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Investigation of Institutional Discourse on Change in South Korean Football from 1945 to Pre-2002 FIFA World Cup

by

Sang Yeol Bang

A Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

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Abstract

This research explores institutional discourse on change in South Korean football. It seeks to understand the construction and legitimisation of change in Korean football as a product of both national and international dynamics. It explores the debates on modernity and modernisation of football in Korean society as a product of Korean colonial and postcolonial histories, including Korea’s construction of ‘self’ and ‘otherness’ in relation to North Korea, Japan, China, and the West. In doing so, this research’s ambition is to contribute to East Asian studies in general and South Korean society (politics, culture, economy, and history) in particular. It emphasises the application of modernity and tradition debates, as well as postcolonial critique and Foucauldian discourse analysis for the study of sport and football in Korea.

Key words: Korea, East Asia, Foucauldian discourse analysis, modernity, postcolonial critique, football development, change.
Acknowledgements

“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”
(John 1: 1)

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I. Introduction

The purpose of this introduction is to present an overview of this thesis which is titled ‘Investigation of Institutional Discourse on Change in South Korean Football from 1945 to Pre-2002 FIFA World Cup’. Over the last half-century, South Korea had experienced various internal and external changes which have shaped the nation politically, economically, and socially. In particular, the terminology, ‘South Korea’ is not just the name of the country but also a product of national and international dynamics in Far East Asian history. Although ‘Republic of Korea’ is the formal name, this research will term the nation as ‘South Korea’ to reflect the dynamics and the process of nation-building in the post-colonial context. Whilst there would be various approaches to review the changes and development in Korea, football is a window to explore how Korea has dealt with constructing its nation and promoting its national development.

Research Aims

This research explores institutional discourse on change in South Korean football. This study seeks to understand the construction and legitimisation of change in Korean football as a product of both national and international dynamics. It explores the debates on modernity and modernisation of football in Korean society as a product of Korean colonial and postcolonial histories, hence Korea’s construction of ‘self’ and ‘otherness’ in relation to North Korea, Japan, China, and the West. In doing so, this research’s ambition is to contribute to the studies on East Asia in general, and South Korean society in particular, (politics, culture, economy, and history) and to the application of modernity and tradition, as well as postcolonial critique and Foucauldian discourse analysis for the study of sport and football.
Research Questions

Based on the above research aims, this research asks the following questions:

1) In what circumstances has South Korean football changed from 1945, the year of liberation from Japanese rule, to the 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup, a prominent event in the contemporary history of Korean football?

2) How has the South Korean postcolonial project for development and nation-state building shaped the development of football in South Korea, or at least the meaning system and power relations around the development of football in South Korea?

3) How has change been defined, diffused, imposed, debated or resisted in postcolonial South Korean sport, in general, and in football, in particular?

Content of the Thesis

Chapter I introduces modern Korean history, the history of modern sports and football in Korea. Dividing the history of Korea into colonial and post-colonial eras, Chapter I seeks to illustrate the dynamics which South Korea dealt with to establish modern South Korea. To ensure the effectiveness of explanation, history of Korea, modern sports, and football were separately described in a similar periodisation strategy. Nevertheless, this periodisation does not necessarily mean that the Korean history and the history of sports and football show the same path of changes or development.

Chapter II contributes to building the theoretical foundation for this research. Macro level discussion focuses on the question of modernity in post-colonial Korea. Meso level perspective deals with examples of dominant interpretative discourses in the study of global and local dynamics in sport (and in football) such as globalisation approaches, the link between policy making and political ideology and international relations. Foucauldian discourse analysis is adopted as a methodological perspective of this study to make sense of change and to gain knowledge about change in football as well as power relations.
Around the meaning of change (i.e. modernisation, rationalisation, and commercialisation) in South Korean football.

Chapter III unfolds the philosophical arguments on knowledge and methods of data collection and analysis. This thesis uses constructionism as an ontological position in understanding the pluralist discourses on change in Korean football in different transitions of Korean society i.e. from colonial to post-colonial; from authoritarian regimes to the democratic era; and from industrialisation to market economy. Meanwhile, the epistemological position of this research is informed by Foucauldian discourse analysis to define the “regime of truth” (Foucault, 1980: 131) around the question of change in Korean football, as a break from the past, or in maintaining tradition, in opposition to/or in cooperation with the ‘others’ as a product of the global or that of the local. To this end, documents about football in Korea are analysed including FIFA archives about Korea; correspondence with the Korea Football Association (KFA), as well as other governmental, parliamentary, and media documents produced from the 1940s to the pre-2002 FIFA World Cup period.

Chapter IV explores the emerging discourses about changes in Korean football in different phases of post-colonial Korean history. It could be argued that Korea’s international relations were an important factor in defining football as a serious business. In addition, other issues emerged in various ways such as players’ bodies, acceptance of foreign football knowledge, the necessity of Korean style football, and professionalisation of football to explain failure and crisis in Korean football or to justify the path for the development of Korean football.

Chapter V returns to the macro and meso level theories to make sense of the emerging discourses. In particular, from a postcolonial critique point of view, this thesis argues that Korean football provided a unique space where the meaning of resistance against others and/or acceptance of others was formulated. In a similar manner, overcoming Orientalism whilst imposing self-Orientalism in institutional (political, football and business) discourse shows the complicated responses to and internalisation of the colonial discourse in building the nation through football. Chapter V also examines from a Foucauldian point of view how South Korean institutions such as government and the KFA utilised football to
promote the value of football (including the 2002 FIFA World Cup), the nation and the people in consistent and in contradicting ways.
Chapter 1: Historical Review – South Korea, Modern sport and Football

The purpose of this chapter is to explore South Korean society, sport in South Korea, and football in international and South Korean contexts from 1945 to the present time. Reviewing South Korean history and history of football in Korea is necessary to understanding the historical context, as well as societal dynamics surrounding the development of football as a complex social phenomenon.

Robertson (1992) divides world history into five phases. Except for the first two phases which cover from the early fifteenth century to the 1870s, Robertson (1992: 59) defines the remaining three as ‘The take-off phase (1875-1925)’, ‘The struggle-for-hegemony phase (1925-69)’, and ‘the uncertainty phase (1969-92)’. For Robertson, the period from 1925 to 1969 witnessed the emergence of international organisations, the decolonisation of the Third World, and the Cold War. According to Robertson, we are now going through a new phase which is full-scale globalisation.

Hoogvelt (2001) views global capitalism and imperialism as a significant impetus for change. Therefore, he places the concepts of colonialism, developmentalism, and post-imperialism under the understanding of world history. Hoogvelt (2001: 17) divides world history into the ‘mercantile phase’ (1500-1800), ‘colonial period’ (1800-1950), ‘neo-colonial period’ (1950-1970), and ‘post-imperial period’ (1970- ). All the periods are inextricably linked to economic relations between the Western powers and the non-Western sides.

Having a direct experience of colonisation by Japan and the Cold War, South Korean history has also been incorporated into the global and capitalistic world trends. In this respect, the periodisation adopted for this chapter divides the contemporary history of South Korea as follows: ‘colonial era (1905-1945)’ and ‘post-colonial era (1945-present)’. The post-colonial era is based on the significant political changes in South Korea which have also influenced economic and socio-cultural conditions. With this in mind, the history of modern sport and football is described with the same rationale as for the historical periodisation.
1.1 History of South Korea

1.1.1 Colonial era - Japanese dominance: 1905-1945

Hoogvelt (2001) and Huntington (1998) observe world order and its relations from a viewpoint of capitalism and power shifting among civilisations. Hoogvelt views colonialism or imperialism which lasted from 1800 to 1950 as a process of transference of economic surplus at the expense of labours in colonies. From a cultural/civilisational viewpoint, Huntington explained the colonial era as Western nations’ expansion to other civilisations with decisive impacts on their colonies. Whilst Korea was incorporated into the world order, Korea was colonised by non-Western imperialist, Japan. Japan’s colonial policy on Korea was contradictory in terms of exclusion policies of Korea and Koreans, and integration policies of Japan and Korea (Peattie, 1984: 14-15).

Political context

During the first half of the twentieth century, Korea could not escape from the expansion of multifarious imperialism, especially from Japanese dominance over the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese colonialism on the Korean peninsula could be divided into four periods, namely a preparation period for annexation (1876-1909), an oppression period (1910-1919), a cultural conciliation period (1919-1931), and a military supply base and Japanisation period (1931-1945) (Kim W, 1988; Nahm, 1988).

Korea officially had to start an ‘open-door policy’ after the inequitable treaty of Kwanghwa with Japan in 1876 (Nahm, 1988). This was different for Japan which progressively accepted Western civilisation and socio-political changes since the Meiji Restoration movement beginning in the 1850s. Korea (Choson Dynasty) adhered to a national isolation policy whilst experiencing some endogenous civilising and modernising.

\[\text{In narrow definition, Meiji Restoration was a coup d’\'\'etat on 3 January 1868 which reasserted ‘the Emperor’s direct responsibility for governing the country’. However, through the movement, Japan established ‘centralised bureaucracy’, reconstruction of social order, a ‘conscription army’ system, factories, trade system, ‘Western style of education’ with slogans such as ‘enrich the country and strengthen the army’, and ‘civilization and enlightenment’ (Beasley, 1973: 2).}\]
movements during the short-lasting Korean Empire (1897-1910), the last monarchy of Korea. Korea was thus very vulnerable to the rapidly changing world situation. After Japan won the Russia-Japanese War in 1905, Japanese protectorate over Korea started in the same year as a result of the Taft-Katsura Treaty between the U.S.A. and Japan (Lee H, 2000: 81). Subsequently, Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and established the Japanese Governor-General of Choson (Korea) which lasted until the end of the Second World War, 1945 (Ok, 2005).

Following the official annexation of Korea in 1910, Japanese authorities established a forceful colonial policy characterised by a military-police regime and several pieces of legislation to enable the exploitation and control of Korean peoples. This consequently caused the March First Independence Movement\(^2\) throughout the country in 1919 (Lee H, 2000: 164). In opposition to the independence movement, Japanese Governor-Generals changed their regime policy from ‘forceful ruling’ to that of cultural conciliation which included a list of reform measures such as abolition of discrimination, approval of local autonomy, freedom of expression, and diffusion of education (Lee H, 2000: 164-165). However, Japanese colonial policies did not change its strategy of a gradual Japanisation of the Korean people and the obliteration of Korean identities. As result to Japan’s involvement in the Second World War, Japanese authorities used the Korean Peninsula as a military base (Lee et al, 2001, Ok, 2005).

\*Economic context\*

The imposed structural changes between 1910 and 1945 shifted Korea’s economy to the ‘increased rice production period’ from 1910-1930 and to the ‘industrialisation period’ from 1930-1945 (Jones & Sakong, 1980; Kim, 1977). Especially, the ratio of manufacturing and mining industries had increased dramatically from 19% of the total Korean production in 1925 to 45% in 1939, as a direct result of the heavy industry policy adopted by Japan in preparing for the Second World War (Jones & Sakong, 1980; Kim, 1977). That being said, until 1940, most of gross domestic expenditure was still

\(^2\) About two million Koreans brought together for national liberation on the 1\(^{\text{st}}\) March 1919 protesting against Japanese occupation on the Korean peninsula (Peattie, 1984: 21).
concentrated upon agriculture and fishery (Suh, 1978). Other industries such as manufacturing industries were still insignificant.

Japan occupied the majority of manufacturing industries in the Korean peninsula (Kang, 1974). This favoured the emergence of Korean business elites. According to Juhn (1977: 10), the behaviour of Korean businessmen can be explained by accommodation, subordination, and obedience to Japanese authorities to acquire monopoly rights and other favours which resembled the close relations between politics and business in the post-colonial era. In terms of economic development during the Japanese rule, some scholars like Eckert et al (1990), McNamara (1990), and Ahn & Nakamura (1993) argue that the economic development and expansion of family managed conglomerate groups, the so-called Chaebol in South Korea since the 1960s, was based on the economic activities of Korean business groups under the Japanese rule. Kohli (1994) even suggests that the Japanese colonialism was beneficial for the economic development of South Korea in the 1960s.

Socio-cultural context

It is worth noting that several modern educational institutions were established and operated by Japanese authorities throughout the Japanese colonial era. Furthermore, as a means of cultivation of national strengths and diffusion of Christianity, modern education was also conducted through private nationalists and missionary schools run by Western missionaries (Lee H, 2000). However, since 1905, Japanese Governor-Generals banned, controlled and restricted the activities of these schools, and established instead Japanese government controlled schools throughout the nation (Ok, 2005). The number of missionary schools decreased from 508 primary schools, 22 high schools and two theological colleges in 1907 to only 34 in total in 1917 (Ok, 2005: 660). Furthermore, Korean students were deprived of higher educational opportunities. Generally, educational purposes under the direction of Japanese authorities were confined to the Japanisation of

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3 Chaebol can be defined as ‘diversified industrial firms’ which are owned and controlled by one owner and his/her family. Chaebol is similar with Japanese family business group, ‘Zaibatsu’ in terms of the definition and meaning (Kang , 1997: 31).
Koreans and the training of skilled labourers to serve the colonial economy (Hong, 1970; Lee H, 2000).

Meanwhile, the Japanese authorities had to deal with violent independence movements on Korean soil, and political independence activities of the provisional Korean Governments established in China, Manchuria, and in the USA starting from the 1920s (Ok, 2005: 657). The resistance movements both inside and outside of Korea adopted different ideologies. For instance, some prominent leaders like Kim Il-Seong who later ruled in North Korea, Rhee Syngman who was later elected as the first President of South Korea, and Kim Ku were backed by the USSR, the USA, and Chinese nationalists respectively (Hatada, 1969). The power relations between the pro and the anti-Japanese colonialism movements, and the ideological fragmentation of the Korean nationalist movement were behind the national confusion after the liberation.

The influx of modern ideologies diffused in the Korean peninsula have challenged traditional Neo-Confucian values in Korea, which was a dominant tradition and ruling system of Choson Dynasty. It stressed a *Yang-ban* (scholar-officials) led social hierarchy, moral-ethical principles, and social harmony in terms of, for instance, family and gender roles, education, loyalty, mutual relationship of superiors and inferiors, and filial piety (Kihl, 1994; Koh, 2003; Lee J, 2003). However it did not completely disappear. The traditional value coexists with modern and post-modern values (Lee S, 2002), and remains as “the last fortress of national morality” (Park, 1963: 11).

Similar to the debates about economic development mentioned above, the evaluation of the impacts of the Japanese colonial reign in Korea in socio-cultural terms is also controversial. For Koreans, Japanese colonialism in Korea was a form of repression and exploitation on their economical, educational, and social activities (Hong, 1970) which caused increasing social inequality and conflicts (Haggard, Kang, & Moon, 1997), and stimulated anti-Japanese enmity and national identity (Eckert et al, 1990). For the Japanese, the colonisation meant numerical improvements of primary school enrolment, literacy levels, and survival rates in the Korean Peninsula (Kimura, 1993; Kim, 1977).
1.1.2 Post-colonial era

From the end of the Second World War, the international order was reorganised in the process of confrontation between capitalism mainly supported by the USA and communism supported by the Soviet Union. Ideologically and militarily, the two blocs fiercely confronted each other until the late 1980s (Huntington, 1998: 21). With the end of the Cold War, globalisation and liberal capitalism has increasingly accelerated the reconstruction of the world, announcing the beginning of the New World Order (Hoogvelt, 2001).

Nation division, the Korean War, the ‘April 19 Revolution’ (and resignation of the President, Rhee Syngman): 1945-1960

Political context

Korea experienced a direct impact of the Cold War. Immediately upon the end of the Japanese occupation, Korea was occupied by the US Army in the southern area and the army of the USSR in the northern area. The line of division between the two blocks formed the division line between North and South Korea. Korea suffered from internal discord which was inevitable in the context of this antagonistic relationship between the USA and the USSR over the Korean Peninsula. In 1948, South Korea established its own government which was led by Rhee Syngman, the USA, and the UN, through a general election and decided the name of the country as the Republic of Korea. In opposition, North Korea was established under the ideology of communism. This finally provoked the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 (Lee B, 2006: 56). As consequence of the Korean War, the devastated land, infrastructures, and peoples’ lives, the ideological antagonism between North and South Korea are still vivid today.

Economic context
After the Korean War, the dictatorial Rhee Syngman’s government, which reigned over South Korea from 1948 to 1960, inevitably had to rely on economic aid from the USA to stabilise the country’s economy. The aid of the USA to Korea amounted to $3,139 million from 1945 to 1961 (Lee, 1965). Rhee’s concern during his regime was not development of the country, but rather aid maximisation (Jones & Sakong, 1980: 42). Therefore, during this period, the economic situation did not improve despite the flow of aid from the USA. For instance, GNP (Gross National Product) per capita in Korea was 67 U.S. Dollars in 1953 and 79 U.S. Dollars in 1960 (The Bank of Korea, 1990). Infrastructure, in particular, from the Japanese heritage, was dissipated by the Korean War and maladministration of Rhee’s government (Jones & Sakong, 1980: 37). Meanwhile, conglomerate company groups, Chaebol, as argued before, emerged as a product of a strong connection with political power. The central governments provided a massive ownership transfer from the governments to the Chaebol and preferential treatment for business groups (Lee B, 2006).

Socio-cultural context

The most important political and social change in this period is the so-called April 19 Revolution (in the Korean term) which occurred on the 19th April 1960 and was followed by the resignation of Rhee Syngman on the 26th April 1960 (Choi, 2003: 35). Rhee’s eagerness to rule the country in a long-term basis caused illegal constitutional amendments and a rigged election which (in) directly resulted in 19 April Revolution (or 4.19 Revolution). South Korean people especially, students and intellectuals went to the streets to express their demands for democratisation. Kim (1996) also argued that economic deprivation provoked the April 19 Revolution in 1960, which became a national movement after the violent response of Rhee’s government.

The Military dictatorship era: From 1960 to the June Popular Uprising in 1987

Political context
Politically, South Koreans had to sustain military coup d’état and the long-term dictatorship of Park Chung-Hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-1988). Park’s regime could be divided into three terms: coup d’état regime (May 16, 1961 to December 16, 1963); a presidency by a direct election system (December 17, 1963 to December 16, 1972) and; a presidency by a Revitalising Reform Constitution (Lee D et al, 2001: 230). In these periods, Park focused on nation building, industrial development, and a life-long presidency, thus disregarding any share of power. In particular, through so-called Yusin Constitution or the Revitalising Reforms in 1972, Park gained more power and could stay in his office as a life President through indirect election (Choi D, 2003: 35). The Yusin Constitution stated that the President could dissolve and control the National Assembly and “exercise emergency powers at will” (Savada & Shaw, 1997: 40). Unexpectedly, Park’s regime came to an end when he was assassinated by his own member of staff Kim Jae-Kyu on the 26th of October 1979. Despite the increasing democratic demands in the Korean society, Chun Doo-Hwan seized power through military coup d’état in the same year of Park’s assassination. A year later, in 1980, he was elected as a new President. During these periods, the National Assembly was controlled by the Cabinets of the President to maximise the control of Korean society and to limit the political manoeuvre of the National Assembly and political opponents.

Economic context

It was not until the 1960s, during President Park Chung-Hee’s regime that the governmental policy for heavy industrialisation resulted in an unprecedented economic growth. As defined by one of the catchphrases of Park’s regime, “Modernisation of the Fatherland” (Lee B, 2006: 63), modernisation through industrialisation was the main agenda of South Korea starting from the 1960s. To accomplish national economic development, Park changed the administrative philosophy in order to secure an effective hierarchical organisation of government and social structure for swift economic decision-making (Jones & Sakong, 1980). Namely, the governments had to establish highly centralised bureaucratic systems to accomplish its economic miracle (Kang M, 2006). The government philosophy manifested itself broadly in four dimensions: export-led economy, control of market, development of public enterprise, and a close relationship with conglomerate business groups, Chaebol (Jones & Sakong, 1980). In a similar vein, Jones
& Sakong (1980) argue that dictatorship and the pragmatic government used those kinds of intervention mechanisms to secure national growth. In particular, a “state-bank-chaebol nexus, a cost and risk sharing partnership” was tightly formed for the industrialisation drive (Lee B, 2006: 65).

From a statistical point of view, the economic growth during these periods was significantly high. GNP per capita increased from 82 U.S. Dollars in 1961 to 3,218 U.S. Dollars in 1987 (The Bank of Korea, 1994). The infrastructure for national industries witnessed a drastic change. In 1961, heavy and chemical industry occupied 26.3% of the whole of manufacturing industry, however, the numerical value changed by 1987 to 59.9% (The Bank of Korea, 1994). In relation to rapid industrialisation, social fabric was also transformed at an unprecedented pace. For instance over 80% of the population today is living in urban areas in comparison with less than 36% in 1960 (Kim D, 1998). In this context, the principle of “developmental interest first” permeated every social stratum (Lee, 1972).

**Socio-cultural context**

In terms of culture, young South Koreans were getting more familiar with Western culture, influenced by the influx of financial support from the USA. However, traditional philosophy of Confucianism, which stresses vertical hierarchy with superiors and subordinates, collectivism, education, loyalty, and obedience in its society, was still prevalent in Korean society (Hyun, 2001). South Korea’s literacy rate was already 71 percent by the end of 1947 (Seth, 2002: 46). Meanwhile, civil society emerged to secure democracy during this dictatorship era. Cumings (2002: 32) argued that civil society, wakened and aroused in the latter half of the 1980s, especially student-led protests and activities provided “an indelible contribution to Korean democracy”. The regimes, contrarily, did not guarantee freedom of expression, through directly controlling media such as television and newspapers (Khil, 2004)

*Transition toward civilian government: From June Popular Uprising in 1987 to 1993*
**Political context**

Throughout the military dictatorship era, the democratic movement gradually gathered strength, especially the so-called ‘June Popular Uprising’, which occurred on the 10th June 1987. It became a trigger of political transition from authoritarianism to democratisation (Lee D et al, 2001: 246). Massive nationwide democratic protests of students, workers, and related associations were directly detonated by the death of Pak Chong-Chol, a Seoul National University student during a police interrogation and torture. Chun Doo-Hwan’s initial rejection for demands of a constitutional revision including direct-presidential election made the situation all the worse (Kim S, 2002). Roh Tae-Woo, a president of the ruling party (Democratic Justice Party) and a main member of Chun Doo-Hwan’s coup d’état announced the so-called ‘June 29 Declaration’ which promoted direct election and democratic social reform plans in 1987. In consequence, Roh Tae-Woo, as the 13th President, was the first to be elected through the direct election.

However, Kim Sunhyuk (2002) argued that the Roh’s regime was just continuity and mere extension of the authoritarian reign. He especially regarded the grand party merger, of which Roh’s ruling party with two opposite parties as weakening the power of other opposition parties “a frontal attack on the consolidation of democracy” (p98). In a similar vein, Cumings (2002) asserted that without the total dismantling of the bureaucratic authoritarian state, the democratic process in South Korean society would have been minimised due to the legacy of repressive and fragmentary socio-political structures inherited from the (military) dictatorship.

**Economic context**

Whilst driving national development, the Korean government regulated and intervened in most economic activities, including, “allocating resources, licensing business, repressing workers’ rights, etc” (Kim D, 1998: 35). The tradition of economic controls from the top was still prevalent in Roh’s economic policy. However, the world economic recessionary trend, the diffusion of labour-management disputes, and wage inflation had directly influenced South Korea’s economic recession (Lee D et al, 2001: 249-250). Two months
after the June 29 Declaration, there were about 3,500 strikes demanding pay raises, better treatment and guarantee of fundamental human rights (Ibid: 250-251). In this circumstance, South Korea had to cope with the changed economic environment.

Socio-cultural context

The role of students and workers in socio-political changes can be a controversial issue. However, Han (2001) argued that student-led grassroots and (sympathetic) connection with the middle class of Korean society made the democratic transition possible but in favour of the middle class although this contributed to the emergence of a civil society in South Korea. With the structural changes of social classes like the expansion of the working and new middle class, which increased from 13% and 5.5% in 1960 to 41.3% and 39.9% in 1990 respectively (Han, 2001: 122), the development of civil society had a significant role before and after the democratic transition. Starting from the democratic reform of 1987, South Korea began to enjoy “an explosion of freedom of expression” in various aspects and became “accustomed to the peaceful change of power” (Choi, 2003: 36).

Democratisation era: 1993 to present

Political context

In 1993, Kim Young-Sam was elected as the 14th President. It was the first fully democratically elected government without any influence of military background. However, as Kim D (1998: 41) explained, even during Kim Young-Sam’s tenure, democratic procedure was often disrespected and authoritarian culture was still present: the consequence of growth-oriented strategy since the 1960s. Similarly, Cumings (2004) argued that bureaucratic authoritarianism was still in practice in every social and governmental stratum. The Kim Young-Sam government was also not free from moral
hazard, for instance, the *Hanbo* Scandal\(^4\), which was the result of the unholy network between politics and business. The scandal exemplified a failure of “the bureaucratic governance system” which was followed by the financial crisis in 1997 (Chang, 1999: 31).

Through the influence of globalisation and neo-liberalism in the market economy, however, South Korean governments, especially since the 1997 financial crisis, encountered a wave of consequential changes. Furthermore, emanating from the fundamental requests of balanced development of the country neglected during the industrialisation of the 1970s and 1980s, the South Korean government has had to deal this time with an international pressure for reform, including decentralisation, and local development. Although the Kim Dae-Jung government executed ‘small government practise’ in the aftermath of the financial crisis and because of the inflexible centralised bureaucracy toward international changes, Kang M (2006: 110) argued that the South Korean government since Kim Dae-Jung conducted decentralisation and local development, “without losing the main characteristics of a developmental state”. Put it in other terms, the central government has still held a strong power in policy making.

*Economic context*

The Uruguay Round (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/GATT) came to a settlement in 1994, which meant that the open market economy became a general trend around the world. South Korea has been a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since 1995 (WTO, 2008) and, in 1996, South Korea joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a member (OECD, 2008). Furthermore, South Korea has already reached the FTA (Free Trade Agreement) with several countries such as the U.S.A. and considered the conclusion of the FTA with some countries including Japan (Park, 2007: 3). Domestically, many formations of labour unions initiated wage inflation, increase expenses of companies, and inflation, making a vicious circle (Son, 2002: 40).

\(^4\) On January, 23, 1997, the second largest steelmaker, ‘Hanbo Steel Industry’ went bankrupt with $6 billion debt. However, this incident shocked the nation because of not only the bankruptcy of the *Chaebol* itself but also the revelation of the collusive relations between the government and *Chaebol*. In particular, several and large bribes from the *Chaebol* to high ranking government officials and cabinet ministers for a special favour such as large preferential bank loans, and involvement of the president’s second son in the connection made this incident quickly dubbed as ‘Hanbo Scandal’ or ‘Hanbogate’ (Oh, 1999: 206).
However the most significant change in South Korea in the 1990s was the financial crisis in 1997 which subsequently resulted in the most drastic socio-economic reforms. Lee B (2006) explains that the Korean government had to accept the IMF and the USA intervention. The Korean economy had to undergo a drastic political, economic, and social reformation to deal with the loosely managed chaebol companies, corruption in politic-economic spheres of the society, and external pressures for an open-market economy (Lee B, 2006).

South Korea’s large business conglomerates, Chaebol were one of the main causes of the financial crisis and thus the primary target of the economic reform. For Korea to receive the IMF aid fund, president-elect Kim Dae-Jung reached an agreement with the top five Chaebol companies concerning five main restructuring principles. The five topic areas of intervention were “transparency of business management”, “minimum level of mutual debt guarantee”, “soundness of the financial structure”, “mutual cooperation with minor firms”, and “corporate governance” (Jun, 2002: 88-89). This has offered increased opportunities for the state to further intervene in the management of Chaebol. Jun (2002) argued that after the bankruptcy of the Daewoo Group in 1999, the third largest Chaebol, the Kim Dae-Jung government became more involved in the national economy to promote the reform.

South Korea repaid the aid fund of the IMF, 19.5 billion U.S. Dollars in 2001, during the Kim Dae-Jung regime (1998-2003). The national credit rating was recovered as the standard of pre-financial crisis. For instance the credit rating companies like Moody's rating increased 5 levels from Ba1 in 1997 to A2 in 2007. Similarly, in comparison with the 1997 financial crisis, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch’s credit rating of South Korea indicated 8 level and 11 level increases in 2007. The GDP (Gross Domestic Product) also increased from 516.4 billion U.S. Dollars in 1997 to 887.4 billion U.S. Dollars in 2006. Furthermore foreign exchange holdings rose from 20.4 billion U.S. Dollars in 1997 to 260.1 billion U.S. Dollars in 2007 (Park, 2007).

The South Korean economy has developed in a spectacular manner during the last 50 years, especially since the Park Chung-Hee regime. However, in a more competitive global economic system, the emergence of other NIEs such as China which is becoming a significant competitor to South Korea in heavy industries such as steel, ship construction,
chemicals, and the drive for exports in the traditional manufacturing industries, on which
the South Korean economy had developed, threatens its continuous economic growth (Han
& Choi, 2008). Consequently, government and corporations started to invest in high value-added businesses, for instance, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) like
Internet, communication equipment, information equipment, software, and the like.
According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU: the United Nations agency
for ICT), South Korea was at the top of the Digital Opportunity Index (DOI) among about
180 countries in 2007 (ITU, 2008). Economically, ICT is contributing to South Korean
economy more than any other sectors. In 2000, ICT occupied half of the overall GDP

Socio-cultural context

South Korea has successfully changed its profile from an agricultural/feudal nation to an
educated, democratic, (post) industrial, and urbanised society (Hyun, 2001). Significantly,
as suggested by Lee B (2006), peoples’ social positions in relation to socio-economic
rights have been threatened since the 1997 financial crisis. Furthermore, in an ethno-
demographic term, South Korean society has recently experienced an “increasing ethnic
and cultural diversity” (Choe, 2007). Choe (2007) stressed that the increased influx of
foreign workers and overseas nationalities, and international marriages, which occupied 12
percent of all South Korean marriages are challenging the ethnic and cultural homogeneity
of South Korea. It is projected that the ethnic and cultural diversity of South Korea will
depth in the future.

As regards to leisure, the ‘Leisure White Paper 2006’ indicated that South Korea is going
through a social value change from a work-centred society to a leisure-centred society.
This is also evident in the shortening of working hours, aging society, low birth rate, and
development of Internet and mobile technology (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007b).

5 ‘The DOI is an e-indicator based on internationally-agreed ICT indicators. The DOI is based on 11
indicators, grouped in three clusters: opportunity, infrastructure, and utilisation’ (source: ITU homepage;
Over the last century, South Korea has experienced several changes in political, economic and social spheres. During the Japanese colonial rule on the Korean peninsula, Korea lost its sovereignty and fostered antagonism toward the political, economical, and social discrimination of Japan while the modernisation process had started to transform the scenery of the society in comparison to its pre-colonial traditional conditions.

Liberation from Japan in 1945 led Korean society to be subject to severe experiences. Because of the geopolitical location, the fate of Korea was inevitably incorporated into the Cold War, in which Korea experienced a civil war and division of the peninsula. In consequence, anti-communism and modernisation became the two main ideologies in South Korea to control and mobilise the society especially during the military dictatorship era. With the incessant democratic movements, South Korea witnessed the end of dictatorial reign. However, especially as a result of the financial crisis and in response to globalisation trends, South Korean society had to endure radical social and economic reforms.
1.2 History of sport in South Korea

1.2.1 Colonial era: Western sport introduction, civilization, and nationalism: 1905-1945

Historically, Korea’s most prominent and traditional sports are Ssirum, Tae Kwon do, and Korean archery (Mulling, 1989). However, from the late 19th century, Western sport flowed into the Korean peninsula keeping pace with the Western Powers’ expansion toward Asia and Africa. For instance, football was introduced in 1882 by British sailors and baseball by American missionaries in 1905 (KFA, 2008; Lee H, 2000). Others introduced sports around this period include track and field sport (in 1896), gymnastics (in 1897), ice sports (in the 1890s), shooting (in 1904), and tennis (in 1884) (Lee H, 2000). Since then, with new social trends like modern education, the influx of Western cultures, and necessity for building a strong nation, Western sport teams, associations, and several sport days (event), were unarguably formed by missionaries, the intelligentsia, nationalists, and private companies in Korea.

According to Lee H (2000), Western sports were exercised through private schools and through a number of sport activities in schools. However, physical education in schools was also conducted as a quasi-military training due to the nationalists’ appreciation of sport or physical exercise which explains the influx of military officers into schools following the Korean army’s disbandment by the Japanese authorities in 1907 (Ha & Mangan, 1994; Lee H, 2000). Since Japanese General Governments controlled the education system, physical education was also purposively utilised to ensure, for instance, military training and stressed gymnastics (Ok, 2005)

Meanwhile, several private sport associations were also established. For instance, the Choson Sports Council (CSC), the predecessor of the present Korea Sports Council (KSC) was founded in 1920 as a representative sport organisation combining individual governing bodies (KSC, 2008; Lee H, 2000; Mangan & Ha, 2001; Mulling, 1989; Ok, 2005). Before and after the Japan-Korea annexation in 1910, as Lee H (2000) explained, physical activities conducted by Koreans could be understood as nationalistic sports. He argued that sports around these times, from the 1900s to 1945, functioned as expressions of peoples’
desires. Given the situation that Japanese authorities tried to restrain any assemblies and political strife by Koreans, sports were performed as a pathway to express nationalism and independence by the Korean people from the intelligentsia and nationalists perspectives (Ha & Mangan, 1994). For these reasons, Japanese authorities kept the Korean activities including sport events under constant surveillance. According to Lee H (2000), during the 1910s to 1930s there were many Korean sport clubs, and social groups with sport activities, which were also banned by the Japanese authorities. In this situation, some commentators like Lee H (2000) and Ha & Mangan (1994) stress the role of the YMCA in Korea, which was inaugurated under the name of ‘Hwang-song Kidogkyo Chongnyon-Hoi (Hwangsong YMCA)’. It was instrumental in spreading Western sport and keeping sport activities in Korea despite being under repression during the Japanese rule. Under the umbrella of the YMCA, organised by American missionaries, toward whom Japanese authorities, inevitably, used much less suppression, Koreans could express their desire for nationalism and independence (Ha & Mangan, 1994; Mulling, 1989; Ok, 2005).

However, as Japan invaded Manchuria (1931) and became involved in the Sino-Japanese War (1937) and the Second World War (1939), sports were used as military drills in schools and for the Japanese ultra-nationalist movement (Lee H, 2000). Furthermore, Japanese authorities forcefully unified Korean sport organisations with Japanese sport organisations in Korea and finally disbanded some Korean sport organisations. For instance, the CSC and the YMCA were disbanded in 1938 and 1943 respectively and incorporated into Japanese organisations (KSC, 2008; Lee H, 2000; Mulling, 1989).

Meanwhile, during the Japanese colonialism, Korean sportspersons participated in international sport events as representatives of Japan. One of the examples would be the Korean marathoner Shon Kee-Jung who won a gold medal in the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games as a member of the Japanese team. Korean intellectuals and nationalists exalted this as a heroic feat manifesting the superiority of Korea, while Dong-A Ilbo (newspaper) issued Son’s photograph without the Japanese national flag on his chest, which caused a sensation in Korean society and controversy among Japanese officials (Lee H, 2000).
1.2.2 Post-colonial era

Sport in the period of disorder: 1945-1960

From the 1945 Liberation from Japan, South Korean sports started to reorganise their organisations and to incorporate them into international federations. As Ha & Mangan (2003: 214) mentioned, since the liberation of Korea in 1945, developing organised Western sport in South Korea was an unattainable task under the conditions of social disorder provoked by the Korean War, and the attendant devastation of land, and division of the country. The most important priorities for governmental authorities and even Korean peoples were livelihood itself rather than sports or leisure.

Nevertheless, many sport organisations were established and reorganised. About thirty sports organisations were rehabilitated or newly established directly after the liberation (Ok, 2004). The Choson Sport Council (CSC) which changed its name to the Korean Sport Council (KSC) was rehabilitated in 1945 and established the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) to participate in the 1948 London Olympic Games, in which Korea won two bronze medals in boxing and weight lifting (Lee H, 2000). The KSC launched nation-wide campaigns for sport, improving physical strength, cultivation of amateur sportspeople, and the contribution to national prestige and development of national culture through sports (KSC, 2008).

The take-off stage of elite sport and professional sport: 1960-1987

It was not until the 1960s that the South Korean government actively engaged sports as part of the national agenda under President Park Chung-Hee’s regime. Park Chung-Hee expressed sport nationalism in the process of nation building and modernisation of the country, stressing anti-communism and national development as fundamental values in the building of a strong country. As Walhain (2001: 104) mentioned, for these national priorities, Park’s government introduced ‘a Spartan regime onto Korean society’. National policies were reflected in sport policies both in elite sport development and mass sports.
The government employed sport actively as one of its national policies, which were projected in the slogan ‘Physical Strength is National Strength’ under Park’s government (Ha & Mangan, 2003: 218; Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a: 19). As Houlihan (1997: 62-64) explains the rationale for government involvement in sport, Park Chung-Hee fully intended to use sport as a means for promoting “national health”, “social integration”, and “international prestige”.

For these mentioned purposes, the ‘National Sport Promotion Law’, related enforcement regulations, and related enforcement ordinances were enacted in 1962 (Lee H, 2000). The law and regulations guaranteed, for instance, special treatment for sports talents and exemption for sport related taxes. In 1972, for the promotion and the implementation of mass sports and sport funds, the ‘National Sport Promotion Foundation’ was established as well. Nevertheless, the socio-economical condition in the 1960s could not build or sustain sports infrastructure. For instance, South Korea had to withdraw from staging the sixth Asian Games in 1970 because of the financial burden, and shortage of sport facilities for the sport event, and was fined 250,000 U.S. Dollars (Kang J, 2006; Koh E, 2005).

The promotion of national health and nationalism through sport continued during the Park Chung-Hee era. For instance, the government imposed a physical strength measurement in the school curriculum as a part of the admission examination to universities beginning in 1973, which was abolished in 1994. Because sport performance became highly valued by the state and even became a guarantee for entry into higher education, young athletes had been fully motivated to develop their athletic skills (Ha & Mangan, 2003: 217). Ha & Mangan (2003: 233) see that the growth of elite sport in South Korea, in terms of the performance in the international events was possible due to a strong governmental involvement in sport. Consequently, South Korea could achieve astonishing results in the Asian Games and the Olympic Games held in South Korea. In their first official participation in the Olympic Games after the end of the Japanese occupation, South Korea ranked 24th in the 1948 London Olympic Games, and forty years later reaching an astonishing 4th position in the 1988 Seoul Olympics (Ha & Mangan, 2003; Lee H, 2000: 545).

In regards to sport facilities, in particular, 19,442 sport fields were built or renovated by 1985 and 59 new sport parks were constructed in relation to the events (Ok, 2004). With
the success of the Olympic Games, South Korea had experienced an unprecedented increase of professional sports in the 1980s. Although there had been some professional sports like pro-boxing, pro-golf, and pro-wrestling before the 1980s, many professional sports like professional baseball (1982), and professional football (1983) launched their campaign under Chun Doo-Hwan’s regime (KBO, 2008; KFA, 2008). As Ha & Mangan (2003: 235) and Lee H (2000: 502) mentioned, Chun Doo-Hwan exploited the inauguration of professional sports as a “classical strategy” to divert peoples’ interests away from the political situations. In a similar vein, hosting global sport events like the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games could be understood as a diversion strategy of the military dictatorship (Koh E, 2005). Nevertheless, Lee H (2000) and Koh E (2005) evaluate that the two major events on South Korean soil contributed to a sudden increase of the population’s interest in sport recreation, social unification, relational improvement with the Eastern Europe bloc, boosting of domestic economy, enhancement of the national prestige, and improvement in social infrastructure.

**Concern for mass sport cultivation: 1987-1993**

From the late 1960s, Park Chung-Hee’s interest in the Sport for All movement for a sound social morale and promotion of physical fitness of people triggered the Korean Sports Council’s initiation of the ‘the Five Year Plan for National Sport Promotion’ executed from 1977 (Lee H, 2000). Under Park’s regime, the plan was mainly developed for local communities and workplaces. The targets of the plan were ‘national consensus’, ‘accomplishment of unification of Korea’, ‘economic development’, ‘sound application of leisure time’, and ‘popularisation of mass sport’. However, the systemic concerns for the mass sport cultivation began in earnest by the so called ‘Hodori Plan’ (Master plan for Mass Sport Promotion) in 1989 under the Roh Tae-Woo regime, which supported the creation of ‘the National Council of Sport for All’, specialised in development and popularisation of mass and recreational sport (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a: 21; Koh E, 2005: 473). The population who participated in sport for one hour a week or more dramatically increased from 1.6 million in 1989 to 4 million in 1991 (Lee H, 2000).

With the emphasis of mass sport since the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the necessity of self-support of sport finance was stressed. Furthermore, effective utilisation of facilities
and human resources after the 1988 Olympics were needed as well. For these reasons, ‘the Public Corporation of National Sport Promotion (PCNSP)’ was established and ‘the National Sport Promotion Law’ was revised in 1989. The business of the PCNSP was summarised as “researches for the national sport promotion”, “cultivation and supporting of elite sport”, “financial support for cultivating a sound young generation”, “sport diplomacy”, and “commemoration of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games” (Lee H, 2000).

Plurality of sport: 1993-present

Following a trend of small central governments, Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung governments reduced the sport administrative organisations in their governments’ hierarchy. During the Kim Young-Sam regime, the Ministry of Sport and Young Generation was incorporated into the Ministry of Culture, and then the Ministry of Culture and Sport was newly inaugurated in 1993 (Lee H, 2000). The Ministry of Culture and Sport had three sport related bureaus and nine sections under the bureaus. The Kim Dae-Jung government reorganised the Ministry of Culture and Sport into the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, consequently sport related bureau were reduced into one bureau in 1998 (Lee H, 2000).

Although the financial crisis in 1997 seriously affected South Korean sport industries⁶, South Korean sport evolved in diverse directions. Up to 2006, there were 9 professional sports (football, baseball, men’s basketball, women’s basketball, men’s volleyball, women’s volleyball, ssirum, men’s golf, women’s golf, bowling, boxing, and wrestling) and 11 professional organisations in South Korea (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a). As seen in the case of the 2002 Korea-Japan FIFA World Cup, the governments’ involvement in sport had not diminished. Furthermore, the sport media environment has been evolving and new types of sports such as X-game have been gathering many supporters. For instance, in 2005, there were 615 amateur in-line hockey clubs and 64,702 members in these clubs (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2007a).

⁶ For instance, about 80 sport teams were dissolved with financial pressures and the Sung-Nam field hockey stadium used for the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was closed (Lee H, 2000).
With Western countries’ imperial expansion and Japanese colonial rule, Western sport was introduced to Korean people. Around this period, Western sport functioned as a way of increasing national fitness and expressing antagonism for nationalists. As for Japanese officials sport was a means for controlling the Korean colony. Sport has been inextricably linked to politics especially since the military dictatorship era. Successive governments exploited sport to legitimate their authorities and divert people’s attention from political issues and democratic concerns. Under this circumstance, elite sport and its success in international competition became a priority in the sport policy agenda. Furthermore, the successful staging of mega-events held in South Korea has naturally increased interest in mass sport since the 1980s. Since the democratic era, the governance of sport in South Korea has showed plural characteristics and people’s interests and involvements in sport have increased.
1.3 International and South Korean football context

1.3.1 Colonial era—International and national football: 1905-1945

International Football Context

La Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) was founded in 1904 by European football officials from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany (Eisenberg, 2006). The objectives of the association were to unify the rules and to establish a European football tournament. Before the foundation of FIFA, the English Football Association (FA) founded in 1863 played a major role in defining the rules of the game and in spreading football around the world (Russell, 1997: 9-10).

In 1916, the Confederacion Sudamericana de Futbol (CONMEBOL) of South American nations was formed to organise the South American Cup, which was also inaugurated in 1916 (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998:93-96; 202). Although CONMEBOL was not considered a serious competitor by FIFA in terms of power relations, the South American football teams of Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil dominated the game of football. In particular, the consecutive Olympic triumphs of the Uruguayan football team in 1924 and in 1928 helped Uruguay lobby Jules Rimet, FIFA president, to stage the first World Cup Finals in Uruguay in 1930. However, the number of participant countries in the first World Cup was not so impressive. Thirteen teams: four teams from Europe, two teams from North and Central America, and seven teams from South America, competed in the first World Cup Finals. This was followed by the 1934 Italy World Cup under the Mussolini regime, the 1938 France World Cup (the last competition before the outbreak of the Second World War), and the 1950 Brazil World Cup Finals (FIFA, 2008).

However, amid the whirlwinds of imperialism and the Second World War during the first half of the twentieth century, Asian countries could not develop any individual or collective political voices in an international context. Historically, except Japan, most
Asian countries suffered from direct and indirect colonialism and dominance by Japan and other Western countries. For example, since the Sino-Japanese War\(^7\) of 1894-95, China (hereafter China indicates the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan means the Republic of China) fell under European hegemony and later, Japanese power. Japan became “the only imperial power in the East” (Mondal, 2007: 139). These conditions were also reflected in the football arena. The Japanese Football Association (JFA) was established in 1921 and fully accepted as a member of FIFA in 1929 (JFA, 2009), whilst the Chinese Football Association was founded in 1924 and officially affiliated to FIFA in 1931 (FIFA, 2009), although, the recognition of the Korea Football Association by FIFA was not realised until the liberation of Korea from Japan.

**South Korean Football Context**

Football was first introduced by British sailors whilst their vessel was anchored in Inchon port in 1882 (KFA, 2008). Since then, football clubs such as Paejae secondary school team organised games and started to diffuse the game (Kang J, 2006; Lee J, 2002). The Chosun Referees Association, the predecessor of the Chosun Football Association (CFA), which finally changed its name to the Korea Football Association (KFA) in 1948, was inaugurated in 1928 (KFA, 2008). Under Japanese occupation, the Gyeong-Pyeong Football Match was the representative football event for Korean people beginning in 1929 (Kang J, 2006; Lee H, 2000).

However, the activities of the CFA did not take place in favourable circumstances. To the Japanese colonial authority, any organisational activities of Koreans were objectionable (Chung, 2004; Mangan & Ha, 2001). This was also the case for sport organisations in Korea, which explains the disbandment of the CFA in 1938 (KFA, 2008). According to Mangan & Ha (2001: 61), the Japanese colonial administrations considered the Koreans’ sport activities as symbols of resistance to their authority and worried about its uses as an independence movement. Chung (2004) explains the reasons behind the dissolution of Korean sport organisations by Japanese imperial authority in the following manner:

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\(^7\) The Sino-Japanese Wars were ‘two wars waged by Japan against China 1894-1895 and 1931-1945 to expand to the mainland. Territory gained in the First Sino-Japanese War (Korea) and in the 1930s (Manchuria, Shanghai) was returned at the end of World War II’ (The Hutchinson Dictionary of World History, 1998: 525).
The colonial government strictly controlled freedom of association; thus, sporting events provided rare opportunities for people to gather together in large numbers. As such, football served, on many occasions, as a major rallying point for anti-government protests and the independence movement. This eventually led to a ban on all football matches and the dissolution of the national and regional governing bodies by the colonial power, near the end of their rule (Chung, 2004: 118).

Not only did the Japanese authorities repress Korean football activities, they also prevented Korean players from representing Korea on international stages. Korean players had to participate in international sport events as members of Japanese teams based on a discriminatory selection process (Kang J, 2006; Lee J, 2002). For instance, for the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, the Japanese Football Association (JFA) announced that the representative of the national football squad would be selected through two All-Japan football tournaments (Kang J, 2006). Unexpectedly for the JFA, the Gyeong-Sung football team (based in Seoul, South Korea) won the two competitions. However, only two Korean players were selected for the Japanese national team, which caused controversial debates in Korea on whether or not the two players had to join the Japanese team (Kang J, 2006; Lee J, 2002). As Lee J (2002) mentioned, such incidents in sport further aggravated anti-Japanese feelings for Korean people.

1.3.2 Post-colonial era

World football and South Korean football in the disorder period: 1945-1960

International Football Context

The membership of FIFA grew rapidly after the end of the Second World War, due to the increased number of independent countries in the context of de-colonisation (Eisenberg, 2006). Regional confederations were also formed under the hierarchy of FIFA:

The AFC officially formed in 1954 with twelve national associations: Afghanistan, Burma, the Republic of China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam (AFC, 2009). The JFA was reinstated by FIFA in 1950 and joined the newly established Asian Football Confederation (AFC) in 1954 (JFA, 2009; Horne & Bleakley, 2002: 122). In 1958, China withdrew from the IOC and FIFA to protest against the IOC and FIFA’s acceptance of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Homburg, 2006; Jinxia & Mangan, 2001: 83).

