developed as an alternative to mainstream contemporary psychology and as such has a strong anti-cognitivist flavour (Edwards, 1997; Potter, 2000) as it has reworked and respecified ‘psychology’ in discursive terms from the outset. On the other hand, CA’s disciplinary roots are within sociology. Partly facilitated by these disciplinary roots, from the outset CA has eschewed cognitivism (Potter, 2006). In his first lecture Sacks advised that analysts “don’t worry about whether they are ‘thinking’. Just try to come to terms with how it is that the thing comes off” (1992, p. 11). As Potter (2006) notes, for the most part, conversation analysts have followed Sacks’ advice and have not worried about people’s ‘thinking’, rarely focussing on topics such as the status of cognition. CA researchers recognise that there may be possible reasons to avoid introducing cognitive notions as part of analysis. First, we cannot know from speakers’ talk and actions what they were ‘thinking’ as they spoke (Drew, 2005). A central premise of CA is that analysis attends to *observable* properties of data which excludes the necessity to speculate about putative cognitive processes. Second, interactional work need not rely on claims regarding cognitive processes as research has shown that talk-in-interaction is systematically socially organised autonomously of any proposed dispositions or mental constructs (Drew, 2005; Wootton, 2006). As Drew (2005) notes “there is no necessary congruence between verbal conduct and a speakers’ cognitive state” (2005, p. 164). For these reasons, in the main conversation analytic work has developed and proceeded without the need to comment on ‘mental states’ or cognition.
Nonetheless, in recent years researchers in CA have begun to consider the status of cognition and the ways in which psychological matters enter into interaction (for a general overview of cognition and interaction research see Potter & te Molder, 2005; van Dijk, 2006). There are crucial differences in how cognition enters into the analysis within the fields of DP and CA as discursive-psychology’s anti-cognitivist stance is not shared by all language researchers (Wooffitt, 2005). DP is firmly incompatible with contemporary cognitive psychology, as there is a fundamental argument regarding the status of cognition as the driving force behind human behaviour. As Potter notes, “DP has systematic metatheoretical, theoretical, analytic, and empirical grounds for being opposed to this when it is instantiated in experiments, when it appears in a wide range of ways of generating and analysing interviews, and when it is played out in perspectives such as interpretative phenomenological analysis or grounded theory” (2010b, p. 694). On the other hand researchers in CA have started to consider the integration of cognitive and conversational approaches.

As the editor of a special issue of Discourse Studies on ‘Discourse, interaction and cognition’ van Dijk states that “the rift between ‘social’ or ‘interactional’ approaches on the one hand, and ‘cognitive’ approaches, on the other hand, has been a regrettable fact of academic research” (2006, p. 5). The contributions to this special issue address the question of whether there is a fruitful way to combine the two. Schegloff (2006) questions the very idea that there are reservations as he cites past work in which he openly invites speculation from neuro-scientific and cognitive colleagues (Schegloff, 2005). He discusses the feature of ‘possibility’ in interaction, a central concept in CA. He proposes the discussion of “‘possible Xs’ as a suitable site for potentially fruitful interchange between conversation analysis and neuro/cognitive analysis” (p. 146). ‘Possibles’ involve speakers being able to entertain multiple understandings of utterances and Schegloff argues that any model of processing for interaction should incorporate ‘multiple passes’.
Drew (2005) claims to identify ‘cognitive moments’ or occasions on which the
cognitive state of ‘confusion’ is interactionally expressed. For example he
claims that repair initiation is “the expression of uncertainty and confusion”
where “this cognitive state comes to the interactional surface” (pp. 175-176,
original emphasis). Drew claims to reverse the dominant Cartesian view that
mental states cause conduct as he claims to identify confusion which is
generated as conversational norms break down; “Instead of regarding
cognition as a determining action, we can view interaction as a source of
cognition. It is in the course of interactional sequences, and speakers moves
and actions within those sequences, that cognition may be shaped- and in this
way interaction becomes a context for cognition” (p. 181).

On the other hand, Potter (2006) cautions against “a potential drift into
cognitivism” (p. 133) as he discusses the inherent difficulties involved in
attempting to identify cognition though an analysis of talk. He argues that any
approach that does so, such as the type of analysis advocated by Drew (2005),
accepts and reifies a dualist picture “where cognitive states ‘can come to the
interactional surface’ or remain ‘disguised” (Potter, 2006, p. 134). Such an
approach is at odds with a DP analysis, which “treats the distinction between,
say, what was thought and what was done as a way of talking” (ibid, emphasis
added). Potter recommends a DP approach, where rather than attempting to
determine the cognitive bases of talk, one focuses on the activities performed
through invocations of cognitive notions. This is the approach which will be
adopted in the thesis.

So far this review has focused on mainstream approaches to cognition and
emotion to situate the thesis as developing an alternative understanding of the
uses of mental states. I then moved on to discuss social constructionist and
discursive approaches to cognition and emotion. In the second part of this
review I will move on to discuss the literature which the following analytic
chapters will draw on. I begin by reviewing work in the new sociology of childhood which frames chapter 5 which focuses on children’s requests.

*Part 2: Intentions are not ‘hidden’: Participation in interaction*

**2.0 Introduction: Research on the sequential organisation of requests**

The second part of this review is divided into two subsections. In the first subsection I outline previous research which is particularly pertinent to chapter 5 and chapter 6, which focus on the selection of ‘I want’ and ‘I need’ to build directives and requests. I begin by outlining work in the sociology of childhood which advocates the detailed examination of children’s talk. Specifically I focus on work which has examines the “situated achievement of intersubjectivity” (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998, p. 4, original emphasis), specifically how mutual understandings are produced and displayed via children’s repair skills and request format selection. From this I briefly outline work in sociolinguistics which has examined speaker selection of request format in terms of situational variables. Finally I outline studies in CA that have examined the sequential organisation of requests in adult-adult talk. In the second subsection I discuss work on intentionality, motives and accounts for conduct. I first outline work which understands intentions as precursors to conduct. I then introduce the concept of motives within sociology. The second subsection concludes with a discussion of discursive studies of accounts.

**2.1 The sociology of childhood**

Piaget’s Stage Theory of Cognitive development has been a major influence on research in developmental psychology. Since the 1960s empirical work has largely followed the tradition that children pass through a series of stages of development on their way to adulthood. In this paradigm adulthood is typically defined as mature, rational and complete in contrast to childhood which is
characterised by deficiency and irrationality (Butler, 2008). This view is grounded in assumptions of children’s biological immaturity as a ‘fact’ of childhood, a view which is reinforced, for example, by longitudinal studies which collect impressive Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scans which allow researchers to see the trajectories of paediatric brain development over time (see Giedd & Rapoport, 2010 for a recent review).

The ‘new sociology of childhood’ emerged out of dissatisfaction with dominant explanations of children’s behaviours and has increasingly posed challenges to traditional developmental models. As the child’s world is typically viewed as an incomplete version of the more important adult world, studies of children’s life-worlds have been neglected (Goodwin, 1997). Rather than being studied in their own right, children are treated as incomplete adults who are primarily examined to investigate the trajectory of development into adulthood. The new sociology of childhood adopts a ‘competence paradigm’ (Danby, 2002; Hutchby 2005; Hutchby & Moran-Ellis, 1998) and treats children as competent social agents in their own right, as individuals who actively construct and develop their own social and cultural worlds (e.g. Church, 2009; Corsaro, 2003; Mayall, 2002). Rather than being defined “by what she is subsequently going to be” (Goodwin, 1997, p. 1, original emphasis) the child is examined for who she presently is.

Studies of children’s social competence have been approached from a range of competing theoretical positions and brings together researchers from diverse disciplines such as sociology (Church, 2009; Wyness, 2006), anthropology (Montgomery, 2008), education (Corsaro, 2000) and feminist theory (Mayall, 2002; Burman & Stacey, 2010). There is an emphasis on using inclusive, child-centred methods to conduct research ‘with’ rather than ‘on’ children. These research agendas draw heavily on the methods of ethnography, using techniques such as interviews and participant observation to offer descriptive accounts of children’s lives. However as Butler notes, these ethnographic
methods tend “not to examine actual instances of children’s everyday lives” (2008, p. 3) and instead offer “information ‘about’ children’s everyday lives, rather than reveal the practices by which children themselves build and understand everyday life in the course of interacting with others” (ibid). For example, researchers are encouraged to consult with children during all phases of research to confront what has been referred to as the “ethical considerations and issues of power and control” (Ridge, 2003, p. 5), and typically use techniques such as interviews to explore issues which children themselves identify as meaningful (see e.g. Ridge, 2003). However as Hutchby argues, “other methodologies which focus closely on the organization of children’s verbal and non-verbal interactions can reveal a depth range of interactional competence that for long remained unremarked in the sociology of childhood” (2005, p. 67).

2.1.1 Conversation analysis and children’s talk

A growing body of work in CA has begun to examine children’s talk in everyday and institutional settings with the aim of gaining insight into “how children themselves understand participating in ‘talk-in-interaction’” (Forrester & Cherrington, 2009, p. 167) (see e.g. Butler, 2008, collections in Gardner & Forrester, 2010a; Hutchby & Moran-Ellis, 2005). Rather than viewing language as a resource which offers information ‘about’ children, this work focuses on children’s competencies and ability to manage participation in social interaction (Hutchby, 2005). As Butler argues, “in order to fully recognize children’s competences there is a need to examine these competences in action, as they are used and demonstrated in the activities that constitute the doings of everyday life” (2008, p. 4). This necessitates an examination of talk “not as a means of gaining information about social organization and competencies, as in interviews, but as a medium for displaying those things in its own right” (Hutchby, 2005, p. 67). In the following subsection I discuss some of the ethnomethodological and conversation analytic studies that have considered
how children participate in talk-in-interaction. I focus on research that discusses the “situated achievement of intersubjectivity” (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998, p. 4, original emphasis) and how mutual ‘understandings’ are produced, displayed and recognised between speakers during conversation (Gardner & Forrester, 2010b). I begin by examining studies of young children’s conversational repair skills. From this I review work that has focussed on the sequential organisation of children’s requests.

2.1.2 Children’s repair skills

A key sociological theme in ethnomethodology and CA is intersubjectivity, the question of how individuals share common understandings of one another and of the world. For conversation analysts, the basis of how shared ‘understandings’ are achieved is to be found in the sequential organisation of everyday talk as “in interaction, participants seek to establish intersubjectivity and make explicit displays of their understanding of cultural and language phenomena through talk” (Gardner & Forrester, 2010b, p. ix). Researchers in child centred CA have emphasised the importance of intersubjectivity for early development (Hutchby & Moran-Ellis, 1998). As Gardner and Forrester note, “understanding the emergence of children’s communicative skills and abilities will be closely linked to whatever we take to be the essential attributes of engaging in intersubjective relations” (2010b, p. ix).

Following Schegloff (1991,1992) researchers in CA acknowledge that repair, the organisation of practices that speakers in conversation use to deal with problems in speaking, hearing or understanding, is a primary mechanism by which intersubjectivity is managed and maintained during conversation. Through turns at talk speakers display their understanding of preceding talk and can display “what they take to be misunderstandings” (Schegloff, 1992, p. 1300). As Schegloff notes, “the ordinary sequential organization of conversation thus provides for displays of mutual understanding and problems
Research has shown that from an early age children are able to initiate third position repair and to clarify their turns in the third position if they have not been understood by the recipients of their talk (Corrin, 2010; Filipi & Wales, 2002; Laakso, 2010; Wootton, 1994). Laakso (2010) documented the emergence of self-repair in Finnish children aged between one and four. She shows how from the age of one, before a child can even speak, they are able to clarify their expression using gesture when misunderstood by a co-interactant. By the age of five children develop repair practices which are similar to those used by adults speaking Finnish. At this age, children use particles such as ‘no I mean’ when initiating self-repair to indicate the cancelling of the cut-off utterance which is replaced with a new formulation. Corrin (2010) documents one child’s understandings of ‘open-class’ repair initiators, such as ‘sorry?’ or ‘what’ which leave ‘open’ what is the repairable trouble that the speaker is having problems with (Drew, 1997). Corrin notes that these “may hold a particular developmental power for the language-learning child” (p. 39). As open class repair initiators do not locate the source of trouble the child is invited to consider the adequacy of their preceding turn and to locate the source of trouble for themselves. As Corrin notes, this involves “skills such as working memory, turn-tracking and perspective-taking and ‘do’ a self-repair that in some way enables the turn to become a next increment of shared understanding” (pp. 39-40).

2.1.3 Children’s requests

A second focus of research is the sequential organisation of children’s requests. The examination of request format selection has revealed how children’s conduct is organised with reference to understandings reached earlier in the interactional sequence. Wootton (1981, 1997, 2005, 2006) made
recordings of his daughter Amy’s everyday activities between the ages of ten months and four years. He examines the design and sequential organisation of Amy’s requests and suggests that “from the age of two onwards her conduct displays a special sensitivity to a particular order of knowledge- sequential knowledge” (1997, p. 196). He shows, for example, how the design of requests is informed by understandings gleaned from the prior interaction such as whether or not a request is likely to be granted and whether or not what is being requested is a departure from the recipient’s projectable next action. He suggests that “it is through coming to take account of that which has gone before, through this order of sequential attentiveness, that the child’s actions come to be systematically aligned with, and to display recognition of, the interactional context within which she is operating” (ibid).

Wootton (1981) compares two request formats that occur frequently during Amy’s fourth year, the declarative ‘I want X’ and the interrogative ‘can I X’. Wootton shows how, rather than being used interchangeably, the child orients to constraints on the use of these formats. As a yes/no interrogative ‘can I X’ formally solicit a yes/no response and so propose that either of these are a possibility. He shows how these formats function as straightforward requests which require either a granting or a rejection. On the other hand, declarative ‘I want X’ formats do not formally solicit a yes/no response. At the age of four this particular child builds requests using ‘I want X’ when there is some basis in the preceding interaction to suppose that the recipient will be unwilling to grant the request, for example to re-request following a rejection of an initial request. That is, these formats recurrently ask again for exactly that which the recipient has indicated they are unwilling to allow. Unlike their interrogative counterparts, declarative formats do not officially propose yes or no as response options and are co-implicated in objecting to the recipient’s position.

Wootton (2006) describes the child’s understandings and sequential knowledge as local, public and moral. These understandings are ‘local’ in that
they are tied up with recent events and the specific details of the interaction. They are ‘public’ and organised with reference to understandings overtly achieved in the preceding interaction. They are moral in that they are tied up with entitlement as the child demonstrates her understandings of how the sequence should unfold. Wootton’s analyses of request differentiation in young children has led him to note that “well before the age of two years nine months the child can organize her conduct in relation to alignments taken up in the preceding interaction, alignments that can touch on such things as people’s wishes, desires, plans and preferences” (2006, p. 194). However rather than making claims regarding what the child is thinking or which psychological mechanisms are involved, he shows “on a case by case basis, the kinds of attribution which are associated with different kinds of turn design, in different sequential positions” (2006, p. 192).

Wootton’s work on the organisation of children’s requests is part of a broader programme of work in CA which has examined speaker selection of request format. I now move on to discuss this work, beginning with an overview of classic work in sociolinguistics which situates request differentiation in situational variables such as to whom requests are directed.

2.1.4 Traditional work on requests

That requests and directives can be built using a variety of syntactic forms has been long documented within anthropology, sociolinguistics and philosophy. In one of the most influential studies of requests and directives Ervin-Tripp proposed the following typology:

- **Need statements**, such as ‘I need a match’.
- **Imperatives**, such as ‘Gimme a match’ and elliptical forms like ‘a match’
- **Embedded imperatives**, such as ‘Could you gimme a match?’ In these cases, agent, action, object, and often beneficiary are as explicit as in direct imperatives, though they are embedded in a frame with other
syntactic and semantic properties.

- **Permission directives**, such as ‘May I have match?’ Bringing about the condition stated requires an action by the hearing other than merely granting permission.
- **Question directives**, such as ‘Gotta match?’ which do not specify the desired act.
- **Hints**, such as ‘The matches are all gone’ (1976, p. 29).

There is an inexact relationship between grammar and action, for example it was noted by linguists that ‘indirect speech acts’, such as requests (*do you know the time?*) have a literal meaning (*I ask you whether you know the time*) and an indirect meaning (*I ask you to tell me the time*) (Clark, 1979). Hence a central question for philosophers and linguists has been how the intent of a speaker is conveyed when “it is possible for the speaker to say one thing and mean that but also to mean something else” (Searle, 1975 p. 60).

Austin was amongst the first to develop speech act theory in *How to do Things With Words* (1962). He challenged the idea that to say something is always to simply state something, in a propositional sense. Austin proposed that there are a class of verbs, which he called performatives, and classes of utterances ‘performative utterances’ which “looks like a statement” (Austin, 1965, p. 137) but which “if a person makes an utterance of this sort we should say that he is doing something rather than merely saying something” (ibid, original emphasis). Similarly, in a series of influential philosophical arguments, Grice (1957, 1968, 1982) contended the notion that sentences and words can be analysed in terms of what speakers mean. Rather, speakers meaning should be understood in terms of speakers having particular intentions. He noted that utterances may include not just verbalisation but gesture, grunts and groans which signal meaning and that what a particular speaker means by a sign on a particular occasion may diverge from the standard meaning of the sign.

Searle later revised some of the ideas of Grice and Austin as he developed the idea of ‘indirect speech acts’ (1975), where sentence meaning and utterance
meaning come apart and a speaker can mean more than he says. According to Searle understanding of such utterances is achieved by combining knowledge of three elements to support a chain of reference. These elements are the felicity conditions of direct speech acts, the context of the utterance and principles of conversational cooperation. Searle’s work on indirect speech acts was important as it highlighted that the intent of any verb or utterance cannot be determined by lexical analysis, but must be understood as operating within a particular context.

Throughout the 1970s there was a great deal of discussion within linguistics of philosophical ideas regarding the organisation of conversation. Grice’s ideas concerning meaning were particularly influential, which was reflected in attempts to develop models of how listeners understand and plan responses to utterances (Clark & Clark, 1977; Clark, 1979; Gordon & Lakoff, 1975). For example Gordon and Lakoff’s conversational postulates (1975) are rules which are put into place whenever a recipient is encouraged by conversational principles to search for an indirect meaning. An example of this is a yes/no question such as ‘can you close the door?’ which elicits a response (the recipient closes the door) rather than a literal answer. Drawing on Gordon and Lakoff’s ideas, Clark and Clark proposed that when computing indirect meaning the following four steps are involved:

- **Step 1:** Compute the direct meaning of the utterance.
- **Step 2:** Decide if this is what was intended. Are there sufficient and plausible reasons for the speaker to have intended to convey this meaning and this meaning alone, in this context?
- **Step 3:** If not, compute the indirect meaning by way of the cooperative principle and the conventions on speech acts.
- **Step 4:** Utilize the utterance on the basis of its indirect meaning. (1977, p. 126)

During the 1970s and 1980s work by anthropologists and sociolinguists shifted the focus of the study of language from the processes involved in computing meaning to its social context and the circumstances in which utterances are
produced. Researchers examined a variety of social parameters related to request differentiation. The most widely studied parameter of context is that of to whom requests are directed, as it was proposed that even young children adjust their speech as they address different listeners (Ervin-Tripp, 1974). In this body of work the different syntactic formats are thought to reflect differing degrees of politeness and requests tend to have been organised along a spectrum according to how direct they are (Curl & Drew, 2008), with politeness thought to be “the chief motivation for indirectness” (Searle, 1975, p. 64). It was suggested that polite request forms are more likely to be addressed to a recipient whose age or profession places them in a superior role. For example James (1978) notes that when issuing ‘commands’ 4-5 year old children are more likely to use a polite format when addressing an adult rather than a peer or a younger child. These findings were corroborated by Ervin-Tripp who proposed that elaborate, polite request forms first appear when overtly required by adult addressees and it is only later that they are deployed as “rhetorical devices in wheedling from other children” (1978, p. 186).

Gordon and Ervin-Tripp note that the implication of this sociolinguistic work was that the child operates with “what might be called the ‘checklist’ model of speech” (1984, p. 310) where an utterance is selected from a list according to current social and situational variables. However such an approach “attributes no power of inference or construction to the child” (Gordon & Ervin-Tripp, 1984, p. 311). Rather, the request “is hardly more than a ritual incantation that is produced according to a simple formula” (ibid). At the same time Gordon and Ervin-Tripp showed that request format is influenced by a wide range of variables such as whether others are oriented to the speaker’s concerns and whether or not granting is expectable. The recognition of the role of these less measurable factors highlighted the need to develop approaches which could account for variation in request forms, as tracking the relevance for the child of social and situational variables on each specific occasion raised issues which
the speech act and sociolinguistic traditions are not equipped to deal with (Wootton, 2005).

Within CA the study of requests and directives is not dependent on prior judgements of politeness or authority. Rather, the criteria governing speakers’ selection of one format over another is accounted for in terms of the relationship between turn design and local sequential context. Before turning to the request literature, I first outline the current literature in the sequential organisation of interaction which has informed this work, particularly adjacency pair sequences or ‘nextness’ (Schegloff, 2007).

2.1.5 Sequence organisation: adjacency pairs

It is noticeable that within everyday conversation many classes of utterances conventionally come in pairs. For example greetings make return greetings relevant; requests granting/rejection; invitations acceptance/declination, and so on. Schegloff and Sacks (1973) developed an account of what they termed ‘adjacency pairs’, pairs of utterances which are ordered and compose pair types. First parts of a pair make relevant a particular second part, or range of second parts. We recognise, for example, that if an interlocutor invites one to the cinema, we respond with an acceptance/declination rather than a greeting (such as ‘hello’). An invitation is the first part of the ‘invitation-response’ adjacency pair. The concept of ‘adjacency pair’ embodies one of the constraints which First Pairs Parts (hereafter FPPs) place on their Second Pair Parts (hereafter SPPs). That is, the type of action launched by a FPP makes relevant a limited range of responses (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984; Raymond, 2003; Robinson, 2004; Schegloff, 1968).

Another aspect of adjacency pair sequences is that certain FPPs make relevant alternative, asymmetrical responses which embody different alignments towards the action implemented in the first pair part, which is
referred to as the organisation of preference/dispreference. For example, if invited to the cinema, an acceptance, rather than a declination is preferred. Agreement is preferred over disagreement (Pomerantz, 1984). Requests may be granted or rejected. Each of these embody different alignments to the request or invitation and research has shown that acceptances and grantings are produced in systematically different ways than their negative alternatives. The format for acceptances, grantings and so on is labelled as ‘preferred’ while declinations, rejections and so on are labelled ‘dispreferred’ (Pomerantz, 1984). In addition to action-type preference the grammatical design of an FPP may convey the speaker’s predisposition to a particular type of response (Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik, 1972). Interrogatives framed with negative polarity (Horn, 1989), such as ‘can’t you’ and ‘shouldn’t you’ and so on, anticipate or prefer a ‘no’ (Heinemann, 2006; Heritage, 2002). A third type of constraint on appropriate SPPs is also imposed by a FPP’s grammatical form (Raymond, 2003), such as when a ‘wh’ type interrogative can make relevant the formulation of a person, place or time. Yes/no interrogatives exert greater constraints as they reduce the relevant response to a choice between ‘yes’ and ‘no’. In summary, research has shown that FPPs place constraints upon SPPs in three primary ways; 1) the action made relevant by an FPP; 2) the preference for one type of SPP over another; 3) the ways in which an FPP’s grammatical form constrains recipients’ next turn. Within CA an understanding of the constraints which constructions place on recipients’ next turn has informed work into the selection of different request forms.

Curl and Drew (2008) examine the construction of requests in a corpus of ordinary telephone calls between family and friends and out-of-hours calls to the doctor. They identified a distributional difference in requests made with modal verbs such as ‘could you’ and requests prefaced by ‘I wonder if’. Modal requests occurred most frequently in calls between family and friends, while those prefaced by ‘I wonder if’ were common in out-of-hour calls to the doctor. Rather than referring to intimate versus institutional talk as sociolinguistic
contexts to explain this distributional variation, they offer an analysis of different types of request based on the entitlement displayed to make the request and orientations to the contingencies which may be involved in the recipient granting the request. They show that modal forms display more entitlement to make a request than those prefaced by ‘I wonder if’. In using modal forms speakers “orient to and claim the reasonableness of their request as grounds for expecting its granting” (p. 145) and display evidence of their entitlement to have the request granted. In contrast an ‘I wonder if’ preface “is a way to display one’s lack of entitlement to having a request granted or one’s awareness of the contingencies surrounding the granting of a request” (p. 141). That is, rather than displaying entitlement to make a request or presuming that it will be granted speakers simply wonder whether such a thing can be done, showing that they are not making any presumptions about whether a particular course of action is the appropriate one.

Displays of entitlement were also found to play a pivotal role in request format selection in studies of how care recipients request assistance from home help assistants (Heinemann, 2006; Lindström, 2005). Focussing on Danish interactions between elderly care recipients and their home help assistants Heinemann (2006) compares positive interrogative structures such as ‘can you pass the salt?’ and negative interrogative structures such as ‘couldn’t you pass the salt?’ and shows that “with a positive interrogative request, the care recipient orients to her request as one which she is not entitled to make” (p. 1081). In contrast, through the use of a negative interrogative request the care recipient “orients to her request as one which she is entitled to make” (p. 1081). Positive interrogatives project a ‘yes’ response and in terms of granting/rejection prefer granting (Lindström, 2005). Heinemann found that these requests are built in ways which show the care recipient’s orientation to the request as a dispreferred activity and anticipate the possibility that the recipient may reject the request. In contrast negative interrogatives such as ‘can’t you’ are typically not oriented to as dispreferred. These requests tend to
be built with no mitigating features and are treated as something which should routinely be granted. Although both positive and negative forms accomplish requesting, requests which are positively formatted differ dramatically from those which are negatively framed. In terms of preference, although both formats are designed to prefer compliance, positive formats allow for the possibility that the request may be rejected and project compliance less so than their negative counterparts.

Landqvist (2005) examines the sequential organisation of advice-giving in calls to a Poison Information Center. Landqvist notes that the advice given to call takers takes the form of a deferred action request (Lindström, 1999) as the advice given to callers is to be carried out once the call has ended. Hence the advice giver has no way of monitoring whether a recipient will carry out the projected action, and is unable to force an unwilling recipient to do so. Landqvist shows how call takers increase the likelihood of compliance “by walking a tightrope between, on the one hand, displaying knowledge and exerting authority and, on the other, maintaining friendly (or at least civil) relations with the caller” (2005, p. 207). She shows how advice which requires the caller to carry out time-consuming measures, such as visiting the hospital, are typically immediately supported by an account for the advice. On the other hand, advice-givers use stronger formulations, such as imperatives, when the risk of poisoning is greater and the caller is told to carry out an action which may involve inconvenience.

Craven and Potter (2010) examine the nature and design of directives as distinct from requests. Drawing on Curl and Drew’s analysis of entitlement and contingency in types of request they note that directives, typically delivered using an imperative format, are built as a telling rather than an asking. They show how “in directives, performing the stated action is not treated as contingent on the capacity or desires of the recipient. At the same time, the lack of attention to issues of capacity and desire (by not embodying these
issues in a modal request form) builds a strong display of the speaker’s entitlement to direct the recipient’s actions” (p. 19).

In this section I have examined literature within philosophy and sociolinguistics which has traditionally examined request differentiation as based on situational variables. From this I discussed work in CA which has analysed the sequential organisation of requests and directives. This work is particularly pertinent to the analyses in chapter 5 ‘Children’s Wants’ and chapter 6 ‘Directing and Requesting’ as the analysis in these chapters extends this body of work.

2.2. From intentions to accounts

This review now moves on to discuss work on intentionality, motives and accounts for conduct. These are important themes throughout the thesis but are particularly pertinent for the analysis in chapter 7 which examines invocations of notions of wanting as an account when delivering a refutation or a rejection. This section begins by discussing work on intentions and motivations as precursors to conduct. From this I discuss the concept of motives, or ‘motive-talk’ (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976) in sociology. Finally I review work in CA and DP which has examined the sequential organisation of accounts.

2.2.1 The individual view: Intentions

‘Intentionality’ is both a technical term of philosophy and a familiar, everyday concept. If you are thinking about your local veterinary surgery and taking your cat there, your mind, your thinking is directed toward your local veterinary surgery, your cat. Intentionality then, is a consciousness ‘about’ or ‘of’ something. The term was originally introduced by the philosopher Franz Brentano and was meant to distinguish a range of mental states such as
‘thinking’ and ‘knowing’ from the object or event in the world which these mental states may be ‘about’.

‘Intentions’ have been examined empirically in contemporary cognitive psychology as a mental state, or a variable, which causes actions and behaviour. Understanding the intentions of others, or recognising others as “agents undertaking intentional action based on our underlying beliefs and desires” (Wellman, 2010, p. 2) is understood as essential for one to manage ordinary life as “human social and cognitive life bereft of such knowledge seems virtually unimaginable” (Flavell, 2000, p. 15). Infants’ understanding of intentional action has been the focus of intense research (see Sodian, 2011; Wellman, 2010 for recent reviews) as it is suggested that the ability to understand others as intentional agents marks the child’s first step towards attaining a Theory of Mind (Tomasello, 1999). The attribution and understanding of others’ intentions has become a major focus of research in clinical settings, particularly with individuals with diagnoses of schizophrenia. According to Frith’s unitary theory of schizophrenia (Frith, 1992; Frith & Corcoran, 1996) problems in monitoring one’s own intentions to act causes symptoms typically experienced in schizophrenia such as thought insertion, delusions of control and auditory hallucinations (see Corcoran, 2000, 2001). According to this theory, being unable to recognise one’s own actions as a result of one’s own intentions may lead one to experience their actions as being under alien control. On the other hand, the inability to infer others’ intentions to act may cause symptoms such as delusions of persecution and of reference.

These research paradigms endorse and embody the view of individual, isolated minds which are faced with the task of ‘figuring out’ the contents of other minds. The processes involved in individuals being able to read the minds of others becomes a problem to be solved by proposing theories, by identifying
mechanisms and structures which bridge the gap between one mind and another.

As Astington notes;

*Social interaction is really an interaction of minds, of mental states, but we have to communicate those states to others. We have to let the other person know we want something, or that we want them to believe something, and so on. Human beings are not mind readers, not in any telepathic sense anyway, and in order to know what is in another persons mind we have to give that information to one another…. You have your thoughts, your beliefs, desires and so on, and I have mine. We share them in language, in the talk that passes between us.* (1994, pp. 45-47).

Just how thoughts, beliefs and intentions are shared and how this process of telementation (Harris, 1981) works becomes an almost impossible problem. According to this view of intentions and of language, once individuals have successfully understood the contents of others’ minds, this understanding is then used to construct explanations of others’ behaviour. This understanding of pre-existing intentional states which motivate, drive and can be used to explain behaviour, embodies commonsense ideas about meaning and action (Heritage, 1990).

This view of meaning and action has its roots in folk-psychology as researchers in cognitive and social psychology have adopted and extended folk-psychological explanations of action by proposing cognitive models to predict actions based on factors such as attitudes, intentions and social norms (Azjen, 1988; Azjen & Fishbein, 1975). For example, according to Azjen and Fishbein’s (1975) Theory of Reasoned Action a person’s behaviour is predicted by individuals’ behavioural intention, which is a function of individuals’ attitude about the behaviour as well as subjective norms surrounding the behaviour (an individual’s assessment of how they think others will view them if they carry out the behaviour). They propose that “the best single predictor of an individual’s
behaviour will be a measure of his intention to perform the behaviour” (p. 369) and that the “most efficient thing that one can do is to ask the individual whether he intends to perform the behaviour” (ibid). Azjen (1988) later extended this in his Theory of Planned Behaviour, a model which includes the concept of perceived behavioural control, a person’s perceived ease or difficulty in performing an action. These two models continue to be widely researched. In particular, the Theory of Planned behaviour has received considerable attention in the psychological literature as its efficacy in advancing understandings of behaviour change in health psychology (e.g. Cooke and French, 2008; Perkins et al., 2007; Sniehotta, 2009) and environmental psychology (e.g. Bamberg & Möser 2007; Wauters et al., 2010) have been widely debated.

2.2.2 Motivations and accounts for conduct

What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it? (Burke, 1969, p. xv)

In the mid twentieth century philosophers in rhetoric began to discuss the notion of ‘motives’, or motive-talk (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976). In contrast to psychological research on intentions and motivations which propose private states as causes of behaviour, motives were defined as reasons for actions which are cited when behaviour is problematic (Mills, 1940). The philosopher Kenneth Burke was amongst the first to develop the notion of ‘motives’ as rhetorical constructs. He argued that “a motive is not some fixed thing, like a table, which one can go and look at. It is a term of interpretation, and being such it will naturally take its place within the framework of our Weltanschauung as a whole” (1954, p. 25). Sociological attention to motives originated through the work of Wright Mills, who noted the linguistic character of motives as they arise during the course of social conduct on occasions when one perceives that their actions may be questionable to others. Mills developed the notion of ‘motive talk’ or a ‘vocabulary of motive’ which arise to describe, redefine and
normalise problematic actions. Mills questioned the psychological notion of motives as determinants of behaviour, as subjective ‘springs’ of action and argued that motives “stand for anticipated situational consequences of questioned conduct” (1940, p. 905). As Blum and McHugh note, “motive is in this regard not a thing in the world but a way of conceiving social action” (1971, p. 101). For this group of philosophers and sociologists then, rather than individual, discrete sensations which determine behaviour, motives and motive talk are resources which are drawn on by speakers when actions may be problematic. Similarly to the work on emotions in anthropology these accounts were understood as being of a moral, rather than an individual nature (Lutz, 1988).

This pioneering work on motives was built on by the work of Scott and Lyman (1968) who introduced the notion of an ‘account’ which they defined as the provision of a justification or excuse for an undesirable or problematic event. As Buttny (1993) notes in a succinct overview of the accounts literature, around this time, during the first half of the twentieth century, disciplines such as linguistics and rhetoric became increasingly concerned with the pragmatic functions of language in a diverse range of contexts, leading to a surge of interest in accounts as an interactional phenomenon. Buttny (1993) observes that within the literature there are several distinct senses of what ‘account’ means. A general sense can be found in the work of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1963; Watson & Sharrock, 1991) and CA (Sacks, 1992) which share a common interest in how people’s conduct is organised in ways which make sense to each other, how activities are produced so that they are understandable and how actions are made ‘accountable’.

Scott and Lyman’s definition provided a more narrow sense of an ‘account’ which they describe as “a statement made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or untoward behaviour” (1968, p. 46). They identify two types of accounts, excuses and justifications, both of which are likely to be cited when
an individual has done something that is wrong, bad or otherwise untoward. The second type is the *explanation* which they describe as “statements about events where untoward action is not at issue” (p. 47). Scott and Lyman’s work was particularly influential as “it is generally agreed in the literature that an account is a particular kind of response used to modify a problematic event” (Buttny, 1990, p. 224).

A key feature of early DP was accountability as a pervasive feature of people’s descriptions of events and actions. “That is to say, they attend to events in terms of what is normal, expectable, and proper; they attend to their own responsibility in events and in the reporting of events…. and they *invoke* notions of motive, causation, justification and cognition” (Edwards, 1997, p. 7). This work draws on the discourse analytic notion of variability and notes that there are multiple ways to describe a particular action or event, that “there are indefinitely many potential versions” (Edwards, 2005a, p. 260) and that particular versions of events are constructed in and for the occasion of their telling. For example, MacMillan and Edwards (1999) examined British newspaper coverage of the death of Princess Diana in the weeks after the event. They found that in reports the press handled their accountability as agents in the events they were reporting as they assembled factual narratives and explanations which assigned and avoided blame. More recently, Edwards (2008) approaches intentionality as a practical feature of how events are reported, and examines speakers’ management and attribution of intent as they account for their actions. Rather than assigning intent to speakers as an *analyst* he shows how, in the context of police interrogation, the intentionality of suspects’ actions (in legal terms, *mens rea*) is a pervasive concern.

In CA research is focussed on the structures of interaction that make activity and talk-in-interaction understandable and ‘accountable’ and the robust patterns of interaction which speakers orient to. For example, ‘turn-taking’, the organisation of who should talk next and when they should do so (Jefferson,
generates positions where a particular action is relevant and if it is not forthcoming is accountably absent (Schegloff, 1972). While CA research is typically oriented to a broad sense of accountability, researchers have examined the structure and sequential organisation of ‘accounts’ in the narrow Scott and Lyman sense. One body of work has examined the practices of soliciting an account. Sterponi (2003) examines the design features of soliciting turns and shows how different features retrospectively define different aspects of the accountable event as problematic and morally consequential. Bolden and Robinson (2011) examine the practice of calling for an account from a co-interactant using a ‘why’ formatted interrogative (such as why did you do that?). They show how, rather than working as an information seeking question, ‘why’ formatted interrogatives index the stance that the item to be accounted for is unwarranted or inappropriate. As such, rather than orienting to these turns as seeking information, respondents frequently orient to the implied challenging stance of the interrogative by either overtly aligning with it or by rejecting the challenge and providing an account to justify the reasonableness of the accountable item.

Research has also examined types of accounts and their sequential design. Ford (2002) shows how the discourse structure of denial plus account or correction is recurrent in everyday interaction. Speakers routinely provide an account or a correction of an assumption following a denial and in instances when such an account is not forthcoming its absence is treated as noticeable as speakers actively pursue a resolution. Dersley and Wootton (2000) examined the organisation of sequences immediately following complaints. They found that the majority of initial responses fall within two main types which they characterise as ‘didn’t do it’ denials and ‘not at fault’ denials. They show how following a ‘didn’t do it denial’, where the speaker denies any involvement in the complained-of action, respondents typically deliver a further assertion of the complaint. They found that typically ‘didn’t do it’ denials are delivered without any typical features of dispreference such as delay, as the
“delay of a denial may be interpreted as an admission of/evidence of guilt” (Garcia, 1991, p. 385). The second category of denial; ‘not at fault’ involves speakers implying agreement with the complainer, but denying culpability for the action in question. While the delay of the delivery of a ‘didn’t do it’ denial may create the basis for recipients to infer that the speaker had some part in the complainable action, a ‘not at fault’ denial does not create the same basis.

Although not focussed on accounts or accountability, a further body of work which is pertinent to the thesis has examined how speakers use terms such as ‘think’ and ‘want’ in everyday interaction. Schick (2010) adopts a language socialisation approach and examines the uses of ‘want’ in the context of school dance classes. Although important, as this work focuses on the uses of ‘want’ in sequences of interaction, the focus of language socialisation is on how linguistic and cultural practices are acquired by individuals, or how, “through their participation in social interactions, children come to internalize and gain performance competence in these sociocultural defined contexts” (Ochs, 1986, p. 2). The focus of Schick’s analysis is how ‘want’ “makes transparent the kinds of thought processes central to a number of socially valued competencies” (2009, p. 1), and how ‘want’ “was useful in conveying internal thought processes” (p. 2). Schick’s analysis then, retains the dualism inherent in contemporary psychology. Kärkkäinen (2003, 2006) examines ‘I think’ as an epistemic stance marker in everyday conversation. She considers stance taking, marked with ‘I think’ as an interactional activity, “rather than a way of framing an isolated ‘thought’ or position of an individual speaker” (2006, p. 711).

The work in this section is important as it marks a move away from conceiving of social understanding as a theoretical accomplishment to examining human actions in interaction. What this review has shown is that cognitive notions (such as ‘intention’) are ways of talking. This sets the scene for the analysis which is to follow, where I examine invocations of notions of ‘wanting’ and
‘needing’ as an integral feature of social practices. The work reviewed in this part is particularly pertinent for each of the analytic chapters as I draw on work which has examined syntactic constraints imposed by first pair parts of adjacency pairs (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984; Robinson, 2004; Schegloff, 1968), the sequential design of requests and directives (Craven & Potter, 2010; Curl & Drew, 2008; Heinemann, 2006; Lindström, 2005) and accounts and their sequential design (Bolden & Robinson, 2011; Ford, 2002; Robinson & Bolden, 2010; Sterponi, 2003).

