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Title: Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction tenders: a taxonomic review
Authors: Ballesteros-Perez, Pablo
Skitmore, Martin
Pellicer, Eugenio
Gonzalez-Cruz, M. Carmen
Keywords: Bidding
International comparison
Scoring rule
Issue Date: 2015
Publisher: © The Authors. Published by Taylor and Francis
Citation: BALLESTEROS-PEREZ, P. ...et al., 2015. Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction tenders: a taxonomic review. Construction Management and Economics, 33(4), pp. 259-278.
Abstract: © 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis. In the global construction context, the best value or most economically advantageous tender is becoming a widespread approach for contractor selection, as an alternative to other traditional awarding criteria such as the lowest price. In these multi-attribute tenders, the owner or auctioneer solicits proposals containing both a price bid and additional technical features. Once the proposals are received, each bidder’s price bid is given an economic score according to a scoring rule, generally called an economic scoring formula (ESF) and a technical score according to pre-specified criteria. Eventually, the contract is awarded to the bidder with the highest weighted overall score (economic + technical). However, economic scoring formula selection by auctioneers is invariably and paradoxically a highly intuitive process in practice, involving few theoretical or empirical considerations, despite having been considered traditionally and mistakenly as objective, due to its mathematical nature. This paper provides a taxonomic classification of a wide variety of ESFs and abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC) gathered in several countries with different tendering approaches. Practical implications concern the optimal design of price scoring rules in construction contract tenders, as well as future analyses of the effects of the ESF and ALBC on competitive bidding behaviour.
Description: This is an Open Access Article. It is published by Taylor and Francis under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence (CC BY-NC-ND). Full details of this licence are available at: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Sponsor: CONICYT Program Initiation into Research 2013 [grant number 11130666].
Version: Published
DOI: 10.1080/01446193.2015.1059951
URI: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/32766
Publisher Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2015.1059951
ISSN: 0144-6193
Appears in Collections:Published Articles (Architecture, Building and Civil Engineering)

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