**South Korean Football Context**

Meanwhile, prior to the Korean War in 1950, the Korean Peninsula was already divided under the supervision and military governments of the USA in the south and the USSR in the north. Under this ideological and territorial division, sport governing bodies were formed to represent the two states. The North Korean Football Association had already been established in 1945, the year of the liberation from Japanese occupation, and officially joined the FIFA in 1958 (Murray, 1994). From 1926 to 1946, the Gyeong-Pyeong Football Match reconvened eight times, and 21 matches were held. The last Gyeong-Pyeong Football Match was held in Seoul in 1946. Since then, the ideological conflict and the territorial border of the 38th parallel\(^8\) which divides the two Koreas had prevented the match from taking place for about 40 years (Kang J, 2006: 65; KFA, 2003).

Since the liberation from Japanese colonialism, the Chosun Football Association, disbanded in 1938, was reorganised in 1945 and changed its name to the Korean Football Association (KFA) in 1948 (KFA, 2008). FIFA had an affiliation with the KFA from 1947

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\(^8\) The line was chosen by U.S. military planners at the Potsdam Conference (July 1945) near the end of World War II as an army boundary, north of which the U.S.S.R. was to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces in Korea and south of which the Americans were to accept the Japanese surrender (Encyclopaedia Britannica (online)).
and the KFA became a member of the AFC in 1954. As a result, the first All-Korean Football Tournament was held in 1945. The South Korean national football team participated in the London Olympic Games in 1948, and took part, for the first time, in the fifth World Cup Finals in Switzerland in 1954 (KFA, 2008; Lee J, 2002; Lee H, 2000). South Korea played Japan in the FIFA World Cup qualifying competition in 1954. This was the first official football match between the two nations (Horne & Bleakley, 2002). However, in an atmosphere of persistent nationalist antagonism between Japan and South Korea, President Rhee would not allow the Japanese team’s away match on South Korean soil. Consequently, both matches were held in Tokyo, Japan (pp122-123).

Interestingly, in relation to sport and nationalism in the devastating aftermath of the Korean War, football acted as a substitute for people’s dissatisfaction, and especially since the 1960s as means to strengthen the political legitimacy of successive authoritarian regimes. As Chung (2004: 119) mentioned, the national football team incited people to cherish their national heritage and international prestige in the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, ‘football firmly established itself as a popular sport along with baseball’ in South Korea. South Korean football became known as ‘the Tiger in Asia’ winning the first two AFC Asian Cups in 1956 and 1960. This was followed by many other Asian-based tournaments such as the Merdeka Cup held by Malaysia, King’s Cup held by Thailand, the Asian Games, and the Asian Youth Football Games (Chung, 2004; KFA, 2008; Lee J, 2002).

**World football and South Korean football during the military regimes: 1960-1988**

**International Football Context**

In 1974, Brazilian João Havelange was elected as the president of FIFA. During Havelange’s reign, FIFA experienced massive commercial expansion in football. Furthermore, the presidency of Havelange meant that power struggles amongst FIFA, UEFA, and the developing world, especially African members, had started on a full scale (Butler, 2002). Namely, Havelange wanted to restrain the power of UEFA members in FIFA with support from newly emerged African members, whilst the African nations tried...
to dismantle the Eurocentric stance of FIFA by demanding an increase of opportunities in the World Cup Final (Butler, 2002; Darby, 2005; Sugden et al., 1998).

From the 1970s, re-admission of China, who withdrew from FIFA in 1958, had become an issue on FIFA’s agenda. Chiefly, this became so when the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974 had decided to recognise the People’s Republic of China as ‘the sole legitimate representative of China and Taiwan as a part of Chinese territory’; FIFA also confronted an interpretational problem of FIFA Statutes: one country and one association policy (Homburg, 2006: 81). However, after lengthy discussions and negotiation in FIFA hierarchy, the Executive Committee announced the successful negotiation of two Chinas in FIFA with some solutions in 1979:

To maintain the membership of the Football Association located in Taipei on the condition that it changes its name to ‘The Chinese Taipei Football Association’ and consequently does not use any symbols of the former ‘Republic of China’ (FIFA Congress report on July 7, 1980, referred in Homburg, 2006: 85).

South Korean Football Context

In the 1960s, South Korean football experienced a stagnation stage. Since winning the second Asian Cup in 1960, the South Korean football team obtained unsatisfactory results: failure to qualify for the 1962 Chile World Cup Final; runner-up in the fourth Asian Games; failure to qualify for the sixth Merdeka Cup; and fourth place in the 6th AFC Youth Championship in 1964. Furthermore, following their poor records in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, South Korea withdrew from the qualifying tournament for the 1966 London World Cup Final, and failed to qualify for both the 1968 Mexico Olympics and the 1970 Mexico World Cup (Kang J, 2006).

In 1960, the so-called April 19th Revolution occurred, followed by the resignation of Rhee Syngman on the 26th of April (Choi, 2003: 35). Consequently, the prohibition of Japanese sport teams’ entry onto South Korean soil was lifted (Kang J, 2006: 99). This was followed by a Japan national football side’s visit to Seoul for the 1962 World Cup qualifier in 1961.
It was the first ever visit to South Korea by any Japanese sports teams since the liberation of Korea (Horne & Bleakley, 2002: 123). It was not until 1965 that the two countries normalised a diplomatic relation.

Meanwhile, the issue of affiliating North Korean football with AFC was at the centre of Asian football concerns during the sixth Merdeka Cup in 1963. However, South Korea diplomatically fought against it and deterred North Korea from joining the Asian Football Confederation (Kim S, 2006: 37-38). In 1965, the South Korean national team was supposed to meet the North Korean squad in a regional qualifier for the 1966 London World Cup Final. However, amid disappointing performances on the international stage, the South Korean team gave up their qualifying campaigns to avoid playing with North Korea (Kang J, 2006: 104).

From the 1970s onward, a number of corporate football teams were created before the official inauguration of the professional league (Chung, 2004; Kang J, 2006). In 1971, the South Korean government and the KFA created President Park’s Asian Cup Football Tournament, the first international football tournament held in South Korea, which underwent several name changes in its lifespan: Park’s Cup International Football Tournament (1976), the President’s Cup International Football Tournament (1980), and finally, the Korea Cup from 1995 until its abandonment in 1999 (Kang J, 2006; KFA, 2008).

In 1983, the KFA created the ‘Super League’ comprised of two professional teams (Hallelujah FC and Yugong FC) and three amateur teams (Deawoo FC, Pochul FC, and Kukmin Bank FC) (Lee H, 2000; The Korean Professional Football League, 2008). Although some clubs were added to the league later on, the professional football league was not able to operate in a stable manner due to the small number of teams and the government’s priorities for national teams and international events such as the Olympic Games (The Korean Professional Football League, 2008).
International Football Context

As Murray (1994) indicates, football around the world was generally confronted with unpopularity and financial difficulties in the 1980s. South American countries, more pointedly, experienced devastating situations such as attendance decline, the exodus of star players to Europe, and hooliganism (Murray, 1994). However, along with the 1990 World Cup’s success in Italy and legislation to tackle hooliganism, commercialised football changed the image of the game of football. For instance, in England, increased concerns over commercial interest and television revenue changed the relations between top English clubs and the FA which enabled the launch of the Premier League in 1992 (Horrie, 2002; Hunt, 2003: 17). In terms of the FIFA World Cup, the emergence of global television networks, lucrative sponsorship deals, and other subsidiary development possibilities for candidate countries have changed the characteristics of the World Cup competition.

Under Havelange’s presidency (1974-1998), FIFA increased the number of participants in the World Cup final from 16 nations in the 1978 Argentina World Cup to 32 nations in the 1998 France World Cup (Darby, 2005). In addition, the World Cup entry for non-European countries increased as well. The African and Asian/Oceanic continents secured five and four places, respectively in 1998, as opposed to merely one place each in 1978. Meanwhile, UEFA allied with the CFA in 1997 to grant financial and technical support to further develop African football (Sugden et al., 1998).

The 2002 World Cup in Asia has long been considered a symbolic event for FIFA and as a powerful booster of Asian football. At first, both South Korea and Japan participated in the bidding campaign individually. Although the Japanese bid was overtly advocated by Havelange, the FIFA Executive Committee election of Dr. Chung Mong-Joon, the president of the Korean Football Association who asserted FIFA reform in alliance with the UEFA, was also critical to produce the decision of the co-hosting for FIFA (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998).

South Korean Football Context
Sport has normally been used as a frontal breakthrough of diplomatic matters around the world. In the Far East, football partly contributed to creating a peaceful environment between the divided nation of South and North Korea after the Korean War (1950-53). Since the Korean War, historical football matches between the two countries were first held in 1990 in Pyeong-Yang, (North Korean capital), followed by another one in Seoul, the capital of South Korea (Kang J, 2006; Lee H, 2000). The event was the basis for forming a unified Korean team, composed of North and South Korean players. The team participated in the Under 20 Youth World Cup in Portugal in 1991. This was the first ever and also the last single team by South and North Korea (Kang J, 2006; Lee H, 2000).

South Korea entered in the 2002 World Cup bidding campaign when Dr. Chung Mong-Joon, a politician and the president of Hyundai Heavy Industries (a Hyundai Chaebol affiliate), was elected as president of the KFA in 1993. The Presidential candidate, Kim Young-Sam, who was finally elected President in 1992, pledged to stage the 2002 FIFA World Cup in South Korea during his election campaign. Once the Bidding Committee for the 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea (KOBID) was launched, the South Korean government and the President himself were evidently supportive (Butler, 2002; KDI, 2003). However, under the circumstantial power relations within FIFA and concern about the fierce rivalry between Korea and Japan, it was decided that the 2002 FIFA World Cup Finals should be co-hosted between the two countries (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998).

Football would be one of the most successful sports in terms of global diffusion, symbolised by the staging of the World Cup Finals in every fourth year. FIFA as a governing body has been a venue of Eurocentric prejudice, post-colonial struggle for African and Asian nations, and cooperation between the member countries and confederations for political interests. Meanwhile football has been successfully incorporated into commercialisation in terms of sponsorship and television rights. This glamorous business had sometimes resulted in a fierce bidding campaign, such as Japan and Korea for the 2002 World Cup Finals. Meanwhile, in South Korea, football has played a role of a popular national sport, along with baseball and basketball. Similar to other sports in South Korea, football has been a medium for fostering nationalism and diverting peoples’ interests. The inauguration of professional football during the dictatorship era would not be irrelevant to the political condition. Holding the 2002 Korea and Japan FIFA World Cup Finals, football in South Korea has witnessed increased football stadiums and
professional football clubs. On the other hand women’s football has had very little attention from people in South Korea.

This chapter shows that society has provided contexts for sport activities and sport has played a role in construction of the society. Football, in particular, has been an expression of antagonism, a method of social integration, and a means of political and economical objectives. Over the last hundred years, football in South Korea has been changed through a process of interaction with societal conditions. Furthermore, the change has been relevant to international and global conditions. For instance, bidding for the 2002 World Cup Finals was a direct legacy of the historical antagonist relation between Korea (the ex-colonised) and Japan (the ex-coloniser), as well as a reflection of FIFA’s internal politics and power struggle (See Table 1).

In a South Korean context, sport and football has changed depending on political, economical, and social conditions. Since the liberation, South Korean football played a role of national prestige in Asian football competitions, which continued until the military dictatorship era. Based on economic development beginning in the 1960s, many football clubs were created by local government and companies, which was also relevant to strengthening the national football team. Furthermore, stimulated by inauguration of professional baseball and supported by the government, professional football was introduced in 1983 with four teams which developed into a league system. Presumably, the most impressive change in South Korean football would be the staging of the 2002 World Cup Finals and the ranking of 4th in the event. The staging of the World Cup in Asia was a good opportunity to boost football on the Asian continent in terms of the world football perspective.

In terms of change, football has been inextricably linked to changes in South Korean society, concerns for sport, and world football politics. As a social phenomenon, changes in this chapter in football have been discussed in terms of political struggle in governing bodies, active political intervention, commercialisation, and professionalisation. However, the picture of change has been different in different spatial-temporal contexts. Therefore investigating how change was constructed, explained, debated, and resisted from Foucauldian and post-colonial perspectives in football, as a reflection of course of change in Korean society, is the following focus of this research.
### Table 1 History of Football in South Korean and Far-Eastern Countries

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Era</th>
<th>Key Events</th>
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| **1. Colonial era - Japanese dominance:** 1905-1945 | • Federation International de Football Association (FIFA) founded (1904).
• Sports like football (though poorly organized) helped express national identity and resistance to Japan.
• Korean players participated in international sports events as members of Japanese teams.
• Chosun (Korea) Football Association (KFA) inaugurated (1928) and disbanded (1938).
• First official Gyeong-Pyeong Football Match (1929).
• Japanese Football Association (JFA) established (1921) and granted full FIFA membership (1929). |
| **2. Nation division, the Korean War, and 4.19 revolution (resignation of Rhee Seung Man): 1945-1960** | • Asian Football Confederation (AFC) founded (1954) with twelve national associations: Afghanistan, Burma, Republic of China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam.
• KFA gained FIFA affiliation (1947) and became AFC member (1954).
• South Korea nicknamed ‘the Tiger in Asia’ winning first two AFC Asian Cups (1956, 1960) and made presence known in many other Asian-based tournaments.
• First Olympic Games (1948 London); first World Cup (1954 Switzerland).
• Since liberation, South Korea encountered Japan in the 1954 FIFA World Cup qualifier - first official competitive national team match between both countries.
• JFA reinstated into FIFA (1950).
• 1958, China withdrew from the IOC and FIFA in protest of IOC and FIFA’s acceptance of Republic of China (Taiwan). |
• 1971, KFA established President Park’s Asian Cup Football Tournament – a first international football match organised by South Korea.
• From the 1960s, Japanese sport teams allowed in South Korea for first time. Japanese national team visited Seoul, South Korea for the 1962 World Cup qualifier (1961).
• Executive Committee announced re-admission of China in FIFA (1979). |
| **4. Democratisation era: From Roh’s presidency in 1988 to present** | • China, Japan, and South Korea are integrated into ‘global commodity markets’
• First friendlies were held between South and North Korea in 1990.
• A Korean team composed of North and South Korean players participated in the Under-Twenty World Youth Cup in Portugal (1991).
• The 2002 FIFA World Cup co-hosted by Korea and Japan. South Korea reached semi-final. |
Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives

2.1 Macro level discussions

The purpose of this chapter is to explore debates on modernity, postmodernity and postcolonial critique as the preformed ways to understand our modern world/ and modern sport as a subject of this study. The investigation of these perspectives has some consequences in relation to this study. Firstly, the investigation of modernity, postmodernity, and postcolonial concepts enlarges our understanding not only of the general aspects of changes, but also their consequence in human history. Secondly, the understanding of different perspectives will provide a foundation to investigate change in South Korean football. In this respect, this chapter will play a crucial role not only in revealing plural aspects of modern society, but also in helping to mould theoretical positions for this research.

2.1.1 Modernity

Before further unfolding this section, explanation of terminologies of modernity, modernisation, and modernism are necessary to prevent any confusion. Modernity could be understood as a subsequent epochal change emerged from Europe (Giddens, 1990: 1). In terms of the epochal change, differentiation with tradition (Hassard, 1993: 113) and “receptivity to social and technological innovation” (Kendall, 2002: 2) would be accepted as characteristics of modernity. In other words, Modernity implies human capacity to control “its physical, social and cultural environment for its own benefit” (Waters, 1999: xii). By considering modernity as a “stable, long-term, sociocultural configuration”, Waters enumerates its characteristics as below:

- Production systems are industrial that is relatively large in scale, internally specialized into occupations, externally specialized by product, and mechanized.
- An increasing proportion of interpersonal practices are self-interested, rational and calculating.
• Physical and social objects, including human labour, are defined as commodities, that is they are alienable and can be exchanged in markets.
• Control of the state is specified by social role rather than by personal characteristics and is subject to periodic constituency legitimation.
• Individuals have citizenship rights that they can claim against the state.
• The primary site of legitimacy and responsibility is the individual person.
• The value-spheres of culture (truth, beauty and morality) are autonomized relative to each other and to other areas of social life.
• Social units – families, schools, governments, firms, churches, voluntary associations, etc. – are differentiated from one another, that is separated and distinguished from one another (Waters, 1999: xii-xiii).

While modernity represents ‘self-conscious experiences’, modernisation would be explained as a process of fundamental change distinguished from traditional ways especially in a material perspective such as “industrialization, technological innovation, expanding capitalist market, and rapid urbanization” (Kendall, 2002: 2). Through a modernisation process, as Hassard (1993: 113) mentions, “cultural changes based on increasing secularization and a spirit of self-development” have also been accompanied.

Finally, as a new fashion, modernism has been highly expressed in cultural and artistic movements (Hassard, 1993: 114). Berman (1988: 5, referred in Kendall, 2002: 3) defines modernism as “any attempt by modern men and women to become subjects as well as objects of modernity, to get a grip on the modern world and make themselves at home in it”. Meanwhile, modernism attacks some dominant characteristics of modernity: “rationalism, positivism, and utilitarianism” (Kumar, 2004: 118).

In his book, The Consequences of Modernity (1990), Giddens (1990) understands that modernity has a discontinuist characteristic. By the ‘discontinuist’, he stresses that modernity is a distinction from traditional order and a change which is fundamentally different with evolutionary explanation. Giddens (1990: 6) identifies some distinct features of modernity such as “the sheer pace of change”, “the scope of change”, and “the intrinsic nature of modern institutions”. According to Giddens (1990), changes are unprecedented
experiences based on technology and global interconnection, and emergence of new social forms such as nation-state, mass production through fossil fuel energy and wage labour.

While Giddens (1990: 174-175) stresses “nation-state and systematic capitalist production” as the main significance of modernity, and globalisation as one of “the fundamental consequences of modernity”, Ulrich Beck and his colleagues clearly present the demarcation of different features of modernity. Beck & Lau (2005: 526) assert that we are experiencing a “second modernity” in which the “first modernity” based on “a territorial sense”, “controllability” and “certainty” is dismantled by “certain interlinked processes: globalization, individualization, the gender revolution, underemployment and global risks”. In this respect, radical social transformation and meta-change causing structural breaks are a “consequence of modernisation itself” that is called ‘reflexive modernisation” (Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003: 13). The pre-given boundaries are dismantled and transformed into multiplicity through “the technological, economic, political and cultural processes of radicalized modernization” in a reflexive modern society (Ibid: 24).

Although modernity has seemed to bring “moral progress” and “happiness of human beings”, however, the utopia that was constructed by Enlightenment philosophers and early modernists was too optimistic (Habermas, 1999: 11). Giddens (1990: 7) indicates modernity as a “double-edged phenomenon” when considering the contemporary world. He sees that the phenomenon can be understood through institutionalised aspects of modernity. Giddens (1990: 59) explains the institutional dimensions of modernity as “surveillance”, “military power”, “industrialism”, and “capitalism”. Interestingly, whilst these four dimensions of modernity represent a significant transformation of the world which is fundamentally different from pre-modern conditions, simultaneously, the dimensions have intrinsically resulted in “unintended consequences” in contemporary human history (Ibid: 152-153).

In a similar vein, Beck (1999: 21) argues that the modern industrial society is confronted with uncontrollable risk and threats such as “nuclear, chemical, genetic and ecological mega-hazards”. Fundamentally, Beck (1999: 31) understands that the “self-annihilating progress” of modern industries causes political and social conflicts in modern society because the risks that modern society embraces could be out of our calculation range and appropriate responses. In relation to the undesirable consequence of modern society and
insecure condition, our concern is fundamentally converged into some questions about perpetuity of our society and the world, and the direction of the progress and development which modernity has pledged.

Whether or not the position and role are under scepticism, the fact that modernity has changed the way people live systematically and transformed the social structure would be undeniable. In particular, due to one of ‘the fundamental consequences’ of modernity, the globalisation (Giddens, 1990: 175), modernisation process has swept the whole planet from Europe to the other sides of the world. In particular, the discourse of modernity and modernisation mentioned previously is based on Western initiative and changes which have been diffused to non-Western areas. However, Huntington (1998:78) argues that modernisation does not necessarily mean Westernisation. For him, modernisation should be accomplished within each nation’s own history and tradition.

**Modernity and South Korea**

Berger (1999: 497) argues that the modernity discourse in a boundary of Western understanding “is no longer adequate” when considering an East Asian (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) development or modernisation. Building on his argument, Berger (1999) compares individualism, which is one of the foundations of Western modernity, and collective solidarity, that is, a socio-cultural feature of Asian modernisation. However, it is generally considered that the intermixture of Western influence and Asian features have produced the distinctive development in Asian countries in a short time span.

As previously discussed, industrialisation is one of the significant concepts in explaining transformation of modern societies. In South Korea, modernity discourse would not be explained without industrialisation, through which the country has established an economic miracle initiated in the 1960s and blossomed in the 1990s. With the project of modernisation, South Korea has transformed its social structure from a traditional agrarian society to an industrial society. In this process, military based authoritarian politics had paradoxically maximised the speed of development. Modernisation as a project has
intertwined with the economic centred public policy, and has played a role of mobilising the whole country. As a set of ideas, modernisation in Korea became “the ideology of the politically alert, articulate, and active part of the population, particularly the intellectual elite” (Myrdal, 1968: 55, referred in Kihl, 2004: 26). Meanwhile, the overemphasis on industrial development had critically delayed democracy and distorted political processes in South Korea.

On the other hand, the idea of modernisation in South Korea means transformation of ideas and beliefs embedded in the society from traditional thinking to modern rationality. Representatively, traditional ideology such as Neo-Confucianism has been called into question in the process of national development. As a socio-political philosophy and social norm, Neo-Confucianism, which was not only “scholarly discipline” but also “Yi-dynasty’s (1392-1910) political order” (Lee Y, 1997: 118), had administrated the affairs of the country and disciplined social order and ordinary people’s lives.

Neo-Confucianism is a version of Confucianism that was established during Chinese Song-dynasty that provided a philosophical alternative to Buddhism and Taoism, both of which had acquired a great deal of strength until that period…Neo-Confucianism is not simply a metaphysical philosophy but a comprehensive system of thought attempting to explain all aspects of nature, man, and society in a consistent fashion. Neo-Confucianism dominated medieval Korea, defining and influencing all aspects of life, much in the manner that capitalism defines and influences all spheres in the modern age (Koh Y, 2003: 60-61).

Nevertheless, as Kihl (2004: 42) indicates, experiencing traumatic incidents such as the Japanese colonisation (1910-1945), the Korean War (1950-1953), and following the nation’s division, Confucianism was intentionally and unintentionally blamed for the cause of historical consequences and its inelasticity in the shifting of world affairs. Furthermore, Hart (2001: 167) argues that materialist culture, as the result of material improvements, had centred economic concerns in formulating political legitimacy by weakening Confucianism, ‘the traditional source of political legitimacy’ in South Korea.
However, Neo-Confucianism as an ideology and value system is still playing a role in modern South Korean society, founding “the context for the miracle of rapid industrialization and socioeconomic transformation” (Kihl, 2004: 40). In explaining the role of Neo-Confucianism, Kihl (2004: 55) argues that although it is difficult to find a direct connection between Confucianism and Asian economic growth, the industrial development was “an unintended consequence of South Korea’s Confucian cultural legacy” such as respect for education, hierarchy, authority, and discipline.

Meanwhile, Krugman (1994) directly criticises the Asian industrialisation itself and the so-called economic miracle. He argues that rapid Soviet economic growth in the 1950s and in newly industrialising Asian countries in the 1970s have common economic logic: ‘mobilisation of resources’, in other words, “extraordinary growth in input like labour and capital” produced rapid growth (Krugman, 1994: 70). Furthermore, he asserts that “input-driven growth is inevitably limited” (p.67). In analysing the South Korean economic miracle, Chang K (1999) heavily criticises various hazardous situations caused by “compressed modernity” in a short time span. He critically argues that many phenomena such as legacy of the non-democratic system, denial of civil access to political power by authoritarian politicians, state-chaebol collusion for chaebol centred industrialisation, alienation of and abuse toward the weak such as workers, farmers, and urban poor people and disregard of the welfare policy stressing family’s responsibility on social welfare matters, are the reality of “compressed modernisation”.

Korea’s modernisation project

Hardt & Negri (2000: 249) argue that postcolonial societies have transformed since the decolonisation era “under the guise of modernisation and development”. Paradoxically, on the one hand, the transformation can be understood as endeavours to overcome a binary power structure and challenges to redefine identity of the once-colonised countries; on the other hand, modernisation was another form of repression and totalisation the societies had to undergo in a postcolonial context. In this respect, the question one should ask is: what are the consequences of the modern project of South Korea in a postcolonial context?
Anti-colonial resistance was ironically accompanied by “self-westernisation” as a strategy to overcome the West through “self-modernisation”, whilst castigating their indigenous culture (cf. Young, 2001: 374). In Korea, for instance, Western attire and knowledge was popularised among indigenous intellectuals as a way of expressing modernity. In the post-independence era, modernisation generally meant industrialisation and social change especially during the 1960s and 1970s in South Korean society, which was reflected in a research article from a South Korean scholar:

> It may even be said that life changes more rapidly in Korea than in many other societies. Much of the change can be covered by the term “modernization”. This concept refers to the process in which a “backward,” “underdeveloped,” or “traditional” society becomes an “advanced,” “developed,” or “modern society”. This term also refers to the conscious efforts a society invests in order to achieve the characteristics of modern society…Anything modern or Western is taken to be good or superior. And anything traditional or Korean is often taken to be bad or inferior (Lee, 1972: 15; 17).

Industrial modernisation in South Korea was possible through military regimes. Lee (1997: 138) explains that the First Republic of South Korea after the liberation failed to establish “a true liberal modern state” despite the introduction of “Western modernity and liberal political institutions”. In contrast, the governing style of political elites was not much different from that of Japanese colonial authority. As Venn (2006: 63) explains, modern governance in the colony was grafted onto “the apparatus of subjugation and regulation to produce hybrid regimes of power”. The legacy of Japanese colonial rule such as the military’s surveillance system and authoritarian based leadership of political elites was still prevalent and maintained until at least the 1980s (Lee Y, 1997: 137; Cumings, 2003: 294). Venn (2006: 69) explains these as ‘the absence of contract’ between the state and the people, through which the apparatus of subjugation, police and military had been revitalised in a post-independent space. Venn continues:

> Today the military in many post-independence countries continues to see itself as above or outside the state, with the right to intervene and dictate and establish itself as the legitimate authority. It is a colonial mindset that suits well
the militarist colonizing attitude and dimension of global corporate capitalism (Venn, 2006: 70).

2.1.2 Postmodernity

Generally, whilst postmodernity is understood as “an epochal shift or break from modernity” (Featherstone, 2007: 3), it is also conceived as “a dominant cultural logic” or “hegemonic norm” (Jameson, 1984: 57). In addition, Lyotard et al (1993: 13) indicate that postmodern(ism) is not “modernism at its end, but in a nascent state, and this state is recurrent”. Meanwhile, Featherstone (2007: 3) explains that postmodernism is strongly based on “a negation of the modern, a perceived abandonment, break with or shift away from the definitive features of the modern”. If these explanations are worth acknowledging, then the question to ask is: what makes postmodernity distinct?

Bauman (1999) argues that postmodernity discourse is a different categorical story than modernity, in terms of sociological theory. According to Bauman (1999: 87), the social condition of postmodernity means emancipation from “the orthodoxy of modern social theory” such as totality and system. Furthermore, postmodernity stresses “sociality, habitat, self-constitution and self-assembly”, focusing on individual agencies. In this situation, social power and control in a system are dissipated into non-total entities such as agency, which would be exemplified by “erosion of national state’s monopoly” (Bauman, 1999: 91).

In seeing knowledge as a language game, Lyotard (1999) stresses de-legitimation of one specific knowledge: scientific positivism in postmodern discourse. For the postmodernists, the decline or rejection of narrative would be a reflection of postmodernity in our contemporary world. In a similar way, based on Ritzer’s (1997: 122) reflection on Derrida’s works—his rejection of “linearity” and “deconstruction of logocentrism”— could be considered main figures of postmodern thinking.

However, Quayson (2000: 87) argues that even if postmodernism implies pluralism and a coup on grand narrative, “it is ultimately apolitical and does not feed into larger projects of emancipation”. While postmodern discourse provides us with an insightful interpretation
and reflection based on philosophical and cultural perspective toward the contemporary world, it can be argued that the postmodernity or postmodernisation is about our on-going experience rather than a completed historical event. Kumar (2004: 27-28) asserts that postmodernity clearly becomes “a form of reflection” on modernity uncovering “the hidden faces of modernity”. Furthermore, whilst postmodernism is concerned with the rejection of totality of knowledge, it enables us to begin to conceptualise the world in plural ways rather than in binary ways.

Postmodernity and South Korea

Since the end of the dictatorship era and the adoption of the open market policy, social power and control seems to disperse into agency dismantling the monopoly of the nation state (cf. Bauman, 1999). With a successful transformation of the country from an agricultural to an industrial society, and now to a service or information focused society, discourse on postmodernity has also emerged in South Korean society to impart a new meaning to the changed environment.

Nevertheless, some South Korean scholars understand postmodernity in South Korean society as a complicated mixture of traditional, modern, and postmodern sense-making. Cho (1999) argues that

Korean modernization has an inter-articulation of modernism and postmodernism via the agent of traditional or pre-modern morality, authority, and ideas (Cho, 1999: 130).

Viewing Seoul, the capital city of South Korea as a flexible space, Cho (1999) does not only focus on the postmodern spectacle of the city, for example, architecture and ways of life, but he also understands the city as an unstable space due to the rapid modernisation and influx of various ideas. In sum, Cho (1999: 141) anticipates that Seoul or South Korea will continue “the unstable combination between Korean traditional and customary values and non-Korean ones” in people’s daily interaction.
Yeu (1999) understands that South Korea is showing complex ideas or ideologies such as traditional values, certainty as modern value, and postmodernity. When investigating Korean Children’s television programs, Yeu (1999) argues that the education of children through these programs is a good example to understand the mixture of tradition, modernity, and postmodernity of South Korean society. Yeu (1999), however, stresses that some hierarchical order, authoritarian oppression, and imposition of ideologies still pervade in our transition period from modern to postmodern. Therefore, Yeu (1999: 71) demands us to be sensible in our institutional practices and “to explore the creative possibilities” to enter into postmodernity in an ideal sense.

Upon investigating South Korean advertisement, Kang (1999) argues that there is postmodern consumer culture without postmodernity in the local market. Namely, the styles of advertisement of the nation are postmodern in terms of “intermingling of the real and the fictional”, “deconstruction of traditional narrative”, and “deconstruction of the concepts of time and space” (Kang, 1999: 20). Postmodernity is adopted to shed light on cultural and artistic deviation which was not affordable during the process of industrial modernisation in Korea. However, postmodern discourse does not necessarily have to be limited in the aesthetic value to review (post) modern Korea.

Through reviewing South Korean films, Min et al (2003) explain postmodernity in a South Korean urban area in relation to the legacy of modernity debates/ and a modernisation project. Whilst analysing a South Korean film, The Day a Pig Fell into the Well (1996), they argue that the film attacks modernity through both content and filming technique. The film consistently reveals that the reality of modernisation in post-industrial Korea becomes “fragile”, “dislocated”, and “confused” (Min et al, 2003: 147). For instance, illustrating the rejection of grand narrative by humiliation of nationalism, meaningless adultery and childless families, the film deconstructs “everything that is conventionally regarded as meaningful, valuable, and unified” (Ibid: 145).

Introducing “a postmodern turn” in Korean literature, Hwang (2007: 5-7) argues that South Korean literature started to show “vulnerability and uncertainty of an individual’s identity” as a counter-attack on dominant discourse or grand narrative in Korean society, including traditional history, masculinity, and nationalism. However, Hwang stresses that this kind of
shift in literature and the evaluation have still been restrained by “the ideology of the modern” (Hwang, 2007: 7).

Mason and Park (1997) explain interesting points of postmodernism in contemporary Korean art. After interviewing important Korean artists, they conclude that the South Korean postmodern artistic movement can be defined as a certain intention “to criticise Korean contemporary reality” or social problems such as “environmental destruction, delocation and war” (1997: 311). Clearly expressing their artistic stands against authoritarian practices of modern Korea in a Western style, the artists also do not abandon Korean traditions and customs in their artistic expression, which can be understood as dualism or hybridity in contemporary Korean art (Mason and Park, 1997).

In those cases, the authors could not deny that Korean (post)modernity is an imitation of or considered by Western modernity. Nevertheless, the post-modern movements and expressions are seriously conducted with reference to the issues of modern Korea. In this respect, to define the characteristics of Korean (post)modernity would not be feasible without understanding the formation of Korean modernity which has plural facets in the Korean context. The position of Western value and norm in Korean society is one of the necessary explanations to understand Korean modernity. However, modernity and the Enlightenment project have failed to keep its promise about progress of history and humanity albeit a general material improvement, which to some extent is the case in South Korea. Therefore, to reflect modernity or, if necessary, to celebrate postmodernity of Korea, this intellectual journey intends to visit modernity debates, again allowing critical, historical, and discursive arguments in the next section, which can be a critique on our modernity and simultaneously reflect a different kind of postmodern explanation on (post-colonial) Korean society.

2.1.3 Modernity and postcolonial critique

Modernisation as a project, which has caused unprecedented changes in human history, has also been dispersed under the assumption of superiority of the West and Western imperialism. That is to say, the imperial or colonial expansion has been one of the most significant engines of implanting Western modernity around the world. Imperialism
deconstructed systems and values of non-Occident, tagging them “pre-modern” and “anti-modern” (Ha, 2009: 6). Experiencing Japanese annexation and an influx of Western values, Korea has seemingly changed its landscape, values, and systems into Japanese and Western styles to escape from the pre-modern condition. In this respect, a postcolonial critique, as a counter discourse to unilateral understanding of modernity, would provide a new way of looking at the post-colonial Korean society.

Having said this, we can argue that postcolonial critique is about challenging the consequences of modernity diffused through colonial/imperial expansions, by revealing the process of resistance and negotiation the once-colonised society has undertaken. Rather than romanticising about the indigenous historical and cultural heritage, postcolonial as a critique, also tackles colonial/imperial legacies by reflecting upon our society in a critical manner. In other words, postcolonial critique is, on the one hand, a series of engagements with discussions about modernity, colonialism, and imperialism, and on the other hand, a critical lens to explore the once colonised society (e.g. Korea).

However, the difference between the term ‘postcolonial’ and other related terminologies such as ‘postcoloniality’ and ‘postcolonialism’ is not always crystal-clear in terms of the meanings and applications. Undoubtedly different experiences of the former coloniser and the colonised as well as the wide ranges of interpretation have caused this difficulty of defining and applying the terms in a standardised manner (McLeod, 2000: 2-3). Loomba (2005: 12) explains that “different understandings of colonialism and imperialism complicate the meanings of the term ‘postcolonial’”. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to understand the terms in some distinguishable manners. For instance, Young (2001: 57-58) distinguished between 1) postcolonial as a comprehensive meaning such as “historical facts of decolonization”, “achievement of sovereignty”, “the realities of nations and peoples emerging into a new imperialistic context”, and “the cultural formation”; 2) postcoloniality as a complex “economic, material and cultural” global system in which postcolonial nations are embedded; 3) postcolonialism as a theoretical and political movement with intentions of tackling “an imperialist system of economic, political and cultural dominance”.

Alongside those definitions, some important (overlapping) questions should be asked to establish ‘postcolonial critique’, as a prism to observe once-colonised societies prior to
application of the terms. These are: 1) how we define ‘post’ of postcolonial? 2) how we define ‘postcolonial’ in relation to colonial experiences? and 3) how we distinguish ‘postcolonialism’ from other critiques such as ‘postmodernism’?. In relation to the first question, ‘post’ could literally indicate physical liberation through decolonisation and ideally a process of disengagement from the whole colonial syndrome (Hulme, 1995: 120). Loomba (2005: 12), however, introduces some arguments such as “if the inequities of colonial rule have not been erased, it is perhaps premature to proclaim the demise of colonialism”. The first question could be parallel with the second question, for which postcolonial does not necessarily have to be understood just as a process of decolonisation. In this respect, how the non-Occident has inscribed modernity in its space of decolonisation would be a different story from how the Occident has dominated the world in the name of ‘the civilising mission’ to diffuse Western modernity to others. This takes us to the debate on identity and otherness, and the construction of ‘otherness’ in opposition with/ or in relation to Western modernity, and for the case of Korea. The end of colonialism is also the beginning of a new, complex and ambivalent process of identity formation for the former colonised, as well as the former coloniser. Bhabha’s concept of resistance and hybridity, Said’s concept of Orientalism, and Couze Venn’s concept of Occidentalism are all useful to understanding these processes.

Resistance and hybridity

Bhabha argues that coloniality is an interactive process between the coloniser and the colonised, through which Bhabha attempts to find a possibility of resistance. One of the significant contributions of Bhabha would be the distinction from Said’s “over-simplifying binaries” such as West and Orient, and the coloniser and the colonised (Childs & Williams, 1997: 122). To escape the dichotomy in understanding (post) colonial conditions, Bhabha presents his core concepts ‘ambivalence’, ‘mimicry’, and ‘hybridity’ as follows.

With the concept of ambivalence, Bhabha attempts to reveal a duality of colonial discourses, in which colonial identity does subsist “in a relation to the Other” that is applied to the coloniser and the colonised as well (Childs & Williams, 1997: 122). In particular, the coloniser fundamentally takes a stand of ambivalence in a colonial context.
In one sense, as Park Sang-Ki (2003: 228-229) understood, the coloniser describes the colonised in terms of a binary concept, in the other sense, the colonial ruler shows, with curiosity, the fear toward the otherness of the ruled.

For Bhabha, mimicry is the representative case of ambivalence because “it requires a similarity and a dissimilarity” of the colonised because they have to be similar to the coloniser and simultaneously they should not be similar to the ruler (Childs & Williams, 1997: 129-130; Park S, 2003: 231). Bhabha describes that colonial mimicry as the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference. The authority of that mode of colonial discourse that I have called mimicry is therefore stricken by an indeterminacy: mimicry emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal. Mimicry is, thus, the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation, and discipline, which “appropriates” the Other as it visualizes power. Mimicry is also the sign of the inappropriate, however, a difference or recalcitrance which coheres the dominant strategic function of colonial power, intensifies surveillance, and poses an imminent threat to both “normalized” knowledge and disciplinary power (Bhabha, 1984: 126).

Hybridity is the other term of Bhabha’s trilogy, used to make sense of colonial and post-colonial conditions. Hybridity manifests as a strategy not for complete sameness but partial similarity (Park S, 2003: 235). However, hybridity as a result of mimicry is not just assimilation but resistance and new self-representation in a given context. Consequently, the emergence of hybridity results in the amplification of inner-disruption of the ruler who already has a fundamental schizophrenia toward the people of the colony (Park S, 2003: 235). Bhabha explains this as follows:

Hybridity is the revaluation of the assumption of colonial identity through the repetition of discriminatory identity effects. It displays the necessary deformation and displacement of all sites of discrimination and domination. It
unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power but re-implicates its identifications in strategies of subversion that turn the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of power (Bhabha, 1995: 34-35).

Through this process, the relation of the ruler who exposes himself in the site of interdiction and the ruled who partly exposes what is supposed to happen in terms of camouflage plays a role of dismantling colonial dominance and legitimacy and discovering a complex possibility of resistance. Meanwhile, this has lasting repercussions in former colonial societies in defining itself independently from the former coloniser.

In this respect, the position of colonial subjects and colonies would not be straightforwardly understood due to the complexity of (post) coloniality. Whilst acceptance could be another facet of resistance, defining ourselves would not have happened outside of the colonial discourse and certain endeavours to overcome the context. Under these circumstances, this study is very interested in exploring how the former colonised South Korea in this case, dealt with the complex situations of building a post-colonial modern Korea.

**Occidentalism, Orientalism and discourses of “Othering”**

As a target of postcolonial critique, the legacy of Eurocentric modernity has been heavily criticised by post-colonial authors. Venn (2000) introduces the terminology of Occidentalism to denounce a standpoint of Eurocentric knowledge and established practices toward the rest of the world and to reflect the condition that universality and totality seem to be significantly imbued in individual societies. Venn continues to explain Occidentalism and its influence in the following manner:

Occidentalism thus directs attention to the becoming-modern of the world and the becoming-West of Europe such that Western modernity gradually became established as the privileged, if not hegemonic, form of sociality, tied to a universalizing and totalizing ambition. Occidentalism indicates a genealogy of...
the present which reconstructs a particular trajectory of modernity, inflected by the fact of colonialism and of capitalism (Venn, 2000: 19).

Venn (2000) argues that modernity historically based on the Enlightenment project and intrinsically exerted through colonialism has been a quest for universal truth of Western societies. As Venn (2000) understands, modern government grounded in imperial governmentality that stresses rationality in every aspect of modern life and considering individual as self or ego, could be exemplified as a massive heritage of Occidentalism. That is to say, Occidentalism has contributed to the spreading of the Messianic attitude of universality in the name of Western modernity.

Meanwhile, Edward Said introduces the concept of Orientalism which is argued to have virtually derived “all contemporary postcolonial theories” (Larsen, 2000: 45). According to Said (2003), discovery and recognition of Orient has played a role of constructing self-identity of the West, through which a binary perspective such as the West and the rest, and superiority and inferiority has been strengthened, whilst establishing others’ subjectivity. For instance, in understanding the early stage of capitalist modernity, according to Featherstone (2007: 153), Max Weber considered that “the separation of the public and the private” enabled Western society to develop “formal rationality” and “the process of rationalization” which successfully led to a capitalist modernity based on Protestantism while other civilisations did not, or rather hindered the process by their religion and their immanent ossification. This Orientalists’ perspective is also evident in the binary conceptualisation of modern and tradition, in which tradition has been normally disregarded to vindicate modernity. This view is shared by Featherstone:

Tradition, as Elias and others have pointed out, often operates as a blame-word, suggesting the domination of habit and fixed everyday routines. Modern people in contrast are presented as engaging in rational calculation of courses of action and exercising individual choice. Traditional culture is presented as integrated, normative and involving inflexible social bonds and belief systems. By contrast modern culture is seen as dynamic, innovative and inventive; as obsessed with ‘the new’ and the excitement of transformation (Featherstone, 2007: 153).
Considering the others as being of a lower grade or even ‘uncivilised’, Orientalism legitimises the colonial expansion of Western countries with ostensible and practical aims such as a project of modernisation for the non-Western countries. Furthermore, Said asserts that Orientalism has

the self-containing, self-reinforcing character of a closed system, in which objects are what they are because they are what they are, for once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical fact can either dislodge or alter (Said, 1978: 70, referred in Moore-Gilbert, 1997: 56).

The Self and the Other in South Korea

South Korea has also experienced oscillating discourses between Japanese version of Orientalism, which considered Koreans as inferior physically and mentally, and its endeavour to overcome the negative conceptions in re-building its own identity and nation. According to Chung (2006: 130-131), the result of Orientalism and the Japanese colonisation has complicated South Koreans’ identity building, and their attitude toward the former coloniser. For instance, whilst South Koreans have suffered reproductions of self sensed Orientalism (or self-Orientalism) in which the people belittle themselves, they resisted the Japanese “cultural and moral superiority” in the post-colonial era. To overcome Japanese colonialism, in particular, Koreans accepted western values more receptively, which consequently resulted in the division of the Korean peninsula into different ideologies (Paik, 2000). Meanwhile, Han (2003) argues that Orientalism or the concept of cultural inferiority of Koreans had provided strong motivation for social reform of Korean intellectuals during and after the Japanese rule. According to Han (2003: 19), the position of some Korean intellectuals such as Yi Eo-Ryeong who claimed that “tradition is loathsome and must be discarded” to achieve Korea’s modernisation and economic development became more popular. Chung (2006) summarises these complex conditions as follows:

Consequently, Korea still maintains an inferiority complex toward Western cultures, ambivalent feelings toward the Japanese, discriminatory views of
other Asians, and sense of the alienation of the individual, which is still carried out to this day. The cause of this condition developed perhaps from a heightened focus on Western notions of civilization and the continuation of such a paradigm (Chung, 2006: 133).

While South Korea has constructed its own position trying to overcome the Orientalists’ discourse, South Korea has also reproduced its own binary of the self and the other. For instance, since the Korean War, North Korea and other communist countries had been placed in the position of the ‘Other’. Some authors argue that South Korean society has recently revealed complicated nation-centred ethnocentrism, which has been incubated and has recurred during the postcolonial era. In particular, the othering discourses was inevitably complicated and intentionally amplifying, since South Korea experienced the national division. Paik (2000) mentions the consequences of an internal system of division and dissidence within Korea as follows:

The division system even reproduces the racism/ethnicism of coloniality, and that within the same ethnos and among the very Koreans who so often boast of their ‘homogeneity’. Members of the other side in the confrontation become not mere adversaries or even enemies but virtually subhuman. This again has its impact on domestic politics, where lack of a secure border already provides stronger than usual grounds for a national security state, as internal dissidence now turns into an unnatural allegiance to the Other rather than simple dissidence for better or worse (Paik, 2000: 77).

In a critical manner, some argue that the othering discourses have developed into complex ethnocentrism in South Korean society. Kim D (2001: 49) argues that the contradictory attitudes toward different ethnic groups are one of the examples. South Korean elites and peoples’ discriminating culture toward the Western and Eastern countries can be understood as a collective manifestation of the inferiority complex and Korean ethnocentrism. In a similar vein, Park (2001: 60-61) stresses that South Korean elites prefer nation-centrism because of its supreme value such as, ‘national prosperity and wealth’.
Modernisation, as a project, has significantly changed the lives of people around the world. Furthermore, modernity has promised a progress of humanity and history, whereas the world has experienced the consequences of modernisation and its limitation as well. South Korea, after the liberation and the Korean War, has accomplished industrialisation and economic development in the name of modernisation. However, forming a modern South Korea and modernisation are also understood in perspectives of postcolonial discourses. In this respect, this research focuses on concepts in postcolonial debates such as discourse of resistance, Orientalism, and Othering as a window to make sense of change in post-colonial Korean society and to examine the modernity project of Korea, investigating how it has been formulated by different (political-military, business, and sports/football actors). In this case, postcolonial critique not only deals with a historical analysis of the colonial past, decolonisation and nation-state building, but also the rethinking of our Korean modernity and the national development included in football, which is the main focus of this study.
2.2 Meso level discussions

In this part, four related categories, namely, globalisation, politics/policy, international relations, and postcolonial critique will be investigated in relation to sport. The aim of this section is to become familiar with the different positions and the distinctive discursive traditions. In exploring change, for example, government policy on sport would be affected by internal political hegemony, a change of regime, economic condition, international relations, and public opinion. In a similar vein, understanding of global-local dynamics, the rationale of state’s intervention in sport, and power relations between different nations and international stakeholders is very relevant to map the change of South Korean football.

2.2.1 Globalisation and sport

Globalisation is generally considered an on-going changing process. The concept of globalisation spark people’s interest as it “could provide an analytical lynchpin for understanding continuity and change in contemporary society” (Scholte, 2007: 1). Giddens (1990: 64) defines globalisation as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distinct localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa”. Furthermore, Waters (2001: 5) considers globalisation as “a social process in which the constraints of geography on economic, political, social and cultural arrangements recede”, while, Robertson (1992: 8) underlines “the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” as one of the characteristics of globalisation. Scholte (2007) recognises some noticeable contemporary global characteristics such as communication technology, mobilisation, production, consumption, finance transaction, military activities, environmental issues, laws, and shared consciousness, as well as supraterritorial connections as new aspects of globalisation. On the other hand, according to Scholte (2007), these forms of globalisation are still affected by the pervasive territorial concept and cultural pluralism.

Globalisation discourse may converge into discussion on homogenisation. Ritzer (2003) stresses that homogeneity is a key aspect of globalisation and argues that globalization and its subprocesses such as “capitalism”, “McDonaldization”, and “Americanization” are all powerful explanations of globalisation- causing homogenisation of political, economical,
and socio-cultural dimensions of the world. Ritzer (2006: 14-17) advocates the interesting term, “McDonaldization” to argue that a society is homogenised through rationalised logics: “efficiency”, “calculability”, “predictability”, and “control through nonhuman technology”, which is well epitomised in the world wide fast-food restaurant, McDonald’s. In similar vein, Hall (1990, p28, referred in Houlihan, 1994, p361) argues that global culture is homogenised and especially Americanised “within a large overarching framework”. Whereas, for Venn Couze, westernisation or the “becoming-modern of the world”, which positions Western society as a civilised superiority over the others is also an important implication in explaining inherent homogeneity in the globalising process (Venn, 2000: 45).

Although the process and impact of globalisation and politico-economical relations among nations are massive, the consequence of the phenomena would depend on how individual entities such as nation-state and societies interpret, reinterpret, reject, accept, and reproduce it. In this respect, Robertson (1992: 27) views that “globalisation involves comparative interaction of different forms of life”.

Present concern with globality and globalization cannot be comprehensively considered simply as an aspect of outcome of the Western ‘project’ of modernity or, except in very broad terms, enlightenment. In an increasingly globalized world there is a heightening of civilizational, societal, ethnic, regional and, indeed individual, self-consciousness (Robertson, 1992: 27).