Part 3: Theories and issues: Discursive Psychology and theoretical debates

3.0 Introduction

In the final section of this review I introduce the theoretical approach of discursive psychology. I begin by discussing the theoretical and intellectual roots of DP; the disciplines of ethnomethodology, CA and the sociology of science. What this review will demonstrate is how the theoretical approaches to DP draw on the notion of language “as a kind of activity, as discourse” (Edwards, 1997, p. 1). From this I discuss in further detail the theoretical approach of epistemological constructionism which I adopt in the thesis. Finally, I discuss work which is critical of cognitivism in psychology, focussing on work which has developed a sustained critique of Theory of Mind.

3.1 Ethnomethodology

In everyday life, becoming a competent interactant involves learning how to recognise and generate organised situated practices. Social life is anything but organised randomly, as activities are generally understood as highly patterned and consistent as they are often explained by members in terms of various norms (Maynard & Clayman, 2003). The disciplines of ethnomethodology, CA
and social studies of science are united in their understanding of the use of language and discourse as constructive and constitutive of everyday life (Potter & Edwards, 2001; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and develop the tools needed to explicate the orderly, socially organised, situated practices of which social life is composed. Rather than conducting research on society, for example by ‘applying’ findings from a setting such as the interview, researchers aim to study the orderliness of social life as it is produced in situ from the perspective of members of society themselves (Boden, 1990; Maynard & Clayman, 2003; ten Have, 1999; Wiggins & Potter, 2008).

In Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967) Harold Garfinkel, who founded the approach, wrote that ethnomethodology is particularly influenced by the work of Talcott Parsons, Alfred Schutz’s work in sociology, and the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Aron Gurwitsch. As described by Heritage (1984), Garfinkel was a student of the structural functionalist Parsons, who proposed that members’ sense of the world “is defined and mediated in terms of culturally structured symbols and beliefs” (1951, pp. 5-6). It is through these structures, as part of a ‘social system’, that “raw streams of experience” are ordered and rendered intelligible (1937, p. 27-42). As Maynard and Clayman (2003) note, for Garfinkel there were a range of issues which weren’t dealt with by Parsons’ analysis of social action. For example Parsons started from a prespecified analytical construct of a ‘unit act’ and “decided against the study of actual, particular social actions and organized sequences of them” (Schegloff, 1987, p. 151). For Garfinkel, Parsons’ “analytic frame of reference forestalls the appreciation of the indigenous perspectives of the actors themselves who, as purposive agents in social life, use forms of commonsense knowledge and practical reasoning to make sense of their circumstances and find ways of acting within them” (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 175). Garfinkel placed matters which were incidental to Parsons “the orderly practices of the participants in interaction” (Schegloff, 1987, p. 102) at the centre of his alternate conception of social action (Maynard & Clayman, 2003).
ethnomethodology “it is a feature of the theory that propositions about social organization cannot be divorced from ongoing courses of inquiry in real settings” (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 175). This rejection of ‘top-down’ theorising contrasts with traditional sociology which is largely based on Durkheim’s principle that ways of making sense of the world are ‘social facts’ that stand outside of the flow of ordinary events.

As a heterogeneous sociological research program inspired by diverse theoretical influences, ethnomethodology resists easy definition. With that in mind, one such definition is offered by Maanen, Manning and Miller;

*In a personal way, it refers to the methods we have available to use to make sense of our immediate social surroundings and thus take action (and offer an account for such action) in league with our companions. As a research field, the term refers to the study of how members of an identified social or cultural group manage to make meaningful the varied worlds of their experience. The methods of interests to ethnomethodologists are those commonplace and more or less taken-for-granted routines by which working definitions of social situations are collectively produced* (1995, p. v).

Central concerns are to examine how people make sense of the society in which they live, how they learn to act appropriately within its norms, or “how the structures of everyday activities are ordinarily and routinely produced and maintained” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 38). At the heart of this is a concern with practical reasoning, or members’ methods of building a shared sense of their common context of action, without which coordinated and meaningful actions would be impossible (Heritage, 2001). In plain terms, ethnomethodology proposes that people organise their conduct and actions in ways that are designed to be intelligible, recognisable and accountable and examines how people make sense of the society in which they live by examining these ways, or ‘members methods’. 
A core principle is that of ethnomethodological indifference, that "reality is temporarily placed in brackets" (Heritage, 1984, p. 229). As Edwards notes, "adopting no particular prior stance on the nature of external reality, social reality, or the nature of mind, ethnomethodology sets out to examine how such notions are constructed and deployed within social life, as participants' practical concerns" (1997, p. 62). In order to study the workings of common-sense talk and practical actions, it is necessary to begin without any preconceived notions. One must avoid legitimising one level of structure at the expense of others in order to examine the social practices by which structure is made to happen (Hilbert, 1990). As Edwards notes "ethnomethodological indifference is merely a reiteration of ethnomethodology's basic project, to study rather than presume the workings of common-sense talk and practical actions" (1997, p. 63). The principle of ethnomethodological indifference is pertinent to the thesis as I examine how people invoke 'mental states' in the service of various conversational activities. This requires that any notion of experiential reality is bracketed off in order to examine how mental state terms are deployed in social life.

3.2 Conversation analysis

The second theoretical influence on DP is that of CA. CA was developed in the 1970s by Harvey Sacks and his colleagues Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson. The discipline is vast and so it is only possible to provide a brief overview here (for books which introduce and discuss CA in detail see Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Liddicoat, 2011; Wooffitt, 2005 amongst others). Inspired by the ethnomethodological focus on social life as it occurs in situ, the aim was to fashion an observational science of society and social action that could be grounded in the "details of actual events" (Sacks, 1984, p. 26). Prior to Sacks' decision to study the details of interaction, few people believed that the structure of conversation was orderly enough to permit formal description (Heritage, 1984). The dominant approach was to study invented or imagined
scenarios, as it was believed that “social interaction is beset by randomizing factors which make any attempt at analysis problematic” (Heritage, 1984, p. 235). Sacks argued that this reliance on invented scenarios distorted features of interaction. As Schegloff notes, “when we encounter something strange that has apparently been invented….. we do not know what we are investigating. About the former we can ask, what might its speaker have been doing talking that way. About the latter we cannot, for we do not now what underlies ‘that way’: an arbitrary decision by the analyst on how to represent an intuited utterance type? A decision to put the utterance just that way for the purposes of the analysts’ argument? A way someone actually talked? A misremembered version of the latter?” (1988, p. 103). For Sacks and his colleagues, the use of recordings of conversational data is an essential antidote to these limitations and problems inherent in the use of imagined scenarios (Heritage, 1984).

CA has largely followed the work of Sacks and focuses on the organisation of conversational materials, identifying robust patterns of interaction and rules which speakers orient to. In a useful summary, Schegloff (2004a) eloquently sketches out various practices which allow orderly interaction to proceed. First, ‘turn-taking’, which organises who should talk next and when they should do so (Jefferson, 1986; Schegloff, 1987, 2000). Second ‘sequence-organisation’, which concerns how turns are produced to coherently follow preceding turns, and the nature of that coherence (Schegloff, 1990,1996a, 2007). Third, the intricate workings of ‘repair’ which manages problems in speaking, hearing and understanding (Drew, 1997; Jefferson, 1974, 1987). Fourth, ‘turn-design’ and lexical choice concern speakers’ selection of components of turns and how that selection informs and shapes recipients’ understanding of the turn (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979; Schegloff, 1972, 1996b). Finally, there is an overall structural organisation of interaction that informs the construction and understanding of the talk (Schegloff, 1986; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). These matters are fundamental to the situation of people interacting with each other, such that conversation analysts hold that language can and should be examined “in
terms sensitive to these basic organisational problems that its structure and use has most likely evolved to manage” (Raymond 2001, p. 8).

CA is a broadly non-cognitivist approach to discourse which makes problematic any approach which adopts the telementation (Harris, 1981) view of language, that is, which conceptualises talk as the communication of speakers’ thoughts and intentions (Edwards, 1997). A key feature of CA is a focus on what talk is doing as opposed to what it may be communicating. Here the influence of the systematic analysis of CA on the thesis is apparent as I examine the mental state terms ‘want’ and ‘need’ as performing actions in specific sequential environments. In addition, the analysis is informed by conversation analytic work which has examined the structural organisation of talk-in-interaction, such as syntactic constraints imposed by first pair parts of adjacency pairs (Goodwin, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984; Robinson, 2004; Schegloff, 1968) and the sequential design of requests and directives (Craven & Potter, 2010; Curl & Drew, 2008; Heinemann, 2006; Lindström, 2005).

3.3 Sociology of scientific knowledge

DP has drawn heavily on constructionist thinking in the sociology of scientific knowledge (henceforth SSK). SSK emerged during the 1970s in the aftermath of Kuhn’s *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970). Prior to the 1970s sociologists tended to accept the content of scientific knowledge as more or a less a reflection of objective, universal truths and while it was acknowledged that there may be a legitimate sociological understanding of scientific error, it was accepted that there could be no such thing as a sociology of authentic scientific knowledge (Ben-David, 1971). As such sociologists were consulted only to examine and explain the social factors which led scientists to believe false claims about the world (Wooffitt, 2005). This presented a problem for sociologists who were interested in science, as their investigations were very much dependent on whatever present scientific consensus happened to be
(Edwards, 1997). The widely accepted view of current scientific consensus as definitive came into dispute as Kuhn fathered the concept of a ‘paradigm shift’, arguing that rather than being progressive and evolutionary, scientific advancement proceeds in a "series of peaceful interludes punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions" (1970, p. 10), where one way of thinking is eventually replaced by another.

During the 1980s SSK attracted researchers from within the phenomenological and ethnomethodological traditions. Many of these social scientists began to adopt a position of methodological relativism (Collins, 1982) with respect to scientific knowledge. Collins and Yearley explain methodological relativism as follows;

*Sociologists of scientific knowledge should treat correct science and false science equally; they should analyze what are taken by most scientists to be true claims about the natural world and what are treated by most as mistaken claims in the same way. The idea was that the construction of the boundary between the true and the false would become the topic rather than the starting point as in existing sociologies of science* (1992, p. 302).

Regardless of the ‘truth’ or otherwise of scientific knowledge, sociologists of science concerned themselves with the social processes through which knowledge claims were produced and validated by the scientific community. Sociologists subsequently developed an interest in scientific disputes where no consensus had yet emerged, as the social processes underpinning knowledge production were still in operation (Wooffitt, 2005). A key study was Gilbert and Mulkay’s (1984) examination of scientists’ accounting procedures surrounding a dispute within biochemistry (see Edwards, 1997; Wooffitt, 2005 for further discussion of this work). They analysed various kinds of documents such as textual records and technical reports from the research literature as well as interviews with various biochemists. They noted that within the data there was variability in accounts as there were a variety of different versions of essentially the same thing. Significantly, this variability could not be accounted for with
reference to various scientists’ affiliation to one or the other side of the dispute as there were conflicting accounts offered by the same scientists. Gilbert and Mulkay were the first to recognise that this variability is an inevitable feature of discourse. That is, that variability occurs as different expressions are used for different purposes, as part of local conversational activities (Potter, 1996b; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). To deal with this variability Gilbert and Mulkay introduced Discourse Analysis, a method of analysis which focuses entirely on participant’s accounts and language. Rather then representing a methodological problem, variability between accounts is an analytic tool that highlights the constructive and action orientated nature of discourse (Edwards & Stokoe, 2004). The classic problem of variability subsequently became an analytic lever for a lot of early discourse work (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

3.4 Discursive psychology

DP was pioneered by Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter (1992) as they set out to rework and respecify some of psychology’s most central concepts. DP has increasingly drawn on conversation analytic methods, with a distinctive focus on how speakers can orient to features of their own or each other’s subjective states and dispositions in building their own course of action or undermining others’ (Edwards, 2007). Edwards and Potter describe the approach as follows;

_The focus of discursive psychology is the action orientation of talk and writing. For both participants and analysts, the primary issue is the social actions, or interactional work, being done in the discourse. But rather than focusing on the usual concerns of social interactional analyses, such as the way social and intergroup relationships are conducted (through forms of address, speech accommodation, etc.), or how ‘speech acts’ might be identified, the major concern in this book is epistemological. It is with the nature of knowledge, cognition and reality: with how events are described and explained, how factual reports are constructed, how cognitive states are attributed. These are defined as discursive topics, things people topicalize or orientate themselves to, or imply, in their discourse. And rather than seeing such_
discursive constructions as expressions of speakers' underlying cognitive states, they are examined in the context of their occurrence as situated occasioned constructions whose precise nature makes sense, to participants and analysts alike, in terms of the those descriptions accomplish. (Edwards & Potter, 1992, pp. 2-3).

The ultimate aim of the thesis is to investigate what is done with the verb 'want', its practical use in everyday talk-in-interaction. As such my concern is epistemological as I treat participants’ words as constructions rather than as expressions of underlying cognitive states or as labels attached to internal referents. As Potter notes, “constructing the research topic as discourse marks a move from considering language as an abstract system of terms to considering talk and texts as parts of social practices” (2003, p. 785). The data for the thesis are conversational materials. However this “is not driven by a fascination with language as an abstract system, but by a concern with basic social psychological matters, how are actions produced, how do people coordinate their activities, how do they support and undermine one another, and so on” (Potter, 2010a, p. 658). That is, I consider talk as part of social practices and adopt the principles of ethnomethodological indifference and methodological relativism within SSK as I bracket off questions concerning the nature of mind and reality and treat these as participants’ concerns.

This conception of language makes discursive approaches incompatible with methods which presuppose different views of discourse and language. As Billig (1997) notes, DP is not a method that can be applied to any topic regardless of the researcher’s theoretical orientation, but it is a broad theoretical approach towards psychology which represents a major alternative to the scientific epistemology associated with the discipline. Attempts to ‘apply’ DP to questions formulated in the traditional psychological style, such as ‘what is the effect of X on Y?’ is likely to result in incoherence (Wiggins & Potter, 2008). ‘Psychology’ is not approached from an analysts’ perspective. That is, rather than applying predefined categories, terms and explanations to social life the
focus is on psychology from participants’ perspectives, as something displayed in talk-in-interaction (Potter, 2005).

3.5 Ontological and epistemological constructionism

Much of the research in the social sciences treats mental states as discrete private experiences and understands language as a realisation or expression of mental states. The thesis adopts the stance of methodological relativism with respect to the topic of talk, similar to that adopted in many social studies of science (Collins, 1982). The primary issue for analysis is the interactional work done in talk. Rather than understanding reports as expressions of underlying cognitive states they are examined as situated occasioned constructions (Edwards & Potter, 1992). For this purpose we do not need to know or be concerned with the mental state of individuals. DP distinguishes between ‘epistemic’ and ‘ontological’ constructionism and as Edwards notes, “in discursive psychology, the major sense of ‘social construction’ is epistemic; it is about the constructive nature of descriptions, rather than of the entities that (according to the descriptions) exist beyond them” (1997, p. 48).

While epistemological constructionism is concerned with how meaning is created in interaction, ontological constructionism takes this further and is concerned with how non-discursive worlds are discursively constructed and the implications of constructions for subjectivity (McAvoy, 2007; Wetherell, 2007). It is exemplified by “those approaches which develop a meta-theory of mind, the psyche and the nature of social relations using constructionist principles to guide their analysis” (Wetherell, p. 672) and is characteristic of constructivism in developmental psychology and socio-cultural approaches in anthropology. What emerges within interaction is understood as shaped by the norms, rules and ideologies that are thought to constrain interactions (McAvoy, 2007).
The term ‘epistemic’ construction is meant to distinguish DP from constructivist theories in developmental psychology such as work by Piaget, Vygotsky and Bruner which examines how ‘actual minds’ (Bruner, 1986) develop and are produced within social interaction (Edwards & Potter, 2005). It indicates a focus on talk as social practices, as performative and interactive rather than a ‘telementation’ (Harris, 1981) of thoughts from one mind to another, or as an objective expression of the way things are in the world. “Crucially, the epistemic label signals a contrast with the standard use of language in psychological methods as a pathway along which to pursue mental, social or biographical objects beyond talk or text” (Potter, 2010a, p. 658).

An example of constructivism in developmental psychology is the approach advocated by Carpendale and Lewis (2004, 2006). They draw on Vygotsky’s constructivist theory and Wittgenstein’s private language argument (see Shotter, 2004, 2006 for a critique of attempts to produce a Wittgensteinian developmental theory), suggesting that Theory of Mind develops discursively, that it is “within social interactions an understanding of mental states develops and is constituted” (2004, p. 80, original emphasis). Carpendale describes constructivism as “a general view of the nature of knowledge and the mind that applies equally to cognitive and social cognitive development” (1997, p. 35). The project for these researchers is to integrate “the social and individual dimensions of development” (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004, p. 80) to explain how children come to understand the ‘psychological world’. In this arena then, “mind is real for the theorist and analyst, and the analytic task is to explain how it is built within a real world of cultural settings and practices” (Edwards, 1997, pp. 47-48).

For DP the wide ranging debate about the ontological status of mind and ‘the mental’ is bracketed off. Just as for the sociologists of science the boundary between the true and the false became a topic rather than a starting point for analysis (Collins & Yearly, 1992) mind and reality are treated as discourse’s
topics and business and analysis focuses on how participants descriptively construct them (Edwards, 1997). Shotter notes that although Wittgenstein’s investigations are inherently hostile towards the whole scientific approach, he is not critical of science as such and that “his remarks are not at all aimed at arguing for what is in fact the case” (2006, p. 280, original emphasis). Rather, his tradition of conceptual analysis draws attention to how words are ordinarily used, what is “always before one’s eyes” (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 129). Rather than beginning with a presupposition regarding the ontological status of ‘the mind’ and arguing for what is the case the approach adopted in the thesis is thoroughly empirically grounded. I examine mental states as practical, “as a kitbag of resources for doing things” (Potter, 2005, p. 740). I ask “when, and in the performance of what kinds of actions, do people talk as if they were in possession of a privately available mental life, which their words may either truthfully or falsely express?” (Edwards & Potter, 2005, p. 247). In analysing the uses of the term ‘want’ as an intelligible practice of accountability (Edwards & Potter, 2005) I make no claims regarding the ontological status of mental states.

3.6 Anti-cognitivism; Against Theory of Mind

Costall and Leudar (2009a) note that during the scientific revolution in the nineteenth century psychology faced particular difficulties as individuals know, or assume to know, a great deal about themselves without the benefit of psychologists. “The New Psychology had, therefore, to establish its own epistemological distance from our ‘common-sense’ knowledge of ourselves, by developing its own distinct methods, most conspicuously the psychological experiment” (p. 43). However as Harré notes, the project of establishing a scientific psychology is paradoxical as “for the most part the processes by which people carry out cognitive tasks are unobservable” (2002, p. 217). Cognitive science maintains a commitment to scientific research using empirical methods, but the phenomena which these researchers aim to
investigate “are intrinsically unobservable whose existence can only be inferred from outward actions, especially language-based actions” (Billig, 2009). Scientific psychology’s subject matter then, mental states and cognitive processes, can only be studied experimentally by formulating operational definitions and models of cognitive behaviour. It is not the case that there are a set of cognitive processes out there in the world, or in our minds, waiting to be found and explained by psychologists (Edwards, 1997). Cognitive psychology’s subject matter must be defined and these operational definitions are “clearly a cultural and discursive matter” (Edwards, 1997, p. 28). In cognitive psychology language is treated as a representation of inner processes. By studying what lies behind behaviour and talk, cognitive psychology has neglected the study of that behaviour. As Coulter argues “they frequently aspire to operationalize or to substitute for, or to regiment, our mundane concepts of thinking, believing, hoping, expecting, remembering, forgetting, reasoning, understanding, perceiving and a host of others. They are typically insensitive to the conceptual articulations and rules of use which apply to their actual topics of inquiry, favoring modes of stipulative theorizing to the analysis of their grammars” (2008, p. 21).

I now turn to a body of discourse based work that has begun to develop a sustained critique of one particular area of cognitive psychology, especially pertinent to the thesis, which is Theory of Mind. Leudar, Costall and Francis (2004) note that the Theory of Mind framework is important as it is “fairly representative of contemporary cognitive psychology and so of its problems” (p. 572). In recent years discourse based researchers have begun to develop a sustained critique of the theory, its fundamental assumptions and methods (see e.g. collections in Leudar & Costall, 2009; Leudar, Costall & Francis, 2004). As Leudar, Costall and Francis (2004) observe, prior to the mid 2000s, the critical literature on Theory of Mind was relatively limited, consisting of a few articles taking issue with its methods (Dunn, 1988, as cited in Leudar, Costall & Francis; Reddy, 1991) and findings (McCabe, Leudar & Antaki,
Within the Theory of Mind framework the ability to communicate with others is seen as a theoretical accomplishment, as a person must construct theories in order to appreciate and understand others’ mental states, a prerequisite for participation in social interaction. The main thrust of the critique is that “the capacity for understanding other human beings that is supposedly acquired through speculative theory construction is in fact acquired with the language” (Sharrock, 2009, p. 191).

One focus of this critique has been on the application of Theory of Mind to explanations of autism and schizophrenia. Shanker (2004) argues that rather than being a predetermined phenomenon, the capacity to experience emotion and appreciate the emotions of others develops in the context of the child’s interactional experiences. According to Theory of Mind, the symptoms of autism are a manifestation of an innate Theory of Mind deficit. Baron-Cohen (1995), for example, proposes that this is caused by a malfunction in a Theory of Mind Module which results in an inability to engage in ‘mind reading’. However Shanker notes that far from being predetermined, there is a growing body of work that evidences a developmental trajectory which leads to deficits typically seen in individuals with autism (Greenspan, 1997). This work notes that a highly prevalent problem experienced by individuals with autism is sensory over or under-reactivity; “for example, the sound of a vacuum cleaner can be unbearable for a child who is over-reactive to auditory stimuli while the intonation changes of motherese might come across as indistinguishable murmurs to a child who is under-reactive” (Shanker, 2004, p. 693). These basic challenges may severely impair a child’s emotional and social development;

Consider how a child who is over-reactive to visual stimuli may resort to tuning out the word as much as possible in order to cope with this incessant assault. Simply looking into his mother’s eyes when en face may be more than his nervous system can bear. But then, the more he avoids interactions with his caregivers, the more he is deprived of those very experiences that are critical for normal healthy development. Unless the caregiver employs communicational
techniques that cater to and if possible help the child overcome his sensory challenges, the child is more and more likely to adopt behaviours that will exacerbate his or her communicational problems (ibid., p. 694).

Rather than understanding social impairments as a result of a malfunction in individuals’ ‘Theory of Mind’, Shanker shows how what may otherwise be understood as an innate, biological, deficit can be traced to developmental issues which arise during the course of child’s early interactions as a result of sensory over and under-reactivity.

A Theory of Mind deficit or an impaired ability to appreciate one’s own and others’ mental states has also been implicated symptoms typically seen in schizophrenia, such as delusions of control, persecution and of reference (see Corcoran, 2000, 2001). It has been noted that there are inconsistent, seemingly contradictory findings in studies of false belief understanding in patients with diagnoses of schizophrenia (Bailey & Henry, 2010; Brüne, 2005). However these discrepancies are typically attributed to processing demands such as working memory. For example, Apperly et al. discuss the ‘dilemma’ faced by researchers as they design Theory of Mind tests as “the tasks must be difficult enough to generate errors yet simple enough that errors are not due to more general processing demands of the task” (2004, p. 1774).

Conversation analytic research focussed on interactions in clinical settings has critically examined the assumption that patients with diagnoses of schizophrenia have impaired Theory of Mind abilities. McCabe, Leudar and Antaki (2004) examine a corpus of cognitive behavioural therapy sessions (CBT) and psychiatrist-patient consultations to examine whether individuals with diagnoses of schizophrenia display specific interactional difficulties as predicted by the Theory of Mind model. They show how during the course of interaction patients display intact Theory of Mind relevant skills, such as representing their own or others mental states and engaging in anticipatory
interactive planning (Drew, 1995), which relies on the projection of an interlocutor’s turn and can only work if an individual has an adequate representation of what a co-interactant intends to do. Antaki (2004) examines interaction in therapist-patient consultations and critiques the notion that people get along by ‘mind reading’. He argues that while researchers in the field of Theory of Mind place scare quotes around ‘mind-reading’ as if they use the term only metaphorically, they “then proceed essentially as if people do actually read minds” (2004, p. 668) and that this “sets the bar impossibly high” (p. 667). He shows how an appreciation of the fine details of interaction reveals individuals’ competencies.

Colombino (2004) carried out ethnographic fieldwork, over a period of two years, in a school that specialises in teaching autistic children. He argues that interactions between autistic children and their teachers presents a problem as “the children appear to display cognitive and interactional competencies that the Theory of Mind claims they should not possess, while teachers treat the children as if they observably and accountably possessed those same competencies” (p. 726). An example of one such competency is ‘shared attention’ which Baron-Cohen (1995) predicts that autistic children cannot engage in due to an inability to compute triadic representations of mental states; “you, and Me, collaboratively looking at, working on or talking about This” (Saxe, 2006, p. 235). Colombino notes that the very physical setup of the classroom presupposes that pupils will pay attention and take part in lessons; “the physical set-up of the classroom is such that the children are all facing Paul and focusing on what he is doing. This is a ‘normal’ set-up for a teaching activity, and not one that would take into account any inability on the part of the children to deal with activities requiring shared attention” (p. 731).

Researchers are also critical of the adequacy of the Theory of Mind framework in explanations of human development. Reddy and Morris (2004) show how young children are able to engage in a range of activities that the Theory-
Theory (e.g. Gopnik, 2008; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992) predicts that they should not. They note that “theory-theorists argue that telling lies, understanding intentions contrary to actual actions, understanding lack of knowledge and understanding misunderstandings are all dependent on complex representational skills which do not develop until about 4 years” (2004, p. 649). They review a range of empirical studies which provide evidence to the contrary. For example, it has been argued that children cannot lie until they pass the false belief task, and that children with autism and those under the age of four cannot pass the false belief task and as such are not able to lie (Stouthamer-Loeber & Loeber, 1986). Reddy and Morris argue that “this prediction ran into problems from the start” (2004, p. 649). The ability to deceive in fact begins from the first year as children deliberately tease with false offers and requests before the age of one (Reddy, 1991). Research has shown that children are able to lie from the age of two and moreover that “the lies of 2-year-old children are as plausible as those of the older children” (Wilson, Smith and Ross, 2003, p. 35).

Sharrock notes that the disagreement between proponents of Theory of Mind and alternatives such as interaction analysis is a deep divergence; “mentalists think that there problems are to be solved by empirical research, whilst my argument against them is that this is not what they are really engaged in at all, and that the crucial understanding is in terms of how the natural language works when put to everyday use in practical affairs” (2009, p. 192). That is, there is a fundamental argument regarding emotions and cognition as the driving force behind behaviour. Cognitivism maintains that thoughts and emotions are a priori entities which motivate and drive behaviour. As this review has shown, this view is opposed by discourse based researchers who maintain that emotions and intentions are conceptual resources which are drawn on during the course of our everyday interactions. In the analysis which follows I extend this work as I consider ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ as practical resources which speakers drawn on during the course of interaction.
Part 4: Chapter summary

This chapter has outlined the literature which is relevant to the thesis. It began with an overview of work in Theory of Mind and mainstream, essentialist approaches to emotion. Both of these bodies of work are grounded in a referential view of language and share common themes such as how individuals understand the mental states and emotions of others and the causal relations between affect, intentions and action. I discussed methodological and theoretical problems which are inherent in this work, and took issue with the assumption that an innate, individual ‘mind-reading’ ability is a prerequisite for participation in social interaction. The purpose of reviewing work in these areas was to situate the thesis by identifying how it will contribute to understandings of ‘mental states’ and ‘emotions’ by presenting an alternative understanding of human action. I then introduced social constructionist approaches to emotion and the problems which this approach raised for essentialist work. I then discussed studies in contemporary DP, situating the thesis in a body of work which is critical of, and is developing an analytically based alternative to mainstream cognitive psychology (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2005). In part 2 I discussed work in CA and DP which informs the analysis in order to show how the thesis will contribute to this body of work by extending knowledge of the sequential organisation of requests, directives and accounts. Finally I gave an overview of DP and discussed in detail the theoretical approach of epistemological constructionism. Having now introduced the background literature and the theoretical approach of the thesis, in the next chapter I move on to discuss the practicalities of the thesis. I begin by introducing the dataset and my rationale for choosing to collect this data. I then outline the methodological procedures and the stages involved in data collection, transcription and analysis.
This chapter focuses on the specific methodological procedures and practicalities of the thesis. The chapter is divided into two subsections. First I introduce the dataset and provide observations related to the use of the data. In the second section I set out the specific procedures for recording, transcribing and analysing the materials and discuss ethical issues and procedures involved as part of the data collection and analysis.

Part 1: The data set

The data in the thesis were taken from two sources; television documentary data and videotapes made during mealtimes by three families. The decision to collect mealtime data was a practical one as mealtimes tend to be occasions where families are gathered in one location, which allows recordings to be made easily and regularly. This is reflected by the large body of work within conversation analysis, sociolinguistics and ethnography which has focussed on mealtime interaction (see Laurier & Wiggins, 2011 for a review). The use of video recordings made by families for the purpose of the research project raises issues concerning reactivity to the presence of recording equipment (this will be discussed in further detail below). While I am not seeking naturalistic data as a more ‘pure’ or natural form of data which is supposedly uncontaminated by the presence of recording equipment (Speer & Hutchby, 2003), I began the project with a broad interest in ‘family disputes’ and arguments. This posed the problem of how to gain access to ‘dispute’ episodes. I viewed examples of mealtime data available in the archives of the Discourse and Rhetoric Group at Loughborough University and it became apparent that participants may orient to the presence of recording equipment
and present their ‘best behaviour’. I was also unsatisfied with relying on mealtime data simply because of practical convenience. As my analytic interest is not in food or mealtimes \textit{per se} I decided to supplement the mealtime data. ‘Fly-on-the-wall’ documentary series for television, which document the lives of a particular family for an extended period of time, were particularly suitable as these shows aim to capture everyday family life as it occurs naturally, without intervention.

1.1 The television documentary data

The predominant source of data used in the thesis was a set of video recordings taken from a series of ‘fly-on-the-wall’ documentary programmes that focus on a particular family for an extended period of time. Table 1 provides details of the family members and the dates during which the documentary series were aired.

The first of these, ‘The Family’, aired in the autumn of 2008 on Channel 4. This corpus is referred to as ‘TF2008’ and comprises approximately seven hours. I made contacts via the internet and gained access to two similar series. ‘An American Family’ originally aired in 1973. This corpus is referred to throughout the thesis as ‘AAF’ and comprises approximately seven hours. The final programme, ‘The Family’ first aired in 1974. This corpus is referred to as ‘TF1974’ throughout the thesis and comprises half an hour.

‘Fly-on-the-wall’ television programmes closely observe individuals or institutions and aim to capture the flow of ‘everyday life’. Programmes are typically filmed by a quasi-invisible recording team and unlike the traditional documentary have no host, no interviews and participants are not given any scripted materials. The genre aims to break down “fixed distinctions between public and private, reality and spectacle, serial narrative and nonfiction, documentary and fiction, film and television” (Ruoff, 2002, p. xii). The name ‘fly-
on-the-wall’ derives from the idea that events are filmed as they occur, as a fly on the wall would see them. The AAF and TF1974 corpuses were filmed by a recording team who followed the families. Filmmakers Alan and Susan Raymond filmed AAF over a period of eight months. TF1974 was recorded by a camera crew for eighteen hours a day over a period of six months. TF2008 was recorded by twenty-one remote controlled cameras installed within the family’s home.

Table 1: Guide to documentary data family members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Series code</th>
<th>Names &amp; relation</th>
<th>Age at recording</th>
<th>Broadcast period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF2008</td>
<td>Simon (father)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>September-December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jane (mother)</td>
<td>39-40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jessica (daughter)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charlotte (daughter)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emily (daughter)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tom (son)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Bill (father)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pat (mother)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lance (son)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grant (son)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kevin (son)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delilah (daughter)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michele (daughter)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF1974</td>
<td>Margaret (mother)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marian (daughter)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tim (Marian’s fiancé)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.2 The family mealtime data

The second source of data were videotapes of mealtimes recorded by three families. I used personal contacts to locate one family, the ‘Potts’ family. The criteria for the selection of the family was that they have children aged between ten and nineteen and regularly share household meals. The family were approached by me via telephone. The research was outlined to one member of the family, Don, to elicit their potential involvement in the study. The research was described to the family as a study of ‘family interaction’ which aims to investigate how families interact with each other during the course of their everyday lives. An information sheet with further information (see appendix A) was subsequently given to the family.

The remaining set of recordings were taken from the archives of the Discourse and Rhetoric Group, a set of data which is available to members of the group for general use. These recordings were made by the ‘Crouch’, ‘Olivers’ and ‘Potts’ families. Table 1 includes details of participants in each family.

Table 2: Guide to family members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family name</th>
<th>Names and relation</th>
<th>Age at recording</th>
<th>Recording period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potts</td>
<td>Judy (mother)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>April-May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don (father)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jamie (daughter)</td>
<td>15-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wayne (son)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olivers</td>
<td>Rachel (mother)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>March-May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phil (father)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Julie (daughter)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carla (daughter)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.3 Advantages and limitations of the dataset

There are some issues regarding the use of television documentary data within studies of interaction which must be noted. One potential problem with using data from television series is that it is often heavily edited and so great care has to be taken in the selection of extracts and examples. I began with an initial examination of the video recordings to identify where disruptions occurred and whether this would create analytical problems. Second, as the families were being recorded for the purposes of making a television programme it is possible that some aspects of their conduct may be designed for a viewing audience. As Harris notes, the use of televised programmes which are broadcast for the purposes of entertainment “introduces questions about how ‘real’ the behaviour of these participants is” (2006, p. 37).

It is often seen as essential that conversation analytic research draws on naturally occurring, spoken interaction (see Heritage, & Atkinson, 1984). Indeed, the term ‘naturally occurring interaction’ “has become a slogan built into many definitions of CA” (Speer, 2002, p. 514, original emphasis). This focus on ‘natural’ talk has generated extensive debate (Billig, 1999; Griffin, 2007; Potter & Hepburn, 2005, 2007; Speer, 2002). It is a central premise that data should not be “produced for the purpose of study” (Drew, 1989, p. 96). Methods such as focus groups, interviews and other materials that have been produced for the purposes of research are considered less appropriate as they fail to capture talk as it occurs during the course of everyday, ordinary life. There is a programme of work which has engaged with how social science
methods work in practice, drawing on data such as interviews and focus groups (e.g. Antaki, Houtkoop-Steenstra & Rapley, 2000; Potter & Puchta, 2007; Puchta & Potter, 2002; Schaeffer & Maynard, 2005). This research is oriented towards social research instruments as social events in their own right, as a topic rather than a resource.

On the other hand, there are several benefits associated with the use of documentary data. First, this data would truly have existed regardless of my own activities as a researcher. It passes what has been referred to as the ‘dead social scientist test’ (Potter, 1996c) at least with regard to this thesis and its concerns. That is, it would still exist if the researcher had been run over on the way to work. It has not been ‘got up’ or produced specifically for the purposes of the research. Second, the recordings were not limited to mealtimes and continuously captured the families’ everyday lives over an extended period of time. This provided ample opportunity for family members to become acclimatised to either the presence of members of a camera crew (as in the case of the AAF and TF1974 corpuses) or recording equipment (as in the case of TF2008). As such the recordings provide a rich source of data as every aspect of their lives in the home was captured. Additionally, these professional recordings are of notable superior technical quality to the data generally used for research in interaction analysis. Recordings were made by several cameras in various positions, there is superior sound and lighting quality and details such as participants’ facial expressions were captured much more clearly.

Several studies of interaction have used televised media data for research. For example Harris (2006) uses CA and Membership Categorisation analysis to investigate the social organisation of crying in interaction. She draws on data taken from counselling sessions, medical training and the Australian reality television programme ‘Big Brother’. As Harris notes, these “data are unscripted, spontaneous and sequentially-based” (p. 37). In other words,
although reality and ‘fly-on-the-wall’ documentary series are recorded for television viewing purposes, these series are not ‘fictional’ and scripted.

With regard to the mealtime data there is an issue of potential recorder influence. This is generally the case with family interaction research, where consent must be obtained from participants prior to recording for ethical reasons. Thus, as families made recordings of meals for the specific purpose of the research project it is possible that some aspects of their conduct were governed by this purpose. For example, participants may present their ‘best behaviour’. At this point it is necessary to note that the level to which the researcher can never be present in the research has been the focus of intense debate. As Speer (2002) remarks, the necessity of obtaining the informed consent of participants along with the presence of a tape-recorder makes it difficult to see how any data could be collected without researcher intervention. Holstein and Gubrium (1997) argue that “contamination is everywhere” (p.126) and so the notion of a pristine domain of social interaction which is only contaminated and distorted by the presence of recording equipment (Speer & Hutchby, 2003) is somewhat misleading. An exception where data arguably may be considered ‘natural’ is that where the recording used for analysis is part of the interaction itself, and the phenomenon being analysed. For example, in a series of papers which examine various aspects of police-suspect interrogations Stokoe and Edwards (Edwards, 2006, 2008; Edwards & Stokoe, 2011; Stokoe & Edwards; Stokoe, 2009a, 2009b, 2010) draw on a corpus of recordings of actual police interrogations. Ethical permission for the use of these recordings was obtained in retrospect, and so recordings were made with no orientation to their use for academic research. As the thesis uses documentary data to gaze into family life (rather than analysing media data as media data, for example to study how documentaries are made), it is prudent to understand the materials which form the basis of the thesis as naturalistic rather than natural. This distinction was made by Potter (2002) to mark the contrast between data that are produced specifically for the research project,
such as interviews, and those data that are not, while recognising the limits of that distinction and appreciating issues of ‘reactivity’ that arise when recording what people do (see also Wiggins & Potter, 2008).

**Part 2: Procedures**

**2.1 Recording**

The mealtimes were recorded using a Sony video camera and with an additional Dictaphone that was attached to a flat microphone. The use of a microphone with Dictaphones ensured that sound was recorded clearly, as it is sometimes the case that audio recorded by a video camera is not sufficiently clear. The family were given a tripod and chose where to place the camera and which meals they would record. They were asked to record approximately fifteen meals over the period of one month. During the initial visit when the family were given the camera they were told that they were able to delete any recordings during the filming period should they wish to do so. They were also given the opportunity for recordings to be deleted during the second visit when I collected the camera. The family chose not to do so.

**2.2 Transcription**

All of the data was initially transcribed verbatim by me. This allowed me to get close to the data, familiarise myself with the range of conversational topics and to begin to identify where disruptions occurred in the television documentary data. The second stage of transcription involved transcribing in full sections related to the emerging themes within the thesis, specifically, sections which contained uses of the verbs ‘want’ and ‘need’. These transcripts were produced using the Jefferson notation system, which was designed to highlight the sequential features of talk and various phonetic and articulatory features of speech (see Appendix for transcription symbols). The use of the Jefferson
notation system is standard in CA, where transcripts aim to capture how things are said, with a view to analysing the actions talk performs, as well as talk’s verbal content. This includes paralinguistic features of talk such as intonation, emphases and pauses in talk, which are routinely omitted by orthographic transcriptions that focus merely on what was said (see Wooffitt, 2005).

2.3 Analysis

The analytic procedure was to produce, read and re-read the transcripts alongside repeated viewings of the video recordings to identify phenomena of interest. The first stages of research in CA have been characterised as unmotivated looking (Psathas, 1995). Rather than beginning with predefined hypotheses and theories to explore, the procedure is to identify examples of phenomena upon which to build generalisable descriptions. As the analysis progressed the attention focussed on sequences in which participants use the verbs ‘want’ and ‘need’. Separate documents were composed according to particular areas of interest. For example where ‘I want’ was used as part of a two-part ‘I’m not X, I want Y’ structure, these formed a separate collection. The first stage of analysis involved identifying what participants were doing through their talk in sequences where ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ were invoked. The second stage was identifying how this was done and the interactional import of these terms in specific interactional sequences.

