POLITICALLY CONNECTED BOARDS-FINAL VERSION.pdf (363.44 kB)
Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms
journal contribution
posted on 2015-02-12, 09:17 authored by Amon Chizema, Xiaohui Liu, Jiangyong Lu, Lan GaoDrawing on social comparison theory, this study examines the relationship between politically connected boards and top executive pay. Moreover, given the socialist orientation of China, tests are also carried out to establish the relationship between politically connected directors and pay dispersion across the firm. We find a negative association between politically connected boards and top executive pay. We also find that politically connected boards are negatively associated with pay dispersion, i.e., the higher the number of political directors on the board the smaller the gap between top executive pay and average employee pay. Finally, our study shows that politically connected directors weaken the pay-performance link. These findings have important theoretical, policy, and managerial implications.
Funding
Leverhulme Trust (RPG-160)
History
School
- Business and Economics
Department
- Business
Published in
Strategic Management JournalVolume
36Issue
6Pages
890-906Citation
CHIZEMA, A. ... et al., 2015. Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms. Strategic Management Journal, 36 (6), pp. 890-906.Publisher
© John Wiley & Sons, LtdVersion
- AM (Accepted Manuscript)
Publisher statement
This work is made available according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. Full details of this licence are available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Acceptance date
2014-02-22Publication date
2014-04-27Notes
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: CHIZEMA, A. ... et al., 2015. Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms. Strategic Management Journal, 36 (6), pp. 890-906, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj.2253. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.ISSN
0143-2095eISSN
1097-0266Publisher version
Language
- en