Robertson (1992: 25) stresses that “the world as a whole” is becoming more complex as globalisation progresses. Robertson understands that complex globalisation is being formed by the following four main aspects “national societies”, “world system of societies”, “selves”, and “humankind”. He argues that the four aspects and their challengeable and constraining relations, which he calls “relativization”, are globalising processes. He also explains that the globalising process, which had been set firmly during 1870-1925, is “the shifting relationships between and the relative autonomization of each of the four major components” comprising the deglobalizing/reglobalizing process. (See Figure 1) In this respect, based on Robertson (1992)’s argument, globalisation cannot necessarily be considered synonymous with Westernisation and monolithic homogenisation of the world.
On the contrary, the argument gives the impression that globalisation is producing diverse consequences through the interactions of the constituents in the global field. In inventing the term: glolocalisation which represents an adapting phenomena of globalisation into local, Robertson (1995: 41) explains that globalisation is “currently being reflexively reshaped” through “the constitutive features of contemporary globalisation”. In a similar vein, many scholars in different disciplines (Keohane & Nye Jr, 2002; Scholte, 2007) do not accept universality and homogenisation as a backbone of globalisation. Scholte (2007: 21-22) rejects “globalism”, “reification”, “global/local binaries”, “cultural homogenisation”, “universality” and “political neutrality”.

In terms of the debate on sport, the Olympic movement and the world diffusion of football through international organisations, competitions, and media are representative samples of the globalisation process in sport (Maguire, 1994, 2005; Amara et al, 2005). Maguire (1990) investigated the Americanisation phenomena in an English cultural context and the
significant influx of American football in England from 1982 to 1990. He especially stresses that the changing cultural phenomena in sport is inextricably linked with commercialisation logic, in which the NFL, media, and multinational corporations could effectively promote and create spaces for cultural reception. Similarly, Kidd (1991: 178) argues that Americanisation in the Canadian sport context is profoundly related to Canada’s politico-economical system seriously affected by “American capitalist hegemony”. In both cases, it can be acknowledged that Americanisation of sport in some Western countries, if not all, is exerted through American capitalistic power, which is tied to the political and cultural nexus.

When discussing global and local cultures, Houlihan (1994: 370) argues that different temporal-spatial contexts show different aspects of global sport penetrations with different locality, which can be broadly termed as “cultural imperialism” and “participative process” respectively. Acknowledging the dominance of the global economy and the bureaucratic organisational form as one of the forces of the globalising process, he stresses that cultural sources such as political tension and national identity in different contexts make globalisation non-homogenising characteristics with different “reach” such as “total” and “partial”, and different “response” such as “passive”, “participative”, and “conflictual” (p371).

In a study on sport globalisation and national identity, Maguire (1994: 421) argues that the concept of wholeness, locality, and resistance connected with national identity have simultaneously intertwined in the process of globalisation based on “the unintended basis of intended social action”. Following Elias’s understanding of the civilising process, “diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties” (Maguire, 1994: 404), Maguire (1994) asserts that there have been cultural interchanging phenomena between the Occident and the non-Occident in sport globalisation based on multidimensional elements albeit its uneven distribution of power. In a similar vein, shedding light on social movements in global and local venues, Harvey & Houle (1994) not only reject cultural homogenisation, but also support cultural fragmentation of sport globalisation. However, Maguire (2005) asserts that different explanations of globalising phenomena do not necessarily indicate a contradictory interpretation of the globalising of sport, which he defines as the complex characteristics of globalisation.
Cultural globalisation, of which global sport is a part, can thus be viewed as unifying, universalising, progressive and liberating, or as divisive, fragmenting, constraining and destructive, of local culture. There appears to be evident for both. On the one hand, a world market for capital, commodities, labour and communications has developed, which is dominated by, and differentially favours, developed countries in general and the civilisation of the West in particular…On the other hand, people, nations and civilisations appear adept at reacting differently to similar experiences of the global and of global sport (Maguire, 2005: 5-6).

Some focus on politico-economical impacts, while others stress cultural consequences of the globalisation process. Stressing cultural perspective, Robertson (1992) does not deny the politico-economical foundation for the globalising process, while Houlihan (1994: 359) summarises Wallerstein’s world system axis as “the maintenance of political collaboration through the manipulation of cultural dependence”. Even in sport areas, cultural perspectives of sport do not exclude the other societal, political and economical environments in the process of globalisation.

Nevertheless, globalisation cannot be dismissed as a simple homogenising process. Although Western sports have had massive impacts on locals and local sports, individual societies experience differently the global influences by rejecting, delaying, and legitimising related changes. Therefore, locals’ understanding, interpretation, and the application of the global influences would be an important factor drawing a picture of globalisation, through discovering the voices and stories of locals.

2.2.2 Politics and policy of sport

Smith (2003) summarises that politics could be understood as a general concept in relation to the activities of politicians, government, and political parties, and as sociological viewpoints including power relations and balance, which are exerted within the family, sport organisations, and states. Whereas, policy would restrictively indicate public policy which “is concerned with the actions and positions adopted by the state” (Houlihan, 1991: 5). According to Bramham (2001: 10), politics is inherently “valued ends” while policy
provides “the means to achieve political ends”. In this respect, Bramham (2001) asserts that understanding political ideologies is essential to grasping policy processes, which provide a space for change or continuity.

Political ideologies are best described as reflections of the world and reflections on the world. They offer a prescription of how the world ought to be and subsequently a guide or mandate for political policies and action. One of the major functions of political ideology is to provide a particular perspective on the world and to highlight the key issues, debates and problems that need to be tackled (Bramham, 2001: 9).

In general, sport and politics are considered as inextricably linked in various domains (Houlihan, 2000). For instance, sport was used as a political instrument in boycotting specific games when political dissatisfaction between countries erupted, and this goes against the usual clichés that “sport and politics should not mix” that denies the relationship albeit the exploitation of sport by politics (Houlihan, 1991: 1-5). There are other cases that reflect the strong tie between politics and sport in the world such as government involvements in elite sport, government roles in school PE, and dominant power of politics in mega-events. Houlihan (1997) summarises some rationales for government intervention in sport, for instance, health benefits, social integration, nation-building, and international prestige. In a study on sport of the United Kingdom, Houlihan (1996: 379) explains that several themes which enabled government involvement in sport in the nineteenth century were still relevant in the twentieth century, for instance, “social stability, the defence of privilege, and paternalism”.

However, different governments could have different approaches toward sport policy. In the United Kingdom, sport in the 1960s as “a discrete area of government policy” had provided some background reasons for governmental intervention to solve: “urban disorder”, “international sporting success”, and “electoral pressure” (Houlihan, 1996: 379-380). Furthermore, the relationship between sport and politics depends on the political philosophies of governments which could provoke some changes. Houlihan exemplifies how Thatcher governments’ ruling philosophy affected sport in the following manner:
The Thatcher governments of the 1980s orchestrated a shift in the dominant political consensus away from welfare state collectivism toward economic liberalism with its antipathy toward public expenditure and preference for market solutions to problems of service provision. With regard to sport, the most pronounced effect of Thatcherism was the privatization of the management of local government sports and leisure facilities, a policy that gathered pace during the 1980s. In addition, the planned restructuring of the Sports Council is intended not only to reduce the number of staff, but also to redefine the successor body so that it focuses more sharply on the needs of the elite and young athletes at the expense of a broader concern with the promotion of mass participation (Houlihan, 1996: 380-381).

In particular, different political ideologies of different governments can result in different sport policy. For instance, Bramham (2001) explains that a social reformist Labour government during the 1970s was interested in integrating a welfare state and sport participation which resulted in promotion of ‘Sport for All’. However, this does not mean that the fundamental attitude and philosophy toward sport policy would fluctuate constantly. Even Thatcher governments’ liberal economic policy “did not replace the more traditional policy themes” (Houlihan, 1996: 381). Bramham (2001: 17) explains that even the New Right Thatcherite government exploited “the extrinsic benefits of sports provision” to expand to “a wide range of government agencies and quangos”.

Based on the above discussions, governments can influence sport and cause change in various ways such as “banning certain activities; regulating and licensing; providing facilities; encouraging and supporting major sporting events; providing funding; through education; and interacting with sporting bodies” (Parker, 2004: 62). Whilst each category is sometimes inextricably linked to each other, sharing and defending the necessity of sport and the change in a particular political environment could show its own characteristics of sport promotion. In particular, when considering the interaction between national and international sporting governing bodies and governments, exploring political discourse or discourse in political circles would explain how politics and policy contributed to the construction of sport and to position in a society. Regarding this point, Henry et al (2005: 489) distinguish between “discourse in policy” and “policy as discourse”. While the former is interested in “evaluating language to identify an underlying reality”, the latter argues for
“the construction of realities through language” (p489). This research deals more with policy as discourse, which explores the process of constructing and legitimising reality about change in the South Korean football context.

2.2.3 International relations and sport

In the *Sport and International Politics* (1998), Riordan addresses introductory remarks on sport and its meaning in the early 20th century in the following manner:

Sport became truly international only after the First World War. It was then that politicians began to appreciate its potential as a vehicle of national values and politics – even for demonstrating and advertising the potency of a political ideology. During the 1920s and 1930s, therefore, sport was inextricably bound up with international relations (Riordan, 1998: 1).

As indicated by Riordan, we can understand that sport has secured its specific position in modern society and has been incorporated into international affairs. Sport had been utilised to promote or to protect certain political interests. Similarly it is stressed that ‘sport can also be a powerful means of achieving and perpetuating both confrontation and conflict resolution’. This was evident during the Cold War era (Hong & Xiaozheng, 2002: 319), and is still felt today, as illustrated in this study, in the Korean Peninsula. Even in the new millennium, sport plays an imperative role in contributing to the present or future configuration of international relations. Gong (2001: 200) stresses that sport is one of the most “active diplomatic means of the 21st century”, in the construction of “new international political territory”. With regards to the above, the term “sport diplomacy” has increasingly been used in sport academia (Merkel, 2008: 290). It is defined as “the whole range of international contacts that have implications for the overall relations between nations concerned” (Peppard and Riordan, 1993: 2, referred in Merkel, 2008: 290).

Allison & Monnington (2002: 107-108) categorise the variety of sport utilisation in international relations into two preliminary areas: 1) “to enhance their image”; 2) “to penalize international behaviour of which they disapprove”. For the former, they explain that sport has been used, for instance, to propagate the superiority of their systems in the
bi-polar era or “to symbolise their acceptance in the international community”. For the latter, they take the case of “the US-led boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980”. In particular, boycotts has been understood as a “low cost” but “high profile” strategy which governments can apply to attain their political objects (Allison & Monnington, 2002: 108; Keech, 2001: 72; Merkel, 2008: 306).

Sport has also been utilised in a process of conflict resolution. In investigating diplomatic problems of a North Korean team’s presence in the 1966 England World Cup, Polley (1998) explains that the British government had to be involved in the high profile football tournament in order to react to discrepancy caused between the government’s non-recognition of North Korea and the qualification of the North Korean team for the World Cup Finals in England. During the 1966 World Cup, a possibility of a cancellation of the tournament by FIFA had pushed the British sides to solve problems, such as visa, North Korean’ national flag and anthem. Whilst the British government attempted to minimise the diplomatic repercussions, it had to deal with serious questions concerning media and civil society about North Korea’s symbolic display and presence.

As Keech (2001: 72) explains, sport can be employed “to build bridges between countries”. In particular, it can be argued that sport would have an opportunity to shine on a space which needs a breakthrough under specific political and diplomatic deadlocks. For instance, Goldberg (2000: 67) highly appreciates the table tennis exchanges between the U.S. and Communist China in 1971, to form an atmosphere of détente between the two countries. In a similar vein, in investigating the tension between South and North Korea, Merkel (2008: 307) argues that sports as a diplomatic means have become ‘more significant over the last few years’ in an attempt to conciliate the relations in the Korean Peninsula and to present a unification discourse. He also stresses that sport is “an efficient way of keeping the issue of reunification in the public discourse without the need to engage in complex and difficult political negotiations” (p307). In terms of relations between South Korea and other Far East Asian countries, it is also undeniable that there has been hope that sport will be the principal axis to develop a mechanism to promote peace and prosperity in the East Asian region (Kim W, 2006; Kim, 1999).

As we have reviewed above, sport as diplomacy in the international society has been used in various ways, including image enhancement, boycotts, and bridge-building between
nations. The different approaches and the consequences also reflect the historical transformation (e.g. from the colonial to the post-colonial era or from the bi-polar to the multi-polar era). Although sport has played an important role in changing some situations, it does not necessarily mean that sport can solely put an end to historical and political conflicts. For instance, acknowledging the uneasy relationships between South Korea and Japan tainted by their historical memories such as the Japanese annexation of Korea, Butler (2002) describes the possible limitations of the 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup from a sport diplomacy perspective in the following manner:

However, the fear remains that while all this progress has been made so far, and will be made in relations between Japan and South Korea in preparation for the joint hosting of the 2002 World Cup, when the finals are over and the ‘circus has left town’, it is not certain whether this will be accompanied by a similar departure of incentive in maintaining good bilateral relations or whether the progress achieved has a degree of permanency or has set in motion a progress which cannot be halted or reversed (Butler, 2002: 55).

Investigating change in Korean football cannot be done without a comprehension of the geo-strategic map of the region shaped by the Japanese colonial past, the persistent tension between North and South Korea, and the competitions over leadership (economic, industrial, cultural and sport) between Japan, China, and South Korea.

This section examines three different perspectives not as theoretical framework but rather as discursive traditions in order to make sense of the discourse on change in the South Korean football context. Firstly, the massive modern phenomenon: globalisation cannot be understood as simply Westernisation or Americanisation. The relationship between global and local has been differently interpreted. Whilst we cannot deny the political, economical, and cultural impact of globalisation on local areas, we can also argue that the binary of global and local is not appropriate because of the complicated interactions among constituents of the world. Politics and policy are inextricably linked to values and beliefs, which comprises political ideologies. Historically, sport has witnessed change in relation to changed political conditions. Nevertheless, the functions of sport for politics in general and government in particular have been kept in some categories such as national prestige and health benefit issues. In particular, in Korean and football studies, international relations
would be an important aspect to looking at change. As mentioned above, for instance, sport was a proxy war between Liberal and Communist Blocs. However, in the détente era, sport had played the role of easing ideological tensions. In this respect, sport can be considered as serious business for governments and governing bodies’ perspectives.
Chapter 3: Methodology

Understanding ontological and epistemological questions are crucial to comprehending the availability of knowledge, appropriateness of research methods, and validation of findings (Henry et al, 2005: 492). In this respect, this chapter seeks to provide justification for the theoretical perspective and supply a useful lens to investigate change of South Korean society and football. The justification is “something that reaches into the assumptions about reality that we bring to our work” (Crotty, 1998: 2). This chapter will start by reviewing different ontological and epistemological positions, then, the rationale of qualitative research, data collection, and data analysis of this research will be explained.

3.1 Ontology

Ontology, explains Blaikie (1993: 6), is “the science or study of being”, that is to say “what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each other”. As Blaikie (1993: 201) noted, different ontological position can entail different assumptions of our views on reality and a different approach to investigating it. For example, Table 2 outlines two representative groups of ontological assumptions- realist and constructivist. (It should be noted that each group includes two research schools selectively). Therefore, understanding the different positions, as a first step to founding methodological structure, is imperative to justifying the rationale of specific choice of ontological position, ‘constructionism’.
Table 2 Main Assumptions of, and Differences, between, Realist and Constructivist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Realist</th>
<th>Constructivist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>•Independency of social reality from social actors and researchers</td>
<td>•Intersubjectivity of social reality (social reality occurs in wider social conditions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•Foundationalism</td>
<td>•Anti-Foundationalism</td>
<td>•Multiple reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•Singular reality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positivism</strong></td>
<td><strong>Realism</strong></td>
<td><strong>Weak social constructionism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•Direct observation (no deep structure)</td>
<td>•Difficulty of direct observation (deep structure)</td>
<td>•Knowledge can be objective (discourse is a reflection of social reality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•No possibility of socially constructed world</td>
<td>•Acknowledgement of discourse (or structure) as constrainer or facilitator of social phenomena</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Blaikie (1993: 202-203); Marsh et al (1999: 11-14)

Realists assume that “social reality exists independently of the observer and the activities of social science” (Blaikie, 1993: 202). Crotty (1998: 10) explains that “realities exist outside the mind”, in other words, “the world is there regardless of whether human beings are conscious of it” in an objectivist perspective. In this sense, essentialism and foundationalism school of thoughts claim, according to Sayer (1997: 454), that the world including people is a product of determinism of fixed essence, such as identity and biological characteristics. With the stress of objectivity and scientific universal truth, subject also secures a position of rational being. In “the celebration of the individual mind” of modern era, individual has been powered as those who can “organise experience, reason logically, speculate intelligently” (Gergen, 1999: 221).
Contrary to these understandings of realistic ontological stance, Blaikie (1993: 203) explains constructivist ontology in that “social reality is produced and reproduced by social actors”. Crotty (1998: 43) understands that constructionism claims, “meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are interpreting”. According to the explanations, meaning is produced through “agreements, negotiations, and affirmations” by which reality is not necessarily fixed, for instance different understandings of specific phenomena is possible (Gergen, 1999: 48).

In regard to whether the social reality exists on its own, this study argues that social realities are also a product of human history in general and discourse in particular. For instance, Venn (2000: 72) considers that Western modernity formulates a “narrative of being” in terms of “one history, one humanity, one subjectivity”, which is that of (Western) subjectivity. “The othering of the other as Other” by the West objectified the other as inferior humanity and therefore legitimated “a divinely ordained right to take over non-Christian lands and goods”, identifying “Europeans as superior” in modern world history (Venn, 2006: 48). Hence, social reality does not exist independently of our discursive activities.

To avoid confusion, this research will use constructionism or social constructionism purposely to explain the ontological claims. Schwandt explains social constructionism as the following perspective:

instead of focusing on the matter of individual minds and cognitive processes, they turn their attention outward to the world of inter-subjectively shared, social constructions of meaning and knowledge. Acknowledging a debt to the phenomenology of Peter Berger and Alfred Schutz, Kenneth Gergen (1985) labels his approach ‘social constructionism’ because it more adequately reflects the notion that the world that people create in the process of social exchange is a reality sui generis. Contrary to the emphasis in radical constructivism, the focus here is not on the meaning-making activity of the individual mind but on the collective generation of meaning as shaped by the conventions of language and other social processes (Schwandt, 1994: 127, referred in Crotty, 1998: 58).
Theoretically, constructionism stresses an interaction between subject and object in creating meaning (Crotty, 1998: 43). Whilst not denying the creativity and meaning-making practice of agents, however, this research would focus on the nature of construction of the world and the connotations of the reality in a specific society and period. This study considers change a product of social interaction, rather than a creation of individuals or creativity. In this respect, it would be naive to imagine that subjects have unbounded abilities to construct meaningful reality. In other words, as Crotty (1998) explains, the interaction between subject and object is already bounded with, for instance, culture, ideology, and power. By adopting (strong) social constructionism as an ontological position, this research has to further clarify some issues based on the ontological assumptions to justify the focus of this study.

Firstly, it should be noted that this research tries to explore South Korean football as a socially and discursively constructed phenomenon. Unlike a realists’ position, this study can position discourse as not a constrainer or facilitator of social phenomena, but as the social phenomena itself. In doing so, rather than focusing on agency/structure dichotomy, the researcher can be locating discourse as social reality. Furthermore, our knowledge is not an outcome of social phenomena which can be objective, but a process of social construction.

3.2 Epistemology

While Ontological discussions focus on “being” itself, epistemology could be defined as a certain way of claiming “how what exists may be known” (Blaikie, 1993: 7). As a philosophical ground, epistemology enables to decide “what kinds of knowledge are possible and how we can ensure that they are both adequate and legitimate” (Maynard, 1994: 10, referred in Crotty, 1998: 8). Meanwhile, Blaikie (1993: 7) introduces that “epistemology is a theory of knowledge”.

In many and different schools, discourse has been considered as one of the points to understand how reality may be known, and to confirm how we know what we know. In particular, in an anti-humanistic perspective, some discourse theorists show their drastic views on discourse in relation to subjects and the society. In his early work, The
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), Foucault was interested in discursive rules and practice, which forms a modern science and a discipline on body, under the assumption of de-centrality of human agency in discourse (Ritzer, 1997: 38). Maintaining a structural perspective, Foucault understands that the meaning of a statement is derived from a system of discourse which is far from the intentions of people (Ibid: 52). Therefore, for Foucault, “the networks of what is said, and what can be seen in a set of social arrangements” can be explored through archaeological analysis (Kendall & Wickham, 1999: 25).

Barker (1998: 14) explains that a Foucauldian discourse analysis would focus on “the emergence of the statement” and “politics of discourse”. In conjunction with the former, Foucault argues that discourse does not consist of one statement but of several statements to form what Foucault calls a “discursive formation” (Hall, 1992: 291). Meanwhile, the ‘politics of discourse’ serves as a methodological strategy engaging with some questions: “what political interest it serves”; “how it participates in the politics of truth”; “what is the speaker’s benefit”; “who speaks on behalf of whom”; “what particular subject positions emerge from it” (Baker, 1998: 15). In particular, the discursive construction would be possible in specific moments of history, which can be recognised under “the same discourse, characteristic of the way of thinking or the state of knowledge” that Foucault calls the “episteme” (Hall, 2001: 73). In detail, the term, episteme represents:

the conceptual structure that frames knowledge in particular periods and places. Though admittedly a vague concept, its main fruitfulness for analysis is to point to the intrinsic (spatial and temporal) limits that circumscribe knowledge, and to draw attention to the fact that the epistemological terrain, on which one poses and answers questions about the world, determines the grid of intelligibility that enables one to make particular sense of the world (Venn, 2006: 183).

Hence, questions such as, in general, ‘what is possible knowledge under the episteme?’ and, more specifically, “why this statement and no other?” can be posed in Foucauldian research orientation (Barker, 1998: 14). As a matter of fact, what Foucault asserts is that “nothing has any meaning outside of discourse” (Foucault: 1972, referred in Hall, 2001: 73). For Foucault, truth is “radically historicized”, that is, something is true only “within a specific historical context” (Hall, 2001: 74).
In a similar vein, Jäger (2001: 37) explains that language or discourse is “super-individual” by which “no individual and no single group determines the discourse or has precisely intended what turns out to be the final result”. Or rather, people derive knowledge from “the respective discursive context into which they are born and in which they are involved for their entire existence” (Jäger, 2001: 33). Therefore, poststructuralism, according to Locke (2004: 35), suggests that ‘reality is discursively constructed via human sign systems’. He further asserts that poststructuralism considers “individual subjectivity as the social product of discourse” rather than “originary meaning-maker” (p36), which is well illustrated in Figure 2.

**Figure 2 Self and Discourse**

![Diagram](source: Locke (2004: 36))

In relation to this perspective, Elliott (1999: 2) introduces the idea of “decentred subjectivity”, which infers “a profound mistrust in the reliability of consciousness as a basis for knowledge”. He explains further:

Consciousness of self is a symptom of broader structural forces, sometimes described as language or the unconscious or social relations, and from this vantage point the Cartesian *cogito* (“I think, therefore I am”) is rendered suspect. We can find a prefiguring of the “decentred subject”, a term which
takes off in much radical social theory after the impact of structuralist and post-structuralist linguistics, in the writings of Freud, Nietzsche, and Heidegger (p2).

In this respect, construction of our knowledge can be investigated in a tradition of discourse analysis. In particular, in Foucauldian research tradition, what exists is not absolute truth but “a regime of truth” (Foucault, 1980: 131), which can be known and argued through investigation of discourse “itself as a practice” (Foucault, 1972: 46). In this, exploring discourse is not a process to find out groups of signs which “represent pre-existent reality” (Rorty, 1986: 41), but rather about how to know the “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972: 49). Moreover, according to Foucault, knowledge is not pre-determined outside certain discursive sites. In other words, the legitimacy of the knowledge is discursively defined and supported. This is explained by Delaporte as follows:

At the level on which Foucault operates, namely the description of epistemological transformation, the question of telling the truth is not pertinent, regardless of how that truth may be enunciated. Foucault is not interested in whether assertions are scientifically true or false; he is not interested in how the true and the false are apportioned at any given moment, nor is he interested in the 'truth-telling' of epistemological history. What Foucault apprehends is discourse itself as practice, insofar as discourse defines the space within which one must situate oneself in order to be 'within the bounds of truth'. The moment that Chomel and Andral began to speak of phlegmasias, they placed themselves 'within the bounds of truth'. As a result, the first edition of their work was immediately cast out 'into the realm of falsehood' because it discussed the concept of essential fevers (Delaporte, 1998: 287).

Foucault’s approach toward the fundamental epistemological question: ‘how we know what exists’ can be understood in relation to his “theory of discursive practices” (Rorty, 1989: 47). For Foucault, discourse is a “system of representation” (Hall, 2001: 72), with which our general approach toward knowledge such as “historical progress” can also be denied (Rorty, 1986: 46). Hall (2001) continues:
This idea that physical things and actions exist, but they only take on meaning and become objects of knowledge within discourse, is at the heart of the constructionist theory of meaning and representation. Foucault argues that since we can only have a knowledge of things if they have a meaning, it is discourse – not the thing-in-themselves – which produces knowledge (p73).

Hence in acknowledging the discursively constructed reality of meaning and the representation within discourse, this study also argues that human subjects also have abilities to interpret the discursively constructed reality, to contest existing discourses, and to change them. It could be argued for instance that the History of modernity has witnessed the transition from the Enlightenment project into the civilising mission especially in the colonial era (Venn, 2000: 56), through which the colonised had also constructed the world within the Western discourse on modernity i.e. “the becoming-West of Europe and the becoming-modern of the world”. Under this circumstance, the concept of social change could be constructed in terms of (western) development and progress, through which other aspects of social issues are silenced and disregarded in the name of modernisation.

In sum, adopting Foucault’s discourse analysis has some benefits for this study to explore our constructed world. Firstly, Foucault’s discourse analysis informs our epistemological position in knowing about the world through the discursive analysis of the texts and statements as a product of historical circumstances. Secondly, Foucault’s discourse analysis provides a useful tool to explore the interaction of subjects and objects, which constructs a meaningful reality. In this case, discourse is neither a neutral nor a simple conveyance of social phenomena, but has some rules to govern “regime of truth” (Foucault, 1980: 131), which restricts and even produces subjects and their positions. Namely, we can know the constructed reality by investigating discursive practices of specific time and space. Thirdly, Foucault’s approach embraces the concept of knowledge and power which enables us to explore the interaction of discursive and non-discursive aspects. In this respect, Foucault’s approach is not mentioning linguistic aspects of social reality, but the practices of social construction itself. Finally, although Foucauldian discourse analysis could not explain every aspect of social phenomena, it would be a meaningful process to understanding Koran society and Korean football in a discursive perspective.
3.3 Understanding power in Foucauldian tradition

In investigating discourse on change in South Korean football, the concept of power plays an important role to comprehend not only how change in Korean football is possible, but also in what perspective we can conceive change in the Korean football context. In this respect, this section explores the Foucauldian concepts of power to understand the nature of power (relations), which helps to explore South Korean society and football.

For Foucault, power is a way of explaining “ontological foundations of modern institutions” (Clegg, 1989: 153), in other words, the aspect of the modern institutional controlling mechanism such as discipline and surveillance. Unlike some theoretical and practical understandings such as possession of power (cf. Arendt, 1970; Lukes, 2005), for Foucault, power cannot be conceived in terms of possession, nor “a form such as the State-form” (Deleuze, 1999: 59), but “capillary form of existence” (Foucault, 1980: 39). Although Foucault explains that the disciplinary exercise of modern institutions such as prisons contribute to produce docile bodies, his point is that power is positioned in social body rather than possessed by agents. In explaining the Panopticon, the architectural mechanism of surveillance, Foucault stresses that:

One doesn’t have here a power which is wholly in the hands of one person who can exercise it alone and totally over the others. It’s a machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised…Power is no longer substantially identified with an individual who possesses or exercises it by right of birth; it becomes a machinery that no one owns (1980: 156)

Whilst there remains the effect of power such as discipline and surveillance, as Foucault (1980: 98) argues, power is circulated, deployed, and exercised not through a monopolised centre but “a net-link organisation”. Foucault continues his investigation on power exercised over individual bodies, expanding his understandings of power to “control of populations”: bio-power (Clegg, 1989: 155). In other words, “a life-administering power concerned…to normalize, control and regulate the life and health of populations” (Lukes, 2005: 94). In this respect, for Foucault, power is not just top-down radiation from specific
sources such as the state and the ruling class, but circulated through discursive practice in both negative and productive ways (Hall, 2001: 77).

The punishment system, for example, produces books, treatises, regulations, new strategies of control and resistance, debates in Parliament, conversations, confessions, legal briefs and appeals, training regimes for prison officers, and so on. The efforts to control sexuality produce a veritable explosion of discourse-talk about sex, television and radio programmes, sermons and legislation, novels, stories and magazine features, medical and counselling advice, essays and articles, learned theses and research programmes, as well as new sexual practices (e.g. ‘safe’ sex) and the pornography industry (Hall, 2001: 77).

For Foucault (1980), whilst the (Western) modern society transformed from a monarchical power system to conception of sovereign power, a disciplinary society had been installed as a counterpart of sovereignty, by which “sovereignty and disciplinary mechanisms are two absolutely integral constituents of the general mechanism of power” (p108). In other words, for Foucault (1980: 106), modern power is exercised through “a public right of sovereignty” and a “polymorphous disciplinary mechanism”. The former can be defined as “juridical rule” and the latter as “normalisation” (pp106-107).

How, fundamentally, the formless power circulates in the whole society, and institutionalises bodies and even their mental, which constantly defines and constructs our modernity? What is the impetus of the modern history in which power has been exercised? Foucault would answer the questions by explaining the linkage between power and knowledge. “Knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of the truth but has the power to make itself true” (Hall, 2001: 76). In other words, the modern discipline and self-reflexivity has been legitimised not because they are the truth in an absolute sense, but because they become true in the necessity of observing individuals and controlling population in modern institutional regimes.

Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the
means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault, 1980: 131).

Foucault understands that effective power produces rather than represses knowledge as discourse, which “reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and inserts itself into their very actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes, and everyday lives” (Foucault, 1980: 39). That is to say, Foucault explains power as a phenomenon which secures a certain truth in the nexus with knowledge, circulating the regime of truth in a specific historical time and space.

In sum, according to Foucault, capillary power administers individuals and populations, and also empowers them to self-govern their behaviours and minds through which power produces knowledge or vice versa in the modern society. In the process, for Foucault, there is no significant space of autonomous and rational exercise of power for individual subjects or agents; rather, power/knowledge forms and shapes the agents’ positions and social engagements. This does not necessarily mean that power can explain everything. However, we can understand how possibly power with an inevitable linkage with knowledge productively provides the whole social subjects with certain understandings on specific issues in a particular period.

In investigating discourse of South Korean football, analysing the capillary form of power would be beyond the scope of this research. However, by studying institutional discourse of South Korean football, “the historical recovery of the formation of norms” from Foucault’s genealogical analysis Lukes (2005: 98), we can understand the effect of productive characteristics of power which normalise, construct, and internalise the regime of truth about change in Korean society through the study of discourse on change in the football context, in the sense of reform, modernisation, and professionalization on the one hand, and in relation/or in opposition to Otherness in Korea and outside (for example, North Korea, Japan, China, and the West) on the other hand.

Foucauldian discourse analysis is positioned as an effective theoretical perspective to explore our modern society. Firstly, Foucauldian discourse analysis reveals different sides of modernity in terms of disciplinary and bio-power, stressing the productive aspect of
power. The nexus of knowledge/power permeates as micro-physics which does not enable revolutionary change, but different arrangements of discourse in a specific time and space. Secondly, Foucault tries to explain our modern society from an anti-humanistic perspective. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that Foucauldian discourse analysis and postcolonial critique are incompatible. Whilst Foucauldian discourse analysis focuses on a productive dimension of knowledge/power, postcolonial critique can explain how postcolonial subjects can initiate changes in a specific system of knowledge/power.

This study emphasises therefore the nexus between knowledge, power, and discourse in general, and specifically, it investigates change in football in South Korea as a discourse-as a product of knowledge which is shaped by exogenous (such as the geopolitics of East Asia region) and endogenous factors (such as political, economic and cultural transformations of Korean society). A comprehensive application of archaeological and genealogical analysis would be a suitable strategy to understand Korean society and football, and to analyse the discourses. Both archaeological and genealogical analyses of Foucauldian research tradition are also suitable to make sense of change, the way it has been defined/ constructed/ negotiated/ and diffused by investigating different archives and correspondence in Korea and between Korea and international football federations. On the other hand, South Korea’s modernisation projects as a change can be explained as a product of knowledge and power nexus in different transitions of Korean society.

3.4 Inductive-deductive orientations

This study has adopted Foucault’s knowledge, power and discourse relation as a theoretical and analytical concept looking at how change in South Korean football is constructed. This will be investigated in an exploratory manner to accept plurality rather than using an explanatory manner to prove some causality. Therefore, falsifying or proving theory is not the main purpose of this study. However, theory enables researchers to explore some research objects, through which specific understanding of social phenomena can provide the implication to shed new light on the theory.

Blaikie (1993: 156) introduces a combination of inductive and deductive strategies “to capitalise on their strengths and minimize their weaknesses”. The inductive research
strategy intends to “produce new discoveries or new theories’ through observations, experiments, and data analysis, which is considered a ‘positivistic view’, especially when the strategy is restrictedly focused on scientific observation (Blaikie, 1993: 133). The fundamental logic of inductivism is that experience, whether it is from senses of human being or instruments, could elicit a theory or a universal conclusion. However, observations, experiments, and selecting data by which we decide what we are looking for are inevitably theory-laden (Blaikie, 1993: 134).

Meanwhile, the deductive research strategy, different to the inductive strategy, starts with “a question or a problem that needs to be understood or explained” refuting its hypothesis and falsifying it (Blaikie, 1993: 144). However, it would also be difficult to exclude “inductive reasoning” in the deductive research orientation (p 151). For instance, Blaikie introduces the inductive characteristics in the deductive strategy as below:

Theories should not be generalized from background knowledge, nor should the results of the tests be able to be predicted from this knowledge. However, some prior evidence that a theory is worth testing is necessary to ensure some probability that it will survive the testing process; severe testing is not all that is needed. This probability is increased both with the severity of the test and the initial probability of the theory surviving the test (Blaikie, 1993: 151).

In this respect, this research adopts the combination of concepts to clarify and to systemise the research orientation, in which the process of this research is based on the deductive stage that could be reappraised and theoretically developed by inductive findings and vice versa in a circular structure. Under these assumptions, this research applies a modified version of Wallace’s model of “Combining Inductive and Deductive strategies” (Wallace, 1971; 1983, referred in Blaikie, 1993: 157) as follows:
From a deductive point of view, this research starts adopting theoretical debates on modernity and postcolonial critique on modernity to explore change in South Korean society in general and in football in particular. From an inductive point of view, the findings from the exploration of the constructed social reality on change could help in making sense of the theoretical debates and developing new perspectives on the study of sport (football) and social sciences in general, and policy and management in particular, in East-Asia and in Korea, taking into account Korea’s different political, economical, social and cultural contexts.

3.5 Qualitative research strategy

According to Sarantakos (1993: 52), some argue that qualitative and quantitative researches have the “same origin” and ‘quantitative methods are simplifications of the qualitative methods’. Although there are some interchangeable orientations between them, the two methods are fundamentally different from each other (Sarantakos: 1993: 52). Bryman (1984: 77-78) explains that while quantitative research is generally described as positivistic approaches to social phenomena, qualitative research sees the social world “from the point of view of an actor” and through “the context of meaning systems”.

An important point to highlight would be that qualitative research focuses “on discovery and exploration rather than on hypothesis testing” (Sarantakos, 1993: 53). Qualitative research methods will allow this study, as stated by Berg (2006:9), “to discuss in detail the various social contours and processes human beings use to create and maintain their social realities”. Sarantakos (1993) provides us in the following table (Table 3) with a useful distinction between quantitative and qualitative research approaches.

**Table 3 Differences between Quantitative and Qualitative Methodology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Quantitative methodology</th>
<th>Qualitative methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of reality</td>
<td>Objective; simple; single; tangible sense impressions</td>
<td>Subjective; problematic; holistic; a social construct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes and effects</td>
<td>Nomological thinking; cause-effect linkages</td>
<td>Non-deterministic; mutual shaping; no cause-effect linkages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of values</td>
<td>Value neutral; value-free inquiry</td>
<td>Normativism; value-bound inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural and social sciences</td>
<td>Deductive; model of natural sciences; nomothetic; deductive; based on strict rules</td>
<td>Natural and social sciences are different; inductive, ideographic, no strict rules; interpretations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Quantitative, mathematical; extensive use of statistics</td>
<td>Qualitative, with less emphasis on statistics; verbal and qualitative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher’s role</td>
<td>Rather passive; is the ‘knower’; is separate from subject-the known: dualism</td>
<td>Active; ‘knower’ and ‘known’ are interactive and inseparable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalisations</td>
<td>Inductive generalisations; nomothetic statements</td>
<td>Analytical or conceptual generalisations; time-and-context specific</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sarantakos (1993: 53)

The purpose of this research is to acquire knowledge about South Korean football and its change by applying various lenses or perspectives. Ontologically and epistemologically, this study focuses on exploring the socially constructed reality of South Korean football,
through which Foucauldian discourse analysis provides useful inspiration. Investigation is conducted to shed light on the historical construction of South Korean football, rather than to prove cause-effect linkages. In this respect, the researcher engages in text/discourse analysis, focusing on the meaning and interpretation in a qualitative research orientation. This approach can distinguish from a quantitative methodology, which adopts a mathematical or statistical gaze on specific social phenomena. From a discourse analysis research perspective, Sapsford (2006) explains the incompatibility with a quest on causal explanation.

What discourse research cannot do, and does not try to do, is to establish causal connections. What underlies a social constructionist position is a view of events which seldom leads to accounts in terms of linear causation. Instead, what is sought is relationships between events (taking ways of coming to understand and name social objects as one kind of event). Kendall and Wickham (1999) talk about ‘contingencies’ in this context, to emphasize that the account will always be in terms of what happens/happened to be the case, not what must/had to be the case (Sapsford, 2006: 262-263).

I, as an academic researcher, part-time football journalist, and Korean, argue that my perspective or cognitive interaction cannot be separated from what I can see and read. Ha (2009) explains that there is a complicated relation between Foucault’s personal experiences/identity and his academic interests, for example, normal/abnormal and sexuality. My position in exploring the meaning system or discourse in South Korea and South Korean football is also not straightforward. For instance, I conduct this research as a Korean outside Korean territory using Western theories to understand Korean society and football. This research deals with quantitative data resource in qualitative research orientations (cf. Sarantakos, 1993: 53) by engaging in modernity debates and Foucaudian discourse analysis not just as a theoretical foundation but also an analytical guideline.

3.6 Data (documents) collection

This research explores institutional discourse on change of South Korean football to understand how football has been positioned in Korea, and how the international and
national institutions tried to build their community and nation using football as the useful medium. Jäger (2001: 52) stresses that the first item of investigation of discourse is “to determine the location” at which the research target is expressed. For instance, in investigating racism and its dissemination, the location would be “the discourse on immigrants, refugees, asylum, and so on” rather than racism itself (Jäger, 2001: 52). In a similar vein, this study can clarify that the locations of investigation would be international practices (conflicts and mediation) on football, governments’ policies, the national football governing body, and media.

Mill (2003) understands that Foucault used a wide range of archives to question our common knowledge about modernity. In this case, ‘archive’ represents tangible venues which contain various, especially unknown texts to the public. In doing so, Foucault could analyse the pattern of discourse which was possible in a specific period (Mill, 2003: 112). Mills advises us that finding texts (documents) from various sources, even though those are obscure, is one of productive methodological attitude when using Foucauldian discourse analysis (Mill, 2003: 111). Adopting Foucault’s theories as theoretical and analytical tools, this research also considers that documents (texts) are crucial material to reveal the nature of modern Korea and the change in football.

A document is a “rich source of data for social research” in both historical and contemporary viewpoints, which does not necessarily exclude “audio and visual evidence” (Punch, 1998, 190). As modern bureaucracy has developed in industrial culture, modern societies could not escape from a series of production and distribution of written texts and has experienced the proliferation of documentary data in their social archive (Finnegan, 2006; McCulloch, 2004). Although texts could not accurately represent “some aspect of an external world”, the representation as discursive rules in a specific social context would be understood as something that “predominates in a particular socio-historical context” (Prior, 1997: 70).

Bearing these in mind, this study selects the FIFA archive, KFA library, South Korean national library, and online databases of governments and media as main locations of collecting documents about South Korean football. Various documents can be nominated in terms of memoirs, correspondence, policy documents, official reports on football, and
newspaper articles, which have been issued, exchanged and produced nationally and internationally from 1945 to hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup.

3.6.1 Data collection in FIFA

The rationale for selecting the FIFA Documentation Centre as one of the locations for data collection can be explained as follows: 1) FIFA, as an international football governing body, produced various minutes and reports which can be analysed to figure out the influence of FIFA on Korean football. 2) In relation to interactions of institutions, finding correspondence between FIFA and the KFA is a task used to understand how South Korean football authorities have engaged in positioning football nationally and internationally. 3) In these respect, the FIFA Documentation Centre preserves rich documents about the operation of international football competition, governance revolving around international conflicts and mediation, and correspondence unknown to the public.

With the help of officials of FIFA Documentation Centre in Zürich, data collection could be performed without any difficulties during a limited period (24th May 2009 - 2nd June 2009). FIFA Documentation Centre permitted the access to internal documents such as correspondence, Congress minutes, and Executive Committees minutes, which are contained in a vault, and a FIFA Intranet network server. Correspondence between FIFA and the South Korean football association (KFA) were not yet digitized, which means that the researcher had to make photocopies when finding appropriate documents. Unfortunately, some correspondence seemed to be missing. Meanwhile, minutes and other reports from FIFA were easily searched and downloaded from the FIFA Intranet without any missing documents.

3.6.2 Data collection in South Korea

Data collection in South Korea was conducted in the two following venues: the KFA library and the South Korean national library. The purpose of visiting the locations can be summarised as follows: 1) the researcher can identify what is possible data for research purposes and how to gain access to them. 2) Football related documents in Korean
language, produced to support the operation of domestic football and to reflect the results, can be collected in the two identifiable places.

The KFA permitted access to several documents in its library such as internal policy reports, magazines, books, and other football related documents. However, the KFA rejected access to some internal documents of the KFA and correspondence with other Asian countries by reason of national security and confidentiality. Most of the relevant and accessible documents were photocopied. To secure relevance and supplement, the researcher visited the South Korean national library to collect football related documents which were not deposited in the KFA library. The collection of documents was conducted from 3rd June 2009 to 31st July 2009 in Seoul, South Korea.

### 3.6.3 Data collection through online databases

In addition to the previous data collection, many documents were also accessed and collected through online databases (for example, National Assembly’s online archive). There are some reasons to identify the online database as an important source for collecting documents: 1) Whilst many documents are still produced in paper formats, they are preserved in electronic formats such as word files and PDF files. In particular, many historical documents from governments and media are easily accessed through an online database without specific restrictions. 2) Online databases are available at any time and any place. (However, most of data collection from online databases was conducted when I was in South Korea: from 3rd of June 2009 to 31st of July 2009) Nevertheless, finding relevant documents could be continued in order to make sense of specific texts along with other texts. Meyer (2001: 23) stresses that “there is no typical critical discourse analysis (CDA) way of collecting data”. Some prefer “mass media coverage” and some stress “incorporate fieldwork and ethnography” (p24). Nevertheless, CDA is similar to “the tradition of Grounded theory” especially in relation to data collection (p18). Although this research does not follow research orientation of CDA, the attitude toward data which Mayer stresses can be useful for this research. He asserts further:

> In any case, in a way similar to grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), data collection is not considered to be a specific phase that must be completed
before analysis begins: after the first collection exercise it is a matter of carrying out the first analysis, finding indicators for particular concepts, expanding concepts into categories and, on the basis of these results, collecting further data (theoretical sampling) (Meyer, 2001: 23-24).

In sum, data collection was conducted at the levels of national and international contexts. Furthermore, some documents can be accessed by negotiations with relevant authorities and physical visits, and some are acquired without specific limitations through online access. The following Table 4 summarises the types, characteristics (contents), and locations of the main collected documents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Characteristics (Contents)</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIFA Congress minutes</td>
<td>The documents describe how FIFA has dealt with international issues such as an agenda of affiliation to FIFA of individual associations, and indicate (in)directly what has been the position of FIFA as a world governing body in relation to this paper’s topic. The minutes also represent the uniqueness of operation of football-matters in FIFA without exception. Namely, in terms of issues from the Far East countries, the problems have been dealt with based on FIFA’s unique voting system and morale.</td>
<td>FIFA Documentation Centre (Intra net)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA Executive Committee minutes</td>
<td>In a similar vein, the documents illustrate how the Executive Committee as a top decision-making body has dealt with international issues. The issues and related decisions from FIFA Executive Committee are forwarded as agendas to forthcoming congresses to confirm the decisions.</td>
<td>FIFA Documentation Centre (Intra net)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence between FIFA and national associations</td>
<td>The documents display in what circumstances individual national associations have consulted with FIFA to issue or resolve problems which, for instance, have been caused through their historical and ideological backgrounds. Based on the level of importance, the issues from correspondence are forwarded to agendas of the related committee’s meeting.</td>
<td>FIFA Documentation Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications of the KFA</td>
<td>The KFA has published some books which record its football history, and several memorial events and witnesses of officials and players. These documents (in)directly evince what have been main issues and discourses in their football world and how the issues have been dealt with in or by the governing body. Furthermore, the information from the publications will</td>
<td>KFA library/South Korean national library</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
complement other documents from other sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy reports of the KFA &amp; the K-League</td>
<td>The KFA &amp; the K-League have published several policy reports to develop their organisation and the quality of football. However, most policy reports were officially produced and preserved since hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup. In this respect, media, governments/parliament, and Memoir provide alternative texts of football policies and relevant agendas.</td>
<td>KFA library/Online databases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government/Parliament minutes and publications</td>
<td>In relation to sports and football, governments/parliament produced several publication and their minutes to record what they dealt with in terms of sports and football, and how they discussed and operated the policies/agendas. Whilst governments’ minutes mostly recorded final decision of specific issues, parliament minutes reflect various voices and discussions in government/parliament circle.</td>
<td>South Korean National Library/Online databases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers/Magazines</td>
<td>South Korean national library and individual media companies provide various articles about football from the 1920s to present football events. Whilst media sources (newspaper articles and magazines) contain various texts about opinions of officials, football policy, and related issues.</td>
<td>South Korean National Library/Online databases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memoirs</td>
<td>Some officials and players wrote their memoirs or personal experiences which can provide some information about what was sayable and possible at that time in South Korean football.</td>
<td>KFA library/South Korean National Library</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also refers Appendix I
3.7 Data analysis: strategy for using Foucauldian discourse analysis

Phillips & Jørgensen (2002) explain different focuses of discourse analysis to distinguish several different orientations of the analysis in social science. Acknowledging that Foucault has influenced most of the theoretical and analytical positions of discourse analysis, they posit the analytical focus of Foucault in more “general”, “overarching patterns” and “abstract mapping of the discourse” position rather than everyday discursive orientation (p20), which is well illustrated in Figure 4.

**Figure 4 Analytical Focus Continuum**

![Analytical Focus Continuum](image)

The overall interest of Foucault is how discourses claim our specific knowledge as truth presupposing power as an indispensible factor to form the regime of truth. Stressing decentred subjects in discourses, Foucault, in particular, analyses discourse in relation to “knowledge, power, and the historical rise of institutions” (Blommaert, 2005: 99). Furthermore, Phillips & Jørgensen’s distinction could be understood as technical demarcation for different research orientations. For instance, everyday discourse can be considered as a discourse analysis of conversations between, for instance, a doctor and a patient.

The aim of this research, however, is to investigate institutional discourse on change of South Korean football in exploratory orientation. The advantage of adopting Foucault in this thesis is that we can understand how language works to construct “particular kinds of objects and subjects” in a particular context, upon which power as knowledge or vice versa is embodied (Graham, 2005: 4). Rather than everyday conversation, or analysis of interviews, this study focuses on textual framing of change in South Korean football as
produced, diffused, constructed, or resisted by different stakeholders in official documents and correspondence from the period of the 1940s to the 2000s.

### 3.7.1 Analytical implication for using Foucault

For discourse analysis, usually researchers look at texts or pictures as a unit for their analysis. Moreover, in Foucauldian perspective, what analysts are looking for is the statement, which is not “a linguistic concept” (Hall, 2001: 72), but “a function of existence” (Foucault, 1972: 86). Namely, the statement as the atom of discourse enables “groups of signs to exist, and enables these rules or forms to become manifest” (Foucault, 1972: 88), hence, “the term discourse can be defined as the group of statements that belong to a single system of formation” (Foucault, 1972: 107). In this respect, to investigate discourse is to identify the regularity in the dispersion of statements as a first step of using Foucauldian discourse analysis. In particular, to explore how South Korean football has been constructed in discursive practice terms, this research investigates what has been said (cf. Deleuze, 1999: 15), as well as, the process which objectifies football and the constituents of football in specific directions. This research opens other possibilities to search for how football in Korea has become ‘Korean football’ in discursive terms.