2.4 Ethics and confidentiality

The project conforms to the British Psychological Society’s Code of Ethics (http://www.bps.org.uk/the-society/code-of-conduct/code-of-conduct_home.cfm) as well as Loughborough University’s Ethical Code of Practice (http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/index.html) that all research must follow.
With regard to the Potts, Crouch and Olivers corpuses, there are ethical issues related to the use of video material that allows individuals to be identified and the use of minors as participants.

The data taken from the Discourse and Rhetoric Group archives (the Crouch and Olivers corpuses) were collected under a set of ethics protocols designed for use with child participants. Feedback from participants has been used to make materials clearer and to identify the issues that are of most concern to participants. The researchers who collected these materials have developed ways of presenting and talking about the research that are clear to younger children. At each stage it was ensured that younger participants were directly addressed rather than having parents answer on their behalf. These same protocols were adopted as I collected the Potts corpus. Participants were asked to record only when they were happy and able to do so. They were informed that they were able to delete any particular recording during the recording period and were given a further opportunity to do so upon collection of the recording equipment at the end of the recording period.

Each participant was given a participant information sheet with full details of the study and it was ensured that each individual fully understood the information provided on this sheet. Participants over the age of eighteen were asked to sign two copies of informed consent forms, one to be retained by them for their personal records and one which was retained by me as the principal researcher. Participants under the age of eighteen were asked to sign two copies of willingness to participate forms and a parent or guardian was asked to sign two copies of parental consent forms. Parents retained a copy of each for their personal records. Initial permission was sought for the use of video data and transcripts to be used as part of the research project for my thesis. Participants were able to opt in or out of further levels of permission which were for data to be used in grant reports, research publications and presentations. A further option which participants were asked to opt in or out of
was for data to be donated to the Discourse and Rhetoric Group archives following completion of the study. Participants were assured confidentiality and were informed of their right to withdraw at any point during the study. Participants were also informed of their rights for anonymity and so far this has not been requested. However pseudonyms are used in publications. A copy of the informed consent form, willingness to participate form and parental consent form are included in appendix B.

All participants in the AAF, TF1974 and TF2008 datasets provided their informed consent for these recordings to be made to the respective production companies. As each participant has given informed consent to be filmed for the purposes of a television documentary, the use of these datasets conforms with the BPS code of conduct (2009) clause 1.3 (ix) which states “unless informed consent has been obtained, restrict research based upon observations of public behaviour to those situations in which persons being studied would reasonably expect to be observed by strangers”. As these data have been publically broadcast, the use of pseudonyms and changes of names and locations were not required.

Summary

This chapter has provided an overview of the practicalities of the thesis. Building on chapter 2, where I discussed my theoretical approach, the chapter began with an introduction of the data set and a consideration of the benefits and limitations of the data. I then moved on to outline the methodological procedures followed as data for the thesis was recorded, transcribed and analysed. The following four chapters present the analysis of the data.
'Want' as an interactional resource

Saying that you want something - demanding it - does not necessarily mean that you will get it, but not saying what you want more or less guarantees that you will not get it. And even if you do, you may not recognise it. Before you can say what you want, you have to know what that is. You have to think about it, discuss it, agree on it. (Fairburns, 2002, pp. 9-10).

1.0 Introduction

The quote above raises important issues for any speaker of the English language. Does saying what you want mean that you will get it? And if one doesn’t say what they want, how on earth will they ever get it? The ability to ‘say what you want’ is held in high esteem in Western culture, and forms an important part of assertiveness training, for example in organisational settings (e.g. Eggert, 2011). The assumption underlying programmes such as these is that individuals ordinarily proceed by expressing what they want and that some individuals find it difficult to do so. This thesis takes a very different view and examines uses of the verb ‘want’ as a specific example of mental state talk, implicated in various kinds of conversational activities. Before examining specific activities in detail, I begin by showing how speakers construct their own and others’ wants in talk and discuss some of the kinds of conversational activities in which these constructions are involved. I begin by surveying work in developmental psychology which is concerned with children’s developing understanding of desire, the fundamental assumptions of this work and the associated methodological and theoretical problems. This work can be contrasted with my own discursive approach, which examines ‘wants’ as constructions which work within a flow of interactional considerations. In section 2.1 the analysis begins with an explication of what is meant by ‘wants’ being implicated in various conversational activities. Specifically, I examine the kinds of sequences in which young children use ‘I want’ constructions. In the second part of the analysis I focus on adult-adult talk and examine in further
detail the various kinds of activities in which invocations of one’s own or others’ wants are implicated. The aim of this chapter then, is to begin to reveal some of the fundamental issues for research into mental states, such as that carried out under the rubric of Theory of Mind, which hinges on an assumption of speakers’ communication of discrete, private mental states.

1.1 Developing understanding of desires: Experimental testing

Theory of Mind is often understood as a single cognitive capacity, which is equated with succeeding in the false belief task. Nonetheless, it is widely documented that acquiring a ‘Theory of Mind’ involves the development of multiple concepts throughout childhood in a hierarchical fashion (see Wellman, 2010 for a review). This notion has its roots in Wellman and Woolley’s (1989) influential proposal that children understand others in terms of their desires before they understand them in terms of their beliefs. Consequently there has been increasing interest in studying children’s understanding of desires, intentions, knowledge and other states using a battery of tasks which are methodologically comparable to the false belief task (Wellman & Liu, 2004). These tests focus on differing constructs, such as emotions, intentions and other states. For example Wellman and Liu (2004) examined children’s performance on five kinds of Theory of Mind tasks; diverse desires, diverse beliefs, knowledge access, contents belief and real-apparent emotion. They argue that children’s performance was scaleable (Guttman, 1950, as cited in Wellman & Liu, 2004) and that children understand contrasting desires before they understand contrasting beliefs and that understanding differing knowledge states is more difficult still. Experimental tests of children’s understanding of desires are based on several assumptions regarding the nature of desire, which have been summarised as follows;

- Children need to understand that desire is a mental state rather than simply identify desires with actions. They also need to understand the
causal link between desires and actions and that different desires may cause different actions.

- Children need to understand the relationship between desires and their satisfaction conditions and that satisfaction conditions for desires are outcomes, rather than actions.
- Children need to understand the representational nature of desire, that desire is an intentional state and represents attitudes towards things, rather than the things themselves. (Astington & Gopnik, 1991).

A central research issue is whether children understand that mental states are subjective; that they can differ from reality and that people can have mental states which differ from one’s own. This understanding is believed to mark the shift to a representational Theory of Mind. Consequently research typically involves creating a conflict between the child’s own desires and those of a protagonist and asking the child to predict how the protagonist will act in a specific situation. For example, the child will be shown several objects such as stickers, items of food or pictures of different activities. They will either be told a story about the protagonist (from which they are required to infer the protagonist’s ‘desires’) or told explicitly which item the protagonist prefers. They are then asked to predict which item or activity the protagonist will choose. If children respond by predicting that the protagonist will choose the item or activity which the character ‘wants’ this is interpreted as a reflection of the appreciation of the subjective nature of desires. If the child ‘fails’ the task and predicts that the character will choose the item or activity which the child themselves have indicated that they ‘want’, this is interpreted as an inability to appreciate that others may have desires that differ from one’s own (e.g. Carlson, Mandell & Williams, 2004; Cassidy et al., 2005a; Wellman & Liu, 2004) (for further discussion of experimental testing of desires, including an example of a vignette, see chapter 2).
We can note that this experimental paradigm is based on several assumptions. The first is that the experimental set-up is an adequate ‘stand in’ for reality. Typically, experimenters read vignettes to participants, from which they are required to draw inferences regarding the protagonist’s (often a doll or puppet) ‘wants’. Children are shown pictures of items or activities and are asked to make predictions regarding what a protagonist will do or feel, based on the story told by the experimenter (for discussion of the problems associated with the use of vignettes from a discursive perspective, see Potter & Edwards, 1990; Edwards & Potter, 1992). The second is that children have sufficient information-processing resources required to understand and adequately take part in tasks (Apperly et al., 2004; Lind & Bowler, 2009). As Bloom and German (2000) note, false belief tasks are inherently difficult and place several non-trivial processing demands on participants. The third, which is particularly pertinent to the analysis in this chapter, is that people ordinarily act in ways which are consistent with the fulfilment of their desires. That is, children are given information regarding the protagonist’s preferences or desires and are asked to predict the protagonist’s actions based on this information.

1.2 Methodological problems

Several basic problems with the methodology and assumptions of Theory of Mind research were discussed in detail in chapter 2. Here it is sufficient to note that ‘mental states’ are understood as discrete private states which are communicated via language. As Leudar and Costall (2004) note, although contemporary psychology claims to set aside Cartesian dualism, it inherits and reproduces the problem of ‘other minds’ as mind is distinguished from behaviour and mental states are accepted as being private. We can also note that the typical experimental set-up involves questions and answers regarding the actions of a puppet and as such is a clear departure from what happens during everyday interactions (Antaki, 2004; McCabe, 2009; Wootton, 2006). As McCabe (2009) notes, in the typical experiment the support structures inherent
in everyday interaction that are available for making inferences are removed. In interactional sequences information regarding speakers ‘intentions’, and so on, is provided so that formal inferences are not necessary. Further, the focus of these experiments is on the activities and mental states of the puppet, which forecloses any insight into how notions of wanting may be used functionally, by the speaker, with regard to the speaker’s own ‘first person’ projects. In what follows I begin to examine speakers’ invocations of wants in interactional sequences and discuss the kinds of activities within which these claims are embedded. In doing so I show that the typical experimental set-up, designed to assess children’s understandings of ‘desires’, is a clear departure from everyday interaction. The aim is to highlight some fundamental problems with the dominant methodology of Theory of Mind research.

2.0 Analysis

The analysis is divided into two subsections. I first illustrate how claims regarding ‘wants’ are fruitfully understood as interactional resources produced within specific sequential contexts, rather than as simply referring to a private ‘mental state’. The analysis in this subsection begins by examining young children’s talk and the kinds of sequences within which ‘I want’ constructions are embedded. The analysis in this subsection leads to the conclusion that in everyday interaction, ordinarily ‘wanting’ is not understood or treated as a sufficient basis for ‘doing’ or for ‘acting’. This has specific implications for work which is based on the assumption that individuals act in ways that are consistent with the fulfilment of their ‘desires’. In the second section I consider in further detail how claims regarding ‘wants’ are embedded within various conversational activities in conversation. For example, I examine the practice of ascribing ‘wants’ to others to achieve a particular rhetorical effect. Rather than understanding actions as a consequence of pre-existing intentional states I approach the relationship between ‘desires’ and ‘intentions’ as “a practical concern in how actions are reported” (Edwards, 2008, p. 177). The ultimate
aim of the thesis is to illustrate that claims regarding ‘wants’ are performative and interactive. Rather than communicating an individual, discrete entity, these constructions accomplish particular activities in specific settings.

2.1 ‘Wanting’ in interaction

In the first section the analysis focuses on young children’s uses of ‘I want’ formulations during the course of conversation. I begin to show how the formulation of what proponents of Theory of Mind may take to be an internal mental experience of desire, or which may otherwise may be dismissed as uninteresting (for example, utterances which are disregarded as they are used “purely for social convention” [Bartsch & Wellman, 1995, p. 67]), functions as a device in and for interaction.

 Extract 4.1 Crouch 3 02:10

01 (7.2) 
02 Kat: I don’t ea:t (. ) all mi::ne (. ) ↑ ↑yoghurt ( ) ↑ ↑
03 (2.0) 
04 Lin: >you’re have to have< so[me chee]rios as well= 
05 Ann: [hh ]
06 Lin: =th[en if you’re not goinna eat that one] 
07 Ann: [bee gesu::h ] neh!ver 
08 gu::h ((singing))
09 ((reaches over and points at Kath’s yoghurt))
10 (2.0)
11 Ann: [gu::h yoghu::rt ]
12 Ann: [((taps Kath’s yoghurt))] 
13 (0.8)
14 Kat: don’t want ↑ ea::t↑ that o::ne 
15 (0.3)
16 Lin: if you don’t eat that one you’re going to need to eat 
17 some cheerios cause that’s not enough one little 
18 yoghurt; before you go to schoo:l. 
19 | (1.6) |
I will begin by considering Anna’s use of ‘I want’ at line 25 and the conversational sequence within which the turn is embedded. We can begin by noting that during the sequence Anna is attempting to retrieve a yoghurt that has been discarded by Katherine (lines 2, 14) and that is subsequently placed in the middle of the table by Linda (lines 20-21) during breakfast. Let us begin by noting the various features of this sequence. Katherine announces that she will not be eating the second yoghurt at line 2. As Linda tells Katherine that in this case she will have to eat some Cheerios instead of the yoghurt, Anna begins to reach over and point at the yoghurt (line 9), before reaching out and physically tapping it (line 12). Katherine then makes a second announcement and rejects the yoghurt using a negative formulation of her ‘wants’ ‘don’t want ↑eat↑ that one.’ Linda then picks up the yoghurt, which is still attached to an empty pot, and separates the two before placing the uneaten
yoghurt towards the middle of the table (lines 20-21). Anna then delivers the
target turn ‘I want one’ as she reaches out for the yoghurt for a second
time.

There are several things to note at this point. First, Anna’s ‘I want’ construction
is delivered to request a specific object that was previously part of Katherine’s
breakfast and which was rejected by Katherine using an ‘I don’t want’
construction. It is notable that both Katherine’s rejection and Anna’s request
are built using ‘I want’ and so Anna’s request stands in direct contrast to
Katherine’s rejection. Analysis of the dataset reveals that children often deliver
‘I want’ constructions to request something which is also available to a sibling.
What distinguishes this from a typical request (such as ‘can I have the
yoghurt?’) is that the turn is built using a declarative, rather than an
interrogative format and so does not formally solicit a yes/no response and
thereby propose either of these as a possibility. Further, the use of a ‘I want’
emphasises the subject-side (Edwards, 2005) of the request. By this I mean
that the ‘I want ’ construction foregrounds Anna as the speaker and requests
the object as simply a relation between speaker and object, irrespective of the
sibling. This proposes that the request is delivered independently of other
considerations that may be circumstantial to the request, such as to emulate
Katherine. This will be taken up in further detail in chapter 5 ‘children’s wants’.
At this point it is sufficient to note that Anna’s claims regarding her ‘wants’,
realised through an ‘I want’ construction, has a practical use in this particular
sequential environment.

The second thing to note is the very nature of the action of using ‘I want’ to
build a request. As an action requesting may be defined as asking for
something to be given or done. As such the very act of requesting presupposes
that permission, assistance or agreement is needed from the request recipient
for the request to be granted. Note that Anna is able to reach the yoghurt and
does so at line 12 as she reaches out and taps it. Thus if Anna were acting in a
way which is consistent with the fulfilment of her ‘desires’ she could simply take the yoghurt. The very act of delivering a request using ‘I want’ presupposes that permission is needed and that in fact, one cannot simply act on one’s ‘desires’, ‘wishes’ and ‘wants’. Rather, Linda is treated as an arbitrator of Anna’s ‘wants’ as Anna seeks permission to eat the yoghurt.

We can also note that Linda responds by moving the yoghurt away from Anna (line 28) as she instructs her to finish her cereal first, using a ‘need’ construction. The use of ‘need’ as a way of delaying the delivery of a second part of an adjacency pair will be discussed in further detail in chapter 6. At this point it is sufficient to note that Anna’s claim to ‘want’ the yoghurt is not treated as a sufficient basis for her to be given it. Rather, Anna is told what she needs to do first and so it is clear that there are obligations and necessities which must first be fulfilled before Anna can do as she ‘wants’.

Let us now move on to consider Katherine’s ‘I want’ construction at line 33. Again, rather than understanding this as simply a reference to a private experience of desire, a more fruitful approach is to consider the turn as part of the interactional sequence within which it is embedded. The sequence starts at the beginning of the extract as Katherine announces that she will not be eating the second yoghurt (line 2). Linda responds by informing Katherine that she will ‘have to have< some cheerios as well’ (lines 4-6). Linda delivers a second directive at lines 16-18 and an account that minimises the amount of food that Katherine has eaten (‘one little yoghurt¿’) and which restricts Katherine’s response options (she is going to school, has not eaten enough and so must eat more). Linda then asks Katherine whether she will have some Cheerios (line 23) or a banana (line 27).

At this point Anna launches a side sequence (Jefferson, 1972) as she attempts to retrieve the yoghurt, disrupting the contiguity of the ongoing sequence between Linda and Katherine. At line 30 Katherine delivers the address term ‘°mumee::°’ which displays an orientation to re-establishing recipiency and
the re-initiation of the interaction between herself and Linda. This is
unsuccessful, however, as Linda continues interacting with Anna as she directs
her to finish her cereal before she can have a yoghurt (line 32). Following this
directive Katherine delivers the target turn 'I want cheerios please'.
There are two things to note at this point. First, Katherine’s 'I want' construction
is produced in a position where the second part of a directive-compliance pair
is due, with Linda’s turns at lines 4 and 6, 16-18 and 23 serving as the first
parts. Katherine could conceivably have responded with ‘I’ll have some
Cheerios’. However the turn is built as a request, as a first pair part. The turn
terminal ‘please’ also marks the turn as a request (a canonical first pair part),
rather than ‘I want Cheerios thank you’ which would imply acceptance of an
offer. By delivering a request format in the space where compliance with a
directive is due, Katherine marks the turn as a new first pair part which makes
relevant a response from Linda. This works to establish intersubjectivity and to
reinitiate the interaction with Linda following the intervening side sequence.
The second thing to note is the selection of an ‘I want’ format, rather than an
interrogative such as ‘can I have Cheerios please?’. An interrogative format
formally solicits yes or no as response options. However within the preceding
sequence the understanding (Wootton, 2006) that Cheerios are on offer was
reached. The use of ‘I want’ rather than an interrogative format displays an
orientation to this understanding. As Butler notes, “the detailed examination of
children’s talk in natural settings has the potential to take theorising about
children’s competence beyond the realms of theory, and towards an
understanding of children’s competences in action” (2008, p. 5). Examination of
the practices which inform the organisation of children’s conduct, such as
request differentiation, may reveal the operation of certain kinds of skill (c.f.
Wootton, 2006). This matter will be taken up further in chapter 5.

With regard to the issue of whether people ordinarily act in ways which fulfil
their desires, and whether ‘wanting’ is a sufficient basis for ‘doing’ or for
‘having’, Linda’s response at line 34 is particularly informative. Katherine’s turn
at line 33 is delivered as a first position request to be granted. The status of the utterance as a first pair part is subsequently accepted by Linda as she delivers a receipting response (‘alright’). It is notable that rather than immediately granting the request and acting on the basis of what Katherine ‘wants’ Linda instructs Katherine to first eat her grapes, using a ‘need’ construction. What is notable about this sequence, for our purposes of questioning the notion of whether individuals ordinarily act in ways which are consistent with the fulfilment of their desires, is that although Katherine has been directed within multiple turns to eat Cheerios and has subsequently expressed a ‘want’ to do so, this is not treated as a sufficient basis for her to immediately eat them. Rather, the provision of Cheerios is contingent on her first eating her grapes and fulfilling this obligation before she can eat what she ‘wants’. That people do not ordinarily act in a manner which is consistent with the fulfilment of their ‘desires’ is evident as one considers the fine weave of interaction in the following two fragments. Both examples are taken from the same family meal. Extract 4.2 is fourteen and a half minutes into the recording, while extract 4.3 is taken from twenty minutes in, towards the end of the meal.

**Extract 4.2 Crouch 1 14:00**

01 Kat: please have a no::ll
02 Ann: ont another [o::ne ]
03 Lin: [(y’just) eat some more] UH vegetables.
04 Kat: [anna no::ll ]
05 Kat: [((reaches towards packet of rolls))]
06 Lin: Katherine >y’need to eat some< eat so:me vegetables.
07 Kat: I’VE ETTON SOME VEGETA~BU:::
08 Mik: [ we]ll, why not eat a few more.
09 (0.3)
10 Kat: no::huo:::
11 (1.0)
12 → Kat: [~#I don’t wa:int! to I don’t li:ke the:m.#~]
13 Kat: [((picks up fork))]
Kat: [((holds fork above plate))]

→ Kat: [-I don’t li:ke vegetabu:::ls~]

Ann: [AYE! I]:: I eaa unt=

Kat: ((eats corn))

Ann: =fwuntable:

Lin: yeah

Mik: I’m eating all mi:ne.

→ Kat: u::n, I: don’t li::ke the::m.

| (4.2) |

Kat: |((puts piece of corn in mouth))|

Kat: thi:s (one) went rou::nd all arou:nd the [circa_]:

Lin: [hmm:: ]

(2.5)

Lin: "s’looks like a (..) (cannibal)"

(1.6)

Mik: "ghu:m ghu:m="

Kat: [=I’ve etton some vegetabu:::ls]

Kat: [((puts fork down))]

(0.6)

Lin: put your sausage do::wn, (..) please and use your (.).

knife and fo::rk.

A preliminary observation is that Katherine makes a claim regarding her ‘wants’, in this instance what she does not want at line 13. To understand this turn one must consider it as part of the conversation within which it is produced. Linda (lines 3, 6) and Mike (lines 8-9) deliver a series of directives as they tell Katherine to eat more vegetables. Katherine repeatedly and emphatically defies and rejects these in a series of turns (lines 4, 7, 13) which can be heard as complaint implicative, evidenced, for example, by the claim that she has ‘ETTON SOME VEGETA~BU:::LS~’. Katherine then delivers a further objection ‘~#I don’t wa_int! to I don’t li:ke the::m.#~’ as she picks up her fork to eat. Notably then, although Katherine resists Mike and
Linda’s directives *verbally* by claiming ‘~#I don’t want! to’ she *physically begins to comply* as she picks up her fork, an action which recognisably precedes ‘eating more’. As Craven and Potter note, as a class of actions, directives “embody no orientation to the recipient’s ability or desire to perform the relevant activity” (2010, p.1), in that as speakers deliver directives they display authority and entitlement to involve themselves in the recipient’s business without being asked to do so. It is precisely by claiming ‘~#I don’t want! to I don’t like them.#~’ as she begins to comply with the directive, that Katherine characterises her actions as *obedience*. It is clear that rather than fully ‘going along’ with the directive Katherine complies *against her will*. As Katherine holds her fork above the plate she produces a further negative evaluation the relevant food item (lines 17, 24). She then immediately picks up a piece of corn and eats it before announcing ‘I’ve eaten some vegetables’ (line 33). In doing so she characterises her actions as *obedience*, displaying an orientation to the notion that one must do as they *should* rather than as they *want*.

Clearly then, when we consider the fine weave of interaction, the notion that individuals ordinarily proceed in a manner which is consistent with the fulfilment of their desires (a key assumption of work within Theory of Mind), is a departure from what goes on during the course of our everyday lives, and a gross simplification of the meaning, for children and for adults, of expressions of wanting. Let us further explore the divergence between the typical experimental set-up and everyday interaction as we consider extract 4.3.

*Extract 4.3 Crouch 1 20:44*

```
01    Ann: .HHHHH ((exaggerated outbreath)) heh heh heh
02    Lin: no::
03    Ann: ↑heh heh heh↑
04    Kat: heh hhm hem
05    Lin: no Anna no not silly noises.
06    Mik: nah
```
Ann: [((kneels up on chair))]  
Ann: [BLU! HAH ]  
Mik: well I think because it’s such a lovely hot day today, think we might be able to have an ice lolly outside as a special treat. <  
Ann: [↑hu:h ]hu::h! ↑  
(0.6)  
Lin: right Katherine finish it  
(1.2)  
Ann: (turns head and looks at Linda))  
Ann: ↑hah! heh [heh >heh heh heh] heh heh<↑  
Kat: [heh heh .hhh! ]  
Mik: £wass he s[a::yi]  
Ann: [ peek]a peeka peek lu[:ke.]  
Kat: [↑heh ]heh↑  
Ann: ↑heh heh peeka peeka luke↑  
(0.3)  
Ann: [pee-]  
Mik: [((points at Anna)]  
Mik: [bu::]t [you’ll have to eat one of your potatoe:s,] before you have an ice lolly:, [.hh you’ll ]have to eat some of your ve:g [(points at Kath)]) before you have an ice lolly. |  
(3.3) |  
Ann: [(remains kneeling in chair)]  
Mik: (let’s) see you eat your potato the:n. |  
(4.4) |  
Ann: [((puts hands over face, picks up potato))]
The first thing to note about this extract is Mike’s offer of an ice lolly at lines 9-10 and 13-16. In some ways this can be compared with tasks designed to assess children’s understandings of desires. As noted earlier, researchers ostensibly create a conflict between the child’s desire and that of the protagonist by presenting items which are designed to be particularly desirable or particularly undesirable to the child. Several design features of Mike’s turn work to present the lolly as particularly attractive, as this is a ‘special treat.’ as it is ‘such a lovely hot day’ (a somewhat rare occurrence during the English summer!). Earlier in the meal Linda asked Anna to try eating her potatoes, to she responded by stating ‘don’t want to’ (data not shown). In extract 4.2, taken from the same meal, Katherine resists eating vegetables, claiming ‘~#I don’t want! to I don’t li:ke the:m.~’. Both girls then, have claimed not to ‘want’ to eat these food items.

Recall that during the typical experimental set-up children are presented with several items or activities, one of which is typically designed to be particularly attractive in contrast to the other items which are designed to be unattractive. Children are then typically told which item the protagonist prefers and are asked to predict the protagonist’s reaction in a specific situation. To ‘pass’ this task, children are required to predict that the protagonist will act in a way which is consistent with the fulfilment of their own, rather than the child’s, ‘desires’. However it is immediately apparent that there is a departure between this experimental design and what goes on during the course of everyday interaction.

One notable feature of the extract is that the ice lolly is offered to persuade the girls to eat more of their main meal. This is evidenced as Linda directs Katherine to ‘finish it’ (line 19) while Mike explicitly presents the provision of an ice lolly as contingent on Anna eating a potato (line 33) and Katherine eating more vegetables (line 35). As Núñez and Harris note, “adults often seek to guide young children by means of conditional rules in which children are given permission to engage in some desired activity provided that a special
condition is fulfilled” (1998, p. 153). Although the ice lolly is presented to Katherine and Anna as something particularly ‘desirable’, it is clear that they will only be given this only when once less ‘desirable’ food items (potato, vegetables) have been eaten. Here we see again that expressions of ‘wanting’ occur in relation to, and in the service of, interactions involving obligations and constraints. Rather than simply acting in ways which fulfil one’s desires, Linda and Mike are the arbitrators of Katherine and Anna’s wants as the moral nature of doing as one should before doing as one wants is put into place.

The analysis so far has focussed on the kinds of environments in which children make claims regarding their ‘wants’. When studying children’s talk researchers in the field of social cognition code utterances as either genuinely reflecting a private mental state, or otherwise as doing some sort of action, in which case they are treated as uninteresting and unrevealing for the purposes of studying the workings of ‘the mind’. Here we have begun to reveal that children’s claims regarding ‘wants’ are fruitfully examined as resources in and for interaction and that considering children’s competencies in action may reveal certain kinds of skill. This will be explored further in chapter 5 which focuses in further detail on the practical uses of children’s ‘I want’ constructions.

Before moving on to examine in section 2 the kinds of conversational activities in which claims regarding ‘wants’ are embedded, let us consider one final extract which shows that claims regarding ‘wants’ may be designed to achieve a particular effect in a specific sequential environment. As noted in chapter 2, a key assumption of work on Theory of Mind is that the function of ascribing ‘mental states’ to others is to explain and predict their actions. An inability to do so is implicated in explanations of autism and schizophrenia (Frith, 1992; Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Corcoran, 2000, 2001). The following extract shows us how the ascription of others ‘wants’ may be organised to achieve a particular rhetorical effect. Here Bill ascribes ‘wants’ and ‘motivations’ to Grant as they are discussing Grant’s plans for work that summer.
Extract 4.4 AAF5 2959

01 Bil: well you know I- I was- (.) I was talki:n’ to 
02 Mother you know and uh to:ld her that uh you 
03 weren’t very interested in doing any more work 
04 ya’ see, 
05 Gra: mmm, 
06 Bil: and I do:n’t blame ye:r, I think that’s a very 
07 (.) 
08 honest rea:ction (.) there’s nothi:ng wro:ng (.) 
09 with that kind of feel:ing, 
10 Bil: [((turns head away front Grant, looks at arm))] 
11 [ (1.0) ] 
12 → Bil: uhm: (1.2) it’s a nat:ural thing to feel like you 
13 don’t wanna work 
14 Gra: I don’t– it’s not that I don’t wanna work, it’s 
15 just u:h, 
16 | (0.6) | 
17 Pat: |((leans head on arm))| 
18 Pat: what kind of work did you have in mi:nd then 
19 Grant* 
20 (1.4) 
21 Pat: [((scratches forehead)) ] 
22 Pat: [watching the television? and listening to the] 
23 recu:rd, and playing guita: r 

The key thing to note about this extract is Bill’s ironic formulation of Grant’s being ‘interested in’, ‘feeling’ and ‘wanna’. At the beginning of the extract Bill claims that Grant is ‘not interested’ in doing any more work, which he subsequently formulates as an ‘honest rea:ction’ with which ‘there’s nothi:ng wro:ng’. Following a gap in the turn space projected for a response from Grant (line 11), Bill continues his turn at talk and claims that Grant doesn’t ‘wanna’ work but that this is a ‘natural thing’. Bill’s turns at lines 1-4, 6-9 and 12-13 may be glossed as follows; Bill knows that Grant isn’t interested in doing any more work and he has told Pat about
this. Bill does not blame Grant for feeling like this as he recognises that it is natural to not want to work. However deliberation and close inspection of the fine weave of the conversational sequence suggests that this glossed report of Bill’s turn is inadequate and insufficient. We must consider the interactional import of what may otherwise be taken to be a cognitive accomplishment; the attribution of Grant’s mental states made by Bill. Rather than Bill using a theory to explain and predict Grant’s actions, we can explore what the turn is built to achieve within the conversational sequence. That is, that Bill’s claims regarding Grant’s ‘interests’ and ‘wants’ is built to lexically separate motivations and ‘wants’ from actions in order to present a case for Grant to find a job that summer, regardless of his ‘wants’.

The claim that ‘it’s a natural thing to feel like you don’t wanna work’ implies that the majority of people experience this feeling but have to work regardless. The effect of this is to challenge Grant’s overt actions and current lack of a summer job. Bill’s turn is built to endorse Grant’s ‘wants’ while appealing to a normative order which dictates that ‘not being very interested in’ or ‘not wanting’ to work is not a sufficient basis for not doing so. Also note Bill’s ascription of ‘honesty’ to Grant. ‘Honesty’ is normatively required when what is being confessed is problematic (Edwards & Fasulo, 2006). That it takes ‘honesty’ to admit to not want to work implies that there is something untoward about this. In sum, Bill produces a formulation of Grant’s ‘wants’ in order to separate these lexically from his actions and to imply that not ‘wanting’ to work is not a legitimate reason for not doing so. Rather than accepting the rather naive and simplistic gloss detailed above, assuming that Bill has used a process akin to scientific theory formation in order to explain and predict Grant’s actions, we can see that Bill’s formulation of Grant’s ‘wants’ is rhetorically organised and deployed in a way that undermines and challenges Grant’s current actions of not working.
2.2 Sequential environments

As noted above, rather than being understood as simple references to private states, or otherwise as functional uses which should be disregarded for the purposes of analysis, utterances in which speakers make claims regarding their own or others ‘wants’ are fruitfully examined as performing actions within sequences of action. This section builds on the analysis in the preceding section and begins to consider the range of activities within which ‘want’ constructions are embedded.

Within my materials, ‘I want’ and ‘you want’ constructions are used in a diverse range of activities such as offers, accounts, requests, directives and rejections. Requests, directives and rejections will be examined in detail in chapters 5, 6 and 7. To illustrate what is meant by considering ‘want’ constructions as embedded within various activities in conversation, in what follows I outline two environments in which speakers systematically make claims regarding their own and others’ ‘wants’, and consider the interactional import of these constructions on these specific occasions. In section 2.2.1 I examine the construction of one’s own and other’s ‘wants’ as a way of challenging an interlocutor. In section 2.2.3 I examine ‘I want’ constructions as a way of providing an account for one’s actions when those actions are challenged by a co-interactant.

2.2.1 Challenging an interlocutor: ‘What you Want X?’

In this section the analysis focuses on the practice of making claims regarding others’ ‘wants’ and ‘motivations’ as a way of building a complaint regarding their actions. As noted in chapter 2, according to Theory of Mind and Folk Psychology individuals manage everyday life by constructing theories
regarding other’s mental states and using these to explain and predict others’ behaviour. In what follows I show how claims regarding others’ wants may be rhetorically organised to challenge a co-interactant’s actions. Thus, rather than understanding the attribution of others’ ‘wants’ as a cognitive insight, I examine this as a *practice in and for interaction*. Specifically, I examine how claims regarding others ‘wants’ may be used to convey a challenging stance towards recipient’s actions by proposing that those actions are nonsensical or illegitimate.

Two prototypical examples of using ‘you want X’ to convey a challenging stance towards recipient’s actions are seen below. I begin by identifying generic features across the extracts before discussing each in further detail.

*Extract 4.5 TF2008 6:10*

01 Sim: just having a little blip, you had one of these before, and [you worked through it.]
02 Cha: [YEAH and then I ] tried to do it again, (0.2) and now I hate it again (1.0)
03 → Jan: what do you wanna do:, work in a fish and chip shop:
04 Charlott [e for the rest of your life?]
05 Sim: |((puts hand on Jane’s arm))|
06 | (0.2) |
07 Cha: ye::ah, I’ve already got a plan
08 Sim: [((looks towards Jane))]
09 Sim: [uh- uhh uhhh; ]
10 Emi: both me and dad (do[n’t] )-
11 Sim: [ Ja]:ne (.) let’s not es:calate this con[versation. ]
12 Cha: [I’m gonna ha:ve] a job right?
13 (0.3)
14 Cha: (.) ‘scuse me[
15 Sim: [m]inimi:se= ]
16 Sim: [((looks at Jane))]
Cha: =let me tell you, (.) <I will save up for two years
and then go travelling>

Extract 4.6 TF2008  40:10

Sim: (((starts to hold up thumb)))
Sim: she’s feeling a bit [lo::nely, (0.4) a:t schoo:1,(0.8) cause her main friends aren’t the:re. (0.2).h she’s feeling-
Sim: (((puts arms down)))
Jan: let me just stop [you there ]and say why couldn’t we have had that conversation downstairs together instead of you: havin a go at me:
Sim: ((puts arm over face))
Sim: .hh c[uh-]
Jan: [ ma]king me look like the crap pare:nt, .h and then co:min’ up here and he coming to talk to you because y’know she’s in a position now where she’s got to talk to you and calm it do::wn
→ Sim: what (.) you wanna have a row about it.
( .)
Jan: oh I’m sorry you were allowed to row downstai:rs.
Sim: ah wasn’t rowing >I were just saying< I did not agree::
Jan: shouting

Both examples are taken from the TF2008 corpus and took place on the same day. In the first extract the family are discussing Charlotte’s plans to leave sixth form school. Throughout the day Simon and Jane have repeatedly objected to these plans (data not shown). The second example occurs later on the same day as Simon and Jane are alone together and are about to go to sleep. Immediately preceding the start of the extract Simon attempted to engage Jane in conversation while she responded minimally. Simon then asked Jane whether she has ‘the raging hump’ (data not shown), which is a colloquial term for being annoyed or angry while implying subjective investment which counters a complaint’s objectivity (Edwards, 2005).
In extract 4.5 Charlotte claims to ‘hate’ school and cites her past experience (she tried to work through it before and now ‘hates’ it again) as a basis for her to leave. Jane challenges Charlotte’s proposed plan to leave school with ‘what do you wanna do:, work in a fish and chip shop Charlotte for the rest of your life¿’. In extract 4.6 Jane accuses Simon of ‘having a go at her’ and making her ‘look like the crap pare:nt,’. Simon responds to this with ‘what (.) you wanna have a row about it.’ As ‘wh’ interrogatives that are delivered in an established environment of disaffiliation, both examples can be heard as a challenge rather than seeking information (Koshik, 2003). In both extracts the proposition that the recipient ‘wants’ to carry out the particular action is hearably ironic and designedly ‘nonliteral’ (see Edwards, 2000). Working in a fish and chip shop for the rest of your life and having a row are states of affairs which are recognisable as things that nobody would ‘want’ to do. My argument is that these constructions convey a challenging stance towards the recipient’s actions by formulating the outcome of those actions as particularly undesirable and by proposing that the recipient ‘wants’ this outcome to occur. Let us now examine each example in further detail.

At the start of extract 4.5 Simon builds a case for Charlotte to continue at school. He characterises her current problems (which have been discussed at length during the preceding days) as a ‘little blip’ the kind of which she has worked through before, implying that she will work through them again and so that she should stay at school. In direct contrast to Simon’s formulation of her problems as a ‘little blip’ Charlotte emphatically claims to ‘↑hate↑’ school, citing her past experience (trying to work through things and failing to do so, and now ‘hating’ it again) as a reason to leave.

Following a slight gap of silence (line 5) Jane delivers the target turn; ‘what do you wanna do:, work in a fish and chip shop Charlotte
for the rest of your life¿’. There are several design features of this turn which evidence its status as a challenge. First, as a ‘wh’ interrogative delivered in an established environment of disaffiliation, the turn can be heard as a complaint, or a challenge, rather than seeking information (Bolden & Robinson, 2011; Koshik, 2003). Second, rather than establishing recipiency, the address term which is embedded within the turn can be heard as underscoring personal concern for the problem (Lerner, 2003). Third, the notion of working in a fish and chip shop ‘for the rest of your life¿’ is an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986). As Edwards (2000) notes, “denying or insisting on something in an extreme way can highlight the action of denying or insisting, as a kind of stance or investment” (p. 365). Here the extreme rejection of Charlotte’s plans indexes a challenging stance towards those plans as it is recognisable nobody would ‘want’ to ‘work in a fish and chip shop for the rest of your life’. Finally, what Charlotte ‘wants’ to do is a matter which Charlotte has more rights to know about than Jane. ‘B-events’ of this type make relevant an answer that confirms the speaker’s belief about the recipient (Labov & Fanshell, 1977), that is, that Charlotte ‘wants’ to work in a fish and chip shop. However such an answer would be heard to be in disagreement with Jane. Neither is disconfirming response an alternative, as this contrasts with the information provided by Charlotte in the preceding talk. In sum, both confirming ‘yes’ and disconfirming ‘no’ response are accountable and problematic. As Heinemann (2008) notes, recipients tend to treat these types of questions as unanswerable and rather than treat them as an information seeking question, orient to them as a challenge.

In this example then we can see that Jane challenges Charlotte’s plans to leave school by proposing that these plans are illegitimate and nonsensical. This is realised through a formulation of a recognisably undesirable outcome of her proposed actions, something that nobody would ‘want’ to do (working in a fish and chip shop for the rest of your life) and by proposing that Charlotte ‘wants’ this to occur. At this point we can note that a Theory of Mind
psychologist may argue that it is precisely because Jane is able to read Charlotte’s mind that she ascribes to Charlotte a desire to work in the fish and chip shop. However such an analysis relies on speakers accurate, straightforward reports of their ‘wants’. My argument is that any conversational deployment of a notion of wanting will always be a means of performing some kind of action within an interactional sequence. Far from Jane making a cognitively based inference regarding Charlotte’s intentions, or ‘reading’ Charlotte’s mind, an ironic formulation of Charlotte’s ‘wants’ is deployed as a way of conveying a challenging stance and displaying disalignment and disaffiliation.

Extract 4.6 provides a further example. Jane and Simon are about to go to bed following the arguments which took place throughout the day, regarding Charlotte’s plans to leave school. Immediately preceding the start of the extract Simon attempted to initiate conversation with Jane, who responded minimally. Note that in extract 4.5 following Jane’s challenging ‘what do you wanna do:, work in a fish and chip shop Charlotte for the rest of your life¿’, Simon put his hand on Jane’s arm as he launched a complaint against Jane. He accuses Jane of ‘escalating’ the conversation and instructs her to ‘minimise’, implying that Jane has ‘gone too far’ and that her actions are antagonistic.

