sensors-18-04040.pdf (1.68 MB)
Man-in-the-middle attacks in vehicular ad-hoc networks: Evaluating the impact of attackers’ strategies
journal contribution
posted on 2018-11-21, 11:29 authored by Farhan Ahmad, Asma AdnaneAsma Adnane, Virginia N. Franqueira, Fatih Kurugollu, Lu LiuVehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET), a vital component of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) technology, relies on communication between dynamically connected vehicles and static Road Side Units (RSU) to offer various applications (e.g., collision avoidance alerts, steep-curve warnings and infotainment). VANET has a massive potential to improve traffic efficiency, and road safety by exchanging critical information between nodes (vehicles and RSU), thus reducing the likelihood of traffic accidents. However, this communication between nodes is subject to a variety of attacks, such as Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks which represent a major risk in VANET. It happens when a malicious node intercepts or tampers with messages exchanged between legitimate nodes. In this paper, we studied the impact on network performance of different strategies which attackers can adopt to launch MITM attacks in VANET, such as fleet or random strategies. In particular, we focus on three goals of MITM attacks—message delayed, message dropped and message tampered. The simulation results indicate that these attacks have a severe influence on the legitimate nodes in VANET as the network experience high number of compromised messages, high end-to-end delays and preeminent packet losses.
History
School
- Science
Department
- Computer Science
Published in
SensorsVolume
18Citation
AHMAD, F. ... et al, 2018. Man-in-the-middle attacks in vehicular ad-hoc networks: Evaluating the impact of attackers’ strategies. Sensors, 18 (11), 4040.Publisher
MDPI AG © The AuthorsVersion
- VoR (Version of Record)
Publisher statement
This work is made available according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence. Full details of this licence are available at: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/Acceptance date
2018-11-18Publication date
2018-11-20Notes
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).eISSN
1424-8220Publisher version
Language
- en