In this respect, reading texts is a process to identify ‘what is said’ and ‘who says what’ in a South Korean football context. Organisation of texts into a “limited corpus” is conducted simultaneously by identifying objects and subjects as well (Deleuze, 1999: 16). Following “the references of the statement and the references of the references” (Andersen, 2003: 13), finding relevant texts from different sources is continued, in order to make sense of the nature of discursive formation, i.e. the regularity in the dispersion. Importantly, in Foucault’s research orientations, the dispersion of regularity accompanies the conceptualisation of objects which happens in specific directions.

Whilst Foucault’s works could be explained as a transition from archaeology of knowledge to genealogy of power, namely, “from discourse to power/knowledge” (Hall, 2001: 75), investigation of discourse using Foucault needs a comprehensive understanding and analysis of the production of knowledge in which power is enmeshed. From an analytical perspective, however, the production of knowledge and power can be explored from the
practice of constituting and presenting objects. “Discourse transmits and produces power” (Foucault, 1978: 101). In other words, discourse already combines with power to produce certain objects, conceptions, and practices in “certain historically specific regimes” (Hall, 2001: 76).

What Foucault stresses in articulating the formation of knowledge is “the discursive practice” and “the non-discursive practice” (Deleuze, 1999: 44). In other words, the two practices can also be understood as a space of power operating within the “institutional apparatus” (Hall, 2001: 75). However, the distinction between the discursive and non-discursive is not an important issue to understand the interplay of knowledge and power (Foucault: 1980: 198). Rather, analysis can focus on how “certain relation of forces” are interacting to manoeuvre objects, its specific conceptualisation, and the presentation in a certain regime, which, as Foucault (1980: 196) enunciates, supports and is supported by knowledge.

3.7.2 Analysis of documents

This research analyses discourse on South Korean football, which emerged throughout Korean history: from 1945 to pre-2002 FIFA World Cup Finals. South Korean history could be ideally divided into three periods, such as “colonial to postcolonial”, “authoritarian regime to democratisation”, and “industrialisation to market economy”. Although the periods of transformations could not be distinguished in a crystal-clear manner, the different historical phrases allow this study to organise the emerging discourses in South Korean football.
The analysis of documents is firstly conducted by reading the whole set of various documents (correspondence, minutes, policy reports, magazines, newspapers), which were collected from different locations. The reading of documents is a process used to identify emerging discourse in South Korean football. This research summarises the focus of reading in Table 5.

Table 5 The Focus of Analysing (reading) Documents

| Objects | • What were the objects of South Korean football?  
|         | • Where the object emerged and who has authority?  
|         | • In what circumstances were different objects related? |
| Enunciative modalities | • Who was speaking about South Korean football in which institutions? |
| Concepts | • Which statements were accepted, rejected, and produced to form specific |

Figure 5 Matrix for Exploration of South Korean Football
Document reading is a repetitive process to identify relevant texts, which is guided by the focus in Table 5. Due to the difference and the variety of documents, identifying meaningful texts is undertaken by different procedures. Broadly, the documents can be categorised into paper-based documents and electronic-based documents. The different formats need different approaches to deal with documents, which are explained in Table 6.

**Table 6 Strategy of Analysing Documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Documents (Format)</th>
<th>1st Stage</th>
<th>2nd Stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy documents, reports, memoirs, magazines (paper)</td>
<td>1. Full reading of documents</td>
<td>1. Revisiting the selected texts (word files)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Selecting relevant texts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA correspondence (paper)</td>
<td>1. Full reading of documents</td>
<td>1. Revisiting the selected texts (highlighted texts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Selecting relevant texts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA reports and minutes, Government/Parliament</td>
<td>1. Finding Korean/Asian football related documents</td>
<td>1. Revisiting the selected texts (PDF files/highlighted texts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>documents (electronic)</td>
<td>2. Full reading of the documents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Selecting relevant texts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers (electronic)</td>
<td>1. Finding Korean/Asian/international football related articles</td>
<td>1. Revisiting the selected articles (online portal service/PDF files)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Full reading of the documents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Selecting relevant articles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 6, document represents the whole of books or reports whilst text means words, sentences, or paragraphs. The purpose of reading the whole document (books and reports) is to identify and to select relevant texts. The identification and selection of relevant texts cannot be achieved by a single reading of documents. The reading is an intellectual response toward theoretical positions which this study established.
Paper based policy documents, reports, memoirs, and magazines are, to some extent, pre-selected documents in a field-work stage. Reading the documents, however, the researcher focuses on the detail texts. The texts are recorded separately in word files to help the researcher when re-reading the documents and related texts by using ‘searching keyword’ function in the Micro-Office Word processor.

The correspondence between FIFA and the KFA, which were photocopied from the FIFA Documentation Centre, also needed full reading at the first stage of the analysis. In doing so, some sentences or paragraphs are identified by the researcher and highlighted on the paper. The selected correspondences are reserved for the repeating reading and analysis.

Many documents can be accessed in electronic forms such as PDF files. Korean and Asian football related discussions, reports, and minute could be identified when using ‘searching keywords’ function. The identified documents are selected or discarded according to the relevance of this study.

Finding newspaper articles depends on two online databases. Chosun newspaper articles are identified and selected from the companies own subscription-based online database. And, the others such as Dong-A newspaper and Kyung-Hyang newspaper are selected from ‘Naver’ (South Korean internet portal site)’s ‘News Library’. Individual articles are identified by using the ‘searching keyword’ function. The keyword is ‘football’.

In the process of selecting and reading texts, a “limited corpus” of texts (Deleuze, 1999: 16) is organised to reflect ‘what has been said’ in South Korean football in institutional perspectives. Table 7 shows the archaeological findings of historical layers which were institutionally produced and deposited as various documents. Based on Table 7, the writing of the following chapters was conducted.

Writing the chapters also provides opportunities to cross-check texts in various documents and to analyse them in different, however interrelated, transitions of South Korean history. In other words, writing about emerging discourse in South Korean football is another form of reading/analysing texts. The purpose of the repetitive reading is to confirm how specific concepts are distributed and shared in specific periods and how alternative statements
opposed to the dominant discourse. Foucault (1972: 66) explains that “all the possible alternatives are not in fact realized” which he terms “the economy of the discursive constellation”.
Table 7 ‘What Has Been Said’ in South Korean Football (Archaeological Findings and Genealogical Implications)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colonial to Postcolonial</th>
<th>Authoritarian Regimes to Democratisation</th>
<th>Industrialisation to Market Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological difference: North Korea as ‘enemy’</strong></td>
<td>The necessity of strong nation and football</td>
<td>Professionalisation and Chaebol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Promoting football in terms of proxy war</td>
<td>-Political legitimacy</td>
<td>-The connection of football development and professionalization of football</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Avoiding the encounters to avoid humiliation</td>
<td>-Poor performance of national teams (rationale for the involvement of governments and Chaebols)</td>
<td>-Acknowledgement of the gap between professionalised football and amateur football</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-The importance of FIFA and AFC membership to be recognised as a sole sovereignty</td>
<td>-President Park’s Cup (New image of the modernised Korea/ Othering)</td>
<td>-Emergence of Chaebols as a new promoter of professionalisation in Chun’s regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and to deny North Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Incidental creation of the first professional football team: Hallelujah from Christian sides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-The issues on designations, national flags, and national anthems of the two countries</td>
<td><strong>Changed relations with North Korea</strong></td>
<td>(The KFA directly governed the operation to secure national football development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-The role of international sport governing bodies such as IOC and FIFA to mediate the</td>
<td>-International sport governing bodies (IOC and FIFA)’ promotion to restore the inter-Korean relations</td>
<td>-Conflicts in understanding national football development (Sound operation of the professional league vs. mega-sport events; Chaebols vs. the KFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sensitive political issues: neutral positions</td>
<td>-North Korea secured its sole representativeness on their territories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Historical antagonism: Japanese football</strong></td>
<td>-The joint communiqué of the 4th of July 1972 (from confrontation to cooperation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Japanese footballers were not allowed to enter South Korean soil until 1960</td>
<td>-Co-winning of South and North Korean football teams in the 1978 Bankok Asian Games and historical South-North Unification Football Matches(from enemy to brotherhood)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Political sensitivity on the presence of Japanese football with Japanese national flag</td>
<td>-Changed relation with China in Détente</td>
<td>Various voices for systematic development of South Korean football</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and anthem.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Monthly Football magazine (various statements and sophisticated policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Cooperation and development with Japan</strong></td>
<td>-The importance of football in school as the channel for supplying talented young players</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-The necessity to overcome Asian periphery and to develop football (South Korea-Japan Regular Match from 1972)</td>
<td>-Two historical forums in the South Korean football community as chances to define some factors for South Korean football’s development: e.g. the role of Chaebol and professional football</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernisation of Football</td>
<td>The 2002 FIFA World Cup and South Korea</td>
<td>Issue on One Korea and the World Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Morphology of football players: idealised Western bodies and disregarded Korean bodies</td>
<td>- Power game in FIFA and bidding the FIFA World Cup</td>
<td>- Possibility of hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup with North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The necessity of foreign knowledge and experience: invitation of European coaches for national teams (acceptance and resistance)</td>
<td>- Anti-Japanese sentiment during the bidding campaign</td>
<td>- Positioning North Korea in South Korea’s bidding campaign to leverage advantageous decisions from FIFA, allowing discourse on reconciliation through football</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Korean style football (4th rank in the 2nd FIFA Youth World Cup in 1983): statements on players’ physique and the necessity of Korean way to compete with others</td>
<td>- The symbolic importance to decide co-hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup in Korea and Japan for FIFA and the nations</td>
<td>- Political deadlock and sport events</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Culture, Tradition, and Visibility** | - Korean culture, tradition, and presentation of the World Cup: “Culture World Cup”
- Harmony of the West and the East
- Globalisation of local identity, culture, and tradition
- World Cup stadiums and the visibility of tradition |
| **Korean Football Development** | - Modernisation of football through the mega-event and governmental supports
- Changes in operation of youth football
- Investment of the KFA and governments for the success of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, whilst defining Korean football as “crisis” |
3.8 Validity and reliability in qualitative research

Whether adopting a quantitative or qualitative research method, according to Meyer (2001: 29) the research “needs concepts and criteria to assess the quality of its findings”: “validity” and “reliability” as traditional categories. Firstly, validity would be “interpreted as the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers” (Hammersley, 1990: 57, referred in Silverman, 2000: 175). To have more valid research findings, Silverman (2000: 188) suggests some practical ways such as “the refutability principle”, “the constant comparative method”, “comprehensive data treatment”, “deviant-case analysis”, and “using appropriate tabulations”. The Silverman's solutions could be understood as a refining process of selecting sound evidence and using deviant evidence to support the sound evidence finally to achieve objectivity of research findings.

Reliability could refer “to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions” (Hammersley, 1992: 67, referred in Silverman, 2000: 175). Indicating some categories of measuring reliability practised by quantitative research such as “control the environment” or “control the researcher-researched relationship”, Sarantakos (1993: 79) explains that testing reliability in qualitative research is differently argued in academia. As an alternative, Bogumil and Immerfall (1985: 71, referred in Sarantakos, 1993: 79) recommend “coherence”, “openness”, and “discourse” to secure reliability of research. With these criteria, they explain that, for instance, the allowance of discussion can be an alternative for reliability of quantitative research.

3.8.1 Warrantability of discourse analysis

Wood & Kroger (2000) propose warrantability in discourse analysis. In terms of social constructivism and Foucauldian discourse analysis, we may not evaluate qualitative research in general and discourse analysis in particular in relation to truth claims. Whilst truth in the realism perspective is supposed to correspond to an independent world, truth is constructed in this research’s perspective. Nevertheless, in relation to discourse analysis, Wood & Kroger (2000) present two criteria for warranting discursive research findings: “scientific criteria” and “moral criteria”. With the presentation, Wood & Kroger attempt to
assert that warrantability of discourse analysis would be secured by not single and conventional scientific criteria but plural orientation which can be tabled in the following manner (Table 8):

Table 8 Warrantability in Discourse Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientific Criteria</th>
<th>Criteria of Trustworthiness</th>
<th>Criteria of Soundness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orderliness and Documentation</td>
<td>Orderliness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Dependability audit: showing process to readers</td>
<td>· Confirmability audit: addressing quality of product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Confirmability audit: addressing quality of product</td>
<td>· Orientation: participant’s orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Orientation: participant’s orientation</td>
<td>· Claim Checking: Patterns: claim about pattern based on the orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Claim Checking: Patterns: claim about pattern based on the orientation</td>
<td>· Summary: inference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherence</td>
<td>Accounting for broad, general and detail sequences</td>
<td>Acceptability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plausibility</td>
<td>Acceptability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruitfulness</td>
<td>Implication of the works to other ones</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moral Criteria

Acknowledging social problems and explicit goals such as social transformation


As we may understand, the several criteria of warrantability comprise some interactional perspectives between analysts and readers to secure rationale of discourse analysis and its findings on social phenomena. In this respect, acknowledging the linkage between theory, method and warrantability, Wood & Kroger (2000: 168) stress that warrantability is a “coconstruction” giving more spaces to reader evaluation while “this does not diminish the responsibility of the analyst to do warranting as thoroughly as possible”.

This research is based on exploratory orientation utilising some theoretical positions rather than verification of the theories. In this respect, maintaining consistency of theories in analysis and vice versa would be another method to secure ‘soundness of research procedure and findings’, especially, in Foucauldian research orientation. Due to the above concerns, this research tries to revisit theoretical perspectives not just as a way to confirm the research findings, but also as a method to understand and to reorganise research findings in the theoretical perspectives.
Chapter 4: Discussion

This chapter consists of archaeological research findings in terms of ‘what is said’, ‘by whom it was said’, and ‘how the object is constructed’, which are organised into three transition periods. In the first transition from colonial to post-colonial, relations between North Korea and Japan in the de-colonised period are considered to be one of the main objects and concepts of discourse. In the second part: transition from authoritarian regimes to the democratisation era, several issues such as international relations and the changed aspect, and the project of football development are explored identifying some interesting endeavours of Korea such as ‘Korean style football’. Finally, in transition from industrialisation to the market economy, the background of emergence of professionalisation, various arguments in South Korean football, and the importance of hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, are discussed from institutional perspectives.

4.1 Emerging discourse in transition from colonial to post-colonial

As a Japanese colony (1910-1945), Korea could not represent its identity and voices in international sport events, which explains its absence as an independent entity at international sport competitions. However, after the liberation in 1945, nation-building through sports has been one of the challenges awaiting the newly-liberated Korea. In particular, football followed and helped build South Korea internally and internationally amidst several unsettled conditions. In particular, in terms of the anti-Japanese sentiment, the Korean War, and a Cold War structure, football in South Korea inevitably reflected socio-political discourses such as anti-Japan and anti-Communism when it had to deal with encountering neighbouring countries. Bearing these in mind, this chapter explores how the dominant discourses had communicated with football in the South Korean society.

4.1.1 “One nation”, two ideologies and two states: South Korea and North Korea case
Historically, ideological differences have provided a situation for conflicts between South Korea and other countries, particularly North Korea, creating a dynamic fluctuation between conflict and compromise. In football, the tension between the two sides has not been an exceptional phenomenon. Or rather, in South Korea, football itself was grafted into the national policy in relation to the relationship with its brother country.

Directly after the division of the Korean Peninsula and the Korean War, both sides labelled the opposite side as an ‘enemy’. Especially, the experience of the Korean War and the following governments’ diplomatic policies had strengthened their hostile feeling and hardened their rivalry and hostile attitude. Sport and football served as the public point of tangency between the two countries, allowing some voices on animosity between these nations. In the maelstrom of the war, the Korean Olympic Committee sent correspondence to FIFA to explain the difficult situation in the country, with South Korea referring to the North as an enemy.

Our country has been in the midst of turmoil since last summer and the capital city of Seoul, fell twice into the hands of the enemy. So, the sports organisation, having lost various documents, finds it difficult to carry out its proper duties and feels sorry for not being able to get along with the sports organizations in other countries (15th June 1951, correspondence from the Honorary Secretary of the Korean Olympic Committee to FIFA).

Since the division of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea and North Korea have had a number of sporting confrontations on international stages. In terms of football, the two countries met for the first time at the senior team level in the final match of the Asian Games in 1978. In the youth level, both sides actually had met in the 1976 Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Youth Championship for the first time. However, before the first match in 1976 at the junior level and in 1978 at the senior level, the first confrontation should have taken place in 1965, about a decade prior, during a regional qualifying round for the 1966 England World Cup Finals. For the first sporting contact, the South Korean side was not ready to compete against North Korea on the international stage. FIFA recorded the South Korean side’s first reaction toward the possibility of encountering North Korea in the following manner:
The South Korean delegation stated that it would be impossible for the two "Koreas" to play each other on a home-and-away basis and, therefore, they suggested that the tournament should be played in a "neutral" country, either Japan or Hong Kong (11th October 1964, minutes of FIFA Bureau of the World Championship-Jules Rimet Cup 1966 Organising Committee).

From international football perspective, Darby (2005: 889) explains that the Confédération African de Football (CAF) decided to withdraw from the 1966 England World Cup qualifying round to force FIFA to guarantee their berth expansion in the World Cup Finals. In Darby’s terms, Asian nations including South Korea followed Africa’s lead in protesting against FIFA’s unfair quota for Asian nations in the Finals. However, amid disappointing performances from the South Korean team and strong performances from the North Korean team, South Korea abandoned the qualifying campaigns in the middle of the preliminary round to avoid the North Korean team and possible humiliation from “the enemy brother” (Kang, 2006: 104). The KFA records the decision and the political backdrop of the withdrawal as follows:

But KFA decided not to participate in the England World Cup preliminary round in discussion with the authorities concerned because there are possibilities to encounter North Korea and the South Korean team’s strength could be compared with that of North Korea. At this time, the South Korean team could not overwhelm the North Korean team. This action was shameful behaviour in terms of sportsmanship. However, KFA could say and do nothing through the influence of political decision. (KFA, 2003: 257-258, translated from Korean).

The evasive tactics of South Korea also produced a rumour during and after the 7th Tehran Asian Games in 1974. At that time, the North Korea football team participated in the Asian Games for the first time. However, the South Korean team seemed to be concerned with the nation’s domestic situation and public opinion about North Korea. Immediately prior to the Asian Games, the First Lady of South Korea was assassinated and an anti-communism movement reached a crescendo under President Park Chung-Hee’s authoritarian regime. Furthermore, South Korea had continually marginalised North Korea as Bukgoe (北傀),
which means ‘north puppet’ controlled by the USSR without any independence and autonomy. The South Korean side, especially from a governmental perspective, could not imagine being defeated by the Bukgoe even if it was in a sporting competition. Due to this, there had been rumours that the South Korean team had to decide to lose some games beforehand to avert direct confrontation with North Korea. Consequently, the South Korean national football team was disqualified and to this day, this incident is known as the “Disgrace of the Tehran Asian Games” in South Korean football history (Kang, 2008; KFA, 2003).

4.1.2 Affiliation to FIFA

Right after the liberation, the Chosun Football Association was reconstructed in 1945. The name was changed to the ‘Korean Football Association (KFA)’ in 1948, then, the KFA was affiliated with FIFA in the same year. For the Korean side, the affiliation with FIFA meant an official recognition of Korean football and a tacit opportunity to confirm the nation’s sovereignty and hegemony in the intricate inter-Koreas’ situation of the late 1940s. The strategy for affiliation was raised whilst the Korean Preparatory Committee for the XIV Olympic Games prepared for its affiliation with the IOC and participation in the IOC and the XIV Olympic Games. Responding to the request of the Committee, the IOC suggested the following guidelines for the Korean side.

If your country is a member of three of these Federations, it will be sufficient for the present. These federations will then form a Korean National Olympic Committee and will be accepted at the next meeting of the I.O.C., which takes place the 15th of June 1947 here in Stockholm (8th January 1947, correspondence from IOC to Vice chairman of Korean Preparatory Committee for the XIV Olympic Games).

The Korean football association was permitted to be part of FIFA via provisional status in 1946. Based on FIFA’s regulations, provisional affiliation seems to be a normal procedure to secure full membership. FIFA’s eighth edition Handbook (Art 6) explains in detail the process of provisional and formal admission:
Associations shall only be elected members at the Congress. Power is however
given to the Emergency Committee of the Federation (see Art. 9) to give
provisional admittance to an Association applying for membership, but the
actual election of an Association so accepted shall be submitted to the next
Congress (FIFA, 1937).

However, the South Korean side had to deal with the matter of affiliation more sensitively
due to the political and ideological pandemonium on the Korean Peninsula. Shortly after
this, Korea was occupied and governed by the USA and the USSR military administration:
the former controlled the Southern part whilst the latter ruled the Northern part of the
Korean Peninsula, which led to ineluctable national division even before the Korean War.
Korea, however, appealed for its independency to the world and endeavoured to deny the
colonial condition.

A speculative question will arise - that Korea has not yet attained political
independence as to have a recognized government of the Korean people. This is
true. Korea is at present occupied by the military forces of the United States and
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, the United States and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are in Korea as liberating nations. Korea is
in nowise a colony or a dependency of these two nations. Korea is not a
conquered nation (27th December 1946, correspondence from Vice chairman of
Korean Preparatory Committee for the XIV Olympic Games to the President of
the IOC).

Under the new geo-political environment set by Western powers and in separate moves
between southern and northern parts of the Korean Peninsula, the Korean Preparatory
Committee for the XIV Olympic Games based in the southern part of Korea contacted
FIFA on behalf of the Korean Football Association to settle the matter on the renewal of its
membership.

The Football Association of Korea desires affiliation in the International
Football Association. And as authorized by the Korean Preparatory Committee
for The XIV Olympic Games and the Amateur Athletic Association of Korea, I
have the honour to submit this letter and enclosures on behalf of the Football
Since then, the KFA went through all the necessary formalities to become a member of FIFA and was finally accepted as a definite member during the FIFA Congress which was held on the 30\textsuperscript{th} July 1948. In the meantime, South Korea firmly distinguished itself politically and ideologically from North Korea through a separate national election to establish the Constitutional Assembly for the South Korean government on 10\textsuperscript{th} May 1948. Subsequently, the South Korean government was established on 15\textsuperscript{th} August 1948 in the southern area of the Korean Peninsula electing Rhee Syngman as their first President. Simultaneously, the Democratic People’s Republic was founded in September with the Premier, Kim Il-Sung in North Korea (Ahn, 2002: 164).

Although the South Korean football governing body was accepted as a full member of FIFA, the affiliation of the Korean Football Association left the door open for tension in relation to North Korea’s application and admission in the world football hierarchy. Crucial to the affiliation issues was whether or not South Korea was a sole representative of the Korean Peninsula from a South Korean and an international point of view. These situations were also a concern for the decision-makers of FIFA and there were also probabilities to utilise these situations for different political purposes during the Cold War era. In the 1948 FIFA Congress, the agenda regarding the Korean Football Association and the Sudanese F.A. admissions was tackled in the following manner:

Dr. Andrejevic, on behalf of the Association of Yugoslavia, asked whether the Korean F.A. represented the football of the whole country. Mr. Rimet proposed that the Executive Committee be authorized to make enquiries and to decide whether the admission of these two Associations should be ratified. This was accepted. The admission of the Associations as above mentioned was ratified by the Congress (FIFA Congress minutes, 1948: 4).

It is not clear whether the Executive Committee and the KFA definitely indicated (in the documents) the representativeness of which territory that the KFA controls. However, FIFA had to have a certain position when North Korea attempted to join FIFA as a full
member. This assumption is clearly supported by FIFA’s response to the Football Association of D.P.R.K. about its application for membership and was reflected in FIFA’s “Statutes and Regulations” Article 1.

In order to be able to examine your application for membership, we would kindly ask you to let us have at your earliest convenience the following information: Over which territory has your National Football Association jurisdiction? Is your Football Association the only Association controlling Association Football in your country? (31st October 1955, correspondence from General Secretary of FIFA to Chairman of Football Association of D.P.R.K).

The “Féderation Internationale de Football Association” shall consist of the Associations recognised by it as the Associations controlling Association Football in their respective countries, provided that only one Association be recognised in each country…The Associations’ members of the Federation shall recognise each other as the Associations controlling Football in their respective countries, other organisations being excluded (FIFA Statutes and Regulation, 1948: 3).

Initially, the Football Association of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did not give any indications about its territory and the representativeness in its internal rules⁹, which was delivered to FIFA in a correspondence on 15th October, 1955. Because South Korea had already affiliated with FIFA, the North Korean side could not avoid the FIFA’s inquiry to move the process of their application forward¹⁰. This was rectified in response to FIFA’s letter dated on 31st October 1955.

The replies to the questions raised in your letter.

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⁹ The KFA also did not indicate whether it represents the whole country or the southern part of the country. The KFA, however, chose a vague strategy (or perhaps it was an accident), to address its representativeness in Article 3 of the regulations: The Association aims to control and guide Korean soccer and to promote the physical standard of the people through a sound development of the game (13th May 1947, correspondence from Vice Chairman of Korean Preparatory Committee for the 14th Olympic Games to Hon. General Secretary of FIFA).

¹⁰ Since then, the Football Association of D.P.R.K earned a provisional membership from the FIFA Executive Committee on 20/21st June 1957, which was subjected to confirmation in the 1958 FIFA Congress in Stockholm.
1. The Football Association of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has jurisdiction over the entire territory of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

2. Our Football Association is the only association controlling football affairs in our country. (20th April 1956, correspondence from the Chairman of the Football Association of D.P.R.K to Chairman of FIFA).

As expected, the South Korean side resisted North Korea’s affiliation due primarily to its symbolic meaning and repercussions in the domestic and the international affairs. The South Korean government had stated that the main agents who controlled North Korea are a puppet regime for the USSR, which underscores the political importance of South Korea to object to North Korea for gaining FIFA affiliation and to deny international recognition of North Korean autonomy. In particular, the resistance was fuelled by severe anti-Communism which the South Korean government adopted as a national policy. Without a doubt, the South Korean side strongly argued during the Congress that the KFA was the sole representative of the whole of Korea and its football. The KFA tried to convince other delegates in the Congress to vote against the agenda of granting North Korea’s member status by sending letters to all delegates of the FIFA Congress.

1. Although the FIFA is not an organisation in governmental basis, it must be taken into consideration that the only legal government to represent Korea, in whatever field it may be, is the Republic of Korea as was firmly recognized by the United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 1948.

2. The International Olympic Committees and the Asian Football Federation have a firm decision that Korea cannot and should not be represented by two different groups in any fields of sports.

3. The so-called Football Association of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is not a member of the Asian Football Federation. (n.d. correspondence from Delegation of the Republic of Korea to 31st Congress of FIFA to all distinguished delegates to the 31st Congress of FIFA).

Nevertheless, the cogent argument and the application could not change the decision of the Executive Committee and the Congress on the agenda of granting North Korea an affiliation with the world football governing body. The 1958 FIFA Congress minutes
attested that although the South Korean side did not abandon its attempt to impede North Korea’s affiliation, the decision of FIFA would be unrevoked. This is illustrated in the following excerpt:

The delegate of the Korean Football Association, Seoul, Mr. Kim Yong Sik, asked the Congress not to accept the application for membership. The President proceeded to the vote. The application for membership was approved by 28 votes to 6. The delegate of the newly admitted Association thanked the Congress (FIFA Congress minutes, 1958: 4).

Nevertheless, the visibility of North Korea in the international community was not acceptable for the South Korean sides. The argument moved from FIFA to a continental level. Since South Korea’s endeavour had come to naught in FIFA, the KFA attempted to resist North Korea’s full membership into the Asian Football Confederation (AFC). When North Korea’s affiliation to the AFC was proposed as an agenda during the AFC Congress held during the 6th Merdeka Cup in 1963, South Korean representatives succeeded in blocking the agenda (Kang J, 2006: 101-102). Before that, when the North Korean application was submitted to the AFC in 1962, the South Korean representatives warned the AFC with the possibility of disaffiliating South Korean football from the AFC (31st August 1962, Chosun Ilbo). Under these circumstances, the AFC’s dilemma was acknowledged by FIFA in the following manner:

The following 18 are in membership with AFC: …Israel, Japan, South Korea…South Vietnam, but Iraq, Jordan, North Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and North Vietnam are not. Mr. Lim Kee Siong and Mr. Koe Ewe Teik were appointed at the recent Executive Committee meeting to visit these countries and to discuss their reasons for not becoming members. Consideration of an application from North Korea, in membership with FIFA but not with the AFC was deferred until the hostilities between North and South are ended (September, 1963, Report of an Eastern Tour Undertaken by the President of FIFA from 5th-31st August, 1963).

The South Korean sides had attempted to deny, as much as they could, the legitimacy of North Korea. As we can acknowledge from the cases, for the South Korean side, football
was a visible representation to build the nation in the Cold War era, in which the existence of North Korea had to be denied through all measures.

4.1.3 Issue on countries’ formal name, national flags, and national anthems

The South Korean football association was concerned with the name of the country it represents and its recognition in the international community. South Korean political circles wished to be recognised as the sole representative of Korea and deliberately tried to disregard the existence of North Korea or treat its status as one of the provinces of South Korea. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea indicated that the territory of the Republic of Korea was “the Korean Peninsula and the affiliated areas” (cf. Constitutional Court of Korea, 2009) that had been constantly maintained in the Constitution from its establishment, by which the South Korean government directly and indirectly attempted to legitimise its sole autonomy on the Korean Peninsula. These attitudes had been clearly recorded when the South Korean side had to cope with North Korea’s first participation in the Olympic Games held in Tokyo in 1964. Chosun Ilbo (South Korean newspaper) attempted to represent the government and its sport governing bodies about North Korean problems in its editorial and stressed the perception that South Korea represented the entire Korean Peninsula, which was constantly argued in and supported by the IOC:

In late October, partly due to our representatives activities in the IOC Congress held in BadenBaden, West Germany, *Hanguk* (South Korea) as “Korea” participated in the Olympic Games representing the whole Korea, whilst North Korea as “North Korea” qualified for the event as a delegation of a region (1st December 1963, Chosun Ilbo: 8, translated from Korean).

With regards to the above, a crucial issue to the South Korean sides was (still is) how South Korea should be identified in international societies and even in the inter-Korean relations. This consideration was also directly and indirectly reflected in the usage of the official name of the South Korean football association: Korea Football Association, which is also recognised by FIFA. However, the official title had been confirmed at last after many twists and turns. Right after the liberation from Japan, Korean athletic organisations (e.g. Chosun Sport Council), which had existed prior to the liberation were revived in 1945.
They introduced themselves to the IOC as ‘the Amateur Athletic Association of Korea’, in which the football association was also listed as a member.

Following Aug. 15, 1945, (date of Japanese surrender) the Korean athletic organisations initiated leadership in sports. On Nov. 12, 1945 these organizations formed themselves into the Amateur Athletic Association of Korea. The members were: The Football Association of Korea; The Basketball Association of Korea… (27th December 1946, correspondence from Vice Chairman of Korean Preparatory Committee for the 14th Olympic Games to the President of the IOC).

After the liberation and before the division, the Korean side clearly indicated its football governing body as ‘the Football Association of Korea’ in the English language. However, regardless of whether or not the name was provisional, the designation of a South Korean football governing body had been changed to find a suitable identity especially in relation to North Korea and its football governing body. Of course, the English title had not always been written in the same way whilst the Korean title has remained the same: Daehan\textsuperscript{11} Chukgu Hyeophoe (대한축구협회; 大韓蹴球協會). When the Football Association of Korea tried to become a member of FIFA, the Korean association indicated its official name as ‘the Korean Football Association’ or ‘the Korea Football Association’ (KFA) which was confirmed in its ‘Regulations of the Korean Football Association’ submitted to FIFA.

The association shall be called the Korean Football Association…The English equivalent of the name of the Association is the “Korea Football Association” (13th May 1947, correspondence from Vice Chairman of Korean Preparatory Committee for the 14th Olympic Games to Hon. General Secretary of FIFA).

In 1969, the South Korean football association sent a letter to FIFA and requested not to limit its designation to South Korea. From a South Korean point of view, using the name ‘South Korea’ itself in internationally circulated documents published by FIFA could strengthen the perception of the existence of two countries on the Korean Peninsula.

\textsuperscript{11} Daehan literally means “Great Korea”.

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Furthermore, through insistence, the KFA may have attempted to acquire an advantageous position in representing football in Korea, thus attacking the international legitimacy of the North Korean authority.

You are cordially requested that the official designation of our Association is to be invariably with the name of “KOREA”, and not South Korea, on all occasions of international meetings and/or competitions in which FIFA is involved. (12th August 1969, correspondence from KFA General Secretary to the FIFA General Secretary).

With this concrete stance, the South Korean sides attempted to act very sensitively on the title issue which is evident in various practices. For instance, the South Korean Sport Council suspended a decision on whether or not the South Korea football team could participate in the 12th Merdeka Cup, because the national title was printed as ‘Korea, South’ in a letter of invitation sent by the organiser of the competition (17th October 1969, Chosun Ilbo). As a result, the Malaysian football governing body, the organiser of the tournament, had to confirm that “our association has always named the country as Korea and this will be the same in the competition” (21st October 1969, Chosun Ilbo). With the confirmation, South Korea sent its football team to the Merdeka Cup.

As a special request by the KFA on 12th August 1969, FIFA dealt with it in a neutral manner and tried to solve the problem through international diplomatic standards in international sport, and FIFA’s practice regarding such matters. Initially, FIFA asserted that it would be difficult not to use the geographical title, south and north, to indicate the divided nations:

FIFA will certainly adhere to your wish but internationally it might be rather difficult as we have every day in the newspapers “South Korea” “North Korea”, “West Germany”, “East Germany”, “North Vietnam” and “South Vietnam” (26th September 1969, correspondence from FIFA General Secretary to KFA General Secretary).

The antagonistic relation between the two sides, especially in terms of designation, is still unchanged in the inter-Korean context and in the sporting arena as well. South Korea
chose to name itself *Hanguk* (韓國) or *Daehanminguk* (Korea or the Republic of Korea; 大韓民國) officially avoiding the use of ‘South Korea’, whilst it chooses to denominate North Korea as *Bukhan* (North Korea; 北韓) or *Bukgoe* (北傀) in the past. In opposition, North Korea chooses to name South Korea as *Namjoseon* (South Chosun), which South Korea clearly does not accept. In this case, Chosun represents the Chosun Dynasty (before Japanese annexation), through which North Korea attempts to deny the whole history of South Korea from the Japanese colonial era up to the present time. In a similar vein, it can be argued that the KFA adopted ‘Korea’ rather than ‘Korean’ to be its official English name, in emphasising the territorial concept. Under these circumstances, the KFA finally decided what name the organisation should be given in 1973 and notified FIFA of its decision:

The purpose of this letter is to remind you that the official title of this association is KOREA FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION. Therefore, it is kindly requested that, hereafter, all the official correspondences to this association should be addressed as above. In other words, it should not be titled KOREAN FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION (2nd March 1973, correspondence from KFA General Secretary to FIFA General Secretary).

Although the issue of designation seemed to have been settled at the KFA and FIFA level, the confrontation revolving around the problem of the name of both countries, even if it could be considered as only a matter of ego from both Koreans perspectives, is still valid. For instance, in a press conference during the Asian final-round qualifier to the 2010 World Cup, the two sides clearly rediscovered their positions on their long-lasting confrontation. South Korean media used the name North Korea (北韓) naturally, whereas Kim Jong-Hun, the coach of North Korea’s national squad, requested to use the official name: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

He (Kim Jong-Hun) unpleasantly affirmed and requested that ‘we are not North Korea but the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Please name it as it is’ in response to the South Korean media personnel’s questions about a call-up

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12 *Bukgoe* means the North Korean puppet regime
training of North Korea’s national team. (31st March 2009, in Han-Kuk Ilbo (online), translated from Korean).

This kind of rivalry between the two sides has been undoubtedly extended to other issues such as national anthems and national flags. At the height of the Cold War, these representations had been imperative concerns for South Korea, especially when North Korea began participating in international sporting events such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup. In the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, there was an argument that South Korea should boycott the Olympic Games if North Korea’s national flag and anthem had to be displayed in Japan, which has no official diplomatic relations with North Korea or if Japan had reacted in favour of North Korea regardless of where the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) stood on the matter (1st December 1963, Chosun Ilbo: 8). In relation to the 1966 England World Cup in which North Korea participated and reached the quarter finals, the governments of South Korea and surprisingly enough, England attempted to make an objection to the exposure of the North Korean national flag and anthem to the public whilst acknowledging the universal claims of sport as apolitical (cf. Polley, 1998).

Recently, the KFA has failed to negotiate with the Football Association of D.P.R.K. to play in a North Korean territory for the Asian third-round qualifier to the 2010 South Africa World Cup, and an Asian final-round qualifying match between South Korea and North Korea for the same event. As a result, as decided by FIFA, the football matches were played in a neutral venue, China. Although these situations have been entangled with political issues and tension between the two sides, North Korea would not allow the South Korean national anthem and flag in its capital city even if it was during a sporting event, whilst South Korea, according to FIFA regulations, allowed the North Korean flag and anthem for the qualifying matches in the capital of South Korea, Seoul. The following newspaper article explains the situation.

The South Korea Football Association (KFA) announced Thursday that FIFA decided to move the Sept. 10 match, initially scheduled to be played in Pyongyang, to the Chinese city. The North has strived to change the location because it disapproves of the South displaying its flag or playing its national anthem in the North Korean capital. The change is not the first time both sides have had a qualifying match moved to a third country. A third-round qualifier,
also scheduled in Pyongyang, was held in Shanghai on March 26 (21st August 2008, The Korea Times).

Although the cases were solved by staging the matches in a third-country, these examples would not be easily rectified in their inter-Korea relations. Even though recently, South Korea seems to have been taking a more flexible stance on that particular issue in the sporting arena than North Korea, the relation between South and North Korea is still a heated and controversial issue in football.

4.1.4 Everlasting (post) colonial rivalry: South Korea and Japan case

The relation between South Korea and Japan has been not so much based on ideological competition but rather historical antagonism which had been established as a result of their shared history and memory. In particular, in modern history, the experience of Japanese annexation and the colonial policies have been the key sources of deep-rooted enmity for South Korea whilst Japan, in some ways, has not considered it as seriously as Korea has. That is to say, crucial to the understanding of their uneasy relations is the fact that both countries interpret their shared history in completely different manners. McCormack (2002) explains the backdrop of the uncomfortable relationship even since their re-establishment of diplomatic relations as follows:

The Japan-Korea rapprochement that was accomplished in 1965 was confined to diplomatic and economic relations between states. Absent was the dimension of forgiveness, mutual understanding and respect at the people’s level, and recognition of the suffering of countless individual victims. The issues remained unresolved, postponed for a half century, commonly forgotten in Japan whilst constituting a deep memory in Korea (McCormack, 2002, 33).

Historically, the encounter between Korean and Japanese football started on the basis of an unequal relation: the coloniser and the colonised. During the colonial era, the Korean football governing body, ‘Chosun Football Association (CFA)’ was inaugurated in 1933. However, according to written memoirs of a CFA staff member who became the president of the KFA in 1960, the organisation had to accept being under the authority of the
Japanese Football Association to maintain its existence under Japanese rule. The staff member, Dr. Jung Moon-Ki looked back upon the situation:

At that time, there were two sport organisations: Chosun Sport Council (CSC) based on YMCA and Chosun Sport Organisation (CSO), the Japanese Government General-affiliated organisation. The CSC was organised with Korean sportspersons with its autonomy…However, the Japanese Governor-General tried to disperse the CSC and to join all the affiliated organisations with the CSO…Football was not an exception…I have continued my friendship with one of the staff of the Japanese football team from when I was a football player in Japan. So I sent him a letter in consultation: ‘I am trying to establish the Chosun Football Association. I would like to affiliate the CFA with the JFA. However, there is one condition: we would like to operate all football related matters independently of the Korean Peninsula, accepting participation in Olympic Games under the name of the JFA’. Then I received a letter from him, which concerned the JFA’s acceptance of our request (Jung, 1983: 168; translated from Korean).

Rather than securing the CFA’s status as an independent football governing body, the Korean side was more concerned with the autonomy of its operations in the Korean Peninsula, prudently acknowledging the unavoidable colonial situation. Under these circumstances, the CFA, as a local branch of the JFA could continually organise nationwide football matches even whilst the Chosun Sport Council (CSC) and its nationwide sport events were placed under interdiction by Japanese rule. However, since the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the Japanese authorities banned simultaneously all sport activities in the Korean Peninsula. Consequently, CFA was self-dismantled in 1942 (KFA, 2003).

Since the liberation, it was not until 1960 that Japan could play on South Korean soil. Principally, Japanese players were banned to enter South Korea, due to the consistent antagonism toward Japan and non-normalised diplomatic relations. However, the South Korean football team met the Japanese for the first time in the Switzerland World Cup preliminary round in 1954. Both the home and away matches had to be held in Tokyo, Japan. The atmosphere of dispatching a team to Japan for the first time since the liberation
from Japan might have been analogous to that of sending troops to an enemy camp. Many South Korean historical records witnessed the team manager, Lee Yoo-Hyung’s heroic promise to the President who allowed the matches to be held only in Japan: “If we do not win against Japan, we all drown ourselves in Hyeonhaetan (玄海灘)\textsuperscript{13}” (KFA, 2003: 234; Kang, 2006: 74).

In 1960, the Japanese national football team finally set foot on South Korean soil for the first time since 1945 for a preliminary match of the 1962 Chile World Cup. As can be imagined, the football match itself was a sport event and, simultaneously, a symbolic representation which could be troublesome to the South Korean government. That is to say, given the fact that the first historical football match has to be held in South Korea, it was difficult to cope with what could be seen by the public, especially from the South Korean governmental standpoint. In his memoirs, the former KFA president, Jung Moon-Ki, wrote:

> If the two countries play a football game according to international custom, both countries’ national flags have to be hoisted. However, the government’s position was that the Japanese national flag cannot be raised because of peoples’ anti-Japanese sentiment. In this situation, the KFA asserted to follow the international custom and the government proposed that it would be better to play the preliminary round in other country if the flag should be raised (Jung, 1983: 170; translated from Korean).

From political and social perspectives at that time, South Korea’s state of affairs was in chaos after ‘April 19 Revolution’\textsuperscript{14}, and an anti-Japanese sentiment was still deeply rooted in the public. These pushed the newly constituted government to a dilemma about the friction between the sport event and the domestic situations. Under these circumstances, the KFA attempted to solve this problem by considering the impacts on South Korea’s status in the international community. This consideration was also advocated by South Korean media. Chosun Ilbo (newspaper) expressed its opinion in its editorial as follows:

\textsuperscript{13} This indicates straits between the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese Islands. The South Korean side calls it ‘the Straits of Korea’ whilst Japan names it ‘the Straits of Tsushima’.

\textsuperscript{14} The most important political and social change in this period is the so-called April 19 Revolution, which occurred on 19\textsuperscript{th} April 1960 and ended with the resignation of Rhee Seung-Man on 26 April 1960 (Choi D, 2003: 35). Rhee’s eagerness to reign the country on a long-term basis caused illegal constitutional amendments and a rigged election which (in)directly detonated the 4.19 Revolution.
Frankly, there will be no one who can be pleased to see and hear the Japanese flag and anthem, the symbol of Japanese imperialism, again on our soil… However, we have to distinguish sentiment of the past and the situation of the present. Furthermore, through discernment between politics and sports, we can become civilised citizens (6th November 1960, Chosun Ilbo, translated from Korean).

As a result, this first historical moment between the two countries was staged with the Japanese national flag and anthem without any incidents (Jung, 1983; Monthly Football, January 1973). During the event, football seemed to transcend the political and historical issues, thus securing the specific position of sports in the relationship between both countries. Nevertheless, the relations between South Korea and Japan have repeatedly re-emerged in sporting arenas, which can also be highlighted, for instance, in the bidding campaigns for the 2002 World Cup.
4.2 Emerging discourse in the transition from authoritarian regimes to democratisation era

In the South Korean context, especially during its authoritarian regimes, sport and football had been appropriated as political propaganda and mobilisation of the whole country. Although it could be argued that the utilisation of sport and football was not new in the regimes, sport and football had secured a more expressible and visible position in society than ever before. Furthermore, some transitional movements such as the democratisation of South Korea and detente between liberal and communist blocs had impacted the relations of Far East Asian countries. Hence, this chapter explores the changed aspects of football relations and the consequences of dealing with several issues in the Far East Asian context.

4.2.1 A Strong nation and strong football

General Park Chung-Hee who seized power in a 1961 coup was in a position to stress the necessity of a strong nation, strong mentality, and strong body not just in the sport sector, but also in every social stratum. The whole nation needed to work together in unanimity to escape from poverty. There was a request for the reformation of the mentality and attitude of the whole nation in order to establish a new era for development. In a speech for the inauguration of his presidency, President Park stated:

I, again, appeal for national unity in front of the beloved compatriots with raising the banner of construction of a glorified new republic in an orderly and prosperous society, by promising the tomorrow’s homeland without retrogression and poverty. We are at the crossroads of whether we will repeat stagnation and emaciation through discord, political strife, and division, or whether we will newly organise the line in the ethnic common square with fraternity, cooperation, and unity, in the face of a tremendous task, modernisation of the fatherland. (President Park Chung-Hee, 1964, National Online Archive, in a speech of his inauguration of presidency in 1964, translated from Korean).
In recognising the lack of political legitimacy, the regime demanded for a massive mobilisation of people around the government policy, which were political approaches by exercising power directly on the society and people (Kim, 2007: 9). Sport also had to be a perfect showcase to reflect national unity, national progress and development whilst it had always been an effective apparatus to control people and to raise their morale. Furthermore, sport was a tool to convince people that Korea would make the world aware of the new image of the modernised country.

It will be no exaggeration to say that we can get a sense of the prosperity and decline of a country, and yardstick of national power through, precisely, people’s physical strength. We have to work together to boost the ethos of revering sport and bring its swift development, to revive our great tradition forever for good, to revive the sound national spirit based on the strong physique of people (President Park Chung-Hee, 1964, National Online Archive, In a speech of the 45th National Sport Competition in 1964, translated from Korean).

Although the performance was not as satisfactory as expected in this competition, it is meaningful that the world has a new understanding of Korea by displaying peoples’ pride through the unification of the players and staff, and fulfilled discipline and collective action (President Park Chung-Hee, 1964, National Online Archive, a statement when Korean team returned to Korea after the 18th Olympic Games, translated from Korean).

The KFA describes the 1960s as ‘a recession of South Korean football’ because of the continuous poor performance of the national teams, and failure of qualifying in the 1962 Chile World Cup preliminary rounds in 1961. This is compared to the advancements of North Korean football. Due to the symbolic representation of football, the national teams’ quality and improvement were considered as a matter of highest priority for the nation and the KFA (cf. KFA, 2003). Meanwhile, the authoritarian regime had positioned North Korean football as an object against which South Korean football had to show its superiority or could not to reveal its weakness at any expense. North Korea’s advance to the quarter finals in the 1966 England World Cup had persuaded Park’s regime to recognise the necessity of creating a strong national team in a more practical way. In this
respect, the regime was directly involved in organising and operating a national-level football team.

After returning home (in 1966), I was summoned to the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) to outline my personal view on the FIFA World Cup, and explained what I saw about North Korean football to Kim Hyung-Uk, the head of the KCIA. At the end, I recommended to organise a strong national team which would be beneficial to promote national image if the team has friendly matches travelling throughout Africa and donates to charities when there is income. Kim, the head of the KCIA seemed to listen to my proposal carefully. The Yang-Gi team was created in 1967 (testimony of Oh Wan-Gun, the then director of the KFA, in KFA, 2003: 263, translated from Korean).

Regardless of whether or not the head of the KCIA created the Yang-Gi team based on the proposal of the director of the KFA, the point is that the individuals in government and the KFA had imposed their views about the role of football, for instance, for the representation of a strong nation, which was very much in opposition to the communist counterpart. The statements on the necessity of strong national teams were willingly produced and accepted. It is undeniable that the national teams’ performance had to be the top priority and the football governing body had to focus on the target despite limited resources. As a consequence, entities such as military and banks which could mobilise resources had to be involved positively in developing Korean football.