Immediately preceding extract 4.6 Simon has asked Jane whether she has the ‘raging hump’ (data not shown), a colloquial term which denotes a dispositional mood and implies than an individual is primed for trouble rather than responding to a troubling event (see Edwards, 1999, 2007 on the rhetorical uses of moods and emotions). In his turn at lines 2-4 Simon begins to formulate Charlotte’s ‘feelings’ about school, namely that she is ‘she’s feeling a bit lo::nely,’ ‘cause her main friends aren’t the:re.’ Jane breaks into Simon’s turn and accuses him of ‘havin a go’ at her and making her look ‘like the crap pare:nt,’ earlier on in the day.
Notably, not only is this utterance interruptive of Simon’s turn, but it is explicitly formulated as interruptive with ‘let me just stop you there’, marking the turn as particularly antagonistic. The notion that they could have ‘had that conversation downstairs’ formulates a sense of grievance towards Simon’s earlier display of disalignment. As a ‘why’ formatted interrogative Jane’s turn at lines 6-8 and 11 calls for an account from Simon while displaying a challenging stance (Bolden & Robinson, 2011). In sum, Jane’s turn launches a complaint regarding Simon’s conduct earlier in the day during the discussions with Charlotte.

The target turn ‘what (.) you wanna have a row about it.’ does not deal with the specific accusations embedded in Jane’s turn, neither does Simon provide a relevant response in the form of an account for his actions. Rather he challenges Jane as he proposes that she ‘wants’ to have a row. The turn is built using a ‘wh’ interrogative and can be heard as challenge (Bolden & Robinson, 2011; Koshik, 2003). Both a ‘yes’ and ‘no’ response are accountable and problematic and so the turn can be heard as asserting rather than questioning (Heinemann, 2008). While the notion of ‘wanting’ to have a row is hearably ironic and nonsensical, the proposal that Jane is ‘motivated’ to do so emphasises her subjective investment in the complaint. This works to counter the complaint’s evidential basis and objectivity (Edwards, 2005b) as it is implied that the source of Jane’s grievance is personal and subjective, rather than related to the object of the complaint, i.e. Simon’s earlier conduct. In sum, Simon formulates the outcome of Jane’s actions (a row will occur) and proposes that this is the motivating force behind her pursuit. The notion that Jane is intentionally motivated and ‘wants’ to have a row delegitimizes and is used to counter her compliant.

In sum, in this section I have examined one practical function of formulating the ‘wants’ of others which is to challenge their actions. These ‘what you want X’ constructs formulate the outcome of recipient’s actions as something which is
recognisably 'undesirable' and propose that this outcome is what the recipient 'wants'. Rather than constructing theories to explain and predict others' behaviour, we can see that ascribing 'wants' to others is a practical feature of the ways in which actions are discussed, as formulations may be rhetorically organised to undermine and challenge recipients' actions.

2.2.2 Challenging an interlocutor: 'I don’t want X’

In the preceding section we saw how speakers may challenge an interlocutor’s actions by producing an ironic formulation of their ‘wants’ and 'motivations'. In this section I will examine a further way of challenging an interlocutor which is to make a claim regarding one’s own wants. ‘I don’t want’ constructions may be used to implement rejections and refusals. Analysis of the dataset reveals that ‘I want’ constructions deployed in the service of rejecting and refusing are frequently co-implicated in other actions such as criticising and blaming. In contrast to inability accounts, which propose that the reasons for rejecting are outside of speakers' control, ‘I want’ constructions invoke personal investment and emphasise the subject-side of a rejection. For this reason rejections and refusals built using ‘I don’t want’ may be co-implicated in challenging an interlocutor. The following extract, taken from the start of a meal taken from the Potts corpus, provides a prototypical example.

Extract 4.7 Potts 2 00:00

01 Jam: |((pulls out chair and sits down))|
02 | (2.9) |
03 Jam: no::! (. ) I’ve just had a bowl, ( .) 'flaming porridge I can’t eat all them pieces of [pizza].
04 | (2.0) |
05 Jam: |((tries to take plate of pizza from Wayne))|
06 Way: |((moves away from Jamie’s reach)) |
07 | (2.0) |
08 Jam: what are you doin
At the start of the extract Wayne picks up a plate of pizza from Jamie’s place at the table. Jamie treats this as objectionable with the emphatic, elongated ‘no::!’,. It is unclear whether the division of the pizza was discussed prior to the beginning of the recording. In any case, it is a recurrent theme within the family that Wayne does not eat enough food and so it may be expectable that if Wayne is responsible for portion sizes, his own portion will be relatively small. Indeed it emerges that the division of pizza is the source of the trouble as Jamie delivers the complaint implicative ‘I’ve just had a bowl, (.) ‘flaming porridge I can’t eat all them pieces of pizza’ as Wayne begins to rearrange the pizza amongst the plates. Several design features of this turn evidence its status as a complaint. First, the turn initial ‘no’ is delivered exaggeratedly, treating Wayne’s actions as particularly complainable. Second, the extreme formulation of the pizza which Wayne places on Jamie’s plate (‘all them pieces of pizza.’) constructs the offer and the notion that she would be expected to eat all of the pizza as unreasonable. The lexical description of the ‘flaming porridge’ also displays a sense of grievance at the expectation of eating pizza after porridge. Jamie then tries to physically take the plate from Wayne to prevent him from distributing the pizza before asking ‘what are you doin’. This turn can be heard as a challenge (Koshik, 2003) as it is implied that Wayne’s actions are puzzling and non-sensical.
Wayne continues rearranging the pieces of pizza between the plates, leaving only a few pieces on his own plate (line 13). The target turn ‘I don’t want all ah them’ is delivered in response to the distribution of pizza. There are several things to note about this sequence. First, the ‘I don’t want’ construction is the second refusal of pizza in the sequence, with the first at lines 3-4. Second sayings take place in a different environment to first sayings (Schegloff, 2004b) and here the second refusal of pizza draws on the ‘not oriented to’ nature of the first refusal. As Jamie’s first refusal was ignored by Wayne who then gave her a large portion of pizza, his actions are particularly complainable. The second thing to note is that the target turn is delivered exaggeratedly with raised pitch as Jamie shakes her head, further evidencing its status as a complaint. In sum, the turn can be heard as complaint implicative as the ‘not oriented to’ nature of the first refusal is sanctioned. The use of an ‘I don’t want’ construction invokes personal investment and subjective reasons for refusing and constructs Wayne’s failure to orient to Jamie’s first refusal as particularly complainable.

That the use of ‘I don’t want X’ to deliver a refusal invokes a sense of grievance and can be heard as complaint implicative is evident as we consider the following extract, taken from the Potts corpus.

**Extract 4.8 Potts12 06:30**

01 Jam: ((looks at pizza box))
02 Jam: have you finshed
03 (1.8)
04 Jud: [((picks up pizza box from table)) ]
05 Way: [(loads of) p[ieces ] (. ) pi:zza: ; ]
06 Jud: [(( )) (yours)]
07 (. )
08 Don: pi:zza.
09 (0.4)
10 Way: [((looks at Judy))] 
11 Way: [NO DON’T! put it >>in bin bin.<<]
The extract is taken from the towards the end of the meal as Judy begins to clear the table, removing a takeaway pizza box (line 4). In his turn at line 11 Wayne tells Judy not to put the leftover pizza in the bin. The turn is delivered with a sense of urgency, with raised volume and exaggerated intonation. It is a
Don responds with the target turn ‘I don’t want (.) half chewed pizza¿’. This turn is more than a rejection of the pizza. Several design features display a sense of offense regarding the very suggestion that he would eat the pizza. First, the turn is delivered exaggeratedly with raised pitch and questioning intonation or what Sacks & Schegloff (1979) have called a try marker. Try markers are used to confirm intersubjectivity and recipients’ understanding and so the notion that Don would not want ‘half chewed pizza¿’ is presented as something which should be recognisable to others. This constructs Wayne’s failure to recognise this as sanctionable and offensive. Second, Don could have responded with ‘I don’t want it’ or simply ‘no’. The use of the locally initial reference form in a locally subsequent position (Schegloff, 1996a) highlights that rather than an objection to eating this particular pizza on this occasion the objection and rejection is relevant to any ‘half chewed pizza¿’ as a category of food. Thus the turn can be heard as complaint implicative. This is further evidenced as Wayne subsequently formulates a disposition on behalf Don, accounting for his emphatic instructions not to throw the pizza away earlier in the sequence; ‘thought you’d eat anything.’ Don subsequently concedes that he will indeed ‘eat anything.’ (line 32) however ‘half chewed pizza¿ does not fall into the category of anything ‘edible’. The exact repetition of the turn at line 16, including the initial reference form in a locally subsequent position (lines 34-36)
again constructs a sense of offense and grievance at the notion that he would eat ‘half chewed pizza’.

In summary, in this section I have shown how using ‘I don’t want X’ as a way of delivering a rejection may be co-implicated in criticising and blaming. In extract 4.7 Jamie’s use of ‘↑I don’t want all ah them↑’ was deployed to display a sense of grievance at the suggestion that she should eat large amounts of pizza after eating ‘a bowl, (.). flaming porridge’. In extract 4.8 Don delivers ‘↑I don’t want↑ (.). half chewed pizza¿’ following the offensive presupposition embodied within Wayne’s turn at line 11 that he would do. Rather than a simple rejection in each example the ‘I don’t want’ construction is used to convey a sense of grievance.

2.2.3 Accounts

In the final section of this chapter I examine a further environment in which speakers systematically produce ‘I want’ constructions which is to account for their actions when challenged by an interlocutor. Prototypical examples can be seen in the following two fragments.

Extract 4.9 TF2008E1 12:59

01 Jan: nickki’s left hasn’t she
02 Emi: yeah
03 Jan: ↑she wants↑ to train you up, (0.6) in her position.
04 Emi: [(looks at table)]
05 Emi: ["I [know that’s what I told you:]"
06 Jan: ["<BUT SHE IS NOT"] GOING TO DO IT*
07 IF YOU’RE A:WAYS OFF SICK* EMILY BECAUSE YOU ARE
08 A:WAYS OUT*.>
09 (0.4)
10 Jan: ↑↑and that (.). really↑↑ makes me quite, (0.2) sad,
11 (.). and frustrated, (.). ↑and then a bit↑ angry:
12 Emi: [(looks down at lap)]
14 → Sim: so if you’re signed off work what you doing going out tonight?
15 (1.6)
17 → Emi: "because I want to:"
18 Jan: .hhh
19 Sim: because you want to.
20 (1.0)
21 Jan: this whole thing (.) >is not* ok<

Extract 4.10 TF2008E7 40:19

01 → Sim: why duh we haff tuh have thuh teevee ;on then, why
02 can’t we have a conversation
03 → Emi: becuz I wan[n the
teevee on]
04 Sim: [why can’t you ]
05 [tell me what you were up to at the weekend.]
06 Sim: [(switches television off)]
07 Emi: becuz I want (. ) thuh teevee on
08 Emi: ((moves away from counter towards television))
09 Sim: >tell me what you were up to at thuh weekend<
10 Emi: ((switches television on))
11 Emi: >ar:: a wen and saw hollee:< we sta:yed (. ) ah her
12 house (. ) an then we went tuh ;london. yes::

In each of the arrowed turns the speaker calls for an account from a co-interactant. In extract 4.9 Simon asks Emily what she is doing going out that night if she is signed off sick from work. In extract 4.10 Simon asks Emily why they have to have the television on rather than having a conversation. The turn at lines 14-15 in extract 4.9 is built using a ‘wh’ interrogative. As noted by Koshik (2003, 2005) ‘wh’ interrogatives such as why and how come may be heard as doing challenging or complaining, rather than questioning. In extract 4.10 the turn at line 1 is built using a ‘why’ formatted interrogative. As Bolden & Robinson (2011) note, why-formatted account solicitations convey a challenging stance and as such “are co-implicated in other/additional actions
such as complaining, criticizing and blaming” (p. 99). The point that I am making is that an utterance such as ‘why duh we haff tuh have thuh teevee ↑on’ is not a neutral, information-seeking question. Rather, by the way in which the turn is formed, the speaker displays a challenging stance towards the accountable item. The supposition that there is no adequate account (Bolden & Robinson, 2011; Koshik 2003) is built into the turn. This has strong implications in terms of the kind of response which is relevant next. Bolden and Robinson (2011) note that following a ‘why’ formatted interrogative respondents often orient to the challenging stance embodied within the preceding turn by responding with a defensive justification, invoking “commonsense norms as grounds for defending themselves (or others) against the challenge” (p. 104). In each example above recipients respond using an ‘I want’ construction. Responding to a challenge by invoking one’s ‘wants’ has two effects. On the one hand, indexing one’s ‘mental states’ without providing a further account may concede that there is no adequate account in environments in which speakers’ response options are severely limited. On the other hand, these constructions invoke authority and entitlement to do as one ‘wants’. The selective emphasis of the ‘subject-side’ of the accountable item deletes the contingencies and considerations of the recipient and rejects the challenge embodied within the preceding turn. Let us now consider each example in further detail.

Extract 4.9 begins several minutes into a discussion between Simon, Jane and Emily regarding Emily’s recent absences from work and her frequent nights out clubbing.

At first glance, this extract seems like one form of evidence that speakers’ actions are driven by their desires, beliefs and intentions. The turns at lines 14-17 may be glossed as follows;

1. Why are you going out tonight?
2. Because I want to.

This gloss of what was said may lead researchers to conclude the following; Simon asks Emily for information about her motivations for going out that night. Emily replies by reporting that she has a desire to do so. This provides evidence that Emily's actions are caused by her desires and that she is able to understand and to communicate her mental states to others. However as Antaki (2004) notes, such glossed reports of interactions are inevitably misleadingly inadequate. Rather “CA reminds us that what a speaker says is to be understood at least in part by reference to the dimensions of space the previous speaker has left open” (p. 673). A consideration of the fine weave of how Emily’s turn fits into the interactional sequence sheds light on what is going on within the sequence and the practical use of the ‘I want’ construction in this environment.

We can begin by noting that at the start of the extract Jane builds a complaint against Emily, using a formulation of Emily’s boss’s ‘wants’. That is, her boss wants to ‘train her up’, presumably with a view to promoting her, but because of Emily’s frequent absences from work this is not going to happen. Emily’s agency and culpability is made clear; ‘YOU’RE ALWAYS OFF SICK* EMILY BECAUSE YOU ARE ALWAYS OUT*.’ That is, rather than legitimately taking time off work because of illness, she does so because of frequent late nights out clubbing. Following Jane’s formulation of her emotional reaction to the situation (lines 10-11) Simon asks Emily why she is going out that night; ‘so if you’re signed off work what you doing going out tonight?’. Several design features of this turn foreground the accountability of Emily’s actions and evidence its status as a complaint. The turn initial ‘so’ builds the turn as a logical or narrative consequence of Jane’s complaint while its grammatical formulation as a ‘wh’ question in an established environment of disaffiliation marks it as a challenge (Koshik, 2003). The notion that Emily is signed off work is treated as done, and this is contrasted with her ‘going out
tonight¿. There is a normative expectation that if one is too sick to go to work, they do not go out to nightclubs, and so the design of the turn highlights that there is an inconsistency and transgression in Emily’s actions. In sum, rather than an information-seeking question regarding Emily’s motivations for going out that night, as the gloss of the conversation above may lead us to infer, the turn displays a challenging stance towards Emily’s actions. It is built as an example of what Koshik (2005) has called reverse polarity questions, which are treated by recipients as assertions of the opposite polarity to that of the question (i.e. that Emily should not be going out that night). Close examination of the design of the turn as part of the sequence within which it is embedded reveals that it is best understood as a challenge of Emily’s actions, rather than as an elicitation of her ‘wants’ or ‘motivations’.

In her response, Emily orients to this challenge; ‘°because I want to:°’. As noted above, this turn may, at first glance, be glossed as Emily citing a desire to go out that night as the basis for her actions, following Simon’s question regarding her motivations for doing so. However having identified Simon’s turn as a challenge rather than an information seeking question, it is clear that such a gloss is inadequate. We can note that by this point Emily’s response options are severely limited. At the start of the extract Jane presents a problem for which Emily is responsible (her boss wants to train her up, but won’t do so because Emily is always off sick after going out clubbing). As noted above, Simon’s turn at lines 14-15, which treats Emily’s being signed off work as done, embodies a clear challenging stance, heavily implying that Emily should not be going out that night. Emily’s response ‘°because I want to:°’ is delivered with several features of dispreference (Pomerantz, 1984). The delay of 1.6 seconds before she begins to answer is relatively long, considering that a response from her is immediately relevant. Further, the turn is audibly quieter than the surrounding talk. Both of these non-lexical features display an orientation to the utterance as an insufficient account.

On the other hand, the use of an ‘I want’ construction and the invocation of ‘wanting’ as a sufficient basis for acting invokes authority and entitlement.
Normally, individuals are expected to have privileged access to their own thoughts, what Pomerantz refers to as ‘type 1 knowables’ (1980, p. 187). For Simon, access to Emily’s ‘mental states’ and ‘wants’ is limited relative to Emily’s access, which is authoritative. The selective emphasis of the subject-side of the accountable item deletes the contingencies and considerations of the recipient. That is, Emily is going out that night because she ‘wants’ to, regardless of the challenge presented by Simon.

Let us now consider extract 4.10. Emily and Simon are in the kitchen preparing food. There is no prior context available because the extract begins immediately after an edit by the television producers. We can begin by noting that, in a manner which is comparable to extract 4.9, Simon’s turn at lines 1-2 is not designed to elicit a factual answer. As a ‘why’ formatted interrogative (Bolden & Robinson, 2011), it calls for an account and is hearable as a complaint that they must have ‘thuh teevee ↑on’ rather than have ‘a conversation’. It emerges that the proffered topic of conversation is Emily’s activities the preceding weekend. Incidentally this is not the first time Simon has attempted to initiate this topic as he did so earlier in the day (data not shown). Several design features of the turn evidence its status as a complaint. First, as a reverse polarity interrogative (Koshik, 2005) the turn can be heard as asserting Simon’s preference for turning the television off and having ‘a conversation’ instead. Second, as a negative interrogative (Heritage, 2002) Emily is heavily held accountable for the complainable matter.

When responding to multiunit turns, speakers normatively orient to the final part of the turn (Schegloff, 2007). That is, Simon’s two-part structure (in which the complaint regarding the television is delivered in the first TCU while the notion of having a conversation is dealt within in the second TCU) makes immediately relevant a response to the matter of ‘having a conversation’. However rather than engaging in the activity of having a conversation, or
otherwise rejecting this, Emily deals with the first part of the turn 'becuz I wann the ↑teevee o:n'. A rejection of the activity of having a conversation, via, for example ‘I don’t want to have a conversation’ is susceptible to challenge. ‘Having a conversation’ is a joint activity to which Simon and Emily have equal rights and access. However the notion that Emily ‘wants’ the television on for Emily is a type 1 knowable (Pomerantz, 1984) and a matter to which Emily has authoritative access relative to Simon. The use of an ‘I want’ construction selectively emphasises the subject-side of the matter, deleting any contingencies or obstacles to her ‘wants’ being satisfied.

Simon challenges Emily’s turn as he begins a turn in overlap, immediately upgrading his objection with a negative interrogative (Heritage, 2002). He also offers a more specified version of what the proffered conversation will be, further restricting Emily’s response options. He physically turns the television off, a move which stands in direct defiance to, and, in the interactional sense, deletes Emily’s preceding turn. Emily responds to the challenge by delivering an exact repetition of her preceding turn, directly defying and challenging Simon. Note that as she is speaking she moves across the room towards the television to switch the television back on. Thus, it is clear that regardless of the obstacles put in place by Simon, Emily still ‘wants’ the television on.

In sum in this example it is clear that rather than an elicitation of Emily’s ‘mental states’ Simon’s turns at lines 1-2 and 4-5 embody a clear challenging stance towards having the television on rather than having ‘a conversation’. Emily’s ‘I want’ construction is responsive to and rejects this challenge as Emily invokes the authority to act on her own behalf.

In summary, in this section I have shown how speakers may respond to a challenge towards their actions using an ‘I want’ construction. There are particular qualities of the types of turn which precede these constructions that we have explored briefly; one being the ways in which they call for an account. Second, there is a challenging stance embodied within these interrogatives as
they are co-implicated criticising and blaming the recipient and implying that there is no adequate account for their actions (Bolden & Robinson, 2011). 'I want' constructions then, may be delivered as accounts for actions in environments in which speaker’s actions are challenged and where response options are limited. While on the face of it these turns may be glossed as speakers seeking information regarding recipient’s ‘motivations’, to which speakers respond truthfully by communicating their ‘wants’, consideration of the fine weave of the interactional sequence within which these turns are embedded reveals that this is an inadequate account of what is going on in the interaction.

3.0 Chapter summary

This chapter has shown that rather than accounting for people’s claims regarding their ‘wants’ as the communication of an individual mental state, these constructions are produced to achieve particular actions during the course of conversation. Cognitive explanations, such as Theory of Mind, then, are inadequate for understanding how and when these claims are used in conversation. In the first section I began by illustrating how claims regarding ‘wants’ have practical uses in specific sequential environments. I showed, for example, how young children’s selection of ‘I want’ when requesting something which is available to a sibling foregrounds the requester and proposes that the request is delivered independently of other considerations that may be circumstantial to the request, such as to emulate a sibling. In this section I examined whether ‘wanting’ is ordinarily treated as a sufficient basis for ‘acting’ or for ‘having’ and showed that ordinarily, people do not proceed and act in a manner which is consistent with the fulfilment of their ‘wants’. Rather, the very act of stating that one ‘wants’ something (for example, in order to perform a request) presupposes that the proposed object, action or state of affairs is not readily available and that permission or assistance is needed. This has important implications for work within Theory of Mind that uses an experimental
set-up to examine children’s understandings of ‘desires’. These implications will be discussed further in the final chapter of the thesis. I also touched on how the examination of children’s competencies in everyday interaction may reveal the operation of certain kinds of skill (Butler, 2008; Wootton, 2006). I will return to this as I consider children’s uses of ‘I want’ in further detail in chapter 5. At this point we can note that when we consider the sequential organisation of claims regarding ‘wants’ it is apparent that coding schemes which are designed to identify genuine references to psychological states are inadequate as they do not take into account the intricacies of interaction and the action orientation of talk.

In section 2 I examined in further detail how claims regarding ‘wants’ are produced as part of various activities in conversation. In this section I considered two types of activities in which ‘wants’ are used, which are to challenge an interlocutor and to account for one’s actions when those actions are challenged by a cointeractant. I showed how speakers may build a complaint regarding others’ conduct using an ‘what you want X?’ construction. These turns formulate a recognisably ‘undesirable’ outcome of the recipient’s actions and propose that the speaker is motivated for that outcome to occur. This constructs recipient’s actions as illegitimate and nonsensical. I then showed how using ‘I don’t want X’ to deliver a rejection indexes a challenging stance and may be complaint implicative. Finally, I showed how speakers may use ‘because I want to X’ to account for their actions when challenged by an interlocutor. These accounts are Janus-faced in that they have two sides. On the one hand, invoking one’s ‘wants’ may concede that there is no adequate alternative account for one’s actions. On the other hand, the selective emphasis of the subject-side of these accounts invokes authority and entitlement to avow one’s ‘wants’ and can therefore be used to reject the challenge embodied in the preceding turn.
The analysis presented in this chapter leads to the conclusion that avowals and ascriptions of ‘wanting’ can and should be examined as interactional constructions designed to achieve a particular action in a specific sequential environment. This shifts our attention towards considering further what these constructions achieve and how they do this, which will be the focus of the following 3 chapters.
Children’s ‘wants’

1.0 Introduction: ‘I want’ formatted requests

This chapter focuses on young children’s uses of ‘I want’ to build requests. Research has shown that from around the age of two and a half children are able to build requests using a range of formats (Gordon & Ervin-Tripp, 1984; Wootton 1981, 1997, 2005) and so when delivering a request select from a range of possible alternatives. Consider the following extract, which is taken from the end of a breakfast meal;

Extract 5.1 Crouch 2 09:43

01 Ann: [ [A:::M GONNA EA:::D IT A:::LL= ] ]
02 [((picks up empty bowl, shows it to Linda))]
03 [((puts bowl back on table))]
04 =[U::::[:P ] ]
05 Lin: [shh] GOOD GIRL ANNA
06 Kat: there’s (.) free pe[as on my foot and it hu::rts]
07 → Ann: [mu::mmy I’m hu::n]gray
08 gai::n
09 Lin: [[ no] no mo::re no::w,]
10 Lin: [((shakes head)) ]
11 (0.2)
12 → Ann: I::: wa- just want ↓my yoghu::rt.
13 → Kat: can we wa:ch [lazy ] to::wn?
14 Lin: [[y[ou didn’t want it darling]]
15 [((shakes head)) ]
16 (1.0)
17 Lin: ta:ke your so::ck, put your ↑sock↑ on lo::ve
In this extract we see that Anna, aged two and Katherine, aged four deliver requests using declarative (lines 7-8, 12) and interrogative formats (line 13). Anna announces that she has finished her breakfast (lines 1-4) and then uses a declarative format to request more food. This turn is not built as an interrogative, (‘can I have more food?’) but as a reporting in which Anna formally, grammatically reports some circumstance, rather than make an explicit request. Linda ratifies the turn’s status as a request for more food as she delivers an emphatic rejection ‘no no more no now,’. Anna then delivers a second, downgraded, minimised request as she asks for a yoghurt which she was given and refused to eat earlier in the meal ‘I just want my yoghurt’. Again the turn is built as a declarative, in this instance using an ‘I want’ format. The minimiser ‘just’ is a key design feature as Anna makes it clear that rather than asking for new food she is simply asking for her yoghurt, which works to downgrade and minimise the request (this will be discussed further below).

Katherine also delivers a request, using an interrogative format; ‘can we watch lazy town?’. The turn is built with interrogative syntax and officially solicits a yes/no response. That is, it is built as a straightforward request which requires either a granting or a rejection (Wootton, 1981). Clearly then, from an early age when delivering requests children select from a range of alternative formats. Language is couched in and is built for specific moments in interaction and so the aim of this chapter is to examine the occasions on which young children select an ‘I want’ format when delivering requests.

The structure of the chapter is based around two recurrent environments in which children produce ‘I want’ formatted requests which are as follows;

1. When there is some basis within the preceding interaction for the child to suppose that the request will not be granted.
2. When there is some basis within the preceding interaction for the child to suppose that the request will be granted. In this section I focus on one specific subset, which is when the object of the request is something which is available to a co-interactant.

At first glance, it may seem that these two sequential environments are contradictory. We shall see that across all examples, the use of an 'I want', format displays an orientation to understandings reached in the preceding interaction (c.f. Wootton, 1981). That is, at the time of building the request there is some basis for the speaker to suppose that the request either will or will not be granted.

1.1 A developmental view: Desire, language and cognition

The idea that desire is central to cognition is fundamental in both psychoanalytic and philosophical theorising (Raphael-Leff, 2010). The German idealist philosopher Hegel (as cited in Raphael-Leff, 2010) saw desire as the condition for subject formation as ‘I’ is first produced with ‘I want’. That the child is absorbed with his or her own desires and intentions to act is one explanation of the ‘terrible-two’s’ (Travis & Brown, 2011). Work on Theory of Mind has focussed on children’s uses of ‘desire terms’ in everyday talk, for what these may reveal about the child’s mind. These philosophical ideas and body of work are based on a picture of semantic and cognitive development which has been described as the ostension paradigm (Montgomery, 2002); semantic development occurs as the child establishes word-referent relations with mental state terms developing as names referring to private mental experiences. There are close relations between specific linguistic and specific cognitive developments with particular words emerging in the vocabulary that are relevant to the acquisition of particular cognitive capabilities (Gopnik & Meltzhoff, 1986, 1987). The child has mental experiences, categorises them and then labels each category (Montgomery, 2002). Consequently, when
studying talk in naturalistic settings, researchers are concerned with uncovering “genuine references to psychological states” (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995, p. 31) as distinct from ‘functional uses’ such as simple requests, idiomatic expressions and “mere repetition of someone else’s utterances” (p. 67).

1.2 An interactional view: ‘Wanting’ in request sequences

Children’s use of ‘I want’ to deliver requests was previously examined by Wootton (1981) as he compared a four-year-old child’s uses of ‘I want X’ with the interrogative ‘can I X’. He shows how the selection of request format is informed by understandings reached in the preceding interaction, specifically whether or not it is expectable that the recipient will be willing to grant the request. Wootton notes that as a yes/no interrogative, ‘can I X’ formats formally solicit a yes/no response and so propose that either of these are a possibility. As such, these formats function as straightforward requests which require a granting or a rejection. In contrast, declarative ‘I want X’ forms do not formally solicit a yes/no response and so do not propose either of these as a possibility. Wootton shows how this format is used when there is some basis within the preceding interaction for the child to suppose that the recipient will be unwilling to grant the request, where the format is used to object to the recipient’s position, rather than as a straightforward request. Wootton proposes that in using declarative ‘I want’ and interrogative ‘can I’ requests in different ways in similar sequential positions, this four-year old child evidences the ability to make use of the constraints each of these constructions places on the recipients’ next turn.

While Wootton’s study was important as he pioneered an approach to examining the sequential organisation of children’s request formats, rather than examining situational variables such as to whom requests are directed, I note that it is not the case that young children select ‘I want’ exclusively when there
is some basis to suppose that the request will not be granted. Rather, in what follows I show how children may select an ‘I want’ format when there is some basis to suppose that a request will be granted. Across all examples the use of an ‘I want’ format displays entitlement to make the request and orients to the expectability, or otherwise, that the request will be granted.

2.1 ‘I want’ requests display heightened entitlement

Requests built using ‘I want’ have several features which suggest that speakers orient to these requests as ones which they are entitled to make. First, this is displayed through the use of a modal which indexes the speaker and invokes their ‘wants’. As Curl and Drew (2008) point out, interrogative request forms such as ‘can you X?’ display speakers’ understandings of the contingencies involved in granting a request. The execution of the requested action or object is treated as dependent on the recipient’s ability or willingness to comply (Vine, 2009) and requests built in such a way, in theory, can be refused (Craven & Potter, 2010). In contrast, one of the strong features of requests built using ‘I want’ is that the verb in first person indexes the speaker, rather than the contingencies of the recipient’s compliance. A second interrelated feature is that the subject-side (Edwards, 2005, 2007) of the request is selectively emphasised. That is, the request is built as simply a relationship between speaker and object, irrespective of other considerations which may be circumstantial to the request. Finally, the grammatical form of these turns, as a declarative, does not formally solicit a yes/no response and so do not project refusal as a response option (Craven & Potter, 2010; Wootton, 1981). These features can be seen in combination in the following extract, in which Anna uses an ‘I want’ construction to ask Linda to give her some more cereal during breakfast.
Ann: where is ↓i::t?
Lin: where’s what darling.
(0.4)
Ann: where my picCHA?
Lin: e::hm,
Ann: ((coughs))
Lin: [just the:re next to you. ]
Lin: [{(nods at chair next to Anna)}]
(0.6)
Ann: ((cough)) ((cough))
Ann: | (0.7)
Ann: #dhah ah#
Lin: [mm ]
Lin: [{(nods)}]
| (0.8) |
Ann: |{(starts to pick up picture)}|
Lin: don’t get it out now finish your break[fast ]=
Ann: []{(coughs)} |
Lin: =fi::rst.
(1.7)
Ann: fi:nish:ed l[o ]
Lin: [good] GI::RL WELL DONE.
→ Ann: #I:: wa::nt some mo::re plea::se.#
(0.1)
Lin: [m’ka::y c’have some more. ]
Lin: [{(nods and starts to get up)} ]
(0.2)
Lin: you must be hu:ngry cause you didn’t eat any of your
dinner last night Anna:, 
Ann: cuz ah 
(0.3)
Ann: don’t li:ke it a::ll u:p.
Lin: |{(looks at Anna while walking to kitchen)}|
| (0.5) |
Lin: {(walks out of camera shot)}
Anna delivers the target turn at line 23 (#I:: want some more please.) to ask for more cereal. The first thing to note is that the turn is not built as an interrogative such as ‘can I have some more please?’. Rather the use of ‘I want’ predicates only Anna herself, rather than the recipient with none of the contingency for compliance that would be implied by ‘could you’ or ‘can I’. As a declarative the turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response and so does not propose either of these as a possibility or project the possibility of refusal. If we consider requests on a continuum of contingency and entitlement as suggested by Curl and Drew (2008), this is a high entitlement way of delivering a request, which contains few contingency markers. The turn terminal ‘please.’ clearly marks the turn as a request for action rather than a simple statement about Anna’s ‘wants’. Note that the request is delivered immediately after Linda’s preceding turn, which offers a positive assessment and praises Anna for finishing her breakfast. As Anna has been told that she is a ‘good’ GI::RL for finishing her cereal it is expectable that the request will be granted and that further cereal will be forthcoming. While the turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response and does not orient to the contingencies involved in granting the request, Linda treats the turn as a contingent request. That is, she verbally accepts the request and reports that
Anna ‘c’ have’ (line 25) some more as if the request was built as contingent on Linda’s willingness to grant it.

In sum, in using an ‘I want’ request format Anna pointedly does not orient to Linda’s ability or willingness to grant the request. Only Anna herself, as the requester, is predicated. The turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response and so does not make acceptance or declination relevant and the possibility of refusal is not projected. Delivering a request using an ‘I want’ format embodies high entitlement as the contingencies involved in the recipient granting the request are pointedly not oriented to. We can also note that Anna delivers the request when there is some basis in the prior interaction for her to suppose that it will be granted, as it is delivered immediately following Linda’s positive assessment of Anna having finished her first bowl of cereal. We can see then that Anna orients to understandings reached in the preceding interaction and that the request format displays recognition of the interactional context within which Anna is operating (c.f. Wootton, 1981, 1997).

Now that I have explicated what is meant by ‘I want’ formats being a high entitlement way to build a request I will examine in further detail two recurrent environments in which young children select this format. The first of these is when there is some basis within the preceding interaction for the child to suppose that the request will not be granted.

2.2 When it is expectable that a request will not be granted

The analysis in this section is divided into two subsections. I begin in section 2.2.1 by showing how speakers may use ‘I want’ to request precisely that which it is expectable will not be forthcoming. This may occur following either a rejection of a first request or when there is some other basis within the preceding interaction for the child to suppose that the request will not be
granted. In section 2.2.2 I show how speakers may use ‘I just want’ as a way of downgrading and minimising second requests.

### 2.2.1 Requesting precisely that which it is expectable will not be forthcoming

As discussed above, that children build requests using ‘I want’ when there is some basis in the preceding interaction for the child to suppose that the request will not be granted was previously documented by Wootton (1981). He compared the use of the interrogative ‘can I’ and the declarative ‘I want’ in the talk of a four year old child. He shows how rather than working as a straightforward request, ‘I want’ is co-implicated in complaining and objecting when there is some basis in the preceding interaction for the child to suppose that the request will not be granted. Wootton’s analysis centres around the syntactic constraints imposed by the use of the declarative ‘I want’. He notes that in contrast to the interrogative ‘can I’, an ‘I want’ format does not formally solicit a yes/no response and so does not propose either of these as a possibility. I note that it is not a simple matter of syntactic constraints that informs request format selection. The imperative is the prototypical grammatical form for a directive, an action which is pointedly designed to restrict recipients’ response options (Craven & Potter, 2010). As such if syntactic constraints were the sole determinant of format selection, we would expect to see the selection of an imperative format in this environment, just as Simon uses an imperative format to tell Tom to remove his earring in the following example:

**Extract 5.3 TF2008E7  30:43**

01 Sim: can you put your ea:rring on the _side _plea:se
02 Tom: °I’m _wearing it°
03 → Sim: _now_. (.) you hear_;? >juss-juss< do it. put it the__re, next to mum’s stuff so she can see where it is.
In his turn at line 1 Simon asks Tom to take out an earring which he had put in the previous day without permission to do so. The turn is built using an interrogative format ‘can you put your earring on the side please’ and formally at least, solicits yes or no as a response option. Following a non-compliant response (‘I’m wearing it’) Simon tells Tom to do it ‘now’ as he specifies the required action using a directive construction ‘put it there’.

By removing the markers of contingency, such as Tom’s capacity to carry out the action (indexed by ‘can you?’) Simon heightens his display of entitlement to direct Tom’s actions (see Craven & Potter, 2010). In sum, in moving from an interrogative to an imperative format Tom’s response options are restricted as the imperative format does not project the possibility of refusal.

For the child, who is not entitled to direct a parent’s actions, there is a major consideration which must be managed when delivering a request when there is some basis to suppose that it will not be granted. Namely, that it is expectable that a further refusal will be forthcoming. In this section I show how ‘I want’ constructions are a way of managing this consideration. Let us now turn to the first extract which provides a clear example of the use of ‘I want’ to deliver a potentially unacceptable request.

Extract 5.4 Crouch 2 08:00

01 → Kat: why ca::n’t, why: uh- (0.2) am I on holiday when
02 sar- (. ) when it’s Sarah’s birthday <a:nd she
03 invi#ted me:::.#>
04    (1.2)
05 Kat: and she’s gonna be fi:::ve
06 Lin: actually:, (0.5) I don’t think you a:re on hu- let me
07 just check.
08    (8.5)
09 Lin: yeah, it’s the fifteenth w’on holiday.
10    (0.8)
11 Kat: YE:::S:[:!]
12 Lin: [ w]e’re at the carava:n
Ann: at Gra:MA’S c[arava::n ]
Kat: [I’m goi]ng I’m going to Sara:h’s pa::ry((sings))
Lin: [(where?)]
Kat: no! we’re at the caravan darling.
Kat: o::h you sai::d.
(1.6)
→ Kat: I wa::nt! to go to Sarah’s pa::ry::
Lin: I’m so:rry darling.
(0.4)
Lin: hi:c- we’re at- (.) we’re on holiday sometimes you
can’t do everything. lo:ts of children can’t come to
your birthday cause they’re on holiday.
(1.0)
Lin: a:ren’t they
→ Kat: I really wa:nt to go to #Sar#ah’s party you’re
allowed to go in the swi:mmi:ng ~poo:::l~
Lin: okay well liste:n, liste:n, (0.6) you can come ho:me,
(0.4)
we’ll put you on the tra:in, you can go ho:me, (0.7)
go to Sarah’s party, (0.3) n’ we’ll have fun on
holida::y. without you.

In this extract Katherine uses an ‘I want’ construction to re-request precisely
that which Linda has indicated will not be able to happen. Although the turn at
line 1 proffers a new topic and is the first mention of the party during this meal,
there are several design features of this turn which suggest that this is a matter
which has been discussed at an earlier point in time. First, the turn is delivered
with elongated, ‘whiny’ prosody, marking the turn as an objection. Second,
Katherine begins to launch a ‘why’ formatted interrogative, which was
presumably headed for ‘why can’t I go to Sarah’s birthday party?’. As Bolden
and Robinson (2011) note ‘why’ formatted account solicitations are frequently
cooplicated in actions such as complaining. As such the turn clearly
presupposes that there is something to challenge. The turn is also built as a
negative interrogative and can be heard as assertive, rather than questioning, holding Linda accountable for Katherine’s inability to attend the party (Heritage, 2002). Finally, the turn terminal ‘<a:nd she invi#ted me::.#>’ (lines 2-3) and the incremental ‘and she’s gonna be fi:::ve’ (line 5) provide an account to justify why she should be allowed to attend the party. These elements orient to the possibility that Katherine may not in fact be able to attend the party and substantiate the force of the turn as a challenge.

