Network capacity enhancement in HetNets using incentivized offloading mechanism

This work investigates distributed algorithms for joint power allocation and user association in heterogeneous networks. We propose auction-based algorithms for offloading macrocell users (MUs) from the macrocell base station (MBS) to privately owned small-cell access points (SCAs). We first propose a simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction (SMRA) for allocating MUs to SCAs. Taking into account the overheads incurred by SCAs during valuation in the SMRA, further improvements are proposed using techniques known as sub-optimal altered SMRA (ASMRA), the combinatorial auction with item bidding (CAIB) and its variations; the sequential CAIB (SCAIB) and the repetitive CAIB (RCAIB). The proof for existence of the Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is demonstrated through establishing that the valuation function used by the SCAs is a gross substitute. Finally, we show that truthful bidding is individual rational for all of our proposed algorithms.