As we all know, North Korea had an unexpectedly good result in the 1966 World Cup held in London. The Yang Gi team promoted this (Europe) training camp without any hesitation for the skill improvement of the South Korean team to get a good result in the forthcoming World Cup. Although I do not know about the aspect of skill, the purpose of this expedition was to know our team’s level and to improve our skill through this camp in Europe which is the

\[\text{15}^5\text{ The camp was held in West Germany, Austria, France, and Switzerland from 27th June 1969 to 4th August 1969 (Sports Korea, 1969(10): 34)}\]
In 1970, one representative team consisting of selected players from bank teams also held friendly away games with Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Japan to improve the performance of Korean football (cf. Sports Korea, 1970/April: 66-67). In other words, even the business football teams schedule was considered as a matter of importance for the national football team whilst the corporate football teams also had responsibility for their national team players and South Korean football. Meanwhile, production of competent national teams and showcase of sound spirit had become the reason of operating the governing body. Therefore, when the KFA did not produce visible results, the power structure or relations within the KFA was easily threatened and changed. For instance, when encountered with football incidents and related national humiliation in international competitions, the KFA presidents and directors were pushed to resign. Table 9 shows the moments of change or restructuring of the KFA

Table 9 ‘Dishonour’ of National Football Team and the KFA in the 1950s and 1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National team performances or domestic football incidents</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Detail of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Non-participation in the Helsinki Olympic Games</td>
<td>Restructuring of the executive board</td>
<td>Korea football team could not participate in the Games due to financial difficulty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Semi-final match of National Football Championship was called off due to tight rivalry of army teams</td>
<td>Resignation of the KFA president</td>
<td>The semi-finalists in question: The provost marshal headquarters and the Counter Intelligence Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>The arrest warrant for 6 national football team members who went to international away match</td>
<td>Mass resignation of the executive board</td>
<td>The players smuggled some foreign products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Incident of beating referee in a national athletic championship and a</td>
<td>Resignation of the KFA president</td>
<td>In terms of the second incident, the players stayed in a camp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sports Korea is an official magazine of Korean Sport Council or Korean Olympic Committee. This magazine was firstly published in January 1966.
1964 Participation in the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games Reorganization of the board members of the KFA to prepare for the Games Because of the relations with Japan and North Korea

Sources: The KFA (2003), Chosun Newspapers, Dong-A Newspaper, Kyung-Hyang Newspaper

During the 1960s, the concept of a modernised and strong nation was not satisfactorily realised through the performance of South Korean football on international stages. South Korean football produced statements on the necessity of unwavering support from the government sides. Although securing financial support from the government was not a new phenomenon, the concept was practically presented whilst the importance of international competitions was increased.

Although it all comes back to a question of money, expense for infrastructure and coaching is the first consideration to do sport business, to promote sport, and to foster players. I remember one famous foreign coach said that to cultivate a world class player you need as much money, time, and labour as to train a pilot. Thus, only civilians cannot possibly do the business which costs an arm and a leg. Without absolute aid or cooperation of government, it cannot but end up in domestic sport events. In this respect, we can conclude that financial support of the government is absolutely needed to participate in the international sport community and to play with world powers (Park Jung-Mi, the former vice-president of the KFA, in Kyung-Hyang newspaper, 27th November 1960: 4, translated from Korean).

The KFA needed powerful leaders and their experiences not only to operate the organisation well, but also to mobilise resources effectively. In this respect, having Jang Deok-Jin, the director of the Ministry of Finance as the finance director of the KFA in 1969 and the president of the KFA in 1970 (to 1973), the KFA could promote the football development issues under his strong political and economical leadership. The KFA president was in a position to bridge football and the government in a more practical

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17 He was also a close relative of the President Park Chung-Hee’s wife. Namely, he was a heavyweight in the government (Kang, 2006: 122).
perspective, which was clearly presented in his strategy to promote the creation of several corporate football teams.

4.2.2 President Park’s Cup

From this period onward, Korean football tried to engage with world football more actively than before. Whilst the world football governing body had started to become actively involved in developing football around the world by initiating for instance courses for coaches, referees, and secretaries, as well as in the form of financial support from the 1970s in the name of “Memorandum on Technical Assistance, Grants and Loans for Development Schemes” (FIFA Handbook (1971/1972), 1972: 115), the government and the KFA also started to be actively involved in Asian and world football to define the nation and Korean football in a specific way. The President Park’s Cup would be one of the examples of how Korean football approached the international stage, especially, to strengthen the image of Korea and to develop Korean football.

In 1971, the government and the KFA created an international football tournament which was called the ‘President Park’s Cup’ after the South Korean football team won the gold medal in the 6th Asian Games. In fact, at that time, there had already been the King’s Cup organised by Thailand and the Merdeka Cup organised by Malaysia in which the Korean teams had regularly participated and produced satisfactory results (KFA, 2003; Kang J, 2006). In political terms, Malaysia and Thailand were rival countries for South Korea in the AFC (Asian Football Confederation). Having its own international tournament could be presented as legitimate for the KFA in order to balance the unseen power relations of football and politics in the Asian context. In particular, the Korean side could organise the President Park’s Cup in an atmosphere of, for instance, strong performance of South Korean football in the Asian Continent, and the leadership of the KFA president, Jang Deok-Jin who was also elected as the AFC vice-president in 1970.

No sooner had the KFA president, Jang Deok-Jin taken his office that he tried to expand the power of Korean football diplomatically. Firstly, he was elected as the vice-president of the AFC and spared no efforts to involve the Far East countries such as Korea and Japan in the AFC’s hegemony which is seized by
As a vice-president of the AFC, I believe that many regional competitions will not be harmful because I think many players can improve their personal skills and strategic way of thinking, accumulating international match experiences. Only by doing this, I think, Asian football, which lagged behind, can reach to the level of Europe and South America and bump shoulders with them. Moreover, in the light of the bitter experience: old colonial regimes by powerful nations, which most of Asian countries experienced except Japan, will be a spiritual foundation for a joint prosperity when all of us have a strong sense of solidarity as honourable independent nations…On this occasion…we have to show them the modern progress of the matured Korea (the KFA president, in Monthly Football, 1971/05: 25-before the first President Park’s Cup-, translated from Korean).

In the 1970s, the President Park’s Cup served to control the society not only by presenting national development as national target, but also by demanding that the nation and the people to be a role model in Asia. The images of developed Korea as a well-to-do nation with good manners had to be well presented to visitors in the competitions held on South Korean soil. The international competition was used for that mechanism. This continued during the 1980s which is illustrated in the following declaration of the KFA president:

While they stay with us in June, they will see the collective will of our nation for the new creation of history like lively and energetic liveliness of all things. In addition, they will engrave into their minds the warmth of our people who work harder than any other people to construct a well-off country and an affluent society (Choi Sun-Young, the KFA president, in Monthly Football, 1981/06: 25-before the 11th President Cup-, translated from Korean).

Interestingly, the President Park’s Cup was appropriated to define how the development of Korea had to be shown to the world. Without a doubt, the first international tournament had to be a showcase to present the image of Korea, including national character, people’s manner, and the fair-play of Korean players. The whole population was asked to be
modern and to represent a modernised image of Korea. Under the circumstances, the process of *othering* was also inevitable to characterise the nation and the people.

Finally, the final game of the 3rd King's Cup was opened by the kick-off by the Korean team. However, whilst hearing the game on the radio, all of our people got angry about the rough play of Thailand players, disturbance caused by Thailand spectators who lost their minds, Thailand coaching staff who rushed into the pitch ignoring rules, and bad calls given by the referee who looked like a blind fool and deaf…However our team stood up under the situations behaving like the sons of Korea and a strong nation who helps allied nations. In the end, the Korean team won the trophy, fighting well with politeness, patience, and an invincible spirit (Monthly Football, 1970/December: 38-39, translated from Korean).

The football magazine depicted, in an orientalist sense, the attitude of Thai spectators and players as ‘barbarous’ and ‘violent’. In this respect, Korea, as the host country of the Park’s Cup, had to show its cultural maturity and the Korean people had to be generous to outsiders whilst players had to do their best to respect the ethics of fair play. In other words, by organising the football tournament, Korea had to be a country that affords to host the competition (cf. Kyung-Hyang newspaper, 30th April 1971: 6).

Rather than to concentrate on results, I hope that the Korean team shows fair-play to the end with the pride of a host country. Also, spectators should have no less applause for the foreign teams than for our team. On this occasion, we have to show them precisely the image of a developed and matured Korea whilst kindly welcoming the staff and players of the seven participating countries. (The KFA president, in Monthly Football, 1971/May: 25, translated from Korean).

Our peoples’ cheers have great power even though we do not lose our mind as South Americans do…The attitude of the spectators indicated the excellence of Korean people, comparable to any advanced country (The Monthly Football, 1971/June: 45-*after the first President Park’s Cup*-, translated from Korean).
4.2.3 Political propaganda or changed relations? South and North Korea case

Since their first encounter (except at youth levels) in the 1978 Asian Games final match, the relations of South and North Korean football have always reflected their political and military confrontation. Nevertheless, some historical movements in political and football exchanges have contributed to constructing a new image of their relationship, such as, proclamation of brotherhood, and, ultimately, the symbolic possibility of unification in South Korean society. Since the Korean War, the historical friendly football matches between both countries were firstly held in Pyeong-Yang, the capital of North Korea and Seoul (South Korean capital) in 1990 (Kang J, 2006; Lee, 2000). Based on this football event, the first-ever single Korean team made of North and South Korean players participated in the Under-20 World Youth Cup held in Portugal in 1991 and reached the quarter-final round of the competition (Kang J, 2006; Lee, 2000).

Before these series of historical events, international sport governing bodies: IOC and FIFA attempted to push divided nations such as South and North Korea, and West and East Germany, to promote reconciliation through sports. However, this did not work due to many insuperable obstacles and objections in inter-Korean relations. In 1959, FIFA, following the IOC’s recommendation, requested that South Korea send a single football team made up of South and North Korean players to the forthcoming Olympic Games.

In accordance with a decision of the International Olympic Committee, Western and Eastern Germany as well as South and North Korea can each field one joint team only (21st March 1959, Minutes of Ad hoc Olympic Committee of the FIFA).

Prior to the request from FIFA, there had already been a decision in the 1957 IOC Congress, that whilst the IOC acknowledges Olympic movements in the northern part of Korea by the North Korean Olympic Committee (NKOC), North Korea had to participate in the Olympic Games as a South-North single team with South Korea’s permission (Lee, 2000: 604).
Based on the IOC’s decision, North Korea attempted to contact the South Korean side to discuss the possibility of organising a single team. The South Korean government described the request as a “ridiculous proposal” (20th December 1957, Chosun Ilbo). A single team was unimaginable under the then socio-political atmosphere of South Korea. As we might imagine, the bitterness and enmity toward North Korea was not unavoidable in the sense of the after-effects of the Korean War (Kim S, 2006). In this respect, South Korean media reported the matter as follows:

According to the KFA, FIFA had sent an eccentric letter to the KFA requesting us to send a mixed team with North Korea for the 17th Olympic Games held in Rome, Italy next year…an official of the KFA said that although North Korea has affiliated with FIFA beginning last year, however, they are ineligible and are in no condition to participate in the Olympic Games (6th March 1959, Chosun Ilbo, translated from Korean).

According to the KFA (2003: 242), the KFA sent a respectful reply to FIFA purporting that the “KFA could not follow FIFA’s instruction”. Given the domestic political situation and anti-communist atmosphere, especially without a specific time schedule for unification between the two governments, contact with North Korea, even in sporting arenas could not be acceptable at that time. Namely, there was no room for South Korea to even imagine the possibility of a football exchange. The possibility was absurd in the given socio-political discourses of the South Korean society. When the rejection from the South Korean side was delivered to the world football governing body, FIFA could no longer argue the KFA into delivering what IOC and FIFA hoped for, and finally confirmed that:

The Committee noted with regret that in spite of the efforts and encouragements made by the FIFA, it has been impossible to find an agreement between the Associations of South- and North-Korea. In this case the Committee referred to the decision of the IOC stating that only the team of South Korea could take part in the Qualifying Competition. The IOC was competent to declare who was allowed to take part whilst the FIFA was only in charge of the organisation (10th December 1959, Minutes of Ad hoc Olympic Committee of the FIFA).
Since then, South Korea had to come to the negotiating table to organise a single Olympic team for the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, based on a decision during the 59th IOC Congress held in the U.S.S.R. in 1962. During the first meeting, both sides concurred with assembling a united team, reaching an agreement on some issues such as a national flag and anthem. This discussion was followed by two more meetings under IOC’s supervision and mediation. Nevertheless, there was no substantive result to stage a single team and, consequently, North Korea could participate in the Olympic Games on their own from the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games onward (Lee, 2000: 604-605). FIFA was also similarly informed that the IOC’s decision attempted to sort out the ‘two Koreas problem’ in the Olympic Games:

FIFA was informed of the following decision: South Korea is admitted under the name of “Korea”; North Korea was authorized to enter a team under the name of “North Korea” (20th October 1963, minutes of FIFA Bureau of the Olympic and other Amateur Tournament Committee).

As we can imagine, the new breakthrough could not be easily initiated without any politico-economical transformation at national, regional and international levels. In this respect, Woo (2009) explains that the authoritarian government, Park Chung-Hee’s regime had changed its North Korea policy and discourse from ‘confrontation’ to ‘cooperation’ beginning in the late 1960s. Along with the detente between the USA and China, South Korea and North Korea adopted ‘the joint communiqué of 4 July 1972’ mutually assenting to some basic principles on their relations and unification policy for the first time since the division of the Korean Peninsula. The changed political situation had inevitably influenced football relations between South and North Korea from the 1970s onward. In 1976, KFA president Kim Yoon-Ha proposed a football exchange between South and North Korea to a representative of a North Korean team, Kim Jong-Hyup during the 18th AFC Youth Championship. Both sides exchanged their ideas and the gesture itself was an inspirational event to the public and to the South Korean sport community, even though the

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18 In relation to unification, both sides agreed to the following principles: 1) unification shall be achieved through independent efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference. 2) unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through use of force against one another. 3) great national unity, as a homogeneous people, shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems. Furthermore, the two sides, in order to restore severed national ties, shall promote mutual understanding and to expedite an independent peaceful unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many areas (Ministry of Unification, 1996: 183-184).
dialogues did not make any immediate visible progress. However, the exchange had to wait for another political breakthrough from both sides to set aside their political intentions.

In the process, even small movements or incidents would cause a sensation and could provide a cognitive space to form discourses which have never been fully exerted before. When the South Korean and North Korean football teams met in the final match of the 1978 Bangkok Asian Games which finished with a draw, the South Korean side was in an ambivalent position whether or not to accept the ‘enemy’ as a ‘brother’. The then South Korean captain, Kim Ho-Gon recounted his feeling at that time as “we did well by ending in a tie” (KFA, 2003: 306). At the awards ceremony for the co-winners, both sides exchanged handshakes, the first symbolic physical contact and another visible event in the relations of South Korea and North Korea. The inter-Korean rapprochement at the political level seemed to permeate into sports and football. The South Korean journalist, Hong described this historical meeting at the football game in a local editorial as follows:

Let us think about what the purpose is of having games in international sport events. There has to be two answers: the first one is to raise the national prestige and the other one is friendship. National prestige is good. However, it makes me feel loathsome toward the fact that the same people desperately fight in front of foreigners to raise their own national prestige…Now, the Asian Games are finished. What have we earned from these Asian Games? Even though there will be those who say that the result is that we ranked 3rd position with a few medals. However, I have a different opinion. I saw that South and North Korean players shook hands. I think that is a more important point than the medal and the rank (Hong, 21st December 1978, Gyeong Hyang Sinmun, translated from Korean).
Captains of North and South Korean football team at the 1978 Bangkok Asian Games (22nd December 1978, Chosun Newspaper)

However, with a single negotiation channel, mainly through the governments, positive exchanges of football were not possible without any political détente. Meanwhile, in the period of transition from the authoritarian regime to the democratisation era, there were heated unification movements, alongside democratic movements among students and citizen groups in South Korean society which developed into demonstrations and even physical conflicts between the police and the protesters. Under these circumstances, President Rho Tae-Woo declared the so-called 7.7 Proclamation announced on 7th July 1988 which promised mutual exchange and cooperation between Southern and Northern sides. Without a doubt, President Rho Tae-Woo’s governmental decisions had influenced South Korean sport governing bodies to take a new position toward the North Korean sides. Physical Education and Youth Ministry summarised the historical and political moments in relation to their sport policies:

The Ministry has set up a policy to positively promote sport exchange with North Korea according to the 7.7 Proclamation’s spirit of Mr. President and established a ‘South-North Sport Exchange Master Plan’ announced on 20th April 1990. According to this plan, we positively promote sport exchanges with North Korea, play a part in the formation of North Korea’s open and reconciliatory atmosphere (between Southern and Northern sides), and to
promote an easy step by step task, which considers North Korea’s situation as our general policy (Physical Education and Youth Ministry, 1991: 4, translated from Korean).

In that atmosphere, the historical football matches were initiated through several meetings at governmental levels. Both sides officially named the matches as ‘South-North Unification Football Matches’ which were held on 11th October 1990 in North Korea and 23rd October 1990 in South Korea. Both sides placed special significance on the event, in terms of revival of the Gyeong-Pyeong Football Matches which were finally suspended in 1946 due to the division of the Korean Peninsula. On that symbolic movement of reconciliation through football, FIFA also could not find any reason to rebuff the realisation of this historical moment in Korea.

FIFA has been asked for its assistance in initiating contact with Pyeong Yang football authorities for the reinstatement of matches to be played between the two cities of Pyeong Yang and Seoul. We would like to ask the Football Association of DPR Korea to study this idea and inform us if such a project can be envisaged. If the answer is positive, FIFA would be happy to offer its good offices for the realisation of such a football match (21st March 1990, correspondence from General Secretary of FIFA to Football Association of DPR Korea).

For the South Korean government, the football matches were a platform used to create and promote a reconciliatory atmosphere. In this respect, not stimulating the North Korean side and accepting North Korea’s requests, individual national flags and anthems should not be displayed during the matches, and it was even requested that South Korean players’ goal celebrations would not provoke the North. In a similar vein, the football teams’ names were also decided as ‘Seoul football team’ and ‘Pyeong-Yang football team’ so as to avoid using ‘South’ and ‘North Korea’ (cf. Physical Education and Youth Ministry, 1991).

Since then, the possibility of reconciliation through football had been reified through the FIFA Under-20 Youth World Cup held in Portugal in 1991, signalling thus the beginning of an era of a peaceful atmosphere in the international society. Under the disposition of inter-Korean dialogues on reconciliation at governmental levels, at least, and the historical
football events such as ‘South-North Unification Football Matches’, both countries assented to form a single South-North team for the Youth World Cup competition. Through 28 rounds of negotiations, South and North Korea agreed to send a single football team to Portugal on condition that ‘Korea’ is used as the team name, the ‘Unification Flag’\(^\text{19}\) as the national flag, and ‘Arirang’\(^\text{20}\) as the national anthem to represent the team’s identity (KFA, 2003: 353). Table 10 summarises the presentation of the united football team. Naturally, the event could not be realised without FIFA’s approval. The position of FIFA seemed to be flexible and positive without any political objections.

The Committee took note of the decision taken by the FIFA Emergency Committee to permit the Football Association of DPR Korea and the Korea Football Association to participate in the World Youth Championship 1991 with a joint team under the name of Korea (15\(^{th}\) March 1991, minutes of FIFA Bureau of the Committee for FIFA Youth Competitions).

Table 10 Formation of a Single Korean Football Team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Agreements for FIFA Under-20 World Cup in 1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Name</td>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Flag</td>
<td>Team Flag: Sky blue map of the Korean peninsula on a white background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Song</td>
<td>Arirang from the 1920’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of</td>
<td>Selected by the consensus of the Joint Commission, based on player’s performance in an evaluation match (Held sometime between April and early May, 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Players</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of the Team</td>
<td>South Korean official once in the South and once in the North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training of Players</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses</td>
<td>Shared by the two Koreas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Unification (1996: 106)

\(^{19}\) The flag was specially designed to represent the whole country including South and North Korea by drawing the whole Korean Peninsula with the colour blue.

\(^{20}\) Arguably, Arirang has been the most popular Korean folk song in both South and North Korea. Arirang has been introduced and shared to represent the peoples’ historical experiences and sentiment.
In allowing for the united team to participate in an official tournament even though it was a junior team, FIFA made full use of this historical moment for its own public relation strategy to emphasise the raison d’être of football and FIFA’s role in the international society, especially in divided nations. After the Under-20 World Cup, FIFA president João Havelange addressed the fruits of the endeavours revolving around the organisation of the ‘Korean team’ in the following manner:

…we have succeeded in keeping FIFA united with its programme so that we can manage, administer and promote football around the world as a means of peace, progress and unity amongst its peoples without discriminating in any way. The result of following these principles is a reassuring picture. For example, we managed to have the two Koreas play as one united team at the World Youth Championship in Portugal in 1991, casting all their differences aside (FIFA Congress minutes, 1992: 3-4).

In South Korea, however, some critics had raised against this strategy as they consider it as another manoeuvre by the government to dilute political crises, like in the case of the Suseo Shock\(^2\). Furthermore, there was deep suspicion that the series of sport exchanges in the 1990s was part of the political propaganda of the North Korean government to relieve its internal dissatisfaction (Lee D, 1996: 10). In addition, the day before the unification match in North Korea, 10\(^{th}\) October 1990 was the anniversary of its ruling Workers’ Party which is one of the most important national holidays in North Korea. Sport and football exchange might be effective and visible tools for the political propaganda of the North Korean government. Of course, South Korea is no exception to these practices. Nevertheless, at that time, many anticipated that the united team would play a leading role in finding a means of escape from the then political impasse between South and North Korea (Lee Y, 1991: 2).

Since then, football had been easily put at the centre of South and North’s relations. In particular, discourse around football has often appeared in South Korean politics, generally as a means of changing the relationship between South and North Korea. For instance, the

\(^{2}\)This was a case of political influence peddling and corruption caused in a process of a new city development project and sale of building lots in 1991. Guilty people in leadership had been sentenced to jail, and this incident had been reverberating throughout South Korean society.
Gyeong-Gi Council had even adopted an agenda in 1996 to build a football stadium in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) located between South and North Korea to ease recent tension and to promote reconciliation, and attempted to propose it to the central governments. One of the council members explained the idea in both a self-doubt and self-confident manner.

At the time that the existence of DMZ is being threatened, the idea could be heard as a groundless plan. However the idea is to provide the wider public with our constant exertions for unification. Who knows if North Koreans who like football would react positively? (17th April 1996, Chosun Ilbo, translated from Korean).

In the same year, the revival of the Gyeong-Pyeong Football Match in preparation for a possible future reunification was discussed in the Seoul Metropolitan Council (19th April 1996, Chosun Ilbo). In the groundbreaking ceremony of the Seoul World Cup Stadium, the Mayor of Seoul, Go Gun, suggested in his speech the revival of the Gyeong-Pyeong Football Matches to the Mayor of Pyeongyang (7th November 1998, Chosun Ilbo). On the one hand, this reflected political and military tension between the two countries which had increased gradually, on the other hand, the discussion had been appropriated on the fact that South Korea did host the 2002 World Cup, which offered the society an opportunity to imagine the reconciliation of South and North Korea.

4.2.4 Cooperation and development: South Korea and Japan case

In the 1970s, South Korean and Japanese Football Associations started to come to a consensus to establish bilateral ties, thus apparently trying to dismiss past antagonism. Interestingly, this happened right after both sides were surprisingly defeated by a Malaysian team in the preliminary round of the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. Both sides had agreed to meet regularly on the football pitch to develop their football levels in a more efficient way than ever before. In this way, the first ‘South Korea-Japan Regular Match’ was held in Tokyo, Japan in 1972 (KFA, 2003: 284). These developments between the two associations have been seen as a first step in their mutual cooperation. The then vice president of the KFA witnessed the disposition of the new ties with Japanese football and the related agreement with the Japanese Football Association (JFA):
Firstly, we will revive regular Korea-Japan matches from April 1971. Secondly, in the case of inviting a foreign team, establishing principles such as: both countries share the flight and travel expenses, which are costly due to the number of games they have, we agreed to cooperate positively with each other in everything. In terms of the first agreement, South Korea has already sent a university team to Japan as a prelude to the revival of the Korea-Japan regular match, then in terms of the second agreement, South Korea and Japan had to bear the expenses caused by an invitation from the Flamenco team (Brazil) and Orario team (Brazil) in accordance with our agreement (Lee Si-Dong, KFA vice president in an article of Monthly Football, May 1971: 34; translated from Korean).

However, the South Korean sides reported that the cooperation had not shown favourable progress. In the KFA’s application and process of inviting the Japanese team to the first President Park’s Cup to initiate a regular match and JFA’s rejection of the invitations due to its own schedule, the South Korean side did not hide its offended feelings toward the JFA’s insincere attitude. According to the KFA vice president’s statement, his impression was that the JFA evaded and deceived the KFA (Monthly Football, May 1971: 34). Interestingly, however, the South Korean side ultimately adopted a receptive stance toward its former coloniser and historical rival. The then KFA vice president, Lee Si-Dong continued in stating:

So, we cannot cope with the situation emotionally, we just have to overcome our sentiments by showing off our ability in the games preparing for the Olympic Games. I think this is the attitude that we have to take as a powerful nation in football (Lee Si-Dong, KFA vice president in Monthly Football, May 1971: 35, translated from Korean).

Without a doubt, the South Korean football governing body and even the Japanese side had considered their historical rivalry as an imperative factor to boost football fever in their countries. So, the initiation of regular matches was also utilised to maximise their projects for developing football capacities, fully appropriating their rivalry in an atmosphere of a series of international exchanges from the 1970s onward.
4.2.5 Exchange with communists countries: the two Koreas and China case

Historically, South Korea’s first encounter with a communist country at a football event was a preliminary match for the 1962 Chile World Cup against Yugoslavia in 1961. However, the then General Park Chung-Hee, who seized power through a military coup d’état, at first did not allow the South Korean team to play matches with the communist country in Yugoslavia or in South Korea, which was later overturned by General Park (KFA, 2003: 250-251; 21st August 1961, Chosun Ilbo). However, in the Far East Asian context, national level football encounters and exchanges in high-profile competitions between South Korea and Communist China happened about two decades later. Due to the Cold War and Taiwan problem (cf. Homburg, 2006), Communist China did not participate in international sport and football events especially those organised in the Western world. It was not until the late 1970s that the USA and China started to meet in an air of détente. The official football match between South Korea and China in détente took place in the 1978 Bangkok Asian Games (KFA, 2003).

Interestingly, on the one hand, relations through football could not overcome some political obstacles or diplomatic concerns between South Korea and China, while on the other hand, football created some opportunities or breakthroughs to resolve the political conundrum between the two countries. In the midst of the Cold War, China abandoned the hosting of the 21st AFC U-19 Championship in 1979 due to South Korea’s participation as a defending champion. The event was due to be held in Shanghai (上海), China, and South Korea was supposed to be invited as the champion of the 20th Championship (KFA, 2003: 308-309). However, China could not condone this situation based on political and diplomatic considerations. In a situation of non-diplomatic ties, the South Korean side understood this matter on the basis of the account of the Hong Kong Football Association’s president who had recently visited China.

The president of the Hong Kong Football Association explained that the Chinese Communists Football Association abandoned the event and gave notice in writing to the AFC because of strong resistance from the FIFA and the AFC,
Through their resistance they had warned about the invalidity of the event if the Chinese Communists would not invite the Republic of Korea team who were the co-champions along with Iraq in the last event. The president added that North Korea stubbornly opposed the invitation from the Republic of Korea during the Chinese side’s preparation for the Championship, which was one of the big factors in the abandonment (3rd September, 1979, Dong-A Ilbo: translated from Korean).

Prior to China’s extreme choice, the KFA had an optimistic view of China’s invitation based on the AFC Executive Committee’s decision to push China to produce a positive result. However, China abandoned the opportunity of hosting the international sporting event due to unresolved political and diplomatic problems with South Korea. Nevertheless, until the Chinese side’s decision was officially confirmed, the South Korean side expected some epoch-making progresses based on the so-called universal role of sport and the apolitical approaches of sport, which international football governing bodies have pursued. The South Korean official expressed the expectations with a national self-confidence on the sporting matters as follows:

The KFA’s president, Choi Sun-Young, after attending the AFC Executive Committee, revealed that the AFC passed the agenda stating that Chinese Communists have to invite the Republic of Korea. This is because Korean football is at the top of the Asian region and sports diplomacy has been effective in the meantime, said the president (19th July, 1979, Dong-A Ilbo: translated from Korean).

Of course, South Korea’s position was not much different from that of China’s stance in relation to allowing entry of communist’ countries such as China and North Korea onto South Korean soil. The AFC must have recognised the difficulty of mediation when countries from different ideological blocs had to meet in one of their countries for sporting purposes. For instance, in 1982, South Korea withdrew its bidding to hold the preliminary rounds in Seoul for the 23rd AFC Youth Championship, accepting the AFC’s persuasion to preclude possible diplomatic concerns and disputes such as the entry of North Korea and China onto South Korean territory (20th January 1982, Chosun Ilbo).
However, in the atmosphere of political détente, both sides tried to change their relationship. In particular, with respect to the active and positive role of sport in international relations, South Korea and China had attempted to establish sound relations through sport and football by leaving their ideological and confrontational perspectives behind. Before the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China, the two countries agreed to have football exchanges in 1983. In particular, before the 1984 AFC Congress in Guangzhou (廣州), China, the two countries solved the visa issuance problems for the South Korean delegates and reached a tentative agreement on sporting exchange. From a South Korean viewpoint, these bilateral ties also reflected the (inter) national transitions in a more positive way than ever before:

It is due to the trend of international sports that South Korea and the Chinese Communists have reached an agreement to have football exchanges. South Korea, which will host the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games, also agreed with the Chinese Communists to have tennis and basketball exchanges last November during the Tennis and Basketball Congresses. Therefore, the direct exchange of football is natural according to the present trend and they also gave us an allusion that they will send large scale teams for the Asian Games…the Republic of Korea and the Chinese Communists have maintained rival relations in all sport events. So the parties concerned about the two countries judge that the mutual competition can be a great help to the respective countries to improve football performance (29th December, 1983, Gyeong Hyang Sinmun editorial, translated from Korean).

Since then, both sides tried to foster their friendship promoting various football exchanges such as university-level football matches (cf. March 1989, Monthly Football: 48). It should be noted here that the price South Korea paid to establish bilateral ties with China, and the signing of sport exchange agreement in 1993, was to cut its diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1992. Under this political and diplomatic situation, football exchanges with Taiwan have been inevitably reduced. Since 1992, the two sides have just had, officially, three football matches for the Asian Cup preliminary rounds: once in 1996 and twice in 2006 (KFA, 2003).
4.2.6 Far East Asian identity

There were a series of discussions to establish a Far East Asian national team football tournament consisting of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Japan. As a way of reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula, sport had been occasionally discussed in high-level and working-level meetings among these countries. In 1982, the JFA suggested a youth football competition for Far East Asian countries for which China evinced an enthusiastic attitude and expressed its positive stance on encouraging North Korea to participate in the competition (28th September 1982, Dong-A Ilbo). However, an incident occurred which had a negative impact on the discussions. In the same year of the JFA’s suggestion, North Korea was banned from all international competitions organised by the AFC for two years after North Korean football players committed an outrage against a referee harbouring dissatisfaction on the match result in the 1982 New Delhi Asian Games (KFA, 2003: 319). Although the Far East Asian football tournament was not a competition organised by the AFC, the JFA finally decided not to invite North Korea to the tournament to respect the AFC’s decision concerning North Korea (18th December 1982, Chosun Ilbo). As a result, the idea of the Far East Asian youth football competition did not go ahead as expected due to the different views among the countries.

Since then, the role of football in relieving historical and ideological tensions in the Far East Asian context was positively appropriated by the Asian football governing body. In the same year that China allowed South Korean representatives’ entry into Guangzhou for the 1984 AFC Congress, the AFC suggested and promoted the idea of establishing a regular friendly competition for Far East Asian countries, to which the countries agreed in principle. The discussions of a football solidarity of the Far East Asian countries which was an unprecedented affair in the post-colonial context had begun in earnest. The KFA recorded the background of the promotion by AFC and the countries’ stances as follows:

The Asian Football Confederation (AFC), on the 30th anniversary of the founding of AFC, decided to establish a Far East League in which South Korea, North Korea, China, and Japan participated for a balanced development of the Middle East and the Far East Asia which had been the two prominent football powers in Asia and for an easing of tensions in Far East Asia. The plan of AFC
was confronted with continuous difficulties, especially due to an uncomfortable relation between South and North Korea, and the negative attitude of North Korea (KFA, 2003: 349, translated from Korean).

Since then, the first Far East Asian football tournament named the ‘Dynasty Cup’, which was confidently confirmed to FIFA by AFC, was held in Beijing in 1990.

The AFC President said that this competition was to be organised biennially and was happy to report that both DPR Korea and Korea Rep would be taking part together with Japan and China this year (2nd June 1990, minutes of the meeting of the Consultative Committee FIFA/AFC).

The KFA evaluated that this historical event had played a catalytic role in the sport exchanges of South and North Korea such as the ‘South-North Unification Football Matches’ in 1990 and ‘the South-North united football team’ in 1991 (KFA, 2003; Kang J, 2006). In particular, the positive interaction with China has transformed football dynamics in the Far East Asian context which bears some implications for the future blueprint of football in Asia.

4.2.7 The modernisation of Korean football: mobilisation and morphology of football players

From a governmental point of view, sport and football has been a popular option to boost the national modernisation project and the atmosphere. It was apparent that the despotic regime was interested in controlling the nation through physical activities. Whilst the regime was interested in disciplining people through physical education or team sports such as football, the KFA used the government’s active involvement as an opportunity to create a solid supply-line of players. One of the pledges of the KFA presidents and the KFA policies was the expansion of the football base by increasing the number of school teams and players. Of course, the policy was also inextricably linked to the ethos of preparing strong national team squads. For instance, youth football tournaments were needed to provide fundamental resources for South Korean football development, especially at international levels. Namely, to foster strong national teams, the KFA had to
expand the base of football by increasing youth football tournaments and school football teams. These were considered, from the perspectives of the KFA and the government, as suppliers of players and as the gateway to select talented players, 

To provide football pan-nationally and to expand the football population, thereby to make football a national sport (One of the business plans of the KFA in 1971, in Monthly Football, 1971/February: 28, translated from Korean).

KFA and Elementary School Football Federation held the first Seoul Elementary School Football Championship (1963) for the continuous development of Korean football and a foundation to reach the top on international stages (KFA, 2003: 254, translated from Korean).

Meanwhile, players were demanded to have loyalty to the country and mental strength to become Asian and world football leaders. Although to stress players’ mentality or allegiance to their country would not be abnormal in sport, the problem was that players were always in a position to be blamed when the desired results were not delivered.

It is a problem which is about mental attitude, but also sincerity...Even though the KFA will establish a policy to solve every problem including health care of members of the national team by establishing the National Standing Team Commission, here, I would like to stress mental armament of individual players (The KFA president, in Monthly Football: 1970/October: 25-after the national team was defeated-, translated from Korean).

Although our players are endowed with much talent, they have not flourished because they are neglectful and they avoid hard training. Also their development has regressed due to the lack of leaders (coaches) (Son Myung-Sub, a member of the technical committee of the KFA, in Monthly Football: 1971/November: 92-after the national team failed to qualify for Munich Olympics-, translated from Korean).

Interestingly, the society had not only designed what mentality the players should have, but also had defined players’ ideal bodies in order to compete with the others. The opinions
from inside and outside the football hierarchy were ascribing the poor performance of the national team to the lack of height and poor physical strength of players. In particular, experiencing continuous failures of the national teams in international levels, the physical difference had easily come to the fore as one of the reasons why Korean football did not show satisfactory performance to the nation and to the world.

Football has to be vivid with discovering bigger players who have enough height and weight. So, we can fight on equal terms with foreign players and we can become close to challenging world stages (Jang Byung-oh, a senior footballer, in Monthly Football, 1974/February: 29, translated from Korean).

I felt the necessity of strong physical strength (after watching the South Korean team barely become co-champions in the first President Park’s Cup). However, because, I know, that it is not realised in a day or two, I made up my mind to thoroughly prepare the physical fitness in youth national team players (Jang Deok-Jin, the president of the KFA, in Monthly Football, 1971/June: 25, translated from Korean).

Discussions within the football authority had focused on the restricted height and small physique of players in comparison to other countries’ players whenever the national team produced disappointing results. Therefore, strong physical fitness of players had been considered as a prerequisite to overcome the disadvantage in physique and to challenge other nations. Even when they produced some satisfactory results, their physique had usually been described as a drawback, which helped to remind us in a way of ‘how the victory was valuable with our disadvantage’.

I had hypercriticised that the height of the Korean national football team was shorter than the average height of Korean university students…I believe that we can train finest players wherever they go if we choose the right players (Choi Yeon-Soo, the former deputy secretary of the KSC in a round table talk, in Monthly Football: 1970/April: 71, translated from Korean).

We have learnt many things through the Merdeka Cup. We had a sense of pride of the undaunted fighting spirit and the holding onto the strong stamina of the
Korean team who fought well during the second half. However, the Korean team made people’s hearts pound at the narrow line between victory and defeat because of inaccurate shooting with poor ball handling in front of the net. Their decisive chances to score were unsuccessful due to their short height (the KFA president, in Monthly Football, 1970/September: n.d.-after the national team won the Merdeka Cup trophy in 1970-, translated from Korean).

The discourse around football performance also developed the rationale of participation of middle and upper classes in football.

Japanese players’ physique is much better than that of our players. That is because Japan is economically superior to our country. However, most football players in Korea, amazingly, are in a position of poverty. For that reason, I think our players lag behind in terms of physique. I believe that our players can surpass the Japanese in the aspect of physique if the upper class families help to make their children football players (No Dae-Hyung, Joong-Ang high school coach, in Monthly Football, 1970/October: 103-after the third Korea-Japan high school good-will match-, translated from Korean).

The morphology on players’ physique was compared with their economic statuses. The difference of their bodies was symbolised as the yardstick of the nations’ economic strengths. Some Korean players who were supposed to represent Korea were observed as those who had inferior physique and even as “dwarf” in a derisive sense (cf. Monthly Football, 1970/April: 71). In the discrepancy between the image of a fast developing father land and the reality presented by players, the social distinctions on class was reinterpreted in terms of what they can deliver to the society. Experiencing world football at the international level and poor performance of the national teams, a certain notion of a footballer’s physique emerged as an alternative option to overcome the limitations of South Korean football. Players who were from the middle or upper class, better nourished, were supposed to be taller and bigger than those who came from the lower class. Hence, the idea of players’ physique became one of the agendas used to strengthen the national team and its performance.
Rather, we plan to select tall players focusing on large-size of players, by
discarding the previous method, in which youth national team players were
selected based on their technique. Although there would be advantages and
disadvantages of their height, we plan to accomplish the large-size of players.
Otherwise, the large-size of physique of the national team will be delayed. It is
not completely disregarding short players, but, as long as we have to select
youth players, we set up a principle to train big players although their skills
will differ slightly (Go Tae-Jin, the KFA president, in Monthly Football, 1974/
January: 24, translated from Korean).

The knowledge on player’s morphology has been continuously constructed to enhance
Korean football’s competitiveness in an international context. To the Korean football
community, whether the players acquire desirable physique would have been one of the
important matters of Korean football. When the KFA sent a promising player to a
European country in a program to prepare for the 2002 FIFA World Cup, the criteria of the
selection was his scoring ability and his physique which had to be enough to fight
physically with European players (cf. the KFA column, in Monthly Football, 2005/January:
142).

4.2.8 Football development and foreign coaches

Statements on the improvement of players’ skills and advanced knowledge about football
had been produced to achieve football development i.e. performance on international
stages. For instance, acquirement of football knowledge and skills from western coaches to
improve the performance of South Korean football had been frequently considered by the
KFA, which was partly motivated by Japanese and other South-East Asian countries’
experience of importing foreign coaches. In particular, whilst the Japan football team won
bronze medals in the 1968 Mexico Olympic Games with a coach from West Germany,
Dettmar Cramer, the South Korean team failed to qualify in the preliminary round for the
Asian region of the Olympic Games and to the preliminary round of the 1970 Mexico
FIFA World Cup. Consequently, this helped to open discussions on the necessity of new
approaches for Korean football.
To keep our sports at international levels, we cannot but invite coaches who have international skills, namely, professional foreign coaches to let them cover the coaching of skills (Park Jung-Mi, the former vice-president of the KFA, in Kyung-Hyang newspaper, 27th November 1960: 4-after South Korea did not get impressive results in the 1960 Rome Olympic Games-, translated from Korean).

Presently, I would like to say that Korean football coaches need more scientific and systematic hard work, whilst abandoning the coaching methods based on their past experiences during their players’ careers. Taking this (failure to qualify for the 1970 Mexico FIFA World Cup) as an opportunity, I call for unity of Korean football and for open-minded football development by instilling new energy (Park Dae-Jong, the vice-president of the KFA, in Dong-A newspaper, 22nd October 1969: 4, translated from Korean).

To improve their standards of football performance, Korean coaches were asked to study football more scientifically and systematically, discarding obsolete thinking and methods, and to accept the widespread western practice. In particular, the KFA president and the upper echelons were in a position where they could publicly state the necessity of foreign coaches for Korean football. The coaching approach adopted by Korean was defined as “obsolete”, and the governing body described Korean football as being in danger of “underdevelopment” (Kyung-Hyang newspaper, 2nd June 1964: 6).

In 1969, the KFA invited a German, Eckhard Krautzun (the then, 28-years-old student of German Sport University Cologne and a former professional player in German Bundesliga) as a coach (practically technical advisor) of the Korean youth national team. Except for South Korean coaches having learned from foreign coaches in the FIFA Coaching School, the invitation of a foreign coach to train the national team was new in Korean football history. The then interpreter of Krautzun, Kim Jae-Ho describes the foreign invitation situation as follows:

About that time, the international status of South Korean football was threatened by losing the qualification for the Mexico Olympic Games to Japan, whilst being confident as a strong team in Asia. Meanwhile, the President of
KFA, Choi Chi-Hwan hosted The 10th Asian Youth Football Tournament and decided to invite a foreign coach to win the championship title. To this end, he asked (the West German government) to dispatch a coach from West Germany (testimony of Kim Jae-Ho, in KFA, 2003: 270, translated from Korean).

According to Kim, Eckhard Krautzun needed coaching experience to finish his degree in the university. Meanwhile, South Korea could try the effectiveness of a foreign coach and could also possibly obtain a good result, in the 10th Asian Youth Cup with a minimum cost, because the entire expenses were paid by the government of West Germany, which had an aid program for developing countries at that time (cf. KFA, 2003: 270). In particular, from the KFA point of view, South Korean football could not afford to invite those who had great international experience and had not formed a consensus to let foreign coaches train the Korean national team in full-scale.

In 1971, the KFA established its plan of operation which focused on the goal of qualifying for the Munich Olympic Games. Similar plans were followed year after year. To realise the targets and to strengthen the national team by integrating Western football skills, the KFA invited other foreign coaches several times (see Table 11). However, the plans were confronted with resistance or non-cooperation of national football leaders (coaches). As a result, the KFA limited the duty of foreign coaches as technical advisors. Otherwise, the management of the national team by a foreign coach had to be in cooperation with South Korean coaches. (cf. KFA, 2003; Kyung-Hyang Newspaper, 26th February 1972: 8; Monthly Football, 1971/February: 29).

### Table 11 Foreign Coaches and Their Roles in Korean Football

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Duty</th>
<th>Etc</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967.12~1969.1</td>
<td>Eckhard Krautzen (German)</td>
<td>Technical advisor of youth national team</td>
<td>The third place in the 10th Asian Youth Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971.3~1972.2</td>
<td>Graham Adams</td>
<td>Technical advisor of national team</td>
<td>Failed to qualify for the 1972 Munich Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1991, the KFA promptly scouted Dettmar Cramer as a general manager of an Olympic team. Whilst the former cases were evaluated as unsuccessful invitations, the KFA could now invest funds in the foreign coach with hopes for the Korean football team to win a medal in the short term, and to advance toward world football with financial support from Dae-Woo chaebol, the company of the then KFA president.

During the last Italy FIFA World Cup, Korean football realised the level of world football. Although we knew that 4-4-2 system which regards midfield as important is the world trend, our knowledge on the operation was minimal. This is not just my thought but also domestic coaches admitted our limitations on their own. Finally, the KFA recognised that Korean football needs a breakthrough and, as an extension, decided to scout Dettmar Cramer who is

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22 Dettmar Cramer was a Japanese national team manager who helped the Japanese team win the bronze medal in the 1968 Mexico Olympic Games. He resigned after qualifying the South Korean team for the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games because there had been continual conflicts over coaching methods with the Korean manager and other coaching staff (Jang, 2008: 123; KFA, 2003: 354).

23 Anatoliy Byshovets was the USSR national team manager who led the USSR team to the gold medal in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. He was the first foreign manager who had rights to control and operate the national team without a co-Korean manager (KFA, 2003: 367).
recognised as a world level coach (Lee Jae-Myung, a vice-president of the KFA, in Dong-A newspaper, 4th December 1990: 19, translated from Korean).

This event was revolutionary for the Korean football community because of what the KFA offered to him in terms of his salary and empowerment. At that time the foreign manager was paid 10 times more than his co-Korean manager (cf. Dong-A newspaper, 10th June 1991: 19). In particular, the governing body could, thanks to Chaebol’s financial support, invite those who had much experience and reputation in international football. In 1994, the KFA clearly indicated the reason of inviting Byshovets as a national coach in the following terms:

Byshovets as technical adviser left remarkable impression in the technical affairs of the South Korean national team for the 1994 USA FIFA World Cup in just three short months. The main reason of this recruit is that he rendered distinguished services to help the Korean team fight well in the World Cup. Furthermore, the fact that he demonstrated his leadership in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games by winning a gold medal for the USSR football team was one of the factors of this invitation. We expect that he will do a great job to achieve success for Korea at the Hiroshima Asian Games this October (Park Kyung-Hwa, a chairman of the KFA technical committee, in Kyung-Hyang newspaper, 6th July 1994: 19, translated from Korean).

According to the KFA’s football history book (KFA, 2003), the Korean football community seemed to value the Korean team’s performance in the 1994 USA FIFA World Cup as one of the best records in international competitions. The Korean team managed to achieve two draws and one defeat against Germany, Spain, and Bolivia. Although the Korean team was eliminated in the first round at the competition, the Korean football community may have understood that the necessity of accepting foreign knowledge on football helps close the gap between South Korean football and world football.

4.2.9 Korean style of football
However, in light of the continuous failures on international stages, Korean football needed a different approach. Meanwhile, one sensational event happened to both the Korean football community and the Korean society. In 1983, the youth national team ranked 4th place in the second FIFA Youth World Cup in Mexico. It was the first time in Korean football history that a Korean national football team made it to the semi-finals in an international competition. This was described as “legendary” (KFA, 2003: 324). The Korean football community, in particular, saw potential of Korean football in international stage. With the success of the youth football team, “Korean style football”, which stressed speed, mobility and fighting spirit, was praised.

Park Jong-Hwan’ vision—the then coach of the youth national team— on the Korean style of football focused on short pass skills in pairs because he thought that the Korean team was in a no win situation lacking skills, as concluded from the players shortcomings in terms of quickness, personal skills, and height (Chosun newspaper, 29th June 1983: 9). However, this did not necessarily mean that the KFA and the football society had systematically developed the Korean style football as a specific terminology and technique. Rather the advancement to the semi-finals and related discussions played a role of complicatedly internalising the concepts of physique, strength, and the fighting spirit of Korean players.

Because football was developed in Europe, everything is designed to match the physical condition of European people. Therefore, there is no way to win against European people if Korean people who are at an exceptional physical disadvantage, play football in the same way as Europeans do…So, because we do not further develop Korean style football by systemising our great ability, we still do not enter the line of advanced football countries (Lee Ui-Jae, a chief correspondent of Sport Seoul newspaper, in Monthly Football, 1991/July: 22-23, translated from Korean).

Figure 6, from a newspaper article, shows how Korean players’ bodies and their technique was described, stressing the necessity of developing a Korean style of football.
Although Korean style football has been defined differently throughout Korean football history, the style was roughly considered as football which stresses physical strengths and fighting spirit. The Korean style of football, however, was also blamed when the South Korean football did not achieve satisfactory results. For instance, when the South Korean Olympic team was defeated twice consecutively by the Japanese team, a former national team coach stated that:

These results candidly show that the battery of Korean football which had held up well with strong will and fighting spirit is quite worn out (Lee Hoe-Taek, a former national team coach, in Monthly Chosun, 1999/November: n.d., translated from Korean).

Nevertheless, the Korean style of football had been defined through various channels and events. In particular, in relation to the invitation of foreign coaches, the debates had been clear: Korean football has peculiar characteristics which cannot be simply trained by European skills. At that point, South Korean football had been interested in learning how to utilise the knowledge and skills of European coaches for the development of Korean football. However, Korean football coaches would not accept the coaching style of the
foreigners, or rather, the Korean coaches would not abandon what they believed in, that is Korean football needs a Korean style. In 1992, after Dettmar Cramer, the then general manager of a South Korean Olympic team, left due to conflict with his South Korean co-manager, Kim Sam-Rak, who was appointed as coach of the Olympic team, asserted that:

The tiresome disputes on coaching methods are finished now. Although I partly accepted the way of Cramer, I did not give up the Korean style (Kim Sam-Rak, in Kyung-Hyang Newspaper, 19th April 1992: 14, translated from Korean).