Note that somewhat ingeniously Katherine restarts the turn with ‘am I on holiday when Sar- (.) when it’s Sarah’s birthday’ (lines 1-3), presenting this as something which has not yet been determined, opening the topic up for further discussion. Katherine initially treats the news that the family will be on holiday as confirmation that she will be able to attend the party (lines 11, 15-16). Once this source of trouble is resolved by Linda (line 18) Katherine delivers the complaint implicative ‘o:::h you sai:::d.’, an introductory quotative marker which usually precedes reported speech (Couper-Kuhlen, 2007). However note that Katherine does not quote Linda’s talk and hence the elliptical use of ‘o:::h you sai:::d.’ (including the emphasis, and final intonation fall, marking the utterance as finished) implies that what would complete the turn is something available in the current talk, such as ‘you said I could go to Sarah’s party’. The initial news receipt ‘o:::h’ treats the prior (confirmation that she cannot attend the party) as news. She then delivers the target turn ‘I wa::nt! to go to Sarah’s pa:::rty::’ (line 21). As noted by Wootton (1981) as a declarative this turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response and thereby does not propose either of these as a possibility. The modal indexes the speaker and pointedly does not orient to the contingencies or obstacles to the fulfilment of the request. Rather than working as a request which seeks a granting or a rejection, then, the turn can be heard as a complaint implicative objection.
The action import of the turn as an objection rather than a straightforward request is further evidenced by the second ‘I want’ construction following Linda’s further refusal (lines 24-28) ‘I really want to go to #Sarah’s party you’re allowed to go in the swimming pool’. Second requests typically orient to a new trajectory brought about by the recipient’s refusal of an initial request. This turn pointedly does not orient to Linda’s right to refuse the request as it is again built using an ‘I want’ format, with ‘I really want’ upgrading the request and in selectively emphasising the ‘subject-side’, deletes recipient considerations, refusals and contingencies. As Katherine offers a further account to justify why she should be allowed to attend the party (she would be allowed to go in the swimming pool), she further specifies and upgrades the request. Normatively at least, everyone is entitled to their own beliefs, opinions and desires and to know what these are, regardless of whether they are ‘right’ to hold them or not. The use of an ‘I want’ construction following the rejection of a request proposes that Katherine ‘wants’ to go to the party irrespective of Linda’s refusal and the obstacles in the way. Thus ‘I want’ is a request form which predicates the speaker and can be upgraded irrespective of the contingencies and obstacles to the request being granted. The format encodes and emphasises the request’s subject-side rather than the object of the request, which has already been refused. While request recipients may be entitled to and choose to refuse requests, the notion that requesters still ‘want’ the object of the request is something that can persist beyond its refusal, and which is not so easily denied. This selective emphasis of the subject-side of a request then, is one way of managing the contingencies involved in delivering a request when it is expectable that it will not be granted.

Let us consider a further example, taken from towards the end of a meal from the Crouch corpus.
Extract 5.5 Crouch 1 10:25

01 Ann: flapack pick a poo::f ((singing))
02 (1.2)
03 Ann: chhuhh ((coughs))
04 (1.0)
05 Mik: I think you’re being a silly sausage.
06 Ann: theh heh heh he::h↑
07 → Lin: come on darlin eat your dinner up
08 | | (0.2)
09 Ann: |((puts kitchen roll down, reaches for food on plate))|
10 Ann: i::s-
11 Lin: you di::d you wen’on the sli::de and you did puzzles
12 you told me di[dn’t you¿]
13 Ann: [ pizza::h
14 Lin: mm:::
15 (0.6)
16 Lin: sausage
17 (1.4)
18 Lin: [put your >leg roun front love.↑<]
19 Lin: [((points at Anna’s legs)) ]
20 (1.4)
21 Ann: [ silly sausah::ge. ]
22 Ann: [((moves legs under table))] (2.0)
23 Kat: what abou::t a silly sausage
24 (0.6)
25 Ann: ↑I’m! ↑ silly sausage I a::m he::h hum. I’m gonna
26 hi::de.
27 | | (0.4)
28 Ann: [((holds kitchen roll over face))]
29 Mik: oh where’s Anna gone
30 (1.0)
31 Ann: *hoh*
32 (1.0)
33 Mik: whe::re’s she gone?
34 (1.8)
35 Mik: hm the::re you are::.
We can begin by noting that Anna delivers an 'I want' formatted request precisely when it is expectable that this request will not be granted. Rather than eating her dinner as instructed to by Linda (line 7), she holds a piece of kitchen roll over her face and announces that she is going to hide (lines 26-29), an activity which provides further distraction from the task of eating dinner. After putting the kitchen roll on top of her head, she is directed to eat more of her dinner by Mike (line 39). In direct defiance of this directive she remains kneeling on her chair and begins making quacking noises (lines 40-41). Linda and Mike both positively assess the manner in which Anna’s older sister
Katherine is eating (lines 44, 48), which is hearably designed as instructing or persuading Anna to do the same. Immediately following Mike’s assessment of Katherine as a ‘big gi:rl.’ (line 48), a typically desirable identity for ‘little girls’, Anna delivers the ‘I want’ format; ‘ah wa_:nt puddi::ng.’ Normally the children in this family are not given ‘pudding’ (a term used in England for ‘dessert’) if they have not eaten enough of their dinner (the first course). As Linda and Mike have been at pains to persuade Anna to finish her dinner and she has so far refused to do so, it is expectable that pudding will not be forthcoming. Indeed ‘eating pudding’, which comes after the first course and normally follows the plates and leftover food from the first course being cleared from the table, directly contrasts with ‘finishing dinner’.

The point to note here is that ‘can I have pudding?’ is not a question that is being asked. The request posed in this interrogative form would seek permission from Mike and Linda. It concedes authority and control to the recipient. In contrast an ‘I want’ construction pointedly does not orient to the contingencies and obstacles to the request being granted. Rather the subject-side of the request is emphasised, and the request is built as a relationship between requester and object, regardless of any obstacles to the request being granted. As noted above, in principle one is allowed to have ones’ own beliefs and desires regardless of whether they are ‘right’ or not. This emphasis of the subject-side of the request is a way of claiming entitlement to deliver a potentially unacceptable request and, as it does not project the possibility of refusal, manages the contingencies involved in doing so.

The request is treated as unacceptable in that it is emphatically rejected by Linda (line 51). Anna’s pursuit ‘I do::: [:]’ (line 53) which is produced with elongated, whiny intonation, further encodes and embodies the request’s subject-side. The turn does not orient to the object of the request, rather it designedly treats Linda’s rejection as a challenge to Anna’s ‘wants’. While Anna may not be entitled to insist upon the provision of pudding, she is entitled
to express her ‘wants’. In sum, the selective emphasis of the subject side of the request allows Anna to insist upon and upgrade the request irrespective of other considerations which may be circumstantial to the request, such as Linda’s refusal to grant it.

2.2.2 Using ‘I want’ to minimise re-requests

The analysis in the preceding section examined the use of ‘I want’ constructions to deliver potentially unacceptable requests. Rather than being built as an interrogative which concedes authority and control to the recipient, the selective emphasis of the subject-side of the request allows speakers to deliver the request irrespective of other considerations which may be circumstantial. In the examples thus far speakers use ‘I want’ to request precisely that which it is expectable will not be forthcoming. In what follows I show how speakers may make claims regarding their ‘wants’ as a way of minimising and downgrading second requests. This can be seen in the following fragment (an extended version of extract 5.1), taken from the end of a breakfast meal, in which Anna requests a yoghurt following Linda’s refusal to give her more food. Originally, the yoghurt was part of Anna’s breakfast, which she chose to discard.

**Extract 5.6 Crouch 2 09:43**

01  (1.3)
02  Ann: I DIDN’T DO that    
03  Kat: [#it’s be]cause my foo:[t hu::rts#]=
04  Kat: [((leans over, touches foot))  ]
05  Lin: no everything hurts. your tummy hurts, your foot
06  hurts <EV’ry night
07  there’s something else that hu:rts.
08  [(so I’m- Katherine don’t-) no listen now,]
09  Ann: [ [A::M GONNA EA::D IT A::LL= ] ]
10  [((picks up empty bowl, shows it to Linda))]
11  [((puts bowl back on table))]
The extract is taken from the end of breakfast. Linda and Katherine have both finished eating and Linda has cleared away their empty bowls as well as a half eaten yoghurt which Anna refused to eat earlier in the meal, stating that she ‘doesn’t like’ the yoghurt (data not shown). At line 8 Anna breaks into Linda’s turn to announce that she has finished her food. Linda continues to speak and both turns are produced in overlap. Anna competes for this turn space as she continues speaking with raised volume and an accompanying embodied action as she picks up her bowl and shows it to Linda (line 9). Linda reclaims the turn with a ‘shh’ which is deployed as an interruption marker followed by a positive assessment of the speed at which Anna ate her breakfast, delivered with exaggeratedly raised volume (line 12). Anna continues to compete for the floor as she delivers a turn in overlap with Katherine’s turn at line 13; ‘Mu::mmy I’m hu::ngry gai::n’, which is hearable as a request for more food.

The notion of being hungry ‘again’ displays an orientation to breakfast time being finished. As the breakfast things have been cleared away, it is expectable that Anna will not be given more food. Indeed, Linda begins a turn in overlap in which this request is decisively rejected (line 16). This rejection is
emphasised as she shakes her head throughout the delivery of the turn. This emphatic rejection provides the environment for Anna’s request at line 19 ‘I:···· wa- just want my yoghuːːrt.’ The central thing to note about this turn is that Anna restarts her utterance which is repaired from ‘I want’ which was presumably headed for ‘I want my yoghurt’. As Laakso (2010) notes, by cutting off and modifying a turn in self repair, the speaker displays an analysis of her ongoing speech. The notion that Anna ‘just wants’ her yoghurt orients to Linda’s ‘no moːre noːw,’ as rather than requesting more food, she simply wants the yoghurt which was hers earlier in the meal. By minimising the request in this manner the likelihood of it being granted is increased; she had the yoghurt earlier in the meal and asks to finish it, rather than requesting a new food item.

Note that there are two bases upon which recipients of ‘I want’ constructions can reject requests. First, they may deal with the object-side of the request and refuse to provide the requested item. Second, they may deal with the subject-side of the request. As noted above, while speakers may be entitled to refuse to grant the request, that the speaker ‘wants’ the object is not so easily denied. However in this example, rather than dealing with the object of the request through an explicit rejection (which may lead to further objection from Anna), Linda orients to the subject-side of the request. That is, she challenges Anna’s claim to ‘want’ the yoghurt as earlier in the meal she explicitly stated that she did not like the yoghurt (line 21). Thus, while speakers may build potentially unacceptable requests by invoking their ‘wants’, irrespective of the obstacles to compliance, claims regarding ‘wants’ are in fact defeasible. In this example Linda challenges Anna’s claims regarding her ‘wants’ on the basis of its inconsistency with what she said and did previously.

The following fragment contains a further example of the use of an ‘I want’ construction to minimise a request. Here the target turn is comparable to that in extract 5.6 as while it is used to re-request that which the recipient previously
indicated they are unwilling to allow, the turn is not a simple re-request and orients to this refusal by minimising the request. The extract is taken from the Olivers corpus and Phil, Carla and Julie are present.

Extract 5.7 Olivers 8 12:10

01  Phi: yeah but what if you look at the video:::, (0.4)
02    and it gives you horrible nightma::res. (0.8)
04  Phi: I don’t want that to happen to you darling. ((shakes head throughout turn))
06  | (6.6) |
07  Phi: |((drinks out of mug))|
08  Phi: its very important (. ) that you:, don’t watch certain thi:::ngs, or only watch the right thi:::ngs.
11  | (7.0) |
12  Car: |((drinks from cup, holding it in front of face)) |
14  Jul: |((does Thriller dance)) |
15  Phi: I don’t mind you listening to the music y’can listen to the music (0.8) as much as you wa::nt (2.4)
19  → Car: the o:::nly actual thing that I rea:::lly want to see, . h I o:::nly want to see the Thriller da:::nce
21  Phi: >yeah but< the wa- (0.2) the way that they’re dre:::ssed (. ) i:::s e:::rm like >they’re< you know mmm [they’ve got ma:::sks on (. ) and they’re ma:::de up ]
25  Phi: [((gestures with hands in front of face))]
26  (.)
27  Jul: they h[ave] n’all weird makeup
28  Phi: [to-]
29  <to look* like dead people, who have come out* o:::f, e:::r the graves.>
31  | (2.4) |
Car: |((holds glass in front of face, nods))|

Phi: and I think that would be a bit too scary for you.

The family are discussing the Michael Jackson video ‘Thriller’, as Julie will be performing the dance as part of a school production. Phil has told Carla that while Julie will be fine watching the video, Carla herself is likely to be scared (data not shown). In the turn at line 1, using a ‘wh’ interrogative, Phil challenges Carla’s earlier suggestion that she watch the video early in the morning, to avoid having bad dreams that night (data not shown). Within this sequential context, where Phil has indicated that he is unwilling to allow Carla to watch the video, the ‘what if’ can be heard as implying ‘this will give you horrible nightmares’ (Koshik, 2003). Phil then delivers a series of accounts in which he formulates his ‘wants’ and ‘motivations’ to justify his rejection of the request (lines 4-5), produces a general rule about the suitability of certain viewing material (lines 8-10) and specifies that the restriction applies only to the video, rather than the music (lines 15-17). Throughout the delivery of these accounts Carla holds her cup in front of her face and does not respond.

Following a slight gap (line 18) she delivers the target turn 'the only actual thing that I really want to see, I only want to see the Thriller dance'. There are a series of minimisers within her turn (‘only actual’ ‘only want to see’ ) which make it clear that her interest is restricted to the dance itself, rather than the actors who are made up ‘look* like dead people,’. There are several features of this turn which suggest that Carla is at pains to selectively emphasise the subject-side of the request. The emphatic ‘really want’ proposes that the request was previously on the agenda, rather than having arisen out of the current discussion about the video. Note that as Carla restarts the turn she retains a formulation of her ‘wants’ ‘I only want’, evidencing the subject-side of the request as a key feature of the turn.
Carla *could* have built the turn as ‘can I just watch the thriller dance?’. As a yes/no interrogative this turn projects the possibility of refusal and concedes authority to Phil. In contrast, the declarative, ‘I want’ format does not project the possibility of refusal. A further feature of the ‘I want’ format is that it is formulated in such a way that seeing only the dance is complete compliance (as she only wants to see the dance and nothing else) rather than partial compliance (seeing what she is allowed to see).

In sum, Carla uses an ‘I want’ construction to re-request that which Phil has indicated he is unwilling to allow, namely that she watch the video. The ‘I want’ formula, together with the minimiser ‘only’, allows her to specify restricted interest in seeing the dance, rather than the entire video. Rather than a re-request of the *precise* same thing, the request is downgraded, minimised and restricted in scope.

In summary, this section has shown how speakers may use an ‘I want’ construction to deliver a request when it is expectable that it will not be granted. This may follow an explicit rejection, or otherwise when there are events earlier in the sequence for the child to suppose that what they are asking will be refused. Often speakers use ‘I want’ to re-request *precisely* that which the recipient has indicated is not going to happen. As Wootton (1981) notes, these turns can be heard as complaint implicative, rather than functioning as a straightforward request which seeks a granting or a rejection. I have also shown how speakers may use ‘I just/only want’ to downgrade and minimise requests following a rejection by proposing that their interests are restricted and limited to a specific element of the projected action or object. This section has documented how the use of ‘I want’ which pointedly does not index the object of the request, is a way of managing the contingencies involved in delivering a potentially unacceptable request. This format selectively encodes the subject-side of the request, irrespective of any considerations which may be circumstantial to the request being granted.
Rather than an interrogative, which concedes authority to the request recipient and leaves the request open to refusal, in theory, speakers are entitled to narrate their ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’ whether they are right or not. While request recipients may be entitled to refuse requests, that the object of the request is something that the recipient ‘wants’ is not so easily denied.

2.3 When it is expectable that a request will be granted

Wootton (1981) examined the request formats of a four year old child and showed that this child primarily selected an ‘I want’ format when there is some basis in the preceding interaction for the child to suppose that a request will not be granted, where the turn functions as an objection rather than a straightforward request. We saw several examples of this in the preceding section. However I note that it is not a simple case of speakers selecting this format when it is expectable that the request will not be granted. In this section I show how young children, specifically a two-year-old child, recurrently uses an ‘I want’ format when there is some basis to suppose that the request will be granted. Similarly to the examples in the preceding section, the speaker displays an orientation to understandings reached in the preceding interaction. Consider the following examples;

Extract 5.8 Crouch 7 05:52

01  Lin:  don’t get it out now finish your break[fast    ]=
02  Ann:            [((coughs)) ]
03  Lin:  =fi::rst.
04        (1.7)
05  Ann:  fi:nish::ed l[ook ]
06  Lin:    [good] GI::RL WELL DONE.
07    → Ann:  #I:: wa::nt some mo::re plea::se.#
08        (0.1)
09  Lin:  [m’ka::y c’have some more. (     )]
10  Lin:  [((nods and starts to get up)) ]
11        (0.2)
Lin: you must be hungry cause you didn’t eat any of your dinner last night Anna.

Extract 5.9 Crouch 1 01:30

01 Kat: mummy please can I have some sauce on my bread please

| (6.9) |

04 Lin: |((picks up sauce and puts it over Katherine’s food))|

05 Ann: <I! do too on my bread>

06 (2.5)

07 → Ann: I want it [tuh u::h ]

08 Kat: [Mummy::! ih- it keeps falling ou:::t

09 (.)

10 Kat: o:::h! ]

11 Mik: [okay don’t worry just try your best.

12 (0.7)

13 Kat: u.hhh

14 → Ann: [I wa::nt sau:ce here plea::se.]

15 Ann: [((passes roll to Linda)]

In each of the arrowed turns Anna delivers a request using an ‘I want’ format and in each example we can note that there is some basis within the preceding interaction for Anna to suppose that the request will be granted. In extract 5.8 she requests more food immediately following Linda’s positive assessment and praise for finishing her breakfast. In extract 5.9 Anna asks for sauce on her bread as Linda is putting sauce on Katherine’s bread. As a declarative format, ‘I want’ requests do not formally solicit a yes/no response and so do not project refusal as a response option. In contrast to interrogative forms, the ‘I want’ indexes the speaker rather than the contingencies of the recipient. This request format then, displays entitlement to make the request and orients to the expectability of the request being granted. In one large group of cases ‘I want’ constructions are used to request something which has been made available to someone else, in these examples a sibling. I now focus on these cases in further detail.
2.3.1 Requesting something that is available to a sibling

‘Sibling’ rivalry is an age old concept and a recurrent theme in religion and literature. One of the first stories in the Bible discusses the rivalry between Cain and Abel, the two sons of Adam and Eve. Because of his jealousy towards his brother, Cain murders Abel after God rejects Cain’s offering of produce but accepts Abel's offer of animal sacrifices. In Western culture, Freud is credited with the ‘discovery’ of the phenomena and consequently within psychoanalytic theory interest with regard to siblings has focussed mainly on the concept of sibling rivalry (Wallerstein & Lewis, 2007). The main emphasis has been on the burdens on a first child following the birth of a second child. It is proposed that all children experience themselves as holding a unique position as the only child of their parents (Mitchell, 2000) and are eventually shocked to realise the presence of their siblings as rivals (Vivona, 2007). As such the arrival of a second child is understood to be a traumatic experience for firstborn children (Adler, 1927).

In contemporary psychology sibling rivalry has been a source of concern as it is considered a common developmental occurrence. Researchers have reported on a range of aspects of development which are purported to be affected by sibling relationships including social development, cognitive skills and adolescent psychosocial adjustment (Noller, 2005). Positive sibling relationships have been found to be a protective factor against mental illness (Gass, Jenkins, & Dunn, 2007) while conflict amongst siblings has been related to a range of pathologies such as eating disorders (Preston, 2010), deviant behaviour (Stormshak, Comeau, & Shepard, 2004), and depression (Waldinger, Vaillant, & Orav, 2007).
In this body of work ‘sibling rivalry’ is considered as an independent variable which is typically measured using self report scales which measure participant’s perceptions of their sibling relationships. The nature of ‘sibling rivalry’ as it occurs in situ has not yet received analytical scrutiny. Here I am interested in how siblings manage their relationships in their everyday interactions. I consider one aspect of this, which is requesting something which has been made available to a sibling. Let us now consider several live examples.

**Extract 5.10 Crouch 3 02:10**

01 Lin: ((separates full yoghurt from Kath’s eaten one and places towards middle of table))
02 Ann: o:[:h!]
03 Lin: [ w’you have some cheerios?
04 Kat: ((nods head slightly and quickly))
05 Ann: I w[a:nt o:::ne ]
06 Ann: [((reaches for Katherine’s yoghurt))]
07 Ann: (18.0)

**Extract 5.11 Crouch 3 05:20**

01 → Ann: I want two: of tho:::se.(.) like
02 K[atherine ]
03 Lin: ((shakes head))
04 Lin: [no >you’ve go-] you’ve g- you’ve had lots of weetabix darling and you’ve got grapes as well.
05 Ann: I’m h:ungry agai:n
06 | (3.0) |
07 Ann: |((kneels up on chair, looks at Linda))|
08 Lin: you haven’t finished your brea:[fast yet darling, (0.5) you haven’t finished your weetabix ye:t,
09 (1.8)
10 Lin: have you:?
11 (8.0)
In each of the arrowed turns the speaker uses an 'I want' construction to request something which has been made available to a sibling. In extract 5.10 Anna asks for a yoghurt which has been discarded by Katherine. In extract 5.11 which is taken from later on during the same meal, after an extended gap in the conversation Anna repeats her request for yoghurt, specifying that she wants two 'like Katherine’. In extract 5.12 Anna asks for sauce on her bread as Linda is putting sauce onto Katherine’s bread. As noted throughout the thesis, stating that one ‘wants’ something as a way of doing a request is quite different from using a modal form (such as ‘can I have X?’). In the former case the speaker foregrounds themselves as the subject of the construction, in
the place of the sibling. Further, the speaker avoids orienting to the willingness or ability of the speaker to grant the request. In attending to one’s own ‘wants’, and selectively emphasising the ‘subject-side’ of a request, rather than the contingencies of the recipient’s compliance, speakers display entitlement to make the request and an expectation that the request will be granted.

There are several considerations which are likely to influence the selection of request format when requesting something which has been made available to an interlocutor. First, if something is available to one interactant, it is expectable that the same thing be available to the requester. Also note that in each example there is an additional basis for the speaker to suppose that the request will be granted. In extract 5.10 Anna delivers the target turn just as Katherine’s discarded yoghurt is placed in the centre of the table and it is clear that Katherine will not be eating it (lines 20-21). In extract 5.11 earlier in the meal Linda told Anna to eat her Weetabix first, before she would be given a yoghurt (see the extended version of extract 5.10 below) and so it is expectable that yoghurt will eventually be forthcoming. In example 5.12 Mike offers a roll to both Anna and Katherine (line 10), but responds to Katherine without orienting to Anna. Note that in each example the first request is produced with the omission of an overt reference form, using a pro-term ‘I want one’ or ‘I want two of those’. The omission of an overt reference form requires that the recipient refer back to the prior interaction to make sense of the turn and the connectedness and continuity between the request and the preceding interaction is emphasised (Oh, 2005). Note that in extract 5.10 Anna states ‘I want two of those like Katherine’. This further enhances the display of entitlement as it is emphasised that the object of the request is one which has been made available to a co-interactant and as such should also be given to the requester.

On the other hand, requesting something which has been made available to a sibling makes available the inference that one may be requesting it merely
because the sibling has it. ‘I want’ constructions foreground the speaker and request the object as simply a relation between speaker and object, irrespective of the sibling or any contingency in the parents’ granting the request. The use of the mental state term ‘want’ emphasises the request’s subject-side and proposes that Anna is truly at one with the request, which is made for her own sake rather than any other reason such as to emulate a sibling. Here we can see that the formulation of what proponents of Theory of Mind take to be an internal mental experience of desire, ‘I want X’, functions as a device in and for interaction in an environment where it may otherwise be assumed by the talk’s recipients (the parents) that the request is made because of a speaker-sibling rather than a speaker-object relationship. Let us now turn to extract 5.13 (an extended version of extract 5.10) in detail.

*Extract 5.13 Crouch 3 02:10*

01       (7.2)
02   Kat: I don’t ea::t (.) all mi::ne (.) ↑↑yoghurt ( )↑↑
03       (2.0)
04   Lin: >you’re have to have< so[me chee]rios as well=
05   Ann: [hh ]
06   Lin: =th[en if you’re not goinna eat that one]
07   Ann: [ [beeh gesuh: ] neh!ver
08              guuh ((singing)) ]
09   [((reaches over and points at Kath’s yoghurt))] (2.0)
10   Ann: [gu::h yogh::ur ]
11   Ann: [((taps Kath’s yoghurt))] (0.8)
12   Kat: don’t want ↑eaa::t↑ that o:ne
13       (0.3)
14   Lin: if you don’t eat that one you’re going to need to eat
15          some cheerios cause that’s not enough one little
16          yoghurt; before you go to schoo:l.
17       (1.6)
18   Lin: |((separates full yoghurt from Kath’s eaten one and

151
Let us first consider the various features of the extract. Prior to the beginning of the video recording, Anna has been given cereal for breakfast while Katherine has been given two yoghurts (data not shown). Two minutes into the meal Katherine announces that she will not be eating the second of these (line 2). In response, Linda tells Katherine that she will have to eat some Cheerios instead if she does not eat the second yoghurt (lines 4, 6). Anna breaks into this turn as she leans across the table and points at the yoghurt while singing (lines 7, 9). She then moves back into her chair momentarily before leaning over again and tapping the yoghurt. Following Katherine’s second announcement ‘don’t want ↑ea::t↑ that o:ne’ Linda delivers a second directive, with an account that justifies the directive while restricting Katherine’s response options, specifying that she will indeed have to eat some Cheerios (‘cause that’s not enough one little yoghurt¿ before you go to schoo:l.’). Linda then picks up both yoghurt pots which are attached together and separates them, placing the uneaten yoghurt towards the middle
of the table. Note that at this point it is clear that Katherine will not be eating the yoghurt. Anna immediately cries out and reaches towards the yoghurt (line 22) and breaks into Linda’s turn to deliver the target turn ‘I want one’.

On the one hand, the design of this turn indexes entitlement to have the request granted as it puts into place the absence of something for Anna which is available to Katherine. The omission of an overt reference term requires that Linda refer back to the preceding interaction to make sense of the request. This marks the turn as reactive and secondary to the preceding talk, highlighting that yoghurt was something that is available to Katherine and as such, should also be available to Anna. On the other hand the ‘I want’ construction emphasises the subject-side of the request and proposes that Anna is requesting the yoghurt for her own sake, as a relationship between speaker and object, irrespective of other considerations that may be circumstantial to the request, such as the fact that Katherine has yoghurt.

Note that Linda does not reject the request, rather she uses a ‘need’ construction (line 31) to propose an intervening action that must be carried out before the request will be granted; namely, that Anna must eat her Weetabix before she is given additional food. Analysis of my materials shows that ‘need’ statements following a request from an interlocutor work as a way of delaying compliance while maintaining alignment with the base action (this will be discussed in detail in chapter 6). The turn is formulated as a delay of the provision of yoghurt, rather than a rejection, and so it is expectable that following the completion of this precondition (once Anna has eaten her Weetabix), yoghurt will be provided. The design of Anna’s second request displays an orientation to this expectability and treats yoghurt as something that will be forthcoming as she further specifies the request ‘I want two yoghurts’. Note that ‘two yoghurts’ is precisely that which Katherine was given to eat in the first instance. Rather ingeniously this highlights Katherine’s failure to finish her breakfast. Again we can note that on the one
hand the design of the turn invokes an absence of something for Anna which is available to Katherine. On the other hand, the 'I want' format builds the request as a relationship between speaker and object, irrespective of other considerations which may be incidental to the request, and grounds for rejecting it, such as that Anna does not really want the yoghurt, but is asking for it merely because her sister was given yoghurt.

A similar pattern is observable in extract 5.13 in which Anna delivers an objectless 'I want' construction at precisely the moment at which Mike begins preparing a bread roll for Katherine.

Extract 5.13 Crouch 1 00:27

01 Mik: does any’ne w[ant a] roll to make a hot dog
02 Lin: [Anna?]
03 what d’you say [Anna?]
04 Kat: [↑me] me me↑me↑me:
05 Ann: me [me me me::
06 Lin: [()]
07 | (1.2) | |
08 Mik: |((takes rolls out of packet))|
09 Ann: |gyep|
10 Kat: mum it’s only little piece of |
11 | (0.4) |
12 Mik: well you can make it (.) like a sort of [hot dog]
13 (to Kath)
14 → Ann: [I WANT]*
15 → WA:[N ]
16 Mik: [y’]can
17 [put some prawns there as well if you want.] (to
18 Kath)
19 Mik: [((cuts roll with knife)) ]
20 Lin: [sa:lt ]
21 Lin: [((gets up and walks into kitchen))]
22 → Ann: >#huh.hh#< I want one like that::t
The first thing to note is that this extract is peppered with offers (lines 1, 16-18) as the family prepare to eat. These are built with the transitive verb ‘want’. As noted by Curl (2006) offers built using this format propose to provide something that the recipient ‘needs’ or ‘desires’. Katherine is first to respond to this offer (line 4) and so Mike takes a roll out of the packet (line 8) and engages with Katherine as he prepares the roll for her (line 12). Note that Anna’s acceptance of the offer at line 14 is a direct repetition of Katherine’s prior turn. Mike does not respond to Anna as she delivers an ‘I want’ construction (lines 14-15) which breaks into Mike’s turn (which is addressed to Katherine) as he prepares a bread roll for Katherine. Anna abandons this turn and the object of the utterance is left unspecified. She begins a second turn at line 30 ‘I want one like that’. The omission of an overt reference form indexes the ongoing interaction (Oh, 2005) and highlights that as Mike is preparing a bread roll for Katherine, one should also be prepared for Anna. Note that the turn is the second part of an offer-acceptance pair with Mike’s turn at line 1 serving as the first pair part. Anna’s initial response ‘me me me::’ is recognisable as a second pair part. The ‘I want’ format is built as a first pair part and undercuts the ‘firstness’ of the offer. By producing a request format following an offer, the turn is marked as a new first pair part which projects a response from Mike. This works to establish recipiency and reinitiate Anna’s interaction with Mike as he engages with Katherine. Note that the turn is not built as ‘can I have a roll?’ which projects yes or no as possible response options. Rather, the ‘I want’ format invokes entitlement and does not index contingencies for the request’s granting. The subject-side format of the request constructs the request as a relationship between speaker and object irrespective of other considerations which may be circumstantial to the request such as an offer being made, or a roll having been made available to Katherine. We can see then that the selection of request format displays recognition of the prior interaction and the interactional context within which Anna is operating, where the ‘I want’ format is designed to manage the considerations involved in requesting something which is also available to an interlocutor.
In summary, this section has examined children’s uses of ‘I want’ to deliver a request when it is expectable that it will be granted. The use of a declarative ‘I want’ format, which does not project refusal as a response option, displays entitlement to deliver the request and an orientation to understandings reached in the preceding interaction. In section 2.3.1 I examined requests for an object that is also available to a sibling. The use of ‘I want’ in this environment has two effects. First, by indexing the speaker, rather than the contingencies of the recipient, and through the use of a declarative rather than an interrogative form (which would formally solicit a yes/no response) these turns display entitlement to make the request. In doing so speakers display an orientation to the expectation that if something is available to a sibling, it should also be available to the requester. Second, these formats propose that the object of the request is one which the speaker requests for their own sake rather than, for example, to emulate or thwart a sibling. When requesting something which is available to a sibling it is inferable that the request is motivated by the projected object being one which a sibling possesses. The use of an ‘I want’ format manages this and proposes that the requester is truly at one with the request.

3.0 Chapter summary

This chapter has examined children’s uses of ‘I want’ in request sequences. I began by showing how this request format displays entitlement to make a request by deploying a subject-side format in which any contingencies or obstacles to the request being granted are not invoked. I then examined one recurrent environment in which children build requests using ‘I want’ which is when it is expectable that the request will not be granted. I showed how the emphasis of the subject-side of the request, which proposes that the request is made simply as a relationship between speaker and object, manages the contingencies involved in delivering a potentially unacceptable request. Interrogative formats concede authority to request recipients and as such allow
for the possibility of refusal. However while recipients may be entitled to and may choose to refuse the object of a request, that this is something that the speaker ‘wants’ is not so easily denied. In plain terms, the speaker ‘wants’ the object, regardless of the possibility of refusal. In this section I also showed how speakers may use ‘I want’ constructions to downgrade and minimise requests by restricting their scope.

In section 2.3 I discussed children’s use of ‘I want’ to request something when it is expectable that the request will be granted. Here the use of ‘I want’, which does not project the possibility of refusal, displays an orientation to this expectability and entitlement to make the request. In section 2.3.1 I examined children’s requests when the object of the request is something which is already available to a sibling. On the one hand, when requesting something available to a sibling it is expectable, without a special case having to be made, that the request will be granted and that the object will be made available to the requester. On the other hand, requesting something which is possessed by a sibling makes available the inference that the request is made precisely because the sibling possesses the object. The use of an ‘I want’ format in this environment has two effects. On the one hand the format displays entitlement to make the request. On the other hand the ‘I want’ construction proposes that the request is made because of a speaker-object, rather than speaker-sibling relationship.

This chapter extends understandings of children’s request sequences. I have extended Wootton’s (1981) analysis in which he suggests that the syntactic constraints placed on the recipient’s next turn governs the selection of request format. What has become clear from the analysis here is that in addition to syntactic constraints, the selective emphasis of the subject-side, realised via the mental state term ‘want’ is a key feature of these requests.
In examining the interactional currency of ‘I want’ constructions in children’s talk a key area that was investigated is what is called ‘desire psychology’ in contemporary social cognitive research. As noted throughout the thesis, according to this view, the word ‘want’ appears in the vocabulary of the child to correspond with a private experience of desire. The use of ‘I want’ is taken as evidence that the child understands others in terms of their desires before they reach a fully developed, representational Theory of Mind and are able to understand others in terms of their beliefs (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). My analysis shows that rather than simply expressing a desire as this corresponds with a private, inner entity, children’s actual uses of ‘I want’ to deliver requests are orderly, sequential phenomena. In sum, a referential view of language which is dominant in contemporary cognitive psychology, does not adequately account for children’s uses of mental state terms in talk-in-interaction. By selecting ‘I want’ formats in particular environments young children display the ability to design their talk with reference to the ongoing sequential context. Rather than making guesses about references to putative internal states and trying to determine what this reveals about children’s development into adulthood, here I have examined one practice for managing the interactional contingencies involved in delivering particular types of requests, as I have shown how children may use ‘I want’ constructions in the service of sequentially unfolding social interaction.
Directing and requesting

You can't always get what you want
But if you try sometimes you might find
You get what you need
(Jagger & Richards, 1969, tr. 9)

1.0 Introduction

This chapter examines speakers’ uses of ‘I want you to X’, ‘you need to X’ and ‘I need X’ to build directives and requests. I show how speaker selection of these formats is a sequential phenomena. As noted throughout the thesis, it is a central premise of work in contemporary cognitive psychology that mental state terms map onto internal referents. That is, that the term ‘want’ reflects an individual experience of desire. The term ‘need’ is understood as referring to a particular class of objects which are “essential or very important rather than just desirable” (Oxford English dictionary, online). Rather than understanding the term ‘want’ as a reflection of a desire, or ‘need’ as an intrinsic feature of the requested object or action, I show how notions of ‘wanting’ and ‘needing’ may be invoked to manage a range of interactional considerations. In section 2 I focus on deferred action directives which are built using ‘I want you to X’ and show how this format is deployed to manage the contingencies involved in directing someone on something which is their business when one cannot monitor or control whether the projected action will be carried out. In section 3 I show how speakers deliver deferred action directives using ‘you need to X’, where the directive is built is an upshot of the prior talk. In section 4 I examine requests built using an ‘I need X’ format. ‘I need X’ formats recurrently occur in second position following a request or directive from an interlocutor and delay the provision of the relevant SPP while maintaining alignment. We shall see
then, that the particular format used to deliver a directive or a request is systematically related to the interactional environment in which it is produced.

2.0 ‘I want’ formatted directives

There are a variety of different ways of building requests and directives. In this section I examine directives built using ‘I want you to X’. The prototypical format for delivering a directive is the imperative such as ‘pass me the salt’. However as Huddleston and Pullam (2005) note, imperatives can be used to build a variety of turn types such as “offers, (have a pear), requests (please pass me the salt), invitations (come to dinner), advice (get your doctor to look at it), instructions (to see the picture click here) and so on” (p.8). The examples in this chapter are understood as directives or requests in part due to their location and in part due to the type of activity that they propose. In distinguishing between directives and requests I draw on Curl and Drew’s (2008) notion of entitlement and contingency in requests, and on Craven and Potter’s (2010) characterisation of directives as actions which embody no orientation to the recipient’s ability or desire to carry out the projected action. The examples in this section can be understood as directives by virtue of speakers’ orientations to their entitlement to issue the directive and the absence of any display of understanding of the contingencies involved with the recipient’s ability to carry out the projected action.

Directives built as ‘I want you to X’ are relatively rare, with eleven instances in the data corpus. My aim is to explicate the interactional work which is being managed by this expression. To that end I show how directives built with ‘I want you to X’ invoke authority and mobilise the recipient’s obligation to the director while on the other hand, they orient to the projected action as the recipient’s business. I show that directives built as ‘I want you to X’ are Janus faced in the sense that they have two contrasting aspects. On the one hand their action import is to tell rather than ask the recipient to do something, but on
the other hand they ostensibly orient to optionality. In other words, they are produced as if they are refusable when in fact, normatively, they are not. Before going on to consider these features I will first outline the typical environments in which speakers frame directives using ‘I want you to X’.

2.1 Particular interaction environment

There are several features which are typical of the interaction environment in which speakers build directives using ‘I want you to X’. First, the format is selected by speaker A when speaker A is directing speaker B on something which is speaker B’s business, rather than making a request on their own (speaker A’s) behalf, such as for assistance or permission. In each example the projected action is within speaker B’s sphere of action and is something to which speaker B has primary access, relative to speaker A. In each example the recipient is required to carry out some action rather than grant permission or to assist speaker A in doing so. This is reflected in the construction of the turn ‘I want you to X’ rather than ‘I want X’. Second, speakers build directives with ‘I want you to X’ when the projected action is deferred (Lindström, 1989 as cited in Lanqvist, 2005) and the turn makes relevant a commitment to a future activity rather than immediate, embodied compliance. Finally, the majority of examples concern an action which is to be carried out when the director will not be present. Several examples are given below.

Extract 6.1 AAF 26:58

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Pat:</td>
<td>((walks into room and puts hand on hip))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Gra:</td>
<td>(let’s get moving o:n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>→ Pat:</td>
<td>oka:y now Kevin and Grant I want you to be ba:ck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>here by six.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Pat:</td>
<td>(.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Pat:</td>
<td>ri:ght?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Mar:</td>
<td>((walks past Pat out of room))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>(Mar):</td>
<td>[ri:ght.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kev: I’m not going any(way,) ((out of camera shot))

Extract 6.2  TF2008 16:20

01 Jan: WHERE YOU GOING?
02 (1.0)
03 Tom: ( we’re not allowed to be in so we’re
04 just gonna go:,)
05 (1.0)
06 → Jan: I WANT YOU BACK BY SI:X,
07 (2.0)
08 Tom: I don’t wanna be back by six s[o ]ma:ybe no:t
09 Jan: [SIX!]

In each of the arrowed turns instructions regarding recipients’ conduct are given. Note that the examples here are deferred action directives and the action which the recipient is directed to carry out cannot take place immediately. Such instructions make relevant a commitment to a future activity. Further, the director will not be present when the projected action is to be carried out. In Extracts 6.1 and 6.2 the recipients are instructed to be back home by a particular time and in extract 6.3 Katherine is told to eat the fruit in her lunch box at school later that day. In these instances, the speaker has no way of monitoring whether the recipient will carry out the projected course of action and there is no way of forcing an unwilling recipient to do so (c.f. Landqvist, 2005). Also note that in each example the projected course of action is something which is within the recipient's sphere of action. That is, Grant and Tom are asked to be home by a particular time and Katherine is told to eat the
fruit in her lunch box. In each example, the turn is built using ‘I want you to X’ and rather than make a request on their own behalf (such as using I want X), the director asks something of someone else.

