Loughborough University
Leicestershire, UK
LE11 3TU
+44 (0)1509 263171
Loughborough University

Loughborough University Institutional Repository

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/16733

Title: Majority bargaining for resource division
Authors: Fatima, Shaheen
Wooldridge, Michael
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: © Springer Verlag
Citation: FATIMA, S. and WOOLDRIDGE, M., 2016. Majority bargaining for resource division. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 30(2), pp.331-363.
Abstract: We address the problem of how a set of agents can decide to share a resource, represented as a unit-sized pie. The pie can be generated by the entire set but also by some of its subsets. We investigate a finite horizon non-cooperative bargaining game, in which the players take it in turns to make proposals on how the resource should for this purpose be allocated, and the other players vote on whether or not to accept the allocation. Voting is modelled as a Bayesian weighted voting game with uncertainty about the players’ weights. The agenda, (i.e., the order in which the players are called to make offers), is defined exogenously. We focus on impatient players with heterogeneous discount factors. In the case of a conflict, (i.e., no agreement by the deadline), no player receives anything. We provide a Bayesian subgame perfect equilibrium for the bargaining game and conduct an ex-ante analysis of the resulting outcome. We show that the equilibrium is unique, computable in polynomial time, results in an instant Pareto optimal outcome, and, under certain conditions provides a foundation for the core and also the nucleolus of the Bayesian voting game. In addition, our analysis leads to insights on how an individual’s bargained share is in- fluenced by his position on the agenda. Finally, we show that, if the conflict point of the bargaining game changes, then the problem of determining the non-cooperative equilibrium becomes NP-hard even under the perfect information assumption. Our research also reveals how this change in conflict point impacts on the above mentioned results.
Description: The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-015-9290-8
Sponsor: Michael Wooldridge was supported by the ERC under Advanced Grant 291528 (RACE)
Version: Accepted for publication
DOI: 10.1007/s10458-015-9290-8
URI: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/16733
Publisher Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-015-9290-8
ISSN: 1387-2532
Appears in Collections:Published Articles (Computer Science)

Files associated with this item:

File Description SizeFormat
Majority bargaining.pdfAccepted version443.19 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


SFX Query

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.