For Korean coaches, the Korean methods of coaching meant that Korean football players have to be prepared with strong physical and mental training to overcome physical handicaps and to produce satisfactory results without losing Korean spirit. In addition, for the Korean football community, the term, ‘Korean style of football’ also involved various Korean cultural meanings such as group culture, senior-junior relationship, and the Korean educational system. From a Korean perspective, Korean football would have different characteristics that foreign coaches could not fully understand. In this respect, until recently, some had objected the idea of a foreign coach with full-scale authority for the national team.
4.3 Emerging discourse in transition from industrialisation to market economy

The global economy has influenced the world on every stratum, in which football is no exception. Especially, since the 1997 financial crisis, South Korea has been experiencing global changes more directly. Under these circumstances, bidding for and hosting the 2002 World Cup was considered an opportunity to bolster peoples’ pride and a stage for a new take-off to positively incorporate Korea’s into the world system and thus to escape its peripheral position. The event played a role in the active responses to global stimulation, to promote an international positive image of Far East Asian football in general, and South Korean football in particular (Ahn, 2002). Close & Askew (2004) described the impact of the 2002 FIFA World Cup as follows:

Neither regarded itself as a helpless, manipulated victim of latter-day Western imperialism, but instead (a) grounded its decision to act as host in tradition, precedence and experience and (b) rationalised its decision in terms of the multiple expected benefit...These particular mega-events served as showcases whereby Japan and then South Korea could impress on the world the spectacular advances each had made in modernising and (which is arguably more or less the same thing) Westernising (Close & Askew, 2004: 249).

South Korea earnestly participated in the 2002 World Cup bidding campaign since Dr. Chung Mong-Joon, was elected president of the KFA in 1993. However, due to power relations in FIFA and the fierce rivalry between Korea and Japan, both participated in the bidding campaign, as co-host, which appeared to be the best solution. Interestingly, the pre and post World Cup has also reflected South Korea’s relations with North Korea, Japan, and China in several ways. With these backdrops, this chapter explores, in focusing on the 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup, how the Far East Asian countries have dealt with this mega football event in Asia and adopted their discourses and practices while trying to internalise them through football.

4.3.1 The necessity of professionalisation and Chaebol’s involvement
From the 1960s and 70s, professionalisation of football had been discussed in an ad hoc manner and as an ideal stage that South Korean football had to pursue. The necessity for professionalisation had been occasionally discussed in a boundary of development of South Korean football. Development was not just about performance and trophies, but also about discarding the image of under-development and inferior status in the international football sphere. When the then manager of the Yang-gi team, Kim Yong-Sik stressed the need of professional teams during a round table, he gave his own diagnosis of the South Korean football in the late 1960s in the following manner:

Although we need sport in military and elementary school football tournaments as we have discussed, we have to establish a more fundamental development plan. During the time I stayed in Europe, when an amateur team requests matches with (European) professional teams, they do not consider the requests and avoid the team. When I was in Germany, there was a team from Guinea in Germany. However, because German professional teams would not play with the team, a selected team (unclear which team it was) had a game with them. The Guinea team won the game. However, there were only five hundred spectators. If amateur teams play football, people do not watch the game. This has happened not only in Germany but also England, France, and Spain. Eventually, our football has to be professionalised for football development to occur. Our football will be developed when newspaper companies or big companies have teams and invite foreign professional teams to play games, and also allowing the participation of amateur teams in the matches (Kim Yong-Sik, a manager of the Yang-Gi team, in a round table for South Korean football, in Korea Sport Council magazine, “Monthly Physical Education”, 1969/April-May: 18, translated from Korean).

Although professionalisation of football was sometimes idealised and occasionally became the ultimate target for South Korean football to mature its performance and to vitalise the domestic leagues, the social and economic context of the 1970s did not favour full-scale professionalisation of football. Nevertheless, capitalisation of the football industry had been unstoppable and players’ ability and performance had been compensated by corresponding financial rewards. Without a doubt, strengthening national teams was a main concern in the discussions held.
To give weight to domestic matches and to seek quality is the best way to cultivate strong national teams…With the creation of professional teams or a lottery system like foreign countries which can capture spectators’ attention, domestic matches will be booming naturally (Sun Young-Je, international referee, in Monthly Football, 1973/December: 34-35, after disqualified from preliminary rounds for the 1974 West Germany World Cup-, translated from Korean).

Whilst confronting limitations in world football competitions, statements about the need for professional teams and leagues had been strongly produced and supported in the South Korean football community. Acknowledging the increasing importance of the FIFA World Cup and the affordability of creating professional football teams, the national football governing body had to deal with the matter in a more practical manner. FIFA clearly confirmed the importance of professional level performance to play in the FIFA World Cup:

Then, Datuk Hamzah, President of the Asian Football Confederation, had the floor. After complaining about the distribution of the tickets, he pointed out how unfair it was that his Confederation had to share its participation quota in the Final Competition of the FIFA World Cup with Oceania. Asian football was so strong right now that 2 places should be exclusively reserved for the Asian Football Confederation. The Chairman (the then FIFA president) indicated once more that the World Cup is a matter for professional footballers and that it was absolutely essential that the best teams participated (Minutes of the 43rd Ordinary Congress of FIFA, 9th July 1982: 6).

Meanwhile, in 1979, there was news about the set up of a professional football team in Japan (cf. Chosun Newspaper, 7th October 1979: 8). This may have acted as a stimulant to rush the discussion of professionalisation because the South Korean football side had been sensitive over the movement of Japanese football throughout history. Most of all, the political and economical circumstances in the early 1980s had helped to build the possibility for launching professional teams and leagues.
Since President Park Chung-Hee’s assassination in 1979, General Chun Do-Hwan seized power through a coup in 1980 and became President in 1981. Keeping his power through military dictatorship, the regime needed to secure political legitimacy. In relation to sports, the Chun regime unfolded a clean-up campaign on a national scale and positively appropriated sport events such as professional leagues, and mega events such as the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.

The Olympic (Games) is a peaceful festival which transcends politics. There have been many concerns and controversies about the political nature of the Olympic Games in the past. However, we have to gather our wisdom to hoist the Seoul Olympic Games into pure athletic meetings and celebration of harmony without any political orientation from the beginning to the end, in which all humanity can meet smiling with friendship regardless of ideology and system. In addition, we have to set an example that we, ourselves, do not link the event with any political intentions by strictly restraining the pursuit of excessive nationalism (The President Chun Do-Hwan, 1981, National Online Archive, in a speech for the opening ceremony of the 62nd National Sports Festival, translated from Korean).

Whilst the regime tried to clean-up corruption, politicians’ involvement in sport was considered as inappropriate, which also helped to position businessmen and corporate sides more positively in the Korea Sport Council (KSC) and individual national governing bodies. To differentiate itself from past regimes, General Chun Do-Hwan’s regime promoted sport whilst stressing the non-political orientation. To this end, Chaebols became a noticeable actor, as a civil face of the military regime. Furthermore, to promote sport as a more visible device which necessarily had to be supported by massive funds, Cheabol’s involvement in sport was desirable. Although the movement directly targeted corruption in the Korean society, the South Korean sport community had also quickly responded to the government’s policy by having the politicians resigned from their offices (cf. Kyung-Hyang newspaper, 26th September 1980: 8). If the past regime had clearly mobilised the

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24 When General Chun Do-Hwan seized the power through a coup in 1980, the regime coercively promoted the clean-up campaign to eradicate social irregularities and corruptions. On 19th July 1980, three ex-ministers and 14 members of parliament were taken to the police, and 114 executives of finance and state enterprises were relieved of their duties because of their corruption. The military regime also encouraged the whole society and every social strata to unfold the campaign by themselves (cf. Encyclopaedia Britannica online Korea, 2010)
connection of politicians with sports, the new regime helped to change the paradigm by bringing the business sectors to the fore. In football, Choi Sun-Young, the president of Shin Dong-A\textsuperscript{25} (Chaebol), who was elected as a KFA president in 1979 could remain in his office under this circumstance. Table 12 shows the changes of KFA presidents from 1964 to 2009.

**Table 12 The President of the KFA (from 1964 to 2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Min Kwan-Sik</td>
<td>Politician (MP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1970</td>
<td>Choi Chi-Hwan</td>
<td>Politician (MP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1975</td>
<td>Go Tae-Jin</td>
<td>Banker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1978</td>
<td>Kim Yun-Ha</td>
<td>Politician (MP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1979</td>
<td>Park Jun-Hong</td>
<td>Bureaucrat/Politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1987</td>
<td>Choi Sun-Young</td>
<td>Businessman (<em>Chaebol</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1988</td>
<td>Lee Jong-Hwan</td>
<td>Football elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-1993</td>
<td>Kim Woo-Jung</td>
<td>Businessman (<em>Chaebol</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-2009</td>
<td>Chung Mong-Joon</td>
<td>Businessman (<em>Chaebol</em>)/Politician (MP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KFA, 2003: 425; Dong-A Newspaper; Kyung-Hyang Newspaper

*MP: Member of Parliament

In the 1980s, Chaebol was at the centre of South Korean industries supported by the governments’ strong policy on exports. The major six *Chaebols*\textsuperscript{26} increased their annual sales from 400 billion Korean Won in 1973 to 14.7 trillion Korean Won in 1980, hence, promoting the multidirectional business diversification (Kim et al, 2005: 8). In particular, the two mega events held by South Korea in the 1980s were very crucial to the emergence of *Chaebol* in sport and football. Whilst the new regime established the Ministry of Sports to successfully host the first ever Asian Games and the Olympic Games on South Korean

\textsuperscript{25}Shin Dong-A was ranked 24\textsuperscript{th} or 25\textsuperscript{th} in South Korean industry. The main business areas were insurance, finance, and service. In 1999, the businesses were worth a combined total of 20 trillion and turned over 9.2 trillion in Korean Won. From 2000 to 2002, the Chaebol was dissolved and collapsed (Monthly Chosun, 2009/March).

\textsuperscript{26}Hyundai, Samsung, Lucky Gold Star (now LG), Daewoo, Sunkyung (now SK), and SSangyong (Kim et al, 2005: 8)
soil (Koh, 2005: 471), Chaebol’s contribution in building sport infrastructure and financial investment from the 1980s was undeniable. Sport may have been considered as one of the domain for diversification by Chaebol to enhance their image, whilst the governments tried to provide more sophisticated sport, that is, professional sport with the help of Chaebol. These were well reflected in a statement from a chief executive of the Lucky Gold Star professional football team as follows:

Our purpose of the creation (of the Lucky Gold Star professional football team) is to respond to the sport promotion policy of the government, to contribute football restoration, to boost the image of our corporation and simultaneously to build a sense of closeness to the customer (Go Kyung-Hwan, a chief executive of the Lucky Gold Star professional football team, in Daily Economy, 19th August 1983: 12, translated from Korean).

The statement clearly indicates that the regime was powerfully promoting sport. As the response to the policy, Chaebols became involved in professional sport and football, having overt intentions to connect their investments to the benefit of their businesses. For instance, advertisement of the corporate images through sport as well as the pressure from the regime could be the reasons for their involvement. Chaebols started to take over the main position which general corporations and banks had usually occupied in Korean football.

4.3.2 The process of professionalisation of South Korean football

Interestingly, the KFA as a national football governing body took charge of professionalisation as a paramount to develop football. The movement started from the South Korean Christian alliance and Christian footballers who created the “Hallelujah” professional football team for missionary purposes in 1980. In announcing the establishment of Hallelujah, the first ever professional team in South Korean football history, the president of the KFA revealed the significance of this event in the following manner:
To break away from the Asian level, South Korean football needs the creation of professional teams…Creation of a professional team was decided after careful consideration according to the dominant opinions of many people in our football community one year ago, and then, recently, based on the promise of positive cooperation in a congregation of 1,200 priests and the support of 7 million Christians, the team, Hallelujah was created (Choi Sun-Young, the president of the KFA, in Chosun newspaper, 3rd July 1980: 8, translated from Korean).

The KFA president supported the creation of the Christian professional football team because not only was the project important to develop Korean football at the international level, but he was also a sincere Christian, and deeply involved in the operation of the football team (cf. Kyung-Hyang newspaper, 7th January 1980: 8). Whilst some exodus of players from corporate teams to the Hallelujah team happened, the corporate football teams strongly resisted the introduction of professional football. Coincidently, in the meantime, the South Korean football team failed to qualify in the preliminary rounds for the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. This might have pushed the KFA president to stress the creation of professional teams as the only way to develop Korean football. The KFA president defended the necessity of professional football teams as follows:

I have no intention to get fame or even to make money through the professional football team. As you may know, someone who has no relation to me will operate the team once the team is established. I think that creating a professional team is the only way for Korean football (Choi Sun-Young, the KFA president, in Dong-A newspaper, 26th June 1980: 8, translated from Korean).

Since the creation of the Hallelujah professional team in 1980 and up to 1983, three more professional teams were established. In 1983, with the two professional teams (Hallelujah, YuGong) and three amateur teams (Kuk-Min Bank, DeaWoo, PoChul), the KFA launched ‘Super League’, the first ever professional league in the Asian continent. Although the South Korean football community is proud that the Super League was the first professional league in Asia, the organisation and operation at the launching stage was deeply embedded
in the sporting ideology of Chun’s regime which could initiate the league and simultaneously jeopardise the operation.

…Board of directors of the KFA had decided to participate one amateur team in the Super League. It was an order of the Ministry of Sport to combine both pro and amateur. Because professional players cannot participate in the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games based on the previous amateur regulation, the Ministry stressed that not only the settlement of professional football but also promotion of amateur football are urgent. According to the order, the Ministry set a regulation that not only the existing professional teams but also others, which will be created in the future, have to operate amateur teams. It is also enforced that all matches of professional teams had to have more than three (it was seven in the first consideration) amateur players (The KFA, 2003: 322, translated from Korean).

Having to host the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games, the operation of professional football had to secure the protection of amateur players in order to produce satisfactory results especially for the two major events. Furthermore, due to a lack of preparation and a small number of teams, professional football in South Korea had been forced to operate abnormally and unstably. National priorities such as preparation of the two international events and the national football team camp could easily affect the schedule and operational plans of the professional football league. For instance, until the 1988 Olympic Games, the KFA set internal policies about how to maintain the Super League with no more than 8 teams (6 professional teams and 2 amateur teams) (cf. Kyung-Hyang newspaper, 19th October 1983: 8). This was to control the supply of eligible amateur players for the Olympic Games. Along this, the KFA established, as explained in the following press article, an operation policy for professional clubs and players.

1. National team players cannot transfer to professional players until they reach the age of 26; 2. If national team players do not devote themselves on purpose, with the intention of leaving the national team, the KFA expels the players; 3. Professional teams have to have amateur teams under their wings; 4. Amateur players can transfer to professional players after their registration as an amateur.
has passed 2 years (Kyung-Hyang newspaper, 27th August 1983: 9, translated from Korean).

In promoting a professional football league, the KFA had to sensitively deal with the eligibility of national team players to play for the Olympic Games. Preparing eligible players for the mega-event was no exception for the league. Before the creation of the professional league, the KFA had to be clear about the eligibility of a player (Kim Jae-Han) who was transferred to a Hong Kong based professional team and returned to the national team squad to prepare for the Asian Games. On the inquiry, FIFA and AFC’s positions were as follows:

As far as the player mentioned in your telex is concerned, he does not comply with the Olympic Eligibility Rule any more if he was a full professional (paid player with a fixed salary). Please consult Rule 26 and the Bye-Laws to Rule 26 of the International Olympic Committee and also the FIFA Amateur Definition as published in the FIFA Handbook (14th September 1978, correspondence from FIFA General Secretary to the KFA vice-president).

In my opinion, I do not think Kim Jae-Han can participate in the Asian Games, because it is a tournament restricted to amateurs. May I refer you to FIFA Handbook 1977-1978 page 49 Article 1.8 which states: “A professional or non-amateur player may be re-instated as an amateur by his National Association, but cannot, under any circumstances, again take part in the Olympic Games or any competition arranged by FIFA restricted to amateurs” (11th October 1978, correspondence from the AFC General Secretary to the KFA vice-president).

Because some former national team players played for foreign professional teams after their actual retirement in South Korea, the KFA did not need to deal with this issue often. Therefore, Kim Jae-Han’s case was unique. Furthermore, although corporate football teams’ players were also regularly paid by the corporate sides, officially, they were not professional players. However, in the dawn of the professional era, suddenly, the control of the demand and supply of players emerged as an important agenda for the KFA to effectively prepare for both the Asian and the Olympic Games and also to protect corporate football teams. In other words, whilst the government strongly promoted the two mega
events as a national matter, professional football had to be in a position to support the national project and to protect amateur football in line with the Olympic Games’ amateur spirit of that time. National team players still belonged to the KFA, which enabled the KFA to summon the players to long-term training camps whilst the players could not play for their professional teams (cf. KFA, 2003: 342; in 1988, national players played 12 games for their professional clubs out of 60 games). Undeniably, the Super League suffered from this situation. From a sporting perspective, it was a burden for the professional clubs, in particular, Chaebols.

Although the number of Super League matches have decreased because of the operation of a national team according to preliminary rounds of the World Cup and the Universiad (the World University Games), (the KFA) is preparing plans separately to settle and vitalise the Super League. Namely, the gate-money of the Super League revenue will be left to the club sides and TV rights will be utilised as a promotional fund for amateur football. So we will discuss with the club sides to seek ways of not only independent development, but also co-development with amateur football (Choi Sun-Young, the KFA president, in a regular delegate meeting of the KFA in 1985, in Monthly Football, 1985/February: 27, translated from Korean).

Speaking bluntly, professional football is operated as return of corporate profit to our society. There has been no other merit to operate professional teams (Park Nam-Gyu, a head of Il-Hwa football club, Monthly Football, 1993/December: 63, translated from Korean).

Meanwhile, the KFA had to make full use of the opportunity to produce the best results from national teams, for which the football governing body created the Professional Football Management Committee (PFMC) in 1984 to reflect the KFA’s policy orientation and its operation of professional football. Furthermore, since the professional league was launched in 1983, the League (or committee) as a governing body of professional football had repeated integration to and separation from the KFA (see Table 13). It was a matter of who controls football and also how to operate Korean football effectively. However, behind that, some debates on how Korean football can be developed had started to emerge,
to enhance the position of professional football clubs and to allow other stakeholders in Korean (professional) football to be involved.

Table 13 Organising Professional Football in the 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27th November 1980</td>
<td>The KFA established the Professional Football League (PFL) to control professional games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th December 1980</td>
<td>The first professional football team, “Hallelujah” was created. The KFA promoted the creation with support of South Korean Christian sides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th January 1982</td>
<td>The KFA integrated its affiliated Leagues (Primary School League, Middle-High School League, University League, and Business Football League) under its direct control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1983</td>
<td>The KFA created the Super League Committee (SLC) to organise the first professional league game, Super League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1983</td>
<td>The KFA created “Super League” with two professional teams (Hallelujah, Yu-Gong) and three amateur teams (Kuk-Min Bank, Dea-Woo, Po-Chul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1983</td>
<td>The presidents of professional teams organised their own council outside the KFA’s reach to discuss the operation of professional football games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1984</td>
<td>The KFA created the Professional Football Management Committee (PFMC) instead of SLC. The committee comprised of the KFA president as chair and presidents of professional clubs as members of the committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1984</td>
<td>The KFA decided to dissolve the PFL and to integrate it into the PFMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>The PFMC was separated from the KFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>The PFMC was re-integrated into the KFA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KFA, 2003; K-League, 2010; Chosun newspaper; Dong-A newspaper; Kyung-Hyang newspaper
4.3.3 ‘Monthly Football’ as a medium for football policy

From the 1970s onward, discourse on football development was discussed more frequently than ever before. Not only because of the increasing expectation in terms of international performance, but also due to the newly created ‘Monthly Football’ magazine (founded in 1970 with support from the KFA) for varied voices inside and outside the football boundary. For the first time, football related issues could be actively discussed and published to influence football policy making or to reflect on institutional debates. Through this media and also through newspapers which has gradually increased its pages for sport news, South Korean football at large has been provided with a place to express more about policies and to debate various aspects of football.

In particular, the magazine could provide some space for the KFA to announce its annual policy and plan in a more detailed manner, which was not feasible in other media. From another perspective, the governing body could utilise the opportunity to make the Korean football community understand what they planned and how they operated. For instance, when the director of the Ministry of Finance, Jang Deok-Jin took over as the president of the KFA in 1970, he made a public commitment to realise 15 pledges, which can be summarised as follows:

a. Unity of football-persons  
b. Expansion of the base of football  
c. Support of local associations  
d. Operation of mobile (football) film theatre (for local fans)  
e. Organisation of standing national football teams (Blue Dragon & White Tiger)  
f. Preparation for the Asian Youth Cup  
g. Exchange with foreign teams  
h. Subsidies for injured players in official games  
i. Dispatch of representatives and researchers  
j. Active promotion of football diplomacy  
k. Publication of football magazine (Monthly Football)  
l. Construction of a football stadium  
m. Fund-raising
n. Organisation of an executive body (*in the KFA*)
o. Transparency of the executive body of the organisation

The KFA president produced these plans as urgent concerns for South Korean football to establish. According to Monthly Football (1970/December), among the 15 pledges, 3 issues (d, l, and o) were unattainable. Reflecting the social, economic, and political circumstances under the authoritarian regime, the 15 goals meant that the KFA attempted to set up South Korean football from scratch. For instance, in terms of expansion of the football base, the KFA reported that they had sent around 2,500 balls to elementary schools around the nation and that football teams had increased from 271 in 1969 to 476 in 1970 (cf. Monthly Football, 1971/February: 35). Right after South Korea failed to qualify for the 1974 West Germany FIFA World Cup, the KFA president announced his plans for 1974 as follows:

a. Reformation of the operation of national teams
b. Composition of youth national team with bigger players
c. Preparation of exclusive football pitch for practice
d. Reinforcement of coaching system
e. Increase the number of referees and control of their qualifications
f. Increase the importance of elementary school football
g. Downsizing of the KFA
h. Invitation of four foreign teams
   (Monthly Football, 1974/January: 23-28, translated from Korean)

The plan focused on the operation of national football teams and practical plans to support them. Since the KFA president, Jang Deok-Jin resigned from his office due to his new post in the government, the KFA with the new president, Go Tae-Jin tried to initiate a different approach to the former administration such as reinforcement of coaching and refereeing systems, as there has been a constant demand by the Korean football community to raise the quality of football games. However, the policy orientations did not escape from the course of national team-centred approaches. Production of strong national football teams and sound domestic football were primary targets, in which national and institutional
powers exercised control over some issues such as players’ bodies, organisation of football and the mobilisation of available resources.

Meanwhile, the failure to secure national football excellence enabled the opportunity to those in positions in the KFA to review Korean football in a holistic way. In this respect, establishing a standardised coaching method, training of young players, and refereeing systems were constantly asserted as strategies South Korean football had to secure for football development. Nevertheless, the debates and the voices had not been satisfactorily realised simply due to limited resources. Discourse on development, which was strongly embedded in the ethos of overcoming the past, and showing the nation’s excellence also made it difficult to systematically initiate long-term investment.

4.3.4 Football in schools

From a governing perspective, the KFA had concentrated on how many football teams and players were created and registered, and how many tournaments were established for young players. In announcing its year plan for 1974, the KFA president, Go Tae-Jin stated:

Now, there is just the National Elementary Football Tournament as a national scale tournament for elementary schools hosted by the Jung-Ang Newspaper Company. I would like to stress that elementary school football has to be focused with deeper interests followed by support with regard to the expansion of the football base and football skills, which have to be prepared in the young players. According to this plan, I intend to add one more tournament for elementary schools. When we increase interests (of the schoolchild) and they enjoy football, true expansion is accomplished (Go Tae-Jin, in Monthly Football, 1974/January: 28, translated from Korean).

The importance of elementary school football as a foundation for Korean football development (re)emerged in the specific plan of the KFA. By providing more opportunities for talented players through the increase in the number of tournaments and school football teams, the KFA could secure the supply of players for the national teams. However, criticism also emerged concerning the delivery of the school football system in the South
Korean context in the 1970s. Namely some criticised that the system of school football operated based on result-centred orientation, thus, not allowing young players to develop their football techniques.

It takes more than 10 years to cultivate perfect football players. But the three years of middle school which is supposed to be a period for basic training, are too short to master their skills. They spend more time during the game to produce results than on the acquirement of skills. With the taken-for-granted requests of football coaches who think that the middle school players have to be used in real matches even if they learn necessary skills in high schools, the young players have to bear fruit before they can put down roots (Choi Youn-Soo, a member of the Korean Football History Compilation Committee, a former deputy general-secretary of KSC, in Monthly Football, 1974/February: 23, translated from Korean).

This question had been inextricably linked to the general national education policy of the Ministry of Education in Korea. Youth football was fostered by individual schools which were governed by the Ministry of Education. Their sporting matters were related to the education of young players. The Ministry and schools could not regularly operate league games due to a shortage of resources and the fact that every single tournament had to be done in a short period of time to ensure the minimum number of required school days for young athletes. Most of all, young players had to win prizes to be qualified to enter higher schools, which was institutionally set up during Park’s regime to promote sports and to control school entry processes.

Although this has been a repeated issue, the first reason why people do not vitalise several domestic leagues and tournaments is that the players’ abilities are insufficient. The problem of school football is on the present ‘Semi-finals Scheme’. To get into university on his merits as a sportsman, his team has to be qualified as a semi-finalist in major tournaments, which makes players only focus on the victory. Furthermore, coaching staff could not teach their players using their own styles. Under these circumstances, players do not have sufficient time to master their skills. (Cha Kyung-Bok, the present coach of

However, because this issue was directly related to the education system, the KFA could not properly deal with this matter, even if the governing body wanted to tackle the issues. The problem had been left to the coaches’ own discretion when they train young players. Above all, historically, knowledge on sport had been formed to represent national strength and superiority, with which institutional power exercised to train the bodies to produce better results for the school and the nation. In this respect, fierce competitions and hard training were required even in school sports. For instance, this was clearly shown when South Korea did not make any impression in the 1972 Munich Olympic Games.

The reason why South Korea was humiliated in the Munich Olympic Games is that the strength of people was poor and there was a lack of fighting spirit. The policy about reinforcement of school sports for physical training from childhood is the only real promotion of physical education (Min Kwan-Sik, Ministry of Education, in Kyung-Hyang newspaper, 8th September 1972: 7, translated from Korean).

Namely, the concepts of physical strength, fighting spirit, competitions, and visible results were too dominant during the authoritarian regimes. These issues were also related to an all-round education for young players. Alas, the school elite players were deprived of their right of proper education due to the idea that they had to be solely trained as sportsmen/women. Although the necessity of all-round education for players had been constantly stressed in South Korean society (cf. Monthly Football, 1970/May), conversely, players were needed to focus on their training rather than school education (cf. Monthly Football, 1995/February). However, the decision on whether or not to undertake school curriculums was considered to be individual players or coaches’ responsibilities not as systematic concerns.

4.3.5 The necessity of a systematic approach
Meanwhile, the necessity of a systematic approach to develop football has been constantly highlighted in the South Korean football community. For instance, after the South Korean national team had failed to qualify for the 1982 Spain World Cup, the KFA president stated:

> It is out-dated and putting one’s head in the sand, to participate in football matches whilst only being concerned about the fighting spirit and strong will of players and settling for the tradition of Korean football. It is because all administration, organisation, and management have to be scientific and all possible support has to contribute to the cogwheel’s function (Choi Sun-Young, the KFA president, in Monthly Football, 1981/June: 25, translated from Korean).

Although the statement did not clearly indicate the specific action to take, the necessity of different approaches in comparison with the past had been put forward. In particular, continuous unsatisfactory results in major international competitions (See Table 14) had always triggered discussions about how to develop Korean football to compete with the world. Before the 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup, South Korean football was not so successful in terms of its performance on international stages whilst the Korean football community’s interest and focus has been moved from Asia to the world stage. In 1988, the KFA held a ‘Public Hearing for Football Development’ which was held from 10th December 1988 to 12th December 1988 to hear various voices within the football community for the first time in South Korean football history.

Table 14 Performance of Korean Football in the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games (1960s~1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Competition</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Preliminary rounds for the 1962 Chile World Cup</td>
<td>Failed to qualify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>The 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games</td>
<td>Failed to advance to next round (Three losses of three matches)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Preliminary rounds for the 1966 England World Cup</td>
<td>Abandonment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Preliminary rounds for the 1968 Mexico Olympic Games</td>
<td>Failed to qualify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Preliminary rounds for the 1970 Mexico World Cup</td>
<td>Failed to qualify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Preliminary rounds for the 1972 Munich Olympic Games</td>
<td>Failed to qualify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Preliminary rounds for the 1974 West Germany World Cup</td>
<td>Failed to qualify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Preliminary rounds for the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games</td>
<td>Failed to qualify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Preliminary rounds for the 1978 Argentina World Cup</td>
<td>Failed to qualify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Preliminary rounds for the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games</td>
<td>Failed to qualify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Preliminary rounds for the 1982 Spain World Cup</td>
<td>Failed to qualify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Preliminary rounds for the 1984 LA Olympic Games</td>
<td>Failed to qualify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>The 1986 Mexico World Cup</td>
<td>Fail to advance to top 16 (One draw and two losses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games</td>
<td>Fail to advance to next round (Two ties and one loss)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>The 1990 Italy World Cup</td>
<td>Fail to advance to top 16 (Three losses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>The 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games</td>
<td>Fail to advance to next round (Three ties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>The 1994 USA World Cup</td>
<td>Fail to advance to top 16 (Two ties and one loss)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games</td>
<td>Fail to advance to next round (One win, one tie, and one loss)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1998 | The 1998 France World Cup | Fail to advance to top 16 (One tie and two losses)  
2000 | The 2000 Sydney Olympic Games | Fail to advance to next round (Two wins and one loss)  


By the time the public hearing was held in 1988, the poor performance of South Korean football was criticised no less than other events because the Korean football community had felt that Korean football was humiliated by its failure to qualify for the quarterfinals as a host country of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, for which the country mobilised all the national resources. In particular, the KFA president Kim Woo-Jung (the then president of Dae-Woo Chaebol) who became a successor of Choi Sun-Young in 1988 had to invest unprecedented funds into coaches and players to successfully prepare for the Olympic Games. In this respect, in the aftermath of the mega-event, Korean football may have needed to have holistic discussions to figure out the whole picture of South Korean football.

But with the year coming to a close, it is also true that Korean football caused disappointment and anxiety to those who sincerely love football. This was due to the achievement of fewer results than expected and unexpected unfortunate incidents in domestic football. Under the circumstances, our football family will have to find some special plans to develop Korean football to the level of the world class, by facing the cold-blooded reality and recovering the glorious past with solidarity (Vice-president of the KFA, in Minutes of Public Hearing for Korean Football Development, 1988: 2, translated from Korean).

Actually, the agendas from the 1988 public hearing had been continuously raised and mentioned before the Olympic Games. However, through the official congregation, the issues had been discussed more systematically to reflect the development of South Korean football.

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27 In the 43rd National Football Championship in 1988, the Dae-woo professional team and the Lucky Golden Star professional team went to the finals. Although Dae-woo won the game four to one, the game itself was a real quagmire due to arguments over a referee’s call, intentional loss from Lucky Golden Star, and intrusion of spectators into the pitch. After the match, the KFA decided a rematch and the Lucky Golden Star won the game two to one (KFA, 2003: 342).
football. In general, seven topics were discussed: 1) development plan for youth and school football; 2) operation strategy and effective hosting of domestic tournaments; 3) fosterage and management plan of referee; 4) fosterage and management plan of coach; 5) operation and effective management of national team; 6) plan for vitalisation of professional football; 7) issues about organisation and operation of the KFA.

The discussions from inside the South Korean football hierarchy did not guarantee final decisions of the KFA, but highlighted issues which the KFA or the government would consider to soundly develop football. Development of football had meant that the performance of the national team, for which youth football, football in schools, and professional football had to expand and secure its infrastructure. Interestingly, in the discussion about South Korean football, women’s football was not adopted as an agenda of the historical meeting.

Almost ten years after the first Public Hearing for Korean Football Development, there was a meeting which was called ‘Seminar for Football Development’. Ninety people, comprised of South Korean football officials, government officials, and related personnel, took part in the seminar. The 1997 seminar took place one year after FIFA chose Korea and Japan as co-host countries for the 2002 FIFA World Cup. In this respect, the panels discussed comprehensively about what Korean football urgently needed. As for the 1988 Public Hearing, the seminar provided opportunities to hear various voices from the Korean football community. Among the arguments, some defined the role of professional football (clubs) to develop Korean football. Nevertheless, the main themes were constantly repeated: to define the necessary factors for the production of satisfactory results on international stages. The next table (Table 15) is a summarisation and comparison of the background and topics of the two historic gatherings around South Korean football.

Table 15 The Summarisation of the Two Historic Meetings in 1988 and 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. This event was held right after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games</td>
<td>1. Since the decision of hosting the 2002 World Cup in Korea and Japan, the national team’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Underachievement in the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.6 The ideal role of professional football (Chaebol) in society

Since Chaebols got involved in the running of South Korean football and the creation of their own professional teams, football was a means to serve the corporate interests of Chaebols. Business rivalry among Chaebols had continued in sporting domains (cf. Lee, 1998: 12). Without a doubt, their professional football teams were strongly tied to their companies. In this respect, in the initial stage of professional football, the individual football clubs’ names solely represented the Chaebols’ names such as Yugong, Deawoo, and Pochul without any sense of locality. Their emblems were also made to represent the
Chaebols’ images. Even in a conceptual perspective, the question of ‘who the football clubs belong to’ had a clear answer: Chaebols, which, however, had also been challenged.

In 1987, the Professional Football Management Committee (PFMC) was separated from the KFA to operate the professional league. However, the so-called ‘Kim Jong-Bu scout scandal’ broke out between the Daewoo team and Hyundai team (Daewoo and Hyundai were rivals in an automobile industry, cf. Kang, 2006: 182). According to KFA’s history book (KFA, 2003: 337), both companies fiercely tried to contract with Kim Jong-Bu. However, both sides could not contract and the deadline for transfer came to a close, Kim became an unqualified player who could not play for any teams until the next transfer period. Meanwhile, the KFA changed the transfer rule to help the talented player and Daewoo swiftly registered Kim as its own player. As a result, the Hyundai team announced its dissolution which resulted in the resignation of the KFA president, Choi Sun-Young from his office. Although the Hyundai team had withdrawn their decision, this incident confirmed how Chaebols dealt with their football teams.

In response to this incident, media and other football teams also produced statements about the social responsibility of professional clubs. The clubs publicly emphasised the concept of ‘returning profits to society’ and the football community had been actively engaged to rethink the meaning of professional football clubs in South Korea. In other words, the incident helped to openly share the different viewpoints on professional teams in the South Korean football context.

But for whatever reason, the fact that (Hyundai) decided to disband their football team which was created upon public interest, shows the high-handedness of the big corporation, even in terms of the social responsibility of corporations. Even if they created the team against their will, the team cannot be a private possession once the team was created (Editorial of Monthly Football, 1987/December: 37, translated from Korean).

Once the Chaebols emerged to the fore by impacting South Korean football, the role of Chaebols in South Korean football had been magnified, not only in terms of financial investment but also as an impetus to promote systematic development of South Korean football. The role of professional football and Chaebols has ideally been conceptualised as
public goods which had to contribute to Korean society in general and Korean football in particular. However, as business entities, professional clubs had to find a way to survive even though there were unwavering supports from Chaebols. Discourse had been formed to support the pursuit of profits as a natural orientation of professional clubs. However, except for the first year of the Super League (in terms of average spectators), the professional football teams suffered from fluctuating spectators as is highlighted in the following Table 16.

Table 16 The Number of Spectators of South Korean Professional Football

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers of Games (Day)</th>
<th>Total Spectator</th>
<th>Average Spectator</th>
<th>Numbers of Teams</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>40 (20)</td>
<td>419,478</td>
<td>20,974</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>114 (58)</td>
<td>536,801</td>
<td>9,255</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>84 (42)</td>
<td>226,486</td>
<td>5,393</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>102 (53)</td>
<td>179,752</td>
<td>3,392</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>341,330</td>
<td>4,376</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>360,650</td>
<td>6,011</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>778,000</td>
<td>6,483</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>527,850</td>
<td>5,865</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1,480,127</td>
<td>12,232</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1,353,573</td>
<td>11,005</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>851,190</td>
<td>8,107</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>893,217</td>
<td>7,089</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1,516,514</td>
<td>10,531</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>1,911,347</td>
<td>10,502</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1,218,836</td>
<td>6,771</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>2,179,288</td>
<td>11,780</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>195 (191)</td>
<td>2,752,953</td>
<td>14,413</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>194 (190)</td>
<td>1,909,839</td>
<td>10,052</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Korea Professional Football League Year Book (2008a); K-League Homepage
Under these circumstances, the Korean football community had started to define the role and success of professional football in relation to connectivity of the football clubs and locals. When the Super League was launched in 1983, the teams were assigned to their provinces, which they represented. However, due to the lack of available stadiums, the league had to be operated as a travelling theatre. Because the government banned using public stadiums to protect the grass for the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games, the level of connectivity between the clubs and the local population could not be firmly established. Hence, the South Korean football community started to produce statements on the vitalisation of professional football in relation to the role of football clubs. The following issues are extracted from the Public Hearing for Korean Football Development (1988)

a) The professional football team can create and support elementary school football tournaments; b) Individual teams have to invest positively in their hometowns, especially in elementary schools; c) Individual teams have to prepare their own exclusive football stadiums; d) Professional football teams can operate their own youth team (Minutes of Public Hearing for Korean Football Development, 1988: 75-84, translated from Korean).

Balanced investment of the grassroots, construction of football stadiums, and the educational problems of elite athletes had been difficult issues for the KFA. During the Public Hearing (1988), whilst the role of the KFA in terms of investment was still emphasised, some reformative plans started to be suggested revolving around professional football. For instance, the professional teams were positioned as the entities which should be positively involved in local football infrastructure, which, in turn, would help to vitalise professional football. For the purposes of planning, settlement of professional teams in their local areas was considered an essential prerequisite of what the teams had to do.

Professional football can settle down when the basic conditions of professional football, namely, hometown system (involvement) in the true sense take precedence. Also, when the teams are comprised of local players, the teams can attract local people’s attention. If so, the teams will support local school teams in their area, and may even secure players. Naturally, overall football development will be accomplished (Kim Woo-Jung, the KFA president, in
The Chaebol sides re-operated their clubs more firmly revolving around their allocated hometowns. Discussions about the necessity of strong connections between the clubs and the locals were welcomed by the Korean football community as one of the ways to avoid disorderly operations. The more the professional teams had settled in their local city or province to normalise their activity from a sport business perspective, the more the club sides had shared their power with local stakeholders. Namely, the process of internalising the professional football teams as public goods, which were supposed to be benefiting the football community and the society at large, had inevitably occurred.

In relation to football development, it would be undeniable that the Korean football community or the KFA had kept the simple concept: production of strong national football teams is football development. Meanwhile, from the 1980s onward, the community also shared the concept, ‘Professional football is the only way’ to develop national football. Although the regime and the KFA clearly showed their attachment to the two mega-events held by South Korea in the 1980s, professional football was also constantly defined as the institutions which can deliver systematic investments on their local football teams. The football community demanded that the Chaebol sides invest in local schools teams, their own youth teams, and football stadiums.

### 4.3.7 Back to the past? Co-hosting the 2002 World Cup by Korea and Japan

The decision of co-hosting the 2002 World Cup was also inextricably linked to the reconstruction of power relations within FIFA. Generally speaking, the UEFA allied with the CFA to agree to financial and technical support for the development of African football in 1997 (Sugden et al., 1998). In 1996, UEFA presented ‘Visions proposals’ comprised of two parts which contained agendas for a FIFA presidency rotation and the World Cup Finals as well as financial support for underdeveloped member countries. With this alliance and based on a newly established friendship with African nations, the UEFA was able to regain its influence over FIFA.
However, as Sugden & Tomlinson (1998) affirmed, several incidents including the emerging power of individual confederations and their alliances, the Visions Proposals with which UEFA negotiated with FIFA, and a movement of anti-Havelange to reform FIFA which unprecedentedly manifested in the bidding processes of the 2002 World Cup, yielded more political, democratic, and co-operative relationships between FIFA and confederations than ever before. Having said this, the decision to co-host the World Cup Finals between South Korea and Japan, and the revamped dynamic power relations in FIFA was supported by most of the stakeholders in the world football community.

The co-hosting possibility had come to the fore from various sources, and the discussions had pushed both countries and even FIFA to choose this option. In March 1996, AFC president, Sultan Ahman, officially proposed the co-hosting idea. However, the FIFA president made it clear that there will be no co-hosting situation due to an infraction of FIFA regulations (Kim J, 2005: 328). AFC General Secretary, Dato’ Peter Velappan also attempted to persuade both countries and said that ‘it would be better to co-host the 2002 World Cup by Korea and Japan’ when he visited South Korea (KOWOC, 2003: 57). These continual activities would be enough to send a meaningful signal to FIFA. Nevertheless, the FIFA president did not seem to consider the possibility at all. Even when both countries had consulted with FIFA about the possibility of the co-hosting, the FIFA president tried to adhere to the following principle:

Lennart Johansson asked whether the national associations of Japan and Korea Republic had asked FIFA whether they might stage the 2002 World Cup as a joint venture. The FIFA President replied that they had asked, but FIFA had replied that it was a quite unfeasible proposition, moreover, not possible according to FIFA Statutes (8th September 1995, minutes of FIFA Emergency Committee).

Politically, however, UEFA’s co-hosting resolution adopted in its Executive Committee as a symbol of reformism had been one of the watersheds for the final decision of FIFA (Kim J, 2005: 329). On the other hand, behind the scene, the South Korean side attempted to explain the co-hosting decision in terms of the football aims that FIFA ideally tried to accomplish. For instance, when FIFA researchers had concluded that both countries deserved to host the 2002 World Cup after they had finished on-site investigations, FIFA,
especially the Havelange’s camp was also in a dilemma with the researchers’ conclusion and seemed not to have many options. Under the circumstances, FIFA had to rethink the purpose of football, especially in the Far East Asian context, which was another interpretation on the co-hosting decision from the South Korean point of view:

…the bidding competition between the two countries who gained confidence on hosting the event had become heated, and if one country is disqualified from this competition, this situation was seen as a reason to make both Korea and Japan uncomfortable in their future relationship. Moreover, the fact that national sentiments between the two countries could be worsened, through this competition, was also counter to FIFA’s goal to create peace of the world through football (KOWOC, 2003: 59, translated from Korean).

Domestically and from relational perspectives with Japan, the bidding campaign for South Korea had been heated nationally due to an anti-Japanese sentiment, and the bidding process had already been raised from the sporting level to the international political level. This was continuously fuelled by South Korea’s unforgettable historical memories under the Japanese rule and several incidents between Japan and South Korea. A South Korean journalist, Lee H (1996: 7) mentioned that “if we fail to host the World Cup, public resentment will be caused”. Under no circumstances was Korea’s bid to be beaten by the Japanese side. To capture the atmosphere revolving around the bidding campaigns, it is worth quoting the following lengthy paragraph:

The bids reached full speed in 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II and of Korean freedom from the Japanese occupation. Therefore it was inevitable that Japan’s past re-emerged in Korean politics, highlighted by the symbolic start of demolition of the National Central Museum in Seoul, the former residence of the Japanese Governor General. While the anniversary brought an apologetic statement from the Japanese Prime Minister, Murayama Tomiichi, that went beyond previous statements, the positive effect was cancelled out by various inflammatory remarks made by Japanese politicians around the time concerning the Japanese occupation and how it had been valid and had done some good for Korea. Such statements angered Korea greatly and tension between the two countries heightened. But South Korea was also
voluntarily raising the issue of the past. President Kim stated in both a Japanese, and then an American, newspaper that Japan was responsible for the division of the Korean peninsula and was hindering its reunification. Then, South Korea used its acquisition of a seat on the United Nations Security Council to raise the issue of compensation for comfort women. Tensions had been heightened in early 1996 with the dispute over possession of the island of Takeshima (Tokdo in Korean). Tensions were fuelled to the extent that a scheduled visit of Japanese politicians to Seoul was cancelled as they would not be welcome. While in a meeting shortly after, President Kim and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō agreed to start talks on the dispute, tensions continued to simmer in part due to the intensification in the World Cup bidding competition as the day of the decision approached. Japanese embassy officials in Seoul even warned Japanese nationals in South Korea to be on their guard should Japan’s bid prove victorious (Butler, 2002: 51-52).

Meanwhile, in South Korea, the problem was how to interpret the situation of co-hosting with Japan from the point of view of politics, public sentiment, and international relationships. In certain circumstances, a hasty co-hosting policy could backfire, aggravating the bidding campaign and the public opinion. Hence, the bidding strategies of South Korea were vulnerable to (un)foreseeable events such as Japanese movements, stances of FIFA decision-makers, and the popular voice. For instance, when the co-hosting issue was discussed from a South Korean political community, one of the South Korean civic groups strongly denounced the possibility (14th July 1995, JoongAng Ilbo).

The bidding process of the 2002 FIFA World Cup had attested power struggles in FIFA, simply, between pro-Havelange and its counterparts, and a fierce rivalry between Korea and Japan which dealt with an increase in political and historical disputes. As a result, the co-hosting seemed to be an ineluctable solution and was an unprecedented decision in FIFA World Cup history. In 1996, FIFA apprised the KFA of its final decision about the joint-hosting matter:

28 ‘With the inclusion of Korea into the Japanese empire, the Governor-General fully exploited this region as a supplier of labour and materials for Japanese imperialism: Korean men were drafted for the army as sons of the Japanese emperor. Furthermore, Korean women were driven into the war to be used as military sexual slaves or labourers under the name of chŏngshindae. Particularly in the 1930s, when the number of military sexual slaves greatly increased, colonial countries like Korea became the target for recruiting comfort women.’ (Shin & Cho, 1996: 52)
We…would like to inform you herewith of the decision taken on 31st May 1996 by the FIFA Executive Committee with respect to your candidature to host the FIFA World Cup 2002. Having taken note of the fact that both your association and the other association bidding to host the event had declared their agreement to consider the possibility of the co-organisation of this very important competition, the FIFA Executive Committee came to the conclusion that, under the prevailing circumstances, the most apposite solution was to award the organisation of the FIFA World Cup 2002 to both the Korean Football Association and the Japanese Football Association, and we sincerely congratulate you on this positive issue (6th June 1996, correspondence from FIFA General Secretary to KFA president, Chung Mong-Joon).

The decision of FIFA, though it was expected, greatly impacted both societies. Even since the co-hosting decision, both sides had a stack of controversial and technical issues requiring mutual cooperation and conciliation. For South Korea, bidding to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup had been a way to fight for its own pride. On the other hand, since “Korea was delighted and Japan was shocked” (AFC, 2004, an excerpt from the then AFC General Secretary, Dato’ Peter Velappan), Japan also had to let go off their disappointment. Both countries conflicted sharply on issues about ‘who would hold opening and final matches?’ and ‘how would the World Cup Finals be named?’ KOWOC (The Korean

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29 FIFA Executive Committee ratified the following points in relation to the 2002 World Cup after several meetings among Korea, Japan, and FIFA.

- The official name of the competition is “2002 FIFA World Cup, Korea/Japan”.
- There is to be only one emblem, but each country may have its own mascot.
- Each national association may install its own local organising committee. FIFA will hold the chairmanship of the whole organisation via a coordination committee to which each country may delegate no more than ten members.
- Korea and Japan will automatically qualify for the final competition.
- Of the 32 teams, 16 will play the 1st round in Korea and 16 in Japan, in four groups of four. For the 2nd round, four of the teams which played the 1st round in Japan will transfer to Korea and vice-versa. The same will apply to the quarter finals with the two sets of two teams switching countries. In this way, 32 matches will be played in each country.
- The opening match is to be in Korea, the final in Japan (the opening match will be the only match of the day).
- There are to be a minimum of six and a maximum of ten stadia in each country.
- The preliminary competition draw will be in Japan and the final draw in Korea.
- The FIFA Congress will be held in Korea prior to the opening game.
- The coordination centre for the two International Broadcasting Centres will be located in Japan (7th December 1996, minutes of FIFA Executive Committee).
The Organizing Committee for the 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan reports their concerns as follows:

Firstly, Korea made an issue of opening a final match. As a result holding the final game is an issue that cannot be easily granted to the other side, for both countries, due to its massive economical effect. The KFA president Chung Mong-Joon proposed to decide the matter using a drawing method. Then, it was FIFA’s opinion that an order of names of the countries for the tournament title would be ‘Japan/Korea’ according to the English Alphabetic order, but Chung drew attention to the fact that French is also FIFA’s official language and FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) is named in French. Therefore, it was an argument that Korea is written as Corée in French and its order is ahead of Japon…these matters were concluded to host the final match in Japan while the tournament title was decided as the 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan™ (KOWOC, 2003: 31-32, translated from Korean).