Certain specific circumstances are likely to have an influence on the construction of turn types in this interaction environment. First, there are contingencies which must be managed when issuing instructions to another regarding something which is the recipient’s business and which is within the recipient’s sphere of action. Second, as the projected course of action is deferred (Lindström, 1989, as cited in Lanqvist, 2005) and is to happen when the speaker will not be present there is no way of monitoring whether the recipient will carry out the action and no means of forcing an unwilling recipient to do so (Landqvist, 2005), just as Simon takes steps to force Emily to clean the bath in the following example.

Extract 6.4 TF2008 5 30:00

01 Sim: ((stands directly in front of Emily and points at bathroom))
02 Sim: I’m not arguin’ with you get in there
03 and do it now
04 (1.0)
05 Sim: >get in clean the bathroom.<
06 Emi: ((steps back away from Simon))
07 Emi: I’ve got to do my BE:[D].
08 Sim: ((pushes Emily into bathroom))
09 Sim: [yes, and you’ve got to
10 [clean the bathroom]
11 Emi: [GET OFF
12 Sim: WELL JUST GO AND DO IT.
13 (0.3)
14 Emi: I [will
15 Sim: ((pushes Emily into bathroom and closes door behind her))
16 Sim: [go and do it] NO YOU DO IT NOW bec’z I wanna go to
Prior to the beginning of extract 6.4 Simon has repeatedly instructed Emily to clean the bath and these directives have been responded to with repeated refusals (data not shown). At the start of the extract Simon stands in front of Emily and points at the bathroom. The directive at line 6 ‘**get in clean the bathroom.**’ receives defiance as Emily provides an account for her refusal and invokes an alternative action which she must do ‘I’ve got to do my BE:[D].’ In response Simon physically pushes Emily into the bathroom (lines 9, 16) and closes the door behind her (line 16). In this example then, the projected action (cleaning the bath) is to be carried out immediately. Following Emily’s refusal to comply Simon uses physical force to ensure that the action is carried out.

While speakers who issue directives which make relevant immediate compliance have resources available to monitor and control whether the projected action is carried out, with deferred action directives speakers do not have resources such as physical force available to them. However there are resources available to speakers when building a directive which work to increase the likelihood of compliance. First, across the examples of ‘I want you to X’ formatted directives within the data corpus, the relationship between speaker and recipient is always asymmetrical in terms of relative deontic authority within the family unit. Notably, there were no examples within the data corpus of children involving themselves in an adult’s business with an ‘I want you to X’ construction. If we *imagine* a child doing that, it sounds rebellious, a usurpation of the direction of parental authority. Thus the speaker can increase the likelihood of compliance by mobilising the recipient’s obligation to them through the invocation of authority and entitlement. Second, speakers can maintain civil relations with a recipient when involving themselves in their business (c.f. Lanqvist, 2005) by orienting to the projected action as *their business*. This is done by building directives as a ‘my-side telling’. According to
Pomerantz (1980) by telling ‘their own side’ of a relevant matter speakers may fish for a response rather than directly asking for one. In doing so the speaker positions themselves as displaying an orientation to respecting the recipient’s right to privacy while simultaneously working around it. Further, the ‘I want’ construction generates an environment where the want may be satisfied, or not. So on the surface the possibility that the projected action will not be carried out is allowed for.

Note that none of the examples here is built with an imperative format. For example the directive in extract 6.1 is built;
oka:y now Kevin and Grant I want you to be ba:ck here by six.

It is not built using an imperative such as;
oka:y now Kevin and Grant be ba:ck here by six.

That is, the example in extract 6.1 does not build a directive by formally, or in speech act terms, directly telling Kevin and Grant to be back by six. We can also note that none of the examples are built using an interrogative format. Extract 6.1 was not built;
oka:y now Kevin and Grant can you be ba:ck here by six.

That is, extract 6.1 does not build a request using an interrogative format addressed to Kevin and Grant regarding their ability to be back by six. As a declarative, the turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response and so does not propose either of these as a possibility.

Directives built using ‘I want’, then, are Janus-faced in the sense that they have two contrasting aspects. On the one hand they strengthen the recipient’s obligation to comply by invoking authority and entitlement while on the other
hand they orient to optionality and appear to give the recipient a way out. In the
following sections I consider each of these two features in turn.

2.2 ‘I want’ mobilises recipients’ obligation to comply

Building a directive with an ‘I want’ preface invokes authority and reflects
speakers’ orientations to their entitlement to issue a directive. Here entitlement
is “pointedly displayed by not orienting to any possibility of the request not
being granted” (Curl & Drew, 2008, p.145). This lack of orientation can clearly
be seen in the following extract, in which Simon, Tom’s father, is stood at
Tom’s bedroom door early in the morning. The previous night Tom and his
sister were involved in a physical fight while they were alone in the house.

Extract 6.5 TF2008 3 29:30

01 Sim: you’re in trouble mate.
02 (1.0)
03 Sim: about last ni:ght.
04 (1.0)
05 Sim: ((starts pointing at Tom))
06 → Sim: I want you home on the fi:rst bu:s,(.) not
07 the second bu:s,
08 (0.4)
09 Sim: okay;
10 (0.2)
11 Sim: no skateboard to schoo:l,
12 (0.5)
13 → Sim: I wanna check your bag before you go to
14 schoo:l,
15 | (1.0)
16 Sim: |((stops pointing at Tom, steps towards him))|
17 Sim: [you’re in trouble.
18 Sim: [((pushes Tom’s bedroom door open further))]
The target turns at lines 6-7 and 13-14 have a clear sense of telling rather than asking. The turn at lines 1-3 (‘you’re in trouble mate.’) invokes Simon’s relative deontic authority. Tom is ‘in trouble’, a notion which implies some sort of punishment, which will presumably be administered by Simon. This turn also deletes Tom’s agency and choice with respect to the events which are to follow. Note that both target turns ‘I want you home on the first bus, not the second bus,’ and ‘I wanna check your bag before you go to school,’ are built as a declarative format. They are not built as interrogatives such as ‘can you get the first bus home?’ which treats compliance with the request as contingent on the recipient’s willingness, ability, or capacity to comply (Vine, 2009). Requests built in this way, formally, can be refused (Craven & Potter, 2010) as yes or no are available as possible response options (Raymond, 2003). As a declarative ‘I want’ does not formally solicit a yes/no response and so propose either of these as a possibility. A further notable feature of the construction of these turns, which distinguishes these from a typical directive, is that the ‘I want’ indexes the speaker, further invoking Simon’s relative deontic authority as his ‘wants’ are treated as a sufficient basis for Tom to comply. Whereas request forms built using a modal such as ‘can you?’, index the recipient (‘you’), and directives tell the recipient to do something often without giving a basis for doing so, here the ‘I want’ construction pointedly indexes the speaker as Simon’s intentional states are provided as the basis upon which Tom should comply. In sum, Tom is treated as going to comply on the basis of Simon’s wants, which further enhances Simon’s display of entitlement.

Note the turn at lines 13-14, which is an implicit directive embedded within a directive sequence. This appears to be a deviant case as the form used does not grammatically present the action as one which Tom, as the recipient, will carry out. Formally, grammatically, the turn differs from that at lines 6-7, where you expresses the agent of the future action. However as Edwards notes “the very notion of an intention to do something, as something worth formulating,
makes relevant a potential gap between thought and action” (2008, p. 180). Thus if Simon were simply able to check Tom’s bag, he would do so. The statement that Simon wants to check the bag, as something worth formulating, displays an orientation to the notion that the projected action requires an action on Tom’s part. Although semantically ‘I wanna check your bag before you go to school,’ refers to a future action that the speaker will carry out, its function is not to simply inform Tom of Simon’s ‘wants’ but to gain Tom’s cooperation, for him to comply and not to leave the house without first showing Simon his bag.

We can see then that building directives with ‘I want you to X’ is a high entitlement way of issuing a directive. The invocation of authority embodied within the design of the turn is one resource for assuring compliance when the speaker cannot monitor whether a recipient will carry out a projected action and cannot force an unwilling recipient to do so.

Let us explore this further in the following example in which multiple directives occur and non-compliance is not oriented to as a response option. In this example Jane has followed Tom, who along with his friend David, has just left the house after being told to do so during a confrontation with his father Simon.

Extract 6.6 TF2008 4 16:20

01 Jan:  WHERE YOU GOING?
02 (1.0)
03 Tom: (     ) we’re not allowed to be in so we’re just gonna go,
04 (1.0)
05 → Jan:  I WANT YOU BACK BY SIX,
06 (2.0)
07 Tom:   I don’t wanna be back by six some [SIX!]
08 Jan:                  [SIX!]
09 Jan:  ((turns and walks back into the house))
Prior to the start of the extract Tom was playing a computer game, which Simon switched off as he told Tom to leave the house. Tom complied and left the house although he displayed a reluctance to do so. Jane is shouting from the front door. She asks Tom, who is out of camera shot in the street, where he is going (line 1). Rather than providing an answer to her question, Tom responds with the complaint implicative ‘we’re not allowed to be in so we’re just gonna go:,’. Jane’s directive at line 6, ‘I WANT YOU BACK BY SIX’ has a clear sense of telling rather than asking. It is notable that the projected action, that Tom be back home by six, is a deferred action directive which requires a commitment to a future activity and is to be put into action when Jane will not be present, such that Jane will be unable to ensure that the action will be carried out. Again, the turn is not built as an interrogative request and so does not formally solicit a yes/no response. The verb format ‘I want’ indexes Jane and her wishes, rather than the contingencies of the recipient. The turn is built, then, without allowing for the possibility that it may be refused.

At line 8 Tom responds to the directive with defiance. Not only does this turn embody a rejection of the projected course of action (he may not be back by six) but he explicitly rejects Jane’s deontic authority (he does not want to be back by six) as he invokes his own wants which contrast with Jane’s ‘I don’t wanna be back by six so maybe not’. The repeat of the directive at line 9 is produced in overlap with Tom’s talk. In displaying a lack of orientation to Tom’s talk this overlap in itself embodies entitlement. This is further evidenced as Tom’s response is treated as a failing; ‘SIX!’. No account is offered for the directive, which would suggest an analysis that an insufficient basis for compliance had been offered. The directive is not
repeated in full, which would suggest that it might not have been heard by Tom. Rather, the partial repeat deletes the prior turn which is not allowed to shift the trajectory of the ongoing sequence. While second requests may orient to a new trajectory brought about by the recipient’s choice to refuse the request, the turn at line 9 does not acknowledge the recipient’s right not to comply. It is irrelevant that Tom does not want to be home by six, as he has been told to do so. Immediately following this partial repeat Jane turns and walks back into the house (line 10) and engages with Simon (lines 11, 13), effectively terminating the interaction with Tom, whose defiant response ‘no’ is not oriented to, responded to or perhaps even heard.

In summary, building directives with ‘I want’ displays speakers’ orientations to their entitlement to issue a directive. There are two key features of these turns through which entitlement is invoked and displayed. First, the declarative format of the turn does not officially solicit yes or no as a response and does not project refusal as a response option. Second, in contrast to classic request forms such as ‘can I X?’ the modal indexes the speaker and attends to their wants, rather than the contingencies which may be involved in the recipient granting the request. In essence, the recipient is treated as going to carry out the projected action on the basis of what the speaker wants.

2.3 Reporting a ‘want’ as a fishing device

So far it has been noted that rather than ask recipients to do something, ‘I want you to X’ constructions are used to build directives that tell recipients to carry out an action. We have seen how these formats embody high entitlement as the recipient is treated as obliged to carry out the projected course of action on the basis of what the speaker wants. However the ‘I want’ format changes the grammar of the turn so that formally the recipient is not being told what to do. Rather the speaker’s ‘want’ is simply reported which generates an environment where it may be fulfilled or not, which (on the literal surface at least) allows for
the possibility that the projected action may not be carried out. Invoking one’s mental states indexes a potential gap between thought and action (Edwards, 2008). In particular, intentional states such as want, wish and hope allow for the possibility of the intention not being realised, as after all one doesn’t always get what one wants. Formally the recipient is not being told what to do as is the case with classic directive forms. Neither are they directly asked to do something, as with requests. Further, these turns take the form of my-side tellings which orient to the recipient’s ‘own side’, the projected action, as the recipient’s business (Pomerantz, 1980). Thus we can see that directives built using ‘I want’ are Janus-faced and on the one hand are designed to display an orientation to optionality, while on the other hand they restrict recipient’s response options. An initial orientation to optionality which is closed down once the directive is reissued can be seen clearly in extract 6.7 in which Pat directs her sons Kevin and Grant to be back home at a particular time later that day.

**Extract 6.7 AAFE3 26:58**

01 Pat: [((walks into room and puts hand on hip))]

02 Gra: [let’s get moving o:n]

03 → Pat: oka:y now Kevin and Grant I want you to be ba:ck here by six.

05 (.)

06 Pat: ri:ght?

07 (.)

08 Mar: [((walks past Pat out of room))]

09 (Mar): [ri:ght.]

10 Kev: I’im not going any(way,) ((out of camera shot))

11 Gra: [((runs past Pat out of room))]

12 Pat: [you’re no:t go:i:ng !good.: o:kay,]

13 Pat: |((walks towards door, following Grant))|

14 |(0.2) |

15 Pat: Gra:nt

16 (.)

17 (Mic):(ye:s)
At the start of the extract Pat walks into the room just as Grant is about to leave the house (let’s get moving o:n). Note that the turn at lines 3-4 is not built as an imperative ‘Kevin and Grant be back here by six’ and so grammatically and formally does not tell the recipients to do something. Rather Pat’s ‘want’ is simply reported. Again there is a formal allowance for optionality as this ‘want’ may be fulfilled or not. The turn is built as a my-side telling. According to Pomerantz by telling ‘their own side’ of a relevant matter speakers may fish for a response rather than directly asking for one. In doing so the speaker positions themselves as displaying an orientation to respecting the recipient’s right to privacy while simultaneously working around it. Here then, Pat displays an orientation to Kevin and Grant’s right to direct their own behaviour, without fully respecting this right.

Following a slight gap (line 5) a response is pursued with the incremental ‘ri:ght?’, an attached interrogative clause with positive polarity which projects a ‘yes’. We can see that the ostensible orientation to optionality, and the gap between the ‘wanting’ and its realisation, is closed down as a ‘yes’ response is pursued. Following a sequence during which it is determined that Kevin will not be leaving the house anyway (lines 10-12) Pat again pursues a response from Grant (lines 15, 18) who has begun to leave the house. In his turn at line 19 Grant responds to the summons ‘yea::h’ rather than provide the response to the directive which is being pursued. The directive is then
redone using an imperative format ‘YOU BE BACK HERE BY ↑SIX↑ O
clock.’ This imperative format restricts Grant’s response options solely to
compliance. The pattern that we see in this example is a move from a report of
Pat’s ‘wants’ that orients at least notionally to optionality to an interrogative
which projects a ‘yes’, to an imperative format. As Craven and Potter note, this
lack of acknowledgement of the recipient’s right not to comply is typical as
repeat directives typically “upgrade the issuer’s entitlement and downgrade the
recipient’s contingency” (2010, p. 8). In sum, the gap between thought and
action and the possibility that the ‘want’ may be satisfied or not, is closed down
as a ‘yes’ is first pursued (line 15) and finally, Grant’s response options are
restricted solely to compliance (line 18).

The following example (an extended version of extract 6.3) is a further
illustration of an orientation to optionality which is subsequently closed down as
the recipient’s response options are restricted. This is brought off and carefully
managed in a way that maintains civil relations with the recipient.

Extract 6.8 Crouch 7 06:54

01 Lin: <right> Katherine?
02 (0.5)
03 → Lin: [[I want you to eat your fruit in your]=
04 Lin: [[[pours milk into Anna’s bowl]]]
05 Lin: =[lunchbox today ]
06 Lin: [[[looks at Katherine]]]
07 | (0.9) |
08 |[[[looks at Linda, continues eating]]]
09 Lin: <alright> c’I know you ev your fruit at snack ti:me,
10 (0.3) but you a:so need to eat your fruit at lu:nch
11 ti:me.
12 | (1.3) |
13 Lin: [[(walks back towards her chair)]]
14 Lin: m:kay cause (.) you never do: and it’s a waste of
15 fruit but it’s very important that you have fruit.
At lines 3 through 5 Linda issues a directive using 'I want' 'I want you to eat your fruit in your lunchbox today'. Again, this directive concerns an aspect of Katherine’s behaviour which Linda is unable to monitor or control, namely that she eat the fruit in her lunch box at school that afternoon. Following a slight delay (line 7) Linda pre-empts a possible objection and provides a series of accounts for the directive (lines 9-11, 14-15) before a reformulation of the turn and a specific pursuit of a response (lines 18-21). By this time Katherine’s response options are limited to a formulation of which fruit she wants, a banana or something else. Whether or not she will eat her fruit is clearly not up for negotiation.

While the series of accounts for the directive (lines 9-11, 14-15) restrict Katherine’s response options to whether she wants a banana or another fruit, this is carefully managed. Each account for the directive (‘you also need to eat your fruit at lunch time.’ ‘it’s a waste of fruit but it’s very important that you have fruit.’) invokes external constraints and general rules about fruit consumption that apply to anyone. 

With directives, essentially one person involves themselves in another’s
business without asking or wondering about their capacity to comply (Craven & Potter, 2010). Here the potential negative implications of this are countered through the invocation of general rules, rather than further personal investment. Although Katherine’s response options are severely limited and she has been told to eat her fruit, this is formulated as a result of the way that things are in the world, rather than Linda involving herself in Katherine’s business. In sum, there is an orientation towards Katherine’s rights to direct her own behaviour (the base directive is formulated to allow for the possibility it may not be realised, the accounts provided are formulated as external constraints rather than a personal investment on Linda’s behalf) however these rights are not fully respected as her response options are limited and she is essentially told rather than asked to eat her fruit that day.

2.4: Summary

Extracts 6.1 to 6.8 are typical instances of how ‘I want you to X’ formatted directives are constructed in the family mealtime data. First, these directives are formulated to invoke authority and entitlement as the recipient is treated as obliged to carry out the projected action on the basis of what the speaker wants. On the other hand, the ‘I want’ construction changes the grammar of the turn so that formally the recipient is not being told what to do. Rather, the speakers’ want is simply reported which generates an environment where it may be satisfied, or not. ‘I want you to X’ formatted directives then, are Janus-faced and work to increase the likelihood of compliance when building deferred action directives by invoking authority and entitlement while ostensibly orienting to optionality.

3.0 ‘You need to X’ formatted directives

In the prior section I showed how speakers may build directives using ‘I want you to X’ to manage the contingencies involved in instructing someone on
something which is their business when one will not be able to monitor or control whether the projected action will be carried out. However ‘I want you to X’ constructions are not the only format that speakers may use to deliver deferred action directives. In this section I examine directives which are built using ‘you need to X’. Unlike their ‘I want you to X’ counterparts ‘you need to X’ formats are interactionally generated and propose to solve a problem which is educed from the prior talk. As noted above, certain specific circumstances are likely to influence the construction of turn types when delivering a deferred action directive. First, in each example the projected action is the recipient’s business and is an action which the recipient is required to carry out. Second, speakers cannot force an unwilling recipient to carry out a particular action. In what follows I show how ‘you need to X’ formats manage these contingencies by building directives as an upshot of the preceding talk, while allowing the director to officially, grammatically, avoid telling the speaker what to do.

The following extract is taken from the TF2008 corpus. As background, earlier in the day Emily announced that she has been sacked from her job. Emily is somewhat accountable for this as she often missed work because of staying out late at nightclubs. She is lying in bed crying for the duration of the extract.

*Extract 6.9 TF2008 5:22*

01 Emi: hhh
02 Sim: can I be Dad for a moment.
03 Emi: °°um°°
04 Sim: you’re burnin the candle at both ends.
05 Emi: °.shihh°
06 Sim: aren’t you.
07 Emi: ()
08 Sim: [a_aren’t you,]
09 Sim: [((nods))]
10 Sim: [(nods)]
11 Sim: [((nods))]
12 Sim: [(nods)]
Sim: and what does this do when you do this,

(0.8)

Emi: *hnhh*

Sim: does it make you feel shit?

(1.2)

Emi: *hm*

(1.0)

Sim: aye?

Emi: #yeah#

Sim: right.

(0.4)

Sim: so you need to do some rest

(1.8)

Sim: don’t you.

(0.1)

Sim: you need to get some early nights, [get your sleep] pattern

Emi: [hhh ]

Sim: =back to normal,

(0.2)

Emi: .shih

(0.3)

Sim: have a bit of rest

(0.1)

Emi: ~#yeah#~

(1.0)

Sim: yeah?

Let us first consider the various features of the extract. At the start of the extract Simon initiates a pre-sequence as he frames what is to follow as him ‘being Dad’, which implies that some sort of advice, or instructions regarding Emily’s conduct are to follow. He uses the idiomatic expression ‘burnin the candle at both ends.’ to describe Emily’s current behaviour, implying that she is ‘overdoing it’. Note that at various points throughout the extract Simon pursues a verbal response from Emily (lines 8, 10, 16, 20, 26) which, as she is
lying in bed crying, is often not forthcoming. In his turn at line 13 Simon produces a post-expansion using a ‘wh’ interrogative (‘and what does this do when you do this,’). Note that the turn initial ‘and’ emphasises continuity. He then revises this using a yes/no interrogative (line 16), as he provides a candidate answer; that ‘doing this’ (spending nights out clubbing and sleeping all day) makes her ‘feel shit?’. This turn is built to restrict Emily’s response options as Simon moves from an open ‘wh’ interrogative to a yes/no format which makes relevant an agreeing response. Note that Simon treats Emily’s weak agreement form (Pomerantz, 1984) (line 18) as insufficient through the pursuit of a further response which projects a ‘yes’ (line 20). Following explicit agreement from Emily (line 21) Simon delivers the target turn ‘so you need to do some rest’. In this sequence then, Simon delivers a series of interrogatives as he formulates Emily’s actions as problematic (going out to nightclubs all night and staying in bed all day makes her feel shit) and recruits Emily as he elicits agreement from her in this matter. The target turn, which is delivered with a turn initial ‘so’, emphasises continuity and is built as a logical consequence of what has proceeded. That is, the ‘you need to X’ formatted directive is delivered to solve a problem which is educed from the preceding talk. Note that the turn is not built using an imperative format, such as ‘do some rest’. Neither is it built using an interrogative, such as ‘will you do some rest?’. Formally Simon does not tell Emily what to do. Rather he merely reports some circumstance and it is left to Emily as the recipient to determine the upshot of this. However we can note that by this point, following the question-answer sequence which culminated in Emily’s agreement that her current actions are making her ‘feel shit?’, her response options are severely restricted. This is further evidenced as Simon pursues a response with the tag ‘don’t you.’ which strongly projects a ‘yes’ response.

Let us consider a further comparable example taken from the AAF corpus. As background, Lance, who lives away from home, is on the telephone to the rest of his family. The phone has been passed around to various family members.
Prior to the start of the extract Lance spent some time talking to Pat and told her that he currently has the flu. Pat has expressed concern as Lance is currently out of work and does not have money to visit a doctor.

**Extract 6.10 AAF 1 54:08**

01 Del: (passes telephone to Pat))
02 Pat: La::nce;
03 Lan: ye:s is this you::;
04 Pat: yes
05 Lan: well listen I just want to say goodbye before my
06 voice goe::s]
07 → Pat: [oh-] listen you’re talking too much
08 >right now,< you need to go to be::d,
09 Lan: uhu::h, I’m only kidding but- I-I will go to bed
10 right no::w
11 Pat: okay darling you be sure to call me >an if you--
12 if there is any cha::nge, I’m gonna be here all
13 day and all night.
14 Lan: okay ( ) u[ hu]:h
15 Pat: [an’] and so you be sure an
16 call me and let me know what is going o:n (.)
17 back there with you ri::ght;
18 Lan: oka:y Mom right
19 Pat: okay now- now plea::se take care of yourself.
20 Lan: I rea:llly will mu:m tha:ns mu:m

In his turn at lines 5-6 Lance tells Pat that he wants to say goodbye before his ‘voice goe::s’, which implies that his illness is severe (as it is serious enough to prevent him from talking). Pat responds by telling Lance ‘you’re talking too much >right now,<’. Similarly to extract 6.9, this turn is built to make problematic some aspect of Lance’s conduct, i.e. as he is ill and is struggling to talk, he shouldn’t be doing so. In the second part of the turn Pat tells Lance ‘you need to go to be::d,’. Again we can note that the projected action, that Lance go to bed, is an action which Lance, as the
recipient, is to carry out, and is something which is Lance’s business. The directive is delivered in the second part of a two-part turn, with the first TCU formulating Lance’s actions (talking on the telephone while sick) as problematic. The ‘you need to X’ format is built to offer a remedy and a solution to the problem educed in the preceding talk. We can note that again the turn is not built ‘go to bed’. That is, Pat formally reports some circumstance (that Lance needs to go to bed) and it is left to Lance as the recipient to determine the upshot of this.

The examples in extracts 6.9 and 6.10 then, are built to address an overt problem which is educed from the prior talk. In extract 6.9 Simon delivers a question-answer sequence in which he builds Emily’s current circumstances as problematic and subsequently elicits agreement from her in this matter. In extract 6.10, following Lance’s announcement that his voice is about ‘to go’, Pat tells Lance that he is ‘talking too much’. In each example the ‘you need to X’ directive is built as an upshot of the prior talk, as a logical consequence of the recipient’s circumstances, rather than a matter in which the speaker has personal investment. Let us now consider one final example, taken from the Potts corpus.

Extract 6.11 Potts 9 06:34

01  (2.6)
02  Way: [the ball were so: solid ]
03  Way: [(makes fist with hand)]
04  Don: hmm
05  Way: an neur- David Brandon blasted it,
06  (0.6)
07  Jud: were Brandon?
08  Way: yea:h
09  (1.4)
10  Way: he blasted it he’s got Ronaldo kicks him.
11  → Jud: you need to get that (. ) !pee ee top off him an all!
12  your pee ee to:p,
As background, Judy works as a playground monitor at Wayne’s school. Prior to the start of the extract Judy started to tell a story about performing first aid on a girl who had been hit in the face by a football, who cried throughout the event. At the start of the extract Wayne describes the ball ‘the ball were so: solid’, as David Brandon ‘blasted it’. This accounts for why the girl cried, as this must have been particularly painful. In her turn at lines 11-12 Judy tells Wayne that he must retrieve his P.E top from David Brandon. Unlike the previous two excerpts, this directive does not logically follow the preceding sequence. That is, there is no source of trouble in the prior sequence which the turn is built to address. Nevertheless, the turn medial ‘an all↑’ emphasises continuity and connects the directive with the preceding sequence. Wayne responds with ‘°I know°’. Notably, he does not respond with ‘I will’, rather he ratifies the status of the turn as telling him something that he needs to do. Judy could conceivably have built the turn ‘I want you to get that pee ee top off him’. As noted in section 2, doing so would invoke personal investment, as if Judy is personally motivated to deliver the directive. The use of ‘you need’ rather than ‘I want’ builds the turn as a logical consequence of the way things are in the world. By using a ‘you need to X’ format Judy formally, grammatically reports some circumstance, rather than ask Wayne to do something, or indeed to officially tell him to do so. Unlike their ‘I want you to X’ formatted counterparts
here there is no ostensible allowance for optionality and it is clear from the outset that non-compliance is not a response option.

In sum, in this section I have examined deferred action directives which are built using ‘you need to X’. Unlike their ‘I want you to X’ counterparts, these turns are built as an upshot of the preceding talk and address a problem which is educed in the prior sequence. There is no ostensible allowance for optionality as response options are limited and speakers are told from the outset what they ‘need’ to do. However formally the recipient is not told what to do. Rather, the speaker merely reports some circumstance and it is left to the recipient to determine the upshot of this. Nonetheless, it is clear that non-compliance is not a response option. These turns are built as an upshot of the preceding talk, as a result of the way things are in the world, rather than invoking personal investment on behalf of the speaker. The speaker formally, officially merely reports some circumstance. Grammatically, the speaker does not tell the recipient what to do. These two features then, the invocation of authority while ostensibly not telling the recipient what to do, work in combination to manage the contingencies involved in directing someone on something which is their business when one cannot monitor or control whether the projected action is carried out.

4.0 ‘I need’ formatted requests

As noted throughout this chapter, requesting may be accomplished through a variety of formats. In this section I examine speaker selection of ‘need’ as a transitive verb in declarative requests. Within the data corpus there are eleven candidate request sequences built using ‘I need’. In the following section I begin by outlining the basic features of requests built using ‘I need’. I then discuss two recurrent environments in which these requests occur. First I show how these formats are produced in second position following a request or directive from an interlocutor where they are constructed as a prerequisite to
compliance with that base FPP. Second, I consider how speakers subvert this feature of these turns as a way of exiting a trouble relevant sequence.

4.1 ‘I need’ as a way of building a ‘no problem’ request

There are several features which are typical of the ways in which requests built using ‘I need’ are produced and are responded to. With this format speakers orient to requests as ones which they are entitled to make. In turn, recipients typically orient to the object of the request as something which should routinely be granted. The selection of ‘need’ as a transitive verb, then, is implicated in bringing off requests as ‘no problem’. In the following extract, taken from a family mealtime, Wayne requests a new back wheel for his bike.

Extract 6.12 Potts 7 06:40

01 (44.5)
02 Way: [(looks at table)]
03 → Way: [nee new back wheel °for me bi:ke°]
04 | (3.2) |
05 Way: [(glances at Don)] |
06 Don: [(nods and stares straight ahead)] |
07 Don: w’get you one.
08 | (6.9) |
09 Don: [(licks sauce from fingers)]
10 Way: [(chews food)] |
11 Jud: then you can buckle ano:ther one
12 | (4.4)|
13 Way: [(chews food)]|
14 Jud: [(pulls face at Wayne)]
15 Way: mi:ne just buckle:di: |
16 | (3.6) |
17 Jud: [(chews food)]|
18 Don: [(coughs)] .pt
19 Way: °went° down steps, ( [ ])}
Don: take it down, Harry Shields, (0.2) and get them to fix it, (1.8)
Don: no matter what it cost, (0.4) get it fixed (7.4)
Don: ((puts food in mouth and chews))
Don: [it doesn’t matter, cause it’s a good bike,]
Don: [((looks at Wayne))]
Don: if it were a rubbish bike you’d throw it away and get another (1.2)
Don: considering you’ve only had it four months (5.0)
Jud: and hardly used it,

We can begin by noting that as Wayne delivers the request 'need new back wheel for me bike' he looks down at the table (line 2) and does not make eye contact with Don, the recipient. There are several design features of the turn which evidence its status as a routine, likely to succeed request. First, note that the turn is not built as an interrogative; 'can I have a new back wheel for my bike?' which formally solicits a yes/no response (Raymond, 2003) and so proposes either of these as a possibility. Rather, as a declarative statement the turn does not require a granting or a rejection. This sense of the request as one which does not formally require a granting and for which compliance is expectable is further strengthened through the declarative intonation with which the turn is produced. We can also note that the utterance does not correspond to a complete grammatical unit, as the deletion of the subject ('I') implies that it is objectively the bike which requires a new back wheel, rather than something in which Wayne has a personal investment. This deletion of agency helps build the request as a matter of fact, as a result of the way which things are in the world. Don orients to the request as routine and non-problematic as he immediately nods before indicating that the request will be granted without gazing at Wayne (lines 6 & 7). In short, the request is produced as routine and
is treated as such through Don’s unproblematic, immediate indication that the request will be granted.

Judy’s complaint implicative turn (line 11) is not aligned with by Don as rather than admonish Wayne for riding his bike down the steps (as something which may cause damage to the bike) he launches a post-expansion and elaborates on his response to the base request. Although the turn at line 20 ‘take it down Harry Shields,’ appears to be an imperative, contextual information suggests that due to the location of the shop, Wayne is unable to take the bike himself and so the turn is hearable as an offer, as an elliptical version of something such as ‘we/I can take it down Harry Shields’. By not specifying the agent, it is left open as to how the bike will actually get there. It later transpires that it is Don who will take the bike to the shop (data not shown). Note that the notion of the bike being ‘fixed’ (line 21) constructs the new back wheel as something which is required, as the bike is broken, rather than something which is desirable. Indeed there is further elaboration by Don (line 23) as he treats the request as one which must routinely be granted; ‘no matter what it cost, get it fixed’.

In sum, Wayne’s request at line 3 is produced as one which he is entitled to make. The ‘need’ construction provides for the request as one which is dictated by the state of the world rather than one in which he has a subjective, personal investment which would be conveyed, for example, by ‘want a new back wheel for my bike.’ ‘Needing’ as a way of requesting goes beyond the realm of personal wishes and desires, a realm which is diffusible and refusable, by invoking some kind of necessity dictated by the state of the world. In general, requests built using the transitive verb ‘need’ are treated as something which should be routinely granted and here Don’s unproblematic indication that the request will be granted is notable.
We can note at this point that to refuse a request built using ‘need’ requires more work than refusing an interrogative request and requires unpacking of the notion that the object of the request is needed, just as Simon rejects the idea that he and Jane ‘HAVE TO’ renew their wedding vows in the following example;

Extract 6.13 TF2008 8 21:54

01 Jan: °.hh I de bo I tried one on° ((whispering))
02 Sim: [you sa(h)d ↑sad sad saddo↑ ]
03 Jan: [((puts handbag down and smiles))]  
04 | (1.8) |
05 Sim: |((walks out of dining room, into living room))|
06 → Jan: .shish SO WE’RE GONNA HAVE TO RENEW OUR VOWS I-IN THREE YEARS TIME.
07 (0.6)
08 → Sim: [°I don’t° need to renew our vows]
09 Sim: [((walks back into living room)) ]
10 Jan: right I’m divorcing you then.
11 (0.4)
12 → Sim: [i we do not need to renew our vows] 
13 Jan: [hhhh heh heh heh]
14 Jan: #we do::, I’d like a twenty fifth wedding anniversary pard-# renewing of vows and par[ty ] PLEASE THANK YOU
15 Sim: [heh]
16 heh he::h [heh]
17 Jan: [hhh ↑heh heh heh↑

As background, Jane has been wedding dress shopping with her daughter, who is about to get married. At the start of the extract she tells Simon that she tried a wedding dress on while out shopping (line 1). She then announces ‘SO WE’RE GONNA HAVE TO RENEW OUR VOWS I-IN THREE YEARS TIME.’ Simon responds by refuting the notion that they need to do so ‘°I don’t° need to renew our vows’. That is, rather than replying with ‘no’, Simon
unpacks and challenges the notion that he ‘needs’ to do so. Similarly, in his turn at line 13 he states ‘we do not need to renew our vows’ again rejecting the notion that he and Jane need to do so.

Extract 6.14 contains a further example of a sequence initial request done using the transitive verb need. The extract is taken from earlier on the same day as extract 6.13. Simon and Jane’s daughter, Jessica, is getting married and it has been agreed that Simon and Jane will pay for part of the wedding. The extract begins immediately after an edit by the television producers. Prior to the edit, Simon has asked Jane what their plans are for that day, as he has a day off from work.

Extract 6.14 TF2008 8 01:30

01 Sim: [((swings arms back and forth))]  
02 Sim: [Beautiful day]  
03 (0.6)  
04 Jan: #I’ve got# to clean the house Simon I won’t be able to do it on Monday.  
05 (0.6)  
07 Sim: why what you doing on Monday  
08 (0.4)  
09 Jan: I’m going to have a root canal,  
10 (0.4)  
11 Sim: [((shrugs shoulders slightly))]  
12 Sim: ueohh  
13 (0.4)  
14 Jan: and then I’m going wedding dress shopping.  
15 (3.1)  
16 Sim: ueohh  
17 Sim: [((exaggerated shrug of shoulders))]  
18 (2.4)  
19 → Jan: I’m going to need you to lend me some money.  
20 Sim: [A:::H the bank of Simon]  
21 Jan: [((scratches ear))]  
22 (0.9)
The notion of obligation and external constraint is invoked in the turn at lines 4-5 as Jane accounts for being unable to go out for the day. It transpires that the cleaning must be done that day as Monday, which is presumably when the cleaning would otherwise be done, will be taken up with a dental appointment and wedding dress shopping. Here then, the activity of 'wedding dress shopping' is treated as one which takes priority. The target turn 'I’m going to need you to lend me some money.' follows Simon’s nonreceipt of the announcement at line 14 (rather he shudders, at lines 12 and 16 in response to the announcement that Jane will be having root canal treatment).

Note that the request is formatted as a projected future need and as such highlights that this is not merely a whim or something which is desirable but something which is a precondition for the activity of going wedding dress shopping. The choice of lexical description ‘lend’, rather than ‘give’ qualifies and softens the request, further enhancing its likelihood of success. Simon’s ironic response; 'A::H the ba:nk of Simon’ is neither an indication that the request will be granted, nor a rejection. Although a response is pursued at line 23 this is not forthcoming, rather there is an implicit indication that the request will be granted; '.shi:sh (0.2) we:ll you better be ni:ce to me then hadn’t you'. This is treated as sufficient as a further
response is not pursued (line 28). In summary, the base request is brought off as one which is routine and likely to succeed. As a declarative statement, rather than a yes/no interrogative, the turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response (Raymond, 2003). Indeed, neither a granting nor a rejection is forthcoming and this is not oriented to as unproblematic as both interactants treat the granting of the request as a given.

In extracts 6.12 and 6.14 the request is produced as one which the speaker is entitled to make. The selection of the verb ‘need’ constructs requests as ones which are dictated by the state of the world, rather than personal subjective investment. As declarative statements these turns do not formally solicit a yes/no response and thereby propose either of these as response options. This is further strengthened by the declarative intonation with which each of these examples are produced. In turn, request recipients treat the requested action as one which should routinely be granted.

4.2 ‘I need’ as a prerequisite to compliance

In the preceding section the logic of speakers building requests with ‘I need’ was explicated. I will now examine the interactive uses of ‘I need’ constructions within a particular sequential position, which is in second position by speaker B following a base FPP which directs some aspect of speaker B’s actions, delivered by speaker A. Extracts 6.15-6.17 provide some examples of declaratively formatted ‘I need’ requests in this particular sequential position.

*Extract 6.15 AAF 7 04:22*

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Pat: [mm gonna get your hair cut today?]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Pat: [((looks at Kevin))]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Kev: huhu: m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Pat: a:h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Bil: tri::m=</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In each of the arrowed turns some aspect of the recipient's conduct is specified. In the first extract Pat requests that her son Grant get his hair cut. In the second extract, Don passes a napkin to Wayne and albeit in a manner which is oriented to as 'non serious', instructs Wayne to wipe his 'arse' on the napkin, with the non-ironic instruction at line 4, which is 'wipe yer face on'. In the third example Judy directs Wayne to eat his left over food and to remain sitting at the dinner table. The kinds of instructions given to recipients in these extracts are built using various turn types and at various positions within TCUs. However, although there is diversity in the content and sequential positioning of these turns it is recognisable that each directs some aspect of
the recipient’s conduct. Note that in each example the base FPP is responded to with an ‘I need’ construction which launches a further request sequence.

Note that none of the examples here use an interrogative format. The request in extract 6.13, for example is built;

I need some mo:re

It is not built with an interrogative form such as

can you give some mo:re

Rather than a request which solicits a yes/no response and which is contingent on the recipient’s willingness or ability to comply (Vine, 2009) speakers display entitlement to make these requests on the basis of their positioning as a prerequisite to compliance with the base request. I now turn to extracts 6.18 and 6.19 (extended versions of extracts 6.15 and 6.16) to examine the practice in further detail.

In extract 6.18, an extended version of extract 6.15, Pat and her daughter Michelle are sitting in the car before leaving the family home to stay with Pat’s mother in another city for a period of several months. Her husband Bill and their sons Kevin and Grant are saying goodbye.

**Extract 6.18 AAF 7 04:30**

01 Pat: [mm gonna get your hair cut today?]
02 Pat: [((looks at Kevin))]
03 Kev: huhu:m
04 Pat: a:h
05 (0.5)
06 Bil: tri::m=
07 → Kev: =I need mone:y
08 (.)
09 Kev: its gonna cost fifty dolla:rs.
10 (.)
We can begin by noting that the example in this extract ‘I need money’, (line 7) appears to be a deviant case. Unlike the examples in extracts 6.15 and 16.6 where the ‘I need’ formats launch an insert sequence in second position as they introduce a prerequisite to compliance, the target turn occurs following a question-answer sequence launched by Pat (line 1) which is responded to by Kevin (line 3) and then appears to be closed following Pat’s turn in third position (line 4). As the sequence appears to be closed, how can the target turn be understood as introducing a prerequisite to compliance?