Table 17 Korea/Japan Co-Hosting Records

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994.04</td>
<td>AFC General Secretary, Dato’ Peter Velappan proposed Korea/Japan co-hosting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994.05</td>
<td>Velappan re-suggested the co-hosting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994.08</td>
<td>Japanese Foreign Minister, Gono proposed Korea/Japan co-hosting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994.10</td>
<td>Korea/Japan Amity Association President, Sakurauch and President of the Federation of Japanese Industries, Toyota proposed the co-hosting during the Hiroshima Asian Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995.07</td>
<td>General Secretary of Democracy-Freedom Party, Kim Yun-Hwan discussed the co-hosting in Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995.07</td>
<td>Prime Minister, Lee Hong-Gu indicated a forward-looking attitude toward the co-hosting issue in the National Assembly’s question and answer session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995.09</td>
<td>Korea/Japan co-hosting was proposed as an agenda of discussion in the third Korea/Japan Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995.09</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture and Physical Education confirmed an exclusive hosting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996.03</td>
<td>AFC President, Sultan sent correspondence to other Confederations to urge the co-hosting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996.03</td>
<td>In a trialogue between the AFC President, Sultan, the KFA President, Chung Mong Joon, and the JFA President, Naganuma, the JFA President rejected the idea of the co-hosting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996.03</td>
<td>CAF President, Issa Hayatou stood for Korea/Japan co-hosting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996.04</td>
<td>8 members of UEFA Exco submitted a petition about Korea/Japan co-hosting to FIFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996.04</td>
<td>FIFA President, João Havelange rejected Korea/Japan co-hosting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996.04</td>
<td>South Korean government implied consideration of Korea/Japan co-hosting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996.04</td>
<td>Japan Prime Minister, Hasimoto reconfirmed an exclusive hosting</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996.05.03</td>
<td>Korea Prime Minster, Lee Su-Seong officially confirmed the acceptance of the co-hosting</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996.05.08</td>
<td>FIFA sounded both countries opinions about whether they were following FIFA regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996.05.10</td>
<td>KFA President, Chung Mong-Joon reconfirmed an exclusive hosting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996.05.15</td>
<td>Both countries clarified compliance of FIFA regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996.05</td>
<td>UEFA President, Lennart Johansson expressed support for the co-hosting</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996.05.21</td>
<td>Vice-President of Japanese Bidding Committee, Kawabuchi expressed acceptance of the co-hosting</td>
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<td>1996.05.23</td>
<td>FIFA Spokesperson implied a possibility of revisions of regulation for the co-hosting</td>
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<td>1996.05.24</td>
<td>UEFA resolved to place co-hosting issue on the agenda of FIFA Exco</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996.05.25</td>
<td>JFA President, Naganuma implied a possibility of acceptance of the co-hosting</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996.05.26</td>
<td>JFA President, Naganuma denied the acceptance of the co-hosting</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996.05.30</td>
<td>Japanese government spokesman implied the acceptance of the co-hosting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Japan decided internally to accept the co-hosting</td>
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From FIFA’s point of view, the relationship between the two countries has not been significantly changed, if at all, as expected with the decision of the co-hosting. FIFA did not hide their concerns about cooperation and difficulties between South Korea and Japan. South Korea had sensitively reported FIFA’s comments on those matters. South Korean newspapers referred to the content of FIFA officials’ interviews with other European newspapers and magazines. For instance, Chosun Ilbo (16th October 1996) issued an article titled “Again, Scepticism of World Cup Co-Hosting: FIFA General Secretary insisted unpreparedness of cooperation between Korea and Japan”, containing a possibility of nullification of the co-hosting decision by FIFA. Arguably, FIFA would have appropriated that comment, regardless of whether or not Chosun Ilbo was playing the media as a means to push the two countries to reach agreements on the title of the game and other technical concerns. According to FIFA South Korea refutably stressed that Korea and Japan have better attitudes than ever before albeit some practical and technical problems (2nd October, 1996, Chosun Ilbo). Nevertheless, the co-hosting of the World Cup by Korea and Japan had been a headache for FIFA. FIFA president, Joseph S. Blatter, who was the FIFA General Secretary until 1998, clearly underscored this concern:

The FIFA President also made it clear that co-hosting would not be reconsidered before the outcome of Korea/Japan was known to FIFA (7th June 1999, minutes of Strategic Study Committee of FIFA).

In conclusion, both sides have evaluated the 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup as a successful model of collaboration of both countries. Also it is stressed that the sport event has strengthened their relationship in a positive way. Sakaedani (2005) claims that the World Cup has enabled the two countries to enjoy a more amicable relationship, and to exchange more activities at the level of civil society. In Horne & Manzenreiter’s terms:

The issue of peaceful collaboration between a former colonial power and its colony underpinned much of the 2002 co-hosting ideology. Without enhancement of bilateral relations the complex tournament logistics, involving
travel and communication between two countries separated by sea, could not have been mastered so successfully. In the end, clearly improved relationships between the co-hosting nations, either on the practical working level of bureaucracies or on the conceptual level of mutual perception, laid the foundations for the smooth and congenial procedure of the event (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2004: 200).

Of course, the views toward the consequences of the mega-event could remain poles apart on the issue of reconciliation of both countries. Chronic disputes between the two countries, however, have been obstacles for the transmission of opportunities caused by the co-hosting and instilling cooperation into grassroots levels. In 2001, with the 2002 World Cup less than 10 months away, the heated topic of historic distortion had again emerged in South Korea as Japan tried to adopt new national textbooks which had different views on the Korea-Japan history than the South Koreans’ understanding. Since then, the South Korean Ministry of Education had put a halt on plans of civic exchanges through cultural and sporting events. Hence, several sports events including football matches between Korean and Japanese schools had been postponed or cancelled (cf. September 2001, Monthly Chosun). With regards to the above, it could be argued that whilst the football mega-event has provided a new opportunity to improve the relationship of South Korea and Japan, the event itself has also amplified their discord in more tangible and visible ways than ever before. Ironically, football seems to resolve political and historical disputes, conversely, the conflicts usually need a scapegoat i.e. football which is very conspicuous to the public.

4.3.8 One Korea or two Koreas? Another factor in hosting the 2002 World Cup

Since the Bidding Committee for the 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea (hereafter: KOBID) had been inaugurated on 15th March 1994, South Korea discussed the South-North problems more than ever before and pre-empted the issues to secure hosting the 2002 World Cup in the bidding competition with Japan. South Korea might have thought that spreading discourses about good relations or reconciliation with North Korea would play an active role to appeal for the justifiability of hosting the first World Cup of the new millennium in Korea. In this respect, several discussions about the issue had flourished in
South Korean society since South Korea jumped into the bidding campaign. After securing the qualification to the 1994 USA World Cup Finals which also meant a third consecutive appearance at the mega-event for South Korea, Dr. Chung Mong-Joon clarified the matter:

Korea is one. Isn’t it desirable if the World Cup football contributes to peace and stability in this area when it is held on the Korean Peninsula?...We have proposed a South and North co-hosting plan to North Korea. We have discussed a South-North joint football team for the USA World Cup Finals. Japan has even offered to give up its bidding campaign for the sake of Korea unification (Chung Mong-Joon, interview with Hankuk Ilbo, 30th October 1993, translated from Korean).

Given these approaches, the South Korean government, the KFA, and other organisations tried to use the unique situation of inter-Korean relations and the FIFA World Cup’s fundamental mottos of ‘peace’ and ‘friendship’ to their best advantage. One of the proposed ideas was be a joint-team in the 1994 USA World Cup, which could promote an ideal image of Korea and appeal the necessity of hosting the mega football event on the Korean Peninsula to the international football community and FIFA decision-makers. Although the consideration could not be the only reason of organising a single Korean football team, the KFA enquired about the possibility of having a unified team for the World Cup to FIFA:

In view of the popular voice in our country that we should form a joint unified team of two Koreas (The Republic of Korea and DPR Korea) to take part in the final round of the 1994 World Cup in the USA …We would draw your kind attention to the background of our idea that the joint unified team of two Koreas. If materialized, will make a good contribution toward reconciliation and settlement of peace in the Korean Peninsula which remains the only remaining area divided after the Cold War era (9th November 1993, correspondence from General Secretary of KFA to FIFA).

Without a doubt, the experience of organising the single team for the FIFA Under-20 World Youth Cup in 1991 could have raised the South Korean side’s expectation of
staging another united team in the World Cup Finals. FIFA, however, could not accept that idea and replied to the above correspondence with the following explanation.

The inquiry about the possibility to send a joint Korean team to the final competition of the 1994 FIFA World Cup was submitted to the FIFA Organising Committee at its meeting in Las Vegas on 16 December 1993. The Committee took note of your inquiry with interest, but it decided that such a request could not be accepted for the major FIFA competition (6th January 1994, correspondence from General Secretary of FIFA to KFA).

Nevertheless, even if the plan could not be achieved due to FIFA regulations, technical issues, and, if any, political reasons, South Korea seemed to (or could) think that the gesture would impress FIFA and its decision makers. This speculation could be justified from a series of South Korea’s bidding campaigns in relation to North Korea. The issue of the South-North relationship was already permeated as discourse into the bidding process. Acknowledging the undeniable contribution of sport to the reconciliation of South and North Korea, South Korea had tried to develop the 2002 World Cup bidding plan into South and North co-hosting strategy or vice versa. South Korean newspaper, Seoul Sinmun, reported the then circumstances in relation to a government policy and the possibility of South and North reconciliation:

On 3rd October, Culture and Physical Education Minister, Lee Min-Seop said that the South and North Korea co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup Finals is a basic policy and the operation for this will soon be initiated…And he continued that the idea will be delivered to FIFA through the FIFA vice president, Chung Mong-Joon as soon as possible. Co-hosting by South and North Korea and wishing unification of the Korean Peninsula is indeed the most appropriate, because the purpose of the World Cup is that the event contributes to world peace, clarified Minister Lee. According to these, the government became known to have been considering an official proposition of the co-hosting matter and organisation of a single team (4th October 1994, Seoul Sinmun, translated from Korean).
Even, the South Korean sides had continually appropriated the South-North co-hosting strategy to push Japan to abandon its bidding blaming Japan to be responsible for the division of the Korean Peninsula (Kim J, 2005). However, these principles seemed to be a means to convince the international football community without mutual and practical discussions with North Korea, which was also the reason for the interruption of their dialogues due to political tensions. Surprisingly, with about half a year to spare for deciding on the host country by FIFA, North Korea suddenly contacted FIFA to consult on the co-hosting issues without giving any notice to South Korea. With the following correspondence, North Korea consulted with FIFA about the co-hosting of South and North Korea:

…we have a desire to try to host the 2002 World Cup, which is not possible for being too late. And it helps me to try to seek any other ways and means to this end. From this viewpoint, I am interested in the Plan of North-South Joint Host which was once expressed by Mr. Havelange. I would appreciate if you could provide me with a working advice regarding the points that should be solved with regard to the Plan of North-South Joint Host of the 2002 World Cup (9th January 1996, correspondence from DPR Korea FA General Secretary, Ri Chang Son to FIFA General Secretary).

Such an abrupt situation threw the South Korean government and the KFA into confusion; they and other organisations had to focus on the elicitation of the true facts whilst keeping the co-hosting principle as one of the main strategies to beat Japan’s bid and, apparently, as a way to build a spirit of reconciliation. Meanwhile, the South Korean sides also carefully considered and examined the possibility of co-hosting with Japan. Before North Korea’s movement, North Korea had not responded to South Korea’s proposal on co-hosting and had also not opened a discussion window for general affairs between South and North Korea. In this respect, South Korea and even Japan had to take a careful approach to the North Korean issue. Calculating the impact on both countries’ bidding campaigns when the idea of the co-hosting of South and North Korea was realised. Therefore, to fully understand the situation was a priority for the South Korean sides before officially responding to North Korea’s movement. Even the South Korean embassy in Berne, Switzerland was mobilised to obtain information about North Korea’s proposal to FIFA.
I have been informed that you have recently sent a letter to the Korea Football Association regarding the North Korean idea of a South North co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup. It seems to me that the North Korean idea is, although it may not be realised successfully, worthy of attention in that the idea can facilitate the dialogue between South and North Korea which has long been interrupted. In this connection, I would very much appreciate if FIFA could send me a copy of the letter which you received from North Korea on January 15, 1996, so that we could analyse the true intention of North Korea (19th January 1996, correspondence from South Korean embassy Counsellor, Kim Woong-Nam in Berne, Switzerland to FIFA).

Yet, FIFA did not further mention the possibility of a South and North co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup regardless of whether FIFA had seriously considered the co-hosting issuer or not. Rather, FIFA redirected this issue and request by North Korea back to the negotiating table and procedure with South Korea, which FIFA clearly indicated in its reply about the correspondence from North Korea. FIFA would consider that the issue is a political concern rather than a sporting affair. FIFA answered the North Korean side as follows:

Your idea of a north-south joint hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup is a matter you have to discuss directly with your sister association in Seoul. At this stage of the World Cup bid procedure, FIFA cannot intervene in this matter (18th January 1996, correspondence from FIFA General Secretary to DPR Korea FA).

Nevertheless, the practical negotiations for South-North reconciliation in general and co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup by South and North Korea in particular had not been realised and did not bear fruit due to a political deadlock between the two countries. Of course, it would not be denied that South Korea’s acceptability and basic policy on co-hosting with North Korea was also pertinent to the experience of the successful inter-Korean football matches in 1990 and united junior team in 1991, and a continuing expectation of the role of sport in South and North Korea relations. However, several incidents such as the death of the North Korean President, Kim Il-Sung, in 1994, and North Korea’s alleged development of nuclear weaponry had inevitably aggravated the political
atmosphere in the 1990s (cf. 1996 White Paper on Korean Unification of Ministry of Unification). Under these circumstances, the co-hosting issues seemed to avoid submission to the negotiating table and were not practically discussed by both countries. On the contrary, there were possibilities that the issue of hosting the 2002 World Cup in one part of the Korean Peninsula without any realisation of their pledges could be abused to defame each other, in which North Korea, with nothing to lose, was in a more free position to cast aspersion on South Korea. In correspondence with FIFA, North Korea clarified its position:

However, contrary to your good-will expectation, north-south confrontation in my country has become exacerbated gravely. And because of this, the issue of co-hosting of the World Cup 2002 was unable to be mentioned even on the table of negotiation between north and south. And now it is out of question to consider it any longer. This being the situation, nevertheless, the South Korean side is spreading an opinion as though we had made public recently that we are willing to play the co-host. Though regretful, I deem it necessary to inform you that this is an absolutely unfounded one, which has been fabricated intentionally (23rd May 1996, correspondence from DPR Korea FA General Secretary, Ri Chang Son to FIFA General Secretary).

Even in the post-World Cup period, the conservative South Korean magazine, Monthly Chosun (August, 2006), controvertibly revealed, based on a witness of a North Korean defector, that there was a North Korean attempt to commit an act of terrorism prior to the 2002 World Cup event in 2001. Although this kind of issue would not be new when considering the relation of South and North Korea and the voices of conservative powers in South Korea, the series of arguments would be meaningful in understanding and anticipating relations through sports and the related exchange between South and North Korea. Furthermore, the speculation reflects the viewpoint of South Korea on North Korea which has also inevitably become embedded in sport policies. Ingrained enmity and the reconciliation have indispensably been side by side in the Korean context, despite the different stresses in different periods. Right after South Korea reached the semi-finals in the World Cup, the Football Association of D.P.R.K sent a correspondence to celebrate the success of South Korean football (KSSI, 2003: 66).
In the inter-Korea sport exchange history, ironically, sporting reunion as a sole reason, even if it were so, would be the most obvious political intention if we consider the situation of division of the nations and the need or possibility of unifying South and North Korea. Under these circumstances, historically, both sides have taken circumspect stances when promoting sport exchanges and carefully calculated the impact on both sides.

Nevertheless, South Korea had enjoyed the unprecedentedly discussions about the justifiability and possibility of a historical co-hosting by South and North Korea, preparing to host the world football event. Socio-political terms such as ‘Korea’ and ‘unification’ had been justified by South Korea to rethink and lighten the atmosphere of a great challenge: hosting the FIFA World Cup on Korean soil. Even Presidential Candidate, Kim Dae-Jung, had mentioned to university students the possibility of reconciliation of South and North Korea in relation to the World Cup co-hosting issue (14th June 1996, Segye Ilbo: 4). It is worth noting that South Korean people internalised and assimilated North Korea’s success in the 1966 England World Cup as theirs as well, displaying ‘Again 1966’ in a stadium in a match between South Korea and Italy to reach the quarter-finals of the 2002 World Cup (cf. Kim S, 2006: 40).

Since the co-hosting with Japan was finally decided, some issues about the possibility of holding some of the 2002 World Cup matches in North Korea and organising a single team for the mega-event had been discussed; Dr. Chung Mong-Joon visited North Korea to discuss those issues which, however, did not bear any fruit (20th November 1999, Chosun Ilbo; KFA, 2003: 390). Also, FIFA was well aware of the South Korean movement and did not deny the possibility of this historical moment. Moreover, based on South Korea’s understanding, the FIFA president stressed that organising a joint team of South and North Korea would naturally help allocate some games to North Korea which was mentioned when the FIFA president visited South Korea and Japan in 1997 (26th November 1997, Chosun Ilbo). FIFA, arguably, recognised what this meant on the Korean Peninsula and even to world football and politics. For instance, explaining the reason why the KFA president would be absent from the next meeting, the FIFA president:

told the Committee that Dr Chung had been unable to come to this meeting as he was preparing to travel to Pyonyang from 12 to 14 June with the South Korean government on its historic visit and intended to use the opportunity to
discuss forming a joint North/South Korean team for Asian competitions and perhaps even for the World Cup (6th June 2002, minutes of FIFA Executive Committee).

However, without any progresses in political and economical relationships with South Korea, North Korea could not move in any direction even if the sporting consideration has no ulterior motives. The consideration itself was a too heavy burden for North Korea to bear or to deal with under the political and ideological tensions with South Korea.

4.3.9 The FIFA World Cup and national development

Since South Korea actively engaged in the World Cup bidding campaign, statements about FIFA World Cup as an effective means for national development had dominated the public debate. Of course, the meaning of ‘development’ was differently perceived by different actors, especially with South Korea’s ambition to enter the democratic era and globalisation. In this context, the development conceptually represented ‘advancement’ of the economy, society, and culture, which was believed to be effectively delivered by hosting the mega football event.

Now, we promote Segyehwa (globalisation) in all areas of politics, economics, society, and culture into the leap into the 21st Century…Moreover, our country which is emerging as a central country in the Asia-Pacific era surely strengthens national reconciliation and increases the possibility of epoch-making Segyehwa through the hosting of the 2002 World Cup. Furthermore, externally, we can contribute to world peace by making the World Cup an unprecedented grand football event for the whole global village (part of the Resolution supporting the hosting of the 2002 World Cup from the minutes of the 170th National Assembly plenary session, 15th December 1994, translated from Korean).

According to this statement, South Korea conceptualised hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup as a crucial turning-point of the nation. In this respect, the 2002 World Cup on the Asian Continent has naturally been linked to the concepts of ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’, 193
‘Asia-Pacific era’, ‘national reconciliation’, and ‘our contribution to the world’. The debates around the unification with North Korea and the historical rivalry with Japan were also all-round concerns since South Korea initiated its bidding campaign.

Since FIFA decided that the 2002 FIFA World Cup would be a co-hosting of South Korea and Japan, statements on development had been more sophisticated. Rhetoric around the impacts of hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup on South Korean soil was repeated and inscribed in the constructed knowledge about the mega-event by government and Korean football governing body as being good for the public and the country to ensure the smooth mobilisation of national resources in the democratisation era.

We can expect that the 2002 FIFA World Cup which our country and Japan will host together will have a great ripple effect in terms of improvement of South Korea’s international status, expansion of sporting and cultural exchanges, economic growth, and balanced development between regions (a chief member of the Special committee for Supporting the 2002 World Cup and Other International Sport Events, in minutes of the 181st National Assembly special committee session, 11 December 1996, translated from Korean).

This reflects that the 2002 Korea/Japan FIFA World Cup had been discursively positioned in South Korean society so as to shape the path of development of South Korea from a neo-liberal point of view. In particular, economic concerns were engaged to position the mega-event in Korean society. In 1997, South Korea applied for an IMF bailout and went under supervision of the international institution when the financial crisis hit the Asian continent. In the situation of the IMF bailout, the necessity of hosting the expensive mega-event created doubts and uncertainty by certain segments of the public and the leadership of society. However, the atmosphere and opinions could not overset the dominant discourse about the 2002 FIFA World Cup.

We cannot underestimate the present crisis (IMF bailout). However, we will overcome this situation. I expect that the IMF bailout is a short-term situation albeit the severity of the crisis. If so, we have to muster our power with something else when we bring ourselves home. Hosting the FIFA World Cup
will be a good opportunity to resolve this crisis because the World Cup will be a massive productive festival rather than just an one-off occasion (Chung Mong-Joon, interview with Dong-A newspaper, 13th December 1997: 7, translated from Korean).

(About the necessity of hosting the 2002 World Cup by Korea) it is a defeatist idea which disregards our abilities. It is an irresponsible comment which demoralises people’s expectation and will. It is short-sighted view of some people who do not know the meaning of the FIFA World Cup and the world of sports. The severity of the problem is that there are people, including the intellectual class, who still have negative opinions toward hosting the FIFA World Cup. Let us be clear, the 2002 FIFA World Cup should be held (Seo Gi-Won, a columnist of Best Eleven (former Monthly Football), in Best Eleven, April 1998: 17, translated from Korean).

A KDI (Korea Development Institute: quasi-governmental institute) report, “The Meaning of National Development and Economic Impacts of the 2002 Korea/Japan FIFA World Cup” had powerfully supported the importance of the football event in terms of economic effects on the South Korean economy. The KDI produced the research paper funded by the government in March 1998, about 2 months after the IMF bailout, and the report was frequently mentioned among institutions to emphasise the significance of the event for Korea. In addition, the report had helped to centre discourse about economic opportunities as Korea actively promoted the World Cup in the post-IMF era. In this respect, whilst experiencing the Asian financial crisis which also directly impacted the South Korean economy, statements were produced to emphasise the importance of the 2002 FIFA World Cup for the Korean economy. This was addressed in the following positive manner:

The FIFA World Cup, which will bring us enormous tangible and intangible profits, can be an important turning point for national economic development. According to the research findings of the KDI, investment and consumption expenditure reaches 2.4 trillion Korean Won. Investment including the construction costs of stadiums is 1.6 trillion, and consumption expenditure including foreigners’ consumption and operating expenses of KOWOC is 0.8 trillion. Also, the ripple effect throughout the national economy would be
approximately 8 trillion of the production inducing effect, 3.7 trillion of the added value inducing effect, 245,000 of the job creating effect...Reinforcement of the nation’s competitiveness through improving national image is a hugely intangible economic effect which cannot be calculated in numbers (Lee Yeon-Taek, interview with YTN on 29th May 2001, in KOWOC, 2002: 167, translated from Korean).

4.3.10 The FIFA World Cup, culture, tradition and visibility

Rediscovery and restoration of Korean culture and tradition, or something ‘very Korean’ has been one of the important agendas for the South Korean government in the post-military era. However, dealing with Korea’s culture and tradition had taken on a complicated aspect. Namely, those in leadership positions had to promote a new vision to reinforce the competitiveness of Korean culture and tradition in a more global environment whilst recognising some other cultures, including Japanese cultural export, as having a negative impact on the country.

In relation to the 2002 FIFA World Cup, South Korea had welcomed the opportunity of hosting the mega-event to re-discover Korean culture and tradition, to globalise local culture and tradition, and to promote the image of Korea as an advanced country. Cultural and traditional values had emerged as an important factor to change South Korea from an industrial nation dominated by the military regime to an advanced country where politics, economy, and culture are supposed to be well balanced in a more democratic environment. Hence, hosting the 2002 World Cup was considered, as proclaimed by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, in its report “Basic Scheme of Government Support for the 2002 FIFA World Cup” as an opportunity for cultural and traditional rediscovery and celebration.

Priorities of promotion for the 2002 FIFA World Cup: 1) systematic and various promotions (advertisement) for the enhancement of national image; 2) Segyehwa (globalisation) of Korean culture through publicising traditionality and excellence of our culture; 3) preparation to for the taking-off of culture, tourism, sport, and communication related industries; 4) promotion of vitalisation and internationalisation of local economy; 5) reconciliation
between regions and classes, and improvement of sense of community; 6) unity between nations of South and North; 7) inspiration of advanced citizen consciousness and people’s participation; 8) utilisation of World Cup related facilities for sound leisure and cultural space; 9) construction of a foundation for the era of friendship and cooperation between Korea and Japan (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, in Basic Scheme of Government Support for the 2002 FIFA World Cup issued by Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 1998: 3, translated from Korean).

South Korea’s cultural inferiority to Japanese culture and the contamination of national culture and tradition by an influx of low-level Western culture was also debated in academia and political circles. However, hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup provided opportunities to imagine Korea as a culturally developed nation. The FIFA World Cup was designed as the ‘Culture World Cup’.

Public opinion is that the 2002 World Cup has to be an opportunity where the cultural image of the nation is widely known in the global village, and that Korea becomes an advanced cultural nation internally, not just simply be a world event of football. This plan, from a cultural perspective, is also a policy to actively cope with the 21st Century in which culture and information become the core driving force of development of the society. In this period South Korea has grown into a G-7 country from an industrial and economic perspective, we can enter the category of developed nations in the true sense of the word when we have matured culturally to the level of advanced countries (Kim Young-Soo, Minister at the Ministry of Culture and Sport, a keynote address for “Open Forum for Hosting Culture World Cup”, in Grand Forum of Hosting Culture World Cup issued by Ministry of Culture and Sport & Korea Cultural Policy Institute, 1996: 8, translated from Korean).

In the process of defining the 2002 FIFA World Cup as the ‘Culture World Cup’, statements about how to initiate the cultural challenges were shared in positive and creative ways. In other words, South Korea tried to present Korean interpretation of and engagement in culture and tradition in a global context. The approach was not stopped at the level of rediscovery of South Korean culture and tradition, but related to the harmony
between West and East, and the concept of tradition in cutting-edge technology mixing cultural image and technological development.

Apart from organisation and infrastructure for the FIFA World Cup, we are also trying to create various festive atmospheres. Visitors from Spain will have a valuable cultural experience in Korea, which would be a once-in-a-lifetime chance. Foreign people can experience ancient traditions, palaces, and national heritage. However, I believe that not only traditional culture, but also Korea’s advanced modern culture, which encompasses from a high level of fashion, popular music, and art to advanced leisure culture, will provide many people with enjoyment. In fact, Korea is on the cutting edge of IT by remaining the world number one in Internet usage. These harmonies of the past and the present will deliver entertainment and amazement for World Cup tourists (Lee Yeon-Taek, speech in a Night of Korea for Spain on 28th January 2002, in Collection of Lee Yeon-Taek’s speeches issued by KOWOC, 2002: 81, translated from Korean).

In the presentation of past and present, and tradition and technology, construction of new stadiums was an illustrative example. The unprecedented process for the national construction of football stadiums was not a smooth process. The selected host cities had eagerly participated in the development of the local economy, in particular, in the globalisation of local identity, culture, and tradition. Although there were FIFA’s requirements about the construction of stadiums, and the KOWOC had also reflected on how Korea has to be presented to the world, and how Korea has to present the mega event in the architecture of the newly built stadiums.

The expert committee for construction has established a goal to construct stadiums, which not only satisfy FIFA’s requirements, but also embodies Korean tradition and aesthetics, since the committee thoroughly examined FIFA’s requirements and recommendations about stadia and considered the unique characteristics of ten host cities. For these, there was the following premise: ‘our stadia are constructed by our architects, our construction companies, and our technology’...these show that there was ambition to improve the building technology for the stadia taking this (construction of
When the IMF bailout situation in 1997 hit the country economically and morally in midst of the preparation for the 2002 FIFA World Cup, there was heated controversy about the justification over the construction of state-of-the-art stadia throughout the country, or as promoted in some political circles, the possibility of remodelling existing sport arenas to fit FIFA’s regulations on the FIFA World Cup stadiums. However, once the political circles decided to build the new stadiums around the nation, representation of the local identity, culture, and tradition through the architecture became noticeable:

An aerial view of the World Cup Main Stadium in Sang-Am-Dong of Seoul is reminiscent of a huge Bangpai-kite (shield kite). ‘I tried to materialise an image which flies wish for a wish to win, it flies the image and culture of Korea, and flies the wish of humanity and unification in new millennium’ said Ryu Chun-Soo, the president of E-Gong Construction, a design firm of the stadium…Configuration represents that the culture and history of our nation and hope of 21st century are like two ‘Palgagmoban(Octagonal Plates)’ that symbolise abundance on ‘Traditional Soban(Traditional small dining table)’…traditional roof and curved-line beauty of Korea are expressed…The image of Hwangpo-dotdae(Ocher sailboat) in Maponaru (Mapo-ferry) located on the Han river is projected as the image of the stadium to harmonise with its surroundings (Daily Finance Newspaper, 1st October 1998: 27, translated from Korean).
Traditional vocabulary such as ‘Palgagmoban, Soban, Hwangpo-dotdae, Maponaru’ were revived to materialise the construction of new stadia. Meanwhile, the stadia were also a showcase for Korea’s abilities in architecture, IT, and other technologies needed to build football stadia and to satisfy FIFA’s requirement. As a result, World Cup stadia throughout the country had significantly contributed to or responded to define the 2002 FIFA World Cup of Korea as more than a football event, but an event that harmonises the East and the West, and traditional values and modern technologies.

http://www.sisul.or.kr/global/eng/worldcup/worldcup01_03.jsp
In 1994, the Korea Football Association (KFA) produced a proposal about its plan to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Although hosting the football tournament was seen as beneficial to South Korean football, statements about the event from the Korean football governing body were produced as a part of the national development agenda. In the report, the KFA stated the objectives of hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup as follows:

1) Reinforcement of Korea’s international status; 2) Provision of a great opportunity for entering the line of developed nations in the 21st Century; 3) advancement of people’s consciousness and enhancement of national pride; 4) take off for a strong football nation in the world and vitalisation of Sport for All (KFA, in Hosting Plan of the 17th FIFA World Cup, 1994: 2, translated from Korean).

Interestingly, the first three objectives are very similar to the statements from political, economical, and social entities. From a sporting perspective, as sport had been a tool for the military regimes and even for democratic administrations, football development was primarily connected to the issues of infrastructure and the national team’s performance.

We much appreciate your kind consideration of bringing the first World Cup Games of the 21st Century to the Asia zone. We firmly believe that it will contribute to make the football enhanced evenly in every corner of the globe. Since the consideration in June 1990 of our candidacy for the World cup 2002, we Korea Football Association have been executing long term preparations to make our greatest dream come true. Those include further enhancement of the Korean football to the international standard and modernization of the facilities to the satisfaction of FIFA requirements (Correspondence from Chung Mong-Joon, KFA president to FIFA president, 1st June 1993).

Under the dominant catchphrase, ‘the 2002 FIFA World Cup must be successful for national prosperity’, the KFA had been interested in ‘the enhancement of the Korean football to the international standard and modernisation of the facilities’. Furthermore, the governments and parliament willingly considered to change regulations if there were
obstacles to preparing the mega-event, and invested available resources to produce satisfactory results of the national football team. This is reflected in the following statement of Cho Jung-Yeon, the executive director of the KFA.

First of all, the KFA could not properly deal with the concerns about facilities and lawn grounds. Also, it would be impossible to construct them without support from government and other authorities. For example, all countries that hosted the FIFA World Cup have their own Football Training Centre. Even, China and Japan, with which we can compete anytime for a ticket of the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games, have their own football training camp. These are built and operated not by the football associations but other institutes such as government…. The KFA is planning to operate ‘Special Supporting Task Force’ from May. The Task Force will discuss scientifically how the national team can produce satisfactory results, and support in terms of information and technique about world football when the KFA operates a standing player pooling system including national junior players for the 2002 World Cup (Cho Jung-Yeon, an executive director of the KFA, in minutes of 203rd National Assembly special committee for Supporting 2002 World Cup and Other International Sport Events, 26 April 1999: 16, translated from Korean).

Hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, football development had been discussed and shared by political and sporting institutions. The idea was that poor performance of the national football team should not distract from national development and the hosting of a successful FIFA World Cup on Korean soil. In particular, the scenario of the failure to win matches or to advance to the round-of-16, and the growth of Japanese football such as advancing to the finals in the 1999 FIFA Youth World Cup had pushed the KFA to seek every solution for South Korea. In this respect, not only short-term methods to boost national teams’ performance, but also long-term football strategies or policies had been initiated to develop South Korean football.

Discussions about change of South Korean football in a systematic way had always been in the South Korean football community. This included the transformation of the tournament of youth football into a league system and provision of a healthy environment
to youth football players were presented as a sound development strategy of football in South Korea. With the 2002 FIFA World Cup in only a few years, the KFA and K-League had tried to make it mandatory to operate youth football clubs under the hierarchy of individual professional football clubs. Several suggestions and proposals which had been only discussed in the pre-World Cup era were materialised step-by-step, allowing for the changes to be idealised in the atmosphere of hosting the FIFA World Cup. It seems that despite the economic crisis money was not an issue to put in place these changes:

“We decided that one million US Dollars as a support fund from FIFA is invested into youth football” said Cho Jung-Yeon, an executive director of the KFA (Kyung-Hyang Newspaper, 11th May 1999: 32, translated from Korean).

As the country tried to enter the club of advanced countries through the FIFA World Cup, South Korean football had to follow European football techniques to successfully compete with developed countries in the football festival. It was necessary that ‘Korean style football’ needed to combine with Western football skills and methods more than ever before. The KFA scouted Guus Hiddink, a football coach from Holland in 2000 as a national team coach by entrusting him with full powers, which had never been allocated to any coach in the past. In addition, some adult national players, junior players, and coaches had the chance to play and train in Western football clubs with full support of the KFA to achieve satisfactory results in the 2002 FIFA World Cup and to strengthen the players’ abilities and performance in a long-term perspective.

The reason why South Korea does not achieve good results in the FIFA World Cup, the Olympic Games, and the Youth FIFA World Cup is because Korean teams lag behind other Europeans and South Americans in skills and competence, even though we are recognised as a strong nation in Asia. Therefore, it is necessary to have young excellent players who have experienced advanced football skills and matches by sending them to foreign countries in the early stages (KFA, in a Report for the National Assembly about Improvement of National Team’s Performance for the 2002 FIFA World Cup and Policy of Football Development, issued by KFA, 1999: 6, translated by Korean).
In 2000, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the KFA, the K-League, and the KOWOC had announced a ‘joint statement to strengthen athletic performance of the national football team for the 2002 World Cup’. The joint statement comprised seven clauses: 1) Flexible military service of national team players; 2) Construction of National Football Centre (NFC); 3) Operation of 50 standing players pooling system; 4) Constant operation of training system for the national team; 5) Special compensation when advances to the first round at the 2002 FIFA World Cup; 6) Support to make the KFA corporation aggregate; and 7) the Government, the KFA, the KOWOC, and Korea Sports Promotion Foundation (KSPO) support the national football team financially for enhancing performance. The situation of the South Korean football team’s performance was described as a ‘crisis’ and an ‘emergency situation’. In a press conference, Kim Han-Gil, Minister of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism argued that:

We formed a certain consensus that Korean football which in this critical situation needs special action because the successful hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup is the request of the people. The government would give the best support possible to plans concerning the production of good results from the Korean national team (Kim Han-Gil, Minister of Ministry of Culture and Tourism, in Best Eleven, December 2000: 60, translated from Korean).

With the 2002 FIFA World Cup ahead and experiencing poor results in international competitions, various voices from media, football agents, academia, football coaches, and staff of the KFA had converged on the necessity of providing lawn grounds and the youth football system which will be beneficial to professional football and national football. When the football community felt the crisis, statements about ‘development from the basis’ emerged to ask the government, the KFA, and other institutions to invest into infrastructure and the youth football system, and to send young football players abroad.

In this respect, the expectation of hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup played the role of progressive motion to start significantly changing the picture of South Korean football. This does not necessarily mean that the KFA or South Korean government had given up the elite-centred sport policy. The changes have always started from the concerns about national football teams and their performance. However, the 2002 FIFA World Cup had
helped to start transforming Korean football development from the perspective of sound progress in all areas of football development.

This chapter explored South Korean football and society in various perspectives. Firstly, in terms of international relations with North Korea and Japan, football was a sensitive topic when it encountered some issues, such as sovereignty of the nations and colonial memories. Whilst strong nation and strong football were strongly promoted under the authoritarian regimes, different possibilities, such as brotherhood and cooperation in relations with the neighbours, also emerged. Even in the process, development of South Korean football was positioned as an important agenda for the government and the KFA. Modernisation of Korean football was discussed and initiated in various dimensions, such as the contemplation of players’ physique, invitation of foreign football coaches, argument of Korean style football, and the necessity of professionalisation of football. In particular, ‘to come close to a world level’ national teams and their performance were stressed, meanwhile sacrificing other elements throughout history. Furthermore, the governments and the KFA considered the hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup on Korean soil as an unprecedented opportunity to develop the nation, international relations, and football. In hosting the mega-event, relations with North Korea and Japan were still important, as were sensitive issues from political, economical, and social perspectives. The FIFA World Cup was also discussed in Korean society as a chance to express Korean culture, tradition, and development.
Chapter 5: Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the meanings of the research findings. In this respect, several theoretical viewpoints, such as macro, meso, and micro levels of discussion are reviewed. In the section of ‘Korean modernity and football development’, the consequence of conflicts and mediation in terms of international relations, and nation-building in a global context are examined. Secondly, postcolonial critique focusing on self-Orientalism and overcoming the peripheral condition is reviewed to find out how South Korean institutional discourse dealt with the contradictory concepts to promote national development. Foucault’s understanding of power/knowledge is applied to make sense of the meanings of change in South Korean football.

5.1 Korean modernity and football development

Since football was introduced as a modern sport in the Korean peninsula, football has been deeply involved in forming modern Korea. Symbolic rehabilitation and nation-building of Korea through football was a meaningful issue for the government and sporting institutions in the post-colonial context. In particular, as seen by one of the catchphrases of Park’s regime, “Modernisation of the Fatherland” (Lee, 2006: 63), discourse on football in Korea reflected the political, economical, and social interests on modernisation/development of the country.

As highlighted in the previous chapters, football in Korea was positioned as a visible mechanism to represent the nation’s strength and drive for modernisation. Institutional interests on industrial development shaped the concept of football development. Development of South Korean football was associated with the national teams’ performance. As South Korea’s industrial development was possible at the expense of other political, economical, and social domains (Chang, 1999), the discourse on football was thoroughly formed around the national teams. The necessity of football development for national prestige had enabled governments, the KFA, and Chaebols to justify their emphasis and investments on national football.
The country was barely tolerant of national humiliation of football, which was frequently described as a sign of ‘underdevelopment’ of Korean football. This position was also reproduced in some prominent media sources such as ‘Monthly Football’. Whilst dominant discourse on football development was formed in a boundary of the nation’s glory, different understandings of football development also emerged. In particular, experiencing transition from authoritarian regimes to democratisation, the notion of ‘a balanced development’ attracted more attention in institutional circles.

5.1.1 Discourse on conflicts and mediation

Football in South Korea and its relations with other Far East Asian countries could not have escaped the confrontational situation resulting from Japanese colonialism of the Korean Peninsula and historical rivalries with other countries in Far East Asia. Nation-building of Korea has been constructed around conflicts with neighbour countries in post-colonial and the Cold-War context. Symbolic representativeness for the nation was vested in football. In this respect, South Korean political and sporting entities viewed international relations in the football arena as a reflection of the rigid nationalist discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’.

In particular, this was the case when considering South Korea’s relation with North Korea. As a diplomatic tactic, South Korea tried to evade the encounter with North Korea even in the domain of sport. Affiliation of North Korea to FIFA and the AFC hierarchy, debates on official designation of the countries, and the North Korean flag and anthem in the sporting context were some of the dominant concerns of South Korea in the context of national division. The South Korean military regime could not recognise the existence of the North Korean regime in the Northern part of Korea. As Allison & Monnington (2002) explain about the role of sport diplomacy, South Korea tried to enjoy the enhancement of its images and its acceptance in the international community, whilst attempting to deny other nations through football diplomacy.

In this respect, international governing bodies such as FIFA and IOC intervened to mediate the situation by demanding, for instance, the possibility to form united teams for major competitions. Homburg (2006) understands that FIFA distinguishes sporting nations from
the concept of sovereignty in geo-political terms, which has allowed FIFA to deal with disputes in a more flexible manner. Homburg asserts that:

Sporting nations could develop and exist inside of a politically unified Empire or even inside of a nation state. The language of FIFA’s statutes was, so to speak, open for these peculiarities and fuzzy dynamics, the building of sporting nations, as it carefully avoided the term “sovereign state” or “state territory” and preferred to talk of “country” when defining the spatial reach and exclusive sporting control FIFA required of its members, the so-called national associations (Homburg, 2006: 86).

Along the endeavours of the international sport governing bodies, sudden political changes enabled them to create new relationships through football. From the handshakes between captains of the North and South Korean football team at the 1978 Bangkok Asian Games to the memorable South-North Unification Football Matches in 1990, football helped to transform the situation between the two countries. Whilst the political relations were in a deadlock, football was frequently considered as a medium to enable change.

Interestingly, the political and economical discourses tried to take advantage of the changed relations through football as tipping-points to achieve their intended goals. For instance, South Korea tried to use regional football tournaments as a new economic opportunity in the Northeast Asian era. When hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, South Korean sides positively produced statements for the possibility of co-hosting with North Korea, thus, giving hope to the people of a possible unification between North and South Korea.

5.1.2 Nation-building and football development

In a political field, the authoritarian regimes and even democratic governments made full use of sport in general, and football in particular, to legitimise not only the regime but also the nation’s project for development. The military regimes identified sporting successes as national achievements. The visibility of football in high-profile contexts helped the regime to produce positive languages on the nation and the people. Statements about, for instance,
‘strong nation’, ‘developed country’, and a ‘model country to other nations’ are good examples. ‘President Park’s Cup’ was another case, through which the government and the KFA unfolded the imagination as a national target.

However, due to the discrepancy between the imagined picture and the performances of national football teams on international stages, the institutional attention was focused on the production of best national teams and players. Presidents of the KFA justified the national team-centred policy orientations of the governing body, in which operation of football was dominated by discourse on achievement of football and national glory.

Since the military regimes were interested in promoting sports with unprecedented support, the KFA and South Korean football community (re) produced various statements on football development to realise competitiveness in world football. Multi-dimensional approaches were discussed and justified. For instance, promotion of and investment into young players, coaches, adult players and facilities were constantly discussed to develop Korean football. From the 1970s onward, business sectors emerged as a medium to effectively deliver the governments and the KFA’s interests on football.

The idea that Korean football was a few steps behind in world football helped the Korean football community to imagine how to develop Korean football and to mobilise its resources. In particular, amid consecutive failures on the international stages, some senior officials of the KFA presented slightly different approaches to achieve competitiveness of Korean football. Whilst some tried to define South Korean football based on their experiences and, glorifying their past, members of the KFA board, such as the KFA presidents, produced a more drastic diagnosis of Korean football.

I think Korean football was the Asian champion until 1954, but from the 1960s onward, Korean football constantly lags behind (underdeveloped). In terms of technique, there was no exertion for distinct long-term objectives. Even if there was an objective, there was no coherent promotion in terms of improving skills because of frequent changes of the KFA’s board members. I also think Asian people who are physically disadvantaged can conquer the world football with vigorous efforts because North Korea had shown a good performance in the 1966 England World Cup (Park Il-Kap, the former member of the KFA board
As Robertson (1992:27) argues about the characteristics of globalisation, the global phenomena are not just the outcome of a “western project of modernity” in South Korean football cases. Whilst Korea was being incorporated into the international football system, the South Korean football community looked at Korean style as possible alternatives for developing Korean football. In the influx of western knowledge and the affordability of investing materials for the acquisition of Western coaches, Koreans constantly questioned, debated, and reinterpreted the necessity of foreign coaching methods. The following comment of the KFA president reflects how the Korean football leaders engaged themselves in the negotiation.

We can establish a coaching system and realise unity of method if we adopt advanced skills from a foreign coach and initiate open forums to change those into the Korean style (Go Tae-Jin, the KFA president, in Monthly Football, 1974/January: 25, translated from Korean).

In the transition from authoritarian regimes to democratisation, football continued to contribute to the nation-building of Korea. In particular, preparing to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup, politico-economical rhetoric defined the football mega-event as an opportunity to further develop the country in the 21st Century. Shared statements on the meaning of hosting the FIFA World Cup were noticeably similar. Statements on economic impact of the mega event were politically reinforced to justify the mobilisation of national resources. The cultural image of the nation through the football competition strengthened the necessity and justification for hosting the FIFA World Cup on the Asian continent for the first time in FIFA history.

Football in the military regime and the mega event in democratic eras were barely debated outside the discourse of nation-building. Although the concept of ‘strong nation’ was replaced by that of ‘advanced nation’ in the democratic era, the regimes’ involvement in producing dominant discourses on football and national development continued, using similar strategies and propaganda.
5.2 Postcolonial critique: Orientalism and the (re) positioning of Korea

Postcolonial theories provided some imperative implications for understanding South Korean football. This study applied a postcolonial lens to investigate Korean football, which provided an opportunity to scrutinise football in South Korean society with a distinct focus on interpretation. Bale & Cronin (2003) emphasise that postcolonial theories can contribute to explain sports of former colonised countries. They stress that:

Among the iconic figures in postcolonial studies are Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak and Edward Said. The work of each of these scholars has relevance to sport; but they barely touch on it in their work. Bhabha’s notions of ‘hybridity’ and ‘mimicry’ have clear sporting applications, as do Spivak’s concern with letting the subaltern speak – i.e. finding a voice for the colonized other in relation to sport. The ideas in Edward Said’s (1995) almost canonized Orientalism can clearly be applied to sports (Bale & Cronin, 2003: 7-8).

Furthermore, this study explored how South Korean society (institutions) internalised colonial discourses such as Orientalism by promoting nation-building and football development. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that understanding South Korean football can involve ambivalent or contradictory interpretations.

5.2.1 Conceptualisation of the Self and the competitiveness in Korean football

Whilst modern sport was utilised as a means of resistance and national representation in the time of the Japanese rule, sports also helped to reinforce the notions of ‘the self’ and ‘the other’ in post-colonial Korea. For the national elites, Western sports in general and football in particular were a tool to modernise the nation and its people and to increase national power. This has been embodied in South Korea’s nationalist ideology to resist and to compete with Japan and the West (Ha & Mangan, 1994).

Western sport was considered as a means to overcome Koreans’ physical difference compared to Westerners. In 1920, the Korean magazine, Gaebyeok (the dawn of history)
published an article entitled “If you are a man, play football”, which emphasised that “if Chosun people play football, national physical defects could be cured because legs grow longer and stronger” (Gaebyeok, 1920/November, cited in Kang J, 2006: 27). Not just during the Japanese rule but also in the post-independence era, sport in general and football in particular played a role in presenting Korea’s excellence and superiority over the former colonial ruler, Japan.

Setting the sense of superiority in terms of race and culture aside, the Chosun people were overwhelming (Japanese) in terms of physique and strength. There was a strong determination not to lose in the world of sport in which people compete based on physical strength. In this respect, we can infer that this was the driving force behind the will to establish the Chosun Sport Council (Wo Ju-Hyung, a member of the KSC 70 Years History Compilation Committee, in Monthly Physical Education, 1990/July: 32, translated from Korean).

The post-independence era characterised by the Cold War era and military regime had defined South Korea’s relation with North Korea and Japan. Institutional discourse around nationalism in South Korea had been significantly formed in opposition to neighbouring countries. The South Korean football team dominated Asian football winning some prominent trophies such as the Asian Cup in 1956 and the Asian Youth Cup in 1959. These were celebrated as the moments to reconfirm the superiority of South Korea. Historical moments, in which Korean teams fought well against neighbour countries since the Japanese rule, were also emphasised by media (cf. Chosun newspaper, 21st March 1958: 4).

However, experiencing football recession in terms of the national teams’ performance from the 1960s (see Table 14), the Korean football community had revealed a different perspective of how they defined themselves and the others. Whilst Western athletes were described as “superhuman” (cf. Dong-A newspaper, 5th November 1964: 8), the fighting spirit and mental strength of Korean teams were powerfully stressed to compensate for the handicaps of South Korean football. South Korean football elite, Hong-Deok Young described in the following statement how the Korean team won the 2nd Asian Cup in 1960, especially the match with Israel.
It was an unprecedented event which was enough to touch spectators that all of the Korean players were full of fight having decisive determination and mental unity to win this competition…I think the Korean team obtained more effect than actual ability with their mental unity and fighting spirit (Hong Deok-Young\textsuperscript{31}, a member of referee committee of the KFA, in Dong-A newspaper, 26\textsuperscript{th} October 1960: 2, translated from Korean).

Nevertheless, the “indigenous” bodies needed to be trained and disciplined by western methods. Although FIFA tried to inject standardised coaching skills and football technique to the periphery, the KFA and Korean football community carefully tried to import European coaches. However, the idea was resisted by some South Korean coaches who had different viewpoints on how to modernise Korean football. Under these circumstances, the emergence of the so-called ‘Korean style of football’ represented a discursive position of South Korean football community, between western infusions and Korean authenticity. On the one hand, the invitation of foreign coaches had been possible with the belief that they could deliver advanced football knowledge and skills for South Korean football. On the other hand, the idea that Korean football could not be developed by foreigners due to Korea’s cultural differences and experiences of football was also present.

5.2.2 Self-Orientalism vs. overcoming peripheral conditions

In postcolonial theories, Orientalism described as a Western look on uncivilised lands and people, Orient, and has been formed as one of the powerful discourses to define and to treat the Orient. Sport has also been a terrain of Orientalist discourse. Orientalism as a system of knowledge and powerful discourse has projected a specific vision and, value about the Orient. However, South Korean society had also shown how the former-colonised society internalised Orientalism as a lens of their reflection of self and others. In developing South Korean football, self-Orientalism was one of the impetuses to promoting change in South Korean institutional approaches toward football.

\textsuperscript{31} Hong Deok Young (1926-2005) was a national goalkeeper during the 1948 London Olympic Games and the 1954 Switzerland FIFA World Cup. He served as an international referee (1957-1969), a national team coach (1971), a chairman of the referee committee of the Asian Youth Cup (1971-1972), and a vice-president of the KFA (1985-1987). He was inducted into the KFA Hall of Fame in 2005 (KFA, 2005).
As mentioned previously, amid the industrial development, Korean people became the fuel and object of modernisation in the Korean society. South Korean football players were also asked to become standardised and modernised. In particular, the shortcoming in international stages provided opportunities to justify discussions about South Korean football including the morphology of Korean players. In particular, the KFA took interest in players’ bodies by categorising them into ‘desirable’ and ‘non-desirable’. Their interest in bodies was an attention-grabbing phenomenon in terms of how Korea responded to/ or internalised their experiences in the international football context. Idealisation of the Western body was manifested in the South Korean football context and, simultaneously, Orientalism was re-inscribed in the Korean society. Modernisation of football, to some extent, was promoted by the necessity to resemble (Western) physique whilst despising inferior Korean footballers’ bodies.

The discourse of self-Orientalism was not limited to bodies, but also casted on the rhetoric of South Korea’s football development. Whilst South Korea enjoyed romanticised history and success of Korean football in the process of nation-building, traditional approaches supported by South Korean football elites were challenged by other discourses. In particular, the disappointing performance of national football teams enabled new statements about the ways to advance football development. Under these circumstances, Korean methods and approaches were disregarded and replaced with so-called scientific methods and Western knowledge on football. The dichotomy of superior Western coaching and playing methods and the inferiority of Korean methods was adopted to promote the reform of football. Under these circumstances, the role of business conglomerates, Chaebols, was naturally presented to lead Korean football development. The Chaebols were asked to invest their funds, management know-how, and infrastructure to ‘modernise’ Korean football.

In relation to the hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, institutional discourse reflected self-Orientalism of the people. Government, civic groups, and leadership expressed their concerns over the general public’s abilities and lack of civility toward other cultures and visitors. In an open forum for the ‘Culture World Cup’ held by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the director of Korea Arts and Culture Education Service (KACES) directly highlighted these concerns:
Now, we are in a situation where we can do a stern self-analysis and self-criticism. It is very questionable whether or not we have a self-managing ability in ethics, courtesy and public order, whether we behave with an arrogant attitude by disguising distorted values as true values, whether we have a weak foundation to deal with the impact, acceptance, and conflict revolving around foreign cultures due to lacks of cultural independence, and whether we properly found the ability to ecologically manage the environment under our lack of understanding of environmental problems. In one word, I feel that our abilities to manage our lives and society culturally remain at the level of zero (Mun Deok-Su, a director of KACES, in Grand Forum of Hosting Culture World Cup issued by Ministry of Culture and Sport & Korea Cultural Policy Institute, 1996: 68, translated from Korean).

Meanwhile, promoting Korean football development and hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup became an endeavour to overcome the peripheral position of Korea in the world context. Paradoxically, the self-Orientalism created an opportunity to imagine and to design the future of Korean football as well as Korean society. South Korea celebrated the 2002 FIFA World Cup as a win-win cooperation for the prosperity of humanity in the 21st Century. South Korea’s efforts to transcend the past and present situations and to re-build a new Korea seemed to be based on hybridity, flexibility, acceptance, and balance rather than imperialistic pillage, imposition, and exclusion. South Korean leadership had positioned the 2002 FIFA World Cup as the showcase for this new paradigm, not only for Korea but for East Asia at large:

Until now, Korea and Japan do not have any experience of a joint enterprise in which both countries’ people participated as true neighbours. In that sense, I think that this World Cup co-hosting will be a test of good-neighbourliness. Also, Korea and Japan need to optimise ethical virtue, values, and traditions of the East. Namely, this is a golden opportunity to confirm the excellence of Asian culture. Therefore, we have to contribute to cure the minds of modern men which has been devastated by ills of material civilisation, and to make a new paradigm of prosperity and happiness. In this respect, there is great meaning in co-hosting the FIFA World Cup by Korea and Japan (Lee Yeon-Taek, speech for Cooperation Committee of Korea and Japan on 6th November
To be accepted into the close circle of advanced countries, South Korean government and leadership initiated a nation-wide movement such as a nation-wide clean toilet building campaign to change people’s attitude and behaviour. The catchphrase ‘kindness, order, cleanliness’ had to be achieved for the success of the mega-sport event. Interestingly, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games had showed similar orientation of a national campaign, which was also not much different to Park Chung-Hee’s military regime sport policy.

The president ordered that the organising committees and Ministry of Culture and Public Relations in union have to consistently promote the meaning and effect of the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and create expectation about becoming an advanced country after successful hosting of the Games. The events have to be an opportunity for historical take-off through the improvement of international credibility and increase of merchandise export. In addition, the institutions make people eliminate inferiority toward foreigners through education of national identity and establishing an image of dignified Korea by promoting easily understandable language and not using foreign words such as ‘Smile Undong’ (Smile Campaign) (The Presidential Secretariat, 1981: 123, referred in Lee, 1994: 184, translated from Korean).

The self-Orientalism and the related nationalist ideology can be understood as peculiar Korean interpretation of themselves in the process of nation-building. In particular, the institutional depiction of the nation and the people was sometimes contradictory and ambivalent. Contradicting discourses on bodies, people and the Korean society coexisted and competed under the flag of ‘national development’. Nevertheless, South Korea constantly negotiated its autonomy as an industrialised and dominant nation in the Far East Asia which, for instance, was also epitomised in the process of building infrastructure for the World Cup (cf. KOWOC, 2003). Even though the event had no choice but to represent Western value, South Korea wanted to stage the global event but with Korean technology, Korean architectural skills, Korean traditional value, and images of civilised, matured, and developed Korea.
5.3 Discourse, power and South Korean football

In Foucauldian discourse analysis, recognising what is sayable and visible is an imperative step to defining the formation of knowledge. As Foucault (1980) argued, our knowledge is governed by a “regime of truth” which, in other words, is understood as discourse in a specific time and space. Discourse has dictated ‘what can be said and viewed’ in the specific period of time, which also delimits our discourse.

5.3.1 Archaeology of knowledge and the development of football

In the era of decolonisation in the region of Far East Asia, South Korean society considered football as a political, economical, and social issue. The governments, the KFA, and the media had actively produced statements on Korean football and formed specific discourse about its historical significance. In particular, football was conceptualised as a proxy-war in the Cold-War era to legitimise the production of strong national teams and players. The governments and the KFA were able to capitalise on national football to build the nation as a ‘sovereign’, ‘strong’, and ‘developed’ country.

During the era of military regimes, football was a visible tool to conceptualise South Korea’s project for ‘development’. In football, players’ physique was an object of South Korean football discourse. The bodies were highlighted because they were another aspect of football development. Westernised bodies and performance of national teams had been a barometer of football development. Under the circumstances, South Korean football had no chance to cultivate its interests in, for instance, women’s football development or development of football at a grassroots level.

In 1970, the KFA presented a new catchphrase ‘Korean football toward the world’s top’. It was an important moment for South Korean football for the following reasons a) the way that the KFA president and his staff were positioned to reflect the regime’s propaganda directly in their football policy; b) the development of football was associated with world class performance and results in international competitions.
I would expect that Asian football will conquer the football world by sweeping over Europe and the Americas, showing excellent performance of our players as a result of fighting well for the honour of the country (The President Park Chung-Hee, 1968, National Online Archive, in a speech of 14th Asian Youth Cup in 1968, translated from Korean).

The discursive practice, by which football was said in the boundary of national development and glory became more sophisticated in the transition from the authoritarian era to democratisation. Frequent encounters with North Korea, Japan, and other countries and the opportunities from the 1970s had contributed to changing some concepts such as ‘enemy’ and ‘competition’ into ‘brotherhood’ and ‘cooperation’ in the regional context. However, in seeing international football competitions as possible stages on which the Korean team can make an impression, development of football as a discourse did not show much difference in comparison with the past. Although the emergence of business sectors in the South Korean football context contributed to the shift toward the rationalisation (in a managerial sense) and commercialisation of football, the Chaebol could not operate their football outside the discourse of ‘national football development’ and ‘development of Korea’.

It does not necessarily mean there was no resistance against the conception of football development which was promoted in a narrow sense. Firstly, Chaebol sides which owned (semi) professional football clubs had stated that football should be developed revolving around domestic football teams and leagues. In presenting different conceptions of Korean football development, the business sides also came into conflict with the KFA, for instance, on the matter of players and their duty to the nation.

The South Korean football community made up of football players, coaches, and referees resisted the national team centred football development and related football policy and practices. Statements from the community emphasised the importance of youth football, education of young players, and development of infrastructure, demanding Chaebols’ long-term investment in locals.

Throughout history, the concept of football development has been formed in relation to the performance of national football teams by scarifying other elements. However, in the
transition from authoritarian regimes to democratisation or from industrialisation to market economy, different conceptions of football development were also possible, hence welcoming other voices in the discursive practice around football. Following Foucault’s perspective (1972) it could be argued that the changes in Korean football were not about revolution but about transformation. In this process of transformation, previous discourse on the neighbour countries, organisation of national football, and the role of business sectors witnessed the emergence of contested discourse about the modernisation of football which somehow reflected the transformation and the democratisation of South Korean society.

5.3.2 Genealogy of power, football, and South Korean society

Foucault (1980: 98) argued that knowledge is inextricably linked with power which is not possessed by specific subjects but exercised as “net-link organisation”. Knowledge/power is dispersed even to peoples’ lives and their bodies, by which subjects are also products of discourse being positioned and bounded in the knowledge and power nexus. Furthermore, Ritzer (1997) explains, that the nexus of knowledge and power can bridge the past history with recent social phenomena in Foucauldian research tradition. In the study on modern Western society, Foucault argues that the aspect of disciplinary and bio power would be one of noticeable phenomena to explain our modern world.

In South Korea, the idea of controlling Korean players’ bodies extended to societal spheres. When South Korea presented its first international football tournament: President Park’s Cup, governments and the KFA defined the people as ‘good people’ or ‘kind people’ who were supposed to behave and follow the rules of society. Also, the presentation of the competition (President Park’s Cup) focused on how the nation and the people were in control. As Hall (2011) explains, the discourse circulated through various discursive spaces. In relation to South Korea, Presidents’ speeches, interviews of football authorities, statements from conferences/forums, policy documents, and media articles were the place to produce the notion of good people as a condition to host international events.

In the democratic era, forming knowledge and exercising power on the people through football events was repeated in a slightly different manner. In the process of bidding,
hosting, and presenting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, South Korea had pursued various values and meanings in the post-military and globalisation context. Cultural and traditional values were promoted on purpose by socio-political leadership. Interestingly, whilst the national development in the new era was initiated and founded by the confidence in national culture and rediscovery of traditional values, the nation and the people were observed and defined as those who needed to change morally and behaviourally to make the country an advanced nation in all aspects. In particular, discourse on change to enter the line of developed countries had the nation and the people positioned to be disciplined and exercised by power. Knowledge on culture and tradition in a global context had simultaneously exercised power on peoples who were supposed to be modernised, advanced, and matured for the accomplishment of the national mission.

First of all, we have to focus on cultural awareness of advanced people whilst people mature culturally. To become a developed country, a high national income is not enough, but rather mature civic awareness suitable for economic success must also exist. We can call it an advanced country when streets are clean and beautiful and people are well-ordered and kind. Our people have to significantly improve their civic awareness in an advanced way in preparing for the 2002 FIFA World Cup. I think concerning this, that civic awareness should be improved as the cultural level of people becomes improved. This is generally achieved by using cultural methods, rather than the government simply exercising control or forcing people to follow (Kim Young-Soo, Minister at the Ministry of Culture and Sport, in Grand Forum of Hosting Culture World Cup issued by Ministry of Culture and Sport & Korea Cultural Policy Institute, 1996: 12, translated from Korean).

There is fair rule in sport games. Only ability determines the outcome of the game. As a result, the winner is praised and the loser accepts it. The FIFA World Cup is a global festival based on fair rules. We will be unqualified for hosting the World Cup if we do not dispel anarchism of code of conduct in preparing for the festival (Mun Deok-Su, a director of KSCES, in Grand Forum of Hosting Culture World Cup issued by Ministry of Culture and Sport & Korea Cultural Policy Institute, 1996: 75-76, translated from Korean).
The governments and leaderships gazed (regarded) the nation and people as having just escaped from military regimes, having no chance to build a sound civil society, and needing to change their attitude and behaviour to the level of developed countries. The 2002 World Cup was defined as a good opportunity to develop people as good civilians whilst trying to advance the nation. Government departments and the KFA had produced statements about the production of sound people and civil society as one of the objectives of promoting and preparing for the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Korea and Korean peoples diagnosed as uncivil, undeveloped, and inferior to Japanese and Westerners should not be obstacles to successfully hosting the sport competition under the discourse of national development and the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Under these circumstances, the society adopted some mechanisms to exercise power on the people as Foucault (1980) explained in his work on discourse as a mechanism of surveillance in modern society.

5.3.3 National civil movement, visible stadia and the 2002 FIFA World Cup

Since Korea and Japan were selected as hosting countries for the 2002 FIFA World Cup, the South Korean government, civic groups and leaders had initiated a nation-wide campaign to produce a better (cleaner) environment and atmosphere for the best global event on the Asian Continent. In particular, the National Council of Better Korea Movement 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea-Japan (NCBKM), which was supported by the government, had organised and unfolded some national campaigns beginning in 1997. The NCBKM, presenting the catchphrase ‘Kindness, Order, and Cleanliness’ worked on various campaigns to boost the World Cup atmosphere and to change people’s attitude and behaviour.

Our committee has been unfolding a ‘culture and citizen campaign’ to help the successful hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup through the creation of national-scale participation and cultivation of cooperating civic community spirit, having the World Cup, a golden opportunity of our national prosperities ahead. We are developing and operating various civil education programmes to make foreigners feel and learn about our matured civic dignity, which has been fostered by kindness, order, and cleanliness (Lee Yung-Dug, a president of National council of Better Korea Movement, in Committee of Supporting 2002
When the NCBKM, chaired by the former Prime Minister, was initiated, some of the opposition party members had doubted the characteristics and, if any, political intentionality. From a political perspective, because the NCBKM for the nation-wide movement was created with a presidential election a few months before, some MPs had seriously questioned the background and funding of the joint venture movement of the government and some civic groups. Some of the arguments were about the ability of the nation and people who can do well without the government funded national movement.

Our people have enough civic awareness to voluntarily promote campaigns for order and movement of community spirit for the World Cup. People themselves participate in voluntary works or movements. We did successfully host the Seoul Olympic Games and did well in terms of public order. Our civic awareness has matured. However, we are in a situation of selecting host cities at a level of preparation for the 2002 FIFA World Cup, for which are several years left. At this moment, is this organisation such an urgent matter that it requires campaigning a public order movement with national budget support? (Park Gwang-Tae, a member of parliament, in Supporting 2002 World Cup and Other International Sport Events, in minutes of 185th National Assembly special committee session, 23 October 1997, translated from Korean).

One of the most striking campaigns of the NCBKM would be the ‘Nation-Wide Clean Toilet Building Campaign’. For the movement, the NCBKM had hosted various public hearing, seminars, and competitions for awards to encourage local governments and public institutions to build clean and comfortable toilets around the country. In conjunction with campaigns about people's behaviour, the campaigners thought that the new toilets can make people use public toilets in a clean and reasonable manner.

With our staff, I continued to make huge efforts to keep our public toilets cleaner and more comfortable. I admit that any nation cannot have the cleanest public toilets within a day, but fortunately, our people are too self-conscious to...
change our toilets culture within a very short period of time. In order to sustain such a desirable change for our toilet culture, however, every one of us needs to be more concerned about our toilets than before, spending more to have better toilets. Indeed, we are staging such a campaign not simply to show ourselves off to our guests, but to improve our society to live in and make ourselves more decent. Nevertheless, the 2002 World Cup may well be a good opportunity for us to establish our advanced toilet culture on our soil (Lee Yung-Dug, a president of National council of better Korea Movement, the former PM, in ‘Beautiful Toilettes’ issued by NCBKM, 2000: 7, translated from Korean).

Governments, social groups, and leaders had categorised and diagnosed the nation’s situation, questioning whether Korea deserved to host the football event or whether Korea could finish it successfully. To become a developed country, to give good impressions to other countries, or even to govern the nation, the underdeveloped nation and people had to be kind, well-ordered, and even clean. The architecture and the image projected an award for the desirable behaviour and punishment for the opposite. The punishment was not imprisonment but fear of failure of becoming a desirable developed country and to survive in a competitive international context.

For the 2002 FIFA World Cup, South Korea had constructed ten new stadiums around the country. The mega-structures had become symbols of football development, national confidence and local development. Projecting local image, culture, traditions, and technology, the stadia were constructed and ready to welcome the global football population. As the delayed process of selecting hosting cities and building stadia was one of the concerns for the government, politicians, the KFA and media, the modern architecture was considered as an imperative factor for staging the FIFA World Cup.

If we prepare good accommodations for foreign visitors and make an outstanding operating plan for the event after the satisfactory construction of the stadia, this is already half the success of hosting the FIFA World Cup. I think these parts won’t be a problem because the KOWOC and the KFA are well prepared. However, the FIFA World Cup is not an event which is judged on success or failure only by the operating aspect. It is also important to show
cultural civility with participation of the whole people. Players are not just national team players who play in stadia. People are another players who show the splendid behaviour of cultural people outside the stadia (Lee Yeon-Taek, a joint chairman of the KOWOC, in Dong-A newspaper, 14th January 2001, translated from Korean).

Whilst South Korean technology on material perspectives and traditional heritage was positively reviewed, statements revolving around the football mega-event were produced and reproduced to make it true that the FIFA World Cup is an unprecedented opportunity to build a developed and sound nation. Discourse on economic effects of the event had persuasive power to convince governments and the KFA of the importance of the event. The discourse about the must-be-successful mega event returned its gaze on the people. In Foucault’s terms, the knowledge/power was not possession of individuals but it produced and circulated other forms of productivity in everyday lives (Foucault, 1980). Nation-wide construction of beautiful toilets and state-of-art stadiums, on which the nation’s ambition was projected, played the role of a machine used to produce a modernised vision of South Korea.

This chapter argues that modern Korea and football can be understood as a complex interaction of varied knowledge. In the post-colonial context, issues on nation-building and international relations provided a rationale for ‘why Korean football had to be strong on international stages’. In this respect, change and development of Korean football was discussed, and it started revolving around national teams. In terms of ‘truth game’, strong national teams were strongly reminded, throughout history, that ‘South Korea is a strong nation’. In the process, players’ bodies became at the centre of debates around the necessity of Western knowledge versus Korean style of football. Interestingly, self-Orientalism had motivated various discussions and change to overcome the peripheral conditions of South Korean football. In particular, governmental sides tried to use football and the 2002 FIFA World Cup event, as an opportunity to define the nation and to govern the people.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis sought to understand meanings of change in Korean football, and thus in Korean society through the study of football. Using various lenses, this research investigates how notions of change in South Korean football – in the sense of development, modernisation reform, and resistance to external influences— have been constructed in Korea. In particular, this study stressed that discourse revolving around nation-state building, Korean identity and even Korean bodies are meaningful ways to explore the development of South Korean football and South Korean society. As a concluding section, this chapter revisits historical and theoretical issues and summarises the main findings of this research.

6.1 Historical overview of Korea and Korean football

South Korea experienced various political, economical and social changes since the independence in 1945. Liberation from Japanese colonial control, division of nations, and national poverty led South Korea to deal with the issues as political or national agendas.

Since the liberation in 1945, Korea suffered from poverty which was worsened by the Korean War and political insecurity. In this context, overcoming colonial experiences was also an important concern for the political leaders. Football in South Korea was symbolised as an important window to express Korean identity and to confirm the status of Korea in the international community. For instance, during the Rhee Syngman regime in the case of ‘prohibition of entry of Japanese football players’ and the ‘issue of North Korea’s affiliation to FIFA’, we can understand that sport (football) was directly used as a tool for nation-building in the post-colonial context.

From the 1960s onward, military regimes dominated every South Korean stratum to strengthen national power and to escape national poverty. The Park Chung-Hee regime earnestly promoted industrialisation and export-led economy by supporting Chaebols politically and economically. As a result, South Korea could accomplish the rapid growth in terms of industries and national economy whilst other demands such as political
democratisation were suppressed by the regime. In these periods, South Korean football had changed its characteristics by accepting politicians and business groups as presidents of the KFA and partners. Whilst the positions of political elites were reflected in the operations of Korean football, business groups were also involved to develop Korean football. In particular, since the emergence of Chaebols, which acted as an important stakeholder in South Korean football, the KFA could afford various attempts to change South Korean football into more acceptable levels and to the standards of international football. In this respect, the invitation of foreign coaches and the inauguration of the professional league were discussed and enabled in the South Korean football context.

Since the so-called ‘June Popular Uprising’ in 1987, South Korea could accomplish political democratisation, which also helped to make economical and social transitions possible. Political reform was inevitable for the civilian Presidents (Kim Youn-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung), who also unfolded various economical and social changes responding to demands of social liberalisation nationally and market-opening pressure internationally. Although South Korea celebrated its political and economical successes in the democratisation era, however, South Korea also had to face an economic crisis (i.e. IMF bailout in 1997). In terms of football, the governments and the KFA promoted hosting the FIFA World Cup from the early 1990s as a more effective way to incorporate South Korea into the global environment. Meanwhile, the KFA and professional league had shared ideas about the necessity of football development and, simultaneously, conflicted on how to deliver the development or change.

As seen previously, South Korea and South Korean football sought changes to survive various political and economical turbulences. In particular, football in South Korea constantly tried to change its relation with other nations, the operations of its national football, and presentation of Korea in the international arena, while Korean society was experiencing historical, political, and economical transitions. In this respect, exploring changes in South Korean football would be a meaningful way to understand Korean football and Korean society as well. In addition, it is also important to know how the concept of change had been constructed and positioned in South Korean institutions such as governments and the KFA, so as to reflect on the implications of history and societal dynamics on South Korean football development.
6.2 Theoretical considerations and contributions

The main contribution of theories would be that the theories make sense of exploring specific social phenomena. To provide theoretical foundation for the investigation of South Korean football, this research engaged with modernity and critiques to modernity, including postcolonial debates at macro-level, and globalisation, international relations and political/policy perspectives at meso-level.

Since the liberation from Japanese colonialism, building a modern country was an important concern for South Korea. In particular, modernisation of Korean through nationwide industrialisation was a practical way for South Korea to realise a strong and modern nation. Rationality, which is one of the core values of modernity, was manifested in Korea by rethinking traditional ideas and practices such as Confucianism, and by pursuing material affluence. However, the process to realise modern South Korea was riddled with ambivalence. Whether or not South Korea became a modern country, South Korea is also experiencing various postmodern phenomena in ideas, art, and peoples’ lives.

In this respect, postcolonial critique unfolded a new perspective to investigate how South Korea built the nation in relation to the legacies of colonialism and decolonisation. Considering postcolonial critique as one of the main theoretical perspectives is important to understanding South Korea and South Korean football for the following reasons:

1) ‘Othering’ was a serious process for South Korea when the nation was concerned about nation-building in post-colonial context of Cold War and in relation to its neighbouring countries. ‘Others’ were also the people who according the military regimes needed to be ‘educated’ and ‘controlled’.

2) Occidentalism and Orientalism provided useful interpretations on how Korea internalised the concepts or practices to accept Western knowledge and to deny Korean tradition and culture.

3) Because postcolonial critique deals also with contradictory and ambivalent perspectives of nation-building of South Korea. Resistance against others (Japan and West) is also making sense of the way South Korea responded to certain international relations and changes during the building of the nation.
This research also considered globalisation, international relations, and politics/policy as discourses to explain our modern societies and sports. Globalisation explains the phenomena of homogenisation around the world overcoming the boundary of nations, which is also the case for global sports. Today, football games such as the FIFA World Cup can be understood as a product of the supra-national governing body, FIFA, which acts like an engine to diffuse the global sport. Nevertheless, globalisation as a discourse also allows us to investigate the response of locals in the form of resistance, acceptance, or hybridity.

Debates on International relations are useful in explaining the role of football in South Korea. Sport (football) was a diplomatic tool positioned at some important moments such as the Cold War era and détente era. The various utilities of sports in international relations helped to explain South Korean football in the international football context.

Furthermore, politics/policy illuminate how sport is affected by national politics and related policies. Sport, in particular, can be strategically used by politicians or governments to deliver specific purposes, such as promoting national health and international prestige. The location of football in political agendas and the usage of football by politicians and governments are important points to investigate because of the significance of their attitude or decisions toward sports and the nation.

6.3 Methodological considerations

This research adopted social constructionism as an ontological position to provide a sound foundation for exploring Korean football and Korean society. Furthermore, the epistemological position of this study was informed by Foucauldian discourse analysis. In particular, Foucauldian discourse analysis provided a useful theoretical and analytical foundation to investigate South Korean football as a product of a discourse. Whilst constructionism as an ontological position stresses that reality is constructed by interaction of subjects and objects, Foucault’s epistemological questions on truth opens up the possibility for our knowledge to be recognised and investigated in a boundary of discourse.
In this case, this thesis positioned Foucauldian discourse analysis as not only a theoretical position but also a method(ology) of data analysis.

This research investigated documents about South Korean football which were produced by institutions such as FIFA, KFA, South Korean governments, and media. It utilised “object”, “subject”, and “concept” of “discursive formation” (Foucault, 1972) to analyse historical documents, which guided us to explore what happened and how they happened in South Korean football.

Applying Foucault in this thesis meant two ways of understanding change in South Korean football. In an archaeological perspective, change could be revealed based on the emergence of (new) discourse formation. For instance, this research focused on how South Korea constructed its nation, and its football, through the process of ‘othering’ of North Korea and Japan. It also identified that colonial experience and the by-product such as division of North and South Korea has significantly influenced in the course of the nation-building of South Korea. Meanwhile, different concepts on otherness, such as transformation of the concepts from enemy to brotherhood, could explain how changes occurred discursively in the South Korean (football) context.

In addition, while Foucault reveals discourse about body, questioning the modernity of Western society, this thesis tried to understand how discourse on modernisation had powerfully dominated South Korean society. This study argues that the nexus of knowledge and power, which was formed around the ‘national development’ agenda in modern Korea, had provided a rationale for governments to promote changes and to control and modernise the nation, the people and football.

The quest for knowledge on changes of South Korea and football was also a process to define my position as a researcher. I, as a South Korean and researcher, realised that I was already a product of these different discourses, from a Foucauldian perspective. Studying Korean football was a changing process of my identity as a Korean and a Korean researcher who can see the Korean society and sport in a critical and reflective manner.
6.4 Emerging Debates

6.4.1 Rationalisation/modernisation of Korean society and Korean football

This study explored how ‘change of Korean football has been conceptualised, legitimised, and manipulated in the South Korean context. Whist development of the nation was associated with authoritarianism (especially, during the Park Chung-Hee regime), it is also clear that development of football was discursively presented throughout history so as to be presented as a significant figure in the society. In this respect, the national aim ‘to be a strong nation’ has always been projected through the operation of South Korean national teams and the staging of football mega-events such as the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Even in relations to ‘others’, the rivalry and antagonism in football had to be sublimated into cooperation to secure an image of a civilised nation. Changes in international relations were also intertwined with the discourse on modernisation of football in Korea.

Korean body, Korean football, and modernisation

The Korean body was reviewed in the institutional circle as a consequence of South Korea’s national agenda, namely, ‘modernisation’ of the nation and football. In particular, in the consecutive failures in international football competitions (since the 1960s), discussions about morphology or physical ability of Korean football players emerged in the Korean football community as an official statement. Western bodies was idealised and the Korean body was blamed for the inability of showing superiority of Korea and projecting modern Korea. The emphasis on autochthonous bodies had an influence on national football policy, including the criteria of selecting national football players.

Accepting Western knowledge on modern football was discussed and implemented in similar manner. Scouting foreign coaches, mostly European, was a popular option to implant Western football knowledge into the Korean football context. Although the recruitment was planned and promoted by the KFA, Korean football coaches had different arguments about the development of Korean football. ‘Korean style football’ emerged as a
way to celebrate the excellence of Korean football on international stages and also to defend its authentic characteristics.

Some can argue that the endeavour of developing Korean football resulted in amalgamation of Korean and Western cultures. Through experiencing the level of world football, mimicking Western bodies and adopting Western knowledge would have been inevitable in order to catch up with dominant nations in football. However, discussions about the ‘Korean way’ and constant re-interpretation of the Korean tradition such as coaching methods could be understood as Korean football community responses to globalisation and international football.

The Korean way or Korean tradition was also presented as an aesthetic value. In particular, the endeavour to revive Korean tradition in the process of modernising South Korean football was more tangible when South Korea hosted the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Presenting Korean values and aesthetics became important features for Korea’s national and football developments. This was illustrated in the architectural design of the World Cup stadiums. The society highly valued the several elements of Korean value and tradition which provided a creative motif for the construction of the new infrastructures for the FIFA World Cup and South Korean football. The football World Cup provided an opportunity to rediscover not only the significance of globalisation, but also Korean culture and tradition.

*Professionalisation and the emergence of chaebols*

Modernising Korean football and rationalising the operation of (national) football were increasing concerns for the central government and the KFA as the role of football increased nationally and internationally. Voices of those who had administrative experiences in government, financial industry, and manufacturing industry started to substitute amateur operations in the KFA. It was claimed to be an urgent necessity to change Korean football to survive in the increasingly competitive international football environment, by leaving behind past glory and amateurism.
Various voices about football development were expressed in a specific medium such as ‘Monthly Football’. The KFA also reflected the opinions in its business plan to develop Korean football scientifically and systematically. Coincidentally, FIFA operated some programmes to support Asian football development, such as the FIFA Coaching School, to which the KFA dispatched Korean coaches. Nevertheless, the emergence of Chaebol in Korean football industry had a significant impact. Until the 1970s, the systematic development from grassroots to national teams was discussed as *sine qua non* condition for developing football, although, without any specific progresses. From the 1980s, the KFA and Chaebols inaugurated their own professional teams and formed a professional league.

Modernisation of Korean football took a new turn in terms of commercialisation and professionalisation. The knowledge on football development and the powerful emergence of Chaebols in these transitions achieved South Korean football’s break-up with amateurism in administration synonymous for some of underdevelopment. Moreover, in terms of financial capacity and infrastructure, the involvement of Chaebols in Korean football was indispensable to producing fine national football players and to improve competitiveness of Korean football. Although the military regime in the 1970s directly involved national football by creating the Yang-Gi team to produce strong national teams, the roles of business partners were infinite in comparison with the role of government. Under these circumstances, from the 1980s, the heads of big companies were more preferable for the presidents of the KFA than politicians.

The KFA has been deeply involved in the creation of professional teams and the league because professionalisation was discussed in South Korean football community as the only answer to the improvement of national teams’ performance. Meanwhile, Chaebols helped Korean football in transforming organisations and the operations into more professional entities and activities. Commercialising football was a new concept in South Korean football industry and Chaebols tried to make the best use of this opportunity for its own business interests.

The KFA and the business sides often came into conflict over the approach toward the development of domestic football the operation of national football teams. Sacrificing Chaebols’ interests for the higher national interest was dominant demand of the government and the KFA. This was evident in the case of the atypical operation of the
professional league before and during the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Furthermore, constant debates on the roles of professional teams and league also pushed Chaebols to act as facilitator for South Korean’s football development and improving national teams’ performance, rather than to take a lead in promoting the development of football.

The 2002 Korea/Japan FIFA World Cup and development of Korea

Hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup was an important occasion in defining national development in the democratisation era. National ambition to become an advanced country was projected throughout the preparation to the hosting stages of the mega-event, in utilising national heritage and tradition as one of the imperative factors. Governments, politicians, the KFA, and media recognised in the football mega-event as a rare opportunity to upgrade national image, economy, and confidence in the 21st century. Hence, to join the ranks of advanced countries.

Football throughout history has been utilised to unite the nation in the postcolonial era, to mobilise resources for presenting a good image of the country, and to convince people of development as a national aim. Hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup was no exception. In addition, experiencing the IMF bailout, the logic of economic benefits of the mega-event and the role of national unity were supported and shared by political and social leaders. In particular, introducing outstanding characteristics of Korea and Korean football to the world audiences was considered as an indispensable process for the nation.

From government’s point of view, however, the excellence was not only demanded of players but also required of the people. Based on Foucault’s concepts of disciplinary/bio-power, this thesis argued that while football was a venue for producing devoted bodies, the peoples were demanded to be kind, cooperative, and even civilised, particularly during sport events, such as for the President Park’s Cup from the 1970s and the 2002 FIFA World Cup. In particular, it was apparent that the democratic governments and social leaders postulated the nation and the people as ‘object’ who needed re-education and modernisation to become better citizens in the 21st century.
6.4.2 Nation-state building in postcolonial context

In understanding South Korean society and football, postcolonial critique was also useful to reveal the legacy of colonialism in shaping South Korea’s international relations and post-independence project for development. Whilst Duncan (2002: 325) argues that postcolonial dialogue should be “flexible enough to support all peoples who have suffered colonisation and emerged into a postcolonial condition”, this study sought to explore how institutional (political, business and sporting) discourse had been manipulated in South Korean context.

The Self and the Others (I): Case of North Korea and South Korea

In relation to other countries such as North Korea and Japan, South Korea constantly modified its political and diplomatic approaches toward its neighbours. Neighbouring countries were positioned as ‘the others’ as former or new enemies when South Korea tried to establish ‘the self’ as a stable nation-state. In the Cold-War era, for instance, the government and the KFA effectively utilised ideological conflicts to cement South Korea’s international status, isolating North Korea as a completely different other.

In this respect, South Korea could not tolerate the affiliation of North Korea into FIFA and AFC (Asian Football Confederation). However, responding to South Korea’s argument on the issue of the affiliation, FIFA allowed the affiliation of North Korea according to universal standards. Whilst South Korean government and the KFA should not recognise North Korea’s authority Northern part of Korean Peninsula, it was no exception in sports.

During the détente era, South Korea seemed to officially recognise the counterpart by promoting several football exchanges including some historic friendly matches and united teams for international competitions from the 1990s onward. Football exchanges helped to modify the recognition of North Korea from ‘enemy’ to ‘brother’. To this end, South Korea tried to promote a joint-team of North and South Korea for the 1994 USA World Cup, which was not realised after all.
In particular, when hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, South Korea, encouraged by FIFA, tried to get North Korea involved in the football festival. Co-hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup with North Korea was an attractive issue for FIFA, the KFA, and South Korean government, even if the symbolic event was less likely to be realised. Especially, the possibility of co-hosting itself could have benefited South Korea, in terms of letting Korea to be known in the world as peace loving nation.

However, these changes did not necessarily mean the end of the tensions between the two sides. Until recently, South Korea has been quite sensitive, as North Korea, about the issues of official names, flags, and anthems even at football games. Conflicts between North and South Korea were still a problem not only in Korean Peninsula but also in Far East Asian context.

*The Self and the Others (2): Case of Japan and South Korea*

In the postcolonial context, Japan, the former coloniser of Korea, was a difficult issue for the South Korean government. In particular, Rhee Syngman regime pushed for the non-recognition Japan including in the sporting domain. Due to the symbolic ramifications, the Rhee’s government did not allow any football match with Japanese teams in Korean soil. Denying Japan and winning over Japanese teams was an important strategy for the governments and the KFA to escape from the colonial memory in the process of nation-building.

Meanwhile, South Korea started to establish a sound relationship with Japan in the football context beginning in the 1970s. Although the rivalry was an important factor to explain the consequence of football matches between Korea and Japan, the two nations shared the same interests about football development which enabled them to meet frequently and to promote friendly matches with other foreign teams. For the national football development, cooperation with Japan emerged as an essential process. Furthermore, by cooperating and competing with Japanese football, South Korean football could have more opportunities to demonstrate its superiority.
Nevertheless, this research reveals that the historical relation of South Korea and Japan was complicatedly reflected in sport in general and football in particular. Football was sensitively affected by the unsolved historic issues between two countries. In other words, football was an imperative medium to firmly establish Korea as a nation by symbolically overcoming Japanese dominance in the colonial era. South Korea fiercely competed with Japan during the bidding campaign for the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Whilst the mega-football event provided an opportunity to build new sound relations, South Korea also tagged Japan as ‘the other’, over which Korea had to win at any cost.

*Resistance and self-Orientalism*

Darby (1997: 15) explains three propositions of postcolonial discourse, which make it distinctive:

First, there has been a movement from the personal and the particular to increasingly abstract analyses. Second, there has been a movement from resistance and recovery to ambivalence and hybridity. Third, there has been a movement from essentially Third World experiences and concerns to globalized perspectives (Darby, 1997: 15).

It can be argued that investigating South Korean football in this research confirmed changing aspects of postcolonial discourse in South Korean society. For instance, since football in Korea was considered as a symbolic restoration of the country, overcoming the others and harmonising with the others were dominant institutional arguments when Korea actively operated football as national and international events. “To beat the world” (Mangan, 2003: 6), it was necessary for Korea to accept Japan as a co-operator and the West as a role-model of football development. It was also argued that the 2002 FIFA World Cup was an important opportunity for Korea to confidently position the nations and its tradition in the global sport event.

Furthermore, whether it was resistance against Western domination or rediscovery of Korean authenticity, endeavours to change South Korean football were the product of an amalgam between Western knowledge and experiences of Korean. Whilst adopting
Western knowledge gradually became unavoidable to develop Korean football in a global context, finding the Korean way of developing football was an inevitable combination to develop football.

However, this research also critically observed how South Korea internalised Occidentalism and Orientalism, when the country promoted changes in football. In other words, the once-colonised nation learned and reproduced (post) colonial discourse so as to build the nation as a sovereign and strong entity. To conclude, postcolonial discourses were inextricably interwoven with social and political discourse in South Korea. Football in Korea was a field of the complicated discourses, which facilitated changes of Korean society and Korean football.

Orientalism (Said, 2003), was highlighted as an imperative discourse which contributed to shape the dichotomy between the superior West and the inferior rest. However, this thesis revealed another dimension which is self-Orientalism. It can be argued that self-Orientalism in South Korean society (cf. Chung, 2006) became cemented as one of the dominant discourses when Korea was trying to secure a world class football performance and national development. Self-Orientalism provided for the necessity to change some practices within the KFA, for instance, ‘selection of players for the national squad’, ‘invitation of foreign coaches’, and ‘training of Korean players’. Furthermore, the KFA more easily accepted Western knowledge to develop Korean football rather than Japanese. In other words, opening to Western values was more feasible idea for South Korea than overtly accepting the legacy of Japanese occupation (c.f. Paik, 2000).

South Korean institutional circles also defined their nation and people in a self-Orientalist sense. In particular, football events such as the 2002 FIFA World Cup were a good case to examine the postcolonial discourse, which had been internalised in South Korean society. By hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, South Korea seized an opportunity to celebrate national development and to show off the traditional beauty of Korea but also its modern technologies. Political and social leaders in South Korea set a high value on the 2002 FIFA World Cup because they believed that it could help South Korea to get away from the periphery. However, in the process of hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup, the nation also had an opportunity to reconfirm self-Orientalism in institutional discourses. The nation and
the people were objectified as those who needed re-education in terms of order, kindness, and cleanliness.

6.4.3 Future research opportunities

Firstly, this research focused on institutional discourse on change of South Korean football. Namely, it tried to explain how institutions had shaped their positions and strategies, imposing them from top to bottom. Meanwhile, exploring responses from the bottom-up was outside the scope of this research. For Foucault, knowledge/power reaches the “very grain of individuals” (Foucault, 1980: 39). Therefore, investigating discourse from the grassroots could contribute to work out a puzzle on how discourses have been dispersed and normalised in our society. For instance, studying statements from football players could explain how individuals contribute to shape knowledge or to resist an existing discourse.

Secondly, discourse on the post-2002 FIFA World Cup era would be an interesting subject to understand Korean football and Korean society. Although South Korean society attempted to utilise the 2002 FIFA World Cup event as an opportunity to open up a new era in Korean history, discourse analysis revealed that there was continuity in the discourse on development. As a comparative research, investigating pre- and post-2002 FIFA World Cup would help to understand the impact of sports or mega-events on changing or strengthening the existing discourse.

Finally, investigation of change of other sports can broaden our understanding of Korean society in general and Korean sports in particular. Many sports have been claimed as a national sport in the Korean sport context. Some traditional sports such as Tae-Kwon-Do have survived, not only as national martial art but also as Olympic sport. Baseball is another national sport which can be understood as a consequence of Japanese and North American influences. To study discourse on change in those sports can provide similar or different explanations of Korean modernity.
## Appendix 1: Lists of Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Document</th>
<th>Title (Place)</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Published Books</strong></td>
<td>Korea Football Hall of Fame (KFA)</td>
<td>Stories of Korean football personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Football is Korea (Jun-Man Kang)</td>
<td>History of Korean football</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power of Dreams, The 50 Years of the Asian Football Confederation (AFC)</td>
<td>History of Asian football</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Memoirs of Dr Jung Moon-Ki</td>
<td>Memoirs of former president of KFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unpublished Books</strong></td>
<td>100 Year History of Korean Football (Korean Football Association)</td>
<td>History of Korean football</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Collection of Newspapers’ article about the 2002 FIFA World Cup 1, 2 (Kowoc)</td>
<td>Newspaper articles focused on the 2002 FIFA World Cup</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Year books of Korean professional football (K-League)</td>
<td>Records on K-League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Documents</strong></td>
<td>Our football, our future (Seminar for football development) -1997- (KFA)</td>
<td>Seminar document on football development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Plan for 1985 Football Super League -1985- (KFA)</td>
<td>KFA’s plan for professional league in 1985</td>
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<td>Plan for the Korea Cup 1989; 1991; 1993; 1995 (KFA)</td>
<td>KFA’s plan for international football competition</td>
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<td>Present Condition of Korean Football -2001- (KFA)</td>
<td>Investigation document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hosting Plan of 2002 World Cup-unknown- (KFA)</td>
<td>Document about World Cup</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(For National Assembly) Report of preparation of 2002 World Cup -1999- (KFA)</td>
<td>Preparation report for 2002 World Cup</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seminar for Youth Football Development -2006- (KFA)</td>
<td>Policy report for youth development</td>
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<td>2008 KFA Census -2008- (KFA)</td>
<td>Census by KFA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>New Millennium K-League Development Policy -1999- (K-League)</td>
<td>Blueprint for professional football development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Analysis of South-North Korean sport environment and Plan of sport exchange -2001- (Korea Sport Science Institute)</td>
<td>Document about South-North sport exchange</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Valuation of South-North Sport Exchange and Plan of Role-Expansion of Sport related organisation -2003- (Korea Sport Science Institute)</td>
<td>Document about South-North sport exchange</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A Written Answer for 2002 National Assembly’s Inspection -2002- (Kowoc)</td>
<td>Report on 2002 World Cup for national inspection</td>
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<td>Official Report of the 2002 FIFA World Cup 1, 2,3 -2002- (Kowoc)</td>
<td>Official report of 2002 World Cup</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2002 World Cup and Future of Korea and Japan -1999- (Kowoc)</td>
<td>Report on Korea and Japan’s prospects</td>
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<td>Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regulation of the 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea (Kowoc)</td>
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<td>International Symposium on the First Commemorative 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan -2003- (Kowoc)</td>
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<td>Symposium report on World Cup</td>
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<td>Speech Collection of Lee, a Chairperson of Kowoc -2002- (Kowoc)</td>
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<td>Collection of Kowoc chairperson’s speech</td>
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<td>Meaning and Task of 2002 World Cup (Jung Mong-Jun, Kowoc)</td>
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<td>Report on 2002 World Cup</td>
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<td>Meaning and result of co-hosting of 2002 World Cup -2003- (Korea Development Institute)</td>
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<td>Assessment report on 2002 World Cup</td>
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<tr>
<td>Report of international conference on South and North Korea sport exchange-1992- (Organizing committee of the conference)</td>
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<td>Conference report on South-North Korea sport exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>Report for the National Assembly on hosting activity of 2002 World Cup -1995- (2002 World Cup Hosting Committee)</td>
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<td>Hosting report on 2002 World Cup for the National Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forum for Hosting Culture World Cup -1996- (Ministry of Sport)</td>
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<td>Forum report of hosting World Cup</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Supporting Plan for 2002 World Cup -1998- (Ministry of Culture and Tourism)</td>
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<td>Plan for supporting 2002 World Cup</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forum about Japan viewed by Korean, Korea viewed by Japanese-2000- (National Council of better Korea Movement for 2002 World Cup)</td>
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<td>Forum report on the viewpoints between Korea and Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forum about Korean and Korea society viewed by Foreigners-1999- (National Council of better Korea Movement for 2002 World Cup)</td>
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<td>Forum report about 2002 World Cup</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest Room-beautiful lifestyle -2000- (National Council of better Korea Movement for 2002 World Cup)</td>
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<td>Report on cultural movement for 2002 World Cup</td>
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<td>2002 World Cup D-365, the Report on World Cup Preparation -2001- (Committee of Culture and Tourism of Han-na-ra party)</td>
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<td>Preparation report from political party</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002 World Cup hosting competition and Co-hosting proposal by North Korea -1996- (Park, a researcher in the National Assembly)</td>
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<td>Speech on North Korea’s co-hosting proposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Symposium) 2002 World Cup and Bouncing Back of Korean Society -2002- (Asian Research Center of Korea University)</td>
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<td>Symposium report on 2002 World Cup</td>
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<td>Report of Feasibility Study on Hosting 2002 World Cup – (Sport Science Research Center of Korea University)</td>
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<td>Report of feasibility on hosting 2002 World Cup from a university</td>
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<td>National Task in Post-World Cup -2002- (Korea Council of Economic &amp; Social Research Institutes)</td>
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<td>Proposal about post-World Cup in terms of political, economical and social perspective</td>
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<td>Forum on 2002 World Cup Result -2003- (Korea Culture &amp; Tourism Institution)</td>
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<td>Forum report on 2002 World Cup</td>
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<td>Present Condition and Future Plan of Government Support for World Cup -2001- (Government)</td>
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<td>Supporting plan for 2002 World Cup from government</td>
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<td>Validity analysis on Football Infrastructure building -2003- (Hyundai Research Institution)</td>
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<td>Report on football infrastructure from private research institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2006 KPSA International Conference) Football and International Peace-2006- (The Korea Political Science Association)</td>
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<td>Conference report on football and international relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Hearing for Normalisation of School Sport-2002- (Korea Sport Council)</td>
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<td>Report on school sport</td>
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<td>Symposium for Foundation of Citizen based Football Club – (Unknown)</td>
<td>Symposium report on founding football club</td>
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<tr>
<td>The International Symposium on the Football Market Integration of Korea, China, and Japan - 2002- (Research Institute of Physical Education of Seoul National University)</td>
<td>Symposium report on football market integration of Korea, China, and Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy in Post-World Cup -2002- (Humanities &amp; Social Research Council)</td>
<td>Policy proposal about post-World Cup</td>
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<td>The 1999 International Symposium on 2002 World Cup -1999- (Korean Alliance of Health, Physical Education, Recreation and Dance)</td>
<td>Symposium report on 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup</td>
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<td><strong>Magazines/ Newspapers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Website Sources</strong></td>
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<td>Monthly Football -1970–present-</td>
<td>Football related minutes of the National Assembly</td>
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<td>Newspaper Articles (covered from 1940s to present)</td>
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<td>South Korean National Archive</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Documents from FIFA</strong></td>
<td><strong>Correspondence between KFA and FIFA - 1945–present-</strong></td>
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<td>Minutes and Executive Committee minutes</td>
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<td>FIFA Official Bulletin -1905–1966-</td>
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<td>FIFA News -1966–2003-</td>
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