The sequence initial request concerns whether Kevin will be getting his hair cut later that day. As background, Kevin will soon be moving away to start a new job working with a colleague of his father’s and it is expectable that he will have his hair cut before doing so, such that we can hear Pat’s interrogative at line 1 as a requirement rather than merely an information-seeking question. As an affirmative-polarity yes/no interrogative this turn projects a ‘yes’ response (Raymond, 2003) which would imply compliance with it as a request. At line 3 Kevin responds with a weak agreement form (Pomerantz, 1984). Note that the turn is not built as an explicit ‘yes’, and is thus open for revision. Following Pat’s receipt of this response (line 4) where the sequence is brought to possible closure, Bill further specifies and reopens the request as he indicates the kind of haircut that Grant should have ‘trim’. Kevin then delivers the target turn, arguably in second position; ‘I need money’. Logically and
sequentially (following Bill’s turn at line 6 as an operation on line 1) this turn deals with the still active request that he have his hair cut. Although there is a glitch in the sequential order in this example, Kevin’s turn at line 7 deals with and can be heard as introducing a pre-requisite to compliance with the request at line 1.

A further notable feature of the design of the turn at line 7 is that it is produced as an upshot of the preceding talk, as something which has emerged interactionally, rather than a request which was previously on the agenda. As a declarative, the turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response. Rather than functioning as a straightforward request which may either be granted or rejected, the obligation of the recipient to comply is strengthened by virtue of the turn’s positioning as a prerequisite to compliance with the base request. As Schegloff notes, insert sequences are promissory in nature as they are “understood to have been launched to address matters which need to be dealt with in order to enable the doing of the base second pair part. They project the doing of that second pair part upon completion of the preliminary work” (2007, p. 99). Hence, the turn builds on Pat’s commitment to having her own, prior request complied with. Note that the request is oriented to by Pat as one which is ‘no problem’. Although the turn receives no explicit response it is implicitly treated by Pat that Kevin will have his hair cut and so will be given the money for this, as she requests that he send her a picture once he has done so (lines 11, 13, 17).

As an action ‘I need money’ accomplishes requesting. One feature which denotes this action import is that Kevin’s co-interactants, Pat and Bill, are in a position to grant the request and to provide Kevin with the money. As Kevin’s parents, particularly as Pat has requested the haircut, it is routine and expectable that they provide the money to do so. A second evidential feature is the turn’s sequential positioning. The request is produced as an upshot of the preceding talk, as something which has emerged interactionally rather than
something which was previously on the agenda. That is, Kevin is not simply requesting money for any old thing, nor simply stating that he needs money ‘out of the blue’. Kevin goes on to further specify the request ‘it’s gonna cost fifty dollars’ and provides an account which justifies this ‘for a good barber’. One key feature of the ‘I need’ construction is that not only will the granting of this request enable the base request to be granted, but it will allow more effective compliance. Kevin ‘needs’ money not only to comply, but a specific amount of money to get his hair cut by a ‘good barber’. This renders an otherwise potentially disruptive intervention an affiliative one.

The central observation about this extract upon which the rest of the analysis hinges is the recipient’s use of an ‘I need’ construction following a request from an interlocutor as a way of introducing a precondition to compliance. The turn is hearable as a request in part due to its sequential positioning. In reporting some circumstance it is left for the recipient to determine its upshot for the projected course of action and to make proposals arising from what is reported (Drew, 1984), allowing Grant to avoid making an explicit interrogative request. The turn is built as an upshot of the preceding talk and so the obligation of the recipient to comply is strengthened, as the ‘needed’ object is formulated as a precondition to compliance with the recipient’s own prior request. Here we can see that there is more than the semantics of the word ‘need’ or the object of the request that contribute to its sense as something which is necessary. Rather, the turn gains its interactional potency from its sequential positioning as formulating a precondition to compliance with a base request.

The following extract provides a further example of an ‘I need’ formatted request which occurs following a directive from an interlocutor. In this example the relevant adjacency pair is the question-answer sequence at lines 2 through 6. The target turn (line 13) is produced as an upshot of what may be heard as directives within this sequence.
While there are several features of this sequence that display speakers’ orientations to the conversation as ‘non-serious’ (the turn at line 7 is produced in a ‘smiley-voice’ while line 12 is said in a sing-song voice along with Wayne smiling as he nods confirmation at line 18) the extract includes a further example of an ‘I need’ construction following what can be heard as a directive from an interlocutor.
In his turn at line 7, in response to Wayne’s question regarding the purpose of the napkin given to him (line 3) and after Judy has provided an answer ‘wipe yer face on’ Don redoes this response; ‘£for wiping your a:arse on after.’, which is partially repeated at line 11 ‘wipin’ th’a:arse on’.

Sequentially the turns at lines 4, 6 and 11 provide the information solicited by the turn ‘↑what tha:t for↑’ produced by Wayne at line 4. These turns also direct some aspect of the recipient’s behaviour, namely that Wayne wipe his face/arse on the napkin. Wayne’s ‘need some mo:re’ (line 13) arises from the preceding turn, continuing the joke. The turn is understood as a request firstly as Don is in a position to grant the request and to give Wayne more napkins. Second, by virtue of its sequential positioning as an insertion sequence required for compliance with Don’s directive implicative turn.

We can note that the request is not built as an interrogative; ‘can I have some more?’ but rather as an upshot of the preceding talk, as something which has emerged interactionally. It is produced as emerging from Don’s turn and highlights a prerequisite which must be fulfilled before the base FPP can be complied with. There is no verbal response to this request, rather Don passes the packet of napkins to Wayne (line 24) and the inserted request is brought off as one which is ‘no problem’. It is again notable that having more napkins will not only enable Wayne to comply with the directive, but it will allow more efficient compliance- if given more napkins, the job will be done more thoroughly. Again, therefore, the inserted ‘I need’ formulated request is brought off as affiliative.

In summary, one recurrent sequential environment in which speakers build requests using ‘I need’ is following a request or directive from an interlocutor, where the ‘I need’ formulated request is inserted as a prerequisite to compliance. Grammatically ‘I need’ constructions do not on their own accomplish requesting but are hearable as requests in part due to their sequential positioning. The selection of this format builds requests as an
The upshot of the preceding talk, rather than something which was previously on the agenda. The obligation of the recipient to comply is strengthened due to this sequential positioning, building on the recipient’s commitment to having their own prior request complied with.

4.3 ‘I need’ as a strategy for exiting a trouble relevant sequence

In the previous section I showed how ‘I need’ formatted turns invoke a precondition to the possibility of continued alignment with an initiating, directive implicative, action. In what follows I examine a further interaction environment in which ‘I need’ constructions occur, namely as an exit strategy in trouble-relevant sequences. These constructions work as a way of doing resistance and exiting a sequence while maintaining alignment in principle. That is, they formulate some precondition which must be fulfilled in order to comply with the course of action projected by the base part. In this manner they are comparable to requests built using ‘I need’ in that they maintain alignment while delaying compliance with some projected course of action.

The first example is taken from the TF2008 corpus. The segment is taken from a scene which occurs during the morning following debate the previous day concerning Simon and Jane’s daughter, Emily, working part time rather than full time (with full time being preferable to her parents) and spending most of her days sleeping.

Extract 6.20 TF2008 5 41:10

01   Sim: ((walks into bedroom))
02   Jan: uhn a lovely da:y¿
03   |   (1.2)   |
04   Sim: |((leans over to kiss Jane))|
05   (0.5)
06   Jan: cleaning the **house** (.). what’s Emily doing today
07   |   (1.3)   |
08   Sim: |((walks towards door))|
09   →  Sim: "I don’t know. I’m not getting into it
10   right **now**, I **need** to go to work. heh°
11   ((slightly whispering))
12   Jan: hmm
13   Sim: ((picks up jacket off bed))
14   Sim: hhh! so y’n- no I’m not going down that path.
15   (1.0)
16   Sim: hh **at all**
17   (1.0)
18   Sim: I’m **afraid**

In this example the action accomplished by the ‘I need’ construction at lines 11 and 12 is to provide an account for refusal to engage with the project of complaining about Emily’s work situation, initiated by Jane at line 8. I will now consider various features of the extract that are relevant to the role played by the construction. As background, immediately before going to bed the previous evening, Simon and Jane engaged in what was characterised by Simon as a ‘row’, as Jane accused Simon of ‘giving in’ to their daughter Emily (data not shown). In the turn at line 8 Jane volunteers the information that she will be
spending the day 'cleaning the house'. There are several features which evidence this turn’s status as complaint implicative. First, as both speakers have equal epistemic access to the object of the enquiry (what Emily will be doing that day) the turn can be heard as doing complaining rather than questioning (Koshik, 2003). Second, although grammatically an answer is provided to the question; ‘I don’t know.’ Simon treats this as an inadequate answer as he provides an account for his refusal to engage with the action which is alluded to within the turn and so he treats the turn as doing more than questioning.

Through the production of an 'I need' construction (lines 11-12) Simon’s refusal to engage with the project alluded to in Jane’s turn at line 8 is formulated as a delay (via ‘right now,’) rather than an outright rejection. The first TCU within the turn ‘I don’t know.’ answers the question as an information solicitation, the second TCU delays engagement with the action packaged within this turn (as a complaint) while within the third TCU 'I need to go to work.' the 'I need' construction itself accounts for that delay. That is, Simon highlights an overriding obligation that prevents his continuing involvement with Jane’s projected actions. Arguably, whether or not the discussion topic is indeed resumed later, once Simon gets home from work, is irrelevant. The ‘I need’ construction allows for alignment with Jane’s project in principle despite engagement with it being impossible at that moment in time, due to externally imposed constraints.

In summary, the 'I need' construction is deployed here as a way of exiting a trouble-relevant sequence (following a complaint from an interlocutor) while allowing that in principle, engagement with the project is preferred. The semantics of the word ‘need’ along with the recognisability of going ‘to work.’ as a necessary action, construct the rejection as imposed by external constraints, rather than personal preference or desire on the speaker’s part. These features are the essence of what makes 'I need' a useful resource for
speakers. In the preceding section I showed how 'I need' constructions can be deployed to delay compliance following a request or directive from an interlocutor as they highlight a necessary precondition to compliance. The granting of this prerequisite enables not only compliance but more effective compliance. So rather than being rejection implicative, these constructions maintain alignment. ‘I need’ constructions, then, are generally a members method of delaying or avoiding compliance while maintaining alignment, this being deployed in extract 6.20 as a way of exiting a trouble relevant sequence while maintaining that, were it not for these constraints, cooperation or compliance would be forthcoming.

The following segment, also from the TF2008 corpus is drawn from a scene during which Simon has asked his daughter Emily, to clean the bath after using it late at night. Also present is Emily’s mother, Jane. Here we have a further example of an 'I need' construction as an account accompanying a rejection, in this instance, defiance in response to a directive.

Extract 6.21 TF2008 5 36:32

01 Sim: [((points towards bathroom)) ]
02 Sim: [<now get in there [and wipe the bath round.]
03 Emi: [there’s no cleaning stuff]
04 Sim: <wipe the bath round,
05 Emi: [there’s no cleaning stuff]
06 Sim: [((nods at bathroom)) ]
07 =the sink.
08 Emi: no it isn’t*
09 Sim: ((turns head and looks at Jane))
10 Sim: [is the bath- (.). cleaner [su]-
11 Jan: [ no]° there isn’t any in
12 the:re (.). "don’t think"
13 | (2.4) |
14 Sim:[((turns head slowly back towards Emily))]
The extract begins immediately after an edit by the television producers. Prior to the edit and shortly before the beginning of the extract there are repeated directives to clean the bath, which have been responded to with resistance from Emily (data not shown). The first directive within the segment, '<now get in there and wipe the bath round.>', is responded to with the first formulation of a prior condition for the cleaning of the bath (lines 3-4), namely that there are no cleaning products. Following a sequence during which it is determined that there are indeed no cleaning products under the sink, Emily builds further resistance and accounts for her inability to comply by stating the absence of a precondition- there is no cleaning stuff and as such she is unable to clean the bath.

The target expression 'I need the cleaning stuff' highlights the absence of a precondition to compliance which prevents the projected course of action being carried out effectively- if there were cleaning products other than the sponge, then Emily would be able to clean the bath properly. Although this response occurs in an established environment of disaffiliation and is rejection implicative there are two features of the 'I need' construction that differ from an outright rejection. First, the formulation of a necessary precondition to compliance appeals in principle to a scenario in which compliance would occur, but is not possible on this occasion due to external constraints. Thus it is due to the nature of the world (no cleaning products),
rather than personal disposition or desire, that Emily is *unable* to comply. Second, the act of looking under the sink (as evidenced in the turn at line 8 in which Emily displays knowledge that there are no cleaning products there) is in itself part of incipient compliance. Thus, rather than an outright rejection of the proposed action, the ‘I need’ construction highlights that *in principle* compliance is the default option. Thus the turn is designed as alignment implicative, rather than an outright rejection as it is external constraints, the absence of cleaning products, that prevent compliance from occurring. The ‘I need’ formulation then, retains Emily’s engagement with the project.

Similarly to extract 6.20, the turn works as a way of exiting a trouble implicative sequence, although in this instance the strategy is somewhat unsuccessful. The turn is not treated as an absolute refusal, rather Simon aligns with the notion of cleaning products as a prerequisite as he directs Jane to retrieve them. Here the precondition is fulfilled and the projected course of action, that Emily clean the bath, is eventually carried out (data not shown).

So far I have examined two sequential contexts in which ‘I need’ constructions occur; as a request following a directive or request from an interlocutor, and as an exit strategy in trouble relevant sequences. However these two environments are not exclusive, rather they are interdependent and both introduce the notion of being unable to comply or cooperate with some projected action due to a precondition which must be fulfilled. This is notable in the following example, in which the promissory nature of insert sequences is subverted and an ‘I need’ request format is used to exit a trouble relevant sequence.

*Extract 6.22 Potts 3 08:00*

01   (14.0)
02 Way: ((puts down knife and fork))
03 Jud: well you can eat the:m two,
04   |   (1.8) |
Let us first note the various features of the extract. At line 3 Judy states a ‘well’ prefaced objection to Wayne having put down his knife and fork, appearing to have finished eating. She states that he ‘can eat them two,’. Two features of this turn make this a particularly forceful way of issuing a directive. First, the ‘well’ preface marks the turn as contrastive to Wayne’s action of putting down his knife and fork, and the implication that he has finished eating. Second, it is implied that Wayne is able to eat more, without an orientation to the possibility that he may be unwilling to do so. At line 7, in a turn which is responsive to, but deletes Wayne having shaken his head to indicate that he will not be eating more, Don issues a request ‘you’re not leaving them are you’ which, formulated as a negative interrogative, prefers a ‘no’ response (Heritage, 2002). Following laughter from Wayne, Don produces a further objection with a ‘wh’ formatted interrogative which can be heard as
challenging (Koshik, 2003) as he displays puzzlement regarding Wayne’s actions; ‘↑s’up wi’yer↑’ (what’s up with you). Judy then issues her second directive within the sequence, ‘you’re not going anywhere so you might as well eat um’ (lines 15-16).

There are a series of directives within this sequence, with the final one at lines 15-16. It is notable that as a base action, this directive does not receive a response. Rather, the target expression ‘I nee- I nuh nee:d a dri:nk?’ works as a way of delaying the production of the required response. As Schegloff notes, insert sequences are promissory in nature as they are “understood to have been launched to address matters which need to be dealt with in order to enable the doing of the base second pair part. They project the doing of that second pair part upon completion of the preliminary work” (2007, p. 99). That is, compliance with Judy’s directive (remain sitting at the table, eat further food) is projected once Wayne has been granted permission to leave the table momentarily to retrieve a drink. Indeed the turn is treated as a request to leave the table momentarily in order to get a drink as Judy grants Wayne permission to do so (line 21). Wayne has been directed not to leave the table but rather to eat more food and his request is formulated as an upshot of these instructions. The turn aligns with the instructions to stay at the table and highlights a precondition for him to comply; he needs a drink and must acquire one in order to stay at the table for a further period of time. Rather than being rejection implicative, therefore, the turn highlights a precondition which will enable more effective compliance.

However as Schegloff (2007) notes, this character of insert sequences is promissory and here no second pair part of the base sequence is produced. Once Wayne returns to the table with his drink of water, the directive to eat more food is not attended to. As it happens, there is no further orientation to this until a minute and a half later (data not shown) when Don eats one of the
items himself, and directs Wayne to eat the other, which he does without further resistance.

Here the ‘I need’ construction aligns with the directive to stay at the table, while delaying production of the required base second pair part. As an insert expansion, the turn is oriented to as coming before the second pair part and works as a way of breaking up the sequence. However this feature of insert sequences is promissory and here the second pair part, namely compliance with the directive to eat more food, is not forthcoming. In summary, the ‘I need’ construction works as a way of exiting the sequence, disrupting the progression from first pair part to second pair part, in this case compliance with the directive to eat more food.

5.0 Chapter summary

The focus of this chapter has been on speaker selection of ‘want’ and ‘need’ in directive and request sequences. I have shown how speakers build directives with ‘I want you to X’ as a way of managing the contingencies involved with directing someone on something which is within the recipient’s sphere of action when one cannot monitor or control whether the projected action will be carried out. In the second section of the analysis I showed how speakers may build directives using ‘you need to X’ to manage these same contingencies. Finally, I documented two sequential environments in which speakers build requests using ‘I need’ which are following a request or directive from an interlocutor and as a strategy to exit a trouble relevant sequence.

In the first part of this chapter, the analysis focused on two features of ‘I want you to X’ formats, demonstrating their interactional import in a specific sequential environment. These two elements are 1) mobilising recipients’ obligation to comply and 2) reporting a ‘want’ as a fishing device. I have discussed each of these two features in detail, showing how they do the work
of managing the contingencies involved with issuing deferred action directives. That is, they increase the likelihood of compliance by invoking authority and entitlement on the one hand, and maintaining civil relations with the recipient on the other (c.f. Landqvist, 2005). In this way, ‘I want you to X’ constructions are Janus-faced and as such tell recipients to do something while appearing to ask.

In the second section I showed how speakers may deliver directives using ‘you need to X’. These turns are built as a logical consequence of the preceding talk. These formats allow speakers to maintain civil relations with the recipient as formally the recipient is not told what to do. Rather the speaker merely reports some circumstance and it is left to the recipient to determine the upshot of this. Nonetheless, I showed how recipient’s response options are severely limited as non compliance is not projected as a response option.

In the final section I examined two sequential environments in which speakers select ‘need’ as a verb in request sequences. One key feature which was examined was speakers’ and recipients’ orientations to ‘I need’ formatted requests as ones which should routinely be granted. In support of this argument two types of evidence were presented. First, speakers orient to these requests as ones which are routine and likely to succeed. For example, in extract 6.9 this was evidenced by the deletion of the subject, declarative (rather than interrogative) intonation and the lack of eye contact as the turn was produced. Each of these features contributed to the sense of the request as one which was ‘no problem’ and likely to succeed. Second, responses to these requests show recipient’s orientations to them as routine in a variety of ways. For example, rather than providing an explicit response speakers may respond to ‘I need’ formatted requests with an ironic, analysably ‘non serious’ response. Rather than pursuing an explicit response, speakers may treat ironic responses as sufficient.
The second stage of the analysis has been to examine the interactive uses of this request form in two particular sequential environments. These two environments are 1) in second position following a request or directive from an interlocutor, 2) as an exit strategy in a trouble relevant sequence. I have discussed each of these environments in turn, showing how they relate to each other and are an effective exit strategy precisely because of their sequential function as a way of delaying compliance while maintaining alignment. Here there are a normative set of rules, that ‘I need’ formatted requests can occur in second position following a directive in order to highlight some prerequisite to compliance, that may be subverted (Sacks, 1992) and used to do some other action. As noted by Sacks (1992), the visibility of interaction allows people to say things and to perform actions for the kinds of actions they will normatively be taken to be. Due to the promissory nature of insert sequences as coming before the base second pair part (Schegloff, 2007) these do not destroy the notion of compliance. Rather their logic can be subverted and used to get participants ‘off the hook’, as it were.

With regard to ‘I need’ formatted requests which occur in second position I showed how the recipient’s obligation to comply is strengthened by virtue of the turn’s positioning as a prerequisite to compliance with the base request. Thus rather than an intrinsic feature of the requested object, the turn gains its sense as something which is necessary from its sequential positioning as formulating a precondition to compliance with a base request.

It is reasonably assumed that the verbs ‘want’ and ‘need’ are descriptions of events which are used when true. That is, that speakers use ‘I want’ constructions to refer to an private experience of desire. Within folk psychology these desires are understood interact with beliefs to produce intentions, while these intentions lead to actions. It is also assumed that the word ‘need’ is used to refer to a particular class of objects which are “essential or very important (rather than merely desirable)” (Oxford English dictionary, online). However
throughout this chapter I have documented how speakers select these terms drawing on sequential understandings, to perform a range of actions. This contrasts with dominant views of ‘want’ as a reflection of an inner desire and of ‘need’ as an intrinsic feature of an object or a projected action.
“I’m not X, I just want Y”

1.0 Introduction

In this chapter I focus on one environment in which speakers formulate their ‘wants’, which is as part of a two-part structure in which they first reject a formulation of their motivations or a proposal regarding their actions and proceed to formulate an alternative motivation using an ‘I want’ construction. There are two formal types of environment in which speakers deploy the two-part structure within my materials;

1. In one large group of cases the device, a responsive turn design used by speaker B, occurs following a turn by speaker A that embodies some proposal by speaker A regarding speaker B’s actions. This group of cases can be organised into two main subtypes which are directives and account solicitations. It is recognisable that in each instance some proposal is made by speaker A regarding speaker B’s actions. The device ‘I don’t want/I can’t X, I want Y’ works as a way of rejecting the proposed action by formulating a ‘want’ which contrasts with the proposed action.

2. In the second group of cases the device is used by speaker B in response to a formulation by speaker A of speaker B’s actions or motivations. In this subset the turn is always built using the minimiser ‘just’. The device ‘I don’t want/I’m not X, I just want Y’ first rejects this formulation and constructs an alternative sense of agency in the second TCU. Here the device implies that as the speaker is motivated to do just a particular thing, they are not motivated to do anything more.
More formally the structure is composed of two TCUs;

1. *I’m not/l can’t/l don’t want* plus a formulation of motivation or desire proposed by speaker A.
2. *I want/just want* plus a formulation of an alternative motivation or desire which contrasts with that proposed by speaker A.

The following example is prototypical;

**Extract 7.1 TF2008 6 12:48**

01 (1) → Sim: you’re not starting a fight now are you Jane
02 Jan: ((walks into dining room towards Simon))
03 (2) → Jan: I’m not tryna’ start a fight
04 I just want my clothes back.
05 Sim: what’s happened now

There is something more than a simple denial here. After denying the accusation that she is ‘tryna’ start a fight’ Jane reformulates her actions as directed at ‘just’ getting her clothes back (‘I just want my **clothes** back.’). This formulation of her wants is *constructed* as the motivating force behind her actions. According to the communication view “communication is supposed to be intentional, i.e. activated by the speakers’ reasoning about its own beliefs, desires and intentions” (Dragoni, Giorgini & Serafini, 2002, p. 120). That is, Jane experiences a desire to obtain her clothes, believes that Emily has her clothes and thus intends to retrieve them from Emily. However that is not an adequate account of what is happening here. Rather, the formulation of ‘wanting’ arises to counter the notion that Jane may be motivated to do some other thing (to ‘start a fight’). Rather than a simple ‘didn’t do it’ denial which is susceptible to further challenge (Dersley & Wootton, 2000), Jane formulates an alternative sense of agency and by doing so she is realising a particular rhetorical effect. To uncover what this effect is it
is necessary to turn to those who treat displays of mental states within talk as “genuine references to psychological states” (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995, p. 31) and who subscribe to the notion of desires, beliefs and intentions as explanatory variables in human actions. Within this literature the creation of a contrast between action and intention is understood as a cognitive accomplishment (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Shatz et al., 1983) however here it is understood and is examined as a piece of interactional business.

One thing to note is the effect of formulating an alternative sense of agency using ‘I want’. If Jane left it at a simple denial her turn would be open to further challenge (see Dersley & Wootton, 2000 on the defeasibility of ‘didn’t do it’ denials). The formulation of an alternative sense of agency has the effect of making turns less susceptible to challenge. The second thing to note is the use of ‘I want’ in the second TCU of a two-part construction. When responding to multiunit turns speakers normatively orient first to the final TCU (Schegloff, 2007). Delivering a denial in the first TCU, away from the zone of contiguity, decreases the likelihood of Jane’s denial being challenged.

My argument then, is that formulating an alternative sense of agency using an ‘I want’ construction strengthens the speakers case, weakens its counter and decreases the likelihood of a further counter. The aim of the chapter is to extend the argument developed throughout the thesis that when people formulate their ‘wants’ they are not simply communicating a private desire but are formulating a desire to achieve a particular effect in a specific sequential environment. I will consider what it is that formulating an alternative ‘want’ following some proposal or formulation does.

The structure of the chapter is based on the two versions of the practice as discussed above. In section 2 I begin with an overview of the relevant literature as I turn to those who treat desires, beliefs and intentions as explanatory variables which are expressed through language. The analysis begins in
section 3 as I show how speakers may reject some proposal regarding their actions by formulating a ‘want’ which contrasts with the proposed action. In section 4 I examine how speakers may refute a formulation of their actions by an interlocutor by claiming an alternative motivation. We shall see that the formulation of a ‘want’, an intention which drives behaviour, is a members’ method for rejecting and undermining an alternative.

2.0 Rejecting a proposal regarding future actions

In this section I show how speakers may use the two-part structure ‘I don’t want X, I want Y’ to reject a proposal regarding their actions made by an interlocutor. The analysis is divided into two subsections. I begin by examining speakers’ deployment of ‘I cant/I don’t want X, I want Y’ in response to directives. Following this I examine responses to account solicitations which challenge speaker B’s actions and make a proposal regarding their future actions. A key feature across the examples is some proposal regarding the recipient’s (B’s) actions. The ‘I cant/I don’t want X, I want Y’ construction is delivered as a way of rejecting that proposal.

2.1 Rejecting a directive

The clearest examples of instructing another regarding their actions in conversation are directives; actions which direct the recipient in some way, to do something or to desist in doing something (Craven & Potter, 2010). As noted by Craven and Potter (2010) although directives can be understood as projecting only compliance, recipients may select response options other than those projected in the construction of the turn and may refuse to comply. In the face of defiance, directors typically respond with second directives which “upgrade the issuer’s entitlement and downgrade the recipient’s contingency” (p. 8), that is, contingencies which may affect the proposed action being carried
out, (Curl & Drew, 2008). Just as Tom delivers a series of upgraded directives in the following sequence;

Extract 7.2 TF2008 4 03:08

01 Sim: [what you wearin to the disco then]
02 Sim: [((walks upstairs))]
03 (0.4)
04 Tom: this
05 | (1.2) |
06 Sim: |((knocks on Tom’s bedroom door))|
07 → Tom: don’t go in
08 Sim: why?
09 Tom: I’m gettin ready.
10 Sim: why can’t I come in?
11 (0.4)
12 Tom: cuz I’m ↑getting ready↑
13 Sim: [it’s only me and you:. (“fi:ne")]
14 Sim: [((pushes on bedroom door))]
15 | (0.3) |
16 → Tom: |((pushes door closed))|
17 Sim: To:m?
18 → Tom: I SAID I’M NOT (. ) LETTIN YOU IN YET

Before the start of the extract Simon arrived home from work and shouted a summons while stood in the hallway, to see whether anyone else was at home. Tom is in his bedroom getting ready to attend a school disco. Tom delivers the first directive ‘don’t go in’ in response to Simon knocking on his bedroom door (line 6). Simon challenges this with a why-formatted account solicitation (Bolden & Robinson, 2011) (line 8). Tom’s responsive turn (‘I’m gettin ready.’) is deleted and treated as insufficient as Simon pursues a further account with ‘why can’t I come in?’. Simon then attempts to open the door (line 14), in response to which Tom physically pushes the door closed, making it impossible for Simon not to comply. He delivers a second, upgraded
directive (line 18) with raised volume. The ‘I SAID’ preface emphasises that this is a repeat directive and holds Simon accountable for not complying in the first instance. The design of the turn indexes Tom as the director (‘I’M NOT (.) LETTIN YOU IN YET’), downgrading Simon’s contingency. Given that Tom has closed the door and physically prevented Simon from entering the room Simon is forced to comply. In sum, we can see that following Simon’s defiance as he attempts to open the door, Tom physically forces Simon to comply by pushing the door closed as he delivers a directive which upgrades Tom’s entitlement and downgrades Simon’s contingency.

I now turn our attention to how ‘I don’t want X, I just want Y’ constructions work as a practice for decreasing the likelihood of a second, upgraded directive being delivered. Through the use of this two-part structure speakers first defy directives and then proceed to formulate an alternative course of action. The following is a prototypical case. Pat is visiting her son Lance who has moved away to live at the Chelsea Hotel in New York to pursue an acting career, although he is not currently working.

**Extract 7.3 AAF 2 07:15**

```
01  Pat:  ((looking through photograph album))
02  Pat:  well uh- Lance are you wo:rk:ing? are you doing
03       anee:, (0.2) any,
04          (0.4)
05 →   Lan:  ↑↑you’l:ll just have to wait Mo:m↑↑ juss
06       hh((singsong voice))
07 →   Pat:  well I can’t wait I want you:, (0.2) to wo:rk
08   Lan:  well that (   )
09  Sor:  well (. ) we’re just holding off.
10   Lan:  we’re juss really (. ) we’re j[ust-   ]
11  Sor:  ['til the] last
12    minute me and him are gonna have to get a
13   Lan:  little £job of some k(h)i[nd£]
14          [ h]eh heh I know.
15          (0.2)
```
Throughout the duration of the extract Pat is looking through a scrapbook of photographs belonging to Lance taken during his previous periods of work in the theatre. In her turn at line 2 Pat asks Lance whether he is currently working. There are several design features of this turn which display an orientation to this question as a dispreferred (Pomerantz, 1984) action. First, dispreference is projected through the ‘well’ preface. Second, there is hesitation and a gap within the turn. Finally, the turn terminal ‘are you doing anee,’ (presumably headed for ‘are you doing any shows?’) constructs the question as an interest in his acting career, rather than a question regarding his employment status (conveyed, for example, by ‘are you wo:rk ing?’). Indeed Lance treats the turn as objectionable as he rejects the enquiry. This turn is built as a directive ‘↑↑you’ll just have to wait Mo:m↑↑’. That is, it tells Pat what she has to do (‘to wait’), and puts Lance into speaker position A in our structure. Pat (speaker B) rejects the directive and the proposal that she ‘wait’ by claiming an inability to do so (line 7). As we saw above, following defiance, directors typically produce a second, upgraded directive (Craven & Potter, 2010). If Pat were to leave it at that her rejection would be open to challenge. It is notable that for Pat the topic of talk, Lance’s employment status, is a ‘B-event’ (Labov & Fanshell, 1977) and is something which, particularly as he is living independently, is Lance’s business, making Pat’s rejection particularly susceptible to challenge.

In the second TCU Pat heads off further challenge by formulating a ‘want’ which contrasts with the projected course of action ‘I want you:, (0.2) to wo:rk’. There are two things to note about the construction of the turn. First, the second TCU ‘I want you:, (0.2) to wo:rk’ is a prototypical example of an ‘I want you to X’ formulated directive. As noted in chapter 6 these turns invoke authority and entitlement on the one hand, while orienting to the projected action as the recipient’s business. That is, by indexing her intentional
states and a potential gap between thought and action (Edwards, 2008), Pat displays an orientation to Lance’s employment status as his business. On the other hand, the invocation of authority displays entitlement to pursue the topic and to direct Lance’s actions. This pursuit contrasts with the directive to ‘wait’.

A second thing to note is that Pat delivers the ‘I want’ construction in the second TCU of a two-part turn. This continuation in what might have been a transition relevant place makes a response to the first TCU less immediately relevant and is a useful strategy for decreasing the likelihood of a further, upgraded directive occurring in third turn position.

In sum, the likelihood of further challenge in the form of a second, upgraded directive by Lance is decreased as the formulation of Pat’s ‘wants’ and intentional states, delivered in the second TCU, are rhetorically organised to undermine and reject the course of action proposed by Lance. The use of an ‘I want’ construction displays entitlement to pursue the topic and to direct Lance’s actions, standing in stark contrast with the directive to ‘wait’.

Compare now a further example, taken from the Potts corpus. Prior to the beginning of the extract there has been disagreement between Wayne and the rest of the family regarding the time Wayne will spend ‘playing out’. Indeed this is a recurrent theme within the family as Wayne often refuses to finish meals in favour of going out to meet friends. Earlier in the meal Judy and Don stated that Wayne will be staying in that night to do his homework, resulting in Wayne leaving the table without permission to do so and reportedly lying on his bedroom floor ‘in a strop’ before being summoned back to the table.

Extract 7.4 Potts 8 19:27

01 Jud: =and then we’ll see what tomorrow (. ) bri:ngs,
02 when yer come in (0.2) when yer home from
03 school and your upstairs get’ cha:nge:d and
04 you’ve gone out while I’m putting car awa:y
05 and you’ve not done your h[ome]work;
In her turn at line 1, Judy builds a complaint regarding Wayne's previous behaviour as an account to justify why Wayne will not allowed to go and play out with his friends on this occasion. The use of the idiomatic expression 'and then we'll see what tomorrow brings,' constructs Wayne's future actions as scripted (Edwards, 1994) and predictable. Wayne cuts into Judy's turn with 'can I go now then,' a request which stands in direct opposition to the line of action proposed in this turn. Judy immediately, emphatically rejects this request ('no:') and tells Wayne to eat his chocolate cake instead. Wayne responds to this directive with the target turn. In the first TCU he first defies the directive. Research has shown that in response to defiance, directors typically deliver a second directive which upgrades the director's entitlement and downgrades the contingencies or considerations involved in the recipient's compliance (Craven & Potter, 2010) (indeed, Jamie takes a turn in overlap with 'tough' which deletes Wayne's turn and challenges his entitlement to refuse to comply, although this is not oriented to by her co-
interactants). In the second TCU Wayne formulates an alternative ‘want’ which contrasts with the projected action ‘°I wanna meet my ma::tes°’. The effect of this is to decrease the likelihood of Judy delivering a further, upgraded directive in third-turn position. When responding to multi-unit turns, respondents typically orient to the final TCU (Schegloff, 2007) and so the two-part structure in which Wayne defies the directive in the first TCU shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence and makes a response to Wayne’s defiance less immediately relevant. The topic of conversation is shifted from the matter of the chocolate cake to that of Wayne meeting his friends, a third party to whom it emerges Wayne has an obligation (‘=the:y’re all wa::y’i:n’). We can note that this topic shift is successful as the matter the cake is not pursued in Judy’s subsequent turn, rather she enquires as to the whereabouts of Wayne’s friends (line 21) and Wayne is subsequently allowed to leave the house after agreeing to eat his cake upon his return (data not shown).

In this example then, in contrast to a simple rejecting response Wayne deploys a two-part structure which decreases the likelihood of a further upgraded directive being delivered in third-turn position. He defies the directive in the first TCU and proceeds to formulate a ‘want’ which contrasts with the projected action. Here he invokes his friends as a third party to whom he has an obligation to meet. The ‘I want’ construction then, undermines the projected course of action and successfully shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence.

2.2 Rejecting a proposal embodied within an account solicitation

In the preceding section I showed how speakers may deliver the two-part structure ‘I don’t want X/I want Y’ following a directive in order to first reject the directive and then proceed to formulate an alternative ‘want’ which contrasts with the projected action. While directives may represent the prototypical action for instructing another on their conduct, there are alternative resources available to speakers for doing so. One of these are why-formatted account
solicitations (Bolden & Robinson, 2011) which embody a proposal regarding the recipient’s actions. As Bolden and Robinson note, speakers’ responses to ‘why’ formatted account solicitations may demonstrate an orientation to the solicitation as a challenge. In their analysis they show how respondents typically respond to account solicitations either by overtly aligning with challenging stances or by rejecting the appropriateness of the challenge and justifying the reasonableness of the accountable item. In what follows I examine one practice for rejecting the appropriateness of the challenge by justifying the reasonableness of the accountable item.

A key feature of the account solicitations across these examples is a challenge of the recipient’s actions, embodying a proposal regarding their future actions. Speakers respond to these challenges by first rejecting the notion that they would be motivated to carry out the proposed action and proceeding to formulate a ‘want’ which contrasts with that action. Consider the following example in which the Potts family are eating a take-away meal from a chip-shop.

Extract 7.5 Potts 11 08:00

01   Don:  [(walks back into camera shot and sits down)]
02   →   Don:  [why don’t you get a portion of chips
03   between you instead of throwing- ]
04   →   Jam:  ‘b’cause I dont want chips! I want ↑rice↑
05   chips and gravy he don’t like gravy I don’t
06   like plain chips.
07   Jam:  |(puts food into mouth)|
08   |   (0.6)   |
09   Way:  I don’t like ri:ce
10   Don:  [(points towards Jamie’s plate)]
11   Don:  [well why don’t you get a portion of ↑rice↑, a
12   portion of chips, (. with the >buh-oh-eh-<
13   gravy,  ]
14   (0.6)
In his turn at lines 2-3 Don challenges Jamie and Wayne’s current practice of ordering food separately, rather than one portion of chips to share as this would be less wasteful (instead of throwing-). As noted by Bolden and Robinson (2011) account solicitations are frequently co-implicated in actions such as complaining or criticising. As it is Don, Wayne and Jamie’s father, who pays for the food, the turn can be heard as complaint implicative. Bolden and Robinson also note that ‘why’ formatted account solicitations index a stance that the accountable item (in this instance, buying food separately rather than one portion of chips to share) is nonsensical. Similarly, Koshik observes that why-formatted interrogatives may “accomplish challenging/complaining rather than questioning” (2005, p. 40) and may convey speakers’ stance that “no adequate account” (p.51) for the problematic action is available. This turn then, is built to imply that there is no adequate account for the purchasing of separate food and thus that in future Jamie and Wayne should order one portion of chips to share. In sum, the turn embodies a proposal regarding Jamie and Wayne’s future actions; that they share a portion of chips rather than ordering separately.

At lines 4-6 Jamie responds with an account; ‘↓b’cause I dont want chips!!’. Bolden and Robinson (2011) note that in third-turn position account solicitors may upgrade their challenging stance in a variety of ways. As chips are part of the meal that Jamie is currently eating her claim that she doesn’t want chips is open to challenge. In the second TCU she heads off this challenge as she formulates an alternative ‘want’ ‘↑ri:ce↑ chips and
gravy,' a specific meal which is typically served in one tray from chip shops in northern England. While chips form part of this meal, this is built as contrastive with the course of action prescribed by Don. This contrast, and the reasonableness of the accountable item, is further emphasised in the final TCU 'he don’t like gravy I don’t like plain chips.'

Here, the use of an ‘I want’ format pre-empts and heads off a further challenge. By delivering the rejection of Don’s proposal in the first TCU, the likelihood of a response in the form of a further challenge is decreased. The ‘I want’ format displays entitlement to decide on what food should be purchased while the subsequent accounts display the reasoning behind this. We can note then that this formulation of Jamie’s wants is “is organised to undermine or reject an alternative” (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 3), namely the proposal that one portion of chips be bought in future.

The next case illustrates how account solicitors may orient to a statement regarding what one does not want as insufficient and may upgrade their challenge in third turn position, and how the two-part structure may work to head off a further challenge. The topic of talk is the date on which the couple, Tim and Marian, will get married. Marian has been at pains to persuade Tim to get married within the next few months, during the filming of the documentary series in which the family are taking part. Immediately preceding the start of the extract Tim has stated that he ‘doesn’t fancy getting married just yet’, citing their current living circumstances (the couple live with Marian’s parents) and lack of resources to decorate a flat a reason for waiting.

Extract 7.6 TF1974 16:59

01 Mar: [((looks directly at Tim))]
02 Mar: [s::o, yer gonna make a da:te then]
03 Tim: ((looks at Marian and shakes head while speaking))
04 Tim: YEAH BUT IT WONT BE IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS THOUGH-
05 TWO OR THREE MONTHS=.
In the turn at line 2, Marian proposes that Tim will set a date for the wedding. Note that 'so' is regularly used by speakers to introduce a formulation of what previously has been said. The turn initial 'so' then, implies that Tim may have already agreed to do so. Tim subsequently confirms that a date will be set but rejects the notion that this will be within the next two or three months, during the timeframe which is preferable to Marian. Marian subsequently challenges this timeframe using a why-formatted account solicitation (Bolden & Robinson, 2011) ‘=*why no::t*’. Tim responds with a defensive account at lines 7-8, claiming a desire not to do so. This response is treated as insufficient as Marian deletes the turn with an exact repeat of her turn at line 6, which is delivered with raised volume (line 9). Although it has been suggested that speakers treat one another as possessing specific rights to narrate their own experiences (Pomerantz, 1980) this is clearly not the case here as there is
disagreement regarding the sufficiency of ‘not wanting’ to do something as an account for not doing so.

There is then a series of further account solicitations (lines 11 & 13) and rejections (lines 10, 12, 15) as Marian continues to challenge Tim. In his turn at lines 18-20 Tim delivers the two-part structure. In the first TCU he refutes the notion that he wants to get married in the next few months ‘ah don’t know, I just don’t want to’. Notably, throughout the sequence Tim’s claim to not want to get married in the next few months (lines 7-8, 10) have been treated as insufficient. If Tim were to leave it at this it is expectable that a further challenge would be forthcoming. In the second TCU the likelihood of a further challenge is decreased as Tim formulates a ‘want’ which contrasts with the projected action of getting married during the next few months ‘I just want to wait, and get everything done.’. He adds an incremental (Schegloff, 2000, as cited in Schegloff, 2007) instalment to this account ‘you can’t do anything in seven weeks time’ which justifies the reasonableness of the projected action of waiting. Again we can see that the trajectory of the ongoing sequence is successfully shifted as Marian orients to and deals with the second TCU ‘(you— you don’t)know that’ (clearly, however, Tim is not completely off the hook as the topic of the date of marriage is pursued further!).

In this section, I examined speakers uses of ‘I don’t want X, I just want Y’ to reject some proposal regarding their actions. I identified two subsets which are directives, the prototypical format for directing another’s behaviour, and account solicitations. Research has shown that when speakers defy directives, directors typically respond with a second directive which upgrades director’s entitlement (Craven & Potter, 2010). Similarly, account solicitors may upgrade their challenge in third position (Bolden & Robinson, 2011). The use of a two part structure in which speakers first reject the preceding turn and then proceed to formulate an alternative sense of agency shifts the trajectory of the
ongoing sequence and decreases the likelihood of a further challenge in third position.

3.0 Following a formulation of actions or motivations

In this section the analysis focuses on speakers' use of the two part structure to refute a formulation of their actions or intentions, as in extract 7.7 'you’re not starting a fight now are you Jane'. When the structure is deployed in this environment speakers first deny the complained-of action and then proceed to formulate an alternative, restricted sense of agency. The minimiser ‘just’ is a key response feature of these sequences (as in ‘I just want my clothes back’) as this implies that speakers motivations are restricted and that they do not intend to do anything more.

Consider the example in extract 7.7. The topic of talk between Jane and Emily is a missing jumper belonging to Jane that Emily has allegedly been seen wearing. Prior to the beginning of the extract Emily has repeatedly denied this.

Extract 7.7 2008E6 12:48

01  Emi: it’s not your jumper
02    (1.0)
03  Jan: well that’s funny cause my jumper’s gone missing and you’re seen wearing one that looks exactly like my jumper
04  Sim: (putting papers away in the dining room))
05  → Sim: you’re not starting a fight now are you Jane
06  Jan: (walks into dining room towards Simon))
07  → Jan: I’m not tryna’ start a fight I just want my clothes back.
08  Sim: what’s happened now:
09  Jan: (hold arm out, pointing towards living room))
10  Jan: well there’s pictures of her on facebook, wearing all my clothes!
As the extract begins Jane proclaims emphatically ‘well that’s funny↑ cause my jumper’s gone missing and you:‘re seen wearing one that looks exactly like my jumper’. At this Simon, who is in the next room, accuses Jane of ‘starting a fight’. There are several design features of Simon’s turn at line 7 which evidence the turn’s challenging status. First, as a negative interrogative, Jane is heavily held accountable as the turn can be heard as assertive rather than questioning (Heritage, 2002). Second, the choice of lexical description constructs Jane’s actions as antagonistic (‘fight’) as well as intentional, unprovoked and unjustified (‘starting’). Finally, as well as specifying Jane, rather than Emily as the recipient, the turn terminal address term works to underscore Jane as the antagonist as well as personal concern for the problem (Lerner, 2003). In sum, the turn can be heard as accusatory as Simon formulates Jane’s actions as intentionally starting a fight. To deny this accusation Jane deploys an ‘I’m not X, I just want Y’ structure (line 9). First she delivers a typical ‘didn’t do it’ denial. Research has shown that when speakers simply deny a complained-of action, co-interactants respond with a further assertion of the complained-of action (Dersley & Wootton, 2000). Thus leaving it at this would leave the turn susceptible to challenge. The likelihood of this challenge is decreased as Jane formulates an alternative motivation which contrasts with ‘starting a fight’ which is ‘I just want my clothes ba:ck.’. Here the minimiser ‘just’ is a key component, highlighting that Jane’s intentions are restricted to obtaining her clothes and hence do not include ‘starting a fight’. Note that the choice
of noun, 'clothes' deletes the specific relevance of the jumper and in generalising constructs this as a matter of principle rather than an isolated, specific, battle. As someone whose 'clothes' have been taken by another, Jane’s requests for them back are hardly compatible with the intentional, unjustified act of 'starting a fight'. We can also note that as the denial is delivered in the first TCU, a response to this is less immediately relevant. Jane could conceivably have built the turn as 'I just want my clothes back, I’m not trying to start a fight’. Notably, none of the two-part structures in the data corpus are built in this manner.

Consider another example, which is extract 7.8. Here the topic of talk is an upcoming party for Jane’s fortieth birthday which falls on the same weekend as Mother’s Day. Earlier in the day Emily, Jane’s daughter, announced that she will be working all weekend and will be unable to spend time with the family. Prior to the beginning of the extract Jane has announced that she is getting ‘fed up of the whole weekend’ (data not shown).

**Extract 7.8 TF2008 1 31:50**

01 Jan: [((gestures with hands))]
02 Jan: [what have you asked people to bring]
03 (0.4)
04 Sim: they could bring:ing, (0.2) wh(h)y are you worried about it
05 (0.4)
06 Jan: [((gestures with hands))]
07 Jan: [well c’z I’m just wondering what foo:d you’re gonna do]
08 (.)
09 → Sim: ↑don’t worry about it;
10 → Jan: I’m not worried about it I just* want* to know what it IS.
11 (0.5)
12 Sim: [((shakes head slightly))]
13 Sim: [↑what are you worried about;]
My argument is that Jane’s ‘I’m not X, I just want Y’ construction undermines and rejects Simon’s ascription of her as ‘worried’. In his turn at lines 4-5 Simon treats Jane’s ‘wh’ interrogative, regarding the food which will be at the party (line 2), as a challenge (Koshik, 2003, 2005). He begins to provide a relevant response (‘they could bringing,’) and then abandons this in favour of soliciting an account using a ‘why’ formatted interrogative, challenging the grounds for her enquiry. Jane’s subsequent reformulation of her enquiries as a normative action (‘I’m just wondering what food you’re gonna do’), again minimised with ‘just’, is rejected as Simon persists with his formulation of Jane as ‘worried’ as he instructs her to desist in doing so (‘↑don’t worry about it↑’). Although the turn at lines 4-5 is delivered partly in ‘smiley’ voice, as Simon is responsible for arranging the party the turns at lines 4-5 and 11 can be heard as complaint implicative. Jane’s deployment of the target turn ‘I’m not worried about it I just* want* to know what it IS.’ counters and rejects Simon’s formulation of her as ‘worried’. As a ‘didn’t do it’ denial (Dersley & Wootton, 2000) the first TCU in itself is open to challenge. This challenge is headed off in the second part of the turn as Jane formulates an alternative motivation- that she just wants to know what it (the food) is. Wanting to know what food will be provided at her upcoming milestone birthday party does not equate to ‘worrying’. It is notable that this is the third revised question regarding the party food. The ‘I want’ format embodies high entitlement and strongly projects a relevant response which further decreases the likelihood of a further accusation.

In the previous two excerpts, the two-part structure was built using the verb ‘want’. In the next case, taken from the Potts corpus, Judy first rejects Don’s formulation of her actions and proceeds to formulate an alternative using the
verb ‘interested’. This eloquently shows the rhetorical work done by the selection of a particular mental state term.

Extract 7.9 Potts 6 11:00

01 Jud: David an Tommy,

02 Way: |((continues chewing))|

03 | (3.0) |

04 Jud: “and whose the sixth one”

05 Jud: |((looks at Wayne))|

06 | (2.4) |

07 Don: would you like the lad alone to eat his (.) [bloody, ((cough))

08 Way: [((scratches face, looks at Judy))]

09 Way: [the[rm] return, e:rm, ]

10 Don: >spedda gi< instead giving him the bloody (0.7)

11 Jud: [((looks at Don))]

12 Jud: [shut: I were making conversation.]

13 Way: not allo:wed

14 conver[sation about [someone els]e’s]

15 children

16 Way: [((glances at camera)]

19 → Don: [yeah but yer juss spyi:ng on him]

20 → Jud: ‘‘I’m no:t spying! I’m just interested who he’s ou- who he’s bin ou:tt with.’

21 (1.2)

23 Jam: Bob Marley.

24 (1.6)

25 Jud: say nowt then,

26 Don: has he got his wa:lers the:re

The topic of talk immediately preceding the extract is what Wayne has been doing, and with whom, while he was away from the house. We can begin by noting that the sequence contains a series of formulations and reformulations of Judy’s actions. In the first TCU at lines 7-8 Don accuses Judy of preventing
Wayne from being able to eat his ‘tea’ (a term used to denote an evening meal), implying that her questions concerning with whom he has been spending time are illegitimate and overbearing. He then formulates her questions as ‘giving him the bloody (0.7) Spanish inquisition’. This idiomatic expression highlights the extreme and complainable nature of Judy’s actions while moving to close the topic (Drew & Holt, 1988). At line 14 Judy emphatically rejects Don’s implied accusation that her questioning is illegitimate by delivering a ‘didn’t do it’ denial (Dersley & Wootton, 2000). Notably this is delegitimized by Wayne as he invokes the presence of the recording equipment as a basis for not talking about ‘someone else’s children’ (i.e. with whom Wayne has been spending time). Judy’s denial is also emphatically rejected by Don as he cuts into Wayne’s turn with a further accusation ‘yeah but yer juss spyi:ng on him’.

In the target turn Judy first denies this accusation ‘↑↑I’m no:≠ spying↑’ and proceeds to reformulate her actions ‘I’m just interested who he’s ou:- who he’s bin ou:≠t with.↑’. The second TCU removes the problematic, specific characterisation of what kind of conversation is taking place as Judy invokes her intentional states and reformulates her enquiries as a normative action. There are two things to note about this sequence. First, following a second assertion of the complained-of action by Don, Judy heads off further pursuit by formulating a mental state; ‘interested’. In this instance this is successful as following a lapse in the conversation (line 22) Jamie offers an ironic candidate answer ‘Bob Marley.’ which is further developed by Don (‘has he got his waι:lers the:re’). A second observation is Judy’s careful characterisation of her actions as she formulates the object of her ‘interest’ as a way of managing an interactional dispute regarding motivation. Note the self repair at lines 20-21, as the projected ‘who he’s out with’ which would suggest an ongoing, perhaps overbearing and illegitimate interest, is replaced with ‘who he’s bin ou:≠t with.↑’, specifying that her interest applies in this instance only. Also note that the choice of lexical description
"interested" is devoid of any notion of monitoring or ‘Spying’. ‘Wanting’ to know something invokes personal investment and a perhaps illegitimate interest, which is precisely the type of interest which the turn is working to refute. In contrast the term ‘interested’ is devoid of any notion of spaying and orients to the topic of conversation, with whom Wayne has been spending time, as Wayne’s business. While being ‘interested’ in what one’s child has been up to is a legitimate action for a mother to be doing, ‘wanting’ to know and having a personal investment in doing so, may not be. We can see then that the choice of lexical description, Judy’s formulation of her actions as ‘interested’ is sequentially specific and is a practical expression which is delivered within a sequential flow of interactional considerations.

In sum, in this section I have shown how, following a formulation of their actions, speakers may respond by first delivering a ‘didn’t do it denial’ (Dersley & Wootton, 2000) and then proceeding to formulate an alternative sense of agency. The interactional import of the ‘I’m not X, I just want Y’ structure in this environment is to decrease the likelihood of accusers responding with a further assertion of the complained-of action in third turn position.

4.0 Chapter summary

This chapter has examined a two-part structure in which speakers formulate their ‘wants’ ‘I don’t want/I’m not X, I want Y’. I identified two recurrent environments in which speakers deploy these this structure. The first of these is to a reject a proposal made by an interlocutor regarding the speakers’ actions. The second is to undermine and refute a formulation of the speakers’ intentions and motivations.

I began by examining speakers’ uses of the device to reject a proposal regarding their actions. I identified two types of turns which precede these constructions, these being directives, which are the prototypical action for
directing another’s actions, and account solicitations which embody a proposal regarding the recipient’s future actions. Typically when recipients refuse to comply with directives, directors respond by delivering a second directive which upgrades the director’s entitlement to deliver the directive and reduces the contingencies relevant to the recipient’s compliance (Craven & Potter, 2010). Similarly, in third position account solicitors may upgrade the challenging stance towards the accountable item (Bolden & Robinson 2011). Speakers may conceivably respond by delivering the first part of the structure only. However doing so would leave these turns open to challenge. The use of a two-part structure in which speakers first reject the directive or proposal and then proceed to formulate an alternative, contrasting ‘want’ works to decrease the likelihood of further challenge. This is realised in two ways. First, when responding to multiunit turns, speakers normatively respond to the final TCU (Scheglof, 2007). Delivering a rejection in the first TCU decreases the likelihood of further challenge. Second, the formulation of an alternative sense of agency highlights that rather than carry out the proposed action, speakers are motivated to do some other thing.

This chapter extends our understanding of sequences in which some aspect of another’s conduct is specified by examining speakers’ deployment of the two-part structure to reject a proposal, realised by directives or account solicitations, made by an interlocutor regarding their actions. Typically when respondents deliver non-aligning responses to directives or account solicitations this response is challenged in third turn position (Craven & Potter, 2010; Bolden & Robinson, 2011). The use of the ‘I don’t want X, I want Y’ structure decreases the likelihood of challenge by formulating an alternative sense of agency. The formulation of an alternative motivation in the second TCU is a key feature of these sequences as this further decreases the likelihood of subsequent challenge.
In section 4 I examined speakers uses of the structure to reject a formulation of their motivations delivered in the preceding turn. This chapter extends our understanding of complaint sequences by examining one practice for responding to a compliant implicative accusation regarding an interlocutor's actions. My analysis shows that complaint recipients may decrease the likelihood of further challenge in third turn position by first rejecting the formulation and proceeding to formulate an alternative motivation in the second TCU. Two features of ‘I’m not X, I just want Y’ constructions work in combination to head off a potential further challenge. First, speakers formulate an alternative sense of agency which implies that as speakers are motivated to do one thing, they are not motivated to do anything more. Second, the formulation of an alternative sense of agency in the second TCU following a rejection decreases the likelihood of a further challenge in third turn position.
This chapter is the concluding discussion. Before considering the areas to which the thesis may contribute and future research directions I begin by summarising the key themes and arguments of each chapter and begin to discuss the implications of the thesis for work in social cognition, in particular that which is carried out under the rubric of Theory of Mind.

1.0 Thesis summary

Chapter 1: Introduction

This short chapter introduced the research topic. I briefly outlined work in Theory of Mind as I discussed the main themes and aims of the thesis. The introduction also included an overview of the chapters to follow.

Chapter 2: Literature review

This chapter provided a review of the literature relevant to the thesis. I began by discussing two areas of cognitive research, those of Theory of Mind and mainstream approaches to emotion. From this I introduced social constructionist and conversation analytic approaches to emotion and cognition as alternative ways of understanding human actions. Here I highlighted the theoretical and methodological problems which are inherent in approaches which begin with the fundamental assumption that the ability to understand others’ mental states is a prerequisite for participation in social interaction. In the second part of the review I surveyed work in the sociology of childhood, in particular work in CA which has examined children’s conversational repair skills.
and the sequential organisation of children’s requests. I then discussed sociolinguistic and discursive work on requests and accounts. The work surveyed in parts 1 and 2 sets each of the analytic chapters in context. In the final part of the chapter I discussed in detail the approach of discursive psychology including the main theoretical influences of ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and the sociology of scientific knowledge. I discussed the theoretical issues which arise from using a discursive perspective to examine mental state talk, and outlined the approach of epistemological constructionism which informs the analysis. Finally, I discussed work within interaction analysis which may be described as ‘anti-cognitivist’. Specifically, I introduced the body of work in CA which has developed a sustained critique of Theory of Mind.

Chapter 3: Method

This chapter discussed the methodological procedures and practicalities of the thesis. The chapter began by introducing the dataset and discussing the advantages and limitations of each corpus of data. Reactivity to the presence of recording equipment and the use of media data which was produced for a viewing audience were key issues that were discussed. It was recommended that the data for the thesis should be understood as ‘naturalistic’ rather than ‘natural’. I then outlined the steps involved in recording, transcribing and analysing the materials.

Chapter 4: Want as an interactional resource

This chapter marked the beginning of the analysis. I began at a basic level and focussed on ‘I want’ constructions as an interactional resource. I examined how speakers construct their wants (I want X) and the wants of others (you want X) in talk and outlined some of the conversational activities in which these constructions are involved.
The chapter began by discussing experimental tasks which are designed to assess children’s understandings of ‘desires’, the assumptions embodied in this work and associated theoretical and methodological problems. The subsequent analysis showed that the assumptions embodied in this work are inherently problematic. First, I showed how the assumption that ‘wanting’ is a sufficient basis for acting is somewhat speculative. Participants in these tasks (which are based on the classic false belief test) are required to predict characters’ actions based on information regarding the characters’ ‘desires’. An ‘incorrect’ prediction is assumed to reflect an inability to recognise that others may have desires which differ from one’s own, and to appreciate the subjective nature of desires. The analysis in this chapter showed how young children often use ‘I want’ to build requests. As an action, requesting may be defined as asking for something to be given or done. Hence the very act of requesting presupposes that permission, assistance or agreement is required for the request to be carried out. Otherwise, one would simply carry out the projected action. I also showed how expressions of ‘wanting’ often occur in relation to, in the service of, interactions involving obligations and constraints. Hence, that individuals proceed and act in a manner which is consistent with the fulfilment of their ‘desires’ is a departure from what goes on during the course of our everyday lives and a gross simplification of the meaning of ‘wanting’ for both children and adults.

In the second part of the analysis I illustrated further what is meant by considering ‘wants’ as embedded within various conversational activities as I introduced the kinds of activities in which ‘I want’ and ‘you want’ are involved. Specifically, I showed how speakers recurrently use a ‘you want X’ structure to convey a challenging stance towards a recipient’s actions, how speakers use ‘I don’t want X’ to implement rejections and refusals and how speakers may provide accounts for their actions using ‘because I want X’.
In sum, the analysis in this chapter showed that rather than the communication of a private mental state, claims regarding ‘wants’ are practical expressions that work within a sequential flow of interactional and deontic considerations. That individuals recurrently make claims regarding their wants in the service of interactions involving obligations and constraints has implications for the assumption that individuals act in ways which are consistent with the fulfilment of their ‘wants’.

Chapter 5: Children’s wants

The second analytical chapter builds on the first and takes the analysis further, examining in detail the sequential environments in which children build requests using ‘I want’. The analysis focussed on two main environments which are: 1) when there is some basis in the preceding interaction for the child to suppose that the request will not be granted, 2) when there is some basis for the child to suppose that the request will be granted. I began by discussing work in Theory of Mind which examines children’s talk and has developed coding systems to identify genuine references to desire as distinct from uses which are behavioural, such as particular types of requests. Within this work, references that are coded as behavioural are dismissed as uninteresting and disregarded for the purposes of analysis. I argue that rather than making guesses about which uses of ‘I want’ refer to putative mental states, all uses of ‘I want’ may be fruitfully examined as performing actions in the service of sequentially unfolding social interaction.

Chapter 6: Directing and requesting

In this chapter the analysis examined adult speakers’ uses of ‘I want you to X’, ‘you need to X’ and ‘I need X’ to implement directives and requests. I examined one recurrent environment in which speakers use ‘I want you to X’ to deliver
directives which is when the proposed action is something which is the recipient’s business, something within the recipient’s sphere of action rather than a request on the speakers’ behalf such as for assistance or permission, and when the directive is future oriented and makes relevant a commitment to a future activity rather than immediate, embodied compliance. The analysis then moved on to examine speakers’ deployment of ‘you need to X’ to deliver directives. I showed how this format allows speakers to maintain civil relations with recipients by officially, formally avoiding telling them what to do. Finally I examined speakers’ use of ‘I need’ to implement requests. I showed how speakers routinely deliver ‘I need’ formatted requests following a request or directive from an interlocutor to introduce a prerequisite to compliance. Here the action import of the ‘I need’ format is to delay the production of the relevant SPP while maintaining alignment with one’s co-interactant. Traditionally, ‘wanting’ something is associated with a desire, while ‘needing’ may be thought to refer to a class of objects which are necessary for some function, rather than merely desired (Oxford English Dictionary, online). The important point raised by the analysis was that rather than simply using ‘I want’ to express an individual desire, or ‘need’ being an intrinsic feature of the requested object, these terms have specific practical uses in their normative sequential environments. Claiming to want or to need something then, is entirely a social matter, as invocations of ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ are sequentially organised and may be deployed in the service of particular conversational activities.

Chapter 7: “I'm not X, I just want Y”

In the final analytic chapter I focussed on two environments in which speakers use ‘I want’ constructions, which are as part of a two-part structure used to reject a formulation of their motivations or a proposal regarding their actions made by an interlocutor. In the first part of the structure speakers deliver a rejection (I’m not/I don’t want X) and in the second TCU formulate an alternative motivation (I want Y). The implications of this two-part structure are
that as the speaker is motivated and ‘wants’ to do one thing, they are not motivated to do anything more or to engage in a proposed action. The important point is that speakers may formulate an intention during the course of a conversation to achieve a particular rhetorical effect. Rather than a priori entities which cause actions, the analysis shows how speakers formulate intentions to attend to considerations which are live in an interactional sequence.

2.0 Contributions of the thesis

This study provides new insights for the fields of DP, CA, social and developmental psychology. The analytic chapters describe the sequential nature of invocations of ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ in both adult-adult and child-adult interaction. The study draws on the methods of DP and CA to offer a radical new way of examining what it means to ‘want’ or to ‘need’ something in interactional terms. Following the pioneering work of Edwards (1997) and Edwards and Potter (1992), I have examined naturalistic everyday interaction between families and have shown how claims regarding ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ are managed within a sequential flow of interactional considerations. In each of the 4 subsections below I discuss ways in which the thesis could contribute to existing work in developmental psychology, sociology, interaction analysis and systems family therapy.

2.1 Developmental psychology: Theory of Mind

The thesis makes a major contribution to studies of social cognition in developmental psychology. How children come to participate in social interaction is currently studied under the rubric of Theory of Mind, which has been discussed at length within various chapters. This theory is couched in a Cartesian view of individual, isolated minds which are faced with the task of ‘figuring out’ the contents of other individual minds. The theory that children
come to understand the contents of others minds by using processes akin to scientific theory formation is a fundamental assumption of work in developmental psychology and has been adopted by researchers in clinical settings. For example a proposed Theory of Mind deficit is fundamental in theories of autism and has been implicated in explanations of schizophrenia.

It was noted in chapter 2 that there is a long standing, intense debate regarding the processes through which children acquire a Theory of Mind. It has been suggested that the resolution of this issue would help settle the debate between two of the main theoretical perspectives, the ‘Theory-Theory’ and the Modular Theory (Wellman, 2010). ‘Beliefs’, ‘desires’ and ‘intentions’ are traditionally understood as individual, discrete entities which creates the problem of how children learn to ‘read other minds’. This ‘mind reading’ ability is understood as a prerequisite to successful participation in social interaction. Drawing on existing discursive research and following the analysis here I argue that researchers should take a different approach to this topic. The thesis offers a new way of understanding ‘wants’ as interactional concepts rather than private, individual entities. What speakers state that they ‘want’ and claim that others ‘want’ are sequentially specific constructions which work within a flow of interactional considerations. These constructions are bound up with a diverse range of conversational activities such as making a request, telling someone to do something and refuting a formulation of one’s actions. The important point is that the problem is not one of how the child develops an innate ability to ‘read minds’ but of how individuals participate in social interaction. Speakers do not need to construct theories to read the minds of others as interaction is a social matter. Regardless of what a speaker may be thinking or feeling, the thesis has shown that speakers state what they ‘want’ in specific sequential contexts to accomplish particular actions. There is no need for theory construction to bridge the gap between isolated, individual minds as what is currently viewed as a ‘psychological’ matter becomes an interactional one.
Chapter 7 ‘I’m not X, I want Y’ has specific implications for the notion that intentional action is an outcome of an individual’s desires and beliefs. Intentions, the product of beliefs and desires, are considered to be a priori cognitive entities that are expressed through communication. Motivation is understood as a causal determinant of action. The analysis in chapter 7 focussed on speakers’ formulations of their wants and motivations to account for their actions in two specific sequential environments. The first of these is following a proposal regarding their future actions. The second of these is to refute a formulation of their motivations in the prior turn. I showed how speakers’ formulations of their ‘wants’ decreases the likelihood of further challenge in third-turn position. Rather than descriptions of a priori motivational states, then, these are best understood as sequentially specific formulations which perform a particular conversational action, namely to undermine and reject an alternative that is alive in the current interaction.

In sum, the thesis has broad implications for the question of how children come to participate in social interaction. Rather than constructing a theory to bridge the gap between minds and being faced with “a referential challenge” (Slaughter, Peterson & Carpenter, 2009, p. 1058) as the child faces the impossible problem of learning how to accurately categorise and describe “internal, unobservable mental states” (ibid.) we can instead consider formulating ‘wants’ as an interactional activity. This understanding of mental state terms as resources which may be used to perform a range of actions takes us away from the view of isolated minds which are faced with the task of mapping mental state terms onto internal referents. Mental state terms are no longer understood as names which develop in language to denote private entities but as concepts which emerge as part of the child’s interactional repertoire. Rather than ask how does the child learn to read the minds of others? We should instead turn our attention to understanding how the child participates in social interaction. This removes the need for theory construction, the operational definition of variables and attempts to pinpoint the precise
moment at which the child shifts to a *representational Theory of Mind*, as understanding others is an interactional, public and visible matter.

**2.2 The sociology of childhood**

The thesis contributes to the body of work in The Sociology of Childhood by examining children’s interactional competencies. Specifically, I extended the work of Wootton and showed how selection of request format is governed by sequential considerations. There is a growing body of work in CA which comes under the rubric of The Sociology of Childhood, which examines children’s social interactional skills. This thesis offers a unique approach by doing a DP analysis. Hence, as well as contributing to the body of work which examines the sequential organisation of children’s request formats, the study offers a radical new perspective on what it means to ‘want’ something in interactional terms. The idea that desire is central to cognition is fundamental in both psychoanalytic and philosophical theorising (Raphael-Leff, 2010). That the child is absorbed with his or her own desires and intentions to act is one explanation of the ‘terrible-two’s’ (Travis & Brown, 2011). The thesis offers a technical, formal understanding of the meaning, for children and for parents, of what it means to ‘want’. As ‘wants’ and ‘desires’ occupy a central place in understandings of children’s development the empirical account of what is involved when children state that they ‘want’ something is fundamental and furthers our understandings of family interaction and socialisation.

**2.3 Work on social interaction: Discursive psychology and conversation analysis**

The thesis contributes to research in CA which has examined the construction and sequential organisation of request and directive formats. I showed how speakers may preface deferred action directives with ‘I want’ as a way of managing the contingencies involved in directing someone on something which
is their business when one will not be present to monitor or control whether the projected action will be carried out. The analysis also examined how speakers may select ‘need’ as a transitive verb in request sequences to introduce a precondition to compliance with a base FPP, delaying the production of a relevant SPP while maintaining alignment. The thesis also adds to the body of DP and CA literature on accounts, rejections and refusals by identifying a two-part structure ‘I don’t want X, I want Y’ which speakers may use to refute a formulation of their actions or to reject a proposal regarding their future actions.

2.4 Systems family therapy

The thesis’s focus on invocations of ‘wanting’, morality and constraints and obligations may have important implications for family therapy practices. In family therapy, narrative and social constructionist approaches have become increasingly popular (Carr, 2009). For example, systemic family therapy is grounded in Gergen’s relational social constructionism and frames understanding of the individual in the context of their most intimate relationships, and aims to integrate family relationships directly into therapeutic intervention (Flaskas, 2009). An important theme in narrative therapy, which also draws heavily on relational constructionism, is narrative coherence, the idea that individuals’ narratives and stories about their lives should ‘fit’ with other parts and that the emotions an individual shows in relation to their story should be congruent and fit with the story (Flaskas, 2009). The analysis in the thesis has implications for this and suggests that therapists’ focus on narrative congruence may be problematic as individuals are seen as creating their own story in isolation and communicating their emotions about their story, rather than being understood as producing a conversational account in interaction with therapists. Although family therapy draws increasingly on constructivist thinking and sees the person as emerging in relationships with others, there is no empirical work which examines the minutiae of interaction between family
members. The thesis addresses this by offering a formal account of what it means to ‘want’ something in interactional terms, for both adults and children.

3.0 Future research implications

The thesis is primarily concerned with the interactive uses of the term ‘want’ which restricted the potential to explore other interesting avenues and themes which emerged during analysis. One such theme would be to explore the interactive uses of mental state expressions of ‘belief’ such as think and know in children’s talk (see Kärkkäinen, 2003; 2006 on uses of I think in adult-adult talk). It was noted earlier in the thesis that there is keen debate concerning children’s acquisition of Theory of Mind. In particular, there is disagreement concerning whether children come to understand others in terms of their desires before they understand the concept of belief, or whether understanding of all mental states develops, or ‘comes online’ together. Children’s frequent use of the term ‘want’ before the use of terms such as ‘think’ and ‘know’ is cited as one form of evidence for this simple desire psychology. My argument is that rather than developing in language as name referring to a discrete experience of desire, the term ‘want’ has practical uses in particular sequential environments. In chapter 4 I showed how children may use ‘I want’ formatted requests to manage a range of interactional and deontic considerations. I argue that it is precisely for this reason then, that ‘want’ is used more frequently than terms such as ‘think’ and ‘know’. Requesting is a common conversational action, particularly in children’s talk as children are dependent on care-givers for permission and assistance with everyday activities. The analysis in chapter 4 showed that for young children, this conversational activity makes relevant uses of ‘I want’. It would be interesting to examine the kinds of environments in which, and for which purposes, children use terms of ‘belief’.

At this point we can note that one limitation of the thesis is the use of edited media data. It was possible to identify where disruptions existed in the video
recordings and the extent to which these would impact on the analysis. However it was often the case that contextual information regarding what occurred earlier in interactions was not available. It is also the case that recordings were purposely selected by the production team for broadcast. During data collection I attempted to contact the producers of TF2008 to gain access to unedited materials but this was not possible at the time. Gaining access to such material would be highly advantageous as an alternative to relying on recordings of family mealtimes. This thesis is a starting point and has shown the potential for extending research on family interaction to include data from alternative sources, such as media data.
References


Locke, A. (2003) 'If I'm not nervous, I'm worried, does that make sense?": The use of emotion concepts in accounts of performance', *Forum: Qualitative Research*, vol. 4, no. 1, ISSN 1438-5627


Schegloff, E.A. (2004a) 'Putting the interaction back into dialogue', *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, vol. 27, no. 02, pp. 207-208.


Stokoe, E.H. (2009b) "'For the benefit of the tape': Formulating embodied conduct in designedly uni-modal recorded police-suspect interrogations', *Journal of Pragmatics*, vol. 41, no. 10, pp. 1887-1904.


Wootton, A.J. (2006) 'Children’s practices and their connections with 'mind”,

Wootton, A.J. (1981) 'Two request forms of four year olds', Journal of
   Pragmatics, vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 511-523.

   Childhood, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire.
Aims of the study.

This research aims to investigate how families interact with each other during the course of their everyday lives. It will examine how basic conversational activities are done and how issues of family roles become live in interaction. It is hoped that the findings will address significant questions about how language is used in social situations, particularly in talk between parents and children.

What does it involve?

Your family will record family meal times using a video recorder. In addition an audio recorder will be placed in a room where the family regularly congregate together, such as the living room. You will switch the recorder on for as long as you are comfortable with it, to record ordinary family interactions. Do not worry if not all family members are present, or even if the recorder is running when the room is empty! The aim is for your family to be comfortable with the presence of the recorder as you go about your everyday lives. In general, try to disrupt your normal routines as little as possible. The research is interested in normal patterns of interaction. The recordings will be transcribed and analysed by the researcher to identify patterns of language use. This will form the basis of a report into how families converse, discussing the day, telling stories, offering advice and so on.

What happens next?

Initially I will meet with you and your family to discuss the procedure, answer any questions you may have, and do the paperwork. If you all agree to participate, I will then explain how to use the recorders and make sure all family members who may be present are comfortable with the procedure.

I will leave the recorders with you to record approximately ten to fifteen meals and to record your everyday interactions as often as you are comfortable with. Which meals you record is entirely up to you – breakfasts, lunches, dinners are all suitable, as are snatched meals, everyday meals or special occasions. If for
whatever reason, you don’t feel like recording one day, then you do not have to. You have complete control over what data you hand over for analysis. If you subsequently decide that any of the recordings should not be in the data these will be deleted.

When not to record:

- When there are guests present please do not record as they will not have signed a consent form.

After the recording period I will collect the recorder from you and begin to transcribe the recordings. At any point during this study, you have the right to withdraw and for your data to be destroyed.

What will you do with my personal information?

- Participants have full control of all data they submit to the researchers.
- The recordings will be stored separately from any contact details.
- Pseudonyms for names and places will be used on the transcripts.
- All recordings and transcripts will be stored safely and securely for the duration of the study and for 10 years in the first instance following its conclusion.
- If participants agree, their recordings will be donated to the DARG archives at Loughborough University Social Sciences Department for research and teaching purposes. Data of this kind has allowed useful historical and cross cultural comparisons. However it is still possible to take part in the study without consenting to donate your data. Furthermore, all participants, child or adult, can request for their data to be deleted from this archive at any time in the future.
- Participants can request access to recordings and transcripts of themselves.

Want more information?

**Student researcher:** Carrie Childs  
**Degree course:** PhD Social Psychology  
**Department:** Social Sciences  
**Contact details:** Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, LE11 3TU.  
[Email: c.childs@lboro.ac.uk](mailto:c.childs@lboro.ac.uk)  
[Phone: 07745 638 790]

**Project Supervisor:** Professor Derek Edwards  
**Department:** Social Sciences.  
**Contact details:** Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, LE11 3TU.  
[Email: d.edwards@lboro.ac.uk](mailto:d.edwards@lboro.ac.uk)  
[Phone: 01509 222 544]
Please contact me if at any time you have any queries or concerns regarding any aspect of this research.

**What if I am not happy with the way the research was conducted?**

The University has a policy relating to Research Misconduct and Whistle Blowing which is available online at http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/Whistleblowing(2).htm

Thank you for your interest in participating.

Carrie Childs
Appendix B: Consent forms

FAMILY INTERACTION
WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE FORM
FOR PARTICIPANTS UNDER 18

Please tick the boxes and sign to say you understand and agree

I understand why this study is being carried out and what I have been asked to do.

I have had an opportunity to ask questions about what I will be doing in the study.

I understand that I do not have to take part in the study.

I understand that I can stop being part of this study at any time for any reason, and that I do not have to explain why I want to stop.

I agree to take part in this study.

Your name

Your signature

Signature of investigator

Date ___ / ___ / ___
FAMILY INTERACTION
PARENTAL CONSENT FORM
FOR PARTICIPANTS UNDER 18
(to be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read)

Please tick the boxes and sign to say you understand and agree

I am the parent/guardian of (child’s name): ___________ (Child’s DOB): ___ / ___ / ___

The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me. I give permission for my child (name) ___________ to participate in this study.

I understand that I can withdraw the child from the study at any point and that I do not have to provide a reason for withdrawing.

I will allow the child to withdraw at any point if they wish to, without pressing them to remain in the study.

Please state whether you agree to your child’s data being used for the following purposes

I agree to my child’s data being used as part of a research project by the student researcher.

I give my permission for the transcripts to be used in grant reports, research publications and presentations.

I give my permission for the video data to be used in grant reports, research publications and presentations.

I give my permission for the audio data to be used in grant reports, research publications and presentations.

I give permission for my child’s data to be donated the Discourse Analysis and Rhetoric Group’s (DARG) archives at Loughborough University following the completion of this study.

Your name
________________________________________

Your signature
________________________________________

Signature of investigator
________________________________________
Date __ / __ / __

FAMILY INTERACTION

INFORMED CONSENT FORM
FOR PARTICIPANTS OVER 18
(to be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read)

Please tick the boxes and sign to say you understand and agree

The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me. I understand that this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have been approved by the Loughborough University Ethical Advisory Committee.

☐ I have read and understood the participant information sheet and this consent form.

☐ I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation.

☐ I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study.

☐ I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any reason, and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing.

☐ I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence.

☐ I agree to participate in this study.

Please state whether you agree to your data being used for any or all of the following purposes:

I agree to my data being used as part of a research project by the student researcher.

☐ I give my permission for the transcripts to be used in grant reports, research publications and presentations.

☐ I give my permission for the video data to be used in grant reports, research publications and presentations.

☐ I give permission for my data to be donated to the Discourse Analysis and Rhetoric Group's (DARG) archives at Loughborough University following the completion of this study.

Your name

________________________________________

Your signature
Appendix C: Transcription notation

The transcription system used is based on that developed by Gail Jefferson (see Atkinson & Heritage, 1984).

(0.8) Pauses are shown by the tenth of the second in brackets.

(.) A micropause, which is too short to measure.

[ ] Square brackets indicate the beginning and end of overlapping speech.

↓ ↑ Vertical arrows precede notable pitch changes.

Underlining Denotes emphasis- the location of underlining within a word locates emphasis and also indicates how heavy it is.

CAPITALS Indicate words which are notably louder than the surrounding speech.

°i know° Degree signs enclose words which are notably quieter than the surrounding speech.

I do::nt know Colons indicate that the preceding sound is elongated. More colons denote more elongation.

hhhh Outbreath. As with colons, this is proportionate.

.hhhh Inbreath, proportionate.

really? Question marks indicate a ‘questioning’ intonation.

no. A full stop denotes a falling intonation.

no, Commas mark weak rising intonation.
>really< Arrow brackets enclose talk which is delivered at a notably faster pace.

<really> Arrow brackets which point away from talk indicate that speech is delivered at a notably slower pace.

heh heh Laughter.

st(h)o(h)p i(h)t h’s in brackets signals laughter within speech.

£ Denotes ‘smiley voice’.

bu-u- Hyphens indicate a ‘cut off’ of the preceding sound.

(guess) Words within round brackets indicate uncertain transcription.